


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THE PERIOD OF CONGRESSES

- I.—INTRODUCTORY.
II.—VIENNA AND THE SECOND PEACE
OF PARIS.
III.—AIX-LA-CHAPELLE TO VERONA.

BY

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LONDON

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1919

THE PERIOD OF CONGRESSES

I

INTRODUCTORY

THE PERIOD OF CONGRESS

I

INTRODUCTION

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EDITED BY C. JOHNSON, M.A., AND J. P. WHITNEY, B.D., D.C.L.

THE PERIOD OF CONGRESSES

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THE PERIOD OF CONGRESSES

THE title of the outline here offered may, like some other titles, seem to promise either too little or too much. On the one hand, the Congresses of the period 1814-22, to be specially discussed in a second essay, were, as a matter of course, only a few among very many recorded in the history of Europe or of the world. On the other hand, the claim of these particular Congresses to be regarded as of enduring international significance, though associating itself with some of the loftiest aspirations of our own as well as of earlier ages, has, by almost general consent, been relegated into the limbo of obsolete experiments. Were the Congress of Vienna and those which sought to supplement its work merely an armistice in an ever-recurring state of war, or did they constitute an attempt, with such means as were at the disposal of the nations, to secure the Peace of Europe, which meant the Peace of the World, for its own sake? The truth may lie somewhere in the mean. In order to show what these Congresses accomplished, and wherein they failed, it is indispensable to take note, in the first instance, of what may be called the antecedents of the earliest and most famous among them, and to this purpose the present introductory survey will be devoted.

I

INTRODUCTORY

1648-1814

THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA

THE Peace of Westphalia (1648) put an end alike to the universal ecclesiastical authority of Rome and to the political system of the Roman Empire with which it had been inseparably connected, and which had already become largely unreal in the face of a grouping of sovereign states as yet devoid of international sanction. What remained to the Papacy was the right of protest; what was left to the Empire was a dignity to nearly all intents and purposes phantasmal. Meanwhile, the concurrent Congresses of Münster and Osnabrück had reconstructed the European state system with a relative completeness never, until our own time, attempted before or afterwards, except in the case of the Congress of Vienna.¹

¹ For an exposition, still unrivalled in lucidity, of the general historic evolution referred to above, see Lord Bryce's *Holy Roman Empire* (4th Edit., 1873), chapter xix.: "The Peace of Westphalia: Last Stage of the Decline of the Empire." The whole subject of the evolution of modern diplomacy, consequent upon the changes in the international relations of the European world, is treated at great length but with much ability in D. J. Hill's *History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe* (3 vols., New York and London, 1905-14), of which vol. iii. deals with the period from the Peace of Westphalia to the Partition of Poland. For a general survey of the Peace of Westphalia, *cf.*, also, *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. iv., chapter xiv. It is noteworthy that, with a view to deliberations such as were afterwards actually carried on at Münster and Osnabrück, and were in their results declared void by his successor, proposals for the assembly of a Congress were made by Pope Urban VIII., so early as 1635; but Sweden would have nothing to say to Conferences

With the territorial arrangements of the Peace of Westphalia (the 'satisfactions' of certain of the Powers) we need not concern ourselves here. What directly interests us is the fact that from the great international compact of this Peace date the real beginnings of modern international law, as resting upon the principle of territorial sovereignty then first definitely acknowledged; and that, as has been well said, 'the work of Grotius was rendered necessary by the failure of Empire and Papacy.'¹

The century and a half, or rather more, of Euro-

held under Papal mediation in a Catholic city (Cologne). After the death of the Emperor Ferdinand II. in 1637, negotiations took place at Hamburg, and were ultimately opened at Münster, between France and the Emperor, under the mediation of the Pope and the Seignory of Venice; and at Osnabrück, under that of King Christian of Denmark, and, from 1648 (when hostilities broke out between Denmark and Sweden), without a mediator. At Vienna, in 1814, Talleyrand contended that, from Westphalia to Teschen, Congresses had never been held without a mediator, and that France should now be called upon to perform this task. Great Britain (through Castlereagh) actually played the part for a time, in the critical Polish-Saxon difficulty. No Christian Power was unrepresented at one or the other of the two Westphalian Congresses, except the Kings of England and Poland and the Grand-duke of Muscovy, and these sovereigns were alike included in the Peace, as allies of certain of its signatories. The Porte took no part in the whole transaction. It may be worth adding that, though the Papal protest offered, immediately after the conclusion of the Peace, on behalf of the Papal claims at large was subsequently reiterated in the Bull *Zelo domus Dei*, it is not known to have been ever invoked against any provision of the Treaties. The pretensions of the Papacy to a direct (if it could no longer be a controlling) share in the settlement of the Peace of Europe were not, indeed, abandoned: such is not the usage of the Vatican. A Papal protest followed on the Congress of Nymegen (1678), as it had on that of Münster. At the Congress of Châtillon (March, 1814), a note in favour of the Pope had at the last moment to be appended to the protocol of its final sitting—as if, said Stadion, to show that we have not forgotten the Holy Father.

¹ Cf. T. A. Walker, *The Science of International Law* (1893), p. 57.

Balance of Power

pean history which followed, and which presents an incessant sequence of congresses and conferences,¹ is not, on that account, to be any more regarded as a period of political chaos than the Peace of Westphalia itself could be held to mark a retrogression in European political and religious life. But the absence of substantial securities from the international system established in the Westphalian Treaties, and from what may be described as the supplementary Treaties concluded in the next dozen years, more than once made necessary a fresh revision of the political map of Europe. And now France—and, afterwards and more gradually, Russia—sought to play over again the part which the unique heritage of the House of Habsburg had of old encouraged it to assume, but which its eastern branch had virtually let drop in the Peace of Westphalia, and its western in that of the Pyrenees (1659).

THE BALANCE OF POWER

It was, hereupon, endeavoured, by means of a series of alliances as well as of other treaties, to bring about a Balance of Power—in other words (for the idea is essentially a negative one), to prevent any one state, with its allies and depen-

¹ Diplomatic usage has not sought to establish a precise distinction between these two terms. Speaking generally, congresses are gatherings of plenipotentiaries (often ministers for foreign affairs, or even prime-ministers), held for purposes of superior importance, as distinguished from conferences, which are often carried on by regularly accredited ambassadors or ministers, and deal with questions of various kinds on which light or agreement is desired (*cf.* Sir E. Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, vol. ii., p. 10). But it would not be difficult to show that this distinction is frequently ignored both by politicians and by historians.

dents, from becoming so strong as to be likely to overwhelm the rest. Hence—to mention only the most salient combinations in the struggle against France—the Triple and the Grand Alliance (1668 and 1701), the Partition Treaties (1698 and 1700), and the Utrecht settlement (1714). Although their conditions were largely due to circumstance, while the territorial changes approved in them ignored any claims of the populations to a share in the decision of their destinies, the Utrecht pacification, with the agreements supplementary to it, remained for nearly half a century the sheet-anchor of the Peace of Europe. In a succession of Congresses on the affairs of its eastern, northern, and western parts (Passarowitz, 1717-18; Nystad, 1721; Cambray, 1722), British mediation succeeded in the adjustment of the trembling political scales. After the Western Powers were once more at discord, and, with the Wars of the Austrian Succession, another great European conflict had set in, the results of the Congress and Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) showed that the main structure of the political edifice still held out. The Seven Years' War, with its reversal of the system of alliances between the chief European Powers, and the confirmation of its results in the Treaties of Hubertusburg and Paris (1763), appeared again to have brought about an enduring political change in the European system. The decline of the power of Austria seemed to be made more manifest at the Congress of Teschen (1779), which closed the War of the Bavarian Succession. Here, too, Russia—who in the Peace of Kutschuk-Kainardje (1774) had, by securing to herself the protection

of the Christian subjects of the Porte, really established her ascendancy in the affairs of the Near East—had first asserted her voice in those of Central Europe. Other events—the failure of the schemes of Joseph II. and the conclusion of the League of (German) Princes (1785)—indicated the decadence of the power of Austria.

THE PARTITIONS OF POLAND AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

But, for the future Peace of Europe, Austria's most disastrous act had been her reluctant assent to the First Partition of Poland (1775), which bade utter defiance to the system, battered and impaired as it was, of treaties between the States of Europe mutually guaranteeing their territorial dominions. The Second, and more extensive, Partition of Poland (1793), quickly followed by the Third (1795), had been preceded by the Convention of Reichenbach (1790), by which war between the two German participants in Russia's assault upon the political order of Europe had been averted, and by the Congress of Sistova (1790-91) and the Treaty of Jassy (1792), which ended her war against Turkey. The coincidence of this Partition with the victorious progress of the French Revolution, and the conclusion, soon afterwards, of the Treaty of Bâle (1795), illustrate, with almost unparalleled force, the potent interaction of apparently disconnected historical movements.¹ Thus, in a twofold sense, was rung the death-knell of the *ancien régime*, if we may apply that term not only to the con-

¹ From this point of view, no student of modern political history should fail to read Sybel's *History of the French Revolution* (Engl. Transl.), 4 vols., 1867-79.

dition of Old France, but to the political system of Europe at large, such as had carried on a broken existence since the Peace of Westphalia. The Partitions of Poland signified the ruthless violation, for selfish purposes, of that principle of the common ('fraternal') interests of nations which the French Revolution inscribed upon its banner, and under cover of which it began the process of extending the 'frontiers of 1792,' afterwards almost indefinitely developed by Napoleon. Yet even he, the heir of the Revolution, was not altogether deluding himself or others, when, in the days of his exile at St. Helena, he declared his secret ideal to have been to weld the great nations of Europe, under the *ægis* of his Empire, into a great confederation united by the same 'codes, principles, opinions, feelings, and interests.'¹

PROJECTS OF PERPETUAL PEACE

Like most of the ideas of the French Revolution, this project had its roots far back, and was, in truth, substantially identical with the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's proposal for developing the Treaty of Utrecht into a plan securing a Perpetual Peace to the nations of the civilised world. Bentham's plan of an international court of judicature and a 'fixation' of armaments was obviously suggested by the futile Armed Neutrality of 1780; Kant's more famous treatise, containing his scheme of a Perpetual Peace (1795), though it transcended all merely pragmatic limits, was doubtless, in the first instance, occasioned by the Peace of Bâle

¹ See the opening of W. Alison Phillips's chapter on "The Congresses, 1815-22," in vol. x. of *The Cambridge Modern History*.

and the attempted guarantee of North-German neutrality. The projects of universal peace cherished by Tsar Alexander I., and beginning with that contained in the instructions communicated by him to N. N. Novosiltov on his mission to Pitt in 1804, were likewise occasioned by political events, though based on sincere conviction. But they interest us chiefly in connexion with later transactions, and more especially with that of the foundation of the Holy Alliance.¹

CONGRESSES OF THE NAPOLEONIC AGE

Meanwhile, the resistless enthusiasm of self-regenerated France, and the imperial genius of the great man to whom she had entrusted her destinies, had transformed the political map of Europe. The Congresses of this period have no special significance for a survey of methods of international pacification, and the treaties concluded may be said, in the main, to have merely registered the results of the great European conflict in its successive phases. Italy, Germany, and other parts of Europe were resettled on lines more or less corresponding to the political impotence to which the states comprised under these geographical names had been in turn reduced; and the twofold process was only temporarily arrested by the Peace of Amiens and the treaties supplementary to it (1802). The frontiers of now imperial France were further extended by a continuous advance, of

¹ As to these schemes, see W. Alison Phillips's extremely interesting *The Confederations of Europe* (1914); and cf. A. F. Pollard's outline *The League of Nations in History* (1918). As to some of the earlier schemes, see also the present writer's essay 'The Peace of Europe' in *Owens College Essays* (1874).

which later Congresses found it an arduous task to fix the principal stages. For Central Europe, 1805 and 1806, the years of Austerlitz and Jena, marked the most important territorial transformations, which included the spread of French 'influence' in the shape of the setting-up of dependent monarchies or confederations under French protection. In 1807, however, the Treaty of Tilsit (1807) seemed to announce that the process would be carried on under new conditions, and that, instead of a single Power endeavouring to extend its dominion over the whole civilised world, a bargain to divide between them the rule or control of it had been struck between Napoleon and the Russian Tsar. The Congress of Erfurt (1808) confirmed this strange alliance, and the Peace concluded with twice-vanquished Austria at Schönbrunn (1809) appeared to verify the omen. The annexation of the Papal States (in the same year) had already typified the termination of the Old Order.

2

THE BREAK-UP OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE

But, though it had been thought that the first symptoms of the Spanish insurrection (in 1808) would prove transitory, the revulsion against the progress of the great dual design was not long in becoming manifest. By 1811, the friendship between Napoleon and Alexander had changed into suspicious hostility; in 1812, the French invasion of Russia ended in the tragic catastrophe which led to Napoleon's fall. The Convention of Taurogen, whereby, on the last day of that year, the Prussian General Yorck broke away from the French command, opened the revolt against the

Napoleonic ascendancy in Germany which swelled into the War of Liberation. Inasmuch as our 'Period of Congresses' comprises the efforts of a liberated Europe to build up its future permanently on a new basis, adopted and elaborated by the assemblies in question, it may be well, from this point onwards, to adhere more closely to the chronological sequence of events.¹

The leading statesmanship of the interval between Napoleon's Russian catastrophe and the resettlement of Europe after his downfall was that of Metternich. His policy in so far directed the process whereby this downfall was ultimately brought to pass, that the decision of Austria determined the combination which overwhelmed Napoleon at Leipzig, and forced him at Paris to submit to the terms of the victorious Allies. Yet, before these results were reached, Metternich cautiously reserved to Austria the choice of her own time for entering

¹ Of the transactions from the end of 1812 to the Second Peace of Paris (November, 1815) a lucid account, pervaded by a fine spirit of patriotism, will be found in vol. viii. of A. Sorel's *L'Europe et la Révolution Française* (Paris, 1904). A clear account of the peace negotiations of this period, and of their interaction with the course of military affairs, is given in J. H. Rose's standard *Life of Napoleon I.*, vol. ii. (1902), chapters xxxiii. to xli. The most useful German book of reference for the same years is W. Oncken's *Das Zeitalter der Revolution und des Befreiungskrieges*, vol. ii. (Berlin, 1886). For Metternich's Dresden interview with Napoleon, and his instructions for the Prague Conferences (1813), see *Mémoires de Metternich*, vol. ii. (Paris, 1880). The diplomatic history proper of the War of 1814, up to the close of the Congress of Châtillon, is most completely treated in A. Fournier, *Der Congress von Châtillon* (Vienna and Prague, 1900), the extremely interesting Appendices to which, especially the still unpublished extracts from the Journals of Hardenberg, should not be overlooked. By the side of these authorities, the impassioned narrative in vols. i. and ii. of Treitschke's *German History* (Engl. Transl., 1915-16) will continue to find readers; but they should always—*e.g.*, when he is speaking of Metternich—bear in mind the historian's 'point of view.' As to the Congress of Vienna in particular, see *post*

into what he intended to be the final conflict. His design was, in any case, to prevent the premature close of the Russo-Prussian effort against Napoleon, and to secure to his own Government the control of its issue. In the first instance, therefore, Austria was to make an offer of intervention between Russia, with Prussia, and France, and, if the belligerents were disposed to accept her mediation, to attempt to impose upon Napoleon her terms of peace. This design was to be carried out by means of a Congress summoned to Prague.

But, before this Congress met, Russia, who had driven back Napoleon's armada, and Prussia, whose most ardent spirits had long been panting to free Germany from his yoke, had entered on a very different course of action. The Treaty of Kalisch between the two Powers (signed in February, and made public in March, 1813) corresponded to the ambition of Tsar Alexander by placing him at the head of the Coalition which Austria was invited to join; and Russia thus put forward a claim to a hegemony among the States of Europe which she cannot be said to have altogether dropped for twoscore years.¹ At the same time, the right of nations to a voice in the determination of their own future was first clearly asserted in the stirring *Appeal to my People* issued by King Frederick William III., on March 17th, 1813.² Since the British Government was ready to guarantee the

¹ In this spirit were conceived the proclamations issued by Alexander's orders after the Russian frontier had been crossed, in which he promised his aid to the nations taking up arms against Napoleon or kept in submission to him by their own rulers.

² Of this very remarkable manifesto, exposed by the younger T. G. von Hippel, see L. Häusser's sympathetic notice in his *Deutsche Geschichte*, 4th edit. (1863), vol. iv., book ii.

Treaty of Kalisch, the responsibility of deciding on the formation of a European Coalition would at least be shared with Austria by the Power on which all the rest depended for subsidies in the final struggle.

Lützen and Bautzen (May, 1813) were insufficient as victories to render Napoleon indifferent to the action of Austria; so that he suddenly became willing to accept her mediation at a Congress, and concluded an armistice with the Allies for the purpose at Pleisnitz (June 4th). But Metternich, though he was contemplating Austria's entrance into the Coalition as the ultimate result of the Congress, was, at the same time, vigilantly intent upon preventing a great increase of the power of Russia as a direct consequence of the overthrow of the 'French colossus.' In the Treaty of Reichenbach, concluded during the armistice between the three Eastern Powers (June 21st, 1813), it was therefore laid down that, in case Austria joined the Coalition, the duchy of Warsaw should be partitioned among them, the reconstruction of the Prussian monarchy of 1805 being in this way to some extent accomplished. In view, particularly, of the fact that the Congress of Vienna and, with it, the Peace of Europe were nearly wrecked upon this question, it should be noted that the idea of uniting under his own sceptre the lands that had of old formed the kingdom of Poland had long been cherished by Alexander. It was with a view to its realisation that he had gone to war with Napoleon in 1805. He had recurred to the scheme towards the end of 1810; but it was not till after the great events of 1812 that it could assume

a practical shape. Although he persistently enjoined secrecy towards Austria and Prussia on his confidential adviser Count Adam Czartoryski, who had long fostered the design in his mind, it came to the ears of the statesmen of both Powers; and Metternich felt that more was at stake than even the future of Austria's Polish province Galicia.

The Prague Congress (July–August, 1813)—a solemn make-believe, as it has been appropriately called—came to its predestined nugatory end. Although, even after his famous stormy interview with Metternich at Dresden (June 26th), Napoleon had refused to believe that Austria would go to war with him, and although the Emperor Francis shrank from it almost to the last, the archdeceiver (to mitigate Napoleon's description of him) carried through his purpose. This was no other than, by means of a succession of notes, to contrive to throw the responsibility of the predetermined rupture upon the French Emperor. Great Britain had signified her adhesion to the Reichenbach agreement, and the question was only as to the form, about which Metternich displayed great anxiety, in which the Austrian *ultimatum* should be communicated. It comprised the relinquishment by France of the control of the duchy of Warsaw, the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine, the reconstruction of Prussia up to the Elbe, and the cession to Austria of the Illyrian provinces. In the end, without the Congress having really entered into deliberations, Napoleon's refusal of these demands was, as it were, extorted from him, and the war reopened (August 10th).

The Treaties of Töplitz between the three

Eastern Powers which followed (September) renewed the engagements into which they had mutually entered, and bound them to engage in no peace negotiations with France, except in common. Secret articles more closely defined the conditions of peace which they were resolved to exact, and provided that the future of the territories comprised in the duchy of Warsaw should, when the time came, be settled by agreement among the contracting Powers. Before the three armies closed in upon the common foe, the Coalition was joined by Sweden, whose actual ruler, Bernadotte, was immediately intent upon securing Norway, while indulging the dream of ultimately taking Napoleon's place in France. And, though too late to take part in striking the decisive blow, Bavaria entered into a treaty of alliance with Austria at Ried (October 8th), which guaranteed complete independence to her. Württemberg did not follow suit till nearly a month later.

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH NAPOLEON

The crowning victory of Leipzig was gained on October 18th; the death of Prince Poniatowski on the next day extinguished a high national aspiration of the Poles, and the all too faithful King Frederick Augustus of Saxony was transported as a prisoner to Berlin. At Frankfort-on-the-Main, which the Allies reached in the first week of November, Napoleon, still in half-boastful mood, declared that, albeit he had no concern either for the Confederation of the Rhine or for the Continental System, France would not tolerate his concluding a 'bad peace.' *En route*, at

Meiningen (October 29th), Metternich, mindful of the fact that already at Leipzig (on October 17th) an informal communication from Napoleon had been received through the captive Austrian General Count Merveldt, which had been left unanswered, took a preliminary step towards the opening of peace negotiations. Baron Saint-Aignan, a French diplomatist accredited to the Court of Weimar, was released from captivity and, on November 7th, instructed by Metternich, with the consent of the Tsar and of the British ambassador at Vienna (now at Frankfort), Lord Aberdeen, to offer peace to France on the basis of her 'natural' frontiers—a term implying those which the Revolution had secured to France: the Alps and the Rhine, with the Pyrenees.

On this informal, but sufficiently definite, offer hinged not only the negotiations at Frankfort, carried on from the beginning of November in the midst of a great gathering of diplomatists, but much that followed. Metternich (although desirous that a more hopeful view should be taken by Great Britain, so as to render her willing to make concessions to France which would facilitate the conclusion of peace) seems to have been slow to believe in the likelihood of the acceptance of the offer conveyed by Saint-Aignan to Napoleon, unless he was nearer to the brink of ruin than at present. The Austrian statesman, therefore, continued to contemplate the invasion of France by the Allies, without being, in accordance with Russian and Prussian patriotic projects, eagerly intent upon it. For nothing would have been more satisfactory to him, not only on account

of the dynastic tie between his Emperor and Napoleon, but more especially in order to preserve an effective counterbalance to the power of Russia and her Tsar, than to have brought Napoleon to a speedy peace, such as public opinion in France unmistakably desired. It should be added that, at this time, neither Metternich nor his master looked for the dethronement of the Napoleonic dynasty, or had any desire for the return of the Bourbons.¹

Napoleon, however, was equally unwilling to precipitate a decision. On November 25th, a communication, dated the 16th, from the French foreign Minister Maret (Duc de Bassano) reached the Allied headquarters, proposing a peace congress at Mannheim, on the basis of the independence of all nations, but making no reference to the basis of 'natural' frontiers proposed through Saint-Aignan. Hereupon, Metternich drew up the celebrated appeal to the French nation, promulgated on December 4th, in which the Allies, while in their turn avoiding any mention of 'natural' frontiers, promised to France limits more extended than had been hers under her Kings. In the meantime, warned by a private letter from Metternich to Caulaincourt (Duc de Vicenza), who was understood to incline to peace, Napoleon had made a step forward. He substituted Caulaincourt for Maret in the management of foreign affairs, and the new minister, on December 2nd, despatched a courier to Frankfort, accepting the general basis of negotiation offered through Saint-Aignan—*i.e.*, the 'natural' frontiers—provided that

¹ At Paris, Talleyrand, about this time, was similarly in favour of peace and a Napoleonic regency.

Great Britain would make possible the conclusion of a general peace allowing no supremacy to any one Power by sea or by land.¹ Metternich now requested Great Britain to offer certain colonial concessions to France, and to name a plenipotentiary for peace negotiations. But, in accordance with his general plan of action, no change was made or proposed in the control of military operations. On December 8th, the Allied headquarters were moved from Frankfort.

The mutual distrust between Alexander and Metternich, which, till driven out by their common fear of revolution, was to prove not the least of the recurring difficulties of the Period of Congresses, was, on the eve of that period, intensified by various causes. The military operations of the Allies were delayed by the Tsar's objection (doubtless first suggested by his Radical Swiss instructor La Harpe) to the crossing of the Swiss frontier, which he at one time declared his intention of constituting a *casus belli*. Bernadotte actively carried on his intrigues, which led to the solid gain by Sweden of the whole of Norway, ceded to her by Denmark in the Peace of Kiel (January 14th, 1814). While the Tsar actually thought of marching direct upon Paris, and there recommending Bernadotte as the successor of Napoleon, Metternich calculated that, by assenting to the acquisition of Saxony by Prussia, he might secure the support of Hardenberg in pressing a speedy peace on Napoleon.

¹ Caulaincourt's letter to Metternich is remarkable from a general as well as a special point of view. In principle, it pleads for a peace founded on the Balance of Power in Europe and the common recognition of the integrity of all national territories—in other words, for an international agreement without power of enforcement.

The Prussian minister, in January, 1814, was certainly persuaded to believe that Austria would consent to the Prussian annexation of Saxony, obnoxious though it was both to the traditions of Austrian policy and to the interests of the lesser German States, inasmuch as it might avert the consummation of Alexander's Polish designs, the dangers of which were quite patent to Hardenberg, untouched as he was by the sentiment of grateful attachment to Russia possessing his sovereign, King Frederick William III. In this curiously inverted order of considerations, what was to prove the chief (*crux*) of the Congress of Vienna, the Polish-Saxon difficulty, first occupied the attention of the Allied Powers. Yet, curiously enough, the immediate obstacle to the conclusion of peace was now to be found, not in reluctance on the part of Napoleon, aware as he could not but be that his popularity was waning fast, but in hesitation on the part of Metternich—and not of Metternich alone—as to whether still more favourable conditions might not, even without further military pressure, be obtained from the French Emperor. By a separate treaty of peace and alliance (January 11th), Murat had been brought over by Austria to the side of the Allies; and they, including Great Britain, were unlikely to remain contented with the Frankfort basis. Metternich, accordingly, advised Schwarzenberg, the commander of the Austrian invading army, to stay his advance, which he accordingly did at Langres, after taking that place (January 18th). On the same day, Castlereagh, the British Foreign Secretary and destined chief

peace plenipotentiary, arrived at the Allied headquarters at Bâle. It was here at once (in accordance with his instructions, dated December 26th) settled between him and Metternich that the conditions of Great Britain's maritime rights (which Napoleon had wished to see defined) should not be called into question in the course of the peace negotiations. Great Britain was prepared, in maintenance of 'the common interest,' to return a large proportion of the French, Dutch, and Danish colonies in her hands. Metternich, also, agreed with Castlereagh that Austria's historic claim to the possession of the Belgian Provinces should not be allowed to stand in the way of their union with Holland. Thus, Antwerp and the 'barrier for Holland' would be secure. While nothing was said about the suggested candidature of Bernadotte for the French throne, Castlereagh was prepared to enter into negotiations with Napoleon, should the French nation continue to recognise his sovereignty; as to the Bourbons, it would be time enough to think of them when that nation proved ready to approve their claims. Castlereagh soon showed himself entirely in agreement with Metternich and Hardenberg as to the impossibility of countenancing Alexander's support of this scheme, in which he persisted, till threatened with the standstill of the Austrian and Prussian armies. What Castlereagh had at heart was a satisfactory peace founded on the old principle of a satisfactory Balance of Power in Europe, and—this addition was to acquire great significance—a guarantee of the preservation of this peace in the form of a defensive and offensive

Union between the Allies, to continue after the war.¹

On these lines, peace negotiations began at Bâle, while, at Châtillon-on-Seine, Caulaincourt, on Metternich's invitation, awaited their progress. They continued in much the same spirit in the new headquarters at Langres (from January 25th), though Alexander and some of his most confidential counsellors were greatly adverse to even a momentary stoppage of military operations. Metternich, after propounding a series of questions which would clear the ground in future discussions as to the reconstruction of Europe, without prejudicing the settlement of Russia's compensations, insisted, by order of his sovereign, upon the immediate opening of peace negotiations on a basis to be settled among the Allies. This implied that the Frankfort basis—the 'natural' frontiers of France—was no longer valid. The British and Prussian ministers concurred; while it was sought to meet halfway the desire of Alexander (who had already left Langres) that the advance on Paris should speedily proceed, by committing the progress of military operations to the judgment of Schwarzenberg as commander-in-chief of the main army. However, only Metternich's threat that Austria would quit the Coalition, and the concession of an advance to some distance beyond Langres, at last induced Alexander to consent to the opening of peace negotiations. The real difficulty had lain in that question of Russian compensations which Metter-

¹ Castlereagh's instructions of December 26th, 1813, plainly convey this design of the British Government, while clearly defining British interests proper in the impending peace negotiations.

nich had hoped to postpone, especially if it was true that Alexander wished to demand Alsace from France and, in exchange for it, to obtain Galicia from Austria. At last (on January 29th), an agreement was reached in the 'Langres Protocol,' to the effect that military operations should continue, but that, on February 5th, preliminary conferences as to the general peace should be held at Châtillon by plenipotentiaries charged, as representing Europe at large, with instructions to offer to France her old frontiers of 1792. The discrepancy between this and the informal Frankfurt offer of the 'natural' frontiers—the real blot upon this entire series of diplomatic transactions—was held to be obviated by an addition, proposed by Castlereagh (whose active exertions on this occasion are very notable), stipulating for an equitable territorial adjustment on both sides of the French frontier. France was to be excluded from any interference in the decisions of the Allies, though kept informed of them so far as possible; on the other hand, the Allies were to abstain from intervening in her internal—*i.e.*, dynastic—concerns. Before the Conferences at Langres arrived at a conclusion, it was agreed to inform Caulaincourt that France would be called upon to acknowledge the independence of all countries formerly under her 'influence'—including Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, and Holland—by means of a renunciation, on the part of 'the Head of her Government,' of all titles implying rule or protection.

THE CONGRESS OF CHÂTILLON

By the beginning of February, 1814, the plenipotentiaries had assembled at Châtillon. They included Count Stadion (an upright and moderate statesman, who, as it proved, in the end found it impossible to act with Metternich), Count Rasumovsky (rather bellicose in his views) for Russia, Freiherr Wilhelm von Humboldt (whom Metternich considered inclined to pedantry, while he thought Metternich devoid of principle) for Prussia, and for Great Britain her diplomatic representatives at the Courts of Vienna, Petersburg, and Berlin. The gathering was thus by no means altogether composed of diplomatists dominated by Metternich or resolved on peace; and Castlereagh, who, while desirous of it, was aware of the idea of it being still unpopular in England, thought it expedient, without being himself a plenipotentiary, to make a fourth in what Hardenberg called the 'British Sanhedrin.' On February 5th, Caulaincourt pressed the Conference for an immediate communication of the terms of peace; but Castlereagh stated that, even if Napoleon accepted the terms proposed to him, Great Britain could not sign a peace until the Powers had settled the reconstruction of Europe. Two days afterwards, Stadion recited the instructions as to the demand of the 'old' French frontiers, and as to the cessation of all French 'influence' beyond those limits. Hereupon, on the 9th, the Conference or Congress set slowly to work. Caulaincourt was informed that it was intended to constitute Germany a federation of independent Governments. But, on

the same day, Rasumovsky preferred a demand by his sovereign for a suspension of the Conference, due to his belief that Napoleon would be unable to stay a further advance upon the capital, where his dethronement and the establishment of another Government in his place would be easily effected. In two interviews at headquarters, however, Castlereagh pressed upon the Tsar the risk involved in the imposition upon France of a Government for which she had not yet declared. Very soon, the military prospect clouded, and the effect of several French successes, especially of that of Etoges (February 14th), which drove Blücher back upon Châlons, rendered out of date a letter from Caulaincourt to Metternich, offering to accept the 'old' frontiers, if an armistice were granted, in return for the surrender of certain fortified places by France.

