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
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



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THE
PHILOSOPHICAL
PRINCIPLES
OF
NATURAL AND REVEALED
RELIGION.

UNFOLDED

IN

A GEOMETRICAL ORDER

BY

THE CHEVALIER RAMSAY

AUTHOR OF THE TRAVELS OF CYRUS.

90

GLASGOW:

PRINTED AND SOLD BY ROBERT FOULIS.

MDCCLXVIII.

P R E F A C E.

IN this twilight of human understanding ‘ we see things
‘ darkly as in a glass.’ The most sublime reasonings, the
noblest ideas, the most perfect schemes we can form of God
and Nature are no doubt looked upon by angelical minds, as
the childish discourses of little babes, according to the expres-
sion of a fine poet ;

‘ Superior beings when of late they saw
‘ A mortal man unfold all nature’s law,
‘ Admir’d such wisdom in an earthly shape,
‘ And shew’d a NEWTON, as we shew an ape.

It is therefore with the greatest self-diffidence that we under-
take the research and demonstration of the principles contain-
ed in the following treatise. We know their sublimity, we
feel our own weakness.

There are but two possible ways of coming to the know-
ledge of truth, by natural evidence, or by supernatural revela-
tion. Both are emanations of that sovereign wisdom which
alone has the right to command our assent, and both are em-
ployed in this essay. Tho’ natural light is not always sufficient
to discover supernatural truths, yet revelation never contra-
dicts reason. The former serves to exalt and ennoble, but never
to degrade and extinguish the latter. Philosophy therefore
as an handmaid may very well be employed to show that reli-

gion is perfectly conformable to reason. So long as Deists and Freethinkers see no sublimity, dignity, nor beauty in the Christian scheme, they will still cry out that our mysteries are blasphemous, and that several doctrines of faith destroy all the moral attributes of God. Prepossessed with these false ideas, they must look upon miracles as tricks of art; prophecy as imposture; inspiration as enthusiasm; sacred history as fabulous; ecclesiastic authority as priestcraft, and all the reasons of credibility as plausible falsehoods. We do not here attempt to prove by such prophecies and miracles as could have proceeded only from omniscience and omnipotence, that God has spoken to his creatures in a supernatural manner; far less that the books of the Old and New Testament were thus inspired and have been preserved ever since pure and uncorrupted. What we pretend to show is, that supposing these books divine, the doctrine contained therein is the only religion which justifies the ways of eternal providence, renders the Deity amiable to his creatures, reconciles all his moral attributes, far from destroying them; and in fine that the Holy Scriptures contain the most sublime system of theology and philosophy concerning God and nature; the visible and invisible world, that has ever yet been discovered.

In order to this, we endeavour to demonstrate in the first part of the following essay, ‘ That the great principles of ‘ NATURAL RELIGION are founded upon the most invincible evidence; and that the essential doctrines of REVEALED RELIGION are perfectly conformable to REASON.’ In the second part we shall show ‘ That vestiges of all the ‘ principal doctrines of the Christian religion are to be found

‘ in the monuments, writings, or mythologies of all nations, ‘ ages, and religions ; and that these vestiges are emanations of ‘ the primitive, antient, universal religion of mankind, transf- ‘ mitted from the beginning of the world by the Antidiluvi- ‘ ans to the Postdiluvian patriarchs, and by them to their po- ‘ sterity that peopled the face of the earth.’ In the whole course of this work we attempt to show, that as the Pagan mythologists adulterated by degrees the original traditions of the patriarchal religion ; so first the Jewish rabbins, and then the Christian schoolmen have disfigured revealed religion, by many absurd opinions, popular errors, and wild fictions, which being neither founded in scripture, nor authorized by the consent of the universal church, ought not to pass for doctrines of faith. Thus we hope to separate the pure from the impure, and thereby remove many scandals, stumbling blocks, and prejudices, that make minute philosophers scoff at, and despise Christianity.

We have digested the great principles of the first part into a geometrical order, which is certainly the most exact way of reasoning, the most proper to convince others, and undeceive ourselves. Each demonstration consists of one syllogism, of which the premises are either a definition, an axiom, a proposition already demonstrated, or some corollary drawn from it. Thus it is easy upon a review to detect the error where it lays. The lemmas are incidental propositions designed to prove others, and they are demonstrated in this treatise by a combination of self-evident maxims. In the scholiums we do not pretend to demonstrate, but only to explain the principles already proved, or to answer objections made against them. Tho’ some of our de-

monstrations or corollaries should seem less evident, or even prove false; yet this will not destroy the truth of the principle advanced, if other demonstrations can be found to support it, and therefore our adversaries must not triumph, till they can show, not only that some of the proofs we give are less cogent and exact; but also that no better ones can be given.

The usual way of demonstrating is by separate and independent proofs, which do not flow from, nor re-unite in the same principle. All the propositions and corollaries of this essay are derived from the simple idea of a SELF-EXISTENT BEING; which all must allow, whether Atheists or Theists; Deists or Christians. This is the seed which contains the hidden tree, with all its roots, branches, leaves, flowers, and fruits. The harmony, order, and connection of truths; the unity of the principle; the multiplicity of the consequences; their mutual dependence upon each other; their tendency to elevate the heart, at the same time that they enlighten the understanding; to secure human society during this life, while they prepare us for a happy immortality in the next; to re-unite natural and revealed religion; and to reconcile reason with revelation, are so many additional proofs that give a new light to each particular proposition.

We have divided the first part into six books, because the objects we treat of may be reduced to six heads. God considered in himself, and then with regard to his creatures makes the subject of the two first books; the third considers the properties and differences of finite beings; the creatures considered in an elevated, lapsed, and re-established state, make the subject of the three last. By this distribution we

embrace the essential parts of philosophy, both physical and moral, and of theology both natural and revealed. I say the essential parts; for since this essay is only a book of principles, it is not to be expected that we should descend into an ample detail and explication of all the consequences deducible from them. We content ourselves to present to thinking minds, the original seeds from whence spring vast fields of new theories, that may be further cultivated, beautified, and enlarged. Truth however being of a coherent nature, it is impossible to separate one branch from another, and see it in all its beauty. I beg therefore my readers not to judge of the work by parcels; but to continue to the end, that so they may see the connection of every part with the whole. Scattered rays do not always enlighten; but when re-united they give a mutual lustre to each other.

We foresee that this performance will not equally succeed with all sorts of incredulous minds. These who are blinded by their passions, will reject it with scorn, and cry out at first sight of the Title-page, 'What would this babbler say?' Determined to indulge sense, appetite, and pleasure; they are afraid to see truth in its native colours. The fullest sunshine cannot enlighten those who shut their eyes to its luminous influences. Truth is a hidden treasure which none can discover but those who search after it with a generous mind, and upright heart, and are resolved to sacrifice all to the love of it, when known. Whosoever does not find in himself these dispositions, is not yet prepared for the search of truth: and without this preparation of the heart it is needless to read this work or any other that pleads the cause of Christianity. We hope

however, that all serious Freethinkers, who are become such only by the false ideas that have been given of religion, or by the prejudices of education, will profit by the discoveries of the great men of all nations and times, which we have endeavoured to re-unite under one view, and into one regular system: for we do not pretend to give here a scheme of new, unheard of theories; but only to concenter in one system the lights and discoveries of the sages of all countries and ages, whether antient or modern.

In the first part of this essay, we give only the philosophical principles of natural and revealed religion, in so far as they are demonstrable by reason, or can be proved compatible with it, tho' not always discoverable by it. In the second part we prove that the great principles advanced are conformable to the tradition of all nations, both sacred and profane. If there be therefore some principles in this part which at first sight seem contradictory to Scripture, we refer to the second part to prove that they are not so.

THE
PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES
OF
NATURAL AND REVEALED
RELIGION.

BOOK I.

OF THE ABSOLUTE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

DEFINITIONS.

IN all demonstrable sciences whether metaphysical or mathematical, whether they regard **BEING** in general, or **QUANTITY** in general, we should begin by defining the things that are to be the subjects of demonstration. Exact and clear definitions are far more necessary in metaphysics than in mathematics. In this later science, sensible figures and images recall to us continually the definitions of things, so that we cannot mistake: but in the former pure intellectual ideas cannot always be exactly represented by sensible signs, and so the terms by which we express those ideas may be equivocal.

1. By a BEING or a Reality, I understand in general whatever is, whether it be a substance, an attribute, a mode, a Power, or Perfection.

2. By SUBSTANCE, I mean a Being which is the foundation of attributes, modes, powers, and perfections.

3. By ATTRIBUTE or Property, is meant a reality that necessarily belongs to, flows from, and is contained in the idea of a being, so that it cannot be taken from it without destroying its essence.

4. By a MODE or Quality, I understand a reality given to a substance that does not necessarily flow from its essence, nor belong to it, in all times, in all places, and in all circumstances, and that may be communicated to it, or taken from it without destroying its nature.

5. By POWER, CAUSE, ACTIVITY, FORCE, we mean a reality that does or that can produce something in itself, or distinct from itself, freely or necessarily; whether this production be a substance, an attribute, a mode, or a being of any kind.

6. By PERFECTION, we mean an attribute or quality that excludes all bounds in the first cause, or that supposes power, activity, and causality in second causes. It expresses infinite or an image of infinity.

7. By FINITE, we mean what contains only some degrees of reality, power, and perfection.

8. By ABSOLUTE INFINITE, we mean the most perfect negation of finite, what is unbounded in all senses, and what contains the fulness of all perfection in the highest degree.

9. By SELF-EXISTENT SUBSTANCE, we mean a Being

that contains in itself a reality which makes its existence necessary; and its non-existence impossible.

10. By IDEA, I mean that which the mind conceives or perceives when it thinks.

S C H O L I U M.

From the foregoing definitions, it is clear that the word Being does not signify the same thing as substance: but simply a reality or something that is and that exists, whether it be substantial or modal; active or passive; necessary or contingent; finite or infinite; material or immaterial. All substances, attributes, modes and powers are equally realities, tho' they be not equal realities; as great and little spheres are equally spheres, tho' they are not equal. The Cartesians seem to confound the idea of Being with that of substance. This may occasion great mistakes; for we shall shew afterwards, that there may be intellectual self-conscious agents that are distinct beings, hypostases or personalities, tho' not distinct substances; and that there may be a plurality of such agents, beings, hypostases, or personalities in the same individual and indivisible substance.

The schoolmen define a Substance, 'That which exists by itself, and which can be conceived by itself without another.' They define a mode, "That which exists in another and cannot be conceived, nor subsist without another.' These two definitions are altogether equivocal, and may have a double sense. They may signify either 'That a substance can exist, subsist and be conceived without any one particular mode; and that no mode can exist, subsist, nor be con-

‘ceived separate from, and independent of some substance.’ or they may signify that ‘a substance is that which exists ‘by itself, independent of any other substance;’ and that a mode is that which exists in and by another. Spinoza understood the school definitions in the later sense; and so confounded the idea of substance with that of self-existence. Hence he maintained that there was but one substance in nature, and that all other things were modes of this only substance. Now since these definitions of the schoolmen may be understood in the latter sense as well as in the former, they are not only equivocal but dangerous, and therefore ought to be rejected.

We have chosen to define a substance, ‘Something that is ‘the foundation of modes,’ and a mode, ‘Something that ‘may be given to or taken from a substance.’ All Mr. Locke’s cavils against these definitions of substance and mode come from his confounding clear ideas with adequate ones. The former suffice to distinguish things, the later suppose a perfect knowledge of their intimate essence. Tho’ we do not know the intimate essence of any one substance, nor the manner how modes are produced in it; yet to know that the one supports and the other is supported suffices to distinguish them. Now all the knowledge we can acquire in our present state, consists in comparing the differences and relations of things, and not their intimate essences, of which we have no adequate ideas; as shall be demonstrated.

We have seldom made use of the words properties and qualities; because these terms are equivocal, and sometimes confounded as synonymous. A property signifies in its etymology, something that belongs to a thing exclusively of all others.

It is apply'd sometimes to essential attributes; as when we say that thought is a property of spirit; and extension a property of matter; and sometimes to accessory modes, as when we say that language and baldness are properties of human nature, because they belong to men only, tho' not always, nor to every individual. It is to be remarked however that attributes, generally speaking, express what is essential to substances; whereas properties denote what is essential to beings of all kinds, whether substantial or modal. Thus we say the properties not the attributes of a triangle. Moreover we say indifferently that understanding and will, as well as sciences and virtues, are qualities of the mind, tho' the one be essential attributes, and the other acquired modes. It is true indeed that when we call understanding and will qualities, we mean rather the actual exercise of these powers, than the faculties themselves; and generally speaking, qualities denote rather modes than attributes; as soft, hard, dry, humid, and all the other sensible qualities; they are accidental, not essential to matter. To shun all confusion, we advertise that in this essay, we mean by properties what is essential to a thing, or what flows from its nature necessarily. By qualities on the contrary we mean what is accessory and communicated tho' durable and permanent. Thus we say that felicity is a permanent quality of pure un-fallen spirits, and motion a constant quality of ethereal matter; tho' both be communicated, and no ways essential attributes, nor properties of either.

The Unitarians and Socinians maintain that all action is free, in order to deny God's immanent acts: but this is absolutely false; for the love of happiness, of good in general, or

the tendency of the soul to beatifying objects, is no doubt an action, and yet it is necessary; as shall be demonstrated. The Spinofists, Fatalists, and Predestinarians assert on the contrary that all action is necessary; but we shall shew that this is also false, and that there may be two sorts of action, one necessary and another free.

There have been great disputes about the term perfection; some maintain that it is altogether indeterminate, equivocal, and even insignificant, unless it be understood in the same sense as the general term reality; others say that it may be apply'd to something, to nothing, and to every thing; and therefore that it ought to be banish'd from philosophy. We grant that the word perfect considered in a relative concrete sense, may be apply'd to all sort of realities, and even to the negation of these realities: but then all the word means, is that the object we speak of is possessed or deprived of some reality in a superlative degree, when compared with others. Thus we say a perfect mettall, a perfect solid, a perfect circle; yea perfect darkness, perfect ignorance, and perfect malice. We say also that beauty, order and regularity are perfections, but they are such only in a relative sense, with regard to some archetype or model to which we suppose them conformed: perfection in an absolute abstract sense, independent of all relation, cannot be said of every being or reality. To be simply a substance, an attribute or a mode, a stone or a mettall, divisible or indivisible, a triangle or a circle, is not a perfection. We call nothing a perfection in a strict and absolute sense but what supposes infinity, or some image of infinity. All God's attributes are perfections, because they are infinite in all senses.

All the attributes of the creatures are not called perfections. Divisibility, mobility, and figurability in matter are not called Perfections, but attributes or properties. Understanding, reason, and will, in spirits are called more or less perfections according to their degree. The reason is because all these properties in intellectual beings express power. Now all power or causality supposes an effect produced that was not before; and therefore a passage from nothing to something; and so is an image of infinity of power. Thus force, knowledge, and beneficence are called perfections, tho' in a finite degree. A perfection then in an absolute sense is not a simple reality, attribute, property, or quality; but a reality, attribute, property, or quality that implies power or activity, and excludes all bounds in the first cause. In one word it is a divine attribute, or an imitation of some divine attribute. It is then an egregious mistake in philosophy to confound the idea of perfection with that of simple reality.

Spinoza says that finite is that which can be limited by another of its kind. This is absolutely false; for a thing may be limited by its quality, as well as by its quantity; by its properties, as by its magnitude; by its attributes, as by its modes; by a being of a superior kind, as well as by a being of its own kind. A being is called finite, not only when some substance of its kind may be added to it, but also when it contains only a determinate degree of reality and perfection.

The same author defines Absolute Infinite 'A substance composed of infinite attributes, every one of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence.' Thus material extension if boundless would be an attribute of God. Thus God

would contain all beings as modes or attributes of his substance, if they were supposed infinite in number and eternal in duration. This is a false supposition as we shall shew hereafter.

All Spinoza's errors, sophisms, and pretended demonstrations are founded upon his false and equivocal definitions. He understands by a Substance 'That which exists by itself, may be conceived by itself, and subsist of itself, independent of all other beings.' This is true only of the self-existent substance, of the supreme infinite, of God himself. He defines an Attribute, 'That which constitutes or composes a substance.' This is false, for tho' attributes flow necessarily from a substance, yet they do not compose it as the parts do the whole. He calls a Mode, 'Something that exists in another, is supported by another, and cannot subsist without another.' In this sense all finite beings would be modes of God. He defines a Power 'That which produces something in itself by necessity of nature.' If this were so, then all finite beings would be consubstantial hypostases of the divine essence, and flow necessarily from it. He confounds the idea of perfection with that of simple reality; if this were so, then all attributes, properties, and modes in the lowest and least degree would be perfections, which is absurd. He calls finite 'That which is limited in quantity;' not in quality. He calls Absolute Infinite 'That which is composed of all sorts of beings, attributes, modes, and realities.' This is nature and not God. Thus he confounds from the beginning of his work all the common received definitions of things, the idea of substance with that of self-existence; the idea of at-

tributes with that of component parts ; the idea of modes, with that of effects ; the idea of necessary activity, with that of free action ; the idea of perfection, with that of reality ; the idea of finite in one sense, with that of finite in all senses ; and the idea of God, with that of universal nature. If his definitions were true, it would have been needless for him to have heapt up proposition upon proposition, and employed near a thousand theorems, corollaries, lemmas, and scholiums to prove his system ; for the demonstration of it is included in and necessarily results from the definitions themselves. To maintain that God is the only substance, and that all things are necessary, eternal emanations, parts, or forms of this self-existent nature ; and to found all his demonstrations of this absurd, impious system, upon false definitions, which suppose what he is going to prove, is a weakness or an impudence inexcusable in a philosopher ; and discovers either a feeble mind that deceives itself ; or a false heart that intends to deceive others.

After having defined the terms of the propositions that are to be demonstrated, we come next to explain their different divisions, branches, or kinds, to avoid confusion.

D I V I S I O N S.

The mathematicians sometimes neglect to give clear distinctions and divisions of things ; and this negligence hinders the perspicuity and order of their demonstrations. Every thing or reality, that is or can be the object of our perception, presents itself to the mind either as a substance, an attribute,

a mode, a power, or a perfection. But as these generical terms express objects that are of several different kinds, it is necessary to distinguish them exactly.

1. SUBSTANCES may be distinguished either by the different degrees of reality they contain, as finite and infinite; or by the different attributes that belong to them, as material and immaterial; or by the different modes, changes and accidents that may befall them; thus the numberless species of bodies and spirits are distinguished; or in fine by their separate and independent existence, as the individuals of each species.

2. ATTRIBUTES may be distinguished into active and passive. The active are such whose ideas suppose the production of something; as conception, reason, and will in spirits, and then they are called powers or faculties. The passive are such whose ideas include a mere aptitude of receiving something; as figurability, divisibility, and mobility in bodies, and they are called capacities.

3. MODES may also be distinguished into two sorts, permanent or transient. The first are these which remain always the same, tho' they do not belong essentially to the modified substance. Such are the primitive forms of the constituent smallest particles of matter. The other are those which change or may change continually, as the figures of visible compound bodies.

4. POWERS are also of two kinds; essential and accidental. The former flow from the nature of a thing, as activity and love in spirits; and they are called inherent properties. The other are communicated to it by a superior force, as motion

and gravitation in bodies; and they are called impressed qualities.

5. PERFECTIONS are either relative or absolute. The former suppose always some degree superior to them, real or possible. The later express an infinite boundless degree; or at least the highest degree possible. Thus a being may be perfect in its kind, and yet imperfect with regard to beings of a superior degree. What is absolutely perfect excludes all superiority; and what is absolutely perfect in all senses excludes all equality, as we shall show hereafter.

S C H O L I U M.

Since by the foregoing divisions and definitions, all properties, faculties, qualities, capacities, powers, and perfections, are either attributes or modes; the whole of nature may therefore be considered as composed of three sorts of objects or realities that include and express all that we can conceive; substances, attributes, or modes. Great care must be taken not to confound them, and especially the impressed qualities with the essential properties. This as we shall show has been a fatal source of great mistakes in philosophy.

Some Cartesians and especially the Malebranchians reduce all the objects of our perception to substances and modes, and say nothing of powers, thereby to destroy the real activity of second causes. It is true that they distinguish betwixt essential and accidental, inherent and impressed, active and passive modes: but what flows necessarily from the essence of a thing, is very improperly called its mode, manner, fashion, or form.

We therefore believe that the most natural, clear distinction of what belongs to substances, is that into attributes and modes; or, what is essential to them, and what is only accessory.

All the other distinctions of objects, whether they be the ten Aristotelian categories, or what the schoolmen call the five universals, are either comprehended in this triple division of substances, attributes, and modes, or they are useless and dangerous distinctions: because they accustom the mind to mistake the knowledge of words for that of things.

Spinoza adopts this threefold distinction of objects: but he maintains that substances are not distinguished when they have the same attributes and modes. Thus according to him, two pieces of gold exactly like in all things are not two distinct substances, tho' the one might exist while the other is annihilated. They are as he asserts only different modes of the same substance. He confounds always generical terms and individuals; and supposes that all beings of the same kind are the same individual substance. But he gives no proof of his assertion, and he can never prove it. He forgets a third distinction of substances which is that of their separate and independent existence. The schoolmen give also occasion to this Spinosian error, by their wild disputes about *UNIVERSALE A PARTE REI*; or an universal object that answers in nature to our universal ideas. Spinoza took occasion from this to maintain that God is this universal object, and the only substance existent, of which all other things are mere attributes or modes. The distinction of kinds and individuals is therefore very necessary, and founded upon the difference there is betwixt our abstract general ideas, and the real particular objects existent.

Hence arises also the distinction betwixt essence and substance, which Spinoza always confounds. An Essence is
' A general idea, which represents to the mind all the attributes, properties and qualities common to beings of the same
' kind. A Substance is a particular being really existent, which partakes of these attributes, properties, qualities and modes. Thus there can be but one ideal essence of the same kind; but there may be many different substances of the same kind. The general idea of human nature is one and indivisible: but there may be many different individuals of the human species, that have the same attributes and modes. Spinoza's design in confounding the ideas of essence and substance, was to insinuate that all individuals of the same kind, are the same individual substance; and that finite beings are not distinct separate substances; but modes of the same universal substance. Thus he still supposes what he is going to prove.

Dr. Berkeley denies that there can be any abstract universal ideas; because all the objects of our perception are concrete or particular. We shall defer this question, till we explain the source, nature and division of our ideas. It suffices here to remark, that all we mean by an Idea, is that which the mind feels, perceives, or conceives when it thinks; and for this reason our ideas are divided into Sensations, Perceptions, and Conceptions, which are vastly different, as shall be explained hereafter.

A X I O M S.

After exact definitions and divisions, the next care in all demonstrable sciences, is to lay down self-evident maxims or axioms, whose truth is perceived by one simple intuitive view, without any successive comparison of ideas. For this reason they are called first principles and elementary truths, because they are the standards, measures, and rules of reason and comparison. I shall not examine here whether they be innate ideas impressed upon the mind from its origin, or perceptions which present themselves unto it upon the least reflection. This discussion would be premature. All I advance is that those axioms are so self-evident that no attentive mind who understands them, can refuse its assent to them. Of this kind are the following truths.

1. NOTHING, or the negation of all properties and realities cannot be a cause, since nothing can have nothing, and produce nothing.

2. Reality in some degree or other is the only reason of inferring necessary existence, since nothing cannot be a cause.

3. Finite is a negation of all superior reality or perfection.

4. There can be nothing greater than absolute infinite, or infinite in all senses.

5. In the scale of finites, the progression may be continual without end; because no addition of finites can make absolute infinite.

6. The attributes, powers, qualities, and perfections of ma-

ny substances of the same kind are a greater sum than those of one of the same kind.

7. Infinite activity, or the production of an infinite effect is a supreme perfection.

8. Infinite perfection known and enjoyed must necessarily produce infinite love.

S C H O L I U M.

All Spinoza's axioms are either false, equivocal, or obscure. They cannot be proved, and yet require proof. I shall give only two examples of this insidious fallacy.

He lays down for an axiom, that 'The knowledge of an effect depends upon the knowledge of its cause, and includes it'. This is absolutely false, for we may know that a thing is an effect without knowing the cause whence it proceeds. Men knew certainly for many ages that water rose to a certain height in a tube, without knowing the true cause of this ascent. They knew in general that this phenomenon was an effect of some cause; tho' they did not know that the pressure of the atmosphere was this particular cause. Moreover it is absolutely false that the knowledge of an effect supposes always that we know how it is produced; for we may know certainly that a thing is an effect, without knowing the manner of its production. Thus we know that all finite substances are effects of the self-existent substance, as shall be demonstrated; tho' we do not know, how the effect produced is connected with the producing cause. Spinoza's design in this axiom was to insinuate that creation is impossible, because in-

conceivable; and that it is a contradictory idea, because we do not know the manner how God creates, or gives existence to beings that had none before the exercise of his creating energy.

Another axiom of the same philosopher runs thus: ' Things that have nothing in common cannot be understood by each other, or the idea of the one does not include the idea of the other.' If the design of this trifling maxim was to insinuate that ' when things have something in common the idea of the one includes necessarily the idea of the other,' then it is absolutely false: for things may have something in common, tho' the idea of the one does not include the idea of the other. All finite beings have something in common, as having either the same attributes and modes; or as being effects of the same common cause, or as representative of the same archetype; tho' the idea of the one does not include necessarily that of the other. The idea of a man does not include that of his picture, yet they have something in common, which is their resemblance. The idea of one man does not include that of another, yet they have something in common, which is that of a soul and body. The idea of minerals and plants have something in common, which is their material and vegetative nature, and yet the idea of the one does not include the idea of the other. In general all individuals of the same kind have the same attributes, and yet the idea of the one does not include the idea of the other. We shall see afterwards why Spinoza advanced this absurd fallacious maxim.

Thus all the Spinosian scheme is founded upon false definitions, that suppose what he is going to prove, or upon false

axioms that are captious and fallacious. No solid edifice can stand upon such tottering foundations. It is strange that men of genius should be imposed upon by such an empty dream, and such a pitiful delusion. Nothing deceives them but the geometrical form this sophist gave to his propositions. It must be granted that his consequences are just, but all his fundamental principles are false. This logical dissertation about elementary truths suffices to confute him; but in the course of this essay we shall unfold and unmask all his pretended demonstrations.

P O S T U L A T E S.

In all demonstrable sciences, there are besides definitions, divisions, and axioms, certain universal maxims or postulates that all must grant unless they renounce reason. They are self-evident when explained, and want only scholiums to illustrate them, and not demonstrations to support them. I shall only mention six, because they are frequently employed in the following essay, and may rather be called proper rules in all strict inquiry into truth.

P O S T U L A T E I.

We must affirm necessarily, when we see clearly; we may doubt when we do not see; but we should never deny because we do not conceive.

S C H O L I U M.

I do not say that ' we may affirm, but that we must affirm

‘ necessarily when we see clearly.’ We are forced to assent to what appears to us evident; as we are forced to love what appears to us good. This is our nature. We do not yet know what this nature is, or who constituted it such; whether it be self-existent or produced by another; material or immaterial; good or bad; true or deceitful; but whatever it is, our essence is so made, that we must assent to what we see clearly. There are certain truths that we cannot deny let us make what efforts we please. No man can deny that the whole is greater than the part; that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time; that nothing cannot be a cause. The axioms we have laid down, and all others of the same kind, are reducible to these three. Whosoever says he denies such axioms, either does not know what he says, or does not believe it; he is either a false, or a very capricious man.

The Pyrrhonists will say that in dreams and fevers, we imagine very oft, that we see what we do not see; that our life is perhaps a continual dream; that we are oft deceived, and therefore may be always so; that our faculties are perhaps so made, that error and delusion are inevitable; and in fine, that human understanding is incapable of demonstrating any thing but geometrical truths; and surrounded with uncertainties as to God and nature; because what it sees clearly on one side is counterbalanced by obscurities on another. Hence they cry out that all metaphysical learning is chimerical, and that system-makers of every kind are ignorant of the true bounds of the human mind.

I answer in the first place, that we may be deceived in attributing to objects without us, sensations that are not caused

by them; as in dreams and fevers: but the dreamer and the frantic cannot doubt that they feel when they feel; for we cannot feel and perceive nothing; for feeling is perceiving; now it is impossible to perceive and not perceive at the same time. Clear evidence is a perception; a light that modifies and determines the mind irresistibly. I do not yet examine if this evidence cheats us. Supposing it did so, we must submit to it: it is an invincible power, that has a sovereign dominion over us, over the American and the European; the Asiatic and the African; the Hottentot and the Laplander; the Chinese and the Peruvian. We cannot escape from its universal Empire. Whoever denies that there are such self-evident propositions, rejects all the fundamental principles of reason; all the standards by which we deny, doubt, or affirm. He can give no reason for his denying that any thing is certain; nor for his affirming that every thing is doubtful. His brain is disordered, his mind is frantic; he cannot be cured by reason. He denies that there is any such thing as reason, so there is no reasoning with him, since he is unreasonable.

I answer in the second place, that we may be deceived in comparing, combining and associating our complex ideas, and that we are very oft so: but then we have the remedy within us, if we be reasonable; which is to review our comparisons; reduce them to self-evident principles, which all must admit, and examine if the consequences be just. Yea I dare say, that tho' prejudice, imagination, and passion may blind so intirely the intellectual eye in some, that they fancy they see what they do not see, yet in all recollected and upright hearts that know how to enter into their spiritual na-

tures, and consult self-evident maxims, there is always a central, internal doubt and obscurity, that hinders the total acquiescence of the mind, when it does not see clearly the connection and relation of ideas. This all men accustomed to profound reflexion feel. The mind is so made, that when it acts without passion, it cannot assent to falsehood, without remorse, inquietude, or hesitation. I do not pretend to give a general criterion or characteristic by which we may know truth infallibly. This is impossible. It is known only by itself, as sunshine is distinguished from twilight. It is so simple, so evident, and so luminous, that it can have no other token, proof, nor badge but itself. This however is one of its inseparable concomitants, that it leaves all thinking minds in an absolute impossibility to doubt; and in a perfect rest, acquiescence, and peace when they affirm. We shall see afterwards what this evidence is that thus brings the mind to tranquillity, fixes its inconstancy, dissipates all hesitation, and commands our assent. All I advance at present, till we investigate the nature of man, is that he is so made, that he cannot resist the evidence of what we call TRUTH, when he sees it, as he cannot resist the love of what appears GOOD, when he feels it.

We answer in the third place, that there are two sorts of metaphysics. One that consists in vain subtleties, useless distinctions, chimerical refinements, and barbarous terms, borrowed from the Aristotelian philosophy, spoiled by the Arabians. This false science of the schools is indeed contemptible. There is another sort of metaphysics which ascends to first principles, descends to consequences; gives each truth its due place, and rises from simple to compound ideas, with order,

clearness, and precision: This is the source of all mathematical knowledge. Those who believe there can be no other demonstrable science but geometry, must naturally fall into a sceptical indolence, maintain that Pyrrho and Bayle have wrote the true history of the human mind; and that all other philosophers have only given the romance of it. A system is nothing but a chain of truths well combined, whatever be their nature, whether mathematical or moral, physical or metaphysical. All weak and effeminate minds that hover about the surface of truth, that have not force enough to try its depths, and that cannot support a long continued series of reasonings, must necessarily cry out against systems. They extoll and exalt mathematical evidence, not because they have any true knowledge of geometry; but in order to flatter their irregular appetites and incredulous prejudices, by rejecting all moral and metaphysical demonstrations. They are, generally speaking, superficial minds, that relish nothing but poetical fiction, sprightly imagination, and glaring wit; as well as corrupt hearts drunk with passion. We must abandon them to the wanton sport of wild imagination, and to be undeceived in a future state, because of all men they are the most incorrigible.

I have added in the same postulate, that ‘ we may doubt, ‘ when we do not see.’ In this case doubting is reasonable, free and voluntary; because we ought never to assent firmly without seeing; without reducing our consequences to first principles; weighing them in these ballances, and measuring them by these standards. To doubt cautiously, till we have examined fully; to retain our assent, till we have seen clearly is force of mind, and not the fluctuation of a wavering soul

that cannot fix a steady view upon any one object. The true, wise hesitation and suspense of the Old Academy has nothing in common with the wild universal doubt of self-evident maxims, and the most demonstrable truths. To doubt thus without any reason of doubting, is as great a defect as to believe without any reason of believing. Both these extremes come from an excess of imagination which disorders the intellectual eye in the credulous, so that they see what is not, and blinds the incredulous, so that they do not see what is.

The last branch of the postulate is, that 'we ought never to deny because we cannot conceive.' If this were not so, then a man born blind would reason right when he forms this syllogism. 'We know the figure of bodies only by handling them: but it is impossible to handle them at a great distance; therefore it is impossible to know the figure of far distant bodies.' To undeceive the blind man we cannot give him the fifth sense of seeing, of which he can have no idea. We cannot convince him by experience that there is another way of knowing the figure of far distant bodies than by contact; tho' we may endeavour to show him by other proofs that this is not only possible, and probable, but absolutely certain. We may prove to him that this is so from the concurrent testimony of all who surround him; but we can never make him perceive how this is so. This is precisely our case in this mortal state as to many intellectual truths. We see that many things must be, but we cannot conceive how they are. We see the connection betwixt some truths, but not betwixt all: we see a part, but not the whole: we see some attributes and modes of things, but we do not see their intimate essence. Thus we

see that eternity, immensity, creating energy, and many other perfections must belong to Absolute Infinite, and are included in his idea; but we do not see how they flow from his essence. We see clearly that he is, and a part of what he is; but not the totality of his nature; since Absolute Infinite must be incomprehensible to Finite. It is therefore a fundamental maxim in all true philosophy, that ‘many things may be ‘incomprehensible and yet demonstrable, that tho’ seeing ‘clearly be a sufficient reason for affirming; yet not seeing at ‘all can never be a reason of denying. The negation of this principle was the source of all Spinoza’s errors. Persuaded that whatever is inconceivable is impossible, he degrades all the divine attributes in order to comprehend them, as we shall show hereafter.

P O S T U L A T E II.

When of three or more propositions whereof one must necessarily be true, all but one are proved to be false, absurd and impossible, this one is evidently certain.

S C H O L I U M.

Thus if it can be proved that the curves described by the periodical revolutions of the planets must be some of the four conic sections; circles, hyperbolas, parabolas, or ovals: and if it be moreover demonstrated that they do not describe any of the three first, it is self-evident that they must describe the last. There are two sorts of demonstrations; one that comes from a clear perception of the immutable necessary relations betwixt things, and another that arises from the absurdities

that would follow upon denying this connection. In this twilight of human understanding, the first sort of demonstrations are not always possible, because we have no adequate ideas of the intimate essence of things, we cannot always perceive by an intuitive view, the properties that flow from them, and therefore we are obliged to have recourse to the second kind of demonstration called in the schools *DEMONSTRATIO AB ABSURDO*, by showing the contradictions that would follow from denying or attributing to them certain qualities. This latter way of demonstrating is as sure as the other, but not so satisfying. By the one we see how a thing is; by the other we see only that it must be, tho' we do not conceive the manner of it. The first enlightens and persuades; the second convinces and forces our assent. The latter sort of demonstrations are less frequently excusable in mathematics, because the object of this science being only the modes of quantity, and not the essence of things, we may generally see by an intuitive view, or successive comparison, the relations of our ideas: but in metaphysics, where we treat of substances both finite and infinite, corporeal and spiritual, we cannot always see clearly how the attributes and modes flow from the essence, and therefore we must have recourse to the demonstrations *ab absurdo*. Thus we can demonstrate against the Malebranchians that activity must be an essential property of spirits; not by shewing how it flows from their essence; but by the absurdities that would follow upon denying it. Thus we prove against the Spinofists, that God must have a creating power, not only by the idea of his essence, but by the contradictions that would ensue upon refusing him this produc-

tive energy. Thus in fine we confound the Materialists by showing that thought and extension are contrary, contradictory, and incompatible attributes; and so cannot belong to the same substance.

P O S T U L A T E III.

In things of a contingent nature, we should not require DEMONSTRATIONS, but only PROOFS; yea sometimes be content with PROBABILITIES.

S C H O L I U M.

A DEMONSTRATION is when its contrary is impossible in all times and in all senses. It is an eternal and immutable truth. It supposes a relation that is founded upon the nature of things, and a property that flows necessarily from their essence. Such are all mathematical truths. The three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones. This property is contained in the definition, nature, and essence of a triangle; and in this sense demonstration is only an unfolding of what is contained necessarily in the primitive idea of things.

A PROOF is when we have all reasons to believe, none to doubt, and when evident absurdities would follow from the contrary supposition; tho' absolutely speaking the thing might be otherwise, and its existence is only contingent. Thus it is impossible to demonstrate that there is a city called Rome; because its existence being contingent; it might never have been. But to conclude from this metaphysical principle that

there is not, and never was any such city as Rome, would be absurd and ridiculous. The schools say very well that *A POSSE AD ESSE NON VALET CONSEQUENTIA*; the simple possibility or non-contradiction of things cannot be a demonstration of their existence. Thus we can demonstrate that God can create myriads of intelligent natures superior to human spirits; but that he has really done so can only be proved by revelation. Thus we can only prove, not demonstrate, that there is in nature a third substance besides God and created spirits, called matter. Thus in fine we can only prove, not demonstrate, that all the men we speak with and that surround us are not fancies, mere appearances, and perceptions excited in us; but real entities, substances, and beings similar to us.

Besides these two sorts of evidence, there is a third kind, that serves only to answer objections; but not to demonstrate principles, and it is *PROBABILITY*. We are sometimes obliged in our scholiums to make use of probabilities and hypotheses, to show how a thing may be, when we have proved otherwise that it must be: but we never employ these hypotheses to found systems and build consequences upon them. This is an essential vice in reasoning; yet the Cartesian, and even the Newtonian philosophy are not quite exempt from this fallacious defect, as we shall show hereafter.

The greatest force and accuracy of the mind consists in distinguishing and applying these three sorts of evidence; in not employing the one for the other, and in not confounding them together. To require demonstrations where proofs can only be given; to content ourselves with proofs where de-

monstrations are not only possible but necessary; and in fine, to heap up probable hypotheses to prove principles, are capital defects in reasoning. This is very oft the method of Bayle. To throw the mind into an universal scepticism, he shows that demonstrations cannot be given where only proofs are requisite; and to invalidate the force of proofs he insinuates that they are not demonstrations. This is the source of all his sophisms. He has wit enough to present to the mind the dark sides of a question, but he seldom or never discovers the luminous point that can determine our assent. He shows very prettily and artfully the bounds of the human understanding, but he seldom or never tries its depths, and knows its true extent. He was an excellent sophist, but not always a philosopher; as shall be proved elsewhere.

P O S T U L A T E IV.

We ought not to require the demonstration of compound truths till we be convinced of simple ones.

S C H O L I U M.

The most exact order in demonstration is to begin with simple truths 'ere we ascend to more complicated ones, not only because the latter are founded upon the former, but also because the capacity of the mind extends and dilates by repeated acts, producing habits of reflexion. This is that luminous order which the ancients talk so much of; but few of their philosophers have constantly observed it. It is a mar-

vellous art in demonstrating to give every truth its due place, to shew how one flows from another, as a corollary or consequence; to demonstrate first some great luminous fruitful principles, that flow from an intuitive view of the simplest axioms; and then deduce all complex truths from a successive comparison and combination of those original ones. Without this order the sublimest discoveries appear chimerical. To give demonstrations of the complicated, intricate properties of curves, 'ere we know those of streight lines is impossible. To demand demonstrations of the properties of finite 'ere we know the attributes of infinite, which is the most natural and simple of all ideas, as we shall show, is yet more absurd. To pretend to prove the necessity, excellency, and certainty of some sublime precepts in the Christian morals, to a man who does not believe in God, is madness. Very oft truths that are posterior in the order of demonstration, are superior in the degree of excellency. To begin by proving these is preposterous. We must ascend by degrees: for this reason we drop very oft, in the following essay, the proof of certain truths, till we come to their proper place; and then the mind sees how they flow naturally and necessarily from propositions already demonstrated. Many sublime doctrines that would at first sight be matter of scorn and raillery to incredulous and unprepared minds, shine forth in a full light, when the true gradation of ideas is observed. In the research of eternal, necessary, and immutable truths, it is therefore of great consequence to hide some of them, till others be demonstrated; for without this precaution, we either weary or scar weak and delicate minds, that cannot all of a sudden digest, nor support

a long series of reasonings. It is therefore a rash inconsiderate conduct in bigots, zealots, and pharisaical doctors to talk to Atheists, Deists, Freethinkers, and minute philosophers of the less necessary, accessory, incidental truths; of church authority, and of the rites of outward worship; before they be convinced of the existence of God, and of the great principles of natural and revealed religion. Here the gradation is necessary. The Atheist must become Theist, and the Theist Christian, before any thing be said to them of churches, scriptures, and sacraments.

P O S T U L A T E V.

We ought never to confound mysterious truths with palpable contradictions.

S C H O L I U M.

There is a great difference betwixt what is incomprehensible by reason, and what is contradictory to it. The one supposes that we do not see the connection between two ideas, the other supposes that we see clearly their opposition. Now as we have said and explained, not seeing is never a reason for denying, tho' seeing clearly is always a reason for affirming. The incredulous Freethinkers pretend that the Christian mysteries are contradictory. This we absolutely deny. The word mystery in scripture signifies very oft a hidden truth, that is not absolutely incomprehensible to human understanding, but only unintelligible to those who are not enlightened from on high. Thus our Saviour says to his disciples, ' it is

'given unto you to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven.' Thus St. Paul calls godliness a mystery. The schoolmen change this definition, and advance as mysteries certain speculations, which are not only incomprehensible, but contradictory to human reason, and altogether incompatible with the divine perfections. Yea they look upon all efforts to reconcile reason with religion as bold attempts to submit faith to philosophy. The design of this essay is to show, that the Christian mysteries, tho' undiscoverable by reason, yet are never contradictory to it.

P O S T U L A T E VI.

We ought not to attribute to men the abuses made of their principles, nor even the natural and necessary consequences that flow from them, when they disavow these abuses and consequences.

S C H O L I U M.

Such is the corruption of human nature, that there is nothing so wise, so just, and so good, but men may abuse it. Thus nothing is more necessary than civil government, and yet the most lawful superiors abuse it every day. Nothing is more useful to diffuse just sentiments of the Deity, to excite men to the love and adoration of the common father and universal friend of mankind, than ecclesiastic polity, and public worship: yet men have most miserably abused these institutions, whether they be human or divine. They have turned priesthood into priestcraft, and religious worship into idola-

try. We ought never to confound principles with the abuses made of them, nor suppose that all those who maintain and practise the same principles are guilty of the same abuses. We should always distinguish betwixt what is tolerated and what is commanded; think the most favourably we can of every body; not love nor tolerate error and corruption; but pity and tolerate the persons who err, in order to gain them. This beneficent, universal charity would mitigate the heats of dispute, and preserve the mind in that calm equanimity which is necessary to examine truth; yea totally extinguish that fiery zeal, implacable wrath, and devout fury which transports bigots of all sects; drives them at first to calumny, then to hatred, and at last to persecution; which makes religion not the cure, but the fuel of all cruel passions.

Moreover, such are the bounds of human understanding, that men do not always see all the different faces and sides of a question, and therefore they may be very sincere and upright in maintaining a principle, while they reject its natural, inevitable consequences. We should not therefore ascribe pernicious designs and intentions where there is only defect of accuracy and attention. Thus we are far from branding Spinoza with deliberate Atheism, tho' we believe that his principles lead to the blackest Atheism. Thus we are far from believing that the Predestinarians are Spinozists; tho' we shall show that their fundamental principles lead to Spinozism.

The ignorance or neglect of these postulates is the source of all the errors, sophisms, and uncertainties of the Spinozists, Deists, Pyrrhonists, Socinians, Unitarians, Freethinkers, and minute philosophers of all kinds: they either maintain

that every thing is uncertain; or they suppose that all that is inconceivable is impossible; or they require demonstrations where proofs suffice; or they demand that complicated truths should be demonstrated without a successive comparison of simpler ideas; or they reject mysterious truths as contradictory; or in fine they confound the abuses of religion with its principles. They pretend to excell in reason, but they are ignorant of its first principles; of the extent and bounds of human understanding; of the different sorts of evidence, and of the true order of demonstration.

We have insisted so much upon these elementary principles, because it is of great consequence not to err in definitions, divisions, axioms, and postulates. We dare say that the most part of errors proceed from not adverting accurately to some of these four heads. First principles, like elementary threads, are in their origine so delicate, so slender, so imperceptible, that they escape the view of weak and unattentive minds: but when interwoven, knit and joined together, they form strong chains and cables sufficient to fix the soul, and hinder it from being hurried away by that torrent of uncertainty which surrounds us in this twilight of human understanding. These primitive original seeds of truth appear in themselves so small, so minute, and so inconsiderable, that men of lively, bright imaginations look upon them as below their notice; but when sown in luminous and fruitful minds, they become of a wonderful fecundity, and produce vast fields of truth. This will appear from the following propositions which arise from a simple combination of the foregoing definitions, divisions, axioms, and postulates.

THE
 PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES
 OF
 NATURAL AND REVEALED
 RELIGION.

PROPOSITION I.

THERE must have been from all eternity
 some original self-existent being.

DEMONSTRATION.

Nothing or the negation of all properties and realities cannot be a cause (a). Reality in some degree or other is the only reason of necessary existence (b). Therefore there must have been from all eternity some original, necessary, self-existent being.

(a) Ax. 1. (b) Ax. 2.

E

S C H O L I U M.

I do not say that the world and all that it contains was produced by a superior Being distinct from it. This we have not yet discovered. What I say is, that either the world, and all things that now exist, must have been from everlasting, or have been produced by something that was eternal, and so it is still true that there must have been from all eternity some self-existent being. For since something now is, it is manifest that something always was, otherwise the things that now are must have been produced by nothing, that is, not produced at all, since nothing cannot be a cause. Now this eternal SOMETHING must be self-existent, that is, it must contain in itself a reason why it does exist rather than not exist, a foundation upon which its existence relies; some internal cause of existence, that renders its non-existence impossible, and its existence necessary.

The notion of an infinite succession of changeable, contingent, and dependent effects, produced one from another in an endless progression, without any original, self-existent, necessary, independent cause, is altogether absurd. This is supposing an infinite chain suspended by nothing, and an infinite weight that has no support (a). It is an infinite series of beings which might not have been, determined to exist without any reason; that is, determined and not determined at the same time, which is a contradiction in terms, as Spinoza himself has very well demonstrated.

(a) See Woolaston's Religion of Nature delineated, page 67.

I do not here enter into the question, whether the world was an eternal, necessary emanation of the divine essence, as Aristotle maintained; or an eternal free effect of almighty power, as the Platonists affirmed. We shall examine both these questions hereafter. All we now pretend is, that there must have been in the totality of nature, some original, independent, necessary, self-existent being, whose non-existence is impossible, whose idea includes existence, and whose essence could not but be. This Spinoza never called in question. He asserts indeed that all finite beings are co-eternal modes and hypostases of the only substance: but he still maintains that this only substance is necessary, independent, and self-existent. Let us now examine what the internal cause, ground, and reason of SELF-EXISTENCE must be.

P R O P O S I T I O N. II.

The greater reality a being has, the greater is the reason for its necessary existence.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

A self-existent substance is that which contains in itself a ground or reason which makes its existence necessary, and its non-existence impossible (a). Reality in some degree or other is the only reason of necessary existence (b). Therefore the greater reality a being has, the greater is the reason for its necessary existence.

(a) Def. 9.

(b) Ax. 2.

S C H O L I U M.

In the scale of finites, we may conceive innumerable beings, superior to any one determinate finite, since progression here may be infinite. At whatsoever degree of being we stop, we may still conceive innumerable other beings that have more reality and perfection than this determinate one, and consequently that have a greater reason for existing necessarily than it. Necessary existence therefore cannot belong to any one of them, unless it belong to all of them equally, and then we must say that the idea of simple existence, and that of necessary existence are the same. Now this is absolutely false; for modes or forms may have a real existence, and yet may be changed, destroyed, and re-produced. It may be answered, that there is a great difference betwixt *SUBSTANTIAL* and *MODAL* realities. We grant it; but both are equally realities, tho' they are not equal realities (c). Now since the force of this reasoning, depends upon their being realities, its evidence is incontestible. Spinoza was so convinced of this truth, that he never maintained that finite of any degree how great soever could be self-existent: he says indeed, that all substance exists necessarily, but then he affirms, that there can be only one substance which is infinite, eternal, and self-existent.

C O R O L L A R Y I.

Hence no finite of an inferior degree contains in itself a reason of necessary existence, preferable to a finite of a superior degree.

(c) Schol. 1. of the definitions.

C O R. II.

Hence in the scale of finites we can stop at no being of any determinate degree, that has an adequate reason of necessary existence proper to itself alone, and exclusive of all others.

C O R. III.

Hence the idea of ABSOLUTE INFINITE contains an adequate reason of necessary existence, proper to itself alone, and exclusive of all others, since beyond ABSOLUTE INFINITE there is and can be no progression.

P R O P O S I T I O N III.

The eternal, necessary, self-existent being is absolutely infinite.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

A self-existent being is that which contains in itself a reason of necessary existence (a). Nothing besides ABSOLUTE INFINITE contains in itself a reason of necessary existence (b). Therefore the eternal, necessary, self-existent being is absolutely infinite, or infinite in all perfections.

S C H O L I U M.

Thus we have discovered that the reason, the foundation, and the source of God's self-existence is his absolute infinity, or infinity in all perfections. The idea of no finite includes that of necessary existence. Its non-existence is not impossible; we may suppose it annihilated without any contradiction:

(a) Def. 9. (b) Cor. 3. of prop. II.

whereas it is manifestly repugnant to say, that a being that contains all perfections does not include the greatest and first of these perfections, which is that of necessary existence. For this reason the Legislator of the Jews defines God the Being that is, or the self-existent being, to insinuate that finite is the being that was made, and that God alone is the being that is. All the definitions of this divine philosopher are exact. He did not deduce them from a successive comparison of ideas; but seems to have seen truth in its source by an intuitive view. The Being that is, or the self-existent being expresses all, contains all, and supposes all the other perfections of the divine nature, and first of all absolute infinity. Whatever is self-existent must be absolutely infinite, and whatever is absolutely infinite must be self-existent. This is the simplest, shortest, and most natural way of demonstrating the existence of a God. It is not deducing this great truth from the bare idea and definition of a God, whose existence is not yet demonstrated; but from the idea of a self-existent being, whom all must allow, even the most incredulous. We do not say with the Cartesians that there must be an absolutely infinite being, because its idea includes that of necessary existence: but we prove first that there must be a self-existent being, and then that this being must be absolutely infinite; because self-existence cannot belong to any thing finite. Neither do we say with Dr. Clarke and the Newtonians that immensity and eternity being ideas which can never be separated from the mind, which are necessary and indestructible, they must be properties or attributes of some substance, and therefore there must be some immense and eternal substance. Spinoza will say the same, and

may reason in the same manner. It is God is immense and eternal, but he is immense by extension, and eternal by succession. This is not the true notion of God.

Somemen seeing the insufficiency or falshood of the most part of the metaphysical reasonings both of the Cartesians and Newtonians, about the existence of a God, pretend that this great truth can be demonstrated only *A POSTERIORI*: but we dare say that all these demonstrations drawn from the perfection of the *EFFECTS* are far inferior to those that are drawn from the perfection of the *CAUSE*. Tho' we discover in the universe undoubted marks of eternal power, wisdom, and goodness; yet Spinoza will attempt to invalidate all these demonstrations by maintaining that the self-existent cause acts without design and choice by necessity of nature; that this only substance being eternal, infinite, and omnipotent, an infinite force acting upon an infinite substance during an infinite duration must necessarily produce infinite forms, and so must contain at the same time every thing possible of all kinds; what appears to us regular and irregular; wise and foolish; good and bad; and all that mixture of contrary and contradictory qualities we see in the universe. They are not effects of hazard, nor design; but the necessary productions of an eternal cause, whose perfection consists in an unbounded power, that produces all that is, and all that can be. Thus he thinks all the demonstrations *A POSTERIORI* fall to the ground, or are at least very much weakened.

We abandon therefore all the subtle modern reasonings both of the metaphysical and natural philosophers, and have recourse with Moses to the idea of the self-existent essence,

as the only source of demonstration. We dare venture to say that all those who endeavour to disparage the evidence of this antient Mosaical demonstration, because of its wondrous simplicity, have no just notions of the original constitution of the human mind. Since the being of God is the first and greatest of all truths, it was worthy of almighty wisdom to make our faculties such that this demonstration should appear to them the most easy and obvious; strike them upon the least reflection, and convince them of the existence of a God from the bare inspection of the idea of a self-existent being whom all must allow.

Thus by the combination of some few definitions and axioms we are at length arrived at the first and most essential of all truths, The existence of absolute infinite, from whom is derived originally all the knowledge we can acquire of finite. It is impossible to know the creature, but by the Creator; the properties of the former, but by the attributes of the latter, and even the existence of the one, but by that of the other. For all finites being contingent, not the being that is, but the beings that were made, we cannot demonstrate their existence by our perceptions of them; but only by comparing these perceptions with the perfections of INFINITE. We cannot demonstrate that the earth, the sun, the planets, the stars, and all the objects of sense without us, are really existent, purely and only by the sensations we have of them, as shall be demonstrated hereafter. We have discovered that absolute infinite is the only being that is, and that all other beings may not be. We have demonstrated his existence, and we feel our own. We are ignorant of all the rest, and unless we derive

light from the idea of the self-existent being, we can be sure of nothing; but that he is and that we are. Yea unless we find in this great idea *WHAT HE IS*, as well as *THAT HE IS*, it is needless to interrogate the objects of sense. We do not yet know if they exist really, or if they are what they appear. All demonstrations *A POSTERIORI* are insufficient. All that we see, hear or feel from without are perhaps mere fictions, and phantoms; or may be alledged to be modes of absolute infinite, who produced them by necessity of nature, not by choice, design and wisdom, as Spinoza said. Lost and sunk in this immense ocean of *ABSOLUTE INFINITE*; solitary with God alone, let us shut our eyes, stop our ears, impose silence upon sense and imagination, fix all our powers upon this one object, retire into our spiritual natures, and examine by this great idea of the *SELF-EXISTENT ABSOLUTE INFINITE*, what are his attributes and perfections. E're we begin this re-search however, we must draw three very useful corollaries from this proposition.

COROLLARY I.

Hence if there be any finite substances really existent, they must be effects, productions, or creatures of absolute infinite; since nothing is self-existent but he alone.

COR. II.

Hence to whatever degree of reality or perfection we elevate any being, this cannot be absolute infinite, if we can conceive another being superior to it.

COR. III.

Hence how great soever be the perfections we attribute to the self-existent, eternal cause, they cannot belong to absolute

infinite, if we can conceive perfections superior to them in any degree.

P R O P O S I T I O N IV.

Absolute infinite excludes all negation, privation, and defect.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

Absolute infinite is the most perfect negation of finite (a). Finite is what contains only some degrees of reality, power, and perfection (b), and is a negation of infinitely superior reality and perfection (c), wherefore its contrary, or absolute infinite, is the negation of all finite, that is, of all negation, and so excludes all negation, privation and defect.

S C H O L I U M.

Tho' the grammatical term INFINITE seem negative, yet its true sense is affirmative when applied to God. The negation of all bounds is the fullness of all perfection. It is the actual possession of being and reality in the highest degree, without any shadow of privation, defect or limitation; without any possibility of increase, decrease, or variation; and surely this object has nothing negative in it.

Hitherto Spinoza had agreed with us; but here he begins to differ from us. He grants that there must be some eternal, original, independent, self-existent cause; and that this self-existent cause must be absolutely infinite. He abuses however

(a) Def. 8. (b) Def. 7. (c) Ax. 3.

that term and understands it in a quite different sense from what he should.

Absolute infinite may signify a being that contains all possible perfections from the highest to the lowest degree; yea all sort of realities, whether modal or substantial, producing or produced; material, or immaterial, active or passive; not collectively but as attributes, modes or hypostases of the same eternal, infinite and indivisible substance.

Absolute infinite may also signify a being that contains in itself, not all perfections, but all perfections in an infinite degree; yea not only all infinite perfections separated, but all reunited in an indivisible manner, and that can produce by an all-powerful fecundity, an innumerable variety of substances really distinct from itself.

Spinoza understands always absolute infinite in the first sense, and never in the second. He does not affirm, as Poiret accuses him, that God is no real being, and that what we mean by the term GOD, is only the metaphysical abstract idea of entity in general, or the collective sum of all possible finites. His scheme is far more intricate. In imitation of the ancient Pantheists, he confounds the essence of God, with the essence of the creature, and maintains that there is but one, sole, eternal, self-existent, absolutely infinite substance; and that all other beings, whether these we call corporeal or intellectual, are coeternal, consubstantial forms, inherencies, hypostases, and personalities of this only substance. He allows that this ABSOLUTE INFINITE produces all, understands all, and wills all, and that it gives existence, intelligence and activity to all other beings, not by creation, which he endeavours to

explode, but by immanent action, and necessity of nature. He calls this self-existent, infinitely active, and infinitely intelligent substance *NATURE PRODUCING*, and its consubstantial forms, inherencies and personalities *NATURE PRODUCED*.

We have already overthrown the original props, and fundamental propositions of this monstrous system, by unmasking the falshood of Spinoza's definitions. We shall now shew the total absurdity and contradiction of this scheme. It is impossible that the absolutely infinite, self-existent being, which excludes all negation, privation and defect, can contain in itself, as essential attributes, the totality of all finites, that is, the collective sum of all negations; or produce in itself by necessity of nature, consubstantial forms, effects, inherencies, and personalities that are full of contrary, contradictory, and incompatible qualities. This impure mixture, this monstrous alliance, this absurd confusion of finite and infinite, of light and darkness, of reality and privation, of perfection and imperfection cannot be the eternal, self-existent, absolute infinite; since we have the idea of another far superior to this Spinosian Hydra, (a) we have the idea of an *ABSOLUTE INFINITE* that is unbounded in all senses, and perfections, without any shadow of privation, defect, or limitation; yea without any possibility of increase, decrease, or variation; of an *ABSOLUTE INFINITE*, that can by its all-powerful energy produce from without, not by necessity of nature, but by free choice, not by immanent but by emanant action, an innumerable variety of substances, attributes, powers, and modes representative of himself, and yet distinct from,

(a) Cor. 2. and 3d of Prop. III.

himself; of an ABSOLUTE INFINITE in one word that is SUMMUM INFINITUM, not SUMMA INFINITORUM; the supream infinite, not the sum of infinites; all Being, not all Beings; all perfections, not all realities; all perfections in an infinite degree, and not all sorts of perfection in every degree. Now since this idea is infinitely superior to that of the Spinozian God, it is evident to demonstration that this must be the true absolute infinite.

All Spinoza's errors on this head came originally from the dangerous definitions of the schoolmen, whom he had studied carefully in his youth; and especially the fatalist divines. They call God 'the universal being, the universal reason, the 'universal goodness, that contains in himself necessarily all 'the ideas and essences of finite.' Tho' Father Harduin was too rash to accuse of formal, deliberate atheism, all the great men who make use of these equivocal expressions, yet he was in the right to look upon the expressions themselves as the fatal sources of Spinozism. God is neither the universal being, nor the universal reason, nor the universal goodness; for these expressions may signify the collective sum of all particular beings, reasons and bounties; he is, as we shall shew, one, sole, singular, individual and indivisible substance, that reunites in himself all perfections, every one of which is infinite in its kind. Neither does this supream intelligence contain in himself all the ideas and essences of finite, as the necessary objects of his understanding. We shall fully demonstrate hereafter that this is a wild chimera of the schoolmen, which favours and produces necessarily Spinozism. Neither must we say that God contains in himself eminently all the perfecti-

ons of finite beings. For tho', as we shall shew, the perfections of finite be analogous to and representative of the divine perfections, yet the later do not contain the former in any sense whatsoever. This dark and rash expression of the schoolmen unknown to all antiquity both sacred and profane, favours the opinion of those, who fancy that causes contain their effects as plants contain their seeds, or as the sun contains its rays, and then we must look upon creation as an evolution, or emanation of the uncreated essence, which modifies itself differently, without producing any real substance distinct from itself; which is pure Spinofism. We shall shew hereafter that creation is neither a discerption, nor an emanation from the divine essence; but a production of something that had no existence before.

These three expressions therefore of the schools, That 'God is the universal being; that the ideas of all finites are the necessary objects of the divine understanding, and eternally coexistent in it; and in fine that God contains eminently the perfections and qualities of all finites,' gave rise to atheism; as will fully appear in the course of this work. We beg our readers to go on, and all these great truths shall be unfolded by degrees. If we attempted to expose them all at once, this multiplicity would perplex the mind, dazzle the intellectual eye, and render all its objects confused.

C O R. I.

Hence ABSOLUTE INFINITE, or that which contains the fullness of all perfection, can neither increase nor decrease in its essential acts, attributes and perfections; because it possesses in every moment all the powers, properties and realities

that are necessary to compleat its idea; which is that of absolute fullness, and perfection in all kinds.

C O R. II.

Hence if we discover in nature, beings that are full of negations, privations, and defects, of different, incompatible, and contradictory qualities; nature produced, or the universe of beings, cannot be an essential attribute or modification of the divine substance.

C O R. III.

Hence we must deny of absolute infinite not only all properties that suppose negation, privation and limitation: but even all perfections that are not infinite in all senses: wherefore if it can be proved, that there is a higher or more perfect way of existing every where, than by extension as bodies do, then we must deny that God's omnipresence is a local diffusion, tho' infinite and indivisible: and consequently that the divine immensity and infinite space are not the same.

C O R. IV.

Hence, tho' absolute infinite excludes all negation; yet the idea which finite intelligences have of it is altogether negative. All we conceive of absolute infinite is that it is greater than any idea we can form of it; that it surpasses all finite comprehension, and that it is none of these things, that we can imagine. Thus tho' the object of this idea be positive, yet the idea we form of it is altogether negative, as Locke very well demonstrates. But it were false to conclude from thence, that the object of that idea includes any negation; as it would be absurd to say that because our idea of God is imperfect, therefore his essence is such.

P R O P O S I T I O N . V .

Absolute infinite excludes all duality and plurality of substance.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N .

If there were two or more absolute infinities, their perfections, powers, and forces united in one sum, would be greater than those of one singular absolute infinite (a). Now there can be nothing greater than absolute infinite (b), therefore there cannot be in nature a duality, nor a plurality of distinct, self-existent, independent and absolutely infinite substances.

S C H O L I U M .

That which exhausts the whole plenitude of perfection in all senses, can admit no other of its kind; not because it contains numerically all beings, powers, and perfections: but because it contains in itself in an indivisible manner a perfection equivalent to all possible multiplicity. Substances of any finite degree may be all equal to each other, and yet be multipliable without end; because none of them singly and separately, exhausts the whole plenitude of reality in its kind. Absolute infinite can admit of no duality nor plurality of substance; because the powers, perfections and realities of both or of all united in one, would make a being of a superior degree to absolute infinite which is a contradiction.

Besides, if by an impossible supposition there could be two

(a) Ax. 6. (b) Ax. 4.

or more absolutely infinite substances, each one of them must necessarily know, love and be united with each other, and with all of them at once; and so they must by this union either become an individual and indivisible substance; or else their united powers, knowledge and happiness, must augment and surpass their single, separate power, knowledge and happiness. Wherefore every one of them would not be self-sufficient, and so could not be absolutely infinite.

C O R. I.

Hence infinite power can never be exhausted by the production of beings distinct from itself; because since it can never produce from without, another absolute infinite equal to itself, there may be in the scale of finites a progression without end.

C O R. II.

Hence God can never communicate to NATURE PRODUCED, or to created beings, a principle of self-existence, so as that they could subsist for ever independent of him; since he can never make them absolutely infinite, which is the only reason of self-existence or independence.

C O R. III.

Hence creation can neither be coeternal, nor consubstantial with God, nor necessary to his perfection; because it cannot be absolutely infinite as shall be shewn more fully hereafter.

C O R. IV.

Hence the absolutely infinite mind can have no other absolutely infinite object of his thought, but himself, or his own idea, image and representation.

C O R. V.

Hence all the sophisms that Bayle makes use of, to prove that Manicheism, or the doctrine of two co-eternal, self-existent principles, one good and another bad, is a plausible opinion; are weak, childish, and unphilosophical. All his witty reasonings on this head, are founded upon this supposition, that moral and physical evil will be eternal and indestructible; and that what is indestructible must be self-existent. This is absolutely false, as we shall prove hereafter both by scripture and reason.

P R O P O S I T I O N VI.

Absolute infinite excludes all division and all divisibility of substance whether ideal or real.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

If the divine substance was divisible into parts, these parts would be absolutely infinite, or absolutely finite. If absolutely infinite, then there might be many absolute infinities; which is impossible (a): if absolutely finite, then the addition of finite to finite would make absolute infinite, which is absurd: (b) therefore absolute infinite excludes all division and all divisibility both real and ideal; since what is ideally divisible may be really divided.

S C H O L I U M.

Spinoza never denied the indivisibility of the divine essence. He maintains indeed, with Des Cartes, that matter and space

(a) Prop. V. (b) Ax. 6.

are the same; and having endeavour'd to prove that space is infinite, eternal, indivisible, and indestructible, he concludes that infinite space and the divine immensity are the same; and that the supreme absolute infinite or only substance is extended every where by local diffusion, yet so as to be ideally and really indivisible. Thus tho' he attributes extension to God, yet he denies that God is corporeal, figurable, and divisible. He does not even say that God is the soul of the world intimately united to all the mass of infinite matter; for he asserts that there is no other real matter but infinite space. We shall unriddle this intricate question very soon.

C O R. I.

Hence all God's essential attributes, powers, and perfections subsist and act in, by and with each other according to all the extent of his infinite nature. They cannot contradict nor be separated from one another. There may be indeed as we shall shew real distinctions in God, but there can be no real divisions.

C O R. II.

Hence nature produced, or the universe of beings is not a participation of the divine substance, for what is indivisible in all senses admits of no separation or division. Wherefore when God produces or creates finite beings, it is not by a discernption, division, or communication of his essence.

P R O P O S I T I O N VII.

The divine essence does not exist by succession of thoughts.

DEMONSTRATION.

Absolute infinite is that which contains the fulness of all perfection: (a) that which contains the fulness of all perfection can never increase, decrease or vary as to its essential acts, attributes and thoughts. (b) Therefore the divine essence does not exist by succession of thoughts.

S C H O L I U M.

God knows and loves himself always equally; and in this permanent, unchangeable knowledge and love, consists the essential perfection of his infinite understanding, and the unbounded happiness of his infinite will. Locke pretends that we can have no idea of duration, but what is successive: but all his specious reasonings on this head tend to confound the idea of infinite time, with that of God's eternity. It is true that we have no idea of duration in finite but what is successive. This however does not prove that we can have no idea of God's duration, without succession, variation and change. He knows and loves himself not by successive acts, but by one continued, permanent, and immutable act; otherwise we must say that he knows and loves himself more at one time than at another. Boethius had far more noble notions, when he said that eternal duration in God is the full, actual, permanent possession of all reality and perfection: whereas infinite time in the creature is the successive augmentation or variation of its modes, realities or perfections without end.

All Locke's mistakes on this head come from his not adverting to this, that eternal duration in God does not regard

(a) Def. 8.

(b) Cor. 1. of Prop. VI.

his absolute essence, but his essential acts. Necessary existence is not the same idea with that of eternity. Necessary existence belongs to the essence of God, as independent of any other cause: but eternity or unsuccessive duration belongs to his essential acts as exempt from all possibility of increase, decrease, or variation. He knows and loves himself always in the same manner and degree; and this permanency constitutes his eternity. We see that this must be so, but we cannot form any adequate ideas of this simultaneous duration in God; because being bounded we conceive only by parcells, by succession, and by progression. All the attributes of absolute infinite tho' demonstrable, yet must be incomprehensible to finite minds.

Dr. Clarke by confounding the ideas of successive and unsuccessive duration advanced a strange paradox which he expresses thus; (a) 'How any thing can have existed eternally, that is, how an eternal duration can be actually past, is utterly unconceivable, and yet to deny that an eternal duration is now actually past is an express contradiction.' He should have said quite the contrary, that to maintain an eternal duration is now actually past is altogether repugnant and contradictory. It is not only unconceivable, but absolutely impossible. Wherever there is a last, there must be a first; now in eternity there can be no first, and therefore no last. Whatever is successive cannot be eternal, as whatever is divisible cannot be actually infinite; because no addition of finite dimensions, nor of finite successions can make absolute infinite. When we say that creatures may be immortal and e-

(a) DR. CLARKE'S Demonstration of the being and attributes of God, page 9.

ternal; all we mean is, that God may still continue their existence without end; and no ways that there can be no last moment wherein they may cease to be. When we say that matter is infinitely divisible or multipliable, all we mean is that infinite power may diminish or augment it without end, and no ways that it can be actually and really infinitely great, or infinitely little. I repeat it once more, wherever there is a first, there may be a last, and wherever there is a last, there must have been a first.

In the pure and absolute essence of God, and in the exercise of his essential, immanent, and necessary acts, there can be neither past nor future. All is one present moment. Because God always knows and loves himself equally, without variation or shadow of change. All his essential acts are co-eternal, consubstantial, and simultaneous with his essence. There is in them neither priority nor posteriority with regard to duration; tho' there may be such distinctions conceived in him with regard to causality, as shall be explained hereafter. When we distinguish anterior from posterior eternity, this does not regard God but us. We do not mean that there can be any real priority or posteriority, any alteration or succession in the divine essence; but only that there was a time when finite began, and when God manifested himself from without: for he can never interrupt the eternal, permanent, uniform duration of his essence, nor of his essential, immanent, and con-substantial acts.

Tho' in God, there is no shadow of variation with regard to his necessary acts, and their immanent effects, yet with regard to his free acts and emanant effects, there may be suc-

cession; that is, they are not co-eternal with his essence, and cannot be the permanent objects of his understanding; there was a time when he did not exert these acts; and there may be a time when he will cease to exert them. This is the sublimest truth in all theology, and the first bulwark against Spinozism; as shall be evidently demonstrated hereafter.

C O R. I.

We may conceive two different sorts of duration: one by which a being exists absolutely and altogether the same in all the periods of duration; another by which it exists differently, in different times, by the increase, decrease, and variation of its modes, qualities and perfections. The idea of time arises from the mutability and succession that happen in the modes, qualities and perfections of finite.

C O R. II.

Hence infinite time and the divine eternity are not the same. Infinite time is the mutable duration of finite continued without end. Eternity is the immutable duration of absolute infinite. Thus duration is the generical term; immutable and successive duration are the two kinds or species.

C O R. III.

Hence it is absolutely false, that duration is an absolute quality that belongs to all beings in the same sense. Successive duration or mutability is the essential property of all finites: unsuccessive duration belongs to God alone.

L E M M A O F P R O P. VIII.

A substance that is extended by diffusion of parts may be conceived as ideally and really divisible.

S C H O L I U M.

In all substance extended by diffusion we may conceive lengths, breadths, heights and depths; parts distinct from each other, parts towards the center, and parts towards the circumference. Now wherever there are real parts distinct and distant from each other, the one is not the other; the whole is not contained in each part, nor does each part contain the rest. One part therefore might exist, tho' all the rest were annihilated, and consequently its parts are separable. They are ideally divisible, and therefore must be really so; otherwise their ideal divisibility would be impossible. For this reason it is, that matter is not one simple, indivisible substance, but a compound of many substances really separable, tho' never so contiguous and homogeneous.

Some will say that we may conceive in space ideal distinctions, but not real divisions; that we may distinguish in it heights, lengths, and breadths, and yet no separable parts; and therefore tho' it may be partially apprehended, yet it cannot be mentally nor really divided. I answer that this is true, because, as we shall shew, space is not a real substance; but if it were a real substance that existed by diffusion, then it would be both mentally and really divisible.

C O R. I.

Whatever is really divisible is really compounded; for it could not be divided into parts if it were not composed of parts.

C O R. II.

Hence if a substance be divisible into parts without end,

since the parts are of the same nature with the whole, this substance cannot be one, single, individual substance, but a compound of innumerable, distinct, and divisible substances.

P R O P O S I T I O N VIII.

The DIVINE ESSENCE is not extended by diffusion of parts.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

A substance that is extended by diffusion of parts, may be conceived as ideally and really divisible (a): the divine essence admits of no division ideal or real: (b) therefore the divine essence is not extended by diffusion of parts.

S C H O L I U M.

We are now arrived at the most difficult, the most abstruse, and the most subtle part of all theology and metaphysics. The mistakes on this head have had bad effects, and tended to open the sluices to Spinosism.

There are three opinions concerning the divine immensity, and there can be but three; some say that God exists in all places by diffusion; others, that his essence is circumscribed to one definite place, while he is present every where by his almighty power; others again assert that the infinite, all-comprehensive mind is present without extension to all beings, not only by the whole exercise of his power, but according to the totality of his indivisible essence. If it can be demonstrated that the two first opinions are false, and incompatible with the per-

(a) By the preceding Lemma.

(b) By Prop. V.

fection of absolute infinite, it is evident that the third must be true (a); since the divine essence can exist no otherwise but in one of these three manners.

Some of Sir ISAAC NEWTON's disciples, without perhaps seeing the consequences of their doctrine, favour directly the first opinion, that God exists in all places by diffusion, when they maintain that infinite space and the divine immensity are the same. They argue thus.

1. As God's existence in all times constitutes infinite duration or eternity, so his presence in all places constitutes infinite space or immensity. The self-existent essence is the substratum of space, and the ground of its existence. God is not in the world, but the world is in him. His immensity is the common place or receptacle which contains all created beings: for this reason St. Paul says, that "in God we live, move and have our being."

2. The idea of space is eternal, infinite, independent of and antecedent to the creation of all matter: for since matter is created, God might have produced from the beginning only two globes of matter which would have touched each other only in a point; and therefore we might have had the idea of a space void of matter betwixt all the other points. Further, since matter is created, it may be annihilated; for whatever does not exist necessarily, may cease to be. Wherefore God might annihilate all the matter betwixt four immoveable walls, without suffering any other matter to fill its place, and then we would have an idea of space where there is no matter. In fine, since matter is created it must be finite.

(a) By Postulate 3.

If we were therefore transported to the utmost boundaries of created matter, we might stretch out our hand, and thus have the idea of a space where God might create another world like ours, yea not only one but numberless worlds, since his power is unbounded. In all these three cases we would have an idea of space where there is no matter, antecedent to, independent of, and infinitely greater than all matter. Thus the idea of space is infinite, eternal, and necessary.

3. Space and time are absolute qualities requisite and necessary to the existence of all beings; since all things must exist somewhere, and in some time, or every where and in all times. To exist no where and in no time, is not to be. Space and time therefore are necessary, indestructible ideas, that nothing can blot out of the mind, and this is the most compendious demonstration of the existence of a God: for since eternity and immensity are necessary, indestructible ideas, they must be properties of an immense, eternal being; and since the properties cannot exist without their substance, there must be an immense, eternal substance to whom they belong.

4. Space must either be something or nothing. It cannot be nothing; since we conceive in space portions greater or lesser, equal or unequal, nearer and remoter. Now nothing has no properties nor parts. If space be something, it must either be a substance or a property of a substance; the same with matter, or an attribute of matter. It cannot be, as the Cartesians say, the same with matter, because space is penetrable, immoveable and indivisible, whereas matter is impenetrable, moveable and divisible. Moreover, space is what contains matter; now the thing containing must be distinct from the

thing contained. In fine, if space and matter were the same, we could not say that bodies quit one space to go into another; for this would be saying that they go out of themselves. Neither can space be an attribute of matter, nor of any created being, since space is eternal, necessary and infinite. Wherefore it must be an attribute of the eternal, infinite, self-existent being or the same with the divine immensity.

These are the principal arguments of Locke, and the English Newtonian philosophers, to prove that infinite space and the divine immensity are the same. This matter has been handled of late by two great men, Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke. The first by his profound depth lost himself in obscurity, without being intelligible. The other by his great subtilty skipped over truth, without going to the bottom. We shall endeavour to shew first that the principles upon which this doctrine is founded are false and sophistical; and then prove that the consequences of it are very harsh and dangerous.

1. It is absolutely false that God's existence in all times is his eternity; and therefore by the rules of analogy his existence in all spaces is not his immensity. As infinite time is not eternity (a), so infinite space is not immensity. The variability of the creature gives us the idea of succession and time (b), and the extension of matter by its composition gives us the idea of space or extension. If there were no variable beings, if we could remain for ever in one permanent thought, we would have no idea of succession or time. Just so, if there were no compound beings made up of distant or separable

(a) Cor. 2. of Prop. VII.

(b) Cor. 1. of Prop. VII.

parts, we could have no idea of space or extension. Time indicates a succession of modes; space, a composition of parts. We shall shew hereafter that the mind is capable of forming abstract ideas both of substances and properties. Now it is certain that the abstract idea may remain in the mind tho' the substances were annihilated. Thus we form the ideas of infinite space, and infinite time. Having observed that all finite beings exist by succession, we form to ourselves the abstract idea of an infinite, flowing, variable duration without end; because God might have created antecedently to all determinate time, and continue his production for ever. In the same manner having once got the idea of a being composed of parts, we conceive that God may augment extended substances for ever; and so we form the abstract idea of imaginary, infinite spaces, as of imaginary, infinite numbers and motions, which are mere modes of the mind's forming, and no wise real substances; far less properties of the infinite substance. When the apostle says therefore, that "in God we live, move, and have our being;" we must not understand this in a gross, material sense, as if all bodies and all beings swimm'd in the divine essence, like fishes in the sea. If some Newtonians (or rather the disciples of the pious Dr. Henry More, who first defended this notion among the moderns) think thus, they seem not to explode the idea of an ethereal fluid that fills all; but they deny the Cartesian, created, finite, passive, divisible, figurable, moveable, unintelligent, subtile matter, in order to transform the divine essence into an uncreated, infinite, unfigurable, active, intelligent, ethereal matter, which too much resembles Spinosism; as we shall shew

hereafter. This then cannot be the meaning of St. Paul, but that God is present every where to all created beings, because they exist and subsist only by the continuation of his creating energy. Now as his power cannot act where his essence is not, he must exist where he acts; and as his essence is indivisible, he must be entirely present to all beings, without diffusion of parts, as he exists always without succession of thoughts.

2. All the reasonings by which these moderns endeavour to prove that space is eternal, infinite and necessary, are pure delusions of fancy. It is true that God might have created only two globes of matter which touched one another in a point; that he might annihilate all the real matter, there is betwixt four immovable walls, without suffering any other matter to fill its place; and in fine, that he might create new worlds beyond our system. In these three cases we would have the idea of a void or space antecedent to and independent of all matter: all this we grant. But in all these cases the idea we have of space is not that of any real substance, or property, distinct from matter, but an abstract idea of extension which remains after the extended substance is supposed to be destroyed, and which we suppose e're the extended substance be created. We consider this abstract idea as a capacity, an interval, a distance or a void, where there is nothing material; and therefore nothing that hinders the position or creation of new matter betwixt or beyond the bodies really existing. Now this abstract idea of void, distance, interval, or capacity, has no objective reality without us; it is a mere fiction of the mind, an *ENS RATIONIS*, the work of our own

thought. It is thus that when we have once the idea of an extended substance, we may form that of imaginary heights, lengths, depths, and distances without end, tho' all the real matter in the universe were annihilated. When the Cartesians therefore deny the possibility of forming the abstract idea of a void or extension where there is no matter, they are driven inevitably to maintain either that matter is absolutely infinite, and consequently eternal and uncreated; or to say that it is an attribute of the divine substance; and so to materialize the divine nature, in a more absurd sense than the later authors. It is a mere Sophism in the Cartesians to say that bodies are united when there is nothing betwixt them; this is false; bodies are only then united, when there can be nothing betwixt them.

3. Space and time are not absolute qualities that belong to all beings. God exists every where without space or extension; as he exists always without time or succession. He exists in himself as his own place, always the same, without variation, in one permanent act of knowledge and love. It is true that the ideas of space and time are inseparable from our minds, because being variable creatures, intimately united to matter, we cannot strike out of our minds the ideas of extension and succession: but if we transfer these ideas to absolute infinite, we become anthropomorphites, and imagine that God is like ourselves. We fancy with children that all that is not extended, is nothing; and that all duration which is not floating, and successive is no duration at all. Space and time are not then absolute qualities that belong equally to all beings created and uncreated, material and spiritual.

4. The dilemma's of these moderns are not conclusive. All the objects of our perception are not substances, or properties of substances. There is yet a third object of our perception, and that is, abstract ideas. Space is not a pure nothing, but an abstract idea of extension, as that of number, time, and motion, which we may consider as greater or lesser, distant or nearer; and which we may add or multiply, divide or combine without end; yea we may reason upon them, as if they were real substances: tho' it is certain that all numbers without multipliable beings, all times without variable beings, all motions without moveable beings, and all spaces without extended beings; are mere abstractions of our minds. We say that bodies exist in space, in the same sense that we say that finite beings exist in time. In both cases, the vulgar imposed upon by imagination, consider space and time, or the abstract ideas of extension and succession, as some things distinct from the extended and successive substances in which these substances exist; and so by a metonymy without precision say that the substances exist in their properties, or rather in the abstract ideas of their properties. Can Philosophers make use of the errors in ordinary speech to prove philosophical principles? Strictly speaking we should not say that bodies exist in space, and finite beings in time; but that the one exist with extension, and the others by succession, or with space and time. Moreover, it was a great mistake in some Cartesians to maintain that SPACE and MATTER are the same; for then it would be nonsense to say that bodies change one space to go into another. This would be saying that bodies go out of themselves to go into other bodies. What is meant

when we say that bodies change space or place, is that they change the relation of distance to each other; for, as we have already remarked, space signifies sometimes a void where there are no bodies at all, and sometimes an interval or distance betwixt bodies. In both these cases, space is only a relation or an idea of the manner that bodies exist by extension. Now extension is not a substance, but a property of a substance; it is not matter, but an attribute of matter. Each atom of matter carries along with it the idea of local extension, and supposes it necessarily: but as succession without any being that varies is a pure idea, so extension without any extended being is a pure idea.

Thus all the principles upon which these moderns found the identity of infinite space and the divine immensity, are uncertain or false: but the natural consequences of this doctrine are of a dangerous tendency.

1. If infinite space were the same with the divine immensity; if God's omnipresence constituted infinite space, and if infinite space were an attribute of God: then the supreme essence would exist by diffusion and local extension, tho' indivisible, unfigurable, and immoveable. Now if the divine essence existed thus by diffusion, there would be more of it in a greater space, than in a lesser, in a mountain than in a molehill, in a giant than in a pigmy.

2. This is not all. We have already demonstrated, that all substance which exists by diffusion must be divisible: for in all such substances we may conceive parts distant and distinct; equal and unequal; greater and lesser, and consequently these substances are ideally and really divisible, tho'

they may be undivided; now what is really divisible is thereby figurable and moveable. If the divine essence existed therefore in space by diffusion, it would be divisible, figurable and moveable; and so subject to all the accidents and qualities of bodies. We might say literally and physically an inch, a foot, a cubit, and a yard of the divine substance. It might be really divided into portions of all forms, triangular, circular, spherical, and cubical. Yea all these portions might be transported from one place to another with more or less velocity. Thus we would corporalize the divine nature.

3. In fine, if the divine essence were locally extended, tho' indivisible, one would think it must be as impenetrable as matter: for a real substance that exists by diffusion fills its own place; and so cannot admit in the same place any other substance of the same nature. It is the diffusion or extension of a substance that makes it impenetrable, and not its divisibility or indivisibility. If the divine essence constitutes infinite space, and fills it, then there can be no other spiritual substance but itself. For this reason Spinoza maintain'd, that there was one only substance in nature, and that all other beings are only consubstantial forms, ideas, hypostases, and personalities of the divine essence.

Dr. Clarke press'd by these absurd consequences, of which he had no doubt a sacred horror, retracts his first expressions, and says (a) ' That God is not in space, nor penetrated by it; ' and that to call the self-existent substance, the substratum of ' space, or space a property of the self-existent substance, are ' not perhaps proper expressions: but that all he means is, that

(a) See the answers to the 3d and 4th letters at the end of his Demonstration of the being and attributes of God.

‘ the idea of space is the idea of a certain quality or relation, which we evidently see to be necessarily existing, and which not being a substance presupposes necessarily a substance without which it could not exist.’ We absolutely deny that the idea of space is that of a quality necessarily-existing: for if there never had been any real matter, or extended substance, we might have been eternally without the idea of extension; and so could never have form’d an abstract idea of this property or of space. For this reason it is that Dr. Berkeley maintains ‘ that we acquire the ideas of grandeur, distance and extension, only by habitude, experience and touch; and that we learn to see as we learn to speak.’ To say that a necessarily existing quality presupposes a necessarily existing substance, is returning to his first maxim; for since qualities cannot exist without their substance, if space be a necessarily existent quality, it must be that of a necessarily existent substance, and so the same with the divine immensity; otherwise this phrase signifies nothing. Thus the Doctor falls into the same jargon he reproaches others with; rather than quite abandon a principle whose natural and necessary consequences alarm him. Thus the mathematical philosophers have fallen into all the absurdities of materialism and Spinosism, without designing it. The greatest geometers are very oft incapable of metaphysical reasonings, because their minds being entirely absorb’d in the contemplations of extension and figure, and constantly accusom’d to the ideas of quantity, they become by degrees incapable of all pure ideas that have no relation to space, figure, and motion.

The opinion of an immense void, of an infinite space, of

an uncreated extension, in which God exists by diffusion, is probably an old, antiquated notion of Democritus and the atomists; which was combated and confuted by Socrates, Anaxagoras, and all the philosophers, who believed that the thinking essence was distinct from the material substance. This fiction was renew'd by Epicurus and Lucretius; and confuted anew by the Platonists. Manes and his followers reviv'd the same chimera in the third and fourth centuries, and St. Augustin was long infatuated by it, but he rejected it at last with horror, and confuted it with force and subtlety. Champeaux, master to Abelard, endeavoured to recall the same error in the twelfth century; but his disciple attack'd him and proved him to be a materialist. Some Scotists, such as Dero-don, revived the same opinion in the fifteenth century; but they were vigorously opposed by all the schools. In fine, Spinoza in the last century essay'd again to introduce this notion into the empire of philosophy, to prove that there is but one substance in nature, and that extension and thought are properties of this only substance; but his dark scheme was abhorr'd by all the philosophers of Europe. It is strange that such profound genii, as Dr. Henry More, Clarke, and many of the learned English, should have agreed in this point with the Epicureans, Manicheans, Materialists, and Spiniosists, in opposition to the most able metaphysicians of all ages, countries, and religions.

Some antient and modern philosophers fell into another extrem, and pretended that the proper residence of God is without this system; that his essence is circumscribed to the highest heavens, and that he is present to created beings, on-

ly by a power of irradiation, an all-extensive virtue, and spiritual operation; and this is the second opinion about omnipresence. These philosophers, to shun the doctrine of diffusive, local extension, limit the divine nature, and render it really finite by essence. Nothing is more absurd and groundless, as will fully appear from the following reflexions.

1. It is absolutely impossible that infinite power can be separated from the omnipotent essence; that a property can exist without its substance; and that an agent can operate where it is not: wherefore if God acts every where, he must be present every where: his essence must exist, where his power exerts itself.

2. We grant, that the holy scriptures speak of the highest heavens, as the proper residence of God: but these passages must signify, as we shall shew hereafter, that there is one place in the divine immensity where the infinite essence manifests itself to created beings, in a more eminent manner than in another, and not that he exists more in one place than in another. Scripture must be explain'd by scripture. Now these sacred books assure us, that God is present in heaven, upon earth, and in hell; "that the heaven of heavens cannot contain him, and that he is not far from every one of us, since in him we live, move and have our being."

3. It is true indeed, that the sacred oracles say, that impious minds, and damned spirits are "far from God; and cast out of his presence; that holy souls are near to him, and united with him; and that none but the pure in heart can see and approach him:" But these expressions cannot be understood of a local presence. In some sense we are pre-

sent to objects only in so far as they act upon us, and manifest themselves to us. If all the avenues of sense were shut up, and all communication with bodies were suspended, we might be surrounded with them, and be in the same place with them, and yet have no perception of them. Thus God is essentially present to the devils and the damned; and yet they do not perceive him: they are said to be separated from him, because he does not act upon them in a beatifying manner; thus we live, move and exist in God, tho' he be invisible: he is present to all beings, tho' they do not feel his presence. They are distinct but not distant, from him. When he creates, he does not produce beings without himself, in this sense that he places their substance in a space where he is not: but in this sense that they are distinct from him, or have a being really different from his.

The two opinions mention'd about the divine immensity, the one of God's diffusive presence in all places, and the other of his circumscription to one place, are then incompatible with the perfection of the divine nature. Now when of three suppositions, whereof one necessarily must be true, two are proved absurd and impossible, the third is invincibly demonstrated (a). God must either be essentially present in all places, or in one definite place: there is no midst. The dilemma is exact; the enumeration is perfect. If he be essentially present in all places, he must be so either by diffusion of parts, or without diffusion of parts. Here again there is no midst. We have already demonstrated that he cannot be present in all places by diffusion of parts; nor circumscribed to

(a) By Postulate 2.

one definite place; therefore he must be present essentially, entirely, and indivisibly in all places without diffusion. The absolutely infinite, necessary, self-existent being must be omnipresent, not 'because absolute necessity' as Dr. Clarke says, 'is always and every where the same;' which seems to be no proof; but because the indivisible, all-comprehensive mind must be at all times entirely and equally present, both by the totality of his absolute essence, and by the perfect exercise of his attributes, to all beings whether material or spiritual. This is incomprehensible, but not impossible. We fancy it such only because we imagine, that there is an infinite space distinct from God, which he fills by local diffusion; and then it would be absurd and contradictory to say, that he is as much in an atom as in the whole of matter. For what is entirely and locally in a part, cannot be at the same time entirely and locally in the whole. When we think therefore of God's immensity, we must abstract from all ideas of extension and diffusion, as when we think of his eternity, we must drop all ideas of succession and time.

Some imagine they have clearer ideas of God's eternity than of his immensity, of his unsuccessive duration than of his unextensive existence: and that we may conceive how he knows and loves himself always by one permanent act without succession; but that we can have no idea how he exists entirely every where without extension. The reason is, because we have no adequate ideas of God's essence, nor indeed of any other substance whatsoever. So soon as we begin to imagine what SPIRIT is, we immediately extend and corporalize it. Immers'd in sense and drunk with imagination, we cannot

imagine that to be a reality which is not extended; as children believe air to be an empty void or nothing, because they do not feel or see it: but when we rise above sense and bridle imagination, we soon discover that God must exist without diffusion of parts, as without succession of thoughts; and that there can be no physical relation between the properties of the eternal mind, power, wisdom, and will; and the properties of matter, divisibility, figurability, and mobility. We cannot say a span of power, an ell of wisdom, and a yard of will. It is true indeed that we express very oft the attributes of spirit by these of body, an high mind, a profound judgment, a soft heart; but then we speak only in a metaphorical, figurative way, and not in a physical, literal one.

The schoolmen have miserably obscured the doctrine of eternity and immensity by their dull, insipid comparisons. They conceive God's immensity as a point, and his eternity as a moment. Pitiful jargon. So soon as we imagine the infinite mind under any form relative to finite, whether it be a point or a moment; an infinite extension, or infinite succession, we corporalize God, or humanize him. To fancy that he is contracted into a point, or expanded thro' infinite space, is degrading his nature. He exists every where and always without extension and without succession. This is all we should say; and if we have departed from this simplicity, it was rather to confute error, than explain truth. The simplest ideas and the simplest expressions are the best, when we speak of the simplest of all beings; and the removing of all imperfections by negative propositions, is safer than attempts by affirmative ones to explain what is incomprehensible.

C O R. I.

Hence as there is a great difference between infinite time and the divine eternity; so there is a total difference between infinite space and the divine immensity. Infinite space is an abstract idea of the manner according to which bodies exist by extension. Divine immensity is the manner by which God exists without extension. To say therefore that infinite space is the sensory, organ, or medium in which and by which God sees all things, is an unintelligible and dangerous way of speaking. It is saying that the abstract idea of a finite mind, is an absolute attribute of the infinite mind.

C O R. II.

Hence we must necessarily admit of two sorts of substances; one that exists without extension, and another with extension: one that is present to all beings entirely, indivisibly, and essentially, to the part as to the whole. Another that exists only by succession and expansion; by parcels, additions, and multiplications. These two manners of existing are quite contrary, and incompatible attributes; and therefore must belong to quite different substances. For this reason we shall call absolute infinite for the future, MIND, INTELLECT, or SPIRIT.

C O R. III.

Hence if it can be proved that God has a creating power; then it is plain that he may produce two sorts of substances quite different and distinct, one that exists without extension, and the other with extension. The one immaterial, and the other material. The one must be like himself, a simple, uncompounded, indivisible essence; the other a compound of

many different substances, which tho' contiguous and similar yet may be divided and separated; yea the one may be annihilated, while the other exists. And this is the first distinction betwixt spirit and body.

C O R. IV.

Hence the idea of an extended, material substance, that is absolutely indivisible, unfigurable and immoveable, is a perfect contradiction. Matter may be undivided, but it is not indivisible. It may be without any one particular, determinate figure we can imagine, but it is not unfigurable. It may be unmoved, but it is not unmoveable; for by its nature of an extended substance that exists by diffusion of parts, these parts must necessarily be susceptible of figure, division and motion by a superior force capable to form, divide and move them.

C O R. V.

Hence the first mystery of natural religion is that of the divine immensity, or unextensive existence: we see that it must be, but not how it is; this attribute is incomprehensible but not impossible. It is unconceivable, but it is demonstrable. Now when we have demonstrated that a thing must be, we ought not to deny it purely and only, because we cannot conceive it.

P R O P O S I T I O N IX.

The absolutely infinite mind must be infinitely, eternally and essentially active and productive of an absolutely infinite effect.

DEMONSTRATION.

Absolute infinite contains all possible perfections (a): infinite activity, or the production of an infinite effect, is a supreme perfection (b): therefore the absolutely infinite mind must be infinitely, eternally and essentially active, and consequently productive of an absolutely infinite effect; since an absolutely infinite cause, acting according to all the extent of its nature, must necessarily produce an absolutely infinite effect.

S C H O L I U M.

Men generally imagine that God is infinitely active, only because he can produce innumerable beings from without, or distinct from himself; but unless this faculty be for ever reduced into act, it is not infinite activity, but infinite power. It is a real inaction, tho' it supposes an infinite capacity of acting. Now such inactive powers as ly dormant during a whole eternity in God, are absolutely incompatible with the perfection of the divine nature which must be infinitely, eternally, and essentially active.

The Deists, the Sabellians, the Unitarians, and the Socinians, yea the great Sir Isaac Newton, with his learned disciple Dr. Clarke, maintain that all action is free, both in the first and second causes. If this were so, then God would be active only by creation, he would not be active by essence, he would not be necessarily but freely active. They must therefore either say that creation is eternal, or maintain that God was during a whole eternity, without any action at all. If

(a) Def. 8. (b) Ax. 7.

they say that creation was coeternal with the Godhead, then, as we shall shew presently, it must be consubstantial; thus they will become Spinofists, and be obliged to assert, that NATURE PRODUCED is a coeternal, consubstantial emanation of NATURE PRODUCING. A consequence which must appear very harsh to every sober mind.

These authors will urge, that to act is to produce freely something that was not, and that therefore the idea of cause supposes always priority of time to its effect. This is absolutely false. Power, cause, activity, and force is what can produce something in itself or without itself freely or necessarily. To desire or tend towards beatifying objects is no doubt an action of the mind; now we desire and love what is beatifying necessarily, and not freely. Therefore we have the idea of an action that is necessary and consubstantial with our essence. Moreover, it is absolutely false that the idea of cause infers always priority of time to the effect produced. On the contrary, if the effect be necessary, its coexistence with its cause is necessary; for cause and effect being relative terms, a necessary, consubstantial effect must exist at the same time with its cause. We may distinguish in such acts a priority of nature or of causality to their effect; but not a priority of time or duration.

Since absolutely infinite must be infinitely, eternally, and essentially active, and since he cannot be eternally active from without, or upon any thing external; he must be eternally active from within; and since his essence is indivisible, and cannot act by parcels, he must be necessarily, and immanently active, according to the whole extent of his infinite nature. Now an absolutely infinite agent that acts according to all the extent

of its absolutely infinite nature, must necessarily produce in itself an absolutely infinite effect; otherwise the effect would not be proportionate to the cause; and so the cause would not act according to all the extent of its absolutely infinite nature, which is contrary to the supposition. Moreover, the production of an absolutely infinite effect is a far greater perfection than the creation of any number of finite effects how great soever; and therefore this immanent fecundity must be an essential, coeternal, consubstantial perfection of the divine nature.

C O R. I.

Hence absolute infinite in his pure and solitary essence, antecedent to all creation must have produced within himself, an eternal, necessary, absolutely infinite effect.

C O R. II.

Hence an absolutely infinite mind or intelligent subject supposes an absolutely infinite object or idea known, otherwise it would be only an infinite capacity of knowledge, and not an infinite understanding that knows and possesses its object.

P R O P O S I T I O N. X.

The absolutely infinite effect and object of the absolutely infinite mind can be no other than its own idea, image, or representation.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

An absolutely infinite and infinitely active mind supposes an absolutely infinite effect produced, and an absolutely infinite object or idea known (a). God cannot produce any absolutely infinite effect from without, and consequently can have no other absolutely infinite object of his thought but himself or his own idea, image, or representation (b): there-

(a) Cor. 1. and 2. of Prop. IX. (b) Prop. V. and Cor. 3.

fore God's own idea, image, or representation of himself must be the absolutely infinite effect, and object of the absolutely infinite mind.

S C H O L I U M.

The Deists, Unitarians, and Socinians deny this eternal generation of the WORD, because they do not fully enter into their own spiritual natures, to examine what passes in themselves. When we think, it is clear that the object of our thought is distinct from our thinking faculty; otherwise we would think equally at all times, and have always the same idea; since we have always the same powers. Our ideas are changeable and imperfect modes of the mind; whereas God's idea of himself is a permanent, necessary and essential image, and not a free, accidental mode. All our simple ideas are produced in us by other objects that act upon us, while we are altogether passive. Whereas this consubstantial idea of the divine mind, is not produced by any other object distinct from itself. It is conceived from within, not received from without; it is produced, not perceived. We may therefore in comparing absolute infinite with finite spirits, (which, as we shall shew, are his living images) distinguish in him the thinking subject or the MIND CONCEIVING; from the object of this THINKING ESSENCE or the IDEA CONCEIVED.

Some moderns will say that intelligence is not action, and that to know is not to produce. I answer that perception is not an action; but conception is the highest act of the understanding. To receive ideas, sensations, or modifications from objects that act upon us, is purely passive. But to form or

create in the mind new ideas, is a real production. We do not form our simple ideas; we receive them from external objects that act upon us. God is impassible and eternal, and so cannot be acted upon by other objects. He does not perceive, but he conceives his essential, consubstantial idea, image, or representation; he does not receive this idea from others, but he produces it in himself. We form our complex ideas by a successive combining of our simple perceptions. God forms his consubstantial idea by one unsuccessive act. Now this is the highest and most exalted of all activities and perfections.

Spinoza never denied the eternal generation of an eternal, immanent, necessary, consubstantial effect in the divine mind; and he calls this effect *NATURE PRODUCED*. But he confounds the ideas of finite with the consubstantial idea of God; and the creature with the creator. Having learned from the schoolmen, that all the ideas of finite exist eternally, necessarily and immutably in the divine Intellect; that all that is in God is God, and partakes of the divine attributes, he concluded that all these eternal, immutable, necessary ideas, or essences of finites are living, active beings, and hypostases that subsist and inhere in the divine nature, from everlasting to everlasting; and consequently that the supposition of created intelligences distinct from those ideas is useless and chimerical. Thus according to him, the ideas and the objects are the same, and finite spirits are not distinct substances from God; but coeternal, consubstantial, necessary ideas or images, forms or expressions, hypostases or personalities, productions or emanations of the eternal mind. Thus the schoolmen have

given occasion to all Spinoza's wild chimeras, and horrible blasphemies. These blasphemous chimeras can never be solidly confuted, unless we overturn the false reasonings of the schoolmen, and shew that the ideas of finite do not coexist eternally, necessarily, and immutably in the divine mind; that they do not enter necessarily into the generation of the *LOGOS* or consubstantial idea; and in fine, that they are free acts of the divine understanding. We must however go on by degrees, lest we perplex such abstract, sublime truths with too much multiplicity. We have already remarked, that to produce ONE ABSOLUTE INFINITE EFFECT OR IDEA, is a far greater perfection than to produce a collection of finite effects or ideas how great so ever; and this one idea suffices to prove, that God's consubstantial idea is not the sum or collection of all finite ideas; as his substance is not the sum or collection of all finite substances. We beg our readers once more to go on, and this all sublime speculation shall be fully unfolded and demonstrated hereafter.

C O R. I.

Hence absolute infinite, in his pure, and solitary essence, antecedent to the production of any finite ideas, is infinitely intelligent, self-knowing, and self-conscious; as well as infinitely active and productive of an eternal, immanent and absolutely infinite effect, object, or idea.

C O R. II.

Hence this generation of the *LOGOS*, or of God's consubstantial idea, is sufficient to compleat the perfection of the divine understanding; for an infinite mind can desire nothing

more to fill, enlighten, and satiate it, than an infinitely infinite object.

C O R. III.

Hence all other ideas, thoughts, and conceptions that do not regard immediately the pure and absolute essence of God, and that do not enter necessarily into the generation of the LOGOS, or the production of this consubstantial image, are not necessary to the perfection of the divine understanding.

C O R. IV.

Hence intelligence or reason is action, yea an action of the highest degree; because it supposes the production of new ideas, or a new combination of ideas already perceived. God conceived in himself the archetypal ideas, and we can form to ourselves abstract ideas, as shall be shewn hereafter.

P R O P O S I T I O N XI.

The eternal, permanent, consubstantial idea God has of himself, produces necessarily in him an infinite, eternal, immutable love.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

Infinite perfection known and enjoy'd produces necessarily infinite love (a); God knows himself infinitely, since absolute infinite must be infinitely intelligent (b): therefore the eternal, permanent, consubstantial idea God has of himself, produces necessarily in him an infinite, eternal, and immutable love.

(a) Ax. 8. (b) Cor. 1. of Prop. X.

S C H O L I U M.

It is clear as sunshine, that since the object and motive of love is perfection known, the greater the perfection is, the greater the love must be, or at least should be; and therefore infinite perfection known must produce infinite love. I do not say that the greater a perfection is, the greater the love for it is, since a perfection may be great in itself, and yet not known; and what is unknown cannot be loved. Nor do I say that perfection known is the only motive of love, since pleasure felt may also be a motive of love. We may attach ourselves to objects, either because of the agreeable sensations they produce in us; or because of the real perfections we discover in them. It is therefore sure that perfection known and enjoy'd produces love; whether that be by the sensation of pleasure that accompanies the view of perfection, or by the natural empire that the knowledge of it has over the mind. This we shall examine afterwards.

Thus it is certain that antecedent to all communicative goodness toward any thing external, God is good in himself and just to himself, as he is infinitely, eternally, and essentially active and intelligent; because as he produces within himself an absolutely infinite effect and idea, so he is infinitely, eternally, and essentially good and just. Infinitely good, because from the knowledge and enjoyment of his substantial idea flows an infinite sensation of joy, an unbounded love, an unspeakable pleasure, and an eternal self-complacency, which constitute his uninterrupted happiness. Infinitely just, because it is this permanent love that constitutes his essential

justice; for by this love he renders to himself all that is due to his supream perfection. He does not therefore want to create innumerable myriads of finite objects to exert his essential beneficence and equity; since he produces within himself from all eternity one infinite object that exhausts, so to speak, all his capacity of loving, beatifying, and doing justice.

The Deists, Unitarians, and Socinians, who deny the doctrine of the Trinity, cannot explain how God is essentially good and just, antecedently to, and independently of the creation of finite; for God cannot be emanently good and just, where there is no object of his beneficence and equity. If then he be essentially, eternally and necessarily good and just, he must be so immanently; he must be so in himself; he must therefore find an infinite object within himself, to whom he dispays all his essential love, beneficence and equity.

C O R. I.

Hence God does not love himself because he is happy, but he is happy because he loves himself. He loves himself not by a blind instinct, not in order to be happy; but because he is infinitely perfect: and this love makes his essential happiness, goodness and justice.

C O R. II.

Hence God would have been eternally, essentially and necessarily good and just, tho' he had never created any beings distinct from himself to beatify and recompense them.

C O R. III.

Hence God's consubstantial love of himself is sufficient to compleat the felicity of his infinite will. Here all its motions, tendencies and desires fix, concenter and reunite.

Wherefore all other acts and productions, that do not necessarily flow from and enter into this consubstantial love, are not essential to the perfection of the divine will.

C O R. IV.

Hence if God at any time creates or produces any beings distinct from himself, he cannot love them but proportionably as they resemble him. For since perfection is the only motive and rule of his love, and since the perfection of all created essences, depends upon the resemblance they have to their uncreated original, it is plain that God can love nothing, but in so far as it represents him or resembles him in some degree or other.

C O R. V.

Hence God loves himself necessarily and all that he has made. His essence is love.

L E M M A OF P R O P. XII.

To compleat the idea of perfect felicity, there must be an object loving as well as an object loved.

S C H O L I U M.

Such is the nature of love, that it must be communicative. Infinite love therefore must be infinitely and necessarily communicative. It must have an object upon which it exerts itself, and to which it displays itself; into which it flows, and that flows back to it again. There is a far greater felicity in loving and in being loved than in loving simply. It is the mutual harmony and correspondence of two distinct beings or persons, that makes the completion of love and felicity.

COROLARY.

Hence God could not have been infinitely and eternally loved, if there had not been from all eternity, some being distinct from himself, and equal to himself, that loves him infinitely; since, as we have shewn(a), creation could not be coeternal, consubstantial, and necessary to the divine nature.

PROPOSITION XII.

The eternal, infinite, and immutable love, which proceeds from the idea God has of himself, is not a simple attribute, mode, or perfection of the divine mind; but a living, active, consubstantial, intelligent being or agent.

DEMONSTRATION.

To compleat the idea of perfect felicity, there must be an object loving, as well as an object loved(b); God could not have been infinitely and eternally loved, if there had not been from all eternity, some being distinct from himself, and equal to himself that loved him infinitely(c): therefore the eternal, infinite, and immutable love which proceeds from the idea God has of himself, is not a simple attribute, mode, or perfection of the divine mind; but a living, active, consubstantial, intelligent being or agent.

SCHOLIUM.

As it is necessary to compleat the idea of perfect know-

(a) Cor. 3. of Prop. V. (b) By the preceeding Lemma of Prop. XII.
 (c) By Coroll. of the same Lemma.

ledge, that there be a subject knowing, and an object known, so it is necessary to compleat the idea of perfect felicity, that there be a subject loving, and an object loved. As God exerts his infinite activity, by producing necessarily, and eternally within himself, one infinite idea or image, so he exhausts all his communicative goodness, and all his capacity of love, by producing necessarily and eternally within himself, a subject that loves him infinitely, according to all the extent of his boundless perfection.

It may be objected here, that tho' we should suppose no third being or hypostasis in the divine nature, yet the generation of the Logos alone, would furnish an infinite, eternal, consubstantial agent, to be the object of the divine knowledge, and the subject of the divine love; so that God by the sole existence of the Son, would be eternally, necessarily, and infinitely loved as he loves. I answer, that if supernatural revelation had not taught us, that there is a triplicity in the divine nature, we would naturally have stopt at a duality, and could have gone no further. For this reason it is, that some ancient hereticks denied the personality of the Holy Ghost. We do not pretend to prove the doctrine of the Trinity by reason, but to shew simply, that if it be truly reveal'd, it is not contradictory to reason.

It is by this eternal generation of the Logos, that the source and fountain of the Deity communicates all his perfections to his consubstantial image; and it is by this everlasting procession of the Holy Ghost from both, that God, so to speak, returns into himself again, by centering in this living image all his love and affections. Without these two

immanent acts, and emanations in the Godhead, the Eternal Mind, in his solitary and absolute essence, would neither be infinitely productive, nor infinitely loved.

The ignorance of these great principles make some persons, that have a sacred horror against Deism and Unitarianism, fancy, that creation must be eternal, otherwise God could not have had an object whereupon to display his infinite activity and beneficence. This idea is manifestly false for the three following reasons; 1. If without creation God had not an object to display his essential beneficence and fecundity, then creation was not only eternal but necessary, since God could not have been infinitely active and loved without it. It must not be a free production of his arbitrary will, but a necessary emanation of his essence; and therefore consubstantial; since nothing can be eternal and necessary but what is absolutely infinite; and nothing can be absolutely infinite but the divine substance. 2. If God without creation had no adequate object of his activity and love, then he could never have any; because he can never create an absolute infinite without himself; and so the objects of his fecundity and beneficence would always be infinitely inferior to his creating energy. Thus he could never find from without, an object equal to his essential, necessary activity and beneficence. He could neither love infinitely nor be loved so. 3. As it is more perfect to produce one infinitely infinite effect, than any number of finites how great soever; so it is infinitely more beneficent to beatify one infinitely infinite object, than any number of finites how vast soever. The essential, immanent, eternal, necessary activity and beneficence of the supream mind is therefore infinitely

more display'd by the generation of the LOGOS, and procession of the Holy Ghost, equal to the Father in all things, self-origination only excepted, than by the creation and beatification of numberless worlds, which are still finite.

It is evident therefore from the four preceding propositions, that we may represent the divine essence, under these three notions, as an INFINITELY ACTIVE MIND that conceives; or as an INFINITE IDEA that is the object of this conception; or as an INFINITE LOVE that proceeds from this idea: the Eternal Mind produces necessarily in itself, the idea of itself. This idea is not like our free, floating, false ideas; but is a necessary, permanent, true idea. From this idea known, possessed and enjoy'd, flow or proceed not inconstant, bounded, accidental desires like ours; but an essential, immutable, infinite love. There are three, there can be but three; and all that we can conceive of the Infinite Mind may be reduced to these three; infinite LIFE, LIGHT, and LOVE.

This is not all; revelation superadds to these natural ideas what reason could never discover. It is this, that these three distinctions in the Godhead, mind conceiving, idea conceived, and love proceeding from both, are not three simple attributes, or modalities, or powers, but three distinct principles of action. The consubstantial image and the coessential love, are not only eternal acts, but distinct agents, that subsist and act in the eternal essence, as if they were really three different, independent minds; tho' they are not so. They are hypostases, inherencies, and emanations of the absolutely infinite mind, whose metaphysical nature we cannot define. They are real

agents, beings, and living principles of action, distinct from their source; so that God is known by the one and loved by the other, as if they were really distinct substances. This is the mystery. Idea and love, or which is the same, wisdom and goodness, truth and justice, which in finite beings are simple modalities, powers, or virtues, are in the absolutely infinite mind, self-conscious agents, intelligent beings, or real personalities. We do not know enough of the intimate nature of things, and especially of the eternal uncreated essence, to deny that this is possible. And if this is possible, all our business is to examine if this be reveal'd. Now that this is possible seems evident from the following reflexions that have been already demonstrated, or that are self-evident truths.

1. God being infinitely, eternally, and essentially active, he must produce eternally and necessarily within himself an infinite effect, object, idea or image of himself. This consubstantial idea must be a living principle of action, a permanent, ever-subsistent, substantial idea; and not a transient, variable modality; otherwise God's essential activity would not produce an effect equal to its infinite cause; and so the cause would not act according to all the extent of its infinite nature, and so would not be essential; which is contrary to the supposition.

2. God's happiness could not be infinitely infinite, if he were not loved by an absolutely infinite object. The perfection of happiness consists in a mutual, reciprocal union betwixt the object loved and the subject loving, and therefore there must be in God, besides his consubstantial idea, a living, self-conscious agent or principle that proceeds from the

union of the mind conceiving with the idea conceived. We have proved that God, without being eternally barren and inactive, must produce in himself, a living, consubstantial image: just so we prove, that if God will be infinitely happy, and loved, he must produce within himself an object that loves him infinitely. He cannot be infinitely known but by the *Logos*; he cannot be infinitely loved but by the Holy Ghost.

3. The effects of God's immanent acts being coeternal, consubstantial, and coessential, must partake of all the divine perfections; because in God there can be no inequality, or dissimilitude. Moreover the divine essence being simple, uncompounded and indivisible, the infinite cause must communicate all his perfections, and all his substance to his coessential productions, effects and emanations. He cannot communicate his substance by parcels. The immanent effects of his immanent acts must be like himself, and equal to himself in all things, self-origination only excepted. His emanant, created effects are, and must be infinitely inferior to himself; they are not portions of his substance, but simple productions of his power; more or less perfect, proportionably as they imitate or resemble his perfections: but the consubstantial image, and the coessential love, must be compleat and total participations of all his essence. This is incomprehensible, but this is not impossible. We do not see how this is, but we must not deny it purely and only because we cannot conceive it.

4. God's immanent acts must have a reality infinitely superior to the acts of finite. The effects of second causes are only bounded, transient modes. The immanent effects of the first cause are eternal, infinite agents. Our ideas and

loves are only variable perceptions and passions; but God's consubstantial idea and love are permanent, active realities, indued with all the divine perfections. Moreover, God's emanant acts must be infinitely inferior to his immanent ones. The effects of the first are real substances distinct from God, but all finite in their kind, tho' of different degrees according as they adumbrate more or less his different perfections. God's immanent effects must be absolutely infinite agents, beings, or realities, tho' not different substances; because, as we have shown, there can be one only absolutely infinite mind, that excludes all duality and plurality of substance. They are not three distinct coeternal minds, because this would infer a triplicity of substance; since three distinct intelligent substances would have three distinct self-consciousnesses; and so their actions might be separated, and their essences be independent of each other. They are not three simple attributes or modalities, because they are distinct intelligent principles, and self-conscious agents. They must therefore be three distinct beings, realities, somethings, or persons; because the idea of personality includes that of an intelligent self-conscious agent. The three persons of the Trinity have the same self-consciousness. They all exist, and act, in, by, and with each other; so that the action of the Father, tho' distinct, is never separated from that of the Son or Holy Ghost: and this is what the Schools call *CIRCUM-INCESSION*.

The Nicene fathers made use of the word *Hypostasis*, and the Latin church translated this word by *Person*, to indicate that the triplicity which is in the divine nature is not a simple distinction of modes, much less of attributes, and far

less yet of substances. But a fourth distinction, that is more than the first and second, and less than the third, and which therefore supposed Intelligence, Activity, and Self-consciousness; yet not so as to constitute three separate minds. The words hypostasis and personality were invented therefore, rather to indicate what this triplicity is not, than to express what it really is. It is neither of substances, nor of attributes, nor of modes. There is it seems, a fourth distinction in the Deity unknown to finite, which we cannot comprehend till we see God as he is.

The Deists, Sabellians, Unitarians, Arians, and Socinians assert, that difference of persons supposes necessarily difference of substance. This is true in finites; but this may not be so in absolute infinite. Yea it must be otherwise, since we have demonstrated, that the two effects of God's immanent acts must be like himself, infinite, eternal, consubstantial, intelligent, and self-conscious agents.

Spinoza had some idea of the distinction of personality in the Eternal Mind, tho' he applied it wrong. He maintain'd, that finite spirits are not substances distinct from God, but coeternal, consubstantial, immanent ideas, hypostases, and inherencies of the self-existent essence. Thus he supposed in NATURE PRODUCING an infinite number of bounded personalities, words, and hypostases; confounded God's immanent and emanant effects, and God with nature: but still he had a notion of real personalities in the divine essence, or of immanent effects that are intelligent, self-conscious, distinct, and separate agents.

The sacred oracles make use of several different metapho-

rical expressions to signify these three personal distinctions in the Godhead. 1. The INFINITELY ACTIVE MIND is what the original Hebrew text of the Old, and the Greek text of the New Testament call THE ETERNAL FATHER, as self-originated; Infinite force, as producing an infinite effect; Essential life, as being the fullest exercise of boundless activity; Flaming center or Fiery source, as emitting rays of coeternal light. 2. They name the INFINITE IDEA God conceives in himself, his only BEGOTTEN SON and LIVING IMAGE; consubstantial WORD or Mouth of God; because it is the full expression of his perfections; ETERNAL TRUTH or WISDOM, because it is the inexhaustible treasure of his knowledge; UNCREATED LIGHT, because it irradiates his understanding. 3. They call the unbounded love proceeding from both, SPIRIT or BREATH of God's mouth, because it proceeds from the Father by the Son; Infinite Justice, because this love renders to God what is his due; absolute Goodness, because this self-complacency constitutes the divine happiness; HOLY GHOST, because this love is pure, unmix'd, and so constitutes God's unspotted sanctity.

All these metaphorical expressions are respectively synonymous to one or the other of these three personal distinctions in the Godhead. 1. Eternal Father, Infinite Force, Essential Life, Flaming Center, or Fiery Source, are all synonymous terms to express the paternal property. 2. Only begotten Son, Consubstantial Image, Eternal Word, Coessential Wisdom, Uncreated Light, are also all synonymous to express the properties of the second principle. 3. Breath of God's Mouth, Coeternal Love, Infinite Justice, absolute Goodness,

Holy Ghost or Spirit, are also synonymous to express the personal characters of the third principle. All that we can conceive of the absolutely infinite essence may be reduced to some one of these three distinctions, realities, somethings, beings, or personalities. There are three, and there can be no more.

The primitive fathers, in imitation of the sacred oracles, make use of many beautiful comparisons and metaphors to express the conceptions they have of this mystery. They conceive God the Father as the source, fountain, and root of the Deity: the Son, as the rays, rivers, and branches that flow from him; and the Holy Ghost as an ethereal fluid, subtile spirit or air, immense ocean, and everlasting fruit, that proceeds from both, and flows back again into the first principle. As the same substance that flows from the sun, the fountain, and the root, constitutes the rays, rivers, and branches; and forms by its reflux an uninterrupted circulation from the center to the circumference, and from the circumference to the center; so the Father communicates to the Son and Holy Ghost all his substance without division, diminution or partition, yea without confounding the incommunicable properties of paternity, filiation, and procession.

We must however allow, that all these beautiful metaphors both of the scriptures and the fathers, whether they be taken from material or immaterial agents, are lame, defective and dissimilar; as all comparisons borrow'd from finite must be, when applied to infinite. They express only a part of this boundless reality and incomprehensible mystery. The ideas of source, ray, and reflexion; of fountain, river, and ocean; of root, branch, and fruit; of mouth, word, and breath; of fire,

light, and air; as also of mind, idea, and love; of power, wisdom, and goodness; of activity, knowledge, and happiness; of intelligence, truth, and justice; of paternity, filiation, and procession; are intelligible in finite agents that exist and act by diffusion and division, by succession and variation; but these distinctions become absolutely inconceivable in an eternal, infinite essence that exists and acts without diffusion, division, or limitation; that is immense in all places, and unsuccessive in all times; where there is neither beginning, middle, nor end: Reason proves that this mystery is possible; Revelation assures us that it is true; heaven alone can shew us how it is.

The schoolmen never shew wherein the difficulty of conceiving this mystery consists. It does not ly in this, (1) that God is eternally, infinitely and essentially active within himself, antecedent to all creation from without; (2) nor in this, that an infinite agent acting according to all the extent of its infinite nature, must necessarily produce an infinite effect; (3) nor in this, that an absolutely infinite mind supposes an absolutely infinite object or idea known; (4) nor in this, that the sovereign happiness of the divine nature consists not only in loving itself infinitely, but in being loved infinitely by an absolutely infinite object distinct from itself; (5) nor in this, that these three distinctions are neither three separate substances, nor three independent minds, nor three simple attributes; (6) nor in fine in this, that the immanent, necessary, and eternal effects of God's activity, of his understanding and will, are and can be only two, his consubstantial idea, and co-essential love. All these six propositions are demonstrable,

and have been demonstrated. Here alone lies the incomprehensible mystery, how these three distinctions, in one eternal, indivisible, and uncompounded substance, can be three real, distinct, intelligent, self-conscious agents and persons. We do not say that this is comprehensible; but we deny that it is impossible. All we pretend to demonstrate is, that this mystery is not contradictory, not that it must be, nor what is the manner of it. We demonstrate that the divine immensity must be without diffusion of parts, tho' we do not comprehend how it is. We demonstrate that the Trinity may be, tho' we do not conceive it adequately. Both are mysteries, the one of natural, the other of revealed religion; but we cannot shew the *QUOMODO* of either, otherwise they would be no more mysteries. We ought not however to deny them because we cannot conceive them; for tho' seeing clearly be always a reason of affirming; yet not seeing at all is never a reason of denying.

The schoolmen have most miserably obscured and perplex'd this mystery, by their definitions of personality. They call it, contrary to the express doctrine of the Nicene fathers, sometimes, a relation; sometimes, a manner of subsistence; sometimes, a substantial form; and very often, an unintelligible somewhat, that does not express a distinct, intelligent, self-conscious agent. When the Deists and Socinians press'd them by the contradictions that follow'd from these absurd definitions, they would not recoil, nor change their barbarous, Arabick, and Aristotelian jargon, that leads by turns to Sabelianism or Tritheism; and so cry'd out that it was needless to form any ideas about this mystery; that reason could neither

prove its existence nor possibility; and that all efforts to reconcile reason with faith are audacious attempts to submit faith to reason. These obscurities, absurdities, and contradictions of the schoolmen have engaged of late the Unitarians, Free-thinkers, and minute philosophers to maintain, that the doctrine of the Trinity is a modern fiction, quite unknown not only to the Pagan philosophers; but also to the ancient Jews. This is absolutely false, as will fully appear in the second Part of this Work, where we shall endeavour to shew, that vestiges of this sublime truth are to be found among the Sages of all nations, times, and religions. This assertion will no doubt appear bold to men unacquainted with sacred and profane antiquity: but we hope to give such clear proofs of it, as will cure all solid, sincere, disinterested minds of their prejudices.

GENERAL COROLLARIES.

C O R. I.

Hence we may conceive in the divine nature three real distinctions, and we can conceive no more; since all that we can comprehend of absolute infinite, is either MIND CONCEIVING, IDEA CONCEIV'D, or LOVE PROCEEDING FROM BOTH. God self-existent; God of God; and God the Holy Ghost. These three distinctions in the Deity are neither three distinct independent minds, as the Tritheists alledged; nor three attributes of the same substance represented as persons, as the Sabellians affirmed: nor one supreme, and two subordinate intellectual agents, as some refined Arians maintain: but three coeternal, consubstantial, coordinate persons coequal in all things, self-origination only excepted.

C O R. II.

Hence in talking of the three persons of the blessed Trinity we may speak of them as if they were three distinct beings, agents, and powers, providing we mean neither more nor less by these expressions, than three coequal, coeternal, consubstantial personalities, whose operations are so perfectly different, that the action of the one, is not that of the other; tho' they all exist, subsist and act in, by, and with each other, in one indivisible substance.

C O R. III.

Hence what constitutes the formal heresy of some great modern divines, is not their calling the three persons of the Godhead three distinct beings, intellectual powers, and self-conscious agents: but their maintaining that the Son and Holy Ghost are subordinate and free, tho' eternal productions of the divine mind, and that honour, adoration and love are due to these two only in a relative sense. This is a refined sort of Arianism which reduces the second and third persons of the Trinity to the order of creatures: for all that is free might not have been, and so is neither necessary nor consubstantial with the divine essence, and therefore not God but a creature.

P R O P O S I T I O N XIII.

The generation of the Logos, and the procession of the Holy Ghost, or the knowledge and love God has of his pure and absolute essence are alone sufficient to compleat his infinite perfection and happiness.

DEMONSTRATION.

The knowledge of absolute infinite is sufficient to compleat the perfection of the divine understanding (a); the love of absolute infinite is sufficient to compleat the happiness of the divine will (b): therefore the knowledge and love of the pure and absolute essence of God are sufficient to compleat his infinite perfection and happiness.

S C H O L I U M.

The reason why variation, succession, and ever-increasing progression are necessary to enlighten, and beatify finite, is not because it loves change as change; but because it cannot grasp infinite by one single act, and because it soon exhausts every thing bounded. There is still something further to be desired and enjoyed; to be discovered and known; to be admired and loved. Whereas God knows and loves himself without succession. His infinite understanding is commensurate to its infinite object; which offers him still the same boundless felicity, and all the three are equal to each other. Now it were a contradiction to suppose, that an infinite mind could know more than an infinite object, and enjoy more than an infinite happiness. In this eternal intercourse, and communication among the persons of the sacred Trinity, God employs a whole eternity without beginning and without end. This is the central abyss of the pure and absolute essence of God; his still eternity and his eternal solitude; wherein he hears nothing but his consubstantial word, he sees nothing but his coessential image, and loves nothing but his only be-

(a) Cor. 2. of Prop. X.

(b) Cor. 3. of Prop. XI.

gotten Son. This eternal commerce of the coeternal THREE is the secret fund of the Deity, of which we can form no idea till we be lost and immersed in our center, 'see light in his light, and behold him as he is.' Then we shall see how the paternal mind conceives within himself the consubstantial image, and how from both proceeds the loving spirit, by two permanent, immanent, coeternal acts, wherein no idea of multiplicity, variation or succession can enter. All the archetypal ideas of finite; of nature material or immaterial; of created beings, and all their possible combinations are free acts of the divine understanding, as the production and beatification of finites are free acts of his power and goodness. This we shall fully demonstrate in the following book.

All those who are ignorant of the doctrine of the Trinity, of the generation of the LOGOS, of the procession of the Eternal Spirit, and of the everlasting commerce among the sacred THREE, look upon God's still eternity, and solitude, as a state of inaction and indolence. For this reason Aristotle fancy'd that the world was eternal in order to find a theater and object of the divine activity and beneficence. The Deists, the Arians, the Unitarians and Socinians, who did not know that God found eternally within himself, an infinitely infinite object of love, and an infinitely loving object, equivalent to and infinitely superior to all possible multiplicity, thought as Aristotle. The Arabian philosophers, and all the disciples of Mahomet, who borrowed all their metaphysics from a false copy of Aristotle, were also Unitarians; and so had no just ideas of God in himself, nor of his pure and absolute essence, without any relation to created nature. Hence Avicenna and A-

verhoes fancy'd that it was a sufficient scene of activity, beneficence and love, for the Eternal Mind to revolve for ever the ideas of finite and all their possible combinations; to produce material and immaterial substances without number, and to govern an infinity of worlds and spheres. The predestinarian schoolmen about the thirteenth century, having adopted the Aristotelian philosophy spoil'd by the Arabians, dropt insensibly into the same dangerous idea, and revived this wild opinion, that the contemplation of finite and all its forms or modes enter'd necessarily into the generation of the *LOGOS*. Spinoza, by natural consequence of this doctrine, concluded; that the production of finite and all its modalities was the immanent procession of the Holy Ghost. The predestinarian mythologists believed that all the collective ideas of finite coexisted eternally with, and were contained necessarily in the consubstantial idea God has of himself. The Spinozists reason very consequentially from this false principle of the fatalist doctors, when they conclude, that all the collective essences of finite coexist eternally with and flow necessarily from the infinite essence. Thus the monstrous schemes of predestination, fatality and Spinozism, which have a strict connexion with each other, were hatch'd and brought forth by degrees, as shall be fully unfolded in the next book; where we shall show, that the independent self-sufficiency of the Godhead e're created nature began, and the ineffable completion of the divine perfection and felicity in the commerce of the eternal *THREE*, excludes all necessary thought, volition, and production of finite, all eternal conception, and creation of what is bounded; and that this great principle is

the foundation and corner-stone of all true theology natural or supernatural, and the surest bulwark against Fatalism, Spinozism and Predestinarianism; as well as against Deism, Arianism, and Unitarianism, which are the six great and dangerous errors we intend to combate in the following essay. The most part of men, yea of philosophers and divines too, have no notion of God's silent and still eternity, antecedent to all ideas and production of finite. The proofs they give of the existence of a God, regard only that of a God creator, and be- atifyer of finite; and not that of a self-sufficient, independent cause, whose pure and absolute essence has no necessary relation to finite ideas, or finite substances; and that might have subsisted eternally without thinking of the one or creating the other.

C O R. I.

Hence we have the essential distinction betwixt finite and infinite spirit. Created intelligences can never find within themselves, wherewithal to fill their boundless capacities of knowledge, and quench their unquenchable thirst of felicity. They must, so to speak, go out of themselves, and rise above themselves to unite themselves to absolute infinite, therein to find the full completion of knowledge and happiness.

C O R. II.

Hence we have the true difference betwixt necessary and free action in God; necessary action, as the generation of the Logos, and the procession of the Holy Ghost, is what flows essentially and eternally from his nature, and without which he could not be infinitely perfect or happy. Free action in him as the thought, volition, and production of finite, is what

he may do, or not do, without interesting the essential perfection and happiness of his nature.

C O R. III.

Hence the effects of God's free acts cannot be eternal: for it is impossible that an agent can be free to do or not to do, what he did from all eternity. To be free to act or not to act, supposes a time wherein the effect was not yet produced. I do not as yet say, that God's free acts cannot be eternal; this we shall prove hereafter. All I advance is, that the effects of his free acts cannot be coeternal with his essence.

C O R. IV.

Hence the creation of finite cannot interest nor augment the essential happiness and perfection of the divine nature; otherwise God would not be self-sufficient. The production of numberless worlds can add nothing to his plenitude; because all that he can produce without himself, is still infinitely inferior to what he possesses within.

C O R. V.

The knowledge of the pure and absolute essence of God is alone sufficient to compleat the perfection of the divine understanding, and all other ideas, thoughts and conceptions are no ways necessary to this perfection.

C O R. VI.

Hence the procession of the Holy Ghost or the infinite, eternal, consubstantial love God has for himself, is alone sufficient to compleat the perfection of the divine will, and all finite beings, substances, effects, and worlds are no ways necessary to his felicity.

THE
PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES
OF
NATURAL AND REVEALED
RELIGION.

BOOK II.

OF GOD'S RELATIVE ATTRIBUTES.

DEFINITIONS.

1. **BY** an INFINITE POWER, I mean a Cause that can produce whatever is possible, or that includes not a contradiction.

2. By NECESSARY ACTION, I understand what flows essentially from the nature of a thing in all times and in all places.

3. By *SPONTANEOUS ACTION*, I mean what is voluntary, whether that volition be free or necessary.

4. By *FREE ACTION*, I mean what may be done or not be done, and to which the agent is not determined by any external constraint, nor internal necessity. It is purely contingent and and possible.

5. By *PROVIDENCE*, I mean that infinite power, wisdom and goodness, by which God employs, knows, and wills all the means necessary to accomplish his designs.

A X I O M S.

1. ‘When a mode is produced, there is a reality made existent which was not before,’ and so a passage from nothing to something.

2. What is inconceivable in the idea of creation is this passage from nothing to something.

3. ‘It is unbecoming the wisdom of an infinitely perfect being to change his will when the same reason of willing always subsists.’

4. ‘God never foresees things but as they are, otherwise his knowledge would be false.’

5. ‘The supreme happiness of all intelligent natures consists in the knowledge and love of absolute infinity.’

S C H O L I U M.

Spinoza defines a free being, ‘that which acts by the sole necessity of its nature, and is determined by itself alone.’

This is spontaneous and not free action. Spontaneity, as we have said, is simple volition without any foreign constraint; but this may also be necessary. Thus we love good in general, or rather desire pure happiness and love perfection spontaneously, and yet necessarily. We will it with pleasure, but we cannot do otherwise. This is an indestructible attribute of our essence. Freedom is what we may will or not will. It is not only what we will without any foreign constraint, but without any inherent necessity of nature. We chuse it as good, real or apparent, but we might reject it and chuse another equal or superior to it. Necessity is what cannot be otherwise than it is, what flows inevitably from the nature of a thing; what determines absolutely and invincibly, so that nothing can hinder its production but the destruction of the agent. Spinoza confounds these three ideas of Spontaneity, Freedom, and Necessity, without giving any reason why he does so; and thus falls back into his general and usual fallacy; which is to suppose in his definitions what he is going to prove. He may, if he can prove it, deny Liberty, and shew that it is a chimera: but to lay down this as a principle in a definition without any shadow of demonstration, is a folly unworthy of a philosopher.

Hitherto we have consider'd God in his eternal solitude, e're he manifested himself from without. We shall now consider him with regard to finite, and examine these three perfections in him by which he produces, knows, and beatifies the creatures. The Spinofists deny his creating power. The schoolmen convert his foreknowledge into fatality. The Predestinarians blaspheme his communicative goodness. We shall

endeavour to lay down such principles in this Book, as may preserve from these three monstrous errors.

P R O P O S I T I O N XIV.

The creation of new substances is no more inconceivable, than the production of new modes.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N .

In the production of new forms, there is a passage from nothing to something (a); what is inconceivable in the idea of creation, is only this passage from nothing to something (b): therefore the creation of new substances is no more inconceivable than the production of new modes.

S C H O L I U M .

Tho' we should suppose with Spinoza that God and nature are the same; that the self-existent being is the only substance; and that all things are consubstantial modifications of his eternal essence; yet we can never explain the manner of this causality, with regard to the continual changes, modes, and forms, that we see in nature every day. When God acts thus immanently upon himself to modify his substance, according to Spinoza, he produces something that was not before. Now this passage from nothing to something is equally inconceivable, whether the effects of the divine acts be substances distinct from God, or new modes of his own substance. The same objection Spinoza makes against emanant action,

(a) Ax. 1. of this Book.

(b) Ax. 2. of this Book.

or the creation of substances distinct from God, returns upon him against immanent action, or the production of modes in the divine substance. We have no adequate ideas of power. We see evidently that there must be such a thing in nature; but we cannot conceive how it acts, nor what connects the producing cause with the produc'd effect. This passage from nothing to something, is and will be incomprehensible, 'till we see God as he is, and discern how all things flow from him, necessarily or freely. Tho' the creation of new substances however, be as conceivable as the production of new modes; yet the idea of creating power is not the same with that of modifying power; since the idea of substance is not the same with that of mode.

C O R. I.

Hence we ought to allow that it is possible to produce new substances as well as new modes; because the passage from nothing to something being equally inconceivable in both, if we allow the one, tho' we do not comprehend the manner of it, we ought not to deny the other, purely and only because we do not understand the manner of it.

C O R. II.

Hence our not comprehending how second causes act, is not a sufficient reason for denying their active power, as the not comprehending how the first cause creates is no reason for denying his creating energy. Wherefore all the Malebranchian philosophy on this head seems false and dangerous, as shall be explained hereafter.

P R O P O S I T I O N XV.

Infinite power can produce new substances as well as new forms.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

It is possible to produce new substances as well as new forms (a); infinite power can produce every thing that is possible (b): therefore infinite power can produce new substances as well as new forms.

S C H O L I U M.

It is certainly more perfect to be able to create than not; and therefore ABSOLUTE INFINITE must have this perfection; unless it be proved that the idea of creation is contradictory and impossible. Now since we have shown that the production of new substances is as possible as the production of new modes, we must ascribe this power to God; otherwise we might conceive a perfection which is not included in the idea of absolute infinite; which is a manifest contradiction.

Here we must shun equally two fatal and capital errors. Some fancy that finite beings are mere modalities of the divine nature: others imagine that creation is a participation of the uncreated essence. The former confound the substance of the Creator with that of the creature. The latter materialize the Deity; and both deny creation.

Spinoza who adopted the former opinion endeavours to

(a) Cor. 1. of Prop. XIV. (b) Def. 1. of this Book.

demonstrate 'that one substance cannot produce another;' and in order to prove this great principle, which is the foundation of all his system, he loses himself in a wild maze of abstract, subtle, sophistical ideas. He reasons thus, 'There cannot be in nature two distinct substances, that have the same attributes. If two substances have not the same attributes, they can have nothing in common, and if they have nothing in common, the one cannot be the cause of the other.' The last proposition is equivocal, and the two former are absolutely false.

This sophist pretends to demonstrate the first proposition thus, 'Substances can be distinguished only by their attributes or modes. If their attributes be the same, they are distinguished only by their modes, and so they differ modally and not substantially.' Both these propositions are absurd. It is absolutely false that beings can be distinguished only by their attributes and modes. There may be a third distinction; and that is by their separate and independent existence. Generical ideas are distinguished by their different attributes, as spirits, and bodies. Species are distinguished by their different modes. Thus wood differs from gold by the different configuration of its parts, tho' both be equally matter. Individuals are distinguished by their separate existence; for tho' two pieces of mettal have the same attributes, and may have the same modes, yet they subsist separately and independently of each other. Beings therefore may be distinguished by their attributes, modes, and separate existence. Wherefore tho' beings have the same attributes, and the same modes, yet they are distinct substances, because the one may exist tho' the

others were annihilated. They may be the same kind or species of substances, but not the same individual substance. Before Spinoza can establish his principle, he must prove that the threefold distinction of genus, species, and individual, is neither founded in nature nor in reason; neither real nor possible; that all beings of the same kind are the same individual substance, and that to be the same numerical substance, and the same generical substance are synonymous terms. This he proves no where. Thus the proof of the first proposition of his dark system is absolutely false.

His second proposition is 'that two substances which have not the same attributes can have nothing in common.' He tries to prove it thus. 'A substance is that which exists in itself, and can be conceived by itself. Two substances that have different attributes exist in themselves, and may be conceived by themselves, and therefore the idea of the one does not involve the idea of the other, and so they can have nothing in common.' Here is a combination of absolutely false maxims and definitions. A substance is not that which exists in itself, and which may be conceived by itself. Neither is a mode always something that inheres in a substance, and that cannot be conceived without it. By these definitions he confounds the idea of substance, with that of self-existence, and the idea of modes with that of effects. A substance is something that is the foundation of attributes and modes; and a mode is a change made in a substance. Further, tho' two substances have different attributes, yet the idea of the one may involve the idea of the other and suppose it. Thus finite substances, and the infinite substance have different attributes,

yet as the former cannot exist by themselves, their existence involves and supposes necessarily that of the last.

Spinoza's third proposition, 'that when beings have nothing in common the one cannot produce the other,' is altogether equivocal. If he means by 'having nothing in common' that beings which have no relation to, no resemblance of, and no dependance one upon the other, cannot be considered as causes and effects; this we grant. But if he means, that when beings have not the same common attributes, powers, and perfections, the one cannot be the cause of the other; this we absolutely deny, and he never offers to prove it. Thus all his principles are the very matters of question, undemonstrated and undemonstrable. He pretends to geometrical reasoning, and metaphysical precision; but he knows neither one nor the other. There is a great difference betwixt the true art of ascending to first principles, and descending to their just consequences, by a strong, nervous, palpable and exact chain of clear ideas; and the subtle refinements of that bastard sophistry, which pains and fatigues the mind, which subtilizes to excess, and which destroys at last all truth, by spinning it so fine, that it becomes invisible. Sound, solid, masculine reasoning retains always a consistence that supports and nourishes, while it enlightens the mind and inflames the heart.

Some of Spinoza's disciples, ashamed of his sophisms and false reasonings, have recourse to another argument to prove his great principle: it runs thus. 'When God creates there flows either something or nothing from his essence to produce the created effect. If nothing, how can nothing be a cause? If something, then creation is an emanation of the divine

‘ substance; which being indivisible, its action is immanent,
‘ produces nothing without itself, nor distinct from itself.
‘ Thus the self-existent being is the only substance, and all o-
‘ ther beings exist by, flow from, and inhere in this only sub-
‘ stance as consubstantial forms, hypostases, and personalities.’

I answer in the first place, that all these reasonings are founded upon this principle, that we ought to deny what we cannot conceive. Now this is absolutely false; for tho’ not seeing may be sometimes a reason of doubting, yet it is never a reason of denying. When God produces substances, there happens no change in his immutable essence; but his almighty will is accompanied with an efficacy which gives a real existence to something that had none before. We have no adequate ideas of the nature of this causality; nor of the manner how it operates; nor of the connexion betwixt the cause and the effect: yea we can have none till we see God as he is, the intimate essences of things, and how they flow from him: but as we do not deny the production of modes, tho’ we cannot conceive how they are produced, so neither ought we to deny the production of substances, tho’ we cannot comprehend how they are created.

I answer in the second place, that tho’ we should suppose with Spinoza and the Spinofists, that the ideas and the objects are the same; that there is no third substance betwixt God and spirits, called matter; that the extension, figure, division, and motion we imagine without us; are like colours, tastes, smells and sounds; nothing but sensations produced in us by the divine substance that acts immediately upon us; yet it would be repugnant and absurd to maintain that our souls are substan-

tial forms of the divine mind. It is absolutely impossible that the same infinite essence, which is, as we have demonstrated, all knowledge and all happiness; all wisdom and all love; all intelligence and all justice; all truth and all goodness, can produce in itself by necessity of nature, living, active, eternal, self-conscious, intelligent forms and personalities that are full of ignorance and misery; folly and hatred; error and injustice; falsehood and malice. It is impossible that all the contradictory reasonings, painful sensations, and irregular passions we discover in others and feel in ourselves, can be the modes of absolute infinite, who is one permanent act, one infinite idea, one immutable love; without succession of thoughts; without variation of forms; without any contradictory qualities, and without any shadow of privation, negation or defect. When we see therefore in nature finite, variable beings, we must conclude that they are effects of the divine power, and not forms or modes of the divine essence.

As we must detest with horror the Spinosian blasphemy, which maintains, that nature produced is only an expansion or modification of the divine substance; so we must also reject the error of those who assert that creation is a participation or discernment of the eternal essence, which God creates into a substance distinct from his own. This opinion attacks and destroys the immateriality of the divine nature; for it supposes that the infinite cause contains and produces its effects by evolution, as plants and animals contain and bring to light their seminal moulds. Thus we corporalize the uncreated essence. The schoolmen seem to favour this opinion, when they say that God contains the essences of finite beings emi-

nently and virtually. This dark phrase may be interpreted as if he produced them by emanation, education, extraposition, or placing without what he once contained within; and therefore we have rejected from the beginning, this rash, dangerous, Arabian phrase of the schools as equivocal.

It is true that some pious philosophers, to exalt our notion of spirit, and shew that it is quite different from, and superior to matter, pretend that the intelligent images of the Deity were not produced from nothing as the material pictures, and that when Moses said, that "God breathed into man the breath of life," he meant that the soul was an emanation of the divine substance. This doctrine destroys the indivisibility of the divine essence, and must be rejected. The essential property of all created beings is that of non-existent: they were made existent, and tho' God has communicated to them greater or lesser realities, powers, and perfections; yet they once were all equally nothing, before his all-powerful free action. They are neither inherencies, discerptions, emanations or participations; much less attributes or modalities of the indivisible essence: but mere effects of his power, that had neither real, ideal, nor modal existence before his arbitrary thought and free production; as shall be demonstrated in the following proposition.

C O R. I.

Hence, since nature produced can neither be an emanation, nor a participation, a discerption or an expansion, an attribute or a modification of the divine essence; it is plain that it must be composed of substances, attributes, and modes distinct from the producing cause.

C O R. II.

Hence father Malebranche speaks very uncautiously when he calls the creatures participations of the divine substance. This indirectly favours Spinosism, contrary to his pious intentions. Yea the zealous anti-spinosist Poiret himself goes too far when he maintains that spiritual substance is an emanation, or participation of the divine nature in a physical sense.

C O R. III.

Hence the divine creating energy is a mystery of natural religion, as incomprehensible as omnipresence; for since creation can neither be an emanation, nor a discerption of the divine essence, it must be some third thing of whose metaphysical nature, and physical production we have no distinct, clear, adequate idea. We see on the one hand, that nature produced must be distinct from the producing cause: We see on the other, that absolute infinite must have a creating power: but we have not at present a third idea to connect these two, to shew the influence of the creating act upon the created effect, and explain the manner of the divine operation by which creatures pass from nothing to something.

C O R. IV.

Hence nature produced, or created beings cannot subsist for ever, but in two ways, either by a continuation of the same creating energy, which gave them existence; or by God's communicating to them, a stability of existence which makes them subsist for ever by themselves: for since they are not emanations nor modifications of the divine essence, but substances distinct from God, their eternal duration and conservation must either be dependent upon, or independent of the

first creating energy. They must subsist by the continued influence of the first cause, or by a communicated stability of existence.

P R O P O S I T I O N XVI.

God was entirely free to create or not to create.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

Free action in God is what he may do or not do without interesting the essential happiness and perfection of his nature (a); the creation of finite cannot interest nor augment the essential happiness and perfection of the divine nature (b): therefore God was intirely free to create or not to create.

S C H O L I U M.

It may be objected, that God in the exercise of his activity, is always determined by the better and the best; that it is better to create than not to create; and therefore God was necessitated to create and even to create the best. I answer in the first place, that God has always a reason for acting, and a reason worthy of himself; but this reason tho' sufficient to determine him to create, yet is not necessitating; because creation is not necessary to his perfection and happiness. I answer in the next place, that God is necessarily determined in his immanent acts, or in acting within himself, by the best; but the best is only the generation of his WORD, and the procession of the HOLY GHOST: for in the scale of finites there can be no MAXIMUM, nor OPTIMUM: no absolute great, nor

(a) Cor. 2. of Prop. XIII.

(b) Cor. 4. of Prop. XIII.

absolute good; since God can never create an absolute infinite equal to himself. I grant indeed, that when God creates, he prefers always among all possibles, the plan that is most proper to display his power, wisdom, and goodness: but then this necessity is only moral, not physical; that is, God's free acts are always conformed to his attributes, but no ways necessary to his perfection. All God's emanant acts are free, because their effects are not and cannot be absolutely infinite. They are good, and therefore worthy of his production; but they are not infinitely good, and so not necessary to his perfection and felicity. On the contrary, his immanent acts are necessary, because their effects are absolutely the best, absolutely infinite, and coequal to him in all things, self-origination only excepted.

The Leibnitian scheme, that God is obliged to create the best, and that the universe in its totality is the best, and most perfect God could create, has been adopted for a decent cloak by some fatalists and predestinarians. The fatal necessity of the poets and some old philosophers, to which God himself is subjected, differs much from what the German philosopher calls the necessity of the Sage, and is as dangerous as that of Spinoza. The last, by reducing the Godhead to an infinite power, that acts by necessity of nature without design, choice, or final causes, strips God of all his moral attributes. This idea is shocking, and immediately offends all wise, and upright minds: as does also that notion of fatality which supposes God himself subjected to it, without choice, or even contrary to his will. The new Leibnitian scheme of fatality has none of these inconveniencies and absurdities; but it makes

God act as necessarily as the creatures, as shall be more fully unfolded hereafter.

C O R. I.

Hence we see the falshood of one of the maxims of the Spinoſian ſcheme; which ſuppoſes that God is obliged by neceſſity of nature to produce all beings poſſible with all poſſible modalities, becauſe an infinite activity during an infinite duration muſt neceſſarily produce infinite effects, and ſo extend to all poſſible events and eſſences. The principle is true, but the concluſion is falſe. An infinite agent, acting according to all the extent of its infinite nature, muſt neceſſarily produce during an infinite duration, infinite effects, but theſe effects are immanent not emanant. God's infinite activity is complet by the generation of the LOGOS, and the proceſſion of the HOLY GHOST. All other acts and effects are free, arbitrary, and no ways intereſt the eſſential happineſs and perfection of the divine nature.

C O R. II.

Hence God's eſſential, immanent activity, and his creating, emanant power are not the ſame. The generation of the WORD is neceſſary; the creation of the world is free. In the one, the effect is equal to the cauſe: in the other, the effect is infinitely inferior to the cauſe. Nothing can be added to the one, additions to the other may be continued without end.

C O R. III.

Hence God can create nothing but what he loves, for being independent and omnipotent, and perfectly happy originally, we can ſuppoſe no original ſenſe of miſery, nor any o-

original natural idea of it, nor consequently any natural appetite toward what was not an object of any innate perceptive power or sense. His notion of misery must arise from seeing the state of finite beings, or be his voluntary invention of a preservative or medicine for them, to avert or cure such evils as they must necessarily be made liable to. Accordingly we see in his creatures of the highest orders; the more perfect they are, and the less indigent through their firmness and strength of soul, the more they are susceptible of love, friendship, and goodwill to others. But 'tis dread of danger, sense of weakness, fear about our interest, sense of having suffered through our weakness, which are the only sources of hatred, cruelty, or ill will.

C O R. IV.

Hence God can create nothing but what he loves, for this action being free, he would not have exerted it, if it had displeas'd him; and for the same reason it is, that God desires necessarily the happiness of all that he creates, because it is impossible to love a being, and not desire its well-being.

C O R. V.

Hence God's communicative goodness or desire to beatify all intelligent beings was the source, reason and motive of God's creating them.

C O R. VI.

Hence God cannot produce in the first instant of creation a being that hates itself, otherwise he would give it a will contrary to his, and so contradict himself; yea he would render it miserable by its very existence, which would be the highest cruelty. Wherefore true self-love or the love of our being and

well-being, is an essential, inseparable, indestructible property of all created intelligences.

C O R. VII.

Since God's communicative goodness was the source of creation, and since this communicative goodness subsists always the same; hence it follows, that the same reason God had for creating freely from the beginning, subsists always to make him continue freely the existence of beings already created.

C O R. VIII.

Hence there is no period in eternal duration wherein it can be said that God could not create; for since this action is free, he might have exerted it at all times. We are sure that he once began, but we cannot decide when he began.

P R O P O S I T I O N XVII.

God could not create from all eternity.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

Creation is an effect of God's free act (a); the effects of God's free acts cannot be eternal (b): therefore God could not create from all eternity.

S C H O L I U M.

Dr. Clarke insinuates in his Demonstration of the being and attributes of God (c) ' that the old Platonick notion about the eternity of the world may be true; that the will of God and his power of acting, being as eternal as his essence,

(a) By Prop. XVI. (b) Cor. 3. of Prop. XIII. (c) See p. 28 and 33.

‘ the effects of that will and power might be supposed coeval
‘ to the will and power themselves; in the same manner as
‘ light would eternally proceed from the sun, if the sun were
‘ supposed eternal.’

I answer, in the first place, that this inaccurate comparison leads directly to Spinozism, for since according to the Newtonian philosophy, the rays of the sun are emanations of its essence; this supposes that creation was consubstantial as well as coeternal with the Godhead, an immanent not an emanant act, a necessary effluence of the divine nature, and not a free effect of his power. We are very far from suspecting the Doctor of such an impious design. We believe rather that he advanced this paradox in philosophy to justify his Unitarian and Arian notions, which suppose that God created freely from all eternity two infinite, subordinate powers, which the Doctor called the Son and the Holy Ghost. We have already confuted this opinion.

I answer in the second place, that if creation was eternal, then there would be an eternal succession past, which is absolutely impossible and contradictory. For wherever there is a last, there must have been a first; and wherever there is a first, there may be a last. As we can never mount up in an eternal duration to the first moment, so neither can we descend in an eternal duration to the last. Whatever is successive, divisible, susceptible of more or less, cannot be absolutely infinite. Eternity and infinity suppose necessarily a permanent plenitude where there can be no additions, successions, diminutions or variations. An eternal duration past is then a contradiction in terms, as an infinite division exhausted.

I answer in the third place, that if God had created from all eternity, then God's creating power would be absolutely exhausted; because an eternal exercise of infinite power must produce an absolutely infinite effect: for this is multiplying an infinite duration by an infinite energy, which must produce an absolute infinite, to which nothing can be added. Hence arose the Spinosian error, that NATURE PRODUCED was absolutely infinite as well as NATURE PRODUCING; that both are equally infinite, consubstantial and coeternal; and that God cannot produce any being but what is already existent.

I answer in the fourth place, that if creation were coeternal with God, then it must be consubstantial: for what is eternal could not be free; since, as we have already remarked, it is impossible that an agent can be free to do or not to do, what it did from all eternity. To be free to act or not to act supposes a time wherein the effect was not yet produced: if creation therefore was eternal it could not be free, and if it was not free, it must be necessary, if necessary it must be immanent, for nothing foreign to the divine nature can be necessary to it; and what is immanent, must be consubstantial. Thus we return again to Spinosism. It may be said, that as the acts or decrees of God's will concerning finite are free and yet eternal; so the acts and effects of his power may be free tho' eternal; and that the freedom of these acts does not depend upon their not being eternal, but upon their not being necessary to the perfection of the producing cause. We answer, that it is absolutely false that any of God's free acts with regard to finite are eternal; for, as we shall shew very soon, God

was as free to think of finite ideas as to create finite substances. We grant, that if God's acts about finite were eternal, there would be no evidence to prove that the effects of these acts were not so too: but as we have already said, freedom and eternity are incompatible.

I answer in the fifth place, that to create is to produce something that was not before: now the eternal existence of something that was not before is a contradiction in terms. I grant that there is no definite moment in eternal duration, wherein God might not have begun to create, but since he began this act could not be eternal. All consubstantial and immanent effects, tho' posterior in nature, must coexist with their cause, since they flow necessarily from its essence: but free and emanant effects must be posterior to their cause both in nature and time, because creation supposes necessarily the giving existence to something that had no existence before. If it be said, that creation is not a production of something that was not before, but of something that might never have been; of something that is purely contingent and dependent; of something that is neither necessary, nor self-existent. We reply, that this reasoning is what the schools call *PETITIO PRINCIPII*; or, supposing what is in question. We deny that what is eternal can be contingent, and free; we have shewn that it must be necessary, immanent, and consubstantial with the Deity.

Some will say, that it is impossible to conceive how infinite power could remain eternally inactive, infinite wisdom unintelligent, and infinite goodness uncommunicative. We have already shewn that God did not remain thus inactive, unintel-

ligent, and uncommunicative during his still eternity, before the worlds began, e're he had thought of any finite ideas, or created any finite substances. He produced, he contemplated, he beatify'd for ever and ever two infinite objects, by the generation of the Logos and the proceſſion of the Holy Ghoſt. It is thus that he was eternally, abſolutely, and neceſſarily active, wiſe, and good, antecedent to and independent of all conception or creation of finite.

We muſt therefore conceive an eternal duration wherein the only effects of God's immanent action were the generation of the Logos, and the proceſſion of the Holy Ghoſt. This is the ſtill eternity, the adorable ſolitude, and the central abyſs of the pure divinity, into which enter no acts about finite ideas, eſſences or ſubſtances; no multiplicity, variation or ſucceſſion; and, as we ſhall very ſoon ſhew, no infallible preſciences or predeterminating decrees about finites and their actions.

Tho' creation cannot be eternal, we muſt not however think that God never exerted his creating power till about five or ſix thouſand years ago; that then he fallied out of his eternal ſolitude for a moment to create a ſmall parcel of beings, and that he recenred into it never more to exert his energy without himſelf. This God has no where declared, and it is audacious in us to affirm it. It is poſſible that God's creating energy never ceaſed from the moment in which it began, and that it may be eternally productive and fruitful from without. As there is no definite period in eternal duration wherein he might not have begun to create, ſo there is no determinate moment in eternal duration wherein he may not continue to cre-

ate; and we shall shew hereafter that revelation says nothing to the contrary.

C O R. I.

Hence in the creation of finite, tho' we remount never so high, we must always stop at some beginning, antecedent to which there was nothing but the pure and absolute essence of God, exclusive of all finite ideas, essences and substances, of all acts and effects relative to nature and creature.

C O R. II.

Hence the Aristotelian, or Platonick opinions about an eternal world real or intelligible may lead the incautious into Atheism or Spinosism.

P R O P O S I T I O N XVIII.