Meanwhile, the ministers of the Allied Powers had been in anxious conference at Troyes. They had been joined here by Castlereagh from Châtillon, where he had come to an understanding with Stadion, that Russia should be made to reveal her Polish plans, and had promised that Great Britain would refuse her consent to the establishment, in any form, of a separate Poland. At Troyes, Metternich, under the mistaken impression that the military struggle was really over, and still hoping to avoid the dangers and difficulties of a seizure of Paris by force, propounded a further series of questions as to the future action of the Allies in French affairs, and the control of Paris if in Allied hands. To these enquiries Hardenberg and Castlereagh replied, more or less in the spirit

in which they were put, advocating the conclusion, after further negotiations at Châtillon, of peace with Napoleon, provided that the allegiance of the French people had not been lost by him, deprecating any attempt to settle the dynastic question at Paris by an appeal in any quarter, and recommending the grant, under satisfactory conditions, of an armistice. On all these heads, the will of Alexander still held out against the opinion of his Allies. He rejected the proposal of an armistice, and insisted on an advance upon Paris, where, if Napoleon's authority were still acknowledged, peace might then be concluded with him. At Paris, the Allies should appoint a governor of the city, whom the Tsar would like to be a Russian, since Russia (here the 'point of view' became manifest) had been longest in the field against the common foe.

The continued repulse of Blücher added force to the contention, resisted by Alexander, that peace should be rapidly concluded; and, already at a Conference held at Troyes on February 13th, Metternich used threatening language about the withdrawal of her army by Austria, and the conclusion by her of a separate peace. Nesselrode refused his signature to a vote of the other Powers, which, while inviting the Tsar to approve the continuance of peace negotiations at Châtillon, expressed the readiness of the Allies to accept the French armistice proposals, if military securities were furnished for the conclusion of a general peace on the basis of the 'old' frontiers. Thus; an *impasse* seemed to have been reached, and Metternich went so far as to propose to Prussia that she should join Austria and Great Britain

in concluding peace without Russia, and thus isolating her. But this proposal put too great a strain upon King Frederick William III.'s fidelity to the Tsar. Ultimately, with Castlereagh's assent, Metternich and Hardenberg signed a Convention, which provided that in no event should any of the Powers depart from the principle of restoring the French frontiers of 1792, while the decision of the dynastic question should be left to the French nation. This Convention Alexander, won over by a concession contained in it as to the eventual military governorship of Paris, and no doubt also impressed by Napoleon's continued military successes, at last accepted (February 14th); and it was agreed that negotiations should proceed at Châtillon, on the basis, not of an armistice, but of a guaranteed preliminary peace. It would seem that the Tsar was prepared to annul the results of these negotiations, should, as he hoped, the military overthrow of Napoleon be still accomplished before their conclusion.

On February 16th, Castlereagh returned to Châtillon, after at Troyes entering into a further agreement with Austria and Prussia, which Russia had after some hesitation approved, laying down certain conditions for the territorial reconstruction of Europe. This agreement stipulated, in accordance with the wishes of Great Britain, for the union of Belgium and Holland, and arranged for the settlement of the lands between the Meuse and Rhine; it also promised the due compensation of King Ferdinand of Sicily for his losses, and the reservation to Great Britain of the ships of war in the ports occupied by her and to be, in the peace, given up to France.

These special conditions obtained by Great Britain reached Châtillon, together with the general conditions of the Preliminary Treaty of Peace agreed upon at Troyes, for communication to Caulaincourt. All French conquests since 1792 were to be ceded, and the independence of all the states of Europe was to be recognised. With certain exceptions (the Mauritius, etc.) and on certain conditions (the prohibition of the importation of slaves, etc.) all French possessions conquered by Great Britain since 1792 were to be returned to France, together with Guadeloupe and Cayenne, while Malta remained with Great Britain. Within specified periods of a few days after the signing of the Preliminaries, France was to evacuate all fortified places ceded by her (including Mainz, Hamburg, Antwerp, and Venice); while Besançon, Belfort, and Huningen were, on the stoppage of hostilities, to be at once surrendered as pledges, to be held till the signing of the definitive Peace.

On the 17th, this draft Preliminary Treaty was communicated to Caulaincourt at the Châtillon Congress, which then adjourned, in order that he might ascertain Napoleon's views. On the same day, Schwarzenberg's advanced guard was driven back across the Seine; and, anxious to avoid staking too much on a battle, the Austrian commander proposed to the Russian and Prussian sovereigns, through Count Paar, to offer an armistice through Marshal Berthier, Chief of the French General Staff. Napoleon, who had revoked the *carte blanche* granted by him to Caulaincourt, and had ordered him to refuse all offers of peace except on the basis of the 'natural' instead of the 'old'

frontiers, was encouraged by the news of Schwarzenberg's proposal (the inopportuneness of which was perceived by both Metternich and Castlereagh) to adhere to the Frankfort terms. What with the existing differences of opinion among the Allies, while Napoleon's plenipotentiary, now all for delaying peace negotiations, was on the watch for the development of these differences, the Châtillon Congress seemed doomed to failure, and the duration of the war to be left wholly dependent on its military vicissitudes.

Napoleon, therefore, while he actually consented to the opening at Lusigny, on February 24th, of negotiations for an armistice, instructed his commissioner, General Comte de Flahaut, besides insisting on the Frankfort basis, to demand the continuance of military operations while negotiations proceeded. So much altercation ensued that the cohesion of the Coalition again seemed in danger, and, indeed, it could hardly have been kept together but by Castlereagh's efforts. In the end, a plan suggested by the distinguished Prussian strategist, General von Grolman, was adopted (February 25th), according to which the main (Austro-Russian) army was to fall back so far as Langres, while the augmented Northern army, under Blücher, was to continue its march on the Marne. At the same time, in order to take away any hope of breaking up the Coalition which Napoleon might have founded upon Alexander's jealous interference in the conduct of the campaign, the Allied plenipotentiaries at Châtillon were instructed to fix a date for a definite reply from Caulaincourt as to peace terms, in default of which they would declare the Congress

dissolved. Notwithstanding the positiveness of this demand, not only Metternich, but Hardenberg and Castlereagh were sincerely desirous of peace; and Napoleon himself, though now hoping for better terms than had at one time seemed within his reach, was by no means desirous of a sudden rupture of negotiations; for he was well aware of the widespread desire for peace in France.

On the 26th, Napoleon wrote to Caulaincourt from Troyes, where he had just held his entry among the acclamations of the inhabitants. As to his terms, he let it be understood that he adhered to the Frankfort basis 'and nothing less—neither Belgium nor Antwerp.' For the rest, he was graciously willing to let the Châtillon Congress proceed, and even to facilitate the progress in a locality now held by him, thus seeming to respond to the general desire for peace in France, while able to carry on his campaign against Blücher. For the same reason, he allowed the armistice negotiations at Lusigny to continue, till, on March 5th, these were broken off by the Allies.

THE TREATY OF CHAUMONT

Their centre of political action was now at Chaumont. Here, since the Châtillon peace negotiations had now virtually failed, it was necessary to take measures for the effective joint conduct of the final conflict in arms, whereby the indispensable conditions of peace might be imposed on the archfoe. To this end, the ministers of the Four Powers at once signed a new Treaty of Alliance. The Treaty of Chaumont, of March 4th (signed March 9th), 1814, with its renewals—at London

on June 29th, 1814; at Vienna on March 25th, 1815; at Paris on November 20th, 1815, and at Aix-la-Chapelle on November 15th, 1818—constitutes, in its full development, the foundation of the new system of Congresses convened and conducted by the Great—originally by Four of the Great—Powers, and of the assumption by them, as Wellington afterwards said at Vienna, of the right of protection over the Peace of Europe. But its immediate purpose was of a more limited nature.

The Treaty of Chaumont¹ was essentially designed as an alliance in arms for the purpose of carrying through the conditions of peace to which, in their preliminary form, the assent of France had not proved obtainable, and of strengthening the Coalition by making the provision required for the continuation and victorious termination of the war. The Four Powers severally undertook to furnish for this purpose a force of 150,000 men, Great Britain promising, in addition, for the year 1814, a subsidy of five millions sterling. None of the Signatory Powers was to conclude a separate pacification with France. From the Töplitz Triple Alliance Treaty of September 9th, 1813, was taken over—in part *verbatim*—the further provision that, if, after the conclusion of peace, any one of the Four Powers were attacked by France, the rest

¹ The Treaty of Chaumont (which bore the date of March 1st, 1814, but was signed on March 9th) has been repeatedly reprinted—most completely, it would appear, in Martens' *Recueil des Traités conclus par la Russie*, Petersburg, 1874 ff., vol. iii., pp. 155 ff. See also d'Angeberg, vol. i., pp. 116 ff., and *cf.*, for the first three supplementary treaties, *ibid.*, p. 183, and vol. ii., pp. 971 ff., 1636 ff. There can be no doubt that the matter-of-fact handiwork of Castlereagh, who called this Treaty 'my Treaty,' is traceable in its articles. As at Töplitz, so at Chaumont, the Signatory Powers severally signed Treaties with every one of the other three.

of them should come to the rescue with a force of 60,000 men apiece. The Treaty was to hold good for twenty years after the definitive conclusion of peace, and other states specially exposed to French invasion (explained, in a secret article, to refer in especial to Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and the dominions of the Prince of Orange, 're-established in Holland'¹) were invited to accede to it. A secret article of the Treaty enumerated the territorial arrangements stipulated in the Allied draft of a Preliminary Peace, supplementing them so as to provide for the union of the Netherlands under the Prince of Orange. At the conclusion of peace, while the Signatory Powers were to agree among them as to the maintenance in France, for a certain time, of a sufficient military force.

Although terming itself (Art. XVI.) a Treaty of 'Defensive Alliance,' the Chaumont compact was also one of Offensive, and was intended to meet later as well as present conditions. It was renewed, whenever France was deemed to show any disposition to pass beyond the territorial limits imposed upon her by the Allies. Thus, as Sorel says, the Alliance of Chaumont constituted the Executive of Europe, while the Treaties of Paris and Vienna formed her Charter. It was by no means a Holy Alliance; but it was an Alliance of Europe against the Power which had long disturbed her Balance.

¹ Bavaria was soon afterwards invited to join by Austria, who, together with Prussia, had significantly declined the Tsar's proposal to invite Württemberg. The two German Great Powers were alike anxious not to allow to any of the lesser German states, except Bavaria and Hanover, the right of declaring war or that of concluding alliances.

For the moment, however, this most important Treaty failed to produce unity in the Coalition with regard to the chief questions in dispute among its members—that of the overthrow of the Napoleonic dynasty, and that of the acceptance of Alexander's Polish design. The Tsar continued to quarrel with Schwarzenberg's plan of campaign, and was countenanced by King Frederick William III. in his suspicions of Metternich's policy. The news of Blücher's success at Laon (March 13th), however, helped to clear the prospect; and, about the same time, the final stage was reached in the peace negotiations with Napoleon, and in the proceedings of the Châtillon Congress.

On the day after the signing of the Treaty of Chaumont, the armistice negotiations at Lusigny had been finally broken off. But even now, and while the plenipotentiaries were still at Châtillon, Metternich had not relinquished the hope that Napoleon might still accept the terms of the Allies, and, so as to be able to 'save his face,' had sought through Count Paul Esterhazy to obtain a French 'counter-project' virtually, though not ostensibly, accepting those terms. But, in spite of the efforts of both Caulaincourt and Joseph Bonaparte (who had remained in Paris with the Empress-Regent Marie-Louise), Napoleon refused to give way. He held fast by the 'natural' frontiers of France, arguing that they included much less territory than had been appropriated by Russia, Austria, and Prussia through the Partitions of Poland, the secularisations in the Empire, and the annexation of Venice, taken together with Great Britain's acquisitions of Malta, and the Dutch

colonies in Africa and the West Indies. He, therefore, demanded a general settlement by a Congress, in which all the Powers at war with him should take part. All this really afforded no material for a 'counter-project'; but, when the close of the armistice (March 10th) was at hand, Napoleon, who still cherished hopes of successes in the field, began to haggle: he could not accept the proposals of the Allies, and in particular their demand of the surrender of Besançon, Belfort, and Huningen (a constant menace to Bâle), as their last word¹; but he might consent to the razing of the fortifications of Mainz, the cession of Dutch Brabant and the valley of the Rhine, besides Isle de France and Réunion.

END OF THE CHÂTILLON CONFERENCES

Even the futility, in existing circumstances, of such an offer could not yet exhaust Metternich's patience, or extinguish his desire for a peace with Napoleon, which might put a stop to the shifting, ambitious projects of Alexander. Of late, the Tsar, in lieu of speculations upon a Bernadotte candidature for the throne of France, had begun to favour schemes for bringing about the restoration of the Bourbons, which might reckon upon at least the moral support of Great Britain, but from which little or no advantage could accrue to Austria. Metternich, therefore, at this late hour, instructed Stadion to delay the closing of the Châtillon Conferences, even should Caulaincourt present no satisfactory reply to the demands of the Allies

¹ This demand he compared to that addressed by the Romans to the Carthaginians at the close of the Third (query Second) Punic War.

announced on February 7th. Thus, at a meeting of the plenipotentiaries held on March 10th, a long memorandum read by Caulaincourt on the subject of these demands, but containing neither an acceptance nor a definite rejection of them, was received in silence, and an offer of certain lesser concessions and conditions made by him was passed over as palpably insufficient. He found himself in a position of almost unparalleled difficulty; for, personally anxious for peace, he had to deal, not only with the Allies—among whom, especially after the departure of Castlereagh, it seemed almost impossible to look for a continual *consensus*—but also with Napoleon himself, who wished for an *ultimatum*, but would not give way as to the main demand which it must contain. On March 13th, the Châtillon Congress met again; but, in reply to Stadion's insistence upon the acceptance or rejection of the Allies' demand, or the presentation of a satisfactory counter-project, Caulaincourt could only bring forward another tentative list of concessions. Further pressed, he, in another sitting held on the same day, asked leave to refer by courier to Napoleon; and, when told that the declaration of the dissolution of the Congress must now be placed on record and could only be reconsidered if fresh instructions arrived for him, he once more asked to be allowed to submit a counter-project. His request was granted, but only on condition that, if this counter-project were not found to harmonise with the draft treaty proposed on February 17th, the Congress should be at once declared dissolved. And any attempt at further delay by means of fresh offers from Napoleon

was frustrated by the request that any such should be at once communicated, not to the Congress, but to the Allied headquarters.

Thus thrown upon the resources of his own diplomacy, Caulaincourt now drafted, and proposed to the Congress, a counter-project which amounted to an elaborate preliminary treaty, but that, at the same time, bore no resemblance to the proposals of the Coalition. Of this draft it seems worth while to recall the chief stipulations, as showing how even a much reduced Napoleonic France was irreconcilable with the establishment of a fair Balance of Power in Europe. Napoleon renounced all titles implying a dominion or authority not derived from his French sovereignty, within the limits defined in the draft Preliminary Peace. These limits excluded the Illyrian provinces (which Napoleon had himself taken occasion to describe as the real matter at issue between Austria and himself) and all departments of the existing French empire beyond the Alps and Rhine, while prohibiting any interference on his part with the future independence of Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Holland (to an augmentation of whose territory he consented), or Italy. But the rule over the last-named he only renounced in favour of his stepson Eugène Beauharnais; while Lucca and Piombino were to be retained by his sister Elisa. On the other hand, the Pope was to recover his territories, with the exception of the principality of Benevento. In Switzerland, the faithful Berthier was to retain that of Neuchâtel; and, which was of more importance, the whole of the kingdom of Saxony was to remain under the sovereignty of

the sorely tried Frederick Augustus. There were some further provisions concerning Germany and Italy; as to the French colonies in the hands of Great Britain, they were all to fall back to France, except certain islands, for which a suitable compensation was to be settled. A special Congress in which, it should be noted, France was, as a matter of course, to take part, would determine the disposal of the European possessions ceded by her; and her soil was to be evacuated by all foreign troops, within from three to five days after the ratification of the Peace.

None of the Allied Powers could regard the provisions of Caulaincourt's draft as meeting its expectations. Austria looked for a very different settlement in Italy, where she hoped to recover Lombardy; Great Britain was consistently anxious as to the destinies of Belgium and Antwerp; and Prussia was intent upon the acquisition of Mainz and the left bank of the Rhine, unmentioned in the draft. Thus, more especially as the military operations of the Allies had of late been successful at several points, the reception given to it was not surprising. But, though the British plenipotentiaries were for breaking off negotiations at once, Stadion was adverse to taking this step without a formal statement of reasons. With this he was furnished by Metternich (March 17th) in the form of fresh instructions, purporting that the 'counter-project' was futile, as calculated to place France once more in the offensive position which had so often tempted her Government to revolutionary enterprise, and that its rejection should therefore be announced, together with a

statement that the Congress of Châtillon was now closed through the fault of the French Government, and that the Allies were not prepared to lay down their arms until it should have accepted the principles laid down by them. We pass over the proceedings which followed, and which comprised a declaration to the above effect, and a counter-declaration by Caulaincourt, whom Napoleon had still left without final instructions. On March 19th, 1814, the Congress of Châtillon came to an end.

LAST NEGOTIATIONS WITH NAPOLEON

Yet this phase of the peace negotiations was, even now, not quite over; for, in accordance with his announcement at the last sitting of the Congress, Caulaincourt remained a few days longer at Châtillon, encouraged by a confidential letter from Metternich, who was still in hopes of an arrangement with the Napoleonic dynasty. Once more, the Austrian statesman's action was determined both by the thought he took of the close connexion (which he had been himself largely instrumental in bringing about) between that dynasty and the House of Austria, and, even more, by his continued fear of the Polish policy of Alexander, against which the establishment of friendly relations with France still seemed the surest safeguard. Hardenberg appears to have attempted to divert Metternich from this line of thought; but, although the latter had an audience from Alexander on March 17th, nothing came of the attempt to create a better understanding between them. On the other hand, Metternich was much impressed by the overtures

of Baron de Vitrolles, an able former *émigré* in the confidence of Talleyrand and Dalberg, and employed by them to help prevent a Peace which would leave Napoleon on the throne. It was made evident that the Bourbons were prepared, if in power in France, not only to conclude peace on the conditions demanded by the Allies, but to effect the constitutional changes required by public opinion, besides providing, in order to satisfy Austria, for Marie-Louise. Conferences were held at the Allied headquarters with de Vitrolles, which indicated that the Powers might be about to support a movement in favour of the restoration of the Bourbons and of its inclusion among the conditions of peace, Napoleon being, so to speak, left out in the cold. Such a movement could hardly fail, now, to be approved of by Castlereagh, who had long felt the difficulty of resisting the current of popular opinion against 'Bonaparte' in England; nor could Metternich, in the end, afford to allow Austria to become isolated. As it chanced, a letter, dated March 19th, fell into his hands, in which Maret intimated to Caulaincourt that Napoleon intended to consider the military situation even after the ratification of the Peace—in other words, that, so far as he was concerned, the Peace would not necessarily end the War. A resumption of peace negotiations with him had, therefore, become an absurdity, unless, indeed, there was to be a total change in the present aspect of the campaign.

As it was, the defeat of Napoleon at Arcis-sur-Aube, followed by the juncture of Schwarzenberg and Blücher and the avowed retreat of Napoleon

upon Paris, announced the beginning of the end. The Allies resolved to march straight upon the capital, and, on the 23rd, indited their manifesto to the French nation. Gliding over the contradiction between the Châtillon and the Frankfort bases of negotiation, it held out to France the prospect of benefits which her present Government could have secured by a word—for the Allies had even been prepared to allow changes extending beyond the frontiers of 1792. For the rejection of these offers, and for the sufferings thereby entailed, the French nation must hold that Government responsible. Peace alone could heal the wounds inflicted by the spirit of universal conquest—and peace with its attendant blessings, not the dismemberment of France, was offered to her by the Allied Powers.

The French people responded to the appeal, and care for the national welfare prevailed over the traditions of Napoleonic glory. On March 28th, just before the actual issue of the Allied manifesto, Napoleon, more and more isolated in his refusal of peace, had offered to abdicate in favour of the regency of Marie-Louise, if this were guaranteed by Austria. But the Allies pressed on; and, on the 31st, Paris, which Napoleon could no longer protect, capitulated. Alexander and Frederick William entered the capital, while the Austrian Emperor, with both Metternich and Castlereagh, remained at Dijon. In face of a decision still undeclared, though Bordeaux had set the example by declaring in favour of the Bourbons, the moment had come for the managing hand of Talleyrand. He began by persuading Alexander

to accept that 'principle of legitimacy,' of which he was to make such dexterous use at the Congress of Vienna; but the Tsar still hesitated to pronounce for the Bourbons. Hereupon, a declaration was issued, stating that the Allied Sovereigns would no longer negotiate with Napoleon or any member of his family; and, after the Senate had nominated a small provisional Government, with Talleyrand at its head, this Government, in its turn, proclaimed the *déchéance* of the Napoleonic rule. Napoleon's desperate design, formed at Fontainebleau, of marching against Alexander at Paris having broken down, the defection of Marmont sealed that of the army. Thus Napoleon's retention of the throne became impossible, even before the Allies had agreed with the provisional Government as to his successor. When, notwithstanding the objections of Castlereagh, the Allies had, in his absence, resolved to grant to Napoleon the island of Elba and the retention of the imperial title, the Senate voted the recall of King Louis XVIII. Thus the dynastic question had been allowed the precedence; and, without a clear *consensus* among the Allies, or a general manifestation of opinion on the part of the French nation, the Restoration was an accomplished fact.

Before the actual entry of King Louis XVIII. into his capital took place, an armistice was concluded (April 23rd) which suspended all military operations and provided for the evacuation of France by the Allies in proportion as she evacuated territory beyond her 'old' frontiers.¹ What France and her 'restored' King now alike desired

¹ As a matter of fact, the process occupied several months.

was the conclusion of peace, though there was no more agreement as to its accompaniments inside France than there was among the Allies as to its conditions outside. Alexander, whose personal relations with Louis XVIII. were of the coldest, would willingly have posed as arbiter both within and without the walls of Paris, intervening (unlike the representatives of the British Government) in the elaboration of the Constitutional *Charte*, in whose fundamental principles he had declared his concurrence as part of the pacific compact.

BASES OF PEACE WITH FRANCE

The bases of peace with France—the return to the ‘old’ frontiers—were now a settled matter; France had been reduced to her royal limits, and the work of the Revolution and Napoleon had been undone. Austria and Prussia had recovered a large proportion of the dominions they had possessed; but, as to the adjustment of their gains with those of Russia in particular, and those of lesser states also, and as to the satisfaction of Russia’s own claims, or again, as to the treatment of other territorial questions arising out of the downfall of the French Empire, the Allies had not yet agreed, or were likely to agree, while they stood, arms in hand, at Paris. A very notable attempt was, indeed, made by Hardenberg in his *Plan for the Future Arrangement of Europe*, dated April 29th, to settle at once the new map of the Continent, at least in so far as the claims of the two German Great Powers were concerned. The duchy of Warsaw was to be divided, on terms not unfavourable to them, with Russia; Prussia was further to have all Saxony and the Rhinelands from Mainz to Wesel;

Austria the Breisgau, with further acquisitions—and a remote prospect of the recovery of Alsace.¹ But Alexander refused to listen to the plan; and, though Castlereagh was in favour of a strong Prussia, neither he nor Metternich fell in with it. The Allied Powers, accordingly, once more adopted the expedient to which they had already resorted since the formation of the present Coalition, and resolved to refer to a Congress—to be held at Vienna—the solution of all these problems. In the Peace, to be signed immediately at Paris, they proposed to deal only with provisions to which the immediate assent of France was assured. In the deliberations which were to follow at Vienna she was, it was now settled, not to be excluded from participating; but her representatives were not to make their appearance till after those of the Four Powers had previously reached their conclusions—in other words, her participation would be *pro formâ* only.

THE FIRST PEACE OF PARIS

Commissioners were now appointed by the Allies to discuss the actual delimitation question with Comte d'Osmond, the commissioner appointed by Louis XVIII. The Allies, now as before, expressed their willingness to consider an adjustment of the 'old' frontier, though denying that the prospect of an actual increase of population on this basis had been held out to France. Finally, part of Savoy, and certain places in Belgium, together with Saarlouis and Landau, were offered—450,000 souls in all. The 'old' limits of France

¹ This is suggested by Treitschke in his full account of Hardenberg's scheme.

necessarily comprehended her conquests and annexations under Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV.; but the phrase was not held to include her colonial possessions before 1792, though most of her colonies (except Tobago, Mauritius, and one or two others) were to be restored to her. As to a lesser matter, but one of very considerable importance, because of the effect the decision adopted would be certain to produce, objects of art taken by France out of conquered countries were to be retained by her. By virtue of a curious *quid pro quo*, France promised to support in principle the abolition of the Slave-trade, and to put an end to her own share in it within five years. Thus, peace—the First Peace of Paris—was concluded on May 30th, 1814, by means of identical Treaties with France, signed severally on behalf of the Four Great Powers in arms against her, together with Sweden and Portugal. Spain acceded on July 30th, making eight the total number of the Signatory Powers. Plenipotentiaries sent by these to Vienna within two months were, in a General Congress, to agree upon the arrangements for adding the requisite articles to those now approved. Nothing in the public text of the Treaties placed France on a footing at the Congress differing in any respect from that of the other Powers; and nothing at the Congress, whether previously approved or not by France, could, on the face of the Treaties, be definitively settled without, at least, her formal participation.

But to the public text of the Treaty of Peace were added certain separate and secret articles, which it is difficult not to describe as equivocal in what they included, and as disingenuous in

what they suppressed. The disposal of the territories renounced by France was to be regulated by the Congress on the bases settled by the Allied Powers among themselves, and in accordance with the following general provisions. Lombardy and Venetia were to belong to Austria; the kingdom of Sardinia, diminished by the transfer to France of part of Savoy, but augmented by Genoa, was to be re-established, and Switzerland reorganised; Belgium and Holland were to be united as a single kingdom; and the German territories on the left bank of the Rhine were to serve as compensations to Prussia and other German states. (It may be added that the arrangements indicated were, in the end, all carried out—the much-disputed city of Mainz being ultimately assigned to Hesse-Darmstadt, while its fortress was made Federal.) The future of Saxony, which Prussia had sought to anticipate by occupying it beforehand, was left uncertain, although the end of its existence as an independent kingdom was virtually assumed. Of Poland, with regard to whose future there was as yet no prospect of agreement, not a word was said; and the Constitution of the Germanic Confederation was necessarily reserved for consideration at Vienna.

Peace had been made, and the Allied armies gradually evacuated the soil of France. The whole imperial edifice erected by the great conqueror now caged in Elba had crumbled into the dust; the Sardinian Government had been re-established at Turin, and the Papal at Rome; the Bourbons were enthroned at Madrid, and the Austrians lords of Venice and Milan. Bernadotte had reached Paris in time to assure the future of his dynasty in the north; while Murat still reigned

at Naples. Thus, Europe seemed at last able to draw breath, and to dwell expectantly upon the vast opportunities which awaited the Congress of Vienna, and which threw into the shade the difficulties that must surround its efforts. These opportunities, it was hoped, would be far from exhausted by a redistribution, as equitable and generous as possible, of the territories reconquered from France, and by the consequent recovery of the indispensable Balance of Power among the European states. Surely, Europe would no longer be left without a permanent international tribunal commanding the respect of all the Powers; surely, they would be severally ready to enter into a systematic, though at first it might be only a partial, disarmament. In the individual states the guarantee still generally sought in representative institutions would be without exception set up; and, on the sea, piracy would be extinguished and the obnoxious slave-trade suppressed by international consent. Only a fragment of these and additional expectations was to meet with fulfilment; and cynics like Gentz derided them from the first as visionary: the real task of the Congress, said the man who was to write its history in its protocols, was the division of the spoils taken from the vanquished. Nor did many of these ulterior problems so much as engage the actual attention of the Congress. Yet, even so, the limit of the task to which it addressed itself were anything but narrow; and it is not so much omission as perversion which marred the political achievements to be briefly described in the Second Part of this outline.

THE PERIOD OF CONGRESSES

II

**VIENNA AND THE SECOND PEACE OF
PARIS**

HELPS FOR STUDENTS OF HISTORY. No. 10.

EDITED BY C. JOHNSON, M.A., AND J. P. WHITNEY, B.D., D.C.L.