The duration of all created substances will be eternal.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

It is unbecoming the wisdom of an infinitely perfect being to change his will, when the same reason of willing always subsists (a); the same reason God had for creating freely from the beginning, subsists always to make him continue freely the existence of beings already created (b): therefore the duration of all beings will be eternal.

S C H O L I U M.

The Wise Man fully persuaded of this great truth, assures us that 'all the works of God will be eternal,' the material as well as the immaterial world. It is true indeed that the irre-

(a) Ax. 3. of this Book. (b) Cor. 6. of Prop. XVI.

gular and imperfect forms of spirit and matter cannot be eternal, but their essences will last for ever. God does not act by starts and fits; by capriciousness and fancy, without reason. He is immutable in all his designs, and never changes them unless the reason of willing changes. The proofs of immortality drawn from the immaterial nature of the soul, are not sufficient; for tho' it cannot die as organical bodies do, by a dissolution of parts; yet not being self-existent, it may cease to be. Neither is it a demonstration of the immortal and eternal existence of the soul, that there must be a future state of rewards and punishments; for tho' we shall shew that the eternal felicity of intelligences, was God's only end in creating them, yet it can never be demonstrated by reason nor scripture, as we shall shew, that laps'd spirits may not be annihilated, if they can become eternally and absolutely unconvertible. The immutability of the divine will is the best proof of the soul's immortality. The eternal existence of all the works of God flows necessarily from the constancy of the divine nature in all his acts, while the same reason of acting lasts.

C O R. I.

Hence the immortality of the soul is a maxim of natural religion, independent of all revelation; and supernatural inspiration was not absolutely necessary to assure us of this great truth.

C O R. II.

Hence all sorts of created substances material or immaterial will be immortal and indestructible; their forms may change, but their essences will never be destroyed.

P R O P O S I T I O N XIX.

The eternal conservation of beings is a continuation of the first creating energy.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N .

The eternal conservation of beings must either proceed from a continuation of the same creating energy, or from a stability of existence communicated to them by the first creating act (a); God cannot communicate to finite beings a principle of independence or self existence (b): therefore the eternal conservation of beings is a continuation of the first creating energy.

S C H O L I U M .

There are three opinions about the conservation of beings. The first maintains, that the divine, omnipotent action communicates such a perfect stability of existence to the creatures, that by virtue of this first act they can subsist eternally of themselves. The second opinion runs to the other extreme, by asserting, that the creating efficacy is so imperfect, that it stands in need of continual new repeated acts, to make its effects subsist, and preserve them from falling into nothing. The third opinion keeps the midst betwixt the two extremes by affirming, that conservation is a continued effect of the same creating energy. If we can confute the two first opinions, the last is demonstrated; since it is impossible to imagine any other but these three (c).

(a) Cor. 4. of Prop. XV. (b) Cor. 2. of Prop. V. (c) By Postul. 2.

If God could give the creatures a stability of existence, permanent, eternal, and independent of his immediate action, he could never annihilate them. We can conceive annihilation possible only in two ways, either by giving non-existence, or by ceasing to give existence. Non-existence or nothing cannot be given or effected by a positive act, for this were giving nothing; giving and not giving at the same time; which is impossible and contradictory. Therefore God can annihilate or take away being, only by ceasing his creating act, and so preserves being only by continuing his productive energy.

Moreover, a substance that exists only by another, being separate from its creating cause, must fall into nothing, unless it contains in itself a reason of necessary existence. Now God cannot communicate necessary existence or independency to the creatures, without placing in them an infinite perfection, which is the only reason of necessary or self-existence, and so is uncommunicable to the creature.

It may be said that creatures once produc'd, subsist eternally after the first creating act, by their essential and necessary inherence in the divine substance, as their support and basis. I answer that if this were so, the creatures would not be substances distinct from God; but emanations, hypostases, or personalities of his essence, which is pure Spinozism.

Some will object that if God could not communicate this stability of existence to his creatures; the energy of the first cause would be far inferior to that of second causes, whose effects last for ever, unless destroy'd by contrary acts. I answer, that the effects of finite causes are only modalities, more or less changed, that have a subject in which they inhere:

but the creatures being real substances, distinct from God, cannot subsist by themselves, unless he communicates to them an independent existence, or support them by a continuation of the same creating energy. Now the former being impossible, the latter must be true.

The second opinion, which places conservation in a continual repetition of creating acts at every moment, destroys all activity in second causes, renders the freedom of intelligent beings impossible, and makes God the author of sin. What is created at every moment, cannot give it self the least modality; since God does not create beings in general but particular beings. If he create them at every moment, he must create them either in rest or in motion, knowing or not knowing, willing or not willing, consenting or dissenting. What exists only in the first moment cannot modify itself in the second, nor receive a real power to act in the third; for before the reproducing act, the being has no existence, nor consequently any powers to act in the posterior moment. God must always create it with all its physical modalities, and moral determinations.

It may be said that God creates the soul every moment active and free; that what he gives in the first moment, he unfolds in the second, adds to it in the third, and so preserves it continually in such a manner, that what he gave it in the first and what he adds to it in the subsequent moment, concur together and unite to make a new action: but as this action results entirely from the addition, repetition, and multiplication of the same creating force, the soul is only acted upon, and not active; there is no real, inherent, internal motion in spi-

ritual agents; but only a passive reception or pure mobility, to be push'd wherever the first cause drives them; and so there is no difference betwixt the spiritual and corporeal agent; but that the one perceives its motion and the other not. Thus some Thomists and Cartesians, by confounding a continued with a continual creation, or the continuation of the same act with continual, repeated acts, have thrown themselves headlong into fatality.

From all this it is plain, that the first opinion gives an independency to the creatures; the second robs them of all activity. The one makes them deities; the other renders them machines; the one by attributing too much to created beings, makes them independent; the other by attributing too little to them, makes God the author of sin. The third opinion prevents all difficulties, it renders the creatures dependent and yet active. It makes them receive from God their essence and powers, without destroying their activity or freedom. The creating energy subsists always, it never passes; it is one continued, simultaneous act without any successive moments. Thus the creatures tho' they be not necessary emanations of the divine essence, yet are free productions of his power, which would cease to be, if they were separated one moment from their creating source. They are real substances distinct from God, but not distant from him, united to him, but not consubstantial with him. In him they live, move, and have their being; but their being is not the same with his.

C O R. I.

Since the conservation of creatures is a continuation of the same creating energy without succession, interruption, or va-

riation: hence all the natural powers, activities, faculties, properties, and qualities given to them in the first moment of their existence, may be considered as permanent effects, that subsist without reproduction or repeated acts.

C O R. II.

Hence in the following essay, we may talk of the natural powers and faculties of the creatures as given to them in full property from the first moment of their creation. Thus we never shall confound God's immediate with his mediate acts, nor the action of the FIRST CAUSE, with the action of second causes; nor the universal concurrence of the creator with the free determinations of the creature.

C O R. III.

Hence all the cavills of the predestinarian sect against FREE-WILL drawn from continual creation, are groundless and unjust. God does not preserve the creatures by repeated acts. He gives to spirits in the first moment of their creation a real activity distinct from his own, as well as a real substance distinct from his own. This shall be fully demonstrated in the following book.

P R O P O S I T I O N XX.

God may create new substances, material and immaterial, and communicate to them without end, new forms, new capacities, and new perfections.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

If God could add nothing to his creation, it must be either because it is already so perfect that nothing can be communica-

ted to it, or because his creating power is already exhausted. One or t'other of these two suppositions must be true. The former cannot be true, because in the scale of finites there may be a progression without end (a); nor can the latter, because infinite power can never be exhausted by its productions from without (b): therefore God may create without end new substances, material and immaterial, and communicate to them new forms, new capacities, and new perfections.

S C H O L I U M.

The Mosaick phrase that after the six days work, 'God ceas'd from his labours,' does not contradict the truth here demonstrated. Cessation here must be understood of the formation of the world after the chaos; of the reparation of the sphere of fallen angels, and of the restoration of nature degraded by their revolt; and not of the creation of pure and primitive nature; which, as we shew, was antecedent to the chaos. Since God's communicative goodness, subsists always the same to prompt him for ever to exert freely his creating power; since this creating power can never be exhausted by the production of an absolute infinite equal to himself; since his immensity can never be replenished with material pictures, nor his consubstantial Logos equall'd by the creation of intelligent images; since, in fine, God may be for ever freely productive from without, as he is eternally productive from within; since I say these four truths have been already demonstrated: it is not only possible but highly probable, yea almost certain, that new worlds are produced every day, in the celest-

(a) Ax. 5 of Book I. (b) Cor. I. of Prop. 5.

tial spaces, and that these superior regions are peopled with new intelligences. Thus we have a high and noble idea of the universe worthy of the creator. Our earth is but a point in comparison of the solar system, that in comparison of those of the fix'd stars; these compared with the new worlds we do not see, and these with the immense spaces that are still replenishing with material and immaterial beings. Once more I repeat the ravishing thought, as God generates for ever and ever, within himself, necessarily, one, sole, coeternal, absolutely infinite, and consubstantial image; so he freely produces from without innumerable finite representations of himself, distinct from himself, and multipliable without end.

C O R. I.

Since infinite power can never be exhausted by its external action; and since he may create eternally new substances material and immaterial; there is and can be no real infinite existent, but the supreme absolute infinite; and therefore the Leibnitian infinity of created matter, that fills all the extent of boundless immensity is a wild chimera that favours Spinozism.

C O R. II.

Hence all the pretended infinities in created nature, are only potential as the Schools say; that is, finite beings may be multiply'd and modify'd in numberless ways, but they do not actually exist nor contain these modes. There is and can be no real arithmetical or geometrical infinite in nature produced; no infinitely great nor infinitely little, actually existent. For this reason the greatest Geometer of the last age, Sir Isaac Newton, never called a fluxion an infinitely small quantity,

as foreigners do; but an ideal division of quantity that may be continued without end.

C O R. III.

Hence the notion of Malebranche, that the world already produced is the most perfect God could have created, is entirely groundless. The worlds already produced, and all the worlds producible to eternity, will never become a *MAXIMUM*, nor an *OPTIMUM*, the best and the greatest to which nothing can be added; because in the scale of finites the progression is boundless; because God's power of creating can never be exhausted, and because the effects of his emanant acts must always be infinitely inferior to his producing power, always finite, and multipliable without end.

C O R. IV.

Hence the divine activity by operating in and upon matter, may produce in the least atom, new forms, new motions, new divisions, and thereby numberless beauties without end. For the same reason God may act eternally upon the smallest and lowest intelligences, so as to enliven, enlighten and beatify them for ever and ever by a continual progressive communication of life, light, and love; of activity, wisdom, and goodness.

C O R. V.

Hence as God may exalt, augment, and enlarge the faculties of intelligent natures to any finite degree of perfection how great soever, so he may by suspending the same activity reduce them to any finite degree of insensibility how low soever. Thus intelligences made for the enjoyment of him who is infinite, may become so stupid that they have no other ideas, nor sen-

fations, but what regard terrestrial objects, and the corporeal vehicles in which they are imprisoned; as shall be more fully unfolded hereafter.

C O R. VI.

Hence God's primitive, ultimate, positive and absolute designs cannot be eternally frustrated; for since he is infinitely wise he can propose no end but what is reasonable and possible: and since he is infinitely powerful he can execute it. Finite impotency, folly and malice cannot surmount for ever infinite power, wisdom and goodness: and therefore to whatever degree of misery and corruption his creatures may fall, he may if he pleases restore, exalt and recover them from it.

P R O P O S I T I O N XXI.

Creation is a representation of God by external Beings.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

God can create nothing but what he loves (a); God can love nothing but what resembles him in some degree (b): therefore creation is a representation of God by external Beings.

S C H O L I U M.

When we ascend to the first cause, and consider his absolute essence, we will find that the only reason he had to fall out of himself, was to impart perfection and happiness by representing himself in external beings; that is, by substances distinct from his own. He can love nothing and so wills no-

(a) Cor. 4. of Prop. XVI.

(b) Cor. 4. of Prop. XI.

thing but what resembles him in some degree, as nothing else can be perfect or happy. In contemplating his eternal perfections, whose simple and indivisible unity is not only equivalent but also infinitely superior to all possible multiplicity, He saw them so beautiful and so excellent; he was so delighted in beholding his consubstantial image, that by the free impulsion of the Holy Ghost, his essential goodness, coeternal love and lover, he was determined to produce a numberless multitude of living images and lively pictures, not by dividing his substance, and erecting the different parcels of it into separate substances; but by creating real beings distinct from himself, and representative of his all-beautiful essence. Thus the free communicative goodness of God, flowed from the love of his consubstantial image, and so all the creatures originally were representative of the divine perfections; otherwise God could not have loved them; nor consequently willed their existence. This will be clearer than any mathematical demonstration if we reflect upon the nature of infinite power, and infinite goodness. They cannot act separately and independently; God cannot produce without loving the effects of his power; he cannot love them unless they resemble him; and from hence it follows demonstratively, that in the original creation all Beings were representative of the divine perfection. I say the original creation, because the present state of nature, in this small point of the universe we now inhabit, is quite different from the primitive state of things, when they came pure out of the hands of God, as shall be fully demonstrated hereafter.

C O R. I.

Hence, none but the son or the consubstantial image of the father, 'for whom, and by whom all things were made,' can know the properties and beauties of nature, the perfect resemblances and innumerable relations betwixt finite and infinite; the pictures and the original; none but he can manifest and reveal them to finite intelligences. It is only by his light and an intercourse with him, that we can know the creator and the creatures, the cause and its effects, the sovereign artificer and his numberless works.

C O R. II.

Hence in a state of pure and exalted nature God could manifest his divine perfections to intellectual beings, in two manners; either by admitting them to the immediate vision of his absolute essence, or by displaying to them his power, wisdom and goodness in his created representations. They may contemplate the original or the pictures; enter into commerce with the pure divinity, or into mutual society with each other.

C O R. III.

Hence, to know the intimate essence of things, we must know the precise degrees of perfection God intended to represent by them; and therefore it is that we cannot know these intimate essences, till 'we see God as he is,' and all things in him, till we be admitted to the beatifick vision, behold the original represented, and the copys representing.

C O R. IV.

Hence, it was a very just and solid principle of Mr. Locke, that we have no clearer ideas of the intimate essence of mat-

ter, than of spirit. We know that there is an extended substance, whose essential properties are figurability, divisibility, and mobility: we know that there must be in nature an intelligent substance, whose essential attributes are a power of perceiving, reasoning and willing. We know that the one is capable of different figures, divisions, and motions: we know that the other is susceptible of different ideas, reflexions, and inclinations. We have as clear ideas of perception, reason and volition, as of figurability, divisibility, and mobility; of thoughts, judgments, and desires, as of figures, divisions, and motions; for we can compare them, distinguish them, judge of their resemblances and differences, and affirm of the one what we deny of the others. As we do not know how the soul perceives, reasons, and wills, because we have no adequate ideas of the manner how objects act upon it, nor how it acts upon itself; so we do not know how bodies are figured, divided, and moved; because we have no adequate ideas of the manner how the moving force acts upon them, nor how they act upon each other. We do not know the absolute, intimate essence of that something which is figurable, divisible and moveable; nor of that something which is capable of perception, reason and will. We know however, that these two somethings must be different substances; as shall be shewn hereafter, because they have incompatible and contradictory attributes; and therefore Locke might without so much hesitation as he shews, pronounced that extension and intelligence could not be properties of the same substance.

C O R. V.

Hence Malebranche was egregiously mistaken, when he

maintained that we have clear, adequate ideas of the intimate essence of matter, but none at all of spirit. He confounds the idea of matter with that of extension, the subject with the property, and the substance with the primary attribute. He says that the adequate essence of matter consists in extension, because all the attributes and modes of matter suppose extension: but for the same reason he might have said, that the adequate essence of spirit consists in a power of perception or intelligence, because all the attributes or modes of spirit suppose intelligence or perception. Now it is plain that when we say a power of intellection, we mean only an attribute of something that understands; and therefore by the rules of analogy, when we say extension, we mean only an attribute of something that is extended. It is true indeed that actual extension is a permanent property of matter; whereas actual intellection or thought is not such, as Locke has very well demonstrated; but then we do not compare actual extension with actual intellection; but only with a power of intelligence. The one is as essential to spirit, as the other is to matter. We can never lose the power of understanding and perceiving; tho', as we shall shew, actual thought may be suspended in us for several ages. Now as the intellectual faculty is the primary attribute of spirit, so extension is the primary attribute of matter. As the power of feeling, reasoning and willing are only secondary attributes of the former; so figurability, divisibility and mobility are only secondary attributes or consequences of the latter: but then our ignorance is still the same of the precise, intimate and adequate nature of that somewhat which is extended, and of that somewhat which is intelligent.

C O R. VI.

Hence there is a great difference betwixt our knowledge of essences, and our knowledge of attributes. The one supposes an adequate idea of a being, according to all the extent of its nature; the other only a partial idea of it. To see the intimate essence of things is to see them as God sees them; it is to see all that belongs to them: to know the attributes is to know only a part of what belongs to them. The former we shall behold only in the other life; we now see the latter only so far as is necessary to distinguish beings from each other. We do not see the source or essence, but we see the rivulets or attributes; and therefore can as really distinguish one substance from another as if we were at the fountain head. This is the foundation of all true philosophy: we know only attributes, modes, relatives, and qualities; but we do not know essences, substances, and absolute natures. The perfection of reason and wisdom in our present state consists as much in knowing the bounds of human understanding, as in knowing its extent: and indeed the true knowledge of the one is inseparable from the other. To pretend to see what we do not see, is as imperfect as not to discover what we may see. To go beyond the limits is an excess; to stop short of them is a defect.

We have thus explained infinite power with regard to the production of things finite; let us now consider infinite wisdom, with relation to the knowledge of finites.

P R O P O S I T I O N XXII.

It was equally a matter of free choice and will in God to think of finite ideas, as to create finite substances.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

Free action in God is what he may do or not do, without interesting the essential happiness and perfection of his nature (a); the knowledge of the pure and absolute essence of God, is alone sufficient to complete the perfection of the divine understanding; and other ideas, thoughts, and conceptions are no way necessary to this perfection (b): therefore it was equally matter of free choice and will in God to think of finite ideas, as to create finite substances.

S C H O L I U M.

When we impose silence upon sense and imagination, and raise up our minds to the contemplation of the pure and absolute essence of God, without any relation to created nature, we discern that his understanding may be infinitely perfect in the generation of his consubstantial image, tho' he had never thought of any other essence. He finds in this sole idea an infinite object, that satisfies his boundless intellect. This great principle is a necessary consequence of the divine self-sufficiency. If any other idea were necessary to the completion of God's boundless knowledge, the contemplation of his luminous essence could not suffice him. He would be obliged, so

(a) Cor 2. of Prop. XIII. (b) Cor. 5. of Prop. XIII.

to speak, to go out of himself to find in the ideas of other beings, the full perfection of his understanding. Nothing therefore is more unsuitable or injurious to the sovereign independency and self-sufficiency of God, than to suppose that by necessity of nature, he is obliged to think of any thing but his own pure and absolute essence. He was pleased however, most freely to consider himself as representable by things external to him; and thus he formed freely in his divine understanding, the archetypal ideas of finites, which are as essentially distinct from the consubstantial idea God has of himself, as the substances of finite are distinct from the substance of God.

The schoolmen will say, that God knows himself necessarily as representable from without; and consequently he knows necessarily all the manners of thus representing himself, and so has necessarily all the ideas of finites. I answer, that God necessarily knows his absolute essence as far as it is knowable; but I deny that it follows from thence, that God is necessarily obliged for the perfection of his divine understanding, to consider himself as representable by things external. For this representation being relative to the creatures, does not belong to the absolute essence of God; otherwise the sole idea of his own essence could not suffice him, and so he would not be self-sufficient. I reason always of God's knowledge with regard to things finite, as of God's will with regard to them; as the one is free, so is the other: as the effects of the one, or the substances, were not eternal, so neither were the effects of the other, or the ideas; as all the essences of things finite add nothing to his infinite essence, so all the ideas of finites add nothing to his consubstantial i-

dea. As he found in the procession of the Holy Ghost, the completion of his infinite love, so he found in the generation of his eternal Logos, the totality of infinite knowledge. As he produced freely in his divine immensity finite substances, so he formed freely in his divine understanding their ideas. As all the collected finite substances are not God's indivisible substance, so the whole collection of finite ideas is not God's consubstantial idea. As the former were not necessary to the happiness of his will, so the latter were not necessary to the perfection of his understanding. As he might have been eternally without the one, so he might have been eternally without the other. As he may cancel and annihilate all finite substances, so he may forget and blot out of his understanding all finite ideas, to re-enter again into his eternal solitude.

The schoolmen will urge, that if God could drop his archetypal ideas of finites, then there might be in him, mutation, variation, and succession, which is impossible. I answer, that in God's necessary acts, and immanent effects there is and can be no variation, nor shadow of change: but 'tis not so in his free acts and emanant effects. Here the schoolmen have engaged themselves in a maze not only of unexplicable difficulties, but of absolute contradictions. 1mo. Whatever is coeternal with the divine essence, is consubstantial. It is impossible that what was known and will'd from all eternity, could have been mutable, or changed; and what could not have been changed is necessary and not free. Thus all finite ideas become coeternal, consubstantial, necessary modes of the divine mind. 2do. If all finite ideas be coeternal, consubstantial, necessary modes of the divine mind, they must be God;

since, according to the schoolmen, all that is in God is God; and therefore these ideas must partake of the divine activity, intelligence, reality and perfection. Wherefore the creation of substances distinct from these intelligent, active, self-conscious ideas, is useless. Thus creation becomes absurd and impossible; and all finite ideas or finite beings are coeternal, consubstantial personalities, hypostases and inherencies of the divine essence. 3tio. If all the ideas of finite be immanent, permanent, necessary, eternal modes and objects of the divine mind, then all the ideas of finite must be God. The idea of a triangle, a horse and a man are God, as much as the consubstantial idea or Logos. Now if the ideas of things finite be God, the beings answering to these ideas must be so too; for it is impossible to conceive how the effects of God's immanent, permanent, coeternal acts, are not also necessary, coeternal and consubstantial. Thus we must say that as the collection or sum of finite ideas is God's consubstantial idea, so the sum of all finite substances is God's infinite substance. This is pure Spinozism, and this odious system can never be overturned, till the schoolmen learn to distinguish betwixt God's immanent and emanant acts; and not to confound the properties of the one with these of the other. It is absolutely false that the production and coexistence of all finite ideas is a perfection, and an immanent act of the divine mind. No archetypal ideas of things finite, as no ectypal finite substances enter into the still eternity of God's absolute essence. We may and must conceive an eternal duration antecedent to all time, wherein God neither thought of nor created any thing finite. This succession in God, or his free passage from his

still eternity to the conception and creation of things finite, is the highest perfection, and a necessary effect of his unbounded self-sufficiency. Succession in the creatures always supposes some defect, and is a necessary adjunct of their bounded capacities. Because they cannot exhaust infinite by one single view, they must necessarily conceive by parcels, by succession, and progression. Whereas God by one simple act exhausts all finite ideas, and all their possible combinations; but he is free to exert this arbitrary act of his understanding. It is not necessary to the perfection of his intellect; it adds nothing to the happiness of his will. When it is said that 'he loved and predestinated the elect from all eternity,' this means that he will'd, lov'd, and decreed their happiness before time, and from the beginning, when he fall'd out of his eternal solitude. For this reason it is, that in scripture from the beginning, and from eternity, are very oft synonymous.

The schoolmen will perhaps say that if the archetypal ideas of things finite exist in the divine understanding, they must be necessary; since God's understanding and his essence are the same; and because all that is in God is God. This maxim as we have already said is true of God's necessary acts, and immanent effects; but not of his emanant acts and free effects. We might reason in the same manner thus; all substances exist in the divine immensity; God's essence and immensity are the same, therefore all substances are inherencies, hypostases, or personalities of the divine essence; thus Spinoza reasoned. To shun therefore this abyss of impiety, we must always distinguish in God, his necessary and free acts. The effects of the one are God; the effects of the other are

nature. The effects of the former are the eternal Word and Holy Ghost. The effects of the latter are material and immaterial substances. The one are immanent, consubstantial, and infinitely infinite, coequal to their cause in all things, self-origination only excepted. The others are emanant, distinct from God, bounded and multipliable without end. As the acts of God's eternal power, and of his eternal love may be distinguished into necessary and free, so by the rules of analogy, the acts of his eternal understanding may be distinguished into necessary and free.

The schoolmen will cry out that God knows necessarily all that is possible, otherwise he would be ignorant: but the archetypal ideas of things finite are possible; therefore God knows them necessarily. I answer that the archetypal ideas of things finite are nothing, as the real finite substances are nothing antecedent to the divine free thought and will. There is no objective reality in finite ideas till God consider himself freely as representable from without. The divine essence is indeed the model of archetypal ideas; but as the original does not contain numerically and necessarily all the pictures that can be drawn of it, so we must not imagine that the divine essence contains numerically and by necessity of nature all the archetypal finite ideas: otherwise we must say that there is something self-existent that is not God; or that the collective sum of finite ideas is the Logos. Now since both these tenets are blasphemous, we must return to our first principle, and acknowledge that the archetypal ideas of things finite exist freely in the divine understanding, as the ectypal finite substances exist freely in the divine immensity. This sublime idea insinua-

ted in several places of the Greek fathers, and renewed in the last age by the pious Poiret, escaped the schoolmen; because about the twelfth century they attach'd themselves to the old Aristotelian or rather Arabick philosophy, which contains all the seeds of fatality.

In fine, the schoolmen will insist thus. If all finite ideas were free, then there could be no necessary and immutable truths whether geometrical, moral, or metaphysical. I deny absolutely the consequence. We should reason always about finite ideas as of finite substances. The existence or creation of things finite is free; yet creatures once produc'd they stand under necessary, eternal, and immutable relations to each other and to their original cause. Just so the ideas of finite are free; God might have thought of them or not: but these ideas being once established and formed freely in the divine understanding, there must result from them necessary, eternal, and immutable truths. For truth is only the relation of conformity or disagreement, equality or inequality amongst our ideas. Thus God might have been eternally without forming the ideas of divisible, moveable, and figurable extension. But these ideas being once form'd, all geometrical truths flow from them; because these truths enunciate the relations of conformity or disagreement, equality or inequality which necessarily flow from, or are included in the idea of material extension. In the same manner God might have been eternally without forming the ideas of finite intelligences. But these ideas being once form'd in the divine understanding, all moral truths follow necessarily from them. For since the idea of spirit supposes necessarily knowledge and will; it is plain

that the perfection and happiness of all created intelligences must depend upon knowing and loving God; and from this principle flow all the divine, moral and social duties. Thus in fine God might have been eternally without thinking of created substances of any kind; but these ideas once form'd, it follows necessarily that all created substances in a pure and primitive state were more or less representative of their uncreated original, and from this great principle flow necessarily the sublimest metaphysical truths.

It is by these great principles alone that we can give just ideas of the divine self-sufficiency. God in his absolute essence, and still eternity wants no other ideas nor objects to compleat his infinite understanding and beatify his unbounded will, but the knowledge of his consubstantial image; and the love of his Holy Ghost. All other ideas and loves, all other beings and substances are pure effects of his free acts. They are not immanent, necessary, coeternal acts, but emanant, arbitrary, transient acts of his power, wisdom and goodness.

C O R. I.

Hence the dependency of finite beings as to their ideas and existence upon the divine free thought and will, derogates in nothing from the certainty, immutability, and necessity of eternal truths; because such is the fecundity of the divine productions whether real or ideal, that they contain necessary, infinite relations and properties.

C O R. II.

Hence it were absurd to say that because the ideas of finite are free, therefore God might have altered the immutable na-

ture of truth, made a triangular circle, or a cubical sphere, seen as certainly and infallibly future what is absolutely contingent and only possible, produced an intelligent creature dispos'd from loving its creator, destin'd the greatest part of the human race to be eternally criminal and miserable, form'd a living image of himself that has no activity, power, nor force, and thus by the same individual act fix'd and renvers'd, created and annihilated, establish'd and destroy'd the nature of things.

C O R. III.

Hence all the divine acts about finite beings, whether of his power, understanding or love, may be considered as free modes of the absolutely infinite being; and not as essential, permanent and immutable acts. Modes are very oft imperfections in the creatures; because they are produced by agents different from us, and even against our wills; but the archetypal ideas that God produces freely in his understanding, and the generous decrees he forms in his almighty will, are pure effects of his own voluntary action. All our simple ideas are passive perceptions or sensations; God's archetypal ideas of things finite are conceived by himself, not perceiv'd or received from others. All our loves, are impulsions made by objects that act upon us. God's love of finite beings is a free act he produces in himself. As the effects of these free acts are emanant and distinct from the divine substance, so the acts themselves are emanant and distinct from the divine Logos. Neither the acts nor their effects belong to God's absolute essence.

C O R. IV.

Since all the emanant acts of God's eternal power, under-

standing and love are free and no ways interest, nor are necessary to the perfection of his essence, hence it follows that God is essentially and absolutely free as to the volition of any finite, determinate, particular good. He might never have thought of nor created, and therefore might never have beautify'd any finite intelligence. He could not create them to be unhappy; but he was free never to think of nor produce them.

C O R. V.

Hence the schoolmen are egregiously mistaken when they maintain that the production of the intelligible world is one of God's immanent acts. Thus they confound the properties of God's consubstantial idea, with those of his archetypal ideas; and so pave the way to Spinosism, for when we confound God's immanent and emanant acts, it is easy to confound his immanent and emanant effects.

P R O P O S I T I O N XXIII.

God never foresees the free determinations of intellectual agents; but as contingent and possible.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

God never foresees things but as they are (a); free actions or determinations are these which may be or not be; that is, contingent and possible (b): therefore God never foresees the free determinations of intellectual agents but as contingent and possible.

(a) Ax. 4. of this Book. (b) Def. 4. of this Book.

S C H O L I U M.

The schoolmen distinguish in God three sorts of knowledge or science: the science of possibles, which they call a science of simple intelligence; the science of what God decrees absolutely to accomplish, which they call a science of vision: the science of what depends upon the will of intellectual agents, which they call a middle science betwixt the other two. God sees the first in his own power, because he knows all its extent, which is the only source of possibility. He sees the second in his own will, because he knows how to accomplish what he decrees. He sees the last in the nature of intelligent beings, because he knows what will be the necessary consequences of their free determinations so long as they persist in them. All the schoolmen however affirm that God foresees every thing that happens, even the moral determinations of free agents as certainly, absolutely, and infallibly future; and so favour fatality; but they explain this infallible prescience in two very different manners.

The disciples of Molina in the Roman communion, and these of Arminius in the Protestant church, maintain that God sees all future contingencies in his all-comprehensive understanding, which represents to him all things future as present. ‘ The creatures, say they, do not exist in themselves
‘ till they be produced; but they coexist with God from all e-
‘ ternity in this sense, that he sees their existence and moda-
‘ lities, actions, passions and free determinations as really
‘ present. They are future only with relation to each other,
‘ but actually present with relation to God, who by necessi-

' ty of nature sees all things without succession; not because
 ' he decrees them, but because he sees what will be as if it al-
 ' ready were. His foreknowledge is not the cause of their fu-
 ' turation, but he sees all as present; because with him there
 ' is no successive moments. They compare this prescience to
 ' the sight of a man, whose eye may be so improv'd, that he
 ' may see at a great distance what other men can only see at a
 ' small one. As this man elevated to a great height would see
 ' unmov'd what other men see only by changing place. Thus
 ' God infinitely exalted above all that is finite, sees by a su-
 ' preminent knowledge as present, all that we call future,
 ' and that is such with regard to us, but not with regard to
 ' God. Now as the sight of an action present is not the
 ' cause of that action, so this foreknowledge does not influ-
 ' ence nor produce future contingencies.'

I answer in the first place, that if God saw future as pre-
 sent, the future would necessarily happen; because the pre-
 sent cannot be and not be at the same time. For since di-
 vine prescience cannot be deceived, what God sees as infal-
 libly, certainly, and absolutely future, must infallibly, certain-
 ly, and absolutely happen. This infallible prescience suppo-
 ses that all things future will certainly exist in such a time, in
 such an order, and in such circumstances, and not otherwise.
 Thus an inevitable fatality is established over all nature, what-
 ever be the cause of it. It is true indeed that this foreknow-
 ledge is not the efficient cause of future contingencies; but
 to foresee thus their certain existence, renders their futuri-
 tion as unavoidable, as if they were really predetermined. The
 comparison advanc'd betwixt God's foreknowledge and the

view of a man, whose sight is improv'd, is altogether unjust, yea, a mere Sophism. In the latter case there is a reality existent, which may be the object of the long-sighted man's perception: but in the free determinations of rational agents, there is no reality pre-existent that can be the object of the divine prescience. For since God does not see them in his own will, he cannot see their certain, determinate, and immutable futurity in the will of free agents, which is supposed by the Molinists and Arminians to be uncertain, undetermined, and mutable. Wherefore this prescience independent of all pre-determination, pre-motion, and efficiency in the first cause, is impossible, repugnant and contradictory. It is a mere palliative scheme, that does not save liberty, and that is altogether unphilosophical. It is the evasion of a feeble superficial mind, that does not examine things to the bottom, and that contents itself to stave off the impious consequences drawn from pre-determination, while it shipwracks and destroys freedom. The Molinists then are as much fatalists as the Thomists and Jansenists; but with this difference, that these latter impute all to God's immediate efficiency and absolute decrees; whereas the former establish a latent fatality in the nature of things independent of God; and so border upon Epicurism, whose pretended freedom was nothing but a voluntary or spontaneous necessity. We chuse without any foreign constraint, but we chuse necessarily, because all is foreseen infallibly, and must happen, whatever be the cause of this futurity.

I answer in the second place that it is absolutely false, as we have already demonstrated, that the coexistence of all finite ideas in the eternal mind is a necessary perfection of the

divine nature. If this were so, then the knowledge of all the imperfect forms of matter and spirit, of all the follies, passions, and vices, of all the errors, corruptions and blasphemies of depraved intelligences would be as necessary objects of the divine contemplation, as the knowledge of his own substantial image. This notion is impious, horrible, and diametrically opposite to the sublime doctrine of all the divinely inspir'd writers, who say in many different places, that God can 'forget sins and blot out iniquities;' to insinuate that these ideas cannot be the eternal objects of the divine contemplation. Forgetting in finite beings is not always an imperfection, but sometimes a great perfection. To forget ideas and judgments that derogate from, or that are usefess to the excellency of our nature, and the accomplishment of our reasonable designs, is a sublime perfection. Now there must be something in the supreme archetype that resembles this perfection, in the creatures, and this is what the sacred writers call in God, 'forgetting sins, and blotting out iniquities,' as unworthy of his remembrance, and usefess to the accomplishment of his great designs. The schoolmen entirely ignorant of this sublime truth, maintain that the infinite perfection of the divine understanding extends equally and necessarily to the knowledge of all objects and ideas, as the rays of the sun enlighten equally the dunghill and the palace; but this comparison is altogether improper. The rays of the sun are necessary emanations of, or impulses made by the body and substance of the sun. It cannot but diffuse its heat, light, and influence over all that lies within the sphere of its activity. Now we have already demonstrated that God is entirely free to think or

not to think of things finite; and therefore that he may without derogating from the perfection of his absolute essence, suspend or continue the free acts of his understanding, as well as the free acts of his power. All grant that he may without changing his essence annihilate or strike out of his divine immensity, all finite substances. In the same manner he may without changing his essence annihilate or blot out of his divine understanding the ideas of all the follies and blasphemies, errors and vices of finite beings. As he will one day destroy all the imperfect forms of matter and spirit, so he will one day forget these imperfect ideas for ever. As the boundless perfection of his infinite power does not depend upon his creating eternally and necessarily all finite substances; so the boundless perfection of his infinite understanding does not depend upon his knowing eternally and necessarily all finite ideas. He is perfectly free as to the exercise of one and t'other of these two emanant acts. Wherefore the necessary knowledge and eternal coexistence of all finite ideas, in the supreme mind, is false, absurd, and incompatible with the self-sufficiency, and boundless freedom of the supreme intellect. Thus we have endeavour'd to undermine the principal prop of the false doctrine about infallible and fatal prescience.

The Thomists, Jansenists, Calvinists, Stoicks, Pharisees, and predestinarians of all kinds maintain that infallible prescience depends upon predeterminating decrees. ' If God, ' say they, see all the free determinations of the creatures, as ' absolutely, certainly, and infallibly future, he must see them ' either in the will of the free creatures as a cause, or in his ' own will as a cause. He cannot see them in the will of the

‘ creature, since it is supposed undetermined and unconstrained. He must therefore see them in his own will, because
 ‘ he has decreed from all eternity to produce them in the creature by a physical premotion and influence; or to permit
 ‘ the contrary by refusing this physical premotion with which
 ‘ the creatures act and chuse certainly and infallibly what is
 ‘ good, and without which they can neither act, will, nor determine themselves to supernatural good. He grants this
 ‘ physical premotion, efficacious grace, and celestial delectation to some, as a pure effect of gratuitous mercy. He refuses it to others for reasons incomprehensible to us. “ He
 ‘ has mercy upon whom he will have mercy, and whom he wills he hardens.” Here we must adore in silence, and cry
 ‘ out, O ALTITUDO! God, continue some of these schoolmen, saw, by his science of simple intelligence all possible futurities; and among these numberless possibilities, he chose,
 ‘ will’d, and decreed only one succession of events, as the most
 ‘ proper to manifest his perfections. This plan contains necessarily a prevision and pre-establishment of all future contingencies. All is foreseen as infallibly future, because all
 ‘ is pre-ordained by an immutable decree.

This predestinarian scheme seems to be an emanation of the Manichean heresy refin’d and improv’d in the fifth century, and of the Arabian philosophy brought into Spain by the Moors about the twelfth century. It was maintain’d by St. Augustin, and Godescalaus; nay many think, by St. Thomas, Wicleff, and Hufs; by Jansenius and Calvin, and by many learned, pious and great men of all nations and communions, who did not see all its fatal consequences. They were

imposed upon by some dark passages and expressions of St. Paul, which we shall shew hereafter to have had quite another meaning than the predestinarians give to them. Tho' the schoolmen have invented many subtle distinctions and cobwebbs to cover, disguise and palliate the natural and necessary consequences of this system, yet when stript of its Arabick jargon, it is impossible for any sincere and penetrating mind to deny that it tends to establish an invincible fatality; as will fully appear from the three following considerations.

1mo. If God sees all the determinations of intellectual agents in his own will as a cause, then they are no longer free, because what is absolutely, certainly and infallibly future by the divine decree is inevitable and must happen: it may be voluntary but it cannot be free, since freedom necessarily supposes what may be done or not be done. There is such an immutable succession of events and actions pre-established and fore-ordained, that the creature cannot shun them. The contrary may be possible in the nature of things; but with regard to the divine decree nothing is contingent; all is inevitable; nothing could happen but what happens; yea in the same order and manner that it happens. It is no matter whether the creatures act with or without constraint, since their action is inevitable. All that happens is equally fore-ordained, infallibly foreseen, undoubtedly future: the contrary is impossible, and the latent fatality is invincible. Intellectual agents fancy they act freely because they act voluntarily or spontaneously; but they are only spiritual machines determined by irresistible springs. The difference betwixt them and bodies is, that the one feel, and the others do not feel what passes in

them. Thus all future events hang together by a continued, uninterrupted chain of causes and effects, where one link cannot be displaced without destroying the whole plan of providence. This is very near to the doctrine of Spinoza, tho' in other words; this is what he calls the immutable laws of eternal order: for as we shall shew presently, Spinoza thought himself neither a materialist, nor an atheist, but a perfect idealist and predestinarian.

2do. I grant indeed that God foresees as infallibly future, what he absolutely wills and fore-ordains. But as he cannot will absolutely nor fore-ordain the sin and damnation of the creatures, he never foresees them as absolutely and infallibly future. According to this harsh, dark system, moral evil enters necessarily into the plan of eternal providence. The errors, passions, vices, and blasphemies of the devils and damned are not only foreseen, but fore-ordained as absolutely future in order to accomplish the divine decree. Thus God will'd deliberately and freely the future existence of sin; for tho' he could have hindered it, yet he not only permitted it, but even he chose and decreed to permit it, as the most proper method of displaying his perfections. Thus, as Vannini says, sin is as conformable to the divine will as virtue. All is equally an effect of God's immediate action, or of his deliberate choice. He foresees it as infallibly future, because he fore-ordains it as necessary to compleat his pre-established plan. Can any upright and religious mind see this doctrine unravelled and not be struck with horror? We shall shew hereafter, that God never foresaw sin as infallibly future; that he did all he could to hinder it, without annihilating free agents; that, strict-

ly speaking, he never permitted it; and that it is in all senses, a perfect contradiction to his divine will.

The first scheme then of the schoolmen concerning pre-science is impossible. The second about predetermination is impious, and both bring in fatality. We must then have recourse to a third opinion which seems to have been the doctrine of all the Greek fathers before St. Augustin. It is founded on the following principles. imo. God is omniscient with regard to things finite, in the same sense that he is omnipotent. He is not omnipotent because he actually and necessarily produces all; but because he can when he pleases produce all that is possible. Just so he is omniscient with regard to finite, not because he necessarily knows all; but because he can when he pleases know all that is possible. We have already shewn that he was essentially free to think or not to think of the actions of finite beings. The knowledge of them is not necessary to the perfection of his boundless understanding. He sees them not by necessity of nature, but from his free love of the creatures. He is neither obliged to think of our essence, nor of our actions or modalities; but he does so out of his pure, generous and communicative goodness. It is true that God by his omnipresence sees necessarily all that is; because all things ly open and bare before him. But this can be said only of what is already existent, necessary or inevitable; and not of what is contingent, possible and free. Because as we have already remarked, there is no reality existent in matters purely possible that can be the object of the divine perception. When God therefore forms the idea of a free creature, he forms that of an intelligence whose determi-

nations he leaves unconstrain'd; they may be or may not be; and consequently their happening is only contingent and possible. Now to see in the nature of the creatures, or in his own eternal decrees, what is only contingent and possible, as infallibly future and inevitable, is a perfect contradiction. It is to create and annihilate, to form and destroy, to establish and overturn his object by the same individual act: it is producing a triangular circle. Wherefore as we do not derogate from the divine omnipotence, by denying that he can produce the one, so neither do we impeach the divine omniscience by denying that he can see the other. In both cases, the ideas are incompatible, their union is impossible, and so they cannot be the objects of the divine power or knowledge. It was therefore a strange delirium in the schoolmen to attribute to God a science of what was impossible to be known, which destroys liberty, establishes an universal fatality in nature, and so destroys all God's moral attributes of justice, sanctity and goodness; and all this under pretext of exalting his knowledge. This impossible, contradictory idea of prescience resembles the monstrous error of Spinoza. This dark philosopher or Sophist, under pretence of exalting God's absolute plenitude, and infinite power, made him contain necessarily and produce immanently all finite substances and their modes, just so the schoolmen, under pretence of exalting God's all-comprehensive intelligence and infinite knowledge, make him contain necessarily, and produce immanently all ideas of finite substances and modes: for as we have already remarked, if all the collection of finite ideas enter necessarily into and compose the divine omniscience; it follows evidently that all the

collection of finite substances must enter into and compose the divine substance. We ought always to reason about the acts of God's power and will, as about the acts of his understanding. If the last be eternal, necessary and immanent, the two first must be so also; because God's eternal, necessary and immanent power, understanding and will act conjointly and inseparably in, by and with each other.

The schoolmen will say that the ideas, or the objects of God's knowledge are eternal, necessary and immanent, whereas the substances that are the effects of his power are temporary, free, transient productions of his will, altogether distinct from God; and therefore that no comparison ought to be made betwixt God's omnipotence and omniscience. This I absolutely deny. They suppose a principle which they can never prove. We have already demonstrated the contrary. The archetypal finite ideas are free productions of God's understanding, as the ectypal finite substances are free productions of his power. Once more I repeat the sublime principle. We must reason of all God's acts concerning finite beings according to the rules of analogy. As God might have suspended for ever the acts of his free power and free love, without being impotent or unjust; so he might have suspended for ever the acts of his free knowledge without being ignorant. His generous, communicative, free, and disinterested goodness alone engaged him to exert all the three. None of these acts interest necessarily the essential perfection of his nature, and all their effects when compared to his absolute essence are nothings. The free production, the free knowledge, and the free love of all possible finites can make

no augmentation of God's essential activity, consubstantial wisdom, and coessential love. All the Spinosian, deistical or scholastick errors on this head come from the same source, a profound ignorance of God's still eternity, and of the luminous doctrine of the Trinity. These pretended philosophers confound God's absolute essence with his relative attributes; his immanent acts with his emanant fecundity; his essential activity, consubstantial image, and coeternal love, with the free exercise of his creating power, arbitrary knowledge, and accessory beneficence. Perplexed and dissipated by a confused crowd of ideas, they fancy that the perfection of the divine intellect, like that of their own, consists in going out of himself to know other objects, and that the completion of the divine power, understanding and love, demand necessarily, and consist in the producing, knowing, and beatifying numberless objects without himself; all whose ideas and essences, substances and modes, are but an infinitely little, when compared with the infinitely great; an atom that disappears before immensity, and an absolute nothing that has no necessary relation to absolute infinite. The only cure of these wandering souls is true recollection, and a thorough conversion of all their powers to the boundless object that surpasses all conception and all expression, and that can be adored therefore in spirit and in truth only by the silence of the mind, as well as by that of the mouth. Till they taste, feel, and practise this spiritual adoration of the supreme infinite, they must form and forge a God like to themselves, and so remain for ever a sort of mistaken idolaters as well as incredulous.

2do. Tho' God never destroys the liberty of intellectual

agents by any fatal preſcience or predeſtination; yet he knows how to accompliſh infallibly whatever he pleaſes in heaven and in earth, by free as well as by neceſſary agents. He has an abſolute, ſovereign, incommunicable empire over the heart, and will ſooner or later reduce all ſpirits by their free choice to the great end for which he created them. As an infinite central power he never ceases to draw them; but becauſe he will never force their liberty, he proportions, regulates, and ſubmits, ſo to ſpeak, the exerciſe of his almighty power to their free natures. They very oft ſtop, retard, and reſiſt his divine attraction, and by their natural, inherent activity, deviate from the ſtraight lines by which he would conduct them to their univerſal center. His long-ſuffering patience is never diſguteſt; he never abandons them abſolutely; he purſues them through all the wild mazes of their deviation; and tho' they deſcribe, ſo to ſpeak, by their centrifugal free activity, numberleſs curves of different kinds, yet he knows how to reduce them all one day to their almighty ſource. He ſees by one ſimple, unſucceſſive act, all their poſſible deviations, and all the combinations of free and neceſſary, of moral and phyſical cauſes: but he neither foreſees, foreordains, nor fixes immutably any one ſucceſſion of events, that can deſtroy their free choice. All his action in and upon them depends entirely upon their co-operation. He foreſees not all that will happen, but all that can happen; and provides for all poſſible contingencies. This is far more perfect than to foreſee infallibly, only one ſort of events, and exclude all the others, by an omnipotent irrefiſtible power, or by reſuſing them the graces neceſſary to act otherwiſe than they do: for it is a far

greater perfection to be able to execute his final designs by all sorts of events, and all sorts of means possible, than by one series of means prefixed and predetermined. This would be more an effort of power than of wisdom. It would not be infinite wisdom in God, to govern spiritual automata, or intelligent spontaneous machines, that follow absolutely, certainly and infallibly all his motions; and that by a passive reception of his influences and impressions, and not a free co-operation with him. True wisdom in us consists in engaging without constraint free agents to enter into our views, and projects, tho' they could contradict, oppose, and overturn them every moment. This prudence in finite minds, is a feeble image of supreme wisdom in the absolute infinite. He finds in the inexhaustible treasures of his almighty power, wisdom and goodness innumerable resources and expedients to answer all possible events, and obtain his ends without destroying liberty, whatever be the free determinations of the creatures. The deviations may be innumerable, and the means he has to reclaim his wandering creatures are infinite. This is the admirable oeconomy of divine providence explained in scripture, which never represents God as acting upon spiritual agents by omnipotent, irresistible wills; but as changing his conduct, managing their liberty, and adjusting his operation to all the different motions and variations of their free choice. God foresaw all plans possible, and all the means to execute the plan he chose ultimately; but he saw these means only as possible, not as future. He did not, say I, chuse this determinate set of means, so that none of them can be defeated, but he foresaw that he could find in his infinite power, wisdom, and

goodness, how to accomplish his end by all these different means. He saw the infinite curves the creature could describe, e'er he brought it freely to its end; and decreed that without fixing it to any one series of means he would be attentive to all equally, and whatever were its determinations, he could at last accomplish infallibly his ultimate design. This is a far more extensive idea of providence, than that which stakes down God to one determinate chain of means, and thereby the creature to an invincible fatality. It is therefore absolutely false, to maintain that all the particular actions, passions and crimes; that all the inspirations, virtues and graces; that all the wandrings, returns and determinations of each individual are so foreseen, and foreordained that one link cannot be broke without dissolving the whole chain of providence. Such a fatal chain far from being necessary to the accomplishment of God's great designs, would entirely destroy them, by converting free agents into spiritual machines. It may be objected that if God foresees that he can absolutely, certainly and infallibly reduce all lapsed beings to the great end of their creation, then this event is absolutely, certainly and infallibly future, and so no longer free, according to the principles laid down. I answer that this last event of the total re-establishment of all beings is foreseen, not because God has foreordained and pre-established a fixed, immutable order, series and succession of means to obtain it; but because in the nature of things, it is absolutely impossible that finite impotence, folly and malice can for ever surmount infinite power, wisdom and goodness. Whatever be the obstinacy, corruption, and depravity of the creature, God knows:

how to reclaim it sooner or later. The end is one, and immutable, but the means are many and variable; as there can be but one straight line, tho' there may be numberless curves drawn betwixt two points. The liberty of the creature consists in the free choice of one or other of these curves, by which it deviates, or in a free co-operation with the means for rectifying these curves; and not in a power to frustrate for ever the end: which to maintain would be impious, as well as absurd, as shall be fully demonstrated hereafter. Once more we beg our readers to go on, and to examine the whole plan of providence, e'er they judge of its separate parts and branches.

3tio. Tho' God does not foresee, nor foreordain as absolutely, certainly, and infallibly future, all the determinations of free agents; yet he may foresee and foretell when he pleases, all the natural and necessary consequences of their free determinations. These he sees not in his predetermining decrees; but in the nature of intellectual agents. All intelligent beings chuse and act not only infallibly, but even necessarily according to what appears to them the best, so long as they remain in that persuasion. Their freedom consists not in chusing at random without any motive or reason of preference, real or apparent, true or false, good or bad; far less does it consist in a power to prefer what they think actually the worst to what they think absolutely the best. We shall fully demonstrate these principles in the course of the following work: If it be allowed to suppose them till we prove them, then it is plain that when we follow the evil principle rather than the good, false self-love rather than the true love of God; the blind sensation of pleasure, rather than the clear percep-

tion of truth, when we resist the divine grace and operation in us, when we persist obstinately in our corruption; It is, I say, certainly, absolutely, and infallibly sure that we will always prefer terrestrial to celestial good; present pleasure to future happiness, and vice to virtue. In this case God may foresee certainly, and foretell infallibly all the natural and necessary consequences of these determinations in which we remain obstinately tho' freely. Thus he may arrange in devils and in wicked men all the natural and necessary effects of their free deliberate choice; damm up their corruption and malice on one side, open its sluices upon another; and without being the source and cause of their sin, overrule and direct infallibly all the free eruptions of evil in them, to the accomplishment of his great designs. He does not produce the source and fountain of evil in them, by any predeterminating decrees, partial preteritions or arbitrary refusal of necessary graces. But he directs the manifestations, the tide, the torrent and the rivulets which flow from this empoisoned source, so as to draw good from evil, light from darkness, and order from disorder. This is the highest effort not only of infinite power, but of eternal wisdom, justice and goodness; yea far superior to creation itself when he found nothing to oppose or resist his divine operation. This is God's prevision of, and provision for the cure and extirpation of moral evil, while his sanctity remains unstain'd, and the freedom of the creature untouched. In this sense God is said in scripture 'to blind the minds and harden the hearts of the wicked; to let loose the devils, and send them to deceive mankind.' These actions in God cannot regard the first springs and absolutely

free determinations of intellectual agents; but the natural necessary consequences, and manifestations of the evil principle in them, to which they voluntarily adhere. On the contrary a soul entirely given up to the divine will, possessed with the divine spirit, and faithful to the divine operation, will no doubt follow eternal order, so long as it remains in the good principle; and it will act not only infallibly but necessarily according to what it thinks the best. In this case God may make use of it as his prophet, instrument, or ambassador; operate in it and by it as he pleases; foresee certainly, and foretell infallibly what will be the natural and necessary consequences of its free determinations. Thus he foresees in angels and holy souls all the natural and necessary effects of their free choice, so that his divine life, light, and love manifest themselves in them and by them without destroying liberty. He does not produce in good men their free moral determinations, but by his preventing graces and lights, antecedent to all merit in them, he gives them a real, immediate, unchained power of consenting to his divine operations. If they continue faithful, he augments daily these first graces, gives them new ones and leads them from light to light, from grace to grace, from virtue to virtue; yet still so as they follow his motions freely, and could resist them if they pleased; yea very oft they do so, and thus retard his operation. Some of them even ‘ after having tasted of the heavenly gift, being made partakers
‘ of the Holy Ghost, having relished the good word of God
‘ and the powers of the world to come, fall away voluntarily,
‘ crucify in themselves the son of God afresh, put him to o-
‘ pen shame, ’ (a) extinguish the life of God in the soul, dar-

^m (a) Heb. VI. 4. 5. 6.

ken the illuminations of the eternal Word, and reject obstinately all the inspirations of the divine spirit. Thus of elect chosen souls they become reprobates and castaways, by their own free deliberate choice and infidelity: but when devout souls continue faithful, he consummates in them his work, transforms them into his divine image, purifies, sanctifies and regenerates them to such a degree that they surrender to him their liberty and all their powers, so that he becomes their life, light and love, their force, their reason and their will, and in fine the free but passive instruments of his holy designs. His divine attractions, illuminations and inspirations produce efficaciously and absolutely all the good that is in them. They have no other merit but that of acquiescing freely in his operations. They co-operate freely, but it is he alone that gives them the supernatural power of acting, seeing and willing; they correspond freely to his action, but they do not produce in themselves efficaciously either the love, or the light, or the force that enables them to consent, act, see, and will. Now this free but passive reception of the divine grace is the highest exercise of freedom, and leaves no place for vain glory, as shall be more fully explained hereafter, when we treat of grace and liberty. This is God's provision of and provision for moral good, whereby the almighty power of the creator never destroys the freedom of the creature. In this sense must be understood all the terms of scripture concerning efficacious grace, and the sovereign empire God has over holy souls, to make them think, will, and execute whatever he pleases. Their free co-operation is still supposed. It is thus that sovereign wisdom arranges or disturbs, stops or hastens, fore-

sees or foretells all the internal effects or external eruptions of our free determinations, without annihilating liberty. The schoolmen never distinguish betwixt the primitive springs of these free determinations which God never forces; and their necessary consequences, which he adjusts, directs, and overrules as he pleases.

4to. It is true that spiritual agents being always free to change their determinations, and the principles of their actions, what God foretells may sometimes not happen. The reason is, because all God's predictions with regard to the cooperation of free agents are conditional, whether that condition be expressed or not. This science and prediction of conditionals is insinuated and inculcated in many places of scripture, where God foretells and threatens punishments and misfortunes that never happen. He very oft advertises his creatures of the natural and necessary consequences of their corruption in order to make them change the principle of their conduct. He sees the precipices into which we hurry; and to hinder us from falling into them, he is represented in holy scripture as admonishing, threatening, exhorting, requesting, and weeping over his creatures; yea exhausting as it were all the efforts of his power, wisdom, and goodness, without success; 'what could I have done more to my vineyard, says the Holy Ghost, and I have not done it.' All these solicitations, admonitions and vehement expostulations would be useless if we were not free, and if God acted upon us by omnipotent, irresistible wills; yea they would be illusory, if he foresaw from all eternity, that free agents would certainly, infallibly, and absolutely do what he exhorts them not to do.

This appears to be the true doctrine of prescience, which Molina broached in the sixteenth century, but as he did not unfold or perhaps comprehend it in all its extent; his disciples since have so disguised and spoiled it by unphilosophical, contradictory refinements, that it solves none of the objections made by freethinkers; establishes fatality, as much as the predestinarian fictions; and impeaches the divine veracity and goodness. The system of prescience that we have unfolded when rightly understood answers all objections, without darkening the matter by the subtleties, palliatives, and subterfuges of the schoolmen. It is by this scheme alone that we can confound all the blasphemies of the Socinians and Epicureans, as also those of the Fatalists and predestinarians. The two first maintain that God can foresee and foretell none of the actions of free agents; and so deny prescience. The two last assert that God sees all the determinations of intellectual agents in his own absolute will, and so destroy liberty. The true midst betwixt these two extremes consists in maintaining that God can and does foresee; foreordain and execute whatever he pleases in heaven or in earth; but that he neither foresees nor foreordains as infallibly future what he leaves to the free choice of intellectual agents; because this is repugnant and contradictory. Far be it from us to maintain the wild Socinian or Epicurean error, that God leaves the world to the government of second causes, gives at first natural powers to free agents, and lets every one of them exert them as he pleases without overruling them, presiding over them, and conducting them at last infallibly to his great ends. Farther yet be it from us to make the whole universe a mass of mate-

rial and immaterial machines, that follow absolutely, inevitably and certainly what is fixed by infallible presciences and predeterminating decrees. The former deny providence; the latter despoil God of all his moral attributes, sanctity, justice and goodness. The one makes God a careless, indolent being; the other makes him a cruel, tyrannical monster.

C O R. I.

Hence prescience is that attribute in God, by which he foresees all the means necessary to accomplish infallibly in his creatures the eternal designs of his wisdom and love, without forcing their liberty; and consequently it is not an eternal, necessary, coexistent knowledge or view of all future contingencies in the divine mind; far less an infallible absolute provision of every thing that is to come to pass in God's predeterminating decrees.

C O R. II.

Hence we see how to reconcile in God all the three sciences taught in the schools. He sees what he leaves absolutely free in spiritual agents only as possible, by a science of simple intelligence. He sees what he has absolutely decreed to accomplish, by a science of vision; he sees in fine all the necessary consequences of our free determinations by a middle science or science of conditionals.

C O R. III.

Hence the Leibnitian scheme of pre-established harmony is but a disguised fatality. According to that German philosopher God by his prescience foresees all the possible plans and combinations of things that could ever happen; and he chose by an absolute decree one of these plans, as the best and

most proper to manifest his perfections. He decreed by a positive, absolute, uncontrollable will that one fixed, determinate, immutable chain of possibles should happen rather than any other; because he knew that this select series of events was the properest to display his glorious attributes. Thus all evil, moral and physical, temporal and eternal enter'd into this pre-established plan; was foreseen, prepared and foreordained to bring about the harmony of the whole. Thus tho' in the nature of things a quite other succession of events might have happened, yet according to the divine choice and pre-established harmony, nothing could happen but what happens, and in the same order and manner that it happens. This as we have proved is everfive of all free agency.

C O R. IV.

Hence the Molinist, Arminian and mitigated scheme about prescience leads to fatality, and is destructive of liberty, as well as that of the Thomists, Jansenists, and predestinarians. The one is but a palliative remedy; the other is a direct impiety; and therefore that mutual hatred, rancour, and persecution betwixt these two sects, is altogether the effect of ignorance, passion or political views. They are equally mistaken and pityable: all true philosophers ought to be ashamed of such scandalous excesses as are on both sides.

C O R. V.

Hence God never bounds or destroys the natural activity and essential freedom of finite intelligences, by any infallible prescience, or predeterminating decrees. Thus we have examined God's foreknowledge of things finite, let us now consider his communicative goodness to finite.

P R O P O S I T I O N XXIV.

God's design in creating finite intelligences could only be to make them eternally happy in the knowledge and love of his boundless perfections.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

God desires necessarily the supreme happiness of all finite intelligences (a); the supreme happiness of all finite intelligences consists in the knowledge and love of the absolute infinite (b): therefore God's design in creating finite intelligences must be to make them eternally happy in the knowledge and love of his boundless perfections.

S C H O L I U M.

All reasonable agents act for an end. This end must be either doing good to themselves, or to others. God's design in creating could not be to do good to himself; and therefore it must be to do good to others. Self-sufficient he could have no interested view in creating. Infinitely perfect in the generation of his eternal image; infinitely happy in the procession of the Holy Ghost, his communicative goodness could have no other end, but the felicity of finite intelligences.

Nothing therefore is more absurd than to say with Spinoza, that God acts without design. This is saying that infinite reason acts without reason. As the design of that sophist was to rob the divine nature of his wisdom, justice and goodness,

(a) Cor. 3. 4. and 5. of Prop XVI. (b) Ax. 5. of this Book.

and reduce all God's attributes to that of a blind, boundless power; he gives a false sense to the word End. To act for an end, says he, denotes indigence. In this sense we grant that God does not act for an end; for he wants nothing of his creatures, and desires nothing of them but what is conducive, necessary, and essential to their own happiness. This Spinosian idea of final causes came from the foolish doctrine of the schoolmen, who maintain'd that God acted for his glory in creating; as if he had views of augmenting it, by the homage of the creatures. God's glory consists in his free, generous, disinterested, communicative goodness. He does not want our adoration; his perfection is not increas'd by our virtues, nor diminish'd by our crimes. He interests himself in one and the other, only because the one advances and the other retards the supreme perfection of our natures. In this sense we may say with Lucretius, of the divine nature

‘ Ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri,

‘ Nec bene pro-meritis capitur, nec tangitur ira.

Spinoza denies final causes for another reason, because, says he, all flows from God by necessity of nature: but supposing this were so, yet necessary action does not hinder reasonable action. Tho' God loves himself necessarily, yet he is determined to this love by the knowledge he has of his own infinite perfection. He does not love himself by a blind instinct, but by a rational and wise, tho' necessary motive. He loves himself necessarily, because his reason for loving is infinite, yea absolutely infinite; and as nothing can be added to it, he cannot but be determined by it. He loves all other beings freely, because the reason of loving is finite, and so he is not

determined to it by necessity of nature. Whether then God acts freely in the production of finite, or in the generation of the Logos and procession of the Holy Ghost, he is still determined, freely, or necessarily, by a reason. For to suppose an infinite understanding that wills and acts without reason, is to suppose the most perfect intelligence acting without intelligence; which is a contradiction.

Spinoza maintains in the third place that to act for an end, supposes the employing of interveing means; and that this is impotency. I answer that this is true when the effect is immediately dependent upon the divine power and efficacy; but not when the effect supposes the co-operation of second causes. Spinoza supposes from the beginning that the free production of finite is impossible; that creation is a chimera; and that the production of a free creature is a contradiction. He proves not and can never prove either of these three suppositions. We have demonstrated already the falshood of the two former, and shall very soon demonstrate that of the last. Now if the idea of a free agent, of an intelligence that can be happy by love and by free love, be possible; then God cannot act upon it by omnipotent wills; and so must make use of intermediate secondary means to beatify it; that is, of its own free correspondence and co-operation.

Spinoza adds in the fourth place that it is contrary to the nature of an infinitely perfect being to desire any thing but what it actually possesses. We grant that this is true with regard to God's necessary, essential, immanent acts; but absolutely false with regard to his free, accessory, and emanant ones. God produces and loves nothing necessarily but his e-

ternal image and Holy Ghost. He wills the existence and desires the perfection of his finite images by a free act, which no ways interests his essential happiness and perfection. Desire is a defect only in so far as it denotes want; but it is a perfection when it proceeds from a principle of communicative goodness, superabundant plenitude, and generous beneficence.

Spinoza concludes that the source of all our errors on this head, comes from our not following the geometrical method, which investigates the essence of things, and not their final causes. If the mathematical method investigates the essence of things, it must contain the doctrine of final causes; since the essence of all intellectual agents, supposes acting for an end. Mathematicks investigate only the relations and properties of magnitudes and numbers, and treat only of necessary and immutable truths. But philosophy examines not only the necessary immutable essence or relations of things, but their free contingent existence; and so must embrace the doctrine of final causes. As Spinoza denied that there was any thing contingent, he was obliged to deny final causes; but happily his principles and consequences are equally false. All is supposed, and nothing demonstrated in his system.

C O R. I.

Hence the Cartesians by banishing the doctrine of final causes from philosophy, directly favour one of the worst parts of Spinozism: to attempt the explaining the phenomena of nature, without the intervention of a supreme intelligence that acts with design is the high-road to atheism. It is only by the doctrine of final causes restored, that men can become

true philosophers and divines, as will appear from the whole course of this essay.

C O R. II.

Hence we have a full demonstration of liberty. If God has no other end in producing finite intelligences, but to make them happy; if their felicity consists in the contemplation and love of his boundless perfections; if they do not at present enjoy this happiness; then this privation must flow from some quality in them by which they can correspond with or resist the designs of God; and this is freedom.

C O R. III.

Hence according to the simple light of natural reason, all those who teach that God can never during any period of eternity, reduce his most rebellious creatures to the love of order, suppose that God may be eternally frustrated in the accomplishment of his sole end in creating; they favour the wild, Manichean notion of an eternal, invincible, indestructible principle of evil; and deny at once God's infinite power, wisdom and goodness; since they suppose that finite impotence, folly and malice can for ever resist and surmount all the divine efforts to reclaim them.

C O R. IV.

Hence God could not produce immediately in finite intelligences without any reason, a perpetual series of ideas, sensations, and perceptions, that turn them off from their almighty original, and from the great designs he had in creating them. This would be contradicting himself, and so acting without wisdom and goodness.

P R O P O S I T I O N XXV.

Eternal providence desires, wills, and employs continually all the means necessary to lead intelligent creatures to their ultimate and supreme happiness.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

Eternal providence is that almighty wisdom, goodness and power, by which God knows, wills and employs all the means necessary to accomplish his designs in creating (a); God's design in creating was to make all intelligent natures happy in the knowledge and love of his infinite perfections, which is their ultimate and supreme felicity (b): therefore eternal providence knows, wills, and employs, continually all the means necessary to lead his intelligent creatures to their ultimate and supreme happiness.

S C H O L I U M.

Those who do not know the doctrine of final causes, nor the designs of God in creating, nor the love he has for his intelligent images, nor the intimate manner by which he is present to them, are very much puzzled how to give a demonstration of providence; but one who rises up to first principles, and shews that God is present every where, that he created finite intelligences only to make them happy, that he knows all their situations, and that he desires their felicity, can no more doubt of eternal providence than he can doubt if a fa-

(a) Def. 5. of this Book. (b) Prop. XXIV.

ther that lives continually with his children, loves them tenderly, knows all their inclinations, and has a full power to make their fortunes, can neglect their education, and leave them miserable.

The wild Epicurean notion adopted by some Deists, as if God abandon'd the world to the government of second causes, free agents, and natural powers, flows from their not understanding the great principles already demonstrated; God's end in creating, his manner of preserving, his omnipresent activity through the whole creation; they suppose that God can be separated from his work; that the creatures can subsist and be happy, enjoy being and well-being when detach'd from their source; they deny God's infinite activity, wisdom and goodness, as if he was so entirely occupied within himself as not to interest himself in his creation. They have no notion of the nature of God eternally active, that preserves and beatifies his creatures by his continual omnipotent efficacy, influence and communicative goodness.

The consequences of the predestinarian doctrine are yet far more impious and blasphemous. The Epicureans and some Socinians seem to deny God's relative attributes, and make him an indolent careless God; but the predestinarians make him a cruel, malicious, Manichean evil principle, and destroy all his moral perfections; since they maintain that he abandons the far greatest part of mortals to eternal misery by free choice, and arbitrary preterition, without allowing them the graces necessary to conduct them to the ultimate end of their creation. A being that loves essentially all his creatures, and that desires necessarily the happiness of what he loves (a), a

(a) Cor. 3. and 4. of Prop. XVI.

being that had no other design in creating but to make them happy for ever and ever in the knowledge and love of his boundless perfections (a); a being that knows, wills, and employs continually all the means necessary to lead all his intelligent creatures without exception to their ultimate and supreme happiness (b) can never become indifferent about them, cease to interest himself in them, and abandon them to everlasting misery. He can never be disgusted with their imperfections; he can never take any pleasure in their sufferings; all his punishments therefore must be remedies; and all his severities salutary cures. He must always be ready to pardon if the creature be convertible. He can never cease to pity and succour, but when his remedies become useless, and the patient incurable, which we shall show to be impossible. These are the natural and necessary consequences that result from the very nature and definition of infinite goodness; and if there be any expressions in scripture that seem to intimate the contrary, they may and must be interpreted in another sense than the predestinarians give to them; as shall be demonstrated hereafter.

C O R. I.

Hence in all times, in all places, and in all situations, almighty providence 'enlightens every man that comes into the world,' and refuses to none of his creatures fallen or un-fallen the helps necessary to conduct them to, or confirm them in the knowledge and enjoyment of their ultimate and supreme happiness. Nothing therefore derogates more from the divine wisdom and goodness than to maintain with some

(a) Prop. XXIV. (b) Prop. XXV.

superficial philosophers, that there is any one nation or savage in the world, that has not at some time or other in his life an idea of God, and of a first cause, of moral good and evil, of virtue and vice, sufficient to excite him to the search and knowledge of his almighty original, or at least to the desire of being enlightened and beatified by that universal wisdom and goodness that diffuses its rays over all created intelligences. Such savages may indeed be incapable of expressing their ideas and sentiments, of reasoning upon them in a philosophical manner, and drawing from them metaphysical principles and consequences: but all of them, even the most barbarous, the most idolatrous, and the most superstitious, have felt more or less the rays, influences, and illuminations of that universal light, ‘that enlightens every man that comes into the world.’

C O R. II.

Hence to maintain with the Fatalist doctors ‘that out of the pale of the visible church, there are no graces;’ that of old all the Pagan world; and at present all those, that are deprived of the light of the gospel were then, and are now left in a state of absolute darkness, and abandoned to eternal damnation, is a wild, absurd, Pharisaical error, that destroys all God’s moral attributes, and thereby leads to the highest incredulity and contempt of all reveal’d religion.

C O R. III.

Hence tho’ there were no revelation, yet we might be assured from the natural ideas we have of infinite goodness, that God’s mercies endure for ever, and that he is always ready to pardon if the criminal detests and quits its crimes. It is therefore

a poor, weak reasoning in some to prove the necessity of revealed religion, by this frivolous argument, that without a supernatural revelation, we could not be assured after sin, that God is appeasable. This poor insignificant notion degrades and humanizes the deity, as if he could be really incensed, angry, or altered by our vices; honour'd, beatify'd or perfected by our virtues. He interests himself in one or t'other only as the former retard, and the latter contribute to the supreme felicity and perfection of our nature. All that scripture says on this head is purely metaphorical, and signifies only, as we shall show, the infinite opposition there is betwixt the divine purity and the everfion of eternal order. God has an irreconcilable aversion to sin, but he never hates the sinner.

GENERAL SCHOLIUM.

Thus I have endeavoured to illustrate the three attributes of the Godhead relative to finite; creating power, divine omniscience, and communicative goodness; which with the three absolute attributes of the Godhead, generating activity, consubstantial wisdom, and coessential love, explain'd in the first book comprehend all we know of the eternal, self-existent, infinite mind. We must never confound the relative properties, with the absolute attributes of the deity; nor God's immanent with his emanant acts; nor his generating activity, with his creating power; nor his consubstantial Word, with the intelligible world; nor the proceffion of the Holy Ghost, with his communicative beneficence. The former are necessary, immutable, eternal, immanent, and unsuccessive acts. The latter are free, variable, temporary, emanant, and arbi-

rary acts. The former are consubstantial personalities: the latter are free modes of the divine essence, which he might have for ever suspended; because the exercise of these acts was not necessary to the perfection of his nature. For this reason an ancient writer (a) calls creating power an effluence of the divine virtue; emanant wisdom, a reflexion from the divine light; and communicative bounty, a picture of the divine goodness. Now it is certain that the effluence, the reflexion and the picture of a thing, are distinct from the thing itself. Wherefore the arbitrary, transient, free, emanant acts, qualities, and modes of the divine mind, may be distinguished from his essential, immutable, necessary, immanent acts, hypostases and personalities. This the schoolmen never advert to, and this has occasioned innumerable mistakes in theology and philosophy; as shall be more fully unfolded in the following book.

(a) Wisdom, Chap. VII. v. 25. and 26.

END OF THE SECOND BOOK.

THE
 PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES
 OF
 NATURAL AND REVEALED
 RELIGION.

B O O K III.

OF THE PROPERTIES AND DIFFERENCES
 OF FINITE BEINGS.

D E F I N I T I O N S.

1. **WE** shall use the term *SIMPLE PICTURES*, for such representations of a being, as have and can have no knowledge of themselves, nor of any other beings, and that represent their original only by their accidental forms, and not by their essential attributes.

2. *LIVING IMAGES* shall in like manner be used for such

representations of a being, as are capable of knowing themselves, and their original, and such as represent it in the nearest, most direct, and perfect manner.

A X I O M S.

1. An original may be represented either by a living image, or by a simple picture.

2. What is essentially intelligent cannot be represented in a direct, immediate, and perfect manner by what is absolutely unintelligent and insensible.

3. The living image of a being, that is essential love, cannot be absolutely incapable of love.

4. What is essentially free cannot be represented in a perfect, immediate, direct manner by what is absolutely necessitated, forc'd, and enslav'd.

5. Infinite activity cannot be represented by absolute inaction, and passivity.

6. Matter in rest is as much matter as matter in motion.

7. No being can exist without its essential qualities, and properties.

S C H O L I U M.

Those who enter deeply into themselves, and then look abroad into the universe to examine by sensation and reflection what are the beings of which nature is composed, will soon discover from within, a self-conscious being that is capable of receiving different ideas, forming different judgments, and loving different objects; and from without an ex-

tended being that is capable of different figures, divisions and motions; while it has no appearances of perception, reason and volition. No man dares say to himself that the mettal, the marble, or the wood of a statue; that the canvass, oils and colours of a picture; that the paper, ink and pencil of a graver; feel, know and love the hand of the workman that gives them their beautiful forms and proportions; or the fine qualities of the originals which they represent. From hence all men of sound and solid sense will naturally conclude that the self-conscious being, and the extended one, must be distinct substances; and that the former might exist, tho' the latter were altogether annihilated.

Two sorts of men however, whose characters are quite different nay contrary, unsatisfied with what natural and common sense dictates to the far greatest part of mankind, have endeavoured to render these conclusions suspected of falsehood by their subtle refinements, or by their gross imaginations. The one pretend that all is spirit, and the other that all is matter. The former accustomed to too much abstraction, doubt of the existence of bodies; the latter immersed in their senses fancy that all is corporeal. Thus the empire of philosophy was ever divided in all ages into two sects, the Idealists and the Materialists; tho' they took different names in different countries and ages; and expressed themselves in different terms; yet their ideas and principles were much the same.

The Idealists pretend that all created substances being representative of the divine perfections, there can be no real matter, which being essentially unactive, unintelligent, and

incapable of all desire, cannot represent him that is infinite activity, intelligence and love; that all the ideas, perceptions, and sensations we have of extension, figure and motion, are excited in us immediately by God himself; that material substances can never act by a physical influence upon intelligent beings; and from these three principles they conclude that there is and can be no third substance beside God and finite spirits, call'd matter.

The Materialists on the contrary maintain that motion is essential to matter; that intelligence and extension are properties of the same substance; some of them also alledge that freedom is a chimerical, impossible and contradictory quality; and from these three principles conclude that all substances are necessarily extended or material.

Tho' these two sentiments appear contradictory, yet they both equally tend to Spinosism. For if once we suppose that there is and can be but one sort of substances, it is easy from thence to pass to the belief that there is but one only substance in nature, which is the essence of the Spinosian scheme. It is of great consequence therefore to confute both these systems, and to prove, first, against the defenders of each, that God can create two sorts of substances material and immaterial, whose essential properties, are not only different, but contradictory and incompatible. We shall show in the next place against the Materialists that motion is not essential to matter; and that intelligence and extension cannot be properties of the same substance. We shall endeavour to prove in the last place against the Idealists, that God cannot be the immediate author of all the ideas, sensations and perceptions we have of matter;

and that he may give to his material pictures, and immaterial images a real, physical activity by which they can act reciprocally upon each other.

P R O P O S I T I O N XXVI.

God can represent himself externally either by living images or by simple pictures.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

Creation is a representation of God in things external (a); an original may be represented both by living images and by simple pictures (b): therefore God can thus represent himself both by living images, and by simple pictures.

S C H O L I U M.

Infinite power, wisdom and goodness may be represented either in a direct, immediate, perfect manner by the essential attributes of beings capable of thought, reason and love; or in a more indirect, remote, and less perfect manner, by the accessory forms communicated to beings that are absolutely incapable of thinking, reasoning and willing. Thus the powers, sentiments, and virtues of one mind may be represented by similar perfections, qualities, and dispositions in another. Thus also intellectual properties may be represented by the figures and colours given to matter. For this reason the sacred oracles represent spirits as the living images of the most high; and the material universe as his shadow or picture. Thus Moses says ' that God created man according to

(a) Prop. XXI. (b) Ax. I. of this book.

‘ his own likeness, and after his own image (a). The royal
 ‘ prophet teaches that the material heavens declare God’s
 ‘ glory (b). The apostle of the Gentiles adds, that the invi-
 ‘ sible perfections of God, even his eternal power and godhead
 ‘ are clearly seen and understood by the things that were
 ‘ made (c). The same apostle affirms that the things which
 ‘ are seen were made according to the model of things invi-
 ‘ sible (d),’ as the Greek original and Latin version may be
 rendered ; for the English translation is not intelligible.