THE PERIOD OF CONGRESSES

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II

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THE PERIOD OF CONGRESSES

II

VIENNA AND THE SECOND PEACE OF PARIS

1814-22

A.—THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA¹

1814-15

PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE IN LONDON

METTERNICH, the originator and, as he was to prove, the guiding spirit of the Congress of Vienna, had intended to carry through the meeting of sovereigns (for as such he had designed it) within a few weeks. He had not reckoned with the Tsar Alexander, who still demeaned himself as another

¹ The literature of the Congress of Vienna is necessarily very large, and not quite exhausted by the bibliographies of it to be found in vol. x. of Lavissee and Rambaud's *Histoire Générale* (Paris, 1898), and in vol. ix. of the *Cambridge Modern History* (1907), which also contains two chapters summarising the history and work of the Congress. The most complete collection of documents concerning it is still Count d'Angeberg's *Congrès de Vienne* (2 vols., Paris, 1864), with a Historical Introduction by J. B. Capefigue. See also Sir E. Hertslet's *Map of Europe by Treaty*, vol. i., 1814-27 (1875). The collection of documents by J. L. Klüber, a Baden Privy Councillor who attended the Con-

6 THE PERIOD OF CONGRESSES—II.

Napoleon in counsel, and, resolved to direct its deliberations when it met, caused the opening of the Congress to be deferred from the beginning of August to that of September, and then again to that of October, 1814. In the interval, he paid a visit to the Prince-Regent of Great Britain, and conferred with the King of Prussia. In London, where public opinion was much preoccupied with the concluding stages of the war against the United States, a series of preliminary Conferences took place. It was thought well to 'stiffen' the cohesion between the Four Powers by a Convention (June 29th) confirming and supplementing the Treaty of Chaumont; while, about the same

gress (where he was known as in sympathy with Napoleon) (8 vols., Erlangen, 1817 ff.), and the *History of the Congress*, by G. de R. de Flassan, 'the historiographer of the Louvre,' and devoted to the interests of the Bourbons, who so early as 1815 was engaged on his labours (3 vols., Paris and London, 1829), are too ample for general use. But students should have at hand for reference the *Acte du Congrès* (printed for our Foreign Office, 1839). Among contributory contemporary sources, special importance attaches to the by no means extensive notes of Metternich in vols. i. and ii. of his *Mémoires* (2nd Edit., Paris, 1880), with Gentz's *Letters to Pilat* (edited by K. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Leipzig, 1867); to the fascinating *Correspondence of Talleyrand and King Louis XVIII.* during the Congress (edited by G. Pallain, Engl. Tr., 2 vols., 1881), with its concluding summaries, the more concise of which is, probably, from the hand of La Besnardière, a French diplomatist the skill of whose pen was notable even in the age of Gentz and other eminent protocollists; to vols. ix.-xi. of the *Memoirs and Correspondence of Castlereagh* (1853); and to vol. xii. of the *Despatches of the Duke of Wellington* (1847), and vols. ix., x., and xi. of his *Supplementary Despatches* (1852). The despatches of Castlereagh in the Foreign Office on the Polish-Saxon problem are printed, with a luminous Introduction, by C. K. Webster in his essay on the subject in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 3rd Series, vol. vii. (1913). The whole organism of the Congress

time, Russia sought to fortify her position by a simple renewal of her 'Kalisch' Treaty¹ with Prussia. This latter Treaty, which, for a time, seemed prohibitory of the accomplishment by the Congress of its primary, and, as soon became evident, its most important, task—the territorial redistribution, and the treatment of Saxony and, in particular, of Poland—thus thrust itself across the very threshold of the Congress, while (except

and its history are, so to speak, dissected in the monograph on *The Secret Police at the Vienna Congress*, by A. Fournier (Vienna and Leipzig, 1913), from whom a 'definitive' history of the Congress may, we trust, still be looked for. This most remarkable selection of reports, letters and 'chiffons,' 'intercepted' or otherwise gathered by the Vienna Secret Police, is arranged with perfect lucidity, and prefaced by an admirable general Introduction concerning the chief subjects of the police recherche, and the principal personages and interests at the Congress, which supersedes most that has been, at all events of late, published on these topics. Still more recently, M. H. Weil has, under the title of *Below the Surface (Les Dessous) of the Congress of Vienna* (2 vols., Paris, 1917), produced a fuller, and carefully annotated, collection of the same materials. Of later Histories, besides the account in Thiers' *Consulate and Empire*, which may be regarded as, in some respects, an antidote to Talleyrand's narrative, Sorel should be studied—in vol. viii. of his work cited in Part I. of this *Help*, and, for the diplomatic transactions during the Hundred Days, in his *Second Treaty of Paris*, cited below—together with Treitschke, whose wholly different standpoint is throughout equally unmistakable, and Oncken, likewise previously cited. Since the present paper and this note were in print, C. K. Webster's *The Congress of Vienna* (published by the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, 1919) has appeared, which will serve as an invaluable guide to the history of the Congress, its antecedents, and the transactions connected with it, at all events till the publication of a larger work on the subject by the same author. Here, it was only possible to add a few references to Mr. Webster's book.

¹ It was negotiated and put into shape there, but signed at Breslau, on February 26th, 1813.

8 THE PERIOD OF CONGRESSES—II.

the Netherlands arrangements¹), no progress was made in London. At last, by the middle of September, most of the intending participators in the first Vienna gathering were on the spot. On the 23rd, the French plenipotentiaries put in a necessarily belated appearance; and, on the 25th, the Tsar and the King of Prussia held their entry into the capital of the Emperor Francis I., which had invited their attendance to meet the Emperor Francis in Congress, as arranged at Langres in the previous March.

INFORMAL PRELIMINARY MEETINGS AT VIENNA

The informal preliminary meetings of the plenipotentiaries of the Four Allied Powers, and of their First Plenipotentiaries, Metternich,^A Hardenberg,^P Rasumowski and Castlereagh^L in particular, succeeded one another from September 16th onwards. Although Metternich's ascendancy in the deliberations of the Congress was not always acknowledged, and although he was at first subjected to much impatient and unfriendly criticism and satire,² he

¹ On July 21st, the Prince of Orange formally accepted the throne of the Netherlands, and the Convention between that kingdom and Great Britain, signed at London on August 13th, stipulated the return of the Dutch Colonies, except the Cape of Good Hope, Berbice and one or two others. An additional article engaged Great Britain to pay a sum of two million sterling for the erection of a barrier (of fortresses) in defence of the Netherlands (against France).

² Talleyrand must be held to have found the right word in charging him with *légèreté*. Gentz, Metternich's great draughtsman, described him as always occupied with a hundred matters, and a little too largely with his own concerns, but gifted, clever and courageous, and likely to land himself and the Austrian monarchy in safety at the end. La Harpe considered that

never allowed his general control of the transactions at Vienna to be interrupted, and thus exercised a continuous influence upon them unequalled by that of any of his colleagues at the Congress. Hardenberg, by reason of his deafness, had constantly to rely on the assistance of his fellow-plenipotentiary, W. von Humboldt, whose powerful mind was less prone to compromise than his own, and whom many judges regarded as the only 'athlete' in debate fit to be matched with Talleyrand. Among the Russian plenipotentiaries, Rasumowski was hardly more than nominally the first; the most effective, perhaps, was Nesselrode. But their master had other counsellors at hand—more especially the far-sighted Capo d'Istria and the high-minded Stein, besides the expert and very ingenious Anstell, and the highflying but singularly wideawake instructor of the Tsar's youth, La Harpe. It was, however, that master himself, who consciously overshadowed the action of his statesmen, and not less openly sought to dominate the Congress in his own person. Nor did Alexander, at least at Vienna, take home to himself the lesson which he might have learnt there: that his power over the destinies of Europe, which he had thought to substitute for Napoleon's, was anything but unlimited. The first plenipotentiary of Great Britain at the Congress, Castlereagh, on the other hand, enjoyed more independence of action than

Metternich was quite *impar congressui* with Hardenberg, Talleyrand and Stein. The strongest censure was that applied by Dalberg (the second French plenipotentiary, who knew Austria well) to the Cabinet of which Metternich was the head, and which he described as devoid of system, consistency, character and principle.

10 THE PERIOD OF CONGRESSES—II.

any of his foreign colleagues, albeit constantly alive to the censure which Parliament might pass upon his course of action. It was in order to defend it there, that, in February, 1815, after virtually settling the thorniest of the problems with which the Congress had to deal, he returned to England, his place being taken for a short time by the Duke of Wellington.¹ On Wellington's departure to Belgium, the Earl of Clancarty became the senior British plenipotentiary at the Congress, where his previous exertions had already marked him out as one of its best men of business (more especially with regard to the affairs of the Netherlands, a subject of the utmost interest to his Government).

The preliminary meetings of the Congress were clouded by many doubts and difficulties. The scope of its deliberations still admitted of debate, and the conditions under which it had assembled seemed hopeless, if the arrogance of Alexander remained unabated, and unless the widespread doubts of the capacity of Metternich, whose failure would mean the failure of the Congress, were to be dispelled by success. It had been called in haste—would it fall asunder not less quickly, and be remembered only as a futile *rendezvous*? The tongues of the mockers were very busy, but their gibes were to prove beyond the mark.

On September 20th, the plenipotentiaries of the Four Allies of Chaumont agreed that a Committee representing them, together with France and Spain, should charge itself with the general preparation

¹ It is on Castlereagh's action at Vienna and Paris that C. K. Webster's recent work throws the fullest light.

of the work of the Congress. The discussion of the proposed German Federal Constitution, however, was, again by the decision of the Four Powers, to be left to a separate Committee representing the principal German states, from which, as a matter of course, Saxony was to be excluded.¹ But it was, likewise, agreed on behalf of the Four Powers that they were to carry out *among themselves*, the main part of the task entrusted at Paris to the Vienna Congress—viz., the distribution of the recovered territories now awaiting disposal.

THE EIGHT POWERS AS A PRELIMINARY COMMITTEE —THE COMMITTEE OF FIVE

The Congress, it will be remembered, was to open on October 1st. Castlereagh, with whom Talleyrand had been in communication before their meeting at Vienna, was still far from desirous of cooperating with the French Government; but he was, at the same time, unwilling that France should be treated in such a manner as to endanger a lasting European settlement. He, therefore (September 22nd), moved that the dispositions intended by the Four Powers under the secret articles added to the Treaty of Paris should be made known to France and Spain; and a resolution in this sense was adopted (September 23rd). The plan of action of the Four Powers had thus been, in a measure, modified. But the task of asserting the claims of France to a full share in the actual proceedings of the Congress necessarily fell to Talleyrand's lot, and was accomplished by him with a

¹ Baden was, much to Talleyrand's chagrin, also left out.

skill to which it is quite impossible to refuse admiration. In a subsequent sitting of the Committee of representatives of the Four Powers (September 30th), which he and the Spanish plenipotentiary Labrador had been invited by Metternich to attend (no such invitation being, for the present, extended to Portugal or Sweden), he obtained the withdrawal of a protocol in which the plenipotentiaries of the 'Allies,' as they had, from force of habit, called the Four Powers, communicated to those of France and Spain what had been done in the earlier preliminary conferences not attended by them. This withdrawal was tantamount to the acceptance of the principle, that the plenipotentiaries of all the Signatory Powers of the Peace of Paris (unless where, as in the case of the Committee on the Germanic Confederation, special arrangements had been made) were entitled to attend all the conferences of the self-formed body which had taken the preliminary management of the affairs of the Congress into its hands. This implied the admission to that body of Portugal and Sweden; and, on October 8th, the representatives of the Eight Powers were, as Talleyrand had desired, formally constituted the Preliminary Committee of the Congress. Thus, instead of persisting in the application of the provisions of the secret articles of the Treaty of Paris, the Four Powers had admitted France to the full deliberative position claimed by her as her due; and, inasmuch as they were themselves all but hopelessly at issue on the most perplexing of the questions which must come under the immediate consideration of the Congress, France had acquired, though not a decisive, yet

an important voice as to its solution, or as to the action to be taken, should it prove insoluble. Having gained this advantage, Talleyrand dropped the idea of a general Congress, and left the small Powers to take care of themselves. As a matter of fact,¹ the Congress of Vienna, as a Congress of all Europe, was never constituted; the real Congress was what had now become the Committee of Five, which held forty-one sittings before the signing of the Act of the Congress, while the Committee of Eight held not more than nine. Spain had sunk from her position as a Great Power; while Talleyrand never lost the position he had secured for France, until, by no fault of his, the course of events once more took her affairs out of the control of King Louis XVIII. and his Ministers. He made use of this advantage by establishing, as a system of political logic which the Four Powers could not contravene, the principle of legitimacy most conspicuously represented by the French monarchy; while, as will be seen, he turned to the best account for France the differences among those Powers which they had proposed to settle without her.

Although the declaration put forth on October 8th (still in the name of the Four Powers) may be regarded as the first official manifestation on the part of the Congress, yet it postponed the formal opening to November 1st. Talleyrand had moved that to the declaration of the postponement be added a clause stating that the proceedings of the Congress would be in conformity with public law (*le droit public*); and this was, with Castlereagh's support, carried, much to the disgust of Harden-

¹ C. K. Webster, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-7.

berg and Humboldt. Even on November 1st, no formal opening took place; though the Committee of the Eight, of which Metternich was elected President, announced the appointment of a smaller Committee for the verification of the powers of the plenipotentiaries. The Committee of the Eight, as observed, rarely sat; but the German Committee was at work from October 14th. On November 14th a Committee met on the affairs of Switzerland, where there was great anxiety for the recognition, while the Congress was assembled, of Swiss neutrality and independence by all the Powers represented. Talleyrand asked for the addition of a French member to this Committee, and Dalberg was appointed accordingly. Committees were also named on smaller territorial questions—Genoa, Tuscany and the duchy of Bouillon, as well as (in the earlier half of December) on diplomatic procedure, on river navigation and (under the designation of a Conference) on the slave-trade. But it was becoming more evident than ever that the Powers were not yet agreed on the crucial Polish-Saxon question, and a feeling was abroad that, after all, the Congress might actually break up before it had formally opened.

PERSONALITIES OF THE CONGRESS

Meanwhile, what was satirically denounced as the real business of the Congress—its social dissipations—had begun on a quite unprecedented scale, to the delight of the Viennese, until even they grew weary of it, though it was mainly carried on at the Emperor's cost.¹ As a matter of fact,

¹ The entire expenses of the Austrian Court in connexion with the Congress were estimated at about £800,000.

the pleasures of the Congress covered a great amount of hard work, though, as is usual in such cases, this work was, from first to last, done by the few who managed the course of affairs and by the indefatigable pens of their chief assistants, such as, in particular, Gentz, La Besnardière and the highly capable Prussian staff, probably the most numerous and complete of those present at Vienna. For a picture of the social life there and a portraiture of the principal personages that figured in it, an overwhelming mass of materials has been accumulated in the memoirs of the time, but more especially in the letters and fragments of letters (*chiffons*) collected—*quocunque modo*—and in the other information conveyed, by the secret police of Vienna and their agents. This secret police was a Josephine legacy—revived under Francis I., who seems to have never wearied in receiving the reports made to him by its chief, Baron von Hager.¹ No other such crop of disclosures has ever been reaped, or at least been subsequently allowed to see the daylight, and no other such machinery set in motion. Servants and innkeepers were suborned; paper-baskets ransacked; impressions of seals taken and letters opened; ciphers deciphered and fictitious names identified. No privacy or intimacy was sacred to this assiduous, but by no means overpaid, agency, from the private doings of the foreign princes and diplomatists, to those of the Duchess of Sagan, who had to break off her intimacy with Metternich because of her Russian estates, and of her rival the

¹ The 'good Emperor,' who could be dignified on occasion, desired that, unless in quite exceptional circumstances, 'intercepted' letters should be returned to their owners

Princess Bagration (whose apartments were in the same house as those of the Tsar's favourite hostess); and it must be allowed that, on the whole, the Government had its money's worth.¹ But it seems fair to add that neither in the diplomatic and official world, nor in Court society in general, were there at this Congress any notable instances of what could be set down as corruption.

It should not be overlooked, in considering the significance of the Congress of Vienna for the national, and perhaps also for the international, life of its times, that many interests were represented in connexion with it at the Austrian capital lying outside the political sphere proper—religious and confessional (by ardent Catholics such as Friedrich Schlegel and Zacharias Werner); military (by the French Marshals anxious about their dotations); financial and commercial (by the Hanseatic Jews). Science was hardly yet a world-interest, and Karl August of Weimar probably stood alone in the curiosity he showed in inspecting the Viennese mineralogical collections. Jahn, the Teutonic enthusiast, must have, in a very different sense, felt out of water. Journalism had never had more arduous functions to perform: the eminent publisher Cotta, who was present in person, was awake to the opportunities of the great Augsburg organ; while Metternich's intimate Pilat edited the semi-official *Austrian Observer*, against which the *New Hamburg Observer* was set up in the Prussian interest.

¹ The cost of the secret police at Vienna is given at a little under £5,000 for 1814, and, with a few outside jobs, at a little under £6,200 for the following year.

★THE POLISH-SAXON QUESTION

In the earlier months of the Congress, the Polish question, with which the Saxon seemed inextricably connected, overshadowed all others in importance. It was as if, in this shape, there had come upon Europe what was at once a Nemesis and a doom, provoked alike, in the words of a French diplomatist at the Congress,¹ by the system of partition carried on by Russia, Prussia and Austria. It had been established by them in the case of Poland, and, though interrupted by the French Revolution, it was now at work again and, unless it were broken up, seemed likely to endure so long as there was anything to divide. In its present stage, it involved a territorial distribution as to which the interests of Russia, and, much more, the ambition of the Tsar, were in direct conflict with the traditional policy of both Austria and Great Britain; nor was there much likelihood that the interests of Prussia, which Alexander had taken care to bind up with his own, could be separated from his by his 'grateful' neighbour and ally. Castlereagh, however, made the attempt, taking advantage of the necessity in which France found herself of making sure of the goodwill of Austria.

Alexander, whose authoritative position in the Near East had derived fresh strength from the first Treaty of Bukharest (May, 1812), which put an end to his war with Turkey, had, after the failure of the Napoleonic invasion of Russia, returned to his Polish schemes. Instead, however, of attempt-

¹ Count La Tour du Pin.

ing to absorb, under the designation of the kingdom of Poland, the whole of the former duchy of Warsaw, he now aimed at acquiring possession only of the major part of it. In a secret article of the so-called Treaty of Kalisch (February 28th, 1813), Russia guaranteed to Prussia the territories joining 'Old-Prussia' to Silesia; and, in the Treaty of Reichenbach (June 27th), she agreed to the partitioning of the duchy among the three Eastern Powers. The 'joining' territories to which the Kalisch secret article adverted meant Saxony; and the guarantee in question, though not communicated to Austria, became known to Metternich. Finally, in a secret article of the Treaty of Töplitz (September 9th), provision was made for the amicable settlement of the proposed partition of the ducal dominions among the three Powers.

This final settlement had now become a matter of vital interest to all the Great Powers. Austria was full of anxiety about her Galician frontier, and about the imminent advance of the strength of Russia in Eastern Europe; while British policy had, since the days of Pitt, borne the same danger in mind. On the other hand, Prussia clung to the promise made to her of Saxony, in compensation of her renunciation of a large part of the Polish dominions of which she had been deprived in 1806. France, whose interference in the matter it had at first been intended to obviate by excluding her from the preliminary Conferences at Vienna, was traditionally interested in the kingdom of Poland, and would, like Great Britain, have welcomed its integral restoration to independence, though averse from its repartition; as to Saxony, Louis XVIII.

had a family interest in the fortunes of her sovereign, King Frederick Augustus.

At first, the Polish-Saxon question had seemed to Castlereagh capable of an amicable settlement, if, in return for the acquisition of the whole of Saxony, Prussia would join with Austria and Great Britain in opposing the undue aggrandisement of Russia. She had annexed Finland, become possessed of sections of Galicia, and incorporated Bessarabia at the mouth of the Danube ; and she now desired to advance as far as Cracow and to let her constitutional kingdom of Poland exercise its growing attractions upon the Galician Poles. Hardenberg, who with other Prussian statesmen could not but be anxious to recover as much as possible of Prussia's former Polish possessions, had seemed disposed to go some way with Metternich, but had found his sovereign unwilling to thwart Alexander's plans. As to Saxony, he had, on September 28th, signed at Vienna with Nesselrode a Protocol which stated the intention of the King of Prussia to add Saxony to his dominions—not however incorporating it in them as a province, but preserving its designation and present status as a kingdom—and notified the approval given to this arrangement by the Emperor of Russia. Still, the situation remained uncertain. On Castlereagh's arrival at Vienna, he frankly informed Alexander that the execution of his plans *in toto* was impossible, inasmuch as the kingdom of Poland which he proposed to establish under his rule and which he meant to comprise nearly three-quarters of the duchy of Warsaw would leave the German Powers without the frontiers and the frontier-fortresses necessary

for their security. On behalf of Austria, Metternich was playing a somewhat uncertain game, at one time even thinking of compensations in Italy for the relinquishment of the Polish territory ceded by his sovereign in 1809; and, as to Saxony, going back upon the assent which he had signified to its transfer to Prussia, provided she would leave Mainz to Bavaria (thus facilitating the Austrian settlement with that state). This change of attitude was, no doubt, largely due to the widespread sympathy entertained for the unfortunate Frederick Augustus, seemingly doomed to lose his kingdom after he had lost his duchy. It is not surprising that this feeling should have been strong among the German princes, and in particular with the King of Bavaria and the princes of the Ernestine line of the Saxon House, headed by the Duke of Coburg;¹ and the general feeling in the kingdom itself was against the transfer. A literature on the subject speedily accumulated; and, so early as November 2nd, Talleyrand put forth a *Mémoire raisonné sur la Saxe*, and was authorised by his sovereign to enter, for the sake of peace, into a combination with Austria, Bavaria, and, eventually, with Great Britain.

Meanwhile, the administration of the kingdom of Saxony, which had hitherto been conducted by the Russian Prince Repnin, was on November 8th handed over to the Prussian authorities, who, to the indignation of the Austrian statesmen, prematurely declared that they assumed it as a permanency with the concurrence of the Powers.

Castlereagh's plan of a united resistance to the

¹ Karl August of Weimar, in the end, favoured the change.

Russian design on the part of the other Great Powers had thus broken down on what Talleyrand called the 'treason' of Prussia. On November 7th, in the presence of both the Tsar and King Frederick William III., Hardenberg signified the Prussian assent to the Russian proposal of a kingdom of Poland in return for concessions as to its frontiers, concerning which no definite decision was reached. This implied, on the one hand, that Alexander perceived the impossibility of his securing the entire duchy, on the other, that Prussia finally separated herself on the Polish question from Austria and the Western Powers. Mett-
ernich's change in the treatment of the subsidiary
Saxon question has been diversely regarded as the cause, and as the consequence, of his treatment of the Polish. Castlereagh, for the moment, allowed himself to fall into the background, being no doubt influenced by the fact that public opinion seemed less rather than more inclined to favour British intervention in these complications. But, after the failure of the negotiations with Prussia, whose interests he had been disposed to support as those of the Power most advantageously placed for staying the aggrandisement of Russia, he was naturally inclined to take a more sympathetic view of the claims of the King of Saxony.

Talleyrand, in whose political insight the power of discerning the right moment was perhaps the most notable element, now saw that his hour had come, not only for bringing about a decision of the Polish-Saxon question, but for putting an end to the isolation of France in European politics.¹

¹ The account given by him to his sovereign of his proceedings at this crisis, we may be sure, lost nothing in the telling.

While Metternich was, under one pretext or another, seeking to gain time before proceeding to joint action, the first French plenipotentiary was all activity. To Castlereagh he made bold to intimate, through his half-brother Charles Stewart (ambassador at Vienna and a plenipotentiary at the Congress), that, if the British persisted in remaining 'men of Chaumont,' France would retire from the Congress. His supreme purpose was to do his utmost for asserting her influence there; and for this the Saxon part of the double question afforded him an incomparable opportunity. At the same time, it illustrated with irresistible force the doctrine of legitimacy on which he was insisting as on the cardinal principle of Congressional policy, while he put forward the French Bourbon monarchy as that principle's natural representative and guardian, and asserted France to have no other wish than to vindicate this principle for all the nations of Europe.¹ Although Castlereagh prevented Talleyrand from issuing a memorandum in this sense, the generalities of which might have

¹ Conquest, this theory maintained, does not confer sovereignty, nor do the rights of a sovereign cease till he has himself ceded them. The consequences flowing from this axiom, which applies both to the retention of Saxony by Frederick Augustus and to the restoration of Ferdinand VII. at Naples, must not, however, be carried into the domain of the impossible; and, since an independent Poland cannot be restored, it will be best, in the interests of Europe, to agree to as restricted a duchy of Warsaw under Alexander as will be accepted by him. Talleyrand was good enough to observe that, although the assistance of British statesmen was most welcome in carrying out the theory advocated by him, they could not be expected to have formed an exact idea of the meaning of legitimacy: 'from this they were prevented by the principles their countrymen had learnt in India.'

proved dangerous, the cooperation of Great Britain and France became more and more desirable. It was about this time that Castlereagh began to draw back from his approval of the acquisition by Prussia of the whole of the kingdom of Saxony, and that (December 2nd) he received instructions, which must have accorded with his wishes, to oppose the Saxon policy of Prussia and the Polish of Russia. Shortly afterwards (December 10th), Metternich categorically refused Austria's concurrence in the cession of all Saxony, insisting, at the same time, on the return of Cracow to Austria, and of Thorn to Prussia, instead of their being absorbed by Russia or constituted free cities. The Tsar, who was, of course, far more deeply interested in the Polish than in the Saxon side of the problem, hereupon, in his turn, recurred to the proposal formerly made by him, and, through Czartoryski, suggested that he would meet the wishes of the House of Bourbon with regard to the throne of Naples, if the French plenipotentiary would take his view of the Saxon difficulty. As to this, moreover, he would give his assent to the acquisition by Prussia of part, instead of the whole, of Saxony, a *noyau* (kernel) being left to King Frederick Augustus. This suggestion was mentioned by Metternich to Hardenberg—to the intense wrath of the Tsar, whose mind may, conceivably, not have been altogether made up on the subject.

Castlereagh now again came to the front. He was not actuated by any hostility to Prussia, and was prepared to mediate effectively between her and Austria, so as, if possible, to unite Europe

against the Russian designs.¹ In order, more especially, to clear up the calculations as to Prussia's previous losses and prospective gains of territory, to which the ultimate solution of the Saxon question would have to be adjusted, but as to which considerable difference of opinion obtained between Austria and Prussia, a Statistical Committee of the Congress was proposed by Castlereagh, who had, with the Tsar's consent, been invited by the two German Great Powers to mediate on the Saxon question. In this Committee, which held its first sitting on December 24th, the second French plenipotentiary, the Duc de Dalberg, was included, Talleyrand having threatened, if France were left unrepresented upon it, to quit the Congress. Expert services like those of the eminent Prussian statesman, Hoffmann, were, at the same time, requisite, since the number of inhabitants of conquered territories to be disposed of by the Congress was reckoned at over 31 millions.

Yet, although the wishes of France were thus considered, and although her action had beyond doubt materially helped to bring about a reconsideration of the Saxon difficulty, the Tsar was not yet disposed to be overruled. On December 27th, he insisted on a Conference of the Four Powers being summoned on the Saxo-Polish question; and it met two days later. No French plenipotentiary was admitted to this conclave, till January 8th, when, as will be seen, the height of the crisis had been passed. At the Conference, a solution of the Saxon difficulty was proposed by Prussia, or rather expanded from one made by her a fortnight earlier

¹ Cf. C. K. Webster, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-4.

(December 16th): that she should acquire the whole of Saxony, but that its King should be compensated by a compact dominion on the left bank of the Rhine, comprising the whole of Luxemburg (now a grand-duchy) except the citadel, which was to be made a federal fortress, and part of the archbishopric of Treves, with the town of Bonn. The population would amount to over 700,000 souls. But Castlereagh would not listen to this proposal of placing under the sway of a dethroned vassal of Napoleon a German border-state on the Lower Rhine.¹ Thus, curiously enough, the Polish question was virtually (though not yet quite definitively) settled at this Conference, by the acceptance of the Russian demands, before an agreement was reached on the Saxon difficulty. The former had consisted of the acquisition by Russia of the duchy of Warsaw, with the exception of the former palatinates of Gnesen and Posen, and part of West-Prussia, with 850,000 inhabitants, which were now returned to Prussia, and the circle of Tarnopol, with 400,000, which, together with the salt mines of Wiliczka, remained with Austria; while Cracow and Thorn were to be declared free cities.

THE TREATY OF JANUARY 3RD, 1815—THE POLISH-SAXON QUESTION SETTLED

But there were signs of the Tsar's willingness to accept a compromise;² and as to Saxony, Prussia pressed her demand of the whole kingdom with

¹ Its rejection is lamented by Thiers, in whose opinion France ought to have cooperated with Prussia and Russia in seeking to bring about a consummation so favourable to the French interests

² Cf. C. K. Webster, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

great violence, her plenipotentiary even going so far as to threaten resort to arms if his sovereign's claim were further contested. Castlereagh's position was further strengthened¹ by the arrival, on New Year's day, 1815, of the news that peace had been concluded at Ghent between Great Britain and the United States. Without delay, he consulted Talleyrand, who agreed to a Treaty between their Governments and the Austrian, to which Metternich at once assented, and which was, accordingly, signed on January 3rd. This Treaty purported that, in the event of its proving impossible to carry out the Treaty of Paris, any one of the three Signatory Powers should, if attacked, be defended by the other two with a force of 150,000 men. Bavaria, Holland and Sardinia were to be invited to accede to the Treaty, and would no doubt have responded with alacrity. The old Coalition, Talleyrand triumphantly wrote to his sovereign on the following day, is dissolved—and for ever.

Such was not the fact; and even the Saxon, and with it the Polish, question were not yet actually closed by this stroke. But the menace of war was to prove sufficient. The credit of the achievement may fairly be divided between Castlereagh and Talleyrand; though it was boldest on the part of the former, whom the British Cabinet had repeatedly warned against war. But he felt that he was master there, and did not shrink from a warlike step intended to prevent war;² Hardenberg, after failing in one more attempt to press the inept

¹ In what way, is shown, *inter alia*, by the satisfaction expressed of Hardenberg, that there was money again among the Allies.

² Cf. Webster, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

scheme of a dominion for King Frederick Augustus on the left bank of the Rhine, with Bonn as his residential capital, began to temporise; and the Tsar, while referring, without animosity, to the reported Treaty, expressed his willingness to agree to the cession of part only of Saxony to the King of Prussia, if the latter agreed to it himself. Thus, Russia's assent—and this is of great importance in judging the significance of this Treaty—had been actually secured for this solution; and the war-cloud was passing away. Frederick William III., indeed (who on this occasion displayed a persistency as to the retention of territory like that, long afterwards, noticeable in his more broad-minded son, the Emperor William I.), resisted to the last the abandonment of his hold upon Leipzig; and his tenacity was in consonance with the wishes of the nationalist party, which had long been labouring for the establishment of the peace of Prussia on as wide a basis as possible. But, as is shown by one of Castlereagh's despatches, he was empowered by Alexander to offer to Prussia, in addition to the Polish territory already agreed upon, the very important fortress of Thorn on the Vistula and its *rayon*; and thus Leipzig, through its trade and through its University one of the most important of German towns, was left part of the Saxon monarchy. Frederick Augustus, re-established on his 'legitimate' throne, ceded to the King of Prussia rather more than two-fifths of his kingdom, and renounced the duchy of Warsaw. The Polish territorial arrangements already noted were now settled; and both the German Great Powers recognised the formation of a kingdom of Poland

of which the Russian Tsar would be the hereditary ruler, and which, with an administration distinct from that of the Russian empire, would possess a constitution of its own. These arrangements were subsequently embodied in separate treaties between the Powers directly concerned, and afterwards confirmed by the Act of the Congress, save that, as if to balance the incorporation in the Prussian monarchy of the (formerly free) city of Danzig, Cracow was, by way of a manifestly hazardous experiment, declared an independent republic.

The final decision as to Saxony necessarily left Prussia relatively unimpeded in her extension in western Germany, though no reconstitution of the monarchy could be altogether satisfactory to those far-seeing politicians whose minds like Stein's and Hardenberg's were intent upon the future awaiting it. As a matter of fact, Prussia's continued lack of an unbroken frontier and of a consequent complete inner cohesion was caused, not by the preservation of the autonomy of the more populous half of Saxony, but by the restoration of Hanover (which now became a kingdom) to the Guelf dynasty, though not with the extended frontiers, which had been hoped for in some quarters.

*MURAT AND NAPLES—NAPOLEON'S RETURN

Thus, the Polish-Saxon problem had at length ceased to be an insuperable obstacle to the accomplishment of the work of the Congress at large; and France had been admitted to the Conference whose efforts had now become the directing centre of that work, though the Committee of Eight had

not been formally superseded. Meanwhile the less bitterly contentious parts of it had been carried on by the Committees to whose labours we will immediately advert. There was, however, one question to which the Great Powers felt compelled to address themselves without delay after the Polish-Saxon problem had been solved, and which Metternich—to say nothing of Wellington (who had now arrived at Vienna as Castlereagh's successor)—was not disposed to accept Talleyrand's bland offer of settling out of hand, with the aid of his Spanish colleague. Murat's retention of the Bourbon throne of Naples, although in accordance with his separate Treaty with Austria of January 11th, 1814, guaranteeing to him the Neapolitan kingdom in return for his guarantee of the Sicilian to Ferdinand IV., bade defiance not only to the principle of legitimacy, but to the whole spirit of the European Coalition against Napoleon. Wellington, whose diplomatic methods were even less occult than Castlereagh's, proposed that Great Britain should take part in the restoration of King Ferdinand at Naples, if she were supported by France in her efforts for the abolition of the slave-trade, on which subject, as it appeared to Talleyrand, British public opinion had nearly gone mad. But Great Britain was spared the trouble of proposing so odd a bargain, and the possibility of friction between France and Austria was avoided, by Murat's own action. Whatever motives, or mixture of motives, may have animated him, he anticipated Napoleon's return by a correspondence, which was intercepted and sent on to Paris, and thence to Vienna, and which helped to bring about his ruin.

Whether or not the return of Napoleon from Elba took all his adversaries by surprise—Castlereagh had, certainly, approved Talleyrand's idea of removing him thence to a place of greater safety, though Metternich had objected—and whether or not the moment for it was ill-chosen, when the chief of those adversaries were still assembled together in counsel, the throw on which he had decided was that of a reckless gambler. In one sense at least, when he reached the Tuileries on March 20th, eighteen days after he had landed at Cannes, he had come too late. His transitory attempt to appear to have a secret understanding with Austria was futile; and of equally little avail to him was the device of communicating to the Tsar (to whom its existence was certainly not unknown), the Treaty of January 3rd, which, strange to say, he had found at the French Foreign Office. He speedily recognised, if he had ever doubted, that his advent on the scene cemented union, instead of intensifying discord, at Vienna. Before long, after going through the pretence that not he, but his adversaries, had violated the compact by which he had taken up his residence on Elba, he had to fall back on proclaiming, through his Council of State, that his cause was that of peace and the independence of France, and to undertake to maintain loyally the Peace of Paris—the document of his downfall.

The course of the Allies—for such they had once more become, though the cause of the Bourbons could no longer be separated from theirs—was, therefore, perfectly clear, and the Congress of Vienna went on, in a literal sense, without inter-

ruption. On March 13th, the Eight Powers who had signed the Treaty of Paris proclaimed that 'Bonaparte' had placed himself outside 'civil and religious relations' with them, and by Talleyrand's putting his name to this manifesto, Louis XVIII. became the ally of the other Powers against Napoleon. The original Four Allies, however, thought it well to confirm, without loss of time (March 25th), what may be truly described as the sheet-anchor of their cohesion—the Treaty of Chaumont, with the immediate object of accomplishing the proper work of the Congress, the carrying out of the provisions of the Peace of Paris. Immediately (on March 27th), Talleyrand signified the adhesion of France to the Treaty, which she had not been invited to sign, lest the Signatory Powers should have been bound to make the conclusion of peace dependent on her consent. Bavaria, Württemberg and the lesser German states followed suit, together with Sardinia, Denmark and the Netherlands.

Opinion among the Allied Powers was not, as yet, agreed as to the limits to be placed on the purposes of their new effort in arms. Austrian statesmanship was, indeed, anything but determined upon a second restoration of the Bourbons. Castlereagh (April 5th) disclaimed any obligation on the British Government to help in imposing any particular rule upon France. The British Government adhered consistently to the principle that the purpose of the present war was simply the suppression of Napoleon, not the establishment of any other dynasty in France; though, at the same time, Wellington, whose opinion could not but have

very great weight, made no secret of his conviction that the only chance of a permanent European peace lay in the Restoration of the Bourbons in France. On the other hand, whether it were true or not that there existed in France no party, except of men over fifty, in favour of a Bourbon restoration, an alternative solution was not treated as out of the question by the Russian Tsar, who once more began to intrigue in favour of a settlement which might permanently raise his influence over French affairs, and who inclined to an Orleans succession to the throne. For the rest, ever since Napoleon's departure from Elba, the Tsar (as if mindful that he had been mainly instrumental in fixing on that island as the vanquished Emperor's place of residence), was heart and soul in the war. Herein, he was at one with Prussia and the great body of general German opinion, conscious as it was of the chance of a second Peace proving more favourable to Prussia and German ambition than the first had been. Yet Prussian statesmanship agreed with Austrian, as to its not being incumbent on the Allies to insist on the Restoration of Louis XVIII., and the Prussian press showed itself very hostile to the Bourbon interest. Thus, the Protocol signed by the representatives of the Eight Powers at Vienna on May 12th, while declaring their relations to 'Bonaparte' unchanged from what they had been on March 13th, contained no explicit reference to the restoration of Louis XVIII.

Before the die was cast in the final struggle against Napoleon, Murat had brought about his own fall. On March 17th he had quitted Naples for his desperate march on Bologna, and, after

failure and retreat, had, at Tolentino, lost both battle and throne (May 2nd and 3rd). Ere the month was out, he had thrown up the game, the Austrians had occupied Naples, and Ferdinand IV. had regained his throne. The Bourbon Restoration in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies was, hereupon, formally recognised by the Eight Powers at Vienna, and no crucial difficulty any longer stood in the way of the permanent settlement of the affairs of the entire peninsula, as it was afterwards formulated in the Act of the Congress.

THE ACT OF THE CONGRESS

To a brief notice of this Act, together with some of the Treaties whose provisions were included in it or added soon afterwards, we may now pass. By the middle of April, Gentz, who early in March had been appointed¹ to draw up a general treaty, had already put into form a large part of the contents of the Act; but the Congress remained at work for some time longer at Vienna. A proposal to transfer it to Brussels, so that it might be in closer contact with headquarters, was dropped. There was, at the last, some fear that time would be wanting for the due completion of the Act, which, as it stands and was signed on June 9th, 1815, by the plenipotentiaries of the Signatory Powers of the Treaty of Paris of May 30th, 1814, purports to embrace the various results of their negotiations, a number of particular Treaties, Conventions, Protocols and Regulations being added to it as Annexes. Napoleon's return to Paris after

¹ With La Besnardiere, to whom Anstell was afterwards added; but the work ultimately devolved on Gentz alone.

Waterloo took place eleven days after the signing of the Act of the Congress. Paris was, or seemed, listless as to the future; and, after the conclusion of an Armistice, and the entry of the Allied troops into the capital, France passed back under the government of the Bourbons by the simple process of the closing of the Chambers by order of the King (July 8th). But Europe, whose peace-settlement the return of Napoleon had, notwithstanding his protests, threatened to undo, was far less ready than was France to accept a resumption of that settlement without change or modification. It may, accordingly, be well in the first instance to summarise its principal conditions, as laid down in the Act of the Congress of Vienna.

AUSTRIA

From the first, Austria, the names of whose plenipotentiaries headed the list of the Signatories of the Act, had resolved to find in Italy what in the negotiations for the Peace of Westphalia would have been called her chief 'satisfaction.' She had, therefore, successfully opposed the consideration of the affairs of Italy in general, like those of Germany, by a Committee, instead of every question concerning an Italian state or territory being discussed separately. Thus she definitively secured her own domination over northern Italy, and her hegemony of the entire peninsula. Her sovereignty was now established over the whole of the newly formed Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, and enhanced by her recovery of all the 'Illyrian Provinces,' with Trieste, and

the Dalmatian coastline. The rule of Austrian Archdukes or Archduchesses was recognised in Modena, and in Massa and Carrara, as well as in the grand-duchy of Tuscany. Parma, Piacenza and Guastella were to be, during her lifetime, under the sway of the Empress (still so called in the Act) Marie-Louise; on her demise, they were to fall to her namesake, the Spanish Infanta, formerly Queen of 'Etruria' (Tuscany), who in the meantime was to rule at Lucca, which would then revert to Tuscany. Even in the Papal States, reconstituted more fully than Austria had wished, she was to have the perpetual right of garrisoning Ferrara and Comachio. The treatment at Vienna of the Pope's claims as a temporal sovereign was largely due to the skilful diplomacy of Cardinal Consalvi, who had begun with demanding the restoration to the Papacy of Avignon and the Venaissin, and thus actually obtained, thanks to the conservative sympathies of the majority of the Powers, the lesser concession of the Legations (States of the Church). Finally, again largely through Austrian influence and a not unnatural miscalculation of the later consequences of this step, the possession of Genoa was, at an early date in the history of the Congress, secured to the King of Sardinia.

BRITISH INTERESTS

The island of Malta, notwithstanding the claims on it of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem (recently domiciled in Sicily), which had been acknowledged in the Peace of Amiens, had in the Peace of Paris been assigned to Great Britain, who had never

relinquished her possession of it. The Ionian Islands, which the French plenipotentiary had, at Vienna, proposed to allot to the Order in compensation for Malta, were not definitively placed under the protectorate of Great Britain till the conclusion of a Treaty between the Four Powers on November 5th, 1815.

HOLLAND AND BELGIUM

While the interests of Great Britain in the Mediterranean thus received ample attention, they were still more conspicuously involved in the question of the union of Holland and Belgium, although the wishes of the majority of the Belgian population for a restoration of the Austrian rule were well known. The Prince of Orange had assumed the sovereignty of the Belgian Provinces on July 21st, 1814; and, on May 31st, 1815, the plenipotentiaries of the new King of the Netherlands and of the Four Powers signed identical Treaties recognising him as sovereign of the newly constituted kingdom. Its frontiers had, inevitably, been much in dispute; the former duchy of Limburg and the bishopric of Liége were both included. The grand-duchy of Luxemburg was assigned in perpetual sovereignty to the King, while at the same time becoming a state of the Germanic Confederation, of which the citadel of Luxemburg was constituted a fortress. In return for the 'compensation' of Luxemburg, the King of the Netherlands, on May 31st, ceded 'in perpetuity' to the King of Prussia all the sovereign possessions of the Nassau-Orange line in Germany. (These were, however, on the same day, with the exception of the principality

of Siegen, transferred by Prussia to the ducal line or lines.¹) The influence of Great Britain, intent upon placing Belgium, and Antwerp in particular, in what seemed the safest tenure, had been paramount in bringing to a conclusion what proved one of the most palpably unfortunate transactions of the Congress. It may be added that, as to the formerly Dutch colonies in British occupation, an arrangement was made—partly by means of pecuniary indemnities—whereby some of these, including the Cape of Good Hope, remained in British hands, while others, including Java,² were returned to the Netherlands.

SWITZERLAND

The complicated constitutional relations of a Federation very different in its history from the United Provinces—that of the Swiss cantons—had been considered at Vienna by a separate Committee appointed by the Eight Powers. The Swiss diplomatic agency was as effective as it was numerous, and dealt successfully with a conflict of influences in which that of the Vaudois La Harpe's pupil, Tsar Alexander, was strenuously exerted on the Liberal, or progressive, side. The sagacious patriotism of H. von Reinhard, burgomaster of Zurich and chairman of the 'Long Diet' which sat till the end of August, 1815, carried the Confederation safely out of the age of the Act of Mediation into

¹ In particular, the principalities of Dietz, Dillenburg and Hadamar.

² A cession which would have been most disastrous to British Eastern trade, but for the subsequent purchase and development of Singapore.

a new era of its political life; and the Congress Committee brought to pass a constitutional settlement which, on the whole, rather lessened than strengthened the federal bond and was approved by the nineteen cantons and the three now added to their number—Vaud, Geneva and the former principality of Neuchâtel. What was of even greater consequence, the guarantee of the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland declared by the Eight Powers on March 20th, 1815, was promulgated as an *annexæ* to the Act of the Congress, and formally executed on November 29th following. It has ever since remained the international basis of the political existence of Switzerland.

SCANDINAVIA

The Act of the Congress made no reference to Scandinavian affairs proper—a circumstance reflecting the fact that Sweden and Denmark had alike ceased to play a part of primary importance in European politics; so that the ambition of Bernadotte remained only partially satisfied, and the personal popularity of King Frederick VI. of Denmark at Vienna availed him nothing against the ill-fortune which had fallen on his state with the beginning of the century. In the Peace of Kiel (January 14th, 1814), Denmark had ceded Norway to Sweden, being assigned in return 'Swedish' (western) Pomerania with the island of Rügen, while the (Schleswig) island of Heligoland, which had since 1807 been occupied by Great Britain, was now formally transferred to her. So far as Sweden was concerned, this settlement represented

her final abandonment of Finland and of any claim to the command of the Baltic. But the Danish compensation was not carried into effect, insomuch that, by a Treaty between Denmark and Prussia concluded on June 4th, 1815, Denmark ceded the rights she had acquired over Swedish Pomerania and Rügen to Prussia, the aspirations of the Great Elector thus at last finding their fulfilment; while the King of Denmark had to content himself with the cession of the petty duchy of Lauenburg, and the payment of a small pecuniary indemnity (£134,000 c.) by Prussia.

PORTUGAL

Unlike Denmark, Portugal—still of some political consequence, and not yet dispossessed of Brazil—had deserved well of the European Coalition against Napoleon, and enjoyed the constant goodwill of Great Britain, in particular. Thus, in her long quarrel with Spain as to the retrocession of the frontier-fortress of Olivenza,¹ she was encouraged to resist the avidity of her neighbour—with the curious result that the Act of Congress contained a clause engaging the Signatory Powers to use their best endeavours for the restoration of that place to Portugal, and that, largely on this account, the Spanish plenipotentiary refused to sign the Act.

* THE GERMANIC CONFEDERATION

It has been already noted that, of the two important problems still awaiting final settlement by

¹ This restoration did not take place.

the Congress at the time of Napoleon's reappearance on the scene, the Neapolitan had been hurried to an issue by the precipitate action of King Joachim himself. The other, on the contrary, had undergone abundant discussion, both before and since the time of the first assembling of the Congress. A draft scheme, in which W. von Humboldt, at that time very intimate with Stein, had had a large share, was submitted by the latter, in March, 1814, both to the Tsar Alexander and to Count Münster, who, as Hanoverian Minister in London, advised the British Government on German affairs (and generally in a sense adverse to Prussian interests). This draft was revised by Stein and Hardenberg in July, and shown to Metternich before it came before the Congress. Here, on October 14th, 1814, a Committee appointed by the Four Powers, and consisting of plenipotentiaries of the five principal German states (Saxony being of course excluded), met to prepare, in accordance with a provision of the First Peace of Paris, a draft Constitution for the Germanic Confederation established in principle by that Peace. It is difficult to say whether it was altogether to the advantage of an enduring agreement that Stein secured from the non-German Powers (and *imprimis* from the Tsar, who reposed great confidence in him) a promise to abstain from any interference in the proceedings of the Committee on the Germanic Constitution. Nothing could be of more moment than a satisfactory internal settlement of Germany for the political future of Europe, and for the maintenance of that Balance of Power by which it was primarily conditioned. This Balance was always in danger of

being disturbed when the relations between the two German Great Powers were mutually hostile, as in the middle of the eighteenth century, or when there was a number of lesser sovereign states which could subordinate their policy to that of a foreign Power, as in the Napoleonic age to France, and in the future, conceivably, to Russia. In any case, the absence of foreign interference actually gave Austrian statesmanship a freer hand in thwarting, as it in the end successfully did, any constitutional scheme in which the position and influence of Austria were not left, to all intents and purposes, paramount.

In the first instance, the Committee took into consideration the scheme which had been evolved from Stein's original draft, and which may be conveniently described as that of a German pentarchy under dual control. The entire Confederation was to be divided into five Circles, respectively under the control of Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg and Hanover, while a Directory over the whole was to be committed to the two Great Powers, and the Presidency of the Diet of the Confederation was to be conferred upon Austria. There was no mention of any representative assembly either at the seat of the Confederation or in the particular states. The scheme broke down hopelessly, though it had had the support, both of Prussia, desirous above all of cementing her power in northern Germany, and—but more faintly—of Austria. It was favoured by Hanover; but the other secondary states were short-sighted enough to refuse acceptance of it, chiefly because of the encroachment they held it to involve upon

the full sovereignty and independence claimed by them, and as a matter of fact promised by Austria to Bavaria¹ in the Treaty of Ried (October 8th, 1814) and to Württemberg in that of Fulda (November 2nd). And it soon became manifest how correctly Metternich had calculated, and how the edifice of a Germanic Federal Constitution, if it was to be built up at all, must rest on the sandy foundations of the sovereignty of the several Princes and Free Cities forming the Confederation. On November 16th, twenty-nine German states, affirming that their sovereign rights had been acknowledged by the Great Powers, issued a manifesto asserting their claim to take part in the discussion of the future German Constitution, which, they declared, could not be enduringly settled without the creation of a Federal Executive head. Thus, both the secondary and the smaller states (which at first had not objected to the restriction of their sovereignty in the event of the restoration of the Empire) were now in agreement with Metternich's policy; and the only interest which continued to favour the idea of a restored Empire was that of the 'Mediatised,' as they are (rather loosely) designated—*i.e.*, the magnates who had definitively lost their rights of sovereignty, though retaining certain privileges of rank. After the appearance of the aforesaid manifesto, and the simultaneous receipt of a note from the Württemberg Government, declaring its inability to cooperate further in the making of a Constitution, together with a

¹ Bavaria might have been better able to press her own views, had she managed to be a signatory of the First Treaty of Paris, and thus secured a seat at the Congress of Vienna.

protest from the Government of Baden, the Committee adjourned *sine die*.

In the following few months, the tension between Austria and Prussia, the conflict between whose interests was of course a main difficulty of the German problem, after, on a different question, it had nearly ended in war, only gradually relaxed. But the return from Elba was followed by a renewal of the alliance in arms between the two German Great Powers. During this interval, there was an almost continuous flow of interesting, and more or less important, publicistic literature on the subject of the future Germanic Constitution; and, in December, even before the antagonism between the two Powers on Saxon questions had come to an end, Baron J. P. von Wessenberg, the second Austrian plenipotentiary at the Congress and one of the most efficient men of affairs there, had drafted a new constitutional project. It provided for a Federal Diet, which should consist of representatives of all the states, and should, under Austrian presidency, control the concerns of the Confederation. On February 10th, Hardenberg and Humboldt submitted to Metternich two alternative drafts, partaking of the nature of a compromise as to the use of the executive and legislative powers of the Federal Government, and providing for the exercise of its military and judicial functions. The two Great Powers were agreed that, on the resumption of the discussions on the Federal Constitution, all the sovereign 'Princes and Estates' of Germany should be invited to take part in them. Thus, when, on May 23rd, a debate formally opened on the last of a long series of drafts

Austria
Prussia

—viz., a revision, through the joint efforts of Metternich and Hardenberg, of Wessenberg's draft of the previous December—it was conducted as a Conference attended by plenipotentiaries of all the German princes and Free Cities, represented either severally or collectively (with the exception of Württemberg). At the second meeting of this Conference, when the actual debate followed and extended to a great length, the First Article was adopted in the amended form proposed by Bavaria, that 'the sovereign Princes and Free Cities of Germany unite in a Confederation, to bear the name of the Germanic Confederation.'¹ The Federal Constitution eventually adopted was declared by Metternich to offer only the basis of a Constitution, which would be subsequently elaborated by the Federal Diet now established. Thus, the proof of the Constitution was to lie in its actual proceedings, with regard both to those provisions laid down in it for immediate operation—the military and judicial systems established by it—and to the additional provisions of which it held out a promise: such as those for the liberty of the Press and for the establishment of a Territorial Constitution in every one of the Federal states. And of this history, and of that of the Federal Diet above all, Austrian statecraft, from the first, undertook to determine the bias, and to direct the course. On June 8th, the Federal Act establishing the Federal Constitution was signed on behalf of thirty-six Governments, certain modifications having been made in it at the

¹ Cf. d'Angeberg, pp. 1219 *f.*; 1227 *ff.* It is not quite clear whether the Württemberg plenipotentiaries attended the second meeting.

last, mainly in order to meet particularist susceptibilities,¹ Würtemberg and Baden (and Hesse-Homburg) coming in rather later. Eleven articles of the Federal Act were (on the following day) inserted in the Act of the Congress, together with a further article confirming the remaining dispositions of the former Act, as if they were actually part of the latter.

{ The Germanic Confederation and its Diet were not so much a political *pis aller* as a device for arresting the advance of the national aspirations for unity. To this aspiration the interests of particularist sovereignty were naturally opposed; and from it Austrian statesmanship shrank with repugnance, while neither Humboldt nor Stein could yet venture to urge Prussia to accept its accomplishment as a political task immediately incumbent upon her. Meanwhile, the territorial changes sanctioned by the Act of the Congress in the dominions of the chief German sovereigns inevitably affected the relations of their states to one another.

¹ It is worth noticing that one of the last modifications introduced into the Federal Act, before it was signed, was one proposed by Bavaria with the approval of Austria, which omitted an article holding out the promise of a common constitution for the Catholic Church in Germany. This project, with which Freiherr Heinrich von Wessenberg (afterwards Vicar-General of Constance) was identified, did not, on consideration, commend itself to Rome, whose instinct was against ideas which, if carried to their logical consequences, made for religious reunion.

AUSTRIAN GAINS

✓ Austria, as has been seen, had once more become mistress of a great foreign (Italian) dominion; and, while she had wisely abstained from reuniting the former Austrian Netherlands to her possessions (as was desired by most of their inhabitants), saw herself now mistress of the vastest and most compact empire over which the Habsburgs had ruled for a couple of centuries. Nor should it be forgotten that the potent principle of nationality, with which she was ere long to enter into a long-protracted struggle, had not yet begun to exert its disintegrating influence, and had, so far, not been met by her in a spirit of provocative hostility. In Germany she had, as will be seen, come to a settlement with Bavaria; but, though she had already regained the faithful Tyrol, while Bavaria was in possession of Würzburg and Aschaffenburg, the remaining arrangements between the greater and the lesser monarchy had not yet been definitively adjusted.

PRUSSIAN GAINS

✓ The gains of Prussia, as enumerated in the Act of the Congress, were in origin far more composite and, from the point of view of increased political strength, much less satisfactory in sum. To her partial recovery of her Polish possessions, which included both Danzig and Thorn, and to her acquisition of a moiety of Saxony, reference has already been made. Whatever advantages might accrue to Prussia's political future from these gains, a state had been left in existence between

her and the Austrian frontiers, which, in the event of a collision between the two Great Powers, was most unlikely to be found on Prussia's side. On the other hand, all that had been taken from her to help to form the Napoleonic kingdom of Westphalia, and much else, including a long list of acquisitions on the left bank of the Rhine, the whole electorate of Treves and part of the electorate of Cologne, were now definitively hers. Yet, apart from the fact that her gain in population had not been more than half a million, while her territorial area had undergone a slight diminution, as compared with that before the Peace of Tilsit, she was more than ever a complex of dominions broken into two halves. And, although she was far more German than she had been at the time of the greatest extent of her Polish dominions under Frederick William II. and III., she was, in other respects—in that of religious confessions above all, and also in that of political sympathies, economic interests and judicial systems—more divided in herself than in any previous period of her history. Time would, doubtless, be on her side in respect of her internal consolidation; but this could not be accomplished at once, even in a state so exceptionally well organised.

OTHER GERMAN STATES

Of the remaining German states it is only necessary to say that the changes introduced into their limits by the settlement reached at the Congress were not such as to advance the prospect of national unity. The feeling at the Congress (as

rightly interpreted by Privy Councillor Jordan, one of the most influential of Hardenberg's advisers) was in favour of important organised states—and 'anti-atomic' in dealing with claims such as those of the 'Mediatized.' Austria and Prussia, it will be noted, entered into the Confederation only with such of their component provinces or parts as had formerly been comprised in the Holy Roman Empire—the Transleithanian moiety of the Austrian Empire, and Prussia proper with Posen, thus remaining respectively outside the Confederation. Bavaria, whose final settlement with Austria on the basis of their Secret Treaty concluded at Paris on June 3rd, 1814, did not altogether close the door upon her hopes of future aggrandisement,¹ and some of the other secondary states, accordingly, continued to be of sufficient importance to make possible the revival of one of the most unfortunate constitutional projects of later German politics—the idea of a *Trias*, or tripartite, Confederation. It should be added that ~~Mainz~~, during the earlier part of the Congress an apple of discord between Austria and Prussia, was ultimately assigned, not to Bavaria, but to Hesse-Darmstadt; its fortress, however, was made Federal, like those of Luxemburg and Landau.² Included in the Confederation were, besides Hanover, for the present in personal union with Great Britain, the grand-duchy of Luxemburg, united with the kingdom of the Netherlands, and the duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg, forming part of the

¹ Nor did their further Treaty of April 14th, 1816.

² According to a Treaty between Austria and Prussia signed on November 3rd, the fortress of Mainz was to be garrisoned jointly by the two Great Powers.

dominions of the King of Denmark. The smaller states (except Baden) were for the most part well satisfied with the Congress settlement of their limits. Saxe-Weimar gained an increase of 77,000 souls. But the clamour of the 'Mediatized' was virtually ignored; the protests of the Houses of Salm and Fürstenberg and of the Count of Bentinck, seemed to Humboldt to 'require no answer.' Into the general conditions of the Confederation thus established we cannot enter here. Of the seventeen votes in the Diet, over which Austria was to preside, she and Prussia were each to have one vote only; the chief federal obligation resting on the members of the Confederation was to refrain from any alliance with a foreign Government against the Confederation or any other member of it. The drawing up of its fundamental laws, and of its military and internal organism, was left to the Diet; no organic change could, however, be made in the system of the Confederation or in its Constituent Act except by a larger assembly (*plenum*) of 69, in which Austria and Prussia were to have four votes each. In all the states of the Confederation a Constitution consisting of estates 'would take place.' Of the alternatives—a federal bond so peremptory and so strict as to threaten to snap under any eventual pressure, and one so loose and so dependent on the future manipulation of it as to admit of preservation only by adroit management adapting it to the surrounding reactionary influences—can we wonder that the second seemed preferable to the statesmanship under whose guidance this singularly imperfect machinery had been called into existence?

GENERAL RESULTS

The Congress of Vienna had executed its primary task of the territorial resettlement of Europe (with the colonial dominions of European states); and the political allegiance of a total of nearly 32 million inhabitants of lands surrendered by Napoleonic France had been determined. Yet, though not a few arbitrary arrangements had taken place, and though there are strange instances in the story of the appropriations made, offered or sought,¹ the charge of reckless bargaining with soil or 'souls' is one which cannot, in fairness, be sustained. Meanwhile, a great territorial system had been established which, with all its imperfections, had this advantage over all previous attempts in the same direction: that not only was the compact on which it rested signed by the principal European states, but that it could not be violated except at the risk of international outlawry, while it might be renewed or amended by the same authority as that which had established it. Of the tasks outside this, and of their fulfilment, few traces are to be found in the Act of the Congress—a sort of *residuum* of the great expectations cherished by the 'ideologists' as to the labours which this Herculean amphictyony was to achieve and to consecrate by the erection of a new temple of peace. It should, perhaps, be remembered that the idea of deferring the conclusion of the Congress, while its results still remained so far from complete, was actually entertained there, and not altogether

¹ The compensations thought of for Eugène Beauharnais furnish perhaps the most grotesque example of (intended) arbitrary transfer.

from interested motives; so that it was the overwhelming desire for peace felt throughout Europe which brought the Congress to what was, in some respects, a premature close.

THE LAWS OF THE SEA

The laws of the sea were unlikely to undergo modifications in an assembly where the last word was, in reality, that of the great Maritime Power without whose subsidies the land-war could not have been brought to a close, or the Peace, of which the Congress was summoned to fill up the outline, concluded. On the other hand, the fact that no Continental System was again possible after the re-establishment of a Balance of Power, was to the advantage of European commercial intercourse, as well as of British trade. The Act of the Congress laid down the principles of an international system of river navigation which opened the prospect of an advance in commercial intercourse of very great importance to Europe, more especially at the time when railway communication was still a thing of the future. Of steps preliminary to the advent of an age of peace among the nations none had been taken or so much as seriously discussed. The establishment of a Tribunal of Arbitration on matters of dispute between nations, and the reduction by mutual agreement of the armed forces of the several Powers, remained ideas to be formulated as international proposals in another age. But a conscientious attempt, at least, had been made to remove two blots, a greater and a less, defacing the civilisation of the present. An

annexe of the Act contained a Declaration of the Eight Powers, proclaiming their adoption of the principle of the abolition of the Slave-trade, though the process of carrying it out was left in the hands of the particular Powers. The endeavours of Great Britain on this head, had, notwithstanding the sneers of Talleyrand, not been in vain; though, as will be seen, the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle was to find it necessary to resume the discussion of the subject, again without carrying it to an effective conclusion. The same was the case with the Barbary pirates, whose misdeeds were, likewise, brought before both Congresses without result, although in the interval the British Navy had made short work with the Dey of Algiers (August, 1816).