This then is the scripture doctrine of the creation, that in-
 telligent natures are living images of the deity; and the mate-
 rial world only a shadow or picture of what is invisible: where-
 fore this sublime and easy notion that God can represent him-
 self from without by living images, and simple pictures is e-
 qually conformable to reason and revelation. I do not intend
 to conclude from this principle alone, that the simple pictures
 and the living images are quite different substances. This I shall
 endeavour to demonstrate afterwards by another principle.
 All I pretend to prove here is, that supposing the intelligent
 substance were extended, yet there must be two quite dif-
 ferent species’s of extended substances; since the one repre-
 sents God only as a simple picture, and the other as a living
 image.

C O R. I.

Hence we have a most noble idea of nature produced. It
 is composed of innumerable living images, and of beautiful

(a) Gen. chap. 1. v. 26. and chap. 5. v. 1 Wisdom ch. 2. v. 23. Ecclesiastic.
 ch. 17. v. 3. 1. Cor. ch. 11. v. 7. Coloss. ch. 3. v. 10. (b) Psal. 19. v. 1.
 (c) Rom. ch. 1. v. 20. (d) Hebr. ch. 11. v. 3.

pictures of the divine perfections. The material universe is an immense theatre with glorious paintings or decorations, by which God displays for ever and ever his power, wisdom and goodness. Spirits are living, lively images or actors upon this great theatre, that are capable of knowing, loving and enjoying the original. Wherefore in the following essay by the simple pictures we denote the material world; and by the living images, the intellectual universe of spirits.

C O R. II.

Hence this great principle is a fruitful source from whence we may derive all the essential properties and specific differences of spirit and matter. The most part of errors in philosophy come from mens endeavouring to judge of the differences and relations of things, either by some imagined ideas of their intimate essences, or by the sensations they produce in us. We have no adequate ideas of the former, and the latter is not always a proof even of their existence. The true source of demonstration, is the perfections of the cause, compared with the perceptions of the effect; and the designs God had in creating along with the sensations produced in us. We shall therefore deduce from the combination of these two, all the principal properties of spirit; and then investigate those of matter.

P R O P O S I T I O N XXVII.

The living images of the divinity do not exist in space by diffusion of parts.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N .

The divine essence is not extended by diffusion of parts (a); living images represent the original in the nearest, most direct, perfect and lively manner (b): therefore the living images of the divinity do not exist in space by diffusion of parts.

S C H O L I U M .

We have fully demonstrated in the first book that infinite space is not a property of the divine nature; that the supreme infinite is present to all beings without extension or diffusion; and that we must allow this omnipresence tho' we cannot comprehend it. It is therefore absolutely false that there can be no unextended substances, and that space is necessary to the existence of all beings. Now since the supreme, absolute infinite does not exist in space, nor by diffusion of parts, it is plain that his living images may and must exist without extension; and therefore are of a simple, uncompounded, indivisible nature. This principle of reasoning founded upon the resemblance of the living image to its almighty original is quite unknown to vulgar metaphysicians, and scholastick divines. It is as we have already remarked, impossible to deduce the properties of finite in a natural, easy manner, but from the attributes of infinite. Till we see the intimate essence of things in God himself, and behold him face to face in another life, the surest way to investigate their properties is by the rules of analogy, deduced from this capital, fundamental, luminous truth, that creation is a representation of God in things external, more or less similar to the supreme archetype. The

(a) Prop. VIII. (b) Def. 2. of this Book.

ancient Greeks of the Platonic and Pythagoric schools, the ancient Egyptians, Persians, Indians, and Chinese were full of this principle; as will be shewn in the second part of this work.

C O R. I.

Hence unextension, simplicity, and indivisibility of essence are necessary, essential, inseparable attributes of spirit. All ideas, similitudes and conceptions of the living image that destroy any of these three properties are false and absurd.

C O R. II.

Hence to suppose that extension and intelligence can be properties of the same substance is a false hypothesis, that has no foundation in true principles; we shall show afterwards that these two attributes are contradictory and incompatible.

P R O P O S I T I O N XXVIII.

The living images of the divinity must be essentially active or capable of action.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

Creation is a representation of God from without (a); God is essentially active (b): infinite activity cannot be represented by absolute inaction and passivity (c). Therefore the living images of the deity must be essentially, necessarily, and immanently active.

S C H O L I U M.

We have already shown that God must be essentially, ne-

(a) Prop. XX. (b) Prop. IX. and Cor. 1 of the same. (c) Ax. 5.

cessarily and immanently active antecedent to all production of other beings without him, that he produced in himself an eternal infinite effect and object. Now according to the immutable laws of analogy betwixt the living image, and the almighty original, if God designed to be represented without himself, in the most lively, direct and immediate manner, it follows necessarily, that this living image must also be essentially, necessarily and immanently active. I do not yet speak of its emanant activity, by which it can act upon other beings distinct from itself; I speak only of its immanent, inherent, essential activity by which it can act upon itself. We shall examine very soon wherein this immanent activity consists, and what are its effects. All I pretend to show now is, that by virtue of the soul's immediate, direct resemblance to the great archetype, it must be essentially active within itself.

C O R. I.

Hence it is absolutely false that spirit as body, is of itself entirely passive, till God act upon it, move it, and animate it, since it has in itself an essential fund of activity, distinct from God's immediate action.

C O R. II.

Hence we must never confound the natural, inherent, essential activity of the creature, with the supernatural, communicated, accessory action of God upon it. We shall now examine wherein this immanent activity of spirit consists.

P R O P O S I T I O N XXIX.

The living images of the divinity must be intelligent and reasonable.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N .

God is essentially intelligent and the sovereign reason (a); what is essentially intelligent and reasonable cannot be represented in a lively, direct, immediate, and perfect manner, by what is absolutely unintelligent and insensible (b): therefore the living images of the divinity must be intelligent and reasonable.

S C H O L I U M .

God knows himself and all his works, their resemblances, differences, and property: therefore spiritual beings must be capable of knowing him and all his productions. They cannot create as God does the objects themselves, nor form ideas of them, unless the same objects act upon them; but when they have received those ideas, they may compare them, combine them, judge of them, and discover their mutual relations, differences and properties. This is what we call conception, or reason; and this conception is action, yea action in the highest degree. It is an immanent, inherent, innate activity, inseparable from, and consubstantial with the mind. From this comparing, combining, and reflecting upon our own ideas, arise all our general and abstract notions, whether of God or the creatures, of the divine attributes or of the

(a) By Prop. X. (b) Ax. 2.

properties of things finite. The soul by virtue of this innate, immanent, coessential activity, may consider objects as similar or dissimilar, as equal or unequal, as concordant or discordant, and thus reflect upon their common properties, without any distinctions, specialities, or limitations, that bound them to this or that particular object or individual. As God by contemplating his own attributes, forms in his divine understanding the archetypal ideas of all beings he can produce; so the mind by reflecting upon its own modes forms to itself general, abstract ideas of all kinds, and of all the different beings it has already perceived. The difference is, that God conceives, creates and produces these archetypal ideas in his all-comprehensive mind; whereas we only combine or otherwise modify the ideas already received from the objects. Thus the action of the living image is some way similar or analogous to that of the original cause; tho' not identical and the same with it.

Doctor Berkeley denies the possibility of forming any such abstract ideas; but his reasonings seem altogether false, and unworthy of his subtile genius. He defines an abstract idea, 'that which is at the same time all and none of the particularities that we know; an idea wherein some parts of several, different and inconsistent ideas are put together.' This definition is unintelligible and unworthy of his natural acuteness. An abstract idea is not the idea of any thing really existent, but a general idea, in which many particular things agree. It is a preterition of, or non-attention to the particularities and specialities that determine it to one individual; and the consideration of it only in so far as it belongs to many individuals.

Thus the abstract idea of a triangle is the idea of that figure considered only as having three sides and angles, without reflecting upon it as equilateral, scalenar or isoscelar, composed of curve or streight lines, of this or that colour, of this or that matter. The learned Doctor confounds ideas with things, and denies that there can be any abstract general ideas, because there cannot be abstract general entitys. He was led into this error to support his favourite scheme, that the ideas and the objects are the same; now because there are in nature no universal, general substances or objects, he concluded that there were and could be no general, universal, abstract ideas. He can never prove his principle, as we shall hereafter show; and therefore his consequences must be uncertain or false. There is nothing real in nature answerable in point of universality to our abstract ideas. The ideas excited by the objects are complicated with all individuating circumstances or differences, but the mind by its natural activity can consider or fix its attention to these properties and relations in which many particular objects agree, while it attends not to their differences.

Father Malebranche does not deny the existence and reality of abstract ideas, but he insists that we do not form them by our own activity, reflection and combination, but see them in God. Thus according to him we have all ideas of infinitude both uncreated and created. He maintains that the idea of the absolute infinite cannot be a mode or effect of the mind, because the mind is finite, and that finite cannot imagine, conceive or comprehend infinite. Is not this a mere sophism? all the idea we have of absolute infinite,

is that of some real, self-existent object, greater than any we can conceive, that surpasses all that we can comprehend, and whose perfections have no bounds. This idea is positive with regard to its object, since it excludes all negation; but it is negative with regard to its subject, since it is incomprehensible. We can never contain or grasp it in its totality, nor exhaust it during an eternity. It is thus again that the living images resemble their sovereign archetype. As he generates continually in himself his own idea of himself, so they may produce in themselves an imperfect idea of him: but here is the difference. God's idea of himself is a living, permanent, coeternal, consubstantial image, which partakes of all his boundless perfections. It is as we have shown, a living, self-conscious, intelligent person. Whereas the idea we form of God is only a transient, speculative, lifeless image, partaking of all our imperfections. It is only, so to speak, an infinitely small perception and shadow of absolute infinite. It is not a simple idea form'd by the immediate intuitive view of the divine essence; but a complex idea produced by a successive combination of the attributes deducible from the idea of a self-existent being. It is a mode of the mind, but a mode representative of something distinct from us. We see from a comparison of the idea of finite with the idea of self-existence, that there must be an absolute infinite. We see that he is, but not what he is adequately. We see some of his attributes, but not his intimate essence, otherwise we would enjoy the beatific vision. For this reason the apostle says that 'we see God darkly as in a glass or mirror.' We do not see his essence by a direct, immediate, intuitive view as angels do; but only by

reflection upon our own essence, and that of other creatures, as representative of him, and as living images or lively pictures of his perfections. When Malebranche therefore says that we see the image or idea of infinite in the divine essence, and not in our own, he inverts the natural order of ideas and expressions. We do not see the images of bodies in the bodies themselves; but in glasses distinct from them. Thus we do not see the idea of infinite in the divine essence; but in our own essence as representative of God.

Malebranche adds, that we have the ideas of infinite triangles, circles, ovals, and geometrical curves of innumerable kinds; that it is impossible to form these ideas by our own activity; and consequently that we see them in the divine mind by simple intuition, as being intimately united to the eternal Logos that contains all ideas. This author imposes strangely upon his own fine understanding by a luxuriant imagination and a pious enthusiasm. It is absolutely false, that we have any positive ideas of created infinity. The idea of infinite when applied to any thing produced is only negative, and negative in all senses, both with regard to its object and subject. It is only a conceiving that God may produce something greater and greater without end, add always to his work, and augment its perfections for ever. The idea of an infinite triangle, circle, polygone, or curve is only this notion, that such geometrical figures may be doubled, tripled, and multiplied without end: but there is and can be no absolute great nor little, in what is finite and created. All the Malebranchian subtleties on this head are therefore not only sophistical but dan-

gerous; because they make the proofs of absolute infinitude depend upon chimera's.

C O R. I.

Hence nothing is more absurd than to maintain, that the present abstract ideas we form from the particular perceptions and sensations which singular objects produce in us, are the original archetypal ideas of the divine understanding. We must carefully distinguish the consubstantial idea God has of himself, from the archetypal ideas he has of things finite; and the abstract ideas we form from the objects themselves. The schoolmen confound the two first; Malebranche the three first, and Spinoza all the four.

C O R. II.

Since the mind by comparing its ideas may discover their mutual relations of similitude and agreement, or of disagreement; and since truth is nothing but these relations of our ideas, hence it follows that the mind by comparing its general and particular ideas, may discover general and particular truths. And since the knowledge of truth, is the knowledge of relations; wherever there are necessary and immutable relations betwixt finite and infinite, betwixt the attributes of the one, and the attributes of the other, we may have as sure demonstrations in moral and theological knowledge, as in geometrical and physical, and while we talk only of relations, we may demonstrate metaphysics as well as mathematics.

C O R. III.

Hence we see the true sources of all our errors; they do

not consist in our simple ideas and perceptions, but in our complex ideas and conceptions; not in our passive sensations, but in the active comparison we make of their relations. We precipitate our judgment ere we see clearly, and thereby conclude that there is a connexion or disagreement, equality or inequality, or a relation of cause and effect, when there is none. This would not happen if we could comprehend and behold all possible relations by one simple view, and see them as God sees them by intuition. But being obliged because of our finite natures to combine, compare and judge by successive acts, we may oft lose the secret chain, and so mistake in our reasonings.

C O R. IV.

Hence it is absolutely false that reason is only a successive perception of ideas, represented to the mind by the divine action upon it; and that the understanding is equally passive, with regard to its simple, and complex ideas: for thus we would be infallible. The source of error is altogether unintelligible, if the mind has no real active power of comparing, joining, separating, and associating its ideas; as the source of sin would be incomprehensible, if the soul had no freedom of examining, chusing, and preferring one object to another.

C O R. V.

Hence all our opinions or judgments arise from the reflection of the mind upon its own modifications, or simple ideas. We shall examine hereafter whence these simple ideas come; whether from God alone as the only agent, or from the creatures both material and spiritual, as second causes.

P R O P O S I T I O N XXX.

The living images of the deity must be capable of love.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

God loves himself necessarily, and all that he has made; his essence is love (a): the living, lively image of a being that is essential love, cannot be absolutely incapable of love (b): therefore the living images of the deity must be capable of love.

S C H O L I U M.

As God loves himself necessarily because he is good; the all perfect, the infinite good; so his intelligent images must love necessarily whatever is good, or whatever appears to be such; that is, must love good as good, or good in general. I do not say that finite intelligences love necessarily as God loves; or that they love all that he loves; but they must love something necessarily, either God, the creatures, or themselves. They may forget God by falling into a degenerate state; and then as a punishment they may lose all gratifying sensations of, and communications with the creatures; but as they cannot be separated from themselves, they must love themselves necessarily, if they be truly self-conscious. This consubstantial love of self is inseparable from their natures; they may lose all other loves, but they cannot lose this; and since they love necessarily their being, they must love their well-

(a) Cor. 5. of Prop. XI. (b) Ax. 3. of this book.

being, for it is impossible to love a being without loving or desiring its happiness, if it be susceptible of any. There is no state of perfection or imperfection, of elevation, or degradation; of purity or corruption in which or by which finite intelligences can extinguish this natural, necessary, and coessential love of felicity; unless we suppose them reduced to a state of total insensibility both of their own existence and that of all other beings: all beings therefore capable of knowing are capable of willing, desiring and loving what they know, feel, and perceive to be good. Love or rather the capacity of loving is a necessary property of their natures; it flows from their essence and definition, as living images and imitations of him that is all love.

The Malebranchian and scholastick notion that 'will in general is an immediate continual effect of the divine action in us,' is therefore a mere chimera. This false idea came from the yet falser notion, that the soul is not self-moving; that it is entirely passive, unless it be moved by God; and that external impulses are as necessary to begin motion in spirits as in bodies. Conception or intelligence must precede love; but it is not necessary that there be any other immediate impulse different from this conception. Now this conception is reason, and reason is comparing, comparing is action; and may be the effect of our own activity, independent of all supernatural light. All beings capable of knowing, comparing, and judging, are capable of willing, desiring, and tending to what appears to them good or beatifying. The soul by its innate, inherent, essential activity tends naturally to whatever is, or appears good, pleasant or conducive to its well-being. The

simple perception of relative good, suffices to make it exert this natural, self-moving activity. As God by his creating matter rendered it necessarily and essentially moveable by the same act; so by creating spirit he rendered it by the same act necessarily and essentially active, or capable of volition. The idea of mobility is necessarily included in that of the material picture, and the idea of volition, in that of the intelligent image. As Malebranche confounded the natural activity of the understanding, with the supernatural contemplation of the Logos, so he confounded the natural activity of the will, with the supernatural action of the Holy Ghost.

This necessary tendency of the soul to whatever appears good, is another proof that the living image is essentially, and immanently active. Reason is action, and love is action; therefore the living, intelligent loving images of the deity must be essentially active. God's essential activity consists in the generation of his consubstantial idea and in the love of his Holy Ghost. Wherefore all his living images, must be capable of a double immanent activity; one by which they can discover, compare, combine, separate, and thereby conceive the relations and differences of their ideas: another by which they can tend to, will, desire and love the objects represented to them by these ideas. The soul made for him who is infinite has an unbounded capacity of knowledge, and an insatiable thirst of felicity. The more it knows, the more it desires to know: its capacity dilates proportionably as it receives: made for the contemplation and love of the absolute infinite, it can never find any repose, till it return to him, and lose itself in him. It may mistake its object, and attach itself for a time to finites,

but it will soon exhaust all their perfection, become weary, and disgusted with them. Nothing can satiate or fill its boundless desire of knowledge, and its ever-increasing thirst of felicity, but the uncreated, eternal, self-existent being. This restless activity is the source of all its pains and pleasures; of all its misery and happiness; of all its passions and natural virtues. This immense capacity of knowledge and love is also that inward, and intimate fund, center, and sanctuary of the soul, which none but God can fill. Tho' there were no other finite spirits, and no material objects existent; yet this essential, indestructible desire of knowledge and happiness, would be an eternal spring and fountain of activity in the soul. As it can never find in itself nor the creatures an infinite object commensurate to this boundless double capacity, it must go out of itself, rise above itself, and lose itself in the immense ocean of good, to be satisfied; and as it can never exhaust this object, it must be eternally active, desirous, and insatiable.

Tho' we have said in the two preceding propositions, that the powers of reasoning and willing are essential properties of spiritual beings, yet we do not suppose that finite intelligences are always in an actual exercise of these two powers. They are capable of action and love, but not always active and loving. We have already shown that created spirits by the suspension of the divine activity in and upon them, may fall into a state of total inaction, and insensibility. Eternal action, uninterrupted intelligence, and immutable love are the incommunicable attributes and perfections of the infinite mind. Wherefore it is possible that laps'd intelligences may lose all perception of their own existence, as well as that of all other beings, and

remain in a state of perfect inactivity and spiritual lethargy, void of all intelligence, and self-consciousness, for many ages: This great principle will be of wonderful use hereafter, to justify the conduct of eternal providence. Neither can it be said that in this state of spiritual lethargy, sleep, and death, there is no difference betwixt the soul and matter. For as we have shown, the one is a simple, unextended substance, capable of thought and volition, whereas the other is a compound of innumerable, extended, divisible substances, that are absolutely incapable of all intelligent self-moving powers, as we shall show very soon.

It is therefore false to maintain with the Cartesians that the soul thinks always: they never did, nor can give any solid reason for this assertion. To think is to perceive some object that acts upon us, or to conceive some truth that arises from the comparison of these perceptions. It is either to feel or to reflect. Now it can never be demonstrated that some objects act always, and necessarily upon us; or that we reflect necessarily upon ourselves. Experience shows the contrary; when we are in a swoon, or in a deep sleep. To think, know and feel always are priviledges of a pure and unfallen state; when the living images shall have a perfect resemblance to him that never slumbers. Locke confutes the Cartesian opinion only by experimental arguments, without ascending to first principles, and thereby giving the true reason why the soul does not always think. This as we shall show hereafter is one of the greatest proofs of our degenerate state. The English and French philosophers, Locke and Descartes, seem to have never reflected upon this sublime prin-

ciple, and so their disciples combat each other in the dark.

C O R. I.

Since finite intelligences can never cease to love themselves; since the love of their being, and well-being, is a natural and necessary property of their essence; since it mixes with, animates, and governs, and is the strongest principle of all their activities and operations; it follows that while they act solely by their own force and natural inherent power, they must have their strongest love to themselves, and their own happiness; and love good chiefly as relative to them, as consonant to their nature, as conducive to their well-being. Their natural, essential, and supreme inclination and passion, motion and tendency is self-love: wherefore the desire of God, purely and only as beatifying, as relative good, as source of infinite pleasure, is a necessary consequence of the natural love we have for happiness, common to the devils and the damn'd, who would desire God as infinite pleasure, if they were not obliged to love him as sovereign justice.

C O R. II.

Hence the soul desires, and loves certainly, infallibly and inevitably, what it judges to be the best, so long as it continues in that persuasion: for since it loves necessarily good as good, it must necessarily love the greater good preferably to a lesser good, and so what appears the better preferably to what appears to it the worse: wherefore it can never love evil as evil; because it cannot hate its own essence, will, chuse and desire its absolute misery as such. It may indeed by mistake, by prejudice, by false judgment and blind passion, love real evil as an apparent good, but it cannot love evil as evil.

C O R. III.

Hence it follows that if ever lapsed intelligences fall into a state wherein they see and feel evidently that moral evil is a source of eternal misery, they cannot continue to will it deliberately, remain for ever inconvertible, and be immutably fix'd in a permanent choice of moral and physical evil, of sin and misery. This principle will be of great use hereafter to unfold all the mysteries of providence concerning infernal pains, and the duration of evil.

P R O P O S I T I O N XXXI.

The intelligent living images of the deity, must be essentially free as to the choice of all particular good.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

God is essentially and absolutely free as to the volition of all finite, determinate, particular good (a); what is essentially free cannot be represented in a perfect, immediate, direct manner by what is absolutely necessitated, forced, and enslaved (b): therefore the intelligent living images of the deity must be essentially free as to the choice or volition of all particular good.

S C H O L I U M.

Freedom may be demonstrated two ways, A P R I O R I, as the schools say, or A P O S T E R I O R I. The former proofs depend

(a) Cor. 4. of Prop. XXII. (b) Ax. 4. of this book.

upon the nature of the soul, and the latter upon the effects of freedom, which we see in the universe.

1mo. The primitive, original source of liberty, is that innate power or activity of the mind by which it can compare objects, suspend its tendency to, or acquiescence in them, till it examine their nature, and hence it is called *LIBERUM ARBITRIUM*, or free judgment, as well as free-will. Spirits made for the enjoyment and contemplation of infinite, may still turn off their thoughts from any one particular good, and think of another far superior to any determinate finite one, and so tend to it by their boundless desire of happiness. Every finite good may attract and draw them, because being good, it contains in it a reason of love; but not being all good, it cannot determine them necessarily, fix them immutably, or move them invincibly; since they may still conceive a greater good more worthy of their love. Freedom therefore is an essential property of all beings that can compare, examine, and judge. It flows from the natural activity of the mind as intelligent which can always think of a good superior to any finite one. It is an inseparable adjunct and concomitant of reason and intelligence. Hence the schools say ‘*Liberum arbitrium est omni intellectui comes.*’

A second source of liberty is the double spring of the will. We shall show hereafter that these two springs, motives, or reasons of willing are perfection seen, or pleasure felt. Both these motives are sufficient to determine us; and therefore we may follow the one or the other, and consequently neither of them constrains us necessarily. We may be determined by the clear perception of truth, or by the blind sensation of

pleasure; by the love of order, or by the love of happiness, by the love of God, or self-love. When we separate the love of order from the love of pleasure we are vicious. When we unite these two loves we are virtuous. When we sacrifice the love of pleasure to the love of order we are heroically good and perfect. When we love order only from the motive of happiness, we are as yet imperfect. In all times, in all states, and in all situations, these two motives or springs may move, actuate and determine the will of all spirits fallen or unfallen, till they be confirmed in fix'd immutable habits of pure love; as shall be fully unfolded hereafter. Hence it is that in heaven itself angelical minds before their fall were free to love God from a view of his absolute perfection, or from a desire of their own personal felicity; by a pure disinterested love of preference, or from an interested motive of happiness. This mobility of the will by one or t'other of these two springs, was, as we shall show, the first source of defection in the fallen angels. Thus freedom is founded upon the nature of the understanding that can think always of a good superior to any finite one, and upon the nature of the will, that may be determined by a double motive. We come now to the demonstrations a POSTERIORI. They are also of two kinds.

First, without freedom the origin of moral and physical evil would be unintelligible and even impossible. Moral good, as we shall show, is the conformity of the mind to the laws of eternal order. Eternal order, as we shall also show, consists in loving God for himself, and all other beings proportionably as they resemble him. Moral evil on the contrary is to reverse or counteract this law of eternal order; it is to love o-

therwise than God loves; to separate the love of pleasure from the love of justice. Now this is impossible, unless finite beings be endued with a power of preferring freely the love of self and pleasure to the love of order and justice. We must therefore either deny that there is any real distinction betwixt vice and virtue, or maintain that all created intelligences are free. Moreover, without freedom, physical evil is no less unexplicable. It is absolutely impossible that beings made for eternal happiness can be for one instant miserable but by their own fault; and therefore they must be endow'd with some faculty by which they can suspend the designs of God. Since the immense ocean of goodness made us only to be happy by his beatifying influences and communications; since he loves all that he made; and since it is impossible to love a being without desiring its well-being, it is plain that if we are unhappy for one instant it must be by our own fault; that there must be something in us that hinders God's beatifying illapses and emanations, and that this can be no other than the abuse of liberty, and the voluntary turning away of our faculties from the overflowing source of life, light, and love. If finite spirits be not free, then God must be the cause of all the sins they commit, and of all the sufferings they endure. There is no other solution of the strange, irregular phenomena of moral and physical evil that overflow the earth. Without this solution we must open the sluices to all impiety and atheism; and deny that God made us to be eternally perfect and happy in the knowledge and love of his boundless perfections.

2do. By the negation of freedom not only all religion, but

all human society is unhinged. If there be no liberty in spiritual agents, then all their inclinations, passions and vices are unblameable. They are virtuous without being commendable, and vicious without being censurable. We cannot shun any one crime or any one action we commit. All human and divine laws are usefess. It is needfess to write, instruct, exhort, threaten, and endeavour to change any profligate inclination in ourselves or in others. All our efforts are vain and superfluous. We must follow the unchangeable laws of nature, according to the Spinofists, or the irrevocable decrees of heaven, according to the Predestinarians, that determine us invincibly, or abandon us inevitably to robbery, incest, and parricide; to strangle an innocent child, stab a tender mother; starve our family; ruin our country; hate mankind; and blaspheme against almighty power. Nero, Caligula, and Domitian were no ways culpable. Their crimes were as necessary effects of invariable laws, or predeterminating decrees, as the virtues of the greatest philosophers, heroes and saints. Yea all the inward remorses of conscience, horrors of mind, raging despair, and all the outward effects of obduration and impenitence are as necessary as the crimes themselves. All events are equally foreseen, foreordained, and pre-established by the predestinarian God, or produced by the Spinofian. It is vain to say that tho' men be necessary agents, yet neither are rewards usefess, nor punishments unjust, because both are causes that produce necessarily their effects in the good or in the bad. This is mere subterfuge. The rewards proposed, and the punishments threatned can have no effect but upon those who are predestinated to hear the one and fear

the other. The former are useful only to a little number, and the latter are unjust to the greatest part of mankind, who could not act otherwise than fate had determined them.

Whether then we consider the nature of intelligent beings upon which freedom is founded; or the fatal consequences of denying liberty, all conspires to prove that finite spirits are endowed with this property. It is the noblest faculty God could grant them. By it they will be for ever happy, but happy by love and by free love, which is the supreme felicity. Thus they will for ever contribute to their own perfection and happiness. This is the nearest and highest imitation of the divine independency. They will remain for ever unconstrained in their choice, preference and love. Nothing can ever force or do violence to their moral determinations. This is the eternal, immutable and universal law established through the whole regions of immensity. God will always act upon intelligent natures in proportion to their free correspondence. Such is the nature of his intelligent images, that he cannot make them happy without their own concurrence; and upon this great principle depends all the beautiful oeconomy of providence with regard to spirits fallen and unfallen. As he loves essentially all his creatures, as he made them only to be happy; as he can never cease to furnish them all the means necessary to come to this end; he never acts upon them by omnipotent, irresistible wills, otherwise they could never be wicked or miserable for one moment. He would convert them all, and beatify them all by one instantaneous act; and therefore if they be not all good and happy, they must have in themselves a real power to resist his divine operations, and so retard the design he had

in creating them. We shall now examine the objections made against liberty.

1mo. Rational agents act still by some reason that determines them. This reason appears to them at the time always the best, otherwise they would be capable of preferring what appears to them a lesser good to a greater, what appears a greater evil to a less, and consequently of willing evil as evil, which is impossible. Now the soul wills, desires, and loves necessarily what appears to it the best, and therefore freedom is a contradiction.

I grant that all rational beings are determined by some reason, and that they always chuse necessarily what at that time appears to them the best; but I maintain that before they are determined thus, they have always a power to examine if what appears to them the best be really so or not, a true or only an apparent good; and this, as we have said, is the first source of liberty. All particular good may draw or move them because it is good; but it does not determine them necessarily, because it is not all good. They have, by virtue of their natural activity or supernatural aid, a power to suspend the last decision of the understanding and will, till they have examined.

2do. It may be urged that when men doubt or suspend thus their judgment, they have always a reason for this suspension, which makes it appear to them the best and the safest, and consequently it is necessary.

I answer that we have always a reason of suspension when we doubt, because we are fallible; but we have also always a reason of not suspending, because we love pleasure. The fear

of error may retain us on one hand, and the desire of pleasure incite us on the other. We may yield to either, and so have still a reason for acting; but not a necessary reason, since either may determine us. If by a false precipitated judgment we think unlawful pleasure best, then we sin. If by a just diffidence of ourselves, we examine, and then renounce this pleasure, we are virtuous. All those who are criminal think at the instant of commission, all things considered, sin a lesser evil, than the pain they would suffer, and the dangers they would incur by not sinning; that is, they think by a precipitate judgment that sin is better than suffering; and hence it is that all moral evil was derived at first from error. But before they followed this judgment, and let themselves be blinded and hurry'd on by passion, they had a real power to examine.

310. Some will say that lapsed beings are not capable at all times of comparing, examining, and judging; because their understanding may be so darken'd, their will so precipitated, and the capacity of the mind so filled with the present object, that they cannot stop their bent to pleasure, nor see objects in their true light. This we grant; we shall afterwards explain fully how the original corruption of our nature has very much diminished freedom, but it has not entirely destroyed it. We are born enslaved to sin, and captivated by false self-love; but what is wanting to nature may be supply'd by a constant application to the divine source of life, light, and love. This superior, supernatural force is refused to none, as we have already shown, and as we shall demonstrate hereafter. Universal grace 'enlightens every man that comes into the world.' Its diffusive rays, like those of the sun, may be seen by all

those that do not shut their eyes, or hide themselves in a cavern, immers'd in sense, or are so habituated to all the impressions of vice and passion, that they never turn their intellectual views and desires to this divine light, nor implore its succours. Thus they contract inveterate habits of evil, and then by cowardice they call impossible what is very difficult, and deny that they can vanquish their passions, because they will not be at the pains to combat them. But if they had true courage of mind or would demand it from on high, if they would shun the occasions of indulging their appetites, diminish by degrees their commerce with terrestrial objects, accustom themselves to a life of reflection, and walk in the divine presence, they would soon see that what appears to them at first impossible, is only at first very difficult, then less so, and by degrees easy. Thus human life is a continual warfare, and those who will not combat can never vanquish.

4to. Others will say that freedom is impossible because of divine prescience. This attribute of the deity supposes that all things future will certainly exist in the same time, order, and circumstances, in which they are foreseen, and no otherwise. For if things future were contingent, indetermined and uncertain, that is, might or might not be, their infallible futurity could not be the object of the divine prescience; it being a contradiction to know that as certain which is only possible and not certain.

I answer, that we have already confuted this false doctrine of prescience by showing, yea demonstrating, that God never foresees the free determinations of intelligent beings but as simply contingent and possible. We must therefore

either abandon the true doctrine of liberty, or this false opinion about prescience; for to pretend to reconcile these two is a contradiction in terms.

5to. The fifth objection against liberty is that of the Spinofists and Naturalists, who confound the essence of the creator with that of the creature, and the action of the one with that of the other. Spinoza maintains that the soul is merely passive with regard not only to all its sensations, but as to all its ideas; that we are hurried on invincibly to every action, will and choice, by the idea of intellectual pleasure, or by the sensation of corporeal delight; that this double delectation enchains us alternately, hinders us from perceiving the necessity of our choice, and moves us so agreeably that we believe ourselves free, while we are invincibly determined; that we chuse always necessarily even particular good in every instance, because the mind entirely passive, can think of no other good, but that which presents itself in the moment of choice, and in fine that all our actions are only spontaneous or voluntary and not free.

I answer that this system is founded upon a combination of false principles which we have already overturned. It supposes (1), that God wills as necessarily the existence of all things, as he knows their essence (2); that all things flow from him by way of emanation, and so are modes or hypostases of the divine substance (3); that God not only foresees as inevitable, but foreordains every thing future (4); that there

(1) Prop. XVI and XXII. (2) Cor. 2. of Prop. IV compared with Cor. 1. of Prop. XV. (3) Prop. XXVIII and XXXI. (4) Prop. XXIII and its Collaries.

is no real agent in nature, as no real substance, but God alone; and therefore that all things happen necessarily by an uninterrupted chain of causes and effects which produce each other successively and necessarily. In opposition to these sophisms we have already demonstrated (1), that the knowledge as well as the existence of things finite, is entirely free, precarious, and dependent upon the arbitrary thought and will of the absolute infinite (2); that nature produced is composed of substances distinct from the producing cause (3); that the intelligent images of the deity are essentially active and free (4); that this natural activity and essential freedom of finite intelligences is neither limited nor destroy'd by any infallible prescience, or predeterminating decrees, nor by any fatal succession of events resulting from the nature of second causes.

6to. The sixth and last objection is that of the pious Fatalists and rigid Predestinarians. They say if men were really endow'd with such a magnificent power as freedom, then they might be authors of their own happiness, determine the action of God in them, and vaunt that they are the only sources of their own felicity.

I answer that freedom consists in a power to consent to or dissent from, to receive or reject the action of objects, and not in a power to produce their luminous and beatifying influences. Liberty in this sense is only what the modern philosophers call an occasional and not an efficient cause; as the

(1) Prop. XVI and XXII. (2) Cor. 2. of Prop. IV compared with Cor. 1. of Prop. XV. (3) Prop. XXVIII and XXXI. (4) Prop. XXIII and its Corollaries.

opening of the eye is only an occasion of seeing, and not productive of light. The creature can only co-operate with, and not operate its own felicity. Now can a beggar be vain because he stretches out his hand to receive the alms given him? all these sophisms are only subterfuges by which the Predestinarians vainly endeavour to justify their notions of absolute decrees and efficacious graces, as we shall show hereafter.

C O R. I.

Hence freedom is not an arbitrary Gift of God as Bayle says; but a necessary, inseparable adjunct of our intelligent, reasonable natures. Reason is comparing, examining, judging: now from this power flows the power of willing, chusing and preferring one object to another, which is freedom. We love good in general, or happiness necessarily; but all particular good freely; because we may still think of another good far superior to any determinate one, and so find a reason of preferring the greater to the lesser.

C O R. II.

Hence freedom does not consist in a power to determine ourselves without any reason at all. To chuse thus would be capricious fancy, and not a true perfection. We never act deliberately without some motive or reason; and this motive is always real or apparent good.

C O R. III.

Hence freedom far less consists in a power to prefer what appears the worst to what appears the best: but in a power to suspend our choice till we have examined if what appears the best be really so or not. The view of the best, or what appears to us such, always determines us necessarily in the ac-

tual moment of choice: but antecedently to this moment, we have still a real, intrinsic, inherent, immediate, unchained power of examining, if what appears to us best be really so or not, and of suspending our choice till we have thus examined.

C O R. IV.

Hence freedom is a purely admittive faculty and no ways productive of the objects that act upon us. We are very oft entirely passive as to the impression of these objects; but always free to reflect upon and compare those impressions. We are not always free to feel; but we are always free to consent to what we feel. We are not always free to reject wholly the involuntary sensations, strong imaginations, and violent impressions objects excite in us; but we are always free to adhere to them, to correspond with them, and to disavow them, or to indulge them, to expose ourselves to their action, to live within the sphere of their activity, to fortify in ourselves the desire, union and love of them, or to shun the occasions that expose us to their influences.

C O R. V.

Hence, tho' original sin has very much impair'd our natural liberty, and tho' inveterate habits of corruption diminish it more and more, yet it is not and can never be totally destroyed during this mortal life. Tho' of ourselves we cannot vanquish our passions, resist violent temptations, do any supernatural good, or practise any divine virtue; yet we have always present and at hand a superiour, foreign, adventitious, supernatural force, by which we can resist all the efforts of sense, passion and self-love, by degrees vanquish them, and be-

come truly just. If we are faithful to God's universal preventing, purely gratuitous favours which are refused to none, what is at first difficult will become less so, then easy, and in fine natural to the new man 'that God creates in us,' if we cooperate with his sanctifying operations.

C O R. VI.

Hence tho' the devout and rigid Predestinarians admit liberty in appearance, yet in effect they really destroy it; since they maintain that God sees all our moral determinations as infallibly future in his absolute decrees; that pleasure is the only spring of the will; that God gives a celestial delectation to a little number, and refuses it to all others by an effect of his arbitrary will; that the alternate returns of celestial or terrestrial delectation prevent us inevitably, and determine us infallibly; that without this physical premotion we have power to do good, in no other sense than a man has to leap into a furnace, throw himself down a precipice, or pull out his eyes without any motive. This doctrine destroys all freedom; for it is absolutely impossible, that a man in his senses can throw himself deliberately into the fire, leap down a precipice, or pull out his eyes without any reason. Freedom, as we have said, does not consist in a mechanical power to act without reason; but in a power, either natural or supernatural, first of examining, and then chusing what we think the most reasonable and the best.

P R O P O S I T I O N XXXII.

The simple pictures of the deity, or the material universe is not one, single, individual, indivisible substance; but a compound of innumerable, distinct, and divisible substances.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

Matter exists by extension or diffusion of parts (a); every substance that exists by diffusion of parts, is not only ideally, but really divisible (b): whatever is divisible is compounded of parts; that is, of innumerable, distinct, and divisible substances (c): therefore the simple pictures of the deity, or the material universe, is not one, single, individual substance, but a compound of innumerable, distinct, and divisible substances.

S C H O L I U M.

Since we have already demonstrated that matter is not the same with space; that it is a substance and not a property; and in fine that it exists by extension or diffusion of parts; it is evident from the idea and nature of an extended substance, that it is figurable, divisible, and moveable; and therefore it is not one, single, indivisible substance, but a compound of innumerable different substances tho' perhaps contiguous, and homogenous. It is capable of infinite forms, divisions and motions, no one of which taken separately, as the points and

(a) Cor. 3 of Prop. VIII. (b) Lemma of Prop. VIII. (c) Cor. 2. of the Lemma of Prop. VIII.

lines of a picture, represent the original; but the totality taken together; so each individual species of the material pictures do not represent the great archetype, but the totality taken together may manifest his infinite power, wisdom and goodness, by their impressed forces, artful compositions, and beautiful forms, as shall be explained hereafter. This then is one of the most essential differences betwixt the living images, and the simple pictures. Every individual of the former is one single, uncompounded monade or substance, representative of the divine perfections by its essential activity, intelligence and love. Whereas every atom of the simple pictures is not so: it is only the totality, symmetry and composition of the whole, that adumbrate the divine power, wisdom, and goodness.

This property of matter demonstrates evidently that the simple pictures are not, and cannot be intelligent; for since matter is not one simple substance; but a compound of innumerable substances, really distinct, tho' contiguous; if the intelligent image in us were corporeal, it would be composed of innumerable little intelligences, that could no more communicate with each other, than the souls of sundry different persons. Thus what one part knows would be unknown to another: we could not compare nor unite our ideas, so as to make propositions, nor these propositions, so as to form arguments, nor these arguments, so as to compose one continued discourse. All the operations of comparing, uniting, and compounding our ideas, suppose therefore one, individual, indivisible, self-conscious essence, that is, an immaterial substance. Moreover, we hear, see, taste, touch and smell by five differ-

rent organs; and these sensations are as different, as the organs themselves; yet they are all united in the same subject, which compares them, judges of them and distinguishes betwixt them. Now this could not be, if the soul was material; for in that case all these sensations would reside in different parts of matter, that is, in different little substances, distinct from, and unknown to each other; and so it would be impossible to compare, unite and judge of these perceptions, unless we suppose them communicated by these organs to one simple, individual, and indivisible substance. (a)

By the same principle it is clear, that the simple pictures, or material substances are incapable of willing, desiring, and loving. Whatever is unintelligent cannot will; since willing is the tendency of the soul to an object because of the good perceived in it; wherever there is no perception, there can be no volition.

For the same reason, the simple pictures are incapable of freedom: since wherever there is no volition, there can be no free volition. Spirits are moved freely by some reason that persuades them; bodies are push'd necessarily by an impelling force unperceived, unfelt and unknown to them. The action of the moving cause in spirits depends upon their own consent, because of their innate activity, by which they can turn themselves to, or from the objects that act upon them. The action of the moving cause in bodies is foreign to them, and independent of them; because being entirely passive, unintelligent, and incapable of volition, and free-

(a) See this argument fully pursued by Dr. Clarke against Dodwell upon the immateriality of the soul.

dom, they receive invincibly the impression of the impellent cause. In one word, the intelligent images are self-moving, whereas the simple pictures are only moveable.

C O R. I.

Hence the simple picture is incapable of intelligence, self-consciousness, and reason. It can neither know itself nor its original, its essence or modalities; its properties, or relations.

C O R. II.

Hence the simple pictures are incapable of volition, for whatever is unintelligent cannot will; for all willing, desiring or loving supposes the perception of some good real or apparent.

C O R. III.

Hence it follows also that the simple pictures cannot be free; since, as we have shown, freedom results from the nature of the understanding that can compare different objects, and from the nature of the will, that can be moved by a double motive, perfection seen, or pleasure felt. Now where there is neither intelligence nor will, there can be no freedom.

P R O P O S I T I O N XXXIII.

The simple pictures of the deity, or material substances, are not and cannot be essentially active.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

Matter in rest is as much matter as matter in motion (a); no being can exist without its essential properties (b): there-

(a) Ax. 6. of this book. (b) Ax. 7. of the same.

fore the simple pictures of the deity, or material substances, are not essentially active.

S C H O L I U M.

As a simple picture, statue or representation, has no spontaneous motion in it, and cannot move unless it be moved; so motion is not essential to matter; and it cannot move unless its infinite cause communicate force, activity and motion to it. The idea of matter does not include that of force, since, as we have said, matter in rest is as much matter as matter in motion. No materialist has ever yet dared to affirm, that the idea of matter includes necessarily that of motion; for then it would be absolutely impossible to conceive or to suppose matter in rest, which is absurd. Moreover if motion were essential to matter, then some particular direction or determination of motion would be essential to matter; since it is impossible to conceive motion without some particular direction: but no particular direction is essential to matter; for if there were but one atom in nature, it would not of itself move naturally and necessarily to the right rather than to the left, downwards rather than upwards, or any one way more than another; and a tendency to move every way at once, could produce nothing but an eternal rest. Matter then of itself is purely passive; it would remain for ever in an eternal inaction, unless it were moved by some foreign agent. This was what gave the Greek philosophers, and especially the school of Pythagoras and Anaxagoras the first idea of a substance distinct from matter; that was self-moving, active by essence, and the primitive source of all motion, which they called ἀρχὴ αὐτοκί-

μητη. This then is another essential difference betwixt the living images and the simple pictures: the former, as we shall show, may fall into a spiritual lethargy, inaction and insensibility: but so soon as they awaken from this deep sleep, they can turn to their proper objects, feel their operations, and tend to them freely. Bodies tho' disengaged from all surrounding obstacles, would remain in an eternal rest, unless pushed by an external force. Spirits on the contrary, so soon as they perceive their true objects, move to them naturally; the obstacles that hinder'd their perception being removed, they tend of themselves to whatever can satiate their natural desire of felicity; yea they can make a choice among the several objects or causes of this felicity. We know no other inherent attributes, powers, or capacities in matter but those of figurability, divisibility, and mobility; of moving where it is push'd; of going where there is the least resistance, and of standing still when it is stopped.

C O R. I.

Hence we have a new demonstration that matter is incapable of thought, volition and freedom; for all these properties suppose action, activity, and a self-moving power, and so cannot belong to a substance that is entirely passive.

C O R. II.

Hence all the inherent, essential, natural tendencies, inclinations, sympathies, attractions, repulsions, and active powers that some attribute to matter, and that cannot be explained by mechanical causes, are purely chimerical. They must be impressed qualities, they cannot be essential properties. The contrary opinion tends visibly to spiritualize extended sub-

stances, and to invest them with all the properties of the living images.

C O R. III.

Hence in a state of pure and exalted nature, the material pictures could not resist the divine action, nor hinder the execution of God's almighty designs in creating them. Being entirely passive and void of freedom, they could not deviate, of themselves, from the laws, motions, directions and forms given them by the author of nature. Wherefore if any change happen to them, it must be in consequence of some impressed force altogether foreign to them.

From the seven preceding propositions demonstrated in this book, we may draw the following general corollaries, which are of wonderful use both in philosophy and theology.

I. GENERAL COROLLARY.

Hence we have the five specific differences betwixt material, and immaterial substances. (1) Bodies exist in space by diffusion of parts; whereas spirits in imitation of God exist without diffusion or extension. (2) Bodies are not one single, indivisible substance, but a compound of innumerable, distinct, and divisible substances; even tho' contiguous or coherent; whereas spirits are single, uncompounded, and indivisible substances. (3) Bodies are simple pictures that have no knowledge of their modifications, nor of their almighty cause; spirits are living images, capable of knowing themselves and their all-wise original. (4) Bodies by nature are entirely passive, but activity is an essential property of all intelligent na-

tures. (5) In fine, bodies are push'd necessarily by an impelling cause; whereas spirits can resist or consent freely to the action of objects that sollicit them. Wherefore spirit may be defin'd 'an unextended, uncompounded, indivisible, intelligent, active substance that can determine itself freely;' body on the contrary is 'an extended, compounded, divisible, unintelligent, passive substance, that follows necessarily the impulse of the moving cause.'

II. GENERAL COROLLARY.

Hence body and spirit cannot be only two distinct individuals of the same species of substance. They must be substances of quite different kinds; since their essential properties are diametrically opposite, incompatible and contradictory; such as extension and non-extension; divisibility and indivisibility; insensibility and perception; passivity and activity; necessity and freedom. To demonstrate the essential distinction betwixt soul and body, it is not sufficient to prove that the properties of these two beings are different; or that they do not suppose or include each other: it is a sophism to say that matter cannot think because the idea of extension does not infer that of intelligence. We might prove in the same manner that matter cannot move, because the idea of extension does not include that of motion. It must be further shown that intelligence and extension are incompatible, opposite or contrary properties; and therefore that they must belong to different substances, and to substances of quite different kinds.

III GENERAL COROLLARY.

Hence the opinion of all those, who imagine that the souls of beasts are material, and yet capable of sensation and volition, is altogether unphilosophical, nay dangerous: for if certain portions of matter ranged in certain forms, and moved with certain velocities were capable of thought, sensation and reasoning in an inferior degree, then other portions of matter with superior forms, forces, and velocities, might be capable of thoughts, sensations and reflections in a superior degree. Thus our souls might be material. Yea by new modifications of matter and motion, innumerable orders of spirits might be formed. This is not all: by complicating and perfecting the forms, augmenting the forces, and velocities of matter, God himself might be material; and his essence an ethereal fluid. Thus the rash doctrine of material souls in beasts tends at last to impiety.

GENERAL SCHOLIUM.

Thus by joining the seven preceding propositions, and their corollaries, we have a full confutation of all the doctrine of the materialists. They pretend that tho' perception, reason, and volition be not essential to matter; yet they may be the effects of certain portions of matter figured, divided, mov'd and organiz'd in a particular manner. Nothing is more absurd. All that is produced in matter by figure, division and motion is only a change of form, bulk, or place. Now intelligence is not change of form; nor reasoning change of

magnitude, nor volition change of place. The change of form, bulk and place in organiz'd or unorganiz'd bodies does not alter the intimate essence of things, and therefore can never superadd to them a new, quite dissimilar quality, or reality they had not before. We have already demonstrated that intelligence is a perfection, and non-intelligence a defect. Now it is not only unconceivable, but absolutely impossible, that what is unintelligent and insensible before organization, can become intelligent and self-conscious by organization; since organization does not alter the nature and essence of things. A mass of numberless, subtile, invisible and unintelligent polygones, spheres, cylinders, elliptoids, pyramids, or any other infinitely small solids, such as all fluids must be, cannot therefore become intelligent, self-conscious, and rational by flowing into the channels or tubes of organiz'd bodies.

The materialists will perhaps say that metaphysical reasonings can never destroy physical facts, and constant experience; that we feel every day how much the dispositions of the body influence those of the mind; that the liveliness of our thoughts and perceptions depends upon the quicker or slower motions of the animal spirits; that persons half-strangled or in a deep swoon, declare upon their recovery that they had no thought, perception, nor self-consciousness. From all this they conclude, that upon the extinction of animal life, they will have no sensation, perception, or intelligence, since these depend entirely upon organiz'd matter.

Imo. I answer in the first place, that this shows that the soul and body are united, but not that they are one. We might as well say, that the art, science, and intelligence of a

musician lies entirely in the strings or pipes of his instruments; because his knowledge is more or less conspicuous according as they are more or less tun'd. The comparison is perfectly just, and therefore the contrary sophism can only dazzle superficial minds that have no accuracy and acuteness to distinguish betwixt union and unity; that mistake appearances for realities, and take effects for causes.

2do. We have already shown that the soul by a suspension of the divine activity in and upon it, may fall into a total insensibility and inaction; and that laps'd intelligences may for a time be void of all thought, sensation, and reflection: but this suspension of their powers, does not prove the annihilation of their essence. The superior faculties of degraded, diseased, fallen spirits may be so darkened, shut up and obstructed, that they can have no communication, but with material objects; and therefore when the corporeal organs are stopt or derang'd, as in a swoon and after half-strangling, they can have no sensations, nor reflections; but this does not argue, that if the union betwixt soul and body had been entirely dissolved, they would not have awakened into another state, wherein they would have been miserable or happy; known God and themselves, and felt the just, natural, and necessary consequences of their virtues or vices. This life is a kind of dream, sleep or lethargy, wherein the most exalted minds are darkned, weakned and sick, or at least not restored to the true exercise of their intellectual functions. We ought not therefore to judge of the properties, powers, and perfections of the soul in a recovered, re-established, and

healthful state, by the symptoms that befall it in a state of sickness, depravation, and malady.

Mr. Locke therefore pronounced too hastily (a) that we do not know enough of the intimate essence of things to decide whether God cannot communicate thought to certain portions of matter. I answer that tho' we do not know the intimate essence of things, yet we know sufficiently their attributes to decide about and determine their differences. We know that matter is an extended substance capable of figure, division and motion, and consequently that it is not one, single, individual substance; but a compound of innumerable substances, that are as really distinct, even tho' contiguous, as if they were separated at the greatest distance. Now it is absolutely impossible that a numberless multitude of different, independent, unintelligent atoms can make up one individual, indivisible and self-conscious essence; or that one indivisible self-consciousness, can be made up of innumerable, divisible and independent self-conscious particles: and therefore it is as absurd to suppose that omnipotence itself can unite these opposite qualities in the same substance, as to suppose that he can make a triangular circle, or a spherical cube. These ideas are contradictory and incompatible. We are however very far from suspecting that Locke had any real design of establishing materialism: but his philosophy being very oft founded upon popular observations, and sensible experience, without ascending to first principles, his consequences are apt to be applied by bad men by turns to all sorts of systems, idealism, and materialism, Spinosism and deism, religion and in-

(a) See Locke upon human understanding, chap. 3. Book IV.

credulity; so that sometimes he seems to pull down with one hand, what he builds up with another.

Thus the Materialists, and all their disguised partisans, must either deny, with Spinoza and the Idealists, that matter is a real, finite, divisible, figurable, moveable substance; destroy thereby its essence, and reduce it to the idea of infinite space; or grant that thought, reason, and volition cannot be essential attributes of matter, nor effects of its modifications, nor qualities superadded to it by almighty power.

Thus we hope we have overturned the unreasonable system of the materialists, by showing that God can represent his perfections externally both by living images and by simple pictures, which are quite different substances. The numerous, beautiful truths that flow from this sublime principle could never have been so easily discovered or demonstrated as by the gradation of ideas contained in the foregoing propositions, scholiums and corollaries. All the other proofs are lame and imperfect, because they are not deduced from, nor reunited in the same great principle. We proceed now to confute the doctrine of the idealists, who maintain that God is the immediate author of all the sensations, and perceptions we have of material objects; that extension, figure and motion, like colours, tastes and sounds, are mere sensations of the mind, that have no real external existence; and in fine that there is no third substance called matter, betwixt God and finite spirits.

LEMMA OF PROPOSITION XXXIV.

The ideas, sensations, and perceptions we have of corporeal and sensible objects very often turn us away from the contemplation and love of the divine perfections.

S C H O L I U M.

This is evident by universal experience. The desire to shun sensible pains, and to enjoy sensible pleasures is the source of all the errors and crimes in the world. None can doubt of this but such as deny that there are any such things as truth and virtue. Now as the idealists whom we are going to combat, are far from maintaining such maxims, and have a sacred horror against all immorality and irreligion, they cannot reject this great principle.

P R O P O S I T I O N XXXIV.

God is not the immediate author of all the ideas, sensations, and perceptions we have of matter.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

God could not without any reason produce immediately in finite intelligences a perpetual series of ideas, sensations, and perceptions that frequently turn them off from the contemplation and love of the divine perfections (a); the ideas, sensations, and perceptions we have of material objects fre-

(a) Cor. 4. of Prop XXIV.

quently turn us away from the contemplation and love of the divine perfections (a): therefore God is not the immediate author of all the ideas, sensations, and perceptions we have of matter.

S C H O L I U M.

The idealists will say that the same objection may be made against God's continuing the action of material objects upon, and their union with spirits; since this serves very oft to corrupt and degrade them. I answer that there is a great difference betwixt the two systems. We shall show very soon, that we are at present in a degenerate state, where we are for wise reasons subjected to pain and pleasure by our physical union with material nature. We suffer the one as a punishment, we may use the other as an innocent mitigation of our exile; and it depends upon us to make a good use of both; yea to suspend, or at least to diminish, all commerce with such corporeal objects, as can turn us off from the contemplation and love of truth and virtue. But to suppose that God is the immediate author of all the impure imaginations, voluptuous sensations, and tormenting perceptions that expose the mind to corruption and depravation, to moral and physical evil, is true Manicheism. This perpetual production of ideas, perceptions and sensations would be unworthy of the divine purity, justice and goodness, unless there were real bodies, a physical union betwixt them and souls, and such a constitution in nature established, that both act mutually upon each other.

Moreover, if there were no external bodies, and if we had

(a) By preceeding Lemma.

no real bodies of our own, to what purpose this continual succession of ideas, as if we had? why does the invincible delusion last? why these pains that seem to be occasioned by the action of noxious bodies upon us? why those pleasures that depend upon an apparent application of our organs to external objects? why that order and connection betwixt our ideas and sensations, which supposes still an organiz'd body, and objects acting upon it? all the common language of men is nonsense and folly. A sword does not pierce the bowels; fire does not consume our members; all these appearances are imaginary: we have no bodies to preserve: there are no bodies to guard against. Why then did God make this useless and arbitrary connection betwixt the ideas of size and figure, and the sensations of pain and pleasure? all nature becomes a phantom, a mere delusion, a false appearance; there is nothing but ideas. This system therefore is equally opposite to God's eternal truth and wisdom, as also to his sanctity and goodness.

The learned Doctor Berkeley (a) from a sincere and a pious zeal against the absurd system of the materialists, is the only modern author we know that has ventured to deny not only the real existence of bodies, but even the possibility of their creation. He reasons thus, ' There are in matter two sorts of qualities, called primary and secondary. The former are extension, figure, division, motion and solidity. The other are colours, tastes, smells, sounds and touches. All philosophers grant that the latter are only sensations of the mind, which have no reality without us. It is easy to prove

(a) See his dialogues betwixt Hylas and Philonous.

' that the former are so too. There is nothing in nature ab-
 ' solutely great or small, slow or swift, plain or angular, real-
 ' ly separated or perfectly united, hard or soft: but all are one
 ' or t'other relatively to our organs; for if we had other sen-
 ' ses differently conformed, we would see them, feel them,
 ' taste them, smell them, hear them quite differently from
 ' what we do now. Other animals see that great which ap-
 ' pears to us little, swift what seems slow, hard what we call
 ' soft, agreeable what we think disagreeable, sweet what we
 ' look upon as bitter, and love what to us is noxious. Now
 ' since size, figure, motion, division, and solidity change con-
 ' tinually upon every alteration in the distance, medium, and
 ' organs of sensation; there can be no determinate material
 ' object from without, that is exactly such as it appears to us.
 ' Wherefore there is nothing real in the objects, like the pri-
 ' mary qualities of matter, more than the secondary; and
 ' both are equally sensations of the mind.'

All the force of the Doctor's reasonings lies here. There is nothing without us like the precise figures, sizes, and motions which we perceive within; therefore there is no material substance existent. The conclusion does not appear just. Tho' there were nothing in material objects perfectly the same with the particular figures, sizes, and motions we perceive with the naked eye, yet it does not thence follow that there is and can be no substance distinct from spirit, that produces in us these sensations, and that is in itself extended, figurable and moveable. Tho' there be in nature no absolute magnitude; tho' the same bodies appear small or great, swift or slow, plain or angular, united or porous according to the different

organs by which we perceive them; yet this does not prove, that there is no real substance without us, betwixt whose extremities, there is a real distance, which may receive different forms, be transported from place to place, and be divided into several equal parts. Moreover, all sensations, ideas and modifications of the soul being real, these changes must have a real cause, which must be material or spiritual, created or uncreated. The Doctor does not pretend that it is finite spirits that excite in us all these perceptions, but God alone: we have already shown that the infinite mind cannot be the immediate cause of these ideas, sensations and modifications; and therefore there must be a third substance betwixt God and human souls, that really acts upon us to produce in us different sensations, according to our different organs, states and situations. No doubt unfallen angels and beatified spirits see matter otherwise than we. No doubt material nature re-established will produce in our souls by the organs of our glorious bodies quite other ideas, sensations and perceptions than those we now have; but still there will be real matter, the cause and the object of their perceptions. The difference therefore of the sensations produced according to the variation of the organs and distances, is no proof of the non-existence of the object producing.

The Doctor's mistakes proceed from his confounding the ideas with the objects, and the perceptions produced with the cause producing. Simple ideas as we shall show, are not objects which the mind perceives without itself; but modes produced in it by objects different from it. The variations therefore of the modes, ideas, perceptions and sensations, accor-

ding to the difference of the medium, organs and distances, is no proof of the non-existence of the object that acts upon us.

The subtle Doctor proceeds in his second dialogue to enquire into the true cause of our ideas and sensations. He confutes most ingeniously the Malebranchian romance of occasional causes, and shows clearly that the hypothesis of seeing bodies in God, makes their creation useless, as we shall demonstrate also very soon. He goes on in the same dialogue to show, that as matter cannot be an occasion, so it cannot be a simple instrument of the divine operation: ‘ for, says he, an instrument being an help made use of to do what cannot be performed by the mere act of the will, to suppose that an all-perfect spirit, upon whose will all things have an immediate and absolute dependence, makes use of an instrument, is perfectly absurd, and inconsistent with the divine omnipotence.’

This argument proves too much, or it proves nothing. It destroys the activity of second causes, and supposes that God is the immediate author not only of all the physical actions, but of all the moral determinations of created beings. Thus liberty is destroyed, and God made the sole cause of all the sins, and blasphemies of finite spirits. It is true that all beings have an immediate and absolute dependence upon the divine will; but it is absolutely false that all actions have such an immediate and absolute dependence on the divine action. Bodies are not mere instruments, but real agents: for, as we shall show very soon, God can communicate to his living images and simple pictures a real activity distinct from his own, as well as a real substance distinct from his own.

Nothing exalts more the ideas we have of the divine nature, than to suppose that God has not only an infinite power to produce all that is possible, and all that is compatible with his perfections, but also that he can communicate a real activity to other beings. The negation of this principle tends necessarily to prove, that God is the only agent in nature; and this opinion leads naturally to Spinosim, because it induces us to believe that God is also the only substance in nature; as shall be fully unfolded in the next proposition.

The ingenious and learn'd Doctor endeavours to prove in his third and last dialogue, that God is the immediate cause, and even the object of all our sensations; and that there is no third substance betwixt God and finite spirits, which as we suppose acts upon us when we perceive extension, figure and motion. ' The eternal, omnipresent mind, says he, which ' knows and comprehends all things, exhibits them to our ' view in such a manner, and according to such laws, as he ' himself has ordained, and are by us called the laws of nature. All things exist in the divine mind from eternity. When ' things are said to begin or end their existence, we do not ' mean this with regard to God, but the creatures. All objects ' are eternally known by God, or which is the same thing, have ' an eternal existence in his mind: but when things before imperceptible to created spirits are by a decree of God made perceptible, then they are said to begin a real existence with respect to created minds. By creation therefore, nothing else can ' be understood, but that the several parts of the world already ' existent from all eternity in the divine mind, become gradually ' perceptible to finite spirits endued with proper faculties.

This is the most refined Spinosism that ever was; for here the Doctor adopts three of the greatest fundamental principles of that impious scheme, (1) The identity of ideas and their objects; (2) The coeternity of these ideas in the divine mind, and consequently their consubstantiality with God; (3) The uselessness of creation. We have already demonstrated, (1) that the archetypal ideas of things finite are quite different from the objects themselves; (2) that it is absolutely false, that all finite ideas have an eternal and necessary existence in the divine mind; (3) that creation is not only possible, but absolutely necessary to explain the phenomena of nature produced. If this were not so, a Spinosist might say, since all things have an eternal existence in the divine mind, this must be true of spirits as well as of bodies. Here all the arguments the Doctor makes use of against the creation of material substances, may be employed against the creation of finite spirits; for if the knowledge God has of all objects be the same thing as their eternal coexistence with the divine mind, then this may be said of spirits as well as of bodies; for God knows both equally. Thus nature produced whether material or spiritual, must be looked upon as an emanation of the divine substance, which by immanent action produces all in itself; the ideas of spirits as well as the ideas of bodies. What we call created intelligences must therefore be eternal, consubstantial ideas, forms, personalities and inherencies of the divine mind; as what we call bodies are only different sensations and perceptions of the several parts of the intelligible world already existent in the divine mind: thus all ideas of creation are entirely destroy'd; and what we mean thereby is only that the

coeternal, consubstantial forms or ideas of the divine mind being living, self-conscious, intelligent hypostases or personalities, are affected with different sensations, perceptions, and modifications produced by the immanent action of the absolute infinite upon itself; this is the flower and quintessence of Spinozism. No doubt the great and good Doctor did not perceive those fatal consequences of his Scheme.

The Doctor asks more than once in the course of his dialogues, what is this third substance betwixt God and finite spirits called matter. I answer that it is, as has been already demonstrated, a picture or representation, or shadow of the divine perfections endowed with a true, real, physical, communicated, and not essential efficacy; by which it can act immediately upon spirits, to produce in them different sensations, ideas, and inclinations. Spirits on the contrary are living images of the deity, endow'd with an essential, inherent, immanent activity, by which they can act upon themselves; and then with a communicated, emanant activity, by which they can act upon bodies, to produce in them real figures, divisions, and motions. All this shall be fully demonstrated in the following proposition.

The Leibnitian doctrine of monades resembles very much this doctrine of Doctor Berkeley. The German philosopher does not say that God is the sole author of all our corporeal perceptions; but that extension, figure and motion are pure appearances and sensations in us, that have no real object out of the mind; that the immediate efficient cause of these corporeal perceptions is monades; that these monades are simple, indivisible, unextended, unintelligent essences, endued howe-

ver with a real, inherent, essential, physical power of action; that God created from the beginning two sorts of monades, one intelligent, and another unintelligent; but both without figurability, divisibility or mobility, and consequently homogeneous; that these two sorts of monades, which compose the whole of the universe, act reciprocally upon each other by certain general laws pre-established; whence arise all the phenomena, harmony, and order of the universe; that these monades being equally simple, uncompounded, unextended, and therefore homogeneous, their mutual action and reaction upon each other is far more intelligible than that of two distinct substances, one extended and another unextended; that God created nothing but simple essences, or monades; and in fine that what we call compound beings extended, divisible, figurable, and moveable are only perceptions in the soul, as sounds, smells, and colours; and not objects really existent without us.

He does not therefore pretend, as some of his disciples falsely alledge, that extended substances or bodies result from the union of unextended monades; this is not only unconceivable, but absolutely impossible. All he asserts is, that extension, figure, and motion are mere sensations which arise from the action of these monades upon the soul. Here there is nothing contradictory, inconceivable, or mysterious. His system differs from that of Berkeley in this alone, that in the one there is no third substance betwixt God and spirit that acts upon the soul, whereas here there is a third substance really created, existent, and active, tho' unextended, indivisible and uncompounded. Thus the existence of matter is

really destroyed, and all reduced to the idea of intelligent and unintelligent monades.

This German invention seems far more hypothetical and less simple than the Berkeleian scheme, which makes God the sole universal agent. In explaining the phenomena of nature, it is in vain to imagine entities that are not necessary. If God's immediate action can explain all, why have recourse to second causes that are purely imaginary, and whose existence can never be demonstrated *A PRIORI* by solid metaphysical principles; nor *A POSTERIORI* by sensible physical experiences. Moreover, this doctrine tends to confound the nature of spirit and matter, by supposing that what is unintelligent may be essentially active. In fine the transition from this Leibnitian fiction to Spinosism is slippery and steep: for if there be really no extended substances in nature, it is easy to pass from that hypothesis to the idea of one only universal substance, that acts sometimes as extended, and sometimes as intelligent; and that produces by turns the sensations of extension, figure, and motion and the ideas of pure intellect, reason and will.

All these modern fictions are only a repetition in different terms of the antiquated Zenonian errors; they are groundless metaphysical refinements, that recede from nature, and that perplex philosophy; which should always combine abstract principles with sensible experiences; otherwise we must fall naturally into Idealism or Materialism, which by different roads lead at last to the Spinosian impiety, which asserts that nature is composed of one only substance of which all beings are only modalities, hypostases or consubstantial forms.

C O R. I.

Hence what the Idealists and Spinosists maintain that the ideas and the objects are the same is absolutely false; as also that the extended substance and the thinking substance are one and the same substance, which acts upon us by turns, and which we therefore conceive sometimes as intelligent, and sometimes as extended. The archetypal ideas are these arbitrary conceptions which God forms freely in his divine understanding, when he thinks of himself as representable by things external. The objects created are the substances themselves, which he produces in his divine immensity, correspondent to these ideas, and representative of his divine perfections. The one exist only in the supreme mind, and are free modes of it. The others exist without the divine mind, and are real substances distinct from it.

C O R. II.

Hence the enthusiastic notion of Malebranche, that when we see bodies it is not real created matter we see; but ideal bodies, produced in us by the immediate action of the omnipresent, all-powerful, and all-luminous essence of God; as also the Berkelean scheme, that by creation, nothing else can be understood but that the several parts of the world, already existent from all eternity in the divine mind, become gradually perceptible by finite spirits; both these new doctrines, I say, favour openly Spinosism: for tho' the French philosopher differs from the English in this, that Malebranche allows the existence of matter, and that Berkeley denies it; and tho' both differ from Spinoza in this, that they distinguish always the uncreated essence from created spirits; yet

they all three agree in this, that the divine substance is the only cause and object of all the ideas, sensations and perceptions we have of extension, figure, and motion. Now the passage from this to Spinosism is easy, as we shall just now show.

C O R. III.

Hence the negation of the existence of matter is followed by visible absurdities and palpable contradictions, that impeach equally the divine veracity and wisdom, sanctity and goodness.

P R O P O S I T I O N XXXV.

God may communicate to his living images and lively pictures a real activity, by which they can act mutually upon each other.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

God is essentially and infinitely active (a); creation is a representation of God in things-external (b): infinite activity cannot be represented by absolute inaction (c). Therefore God may communicate to his living images, and lively pictures, a real activity by which they can act mutually upon each other.

S C H O L I U M.

It may be said, that by the same reasoning we might prove that all corporeal beings are intelligent, because infinite intelligence cannot be represented by what has no intelligence at all. This is absolutely false; for wisdom and intelligence,

(a) Prop. IX. (b) Prop. XXI. (c) Ax. 5. of this Book.

art, and knowledge, may be represented by the beautiful arrangement of the different parts of the material universe, as well as by the essential attributes of intelligent natures: but infinite activity cannot be represented by pure passivity, and absolute inaction. Wherefore all finite beings must be originally active as representative of the great archetype. We do not speak here of that immanent activity essential to spirits alone, and by which they can act upon themselves, to compare their ideas, and chuse betwixt them, judge of them, and adhere to them. We speak of that emanant, communicated activity, by which all the parts of the creation material and immaterial, the living images and the simple pictures, can act really, reciprocally, and physically upon each other according to the general laws established by the author of nature.

Moreover, it is certain that God may communicate a real activity distinct from his own, as well as a real substance distinct from his own. For if God could not communicate a power of acting to creatures, it must be said for the same reason that he cannot communicate to them a power of reasoning and willing. The one is no more incommunicable than the other. All God's attributes are communicable in greater or lesser degrees, except Self-existence, which supposes absolute infinity. That a created finite being should be self-existent, is a contradiction in terms: but it is no contradiction to suppose it endued with any other powers or perfections whatsoever in a bounded degree. Unless we suppose, with Spinoza, that reason and choice are mere passive receptions of impulse from a continual, necessary series of causes that produced each other successively; we must allow that the soul has a

real power of comparing its ideas, and chusing betwixt them: and therefore since God could communicate a power of reasoning and willing, he may communicate also a power of acting. As he can communicate to his living images, and simple pictures, an imitation of his infinite wisdom and goodness by their essential attributes or impressed forms, so he may impart to them an imitation of his infinite emanant activity, by their communicated powers, and impressed forces. The property of the Father may be represented in external things as well as that of the Son and Holy Ghost. The rules of analogy are the same in all the three; and if we deny the one, we must deny the others; or give a reason why the imitation of the first is impossible, and that of the two last possible. Now since no such reason can be assigned, we must allow that an imitation of all the three is equally feasible.

The schoolmen say very well, that *AGERE SEQUITUR ESSE*; beings act as they exist. If they exist infinitely, they act infinitely; if they exist dependently, they act dependently; if they exist finitely, their action is finite; if they exist in an imperfect manner, their action is imperfect. In all these senses their action is real, tho' their powers be not equal. As all the creatures exist in the divine immensity, so they all act by the divine efficacy: but as their receiving existence originally from God does not hinder them from having a real being distinct from his; so their receiving originally power from God, does not hinder their having a real activity distinct from his. It is by God's continued efficacy that all beings, whether material or spiritual, become intelligent and intelligible; that bodies move bodies; that spirits act upon spirits;

and that these two substances mutually influence each other, by an immediate communication as analogous in this that they represent the same original. It is in God, and by God that they live, move and have their being. The creatures in whatever state they be considered, whether fallen or unfallen, are never entirely disjoined nor detached from their almighty cause. They exist, subsist, and so to speak, swim in the immense ocean of life. The only difference betwixt glorious and mortal bodies, beatify'd and deprav'd spirits, exalted and degraded natures, is, that God operates more in the one than in the others, manifests himself more to the former than to the latter; but he is equally present to all; they are all entirely dependent upon, existent in, and inseparable from his omnipresent essence and creating energy, which supports all, animates all, and overflows all. God not only preserves and governs all things by his providence; but he moves all things and makes them act, yet in such a manner that second causes move and act by a force that is proper to them, as they subsist by an existence that is proper to them. As the creating energy that gives existence to finite substances is not a real emanation of the divine essence; so the omnipresent energy that gives activity to second causes is not the same with the divine action. In both cases the essence and activity imparted to the creatures are quite distinct from the divine essence and action. This idea is very subtle, but it will be found solid, and profound.

It is true indeed that we cannot conceive how this communicated force produces its effect. We do not see how bodies move bodies; far less how spirits move spirits, and least of

all how these two substances act reciprocally upon each other. When one body acts upon another to transport it from place to place; all that we see is a contact or junction of surfaces; but the idea of contact does not infer transporting. We do not comprehend how the soul moves the hand; nor how the hand communicates force to a stone thrown; nor how this stone preserves this force after the hand has abandoned it; nor in fine how this force passes from one body to another. Thus the communication of force by spirit to body is altogether incomprehensible. We understand far less yet how bodies can act upon spirits. It cannot be by contact and junction of extended surfaces; since spirits have none. It is also certain that unintelligent matter alone cannot produce in spirits ideas and sensations; since the effect cannot be superior in reality to the cause. That force which resides in matter, and which makes matter act, is not essential to matter. Moreover, that emanant activity by which spirits act upon matter, upon a substance so distinct from themselves, is not essential to them: they might have existed eternally tho' they had had no communication with matter, and tho' it had never been created. The force therefore by which spirits act upon matter, and matter upon spirits, is entirely an effect of that vital, spiritual, all-creating energy that runs through the whole series of beings from the absolute infinite to the lowest finite; that reaches from one end of the universe to the other, and that connects all second causes with the first original cause. This universal, all-creating, all-preserving, all-enlivening energy, is the original source of all the activity we see in the creatures; tho' not the immediate cause of all their actions, determinations,

and motions. It communicates to them activity as well as existence. As they have a real existence distinct from God, so they have a real activity distinct from his. Their action is different from God's, as their substance is distinct from his, tho' both are derived originally from him. This universal force makes bodies act, but they are real agents. It renders spirits perceiving and intelligent; but they really perceive and reason; it makes matter perceptible, but matter is really perceiv'd; otherwise, as we shall show, the creation of bodies would have been useless and superfluous.

I grant then that we have no clear ideas of this force, neither in the first nor in second causes: but as we do not deny creating power in God; tho' we cannot conceive it; so neither ought we to deny modifying power in the creatures, because we do not comprehend the manner of its operation. In one and t'other, the passage from nothing to something is equally unintelligible. We do not conceive the connection there is betwixt the modifying cause, and the mode produced; nor betwixt the creating cause, and the substance produced. If we deny the former because we cannot conceive it, we must for like reason deny the other; and maintain that as there is but one agent, so there is but one substance in nature. We see plainly that the universe is composed of substances, powers, and modes. We have clear enough ideas of all the three, to distinguish them from each other; but we cannot explain how the first exist, nor how the second act, nor how the third are produced. A substance is something that sustains modes; a power is something that produces them; a mode is a change that happens in a substance, by this active power: but as we

have no adequate ideas of substance, so we have none of power. We know that both exist; but during this mortal state we comprehend neither how the one is created, nor how the other operates. All the system of the idealists comes from presumptuous desire and pretension of knowing what we can not discover, till we see God as he is; how he created all things without any participation or discernion of his substance; how he preserves them by an unrepeatd continuation of the same creating energy; and how he communicates to them a real activity distinct from his own, as well as a distinct real substance. Some ancients established occult qualities and virtues in nature, underiv'd from the first cause, and so diviniz'd the creature. Some moderns destroy the activity of second causes, and thereby the freedom of intellectual agents, and the existence of material beings; and so make God the immediate author of all moral and physical evil. Both extremes are dangerous. The true midst is to acknowledge the real but communicated activity of created beings, tho' we cannot conceive it.

Father Malebranche and his disciples attack'd the doctrine of causality in the creatures, and especially in material agents, for the following reasons.

Imo. Since in all action there is a passage from nothing to something, activity in second causes would be a real creation, which is an incommunicable attribute of the divine nature. Hence he concludes that finite cannot act upon finite, and that God present every where to his creatures is the only means of communication betwixt them. I grant that God cannot communicate to creatures a creating power; but I

deny that he cannot impart to them a modifying power. There is as great a difference betwixt the production of substances and that of modes, as there is betwixt substances and modes. Substances cannot subsist independently of the divine creating energy; but modes may subsist independent of their producing cause; because they have substances to inhere in, and so subsist till they be destroyed by contrary acts. God then cannot communicate to finite beings his creating power; but he may give them an image of it, which is modifying power. Since they are originally representative of their divine archetype; they must or may have something representative of his creating energy. As he can produce substances that had no existence before his action; so they may produce forms that had no existence before their action. He may render them active as well as existent. They may become by his divine beneficence real agents, as well as real substances. There is no denying the one, without denying the other.

2do. The Cartesians reason thus: ‘ The conservation of
 ‘ beings is a continual creation; wherefore God gives to all
 ‘ creatures every moment, not only their being, but their
 ‘ modes of being. He does not create Being in general, with-
 ‘ out any particular modes; that is impossible; but he creates
 ‘ every being in each instant, with the real, physical, and par-
 ‘ ticular modes it has. He cannot create a body without
 ‘ some figure, without rest or motion; wherefore the continu-
 ‘ al creation of the substance supposes the continual produc-
 ‘ tion of the mode; and that of the mode, the production of
 ‘ the substance. These two are inseparable, because as no mode

‘ can exist without a substance, so no substance can exist without some particular mode.

I have already confuted this opinion that the conservation of beings is a continually repeated creation, and so all the natural consequences of this doctrine fall to the ground. Conservation is not a succession of new repeated acts, but a continuation of the same creating energy, whose effects are as permanent and eternal as if God had given them a real stability of existence independent of his. Now as God by the continuation of his creating energy gives a real substance to creatures, which is distinct from his own, so he gives them a real activity different from his action. *AGERE SEQUITUR ESSE.* The idea of activity, causality, and power supposes and includes something that can really produce acts and effects; and therefore the creatures may have a real action proper to themselves, distinct from the immediate action of God. Wherefore it is absolutely false that modifying power supposes at the same time creating power; unless we maintain with Spinoza that all beings are consubstantial forms of the deity. I grant that God cannot produce a substance without it have some particular mode; but we have already demonstrated, and shall explain more fully hereafter, that God created at first all beings with modes, attributes, and powers representative of his divine perfections. We shall also show very soon that by their natural, inherent force, activity, and freedom, laps’d spirits lost their original forms, and forces; and that in consequence thereof the material spheres which they inhabit lost a great part of their original beauty and activity. The Cartesian and Malebranchian philosophy gives no idea of this

pure, primitive, and uncorrupted state, and so confounds eternally the laws of nature exalted with those of nature degraded.