THE SIGNING OF THE ACT

The Act of the Congress was signed—by seven out of the Eight Powers—under the date of June 9th, 1815, though the authorisation for the Russian plenipotentiaries to sign did not arrive till the 26th. They had, to the last moment, interposed obstacles of a practical as well as of a formal nature—seeking to the last to meet the wishes of their master by obtaining some substantial endowment for Eugène Beauharnais, who in the end had to content himself with the title of Duke of Leuchtenberg, and the principality (formerly bishopric) of Eichstedt in Bavaria. On the other hand, a radical change was suggested at the last moment for avoiding—or undoing—the partition of Saxony, and opposing a strong barrier to the advance of Russia, by uniting the kingdoms of

Denmark, Sweden and Norway into a single state, while making over Schleswig and Holstein to Prussia and leaving Saxony in its old dimensions. This ingenious eleventh hour scheme, of which the authorship is unknown, necessarily collapsed.

The signing of the Act was followed, on June 12th, by the protests of the Pope against the Resolutions of the Congress 'prejudicial to Religion and the Catholic Church' and against the Treaty of Paris and the Resolutions of the Congress 'prejudicial to the temporal interests of the Holy See.' Sweden (how the relations among the Powers had changed since the Peace of Westphalia!) put on record some insignificant reservations. Spain, who through her plenipotentiary Labrador had altogether refused to sign, because of the settlement as to Parma and the recommendation as to the restoration of Olivenza, did not accede to the Act till June 7th, 1817 (or to the Second Peace of Paris till the following day¹).

¹ Cf. d'Angeberg, pp. 518 ff.

B.—THE HOLY ALLIANCE AND THE SECOND PEACE OF PARIS¹

1815

RENEWAL OF THE TREATY OF CHAUMONT

The Congress of Vienna had, as was seen, continued its deliberations notwithstanding the re-appearance of Napoleon, and this event was not allowed to interfere with carrying them to a formal conclusion before the overthrow at Waterloo of the disturber of the Peace of Europe. Yet his return could not, for more than a few days, be treated as merely an untoward incident. The

¹ Both as to the Holy Alliance and as to the Second Peace of Paris much information will be found in several of the authorities on the Congress of Vienna cited above; but the best connected account of these transactions is that in A. Sorel's *Le Traité de Paris du 20 Novembre, 1815* (Paris, 1872), an essay inspired by a true, though chastened, patriotism. It has a short but useful bibliography. With regard to the Holy Alliance reference may be made to A. Malet's chapter, 'La Sainte Alliance et le Congrès,' in vol. x. of Lavissee and Rambaud's *Histoire Générale* (Paris, 1898). Much has recently been written about the Holy Alliance from the point of view of schemes of international confederation; the subject is treated both fully and attractively in W. Alison Phillips's *The Confederation of Europe* (1914), which covers the period from 1813 to 1823. A brief summary of these efforts is given by A. F. Pollard in *The League of Nations in History* (1918). For German relations in particular, see A. F. H. Schaumann, *Geschichte des zweiten Pariser Friedens für Deutschland* (Göttingen, 1844). The text of the Act of the Holy Alliance will be found in Alison Phillips's book mentioned above, and in vol. i. of Sir E. Hertslet's *The Map of Europe by Treaty* (1875), where the invitation to the Prince-Regent of Great Britain to accede to the Alliance, and his reply, are also printed.

Four Powers—once more Allied, although neither technically nor even, in the same measure, actually, against France—had, as was seen, on March 25th, renewed the Alliance of Chaumont, and Talleyrand had deemed himself sufficiently authorised by the Most Christian King to adhere to it without delay. The game, half-cynical, half-desperate, hereupon played by Napoleon, it forms no part of our present purpose to describe. While he declared himself bent upon carrying out loyally the Peace of Paris, which the Alliance reknit against him had undertaken to maintain, he made an attempt, in his most insidious style of statecraft, to play off for the benefit of Russia the Treaty of Alliance which Austria had concluded (January 3rd) with Great Britain and France for the event of the Polish-Saxon difficulty ending in war. But the revelation which the incredible carelessness of the French Foreign Office enabled him to make, and which, in other circumstances, could hardly have failed to intensify Alexander's far from friendly feeling towards the Bourbons, availed Napoleon little or nothing. The existence of the Treaty was no secret to the Tsar. Thus, the conflict in arms proceeded on the definite issue which could neither be misrepresented nor glossed over.

At the same time, Talleyrand's well-calculated haste in seeking to identify his Government with the Alliance against Napoleon, and in insisting upon the restoration of the Bourbons as forming one of its purposes, was far from welcome to the Four Powers. Least of all did it approve itself to the two statesmen most conspicuously charged with the care of British interests in the settlement.

Whatever might be their personal wishes or expectations, they knew that strong resistance would be offered in Parliament to any war carried on for the reseating of a particular dynasty on a foreign throne. Wellington, who, from first to last, himself heartily desired the restoration of the Bourbons, was on this head of one mind with Castlereagh, who, on April 25th, 1815, on proceeding to ratify the Treaty of March 25th in the name of the Prince-Regent, formally declared that it must not be interpreted as binding Great Britain to pursue the war with the view of imposing any particular Government upon France. Metternich's reply expressed the entire concurrence of the Austrian Government in this reservation¹; and it would appear that the Russian and Prussian Governments expressed themselves in the same sense. Certainly, patriotic German opinion had never been more bitterly adverse to the Bourbons; while public feeling in England was unanimous against internal intervention in France, although parliamentary attempts to stop the war itself broke down.

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND WATCHING CONFERENCE

Thus, when the issue of that war had been decided at Waterloo, and when, after Napoleon's abdication on June 22nd, the commissaries appointed by the French Chamber arrived at the Allied headquarters at Hagenau, they were informed by the Allied plenipotentiaries that they had no authority to negotiate with the French

¹ D'Angeberg, pp. 974-6.

people; and nothing came of the conference, except that Lord Stewart lost his temper with Lafayette. On July 3rd, Paris capitulated. An armistice was concluded between the British and Prussian, and the French armies; and, on the 8th, the Chamber of Peers having been expelled, the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies was, in the name of the King's Government, announced in the *Moniteur*. No address, such as Wellington had recommended, had been offered to the King by the Chambers; nor had any royal promise of seeking to meet the wishes of the nation preceded their dissolution. The Bourbons simply returned to power under the shadow of an armed foreign intervention, which had announced that it would do nothing on their behalf. A watching Conference of the Ministers of the Four Powers was set up, to meet—at first every day—at the British embassy. Its task was to supervise the progress of French affairs; and this board of control seems to have continued to hold its sittings, and to exercise a more or less direct influence, till the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle.

Thus, to go back to the summer of 1815, the Bourbon *régime*, without national approval and without European prestige, confronted the Coalition, which, with arms still in hand, proceeded to impose peace upon France, distracted as she was by the invasion north of the Loire, by the beginnings of the 'White Terror' in southern France, and, between them, by the presence of the army, desirous of a fresh revolution. Peace it was to be—but what sort of a peace? The terms of the First Peace of Paris had, certainly, been by no means exacting, and the military occupation of French territory

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accompanying the conclusion of it had not been unnecessarily protracted. But the present invasion was carried on both on a different scale and in a different spirit, significant of the widespread hopes as to the new conditions on which the new Peace would be made. British feeling on the subject, violent in the hour of danger, was no longer such in the hour of victory; and, though the Prime-minister, Lord Liverpool, was in favour of taking something from France, neither Castlereagh nor Wellington cherished any wish of the kind. German national sentiment, on the other hand, nurtured by the *Tugendbund* (the German *carboneria* of the epoch of oppression) and brought home to the Emperor Alexander by Stein,¹ was, on this head, at one with the policy of the Prussian statesmen Hardenberg and Humboldt, with the demands of the military party, and with the appetites of the south-western states. 'What we demand from France' was now, as it was to be more than half a century later, the question which a victorious nation under arms propounded, but which it was not to be allowed, as it was in 1871, to settle for itself.

GERMAN DEMANDS AND THE POWERS

Thus, from Prussia and the lesser German states in the south-west, there arose a cry for aggrandisement, which, with the addition of minor cessions to the Netherlands, Switzerland and Savoy, would

¹ The connexion between Stein and the *Tugendbund* is wholly legendary; he opposed it, and it was dissolved by royal ordinance in December, 1809. See A. Fournier, 'Zur Geschichte des Tugendbunds' in *Historische Studien u. Skizzen* (Prague and Leipzig, 1885).

have, indeed, amounted to the 'dismemberment' of France, and which, in their widest range, included Franche-Comté and Burgundy. In the meantime, the Emperors of Austria and Russia, together with the King of Prussia, decided to remain in Paris till the conclusion of the peace negotiations by the plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers; for Alexander's hope of dictating peace, while a French representative body, perhaps presided over by La Harpe, should determine the future Constitution of France, had more or less passed away. The confidential stage of the actual negotiations began on July 28th. For some weeks, the French Government was in a most difficult, as well as humiliating, position, uninformed as to diplomatic transactions carried on in its own capital, or only admitted to a hearing as an outside solicitant. Yet French interests were not left without defenders among the Allies themselves. Notwithstanding the view commending itself to the British public at large, and for a time shared by the head of the British Government, that France should at last be taught a lesson which would ensure the future peace of Europe, both Castlereagh and Wellington, who represented Great Britain in the Paris discussions, held that the primary interest of Europe lay in the conclusion of a durable Peace on a basis not essentially different from that which the Allies had agreed to maintain; and Wellington was clear that Great Britain ought to seek to secure the lasting goodwill of France by protecting her against the imposition of intolerable conditions of peace. Moreover, the British negotiators were aware of the desire of the Tsar to play a protecting part of his own in the

future; and neither they nor Metternich could shut their eyes to his inclination to secure for his Eastern designs, which were at this time reviving, the support of France as the only Power likely to fall in with these projects. On the other hand, there was nothing to attract his approval in the German annexationist schemes and aspirations, towards which even Austria maintained an attitude of reserve. Neither the Emperor Francis nor Metternich was likely to support the allotment of Alsace and Lorraine to Archduke Charles;¹ if, however, Prussia received Alsace, Austria would require a compensation, or again, if it fell to Bavaria; were it divided between Württemberg and Baden, then Bavaria must be compensated—and so on.

When the peace negotiations opened, a note by Capo d'Istria at once sought to impress upon the Allies the guiding counsels of his master. It pronounced the Allied Powers to be at peace with France, and declared that any direct or indirect enfeeblement of her would be tantamount to a declaration to the contrary. Humboldt and Hardenberg, however, protested that it was impossible to distinguish between the nation and the usurper, and that a durable peace implied the restoration by France to her neighbours of the 'defensive' of which she had deprived them—in other words of Alsace and of the barrier of fortresses from the Meuse to the Moselle and the Sarre. Metternich thought it well to move part of the way in the same direction, advocating the taking away from France of the points of offence left to her by the First

¹ He had retired from the chief command in 1809, but in 1815 he undertook that at Mainz.

Peace of Paris. But the British plenipotentiaries insisted that whatever cessions were demanded from France should be on a quite moderate scale, and imposed not as by right of conquest, but by virtue of some such principle as that of a return to the 'old' French frontiers. Long discussions followed, in which the Prussian plenipotentiaries more and more openly upheld the wishes of the lesser German states, while Stein appealed in the same sense to the goodwill of the Tsar. By the end of August, this singularly interesting and momentous debate had come to narrow itself, in essence, to the following issues.

ARMY OF OCCUPATION

* All the Powers represented agreed to an occupation of French territory by Allied troops, Russia and Great Britain insisting strongly on its temporary character, while Austria fixed it at 150,000, and Prussia at as many as 240,000, men. All, again, agreed to the payment of an indemnity by France, Prussia proposing that it should amount to 1,200 million francs. With regard, however, to the cardinal question of territorial cessions, Russia made no proposal of this description, and Great Britain adhered to the principle that they should not extend beyond a return to the frontiers of 1790. Austria demanded, in addition to this, the cession or dismantling of the fortresses in (French) Flanders and Alsace, and Prussia, without alternative, the cession of these fortresses, while the Netherlands and lesser German states urged the cession of French Flanders, Alsace-Lorraine and Savoy.¹

¹ Cf. Sorel. *op. cit.*, p. 105.

The estimated loss of inhabitants which would have been inflicted on France by the maximum of these demands would have exceeded four and three-quarter millions of souls.

* CASTLEREAGH'S 'ULTIMATUM'

The negotiations on these varying proposals were covered with the utmost secrecy by the plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers, while the representatives of lesser states were restricted to private communications, and King Louis XVIII. and Talleyrand were kept entirely in the dark. On the other hand, the British plenipotentiaries had the twofold difficult task of holding to their line of action the Prince-Regent and the Prime-minister of Great Britain, and of preventing the Russians from too manifestly identifying their Government with a policy of moderation towards France. Herein, indeed, they gradually secured the cooperation of Metternich, whose policy was fundamentally in accordance with their own. Still, this cooperation was, for a time, uncertain, and the lesson which it was held desirable to administer to France on this occasion would, as Metternich himself says,¹ have been far more severe, had it been possible to settle the destiny of Alsace-Lorraine, if relinquished by France, after a fashion satisfactory to the various German interests involved.²

¹ *Memoires*, vol. i., p. 209.

² It is noteworthy that in the accounts of these discussions there is rarely any reference to the wishes of the inhabitants of territories to be allotted. Alexander, however, is found pointing out to Stein that 'the Alsatians object to becoming Germans. Their commercial interests necessitate their union with France.'

In the end, Castlereagh, after completing the conversion of Liverpool and sending Stewart to London to bring about that of the Prince-Regent, on September 2nd proposed what was called an *ultimatum* to France, but what really represented a *maximum* demand from her upon which the Allies were invited to agree. It consisted of the frontiers of 1790, the occupation of certain French fortresses and the levy of an indemnity, which was in part to furnish the means for constructing other fortresses in the states bordering upon France. Russia promptly adhered to this proposal, and, after discussion, it was likewise accepted by France. But Prussia continued to insist on more rigorous terms, and it was not till after an interview between Alexander and Frederick William III. that Hardenberg was ordered by the King to draft a fresh memorandum. In this (presented on September 8th), he accepted the principle of Castlereagh's '*ultimatum*,' merely suggesting certain changes of frontier by means of a rearrangement of *enclaves*. On the other hand, he undertook to prove that the indemnity proposed by Prussia was not higher than was necessary to her or could be reasonably borne by France.

OBJECTS OF ART

A basis had thus been found for a settlement; but, before it could be reached, a secondary question remained to be solved, which had, from the first, given rise to much agitation of feeling, and which was not closed without leaving behind it a long-lasting resentment. In the First Peace of Paris, the Allied Powers had declined to give ear to the loud clamour raised by Italians, Dutch.

Belgians and Germans for the return of the objects of art—statues and pictures in particular—which, in the course of the Napoleonic age, had found their way into France. In the words of King Louis XVIII., these spoils had thenceforth belonged to the French nation ‘by a right more stable and more sacred than that of conquest.’ All the more bitter was the feeling in France, when, in 1815, the restitution of these objects was set down as one of the conditions of peace; and the French Government refused to enter into any negotiation in the matter. Hereupon, the Powers in question began to take the process of recovery into their own hands; and Wellington (as commanding the Allied forces in France) did not think himself called upon to interfere. Thus it was upon him and Castlereagh that descended most of the wrath provoked by a not unnatural, if not wholly correct, proceeding.

The agitation in France inevitably grew, as the uncertainty concerning the whole of the terms of peace to be exacted continued; and, by September 20th, the Four Powers thought it well to forward their ‘*ultimatum*,’ in its final form, to Talleyrand. It demanded from France the surrender of two-thirds of the excess of territory beyond her ‘old’ limits—allowed her in the First Peace of Paris—including that of Savoy and a series of fortresses of which Landau was one, while the fortifications of Huningen were to be rased. It exacted from her a war indemnity of 600 millions of francs, together with a further 200 millions for the destruction of fortresses facing her borders. Parts of her territory and a line of her fortresses on her northern and western frontiers were to be occupied by Allied

troops during the next seven years. Talleyrand had speedily to recognise that nothing remained for him but to seek to obtain a numerical reduction in the height of the sacrifices demanded; but, though his attempts in this direction met with a certain amount of British support, they failed; and, knowing himself to be regarded with disfavour by the ultra-royalist Chamber now sitting in Paris, he decided to resign his office as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

THE HOLY ALLIANCE

The day—September 26th—on which the Duc de Richelieu was appointed his successor, was also the date of the signing of a famous agreement which marked the beginning of a new stage in the relations between certain of the Allies, and of which the author was the potentate to whom the collapse of Talleyrand's influence upon the political situation was largely due. The document known under the imposing, and in many quarters execrated, name of the Holy Alliance, and bearing the signatures of the Emperors of Russia and Austria and of the King of Prussia, was not designed as a Treaty, or even as a declaration of policy, except in so far as it sought to unite as closely as possible, and by the most hallowed of bonds, the Powers which had signed and those which adhered to it. In this sense, the union which it proclaims is only that of a league of sovereigns and their subjects, concluded from a particular point of view; but, inasmuch as that point of view was the consistent pursuit by the parties to the Alliance, as 'members of the same Christian nation,' of the religious ends which its author, the Tsar Alexander, had at

heart, it is not wonderful that, for more than a generation, the Holy Alliance should, even by so clear-sighted a judge as Bismarck, have been held to amount to a definite system of policy. In its * origin, however, the Holy Alliance was nothing of * the kind, but rather a revival of an earlier project * of his by Alexander, whose tenacity in clinging to * the notions suggested to him by his imagination and by influences from which it took him the greater part of his life to shake himself free, was equalled only by the variableness of the moods and conditions in and to which he applied these notions. In whatever measure the ideas of Rousseau, as interpreted by La Harpe to his imperial pupil, may have contributed to the development of Alexander's projects, he had, in 1804, furnished his friend, N. N. Novosiltsoff, when proceeding on a mission to Pitt, with instructions x drafted by Czartoryski. Their purport was that * the alliance between Russia and Great Britain * against Napoleon should be expanded into one * founded on the sacred rights of humanity, which * should aim at reconstituting the life of the nations * of Europe in the form of a union based on a new * code of international law. In the Treaty con- * cluded between the two Powers on April 11th, 1805, Pitt went so far as to commit himself to the project of a federative system which should guarantee the international obligations entered into for establishing it.¹ Later, Alexander had become more and more enveloped in the mysterious atmosphere

¹ Similar designs of a league of Powers for ensuring international peace and security had been entered into before Alexander. Kaunitz, in July, 1791, had addressed a circular note, in this sense, to the representative of Austria at the several

which had for some time pervaded the leading circles of State and Church in Russia; nor is it wonderful that his thoughts of the destiny and the task awaiting him were carried to an extraordinary pitch by the catastrophe which culminated in the burning of Moscow and the annihilation of the invading armada. His biblical imaginings were just before and during his stay at Paris in 1815 worked up into passionate enthusiasm by the influence of that strange saint, Mme. de Krüdener.¹ He now became intent upon the joint adoption by the sovereigns of Europe and their peoples of the true principles of political life, and upon their cooperation in asserting them. The Holy Alliance was, in conception, to include all Christian nations; and it, therefore, excluded the Turk, whose continuance in Europe would hardly be considered in harmony with such a propaganda.²

European Courts, and the same idea may be read out of the celebrated Declaration of Pillnitz in the following month. Cf. Alison Phillips, *op. cit.*, pp. 30 ff., where it is also shown that Burke recognised a juridical basis for the intervention of the 'grand vicinage of Europe' against any 'capital innovation' amounting to a 'dangerous nuisance.'

¹ As to her, see an admirable article by A. Fournier, in the collection cited in a previous note, based on P. L. Jacob, *Madame de Krüdener* (Paris, 1880).

² In this connexion, it may be noted that the intention of Castlereagh, before leaving Vienna, had been to obtain a guarantee of the Act of Congress, when passed, by the Signatory Powers; but nothing came of this design, though it had the approval of Alexander, except the project of a wordy declaration, composed by Gentz and dated 'February, 1815.' (It is printed in d'Angeberg, pp. 864 ff.) To the contemplated guarantee Castlereagh had proposed to add one of the integrity of the Ottoman empire. But here he could not look for Russian assent, and the notion fell to the ground. Cf. the essay *Securities of Peace* (1919).

* King Frederick William, although never quite
 * at ease when confronted by ideas on a compre-
 * hensive scale, signed the Holy Alliance document
 * as a matter of course; and the Emperor Francis,
 * who could, if necessary, swallow camels, made no
 * objection, though Metternich, to whom this
 * 'diplomatic apocalypse' was intrinsically repug-
 * nant, merely suggested certain amendments—as
 * if it had been a circular note agreed upon by the
 * chanceries. The Prince-Regent of Great Britain
 * was attracted by it; but Castlereagh was of opinion
 * that Parliament would not care to enter upon an
 * assertion of 'biblical principles.' Moreover, the
 * Prince-Regent's signature would have had to be
 * countersigned by one of his ministers—and that
 * was out of the question. The King of France
 * adhered, though rather late in the day (November
 * 19th). But the general welcome vouchsafed to
 * the manifesto was lukewarm, and the practical
 * significance of the union which it announced did
 * not at the time reveal itself. Content with such
 * moral effect as had attended his demonstration,
 * Alexander gave no present sign of an aggressive
 * Eastern policy, and raised no objection against the
 * recognition of the British protectorate over the
 * Ionian Islands (November 5th), which for a time
 * very effectively contributed to the maintenance of
 * British influence in the Mediterranean.

THE SECOND PEACE OF PARIS

By this time, largely in consequence of the
 advent to power in France of the Duc de Richelieu
 —a minister both high-minded and straightforward,

who enjoyed the goodwill of the Tsar while retaining that of the British Government and its agents—the peace negotiations at Paris had come to proceed far more smoothly. Austria gradually drew away from giving support to the drastic demands of Prussia and the lesser German states. Thus, the conditions of the Peace were finally settled, virtually, on the lines of the ‘*ultimatum*’ sent on September 20th—the frontiers of France to be those of 1790 without further restrictions; while the indemnity was fixed at a total of 700 million francs, and the period of occupation of parts of Northern and Eastern France, by 150,000 Allied troops, at five years, to be reduced to three, if the state of the country should permit. On these terms, the Treaty of Peace was, together with the military and other Conventions attached to it, signed by the plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers and Richelieu in his house at Paris on November 20th, 1815.

QUADRUPLE TREATY OF ALLIANCE (CHAUMONT) AND ITS SIXTH ARTICLE

The ideas or principles of the Holy Alliance are not to be found underlying the articles of the Second Treaty of Paris. But the determination of the Allied Powers, and, very emphatically, of Great Britain, to be provided with a sure guarantee against any action on the part of the French Government or nation which might imperil the preservation of peace, was (apart from Castlereagh’s unsuccessful effort referred to in a note), evinced by another Treaty signed at Paris on the

same day as that of the Peace by the representatives of the Four Powers. This was a quadruple Treaty of Alliance—in other words, the Treaty of Chaumont, renewed at Vienna on March 25th, 1815, and now again renewed, in a form, proposed by Castlereagh, which in some measure attenuated the obligations imposed.¹ The celebrated sixth article, however, was more definite than the Russian draft, and, since it clearly implied the establishment of that system of Congresses which is the subject of our present enquiry, and which for a time sought to control the destinies of Europe and beyond doubt exercised a potent influence upon them, must here be cited in full. Having, in what preceded, undertaken to maintain the provisions of the Treaty of Peace, concluded with the King of France, the Signatory Powers, in this article declared that, ‘in order to assure and facilitate the execution of the present Treaty, and to consolidate the intimate relations now uniting the Four Sovereigns for the welfare of the world, they have agreed to renew, at fixed epochs, either under the immediate auspices of the sovereigns, or through their respective ministers, meetings devoted to the grand interests they have in common and to the discussion of measures which, at these several epochs, shall be judged to be most salutary for the repose and prosperity of the nations, and for the maintenance of the Peace of Europe.’²

Thus, while the preservation of this Peace was

¹ The mutual guarantee of possessions stipulated in the Russian was not included in the accepted draft.

² D’Angeberg, p. 1638 (art. vi.).

entrusted to Congresses summoned by the Four Powers, not including France, she was, at the same time, made subject to their will in the administration of the parts of the country occupied by their forces, and, financially, as to the whole monarchy.

The renewed Treaty of Alliance was communicated to the French Government with the most courteous assurances that it implied nothing but goodwill towards France; and the announcement, made at the same time, that Wellington had been named Commander-in-Chief, could not, at least by those acquainted with the course of the recent negotiations, be interpreted in any other sense. The admission of France to the Concert of the Powers, which she desired to see established, was, however, still deferred. The French Prime-minister was informed that the representatives of the Four Allied Powers at this Court had been instructed to maintain a regular correspondence with him and his Government; and thus was fully established a machinery enabling those Powers to obtain a constant insight into the progress of affairs in France, and to exchange views with one another, and if necessary with the French Government, concerning it. This Conference of Ambassadors, in which the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Occupation took part, showed no hesitation about fulfilling the functions assigned to it, and about using its best endeavours to advise the French Government, in its own interests, and in those of the preservation of peace, against the efforts of the Ultras, headed by the Comte d'Artois (the heir to the French throne), to impose their policy upon the King and his ministers. But a

want of unanimity gradually came to manifest itself at this Conference, and it was unable to agree upon advising the dissolution of the Chamber, which had come to be recognised as the indispensable condition of an end to the existing troubles of France. When (in September, 1816) this dissolution at last took place, it came almost as a surprise to the foreign embassies in general, although the Russian ambassador treated it as a personal triumph.

RESULTS OF THE SECOND PEACE OF PARIS

To sum up. Whatever hopes might have animated Alexander in his visionary speculations on the future of Europe, in the negotiations which ended in the Second Peace of Paris the joint counsels of the Allied Powers had given proof of a moderation which had its reward, and which vindicated the political wisdom to be found in the settlement of the Congress of Vienna, with all its shortcomings and all its neglect of the rights of nationalities and populations. Few great peace settlements are acclaimed by what is called public opinion, and that of 1815 was certainly no exception to this experience. But posterity should not withhold a grateful acknowledgment from pacifications followed, as the Second Treaty of Paris was, by a long era of peace, instead of by a brief and restless interval breathing thoughts of revenge and reconquest.

THE PERIOD OF CONGRESSES

III

AIX-LA-CHAPELLE TO VERONA

HELPS FOR STUDENTS OF HISTORY. No. 11.

EDITED BY C. JOHNSON, M.A., AND J. P. WHITNEY, B.D., D.C.L.

THE PERIOD OF CONGRESSES

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III

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THE PERIOD OF CONGRESSES

III AIX-LA-CHAPELLE TO VERONA

C.—THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE¹ 1818

FRANCE AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE

To understand the condition of affairs, more especially in France, which led to the assembling of the second of the Congresses under review, it is necessary to glance at the course of events in the three years after the Second Peace of Paris, which bore directly upon the resort of the Powers to the

¹ The special literature of this and the succeeding three Congresses is less considerable in bulk than might be expected. A survey of the principal published and unpublished documents, as well as of contemporary and of later memoirs and other works, will be found in the bibliography to W. Alison Phillips's chapter in vol. x. of the *Cambridge Mod. rn History* already cited. See also the latter part of his *Confederations of Europe* (1914). The best summary of European history from the end of 1815 to the Congress of Verona, and of that and the three preceding Congresses in particular, is continued in vols. i. and ii. of the eminent Swiss historian A. Stern's *Geschichte Europas seit den Verträgen von 1815* (Berlin, 1894-97), to which work a special acknowledgment is due from the present writer, together with thanks to its author for many courtesies, the more welcome for the troublous times during which they were bestowed.

Congressional expedient. In France, the ambition of the Ultras, who at first had it all their own way in Government and Chamber, was, avowedly, to set up a system of administration wholly irreconcilable with the spirit of centralised democracy, which had draped itself in the forms of the Napoleonic empire. The suicidal folly of these fanatics was transparent to all the members of the Quadruple Alliance, of whose policy the preservation, not the ruin, of the French monarchy, formed an integral part. But there was much difference of opinion among the Four Powers as to the remedies to be pressed upon the French Government; and even the Russian ambassador, Pozzo di Borgo, so late as April, 1816, shrank from a collective representation in favour of the dissolution of the 'undiscoverable,' or unmanageable, Chamber, urged by his Prussian colleague, Count von der Goltz. The result was that, in the summer of this year, a political persecution set in, out of all proportion to the provocations which had caused it; and the Tsar thought it incumbent upon him to intervene with his advice, in the name of an Alliance by no means unanimous in approving his action. In the end (September 5th), the Chamber was dissolved, and a more moderate assembly took its place (November). Richelieu had hoped that this change, as favourable to the prospect of internal peace in France, and commending itself to the approval of the Allies, would lead to the recall of at least part of the army of occupation; but, on this occasion, Wellington's caution prevailed over his wish to promote the interests of the Bourbon *régime*, and no concession was made except that of

a brief postponement in the payment of the indemnity. Though further internal troubles followed in France, they were not such as to call for any special measure on the part of the Allies; but a question directly connected with them was the payment of arrears due from France to foreign creditors—debts very miscellaneous in character, but amounting, by 1817–8, to the formidable total of 1570 millions of francs. Thanks to the rather ostentatious generosity of Alexander, and the less demonstrative moderation of Wellington, a composition was arranged, which was accepted by the French Chamber and the creditors in April, 1818. As to the general political situation in France, the representatives of the Four Powers had in 1816–17 been repeatedly plied for their support of ultra-royalist action; but, in the spring of 1818, these operations were subjected to an unwelcome exposure. By order of Decazes, Fouché's successor in the Ministry of Police, and a particular favourite of Louis XVIII. (who created him Count and *pair*), the last of the confidential memoranda for the use of Foreign Powers, drawn up by the Comte d'Artois' active follower, Baron de Vitrolles, was put into print, as evidence of a plot of which he was the agent. De Vitrolles' name was struck off the list of the Privy Council, and this attempt to stimulate foreign influence upon the conduct of the nation's affairs had thus received a very plain rebuff. Clearly, though it might still be necessary to continue the occupation of French soil, the national susceptibility was wide awake and unlikely to bear much longer with the subjection of France to the tutelage of the Quadruple Alliance.