3tio. Malebranche adds that if there were any real agent in nature besides God, then there would be other beings besides him, that we might honour, fear and love. I answer that all beings are to be lov'd, fear'd, and honour'd relatively to God as their source and archetype. Thus all second causes and created agents, are to be more or less fear'd, lov'd and honour'd, according as their action is more or less conformable or contrary to the divine action; and according as the one accelerates or retards the other: but God is still the primitive source of all power, as he is the first author of all being. This pious discourse of Malebranche ought no more to impose upon us than that of Spinoza, who affects in his works a devote air, and a sincere zeal for the glory of God. He rejects with horror the imputation of Atheism and Materialism. What can be more pious than the editors preface to Spinoza's works? If we may believe the author of it, his master was a zealous Christian. All his moral and theological works are commentaries upon the gospel. His design was to make men look upon all created substances as inherencies, hypostases, and modalities of the divine essence, that so God might be honour'd, lov'd, and fear'd not only as the sole cause, but as the sole object of all our perceptions. ' If there were
' any substances but God, (may the Spinosists say) then there
' would be other substances besides God, that might be ho-
' nour'd, fear'd, and lov'd. Then God would not be HE
' THAT IS. The doctrine of creation derogates from the

' perfection and unity of the divine essence; it erects nature
 ' produc'd into a deity, into a real substance, into a Being that
 ' is. By creation therefore nothing else can be understood,
 ' but that the divine essence, as infinitely extended or immense,
 ' becomes gradually perceptible to finite spirits endued with
 ' proper faculties; and these finite spirits are nothing else but
 ' consubstantial forms or ideas of the divine mind, that con-
 ' tains necessarily all ideas and all objects, which are one and
 ' the same thing.' Thus the pious Malebranchists and the fan-
 atical Idealists agree with the devout Spinosists; and all the
 three by an effect of imagination, destroy the very idea of
 that God, whom they look upon as all in all. Thus men may
 fall into Atheistical maxims as well by attributing to God what
 does not belong to him, as by denying what is essential to him.
 Far be it from me to accuse Father Malebranche, and Doctor
 Berkeley of Atheism; their life and character show that they
 were fully persuaded of Christianity: they established prin-
 ciples that lead to Spinosism, but they denied their just con-
 sequences, from a sincere respect for religion. The purity of
 their hearts hindered them from pursuing too far the errors
 of their understanding. It is possible that Spinoza did not think
 himself an Atheist, and that he believed in maintaining that
 there is but one substance and one agent in nature, that he ex-
 alted the idea of God, who defines himself THE BEING
THAT IS, perhaps thought he, to signify that there is no o-
 ther substance but he alone. His life and morals seem to de-
 cide in his favour, for he was a very temperate, abstemious, re-
 tir'd philosopher, without any ambition, and very disinterest-
 ed: but good intentions do not justify bad principles.

. 4to. The Malebranchists say that beings that have no knowledge of the effects they produce, cannot be causes; that there can be no real force, where there is no adequate knowledge; and consequently that spirits can neither act upon each other, nor upon bodies; and far less bodies upon each other and upon spirits; because the one know not the manner how they act, and the others have no knowledge at all.

I answer, in the first place, that the idea of force does not include that of knowledge, as the idea of knowledge does not include that of goodness. They are three distinct, separated, and separable qualities; and therefore they may exist, and be communicated separately. God may represent himself by things external as powerful, without representing himself as intelligent, by the essential properties of one and the same individual substance. Thus the ethereal fluid may be endued with a real force to move solid bodies, and so become the universal, physical cause of all visible motions, tho' this subtile ether be not intelligent. Thus again the soul may be endued with a real force of moving bodies, without knowing the manner how it produces this effect. I grant indeed that in a state of pure, primitive, and uncorrupted nature when the soul had an adequate idea of its own essence, then activity, wisdom, and goodness, were inseparable from spirits, as the perfect images of their almighty archetype. But in a state of laps'd, diseas'd, and degraded nature, these three qualities may be separated, more or less vitiated, weakened, or suspended. We see that goodness may be separated from science; why may not science be separated from power? Thus bodies are active without intelligence or goodness; demons are active and intelli-

gent without virtue; angelical spirits enjoy all these three qualities together.

I answer in the second place that tho' the Malebranchian scheme tends visibly to destroy the natural activity of the understanding and will; yet that philosopher does not and dares not deny either. He admits on the contrary a real activity in the soul to compare and chuse betwixt objects. Now we exert these real powers every moment without having a clear idea of the essence of the soul, nor consequently of the manner how it thus acts. We do not know how the mind recalls to memory, compares, separates and conjoins its ideas; nor how it desires, wills, and loves objects. We have no clear, adequate ideas of the manner how all these operations are produced; and yet we feel that we produce them. It is then possible for a finite spirit to have real powers, without knowing how it exerts them; because we have no adequate ideas of the essence of the soul. It is possible also that ethereal matter may be endued with a real activity and force, tho' it does not know its powers and effects.

5to. Father Malebranche in fine reasons thus; ' we have ' no idea of action in second causes whether material or spiritual. When one body moves another there flows something or nothing out of the moving body to transport the body mov'd. If nothing, then how can nothing be a cause? if something, then this something is either material or spiritual; if material, what moves it? since the idea of matter does not include that of force: if spiritual, then when one body communicates a part of its motion to one, two, three or more bodies, this spiritual Somewhat divides itself into two,

‘ three, or more portions, to push the different bodies mov’d.
‘ Thus the spiritual Somewhat becomes divisible and corpo-
‘ real. Wherefore motion in matter is only intelligible by
‘ the immediate action of the first cause, who by his omni-
‘ present efficacy operates immediately upon all the material
‘ frame, and gives it infinite forms according to general laws.
‘ As bodies cannot act upon bodies, so far less can they act
‘ upon spirits. All that passes in bodies, when we see or feel
‘ them, is vibrations more or less swift in the fibres of the
‘ brain. Now there is and can be no natural and necessa-
‘ ry connection betwixt the motions in this matter and
‘ the sensations produced in the soul. What relation is
‘ there betwixt a fluid moving in the nervous channels more
‘ or less swiftly and the sensation of pain and pleasure, brigh-
‘ ter or obscurer ideas, more refin’d or more deprav’d incli-
‘ nations? It is true the one follow or accompany the others,
‘ and therefore we believe foolishly, that the one is the effect
‘ of the other. Imagination imposes upon us, and we call that
‘ a cause which is only precedent or concomitant. It is plain
‘ then that when we see bodies, it is not dead, lifeless, ineffica-
‘ cious, created matter that acts upon us, but the divine essence,
‘ in so far as representative of matter. We do not see real, cre-
‘ ated matter, but ideal, uncreated, intelligible extension. Spi-
‘ rits and bodies have then no inherent action, no mutual u-
‘ nion, no physical efficacy, no immediate influence upon
‘ each other. Moreover, spirits cannot act upon spirits so as
‘ to modify them and change their forms. There is and can
‘ be no connection betwixt the act of a finite will, and the
‘ production of an effect that was not before. This is a pas-

‘ sage from nothing to something, yea a real creation, which
‘ is one of the most glorious, incommunicable attributes of the
‘ deity. Now God cannot communicate his glory to the crea-
‘ ture, nor therefore any real, physical, efficacious power. All
‘ is the effect of the immediate operation of God, of his only
‘ luminous and efficacious essence, which being present eve-
‘ ry where acts alternately upon bodies and spirits, to pro-
‘ duce all the forms and motions of the one, and all the ideas
‘ and inclinations of the other. It is in God alone that we live,
‘ move, and have our being. It is he that is the only cause,
‘ which operates effectually upon all material nature. It is he
‘ alone who is the light that enlightens all created intelligen-
‘ ces. His archetypal ideas of intelligible extension act upon
‘ us when we see bodies. His luminous essence alone enligh-
‘ tens us when we see truths. The creature is only an occasi-
‘ onal cause of his communications, which produce all, pre-
‘ serve all, and move all, thro’ the whole universe. Without
‘ his immediate action and impulsion, spirits and bodies are e-
‘ qually unintelligent and unintelligible, unperceiving and im-
‘ perceptible. Thus all the imaginary powers and Pagan deities
‘ are destroyed, and the creatures no more erected into divi-
‘ nities.’

This is that witty romance of occasional causes, invented by Malebranche to explain the union of soul and body; and the reciprocal action and reaction of spirit and matter. This pious philosopher imposed upon by a full persuasion that this system exalted our notions of the divine power, placed the creature in a continual dependence upon the creator, and made every thing even the least motion of matter, and the smallest

modification of spirit a proof of God's existence. The devout father did not advert to either the false consequences he drew from true principles; or to the false principles, upon which his system was founded, or to the dangerous consequences that flow from it, or its absolute uselessness to explain what he intends. We shall examine fully these four articles.

1mo. There is a strange mixture of truth and falshood in this doctrine. We grant that the spiritual, intimate, omni-present energy of the creator is the original source of all the powers of nature: but we deny, that it is the immediate cause of all the actions of the creature. This all-powerful efficacy can communicate activity as well as existence to substances distinct from itself. By it we see bodies, but we really see them. Bodies and spirits receive their force from it: but by that force they become active as well as acted upon. It is degrading instead of exalting omnipotence, to maintain that it cannot produce active beings representative of itself, unless we prove that this idea is incompatible as well as inconceivable. Moreover, it is false that when the first moving cause operates to communicate motion to many bodies, it divides itself into parcels. It produces different effects, but it remains always indivisible. It is one and manifold, intelligent and intelligible, penetrating and penetrable; it possesses all virtues, contains all spirits, penetrates all bodies, and remaining in itself it preserves, animates, and renews all things. This universal, secret, omnipotent force that runs thro' the whole of nature, gives to all substances their existence and activity: but as their essence is not a part of the divine substance, so their activity is not a portion of the divine force. This omnipresent energy is the

first mover, but not the only agent. It acts immediately upon ethereal matter, and by this ethereal matter upon all solid bodies. By its action ethereal matter becomes truly active; and, as we shall show hereafter, becomes the universal spring of all the corporeal world. This omnipresent force acts, in, by, thro' and with, all second causes whether spiritual or material, yet so as not to destroy their action. It renders them real agents, and not simple instruments, nor merely passive occasions.

2do. All the system of occasional causes depends upon this fallacious argument, 'viz. We have no clear idea of action in second causes, therefore there is none.' The conclusion is unjust and absurd. Tho' seeing clearly be always a reason of affirming, yet not seeing at all is never a reason of denying. The same argument that engaged Father Malebranche to deny modifying power in the creatures, made Spinoza deny creating power in God. His disciples reason thus; 'When God creates, there flows something or nothing from his essence, to produce the created effect. If nothing, how can nothing be a cause? if something, then creation is an emanation of the divine substance, which being indivisible its action is immanent; and so all things are only modifications of the divine essence, and not a production of new substances.' If Malebranche's reasoning be just, Spinoza's must be so too. Thus there would be but one substance in nature, as but one agent. This is not all; modifying power in God is as unconceivable as creating power. When God acts upon spirits or bodies to modify and move them alternately, does there flow something or nothing from the divine essence, to

produce these effects. If nothing, how can nothing be a cause? if something, how can a spiritual being act upon a corporeal? how can an indivisible essence communicate itself to a substance distinct from it. Malebranche has nothing to reply, but that God is present every where, and that his omnipotent will is always efficacious. This we know as well as he; but we demand how this all-powerful omnipresent will acts to modify corporeal and immaterial substances, distinct from it? what connects this will with its effect, and how does the one produce the other? this he is ignorant of as well as we. Will and power in God are not the same. He executes by his power what he wills; but we cannot conceive how this power operates to produce its effect. We have no adequate ideas of causality, power, or force; neither in the first, nor in second causes. We see that there must be such a thing in nature; but we do not know how it operates. We do not see how bodies can act upon bodies; much less, how spirits can act upon spirits; and far less yet how they can act reciprocally upon each other; because we are ignorant of the intimate essences of both, and of that vital, spiritual, omnipresent force that renders them active, and gives them a real activity distinct from that of God; as well as a real existence distinct from that of God. But as I have said already, this ignorance is not a proof of the non-existence of things, nor consequently of the inactivity of finite beings.

3tio. The consequences of this doctrine are fatal and Spinozian. If matter be altogether unactive and imperceptible; if the object as well as the cause of our perception be the essence of God as representative of matter; if we do not see bo-

dies but only ideas; then to what purpose create matter? since the divine efficacious essence acts alone upon spirits, to give them all the ideas of extension, figure and motion. The creation of corporeal substance was altogether useless, and superfluous; God does by tedious round-about methods, what might have been performed in one much more easy and compendious. Thus matter was made in vain, which being altogether incompatible with the divine wisdom, its existence must be denied. Thus figures, motions, and divisions, are nothing real without us, but mere sensations of the soul; as colours, tastes, and smells. Thus all is reduced to the idea of an intelligible and intelligent, indivisible and immoveable, unfigurable and infinite, uncreated and efficacious, but extended substance; and this is precisely Spinosism. This is not all; if God be the only agent in nature, then he is the immediate author not only of all the physical actions of the creatures, but also of all their moral determinations. For what has no real power can neither chuse, nor determine, nor will of itself. Father Malebranche foreseeing this dangerous and impious, tho' natural and necessary consequence of his principle, supposed that finite intelligences have a power of stopping the divine action in them, and this according to him is Liberty: but thus he visibly contradicts himself; for, as Bayle very well remarks, since it requires as great a power to stop an action begun, as to begin an action stopped, the creatures must have a real power. Malebranche to shun the force of this reasoning adds, that the act of the creature as free is altogether immanent, it terminates in itself alone, and produces nothing real without itself; this we grant; but is the stopping of the all-

powerful action of God in us, no real action? or rather is it not the greatest and highest of all? now if created beings have this power, why cannot they have a lesser one, which is that of acting really upon each other. If Malebranche reason therefore consequentially to his principles, he must deny the power of free determination, as well as that of physical action. Thus fatality is introduced, God is made the author of sin, and Spinosism is consummated.

4to. The ingenious fiction of occasional causes explains nothing, and is a visible contradiction. Malebranche says at first that we see all things in God; and then he endeavours to prove that we see only ideas; an ideal matter, an ideal face, an ideal nose. Thus to make us comprehend how we see bodies in God, he maintains that we do not see them at all. This doctrine therefore does not explain the union of soul and body. It shows indeed how God acts alternately upon matter and spirit as passive machines; but not at all how they act upon each other, which is the sole true union. The idea of union does not suppose perfect identity of substances, attributes, and modes; this is more than an union; nor does it imply bare similitude of substances, attributes and modes; for beings may have no union nor communication and yet resemble each other. Union therefore must consist in a mutual action and reaction of beings upon each other. Bodies are united when the one cannot be moved unless the other be so too. Spirits and bodies are united when the one acts upon the other by a real, physical, and immediate influence. To deny the possibility of this mutual action and reaction, because we have no adequate ideas of substance and force, is

measuring the absolute possibility of things by our own capacity, and opening the sluices to Spinosism.

Some disciples of the great Newton, such as Doctor Clarke, Baxter, Cheyne, and many others both French and English, contrary it seems to the last judgment of their master, have adopted the doctrine of the absolute inactivity of matter, and pretend that the great law of attraction is an immediate effect of the divine action, which pushes all bodies to one another in a certain proportion to their masses and distances without any interveening, physical, or mechanical medium. It is not our business to show here that the great Sir Isaac does not establish this doctrine, nor despoils all material agents of active force; this idea is entirely subversive of all natural philosophy. It suffices to remark that this opinion being founded upon the same principles as the Malebranchian notion, by confusing the one we have overturned the other.

By the principles explained in this Scholium we have a clear notion of the source of our simple ideas. Objects created or uncreated, spiritual or material, act upon the mind really and efficaciously. This action produces an effect, impression, or change in the soul. These impressions are modes, and these modes we call ideas when they represent something in the objects, as figures, divisions, and motions; but they are called sensations, when they represent nothing in the objects, as those of pain and pleasure. Hence the true difference betwixt ideas and sensations. Ideas represent to us the attributes and modes of substances; whereas sensations represent nothing really existent in the objects; such are all these perceptions called the sensible secondary qualities of bodies, co-

lours, tastes, smells, sounds and touches. They are mere modifications of the mind that have no external reality, tho' they be produced in the soul by the action of bodies differently figur'd and moved. They are very oft, tho' not always, short advertisements that warn us of the relations other bodies have to ours; or that excite us to do what we would otherwise neglect. Being made for God, for the contemplation and love of the absolute infinite, ideas of bodies are given us to investigate the marks of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness manifested in the creation, and to raise our thoughts from the pictures to the original. Sensations are destined either to punish, purify, and detach us from our irregular union with material objects; or to soften, and mitigate the pains of our exile. Yea very oft they are short ways to let us know what we ought to seek and shun in material objects; because not being made for them, the capacity of our mind ought not to be employed in a long chain of reasonings, to discover what is proper or not proper for the conservation of our bodies. If we did not feel pleasure and pain in our different approaches to sensible objects; if we were obliged to examine physically the aptitude of victuals to promote circulation, and the necessity of cloathing to prevent the fatal effects of cold, all our time would be spent in these low exercises: but the quick sensations of heat and cold, of hunger and thirst, advertise us of our wants and dangers, without a long series of reasonings. This remark of Malebranche upon the design of sensations is just and beautiful.

We must not however conclude from hence that the painful or agreeable sensations we feel in bodies, is always a proof

of their being noxious or useful to our corporeal machines. The soul is now in a diseased state, as we shall show presently; and material nature in the sphere which we inhabit is quite disordered. Pleasure does not always accompany order, nor pain disorder in this mixt state, where man is neither an angel nor a devil, perfectly good, or absolutely bad.

I shall conclude all these remarks by one that is most important; as created objects whether material or immaterial, may by a real, efficacious, and physical action, modify our souls, and produce in them different ideas, and sensations in a natural manner; so the infinite, uncreated object may act upon our souls in a supernatural manner, and produce in them ideas and sensations far more lively and penetrating than material objects. This is the source of inspiration and divine grace, of supernatural light and love, very far different from the reasonings and discoveries we make by the successive comparison of our ideas. God, who is far more intimately present to souls than corporeal objects are, who can act upon them, invest them, and penetrate them, may open their intellectual faculties, show them the mysteries of his nature and providence by an intuitive view; and thus inspire them to write, speak, and think, to reveal what is hid, and foretell what is future in a supernatural manner. For this reason it is that holy writ calls the prophets the Seers, because their intellectual eyes were opened to see into the invisible world, and discover many wonders of providence past, present, and future.

C O R. I.

Hence the denying the activity of second causes leads to pernicious and blasphemous consequences.

C O R. II.

Hence the activity of second causes, is the third mystery of natural religion, as incomprehensible as immensity and creation. We demonstrate that all the three must be true, but we do not comprehend how they are so.

C O R. III.

Hence all our simple ideas come from the action, impression, or sensation, that objects distinct from us whether created or uncreated, material or spiritual, make upon the soul. It is altogether passive as to these simple perceptions, and cannot produce them in itself, unless the objects act upon it. It may remember them, recall them, and compare them, but it cannot create or produce them, unless the objects make impressions upon it.

C O R. IV.

Hence supernatural inspiration is possible. The sovereign mind may act immediately upon souls, open their intellectual eyes, and give them ideas and sensations far more lively, and penetrating than second causes, whether material or spiritual.

P R O P O S I T I O N XXXVI.

Sensation and reflection are the only two sources of all our ideas whether simple or compound.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

All our simple ideas come from the action, impression, or sensation that objects distinct from us make upon the soul (a);

(a) Cor. 3. of Prop. XXXV.

all our compound ideas arise from the reflection and action of the mind upon its own modifications (a); therefore sensation and reflection are the only two sources of all our ideas simple or compound.

S C H O L I U M.

Locke has very well remarked that all our ideas arise from these two sources of sensation or the action of objects upon us; or of reflection, or the action of the mind upon itself. The soul, as we have said, is entirely passive with regard to its simple ideas, as matter is altogether passive with regard to its figures, modes, and motions. We cannot produce these simple ideas in ourselves, unless the objects act upon us: but we may by our own immanent, innate activity form complex ideas by reflection upon the different objects already perceived.

It is however an egregious mistake to confine the actions of objects upon us to those of material agents. The infinite intelligent cause as well as finite spirits may act immediately upon the soul, and modify it in a manner far superior to corporeal agents. It is absolutely false therefore to maintain that all our ideas come originally from the perceptions produc'd in us by material objects; and that in our present state we can have no ideas of God, but what arise at first from corporeal sensation. Tho' we should shut our eyes, stop our ears, and draw a veil upon the whole of material nature; tho' we did not reflect upon the evident marks of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness visible in the creation; tho' we were stript of body; tho' there were no other finite substances whether material or immaterial existent but our selves; yet the simple

(a) Cor. 5. of Prop XXIX.

fenfation of our own exiftence, infufficiency, and finitude would be enough to produce in us the idea of a felf-exiftent caufe, and demonftrate to us the exiftence of its object. Tho' there were no matter exiftent, yet we might have the ideas of power, wifdom, and goodnefs; of felf-exiftence, eternity, immenſity, infinity, and all the divine attributes, as has been already ſhown.

The Malebranchian doctrine concerning the ſource of our ideas is yet more dangerous and ſophiſtical. The French philoſopher reaſons thus, our ideas muſt either be (1) images detach'd from the objects, or (2) created by God in the ſoul from the beginning, or (3) originally contain'd in the mind as archetype of all things; or (4) produc'd in the ſoul by its own innate activity; or (5) form'd in the mind by God's immediate action; or (6) perceiv'd in God as repreſentative of all things. He endeavours to prove that the ſoul can have its ideas by none of the firſt five ways; and therefore he concludes that the ſixth is the only true one. This enumeration is not only obſcure but imperfect. There may be yet another way by which the ſoul may have ſome of its ideas, and that is, (7), by the impreſſion which finite objects whether material or immaterial make upon us. The firſt three ways are abſurd, the ſixth is fanatical, the fourth, fifth, and ſeventh ways are the true ſources of all our ideas, ſimple or complex; natural, or ſupernatural. We have already demonſtrated, that ſpiritual or material agents may by an emanant communicated activity really modify the ſoul; and theſe modifications are what we call our ſimple ideas. Theſe we compare and combine, compound and divide in numberleſs ways by our

own innate and immanent activity; and this produces our complex ideas. The action of the first cause in a supernatural manner by inspiration; the action of second causes in a natural manner by sensation; and the action of the mind upon itself by reflection, are the three sources of all our ideas. The French philosopher confounds these three sources, by attributing all to the immediate action of God, as the only efficacious cause of all our modifications and perceptions. Thus he introduces enthusiasm into philosophy; thanks the Logos for discovering to him that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones; looks upon geometrical theory, as a real contemplation of the divine essence; and so confounds the natural activity of the mind, with the supernatural illumination of the eternal Word. The privilege of seeing all things in God is an advantage not of our exil'd state here below; but a felicity reserved for our celestial, native country. Then we shall see light in its true light, God as he is, and the archetypal ideas of all things, as they were at first freely formed in the divine understanding; e'er God created substances correspondent to them. Then we shall see the intimate and inmost essence of things in the eternal essence; the relation of the original to the pictures; whereas now we see only some of their attributes and modes. All the Malebranchian philosophy is founded upon a perpetual confusion of nature and grace, of the archetypal ideas with the consubstantial Logos; of the natural activity of the understanding with the supernatural illumination of the Word; of the natural immanent action of the will, with the supernatural impressions of the Holy Ghost; and in fine of the privileges of a beatified

state with these of our exile. The Spinofists make use of all these obscure ideas to confound the action of the first cause with the action of second causes, and the substance of the creator with that of the creature; and by a tendency to the same purpose, the Malebranchian system is exceedingly dangerous: it seems the beginning of Spinofism; and Spinofism is Malebranchism consummated.

By this enquiry into the different sources of our ideas, we may resolve the great question about innate ideas and judgments or maxims. By innate ideas or judgments are to be understood these natural notions, and self-evident, natural, universal maxims which all attentive minds may discover, when they seriously reflect upon their own modifications; and the necessary relations of conformity or disagreement among them. They are called self-evident, because they are seen by one intuitive view, without a laborious, successive comparison of ideas. They are called natural, because they are the most simple, the most obvious, the most easy, the most congenial reflections of the mind, when it begins to exert its intellectual and comparing powers. They are called universal, because the general ideas of being and not being, of a whole and of a part, of cause and effect, of substance and mode, of essential attributes and accidental qualities; of finite and infinite, of intelligence and volition, upon which self-evident axioms are founded, are the same in all. Thus no man can doubt of these truths, 'that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time; ' that the whole is greater than the part; that nothing has no ' properties; that the same substance cannot have at the same ' time, incompatible and contradictory attributes; that a sub-

'stance is not a mode; that infinite is greater than finite.' We do not see these truths in God; we see them in ourselves by reflecting upon our own modes or ideas, and their relations of conformity or disagreement; equality or inequality; identity or difference.

C O R. I.

Hence the Malebranchian system about seeing all objects and all ideas in the divine mind is an imaginary scheme that tends indirectly to Spinosism, to confound the action of God with the action of the creatures, and the substance of God with that of the creatures.

C O R. II.

Hence that system, whoever be its defenders, which confines all our first perceptions and simple ideas to the impressions which corporeal objects make upon us, coincides with that false maxim of the Aristotelians *NIHIL EST IN INTELLECTU QUOD NON FUERAT PRIUS IN SENSU*. This maxim is absolutely false, if we understand by Sensation the modes of the soul produced by the action of material objects upon our corporeal organs.

P R O P O S I T I O N XXXVII.

There may, is, and must be in nature, a third substance besides God and finite spirits, called body or matter.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

Infinite power can produce new substances as well as new forms (a); creation is a representation of God by things ex-

(a) Pop. XV.

ternal (a): God can thus represent himself both by material pictures and intelligent images (b): God is not and cannot be the immediate author of all the ideas, sensations, and perceptions we have of matter (c): The negation of the existence of matter is followed by palpable absurdities, and visible contradictions (d): God may communicate to his living images, and material pictures a real, physical activity by which they can act reciprocally upon each other (e): the negation of this activity of second causes leads to pernicious and blasphemous consequences (f). Therefore there is, may, and must be in nature a third substance besides God and finite spirits, called body or matter.

S C H O L I U M.

It may seem strange, that in this chain of truths, the proof of the existence of matter is placed as the thirty seventh proposition: but in the order of just reasoning, all the others must be demonstrated e'er this can be proved. I grant indeed that all this series of reasonings by which we evince the existence of matter is only a proof and not a demonstration. I have remarked from the beginning that demonstration belongs only to necessary, eternal, and immutable truths. Thus we can demonstrate the existence of a God, because it is eternal, immutable and necessary: but the existence of matter being contingent, mutable, and temporary, it can only be proved; that is, we have all reasons to believe it, none to deny it, and the negation of it reduces to absurdities equally impious and fanatical. Now this is all the proof that can be demanded by reasonable minds, for a matter of fact.

(a) Prop. XXI. (b) Prop. XXVI. (c) Prop. XXXIV. (d) Cor. 3. of Prop. XXXIV. (e) Prop. XXXV. (f) Cor. 2. of Prop. XXXV.

All the use that can be made of the Berkeleyan and Malebranchian reasonings against the existence and activity of bodies, is to confute Materialism, to show that we have a greater certainty of the existence of spirit, than of that of matter, to prove, that, absolutely speaking, we might have the most vivid ideas and sensations of matter, tho' there were no bodies at all; and therefore it is certain, uncontestible, and demonstrated, that a being whose existence is only contingent and possible, cannot be the necessary, eternal, and self-existent substance. Materialism therefore is a poor, weak system without any shadow of reason; whereas Idealism requires a great strength, and vivacity of imagination, a wonderful subtilty of genius, a complication of the most abstract ideas; but at the same time it is not solid; since it is founded upon false consequences drawn from true principles; its fundamental maxim is undemonstrable, and its natural consequences lead us to look upon God as the author of sin, and the immediate, deliberate, voluntary cause of all moral and physical evil. Materialism affirms that there is a necessary relation of cause and effect where it sees none; it confounds identity with union; it supposes that the self-same substance may have contradictory, and incompatible attributes. Idealism denies that there can be a real activity in second causes, because we cannot conceive the manner of their operation; it measures the absolute possibility of things by its own capacity; it denies modifying power in the creatures, for the same reason that Spinoza denies creating power in the God-head.

Both these systems are equally undemonstrable and incapable of solid proofs: but Idealism is far more dangerous than

Materialism. The Materialists can only impose upon weak, superficial, wanton imaginations that pretend openly to degrade human nature, and flatter all the passions: but the Idealists have a devout and serious air, an apparent zeal for the rights of the deity, a specious pretence of seeing all things in God, and God in all things, which allures at first virtuous minds; but it hurrys them at last into the darkest Atheism, when they reason consequentially, and are not startled at the necessary consequences of the principles laid down. Thus the Malebranchian enthusiasm, and the Berkeleyan fiction end inevitably in Spinosian blasphemy, contrary to the pious intention of their inventors, and thus these three sprouts of the Cartesian philosophy have corrupted, debauch'd, and perverted some of the greatest and finest Genii of the last age. Wherefore it was with reason that some learned men of all nations contemporary with Descartes declaimed against his system as dangerous, tho' they were unjust to attack his designs as pernicious.

C O R. I.

Hence it is absolutely false that the existence of matter is neither probable, nor possible.

C O R. II.

Hence it is pure Fanaticism to maintain that we can be sure of the existence of matter only by revelation.

Thus we have demonstrated the properties, differences and existence of material and immaterial substances. We shall now examine their laws, resemblances, and relations, during the pure and primitive state of nature exalted.

END OF THE THIRD BOOK.

THE

PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES

OF

NATURAL AND REVEALED

RELIGION.

BOOK IV.

OF NATURE

IN AN EXALTED STATE.

DEFINITIONS.

BY NATURE EXALTED, I mean that original state wherein all things were created, as they came pure from the hands of God; representative of his perfections, and conformable to eternal order.

Nn

2. By *ETERNAL ORDER*, Beauty, Harmony, or proportion in the universe, I mean the conformity of the created images, and pictures to their uncreated original, and his designs in producing them.

A X I O M S.

1. Beings that resemble one common *THIRD*, must resemble one another.

2. In a state of pure and exalted nature, the eternal, universal, and immutable law of all finite intelligences, was that of the infinite intelligence.

S C H O L I U M.

The source of many egregious mistakes in philosophy and divinity is the confounding the state of nature exalted, with that of nature degraded. The Atheists, Materialists, Spinozists, and minute philosophers, pretend that there are in the present constitution of nature, many irregularities, disorders, and contradictions; so that we cannot from it conclude either design, wisdom, or goodness. Some answer that the evil is infinitely less than the good in the universe, and that therefore the one is to be accounted as nothing, when compared with the other. Others say that the necessary evils that happen are as shades that give a lustre to God's works. Others affirm that God ought not to change the simplicity of his laws, and his general wills to prevent particular disorders. Some go yet further, and maintain that God foresaw infallibly, preordained inevitably, and permitted deliberately the evils we see to manifest his divine perfections of mercy and justice: others

in fine are so extravagant as to advance that such is the perfection of the divine nature, that it cannot but produce all that is, and all that is possible, what we call bad, as well as what we call good; what we call vicious as well as what we call virtuous; what we call miserable as well as what we call happy. We shall show hereafter that all these systems are lame, unworthy of God, and tending visibly either to disparage his moral attributes, or to destroy his very essence. All these schemes came from confounding the effects, irregularities, and defects of nature in a degraded state, with the properties, laws and perfections of nature in an exalted state. We shall first consider nature in its primitive original creation, as it came pure out of the hands of God; then in a fallen lapsed state after the introduction of moral and physical evil into it; and last of all, nature re-established in its original glory, order and perfection.

P R O P O S I T I O N XXXVIII.

In a state of pure and exalted nature all finite intelligences enjoyed a double happiness; one in the immediate contemplation of the divine essence; another in the knowledge of his representations.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N .

God created finite intelligences to make them happy in the contemplation and love of his divine perfections (a); in a state of pure and exalted nature God can manifest his di-

(a) Prop XXIV.

vine perfections to finite intelligences, two ways, either by admitting them to the immediate vision of his absolute essence, or by displaying to them his power, wisdom, and goodness in his created representations (a): Therefore in a state of pure and exalted nature, all finite intelligences enjoyed a double happiness; one in the immediate contemplation of the divine essence, another in the knowledge of his created representations.

S C H O L I U M.

We have already demonstrated it possible that God's creating energy never ceased since it began; that it may be ever since continually fruitful and productive; that he may create new substances material and immaterial without end, and communicate to them new forms, new capacities, and new perfections by an everlasting progression; and therefore it is possible and probable that the immense spaces are still replenishing with new worlds and new inhabitants, with material pictures and intelligent images innumerable. Now in these blest abodes, and immense regions we must conceive finite spirits possessed of a double happiness. As God had no other design in creating them but to make them happy, it is certain that he beatifies these unfallen intelligences, not only by the intuitive view of his pure and absolute essence, but also by discovering to them all the wonders of his omnipotence. They see God as he is, and all his productions as they came pure from his hands. The one is the essential, the other is only the accessory happiness of such celestial spirits as never

(a) Cor. 2. of Prop. XXI.

fell, or that are restored to their primitive state. It is thus that they pass an eternity. Sometimes they lose themselves in the central abyss of the pure divinity; and sometimes they enter into society with each other, and adore God in his works. He is still their supreme and ultimate object; but they adore him by turns in himself and in his representations. For this reason the scripture says, 'that all God's works will be eternal; and that we shall rise again with glorious and immortal bodies;' which would be useless and superfluous, if the material world were not to be eternal. The forms will change, but the essences will last for ever.

Far be it from us then to assert with Origen, that the accessory happiness of created intelligences is altogether useless in a state of beatific vision; that all material nature will be destroy'd after the final re-establishment of all fallen intelligences; that in eternity nothing will remain but pure spirit; that then the essential bliss will suffice to fill all the boundless capacity of finite beings: that the pretended accidental felicity, in the knowledge and enjoyment of the material pictures would be an interruption, and so to speak, an amusement, which would divert celestial spirits from their supream original. All these reasonings are false in their principle, and dangerous in their consequences, yea they tend visibly to destroy all the analogy of faith; as shall be fully demonstrated hereafter. They proceed from not understanding the following principle.

If finite spirits could contemplate the divine essence without interruption, the creation of the material world would have been useless; because they would have had no time, to enjoy this accessory accidental happiness: they would never

have turned from the original to the pictures; nor preferred an inferior to a superior bliss: but such it seems is the nature of finite minds how exalted soever, that the constant irradiations of the absolute infinite would over-power their bounded faculties, over-whelm them with joys and raptures so strong and vehement, that they could not support the immense weight of glory. All finite intelligences therefore are obliged to the alternate returns of essential and accessory happiness. Admitted to the beatific vision, received into the divine essence, and immersed in the immense ocean of light, there they remain till they are no longer able to support its radiant splendors; then they veil their eyes, fall out, so to speak, from the centre, retire to the circumference, and there contemplate the original in the pictures, and enter into society with each other; and it is during these intervals that they may become peccable. If finite intelligences could have remained eternally in the divine presence, they would have been for ever impeccable. They would have had no reason of knowing, chusing, or loving inferior good; God would have been their only object; immersed in the divine essence, no other borrowed ray could have turned them off from this boundless source of light: but in these intervals, wherein they are obliged by the finitude of their natures, to fall out of the divine presence, and to adore their infinite creator in the creatures, they enter into commerce with finite things, and exert their natural powers and activities; they may judge, reason, and compare, and therefore may err in their judgments, make a false choice, and so depart insensibly from eternal order; and that by a long, continued series of gra-

dations imperceptible, as shall be explained in the next book.

C O R. I.

Hence we see the true reason of the creation and duration of the material world. It was not made, according to the error of Origen, for the punishment of degraded intelligences; but to be the accessory happiness of the most exalted spirits.

C O R. II.

Hence finite intelligences are obliged at certain intervals by their natural finitude and weakness, to turn off their intellectual eye from the direct contemplation of the pure and absolute essence of God, to adore the original in his pictures and images: then they are said to veil their faces with their wings, and turn their eyes from the dazzling original to admire and behold him in his created shadows and pictures.

C O R. III.

Hence, as we shall show in the second part of this work, several ancient fathers of the church, and the wisest Pagan philosophers, yea all the sages of antiquity both sacred and profane, maintained with reason, that all finite spirits whatsoever are somehow or other united to material, ethereal and celestial vehicles; by which they are in commerce with the glorious corporeal world in the celestial regions. None of them whether of seraphical, angelical, or any lower order can contemplate the pure, naked, and absolute essence of God with an open, direct, and uninterrupted view.

C O R. IV.

Hence we may understand how finite intelligences admitted to the beatific vision can become peccable. They

are not able to support with a permanent, immutable, immediate view the splendors of the divine presence, because of their natural finitude; and so must go out of their divine center, to adore the original in his created images, and during these intervals they may err in their judgments, make a false choice, and thus separate the love of pleasure from the love of order, which is moral evil.

P R O P O S I T I O N XXXIX.

In a state of pure and exalted nature, the intelligent images and material pictures, tho' quite different substances, must have necessary resemblances to each other.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N .

In a state of pure and exalted nature the whole creation is an external representation of God (a); God can represent himself thus both by intelligent images and by material pictures (b): beings that resemble one common third must necessarily resemble each other (c): therefore in a state of pure and exalted nature, the intelligent images and the material pictures, tho' quite different substances, must have necessary resemblances to each other.

S C H O L I U M .

Tho' the intelligent images, and material pictures, be different substances, that have contrary and incompatible properties, yet they are in this analogous as both are representa-

(a) Prop. XXI. (b) Prop. XXVI. (c) Ax. 1. of this Book.

tive of the same archetype. Tho' we do not see at present the intimate essence of things as we shall see them one day, when we behold God as he is, yet we now perceive that the properties and modes of matter are analogous to the powers and modes of spirit. Thus figurability, divisibility, and mobility in matter are similar to and shadows of intelligence, activity, and love in spirits. As the impressions made upon bodies give them different forms and figures; so the impressions made upon spirits give them different sensations and ideas. As the moving external force divides, separates and reunites the different parts of matter; so the innate activity within divides, separates and unites the different ideas of the mind; and this is reason or comparison. As the impulse given to bodies produces in them different motions and directions, so the impulsions given to spirits form in them different desires and inclinations. It is thus that configuration, division and motion in bodies are shadows, and images of perception, reason, and volition in spirits. For this reason, when we talk of the attributes, modes, and operations of intellectual agents, the expressions we use, are very oft, yea almost continually, drawn from the forms, properties, and actions of corporeal agents. Thus we say a profound genius, an high mind, a soft heart, warm passions, a boiling imagination, a sweet soul, a shallow judgment. For the same reason it is that sacred writ in speaking of the infinite mind calls very oft the Father a consuming fire and a devouring flame; the Son, the light of the world, the sun of righteousness, and the morning star. The Holy Ghost, a strong wind, a soft zephyr, and the breath of God's mouth. Yea the purifying, sanctifying, beatifying

influences are called an holy uncti^on, a balmy oil, a soft dew, and living waters. This great principle was also the source of that symbolic and hieroglyphic language, by which the first sages, from the earliest times after the fall of man, expressed all the mysteries of religion, and all the secrets of the invisible world. They looked upon the material universe and all its parts as shadows, emblems, and pictures of the intellectual world; and so made use of the properties, virtues, and qualities of the one, to design, indicate and represent the powers, attributes, and faculties of the other. These sacred symbols therefore were not at first veils and masks to hide sublime truths from vulgar minds; but types, and images to recall these great truths to our remembrance, as shall be fully explain'd in the second Part.

C O R. I.

Hence if we knew the properties, forms, and laws of the spiritual world, and the reasons of their institution, we might thereby discover the properties, forms and laws of the material world, and the reasons of their institution.

C O R. II.

Hence flow all the rules of analogy which run through the whole creation; and this analogy may be of great use to guess at the principles of true philosophy, and form a new system of natural philosophy, more luminous and fruitful than any that have yet been invented, as shall be unfolded very soon.

C O R. III.

Hence as there is a centripetal force that impells necessarily material objects to the center; so there may be a cen-

tripetal force, that draws freely intelligent beings to the infinite and omnipresent mind, their common and universal center; and as bodies that tend to their center augment more and more their velocity the nearer they approach it, so spirits augment for ever and ever their activity, the more they approach to their infinite center.

P R O P O S I T I O N XL.

In a state of pure and exalted nature all finite intelligences, or the living images, follow'd the eternal, immutable, and universal law of order, which is to love God for himself, and all other beings proportionably as they resemble him.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

By a state of pure and exalted nature, I mean that original integrity in which all things were created, and as they came pure from God's hands, representative of his divine perfections, and conform to eternal order (a); the eternal, immutable and universal law of all finite intelligences is and ought to be that of the infinite intelligence (b); God loves himself because he is infinitely perfect, and loves all beings proportionably as they resemble him (c): therefore in a state of pure and exalted nature all finite intelligences followed the eternal, immutable and universal law of order, which is to love God for himself and all beings proportionably as they resemble him.

(a) Def. 1. of this Book. (b) Ax. 2. of this Book. (c) Cor 1. and 4. of Prop. XI.

S C H O L I U M.

A modern author, (a) who is justly valuable for his fine genius, delicate taste, noble sentiments, and universal learning, has demonstrated by experience, that there is in the soul an intimate, moral, superior sense or sentiment, by which we discover and approve, relish and love virtuous actions and agents, independent of all interested views; and that the sensible pleasure accompanying these actions, or the future rewards that attend them, or any other natural good which may be the consequences of them; are not always the motive of our esteeming, loving and practising them; so that we undesignedly promote our own private good, while we are only intending the good of others.

This was the universal sentiment of all the refined Pagans, as shall be shown in the second part of this work: but we shall resume this subject higher, rise up to first principles, and endeavour to show that this moral sense and disinterested love of virtue is founded upon the immutable relations betwixt finite and infinite.

The love of God for himself, and of all other beings for him, is the law of eternal order; for order in the creation is the conformity of the created images and pictures to their uncreated original, and to the designs he had in making them. This is the supreme original law, yea the law of God himself, from whence he cannot depart without ceasing to be what he is. He did not make this law in any determinate period of duration, by a free arbitrary decree; it flows necessarily from his essence, and is equally binding upon him and upon

(a) See Mr. Hutcheson's enquiry into moral good and evil.

all created intelligences. It is founded upon the eternal, immutable relations of finite and infinite. All other laws are only emanations of this original law; or helps to arrive at it. We might have been placed in circumstances, wherein all other laws would have been useless. This is the only necessary, essential, universal law of all intelligent natures, in all times, in all places, and in all situations. God cannot give a dispensation from it without contradicting himself, without overturning eternal order, and destroying the essential relations betwixt the creature and the creator.

This doctrine of the pure love of God for his sovereign perfection, was strongly combated in France, by several philosophers and divines of the last age, who maintained that in all times, places and states, fallen or unfallen, pleasure is the only spring of the soul; that the invincible desire of happiness, is the essence of the will; and in fine that the perception of truth, and the beauty of virtue never move the soul otherwise than by the celestial delectation which accompanies them; and therefore that it is impossible, even in heaven itself, to love any thing but for the pleasure, happiness, relative good, and interest we find in it.

E'er I confute this scheme, it is fit to remark the equivocal sense of the word Pleasure. It signifies either the deliberate act or purpose of the will; as when kings say, 'such is our pleasure;' or an indeliberate passive sensation of the soul, as when we say that music gives us great pleasure. Those who maintain that pleasure is the only spring of the will, must understand this word in the latter sense, not in the former; for the motive of the will cannot be the act of the will; as the

moving force cannot be the motion itself; or the cause, the effect. Now in the latter sense Pleasure, or the agreeable sensation of the soul, the desire of happiness, of relative good, and self-interest cannot be the only motives of the will for three reasons.

1mo. If pleasure, happiness, good relative to ourselves, and self-interest, were the only motives of the will, then it would be impossible to have greater love to an object that produces in us less agreeable sensations, than to another that produces in us more agreeable sensations. Now it is certain by experience that during this life, truth, virtue, and eternal order do not always produce in us such lively, penetrating, gratifying sensations as terrestrial objects; and therefore it would be impossible to love the former preferably to the latter, and to remain virtuous when solicited by strong terrestrial delectation. Thus the most vicious would be excusable, because they do not feel any pleasure in virtue. If it be said that intellectual pleasure is stronger than corporeal, tho' it be not so sensible; I answer, that since pleasure is a sensation, its force must be measured by its sensibility, and therefore if a pure reasonable pleasure act upon us more strongly than an impure unreasonable pleasure, it does not then act upon us as more agreeable, but as more reasonable, or as of a superior dignity; and consequently the view of truth or virtue may act as forcibly upon the will as the sensation of pleasure. For this reason it is that the vicious are always blameable, because by virtue of the universal grace and light refused to none, they may always turn their intellectual eye to the view of truth, virtue, and justice.

The modern refined Epicureans will urge, 'that when we sacrifice sensible pleasure to intellectual, temporal happiness to eternal, and apparent good to real, it is because we prefer a more durable to a less durable pleasure; that a vicious man who follows his passions, may have an hundred degrees more sensible pleasure than a saint, who sacrifices all his passions: but that the latter with one degree of celestial delectation surmounts the hundred degrees of terrestrial, because he considers the one as eternal, and the other as transient. Now an eternal duration multiply'd by one degree of pleasure, is infinitely superior to an hundred degrees of pleasure multiply'd by any finite time; because in spiritual as in material motions, the force is still to be measured by the vivacity or momentum multiply'd by the duration and the number of repeated impressions. Thus happiness present or future, relative good, self-interest, and pleasure, celestial or terrestrial, are always the latent, primitive, and only springs of the will.'

It is by this comparison of spiritual and corporeal agents that the modern Epicureans reduce all the operations of spirit to mechanism and calculation. They suppose tacitely that the soul is an intellectual machine, whose mobility differs from that of bodies in this alone, that the one perceives what passes in it, and the other does not: but both are equally mechanical, and push'd necessarily by the moving cause, that impells and determines them inevitably and invincibly. Thus they destroy all ideas of Liberty, which they reduce to a simple spontaneity, and so confound what is voluntary with what is free. I grant that we may sacrifice a temporal interest to an

eternal, an impure pleasure to a more refin'd one; and the delights of sense, to those of the mind; and this is a most reasonable self-love: but this does not prove that we cannot also sacrifice the natural love of pleasure to the pure love of justice, which I demonstrate thus.

2do. Since that for which we love is properly the end and object of our love; if pleasure, happiness and relative good were the only springs of the will, then we would not love God as he loves himself; we would love nothing but ourselves; we would love the original less than the image; the small rays more than the immense ocean of light, the infinitely great for the infinitely little, and thus love the total sum of perfection less than a small participation of it. Thus by the essential fundamental constitution of our natures we would be obliged necessarily to overturn all order, contradict the eternal law of God himself, and have a will diametrically opposite to his.

The modern Epicureans will say, that God loves himself because he is happy, and that the pleasure accompanying the view of his perfections, produces in him the love he has for himself, and that therefore to love him as beatifying, as our supreme happiness, as infinite source of pleasure, as relative good, as our sovereign interest, is loving him as he loves himself. I answer that the knowledge God has of himself is no doubt accompanied with infinite pleasure, but then this pleasure is not the formal reason of his love. God's love of himself is not a blind instinct, but a necessary emanation of the infinite knowledge he has of himself; otherwise God's love of himself, or the Holy Ghost, would not proceed from the Father by the Son, but from the sensation of his happiness; and

so there would be in God four persons instead of three; the mind conceiving; the idea conceiv'd, the happiness flowing from this conception; and the love proceeding from all the three. This is equally false philosophy, and false divinity. The happiness of the Godhead is the infinite complacency he takes in himself; this complacency is his love; and this love flows from the knowledge he has of his own perfection. In God knowledge and love are not the same; they are distinct acts, emanations, and personalities: but God's essential happiness and coessential love are the same act, virtue, personality, and both have the same motive or formal reason, which is the boundless perfection God discovers in himself. We are made for the knowledge of truth, as well as for the enjoyment of happiness. As God loves himself, because of his perfection, and not because he is happy; so we are made to love God because of his perfection, and not because our happiness flows from him; or rather as God's happiness, is the love of his perfection, so our supernatural beatitude, is the love of the same perfection.

If it be urged that God loves himself not only as sovereign good, but as good to himself, as his own good. I answer that this is absolutely false. If there were any other good beside God, he would go out of himself, so to speak, to enjoy it, and therefore he does not love his perfection, as proper to him, as his own, from a principle of interest; but because this good is good in itself, and amiable by essence. Self-love in us purely as selfish is a defect and not a virtue; and so has no archetype in our great original. God loves himself because he is perfect; and not because he is selfish. We ought to love our-

selfes for him as his images, and in so far as we resemble him in any degree of perfection, and not for ourselves and as separate beings distinct from him. The knowledge God has of his absolute perfection, or his eternal Word, is the only source, motive, and reason of his co-eternal love or Holy Ghost. To maintain therefore that the creature can love nothing but itself, for its own pleasure, interest and happiness, is to deny that God can make a being that loves him as he loves himself, that he can produce a creature after his own image, and that has the same law with him.

3tio. If pleasure, happiness, and relative good, were the only springs of the will, then God considered as sovereign truth, would act less strongly upon us, than God considered as supreme happiness. We would love him more for what he does to us, than for what he is in himself, for his bounded communications, than for his boundless perfections, as relative good than as absolute good, as beatifying to us, than as beatifying to all intelligences. It may be said that since the view of truth, perfection and order is always accompanied with pleasure, it is the pleasure that is the only motive of love. I answer that in all intelligences the view of order is always accompanied with pleasure: but as the pleasure that accompanies the view of truth is not the reason why we acquiesce in it as true, so the pleasure that accompanies the view of order, is not the reason why we love and adhere to it as just. In one and t'other case, it is the immutable relation of things that determines our judgment and choice, and not the agreeable impressions they make upon us. If it be said that this is only esteem, adoration, speculative love, and not

an efficacious charity. This we deny, since it produces a conformity to the object, a constant observation of his laws, an inviolable attachment to justice and an imitation of all the divine perfections. It is not a sensible, indeliberate, voluptuous delectation, but a spiritual, deliberate, universal choice of, and adherence to eternal order. Now true love is a transformation of the soul into a conformity with the object lov'd. It is true that we always love with pleasure, but not for pleasure. The act of love when sensible is the greatest pleasure; but the act is not the motive. Moreover, the pure, spiritual love of God in the saints is not always sensible nor perceptible by its effects. This habitual love of preference is very oft accompany'd, as in our great modell, with inward aridities and outward desolation, spiritual agonies, and internal martyrdom; and yet the mind adheres invincibly to the choice it has made from the sole love of justice. This love is called pure, not only because of its object, but because of its act, which being altogether intellectual and central, does not always affect the imagination with grateful ideas, strong emotions, and sensible delectations.

The modern more refined Epicureans have no notion of this pure love. All their devotion is a pious drunkeness, and a sensible delectation. They desire to go to heaven upon a bed of roses; so soon as they feel no inward joys in the paths of virtue, they recoil, turn back, and fall into despondency, till they feel again the sweet returns of a celestial delectation. They look upon this milk of babes as efficacious grace, and upon the aridities, desolations, and the suspensions of these sensible favours as dereliction, infidelity, and marks of repro-

bation. They love, value, search and esteem nothing in piety, but the melting transports of a mechanical devotion. Thus Self is the source and center of all their virtues, and pleasure the only spring of their will. Thus they exchange the gross passions of sense, with the most refined vices of the fallen seraphin. Their self-denial is very oft ostentation; their desire of perfection, an intellectual ambition; their shining virtues, gawdy shows; their apparent disinterestedness, a secret vain glory, and their love of God a spiritual concupiscence. They condemn all the delicacies of pure love as vain refinements of mind; and if they have any subtilty of genius, they propose the following objections against the eternal law and love of order.

1mo. The love of God is our supreme interest, so it can never be gratuitous and without view to a recompense; and therefore it is always interested. But there is no force in this argument: we grant that the love of God is our supreme interest, but it does not thence follow, that this interest is the reason, the end or the motive of our love. This love will not become interested, because our greatest interest is in fact inseparable from it, unless we act only from a selfish view to obtain this interest. Neither is this love interested, because it in fact procures us necessarily eternal happiness, since our view in loving purely is not to be happy but to be good; not to enjoy the recompense, but to be just; nor to quench our insatiable thirst of felicity, but to conform ourselves to eternal order. Thus these Epicurean divines confound eternally the motive and the effect, or consequent of pure love.

2do. These mistaken divines urge that we can love no-

thing but what is amiable, and that God is only amiable as he is beneficent to us. The latter proposition is false: God as beneficent toward us is desirable, but he is amiable as sovereignly perfect, and good toward all, and as the supreme beauty; that is, because of the immutable harmony and order amongst all his perfections. All other beings are only amiable in so far as they resemble him. The intuitive view of his absolute beauty ravishes superior intelligences, and transports them so entirely beyond themselves, that they have not time to think of, or reflect upon their own happiness. These incautious philosophers perpetually confound desire with love; chaste hope with spiritual cupidity, and the natural love of happiness with supernatural charity. We desire what is good to us, we love what is good in itself. The intrinsic beauty and perfection we see in an object may be a reason of love; of adherence and tendency to it; as well as the relative happiness, and agreeable sensations we expect from it.

3tio. These spiritual Epicureans add, that if God were not beneficent to us, if he refused to make us happy; if he were indifferent about his creatures, they could not love him, and he would not be amiable, and therefore our love is always interested. This too is a mere cavil. If God were not infinitely beneficent to his living images, he would not be infinitely perfect. He is free to create finite beings, but he is not free to make them miserable, to hate them gratuitously, to predestinate them to eternal misery purely to show his empire over them. This were a contradiction to his nature, and to his designs in producing them. One of his most amiable perfections is to love all he has made; and to beatify all intelligences; but this is

not the sole pulchritude and perfection of his nature. Tho' he should annihilate us in particular after this life, and thereby refuse us the beatific vision during eternity; yet so long as we exist, it would be just and reasonable to love him as amiable in himself, and beneficent to all the other myriads of beings and orders of spirits that he has created. He cannot torment us without reason, nor make us for ever miserable, his overflowing goodness must at last make us all happy: but the degrees of happiness he gives us, are not the standards of the love we owe to him, nor what make him precisely and sovereignly amiable. We ought to love him not only for what he does, but for what he is. To separate the love of God as beatifying from the love of God as perfect, the desire of God as the source of pleasure, true happiness, and relative good, from the love of God as sovereign justice, order and beauty, is mangling in our notions and dividing the living God: it is loving him only for what he is to us, and not for what he is in himself. This probably was the sin of Lucifer.

Thus the devout Fatalists and rigid Predestinarians from a latent self-love fancy themselves the only elect. God as infinitely perfect in himself, and as infinitely good to all beings, is not the object of their love; but a partial God that doats upon them, while he neglects, hates, and damns all other beings. Their most perfect charity is only a love of gratitude, and of gratitude for an arbitrary choice, predilection, and preference unworthy of God, and destructive of his moral perfections.

4to. These Epicurean casuists, enraged to see the idol of Self overthrown, contend earnestly that self-love is inseparable

from our natures: we can never be indifferent about our own happiness: if we could, then we might become independent, defy God, laugh at hell and damnation, yea despise eternal felicity. This objection is founded upon the sophistical reasonings of some antagonists of pure love; who pretend that a necessary consequence of this sublime doctrine is, that we may sacrifice eternal bliss and submit to everlasting damnation, that is, to the hatred of God, from a principle of absolute resignation to the divine will. All this is extravagance, and a wandring from the true question. We can never separate the pure love of God, from the true love of Self; nor the chaste hope of eternal happiness, from pure charity. By the laws of immutable order we ought to love all that God has made; love even ourselves out of pure charity as his living images; and our everlasting felicity as the consummation of divine love in us. Do we desire God less, because we love him purely? is our chaste hope less ardent, because we hope from a motive worthy of God? do we become indifferent to the beatific vision, because we aspire to it as the period, and perfection of pure love? do we love ourselves less, because we love ourselves for God, as God loves us, and as finite images of his consubstantial Word? our essential happiness is the vision and love of God. Can we become indifferent to love by an excess of love? this is downright contradiction. All the sacrifices that some pious minds make of the beatific vision are the transports of a heart inflamed with love, that forgets itself, and that does not advert to the repugnancy of its ideas, which are not conformable to the just and noble sentiments we ought to have of the Deity. They suppose that God can

contradict his designs in creating, leave a being that loves him in eternal misery, and will deliberately the irretrievable damnation of any creature. False philosophy and yet falser divinity; as we shall fully demonstrate hereafter. All these impossible suppositions far from being the supernatural efforts of pure love, are the imperfect fallys of a mind not sufficiently enlightned. When Moses offered to be blotted out of the book of life, and St. Paul to become Anathema for the salvation of his brethren; they meant their own personal annihilation or privation of the beatific vision, if this could procure the return of their fellow creatures to eternal order. They could never mean that they desired hell and damnation, or consented to hate God from an excess of love; this is a contradiction. If by an impossible supposition, the perfection and happiness of all the human race, and of all created beings, depended upon the particular, personal annihilation of any one man, or his being deprived of the beatific raptures, then it would be just and reasonable to submit to these two privations; because by the laws of eternal order we ought still to prefer the greater to the lesser good: but these pious transports of the saints prove rather their self-forgetfulness, and universal charity, than the possibility of any such suppositions.

Thus the modern Epicureans, unhappily prejudiced against some pure intellectual ideas, sublime reasonings, profound thoughts, and noble sentiments, perpetually confound the motive with the effect; Desire with Love; God as beatifying with God as perfect; the false with the true self-love; and natural hope with supernatural charity. The source of all the clouds

and dust, they raise on this head is their mistaking always NATURE for GRACE; what souls laps'd, diseas'd, and degenerated do ordinarily, with what they may, should, and will do, when exalted, cured and purified. In our present state, the speculative ideas of truth and order do not always act efficaciously upon the will to determine its choice, unless accompanied with celestial pleasure; and herein lies the necessity of spiritual delectations to divert us from corporeal objects, and convert us to God as beatifying. This, as we shall shew hereafter, is only the first step of the divine life: but these novices in true piety confound the beginning with the end, the milk of babes with the food of strong men; the jargon of children with the language of the perfect. They pretend to be doctors in Israel, profound divines, yea fathers of the church, but they are ignorant of the first elements of reasoning. They stop at the rudiments of true theology; they know nothing but the alphabet of Christianity.

Having thus dissipated all the clouds by which some superficial or prejudiced minds endeavour to obscure the sublime doctrine of seraphic love; let us now return to our subject.

In these superior regions of pure and exalted nature, all finite intelligences follow this eternal, immutable, and universal law; and from the observation of it flows necessarily all their perfection and happiness. This is not an arbitrary law, which God has imposed, to make them merit; nor is their obedience to it a motive determining him to make them happy. He cannot beatify them without it, and they cannot be happy but by it. Felicity is not an arbitrary recompence, but

a necessary consequence of this pure love. It constitutes their happiness, and is inseparable from it. They are happy by love and by free love. So long as they remain faithful to this eternal law, they open and expand themselves to God's luminous influences; and the more they receive, the more they are dilated. God cannot but communicate himself to his living images, that love him, as he loves himself. He made them only to know and love him, and therefore when they put no stop to his divine illapses, he cannot but manifest himself to them, and display all the beauties of his essence, and all the wonders of his omnipotence. When they can no more support the direct view of the divine splendors, they enter into society with each other, admire the wonders of nature; and compare the beauties they see in the pictures with those they have seen in the original. They see all in God and God in all; and proportionably as they discover in the supreme archetype new beauties and new perfections; they discover also in the created pictures new manifestations of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness. God flows continually into them; and they transmit to each other his beatifying effluences, which return again to their almighty center without any let or hindrance. In this everlasting flux, reflux, and circulation of divine life, light and love consists the beatitude of all the celestial choirs, and of each particular spirit. The action of the Father augments for ever their activity; the action of the Son communicates to them still new knowledge; and the action of the Holy Ghost exalts eternally their love, so that lost in the divine ocean, and consummated in unity, they partake in the operations of the Eternal Three.

It was by failing in this law of pure love that lapsed spirits fell from their primitive state; and it is in order to reestablish them for ever immutably in this eternal law, that they pass thro' a state of sufferings, expiation and misery.

C O R. I.

Hence in a state of pure, primitive and exalted nature, there was and could be no moral evil, no false ideas, nor irregular loves, no unjust actions, since God was the life, light and love of all created intelligences, and they all followed the eternal, immutable, and universal law of order.

C O R. II.

Hence in all states, fallen and unfallen, all finite intelligences in order to enjoy the supreme felicity and perfection of their natures, that is, the supernatural knowledge and love of the absolute Infinite, must expose their faculties to his immediate influence, by a free conversion of all their powers to the eternal source of life, light and love. They must remain freely passive before him to receive his divine irradiations and motions. They have all but one essential, primitive and original law, in order to be continued in, or restored to their supreme happiness; which is to stand still before the BEING OF BEINGS, that he may flow into them, irradiate their understandings, animate their wills, and become their only Reason and their only Law.

C O R. III.

Hence if finite intelligences deviate from the law of eternal love; if they cease to open and expand themselves to the divine influences, if they voluntarily turn themselves away from this almighty source of LIFE, LIGHT and LOVE; they must

necessarily become dead, dark and miserable. Wherefore since God loves all that he has made, since he created finite intelligences only to make them happy, if they be exiled from this beatific vision, it must only be because they have deviated from the eternal love of order, render'd themselves incapable of all communication with God, and stopt as to themselves that continual circulation from the center to the circumference, which makes the perfection and felicity of all created intelligences.

C O R. IV.

Hence the natural tendency of the will towards God as beatifying and as relative good, is not the love of God, according to the laws of eternal order. This natural, congenial, inherent love of felicity is common to the devils and the damn'd: whereas the pure love of order can be produced in the soul only by God's immediate, continual irradiation, and action.

C O R. V.

Hence to love God for himself, and all beings proportionably as they resemble him, is the eternal, immutable, and universal law of all intelligences. This is the true law of nature, of which all particular, positive laws, whether civil or religious, are but branches, and consequences; or means, and helps to facilitate the observation of it.

C O R. VI.

Hence we ought to love general, more than particular good; and in all circumstances, times, places, and states, whether fallen or unfallen, we ought to prefer public to private interest; we ought to love our family more than ourselves, our

country more than our family; mankind more than our country; all intelligences more than the human species; and the BEING OF BEINGS more than all his productions. This is the shortest, surest, and most universal way to investigate and demonstrate the religion of nature; the laws of nations, the social duties, and all human virtues. They flow from the necessary and immutable relations betwixt finite and infinite. And to deduce them from the love of self-preservation and self-interest alone is inverting the order of things, drawing universal consequences from particular principles, and endeavouring to prove truth by falsehood.

P R O P O S I T I O N XLI.

In a state of pure and exalted nature, no finite intelligence can obey the law of eternal order by its own natural and inherent force; without a supernatural grace and assistance.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N :

Finite intelligences by their own natural inherent force, can love nothing but themselves, and their own happiness (a); the natural tendency of the will towards God as beautifying and as relative good is not the love of God according to the laws of eternal order (b): therefore in a state even of pure and exalted nature, no finite intelligence can obey the law of eternal order by its own natural and inherent force; without a divine supernatural grace and assistance.

(a) Cor. 1. of Prop. XXX. (b) Cor. 3. of Prop. XL.

S C H O L I U M.

We may indeed by feeling our own nothingness, misery and insufficiency, by discovering the incommensurability of all finite good to our boundless capacities, desire to be united to the infinite as our supreme felicity: but this natural love of God as beatifying to us, as relative good, as the source of eternal pleasure, is not loving God for himself. This is not loving him according to the laws of eternal order. It is only loving him for our own sakes, a desire to satisfy our insatiable thirst of happiness; and, as I have said, this desire is common to us with the devils and the damn'd. It is nothing beyond the reach and power of finite minds; or rather it is a necessary and natural consequence of the invincible love we have for Self. To love God for himself, to love him as he loves himself, to love him for his infinite perfections, as sovereign justice and eternal order, to rise above ourselves, and lose ourselves in him by a total preterition of Self, we must be enlightened, inspired and animated by a superior force continually descending upon us and investing us. As it is God alone that can enlighten us, so it is he alone that can love himself in us. As no man can know the Father but by the Son, so no man can love the Father but by the Holy Ghost. As the supernatural light by which we know God is an emanation of the eternal Logos, and a participation of that light by which he knows himself, so the supernatural love by which we can love God, is an emanation of the Holy Ghost, and a participation of that love by which he loves himself.

By this great principle we come to understand the true

distinction betwixt Nature and Grace. The one was establish'd at first by God's all-powerful, simple, creating act, whose energy continues without interruption and without repetition. The other requires a constant, immediate repetition of the divine acts and operations in the creature, which are oft interrupted, and renew'd by the alternate resistance and co-operation of our free will. The natural properties of finite beings are these which they have by creation, as inseparable adjuncts of their essence. The supernatural graces of God, are perfections which the creature receives immediately from the divine action. The former are inamissible qualities, inseparable from our natures; the others may be lost by the abuse of liberty. Thus in spiritual agents, or the intelligent images, the powers of perceiving, comparing, and willing, of knowing their being, and of desiring their well-being are essential properties, inseparable from their nature, and communicated to them by God the Father, in giving them existence: but supernatural light and love; their seeing God as he is, and their loving him as he deserves, are impressions that come from the immediate operation of the eternal Word and of the Holy Ghost. Thus again in the material pictures, figurability, divisibility, and mobility are properties that flow from the idea of an extended substance: but their representing the divine perfections by their harmonious forms, divisions and motions, are modes given them by the immediate action of the Deity. Being and all its essential properties are effects of God as source of nature: but Perfection and all its progressive augmentations, are effects of God as the source of grace. Both these gifts are equally gratuitous, and pure effects of the

divine beneficence: but the former become by donation inherent in, and essential to the creature. The latter are continually communicated to it as qualities and modes, that depend upon its adherence to, union with, and receiving influences from its almighty original; and so are not attributes and properties that belong to its essence. Wherefore Malebranche was egregiously in the wrong when he made all the natural powers and activities of the creature immediate effects of the divine operation. This is confounding nature and grace, and the action of God with the action of the creature. This is a far more dangerous error than that of Pelagianism. Pelagius by ascribing too much to the creature divinizes it; the other by attributing all to God, makes him the author of evil, and so demonizes him. The one extends our ideas of the divine liberality too far; but the other tends to destroy all his moral attributes. The one may lead to a presumptuous self-idolatry: but the other may lead to the blackest atheism. The true midst consists in such an account of our activity as makes the creature the free cause of all evil, and God the sole cause of all true good.

C O R. I.

Hence it is absolutely false, that there ever was, or can be a state of PURE NATURE, wherein souls by their own inherent force could love God as he deserves, without any supernatural grace or immediate influence of the Holy Ghost: as it is impossible that there can be any state of PURE NATURE wherein the soul can know God as he is, without any supernatural illumination or irradiation of the eternal Word. Men indeed may acquire by a successive comparison of their ideas

a natural knowledge and love of God, but not the supernatural knowledge and love we are speaking of. If this were otherwise, the soul might beget within itself the eternal Logos, and the Holy Ghost; be its own light, and its own love; its own perfection, and its own happiness.

C O R. II.

Hence the will may have two motives of action, natural self-love, and the supernatural love of God; the desire of happiness or the perception of truth; Perfection known, or Pleasure felt. The soul may always turn off its intellectual eye from the view of truth, solicited by strong sensations of pleasure; or may remain firm and unmoved in the love of truth from a principle of justice. Wherefore the essence of the will is not, as the modern Epicureans say, the invincible desire of its own happiness; but a tendency towards good in general whether absolute or relative; good in itself or good to us; good to all beings, or good to our particular being; universal good, or private interest.

C O R. III.

Hence all finite intelligences may separate the love of order from the love of pleasure; since the view of the one and the sensation of the other may equally act upon and influence their will; and this separation is sin or moral evil.

C O R. IV.

Since we can love nothing but by the motive of Perfection known, or Pleasure felt, we may cease to love eternal Order, either because we do not perceive its sovereign Beauty, or because we feel pleasure in departing from it. There can therefore be but two possible ways of curing moral evil, and

reclaiming lapsed intelligences; the sensation of pleasure in the discovery of truth, or the sensation of pain in the love of error.

C O R. V.

Hence as there is an essential difference betwixt the natural activities of the understanding concerning God, and the supernatural illuminations of the eternal Logos; so there is an essential difference betwixt the natural tendency of the will towards God as beatifying, as relative good, as the source of infinite pleasure; and the supernatural action of the Holy Ghost, which makes us love God for himself, according to the law of eternal order. The one is common to us with the devils and the damned; the other makes us resemble angelical and beatify'd spirits.

C O R. VI.

Hence there are but two sorts of affections that can divert us from the love of eternal order; false self-love, and the irregular love of the creatures; for besides God, ourselves, and the creatures there can be no other objects in nature. We sin against eternal order by loving God only for ourselves, as we sin against the same eternal order by loving the creatures more than God; since in both cases our love is not proportioned to the perfection of objects.

C O R. VII.

Since we never love the creatures in an irregular manner but for our own interest, or the pleasure they procure us, hence it follows that false self-love is the primitive source of all moral evil, and a self-idolatry that erects the creature into the place of God, that usurps upon all his rights, that renders

itself the center of all the creation, and the end of all its actions, and thereby engenders all passions, sins, and crimes.

P R O P O S I T I O N XLII.

In a state of pure, primitive and exalted nature all the properties, forms, and laws of the material pictures were representative of the divine perfections.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

God's design in creating was to represent his divine perfections by external beings (a); in a state of pure, primitive, and exalted nature, the material pictures of the Deity, could not resist the divine action, nor hinder the execution of his almighty designs (b): therefore in the pure, primitive, and exalted state of nature all the properties, forms, and laws of the material world, were representative of the divine perfections.

S C H O L I U M.

This great truth is a fruitful source of many luminous principles that may be of great use in natural philosophy.

1. Since we have shown that the creation must be originally representative of the divine perfections, it follows evidently that to paint forth in a sensible manner by material pictures, the infinitely active and omnipresent essence of the Deity, that gives life, light, and order to all things, nothing is more proper than the creation of an infinitely active ethereal matter that fills all, penetrates all, and overflows all. It is true

(a) Prop. XXI.

(b) Cor. 3. of Prop. XXXIV.

that created matter must always be finite; because, as we have shewn, God's creating power can never be exhausted, nor can he produce without himself an absolute infinite of any kind; and in this sense as in all others, the picture is always infinitely inferior to the original: but we may conceive this ethereal matter as eternally augmenting by the continual external activity of the divine nature. In this immense ocean of ethereal matter we may conceive by the same rules of analogy, three distinctions, conditions or principles: 'a fiery active principle' that diffuses itself every where, and is the first original spring and source of motion in the universe; 'an ethereal luminous fluid' that transmits the action of its flaming source or center to all the points of the circumference; and 'an elastic aerial fluid' dilatible and compressible; that is the source of union in all the different parts of the material system. This resemblance betwixt the archetype and the type is perhaps the reason why the sacred writers when they speak of God, compare the Father to a consuming fire, the Son to an universal light, and the Holy Ghost to a subtile air or spirit. Thus Fire, Light, and Air the component parts of the pure fluid which fills the vast expanse are types, emblems, and pictures of the divine essence, and its three consubstantial personalities.

2. Besides this ethereal fluid representative of the divine essence we observe in nature solid bodies that have neither life, light, nor motion in themselves; and therefore represent intelligent beings that receive all these from God alone. As the supernatural emanations or influences of the divine life, light, and love modify differently spirits of all possible degrees, and thereby form different kinds, orders, and hierarchies of in-

telligent images; so the luminous, universal, active, ethereal fluid modifies differently all the various parts of solid bodies, and thereby produces innumerable kinds of material pictures. As each intelligence is one simple indivisible essence, so the elementary part of all compound bodies, may be unities, atoms or monades not absolutely indivisible like spirit, but inseparable and infrangible by any finite force. These original atoms of numberless sizes and figures were not produced at random, by one blind shock impress'd upon matter, but were all at first modelled and formed by an almighty wisdom that foresaw all their possible combinations, uses and effects. The subtle ethereal fluid by circulating thro' all the parts of the universe produces in these original monades various motions and velocities, unions and divisions, and thereby compound bodies of all kinds. When it binds together these original monades, so that they adhere to each other by a strong union of continuity, it forms solids of all kinds. When it approaches these indivisibles, so as to render them simply contiguous, or make them join in small masses and drops, it produces liquids of all kinds. When it mixes these primitive compounds both solid and liquid, and presses them into the pipes and channels of organical moulds or seeds which were all first formed by the fingers of the Almighty; then it forms animals, vegetables, and individuals of all sorts. In fine, when it gathers together elements, animals, and vegetables, solids and liquids of all compatible natures into vast masses, it produces planets, orbs, and worlds of innumerable kinds. This ethereal fluid is then, so to speak, the instrument, image, and sensory of the Deity, to make use of Sir Isaac Newton's expression, upon which he

acts immediately, and by which he acts upon all other corporeal beings. It is the physical spring of the universe that sets the great machine a going. It is this universal agent that animates and enlightens, moves and penetrates, unites and separates, compresses or expands, forms and produces compound bodies of all kinds solid and liquid. Hence it is that in the Hebrew language, the plural word Schemim which expresses the different principles of the celestial fluid signifies in different places of the sacred text; agents, formers, disposers, placers, shifters, enliveners, enlightners, producers, augmenters, dividers, compressors, and separators. All the different forms, divisions and motions of solid, visible, tangible bodies, are produced by the action of this invisible, universal fluid, according to immutable laws known to God alone, and most proper to express his divine perfections, and accomplish his great designs. As the different combinations of letters produce at first words, then sentences, next discourses, and at last volumes, which express all the thoughts of the mind, so the different composition of the original monades, form first elementary solids and liquids, then individuals, next spheres, or worlds, and at last the whole material universe. Each monade is a letter, each primitive compound a word; each individual a sentence, each sphere a discourse, and the whole together justly combined is that great book and volume of nature which expresses all the divine perfections and archetypal ideas. This is the true visive language, which Dr. Berkeley mistakes for a wild metaphysical theory: but in order to read this great volume we must see it as God sees it, and behold it in its pure, primitive and exalted state as it came pure from his hands, ere

physical and moral evil had obliterated, darken'd, and defac'd in it the noblest characters of the divine resemblance.

3. As the perfection and happiness of all intelligent natures consists in an uninterrupted reception and transmission of the divine communications without any let or hinderance; so the beauty and harmony of all material substances in a pure and primitive state, consists in a continual admission and transmission of the ethereal fluid. In this exalted original state therefore, we may conceive that all was composed of an active, luminous, ethereal fluid, representative of the divine essence, and at the same time of transparent, solid substances representative of intelligent beings. For this reason it is that tho' nature be now vail'd and disturb'd in this spot of the universe we inhabit, yet its original principles are not destroy'd. All bodies are reducible to light and glass or crystal; and for the same reason it is, that the scripture always represents the new Jerusalem as a sea of glass or crystal, and God as the light thereof. Nature then is composed of two elementary principles: the one an ethereal, active, subtile matter that is the depository or source of all the motions in nature. The other solid, inseparable, altogether passive monades form'd by the hands of the Almighty of different sizes, and figures, that are so to speak depositories or seats of all the rest and inaction in the universe. The material world is a great machine compos'd of innumerable springs and wheels, which are set in motion by a subtile matter, whose parts are also of different magnitudes and velocities. Thus the fluids that act upon certain solids have no effect on others. The forces and the forms of every monade are regulated; the activity and swiftness of every

fluid is fix'd: the fluids are unmixable, the springs indestructible. The one circulate, the others act with a perfect harmony, so as to shew that none but an infinite power, wisdom, and goodness could have imagin'd, produced, and adjusted these several parts of this beautiful machine. It is as impossible to discover at present the particular laws of this active fluid as it is impossible to discover the particular forms of each passive solid. The Cartesian vortices and the Newtonian attractions are equally insufficient to explain all the phenomena of nature. We may by these helps make some scanty guesses about some of the more general, superficial and obvious phenomena of nature: but these are subject to great difficulties, and will be an eternal source of disputes. Neither can we come to any true knowledge of the primitive laws of nature, till we see it as God sees it, know his way of operating in the material world, and all the different designs he had in creating and representing himself by it.

4. Tho' there might have been but one common center that was the original source of life, light and motion to all the material universe; yet, as in a vast expanse of matter that extends, dilates, and augments every moment, the rays in flowing from this universal center would have been weakned, dissipated, lost, or made useles, we see by experience that there is not one only system; but many, yea innumerable, stars or suns that are the luminous centers of each system; and therefore by the rules of analogy there may be planets, orbs, and worlds that rowl about these flaming centers, and that may be the abodes of intellectual inhabitants of innumerable kinds. The wonders of every sphere, world or system are dif-

ferent: but in all, the two original passive and active principles are the same. The great laws of analogy prevail in all; tho' the effects be different and various, yet all are similar and representative of the same original. Now it is the contemplation of these wonders and beauties of nature in its pure, primitive, exalted and uncorrupted state that makes the accessory happiness of blest intelligences. We have already shown that such is the essential weakness of finite intelligences, that they cannot always contemplate the divine splendors with a direct, uninterrupted view; and therefore they pass an eternity in the alternate returns of an essential and accessory bliss. During the intervals of this later, they remain in their respective orbs, spheres, and planets, converse with each other, and contemplate the original in the pictures; but when their souls are admitted to the immediate vision of the pure divinity, lost and immersed in the central depths of their immense original, then their glorious bodies are transported to the highest heavens, to the seat of God's glory, to the throne of his majesty, that is to the empyreal regions, where there are neither suns, stars, nor planets, but one uninterrupted ocean of light, which is the universal common center of the vast expanse, where they see light in its true light, till they return again into their respective orbs. This great idea seems to have been transmitted by original tradition from age to age, to the Platonic philosophers, who represent celestial spirits as sometimes confin'd to particular orbs within the sphere of the heavens, and then transported to a supramundane, supracelestial space where they see the **BEING THAT IS**, the eternal essence, face to face, and see truth in its source. It is perhaps by the effluences from that

universal empyreal center, where God manifests his activity, power, and energy in a more particular manner than in any other part of immensity; that all the suns, stars, and luminous centers of the universe or vast expanse are nourished and supplied with matter sufficient to preserve their force and motions, during a whole eternity.

V. As in all the superior regions of pure, primitive, and exalted nature there was and can be no moral evil, no false ideas, nor irregular loves in the intellectual world; so in the material universe there could be no physical evil, no painful sensations, no contradictory elements, no mortal qualities, no opacity, darkness, or confusion. None of these can be in a state where all the ideas and inclinations of spirit; all the forms and motions of matter were representative of the divine perfection; where all the intelligent images are full of life, light, and love; where all the material pictures were composed of an ethereal fluid, and transparent solid substances, acting upon each other, so as to paint forth eternal power, wisdom, and goodness. The irregularities therefore that we see in our inferior sphere must be derived from another principle; and it seems to be this: As the deviation of spirits or of the living images from the first and primitive law of eternal order must necessarily occasion in the intellectual world disorders, irregularities, and moral evil; so the deviation of bodies or of the material pictures, from the first original laws of nature, must necessarily produce in the corporeal universe, disorders, irregularities and physical evil. Wherefore if at any time one or more particular hierarchies of spirits, fall from their first life, light, and love, the material orbs, or stars which they inhabit,

and the corporeal vehicles which they animate, must lose also their original activity, splendor, and harmony. There is a physical, necessary connection betwixt the changes of the immaterial and material world. The divine activity the original source of order, proportion, and beauty in both, must by a natural, and necessary consequence be suspended in the one, when it is interrupted in the other.

These five great Metaphysical principles combined with Physical experiments, and Geometrical calculations, may perhaps be of great use to investigate the properties of material nature; and form a new Physiology more perfect than any that has yet appeared. I have adopted none of the maxims of the Cartesian philosophy, as they are purely hypothetical, dubious, or false, such as the formation of the universe by purely mechanical laws from one or many impulses given to the formless mass of infinite matter; the absolute impossibility of a void in nature; the generation of the three imaginary elements; the rotation of the planets about the sun by celestial whirlpools according to the simple laws of centrifugal forces; and the other peculiar, distinctive, and specific hypotheses, proper to the French philosopher. Moreover, I have rejected none of the Newtonian discoveries that are founded upon uncontested experiments, or invincible demonstration. For it may be proved that the great Sir Isaac never taught, what some of his disciples have maintain'd, that attraction is an inherent, innate, absolute quality of all matter; nor an universal, immediate, perpetual impression of the author of nature: on the contrary, the sublime English philosopher supposes that attraction may be an effect and not a cause; that gravita-

tion may be produced by impulsion; and that a subtile spirit or fluid is perhaps the primitive universal spring of nature. It is not my design, nor would it be proper here, to enter into the detail of particulars, nor explain the general phenomena of nature in this lower sphere; but it is perhaps possible to reconcile the antient doctrine of ethereal matter, with all that is demonstrable or demonstrated in the Newtonian scheme.

C O R. I.

Hence in the first production of the universe and in all the superior regions of pure, primitive and exalted nature, there could be no physical or moral evils. As there were no false ideas, irregular loves, or unjust actions; so there were no painful, noxious sensations, no contradictory elements, no mortal qualities. None of these can be in a state where all the ideas and inclinations of spirit, all the forms and motions of matter, were representative of the divine perfections; where all the intelligent images were full of life, light, and love; and all the material pictures painted forth eternal power, wisdom and goodness.

C O R. II.

Hence it is, that the chaos which Moses mentions in the book of Genesis cannot be understood of the first and primitive state of nature. Darkness, confusion, and disorder; death, opacity and destructive elements, cannot represent him that is all life, all light, and all love; all perfection, all beauty and all harmony. To suppose that the first productions of an all-powerfull intelligence, who had no other design in creating, but to paint forth his divine perfections, could be a chaos void of light and without form seems to be a mere Pagan fiction,

which Christian divines have adopted too easily; as shall be fully unfolded in the second part of this work.

C O R. III.

Hence the present disposition of things in our solar system; the rotation of the planets about the sun, the oblique position of the ecliptic to the equator, the distinctions of night and day, of summer and winter, of spring and harvest, and all the vicissitudes, irregularities, and disorders that have happened since the fall of angels and men, since the origin of moral and physical evil, are qualities, accidents and defects of fallen, degraded nature, that are to pass, disappear, and be entirely destroyed in a re-established state. For this reason the prophet Isaiah, St. Peter the apostle, and the evangelist St. John declare that upon the second advent of our Saviour the present heavens and the present earth shall pass away, and that in their place there shall be new heavens and a new earth, where all shall be renewed. All this shall be more fully explain'd, and unfolded in the second Part.

C O R. IV.

Hence it is a great mistake to confound the state of pure and exalted nature with that of lapsed and degenerated nature; and to regard the defects of the latter as necessary effects of the primitive laws of the former. This poor notion fortifies all the objections which atheists make against the existence of God, and all their cavils drawn from the present irregularities of nature in our terrestrial globe. If these irregularities flow necessarily from the first established general laws of nature, it is impossible to justify the divine wisdom, justice and goodness, which made such imperfect laws, with such fa-

tal consequences. All this will appear in a clearer light when we consider nature in a lapsed state, and the changes which happened to the material world in our sphere, since the fall of angels and men.

P R O P O S I T I O N XLIII.

In a state of pure and uncorrupted nature, it is possible that the eternal *LOGOS* might have taken a corporeal visible form to communicate with finite intelligences in a sensible manner.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

In a state of pure and exalted nature all finite intelligences enjoy'd a double felicity; one in the immediate contemplation of the divine essence, another in the knowledge of his representations (a); finite intelligences are obliged at certain intervals, by their natural finitude and weakness, to turn off their intellectual eye from the direct contemplation of the pure and absolute essence of God, to admire and adore the original in his images and pictures (b); during these intervals none but the eternal *Lōgos* could manifest and reveal to them, the infinite beauties of nature, the designs God had in creating, and the numberless resemblances of the original and the pictures (c): therefore in a state of pure, uncorrupted nature the eternal *Logos* might have taken a corporeal, visible form to communicate with finite intelligences in a sensible manner.

S C H O L I U M.

We shall shew in the second part of this work that there is no doctrine more clearly reveal'd in the Old Testament than

(a) Prop. XXXVIII. (b) Cor. I. of Prop. XXXVIII. (c) Cor. I. of Prop. XXI.

that of our Saviour's preexistent humanity, from the beginning of the world, long before his incarnation in the womb of the Blessed virgin; that it was he that conversed with our first parents in a paradisiacal state; that it was he that appeared to the holy patriarchs under a visible form; that it was he that discoursed with Moses upon the mountain; it was he that manifested himself to the prophets in supernatural visions, with a glorify'd body. We shall also shew in the same second Part that the Pagans themselves had a distinct notion of a divine person or Being united to a human nature or form, that was the leader, the conductor, and the chief of all created intelligences. It is thus that the Logos will converse under a human form with blessed spirits during a whole eternity; in these moments and intervals that they cannot contemplate the divine splendors with a direct and immediate view. It is thus that he will lead them from the central depths of the Divinity into all the immense regions of nature, shew them the numberless relations, and resemblances of the original and the pictures; then lead them back again into the sacred abyss of the divine essence. It is thus that the Logos humaniz'd will be the eternal high priest of the intellectual world, because he alone can render to God the homage and worship due to him; since he alone knows the Father, and the adoration that belongs to him. What a glorious idea does this give us of the hypostatic union, and how contemptible and ignorant are these who scoff at and blaspheme this mystery because they do not understand it?

COROLLARY.

Hence the doctrine of the hypostatic union betwixt the

divine and human nature has nothing in it contradictory to the sublimest reason; but it is no wonder that men blaspheme the mysteries of our holy religion, when they do not see the connection they have with the principles of the most exalted philosophy.

We have endeavoured to destroy in the four preceding books the great principles of Deism and Socinianism, by shewing that absolute infinite contains necessarily three and only three distinctions, which are neither simple attributes, nor different substances, but three real, consubstantial, co-eternal, self-conscious persons or intellectual agents, equal in all things, self-origination only excepted: that the eternal Logos united himself from the beginning to a visible, sensible, human form to communicate with finite beings, during those intervals wherein they cannot contemplate with a direct open view the unveil'd splendors of the uncreated essence; that this eternal Logos took upon him our mortal natures, and by his humiliation, sufferings, and sacrifice, expiated sin, and reconciled God's clemency with his unspotted justice, and his paternal love of the criminals, with his infinite abhorrence of their crimes. We shall now proceed to confute Fanaticism and Pharisaism that dishonour and disparage Christianity, and shew wherein true practical religion consists. This is the great end and scope of this essay, and without this all the rest are but dry, superfluous, barren speculations. All philosophy that stops at the understanding without reaching to the heart, is at best but an ingenious romance.

THE
 PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES
 OF
 NATURAL AND REVEALED
 RELIGION.

BOOK V.

OF NATURE IN A DEGRADED STATE.

A X I O M S.

NO Being can have merit or demerit personally, before its existence.

2. Experience teaches us that we feel pain, and that we are frequently unjust; that we suffer and sin; that we are subject to physical and moral evil.

P R O P O S I T I O N XLIV.

All finite intelligences are peccable.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

All finite intelligences may have two reasons of willing, viz. the perception of truth and the sensation of pleasure; self-love and the love of order (a); all finite intelligences may separate the love of order from the love of pleasure, and this separation is sin or moral evil (b): therefore all finite intelligences may sin, or are peccable.

S C H O L I U M.

God is impeccable for two reasons; as finite minds are peccable for two reasons; the one drawn from the understanding, and the other from the will. God can never err or fail in his knowledge; and therefore cannot make a false choice. His judgments are always conformed to eternal reason; and so he cannot sin: but the creature may err in its judgment, and so make a false choice. Moreover, God can never separate the love of order from the love of himself, because he is order. Whereas the creature may love itself, without loving order, and so separate self-love from the love of God. Thus whatever is essentially free and finite must be by nature fallible and peccable, till by long continued repeated acts it be confirmed in the immutable habits of good, as we shall shew hereafter.

VANNINI maintains that the idea of sin is a contradiction.

(a) Cor. 2. of Prop. XLI. (b) Cor. 3. of Prop. XLI.

on. Sin, says he, is an opposition, and resistance to the divine will. Now to suppose that a finite being can contradict or resist the will of an infinite being is altogether repugnant and impossible. This is a poor sophism. A finite Being cannot resist the absolute, direct, immediate acts of infinite power, which suppose no co-operation of the creature: but since we have demonstrated that God can communicate a real activity to second causes; that his intelligent images are perfectly free; and that he cannot destroy this freedom without annihilating their essence, it is plain that they may will contrary to what he wills. He leaves them to their free choice, and does not force them absolutely to do what he would have them.

It may be urged, that if this be so, then God does not will absolutely the happiness of all intelligences. This also is a sophism. If by absolute wills we mean omnipotent acts by which God produces his effect without any co-operation of intellectual beings, as in creation; then it is true that he does not will absolutely the felicity of the creatures. The supreme beatitude of all intelligent natures consists in the knowledge and love of the divine perfections. Now to will that an intelligent creature should know and love him without its free co-operation, is a contradiction. This is willing that an intelligence should be happy by love and by free love, while he forces and constrains it to love without freedom, by the irresistible dint of almighty power. This is willing an impossibility, and a triangular circle. God wills absolutely and without exception that all beings should love him freely, that they should love him without force and constraint; in this love consists their essential and supreme felicity; and therefore God

not only will not, but he cannot make them sovereignly happy without their co-operation. He might indeed modify them agreeably, overflow them with pleasure, and produce in them a continual succession of ravishing sensations; but this invincible love of happiness and pleasure is not loving God according to the laws of eternal order. This is not loving him for himself, by a free preference of his boundless perfections to all his bounded communications.

Spinoza denies liberty as well as Vanini: but he maintains the impeccability of the creature from another principle than that Italian Sophist. He says not only that the creatures cannot resist the divine action, but that all their modifications, sensations, perceptions, and volitions, are immediate effects of the divine action. ‘ God, however, says he, is not the author
 ‘ of sin; for sin is a privation, a negation, a nothing; and so
 ‘ does not want a cause. God is the only efficient cause of all
 ‘ that expresses reality or power; but the defectiveness comes
 ‘ from their finite natures in which there are infinite degrees
 ‘ (a): now to ask why God did not make all things equally
 ‘ perfect, is to ask why the divine nature is necessarily and in-
 ‘ finitely productive. So vast and so fruitful are the powers,
 ‘ and perfections of the divine essence, that they extend ne-
 ‘ cessarily to all degrees of being, which tho’ unequal with re-
 ‘ gard to each other, yet are equal with relation to God, and
 ‘ necessary to complete the boundless effects of his activity (b).
 ‘ He gives virtue to the good, and refuses this perfection to
 ‘ the bad, not by free choice and arbitrary decrees; but by
 ‘ the necessary laws of his infinite fecundity, which obliges

(a) Epist. XXXVI. (b) Ethics Part. I. append. pag. 39.

‘ him to produce beings of all degrees from the highest to the lowest, yea all sorts of beings possible, both these we call virtuous and those we call vicious (a).’

I answer in the first place, that it is absolutely false, that all events are the immediate effects of the divine action. We have already demonstrated that God can give a real activity to the creatures distinct from his own; by which they can become real, and free agents; and thereby produce effects and volitions that are distinct from, and contrary to the divine will. Activity and freedom are inseparable properties of all intellectual beings; and therefore by the essential finitude of their natures they are fallible and peccable.

I answer in the second place, that it is absolutely false, that God is obliged by necessity of nature to produce all that is possible. He is entirely free to create or not to create; and when he creates he produces only what he pleases, and what is representative of his divine perfections. All his primitive, original productions are free of moral and physical evil.

It is however remarkable that tho’ Spinoza denies the culpability of the creature, yet he authorizes not the impious opinion of those who maintain that there is no essential difference betwixt moral good and evil, for as he says very well ‘ our being determin’d necessarily by the original constitution of our nature to virtue or vice, to the love or hatred of God, does not destroy the essential distinction there is betwixt these two contrary and opposite dispositions of mind (b).’

The devout Fatalists and Predestinarians do not deny the existence of sin; but they say that the origin of moral evil is

(a) Epist. XXIII. (b) Epist. XXIII.

altogether unconceivable: for tho' the creature be fallible and peccable by nature; yet God might have confirmed it in grace by supernatural and infused habits.

I answer, that this opinion seems to me to destroy at once all the natural ideas we have of the divine wisdom, goodness, and sanctity. God as infinitely wise and provident should have taken all the measures possible to accomplish his great end in creating, that so he might not be eternally frustrated in his designs. Now since God's design in creating, was to make finite intelligences for ever and ever happy; if it had been possible to accomplish this end by one instantaneous act and infusion of supernatural graces and habits of good; he should have given to all finite spirits these efficacious graces that would have ascertained his end, and made it inevitable. Moreover, God as infinitely good loves all his creatures without exception, and is the common father of spirits, and so should have refused to none of them the graces necessary to prevent their total ruin and misery. In fine as infinite sanctity and justice, he should have done all that was possible to prevent moral evil, injustice, and disorder; and therefore if the infusion of such habits and graces had been possible, he should have granted them to all his creatures, rather than expose any one of them to sin, revolt and disobedience. This makes me believe that the infusion of such supernatural habits by one instantaneous act is impossible, and contrary to the nature of a free intelligence, which cannot be confirmed in immutable habits of good, but by a long continued repetition of free, deliberate and successive acts. This is the reason why all created spirits both fallen and unfallen,

must pass through a state of probation in felicity or suffering, till they be confirmed in the habits of pure love. We do not say that this state of probation was instituted arbitrarily by God, to make us merit; but that it is a natural and necessary consequence of our free natures that cannot be confirmed otherwise in the immutable love of order. Thus it is that blessed spirits whether fallen or restored become at last impeccable in heaven. Such it seems is the nature of finite spirits, that after a certain degree of good habits contracted, they become unpervertible and immutable in the love of order, because these habits become a second nature, so that they can no more chuse evil, nor mistake in their deliberations.

C O R. I.

Hence the origin of all evil comes from the natural freedom and finitude of the creature, that can always separate the love of perfection from the love of pleasure, and the love of self from the love of order.

C O R. II.

Hence all free and finite intelligences are fallible and peccable till by the repeated acts of pure love they be confirmed in the habits of good, which become a second nature, indestructible, inamissible, and unchangeable. No supernatural graces, nor infused habits can operate this second nature in them by an instantaneous act of omnipotence. It can be produced only by the long repeated free co-operation of the creatures with the supernatural operation of God in them. Thus deification is not like creation, a simultaneous momentary act of almighty power; but an effect of the creatures free co-operation with the divine transforming action.

C O R. III.

Hence the schoolmen are egregiously mistaken when they maintain that God could have rendered angels and men impeccable by supernatural graces and infused habits, which he refused them: since this opinion attacks and impeaches God's wisdom, goodness, and sanctity, which could have hindered evil, and yet would not do it.

C O R. IV.

Hence to maintain that God could have hinder'd the fall of rebellious angels, and of human spirits without destroying their liberty, but that he chose not to do so, in order to display his perfections of justice and mercy, is the highest blasphemy; for thus God to display his vindictive justice violated his love of holiness; and to shew his gratuitous mercy to a few derogated from his eternal goodness to many. He created finite intelligences to make them happy, and he fail'd deliberately in the designs of his eternal wisdom. Thus his perfections contradict and destroy each other mutually.

C O R. V.

Hence the Predestinarians favour the monstrous atheism of Vanini, when they say that God's graces are irresistible, and that he refuses those irresistible graces to the most part of men. This is really denying that he wills sincerely the salvation of all men; yea, it is supposing that he wills deliberately their crimes and damnation, and thereby destroying the idea of sin, of peccability and culpability in the creature.

C O R. VI.

Hence Spinoza's supposition that God by necessity of nature produces beings of all degrees, some virtuous and others

vicious; some elect and others reprobate; some happy and others unhappy is far less impious than the predestinarian scheme, which asserts that God out of free choice destin'd the most part of mankind to everlasting torments and blasphemy.

P R O P O S I T I O N XLV.

The present state of human nature is a state of degeneracy and corruption.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

In the first production of the universe, and in all the superior regions of pure, primitive and uncorrupted nature there was and could be no moral, nor physical evil (a); experience teaches us that in the present state of human nature we sin and suffer; that we are subject to moral and physical evil (b): therefore the present state of human nature is a state of degeneracy and corruption.

S C H O L I U M.

Those who deny our present degradation deny it only because they know no true ideas either of the nature of God, or of his designs in creating, or of the destiny of man. If souls be living images of the Deity; if God made them only to be happy; if this happiness consists in the view of God as he is, and in the love of God as he deserves, can we be said to be in the same state, in which we were created? are we admitted unto the immediate intuition of the divine essence? do we en-

(a) Cor. 1. of Prop. XL. compared with Cor. 1. of Prop. XLII.

(b) Ax. 2. of this book.

joy the beatific vision? is our love regulated by the laws of eternal order? do we see nature as God sees it? is all in it representative of the divine perfections? we need but look into ourselves and abroad into the world, to see evident proofs of the contrary.

The mind of man is a continual source of inconstant thoughts, and contradictory ideas, of false hopes, and anxious desires. The soul deprived of its true object, finds nothing within itself but a tumultuous ocean of incoherent and restless passions that destroy each other successively. If the wisest of men would keep a register of the incongruous thoughts, wild imaginations, and chimerical ideas that present themselves to his mind from morning to night: if the most virtuous men would unfold and follow out all the passions, desires, and sentiments which they find springing up in themselves, they would seem not only bedlamites, but monsters. Man in his present state feels nothing within himself but an empty void, thick darkness, gross ignorance, and restless self-love. Incapable to support the lingering torment of his own society, he flies himself, wanders abroad, and seeks where-with-all to amuse himself. His own passions expose him to those of other men. His self-love incompatible with theirs, rages like a boisterous sea. Every thing combats, repulses, or wounds its false delicacy, sensibility and jealousy. We live in society very oft as sick persons, whom the gentlest approaches hurt, ruffle and discompose. This is the present state of the sons of Adam. They torment each other mutually, the one half of them renders the other miserable; and this martyrdom of self-love abounds in all nations, provinces, cities, familys, and even in

each particular man, who is a little republic of factious and contrary members. Who can express the terrible effects of self-love which appear in the world, and of the inordinate love of pleasure that flows from this irregular love of self? They beget at first lust, intemperance, and hatred; then rapes, debaucheries, robberies, murders, poison, perjury, treason, forgery, and all the monstrous spawn of the blackest crimes.

If we consider the three principal sorts of men who shine upon the great theatre of life, warriors, statesmen, and men of learning, what terrible scenes of vice present themselves to the mind?

(a) ‘ The trade of a soldier is look’d upon as the most honourable, and yet he is a man hired to kill in cold blood as many of his species as possibly he can. The motives to war are very oft to revenge a minister, to please a mistress, to satisfy the ambition of a prince. Sometimes monarchs declare war because their neighbours are too weak, sometimes because they are too strong: sometimes to preserve an imaginary ballance of power, which every one endeavours to destroy. At other times they equip vast fleets, levy armies, and run to far distant continents, upon pretence that the inhabitants are ignorant. Then they invade them, tho’ far more virtuous than themselves; put half of them to death, and make slaves of the rest, in order to civilize them, and teach them all polite vices. In fine the most cruel wars are very oft produced by the most trifling disputes, and for as ridiculous subjects as to know, If whistling be a virtue or a

(a) This is much borrowed from a modern Humourist, well versed in the darkest side of human nature, and of a very singular genius, Dr. SWIFT.

‘ vice? what is the best colour of a coat, black or white? whether it should be long or short; narrow or wide? whether shoes should be high or low heel’d? or if an egg is to be broke by the big or small end. Neither are any wars so bloody, so furious, and so durable, as those occasioned by difference of opinions, especially about things indifferent. And because nature has not furnished men with offensive weapons, science has been employed to invent all sorts of instruments for destruction; Geometry, Mechanics, the Metallic art, Chymistry, have been improved to find out new means of sacrificing each other; from whence arise deaths under a thousand hideous shapes; fields strew’d with carcases; bodies left for food to wild beasts and birds of prey.

If we go from the camp to the court, what new scene of misery, and iniquity present themselves to our view, flattery, dissimulation, grasping avarice, unbounded luxury, oppression, proscriptions, and all the refinements of vice. Superior and inferior courts of justice instead of being protectors, and executors of laws, destroy them by chicaning; and by useles, intricate, and tedious formalities. When the states of a nation are assembled, three or four intriguing, eloquent, perverse men hurry on the monarch or the senate to the most perfidious decrees, they betray the public trust, consult their private interest rather than the general good: members are bribed by money and pensions; places are sold, money promotes the ignorant to be judges of the laws, cruel laws are enacted and civil government perverted entirely from its natural purposes. These public injustices create civil wars; lawful and regular power is overturn’d; all falls into anarchy;

some brave, bold, impious man gains at last the multitude, enslaves the people, and declares himself a monarch. In all sorts of government even the most regular and peaceful, the rich enjoy the fruits of the labours of the poor, who are a thousand to one. The multitude is obliged to live miserably by drudging hard every day to indulge the passions, luxury, intemperance, and vanity of the few. Is this following the laws of human fraternity? and could the God of nature have subjected men to such inevitable miseries, if they were not in a state of punishment and degradation?

When we go from the camp and the court to the closets of the learned, what new monsters appear! Some of these called exalted Genii, deny there is a God, laugh at virtue and vice, call them only political inventions to impose on the mob; and pretend that all religion is a cheat. Others assert that spirit and matter are the same, that man is composed of ten yards of gut, and that his supreme felicity consists in filling and emptying them by turns. Others that pretend to confute these impious freethinkers, trump up such systems of prescience, predestination and providence, as destroy all God's moral attributes, and represent him as a tyrant, or a cheat. Others spend all the force of their mind in the speculations of Algebra and Geometrical curves, or in metaphysical quibbles, or in etymologies, antiquities, criticisms, shells, cobwebs, and a thousand curiosities, so as to forget the great end of their creation, and instead of knowing, loving, and adoring the Supreme Infinite, they never so much as think of his existence.

Physical evil is no less abundant than moral. To what infirmities is human nature subject, not only by voluntary

passions, but by inevitable accidents arising from the constitution of the elements; the structure of the animal machine, and the present frame of nature in this inferior globe? the havocks produced by inundations, pestilence, earthquakes, storms, thunders, shipwracks, are innumerable. It would be endless to give a catalogue of all the diseases incident to human bodies; every part external and internal have maladies appropriated to them. From the cradle to the grave, from the throne to the cottage none are exempt from these epidemic evils. The whole creation languishes and groans. Can such an ignorant, miserable and imperfect creature as Man be the immediate production of infinite power, wisdom and goodness? Must not some strange Catastrophe have happened to nature in this dim spot of immensity since it came first out of the hands of the Almighty?

C O R. I.

Hence the wise legislator of the Jews was in the right, when he taught that Man is fallen from the primitive state in which he was created; that he is banish'd from the divine presence, and condemn'd to a state of mortality and exile; while the material world is accursed, changed, and disfigured. The soul is detach'd from God, and debarr'd from an immediate view of its almighty original; its activity is diminish'd, its understanding is darkened, its will is depraved, and all its faculties are sick and lame; because the divine communications of life, light, and love are suspended. All is dark, obscure and irregular by a suspension of the divine activity, which reigns thro' all nature in the superior regions. All external nature in this earth is an image of the changes within, and the laws of the

material world are analogous to those of the intellectual in the sphere of degraded beings.

C O R. II.

Hence to deny that we are at present in a degraded state renders the conduct of eternal providence unjustifiable, throws a dark veil upon all the oeconomy of divine providence, and tends indirectly to atheism and impiety. The Deists, Socinians, Pelagians, and all those who deny original sin, can never justify the conduct of God, in the government of the world, in subjecting human nature to such inevitable misery, in exposing us to temptations, passions and vice, and in creating a world so full of moral and physical evil. They can never propose any scheme of providence worthy of eternal power, wisdom, and goodness.

P R O P O S I T I O N XLVI.

Under the government of an infinitely wise, good, and just Being, no creature can suffer, but what has merited punishment.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

God can create nothing but what he loves (a); his design in creating finite intelligences could only be to make them eternally happy in the knowledge and love of his boundless perfections (b): therefore if they be unhappy or suffer, there must be some other cause than defect of goodness in God: and no other can be supposed than some demerit of theirs, which makes punishment necessary.

(a) Cor. 4. of Prop. XVI. (b) Prop. XXIV.

S C H O L I U M.

The schoolmen say, that God punishes Adam's fault in his posterity, as legislators do, when they deprive the children of criminals of their inheritance. This is humanizing God, and ascribing to him our own mortal and even wicked passions, and imperfections. Kings and magistrates have no power but over the bodies of men. The design of their laws is not to reform the heart, but to preserve external order in society. They punish only to hinder political vice; and to reinforce their laws, they are obliged very oft to do one evil to prevent a greater; to sacrifice private families to public good, and so to make innocent children suffer, because of their father's fault. Eternal justice cannot act in this imperfect manner. Under his government no Being can suffer but what has merited punishment by its own voluntary free choice.

It is true that Moses says (a) 'that God is a jealous God, 'visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children to the 'third and fourth generation.' This text however (if it was not a prophecy of what was to happen to the Jews upon their defection to idolatry, as the event makes it very probable) must be explain'd so as not to contradict that of the prophet Ezekiel who makes the Almighty speak thus. (b) 'Behold all souls 'are mine, as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the 'son; I will judge every one according to his works. The 'righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the 'wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him.' By this text the prophet seems to have foreseen, and design'd to confute

(a) Exod. xx. 5. (b) Ezekiel xviii. 4. 20. 30.

the monstrous opinion of those who maintain that Adam's sin was imputed to his posterity without their co-operation. 'God is the same yesterday to day and for ever:' his conduct can never contradict his attributes. If therefore he declares by a solemn oath, 'that the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father,' nothing can be more opposite at once to both natural and reveal'd religion, than the horrible, modern, scholastic notion of imputation.

To reconcile these two texts of Moses and Ezekiel, we must understand Moses of temporal, present evils; and Ezekiel of infernal, future punishments. The physical effects of certain vices extend from generation to generation. Thus very oft the bodily diseases, and external misfortunes that happen to lewd, corrupt, and profligate men become hereditary and affect their posterity with sickness and poverty: but the divine wisdom and mercy knows how to turn these temporary and transitory evils to the eternal good of those that do not imitate their father's vices; and his supreme justice will hinder him from condemning souls to future punishments or judging of them otherwise than by their personal malice and voluntary co-operation with their fathers unrighteousness. Thus scripture never contradicts scripture; and one passage of it that seems to obscure the divine attributes is to be explain'd by another that clears them up, and sets them in a true light.

C O R. I.

Hence all those who maintain that in a state of pure, uncorrupted nature, God by virtue of his sovereign dominion over the creatures, might have placed them in a state of sufferings and misery, to try their obedience, and make them me-

rit, have no just notions of the plan of eternal providence, nor of God's original design in creating, and his paternal love for his creatures. God does not want or demand any merit in us to beatify us, but that of our love. He does not act as an arbitrary legislator in rewarding us. Our only worship and merit in his sight is pure charity: but he cannot make us happy by love, and by free love without our co-operation and correspondence.

C O R. II.

Hence we have a full confutation of the opinion of those, who grant that the souls of beasts are immaterial, and yet suppose that they are created by God to animate for a time brutal forms, and afterwards to be annihilated. A being capable of thought, sensation and reflection has no doubt more reality and perfection than a being which is entirely depriv'd of these faculties. Can God create a being of a superior nature, to subject it to a being of an inferior nature, unless it be for a punishment? Can he condemn an intelligence that comes pure from his hands to the cruel pains, and horrible miseries that beasts suffer, without recompensing it for its slavery? will he ever annihilate what he has once created? and are not all his works eternal? Moreover, an intelligent being capable of thought, sensation, and reflection in the lowest and least degree, may be exalted and elevated, as we have shewn, to any finite degree of knowledge, perfection and felicity how great soever (a). Is it possible that God can create an immaterial soul capable of knowledge and happiness without end, for no other design but to animate for some hours, days, months,

(a) Cor. 4. of Prop. XX.

and years, the miserable machine of a beast? This foolish opinion therefore attacks all the divine attributes, GOD'S WISDOM, in creating to annihilate after a minute's duration, for such is all definite time in comparison of eternity; his GOODNESS, in rendering miserable a being that he created pure and innocent; his JUSTICE, in destroying without recompense a being he made so unhappy; and that by its intelligent nature was capable of an everlasting felicity.

P R O P O S I T I O N XLVII.

According to the bare light of natural reason, it seems evident that all the human race sinn'd in a pre-existent paradisiacal state.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

Under the government of an infinitely good, wise and just Being, no creature can suffer unless it has merited punishment (a); no being can merit or demerit before its existence (b): therefore according to the bare light of natural reason, it seems evident that all the human species sinned in a pre-existent state.

S C H O L I U M.

There are and can be but three opinions concerning the imputation, or transmission of original sin. The doctrine of the IMMEDIATE CREATION of souls; that of their TRANSDUCTION, OR SPIRITUAL GENERATION; and that of their PREEXISTENCE. Now if it can be proved that the two first

(a) Prop. XLVI. (b) Ax. 1. of this book.

opinions are absurd, it will follow that the last must be true (a).

The doctrine of the immediate creation of souls, and their infusion into mortal bodies, is contrary to all the divine attributes, renders original sin inexplicable; and paves the way to Socinianism, which denies this great and fundamental article of faith. God is the father of spirits and loves them; now is it consistent with loving them to stake down innocent souls, from the very first moment of their creation, to a state of ignorance and suffering? to subject intelligent natures that come pure out of his hands, to mortal bodies, that give them propensities to vice, and to passions contrary to the love of order? to condemn beings that are capable of knowing and loving him, to a state wherein they neither know nor love him? to expose them to eternal misery because they follow these inevitable propensities with which they are born? and all this for the sin of a man, who lived six thousand years ago, and with whose soul ours have no more relation than with that of Nero or Mahomet. Father Malebranche's hypothesis obviates none of those difficulties. He supposes ' that God unites according to general laws, pure, new created-minds to a corporal machine that darkens, obscures, and degrades their understandings, that taints, corrupts, and byasses their wills; because God as immutable should not change his general laws, to prevent particular disorders.' What a strange notion does this system give us of infinite wisdom, justice, and goodness which established general laws, that have such monstrous consequences. Here the Malebranchian and Spinozian schemes unite again in the same principle. God cannot change

(a) Postulate 2.

his laws, says Spinoza, because he foresees, wills, and produces necessarily all that is possible. God will not change his laws, says Malebranche, because in him there is no variation nor shadow of change. Now it is no matter whether this immutability flow from the necessity of the divine nature, or from his arbitrary decrees, providing the inevitable consequences of his general laws be contrary to infinite wisdom, goodness, and justice. Why did infinite wisdom establish such laws? why does infinite goodness continue them? how can infinite justice execute them?

The second opinion of the Transduction of souls, as if they had a real, physical fecundity to propagate each other, destroys the immateriality of the soul. Generation in bodies is only an evolution of their parts, by new liquids that flow into them. Souls that are immaterial can have no such fecundity. If it be said that this generation is entirely spiritual, and has nothing in common with corporeal procreation; that as God is infinitely productive within himself, as well as externally, so his living images in imitation of him, have a real power of fecundity; and in fine, that since bodies have this quality, spirits must have some perfection analagous to it. I answer that if souls procreated souls, there either flow'd something from them, or nothing: if nothing, how can nothing be a cause? if something; then the soul is divisible, and so material. If it be urged that we ought not to deny this fecundity because we cannot conceive it, no more than we deny creation in the first cause, and activity in second causes; tho' they are unconceivable. I reply that if we ought not to deny, because we do not see, far less ought we to affirm, because we do not con-

ceive. The reason why we admit creation in God and activity in the creatures, is because we can demonstrate that these attributes must belong to God and spirits; or admit of consequences that destroy both the nature of God and spirits. Now no such demonstrations can be given for the necessity of admitting the traduction of souls; and no absurdities follow from denying it. On the contrary by admitting it, the same difficulties remain with regard to the transmission of original sin. Why did not God interrupt and suspend this spiritual fecundity, since he foresaw that it would be a source of temporal and eternal misery to his creatures? It was unbecoming his wisdom, justice, and goodness to continue this free, arbitrary, communicated gift to lapsed and degenerated souls, which would perpetuate for ever moral and physical evil. Now it is absurd to adopt an opinion which far from solving the difficulties, for removing of which it was invented, tends rather to augment and reinforce them. If it be further urged that spiritual fecundity is an essential quality of all intelligent natures, as liberty, and activity. We answer that this is a bare supposition undemonstrable by any solid reason. Moreover, tho' we should grant that God could impart such a quality to intelligences in an exalted state, yet he is not obliged to continue it to them in a degenerate state: on the contrary, all his moral attributes seem to demand the suspension of this quality in lapsed spirits.

The doctrines then of the immediate creation, or of the spiritual generation of souls, to be united to corrupted, depraved bodies, can never account for the depravation of our nature called original sin: they are both incompatible with

the divine attributes, and consequently impossible: wherefore the third opinion of pre-existence must afford the true account of it. We shew in the second part of this Work that this doctrine is perfectly conformable to the scriptures, was never condemn'd by the Christian church; and was a commonly receiv'd doctrine of the Jewish church in our Saviour's time, approved by his not opposing it when mentioned, believed by many of the first fathers, yea confirm'd by the universal tradition of all antiquity both sacred and profane. We shall now shew that there are but two plausible objections that can be made against this opinion.

1. The first objection is, that all the individuals of the human species could not exist in the paradisiacal earth at the same time with bodies as well as souls perfectly form'd; because our globe would not have sufficed to contain them. This poor objection comes from a chimerical supposition that the paradisiacal earth and bodies were such as we now see. This is directly contrary to the whole tenour of scriptures, which assures us, that since the curse imposed upon man by the fall, great changes have happened to our globe, and that the whole creation both material and intellectual, in the sphere of lapsed Beings was 'subjected to a bondage of corruption, under which it groans and travails in pain till now.' We shall shew in the second Part, that tho' the paradisiacal earth and bodies were not so perfect as they will be after the resurrection in a re-establish'd state, nor as the celestial abodes and ethereal vehicles of unfallen spirits in a purely angelical state; yet they were quite other than they are now. If this be so, who can decide what space was occupied by paradisiacal

bodies, or what the extent and form of the primitive earth ; which contain'd then all bodies, as the renewed earth will contain them after the resurrection. All our mistakes then come from the false, gross, and absurd ideas we have of the state in which man was created: and here we may say of paradise what Virgil said of ancient Rome ;

Orbem quem dicunt primum ;----putavi
Stultus ego huic nostro similem.

2. It may be objected in the second place, that if the doctrine of pre-existence be true, how come we to have lost all ideas of this paradisiacal state? To this I answer, that as God by acting in and upon created intelligences, may exalt, augment, and enlarge their faculties to any finite degree of perfection how great soever, so by his ceasing to act in them they may fall into any finite degree of insensibility, ignorance and forgetfulness, how low soever (a), yea into a state of spiritual inaction, lethargy, and sleep (b). It is thus that all human souls are with respect to the first years of their existence in mortal bodies: nor do they ever recover any remembrance of what passed in them. Now what may happen for a year or two years, may happen also for many years, and even many ages ; by the cessation of the divine activity in spirits. This total oblivion of our pre-existent state is a pure effect of the divine mercy ; for if we knew and retain'd a lively remembrance of the glory from whence we are fallen, we would be infinitely more miserable than we are. Thus a king condemn'd to tug in the galleys, or to labour in a mine, would be far more miserable than slaves born in this condition. The

(a) Cor. 5. of Prop. XX. (b) Schol. 2. of Prop. XXX.

comparison is low and imperfect; but it suffices to give us a faint idea of the reason why we have no notion of a pre-existent state. By this state of insensibility, inaction, and spiritual lethargy in which all souls remain more or less, e're they awake into mortal bodies; the habits of evil are laid asleep, and in some are totally extinguished, so that they scarce pass through a state of purification here below. It is thus that some die in the womb, and others in their tender infancy. These souls are too pure, to pass through the temptations, pains, and dangers of this life, or too weak to be exposed to them, and if any impurity remains in them, it is consumed and destroyed in a middle state after death. They pass rapidly through life, and so to speak, only to take possession of their corporeal vehicles, that are to be eternal and soon lay them down again, till they reassume them after the general resurrection. All this is ordered and adjusted with number, weight and measure, by an all-powerful, all-wise, all-beneficent providence, that is ever attentive to the dispositions and indigences of every individual. It is therefore a strange phrenzy in the schoolmen to deny the doctrine of pre-existence, because we have retain'd no remembrance of it; and upon this miserable pretence, to introduce an opinion about the immediate creation and infusion of souls into mortal bodies, which is contrary to all the usual laws of nature; which darkens all the oeconomy of providence; renders his conduct more barbarous than that of the most cruel tyrant, destroys all his moral attributes; makes original sin inexplicable, yea impossible; contradicts reason, scripture and the universal tradition of all nations. To be

sure there is no hypothesis, but what should be admitted rather than an opinion that has such fatal consequences.

C O R. I.

Hence the schoolmen who represent Adam's transgression as imputed to souls immediately created; that came pure from the hands of God, and therefore have no relation to the soul of the protoplast, introduce into religion a mystery unknown to scripture, and antiquity, that was never revealed by God, that renders the sacred doctrine of original sin not only incomprehensible but absolutely impossible, and so paves the way to Deism, Socinianism, and incredulity.

C O R. II.

Hence all those who pretend that since Adam's transgression, human nature was only subjected to a state of physical evil, suffering and misery, purely to make men merit; and that men were not infected, vitiated, and corrupted by moral evil; really deny original sin, and so favour indirectly Socinian and Pelagian errors.

P R O P O S I T I O N XLVIII.

Finite intelligences may fall from the love of eternal order two ways.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

In a state of pure and exalted nature all finite intelligences follow'd the immutable, and universal law of eternal order, which obliges us to love God for himself, and all other beings proportionably as they resemble him (a); false self-love

(a) Prop. XL.

and the irregular love of the creatures are the only two objects that can divert us from the law and love of eternal order (b): therefore finite intelligences may fall from the love of eternal order these two ways.

S C H O L I U M.

Sacred tradition represents two sorts of Beings that fell from the love of eternal order; devils and men. The defection of the former was according to scripture an effect of self-complacency and pride. The fall of the latter proceeded from an irregular love of knowledge and pleasure. Nothing is more difficult than to conceive the source of this defection. Incredulity pretends to triumph here, and to baffle all the accounts that can be given of this original apostacy.

Some think to answer this difficulty by maintaining that angelical fallen spirits were not at first admitted to the beatific vision, which would have render'd them impeccable. This opinion is not only contrary to scripture; which still represents those rebellious spirits as sons of light, and gratify'd from the beginning with the fullest irradiations of the Divinity: but it is also injurious to the divine sanctity and goodness. If the beatific vision could have preserv'd these angelical beings from falling, then God would not have deny'd it them. His infinite purity, and abhorrence of sin, as well as his essential love for the creatures, would have engaged him to refuse nothing that could have confirm'd them in a permanent and immutable state of perfection, justice, and felicity. We must therefore find out some other source of evil, arising not from

(b) Cor. 6. of Prop. XLI.

any defect in, nor refusal of the divine graces, but from the nature of free agents. Now this is not impossible to conceive by the three following principles.

1. If finite intelligences could have remain'd for ever in the divine presence, they would have been for ever impeccable: but we have already demonstrated that they cannot always contemplate thus, the uncreated essence with a direct, immediate, and uninterrupted view. They are sometimes obliged by their inherent essential weakness to veil their eyes, and adore their almighty original in his created pictures and representations: and in those moments they become peccable, fallible, and capable of departing from the laws and love of eternal order (a).

2. We have also demonstrated that all free and finite intelligences are fallible and peccable, till by the repeated acts of pure love, they be confirm'd in the habits of good, which at last become a second nature inseparable, inamissible, and unchangeable. No supernatural graces, no infus'd habits, can operate this second nature in them by an instantaneous act: it can be produced only by the long repeated, free co-operation of the creature to the supernatural action of God in them (b).

3. The defection of angelical spirits was no doubt gradual, as finite beings cannot become perfectly good, but by a long continued series of repeated acts; so they cannot become perfectly criminal but by a successive gradation of irregular desires. They did not pass instantaneously from the state of perfect innocence in which they were created to a state of depravation. The degrees by which they fell were various. The

(a) Cor. 2. of Prop. XXXVIII. (b) Cor. 2. of Prop. XLIV.

different shades of return and relapse were imperceptible. These three great principles premised as already demonstrated, we may thus conceive the different shades, steps and gradations of defection, first in angelical spirits, and then in human souls.

I. By the laws of eternal order, the seraphic intelligences were obliged to rise continually above themselves; to love God only for himself, to be passive channels of communication betwixt him and all inferior spirits; to retain nothing of his beatifying influences for themselves, but to transmit all to others, that so the eternal circulation of life, light and love might never be stopt through all the celestial regions. The least self-attribution, self-appropriation and self-complacency in God's gifts, graces and communications is an usurpation upon his rights. On the contrary, self-preterition, self-evacuation, and self-annihilation of the infinitely little before the infinitely great, is the eternal sacrifice which created beings owe to absolute Infinite. Now this sacrifice must necessarily bound and restrain their natural love of self, till they be confirm'd in the supernatural habits of divine love. Yea it is possible, that till created spirits acquire this second nature, this supernatural transformation, this true deification, the exercise of pure, disinterested love and self-oblivion may be painful to them, because of the natural love of self, inseparable from our essence. I do not mean by pain ungrateful, noxious sensations; but a supernatural effort, combat, and contention to rise above self, and correspond to the divine attraction that draws them out of self, to unite them to his pure essence. This cannot be understood by minds im-

mersed in matter and strangers to all the purest intellectual functions of the soul: And this is the first source of peccability in all finite spirits upon their first creation. It arises not from any defect in God, nor refusal of his graces; but from the natural, necessary finitude and weakness of the creature, how great soever its natural capacity be, till by a free and long correspondence to God's supernatural action, it be truly transform'd, diviniz'd, and confirm'd in the habits of pure love.

2. It is not altogether inconceivable how the most elevated, and most luminous order of spirits that approach'd nearest to the throne, and that were immediate channels of communication to all other intelligences, might be dazzled by the view of their own excellency. The greater, the sublimer, and the more exalted their natures were, the more easy it is to imagine that they might be capable of self-attribution, self-appropriation, and self-complacency, unless they continually turn'd off their view from self, to refer all to their great original; and by the least infidelity, the sacrifice of self-annihilation, must have become more and more difficult, and self-complacency more easy; and this might have been the second imperceptible source of their declension.

3. In these moments wherein the angelical spirits, went out of the immediate presence of God, and enter'd into society with each other, they became susceptible of error, and so by degrees might have flattered themselves that God's infinite goodness and self-sufficiency would engage him to relax the purity of his eternal law, and dispense them from the duty of self-disappropriation. They might have begun then to

love him only as beatifying, and to desire no longer the beatific vision, but to gratify their natural and insatiable thirst of happiness. This spiritual concupiscence, this disguised and refin'd self-love by which they refer'd the Creator to the creature, the source to the rivulets, and the infinitely great to the infinitely little might have been the third step of their apostacy.

4. They did not however as yet consummate their crime; their defection was gradual. God employed no doubt all the efforts of his power, without doing violence to their liberty; he opened, so to speak, all the treasures of his wisdom, he displayed all the charms of his goodness to hinder their infidelity: but the more abundant his luminous communications were, the more they serv'd to augment in these seraphic spirits the high opinion they had of their own excellency; which is the most delicate and the most dangerous of all delusions. God pursued them from error to error, till at last there was no other remedy, no other way of curing their natural weakness, but by depriving them for a time of the beatific vision, without degrading them altogether; and this might have been the fourth step of their declension.

5. During this interval, it is possible that the first and chief of the seraphic spirits, irritated by the privation of their essential happiness, tho' not as yet deprived of the accessory felicity which they enjoyed in their celestial abodes; fell by degrees into open rebellion, and declared war against Heaven, which was the fifth and last step of their apostacy. Holy writ represents them as yet inhabitants of the ethereal regions,

when they made war upon Michael and his angels: after mighty combats they were at last defeated, thrown out of the divine presence, precipitated from the heavens, deprived both of their essential and accessory happiness, and condemned to punishment; tho' they were not all immediately shut up in the abyss; as we shall explain more fully in the second Part.

These seem to be the different shades, steps, and gradations, by which seraphic spirits fell from their primitive abodes. Let us now see what sacred writ authorizes us to think of the manner and degrees by which human souls lost their original innocence.

IMO. So soon as angelical spirits had proved rebellious by pure choice and deliberate free will, God who is immutable in his design; but who changes very oft the means by which he executes them, because he accommodates himself to the freedom of intelligent natures, resolved to accomplish in another manner the wonderful plan laid from the foundation of the world; which was to form a number of chosen, elect souls to reign in the new Jerusalem, to be exalted to the thrones from which seraphims had fallen, and to be made conformable to his only begotten Son in their obedience, adoration and love. They were to be tried in a state of delights and immortality, if they had continued faithful therein or purified in a state of sufferings and expiation if they fell freely. In consequence of this great decree, God dissipated the Chaos introduced into the solar system by the fall of angels, and formed anew the paradisiacal earth, far inferior to what it was during an angelical, primitive, original state, but exempt from

all moral and physical evil. He then created a new species of intelligent natures united to material vehicles, and placed them in this paradisiacal mansion.

2. To prevent mens falling into the same revolt with the devils, by a refin'd self-love, and a too high opinion of their own excellency, God did not as yet admit them to the beatific vision; but, as we shall shew in the second Part, the sacred pre-existent humanity of the Logos conversed with them under a visible form in paradise. There they enjoyed the accessory happiness, contemplated the original in his representations, saw the beauties, and tasted the pleasures to be found in the enjoyment of the material pictures and the society of the intelligent images. If they had continued faithful in this happy state till they were fix'd immutably by long, continued and repeated acts in the habits of pure love, they would have been exalted at last to the intuitive, immediate view of his pure essence.

3. In this state of probation and tryal man was obliged by the fundamental laws of his creation, to look upon God as his supreme object; to adore him as present tho' invisible; to aspire continually to the view of his unvail'd essence; and to refer all the creatures to God, and attach himself to them proportionably as they resembled their great original. Thus supernatural faith, hope and charity were to be man's continual duty and worship, even in paradise. In this happy state however men were expos'd by their natural fallibility to two sorts of dangers: the one of being so charm'd with the delightful sensations, which the material pictures excited in them; the other danger was that of being so immerf'd in the admiration

of the wonders of the paradisiacal world as to content themselves with this accessory happiness, neglect aspiring to their supreme felicity, and thus relax their superior powers in the supernatural exercise of faith, hope, and charity. In one word, the delights of paradise and the wonders of nature were capable to turn off the minds and hearts of men from divine contemplation and love, unless they were continually upon their guard against their own natural defectibility.

4. The holy scriptures assure us that all the individuals of the human species were not produced at once by an instantaneous act as angels, but that the original pair of this new species were united by marriage, endowed with a divine fecundity, and ordained even in this paradisiacal state to increase and multiply. They no doubt obeyed this great commandment given them from the first instant of their creation; and so replenished the paradisiacal, primitive, uncorrupted earth with inhabitants, as we shall shew in the second part of this Work. This is that golden age, that reign of Gods and men, that primitive state of innocence, justice and purity, in which all the human species was at first placed, created or procreated. It is during this happy state that the divine Logos God-man is said to have 'taken his delights with the sons of men.' How long this state lasted no mortal can tell. To suppose it was only for an hour or a day, and that it was enjoyed only by the first original pair, while all the rest of mankind were unborn, is a mere fiction, not at all authorized by scripture or antiquity; as we shall prove in the second Part.

5. Revelation however assures us that our first parents fell at last from this happy state by the temptation of the devil.

All the rebellious angels, as we shall shew in the second Part, were not shut up in the abyfs of darknefs, immediately after their defection; a great part of them animated the bodies of living creatures in paradife, fpoke and converfed with men; as we shall shew in the second Part. They were then fubjected to men, who had an absolute empire over them, and gave them names according to their natures. The chief of thefe degraded intelligences feduced our firft parents by exciting them to an inordinate defire of natural knowledge, and an irregular love of fenfible pleafure. All the human fpecies that fubfifted with them in paradife, followed the example of our firft parents, co-operated voluntarily with them in their crime, and fell, perfonally into the fame defection. I do not fay that diabolical fpirits, and degraded intelligences tempted all the fons of Adam in the fame manner, and by the fame means; and that they all ate corporeally of the forbidden fruit; fince St. Paul fays exprefly ‘ that tho’ all finned, yet all did not fin ‘ after the fimilitude of Adam’s tranfgreffion.’ Neither do I fay that all the offspring of Adam in a paradifical ftate fell with Adam, and finned voluntarily with him: but it is clear by the Mofaical account of the fall, that all thofe that co-operated with our firft parents in their difobedience were condemn’d to a ftate of punifhment; and that the great fource of our firft parents infidelity and of their pofterity’s degradation, was the irregular love of pleafure and knowledge, to which they were follicited by the temptation of fallen angels, who deceived firft the female fex, and by that fex all the human fpecies who fell. For this reafon it is, that ever fince, the two fources of all the evils that overflow the world, are the im-

moderate activities of human understanding, and the insatiable thirst of sensible pleasure. The former fountain of corruption produces all the Hydras of error and false science, that puff up the mind, and divert it from divine contemplation. The other produces all the monsters of vice and debauchery, that pollute the heart, and divert it from divine love. All this shall be fully unfolded, illustrated and prov'd in the second Part.

By this explication we understand how the wills of all the individuals of the human race were contain'd in that of Adam; for the will of one soul can be contain'd in that of another, only as it approves of, co-operates to, and unites itself with that of another by deliberate choice, voluntary adhesion, and a perfect imitation. Thus the Mosaic history of the fall, has no longer an air of fable; but becomes a sublime truth perfectly conformable to reason; and as we shall shew in the second Part expressly taught in scripture, and transmitted from the age of Noah by universal tradition to the Sages of all nations, ages, and religions. Deists, Socinians, and Freethinkers have reason to laugh at the schoolmen, when they teach only the 'letter that kills,' and are ignorant of the 'spirit that quickens,' enlightens, and gives us a noble and amiable view of the whole conduct of providence.

C O R. I.

Hence it is plain, that in whatever degree of perfection, God creates finite intelligences, they may by virtue of their natural freedom and fallibility turn off their intellectual eye from the view of eternal order, forget its beauty, become darkened and obscur'd in their understandings, and so feel no

more pleasure in the contemplation of it. To this they must be liable, until they are confirm'd in the habits of pure love by long répeated, successive, and free acts. None but God is infallible by nature; none but God is essentially impeccable. To ask why he made spirits free is to ask, why he made them intelligent? To ask why he made them finite, is to ask why he did not make them Gods equal to himself in all things, which is impossible. To ask why he did not confirm them in the love of God, by infused habits, and an instantaneous effort of his omnipotent will, is to ask why he did not treat them as necessary agents, by destroying their freedom and thereby their essence.

C O R. II.

Hence in all states self-annihilation or true humility is the sole preservative of angels unfallen, and the sole restorative of souls degenerated. Without this virtue, heaven itself would become a hell, and the beatific vision a source of self-love, and self-attribution. The more that finite beings augment in light and happiness, the more they are in danger of pride, presumption, and self-complacency; unless they remain in a perfect self-disappropriation of all the gifts, graces, and beatifying sensations God imparts to them.

C O R. III.

Hence all those who deny the doctrine of pure love, and self-disappropriation, understand nothing of the divine oeconomy, or of the origin of evil. If the love God demanded of his creatures were only interested, an attachment to him as beatifying, a desiring of him as the source of pleasure; they would never have fallen: for since by the essential property

of our natures, we constantly prefer greater pleasure to lesser; God could have augmented the degrees of spiritual delectation and attach'd us to the love of his uncreated essence, by delights far superior to those that created substances can produce. But this is not the object or motive of supernatural love, which renders us susceptible of the divine union. Our love would not have been a love of perfection, but a love of pleasure; not a pure charity, but a spiritual concupiscence; not a reasonable choice, but a necessary instinct.

C O R. IV.

Hence the doctrine of the schoolmen who teach that angels fell very soon after their creation, and that Adam remain'd in paradise only for an hour, or a day, a month, or a year, is a wild chimera, without any foundation in scripture. By this poor notion, they degrade all the conduct of eternal wisdom, and represent God upon the catch with his creatures, always ready to surprize them in their weakness, without making the least essay to retain them; and without employing all the efforts of his long-suffering patience e're he abandon them to the fatal consequences of their crime.

C O R. V.

Hence God dissipated the chaos after the defection of angels, and form'd the paradisiacal earth to be the habitation of souls that enjoyed the accessory happiness, without being as yet admitted to the essential felicity of the beatific vision.

P R O P O S I T I O N XLIX.

Physical evil is the only means of curing moral evil.

DEMONSTRATION.

There are but two possible means of curing the mind of moral evil; the sensations of pleasure in the view of truth, or the sensation of pain, in the pursuits of error (a); in whatever degree of perfection God creates finite intelligences, they may by virtue of their natural freedom, fallibility, and weakness, turn off their intellectual eye from the view of truth, forget it, and become dark and obscured in their understandings, and so feel no more pleasure in the contemplation of it (b): therefore the sensation of pain or physical evil, is the only efficacious means of curing sin, or moral evil.

S C H O L I U M.

God never altered his eternal design made from the foundation of the world, which was to form a chosen number of souls that were to become the heads and chiefs of the celestial hierarchies, and the immediate channels of his divine communications to all created intelligences: but the seraphims first, and then men, having resisted freely all his graces, and abused his favours, he resolved to accomplish his great and immutable end, by other means, and that was by condemning the latter to a state of sufferings and physical evil, as the only efficacious way to cure them of moral evil, to restore their lapsed powers, reclaim them from their rebellion and confirm them for ever in the permanent love of order. This great principle gives us a full justification of all the changes made in material nature since the fall, and of all the steps of almighty providence mention'd in scripture, during this dark period

(a) Cor. 4. of Prop. XLI. (b) Cor. 1. of Prop. XLVIII.

of duration called Time. The detail of these changes, steps and laws is a beautiful speculation.

1. Moses represents nature as accursed after the fall, altered, degraded, and fill'd with mortal qualities. As the beauties of the material world had seduced human souls; as the delights of the paradisiacal state which were but their accessory happiness had intoxicated them and made them forget the supreme felicity of their natures, it was necessary in order to reclaim them to cast a veil over all these ravishing, and beautiful scenes. The divine activity that manifested itself in the primitive, angelical, original state of nature was not as during the chaos entirely suspended; but very much diminish'd; and by this diminution, the circulation of the active, luminous principle was interrupted, the original transparency of solids lost, and the whole of nature in the region which man inhabits became barren and opaque, full of contrary, opposite, and self-destructive elements: yea according to some the situation of our earth was chang'd with regard to celestial bodies, whose influences and irradiations became less strong and durable (a). However this be; it is certain from the principles already demonstrated, that nature in these inferior regions is not as in its original state, a picture of the divine perfections; it is become a prison, an exile, a valley of tears, and a place of punishment; wherein all is adapted to the state of souls that suffer, and that must be purified by their sufferings. This is the curse under which the whole visible

(a) See Dr. Burnet's, and Dr. Whiston's Theorisy of the Earth. They contain some scatter'd rays of the great system of nature, and the changes which happened in it by the fall.

creation is said to 'languish and groan till it be delivered from 'the bondage of corruption' to which it was subjected by the fall of man.

2. This curse however is mixed and mitigated with goodness, compassion and mercy. Nature thus altered and degraded excites in us painful sensations, which serve to detach us from the world, and make us aspire to a better life. If God had continued us in a state of pleasure and immortality after our fall, we would have immersed ourselves in the love of the creatures and neglected for ever to aspire to the supreme felicity of our natures. If he had deprived us altogether of all consolation, we would have been as miserable as the devils. All his punishments are mixed with mercy, and all his judgments are full of goodness. He treats us severely but as a tender father, only to purify us from our corruption. Exempt from human passions, vengeance and cruelty, all his penal laws are salutary cures; he is the Physician as well as the Father of spirits, and therefore inflicts no pains, but what are remedies.

3. By this merciful oeconomy of providence the souls of all the individuals of the human species that sinned with Adam, were condemn'd to a state of spiritual death, inaction and insensibility, according to the sentence pronounced against man if he should fall; 'in the day thou eatest thereof 'thou shalt die.' This cannot be said of corporeal death, such as befalls men now, since Adam lived long after the fall; far less can it be said of his posterity. It must be meant of this spiritual insensibility and inaction in which they all remain till they awake into mortal bodies. Thus we have no

notion of our pre-existent state; otherwise the view of what we once were, and of what we now are, would torment us like the damn'd, and make our present life an hell. The ethereal, paradisiacal body that was the vehicle of souls in the primitive state, was, like the rest of our globe, veil'd and clothed upon with mortality, and incrusted with gross opaque matter, which is a mere accident of our nature, that perishes every day, by the course of perspiration, changes probably every seven years, decays, dissolves, dies and crumbles at last into dust and ashes. All the organical molds of these paradisiacal bodies were by a new effect of the divine omnipotence shut up again in the loins of the first man, that thus by corporeal generation all our mortal bodies might descend from him, and from one another by a successive evolution. Thus the establish'd order of procreation ties men together, and unites them as children of the same common father.

4. Tho' the earth was accursed, disfigur'd, and condemn'd to an universal sterility, after man's disobedience; yet scripture mentions a second curse that befell it. During the first sixteen hundred years after the fall, man's life was very long, and extended to nine hundred years. As their souls had passed but a short time in a state of insensibility, from the time of their degradation to their awaking in mortal bodies, it was necessary their state of purification and exile here below should be longer, and their mortal life last for many years, till they were sufficiently purify'd. This longevity however serv'd only to perpetuate corruption in the most part; and increase it to such a degree, ' that every imagination of the thoughts of ' man's heart was evil and evil continually; that the earth was

‘ fill’d with violence, and that all flesh had corrupted their ways.’ In order to stop this universal tide of wickedness, which would soon have render’d men like devils, and the earth like hell, God made a new change in our globe by the deluge. The fountains of the deep were open’d; for as we shall shew in the second Part, the paradisiacal earth was not overflow’d as now, with a tempestuous ocean of troubled waters; the sea was at first shut up in the center of the earth, call’d ‘ the great deep, and its fountains were open’d’ when the earth was totally overflow’d. By this universal deluge the first race of men were destroy’d; the waters that covered ever since the greatest part of the globe, render’d that part uninhabitable; the outward and inward constitution of our planet was quite dissolv’d and altogether alter’d; the vegetables lost their force, the life of animals was abridged, there remain’d no more vestiges of the paradisiacal earth. Nature in this inferior sphere, retain’d nothing of its primitive beauty and splendor, all became like the shatter’d ruins of a pompous edifice. Yet as there is a mixture of mercy and justice in all God’s oeconomy, this new curse, as also the division of tongues that happened soon after it, became new tyes of society, and gave occasion to that separation of the earth into isles and continents, countries and languages, kingdoms and states, by which great numbers of men look upon each other as citizens of the same nation.

5. As souls by departing from the love of eternal order have no other principle of union but self-love, nature is so regulated that we cannot subsist without each other. At present men are join’d in society chiefly by indigence; whereas the

principle of union in our primitive state was divine charity. The same love that united us then to our almighty original, united us with all his living images; whereas now the state of corrupt nature has much of a state of war; and the bonds of our mutual union, are our corporeal wants. By this beautiful order of providence all men stand in need of each other, from the king to the beggar; yea every individual that lives in society is served by numbers of men without more expence than what he can gain by his own labour. How many are employ'd to prepare the food, drink, and cloathing of each particular person? whereas if he were obliged to do all this himself, neither his time nor strength could suffice. By these different employments necessary to subsistence, labour which is a penance, becomes an amusement to the mind, and thereby diverts us from an intimate sense of our miserable and forlorn condition.

6. For the same reason God established that beautiful order of nature by which our mortal bodies are subjected to sleep, so that the most part of men pass a third part of their time in a state of inaction, which suspends the augmentation and manifestation of moral evil in the bad, the sentiment of physical evil in the good; and repairs in all the forces of the body exhausted by labour. In a paradisiacal state, sleep according to the primitive fathers was voluntary and holy. It was a mystical, spiritual repose before God, wherein the mind elevated by contemplation retired into its intellectual nature, suspended for a time all commerce with sensible objects, and exerted the noblest functions of its angelical part. Sleep was not then as now a short interval of phrenzy, wherein imagi-

nation is filled with all sort of incongruous ideas; nor as in some a total insensibility, where the superior faculties remain in a kind of lethargy, as well as the senses.

These are the principal changes made in nature, since the fall, and the laws establish'd in the sphere of lapsed souls. From them we may draw some very useful corollaries.

C O R. I.

Hence we see the necessity of the cross, sufferings, and expiatory pains, in order to purify, restore, and reunite lapsed beings to their original, primitive state of perfection and happiness. This is that sublime mystery which scandalizes both the Greeks and the Jews, that is, the superficial witts, and superstitious minds, that have no just ideas of the oeconomy of providence, of the purification of the soul, and of the intrinsic efficacy of physical evil to cure moral depravation.

C O R. II.

Hence Christianity alone teaches us the true reasons of the physical changes, laws, and defects of the present constitution of things below: thus revelation exalts reason, presents to the mind a plan worthy of eternal wisdom, solves all atheistical objections against the existence of a God, drawn from the origin and duration of moral and physical evil; and justifies the ways of God with men. The Deist and the Socinian cannot account for the phenomena of degraded nature, nor vindicate the conduct of the sovereign Creator of all things, who made a world so full of imperfections, defects and irregularities.

C O R. III.

Hence man is composed of three parts, the spiritual sub-

stance which is the living image of the Deity; the celestial, glorious, immortal body, which we had in a paradisiacal state, and which is to rise again after the general judgment; and the mortal, corruptible, gross body of flesh, which is only an accident, and the Exuviae, foreign to our essence. These three parts the scripture calls πνεῦμα, ψυχή, σῶμα, spirit, soul, and body; and this was a doctrine of all antiquity both sacred and profane; as shall be demonstrated and unfolded in the second part of this Work.

LEMMA TO PROP. L.

If the beasts have any souls at all, they are either material souls, that perish with their bodies, or immaterial souls, that are to be annihilated after death; or they are degraded intelligences that are to be immortal. All the wit and reason of man cannot invent a fourth opinion concerning the souls of beasts. Now if it can be proved that the two first opinions are absolutely false, it follows evidently, that the third must be true (a).

PROPOSITION L.

If beasts have any souls at all, these souls must be degraded intelligences, that are to be immortal.

DEMONSTRATION.

The souls of beasts must either be material, that perish with their bodies; or immaterial that are to be annihilated af-

(a) Postulat. 2.

ter death; or degraded intelligences that are to be immortal (a); the souls of beasts cannot be material (b); nor can they be immaterial spirits created expressly to animate brutal forms, and annihilated after death (c): therefore if beasts have any souls at all, these souls must be degraded intelligences that are to be immortal.

S C H O L I U M.

This doctrine must necessarily shock superficial minds, and weak imaginations, that have no knowledge of the great principles, and the general plan of providence. It is thus that very oft the most luminous and sublime truths, appear paradoxes and chimeras to vulgar minds, which cannot pierce into the secret depths of wisdom, nor see principles in their first source, nor follow out consequences in all their just extent. We shall shew in the second Part, that this opinion of degraded intelligences imprisoned in brutal machines, is a scripture doctrine, and conformable to the universal tradition of all nations. It is true that this antient tradition was much disfigur'd by the Pagan poets of Greece and Rome in the later ages; and reduced at last to the ridiculous fable of a Metempsychosis. They imagined most foolishly that not only human souls vitiated and corrupted by monstrous crimes, pass'd into the bodies of beasts, but also that the most exalted spirits in the empyreal regions, after having tasted of the joys of heaven, desired to return into mortal bodies, and so roll'd on in an eternal vicissitude of bless and misery, of pure intel-

(a) By the preceding Lemma. (b) By 3 General Coroll. of Prop. XXXIII.
 (c) By Cor. 2. of Prop. XLVI.

lectual delights and low corporeal pleasures. How unworthy is this idea of God, of his great designs in creating, of the original grandeur of spirits and of the sublime happiness to which they are destin'd?

The great Descartes rejected with reason and horror this doctrine of transmigration, as a fiction of the ancients that did not deserve his attention. The foolish idea of material souls destroys the very essence of spirit, and could not please such a penetrating genius. The absurd opinion of immaterial substances created only to animate beasts, and then to be annihilated, impeaches all the divine attributes, and so was justly abandon'd by a philosopher, that believed the existence of God. Having then no knowledge of the scripture doctrine of degraded intelligences, he concluded that beasts had no souls at all, and that they were mere machines. In order to persuade men of this chimera, he display'd all the force and wit of a French genius, to shew that God could create a machine, whose springs might be so disposed as to produce the same effects, as if they were directed by an intelligence that feels and reflects. ' It is thus, ~~say~~ the Cartesians, that
 ' a child sliding upon ice, endeavours to find out the cen-
 ' ter of gravity, in his body, and hinder himself from falling.
 ' He bends and stoops to right and left, before and behind,
 ' he ballances all his motions, as if he truly knew the rules of
 ' the most perfect mechanicks. It is thus that mountebanks
 ' dance upon ropes, search the equilibrium, and follow the
 ' laws of Staticks, without having any idea of them. It is
 ' thus that swimmers extend, contract, and move their mem-
 ' bers without understanding the rules of Hydrostaticks. It is

‘ thus in fine that every day we stretch and unbend our
‘ muscles, without knowing that all those motions are perfect-
‘ ly conformable to the sublimest Geometry. We are with
‘ regard to beasts what a superior intelligence would be with
‘ regard to us; which in seeing us, would fancy that we act by
‘ a particular directive knowledge of Mechanicks, Staticks,
‘ Hydrostaticks, and the sublimest Geometry. Just so we i-
‘ magine foolishly that brutes act with knowledge, sensation
‘ and reflection, while all in them, their cries, their gesticu-
‘ lations, their apparent appetites, and passions; their seeming
‘ docility and fidelity; their imaginary pain and pleasure, are
‘ pure effects of organical machines, so contrived and adjust-
‘ ed by the author of nature, that they produce the same ef-
‘ fects, as if they were really animated, sensible, and intelli-
‘ gent.’

All this is ingenious, witty, and truly worthy of a lively, luxuriant French imagination; but all this is neither proof nor demonstration; and it is easy to dissipate all these hypotheses, by the most solid reflections.

1. Tho’ children have no explicite knowledge of the natural connection there is betwixt their motions and the laws of mechanicks, yet they make all those motions only out of fear, and so have a lively, quick sensation of danger. Now it is possible that they may have also a secret perception of what is necessary to self-preservation, antecedent to all reflection, reasoning and demonstration. Our spiritual part, tho’ shut up in a mortal prison is still intelligent, and so may have many operations, and notices that can be no more accounted for at present than the latent habits, passions and inclinations, that

lurk long in the soul e're they are discovered. We have no adequate ideas of the intimate essence of spirit, and so cannot decide about the sensations, perceptions, and ideas it is capable of, independent of reason and comparison. In fine, there are in the body the eye, the ear, and all the organs of sensation; many motions undoubtedly voluntary and dependent upon the soul, which by habit are become so familiar, that they are performed without our reflection upon, or even perception of them (a).

2. Mountebanks, swimmers, and all men naturally have learn'd by repeated essays and experience that the motions they make are necessary to their preservation, tho' they have not studied Mechanicks, Staticks, Hydrostaticks, or Geometry. They have a practical, experimental knowledge, tho' not a speculative mathematical science of the principles by which they act. They judge by effects and not by causes; but they judge, reason and compare; whereas there can be no such operations in beasts if they be pure machines. In all these actions which we call spontaneous and mechanical in ourselves and other men, there is still a sensation, experience, or a kind of reflection, that directs all our motions; tho' we have no adequate knowledge of the manner how they are produced, of the numberless springs that act in us, and of the union of the soul and body. If this directive sensation and perception be refused to beasts, then God himself must be the immediate agent and director of those machines; and all the animal oeconomy and motions must be so many different

(a) See the Medical essays and observations of the Society of Edinburgh, T. iv. Essay upon the motion of the eyes by Dr. Porterfield.

puppets-shews, of which God is the great operator behind the scene. What a fine idea is this of God and nature? The Cartesian philosophy refuses souls to beasts, in order to make God the universal soul of all the brutal species.

3. We grant that God could form such machines; but does it follow from thence that he has really done so? we might also prove by the same reasoning, that all other men are machines; for since we have no such intimate sensation of their existence, as of our own, every man might conclude that far from being in society with reasonable, intelligent beings, he is surrounded with machines. It is thus that the Malebranchists prove that the objects which act upon us when we see, hear, taste, smell, and feel, are not real but ideal bodies; that Dr. Berkeley demonstrates that there can be no third substance betwixt God and spirit, called matter; and that the Egotists maintain that no man can be sure of any thing but of his own existence; that all nature, all men, all individuals are but modifications of his own particular substance, and not real substances. Thus the demanding of demonstrations where proofs alone suffice, is the high road to the greatest folly, and fanatical madness.

4. Descartes foresaw that if beasts had immortal souls capable of thought, sensation and reflection, they would be susceptible of moral actions; of virtues and vices; of rewards and punishments; of eternal happiness, and immortality. These consequences alarm'd him, and as he knew nothing of the scripture-doctrine of degraded intelligences, he fell naturally into the system of the beasts being machines, as far more reasonable than that of their having material souls, or immaterial

ones that are annihilated after death. But if he had had just notions of the great plan of providence, of the eternal duration of all God's works, of the fall of man occasioned by the temptation of degraded intelligences that animated brutal forms even in paradise itself; to be sure that sublime genius would never have prefer'd the romance of mechanism, to that of the sacred writers, supported by the universal tradition of all antiquity.

5. It is possible for a speculative genius who intoxicates himself in his closet, with all the phantoms of his imagination, to persuade himself that beasts are machines: but if we descend into a strict observation of the animal oeconomy, we will soon be undeceiv'd. When we consider narrowly the art, industry, and stratagems of hounds in the chace, and of staggs that fly from them; of the bee in the hive; of the ant in the mole-hill, of birds in their nests, of the beaver in his buildings; and of all the different families of the animal republic, in their manner of lodging, and nourishing; of propagating and educating their offspring. When, I say, we enter thus into the detail of all these wonderful phenomena, experience and observation will strongly confute, and soon disgust us with this French romance.

6. In fine, we discover in beasts not only all the marks of sensation, and reflection; but different shades, gradations, and unfoldings of intelligence. A young dog does not know the meaning of its master's signs, sounds, tones of voice, threats, and caresses, as in a more advanced age. Yea by education, the nature of all sorts of tameable, docile beasts, may be very much improved as to their sagacity, and intellectual percepti-

ons. Can this be said of machines, whose springs never alter, till they be put into disorder. Long use rather spoils, than improves them. I know that it may be said that in all sorts of agents, whether material or immaterial, habits render their operations more easy. This I grant, but custom adds nothing to material agents, unless it be facility: this facility does not alter their inward springs, nor give them new motions they had not before. They execute more easily the necessary laws to which they are subjected; but they do not alter the direction or determination of their motions; they do not describe other curves, spaces, or lines, than these they are necessarily determined to by their original construction; whereas in beasts we see new ideas, new notices, and progressive perceptions, that cannot be accounted for by pure mechanism. We may cheat and impose upon ourselves by the jargon of imaginary traces form'd in the brains of animals; but these traces are unintelligible, unless we suppose that they are physical or occasional causes of habits, inclinations and dispositions produced in some intelligent principle united to these corporeal machines.

These six reflections serve at least to suspend our admiration of the Cartesian romance; for tho' they were not perfect demonstrations, but simple probabilities; yet they suffice to render suspected the mere hypothesis of the French philosopher; since wherever two contraries are equally possible and probable, neither of them can be demonstrated, because demonstrable truths are those only whose contraries are impossible.

The Predestinarians, and pious Fatalists have adopted this

Cartesian whim in order to fortify their doctrine of the inefficacy of second causes, and the universality of God's immediate and sole action in, and upon all creatures, thereby to establish their barbarous decrees of election and reprobation. These bewilder'd divines, and philosophers reason thus: ' If beasts thought, felt, and had in them a principle of reason, we would not see them puzzled, stupid, and untractable, when they are put out of their ordinary method of acting. ' If the spider had a fund of knowledge in it, it might make something else than its cobweb. If the bee acted with intelligence, it might form something else than its honeycomb. ' If brutes were capable of any reasoning, they would not be stinted to one, uniform, invariable rote; we might throw new ideas into their understandings; the principle of reason would not be fruitless and barren in them; it would manifested itself by a variety of new effects, and new ideas, and this diversity of thought would not fail to diversify their operations.'

To all this, I answer, that we see every day craftsmen, great Geometers, and transcendent genii, who excell in one art and science, puzzled, stupid, and untractable when we talk to them of other arts and sciences. We have known great Mathematicians incapable of poetry, great poets incapable of Geometry, and wonderful mechanicks appear quite stupid when we endeavour to explain to them the Geometrical reasons of their own arts. We can never throw into their understandings any new ideas different from their own trade. They have no aptitude, no genius, no talent but in a certain degree, and in one kind only. Insects, beasts, and fowl are in the like

case. Their instincts, their understandings, their talents are stinted to their own preservation and that of their species. They are incapable of all other operations. They are confin'd to a small circle of ideas, sensations and perceptions, beyond which they cannot go in their present, degraded state. Some of them are more tractable and docile than others: but still their intellectual powers are immerf'd in matter; and they cannot attain, during this state of degradation, to the same degrees of knowledge and industry that men do. Our reason is more unfolded and extensive than theirs; but it does not thence follow that they have no reason at all. We reason more, but we are less reasonable than they, because our passions are stronger, and our abuse of reason greater. Moreover, if we had subtiler organs, quicker sensations, and more extensive perceptions to discern the intimate essence, faculties, and actions of beasts; perhaps we might perceive in them all the traces of a wonderful art, surprizing invention, and astonishing variety. We would perhaps find, that the same spider does not always spin its cobwebs of the same form; that the same hive does not contain the same sort of honey-comb; and that the same beaver does not build its houses in the same manner, or with exact simularity.

Let us argue for a moment as the Cartesians do; we are in the same case with regard to beasts as an angelical spirit would be with regard to us, if it knew neither the original excellency of man, nor his present degradation, nor his future immortality. To be sure, could this celestial inhabitant look down upon our globe, see our actions, passions, and disorders; and judge of us only by our conduct, it would have

reason to conclude that we are irrational, and that the animal called Man has nothing above the beasts his fellow-creatures.