CALL FOR ANOTHER CONGRESS—POLICY OF AUSTRIA

A change in the relations between that Alliance and France was, therefore, becoming urgently necessary, and seemed to be of so much importance as to warrant the assembling of another Congress, if anything like a real Concert of Europe was to come to pass. In other respects, the conclusions reached by the Congress of Vienna seemed as yet to call for completion rather than change. The Austrian monarchy had come forth from the Congress with enlarged limits and heightened prestige, rather than with any increase of internal strength. With the exception of the Magyars in Hungary, the nationalities in the Empire were but beginning to assert themselves, while, in the same connexion, the Government was seeking quietly to weaken the foundations of prescriptive rights. On the other hand, the Austrian Government was traditionally averse from adopting harsh methods in ordinary administration; and, in the new Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, it tempered its rule by the establishment of a sort of provincial representative system. Indeed, Metternich was by no means blind to the advantages of the introduction of something in the nature of popular representation throughout the Austrian empire; but he lacked the moral courage needed for inducing the Emperor Francis to give his assent to such a step. Thus, the existence of the Austrian empire, as a whole and in its several parts, continued to depend largely on administrative traditions of which, in full accordance with the temperament of the Emperor, those of the Police were by far

the most important; and its foreign policy remained one of unceasing watchfulness against the symptoms of outbreaks which might upset, or of ulterior designs which might undermine, the edifice laboriously built up by circumspect statecraft.

In non-Austrian Germany, the failure of Prussia, in spite of the leading part she had played in the Wars of Liberation, to exact from France a peace corresponding to the demands of the national ambition, could not but contribute to the decrease, almost approaching extinction, of the feeling in favour of a Prussian hegemony which had been so assiduously fostered in the lesser states. The ascendancy of Austria could not have been more strongly marked than it was in the initial period of the Federal Diet; and, while her final settlement with Bavaria was still delayed and her relations with the other south-German states were strained by the Württemberg scheme of a League of secondary southern states, there was as yet no question of actual Prussian rivalry. Indeed, the Prussian Government showed signs of falling in with the reaction, favoured by the Austrian, against the display of a restless patriotic enthusiasm, inspired by the hopes as well as the achievements of the late wars, and demanding a consummation which those achievements had failed to secure. The period was already drawing to a close of patriotic demonstrations, more especially in the imaginative spheres of the academic world—during which nationalism, destined to become, in the next generation, the most marked feature in the life of the European peoples, had continued to assert itself far more conspicuously in Germany than in

any other country of the continent. It was superseded by an age of official and officious denunciation and repression; and, with an exception that only proved the rule (Karl August of Weimar), the German Governments were unanimously intent upon this inglorious domestic campaign.

Outside Germany, too, Austria had, at first, no difficulty in maintaining the ascendancy assured to her policy through the Vienna compacts, notwithstanding the endeavours of Alexander to infuse into the Quadruple the less finite spirit of the Holy Alliance. The conservatism of Metternich's foreign policy was prone to reckon with all Powers, except that of the Future. In Italy, all that he asked was that the Governments should follow the Austrian lead, ruling without harshness populations which, in their turn, were expected to ignore the memories of the past and the ideals of the future. A secret article of a Treaty concluded (June 5th, 1815) between Austria and the restored Bourbon King Ferdinand IV. of Naples¹ bound him to introduce no changes into the government of his Neapolitan kingdom incompatible with its ancient monarchical institutions, or with the principles adopted by the Emperor of Austria for the rule of his own Italian provinces. With Tuscany, Metternich was, to begin with, rather less successful; but, by the summer of 1817, the provisions of the Vienna Act concerning the north-Italian duchies had been supplemented—at the cost of Napoleon's son, no longer the

¹ He was Ferdinand III. of Sicily, and from December, 1816, Ferdinand I. of the Two Sicilies.

‘ wondrous child ’ of former days—by an arrangement satisfactory to all other interests concerned (including that of Spain) as well as to Austria’s own. The uncomfortable ambition of Sardinia Metternich was unable to disarm; but, clear-sighted though he was, he had not, in general, any inclination to trouble himself about the remoter future.

In her Italian policy, Austria had the support of Great Britain—the story of a general Treaty between the two Powers as to Italian affairs in July, 1813, may, however, be dismissed as fiction—as well as of the other members of the Quadruple Alliance. But, both in her Eastern policy and, in a measure, in that of Great Britain, suspicion of Russia was an element warranted by unforgettable historical experience, and intensified by their knowledge of the influence continuously allowed by the Tsar to one of the ablest of his intimates, the Corfiote Count J. C. Capo d’Istria, the pride of his countrymen and the hope of their patriotic propaganda.

The proposal made by Metternich, in 1817, to carry into effect the design of the Four Great Powers to meet periodically for the discussion of the state of Europe with a view to the maintenance of its peace, had fallen through; nor was it till the autumn of the following year, 1818, that it was taken up again. Aix-la-Chapelle, whose central position commended it to all the Powers, was chosen as the place of the Congress now contemplated. It was generally understood that the speedy evacuation of France would be the first subject for consideration at the meeting: it was not so certain what attitude the Quadruple Al-

liance would adopt towards France after her release from armed supervision. Pozzo di Borgo warned the Tsar against any action on the part of the Allies which, by seeking to keep France under their continued control, would tend to isolate Russia, jealousy of whom was predominant among them. He would have preferred that the Concert of Europe were based on the principles of the Holy Alliance rather than on those of the Treaty of Chaumont. But nothing was further from Metternich's intentions than to follow any course calculated to give a prerogative voice in the Concert to Russia, who had of late been very prolific of political counsels. In the course of the summer of 1818, however, Metternich had occasion to convince himself of the wholesome dread of the revolutionary spirit which, in spite of Alexander's Liberal and Constitutional philanderings, was more and more taking hold of him; while the general success of Metternich's German policy, together with the likelihood that the views of Great Britain on European affairs would remain in substantial agreement with those of Austria, bade fair to assure to them the general support of Prussia, also, at the impending Congress.

THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE

Thus, towards the close of September, 1818, the ancient city of Charlemagne began to fill with an assembly whose numbers and distinction approached, though of course they could not rival, those of the Vienna Congress itself. At Aix-la-Chapelle, the Emperors Francis and Alexander

and King Frederick William III. were once more present in person, with Metternich, Capo d'Istria and Nesselrode (afterwards reinforced by Pozzo di Borgo), and Hardenberg as their chief plenipotentiaries. Castlereagh and Wellington represented Great Britain; while the Prime-minister of France, the Duc de Richelieu, awaited the results of the preliminary meetings of the Four Powers. The protocols of the Congress were once more in the hands of Gentz, who had good reason for declaring this Congress the culminating point of his career. Prominent among the outsiders in attendance were heads of some of the great banking-houses of Europe—Rothschild, Baring and others; for the primary business of the meeting—the terms of the evacuation of France—had a very important financial aspect.

EVACUATION OF FRANCE—FRANCE ADMITTED TO THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

The evacuation of France within the next two months was, in accordance with the general expectation, agreed upon by the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle at its first two meetings (September 30th and October 1st, 1818), and settled by a Treaty signed (October 9th) by the plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers and Richelieu, who had been immediately admitted to their meetings. It was also arranged that the remainder of the war indemnity should be paid, in two instalments, by the end of September, 1819. Hardly had the Tsar and the King of Prussia returned to Aix-la-Chapelle from a visit to the King of France in his capital, when

the thorny question of the future position of France in the Concert of Europe was brought to a settlement. The solution of the problem, difficult in itself, was not made easier by the French elections, which had, in fact, proved unfavourable to the existing *régime*, or by a financial crisis at Paris. The influence of Russia, always eager to display her goodwill to French interests, had supported Richelieu's contention that France should be admitted to the Concert on a footing of equality with the other Great Powers; and ~~Alexander had at heart nothing less than the organisation of a European authority which should as it were clothe in flesh and blood his ideal Holy Alliance.~~ This project was opposed by Castlereagh, in a memorandum pronouncing it derogatory to the dignity of the Holy Alliance to contaminate its purposes with ordinary diplomatic obligations, such as could alone be looked for in treaties; so that, after this half-ironical fashion, the British Government first indicated the policy which was hereafter to bring the Concert of Europe to an end. Austria favoured the cautious policy of renewing the Quadruple Alliance and admitting France to a share in its deliberations in particular instances only. The British plenipotentiaries, though alike well disposed towards the existing French Government, were, however, hampered by their own unwillingness to ask Parliament to approve such a continuance of the existing system of European policy. Already, in the Cabinet itself, Canning was raising his voice against the principle of a devolution of the conduct of European affairs upon Congresses of the Great Powers. Accordingly,

Hardenberg characteristically proposed, as a compromise, that France should, openly, be invited to join the existing Alliance, but that, secretly, the Four Powers should counterbalance this concession by renewing the old Treaty between them. The process by which this disingenuous proposal was carried betrayed the mistrust accompanying the concession whereby the Concert of Europe was to be called into life. After, on November 4th, Metternich had, once more, opposed the conclusion of a formal Treaty of Alliance between the Five Powers, the plenipotentiaries of the Four apprised Richelieu that, since the condition of France warranted an immediate termination of the occupation, her King was invited to join the other Sovereigns in taking counsel for the preservation of the Peace of Europe and, in token thereof, to participate in their present and future deliberations. Hereupon, a Protocol was signed, on November 15th, by the plenipotentiaries of the Five Powers, which was communicated to every other Government which had signed the Act of the Vienna Congress or any of the Paris Treaties. The Concert of Europe was, though not under that name, formally established by this declaration of the aims of the new Union, not with reference to any special occasion, or the advancement of any particular interest, but as directed to a maintenance of the General Peace, based on a strict observance of Treaties, while it was stipulated that notice should be given of any Conferences deemed requisite between Sovereigns or Ministers. To these Conferences other (lesser) states were to be admitted, if their particular affairs or interests were to form

the subject of discussion. Gentz's pen was employed on a Declaration offering to Europe this pledge of her future tranquillity.¹

THE EUROPEAN 'PENTARCHY'

Thus, the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle had carried to an issue the first practical attempt at the establishment of a plan for the international conduct of European politics. This new Holy Alliance—whether it merited that epithet or not, and whether or not the designs of certain of the Powers included in it contained elements deservedly suspect (as they, certainly, were to Castlereagh from this date onwards)—was in its main design neither insidious nor ignoble. It is true that, in some respects, the obligations of the European 'Pentarchy' were left as indefinite as had been those of the Holy Alliance itself. The attempt made by Austria, at the Congress of Vienna, to commit the Signatory Powers to a guarantee of the territorial integrity of all existing states (not omitting the Ottoman empire) was, at Aix-la-Chapelle, revived by the same Power, this time with the approval of the Tsar, provided it were limited to Europe. But it met with no support from the British Government, which knew very well with what sort of a reception such a scheme would meet from Parliament. It was accordingly dropped, and carried with it into oblivion certain further provisions which, in a memorandum issued in 1816, the Prussian Ancillon had sought to graft

¹ For the Declaration see d'Angeberg, pp. 1760 *f.*, and for the Protocol to which it is annexed, *ib.*, pp. 1755 *f.*

on such a guarantee, in favour of a League of European Nations, with Congresses expanded into tribunals of arbitration for the settlement of all international difficulties.

On the same 15th of November, 1818, on which the European Pentarchy began its brief course of existence, the old Quadruple Alliance of Chaumont was renewed, so as to be ready to meet what continued to seem possible—the occurrence of some internal crisis in France. And it was only the cool prudence of Wellington which prevented the preparation of plans of military operations for eventual use; while the Prussian plan of leaving garrisons in the Netherlands fortresses was resisted by the King of the Netherlands himself.

GERMAN AFFAIRS

[While the relations between France and the other Great Powers were thus placed upon a more satisfactory footing, the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle proceeded to deal with other matters left unsettled at Vienna. Some of these concerned the states forming part of the Germanic Confederation. Their territorial limits and the Constitution of the entire body were under the guarantee of the Act of the Congress; but it was inevitable that many aspects of the political and social life of Germany should form the subject of intimate communications between the two German Great Powers. From Aix-la-Chapelle, Metternich indited two Memorials for confidential communication to the King of Prussia, designed to impress more strongly upon his easily impressed mind the substance of the counsels the Austrian statesman had recently

found opportunities of tendering to him in conversation. These documents dealt with the 'innovating' attempts to undermine loyal and dutiful feelings in the younger generation at the German Universities, especially by means of the Students' Unions (*Burschenschaften*), and here and elsewhere through the Gymnastic Associations (*Turnvereine*), one of the most widespread popular institutions of the day. The danger was demonstrated of carrying out in Prussia, as explicitly promised by the King, the article (XII.) of the Federal Act holding out the prospect of a Constitution, with a parliament representing the entire kingdom. Metternich's advice came home to Frederick William III., and contributed not a little to encourage him in a reactionary policy, and in the desire to conform the spirit of his Government to that of the Austrian which marked the later years of his reign. The bearing of Alexander at Aix-la-Chapelle showed that he, too, was at one with Metternich as to the necessity of opposing the revolutionary tendencies of the age, particularly in Germany, and of repressing their manifestations there at the Universities and in the Press.

As to certain questions affecting individual German states and dynasties, there was no difficulty in putting a stop upon the ambition of the Elector William I. of Hesse to be invested with the dignity of King. More circumspection was needed in settling the affairs of Baden, complicated as they were by the ambition of Bavaria and her uneasy relations with Austria. The retrocession by Bavaria of the duchy of Salzburg and certain parts of Upper Austria, promised in 1814, had been

delayed, in consequence of the apparently insuperable difficulty of furnishing Bavaria with acceptable equivalents; and the Congress of Vienna had been unable to come to a conclusion on the subject. At last, in April, 1816, it was arranged that Bavaria was to receive certain lesser territorial compensations on the Rhine, and should, in addition, on the imminent extinction of the direct male line of the grand-ducal House of Baden, become possessed of the coveted Rhenish Palatinate. In April, 1817, Grand-duke Charles had, by the promulgation of a family statute, sought to secure his inheritance, which was at the same time declared indivisible, to the descendants of the second (morganatic) marriage of his predecessor—the Hochberg line. The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle now accorded the desired recognition to the new Baden succession; and Bavaria had, though unwillingly, to submit to the loss of the much-desired Rhenish Palatinate; although the Wittelsbach dynasty did not cease to cherish the hope of ultimately obtaining possession of it.

SPAIN AND HER COLONIES

Of greater importance, as exhibiting a distinct difference of point of view among the Great Powers themselves which was before long to create a lasting breach in the newly established system of the Concert of Europe, was the question of the relations between Spain, to the course of whose internal affairs reference will be made immediately, and her insurgent South-American Colonies. The germs of their struggle for independence may be

traced back even before the beginning of the century, but its actual course had been run, not altogether continuously, since 1808 and the crisis of the abdication of Ferdinand VII. In 1816, the independence of the Argentine Provinces had been proclaimed, and, two years later, Bolivar had issued a corresponding declaration from his Capital, Angostura. But as yet, while absolute government under the restored Ferdinand VII. prevailed in Spain, forcible repression was the only way in which the monarchy could bring itself to meet the rebellion. The insurgent leaders and the Governments set up by them had, however, from the first looked for British as well as North-American support. Although, in 1814, Great Britain had concluded a Treaty with Spain, by which she promised a cessation of any supply of arms or other materials of war to the insurgents, her sailors led and manned their ships, her financiers negotiated loans for them, and her merchant navy openly traded with their ports. By 1817, these relations had become fully established; and it was only by piracy and filibustering that Spain could resist commercial operations against which she strongly protested—while the United States, which had for some time looked with unconcealed expectancy upon the action of the South-American Colonies, were actually sending commissioners, to be at once followed by consuls, to their ports in revolt. Russia and France were desirous of admitting the Bourbon King of Spain to the deliberations of the Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle; though such a step, besides not being easy to take, would have been out of harmony with the restrictive principle of

the Concert. It was, accordingly, declined. When, hereupon, France and Russia proposed to try the effect of the advice of the Congress between the combatants, Castlereagh was found unwilling to join in any attempt to bring back the insurgent Colonies authoritatively under Spanish rule, unless a declaration were previously issued by Great Britain that she was not prepared in any case to interrupt her commercial relations with them; while Wellington declined to undertake a confidential mission on behalf of the Powers to Madrid, where it was still hoped to overcome South-American resistance by force. The still continuing quarrel between Spain and Portugal, in which France and Russia were, again, anxious to further the interests of the Bourbon Monarchy, and which, under British pressure, the Paris Conference of Ambassadors had previously essayed to settle, the Congress was, likewise, unable to bring to a satisfactory conclusion.

OTHER EFFORTS OF THE CONGRESS

More success attended the efforts to end the differences between the Scandinavian Powers, by inducing Sweden to fulfil the obligations undertaken by her towards Denmark in the Peace of Kiel (January, 1814). The Congress, also, laid a direct injunction for the better government of his principality upon the autocrat of Monaco. But, in matters of wider bearing or of more general interest, it could only display an activity accompanied by what very closely resembled impotence. The outrages which con-

tinued to be perpetrated by the Barbary pirates on or beyond the Mediterranean shores were met by a proposal from Metternich, quite out of harmony with the usually cool and limited character of his methods, for the restoration of the Maltese Order, of which the Tsar Alexander would, probably, not have been unwilling to accept the grand-mastership. But the pirates were left in command of the situation. Nor was the still larger question of the suppression of the Slave-trade, which Great Britain continued to urge, together with the adoption of a general Convention establishing the Right of Search, carried to any definite solution. France thought it became her dignity to refuse such a Convention, while Russia launched a counter-project for an international authority, with an international fleet, on the west coast of Africa. Nothing was done, except that some admonitions were administered to Portugal, who had declined to follow the example of Spain by concluding a bargain as to the abolition of the obnoxious trade.

The labours of the Congress were, however, not exhausted by the accomplishment of these, on the whole, insignificant results. A unanimous assent was accorded to the Russian memorandum, drawn up by Pozzo di Borgo in reply to Bonapartist complaints (including one from the mother of Napoleon), as to the treatment of the prisoner at St. Helena. This document expressed the present views of the Tsar, though even Castlereagh thought some of the expressions employed by 'Corsican against Corsican' too pointed. Alexander seemed to have finally settled down into a detestation of

the Revolution in all its phases, quite after Metternich's heart; and thus, at the end of November, 1818, the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle closed, having, to all outward semblance, testified to a complete agreement among the Great Powers as to the political principles which they had assembled to assert in common. The Congress, however, left much to confirm and much to complete; and, though its leading statesmen, on the whole, regarded the consummation reached by it with complacency, and the prospect of preserving the Peace of Europe, which it had laboured to maintain, with confidence, yet more than one rift was visible in the partly very artificial edifice now confronting the world. Nor was it long before a change came over the hopefulness with which this Congress separated, as the disturbing events of the next two years caused the trust in the cohesion of the Concert gradually to give way.

D.—THE CONGRESSES OF TROPPEAU AND LAIBACH

1820—1821

POLITICAL AGITATION IN EUROPE. THE CARLSBAD AND VIENNA CONGRESSES, AND THE VIENNA FINAL ACT

IN France, after the fall of Richelieu in December, 1818, the violence of party feeling had increased again, and, while the Ultra-royalists refused to abandon their aspirations, the elections of September, 1819, seated in the Chamber a body of thirty-five uncompromising Liberals or Radicals. The counsels of the Great Powers began to breathe alarm; Metternich doubted whether steps should not be taken for the supervision of French affairs by an agency specially appointed for the purpose; and a Russian proposal suggested the revival of permanent Ambassadorial Conferences at Paris. The murder of the Duc de Berry (February, 1820), in whom were centred the hopes of the Bourbon dynasty and those of the extreme Royalists, infuriated that party and seemed to render any attempt at compromise hopeless. Richelieu's return to power, at this time, was unhappily accompanied by repressive measures (including the restoration of the censorship of the Press) which seemed forced upon him by Bonapartist and Republican agitation and by the spread of secret societies (*Charbonnerie*) little in accordance with the genius of French political life. But his adminis-

tration, supported by a combination of the Right and Centre, was both moderate in spirit and constructive in action. Within two years, however, it came to an end, and the extreme Royalists, as will be seen, were once more in power, under the skilful guidance of Comte de Villèle, with Vicomte (afterwards Duc) Matthieu de Montmorency in charge of Foreign Affairs.

The joint policy of the Great Powers can hardly be said to have been affected by the course of events in England; but, though the agitation which marked these years at home was mainly due to the social grievances of the labouring classes, it was no doubt influenced by the revolutionary movements which pervaded a great part of the European continent, and the apprehensions excited by them. The Six Acts (1819), which mark the height of the Reaction in this country, amounted to a less formidable infringement of personal freedom and civic rights than did the corresponding measures in France and Germany; but their success in repressing popular aspirations was even more transitory, and came to an end with the beginnings of the great and ultimately successful effort for Parliamentary Reform.

In Germany, political events continued to cause anxiety to the Governments of the states both great and small, and, more especially, to Metternich, whose ascendancy in the counsels of one and all of them had never before been so commanding. On the one hand, he had succeeded in impressing King Frederick William III., whom he met at Töplitz in July, 1819, with the necessity of curbing, in his own monarchy, the Constitutional movement

which was making rapid progress in some of the lesser states; on the other, rigorous proceedings were taken against the more widespread demand for popular changes, of which the Universities (Jena most conspicuously) were the *focus* and the Radical Press the mouthpiece. This agitation the authorities did not fail to bring into direct connexion with such excesses as the murder, in March, 1819, of the dramatist Kotzebue, denounced as a Russian spy. A period of 'demagogic persecution' at once set in, which long left its mark on the public and private life of northern and central Germany.

The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle had left over certain outstanding German questions to be settled at Frankfort; but, after the Töplitz meetings, Metternich and Hardenberg had (August 1st) drawn up a 'Punctation' for a special meeting, to be held at Carlsbad, where the matters calling for immediate attention (the state of the Universities, the Press and the territorial Constitutions) were to be considered by plenipotentiaries of Austria, and Prussia, and specially invited Ministers of the German Governments. The Conference met without delay, and speedily arrived at several drastic conclusions—a uniform law for the control of the Press and, above all, the appointment of a Central Commission (at Mainz) to deal with the treasonable agitation supposed to be pervading Germany at large. On the subject of state Constitutions, unanimity could not be reached, and the settlement of details was adjourned to a public Ministerial Conference to be held at Vienna. The 'Decrees' adopted at Carlsbad were passed by the Federal Diet on September 20th. The Vienna Conferences opened

in the following November, and finished their work in the following spring, when—on May 24th, 1820—the Frankfort Diet adopted the so-called ‘Vienna Final Act’ as the completion or coping-stone of the Federal Act of 1815. As to state Constitutions, it failed to provide for any very marked advance on the general obligation imposed in the Federal Act; and, for the rest, no additions of vital importance were made to the Constitutional provisions contained in it. But the question had been got out of the way; and the Federal Diet had unanimously adopted the Constitutional policy commended to it by the two Great Powers. In the matter of the ‘demagogic,’ or supposed demagogic, movement, Austria with Prussia at her back, had carried out her policy of repression, without any reference to the Powers under whose guarantee as signatories of the Act of the Vienna Congress the Germanic Constitution lay. Against the reactionary proceedings of the two German Great Powers, neither the British nor (after some hesitation) the French had entered into any protest. As to Russia, and the conclusions of Alexander, there were doubts which left Metternich unsatisfied. La Harpe’s day seemed over, and the effect of the murder of Kotzebue and of Metternich’s persuasiveness was not likely to be counteracted by the Liberal King of Württemberg’s visit to the Tsar at Warsaw. But Capo d’Istria had his reasons for censuring the action of the Great German Powers, and appealed to Castlereagh, who, though approving of the repressive action of Austria and Prussia, warned them to beware of irritating their neighbours. In sum, while the two German Great

Powers were more closely united than ever at home, and therefore surer than ever to go together in European affairs, an unmistakable change, most unwelcome to Metternich, had marred the unity of sentiment which had seemed to prevail at the time of the dissolution of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle.

SPAIN AND THE POWERS

Thus Germany, or rather the German Governments, had, after a fashion, for better or worse settled their affairs by themselves; nor was it in this quarter that the Concert of Europe was, in this period of conflict between the Reaction and its adversaries, to seek to intervene. Not in the centre of Europe, but at its western extremity, the progress of the opposition to 'legitimate' authority first provoked outside intervention on behalf of the order of things held to have been established at Vienna and confirmed at Aix-la-Chapelle. In the Pyrenean peninsula, the quarrel between the two kingdoms (unallayed by the marriage of King Ferdinand with a Portuguese Infanta in 1818) continued; but it could not prevent the violent popular movements pervading the larger from communicating themselves to the lesser. In Spain¹ the return of Ferdinand VII. in 1814 had very speedily been found to signify the beginning of a relentless repression, throughout the

¹ General authorities for this phase of European politics have been already cited; the most picturesque account of the Spanish troubles and of French and Congressional intervention will be found in Châteaubriand's *Congrès de Vérone, Guerre d'Espagne*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1838)—perhaps the most amazingly self-centred work to be found in either historical or political literature.

monarchy, of anything that savoured of Liberalism. The idolised Constitution of 1812, which limited the royal power in all directions, transferred its principal functions to the Cortes themselves. Personal persecutions ensued; discontent spread through the army, always a main *focus* of political agitation in Spain; public security was in danger, and the struggle for independence of the South-American Colonies assumed a more and more alarming character.

In these circumstances, it was impossible for the Spanish Government to maintain the attitude of arrogant self-reliance which had been that of its plenipotentiary at the Vienna Congress. Friendly counsel was not wanting at Madrid. Intimate relations with Great Britain would have seemed a natural consequence of the services rendered to Spain and her dynasty by that Power; but, though the Spanish Government was induced to promise a favourable Commercial Treaty with Great Britain (concluded September, 1817), and renounced for ever the thought of a resumption of the Bourbon *Pacte de Famille* with France, these half-hearted concessions only concealed its coldness towards a Power, in its turn, out of sympathy with the existing Spanish régime. On the other hand, Russian influence, everywhere, at this time, ready to 'take the wind out of the sails' of British, which was so often in cooperation with Austrian, policy, found an extremely assiduous agent in Count Tatischeff; and it was due to him that, from 1816 to 1818, a more intelligent and Liberal administration (that of J. L. y Pizarro) came into power at Madrid. But the change could not be

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maintained; and, though Great Britain furthered the interests of the Spanish dynasty in the Italian duchies and sought to bring about a satisfactory settlement with Portugal, the Spanish Government proved incapable of improving the state of affairs either at home or abroad. Virtually, all measures of internal reform collapsed, and, in her foreign relations, Spain fell back upon the policy of standing still. No concession was made either to the insurgent Colonies, or to Portugal; and at Aix-la-Chapelle Spain had proved as immovable as she had at Vienna.

THE SPANISH REVOLUTION

The storm signal came at last, in true Spanish fashion, from the army at home. When, on New Year's Day, 1820, Colonel Riego, a staff-officer of the expeditionary force which had been long waiting at Cadiz for orders for South America, proclaimed to his soldiery the Constitution of 1812, the success of the Revolution, long prepared in secret, was assured from the first. On March 9th, King Ferdinand VII., by swearing fidelity to the Constitution imposed upon him, submitted unconditionally to the programme of the *Exaltados*, as the extreme Liberals were called in the Cortes which assembled in July. Though here the *Moderados* prevailed and Riego's 'national army' was disbanded, both parties agreed in the legislation which followed, and which was directed against the preservation of large estates and the continuance of all male monasteries, except of the Mendicant Orders. The King was incapable of lasting resistance; and the reactionaries had nothing to fall

back upon but intrigue. Meanwhile, the social condition of the country had inevitably suffered from the political agitation, which, notwithstanding the chronic ill-will between the two neighbours, had unavoidably spread to Portugal.

THE PORTUGUESE REVOLUTION

This kingdom had suffered severely, both in population and in its agricultural, commercial and industrial condition during the Napoleonic Wars. The royal family had fled to Brazil, of which the mother-country had almost become a dependency, while of her commercial relations with her constant ally Great Britain the latter reaped the chief advantage. The Peace had brought little relief to Portugal, more especially since the continued tension between her and Spain seemed to demand the maintenance of a large armed force, of which the British General (afterwards Viscount) Beresford still remained in command. He had no sympathy with Constitutional ideas, and the result was a conspiracy, of which the discovery, in 1817, led to a series of executions, and to the continuance of angry discontent and secret plotting. When at last (in April, 1820) he sailed for Rio, to concert action at the main seat of Braganza rule, the Revolution broke out behind his back at Oporto. The *junta* established here to carry on affairs united with another, formed for the same purpose at Lisbon, as a Provisional Government (October), and, after Beresford's return from Brazil and departure to England, set about the task of Constitutional reform. Ultimately (not without the use of violence in carrying through the process)

it was agreed to summon a Portuguese Cortes for the adoption (with certain modifications) of the famous Spanish Constitution of 1812. On March 29th, 1821, a majority approved the draft, in a most rigorous form, in spite of strong clerical opposition to the provisions affecting the privileges and property of the Church. When, in July, 1821, King João VI. returned to Lisbon (leaving behind him as Regent in Brazil the ambitious Crown-prince Dom Pedro), he took the oath to the Constitution. Thus here, too, the Revolution seemed to have consummated a victory. It was disquieting to the Great Powers, and more especially to Austria, to whom the established order of things in Europe had been so largely due, and who was pre-eminently anxious to prevent its overthrow in another peninsula, once more subject to her special tutelage.

THE REVOLUTION IN ITALY (THE TWO SICILIES)

Although in Italy the Revolution broke out a few months later than in Spain and in Portugal, the course of events in these three countries forms essentially a connected whole. In Italy, national patriotism, while deeply engrained in the hearts and minds of many of her noblest sons, and provided with concrete terms of expression by the policy of Napoleon, had not yet come to dominate a wide range of popular opinion, or to assume the shape of a definite political design. Neither the idea of a Union or Confederation of Italian States under the Pope or some other head, nor that of an Indivisible Republic, was more than the conception or vision of individual thinkers or dreamers.

On the other hand, the plan of a single monarchical state, to be formed by accretion round the Sardinian kingdom, had hardly as yet found anything beyond isolated expression; and even this seemed deprived of any significance by the fact of the demonstratively reactionary policy of King Victor Emmanuel I. at Turin, whose rule was resented by Genoa, on her being subjected to it by the unsympathetic Congress of Vienna.

The Austrian Government had reason for distrusting the good will of his relative (and later successor) Prince Charles-Albert, of the Savoy-Carignan line; but the hopes of Liberalism resting on him were concerned only with the future; while the consistently intelligent Government of the most important of the 'independent' states of northern Italy, the grand-duchy of Tuscany, contented itself with reviving the traditions of an earlier age of progress and reform. In the Papal States, too, the unselfish kindness of Pope Pius VII., and such perception of the signs of the times as the Cardinal-Secretary Consalvi had shown already at Vienna, seemed at first to promise improvement in the administrative system. But here the form of government itself, with its inevitable consequences, put any real progress out of the question; and secret associations flourished among both the adversaries of the existing *régime* and their opponents. These societies, a truly indigenous growth, which, in the eyes not of the Austrian Government only, became the most formidable feature in Italian political life and, as has been seen, spread into other countries, flourished with particular exuberance in the Papal

States. Their original (and perhaps their most enduring) home, however, was Naples, where the next violent outbreak of the Revolution was to occur. The activity of the *Carboneria*, at first in both name and character an *analogon* of Freemasonry in its earlier phases, had, during Murat's reign, taken a political direction, as opposed to the sway of a foreign Prince; but when, in his final struggle, he had proclaimed himself the champion of the unity and independence of Italy, the *Carbonari* made common cause with him; and the reactionary policy of the restored Bourbon Government invested their designs with an unprecedented significance.

King Ferdinand I. (as he was now called), whose long reign as Ferdinand IV. in Sicily had virtually been that of his Consort, Queen Caroline, till her death in 1814, now reunited 'both Sicilies' under his utterly incapable and not less ungenerous sway (December, 1816). The provision made, in the Sicilian Constitution of 1812, for his resignation of one of his thrones, should he come into possession of both, had become a dead letter through an article (CIV.) of the Vienna Act; and, though Sicily was formally promised the preservation of its ancient privileges and was, as a matter of fact, mainly left to its own semi-medieval conditions of life, it became, to most intents and purposes, a dependent province of the Neapolitan kingdom, in whose interests it was governed, or misgoverned. The political and social conditions of Naples itself were at a low ebb. While secret societies abounded, and, in the Abruzzi in particular, banditti defied, or bargained with, the Government, the judicial

system was corrupt, education largely unknown, and the pauperism of the capital and its *Lazzaroni* unmitigated. The Church was eager to improve the advantages which she had gained from the restoration, and which she secured by the Concordat of 1818; and the Army, commanded by General Nugent, an Irishman formerly in the Austrian service, and up to the autumn of 1817 reinforced by Austrian troops, was corroded by a spirit of factiousness and discontent. The former civic militia, by re-embodiment which it was attempted to strengthen the regular forces, was found to have been in a large measure 'penetrated' by the *Carboneria*, and intent upon that demand for a Constitution with which this association had now identified itself.

Towards the close of 1818, the Constitutional agitation began to recognise as its leader General Guglielmo Pepe, who had taken advantage of successful military operations against the brigands of Foggia and Avellino to fuse the militia under his command with the *Carboneria*, which named him its General and secret leader. The triumph of the Revolution in Spain brought a long period of expectancy to a sudden consummation. On July 3rd, 1820, the *Carbonari* of Avellino and its vicinity proclaimed the Spanish Constitution of 1812. Pepe cast in his lot with the insurgents; and, on July 7th, the militia marched upon the palace at Naples. Here, the terrified King gave way at once, accepting the Constitution, to which army and militia took oath.¹ A Provisional Govern-

¹ A translation of this document from the Spanish had been furnished with all speed.

ment, made up of *Carbonari* and *Muratists*, was formed, to which the King renewed his pledge. Till a parliament should meet, Pepe was master of the situation; though there were ominous signs of disunion, and much fear as to the bearing foreign Governments, and the Austrian in particular, would adopt towards the successful Revolution. Meanwhile, King Ferdinand, suspicious even of his heir the Duke of Calabria, into whose hands as Governor-General he had resigned his power, and who played the Liberal, remained shut up in his palace, feigning sickness and secretly communicating with Metternich.

When the news of the adoption of the Spanish or 'Cortes' Constitution reached Messina, the population joined in the enthusiasm of the garrison (which included many *Carbonari*); but in the Sicilian capital, Palermo, where a sinister manifestation followed (July 14th), a counter-movement ensued in favour of the Sicilian Constitution of the same year (1812), as the symbol of Sicilian independence. Although, after a Terror of some days, a Provisional Government was established, wild disturbances ensued in different parts of the island.

In the end (October 5th), an agreement was concluded, by which the Neapolitan army held possession of the fortifications of Palermo, while the conflict concerning the Constitutions was settled by a compromise. The Spanish Constitution, sworn to by the King, was to be valid for Sicily as well as for Naples, but with such modifications as a joint *or* separate parliament should approve. The decision as to which kind of parliament should be

summoned was to be left to an assembly of Sicilian deputies.¹ But so impotent a conclusion could not stand. At Naples, the Parliament had been opened by the King, and though G. Pepe had laid down his dictatorship, he retained the control of the militias and the capital, and the King made his way back to his country retreat. But, when the Sicilian agreement contrived by F. Pepe came up for discussion, it was rejected, and General Colletta, sent to Sicily in his place, had to use force and keep masses of troops under arms at Palermo. Thus, the kingdom of the Two Sicilies was once more split in twain, at the very moment when the intervention of the Concert of Europe was once more to descend upon it.

THE POWERS AND THE REVOLUTION

Tsar Alexander, commissioned as he deemed himself to be with the supreme task of watching over the destinies of Europe at large, and more and more convinced that 'Jacobinism' was at present the foe to face, had been the first member of the Pentarchy to advocate resistance to the approach of the Revolution. A week before the acceptance by Ferdinand VII., on March 9th, 1820, of the 'Cortes' Constitution imposed upon him through Riego's successful rising, he had urged that advantage should be taken of the Conference of Ambassadors, then sitting at Paris on the chronic troubles between Spain and Portugal, to agree on common action by the Powers with regard to this insurrection. Wellington, however, who was afterwards very

¹ This complicated agreement was concluded between Palermo and G. Pepe's brother Florestan.

anxious lest the Spanish revolutionary agitation should spread to the neighbouring kingdom, regarded Riego's as merely one of the military risings indigenous to the Spanish soil; and nothing was done at the time. But, when King Ferdinand's submissive acceptance of the Constitution became known, the French Government, deeply disturbed as it had been by the assassination of the Duc de Berry, became, in its turn, much agitated, and was with difficulty prevented from interfering by sending a special mission to Spain. The Tsar, while suggesting a Conference at Paris on French affairs (to which neither Castlereagh nor Metternich would agree), proposed to the Spanish ambassador at Paris the despatch of a joint note of dissatisfaction, and, in case the Cortes refused to establish a fair Constitutional Government in place of that in existence, intervention by the Powers. Hereupon, the British Government roundly declared that the Alliance of the Four Powers had not been designed as a combination for the rule of the world or for the supervision of the internal affairs of particular states. Metternich's distrust of Russian policy even made him unwilling to let the discussion among the Powers be made public property. Thus, for the moment, the Revolution in Spain was allowed to run its course, and no action was taken to prevent the success of that in Portugal.

But, when, a few weeks earlier than the beginning of the movement in Portugal, the Revolution broke out in Naples, whatever suspicions Metternich might feel of Russian designs, Austrian interests, as he viewed them, were directly involved, and he could not look on in quiet. Military precautions

were taken by Austria, and the Italian Governments, from Turin to Rome, were informed of her determination to maintain, as she was bound to do by the Treaties of 1815, the tranquillity of the peninsula. And, without any secret being made of Austria's hostility to the new *régime* at Naples, a personal request for a mutual understanding was addressed by the Emperor Francis to the Tsar. But neither from him nor from the French Government could Metternich, although assured both of the approval of Prussia, and of no objection being raised against Austrian intervention by Great Britain, obtain an assent to any action not proceeding from the entire Concert of Europe. The French Government was jealous of the ascendancy of Austrian influence in Italy, more especially in the Bourbon monarchy of the south; and the Tsar, who would have liked to send a Russian army across the Alps, was resolved not to forego a leading share in a European intervention, although it would have suited Austria best to take upon herself the suppression of the Revolution, with the approval, and, as it were, in the name, of the Allied Powers of Europe. Thus, in the end, Alexander was ready to fall back on the French proposal of a Congress of Princes or their Ministers, to discuss the Neapolitan question; and Metternich, who at first demurred and then would have had it meet at Vienna, was at least successful in having its place of assembly fixed at Troppau, a small town of historic name in Austrian Silesia.

THE CONGRESS OF TROPPAU. THE PRELIMINARY
PROTOCOL

Though the British Government had shown no sympathy with the Neapolitan revolutionary movement, neither it nor the director of its foreign policy, Castlereagh, could accept the principle laid down by the Tsar (which it would certainly not have been easy to illustrate from British history), that, to be accounted satisfactory, constitutions must be granted by the Crown. Castlereagh, indeed, plainly asserted that an unlimited extension of the objects of the Alliance, as established in 1815 and renewed in 1818, could only result in its 'moving away from us, without our having abandoned it.' Lord Stewart, British ambassador at Vienna, on being sent to Troppau, was, accordingly, instructed either to take the resolutions of the Congress *ad referendum*, or to sign the protocols with a reservation. The French Government, although it had first suggested the Congress, thought it safer to instruct its plenipotentiaries to follow, virtually, the example of the British; and Metternich was thus, to all intents and purposes, left face to face with the Tsar, with whom, notwithstanding the Liberalising activity of Capo d'Istria, he prevailed. The causes of this success are, no doubt, partly to be found in Metternich's ability, self-confidence and good luck, but, above all, in the rapid progress of Alexander's conversion to the cause of the Counter-revolution, expanded by his imagination into that of civilisation against anarchy.¹

¹ He seems, according to Châteaubriand (whose apology for him is both elaborate and candid), to have had a personal *piquet* against King Louis XVIII.

The revolutionary conspiracy discovered at Paris (August), and the ingratitude with which the Warsaw Diet had met some of the measures imposed upon it 'from above,' helped to bring the Tsar to Troppau in a most amicable mood towards Metternich and his policy, though at first the Austrian and the Russian proposals were not altogether uniform.

The Congress opened on October 20th, 1820. In substance, Metternich asked for the assent of the Powers to the despatch of a sufficient body of Austrian troops to Naples. Approved by Hardenberg for Prussia, this proposal met with a divided reception on the part of the two plenipotentiaries of France, whose Government was still speculating on the possibilities of a French or Russian mediation—or by one conducted by both these two Powers—for the revision of the obnoxious Constitution adopted at Naples. Capo d'Istria desired that Austrian intervention on behalf of Europe should be limited to seeking to bring about a condition of things approved by the King and in accordance with the wishes of the people; but Metternich insisted upon the necessity of the existing *régime* ceasing before the liberated King was advised by the Powers as to future legislation. Hereupon (November 7th), Russia arrived at a confidential understanding with Austria and Prussia amounting to a practical approval of the course outlined by Austria. While Great Britain held aloof, and France, at least for the moment, abstained from action, the three Eastern Powers,¹ on November 19th, agreed among themselves upon a Pre-

¹ King Frederick William III. had arrived late at Troppau, where he had hitherto been represented by his son, the Crown-prince.

liminary Protocol, which, representing as it did a notable combination of principles of action, is of considerable moment in the history of the Congresses of this age. It purported that any state hitherto forming part of the European Alliance was to be temporarily excluded from it, if an insurrectionary movement in that state had led to changes in its system of government imperilling the well-being of other states. In cases of immediate danger, the Alliance was to be entitled, if friendly steps proved in vain, to bring back the offending state into it by the use of force. As applied to the present condition of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, this 'principle' was asserted to imply the temporary occupation of it by an Austrian army, and King Ferdinand was to be invited to attend the Congress, which, with this intent, was to be removed further south to Laibach, where the situation would be considered anew.¹

DISSENT OF THE WESTERN POWERS. METTERNICH'S CONFIDENCE

But, however near, in logical sequence, the 'principles' of the Troppau Preliminary Protocol came to those of the Pentarchy, as established at Aix-la-Chapelle, and to the ideas at the root of the Holy Alliance itself, their application proved to be beset by the greatest difficulties. And, in the result, the formulation of these 'principles,' instead of, as it had been hoped, consolidating the Pentarchy, gave rise to the first manifestation of a

¹ The principles of this Protocol were solemnly reasserted by the Convention of Berlin between Austria, Prussia and Russia bearing date October 15th, 1833.

fundamental difference within it. The document, signed by the Three Powers as a draft, was communicated to the British and French Governments, with an expression of confident expectation of their assent. But the French Government, while readily approving of the consideration shown to the Bourbon King of the Two Sicilies by inviting his attendance at the Congress, could not reconcile itself to the assertion of a right of internal intervention which might subject Spain and (what was more) France itself to the same treatment as that which it was proposed to apply in southern Italy—to military occupation, in a word. When these objections were prematurely made known to Alexander, they deeply stirred his wrath. But a more outspoken protest came from Great Britain. Inasmuch as the British Parliament was even more certain than were the French Chambers to find fault with the policy of the Protocol, Castlereagh could speak plainly. While making no secret of his goodwill towards the Austrian design of suppressing the Neapolitan Revolution, he announced the intention of his Government to resist the attempt of the Eastern Powers to deduce from the settlement of Vienna and the Alliance on which it was based ‘an abstract rule of interference in the internal affairs of independent states.’ When the Three Powers, on December 8th, issued a circular despatch explanatory of their views and intentions, Castlereagh replied by a Memorandum, dated December 16th, which stated at length the grounds on which Great Britain refused her assent to the Protocol, and demurred to the Troppau ‘code of international police.’

A final attempt was made by Capo d'Istria to bring about the close of the quarrel between the King of the Two Sicilies and his subjects through the mediation of Pope Pius VII.; and Metternich had no objection to this device, since it was as harmless as it was belated. The King's Ministers had, in vain, sought to persuade the Neapolitan Parliament to meet the irate Powers halfway by modifying the obnoxious Constitution into one of a less radical type; the answer was the overthrow of the Ministry, and the injunction imposed upon King Ferdinand, in return for the permission granted him to attend the Congress, to make no use of the occasion except for the maintenance of the Constitution as it stood. Self-delusion on the one side, and cunning on the other, could not further go; and, on December 13th, King Ferdinand started his journey. When, about Christmastide, the news of his departure reached Troppau, the dissolution of the Congress there followed straightway.

Metternich's policy had been, in the main, successful; and, for the time at least, his ascendancy over the mind of the Tsar had been very palpably established, in spite of the Liberalising counsels of Capo d'Istria. The unity of both design and action on the part of the three Eastern Powers had never before been so close. On the other hand, while the bearing of France had necessarily alienated much of the goodwill which Alexander had been anxious to display towards her, the British Government, without in the least wishing to break through the general concurrence between its foreign policy and that of the Austrian, had made

clear the limits of its own cooperation in the Concert, of which Metternich had at Troppau more than ever shown himself to be the guiding spirit. The hope of Alexander, that all the Powers would agree to guarantee legitimate sovereignty in Europe, had been disappointed; but Metternich, sure of the Tsar's goodwill and well satisfied with King Frederick William's willingness to postpone *sine die* the fulfilment of the hopes of Prussian Liberalism, could confidently sound the note of the necessity of a close agreement between the Three Powers as the epitome of the lesson learnt by them at Troppau.

REASSEMBLING OF THE CONGRESS AT LAIBACH. BRITISH CIRCULAR NOTE

The same was even more emphatically the line of action which it was endeavoured to lay down at Laibach. Here, in the capital of the Austrian province of Carniola, the Congress, early in January, 1821, reassembled in larger numbers than those in which it had met at Troppau. In accordance with the Tsar's wish, all the Italian Governments had been invited to send representatives; although these were not admitted to the deliberations till the main question—the Neapolitan—had been settled. King Ferdinand arrived without loss of time, accompanied by Prince Russo-Scilla, formerly ambassador at Vienna and a resolute reactionary. The King now openly took up an attitude which the Neapolitan Parliament had failed to foresee: he regarded himself as no longer bound by the promises made by him to the 'assassins' out of whose hands he had escaped. As for the Tsar,

who at Laibach seemed completely fascinated by the personal influence at Metternich, he made no secret of his hope that the action which Austria had taken it upon herself to pursue at Naples might be followed by similar intervention in Spain on the part of France. The French plenipotentiaries soon finding that, with the Italian Governments represented at the Congress, the fear of the spread of the Revolution overpowered that of an increase of Austrian influence—the Papal Government alone abstaining, with well-calculated reserve, from committing itself to any approval of the policy of the Eastern Powers—took care themselves not to fall out with it. For they were aware that any opposition to the action of Austria and her confederates would stir the wrath of the ultra-royalist faction at home in France, elated by their success in the recent elections (of November, 1820). Thus, it was left to Castlereagh, however little he and his colleagues might object to the suppression of the Revolution at Naples, to repeat the British protest against the Troppau Protocol in a Circular Note, dated January 19th, 1821. This document, as the first intimation of the actual condition of things which reached the public ear, aroused a storm of indignation in Parliament against the action of the Powers. Hereupon, Castlereagh roundly condemned the particular revolution which had led to the imbroglio, but at the same time expressed a hope that Great Britain would not be called upon to interfere in it.

¹ The speech in Parliament in which Castlereagh thus defined his policy was made on February 21st, 1821, and was the last ever delivered by him.

AUSTRIAN INTERVENTION AT NAPLES

The Duke of Gallo was now sent to Naples with a letter announcing the condemnation by the Congress of the Revolution and its works, endorsed by King Ferdinand; and, without delay, an Austrian army of 60,000 men set out to cross the Po. The Congress was invited by Austria to approve a document regulating the military occupation of the southern kingdom, which was not to extend over more than three years, and which might eventually involve the Allies in certain financial liabilities. Prussia, with characteristic caution, hesitated to go so far, and France held aloof. But the Tsar cordially approved of these proposals, and Metternich resolved to take a further step, and suggest to King Ferdinand a draft Fundamental Law for the Two Sicilies, separating their administrations and entirely doing away with representative assemblies in either country. The draft, having been accepted by the King, was submitted by Ruffo to the Congress, and adopted by it, the French plenipotentiaries acquiescing and the British merely taking the document *ad referendum*. Metternich's policy had thus, with the full consent of the Tsar, been entirely successful. But he prudently abstained from seeking to extend it to the perfectly analogous case of Spain, until in neighbouring France the ascendancy of the ultra-royalist faction should have been completely assured. Within a few weeks, after a feeble resistance on the part of the Neapolitan army and its subsequent disbandment, the Austrians entered Naples (March 24th, 1821), and the Revolution in southern Italy came to an inglorious end.

REVOLUTION AND INTERVENTION IN PIEDMONT

Shortly before this, however, the news reached Laibach that a movement of the same kind had broken out in Piedmont, where the conservatism of Victor Emmanuel I.'s rule had been deemed a sufficient safeguard against any Constitutional or anti-Austrian agitation. On March 12th, the King abdicated in favour of his brother Charles Felix; and, on the following day, the 'Cortes' Constitution was proclaimed, and, in the absence of the new sovereign, the young Prince Charles Albert, of the Savoy-Carignan line, the heir-presumptive to the throne, on whom the Liberals built high hopes, assumed the regency. At Laibach, the two Emperors, with the assent of the Prussian plenipotentiary, at once resolved upon armed intervention, as indispensable in order to prevent any cooperation of the French 'Jacobins' with the Piedmontese Revolution and, above all, its spread into Lombardy. Together with the hesitation and ultimate refusal of Prince Charles Albert to incur responsibility for the new order of things, the energetic action of Austria brought about the collapse of the entire movement. On July 24th, the three Eastern Powers at Laibach concluded a treaty with the Sardinian Government, which fixed the number of the Austrian occupying force at 12,000 men. The small 'Constitutional' army was broken near Novara; and Alessandria was occupied by Austrian troops. Once more, without a single soldier of the armada which Alexander prided himself on holding always in readiness having crossed the frontier, his Austrian ally had mastered

the Revolution. Charles Felix, who had denounced the proclamation of the Constitution as an act of rebellion, was in definite possession of the regal authority, while Charles Albert, who resigned the regency in March, 1823, withdrew in semi-exile to Florence.

While, in Piedmont, the victory of the Reaction, thus established in most respects, stopped short of extreme severity, such was not the case at Naples. Here, Francis Duke of Calabria had, unlike Charles Albert of Savoy-Carignan, by his retention of the regency covered his secret agreement with the principles of his father's system of government. In anticipation, however, of his return from Laibach, King Ferdinand had committed the conduct of affairs at Naples to a Provisional Government, which openly undid all the public measures of the last nine months, and alarmed Metternich himself by the brutality of its proceedings. On May 15th, 1821, the King held his entry into his capital, where he disbanded the remains of the Neapolitan army, and set about the foundation of a new one, under the temporary protection of the Austrian forces on both sides of the Straits of Messina.

DECLARATION OF LAIBACH: THE *Triple Entente*

Before these arrangements were carried to a definite conclusion, the two Austrian and Russian plenipotentiaries at Laibach, with the concurrence of the Prussian, issued a Declaration (May 12th, 1821), in which the three 'Allied Sovereigns' took to themselves the credit of having preserved Europe from the peril of a general Revolution.

This late effort of Gentz's indefatigable pen amounted, at the same time, to a recital of the 'eternal truth,' that salutary legislative and administrative changes in the several states should emanate only from those on whom a Divine Providence has imposed the responsibility for the use of the authority entrusted to them, and to an admission that those who at present accepted this responsibility were the three Eastern Powers only. And the south of Europe knew, as did the north, that, of these Powers, it was Austria whose choice and policy had inspired and directed the course which had been taken, and whose armies had secured the triumph of the Reaction in Italy. A European Trias—or *Triple Entente*—had thus begun to supersede the European Pentarchy—or Concert; and the schism between the three Eastern and the two Western Powers, and Great Britain in especial, had already announced itself to those who had eyes to see. But would Metternich, supposing him to remain assured of Prussian support, continue to command the goodwill and cooperation of Russia in the future—a future which the first signs of the Greek Insurrection were already beginning to cloud? For these signs implied the reopening of the Eastern Question, as to which the policy of Russia and that of Austria had so long gone asunder.

E.—THE CONGRESS OF VERONA¹

1822

RUSSIA AND THE PORTE

IT was not, as it proved, the Greek Insurrection which, at the next European Congress, was to provoke the immediate intervention of the Great Powers. The outbreak of this Insurrection (1821) had been the inevitable consequence of the concessions which, after the Serbian revolt of 1815, Milosh Obrenovitch had secured for his country from the Sultan (1820), and which had marked the beginning of a process destined to occupy a century in its accomplishment—the break-up of the Ottoman empire in Europe. The Greek Insurrection, whose course cannot be pursued here, in 1821 overspread a wide area of both

¹ As to the Congress of Verona and connected events, see Stern, *op. cit.*, vol. ii., chapter ix., with those immediately preceding and following; and W. A. Phillips, *op. cit.*, vi. 3-7. Cf. Metternich, *Mémoires*, vol. iii. (1881), *année* 1822. It is impossible, even at this time of day, not to be fascinated by the literary charm of Chateaubriand's *Congrès de Vérone, Guerre d'Espagne*, etc. (2 vols., Paris, 1838); and the work is full of fine thoughts and acute characterisations; but though it necessarily contains much curious information, with many original letters, it must, as already indicated, be regarded as a chapter of high-flown autobiography rather than of careful political history. Those who read it for the first time should, if possible, read with it Lady Blennerhassett's admirable monograph on *Chateaubriand* (Mainz, 1903). H. W. V. Temperley's *George Canning* (1905) contains a valuable chapter 'The Congress of Verona.' J. E. Green, in 'Castlereagh's Instructions for the Vienna Conferences of 1822' (Transactions of the R. Hist. Soc., vol. vii., 1913), seeks to vindicate Castlereagh's political insight at the expense of Canning's candour.

land and sea, and led to terrible reprisals, which, together with the vengeance taken by the Turks for a rising in Wallachia, seemed to make Russian interference certain. On June 28th of that year, Alexander, moved, it must be allowed, by the most generous impulses of his nature, but also, once more, under the joint influence of Mme. de Krüdener and Capo d'Istria (whom Metternich called 'the fatal element of eternal discord'), issued a wrathful manifesto purporting that the cause now espoused by Russia was one common to Europe at large. Unless Turkey, he added, gave satisfaction by changing her whole system of rule, she had forfeited all claim to coexist any longer with the Christian Powers of Europe. At the same time, the Tsar showed every disposition to adhere to the lines of action laid down at Laibach. In a letter to the Emperor Francis (July 11th), he promised, unless the Porte refused his demands, not to enter into hostilities without a previous understanding with the other European sovereigns, and called upon the Emperor to guarantee to them the purity of his—the Tsar's—intentions. Metternich, though out of sympathy with the Greeks (whose revolt, whatever its distinctive features, he regarded as, nevertheless, identical in origin with the previous manifestations of the Revolution), felt himself obliged to address some serious advice to the Porte. But it had no effect, since the Turks perceived that Austria forbore from any action of a collective kind or in conjunction with Russia. The endeavours of Castlereagh (now Lord Londonderry), who shared Metternich's apprehensions of Russia's ultimate designs, seemed equally hopeless; and

the summons of a Congress, or at least of a Conference of Ambassadors at Vienna, found no favour, for the present, at Petersburg. Still, Metternich persisted. The French Government, which the Tsar was believed to have sought to gain over to his Eastern policy by the offer of eventual Mediterranean acquisitions, hesitated to join in action against the Porte, the old ally of France. The Prussian Government, notwithstanding Ancillon's early Philhellenist manifesto, held firmly by its Austrian ally. And, with Great Britain, Metternich, after an interview with King George IV. and Londonderry at Hanover in October, 1821, arrived at so close an understanding, that he felt himself warranted in making a fresh appeal to the Tsar (December) on behalf of the principles of that 'general Alliance' of which he had so long posed as the mainstay. In a Memorandum, dated October 23rd, he defined the policy of Austria as the maintenance of peace on the basis of existing Treaties; and, a few days later (28th), Castlereagh asserted the necessity of maintaining the present state of Europe—of which Turkey as it stood formed part. Alexander was, however, not yet to be moved, being confirmed in his attitude by the virtual refusal of the Porte to accept the Four Points pressed upon it by Austria and Great Britain: they amounted to a concession of the Russian demands as to the Danubian Principalities and the protection of the religious worship of the Porte's Christian subjects. Thus, for the time there was a standstill; and Alexander's Eastern designs remained in conflict with his ideal of a general European Concert.

THE GREEK INSURRECTION AND THE POWERS

Meanwhile, the Greek Insurrection ran its course up to the Declaration of Greek Independence in January, 1822, and thence to the battle of Peta in the following July, which seemed to threaten the downfall of the national cause in the whole of western Greece, and eventually in the Morea. Manifestly, as the struggle appeared to be approaching its catastrophe, the prospect of intervention by the Great Powers waned, and the Tsar's eagerness to aid an insurrection which was, under his protection, to have secured a victory of the Cross over the Crescent began to cool. Early in the year, he sent to Vienna an able agent, de Tatischeff, to discuss the chances of inducing the Porte, by diplomatic pressure, to make concessions short of the Four Points. Metternich, trusting to his understanding with Great Britain, had met the Russian policy so far as to promise to recall the Austrian ambassador from Constantinople, if the same step were taken by all the members of the 'Grand Alliance.' The future relations of the Porte to its Christian subjects Metternich desired to have discussed in Conferences between the Powers and the Porte at Vienna, to be followed by a Congress at the same place. These Conferences had actually begun at the end of June, when Tatischeff reappeared, to announce the willingness of his Government still further to reduce its '*ultimatum.*' The evacuation of the Danubian Principalities, beyond which, practically, no demand was now made, had, as a matter of fact, been already promised by the Porte to the British ambassador,

Lord Strangford. But, though new and acceptable hospodars were sent into the Principalities, the evacuation was delayed, in approved Turkish fashion; and when, in August, Strangford arrived from Constantinople at Vienna, to take part in the Congress which was to assemble there, he brought with him no more categorical assurance than a promise from the Porte to sacrifice everything, except its dignity and independence, to the friendship of Great Britain.

Still, with British aid, Austria had succeeded in staving off the direct intervention of Russia, or of the Powers under Russia's guidance, in the affairs of the East. In the previous month (July) Capo d'Istria's fall had put an end to fears of his policy prevailing at the Vienna Congress. The Greek Insurrection lay low; and the Tsar, intent upon repressing the Revolution elsewhere, was fain to confess that he had never mistaken the impure source of the movement which he had favoured, or the danger in which his intervention would have involved his allies. In other words, the autocrat had at last been 'brought into line.'

SPANISH AFFAIRS, AND THE QUESTION OF FRENCH INTERVENTION

Very different had been the course of events in Spain, to whose revolutionary movement Metternich had persuaded himself, and sought to persuade the Tsar, that the Greek Insurrection was essentially akin. Ferdinand VII., forced to consent to the dismissal of his life-guards, as a preliminary step to their disbandment, was more helpless than ever;

and, though he brought about the dismissal of one Ministry of Constitutionals (*Moderados*), had to accept another, equally obnoxious to himself, at the hands of the Cortes. In secret, he was soliciting foreign aid, though, as yet, the French Government steadily refused to intervene. In the Extraordinary Cortes, opened in the autumn of 1821, the Radicals (*Exaltados*) prevailed, and gave their support to the resistance to the Government offered at Cadiz, Seville and Coruña. Early in 1822, the Ministry was forced to resign, and the Extraordinary Cortes were soon afterwards closed, without any real decision as to the political situation having been reached. The risings in the south had begun to quiet down; but Radical feeling was unsatisfied, while, especially in rural districts, the Conservatives (*Serviles*) could more than ever count on the apathy of the masses and the goodwill of the clergy. And their hopes of putting an end to the whole 'Constitutional' business, and bringing to pass the restoration of the absolute monarchy, were greatly encouraged by the prospect of the victory of the same cause on the other side of the Pyrenees.