Superficial minds and wanton imaginations will perhaps make this doctrine of degraded intelligences matter of jest and raillery. They will endeavour to render it ridiculous by all the pretty, ingenious querks that wit and fancy can invent, as they thus often disparage the sublimest truths; such men will say with a jeering look, that the soul of an oyster must be wonderfully degraded; and that the number of lapsed intelligences must be prodigiously great, to answer to all that innumerable variety of brutal forms and even insects that inhabit the air, the earth and the seas, from the greatest elephant to the smallest insects discover'd by microscopes, which may be so small that one grain of sand may serve to lodge two hundred and eighty millions of these insects that live only some few hours or minutes.

I answer in the first place, that we do not know sufficiently the laws of nature to distinguish precisely the boundaries of the animal and vegetable kingdoms; far less to fix the precise moment when true life and sensation begin in these dim specks of entity called invisible insects. They perhaps never come to any degree of true animal and sensitive life, and die like embryos that cannot be called men. I answer in the second place, that sacred tradition represents to us the number of fallen spirits as immense; since it is said in scripture, 'that the dragon when he fell, drew after him the third part of the heavens.' I advance in the third place, that since all grandeur whether of space or time, is relative, not absolute, we are not to measure the greatness of bodies, or of duration, by our

senses and sensations. What appears to the naked eye an atom would appear a mountain to the organs of other animals, and what seems to us a minute may seem to others an age. I conclude in the fourth place, as a decisive answer to all these little cavils, that perhaps the same degraded intelligence animates successively many brutal forms of different kinds; and that it passes gradually from insects to reptiles, from reptiles to quadrupeds, and thence to birds according to the different degrees of its developement. All these suppositions are possible; and simple possibilities serve to answer objections, tho' not to make proofs.

This transmigration of degraded intelligences from one brutal form to another has nothing in common with the senseless doctrine of the Pagan metempsychosis, by which the souls of beasts pass into the bodies of men, and the souls of men into the bodies of beasts. Revelation does not authorize this wild fiction in any sense; nay this inglorious fable is diametrically opposite to scripture, which distinguishes three sorts of states after death: a state of bliss in the divine presence to which holy souls are admitted; a state of infernal pains and torments for the wicked in a place prepared for the devil and his angels. A middle state, where souls that go out of this life with pious dispositions but not entirely pure, are further purify'd, refin'd, and transform'd into the divine resemblance. No mention is made of a fourth state wherein human souls are imprisoned in brutal forms. This is a mere fiction super-added to the true doctrine of the Metempsychosis, which is a very antient tradition; as shall be demonstrated in the second Part.

The only solid objection that can be made against this system is, that it seems dishonourable to the spiritual nature, and dignity of an intelligence made after the divine image, to suppose that it can be confined to the body of an insect or reptile: but is this more unworthy of its native dignity, than to be attach'd to the body of a man that wallows in brutal lusts and passions; or to be a reprobate spirit that preserves its vigour and faculties purely to blaspheme and hate God? Men are surely imposed upon by foolish imagination, and childish prejudice, when they fancy that these horrible crimes are not far more inconsistent with the natural dignity of spirits, than the stupidity and insensibility to which degraded intelligences are reduced by their union with brutal forms. To be sure that reprobate, rebellious, impious spirits are far more contemptible and odious before God and angels, than birds, beasts, reptiles or insects. So soon as created intelligences detach themselves from their supreme original, turn off their superior faculties from their infinite object, and render themselves incapable of true life, light, and love, it is no matter to what state they be condemn'd, to what parcels of matter they be attach'd, nor what machines they animate. The more insensible they become, the less are they capable of new crimes; and therefore the better it is for them; for no doubt it is morally better to be an insect than a devil.

Tho' all these reasonings seem consequential and demonstrative, yet we should suspect them of some latent falshood, if this doctrine concerning the souls of beasts, were not perfectly conformable to the whole oeconomy of providence, which ought to include all times, all places, and all beings,

and leave in all parts of the creation the marks of infinite justice and goodness. Now since all God's works are and must be eternal, since every atom of matter may contain when unfolded new beauties, new wonders and new worlds; since souls, by the divine activity displaying itself in them, may be exalted and sublimated without end; and since by a suspension of the same activity, they may be reduced to any degree how low soever of insensibility, inaction, or stupidity; all that we conclude is, that the doctrine of degraded intelligences is perfectly conformable to the plan of eternal wisdom, and very proper to solve many phenomena in nature and providence otherwise inexplicable.

C O R. I.

Hence the Cartesian doctrine about the mechanism of beasts is founded upon mere hypotheses, combated by experience and observation, incompatible with the great plan of providence, and, as we shall shew in the second Part, is repugnant to scripture and the universal sentiment of all antiquity both sacred and profane.

C O R. II.

Hence the whole universe from the smallest insect to the sublimest seraphim, from the least atom to the greatest star, becomes worthy of God. Nothing is useless in the creation, nothing is despicable, nothing will be for ever lost in the work of an infinitely perfect being: the forms must change, but the substances will last for ever.

END OF THE FIFTH BOOK.

THE
PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES
OF
NATURAL AND REVEALED
RELIGION.

BOOK VI.

OF NATURE IN A RE-ESTABLISHED STATE.

DEFINITIONS.

BY PRAYER, I mean the continual return of the thoughts and desires of the soul towards God.

2. By MORTIFICATION, I mean the continual turning away from all irregular love of the creatures.

3. By SELF-DENYAL, I mean renouncing all the subtle,

refin'd, spiritual desires, inclinations and passions of self-love.

4. By the three theological or divine virtues, FAITH, HOPE, and CHARITY; I mean these habits of soul, which make us ' think as God thinks, desire to see him as he is, and ' love as he loves.'

5. By internal TRANQUILLITY, I mean that noble liberty of soul, by which it is deliver'd from all the uselefs activities of the understanding, and all the irregular desires of the will which might disturb the true exercise of its intellectual powers.

6. By divine GRACES I mean all those outward and inward, mediate and immediate, accessory and essential helps, means, and succours by which God endeavours to cure, purify and restore lapsed beings.

7. By the immediate, internal, and necessary means of salvation, I understand all these operations by which God acts directly upon the soul to enlighten, and enliven, cure, purify and restore lapsed beings.

8. By remote, external, and accessory means, I understand all these succours which act upon the soul by the corporeal organs, and in general all these exterior helps that are useful, tho' not absolutely necessary.

A X I O M S.

1. God's attributes cannot contradict each other; his mercy cannot derogate from his holiness; nor his goodness connive at the breach of eternal order; nor his clemency authorize the revolt of finite intelligences.

2. If God pardoned criminals without shewing his essen-

tial love of justice, and the infinite opposition of his nature to the breach of eternal order, his mercy would derogate from his holiness, his goodness connive at the breach of his eternal law, and his clemency would authorize the revolt of finite intelligences.

3. The only two means of re-uniting the soul to an object are continually turning our thoughts and desires to it; and constantly turning away our thoughts and desires from every thing that hinders the love of it.

4. The order, happiness, and safety of human society consists in the practice of perfect veracity, uncorrupted justice, and universal beneficence.

5. Some men are born in such circumstances as must detain them in a perfect ignorance of scriptures, churches, and sacraments.

6. God's primitive, positive, ultimate, and absolute designs cannot be eternally frustrated.

S C H O L I U M.

Having already examined the properties and perfections of nature in an exalted state, as also the qualities and defects of nature in a degraded state, we shall now consider nature in a re-establish'd state, and the means of re-uniting lapsed beings to their great original. These means are of two kinds, the one are necessary to justify the conduct of God, and the others are necessary to render the creatures just and good. The former regard the plan of redemption, and the later the means of purification: and we shall next prove the necessity of an universal restoration of all lapsed intelligences to their

original, primitive state of purity, perfection and happiness. We beg our readers to go on and not be startled at the freedom or boldness of our reasonings, till we shew in the second Part that they are perfectly conformable to scripture and the universal tradition of all antiquity both sacred and profane.

P R O P O S I T I O N L I .

God cannot pardon and restore lapsed beings without shewing his essential love of justice, and thereby the infinite opposition of his nature to the violation of eternal order.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N .

God's attributes cannot contradict each other, his mercy cannot derogate from his holiness, nor his goodness connive at the breach of eternal order, nor his clemency authorize the revolt of finite intelligences (a); if God pardon'd criminals without shewing his essential love of justice, and thereby the infinite opposition of his nature, to the violation of eternal order, his mercy would derogate from his holiness, his goodness would connive at the breach of his eternal law, and his clemency would authorize the revolt of finite intelligences (b): therefore God cannot pardon, and restore lapsed beings without shewing his essential love of justice, and thereby the infinite opposition of his nature to the violation of eternal order.

(a) Ax. 1. of this book.

(b) Ax. 2. of this book.

S C H O L I U M.

Thus we have a noble, exalted idea of the whole oeconomy of providence in the tremendous mystery of redemption. All intelligent natures are spectators of what passes in the sphere of lapsed spirits. God cannot shew to all the celestial quires his infinite aversion to disorder, by the eternal punishment of his rebellious creatures; this, as we shall shew, is incompatible with his clemency. He must therefore have found out some other way to reconcile his infinite love of justice, with his paternal love of the creatures, and his eternal abhorrence of sin, with his boundless compassion for the sinner. Now it is impossible for men or angels to conceive any other way of God's manifesting for ever his infinite opposition to the breach of eternal order but by the incarnation of the Logos, hypostatically united to the sacred humanity. The pure Divinity is impassible, and unsusceptible of anger, wrath, vengeance, grief and horror; and so could not manifest his infinite opposition to the breach of eternal order any otherways than by the impression this disorder and revolt of lapsed beings made upon the sacred humanity that lived in his bosom, that knew him as he is, and that was admitted into the central depths of the divine essence. The Son of God quitted the bosom of the Father; the living image of the most High took upon him the form of a slave; the eternal Word became a speechless babe, 'a man of sorrows, overpower'd with griefs, and bruised for our iniquities;' the splendor of the uncreated light suffered as to his humanity, a terrible eclipse that frightened the cherubims, the seraphims, the angels,

archangels, thrones, dominations, and all the celestial powers. They had seen his sacred humanity from the beginning of their existence under a visible form, and the First-born of all creatures sitting at the right-hand of the Father, clothed with his majesty, and fill'd with all the fullness of the Godhead: but now they see him divest himself of his glory, and as sacred writ expresses it, 'empty himself of his fullness.' They saw his human nature supported by his divine, suffer because of the sin of lapsed beings, infinite agonies and pains, as a tender father suffers to see the vices and corruption of his profligate children. All the privations, sufferings and humiliations of the Messiah that were visible to mortal eye were nothing in comparison of his inward desolations. The 'torments of hell surrounded him; the terrors of the almighty' 'fill'd his soul. He drank the bitter cup to the dregs.' He felt and tasted all the physical agonies that lapsed angels and men should have suffered during a whole eternity, without their immoral dispositions, revolt, and despair. When superficial preachers of all communions talk of his external sufferings, without mentioning his internal dereliction and desolation, they diminish the grandeur of the mystery, and expose it to the contempt of incredulous minds.

By this unexpressible anguish of the Messiah, all the inhabitants of heaven conceiv'd the excessive deformity of sin, and God's infinite abhorrence of it; since it occasioned such immense grief, anguish and sorrow to a soul intimately united to the divine nature, that knew all God's perfections, sentiments, and thoughts. The expiring Messiah cry'd thus aloud from the cross to all intelligent natures, that were, that

are, and that ever will be; JUDGE OF THE HEINOUSNESS OF SIN BY THE PAINS I ENDURE. Without this sacrifice celestial spirits could never have known the horrible deformity of vice; nor have been for ever immutably confirm'd in the love of order; it is thus that the suffering Messiah reconcil'd justice with mercy, and God's love of eternal order, with his paternal love of laps'd beings. In this sense he substituted himself as a victim to take away the sins of the world; not to appease vindictive justice, but to shew God's infinite love of justice, and abhorrence of injustice.

This astonishing scene remains still deeply imprinted upon the minds of celestial spirits, and will to all eternity be an everlasting proof of the wisdom and sanctity, justice and goodness of God. All the hosts of heaven were present at this mystery, and adored its depths and sublimity. Mortals saw only the outward appearance, and it made little or no impression upon them. The Jews who expected a triumphant Messiah, did not understand this first coming. The false sages of all nations, who see only the surface of truth, discover'd nothing great in this wonderful appearance. The just themselves during this life cannot comprehend all the beauty, extent, and necessity of this great sacrifice. All that we have said, or can say of it, falls infinitely short of what we shall know one day, when we shall see God as he is, and the Son sitting on the right-hand of the Father. When we look upon this mystery with Pagan and Judaical eyes, when we consider only what pass'd at Jerusalem before a blind and furious mob; when we see the feeble impression this first coming has as yet made upon human minds, the few that ever heard

of this mystery, and the fewer that profit by it, it is no wonder that we see nothing in it tremendous, august, and worthy of God: but when we draw the veil, pierce into eternity, and behold the impresson it made upon the whole universe of spirits, and the effects it will produce for ever upon all created intelligences, then it is that we begin to see the infinite extent, height and depth of this mystery.

This sublime doctrine of a suffering Messiah to become one day an expiatory sacrifice, a purifying holocaust, and a propitiatory victim for the sins of the world, was reveal'd to Adam immediately after the fall, and to Noah after the deluge. In order to perpetuate the memory of this great truth, sacred writ informs us, that annual, monthly, weekly, and daily sacrifices were instituted. In effect nothing was more proper to keep in mind this revelation, that a Saviour, the first-born of all creatures, should die for the sins of men, and by his sufferings expiate their guilt, than such constant, typical observances, wherein men kill'd a kid, a lamb, a dove, an unspotted male and first-born of some animal, as an emblem of the suffering Messiah. This symbolical worship to be repeated every year upon a solemn day, once every moon upon the first day, once every week upon the seventh day; and twice every day morning and evening, was a living memorial, and an emblematical record of this supernatural, divine mystery.

This also seems to be the source of that universal practice common to all nations of offering up victims to the author of nature. They were originally representative and symbolical of the great sacrifice of the Messiah. This truth was trans-

mitted to all nations, as we shall see in the second Part, by an ancient, primitive tradition, which the Pagans at length obscured, disfigured and corrupted by idolatrous practices, superstitious ceremonies, and inhuman sacrifices. Nothing but the remains of such an ancient tradition could suggest to the human mind the idea of immolating beasts in homage to the divine nature. What connection can there be betwixt the natural notions we have of the self-sufficient Being, Creator of the universe, and the cruelty shewn to poor animals, yea to our fellow-creatures? Human nature has been much the same in all ages. Thinking men have always had the same ideas of the first eternal cause. They were never so stupid as to imagine, that he could pardon the vices of men, and vouchsafe his protection and favours, because of the inhumanity they shew to beasts, and even to each other by sacrificing them. Superficial philosophers may favour impiety as much as they please, by disparaging human nature, and attributing to the first ages of the world, a brutish, childish stupidity: but those who know antiquity and the wisdom of the ancients, will never be imposed upon by such low, pitiful notions. The general idea then which all mankind had of the necessity of sacrificing living victims to the Almighty, came originally from an universal tradition handed down successively from generation to generation since the fall; tho' differently disfigur'd, that sin was to be expiated by the Messiah, by a divine man, by a Son of Jupiter or the most high God; yea by a God himself who was to appear upon earth, under a human form. By degrees this primitive tradition was lost, and men retain'd only the general idea of sacrificing. Tho' the memory

of what was at first intended by immolating a perfect male was forgot, yet care was taken that nothing but what was perfect should be sacrificed. Tho' what was originally represented, by the first-born's being to discharge the priestly office, was dropt into oblivion; yet in all nations, men for many ages, look'd upon the right of priesthood to be in the first-born. Tho' men forgot by degrees that the blood shed upon the altar was only typical, and had no real virtue in it; yet they still continued with the greatest zeal to make use of sacrifice, to believe it the means of atoning for sin, of averting punishment, of procuring favours from the Deity, of making their prayers and praises acceptable, and that it was the highest mark of divine homage. Now as there is and can be no natural connection betwixt the ideas we have of God, and the immolation of beasts, we must search in supernatural traditions for the relation betwixt the sign and the thing signify'd. And therefore the antiquity and universality of sacrifice in all nations, ages, and religions, notwithstanding the corruptions introduced into it, is a proof of the supernatural, universal, early tradition concerning a suffering Messiah.

The Logos incarnate was not only an expiatory sacrifice for sin, but at the same time a model of virtue to all intelligences during this mortal life, and during all eternity. He shewed by his humiliation, abstinence, and abjection, the contempt we ought to have of all human grandeur, riches, and pleasures; by his agonies, sufferings, and death, the necessity of expiatory pains to purify all lapsed beings; by his disappropriation and self-annihilation before God, the homage finite minds owe to the infinite, even in heaven itself, and during a

whole eternity. It is only by imitating this divine Messiah, in his life, sufferings and death that the soul can be truly purified and re-established, as shall be unfolded in the following propositions: but before we proceed, let us draw from what has been said two important corollaries.

C O R. I.

Hence we see the deplorable ignorance of those who represent the expiatory sacrifice of the Messiah, as destin'd to appease vindictive justice, to appease an incensed Deity, and avert divine vengeance: attributes that cannot belong to God, but in a metaphorical sense, as hands, eyes, and feet. The scripture says on the contrary that ' God so loved the world ' that he sent his only begotten Son to redeem it.' All therefore was the effect of goodness and sanctity, of justice and mercy, which can never be separated. It is by such frivolous, and blasphemous notions, that the schoolmen have exposed this sublime mystery to the raillery and contempt of deistical, Socinian and incredulous minds; who are afraid to attribute to the divine nature, human yea inhuman passions.

C O R. II.

Hence it will be found upon a strict enquiry that all the sufferings, incarnations, labours, exiles, and combats of Chingim among the Chinese; of Brama among the Indians; of Mystras among the Persians; of Osiris among the Egyptians, of Adonis among the Tyrians; of Apollo, Hercules, and Mercury among the Greeks and Romans, and of all the other imaginary divine Heroes in the different mythologies and primitive religions of Asia, Africa, Europe and America were only different disguises of the antient tradition from Noah

concerning a suffering Messiah, as shall be fully demonstrated and unfolded in the second Part.

P R O P O S I T I O N L I I .

The three immediate, essential and necessary means of re-uniting lapsed beings to their almighty original, are prayer, mortification, and self-denial.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N .

The only two means of re-uniting our souls to an object are the turning our thoughts and desires continually to it, and turning away our thoughts and desires from all that hinders the love of it (a); the continual return of the thoughts and desires towards God is prayer (b); the continual turning away from all irregular love of the creatures is mortification (c); the continual renouncing of all the subtle, refined, spiritual inclinations and passions of self-love is self-denial (d): therefore the three immediate, essential and necessary means of reuniting the soul to God are prayer, mortification and self-denial.

S C H O L I U M .

Religion according to an etymology of the word given by some of the ancients is reunion, a tying again of the mind to God, from whence it was detach'd. Wherefore the essential precepts of religion, must be the necessary means of reunion,

(a) Ax. 3. of this book. (b) By def. 1. of the same. (c) By def. 2. of the same. (d) By def. 3. of the same.

which as we have shewn can be no other but prayer or contemplation, mortification or the sacrifice of the passions; and self-denial, or the extirpation of all false self-love.

True spiritual prayer does not consist in the multiplicity of words, nor in fine speculations, nor in enthusiastic raptures, nor in soft, tender, and delicious sensations: but in a constant tendency of the soul to its first principle. It is thus that it recalls its wandering thoughts and affections, that it reunites its different powers, that it retires into its spiritual nature, to adore in silence him that surpasses all expression and all conception. It is thus that it exposes its degraded, weakned, and sick faculties to his luminous and purifying influences, which elevate, fortify, and cure them. This is that adoration in spirit and in truth of which the gospel speaks.

True mortification does not consist in singular austerities, nor in voluntary pennances, nor in corporeal macerations. Our great Model practised none of these extraordinary severities. He led a common life as to external appearance, while all was divine within. True mortification is a continual death to all that is visible, a perpetual retreat of all the powers of the soul from external objects, an universal sacrifice of all pleasure, whether of sense or imagination, ideal or corporeal, that is contrary to the love of order.

True self-denial is a constant, universal, generous abnegation, suppression and sacrifice of all the subtle, refined motions, complacencies and pleasures of false-self-love, whether they regard natural and intellectual qualities, talents, and perfections, or divine supernatural gifts, graces, and communications. It is that perfect poverty of spirit, profound humi-

lity, and self-disappropriation whercin seraphims fail'd, and so became devils.

C O R. I.

Hence prayer, mortification, and self-denyal must necessarily produce in the soul a desire to think as God thinks, to see him as he is, and to love him as he loves himself: for it is impossible that a mind which converts continually its lapsed powers and faculties to the divine influences, illuminations and motions should not receive that supernatural life, light, and love which make it believe whatever God reveals, breathe after the beatific vision, and love as God loves; since the infinite source of life, light and love, is always ready to communicate himself to souls that do not resist his divine action.

C O R. II.

Hence prayer, mortification, and self-denyal deliver us from all the useles activities of the understanding, and all the irregular motions of the will, which disturb the true exercise of our intellectual powers. A soul whose thoughts and desires tend continually towards its infinite object, and turn away continually from all terrestrial, corruptible objects, must be disengaged from every thing superfluous and impure below the dignity of its nature, and contrary to eternal order.

C O R. III.

Hence the continual exercise of prayer, mortification and self-denyal, in order to know and love God, produce necessarily in the soul a desire to resemble him, and a hatred of all the vices that render us unlike him. Now since God is essential truth, goodness, and justice; prayer, mortification, and self-

denial must produce in us the practice of perfect veracity, uncorrupted justice, and universal beneficence.

P R O P O S I T I O N LIII.

The continual practice of prayer, mortification, and self-denial produce necessarily in the soul the three divine virtues, Faith, Hope, and Charity.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

True spiritual prayer, mortification, and self-denial produce necessarily in the soul a desire to think as God thinks, to see him as he is, and to love him as he loves himself (a); but to think as God thinks, to desire to see him as he is, and to love him as he loves himself are Faith, Hope, and Charity, the three divine virtues (b): therefore the proposition is manifest.

S C H O L I U M.

True, supernatural, living faith is not a speculative conviction of any system of truths how sublime soever; all these the devils believe and know better than any mortal: but it is as the apostle defines it 'the evidence of things not seen.' It is a divine light in the soul that opens its intellectual view not to see visions, revelations, and fanatical chimeras; but to discover the laws of eternal order; the all of God, the nothingness of the creature, and the immutable relations betwixt both. It is a vital, quick, spiritual sensation by which the soul sees God in all, and all in God, not in the Malebranchian sense,

(a) Cor. I. of Prop. LII. (b) Def. 4. of this book,

but by receiving all from him as our source, and in referring all to him as our end. In fine it is a constant submission, evacuation, and sacrifice of all our finite, imperfect, feeble activities and thoughts to the dictates and orders of his eternal will, whether manifested by inspired revelation, enlightned reason, or the dispensations of his providence, and a full persuasion that they are conformable to infinite wisdom, goodness; and justice, however contradictory they may appear to our bounded reason, and to our natural self-love.

True supernatural hope, or desire of the beatific vision, is not an effect of that natural, necessary and invincible instinct all beings have toward happiness, but an immediate offspring of the divine operation in us, by which we die to every thing visible, draw aside the vail of mortality, look beyond all created objects, and see in the future state the high destiny of Man, and the glory prepared for him. It is a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ, not to shun expiatory pains, salutary crosses, and purifying afflictions, not to enjoy intellectual pleasures, spiritual transports, and endless delights, but to be consummated in the divine unity, to see God as he is, that we may love him as he deserves; and to be re-united to our first principle as a state that will cure all our imperfections, that will destroy all our vicious habits, that will restore the soul to its primitive health and purity, and that will confirm it for ever in the permanent, immutable love of order. The motive, the end, and the object of chaste, supernatural hope, is not so much the pleasure as the purity of a celestial state.

Supernatural charity is not a tendency to God purely and only as beatifying, as relative good, as the source of infinite

pleasure. All these acts are natural and necessary effects of the invincible love we have for happiness. True supernatural love is an effect of that immediate operation of God in the soul, by which he sublimates, refines and exalts it above its own natural powers, makes it go out of itself, and lose itself in him, that so it may love him as he loves himself, and all things in him and for him; the infinitely little for the infinitely great; the images for the original, and the scattered rays for the immense ocean of light. Thus living faith is the most perfect prayer; chaste hope the most perfect mortification, and pure love the most perfect self-denial. All these divine virtues produce mutually each other, all are equally the effects of the divine operation, enlightning, purifying and regenerating the soul.

At first divine grace acts upon us differently by motives of self-interest, and attracts by celestial delectation or inward remorse. It discovers to us by turns the beauty of virtue, or the deformity of vice, the punishments that attend crimes, and the pure delights that are to be enjoyed in a future immortality. Fear and hope act in us alternately. Sometimes the soul is filled with a sacred horror for its present state, a bitter anguish for its infidelities, and a true desire of satisfying divine justice. At other times truth shews itself to the mind, with all its charms, draws us with soft smiles and endearing caresses, enchants us with noble ideas, luminous principles, and celestial sensations. Then we attach ourselves to the love of virtue by the sweetness that accompanys it, from a view of the recompense that attends it; and by the natural, invincible love of happiness. Grace makes use of our natural dispositions

and faculties, to convert the soul to its true supernatural object as beatifying. It is thus that we renounce all the delusions of sense, gather in our scattered powers that were dispersed upon things without us, and retire into our spiritual natures, there to study our own heart and be acquainted with ourselves. This is true conversion, and the beginning of wisdom.

After this, grace proceeds to another operation less delectable, but more purifying. It is then that we discover by degrees all the labyrinths and windings of the heart, all the refined passions of self-love, its usurpations upon the rights of the Deity, its idolatrous complacency in its own virtues, and the secret pride by which it referred them all to itself. To humble and cure it of this spiritual self-attribution by which the devils fell, crosses from within and from without besiege it, temptations of all kinds molest it; imagination seems unhinged; the passions which it thought extinguish'd, return upon it with more violence than ever; all the sources of spiritual consolation are dried up. It can rejoice no more in its sublime ideas, noble sentiments and shining virtues. Like gold purify'd in the fire, the central operation of divine justice and love, throws up from the bottom of the soul to the surface all its natural impurity, dross, and corruption: all its faculties seem darkned, weakned and depraved: it feels for a long time its natural impotence, immense void, and absolute nothingness, and the horrible solitude of a soul exiled from the divine presence, that can neither take pleasure in the creatures, nor in itself.

In fine if the soul continues faithful in a total abnegation

of all outward, and inward pleasure; of all spiritual and terrestrial concupiscence, of all corporeal and selfish delectation, it dies to its natural life, it is evacuated of self, elevated above self, disengaged from self, becomes truly regenerated, and breathes a new life hid with Christ in God, who invests it, dwells in it, and becomes its life, light, and love. It is then that it enters into the HOLY OF HOLIES, that it becomes a living temple of the most High, partakes of the royal priesthood and offers up a perpetual holocaust of praise, love, and adoration, while it practises externally all the virtues and duties of its station. The first of these three operations detaches us from terrestrial objects: the second disengages us from false self-love: the third transforms us into the divine image.

During these three illuminating, purifying, and regenerating operations, the soul does nothing that is truly meritorious, but consents and acquiesces in, co-operates, and concurs with the divine action; which produces all that is truly luminous, sanctifying and beatifying in us. Its only virtue during all these states is docility to the divine inspirations, a humble reception of what comes from above, and a total passivity, that God may act in it and by it. It can boast of nothing, yea not so much as of its co-operation; no more than a poor man, who receives daily alms from the free, liberal and generous beneficence of a prince, can boast of being the author of his fortune, because he stretched out his hands to receive what was freely and gratuitously offered to him. This co-operation, consent and acquiescence must be prepared by God himself. Free will, as we have shewn, consists in a power to

suspend our choice and tendency towards objects, till we have examined their true value. Since the fall, men cannot always thus suspend their choice to examine, to compare and to judge of the true merit of objects. Sensible pleasures fill the capacity of the soul; their impression is very oft so lively, so violent, so impetuous that they blind, captivate and hurry us headlong. Wherefore the scripture represents man since the fall as blind, dead and enslaved by sin. We want a continual grace to suspend the force of concupiscence, to untie our natural bonds, to re-enliven our dead powers. This preventing grace is a true physical premotion, antecedent to all the activities, and merit of the creature, which gives us a perfect, immediate, real power of consenting to the divine operation. But it never produces by omnipotent wills our moral determinations; nor our actual co-operations, because he that made us without our aid will not and cannot save us but with our concurrence. This preventing grace is refused to none of the lapsed sons of Adam; it is a light 'that enlightens every man 'that comes into the world.' It is as universal as sun-shine. It knocks at the doors of the heart, it presses, sollicites, and excites us continually to return to our original. If the soul co-operates faithfully with these preventing motions, God enlightens us a-new, purifies us by degrees, regenerates us at last, and in these three operations consist all the degrees, the beginning, the progress and the consummation of the spiritual life.

C O R. I.

Hence it was, that the sages of the philosophers of all times, countries, and religions, by virtue of an ancient tradi-

tion, represented these three operations, by those of WATER, AIR, and FIRE. The first purification like that of water cleanses us from all the spots and stains contracted by our commerce with terrestrial objects. The second like an impetuous wind, detaches and separates us from false self-love, that adheres more intimately to our natures. The third like a devouring flame dissolves, destroys, and consumes in us all that is dissimilar to the divine nature. We shall shew in the second Part, that all the mysteries, rites, and ceremonies of the Pagan initiations were originally symbols of these three purifications transmitted from the beginning of the world, to all successive generations.

C O R. II.

Hence we conceive that the life of man is of three kinds since his degradation; BRUTAL, HUMAN, and DIVINE. The brutal life is when we devote ourselves to material objects, abandon ourselves to the mechanical instincts of pleasure, immerse ourselves in sense, and lay asleep all our superior and intellectual powers. This is the life of the most part of mankind. The human, rational life is when by the pure efforts of natural reason, and the mere effects of self-love we sacrifice all the grosser passions to more refined ones, fulfill all the social duties from a principle of self-love, as conducive to our interests, and glory, without referring them to God, or practising them from a desire of resembling him. Tho' all those seemingly heroic virtues be empoisoned by self-complacency, and very oft transformed into self-idolatry; yet this is that rational, philosophical life which very few men attain to. The divine life is that by which the soul yielding to the attraction

of the Father, enlightned by the eternal Word, and animated by the Holy Ghost, dies to the creatures, and to self, and follows the laws of eternal order, by the pure love of perfection, and a desire of the divine resemblance. This is that new life to which fewer yet, yea almost none at all arrive during this mortal state. The Pagan philosophers had the same ideas as we shall see in the second Part, when they said that we must first cease to be Beasts, then become Men, and at last Gods, by a participation of all the deiform virtues.

C O R. III.

Hence we have a new proof of the doctrine of PRE-EXISTENCE. It is impossible that souls who have lived for the most part in a state of innocence and purity, at least as much as human frailty permits, could pass through and be condemned to such inward martyrdoms, and outward sufferings, unless they had sinned in a state antecedent to their natural birth. It is far more impossible, that souls created pure and immediately infused into mortal bodies could want such crucifying purifications, and cruel tribulations to prepare them for a celestial state. There is and can be no solution of this strange, foreign, and uncouth phenomenon of providence but by supposing a pre-existent state wherein souls sinned voluntarily, and thereby contracted a radical corruption that cannot be cured and removed but by such direful pains and expiatory sufferings.

C O R. IV.

Hence we have a full proof of the doctrine of Purification in a middle state after death; of which as we shall see hereafter, the Pagans themselves had some idea transmitted by tradition from Noah. When we consider the infinite sanctity of

the divine nature, that can receive nothing into union with it, but what is perfectly pure: the great agonies, pains and martyrdom by which we must come to this perfect purity; and the boundless goodness of the Father of spirits, that cannot reject any soul that has the least tendency to him; from these three principles follows a fourth, that many souls die in dispositions of grace, and desire to be reunited to God, that are incapable of this union because not perfectly purified, and therefore they must undergo the remains of this purification in a middle state, e're they can be admitted to the beatific vision. The reason why men resist the force of this demonstration is because they have no just ideas of the divine purity, nor of the profound corruption of human nature. It is not enough to believe the mysteries of our Saviour speculatively. We must all pass through the states he underwent, 'be made conformable to him in his death, partake of his sufferings, and know the power of his resurrection.' This operation is long and painful, and how few are there, that look upon it as the only thing necessary.

P R O P O S I T I O N LIV.

The continual practice of prayer, mortification, and self-denial produce necessarily in the soul a perfect tranquillity, and all the virtues that reconcile man with himself.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

Internal tranquillity is the noble liberty of a soul deliver'd from all the useless activities of the understanding, and all the

irregular desires of the will which disturb the true exercise of its intellectual powers (a); the continual practice of prayer, mortification, and self-denial deliver us from all the useless activities of the understanding, and all the irregular desires of the will that disturb the true exercise of its intellectual powers (b): therefore the proposition is manifest.

S C H O L I U M.

Man by the fall is become an enemy to himself: that creature which loves itself with passion shuns itself with care, and cannot support the lingering torment of its own society. Depriv'd of its true and sovereign object, it feels nothing within itself, but an immense void, and an inexhaustible fund of misery. The mind is continually agitated like a tempestuous ocean with trifling ideas, wandring imaginations, and incongruous phantoms. The heart is torn to pieces by false fears, false hopes, and yet falser loves. All the efforts man makes abroad to amuse and please himself, are to hinder him from feeling this mighty void within. So soon as he turns himself to his infinite object, he begins to reconcile himself with himself. Cured of wild ambition, impure lust, cruel hatred, dire vengeance, impetuous wrath, black envy, tormenting jealousy; freed from all the irascible and concupiscible passions, he feels inward peace, serenity, and joy. By degrees the noise of sense and imagination cease, as does the tumult of false reasoning, the enchantments of passion, the itch of curiosity, and all the inquietudes of self-love. The soul enters by little and little into the spiritual rest and sabbath of the Lord; where in

(a) Def. 5. of this book. (b) Cor. 2. of Prop. LII.

imitation of its supreme original, external activity does not hinder repose within. What can disturb the peace of a soul, that quietly receives from the hands of God every thing that happens; that adores the infinite power, wisdom, and goodness which orders or permits all human events; that looks upon life as a dream, the earth as an exile, heaven as its country, and the infinite being as its only object; that lives continually in the divine presence, while it breathes, desires, and loves nothing but the accomplishment of the divine will in all things? Prosperity cannot elevate such a man, nor adversity crush him. He makes use of the one to shew his beneficence, and of the other to give an example of patience. He suffers, but he loves to suffer in imitation of our great Model; and knows that expiatory pains, crosses and misfortunes are absolutely necessary to purify, detach, and divinize the soul.

C O R. I.

Hence Christianity is the true road to happiness in this life, as well as in the next; because it produces in us not the Stoic apathy, which is impossible, and would be inhuman; but a perfect submission to the divine will. The Christian philosopher regulates his passions, but he is not insensible; he vanquishes them, but he feels them. True virtue rectifies nature without destroying it.

C O R. II.

Hence all those who do not feel this peace of mind, inward serenity, and joy in the Holy Ghost are yet novices in the spiritual life, or unfaithful to the divine inspirations. They torment themselves with vain reflections upon what is past; with anxious precautions about what is to come, and do not

know how to enjoy the actual moment in the divine presence as the best and properest that could befall them, since all is ordered and regulated by unerring wisdom and paternal goodness. Prayer, mortification and self-denial; faith, hope, and charity cure all those foolish inquietudes and reflections, either about this or the other life.

P R O P O S I T I O N L V.

The continual practice of prayer, mortification and self-denial produce in the soul all the social virtues.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

The order, happiness, and safety of human society, consist in the practice of perfect veracity, uncorrupted justice, and universal beneficence (a); the continual practice of prayer, mortification, and self-denial produce perfect veracity, uncorrupted justice, and universal beneficence (b): therefore the continual practice of prayer, mortification, and self-denial produce in the soul all the social virtues.

S C H O L I U M.

The divine man, as Plato says, produces, not the shadows of virtue, but the virtues themselves; and practises all the social and civil duties in a constant imitation of the divine veracity, goodness and justice. He is not only sincere in never saying but what is true; but he is also simple and candid to that degree that he does homage to truth, when necessary, at

(a) Ax. 4. of this book. (b) Cor. 3. of Prop. LII.

the expence of his own self-love. Thus he becomes a stranger to himself, thinks seldom of himself, and talks yet seldom of himself, unless the love of truth demands it; and then he speaks of himself as of a third person, without any regard to praise or blame, to applause or condemnation. He is not only sincere, but also simple with prudence and precaution. SINCERITY never says nor shews WHAT IS NOT: SIMPLICITY, a far more noble and exalted virtue, says and shews WHAT IS, without vanity, affectation or self-love. The regenerated man enamour'd with the beauty of truth feeds upon it WITHIN, and does not affect to dazzle, overpower, and shine in company, to shew his wit, and display his talents. He speaks only to discover truth, and discovers it only to make it be loved. He proportions it however to the capacity of those whom he instructs, and insinuates it into their minds so delicately and imperceptibly, that their self-love is not offended. He knows that all men are not capable of the same lights; that all truths are not equally useful; that some would be very dangerous; and that the various distempers of the mind, like those of the body, are not to be cured by the same universal remedy; wherefore he does violence to no man, affects not to make profelytes, does not erect wisdom into a Pharisaical scheme for a sect, and has no false zeal of reducing others to his way of thinking. Persuaded that God alone can enlighten the understanding and change the heart, he tolerates all men, as God tolerates them; and yet without deeming all indifferent, doubtful or lawful. Fill'd with one desire, one object, and one love; he reduces all his speculations, studies, and sciences to one great principle,

which is the knowledge and love of eternal order. Thus he knows how to give every truth its due place, and to distinguish betwixt the central and circumferential ones, the forms and the substances; the spirit and the letter; the symbol and the thing signified; the nearer and remoter means, or the essential and accessory helps; the opinions and the doctrines; what is commanded, and what is only tolerated. All his thoughts are thus regulated by the laws of eternal and immutable order.

The sovereign love of justice produces in him all noble sentiments and heroic virtues. He gives not only to every man his due; but he sacrifices himself, and divests himself of all, when the love of justice demands it. He does not look upon himself as an independent being made for himself alone; but as a member of that universal republic of which God is the common head and father. He fulfills thereby the laws of nature and nations, prefers always public to private interest, and never seeks his particular good, but in the general good of the whole, or in so far as it is compatible with the laws of eternal order. He loves his family more than himself, his country more than his family, human kind more than his country, the totality of beings more than the human species; and the Being of beings more than all his creatures. In whatever state he is, therewith he is content, knowing that all is regulated by the laws of eternal wisdom and goodness. He envies no man, covets nothing, jealousy has no empire over his soul. He sees in others talents, virtues, and perfections, honours, riches, temporal and intellectual advantages with pleasure, complacency and joy, as if he possessed them himself; because he

looks upon all as the wise dispensations of an unerring wisdom, that regulates all with number, weight and measure. He loves the employment that providence has given him, and strives therein to excell, by all the means that are conformable to justice. If he be a king or a prince, he exerts the duties of that station without affecting the virtues of a retired and obscure life. If he is a statesman or a magistrate, he founds all his politics upon justice; and pursues his ends without the low, vulgar artifices of a little mind. If he be a general of an army or a soldier, he looks upon himself as the executor of divine justice by war; but he banishes all private views, false glory, unbridled ambition, barbarous cruelty and unjust exactions. His courage is invincible because he looks upon life as a dream, and rejoices when providence orders him to quit this dark prison of flesh, and tragical theatre of life, by the noble sacrifice of himself for his country. If he is preferred to ecclesiastical employments, he looks upon himself as a physician of souls, and endeavours to cure their errors and vices, not by authority, which over-powers without conviction, but by soft persuasion which gains the heart. If he be born in a state of dependence, he is content with his humiliation, indigence and poverty, as the means chosen by God to expiate his sins, and purify his heart, detach him from life and give him strong desires to return to his celestial country. In short in whatever state he is, he fulfils all the duties of it, as other men do, but from a nobler and purer principle.

The beneficent, universal goodness of such a man, is an imitation and emanation of the divine bounty. He is no lon-

ger dried up nor contracted by the capricious inequalities or false delicacies of self-love. He bears all, suffers all, supports all, sympathizes with all; knowing that the world is a great hospital, wherein every man has his particular disease. He is severe to himself alone, and tender toward others. He does not exaggerate their faults, is not easily shocked with their weaknesses, has no bitter zeal against them, and never looks upon them in a false light, to criticize and oppose what is disagreeable and defective in their character. He studies the dispositions, humour and capacities of every one, in order to accommodate himself to all. He weeps with these that weep, rejoices with those that rejoice, and if natural talents be join'd with supernatural graces, he rises up to the highest, descends to the lowest, and proportions himself to all; not to flatter, to deceive, to become the idol of men, and make them subservient to his passions; but to tame and reform them, and make them at once happy and virtuous. His politeness is a continual self forgetfulness, and a perpetual sacrifice of his own will. This amiable quality in him becomes a divine virtue, and a daughter of charity. It consists not in outward forms, and demonstrations of civility; but in an inward sweetness of soul that makes him please without adulation, falsehood, or affectation. He affects no outward harsh austerity of manners, he enters into the innocent joys of others, contributes to their harmless pleasures, and endeavours to amuse them out of charity, thereby to soften and mitigate the chains of their exile, without abandoning himself to false joys, impure delights, and inordinate transports. Like our great Model, he knows no other vengeance, but that of doing good for evil,

and punishing only to amend. Thus he renders himself independent of the passions of men, and tastes within himself the noble pleasure of making them repent of their injustice, by the effects of his beneficence and generosity. He therefore pardons all private and personal injuries, that do not authorize the violation of public order; for when they do, he can be piously brave, disarm imperious pride, and bridle impetuous passion, with cool blood and a calm undisturb'd mind. Such is the true sage who regulates his thoughts and desires by the noble principles of prayer, mortification and self-denial, of faith, hope, and charity.

C O R. I.

Hence Christianity ensures, purifies, exalts, and divinizes all the common, civil, and social virtues. It makes us act as other men do in external appearance, but by a divine principle within. It is not interest, vanity, nor the idolatrous love of self, that is the source and spring of our conduct, but a living principle of pure, unspotted charity, and a sincere desire to imitate the divine perfections.

C O R. II.

Hence Christianity not only purifies, and divinizes the common, ordinary virtues of civil society, but it discovers and cures all the refined vices of self-love. Some men appear void of this secret passion, because they cunningly hide it. They unite all the different sorts of self-love; yet they so moderate the one by the other, that they sacrifice none, and gratify all by turns. A refined, delicate, and artful self-love shews its wit, its science, its virtues with so much precaution that it eclipses none, outshines none, and irritates no man's self-love

by too great an ostentation of its own excellency. This secret, self-idolatry feeds and fattens itself by outward mortifications, popular virtues, and seemingly disinterested sentiments, which are indeed disengaged from all low, mercenary views, but full of spiritual pride. This self-idolatry is a continual usurpation upon the divine rights, a hidden robbery of what belongs to God alone; an imitation of the sin of the fallen cherubims, who fail'd in the great law of self-disappropriation, and so became devils. Divine charity alone can cure the soul of this refin'd diabolical vice, by a true, generous, exalted self-forgetfulness.

GENERAL SCHOLIUM.

The great truths contained in the four preceding propositions, are the best preservatives against enthusiasm of all kinds. Enthusiasm is a full persuasion that God inspires us, while it is imagination alone that deludes us. It comes generally from an excess of spiritual pride and self-love, which make men fancy themselves more enlightned and more virtuous than others. It either attaches itself to its own wild notions and Phariſaical sentiments, as the standards of truth and holiness; or goes out of its proper station, under a specious pretext of enlightning and reforming others. When once it wanders thus out of itself, it disturbs the world with its infectious contagion, disturbs both human and sacred societies; and according to the natural temper and complexion, and station of the persons it smites, begets bitter disputes or cruel wars. When it seizes upon men of a melancholy, vicious humour, it produces raptures, extasies, visions, quakings, agitations, epileptic fits, convul-

sions, and other strange phenomena accompanied with extravagant, blasphemous pretensions to be the Messias, the Paraclet, Elias, the last and greatest of all the prophets. When it impregnates fiery, hot, choleric complexions, it fills the mind with spiritual passions, blind zeal, violent animosity, devout hatreds, direful persecutions, and proud revolt. When it inflames a sanguine, lively, vigorous constitution, it very oft begins with the spirit and ends with the flesh. It pretends at first to enlighten, reform and spiritualize its disciples, but by degrees it degenerates into impurity, and lewdness. Thus in all ages, religions and countries, enthusiasm has hatched and brought forth fanatics of all kinds; false prophets among the Jews; Pythonissian furies among the Pagans; Montanists and Manicheans among the first Christians, and in later times, Beguardi in Spain, Anabaptists in Germany, false Quietists in Italy, Convulsionaries in France, and Quakers in England.

A soul that lives in the continual practice of the virtues above-mentioned, of prayer, mortification and self-denial, can fall into none of these excesses. These divine virtues furnish not only spiritual, but even natural cures to enthusiasm. True inward recollection and prayer keep the mind in a constant equable temper; submitted to the divine will in all things, and so preserves the natural vigour of reason; yea by an intimate sense of the divine presence, a central tendency to our first principle, and a peaceful exposition of our dead, dark, and disordered faculties to him that is all life, all light, and all love. We thus exalt and sublimate our natural powers, become masters of imagination, and put to silence by degrees all its im-

petuous fallies, and emotions. By temperance, mortification and abstinence from all corporeal delectations that inflame the concupiscible appetites; from all useles amusements that augment our union with terrestrial objects; and from all spiritual ambition that exhaust and weaken the natural constitution by self-destructive austerities, we come to prevent, diminish or cure all the excesses of a sanguine, melancholy and choleric temper. By true self-denial, profound humility, and inward disappropriation, we die to all ideas of self-excellency, to all desire of singularity, vain-glory and pre-eminence above others, and to every thing that tends to attract the eyes of men toward our own persons. A man that lives thus in a continual practice of faith, hope, and charity has no attachment to his own opinions, ideas, or speculations how sublime soever. He proposes them without presumption, ostentation or obstinacy; always self-diffident, docil, and submissive to those that have superior lights. Far from thinking himself fully regenerated, arrived to perfection, and capable to reform others, he looks upon himself with a generous contempt, yea very oft with self-abhorrence, because he is filled with the justest ideas of THE ALL OF GOD, and THE NOTHINGNESS OF THE CREATURE, of the wonderful extent and purity of the divine law, and of his continual deficiency in respect of its exalted precepts.

P R O P O S I T I O N LVI.

The three remote, external, accessory means of re-uniting the soul to God are scriptures, churches, and sacraments.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N .

Remote and accessory means of re-uniting the soul to God are such external helps as are useful, tho' not absolutely necessary (a); eternal providence knows, wills, and employs all the means necessary to lead his intelligent creatures to their ultimate end and supreme happiness (b); some men by their situation and circumstances necessarily remain in a perfect ignorance of scriptures, churches, and sacraments (c): therefore scriptures, churches, and sacraments, can only be remote, external, and accessory means of re-uniting the soul to God.

P R O P O S I T I O N LVII.

The internal graces necessary to enlighten, enliven, cure, purify and restore lapsed beings, are universal, unlimited, and refused to none of the lost sons of Adam.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N .

In all times, in all places, and in all circumstances, almighty providence enlightens every man that comes into the world, and refuses to none of his creatures fallen or unfallen, all the helps and means necessary to conduct them to, and confirm

(a) Def. 8. of this book. (b) Prop. XXV. (c) Ax. 5. of this book.

them in the knowledge and enjoyment of their ultimate and supreme happiness (a); the immediate, internal and necessary means of salvation are all these operations by which God acts directly upon the soul to enlighten, enliven, cure, purify and restore lapsed beings (b): therefore the internal graces necessary to enlighten and enliven, cure, purify, and restore lapsed beings, are universal, unlimited, and refused to none of the lost sons of Adam.

S C H O L I U M.

The eternal Father of spirits who is present every where, who loves essentially all his creatures, who made them only to be happy, in the contemplation and love of his boundless perfections; who knows, wills, and employs all the means necessary to re-establish lapsed beings without forcing their liberty, and whose mercies endure for ever, must certainly watch over them continually by his almighty providence, and give them exterior helps and inward succours to cure, purify, and deliver them from their corruption and misery. Some countries are blest with the extraordinary privileges of supernatural revelation, become the seats of the visible church, and enjoy all the advantages that are to be found within the sacred pale: but while God thus favours with special graces, some particular nations, he does not forget the rest of mankind. He speaks to them externally by the works of the creation, which manifest his power and Godhead, and within them by the voice of uncreated wisdom which teaches all that listen to it, the precepts of the eternal law. The prodigies

(a) Cor. I. of Prop. XXV. (b) Def. 7. of this book.

which the Messias works within us, are no less miraculous than those which he wrought without us. The light that enlightens every man that comes into the world refuses his preventing graces to none. All-watchful providence and universal grace overlooks none of the lost sons of Adam. God places every one of them in the state, circumstances, time, and place that is most proper and conducive to his great designs. Nothing happens by hazard. All is regulated with number, weight and measure. While he adjusts thus all external circumstances, wisdom knocks within at the doors of the heart, prevents souls by his salutary admonitions, interior remorse, and divine attractions, and neglects no means of converting and transforming their corrupt and degenerate natures. He pursues them continually through all the dark paths of error and vice in order to cure, purify, and restore them. He enlightens their understandings and excites their wills, by his preventing graces, antecedent to all merit in them. He adds new graces to the first if they be faithful, and so conducts them by degrees from light to light, and from virtue to virtue, till they arrive freely at the end of their creation. All these truths are natural and necessary consequences of God's design in creating, which was to make all intelligences happy, and of his paternal love for all that he has made.

In these last and dangerous times, Christians have rejected this admirable doctrine of universal grace, and are fallen precisely into the same error with the Jews. That gross, stupid, and ungrateful nation sometime before our Saviour's first coming, imagin'd that God neglected and despised all other nations; and because they were the only depositaries of the sa-

cred oracles of heaven, fancied that God had for ever abandoned the rest of mortals, and that he was not the common Father of spirits. The schoolmen in these latter days before our Saviour's last coming have adopted the same Pharisaical prejudices.

As the design of this first Part is only to shew the reasonableness of the Christian doctrines by purely philosophical principles, without proving that they are supernaturally revealed; I shall not insist here upon the passages of the Old and New Testament that teach in the most express words the doctrine of universal grace, and the possibility of salvation out of the visible church. I refer all that I have to say upon this important subject to the second part of this Work, when I treat of the traditions of all nations both sacred and profane. There I shall shew (1) That there are many express formal texts that prove and confirm the universality of God's love for all his creatures without exception. (2) There I shall answer all the cavils of Judaizing Christians against this luminous and salutary doctrine. (3) There in fine I shall demonstrate by quotations made from the Pagans, the knowledge they had not only about the moral, but also the divine virtues of prayer, mortification and self-denial; faith, hope, and charity; and by these three proofs vindicate almighty providence from the partiality, injustice and cruelty with which it is chargeable according to the Predestinarian and Pharisaical schemes. Here it suffices to have shewn by the pure effort of reason that the doctrine of universal, internal, sanctifying grace is perfectly conformable to God's original design in creating, and to his paternal love for his creatures.

This doctrine of universal grace does no way favour the latitudinarian scheme which maintains that all sorts of religious worship, like those of civil government, are equally indifferent and countenanced by the King of kings; that both civil and ecclesiastical authority are mere effects of human policy, tho' wisely instituted to preserve order in sacred and civil society; that since God is infinitely exalted above all the little ideas we can have of him, and above all the imperfect homage we can pay to him, all religious principles and all sorts of worship are equally agreeable to him, providing we love him sincerely, which is the only worship he demands; that as the different flowers of a garden, the various forms of animals, and all the divers productions of nature, shew forth infinite power and wisdom by their wonderful beauties, proportions, and effects; so the different ways by which men of all nations, religions, and ages express their homage to God are equally agreeable to him, when they are all referred to him; and in fine that all the passages of scripture or of the fathers, which seem to contradict those maxims, have been inserted in these ancient records and annals of religion, during the dark times of Christianity, by cunning priests, that intended to enhance the credit and establish the despotic power of the clergy.

But if it can be demonstrated to every attentive and religious mind, that God has inspired men to write the sacred oracles, and by them instituted a sacred worship, and consecrated an order to interpret the one, and administer the other, then the latitudinarian scheme is dangerous as it tends visibly to lead men to despise all churches, scriptures and sacraments, to set Paganism and Mahometism upon a level with Christianity,

and to open the sluices to a criminal indifferency for all holy ordinances and positive laws. There is an obvious medium betwixt maintaining that the three external means of salvation are altogether usefess, and the maintaining that they are absolutely necessary. There is a wide distance betwixt maintaining that God independent of all external means may act without them, and that we may despise and neglect them when known and established. In fine, there is an obvious middle scheme betwixt maintaining that in all nations, ages and religions God may preserve holy souls from the contagions of damnable error, idolatry and superstition; and maintaining that all outward means are pure human inventions, not instituted by God. Whosoever does not see the difference of these two extremes does not reason philosophically, and is carried away by prejudices, passion, and partiality.

C O R. I.

Hence it follows that nothing is more dangerous than the narrow, contracted scheme of the Pharisaical doctors, who assert that the three external means of salvation are not only usefully, and wisely instituted by God; but at the same time so absolutely necessary, that without them there is and can be no salvation. This doctrine throws a dark vail upon all the oeconomy of providence: because if scriptures, churches, and sacraments were absolutely necessary, then God would be unjust, cruel and partial in not vouchsafing them to all nations equally. The latitudinarian heresy is less injurious to the Deity than this narrow, contracted, Pharisaical scheme. The former attacks the sovereign wisdom of God, who has an absolute power to judge of, and establish what outward means

he thinks most proper to purify and reunite souls to himself: but the latter impeaches all the moral attributes of God; his veracity, his justice and goodness, who declares in many places of scripture, 'that he loves all his creatures,' that 'he desires the salvation of all,' that 'he enlightens every man that comes into the world,' and that he refuses his graces to none, while at the same time he leaves the most part of mankind in an invincible ignorance of the only means of salvation, and debars them from all possibility of knowing these absolutely necessary succours.

C O R. II.

Hence this glorious doctrine of universal grace may serve to extirpate and throw out of the sacred pale all the tares sown in the field of the Lord, by the Predestinarian sect; the most of whose fatal errors come from confounding what is said in scripture of the particular, extraordinary, external advantages granted to the visible church, with the universal, unlimited, internal graces refused to no mortal. It is because of these low, narrow, pitiful ideas of the Predestinarian and Pharisaical doctors, that the incredulous Free-thinkers cry out, that the whole system of the Old and New Testament tends to degrade the divine nature, and represent God as a topical tutelary Demon of one or two countries, or a partial, capricious tyrant, that dotes upon a small portion of his creatures, while he abandons all the rest to ignorance, vice and eternal misery.

P R O P O S I T I O N L V I I I .

God will at last pardon and re-establish in happiness all laps'd Beings.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N .

God's ultimate design in creating finite intelligences could only be to make them eternally happy in the knowledge and love of his boundless perfections (a); almighty power, wisdom, and love cannot be eternally frustrated in his absolute and ultimate designs (b): therefore God will at last pardon and re-establish in happiness all lapsed beings.

S C H O L I U M .

If any portion of lapsed beings are to be eternally miserable, this must either come from the nature of the creature that is absolutely unconvertible; or from the nature of God that is unappeaseable. The creature can never be unconvertible for three reasons.

1. Finite weakness cannot for ever surmount and resist infinite power. Free intelligences may indeed resist for a time, but God would not have an absolute empire over the heart, yea he would cease to be omnipotent if he could not at last reduce the most rebellious creatures without doing violence to their liberty. The Predestinarians deny God's infinite goodness when they maintain that God could but would not convert them. The Socinians deny his infinite power, when they maintain that he would but cannot convert them;

(a) Prop. XXIV. (b) Cor. 3. of the same Proposition.

and so will be obliged one day to annihilate all reprobate spirits.

2. Created intelligences who have an insatiable thirst of happiness, cannot for ever prefer by their own choice, what produces eternal misery to what produces eternal happiness, nor love evil for itself. In a state of damnation they must one day feel and see that there is no resource, no remedy, no end of their misery, so long as they resist. If they continue then their resistance by deliberate, free choice; they must love evil as evil; evil for itself; evil where there is and can be no appearance of good, which is absolutely impossible (a).

3. If God had foreseen that the most part of lapsed intelligences would be eternally inconvertible, and thereby miserable, he would never have created them. To give them existence, knowing the everlasting abuse they would make of their liberty, was not only contradicting the great designs he had in creating them, but also an act of the highest cruelty. If God had consulted them before their fall, they would rather have chosen annihilation than eternal misery; because a creature that loves itself necessarily cannot prefer being to well-being. When we consider therefore the nature of the creature, all conspires to prove that no finite intelligence can be for ever inconvertible.

The divine nature cannot be unappeasable for the following reasons. 1. Wise and good legislators have no vindictive wrath, nor implacable aversion to the most execrable malefactors. They hate the crime without hating the criminal. They punish only to prevent the one or correct the other. If

(a) Cor. 2. and 3. of Prop. XXX.

If the torments of the damn'd be eternal, God can have none of these two views. Instead of correcting damn'd spirits, his punishments serve only to confirm them in their vicious habits and hatred of God. Instead of putting an end to their crimes, eternal pains will but augment despair, rage, aversion to God, and blasphemy.

2. If the divine nature was unappeaseable, wherein could his goodness consist? How could his mercy be said 'to prevail over all his works?' All grant, and the scripture says expressly, that the number of the elect is small, yea very small in comparison of the number of the damn'd. Now wherein does the mercy of God appear, if the most part of fallen spirits be eternally miserable? This is infinitely more absurd than if we should say that a king is a good, humane, and merciful prince, because he rescues four or five criminals, while he condemns thousands, yea innumerable millions of his subjects to racks, slow tortures, and languishing pains. This however would be much less cruel than the conduct of God who continues his punishments eternally, without any view of extirpating crimes or reforming the criminal.

3. This doctrine of God's being unappeaseable destroys at once all our ideas of his most perfect distributive justice. There is no attribute of which men have falser ideas than of divine justice. They fancy that it is an attribute of God which obliges him by necessity of nature to torment for ever and pursue with implacable vengeance beings that are criminal. This is again humanizing the Godhead. Justice is that perfection in God, by which he endeavours continually, to make all intelligences just, as goodness is that attribute in God, by which

he endeavours to make them all happy. Now these two perfections are one and the same in the infinite Being; tho' their effects be different, according to the nature of the subject upon which he exerts them. We have already demonstrated that all the communicable perfections of the Godhead are reducible to three, POWER, WISDOM, and GOODNESS. Now since all the active attributes of the Godhead, power, life, and force are the same, and since all his intellectual attributes wisdom, light, and truth, are the same; it follows by the rules of analogy that all his moral attributes, goodness, love and justice are the same. God punishes therefore only to purify; he chastises only in order to reclaim; he wounds by physical evil that he may cure moral evil. He shews his essential love of justice and holiness, by doing all that he can to destroy what is contrary to these attributes. Supposing however that these perfections were distinct in their cause as in their effects; yet since all the divine attributes act in, with, and by each other, they can never be separated, they are never incompatible; and therefore God's justice is always accompanied with goodness and love; his punishments must be cures, and his most terrible judgments remedies.

4. It is true that God is represented in scripture as vindictive and revengeful, as he to whom alone vengeance belongs; as a consuming fire; as punishing with fury, anger, and hatred. But unless we suppose that his perfections are incompatible, and mutually destructive of each other, we must allow that all these expressions signify only that God is an irreconcilable enemy to vice; that there can never be any alliance betwixt holiness and sin; purity and corruption, order and disorder; and

not that he ceases to be eternal love and essential goodness. Tho' he hates the crime, yet he loves the criminal; and so long as he is convertible, God must be appeaseable; otherwise we might conceive a greater goodness than his, and so his benevolence would not be infinite. Vindictive justice therefore is that attribute in God, by which he pursues vice with all sort of torments till it be totally extirpated, destroy'd, and annihilated; yea this revenging wrath is an emanation and a necessary branch of God's distributive justice, which is that attribute in God by which he proportions the rewards and punishments, the happiness and misery of all his creatures, to their dispositions of fidelity or infidelity; to the degrees of their co-operation or resistance. Thus there is not one saint in heaven, nor one devil in hell, but what is beatified or punish'd according to the laws of the most exact equity. Distributive or vindictive justice consists then in this admirable proportion, and not in that cruel enmity and aversion, by which God is represented as hating the criminal for ever; and so defeating for ever the design he had in creating, ceasing to be essential goodness and love, neglecting to destroy injustice, and voluntarily leaving lapsed beings in a state of rebellion, unholiness and injustice. According to this inhumane doctrine of the schoolmen God must either be impotent, so that he cannot convert the creature, or must love eternal disorder, since he will not employ almighty power to destroy it. In both these senses the doctrine of eternal punishments is a disguised Manicheism, and supposes that the evil principle is co-eternal with God, since it is indestructible.

The schoolmen will say that as God's rewards are eternal,

so his punishments ought to be; that tho' sin be finite as to its duration, yet the offence being committed against an infinite object, its punishment must be infinite in duration or eternal. All this reasoning proceeds from false ideas of God, as an arbitrary legislator, making positive laws, and promising rewards, or threatening punishments to those that obey or disobey, in order to enforce his laws. This is false philosophy, and yet falser divinity. The eternal love of order is not an arbitrary law; it flows necessarily from the divine essence. All these that follow this eternal law must be happy; their reward is not arbitrary; God cannot but manifest his communicative goodness to creatures that love him. He can no more cease to beatify such beings, than the sun at noon can fail to enlighten eyes that open themselves to its influences. Neither are hell and damnation arbitrary punishments, they are natural and necessary consequences of our separation from God. So long as we resist the divine action in us, so long must they last: so soon as we yield to this action, they must cease. Moreover, it is humanizing and degrading the divine nature to suppose that he can be offended by our crimes, or glorified by our virtues. He interests himself, as I have already said, in one and the other only in so far as the former retard and the later advance the supreme perfection and happiness of our nature. When he is therefore represented in scripture as pleased, rejoiced and glorified by our virtues; or as angry, grieved and offended by our sins, all these are purely metaphorical expressions, which signify no more but the essential love God has for order; his infinite opposition to disorder, and the impossibility of reuniting to him any thing that

is impure. This is the last and most magnificent scene of providence; the utmost effort of omnipotence, far superior to creation; the highest demonstration of almighty wisdom, the tenderest effect of eternal love, and the noblest manifestation of the divine glory. Then we shall see that all the sufferings and torments of reprobate spirits were absolutely necessary to vanquish, extirpate and cure their corruption, and confirm them for ever and ever in the love of eternal order. Then universal harmony shall be re-establish'd never more to be interrupted, and nothing shall be seen, through all the regions of immensity, but God as he is, and nature as representative of him.

It was the ignorance of this glorious doctrine that made Spinosa fall into all his monstrous errors, without perhaps any design of becoming an atheist. He found it an establish'd maxim in the schools that moral and physical evil, sin and sufferings, vice and disorder were to be eternal. Now as he could not imagine that finite impotence could for ever resist infinite power, nor almighty wisdom be frustrated in his eternal designs, nor unbounded goodness love everlasting disorder; he chose to maintain that God acted by necessity of nature, rather than by free choice. Thus he was reduced by inevitable consequences to deny the culpability of the creatures; yea to assert that all the disorders, contradictions, and irregularities are necessary to the completion of the whole; that the perfection of God is to be measured by the extent of his power, and not by what feeble mortals call justice, wisdom and goodness: and in fine that all happens by an eternal, uninterrupted, necessary succession of causes and effects,

wherein one link cannot be altered, without reverſing the eternal laws of order, yea deſtroying the immutable eſſence of God. However monſtrous this doctrine be, yet, as we ſhall ſhew, it is far more excuſable than the Predeſtinarian ſcheme, which makes God malicious, cruel, and partial, by free choice and arbitrary decrees.

The only plauſible objection that can be made againſt this great truth of the final re-eſtabliſhment of all laſed beings, is that it is diametrically oppoſite to the holy ſcriptures, and to the conſtant deciſions of the Chriſtian church. As the deſign of this part is only to give the philoſophical reaſons of the truths therein contained, I ſhall refer the answers to theſe objections to the ſecond Part; where we ſhall ſhew that the opinion of eternal pains is no where taught in ſcripture; that the contrary doctrine is inſinuated, nay taught and inculcated in many texts both of the Old and New Teſtament; and in ſine that this ſacred, luminous truth was never condemn'd by any decree of the univerſal church.

C O R. I.

Hence the doctrine of the three ſtates of nature in general through all the ſphere of fallen ſpirits, is founded upon the ſublimeſt principles, and perfectly conformable to the wonderful plan of providence. The whole duration of thoſe angelical natures who have fallen ſince their firſt production, may be juſtly divided into an elevated, fallen, and re-eſtabliſh'd ſtate; a primitive, a corrupted, and a renew'd world; quite different from the three ſtates of the earth in particular which we ſhall examine in the next propoſition.

C O R. II.

Hence after the general re-establishment of all beings, all spirits celestial, terrestrial and infernal, will be admitted to the beatific vision, and enjoy by turns the essential and accessory felicity, the immediate view of the divine essence, and the full enjoyment of his created representations.

P R O P O S I T I O N LIX.

Before the general re-establishment, the earth and all its inhabitants are to be restored to their primitive, paradisiacal beauty, perfection, and happiness.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

After the general re-establishment of lapsed beings, all spirits celestial, terrestrial and infernal will be admitted to the beatific vision, and enjoy by turns their essential and accessory felicity (a); God dissipated the chaos after the defection of angels and formed the paradisiacal earth to be the habitation of souls that enjoy'd the accessory happiness, without being as yet admitted to the beatific vision (b); God's primitive, positive, ultimate and absolute designs cannot be eternally frustrated (c): therefore before the general re-establishment of lapsed beings, the earth and all its inhabitants are to be restored to their primitive, paradisiacal beauty, perfection and happiness.

(a) Cor. 2. of Prop. LVIII. (b) Cor. 5. of Prop. XLVIII. (c) Ax. 6. of this book.

S C H O L I U M.

This is that glorious reign of the Messiah with the just upon earth, which, as we shall shew in the second Part, is plainly and clearly revealed in scripture. We shall confine ourselves here to give the philosophical reasons of this glorious reign.

1. As in a paradisiacal state we were not yet admitted to the immediate vision of the pure Divinity: but the sacred humanity of the Logos conversed with men under a visible form; so during the state of the earth re-establish'd and restored to its primitive beauty; blest souls restored, purified, and delivered from all corruption and suffering; from all false love of the creatures and of themselves, from all moral and physical evil will see God-man face to face, enjoy all the pure and heavenly delights they would have enjoyed in paradise had they never sinned; and be confirmed for ever and ever in the permanent, immutable habits of pure love, e're they be admitted to the beatific vision. Thus the glorious reign of the Messiah upon earth will be a prelude to the eternal kingdom of the Father in heaven. It is of this glorious state of the church upon earth renew'd and re-establish'd that the most part of the magnificent prophecies of the Old Testament are to be understood, and not of the church militant during its present state of sufferings and combat, where the chaff is mixed with the good wheat, where the number of the corrupt is the greatest; and where the true kingdom of the Messiah is not and cannot be manifested.

2. As the earth has been for many ages a theatre of sin,

corruption, and misery, of moral and physical evil; it is just, conformable to the divine perfections, and agreeable to the analogy of faith, that the earth renew'd and purified by fire should be at last for many ages, a scene of holiness, perfection, and felicity, of unspotted innocence and consummate sanctity. This, as we have seen, was the primitive design of its formation after the fall of angels. Now sooner or later all God's absolute and ultimate designs must be accomplished, and cannot be for ever frustrated.

3. During this happy interval, the reprobates shut up in the abyss with the devil and his angels are to be radically purified and transform'd by infernal pains. Now it is impossible that these blessed spirits inflamed with divine love can become indifferent to the horrible sufferings of their fellow-creatures. They cannot on the contrary be absolutely and compleatly happy, while they see so many images of the Deity and children of the same father, exquisitely miserable, shut up in the abyss, and tormented with the devil and his angels. Their pure love for God, and for all created intelligences, must make them desire ardently to see the empire of the Most High totally re-establish'd, the usurpation of the creatures for ever destroy'd, and God recover his rights over all lapsed beings by their own free choice and perfect love.

C O R. I.

Hence we must not confound the three states of the angelical world or solar system, with the three states of the earth or the habitation of men; the primitive creation with the paradisiacal earth, nor the chaos, after the fall of angels, with the earth accursed after the fall of men; nor the glori-

ous reign of the Messiah, with the total restoration of all lapsed beings. The small portion of duration called Time, may be justly divided into an elevated, corrupted and renewed earth; a golden age, an iron age, and the return of justice. Thus sacred and profane tradition agree in the same essential truths, tho' painted forth under different images and allegories, as shall be fully unfolded in the second Part.

C O R. II.

Hence all these who maintain that the magnificent prophecies about the glorious state of the church are fully accomplish'd by the first coming of our Saviour, by the pomp, splendor, and riches of the Christian hierarchy are egregiously mistaken; confound the first with the second coming of the Messiah; his suffering state with his glorious reign; and the first fruits of his expiatory sacrifice, with the full completion of his triumphant victory. The changes that Christianity has made hitherto in the world do not answer the grandeur and magnificence of the prophecies, as shall be fully explained in the second Part.

P R O P O S I T I O N LX.

God did not divide the lost sons of Adam into two masses, of which the smaller and lesser, to whom alone he gives efficacious internal graces, were destin'd from all eternity to salvation; while the far greater and more numerous, to whom he refuses these efficacious graces, were abandon'd from the beginning to eternal perdition.

The internal graces necessary to enlighten, enliven, cure, purify, and restore lapsed beings are universal, unlimited, and refused to none (a); all lapsed beings will at last be pardoned and re-establiſh'd (b): therefore the proposition is manifest.

S C H O L I U M.

One of the greatest scandals that ever was brought upon Christianity, arises from the false opinions that have been spread abroad in the schools and among the vulgar about predestination and reprobation. All the other mysteries of faith have nothing so shocking; the doctrine of the Trinity and Incarnation seem incompatible with the ideas we have of God's unity and natural perfections; but the scholastic schemes of predestination and reprobation destroy all God's moral attributes. The former, as we have shewn, are only incomprehensible by reason; but the latter seem diametrically opposite to it.

We shall not enter here into an exact enumeration of all the different sects and sentiments of the Predestinarians; nor therefore examine the various systems of the Supra-lapsarians and Sub-lapsarians; of the Jansenists and Molinists, of the Fatalists and Congruists; of the Thomists and Augustinians, of the Calvinists and Remonstrants. We shall far less enter into the detail of all the little metaphysical quibbles, subterfuges, and refinements by which these different parties endeavour to palliate the consequences of their dangerous or at best very imperfect schemes; in order to reconcile the goodness

(a) Prop. LVII. (b) Prop. LVIII.

and knowledge of God with the freedom of man. We confine ourselves to shew wherein consists the essence and difference of the two principal systems of the rigid and mitigated Predestinarians.

The one pretends that antecedent to all prescience of merit, or demerit, God by a pure act of his absolute will, and sovereign dominion over the creatures, for reasons incomprehensible to mortals, divided from all eternity mankind into two masses; one destined to eternal happiness as monuments of his goodness; and the other to absolute eternal misery, for the glory of his justice. That to accomplish this end he so ordered their state that all men were involved in guilt and corruption, and out of this corrupt system he destined the smaller part to eternal life, and resolved to give them all saving and efficacious graces to accomplish inevitably his great decree of predilection: while he refused the same necessary and efficacious graces to the most part of men, and thereby abandon'd them to their natural corruption, and to all the fatal consequences of original sin. It will be very hard, yea absolutely impossible for these doctōrs to excuse the divine justice, and not to accuse God of the highest cruelty, yea of being the author of sin. They indeed deny these horrible consequences, and cry out O ALTITUDO! but this solves no difficulties.

The more moderate Predestinarians pretend that predestination is consequent to prescience; that it is nothing else but a preparation of all the means by which God accomplishes his decree of predilection to a little number, who he foresaw would correspond to his graces; that he refuses necessary succours to none of the lost sons of Adam, and so renders the sal-

vation of all possible; but he assures it only to the elect; that he could have given congruous and efficacious graces to save all, but that he would not do so for reasons incomprehensible; that tho' election be an effect of pure grace, and an absolute decree independent of all merit; yet reprobation is a mere effect of demerit, of obstinacy in sin, and final impenitence, to which God no way contributes, either by infallible prescience, or by any positive decree. This doctrine however mitigated seems to impeach the divine goodness, that could have saved all and yet would not do so. Here the defenders of this mitigated scheme like their rigid brethren resolve all into a mystery, and cry out also O ALTITUDO! without solving any objections.

There is no doubt a considerable difference betwixt these two systems; the former, as we have said, seems to destroy God's justice, and all his moral attributes; whereas the second seems only to bound his goodness: all however equally agree in the three following points. 1. That reprobation is to be eternal, the damned for ever unconvertible, God unappeasable; and infernal pains everlasting. 2. That all the virtues or vices, actions and passions, fidelity and infidelity, correspondence and resistance, that lead to salvation and damnation, were foreseen as infallibly, certainly, and inevitably future. 3. That the number of the elect and reprobate is so fix'd and immutable that not one can be added to, nor retrenched from that determinate number; and that the decrees of predestination and reprobation regard not dispositions and characters, but particular persons and individuals.

We have already shewn in speaking of the general re-esta-

blishment of all beings, that the first opinion is absolutely incompatible with all the moral attributes of God; and we shall shew in the second part that it has no foundation in scripture, yea that it is diametrically opposite to express revelation. We have also shewn in speaking of prescience that the second opinion is absolutely false, and a mere fiction of the schoolmen. We shall now shew that the third opinion is not founded in scripture, and that the doctrine of St. Paul insinuates no such predestination and reprobation of individuals. In order to clear up this important matter, we shall give here a short analysis of the epistle to the Romans, and especially of the eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh chapters, which are the citadels, and bulwarks of the predestinarian Fatalists. Before we enter upon this great and important subject, it is fit to premise some great principles that are uncontested by any parties.

1. If there be any expressions in scripture which seem clearly and directly opposite to the nature of God, or to other most express passages of holy writ, and to the whole analogy of faith, they are not to be explain'd in a strict, literal, obvious, and grammatical sense. Thus when hands, feet and human members; fury, wrath, hatred, vengeance, and other inhumane passions, are ascribed to God in scripture, they are not to be interpreted in a literal sense.

2. It is certain that all the Greek church and the most part of the Latin, that many of the Christian schools both of the Roman and Protestant communion; that the two most considerable and learned churches of the world, the church of Rome and the church of England have a sacred abhorrence of the rigid predestinarian scheme; and always interpreted the

darker expressions contained in this epistle to the Romans, of a predestination to grace and not to glory, of external succours that are altogether independent of all fidelity in the creatures, and not of absolute personal decrees that regard eternal life and misery.

3. St. Peter assures us (a) ' that in the epistles of St. Paul ' there are some things hard to be understood, which the un- ' learned and the unstable wrest to their own destruction.' This text makes some think that these expressions of St. Peter regard those passages wherein the apostle speaks of predestination and reprobation, and therefore that great care is to be taken not to explain them in a manner that destroys human freedom or the divine goodness, the culpability of the creature, or the sanctity of the Creator.

4. All grant that tho' predestination be a pure effect of God's gratuitous bounty; yet reprobation is a necessary consequence of the creature's obstinacy, corruption and voluntary malice. Predestination to eternal life is not an effect of merit, tho' reprobation be an effect of demerit. Predestination is a free act of God's communicative goodness as creation was. The creature by its fidelity can never merit the beatific vision; God has attached the one to the other by a free, generous beneficence; and we merit by our fidelity as the schools say NOT EX CONDIGNO, SED EX CONGRUO. Our free co-operation with divine grace is a purely occasional, and not a meritorious cause, as we have fully explained in talking of the nature of liberty. These great principles premised, we come now to the analysis promised.

(a) St. Peter II. ch. iii. 16.

The substance of the first chapter of the Romans is to shew, that the Pagans were not left without a sufficient knowledge of God, since his 'eternal power and Godhead were 'manifested to them by the external works of the creation,' and the inward inspiration of universal reason, 'or wisdom 'that enlightens every man that comes into the world; that 'they were inexcusable because knowing God, they did not 'glorify him as God, but changed the glory of his incorruptible nature into an image made like to corruptible man: 'and in fine that they were abandon'd to uncleanness, and 'the lusts of their own hearts, because they changed thus the 'truth of God into a lie;' attach'd themselves to the sign, forgot the thing signified, and so fell into gross idolatry.

In the second chapter St. Paul teaches that notwithstanding this corruption of the Gentiles, yet we ought not to judge them as altogether abandon'd of God, without any saving graces, because 'with God there is no respect of persons, that the Gentiles who have not the revealed law, have 'a law written in their hearts, which will accuse or excuse 'them in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men; 'that the uncircumcised may keep the righteousness of the eternal law, as well as the circumcised; that he is not a Jew, 'who is only so outwardly, nor is true circumcision that of 'the flesh; but he is a Jew who is one inwardly, and true circumcision is that of the heart.'

In the third chapter the sublime apostle teaches, that tho' the Jews have great advantages above the Gentiles, yet they are not really dearer to God than the Gentiles, since they are equally under sin, and since God is the common Father of

spirits and lover of souls; 'that by the works of the law no flesh shall be justified;' that is not by an exact observation of all the rites, ceremonies and sacraments of revealed religion, but by divine grace and saving faith, without the deeds of the law, 'because God is the God of the Gentiles, as well as that of the Jews.'