The Congress of Laibach had borne witness to the prudent and patriotic determination of the Richelieu Ministry in France, notwithstanding the pressure exercised upon it from both sides, to preserve neutrality with regard to Spanish affairs. The course of events at home, however, had gradually come to exert its irresistible influence. The success of the ultra-royalists in the autumn election of 1820 had already led to the inclusion in the Ministry of two prominent members of their faction, Comtes de Villèle and de Corbière; but this

had failed to content the extreme section. In the end, the further demand for the appointment of the Duc de Belluno as Minister of War led to a rupture between Richelieu and the '*Congréganistes*,' as the fanatics of ultra-royalism were called (they were supported by a religious propaganda, as well as by the influence of Mme. de Caylas over Louis XVIII.). When the autumn elections of 1821 had proved largely in favour of the ultras, Richelieu had to give way, and, after a useless appeal to the good faith of the Comte d'Artois (heir-presumptive to the throne), whose persuasion had induced him to take office, sent in his resignation, in which his ministerial colleagues joined (December). The new Villèle-Corbière Ministry, which represented the extreme Royalist faction gathered round the person of the Comte d'Artois, included Vicomte Mathieu de Montmorency, a convert from Constitutionalism and a devoted adherent of the policy of Intervention. The temporary alliance with the Left, formed to bring about the fall of Richelieu, was at once broken. The numbers of the adversaries of the Bourbon throne, in consequence, at once increased, while the *Carboneria* spread through the country and produced a series of conspiracies. Delations, persecutions and executions, with other measures of repression, followed, and a 'White Terror' seemed, once more, to reign in France.

What wonder, that the eyes of King Ferdinand VII. and the Spanish *Serviles* should have turned expectantly across the frontier, although, at first, the new French Ministry seemed loth to abandon the non-intervention policy of its pre-

decessor, or to interfere in Spain on its own responsibility? Advantage was, however, taken of the spread of yellow fever in Catalonia, and the consequent muster of a large body of French troops on the frontier (August, 1821), for the purpose of protecting the mountain-passes against the penetration of the epidemic into France, to detain these troops there, even after it had abated; so that the *cordon sanitaire* was gradually changed into the presence of an army of observation. Thus matters stood, when, in March, 1822, the new Cortes met, and a *Moderados* Ministry (under Martinez de la Rosa) faced both a Radical majority and the insuperable animosity of the partisans of absolute royalty, strong in the support of large sections of the population and in the secret favour of the King.

To crown all, the quarrel with the South-American Colonies had now reached a hopeless stage. Spain had, in 1816, lost her last opportunity of reestablishing her rule over these Colonies on the basis of reforms satisfactory to the great body of their populations; and, from that date onwards, encouraged by the goodwill and the mercantile interests of the United States, Great Britain and Portugal, the Insurrection continuously progressed. Independent republics were now formed in several of these Colonies. The Spanish Government would not hear of transaction with the insurgents, and in 1820, as was incidentally mentioned above, was preparing an armed expedition from Cadiz, when Spain itself was plunged into revolutionary agitation. In vain, Great Britain, whose trade Spanish retaliatory proceedings were more and more

seriously affecting, urged a pacific solution of the quarrel; and in March, 1821, the United States recognised the independence of those of the Spanish South-American Colonies which had already proclaimed it.

Thus the impotence of Spain seemed to declare itself on every side. Though, in May, 1822, an attempt at an Absolutist *coup d'état* failed, the *Moderados* Ministry was, in the end, unable to hold its own against the desperate plotting which ensued, probably with the secret encouragement of the King, who had not dared to follow the larger number of his guards to his country seat. When, on July 7th, they returned in order to seize the capital on his behalf, they were overpowered, and he was to all intents and purposes a prisoner in his palace. A Radical Ministry was with difficulty formed, and vengeance taken on those who had taken part in the secret conspiracy. On the other hand, in the north, guerilla bands of adherents of absolute government continuously spread; and at Seo de Urgel, at the base of the Pyrenees, a Regency was formally established in the name of the legitimate King, which declared the annulment of all measures passed since the proclamation of the 'Cortes' Constitution.

Arrogant self-confidence marked the proceedings of this Regency, after the manner of many Spanish Governments, *juntas* and 'pronouncements.' But, though before long all Catalonia (with the exception of the larger towns), as well as Navarre and part of Aragon, adhered to the counter-revolution, its real dependence was on foreign aid. None was to be expected from Great Britain against

Liberalism and the Madrid Government, whom she was willing enough to advise to make peace with the South-American Colonies. But the Tsar, who, so early as the spring of 1822, had been plied by King Ferdinand of the Two Sicilies in favour of his brother-in-law and namesake at Madrid, listened with marked favour to this urgent appeal, and recurred to the idea of sending across the Pyrenees a force of 40,000, as the Russian contingent to a 'European Army.' Metternich, though by no means blind to the effect which the degrading position of Ferdinand VII. must have upon the cause of legitimacy and order, shrank from any share in the designs of the Tsar, and looked with suspicion upon the close understanding between Russia and France which they seemed to imply. From this point of view, too, as well as because it was on her rulers that the Spanish absolutists primarily depended, the action of France was the all-important element in the situation.

Conscious of this, the French Government, at the outset, showed great caution in its proceedings. Before taking any step in the direction of intervention, Montmorency asked for a declaration on the part of the King of Spain, that he would not refuse to renounce part of the royal power which he had possessed in 1814. Such a declaration would enable the French Ministers to make it known to their Chambers and army that he had assented to reforms reconciling the rights of his crown with the lawful liberties of his people; whereupon, supposing King Ferdinand to have succeeded in retiring into one of his provinces

and then approaching the French frontier at the head of a loyal body of troops, the French Government might appropriately take into consideration the question of mediation. But, although a guarded statement to the above effect was accompanied by an autograph letter of advice in the same sense from King Louis XVIII., and although Montmorency ventured to add the unwarranted assertion (afterwards denounced by Metternich), that the view here developed was shared by the Allied Courts, Ferdinand VII. would, at first, have none of it. What he desiderated was nothing short of the restitution of his unlimited royal authority; and, even after the *coup manqué* of July 7th, he would not bind himself to the concessions pressed upon him by the French ambassador, or assent to more than the restoration of the Cortes in their ancient form. In the meantime, he asked for speedy assistance towards the recovery of his personal freedom, and for a further loan of money to that end.

At Paris, Villèle continued to restrain the zeal of Montmorency, who had actually already sent money and arms, which had been stopped at the frontier. In accordance with Villèle's counsel, France for the present did not go beyond an armed neutrality, and refused to listen to any suggestion of a march through her territory of a foreign (Russian) armed force, while reserving to herself the right of fixing the moment of her own action, and the limits within which she would accept the 'moral support' of the Allies. What, in their turn, was to be their own line of conduct with regard to the Spanish problem, must form the

principal, if not the sole, subject of their deliberations at the European Congress now about to assemble.

PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS AT VIENNA

When, in May, 1821, the Congress of Laibach separated, and Metternich claimed for the Eastern Powers the credit of having saved Europe from a revolutionary conspiracy against the existing order of things, it was felt that another Congress was needed, more particularly for a complete settlement of the affairs of Italy, in which Europe, and Austria in especial took so keen an interest. Florence was, at first, thought of as a suitable locality. But, as has been seen, the area of political movements demanding attention had widely extended; and, since Austria retained the general lead in European politics, it seemed appropriate that the Powers should deliberate within her dominions. Verona was, therefore, chosen; but it was thought convenient that a preliminary series of discussions should take place in the Austrian capital. In these, Tsar Alexander had promised to take part; but he arrived so late, that no regular Conferences could be held at Vienna, though important conversations were held there between the Tsar and Wellington. For the Duke had taken the place which was to have been filled by Londonderry, the startling news of whose tragic death (August 12th, 1822) had reached Vienna just before the beginning of the meetings there.

The instructions drawn up by Londonderry (Castlereagh) for his own guidance at Vienna show, beyond doubt, that he and his Government were

well aware that Spanish affairs might come under discussion there and at Verona, and that Castlereagh was fully alive to the expediency of a non-intervention policy, of which, therefore, the entire credit ought not to be given to his successor Canning. Great Britain was to observe 'a rigid abstinence from interference in the internal affairs of Spain'; and a consultation *en route* at Paris with the French Ministers might prove of great importance. The Duke of Wellington, accordingly, on his way to Vienna, visited Paris, whence he wrote for 'more specific' instructions. From Italian affairs it was probably intended that British diplomacy should hold aloof, as it had at Troppau and Laibach. When the Duke reached the Austrian capital, he found that these were in the background, and that, to Metternich's great satisfaction, the danger of a Russo-Turkish war was at an end. The Tsar declared Spain to be the headquarters of European Jacobinism, and strongly advocated intervention there, such as had taken place in Naples and Piedmont. But, in the present instance, the probability of independent French action had to be reckoned with. Thus, it was not enough that Villèle (really anxious for peace) instructed Châteaubriand, who (in August) was named to act as one of the three French Plenipotentiaries at Verona, to beware of the bellicose measures on behalf of 'Europe' urged by the Tsar, and took the same tone in his conversations with Wellington at Paris, or that of Vienna. Montmorency, who was to be First French Plenipotentiary at Verona, represented to the Tsar that no necessity for European intervention had as yet arisen in Spain. Neither

Montmorency nor Châteaubriand (though they by no means saw eye to eye with each other) really looked forward to the maintenance by France of a policy of non-intervention; and Châteaubriand has with engaging frankness told us of his resolution to secure to France, *quocumque modo*, the beneficent glory of a victorious war against revolutionary Spain. Metternich, although unwilling to pursue a policy contravening that of Great Britain, felt himself unable to oppose the Tsar directly, but was at the same time determined to prevent any armed Russian interference.

MEETING OF THE CONGRESS OF VERONA.
THE FRANCO-SPANISH PROBLEM

So doubtful was the prospect of agreement among the Powers, when, in the middle of October, 1822, the Congress assembled at Verona in great numerical strength, and with a display of social splendours recalling those of Vienna, seven years earlier. It became obvious, at once, that the Spanish problem would take precedence over all others; and Metternich drew up, of course by Gentz's hand, a Memorandum for communication to the Russian and Prussian Governments on the affairs of both Spain and Portugal, pointing out the necessity, in the interests of these kingdoms and of Europe, of putting an end to 'the so-called Constitutions' imposed upon them. In the case of Spain, he argued, the revolutionary edifice would have long since been overthrown, but for the necessity of safeguarding France, who would naturally be called upon to conduct the assault. It was, therefore, indispensable that the Five

Governments should arrive at an understanding as to the lines of their common policy.

A few days later (October 15th), Montmorency, notwithstanding Villèle's caution, met this manifesto halfway by enquiring, through the plenipotentiaries of the Powers, whether, in the probable event of a Franco-Spanish war, France might reckon on their assistance. Wellington was prepared to give an answer on the spot; the others desired to refer to their respective sovereigns. A fortnight afterwards the replies were to hand. The Russian with the utmost cordiality, the Austrian and Prussian in more guarded terms, declared their willingness to cooperate with France. But Wellington stated that the British Government had since the spring of 1820 (the time of the outbreak of the Spanish Revolution) lost no opportunity of advising the Allies to abstain from any intervention in the internal affairs of Spain. The Alliance had indeed, in Castlereagh's phrase, 'moved away from Great Britain'; and the policy to which, under his guidance, she had steadily adhered in the last two years of his life she was not likely to abandon now that Canning had taken his place.¹

THE CONCERT OF EUROPE BROKEN UP

The endeavours of Metternich, anxious, even now, to find a pacific solution, having failed, and

¹ It may serve as an illustration of Châteaubriand's unsurpassed power of self-delusion to mention that he felt certain of the British belief that France would suffer defeat in a war with Spain, and that such a result would shut the door against any renewal of the Bourbon *Pacte de Famille* (*cf. op. cit.*, vol. i., pp. 126-7).

France having declined the British offer of mediation between her and Great Britain, a species of compromise was (November 19th) reached between the plenipotentiaries of the three Eastern Powers and of France. Despatches were to be sent to the ambassadors of the former at Madrid, bidding them take their departure unless the Spanish Government should change its course—more especially by changing the present situation of the King. At the same time, a Secret Protocol was signed with Montmorency, whereby the Eastern Powers undertook to fulfil their obligations towards France, should she be attacked by Spain, or should the rights of King Ferdinand or his dynasty be overthrown, or should unforeseen cases arise which in the opinion of the French Government and the ambassadors of the Three Powers at Paris should correspond to their obligations. On the following day, Wellington, who had been informed as to these documents, reappeared among the plenipotentiaries, to declare it impossible for his sovereign in this matter to hold the same language as his Allies; so that nothing remained for Great Britain but to seek to allay the agitation which must be expected in Spain. Montmorency, hereupon, took his departure for Paris, there to obtain the approval of the conclusions reached, before they were made known at Madrid, leaving the less scrupulous Châteaubriand behind him at Verona.

Thus, so far as Great Britain was concerned, the Concert of Europe was avowedly at an end, while the attempt to prevent a French war against Spain had proved a failure. For the rest, although the demeanour of France at Verona, as exhibited in

Montmorency's absence by Châteaubriand, became less and less restrained, especially after the November elections had once more raised the self-confidence of the Ultras, Villèle still delayed warlike proceedings against Spain; and, though the Tsar continued to show himself eager for war, the French Minister would not hear of the march of Russian troops through France. In this reserve, he might have had the concurrence of Metternich, had not the Austrian statesman been, above all, anxious to avoid a quarrel with Russia, so long as she kept the peace in the East, which to him was a matter of primary importance. And on this head, at all events, a Conservative policy could be successfully carried out at the Congress of Verona.

A lull having supervened in the discussion of Spanish affairs, those of the Near East were taken up by the active Russian plenipotentiary Tatischeff at the point where they had been left at the time of the fall of Capo d'Istria. Castlereagh's instructions for Verona had been not to recognise the Greeks as belligerents, but to seek to bring about the close of the struggle; and Canning had subsequently directed that Strangford should do what he could towards obtaining for the Greeks a generous and comprehensive amnesty. Though Russia increased her demands on the Porte, claiming the revocation of all measures restricting navigation in the Black Sea, no serious difference arose on this score among the Powers; on the other hand, no attention was paid by any of them to the petition for aid addressed from America to the Christian sovereigns at Verona by an emissary of the Greek Provisional Government. The subse-

quent history of the relations between the Greek Insurrection and the Concert of Europe—or what remained of it—falls outside the range of this sketch; it includes a proposal by Strangford (in 1825) to send to the Porte a collective menace representing ‘the united voice of the five Allied Courts,’ which drew upon the ambassador a reprimand from Canning—to whose diplomatic dictionary, as Gentz observed, ‘such phrases had long been unknown.’ Canning’s avoidance, in the following year, of a Congress, and resort to a more expeditious method, were dictated by a sure instinct.

The affairs of Italy, for the settlement of which the Congress had been originally proposed, occupied little of its attention till near its close. The treatment of this subject then took a course not less satisfactory to Austria than had, in a different way, been that of the Græco-Turkish trouble. The persecutions which had followed on the return of King Ferdinand to Naples continued, even after the dismissal of the most remorseless of his Ministers; and, though a reduction of the Austrian force began at the end of December (1822), there was no visible intention of bringing the military occupation to a close.¹ In the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom and the northern and central states more or less under Austrian tutelage, constant raids were carried on, as in the south, upon actual or supposed *Carbonari*. Although the French plenipotentiaries at Verona had been instructed to use their best endeavours for protecting the Italian states against the domination of Austria, they did nothing; while the in-

¹ The last Austrian troops did not quit Naples till the beginning of 1825.

structions of their British colleagues merely bound them to prevent any steps being taken in contravention of European Treaties. As to Piedmont, which was not evacuated by the Austrians till late in 1823, the Congress had under consideration the question of the future succession of Prince Charles Albert to the Sardinian throne. Metternich declined to interfere with the principle of legitimacy, but suggested the requirement of guarantees from the suspect Prince.¹ Thus, when, in December, 1822, Metternich, in the name of the Eastern Powers, laid before the several Italian plenipotentiaries assembled at Verona a declaration which, while deprecating any intervention in the concerns of other states, asked for the united efforts of the Italian Governments in the suppression of revolutionary movements, this communication was generally approved in principle, although the suggested method of an Italian Central Commission—a sort of political Inquisition like the German at Mainz—was regarded with so much doubt that it had to be dropped. In the meantime, Austria had again sufficiently asserted her predominant influence in the affairs of Italy, and Verona seemed to have set the seal upon the most successful chapter of Austrian policy in the whole Period of the Congresses.

Yet, that the Concert of Europe had shrunk into the combined action of the 'three Gentlemen of Verona,' as Brougham's not very pungent pleasantry called them,² was shown in some at least of the fur-

¹ He actually succeeded in 1831.

² To this jest Cobbett refers in a passage of his powerful letter thus rendered by Châteaubriand (*op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 343): *les trois gentilshommes de Vérone (titre d'une comédie de Schakea-spere et allusion aux deux empereurs et au roi de Prusse)*.

ther questions to which the Congress addressed itself before its dissolution. The continued complaints of the reactionary Sardinian Government as to the refuge granted to political fugitives in Switzerland were sympathetically received at Verona by the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Russia and Prussia, on the ground that any European state in such straits was entitled to appeal to the 'Allied Powers' for aid; and it was agreed to discuss the subject with the French Government. The British was not approached concerning it. But there were two other questions with regard to which it could not be left out of sight.

THE SOUTH-AMERICAN COLONIES AND THEIR INDEPENDENCE

One of these has already been noted as having gradually become an all but insuperable difficulty in the political life of Spain. Armed intervention for the suppression of the Revolt of the South-American Colonies of Spain had been urged by Tsar Alexander, and deprecated by Castlereagh, at Aix-la-Chapelle; and the Spanish Government had consistently refused repeated offers of mediation on the part of Great Britain. Meanwhile, British trade with these Colonies had continued to increase, and a tacit understanding had come to obtain between Great Britain and Spain that, so long as the former refrained from recognising the independence of the revolted Colonies, Spain would not interfere with the trade between them and Great Britain. In his instructions for Verona, Castlereagh, while stating that no recognition would take place, while the conflict with the

Spanish Government still continued, treated the grant of it to the Colonies as merely a matter of time. Canning was, therefore, but carrying to its logical consequences a policy already adopted by the British Government, when, on September 27th, 1822, he wrote to Wellington that Great Britain must not in any circumstances be pledged against recognition, and that she might be compelled to accord it immediately (before the meeting of Parliament). As a matter of fact, the United States having already set the example, the interests of Great Britain rendered the same step necessary on her part, if her trade with the New World was not to suffer irrecoverably—more especially since France was suspected of designs which the Tsar was prepared to encourage.¹ Wellington's calm communication to the Congress of Canning's despatch aroused a protest, in which all the Plenipotentiaries (including, of course, Châteaubriand) joined; nor could there be any doubt but that to the Spanish difficulty, as a source of disunion between the Powers in the Old World, had been added a cause of patent discord in the New.

THE SLAVE-TRADE

One other question, in which, much to her honour, Great Britain had, during the whole of this period, stood isolated among the European Powers, and which she had forced upon their attention both at Vienna and at Aix-la-Chapelle, was brought up at Verona on November 28th, 1822, by a Declaration presented by Wellington. Notwithstanding

¹ Châteaubriand mentions with complacency the notion of two or three Bourbon monarchies, to be set up in South America.

the resolutions adopted, in 1815, at Vienna and at Paris, the African Slave-trade had been carried on without abatement in the south-African dominions of Portugal, with the connivance of France, who refused to admit the right of search agreed to by the other Maritime Powers. Wellington's proposals for incisive action, accordingly, met with active opposition at Verona, where the eloquence of Chateaubriand revealed the jealousy of French feeling; and, for the moment, all that could be done was to adjourn further consideration of the subject to Conferences to be held in London. The Treaty with Brazil for the suppression of the Slave-trade was not concluded till 1827, three years after Canning had carried in the House of Commons the proposals which, in 1833, led to the Act of Abolition of Slavery throughout the British dominions.

END OF THE CONGRESS, AND OF THE EPOCH

Thus, before Christmastide, 1822, the last of the Congresses which had represented, or professed to represent, the Concert of Europe separated without having resolved on common action, either as to the question pressing upon it most urgently or as to others. 'The time for Areopagus, and the like of that,' as Canning irreverently declared, had gone by. Yet, in their farewell Circular to their plenipotentiaries (December 14th), the three Eastern Powers—Gentz once more acting as their mouth-piece—could treat the settlement of Italy as a consummation effected by the Congress; though they made no secret of the fact that the condition of Spain remained unredeemed, while an appeal for the preservation of Europe from the Revolution

must lie more largely to the endeavours of the future than to the achievements of the past. There would, in good truth, hardly be so much as a pretence that the unity of action based on common interests, and the pursuit of common ideals which previous Congresses had, more or less successfully, striven to display, had been the guiding principle at Verona, where Metternich had striven in vain, and Canning's policy had openly declined, to restore the broken harmony, and where, in the end, the antagonistic principle of Non-intervention in the internal affairs of nations had asserted itself. The historical importance of the Congress of Verona is therefore rightly described as consisting in the fact that, instead of marking out the height, it announced the close of an epoch.

The Congress, it may be convenient to add, broke up with the knowledge that the particular problem, which had engrossed so much of its attention, must speedily find its decision elsewhere; nor could the political condition of France leave much doubt as to the direction which that decision would take. The offer of British mediation between France and Spain, which at Verona Wellington had declined, was now made for him at Paris on his way home, but, as had been foreseen, in vain. On Christmas-day, 1822, in the presence of King Louis XVIII., the whole of the French Ministry, with the exception of Villèle, voted for keeping French policy towards Spain in line with that of the Eastern Powers; but, by the advice of the King himself, aware that upon France must fall the immediate conduct of hostilities against Spain, diplomatic relations with her were not at once broken off.

But the delay was only momentary. Though Montmorency resigned, the bellicose Châteaubriand, with many protestations, succeeded him as Foreign Minister; and, though the Spanish reply to the last French note was more courteous than those to the Eastern Powers, the subsequent departure of their ambassadors was speedily followed by that of the French. King Louis XVIII. had to give way, and, after parliamentary scenes of unprecedented violence at Paris, the war began. On April 7th, 1823, the advance-guard of the French commander, the Duc d'Angoulême, crossed the Bidassoa. In the same month (April 28th), a powerful speech by Canning warned all whom it might concern that the strength of Great Britain, though quiescent at the moment, might, on adequate occasion, be called into action.

THE FRENCH INVASION OF SPAIN—THE SOUTH-AMERICAN COLONIES

The result of the French invasion of Spain was to bring to a fall the unstable constitutional edifice set up at Madrid, but not to restore order or the fundamental conditions of national prosperity to the unhappy kingdom which the French arms had mastered in the name of 'legitimacy.' As the state of things went on from bad to worse, there could no longer be any question of Spain maintaining her traditional policy towards the revolted South-American Colonies which at Verona had met with the sympathy of the Eastern Powers. Yet Spanish pride would not listen to the idea of an amicable separation, such as was (in 1825) agreed to between Portugal and Brazil. After the success

of the French army of invasion in Spain, the French Government, indeed, suggested that the future of the South-American Colonies should be settled by a Conference at Paris; but to this Great Britain naturally demurred. Of her own ultimate action there could be no doubt, even had not the United States in December, 1823, proclaimed the doctrine of Non-intervention in America as a principle of their own policy,¹ and even had Great Britain herself not in this year appointed consuls in South-America, and, in the following, concluded a commercial treaty with Buenos Aires. On the last day of 1824, the British Cabinet declared for recognition. The principle of Non-intervention was thus asserted contemporaneously with the collapse of the Concert of Europe, and another era began in the political history of the New, as well as in that of the Old, World.

PORTUGAL, FRANCE AND GERMANY

Portugal, whose 'Constitutional' Revolution had been treated by the Congress of Verona, under Metternich's guidance, as part and parcel of the Spanish, and subjected to the same uncompromising condemnation, had been preserved from the intervention in store for her neighbour, by the intimacy of her relations with Great Britain. King João VI. having returned from Brazil to Lisbon, the Constitution granted by him (September, 1822) failed

¹ For the subsequent development of the *Monroe Doctrine* then accepted by the United States Government, Canning is certainly not to be held in any way responsible. The Panama Congress of 1826, which discussed the Union-of American States, North and South, came to no conclusion in its favour—partly through his influence

to improve the social and economic condition of the kingdom; and the declared separation of Brazil from the mother-country under the Crown-prince Dom Pedro (October) completed the disillusionment of the Liberals. At Lisbon, the intrigues of Queen Carlota and her second son, Dom Miguel, fostered the hopes of the Reactionaries. Encouraged by the success of the French invasion of Spain, they, in May, 1823, brought about a counter-revolution, which ran a course in many respects analogous to that of affairs in the neighbouring kingdom and earned the approval of the Tsar Alexander. It culminated in a brief reign of terror at Lisbon (April, 1824) and the escape of the King on board a British warship. Conferences, presided over by Canning, in London arranged for the formal separation of Brazil from Portugal which was signed at Rio in August, 1825; and, since the counter-scheme of a new Congress broke down, the Concert policy had suffered another defeat through Canning's mediatory endeavours. But the peace between the parties, patched up in Portugal, was not to prove of long endurance; nor was the country to begin to recover its prosperity for nearly another generation.

In France itself, the triumphant self-assertion of the Reaction in the Spanish campaign had raised the arrogance of the Ultra-royalists to an extreme pitch. Although Villèle was at one with the King (whose policy was Moderate like his own) in the dismissal of Châteaubriand, the indignant pen of that personage turned upon his former colleague, with a fury which did not spare the throne. In the midst of these alarms, the shrewd old

monarch at last passed away (September, 1824), and was succeeded by the Comte d'Artois as Charles X. The future of France now seemed once more to lie at the mercy of the Reactionary faction, of which the new sovereign had long been the chief in Church and State.

German home politics had played no prominent part in the deliberations at Verona, since there had been no slackening in the cooperation between Austria and Prussia—or, in other words, in the general deference of the latter to the former on all subjects, foreign or domestic, which received the special attention of both Governments. The unanimous acceptance by the Federal Diet of the Carlsbad Decrees (September, 1819), the passing by the same body of the so-called Vienna Final Act (August, 1820) and its approval of the renewal of the Carlsbad Decrees (January, 1824), marked the unbroken ascendancy of the Reaction which the *entente* between the two Great Powers ensured; and the Mainz Commission for the repression of demagoguery continued more or less at work during the eight years of its existence (1819–27). These concerns did not much trouble the great personages at Verona, though there had been some talk between the Austrian and Prussian Ministers of invoking the aid of the Tsar for repressing the Liberal sympathies of his brother-in-law, King William I., of Württemberg. On the whole, the two German Great Powers might safely be left to carry on their own ignoble work at home. Much of the police tyranny which marked this humiliating period of the national life, particularly in Prussia, was of a petty kind, as compared with the blood-

thirstiness of southern persecutions; but, since it spent itself, above all, on the chief sources of popular enlightenment, education and the Press, it ate deeply and enduringly into the heart of the nation.

THE GREEK QUESTION AND THE PETERSBURG CONFERENCES

One question remained, of which the Congress of Verona had declined to touch more than the fringe, and which was not to be brought to a settlement in the immediate future. At the Congress, Tsar Alexander had, as was seen, taken no step calculated to sustain the sinking Hellenic cause, and had even begun to move, or to allow the representatives of Austria and Great Britain at Constantinople to move, in the direction of a reconciliation between Russia and the Porte. But no such reconciliation was possible, so long as the Greek Insurrection continued. And, notwithstanding its vicissitudes, European sympathy with it—Philhellenism, in a word—had never before been so ardent or so widespread. Thus, in the interview between the Tsar and the Austrian Emperor at Czernowitz (October, 1823), a first attempt was made to bring about a 'pacification' of Greece by means of Conferences between the ambassadors of the Great Powers in Petersburg. But when, in response to the Russian proposal to this effect, the Conferences met there in June and July, 1824, no basis for an agreement was found by them, or was really possible. Russia's design of placing Greece, as a semi-independent principality, under the Turkish protectorate, this relationship to be guaranteed by the Powers, offended

Turkish pride, while failing to satisfy Greek aspirations. This being so, Great Britain declined to offend against the principle of Non-intervention by forcing a decision upon either side—for the Greeks as well as the Turks, were treated by her as belligerents; and the Conferences broke down—not to the satisfaction of Metternich. The second Petersburg Conference on the subject, held in April, 1875, in which Great Britain took no part, really made no further progress. For, although it was here resolved to endeavour to induce the Porte to accept the intervention of the Powers, the Russian proposal to enforce this advice found no support, except, in a measure, from Prussia, and the invitation itself was declined by the Sultan. In other words, the question of effective intervention in Greece was once more left unsettled; and the last declaration on the subject, made by Tsar Alexander before his death, was the statement through Nesselrode (August 18th), that, as to the Eastern Question, Russia would henceforth act as befitted her own dignity and interests, without entering into further explanations with her Allies.

THE CONCERT OF EUROPE AT THE END

This pronouncement in favour of Non-intervention was not, indeed, the last word in the history of the foreign policy of Russia or in that of the Powers who had joined with her in the Troppau Protocol. But it put the seal upon the entombment of that Concert of Europe which we have regarded as the height of achievement in the Period of Congresses. It was not the Concert of Europe, which in July, 1827, responded to the appeal of

the Greeks to save them from annihilation, but a separate combination of three Powers—Great Britain, France and Russia—against which Austria and Prussia protested. Once more, in the political history of Europe there began a new era, of which the guns at Navarino announced the advent and which opened with the recognition by the Porte of the independence of Greece. The Concert of Europe was no more, and the new kingdom of Greece stood under the guarantee of the Three Powers who had intervened on her behalf. Henceforth, the respect still paid by the several Great Powers to the Treaties in which they had borne a part, and their care for the maintenance of the Balance of Power, were to be once more substituted for attempts at a representative League of Sovereigns or of Governments. Peradventure, with the gradual growth of an acknowledged system of International Law, and in an age which was striving to leave that of Absolutism behind it, the nations might at last succeed where Sovereigns and Governments had failed.



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Ward, (Sir) Adolphus William
The period of congresses

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