In the fourth chapter he shews that Abraham was not justified by works, or by an exact observance of the ceremonial law; but by FAITH; that is, not by a speculative belief of incomprehensible truths, 'for so the devils believe and tremble;' but by a perfect submission, sacrifice, and a total abandoning of himself to the divine will in all things, 'which was imputed to Abraham for righteousness, even before he was circumcised:' and that he received the sign of circumcision, as a seal of the righteousness which he had already while he was uncircumcised, that so he might be a common father of all truly spiritual believers, whether they be circumcised or not.

In the fifth chapter the great apostle shews the universal extent of divine grace; and that by the meritorious sacrifice of the Redeemer all the lapsed sons of Adam will at last be reclaim'd, recover'd, and re-established, because 'as by the offence of one man, judgment came upon all to condemnation, so by the righteousness of one, all shall one day receive the justification of life;' and as he says in another place (a), 'as in Adam all died, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.' This, as we shall shew in the second Part, is the burthen of St. Paul's song, and the substantial capital doctrine of all his

(a) 1 Cor. xv. 22.

epistles ; and especially the key to what he writes to the Romans.

In the sixth chapter, lest the Romans should abuse this doctrine of universal restitution, St. Paul teaches them that none can ever enjoy eternal life, nor be admitted to the beatific vision, but those that die to all created objects ; wherefore he says that we ‘ must be buried with Christ by spiritual ‘ baptism ;’ that we must be thoroughly cleansed, washed, and purified in the inward man ; ‘ that the old man must be crucified ; that the body of sin must be destroy’d ; that as Christ ‘ was raised up from the dead by the power of the Father, even ‘ so we must rise again to a new life ; otherwise we cannot enjoy the gift of God, which is eternal salvation.’

In the seventh chapter St. Paul says, that ‘ while men are ‘ in the flesh,’ under the bondage and slavery of corporeal objects, ‘ the passions work in our members the fruits of death, ‘ by the knowledge of the law that forbids us to follow those ‘ passions,’ because corrupt nature is violently inclined to every thing that is forbidden ; that till the law of love invest, transform and govern the heart, all external restraints are inducements to sin ; that tho’ ‘ the law in itself be holy, just, and ‘ good,’ yet while we remain under the power of corruption, ‘ in the spirit of the old man, the law appears a bondage and ‘ a slavery ;’ and in fine that the superior part of the soul which he calls the mind, the inward man, the pure spirit may be submitted to the law of God, to the law of love, while the inferior part, the senses, and the imagination, are exposed to the temptations, and assaults of sin, ‘ of this body of death, of ‘ the law in the members that wars against the law of the

‘mind.’ We come now to the four critical chapters where there are many things hard to be understood, and here our explications will be far more ample and extensive.

In the eighth chapter the apostle teaches that ‘there is no ‘condemnation to those that are in Jesus Christ:’ he speaks not of those that make an external profession of the gospel, that have received the baptism of water, that know the historical facts of the Bible, and that practise all the rites and sacraments of the new law; ‘but of those who walk not after ‘the flesh, but after the spirit; for if any man have not this ‘spirit of Christ he is none of his,’ tho’ he enjoy externally all the privileges, and know speculatively all the truths of the Christian law. The apostle adds ‘that we cannot be heirs ‘and joint-heirs with Christ, unless we suffer with him;’ that all the sufferings, pains and combats of our present state, ‘work ‘together for the good of those that love God; that all those ‘whom God foresaw would be faithful to this divine love, he ‘predestinated them to be conformed to the image of his Son; ‘that those whom he predestinated thus, he calls them by the ‘internal voice of his eternal wisdom, that can alone speak to ‘the heart; that those who hear and follow this inward call, ‘he renders them just,’ and those whom he ‘thus justifies’ or sanctifies, ‘them he also glorifies.’ And in fine, that by the power of divine grace which transforms the soul, consummates it in the divine unity, and makes us one with Christ, as he is one with the Father: all those who continue faithful to its sanctifying operations become so strong and fortified in the habits of good, that neither ‘death nor life, principalities ‘nor powers, nor any other creature can separate them from

' the love of God.' This sublime text explains only the order, oeconomy, and gradation of divine grace in purifying and restoring lapsed beings. God foresaw not in absolute, partial, personal decrees and predilections, but in the nature of free agents, when they fell from their primitive pre-existent state, all the different degrees of their corruption. He foresaw that those who would remain freely and voluntarily in it, could not be reclaim'd, but by future punishments; and so he predestinated all of this kind and character to be purified by infernal pains. He foresaw that if others surrendered themselves to his divine operations, that he could and would purify them throughly during this life. Those he predestinated by an immutable and universal law to be conformable to his only begotten Son; he foresaw that those who would thus conform themselves to Jesus crucified in his life, death, and sufferings, would hear his inward voice, inspirations, and invitations to die to self and all created objects; that those who followed this internal call, would be thereby purified, justified, sanctified and at last glorified; because in the order of grace, there is a necessary connexion betwixt these different shades and gradual operations. The apostle does not say one word of an eternal and infallible prescience of future contingencies; that is a contradiction in terms, incompatible with human liberty, and destructive of the divine goodness. The prescience here spoken of regards characters and not persons, dispositions and not individuals, the natural and necessary consequences of their free moral deliberations, and not those deliberations themselves, which God never foresees but as possible, contingent, and conditional, whether that condition be

expressed or not; as we have fully shewn in speaking about prescience. Far less does the sublime apostle speak here of arbitrary, partial, personal decrees, by which God predestinates only a little determinate number of individuals to salvation, and abandons all the others by name to their original corruption and its fatal consequences. These are two wild fictions of the schools, which have no foundation in the great apostle's doctrine, as will appear by the analysis of the two following chapters. We beg our readers to go on, and what St. Paul adds will fully explain what he has already said.

In the ninth chapter the apostle shews that the source of all the obstinacy, ingratitude, incredulity and cruelty of the Jews to our Saviour, was, their interpreting all the promises made to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob of a temporal kingdom, of a visible church, and of those that were born of Abraham according to the flesh: St. Paul proves on the contrary that those promises are to be understood of a spiritual Canaan, a spiritual kingdom, and a spiritual generation. To clear up this important truth, he shews that all the descendants of Abraham and Isaac according to the flesh, were not members of the visible church, tho' otherwise they were dear to God. Thus Ishmael and his posterity were the children of Abraham by corporal generation; yet they were not blest with the same external graces and advantages as the Jews: but this choice and predestination cannot regard eternal glory and happiness; since it is said elsewhere (a) ' that God so loved Ishmael that he wrought a miracle for his preservation; that his angel spoke from heaven to Hagar to comfort her, exhort her not to fear for her son, and to assure

(a) Gen. xxi. 17.

' her that he would make the lad a great nation, and that
 ' he would be with him;' tho' he lived in the wilderneck of
 Paganism; and tho' his posterity were to be deprived of all
 the privileges and advantages of the Mosaic law. St. Paul
 confirms this doctrine again by the example of Jacob and E-
 sau. They were both sons of Isaac according to the flesh;
 and ' yet it was said before the children were born long be-
 ' fore they did any good or evil' in this life, that God loved
 Jacob, who according to all interpreters represents the visible
 church, and that he hated Esau, who is a figure of the Gen-
 tiles, or Pagan nations: because he gave to the members of
 the visible church, all the advantages of the law, the prophets,
 and revealed religion: but he hated Esau or the Pagans; that
 is, he behaved to them externally as if he hated or neglected
 them, because he refused them those extraordinary privileges,
 and sublime advantages of reveal'd religion. This cannot be
 understood of a real hatred and eternal reprobation without
 rendering scripture contradictory to itself; since the Holy
 Ghost declares elsewhere ' that God is the lover of souls, and
 ' that he hates nothing that he has made;' and since St. Paul
 himself says in this same epistle to the Romans, that as to eter-
 nal life, and inward, saving, sanctifying graces ' God is no
 ' respecter of persons, that he is equally the God of the Jews
 ' and the Gentiles,' and in another epistle, ' that he desires
 ' the salvation of all, and that Jesus Christ died for all.' The
 Greek fathers seem to have understood this text much better
 than the Latins; the Greek fathers explain'd all St. Paul's
 reasonings in this chapter as relating to the external graces,
 and glorious privileges granted to the visible church; and not

of absolute decrees of predestination to eternal life. St. Paul continues to shew that God distributes these external favours, visible advantages, and outward graces, not according to the merit or demerit of creatures, their co-operation and fidelity, as he does his internal, sanctifying graces. ‘ It is not of him ‘ that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.’ The external favours, helps, and means of revealed religion are not dispensed according to the pious desires, activities, and virtues of men. Very oft the Pagans had more of those good desires, and humane virtues, than the Jews, who were the most perverse, and the most rebellious, of all nations. God distributes these outward favours, according to the profound impenetrable views and designs of his eternal wisdom. He sees what is most proper for the final, and total re-establishment of all the lost sons of Adam, and places every one of them in the state and circumstances that are most proper to accomplish in them his great plan; and therefore it is said, that as to these external graces and privileges, ‘ he hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and ‘ compassion upon whom he will have compassion:’ but as his wills are ever regulated by immutable wisdom, justice, and goodness; he has reasons known to himself, why he grants those privileges to some nations and refuses them to others. He sees that these external graces would be useless to some, and serve only to augment their ingratitude and obstinacy; and that they could not be reclaim’d by those outward means, helps, and ordinances. He makes others members of the visible church, because he sees that it is fittest for them, and that they will profit by these salutary succours. He leaves a third

fort of men in the bosom of Paganism without these advantages, because he knows how to supply them by his inward graces and operations. Those SOULS OF GOOD WILL are not deprived of revealed religion because God sees it would be uselefs; but because in the depths of his incomprehensible wisdom he knows how to supply the want of these external succours. All is regulated with weight, number and measure; and not one soul escapes the view of almighty love. This wonderful oeconomy of providence suited to the nature and dispositions of every creature and nation, will be one day a subject of surprize, adoration and love, when all the plan of providence shall be unveiled. To confirm what he has said of the inefficacy of all external privileges and graces, the apostle adds that prodigies, miracles, and all the most extraordinary effects of almighty power, far from converting, truly, serves sometimes to harden the heart. Thus he quotes the example of Pharaoh. Tho' that prince saw all the prodigies and miracles of Moses; yet he was not converted, but harden'd his heart, notwithstanding all the wonders of omnipotence. Then he adds this harsh and shocking expression which the Predestinarians have wrested to their own destruction, 'therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he wills he hardneth.' The meaning of this text cannot be that God hardens the hearts of men by a direct, immediate influence; or by the refusing his salutary graces, in order to make them criminal and inconvertible. Here the effects are put for the cause; and so the sense of this tremendous passage is, that 'the bad use we make of the external graces, serves to harden the heart, and make it

‘ more obstinate in its corruption.’ God never abandons us till we abandon him, and if he refuses external or internal graces it is because he sees they will not only be useless, but be pernicious to souls arrived to a certain pitch of voluntary rebellion, and perversity. He sees that their conversion and purification in this life is impossible, and that nothing can extirpate their profound corruption but infernal pains; and so he abandons them to the free exercise of their voluntary, deliberate malice in order to accomplish his wise, holy and great designs. This mysterious conduct of providence shocks very oft unthinking minds, and makes them say, If all this be so, if God distributes to some persons and nations external succours, graces, and means, which he refuses to others, ‘ why does he find fault with them?’ The apostle answers, ‘ O! man what art thou that repliest against God? shall the thing form’d say to him that formed it why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay to make one vessel to honour, and another unto dishonour.’ The meaning of this text cannot be that God by a pure act of sovereignty has a right to make some men vessels of honour, virtue, love and election, and others vessels of dishonour, vice, wrath and damnation. God has no right to make his creatures vicious, nor even to damn them eternally, whatever be their rebellion and wickedness, unless they become altogether unconvertible; because God has no right to deny his attributes, contradict his sanctity, become the author of sin, defeat his own end in creating, and cease to be eternal love. The predestinarian interpretation cannot then be the meaning of the text; otherwise it would be suspected of being interpolated and

foisted into the sacred oracles by the impious Fatalists of the dark and ignorant ages. The true meaning of St. Paul must be far more profound and worthy of God. He puts an objection in the mouths of those who complain of the unequal distribution of God's external graces, granted to some and refused to others. The apostle answers, that he will shew one day that as a wise potter he adorns according to his great plan some vessels with beautiful external forms, and leaves others without these comely ornaments, because he knows how to make use of the graceful and ugly vessels in his great work. He knows how to employ both revealed religion and the privation of it to gather together from the four corners of the world chosen souls of all nations. Some are blest with the glorious lights and privileges of the visible church; others are left in the bosom of Paganism: but God abandons none of them, till they abandon him. He will shew that he is the lover of souls, the Father of spirits; that he desires the salvation of all, and that he refuses his saving internal graces to none, tho' he seems to abandon some by refusing external aids to them. The apostle goes on to shew that both among the Jews and Gentiles, in and out of the visible church, ' God endures with much long suffering the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction,' by their voluntary deliberate abuse of all external and internal graces, and that can be reclaimed only by hell-torments. ' He will manifest also the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy not only among the Jews, but also among the Gentiles,' in the womb of the church, and the bosom of Paganism, ' whom he before prepared unto glory,' that is, during this mortal state of probation; not by ' predeterminating

‘decrees,’ but by preventing graces, and by his internal operations. Thus the prophet Hosea says, ‘that God will call ‘them his people that were not his people, and her beloved ‘that was not beloved, and these that were not my people, the ‘sons of the living God.’ This cannot be meant of the Gentiles to whom the gospel was promulgated soon after the first advent. Hosea in his prophecy speaks all along of what is to happen at the second advent, and the judgments that are to precede it. This text then must be understood of all the elect that are to inherit the glorious kingdom, and form at the last day a church without spot and blemish, ‘when all the children of Judah and all the children of Israel shall be gathered ‘together under one head(a)’ as the prophet adds in the same place. It is then that God will shew, that in the bosom of Paganism he had holy and pure souls, tho’ they were not members of the visible church. Then, continues the apostle, men shall see ‘that the Gentiles who followed not after righteousness attained to righteousness, even the righteousness which ‘is of faith;’ not a speculative faith by which the devils believe and tremble, but a saving, internal, sanctifying trust and confidence in, a total adherence and resignation to God’s internal graces, tho’ they did not follow the righteousness of the law, and were deprived of the sublime advantages of revealed religion. Men shall also see at the last day, ‘that Israel,’ or the members of the visible church, ‘that followed the law,’ and that observed the rites, ordinances, and sacraments of revealed religion, ‘attained not to the law of righteousness,’ to the spirit of the law which is love, ‘because they sought it not by

(a) Hosea i. 10, 11.

‘faith but by the works of the law.’ They sought not true righteousness and justice by an internal and total resignation of their powers to God, to be vivified, illuminated and actuated by his life, light, and love; but by an outward observation of external rites and ordinances, that can never justify. The apostle concludes this chapter by declaring that this doctrine of universal grace and salvation out of the sacred pale, ‘will be a stumbling-stone and a rock of offence laid in Zion,’ among the members of the visible church, the Pharisaical doctors and Judaizing Christians; ‘but that all those who believe it, shall not be ashamed.’ For the Greek word translated by the personal pronoun Him should be translated by the demonstrative one It.

In the tenth chapter the apostle shews that the zeal of the Jews was not according to knowledge; that not understanding wherein true justice and sanctity lay, they believed that it consisted in a faithful submission to, and practice of the rites and ceremonies of the ancient law, and in a speculative belief of its miraculous facts without entering into the spirit of it, and of the truths intended, and adumbrated by all its symbols and figures; that the righteousness of true saving faith lies in a belief of the heart, and in a total surrender of the soul to the illuminations of the eternal Word. Now tho’ this belief of the heart be not sufficient, unless we confess with the mouth the divine mysteries of revealed religion when they are revealed to us; yet to those who live and die in an invincible ignorance of these sacred truths, it suffices to believe with the heart, that is, to surrender ourselves to the purifying, illuminating operations of the eternal Logos. The reason St. Paul

gives for this doctrine is, that before God ‘ the Father of spirits, and the lover of souls, there is no difference betwixt ‘ the Jew and the Greek,’ between the members of the visible church and those that are not so; since ‘ the same God ‘ is the Lord of all and rich to them that call upon him’ not by the words of the mouth, but by the inward cry of the heart; whatever be their nation or religion, Jew or Gentile, Pagan or Christian; Mahometan or heretic. The apostle then proposes a difficulty, ‘ How shall the Pagans call upon him in ‘ whom they have not believed, and how shall they believe in ‘ him of whom they have not heard; and how shall they hear ‘ without a preacher; for faith comes by hearing and hearing ‘ by the word of God.’ Vulgar interpreters explain all this of the external promulgation of the gospel to the Jews: but it is manifest that this cannot be the sense of the text, for in the following verse the great apostle adds; ‘ Have they not heard? ‘ yes verily; their sound went forth unto all the ends of the ‘ earth, and their words unto the utmost extremities of the ‘ world.’ This, as we shall more fully demonstrate hereafter in the second Part, is a passage taken from the psalmist, wherein the royal prophet shews that God has manifested himself to all nations, either by the external voice of nature, or by the inward inspiration of his eternal wisdom. Now when St. Paul wrote this epistle four and twenty years after our Saviour’s death, it was absolutely false that the external preaching had been made to all the earth, and that it was gone forth to the ends of the world; for to this very day the far greater part of mankind in the several ages since the promulgation of the gospel, have not heard of it. But Judaizing Christians that

look upon the external favours granted to the visible church, as the only saving graces, interpret all of an outward conversion to the sacred worship and speculative belief of Christianity. The apostle adds that this doctrine of universal grace will irritate Judaizing minds. ‘ Moses says of them, I will provoke you to jealousy by them that are no people, and by a foolish nation I will anger you.’ This sublime doctrine of inward, saving graces granted to hidden souls left in the bosom of Paganism, idolatry, superstition, and error will incense the Pharisaical Christians as well as the incredulous Jews, when they hear that God is found of them that asked not after him, while he says of the chosen nation that had all the advantages of revealed religion, and to all the corrupt members of the visible church; ‘ all day long I have stretched forth my hands unto a disobedient and gainsaying people.’

In the eleventh chapter the apostle unfolds the whole mystery of universal grace and redemption. ‘ God, says he, hath not cast away his people;’ tho’ they be no more members of the visible church. ‘ He is still the God of the Jews as well as of the Gentiles;’ and all the posterity of those incredulous crucifiers of Jesus are not excluded from the effects of his bounty, nor from the operations of his internal graces, tho’ they are deprived of the outward and accessory means. For as God said to Elias of old when the Jewish church fell into an almost universal defection, ‘ I have reserved to myself hid and unknown seven thousand men that have not bowed the knee before Baal.’ Just so there is at present and has been in all generations ‘ a remnant according to the election of grace,’ that are chosen by the internal, saving, sanctifying

attractions of the Father, the illuminations of the Son, and the inspirations of the Holy Ghost, and not by their faithful observation of the external rites, sacraments and ordinances of the evangelical law: for otherwise grace would be no more grace; that is independent of all the external privileges and favours granted to the visible church, and antecedent to all the merits, activities and co-operations of the creature. Tho' then the most part of the Jews have not attained to the true righteousness of the law, which comes only by saving faith; yet the chosen faithful souls among them have and will obtain it; while the rest are blinded, not by previous, predeterminating, absolute decrees and preteritions, which render men blind, wicked and reprobate; but because they blinded themselves, by a false persuasion and confidence in the exact observation of the ceremonial law, which gives not the true spirit; and 'therefore God gave them up to a spiritual slumber and lethargy;' or rather they have fallen into it by their voluntary infidelity, obstinacy, and attachment to the letter of the law; so that 'they have eyes to see' the figure 'without knowing the reality, and ears to hear' externally but not to hear the voice within. 'They have not stumbled that they should fall,' as if God had denied them the graces necessary to prevent their defection; but he has permitted in the wise course of his providence, yea and ordained that they should cease to be the visible church, the depositaries of his sacred oracles, and the guardians of the true faith. By this transportation of the external means and graces from the Jews to the Gentiles, God's design is to excite the Jews to emulation and jealousy, that they may amend and reform. Their infidelity

is become a mean of light and salvation to the Gentiles. However if ' their rejection be the reconciling the world to ' God,' and the manifestation of divine truth to the Pagans, ' what shall their reviving be,' or their return to the visible church? it must be something more magnificent than what happened at the first promulgation of the gospel; and the establishment of a visible church among the Gentiles upon this corrupt, degraded earth: it must be the glorious reign of the Messiah after the resurrection, when the elect both among the Jews and Gentiles shall be gathered in from the four corners of the world, and reign with Christ upon earth, till the final restitution of all things. ' Take care then O Gentiles ' not to boast' of the privileges you now receive by becoming members of the visible church: ' the Jews were the natural ' branches, you are as wild Olive-trees; if God spared not the ' natural branches, take care lest he also spare not you, if you ' do not continue in goodness, you shall also be cut off,' and deprived of all the glorious advantages of the visible church; and ' if the Jews abide not still in unbelief, they shall be ' grafted in' and become members not only of the visible church, but of the glorious church which Jesus Christ is very soon to come and establish upon earth, when there will be no more any sin or suffering; but all the members shall be holy; and the whole without spot or blemish: ' for I would not ' have you to be ignorant of this mystery,' of the glorious kingdom; ' that blindness has happened to the Jews, till the ' fulness of the Gentiles should be called' to the same external graces and advantages: but at length ' the true Israelites shall ' be saved, and gathered in' from all the places and ' countries

‘ where they are now scattered ;’ and become not members of a visible church mixed with good and bad seed, but of a glorious church where all shall be truly sanctified, and their corruption totally extirpated ; since it is written ‘ there shall come ‘ out of Zion a deliverer, that shall turn away ungodliness from ‘ Jacob, for this is my covenant with them, when I will take ‘ away their sins.’ This cannot be understood of the first coming ; since while men are mortal, they cannot become impeccable. This is the glorious delivery of the Israelites from the spiritual Egypt, and their return to the true land of Canaan promised to Abraham and his seed, when God will re-establish the earth in its primitive beauty. This is the delivery promised by all the prophets, and the burthen of their song. ‘ God’s gifts and promises are without repentance.’ He has not, he cannot change his final designs, nor be frustrated in his ultimate end. He said to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, that he would raise them up a seed that was to inhabit the promised land for ever and ever. He did not understand thereby a little canton of this terrestrial globe called Canaan ; but the glorious earth re-established and renewed. All his promises regard spiritual and eternal objects, and not temporal and carnal blessings. This glorious reign with the elect upon the earth renewed, will not however be the last scene of providence, nor the total consummation of all things. At length both Jews and Gentiles shall be recalled, redeemed and restored, ‘ for God concluded all in unbelief, that he might have ‘ mercy upon all.’ He shut up all nations, all souls, and all lapsed spirits, in a state of darkness, privation, and banishment from his luminous presence, ‘ that he might one day have

‘mercy upon all. O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God,’ who knows how to make use not only of physical evil to cure moral evil, but of unbelief, darkness, and corruption itself to cure for ever all lapsed beings of their apostacy, and confirm them against a relapse: ‘His judgments are unsearchable and past finding out.’ Weak superficial minds are scandalized at the strange event of man’s fall and degradation; they cannot imagine how the least shadow of moral and physical evil could happen under the government of an infinitely powerful, wise and good Being. ‘But who hath known the mind of God, or who hath been his counsellor?’ What man is there upon earth that knows the plan of providence in all its extent? all the infinite combinations by which he is one day to accomplish his great end in creating? how he will draw good out of evil, light out of darkness, order out of confusion? This must be so, God is irreconcilable to sin, but not to the sinner; he hates the crime but he loves the criminal; ‘for of him, and by him and to him are all things;’ all souls come from him originally, subsist by him actually, and must return to him finally. He cannot abandon his rights over them, and must draw all spirits to himself as their infinite center. By this universal restitution of all lapsed beings ‘he will be for ever and ever glorified;’ yea because of this wonderful act of omnipotence far superior to creation, glory belongs to him alone, and to the creatures nothing but shame and confusion. They have been the only causes of all the evil that happened, and God the only efficient cause of all the good that can befall them in this life, after this life, and during all eternity.

The five following chapters of the epistle to the Romans contain nothing that wants explication; they are a chain of moral precepts and instructions, very intelligible without any commentary. According to this analysis, the doctrine of the apostle to the Romans, and consequently to all the Gentiles, and the whole Pagan world that was then, or that should hereafter be converted, may be reduced to the four following sorts of principles.

1. Tho' all mankind were not equally members of the visible church, and favoured with the supernatural advantages and privileges of revealed religion, yet God left none of the Pagans without a testimony, and a law written in their hearts; and supplied by his internal graces the want of all external means. He refuses those internal graces to none of whatever country, age or religion they be. He speaks continually, and spoke from the time of the fall, to all mortals, either by the voice of nature, that manifests his power and Godhead, or by the internal whispers of his eternal wisdom; which has been heard through all the earth, and to the ends of the world in Asia, and Europe, in Africa, and America, from East to West, from North to South; because with him there is no partial respect of persons; and because he is equally the God of the Jews and the Gentiles, of the members of the visible church, and of these that are not, of Christians and Pagans.

2. It is vain and absurd in the members of the visible church to think that they are dearer to God, than the rest of mankind, because he has given them external graces and succours. To think that we can be saved by the works of the law, and a faithful observation of the rites, ordinances and sacraments

of revealed religion; is a Judaical delusion; since it is not by the works of the law, but by faith alone that we can be saved; not by a speculative belief of the historical facts, and sublime mysteries of revealed religion; for so the devils believe and tremble; but by an internal resignation of all our powers to the saving operations of divine grace, which alone can purify and sanctify the soul. The promises made to Abraham, and to his seed do not regard any temporal advantages or external graces; since he himself was not justified by the works of circumcision and obedience to the ceremonial law; but only by this faith, hope, and love of God, antecedent to the circumcision of the flesh. By the true Israelites are not to be understood the members of the visible church; but all those who imitate the divine virtues of the patriarchs. The ceremonial law and moral precepts of revealed religion serve only to irritate our cupidity, self-love and passions, when we are not governed inwardly by the love of God; because naturally we incline to what is forbidden, and are impatient of every thing that restrains our freedom. The Jews abused all this lip-service and speculative knowledge; and fell into infidelity, superstition, false worship, and even idolatry; by misunderstanding the true sense of all the symbols, figures, and sacrifices of the Mosaical religion; as the Pagans adulterated, mistook and degraded all the symbols and rites, emanations and traditions of the patriarchal religion.

3. By an eternal, immutable, and universal law, God has decreed, that none shall enter into the kingdom of heaven but those that are conformed to Jesus crucified, in his sufferings, death and resurrection. This predestination is not a

free, arbitrary act of sovereignty; but a consequence of the foreknowledge he had that mankind after the fall, might divide themselves into two great sects, by voluntary free choice, and unconstrained deliberation; and that the one by adhering to the evil principle, would form a spiritual Babylon, and could not be converted or reclaimed but by hell flames; and that others might freely submit and adhere to his divine operations. He foresaw this not in absolute, previous, partial, personal decrees and preteritions; but in the nature of free agents, when they fell from their primitive pre-existent state. He saw the different degrees of their corruption, how far each of them was to be reclaimed in this life or in another; and made this immutable, universal law, that all those who were to be chosen should be made conformable to his only begotten Son. This is the only predestination St. Paul speaks of in this epistle. These decrees made from the beginning of the world do not regard individuals, nor particular persons; but their dispositions and characters. The scholastic opinion of a determinate number predestinated or rejected from all eternity, is neither founded in scripture nor tradition. No general council ever decreed by an universal, irreformable act, that the number of the elect and damned is so immutably fix'd that none can be added or diminished. On the contrary, in many places of scripture it is insinuated that those who have been once elect and chosen souls may become unfaithful and 'be blotted out of the book of life.' Our personal election and reprobation therefore depend upon our fidelity or resistance to the divine attractions, illuminations, and inspirations.

4. Tho' predestination and election to eternal glory require

and suppose necessarily our fidelity and correspondence to the divine operations; yet predestination to the external graces and favours, by which men become members of the visible church, is antecedent to and independent of all merit and demerit in particular persons and nations. The Jews were no more holy than the Gentiles. God distributes those external graces according as he sees that they may be most useful and conducive to the final re-establishment of all lapsed beings. He forms some glorious, others inglorious vessels, both of the same mass; but the souls contained in these vessels of clay are equally dear to him. As a proof of this, the apostle declares that the promises made to Abraham will be accomplished in their full sense to the true elect and chosen souls of all nations, at his second coming; when the true Israelites and children of Abraham according to the spirit; and not according to the flesh, shall be gathered in from the four corners of the world, and made members of the glorious kingdom of the Messiah; and in fine all beings shall be restored to their primitive perfection, by the wonderful depths of divine wisdom and love: because as all comes from God and subsists by God, so all must return to him as their source and center.

By the help of the analysis given, and the principles thence derived, we hope we have found out a true key to this sublime epistle to the Romans; and that some more learned and able hand will very soon give us a continued exact commentary upon every chapter and verse of it, so as to convince all upright minds of the blasphemous paraphrases made hitherto upon it by the Predestinarians. These fatalist doctors not un-

derstanding the sense of the scriptures, their wavering and unstable minds, wrest unto their own destruction all that St. Paul says of predestination. The error is ancient, it began among the Pharisees, was supported by the Manicheans, renewed in the ninth century by Godescalchus, crushed and condemned by the church; then revived by Wicklif, and Hufs, and at last by Calvin. The last four authors pretended that St. Augustin was the doctor and patron of their dismal scheme. Some deny this, and endeavour to give plausible explications of many dark and uncautious expressions of that great saint. Others go to another extremity, and pretend with father Harduin that all the works that pass under the name of St. Augustin are entirely supposititious; and invented by the Fatalists in later ages. Others say that St. Augustin was a man of a bright, African imagination; that his genius was more extensive than profound, more shining than solid; and that in the heat of disputes against the Pelagians he dropt now and then many unguarded maxims, and commentaries upon St. Paul, which the Fatalists have greedily embraced in all ages. Others go further, and pretend that those dangerous and uncautious expressions of St. Augustin, came from his having still retained a secret and undiscovered tincture of the Manichean heresy which allows of two eternal principles of evil and good. Now there is nothing that approaches nearer to this odious heresy than that of absolute predeterminating decrees, that render some men inevitably good, and that constitute others vessels of wrath even before their creation. We are very far from going into any of those extremes or disparaging the merit of so great a light of the church as St. Augustin:

all we dare say is, that if there be any equivocal expressions in the works of that great saint which really favour the monstrous herefy of the Predestinarians, the church should reform them. Yea we add further that tho' the most part of the Latin church, and almost all the schoolmen of all sects, have adopted the dangerous schemes of infallible prescience or absolute predeterminating decrees, yet no general council ever erected into doctrines of faith a particular predestination and reprobation of individuals; and therefore the Christian church has always a sovereign, absolute, unlimited right to reform, reject, and explode them and all others about prescience and predestination that tend, by inevitable consequences, to destroy God's goodness and human liberty. We shall now examine what could have determined so many great and pious men of all ages and nations to favour this monstrous herefy, and fatalist doctrine of a particular predestination and reprobation of individuals.

1. The first original source of this error was the false ideas of prescience. Men fancy that God foresees all the actions, passions, crimes and virtues, good and bad dispositions of free agents as certainly, absolutely, and infallibly future; that all the ideas, forms and modes of the human mind, past, present and to come, co-existed in and with the eternal mind; and that this prescience is as necessary to the perfection of God's understanding, as the generation of his eternal Logos. We have already confuted those false, dangerous, and impious maxims, which tend directly to Fatalism, Spinosism, and the most odious atheism: for we have shewn that the scholastic doctrine of prescience introduces as great a fatality

into nature as the predestinarian heresy; that if this fatality be once introduced, then men are no longer free; that if they be not free, the idea of sin is impossible; that if there be no vice nor injustice among finite beings, then there can be no sovereign justice nor goodness, in the supreme being; that if God be despoiled of these two attributes, then all must be reduced to the idea of an infinitely powerful agent that acts by necessity of nature without design, choice, or goodness; and this is pure Spinosism. Till therefore all the false scholastic ideas about prescience be quite extirpated out of the Christian schools, all attempts against the Fatalists predestinarian heresy will be fruitless.

2. The second source of all the fatal mistakes of the Predestinarians is the false explications given of original sin. According to the schoolmen, all men became criminal, and one mass of corruption, for the sin of our two first parents, to whose souls we had no relation, and in whose crime we had no share; since they lived many ages before the immediate creation and infusion of our souls into mortal bodies. God chose of this mass, a select number, and left all the rest to the fatal consequences of their corruption, by a partial preterition, altogether destructive of his paternal love for all that he has made. From this odious scheme flow'd another false tenet, that God rejects, punishes, hates, and damns whole races of men, because of the sins, perversity, and corruption of their ancestors. This is absolutely false and diametrically opposite to the nature of God, and the doctrine of the holy scriptures. It is true that as to external graces and temporal favours God may punish the sin of the parents upon the chil-

dren to the third and fourth generation; because, as we have said elsewhere, the natural consequences of the crimes of our ancestors, may be physical evils that last for several ages. But God punishes none in a future state, much less damns eternally for the sins of their fore-fathers; yea he never punishes the children for the crimes of their predecessors, but in so far as they imitate and contract guilt of their own. Tho' then the Jewish nation was dispersed, and their ceremonial worship changed into one more simple, more spiritual and more universal, yet this does not prove that God abandoned all the Jews, who have lived since the crucifixion of our Saviour; and has refused them, because of the sin of their ancestors, all internal graces, and paternal love.

3. The third source of all the mistakes of the Predestinarians, comes from their imagining Judaically that all the promises under the ancient and new law, regard an external conversion to the visible church, that all those who have not the true scriptures, churches and sacraments, are without the reach of his internal grace, objects of his hatred, and vessels of wrath. Nothing is more false and contrary to St. Paul's doctrine. The true vessels of wrath are all those that have not true saving faith and resignation to God's internal operations; whether they be members of the visible church or not. The true vessels of mercy are those who are faithful to God's celestial inspirations, supernatural influences and internal graces; tho' they be left in the bosom of Paganism. The Predestinarians prepossessed with false and contrary tenets, fancy that the rejection of the Jews, and the vocation of the Gentiles to the outward knowledge and profession of Chri-

stianity, was the only scope, end, and object of the divine oeconomy. This however is but a small, accidental branch of his great plan. To establish in one or in many nations, a perfect form of outward worship; or the most sublime system of speculative truths, may be worthy of a great philosopher or legislator: but this cannot be the ultimate end of God-man; who knows the impotence and insufficiency of all external means to make men truly good and happy. He has far more exalted views: to watch continually over the hearts of free agents, overcome their corruption without destroying their liberty; to ruin the idolatry of self-love, which usurps all the rights of the Deity; to move all the inward springs of human nature, change, transform, and form to himself in all ages, nations, and religions a chosen number of elect souls, that are truly converted, enlightned, purified and sanctified by his divine attractions, illuminations, inspirations, and operations, whatever be the prejudices of their education, the infirmities of their temper, or the darkness with which they are surrounded. This is a work worthy of a God, and which none but God can operate. It is the formation of this spiritual kingdom of the Messiah by his immediate action and operation upon the heart, that is the true object of eternal wisdom and providence; and not revealing to them outward forms of worship, and giving them speculative ideas of the divine nature. The Predestinarians place all in conversion to outward forms, ceremonies, and theoretical systems; and so must fall into Judaism, and interpret all the scriptures in a literal, grammatical, external sense as the Jews did.

We have already shewn that the epistle to the Romans fa-

vours none of those errors; and that it is one of the sublimest wrote by the apostle of the Gentiles, and design'd to shew to the Romans and all the Pagan world, that Christianity never could adopt the wild error of the Pharisees, who fancied that the Jews, or the members of the visible church were the only favourites of heaven; and that all the Gentile nations without the sacred pale were accursed of God.

This doctrine of grace and predestination which we attribute to St. Paul does not favour in the least the heresy of the Pelagians. These sectaries denied the necessity of all supernatural, internal graces; maintain'd that man by the pure force of his natural powers could obtain eternal salvation; and that the beatific vision was not a pure effect of the divine, gratuitous beneficence; but due to our merits. In these three errors more or less mitigated, consisted also the error of the Semi-pelagians, who denied not the necessity of internal, supernatural graces, but they affirmed that man could merit them by the first good motions of his free will, without any preventing action of God. The heresy of the Pelagians and Semi-pelagians did not then consist in this, that both denied a particular, personal predilection, or preterition of individuals from all eternity, by which only a determinate number of elect can be saved, and a fix'd number of reprobates to be infallibly damned. This wild, tho' ancient idea of the Fatalists in the fourth, or perhaps only in the ninth century was never adopted, nor established by any irreformable decree of the universal church. Yea supposing that some particular fathers, schools, synods, or even councils had espoused this uncautious opinion, yet it ought to be looked upon as a metaphysi-

cal refinement that does not regard the depositum of faith, that rather spoils its simplicity, that obscures all the plan of providence, and so may be redressed, exploded, and rejected by the universal church, who can set bounds to its own supreme authority.

C O R. I.

Hence there is nothing in St. Paul's epistle to the Romans, that insinuates a particular, personal, partial, arbitrary predilection or preterition of individuals; nothing that resembles or favours the hypotheses of the Arminians or Semi-pelagians; of the Molinists or Congruists who fancy that predestination and reprobation include a fix'd, immutable, infallible prescience of future contingencies; that God decreed from all eternity to give efficacious graces only to a few, and that he resolved from all eternity to refuse these efficacious graces to the most part; that he could have saved all, but that he would not do it, for reasons incomprehensible; that he renders salvation possible to all, but sure only to a little number; and in fine that the most part of lapsed beings will be for ever unconvertible, and infernal pains eternal. All these poor notions of the schoolmen are equally repugnant to scripture and reason, destroy human liberty and God's goodness, and deny the efficacy of our Saviour's sacrifice, God's sincerity, and all his moral attributes.

C O R. II.

Hence by the elect or chosen souls, are meant in scripture those heroic minds of all nations, ages and religions, that imitate Jesus Christ in his life, death, and sufferings, by purity of heart, crucifixion of corrupt nature, and daily mortifi-

cation of the passions, tho' they never heard of the external history of the gospel; and that surrender themselves to the inward attractions of the Father, illuminations of the Son and inspirations of the Holy Ghost, tho' they do not know the speculative ideas of religion. Those are they that shall one day be chosen to fill the places of fallen seraphims, and be exalted to the highest seats in heaven. On the contrary, by reprobates are meant all those who reject the divine graces, surrender themselves voluntarily to the false love of self and creatures, to their vices and passions, and by a final impenitence in sin and corruption, die in obstinate, obdurate habits of moral evil, which can be extirpated and destroyed only by infernal pains.

C O R. III.

Hence according to St. Paul's doctrine, all men both Jews and Gentiles, Pagans, Turks, and Christians are equally and originally dear to God; and predestinated to eternal happiness. All will at last be saved, but all will not be elect chosen souls; that is, elevated to thrones, dominations, and principalities in heaven. The reprobates will be for ever and ever, even after their re-establishment far inferior to the elect; not by an arbitrary decree of God, but by the nature of things; since, as we have said elsewhere (a), the same law of centripetal forces holds in the intellectual as in the material world. Souls that return to their center the soonest will for ever and ever approach nearer to it, than those that began later, and so advance far slower and later to perfection, happiness and glory.

(a) Cor. 3. of Prop. XXXIX.

LEMMA OF PROPOSITION LXI.

The principal objections made against the plan of providence because of moral and physical evil, may be reduced to four.

S C H O L I U M.

Bayle has collected in his dictionary and in his letters to a country gentleman, all the objections that incredulity can form against the plan of providence, because of the strange phenomenon of moral and physical evil that is own'd to have happen'd under the government of a Being supposed infinitely powerful, wise, and good, which could and should have hinder'd this fatal event. Now upon a strict examination and exact analysis of all these numerous difficulties which the witty Bayle repeats, and presents, under a thousand different shapes, it will be found that they may all be reduced to the four following hypotheses. 1. That liberty is a free gift which God made to his creatures, and which his infinite goodness should have hinder'd him from bestowing upon them, since he foresaw that they might and would abuse it. 2. That God might have confirmed finite and free intelligences in a permanent state of happiness, by a constant, direct, and uninterrupted view of his essence. 3. That God might have cured moral evil or sin, without employing physical evil or suffering as a remedy. 4. In fine that moral and physical evil are to be eternal, the damn'd unconvertible, and God for ever unappeasable.

The design of the preceeding Work was to lay down such principles as prove these four hypotheses precarious and false, yea plainly repugnant both to natural and revealed religion.

P R O P O S I T I O N L X I.

All the objections made against the plan of providence because of moral and physical evil, are founded upon false hypotheses that have no foundation in reason, nor scripture.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

All the objections made against the plan of providence because of moral and physical evil are founded upon the following hypotheses; that liberty is a free gift which God made to his creatures, and which his infinite goodness should have hindered him from entrusting unto them, since he foresaw they would abuse it; that God might have confirmed finite and free intelligences in a permanent state of happiness, by a constant, direct, and uninterrupted view of his essence; that God might have cured moral evil without employing physical evil as a remedy; and in fine that moral and physical evil are to be eternal and undestructible (a): it is absolutely false that liberty is a free gift which God made to his creatures; we have shewn on the contrary that it is a necessary, essential, inseparable adjunct of all intelligent natures (b): it is also false that God could have confirmed all finite intelligences in a permanent state of happiness, by a constant, direct and un-

(a). By the preceeding Lemma and its scholium. (b) Prop. XXXI.

interrupted view of his essence; we have shewn that such is the weakness of finite minds that they could not always support this direct, immediate, uninterrupted view of the divine splendors (a): it is likewise false that God could have cured moral evil without employing physical evil as the sole and only remedy (b); in fine it is also false that infernal punishments are to be eternal, the creature for ever unconvertible, and God unappeaseable (c): Therefore all the objections made against the plan of providence, because of moral and physical evil, are founded upon false hypotheses that have no foundation in reason or scripture.

S C H O L I U M.

The famous Leibnitz a German philosopher pretends to answer all the objections made against the plan of providence, arising from the origin and duration of evil, by refining upon the scholastic scheme, and adding some strokes to it that seem to give a new light to those mysterious obscurities. All his system, which some think to be full of confusion and tedious intricacy, turns upon these two great principles.

1. As God never acts without a reason, so he is never determined but by the reason of ‘the best and most excellent plan.’ Now God having foreseen from all eternity an infinitely infinite number of possible events, chose one series of them, and decreed to place the creatures in such circumstances that they would freely but infallibly chuse this series, because he foresaw that it would contribute the most to the manifestation of his perfections and so form the best plan possible.

(a) Cor. 2. of Prop. XXXVIII. (b) Prop. XLIX. (c) Prop. LVIII.

2. Tho' moral and physical evil enter into this plan, yet all considered, the universe mixed with good and evil, is more perfect than a world where there is nothing but pure good, and perfect felicity, universal justice, and unmixed happiness.

We shall endeavour to shew that both these branches of the Leibnitian scheme are false, and attended with the most fatal consequences.

1. We grant that God acts always by a reason worthy of his perfections, and that he chose the most excellent plan, as to the ultimate end and design in creating. But we deny that he fixed and predetermined all the means to come at this end. His great plan was to create a world composed of material pictures, and intelligent images, the most proper to represent his perfections; and to render all intelligences happy by love and by free love. Now to suppose all the actions of free creatures, foreseen or predetermined, as infallibly future, certain and inevitable, is a plain contradiction, as we have already demonstrated. God chose the most excellent plan, and foresaw all the means by which he could execute it; but he foresaw them only as possible, and not as future. He wills the end absolutely, but he leaves the means to the unconstrain'd choice of the creature. He found in the inexhaustible treasures of his infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, wherewithall to obviate, or answer, and remedy all evil events, whatever were the free choice of the creature; and knew how to reclaim it certainly and infallibly, but freely, tho' it should deviate from any one particular chain, and series of means. He wished and desired that free creatures would have followed the shortest and straightest road to perfection and felicity; and if they

had done so, there would have been no moral or physical evil. He foresaw also the infinite curves that they could describe by deviating from this straight road and line; and decreed, that without fixing them to any series of actions and means, he would be attentive to all equally; so that at last they could not escape him. This is a far more extensive plan of providence than the little narrow one of staking down the creature to one determinate, inevitable series of means, which establishes an universal fatality in nature, as we have shewn in the second book.

2. We grant that, relatively to the nature of a free being that deviates by choice from the great end of its creation, the permission of physical evil for a time, was the most perfect plan; because as we have shewn, suffering is the only cure of sin: but we deny that moral or physical evil were necessary to the perfection of the divine plan. The universe would have been far more perfect if moral evil had never happened; and if intelligences had never sinned. The phenomenon of moral evil is a stain, blemish and blot in the divine work; it is a foreign accident, that he neither foresaw nor foreordained as inevitable. He could not hinder it absolutely without rendering the creatures impeccable and infinite, which is impossible; or without depriving them of freedom, which is destroying their essence. He did all he could to hinder this fatal event; and seeing that he could not do it without annihilating them, he chose rather to suffer moral evil for a time, than overturn his eternal plan by this annihilation; because he knew how to draw good out of evil, light out of darkness, and order out of confusion. This, as we have already said, is the highest

effort of omnipotence far superior to creation. The plan then of a world mixed with good and evil is only the best upon the supposition that physical evil will serve one day to cure moral evil, that both will cease for ever, and that universal order, and harmony are at length to be re-established through the whole universe. For if evil and disorder, sin and sufferings are to be eternal, then to maintain that a world mixed with good and evil, is the most perfect, is to say, that God's work would be imperfect if there were not in it an eternal stain and blemish; that is, that it would be imperfect, if it were not eternally imperfect; which is a plain contradiction. All the answers that Leibnitz makes to Bayle's objections, turn upon this one idea, that the evils which happen are suffered, allowed, or permitted to procure the greatest of all goods. This is true only upon the supposition of a total re-establishment: but 'tis false; if evil is indestructible, and the creature for ever unconvertible.

GENERAL SCHOLIUM,

O R

RECAPITULATION OF THE WHOLE WORK.

In order to set the great truths hitherto demonstrated in a clear light, and give them their due force, we shall reduce them to the twelve following articles.

I. The eternal self-existent, infinite being presents himself to the mind under the notion of a simple, uncompounded, indivisible essence without diffusion of parts, without succession of thoughts, and without division of substance; yet he contains necessarily the three real distinctions of SPIRIT CONCEIVING, IDEA CONCEIVED, and LOVE PROCEEDING FROM BOTH; which in the supreme Infinite are not three simple attributes, or modes; but three distinct persons, or self-conscious, intellectual agents. The infinite spirit by a necessary, immanent, eternal activity produces in himself his consubstantial image equal to him in all his perfections, self-origination only excepted; and from both proceed a distinct, self-conscious, intelligent, active principle of love, co-equal to the Father and the Son, called the Holy Ghost. This is the true definition of God in his eternal solitude, or according to his absolute essence distinct from created nature.

II. Tho' the self-sufficient Being might have been for c-

ver perfect and happy in the eternal generation of the Word; and in the everlasting procession of the Holy Spirit, without so much as thinking of any finite ideas, or creating any finite substances; yet he was pleased to consider himself as representable externally, and thereby to form freely in his divine understanding, the archetypal ideas of all possible finite beings, which are not distinct personalities, co-essential forms, or consubstantial modes of the Deity; but free, arbitrary conceptions, whose existence or non-existence neither increase nor diminish the divine plenitude. As he produced them freely, so he may forget them freely, or blot them out of his divine understanding, without interesting his perfection, glory or happiness. As the creation of finite substances adds nothing to his infinite substance, so the production of finite ideas adds nothing to the infinite knowledge of his consubstantial Logos.

III. The essential love God has for his consubstantial image, determined him freely, without any necessity drawn from his perfection or happiness, to create from the beginning of time, finite substances, answering to those numberless ideas, intirely distinct from his indivisible essence, but representative of his divine perfections. Now as God can represent himself two ways, either by lively pictures, or by living images; hence arises the distinction of material and immaterial substances. The former are extended, passive, unintelligent beings, that have no knowledge of what passes in them; that act necessarily by an exterior force moving them, and that have neither reason, volition, nor freedom. The others are unextended, active, intelligent beings, that are ca-

pable of knowing themselves and their original, and endowed with reason, love and freedom.

IV. God created his living images only to make them happy in the eternal contemplation and love of his boundless perfections. But as they are not capable, because of their natural, inherent finitude to support the continual, uninterrupted, direct views of the divine splendors, he produced also glorious, material pictures; that so the intelligent images might, during these intervals of their essential blifs, enjoy an accessory happiness by contemplating God in his works. For this reason it is that all sorts of created, unfallen spirits are united to material, glorious, ethereal vehicles. The consubstantial Logos united himself also from the beginning of the world to a finite nature composed of soul and body, that so he might converse with created intelligences in a sensible manner, be their conductor and guide, their model and high priest, lead them into the central depths of the Divinity, and from thence into all the immense regions of nature; shew them by turns the beauties of the original and the pictures, and teach them the homage finite beings owe to the infinite.

V. God can communicate to his lively pictures and living images a real activity distinct from his own, as well as a real substance distinct from his own; by which those two analogous, tho' very distinct substances may act reciprocally, physically and immediately upon each other. Tho' we have no adequate ideas of this force, tho' we do not conceive the manner how it acts; yet we ought not to deny its existence, purely and only because we do not conceive how it operates. By virtue of this activity essential to spirits, the living images are

capable of comparing, reasoning, judging, preferring, and thereby chusing freely. This liberty of choice is the nearest imitation of the divine independency, and the greatest perfection of finite intelligences; because it makes them capable of contributing eternally to their own happiness by love and by free love, which is the supreme felicity. The will of finite intelligences may be moved, inclined and freely determined by two sorts of springs, 'the perception of truth, and the 'sensation of pleasure;' and consequently of tending to or acquiescing in objects either from a supernatural 'love of order,' or by the 'natural desire of happiness; and therefore of separating these two loves, the love of themselves from the love of order, and the love of the creatures from the love of God; which separation is moral evil or sin.

VI. God does not act upon his living images by omnipotent, irresistible wills, that force their consent: but he accommodates, proportions, and submits, so to speak, the exercise of his almighty power to their free natures. He knows how to accomplish whatever he pleases in heaven and upon earth; his great ends can never be eternally frustrated: but there is no fatal, unchangeable succession of means, foreseen, foreordained and fixed. He sees by one unsuccessive act, all the possible combinations of finite forces or wills: but he never foresees what he leaves free as absolutely, certainly, and infallibly future. He can foresee and foretell all the natural and necessary consequences of the free determinations of intellectual agents; yet he never foresees these free determinations themselves but as contingent and possible. He overrules all events, by his all comprehensive providence, and directs them to the

accomplishment of his final designs; but they do not necessarily co-exist in his mind from all eternity as present. Thus the essential freedom of intelligent natures, is neither fetter'd nor destroyed by an infallible prescience, or fatal predestination.

VII. The only worship God demands of his intelligent images, is to love him for himself, and all created beings for him. He demands this worship, not as an arbitrary homage due to his sovereign grandeur; but as the necessary means of their arriving at the supreme felicity and perfection of their natures; and from the constant observation of this eternal, immutable, and universal law, flows naturally and necessarily the communication of God's luminous and beatifying influences, which make the sovereign happiness of all created spirits. Two sorts of intelligences fell freely from the love of eternal order, rebelled against the universal, immutable law, and so rendered themselves incapable of their original, primitive happiness in a pre-existent state, to wit, angelical spirits and human souls. The former admitted from the beginning to the beatific vision, sinned by spiritual pride, self-attribution, and an over-weaning opinion of their own excellency: the later fell from the love of eternal order by an inordinate desire of knowledge, and an irregular love of pleasure. Of the former sort the scripture mentions several kinds, some that are shut up in the abyfs of darkness, and others that are imprisoned in brutal machines. Thus there are three sorts of degraded intelligences, devils, human souls, and those in brutal forms.

VIII. Tho' God has no vindictive justice; tho' strictly

speaking, he can neither be honoured by our virtues, nor dishonoured by our crimes; yet according to the immutable laws of eternal order, almighty wisdom cannot pardon sin, and restore lapsed beings, without shewing at the same time his infinite love of justice, purity and holiness. This is what omnipotence itself could not do in a more effectual manner than by the incarnation of God-man; who by the sufferings and agonies that the breach of eternal order produced in the Messiah, shewed to cherubims, seraphims, and all the hosts of heaven, the infinite opposition of the divine nature to disorder. Thus he reconciled mercy with justice, and God's eternal abhorrence of sin with his paternal love of the sinner. By this sacrifice of the Lamb slain, as it was destin'd from the foundation of the world, redemption was promised to all the human race that should imitate the love and obedience of this divine Saviour, and co-operate with his grace, which alone can purify and restore lapsed beings. It was then that all nations were given unto the Messiah to sanctify them, destroy in them the evil principle, renew in them the divine image, and restore them at last to their primitive happiness and perfection.

IX. Human nature is at present excluded from all immediate intercourse with the pure Divinity; and God communicates with lapsed beings till their restoration, only by this divine Mediator; and vouchsafes to them all favours and graces only in consideration of the merits and sufferings of this great High-priest. As this all-wise Redeemer knew that physical evil or suffering is the only cure of moral evil or sin, he appeared himself, under a visible form, in his pre-existent state, to our first parents in paradise, and condemned them with all

their degenerate race to a state of purifying pains. Thus man was banished from his happy abode; the earth was cursed, became fruitless and barren; and many other changes happened to our globe which made it an exile, a prison, and a valley of tears; where all is adapted to the state of souls that suffer, and that must be purified by their sufferings.

X. During this state of expiation, in which man is placed, Prayer, Mortification, and Self-denial, are the three internal, necessary and immediate means of purification; and the continual practice of these three duties produce in the soul, Faith, Hope, and Charity; with all the divine, moral, and social virtues. The external, accessory and remoter means of salvation are Scriptures, Churches, and Sacraments; because they are helps, as ladders, and channels, for our ascent to God, for conveying light to the mind, preserving unity, and awakening the sense of divine things by visible signs, symbols and representations. However, these particular favours, external succours and supernatural channels which God grants to some nations, and refuses to others, derogate nothing from his universal bounty to all the lost sons of Adam: and their invincible ignorance of those outward privileges is no obstacle to their salvation. The almighty Father of spirits, who loves all that he has made; his only begotten Son who died for all; the Holy Ghost who refuses his preventing graces to none, neglect nothing requisite to convert and transform the corrupt and degenerate sons of Adam of all nations, ages, and religions, by external succours, or inward attractions.

XI. All those who surrender themselves freely to the purifying, enlightning, sanctifying operations of divine grace

are the true elect. All those that persist obstinately in their corruption are reprobate. This distinction of mankind into two classes comes from their voluntary adherence to the motions of false self-love, or to the true love of God, and not from any fatal prescience or predestination, or any partial preterition and reprobation of individuals. After a certain period of time when the number of the elect is compleated, a general conflagration will destroy all the present, imperfect forms of nature: our earth will be restored to its primitive, paradisiacal beauty; the dead shall rise again; God will separate the just from the unjust; and while the former shall enter into the kingdom of the Messiah with their glorious bodies, the later shall be shut up in utter darkness, with the devil and his angels, there to be purified for ages of ages, because the corruption of their nature will be so profound, and so inveterate, that it could not be totally extirpated but by hell-torments, and infernal pains.

XII. As God however cannot be eternally frustrated in his designs; as finite impotence, folly, and malice cannot for ever surmount infinite power, wisdom, and goodness; as the sacrifice of the Lamb slain cannot be for ever void and of no effect; reprobate souls and angels cannot be for ever inconvertible, nor God unappeaseable, nor moral and physical evil undestructible. All stains, blots, and imperfections in the work of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness must be for ever washed out; otherwise God would not have an absolute empire over the heart; he would not act according to the laws of eternal wisdom; he would not love essential wisdom, goodness, and justice. Wherefore infernal punishments must at

last cease, and all lapsed beings be at length pardoned and re-established in a permanent state of happiness and glory, never more to fall again. This is the end and consummation of all things, and the design of all God's promises and punishments. If he does not accomplish this end sooner by converting all lapsed beings, it is not because he will not; but because he cannot do it in a permanent and efficacious manner without doing violence to their liberty, destroying their free natures, and thereby frustrating for ever the eternal design of his wisdom, which were to make intellectual beings happy by love and by free love, their supreme felicity.

This is the general plan of providence, and these are the great principles of natural and revealed religion contained in scripture, confirmed by reason, and scattered here and there in the traditions of all nations. As the Pagans adulterated the maxims of the ancient patriarchal religion, and turned all into fable and idolatry, and as the Jews by attaching themselves to the letter of the law, lost the spirit of the law, and transformed all into superstition and outward form; so the Christian schoolmen have obscured and degraded the sacred doctrines of faith by their false explications and metaphysical subtleties, unknown from the beginning. The true doctrines of faith are eternal, but these explications are modern.

During the first ages of Christianity, all was cross, poverty, persecution and martyrdom. None enter'd into the church, or at least remain'd in it, but those who were resolv'd to imitate Jesus crucified, to be buried with him in baptism, to die to the world, and to wash their robes in the blood of the Lamb. Soon after the conversion of the Roman emperors,

Christians were delivered from persecution: the kings and princes that were converted to our holy faith rewarded liberally the pastors of souls for their labours. The Christian world was divided into bishoprics with vast revenues, churchmen became rich, and lived in outward splendor; men unmortified and not possessed with the spirit of religion, aspired to rich benefices: great men and lords entered into sacred orders without vocation; not to become physicians of souls, but to enjoy opulent fortunes. Then prelates and churchmen kept courts, extended their dominions, became great politicians, appeared at the head of armies, and united in the same person spiritual and temporal power. Thus faith decay'd and charity waxed cold. Tho' there were still in every age great men and great saints that cried out against these abuses, and tho' the universal church never authorized nor approved them by a law, yet many particular pastors degenerated by degrees into external Judaism, and Pharisaical practices; yea fell at last, about the ninth century, into great ignorance and scandalous superstition.


Towards the eleventh or twelfth century, the schoolmen just awakened from the deep lethargy they had been in during two or three ages before, adopted the Aristotelian philosophy spoiled by the Arabians; and brought by the Moores into Spain: they consulted no more the ancient traditions whether sacred or profane; they contented themselves to spend the force of their minds in subtle reasonings; they spun out of their own brains all the cobwebs of scholastic divinity, multiplied useless questions, became minute in deciding about metaphysical quibbles, and thus spoiled the simplicity

of faith, degraded the majesty of divine truths, and obscured the luminous principles of religion. Thus the Christian schools were over-run with many absurd tenets about prescience and predestination; creation and paradise, original sin, and salvation only in the church; grace and liberty; vindictive justice and infernal pains. These scholastic opinions, and wild explications of sacred truths passed insensibly from school to school, and from nation to nation; and so infected successively Spain, Italy, France, Germany, Great-Britain and all the northern countries.

All this was foretold by our Saviour when he said that in the last times, ‘ the enemy would sow in the field of the Lord, ‘ many tares among the good wheat; but he forbids to root ‘ them out, lest in gathering up the tares, his servants pluck ‘ up the wheat with them.’ These speculative, metaphysical errors about prescience and predestination, original sin, and vindictive justice, creation and paradise, salvation not out of the sacred pale, and eternal pains, do little or no harm to pure and upright souls, who do not see their fatal consequences, or who make a good use of them, from simplicity of heart. Our Saviour reserves to himself the only right of burning those tares, and reforming those abuses at the time of the great harvest, when the Jews and Gentiles shall be converted, when there will be but one shepherd and one sheepfold. It is then that the fire of divine light and love will consume in every particular member of the mystical body, and in the Christian church in general, all the false speculative opinions, and popular errors, all the vices and immoralities, all the superstitions and scandals that have grown up in the field of the Lord.

Till this great harvest Religion mourns like a dove, over all the speculative errors, all the corruptions and abuses which obscure her sacred doctrines, which throw a veil upon all the oeconomy of providence, make faith decay, and charity wax cold. Our design in this essay was to remove the scandals which make men contemn both natural and revealed religion; and at the same time to shew that the holy scriptures so much despised contain a most rational and amiable system of theology and philosophy. We do not however pretend to give all our speculations for demonstrations; far less for articles of faith. In matters of such a sublime nature, it would be a fanatical presumption to imagine that we have never mixed falsehoods with truth, imagination with reason, probability with proofs, and folly with wisdom. ‘What is man or the son of man that he should pretend thus to have sat in the councils of the Most High, and to have fathomed the depths of eternal wisdom.’ Fallibility is an inseparable companion of all finite minds. If we have therefore mixed the impure with the pure, and if there be any opinions in this essay found contrary to reason, scriptures, or the analogy of faith, we heartily submit them.

END OF THE SIXTH AND LAST BOOK.



A P P E N D I X
TO THE
F O R E G O I N G W O R K:
CONTAINING
A
R E F U T A T I O N
OF THE FIRST BOOK OF
S P I N O S A ' S E T H I C S;
BY WHICH
THE WHOLE STRUCTURE
IS UNDERMINED.

A P P E N D I X

TO THE HISTORY OF THE
CITY OF BOSTON

BY

JOHN MITCHELL

OF THE CITY OF BOSTON

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME II

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OF THE
SPINOSIAN SYSTEM,

OR THE
CONFUSION

OF
FINITE AND INFINITE.

SPINOSA'S DEFINITIONS.

I. DEFINITION.

'**B**Y Cause of itself, I understand that whose essence includes existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived but as existing.'

EXAMEN.

Spinoza's design was not to deny the existence of an absolutely infinite Being; but to prove that this absolute Infi-

DEFINITIO I.

Per causam sui, intelligo id, cujus essentia non potest concipi, nisi existens: sentia involvit existentiam, sive id cujus

nite is the only substance existent, and that all other beings are only modes, inherencies, or hypostases of that infinite Being: wherefore he adapts all his definitions and axioms to this supposed principle which he never proves. Thus his very first definition contains the elementary seed of all his system; but happily it is altogether false. CAUSA SUI, or cause of itself, is an obscure term. God contains in himself such infinite perfection as may prove to us that his existence is necessary, or that no will could either have produced him, or can destroy him; and this we may call a reason of necessary existence; but he is not the cause of his existence: for a cause implies the idea of something prior at least in nature to its effect. Now the divine essence cannot be said to be prior in nature to his existence. He produces indeed in himself two necessary and consubstantial emanations; but he cannot therefore be called the cause of his own existence; for otherwise he would exist before he exists. Spinoza's intention was to insinuate that God produces in himself by an immanent, necessary action all things as modes of his substance; and thus from the beginning he supposes the very thing he is going to prove.

II. DEFINITION.

‘ That thing is called finite in its kind, which can be limited by another of its kind; for example, a body is said to be finite, because we may conceive another greater; so

DEFINITIO II.

Ea res dicitur in suo genere finita quae alia ejusdem naturae terminari potest. Exempli gratia, corpus dicitur finitum quia aliud semper majus concipimus. Sic cogitatio alia cogitatione terminatur. at corpus non terminatur cogitatione, nec cogitatio corpore.

‘ thought is terminated by thought; but thought is not terminated by body, nor body by thought.’

E X A M E N.

This definition is false, for a thing may be limited by a being of a superior kind, as well as by a being of its own kind. A being is limited not only when something of its kind may be added to it; but also when it does not contain all the realities conceivable or possible. Spinoza begins here to confound the ideas of Essence and Substance. An essence is a general, complex idea which represents to the mind all the qualities, properties and attributes common to beings of the same kind. A substance is a particular being really existent, which hath these qualities, properties, and attributes. Thus there can be but one ideal essence of all the beings of the same kind; but there may be many different substances of the same kind. The general idea of human nature is the same for all men; but there may be many different human substances, that have the same attributes. Essences or ideas are limited in their kind only by ideas or essences of a superior degree. But substances are limited in their kind, by other substances of the same kind, or genus, that are greater either in number, quantity, or qualities. Thus bodies are limited by other bodies which may be more extended than they. But the idea or essence of matter in general can be limited only by the idea of beings of a superior kind or degree, and not by that of beings of the same degree. Spinoza's design in confounding thus the ideas of essence and substance was to insinuate that all individuals of the same kind are the same individual substance; and that the several finite beings are not distinct, separate substances, but

modes of the same universal substance, whose properties are intelligence and extension. Thus in every definition he still supposes what he is going to prove.

The rest of Spinoza's definition is obscure, captious, and equivocal. If he means by this expression, 'thought is not terminated by body, nor body by thought,' that spiritual and corporeal beings cannot terminate each other by juxtaposition, we grant it. If he means that intelligent beings have no properties but what are common to material ones, that intelligence and extension are properties of the same substance, that all extended beings are intelligent, and all intelligent beings are extended, we deny this. Thus again he supposes what is in question.

III. DEFINITION.

'By substance, I understand that which exists in itself, and is conceived by itself; that is, whose idea does not stand in need of another idea to conceive it.'

E X A M E N.

This definition is equivocal and captious. If Spinoza means by 'existing in itself,' that whose essence or idea includes existence; then there is and can be, but one such substance, which is the absolutely infinite one: but this is not the true meaning of the word; for the true idea of substance is that which is the foundation of modes; that which may be conceived as independent of any other being of its kind; and not that which exists in itself and by itself, independent of any superior cause. Thus Spinoza supposes again what he should prove.

D E F I N I T I O III.

Per substantiam intelligo id, quod in se
 est, et per se concipitur; hoc est, id, cu-
 jus conceptus non indiget conceptu alte-
 rius rei a quo formari debet.

IV. DEFINITION.

‘ By attribute I understand that which the mind perceives
 ‘ of a substance, as constituting its essence.’

E X A M E N.

This definition too is obscure, equivocal or absolutely false. An attribute is that which is included in the idea of a substance, which flows necessarily from it, and without which it cannot be conceived. But the attributes we perceive in a substance do not always express, as we have shewn, the intimate, adequate essence of things. Spinoza seems to confound the idea of attributes known to us with the real essence. Now this is plainly unjust. The Essence is that from whence attributes flow, but one is not the other, as the rivulets are not the source, nor the rays the sun. If this were otherwise, the knowledge of the attributes would infer necessarily the adequate knowledge of the essence; and we have demonstrated the contrary. Tho’ we know the attributes of matter and spirit, yea of God himself, yet we do not know their intimate essence.

Moreover: beings may have the same, that is, perfectly like or similar attributes and not be the same individual substance. Thus all material beings have the same or similar attributes, but they are not the same individual and indivisible substance. Spinoza’s design in this definition was to insinuate that all finite beings are only modes of the same universal substance. Thus he still supposes what he is to prove.

D E F I N I T I O IV.

Per attributum intelligo id quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam e-

V. DEFINITION.

‘ By mode, I understand the affections or qualities of a
‘ substance ; or that which inheres in another, yet that by
‘ which it is conceived.’

E X A M E N.

This definition is the most captious and false of all Spinoza’s definitions. Modes are not that by which a substance is conceived; for a substance may be conceived without any of its particular modes. We have a clear idea of matter, tho’ it be neither triangular, circular, nor elliptical, and tho’ it have no particular figure, division, or motion. Neither is a mode that which inheres in another as the schools say. The true idea of modes results from the idea of finite, which is susceptible of continual variations, augmentations and diminutions; and these changes are called modes. But these modes are neither conceived by the simple idea of substance, nor is the substance conceived by them; for we must conceive a changing cause to conceive them, as well as a changeable substance in which they are produced.

The definitions of substance and mode given by the schools are the first original seeds of all Spinosism. If a substance, as the schoolmen say, were ‘ that which exists in itself, and by ‘ itself,’ then there would be but one substance, which is the self-existent Being, the supreme Infinite, God himself. Besides if a mode were that which exists in another, is supported by another, and cannot subsist without another; then all finite beings would be modes of God, since they all exist in, are sup-

D E F I N I T I O V.

Per modum intelligo, substantiæ affectiam concipitur.
tiones, sive id quod in alio est, per quod

ported by, and cannot subsist without God. In this sense there would be but one substance and all other things would be the modes of that only substance.

VI. DEFINITION.

‘ By God I understand the absolutely infinite Being: that
‘ is, a substance composed of infinite attributes, every one of
‘ which expresses an eternal and infinite essence.’

E X A M E N.

God is not a substance composed of infinite attributes. He is a simple, uncompounded essence, all whose attributes are reducible to three, POWER, WISDOM and GOODNESS; LIFE, LIGHT and LOVE; CAUSALITY, TRUTH and JUSTICE; as we have already demonstrated. All his incommunicable attributes are reducible to and expressed by that of Absolute Infinite; and all his communicable perfections are reducible to three and can be only three. Trinity exhausts his essence, and a quaternity is impossible. Spinoza adds in the explication of this definition, that ‘ what is absolutely infinite contains in
‘ its substance, all that expresses essence.’ If this were so, the divine nature would contain numerically all beings, all realities, and all essences; this is Nature and not God: or at least all things would be only modes of God; which is again begging the question. God, as we have shewn, is ALL BEING, NOT ALL BEINGS; a singular, individual, indivisible Being, and not an universal, general, collective Being; far less the universal Suppositum in which all particular beings inhere as modes, hypostases, or personalities.

D E F I N I T I O VI.

Per Deum intelligo, ens absolute infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque nitum, hoc est, substantiam constantem in- aeternam et infinitam exprimit essentiam.

VII. DEFINITION.

‘ That thing is called free, which exists by the sole necessity of its nature, and is determined to act by itself alone. That thing is called necessary, or rather forced, which is determined by another to exist and act in a certain determinate manner.’

E X A M E N.

This definition is absolutely false; for if this were true, where then would be the difference betwixt free and necessary existence, betwixt free and necessary action. To establish this definition, Spinoza must first prove that freedom is an impossible, contradictory and absurd idea; this he does no where. He may if he pleases deny liberty and endeavour to prove that it is a chimera; but to lay down this as a principle in a definition, without any shadow of demonstration is a boldness not to say an impudence unworthy of a philosopher. He confounds through all the course of his work spontaneities, necessity, and freedom. Spontaneity is simple volition, and may be necessary; thus we love GOOD IN GENERAL spontaneously, tho’ necessarily. Freedom is what may be or may not be, what we may will or not will; it is not only what we will spontaneously without any foreign outward constraint, but without any inherent necessity of nature, and by pure choice. Necessity is that which cannot be otherwise than it is, what flows from our nature inevitably and invincibly, so that nothing can hinder its effect. Spinoza boldly confounds these

D E F I N I T I O VII.

Ea res libera dicitur, quae ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit, et a se sola agendum determinatur. Necessaria autem vel potius coacta quae ab alio determinatur ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione.

three ideas without giving the least reason why he does so. In consequence of this false, absurd definition of liberty, Spinoza maintains that the soul is intirely passive, &c. see Prop. xxxiv.

VIII. DEFINITION.

‘ By eternity I mean existence itself, as flowing from the
‘ idea of the thing eternal; for such an existence is concei-
‘ ved as an eternal truth, like the essence of that thing; and
‘ therefore cannot be explained by duration or time, tho’ we
‘ suppose it without beginning and without end.’

E X A M E N.

This definition is also absolutely unintelligible. What Spinoza seems to define, is necessary existence, and not eternal existence. God thought of, and will’d freely from all eternity the creation of finite beings; and yet their ideas and existence are free, and do not necessarily flow from their definition, nor from that of God. Eternity is a duration that has neither beginning nor end, and this duration may be of two kinds; with, or without variation of modes. Spinoza’s design in confounding thus eternal existence, with necessary existence, is to prove that all the acts of God’s power, understanding and will, whether immanent or emanant being equally eternal, are equally necessary. Thus all Spinoza’s definitions are pure suppositions of what he is to prove.

D E F I N I T I O VIII.

Per aeternitatem intelligo ipsam existentiam quatenus ex sola rei aeternae definitione sequitur. Talis enim existentia ut aeterna veritas, sicut rei essentia concipitur, proptereaque per durationem aut tempus explicari non potest, tamen duratione principio et fine carere concipiatur.

S P I N O S A ' s A X I O M S.

I. A X I O M.

‘ All that exists, exists in itself, or in another.’

E X A M E N.

If Spinoza means by existing in itself, existing by itself; then it is true, that all things are either self-existent, or produced by another: a thing may be said to exist in or by another as an effect in its cause or as a mode in its substance; now as Spinoza denies that one substance can produce another, he understands by this dark expression, ‘ existing in another,’ that all things exist in God as modes of the divine essence. And this is again supposing what was to be proved.

II. A X I O M.

‘ That which cannot be conceived by itself, must be conceived by another.’

E X A M E N.

A thing may be conceived by itself either as independent of any other cause producing it, that is as self-existent; or as independent of all other effects that flow from the same cause. Thus a finite substance, tho’ produced by the infinite, may be conceived as independent of any other finite substance. A thing also may be conceived by another either as an effect or as a mode, as a production of its power, or as an emanation of its substance. Spinoza still confounds these two notions by

A X I O M A I.

Omnia quae sunt vel in se vel in alio sunt.

A X I O M A II.

Id quod per se non potest concipi, per aliud concipi debet.

an eternal repetition of the same paralogism, and of the same begging of the question.

III. A X I O M.

‘ A determined cause given, the effect follows necessarily; and on the contrary, if no determined cause be given, it is impossible the effect can follow.’

E X A M E N.

This axiom is either absolutely false or it signifies nothing. If there be any such thing as a free cause, the effect happens freely. Spinoza therefore should have proved first, that there can be no free cause, before he established it as an axiom, that all determined causes act necessarily. I grant indeed that a thing is not truly a cause, till it produce an effect, and in this sense it is true that all determined causes are necessarily causes when they act and produce their effect; because it is impossible that a thing can be and not be at the same time: but then this signifies nothing to Spinoza’s purpose, unless he prove that there is and can be no power, but what is necessarily determined or reduced into act.

IV. A X I O M.

‘ The knowledge of an effect depends upon the knowledge of its cause, and includes it.’

E X A M E N.

This is absolutely false, for we may know that a thing is an effect without knowing the cause whence it proceeds. Mer

A X I O M A III.

Ex data causa determinata, necessario determinata causa impossibile est ut effectus sequatur; et contra, si nulla detur tus sequatur.

A X I O M A IV.

Effectus cognitio a cognitione causae dependet, et eandem involvit.

knew certainly for many ages that water rose to certain heights in a pump, without knowing the true cause of this ascent. They knew in general that this phenomenon was an effect of some cause, tho' they did not know that the weight of the air was this particular cause. Moreover, it is absolutely false that the knowledge of an effect, supposes always that we know how it is produced; for we may know certainly that a thing is an effect, without knowing the manner of its production. Thus we know that all finite substances are effects of the self-existent substance; tho' we do not know how the effect produced is connected with the cause producing. Spinoza's design in this axiom was to insinuate that creation is impossible, because we do not know how God produces.

V. A X I O M.

' Things that have nothing in common, cannot be understood by each other; or the idea of the one does not include the idea of the other.'

E X A M E N.

This is again equivocal. Things may have something in common, tho' the idea of the one does not include the idea of the other. All finite beings have something in common, as having either the same attributes and modes, or as being effects of the same common cause, or as representative of the same archetype; tho' the idea of the one does not include that of the other. Moreover, it is absolutely false in all senses that because the idea of one thing, does not include the idea of another, therefore they have nothing in common. The idea

A X I O M A V.

Quae nihil commune cum se invicem possunt; sive conceptus unius, alterius habent, etiam per se invicem intelligi non conceptum non involvit.

of a man does not include that of his picture, yet they have something in common, that in which they resemble each other. The idea of one man does not include the idea of another; yet they have something in common, which is that of soul and body. The idea of metals and plants have something in common, which is their material and vegetative nature; and yet the idea of the one does not include that of the other.

VI. A X I O M.

‘ A true idea should agree with its object.’

E X A M E N.

This axiom is just; but then great care is to be taken not to confound true ideas with adequate ideas, or conformity with identity. This Spinoza does frequently in his demonstrations, in order to prove that our true ideas are all adequate, and that the ideas and the objects are the same.

VII. A X I O M.

‘ That which can be conceived as non-existent, its essence does not include existence.’

E X A M E N.

This axiom is certainly true, but we must not thence infer with Spinoza, that what may be conceived as existent its essence includes existence; that to suppose a being created, which was not before, is to suppose that what is false may become true; that existence belongs to the nature of all substance; and in one word that all that exists, exists necessarily. All this he advances without any shadow of proof.

A X I O M A VI.

Idea vera debet cum ideato convenire.

A X I O M A VII.

Quicquid ut non existens potest concipi, ejus essentia non involvit existentiam.

Thus all Spinoza's definitions and axioms are false, equivocal, or eternal repetitions or insinuations of the same undemonstrable principle, 'that all things are modes of the same substance.' We shall now see what system can be built upon such tottering foundations.

SPINOSA'S PROPOSITIONS, AND DEMONSTRATIONS.

PROPOSITION I.

'A substance is prior in nature to its modes.'

DEMONSTRATION.

'This is clear from the third and fifth definitions.'

E X A M E N.

This is a self-evident proposition, which wants no demonstration, for a thing cannot be modified till it exist; since nothing can have no properties.

PROPOSITION II.

'Two substances that have different attributes, have nothing in common with each other.'

DEMONSTRATION.

'This is clear from the third definition, for every one of these substances should exist in itself, and be conceived by

P R O P. I.

Substantia prior est natura suis affectionibus.

DEMONSTRATIO.

Patet ex definitione tertia et quinta.

P R O P. II.

Duae substantiae diversa habentes attributa nihil inter se commune habent.

DEMONSTRATIO.

Patet ex definitione tertia; unaquaeque conceptus unius, conceptum alterius non enim in se debet esse et per se concipi, sive involvit.

‘itself; or the idea of the one does not involve the idea of the
‘other.’

E X A M E N.

The proof of this proposition is founded upon a false or equivocal definition, and so is false. A substance is neither that which exists in itself, nor by itself, nor which may be conceived of itself without any other. This is true only of the self-existent absolutely infinite substance. Spinoza therefore should have proved that there can be no other substances but this. Moreover; tho’ two substances have not the same attributes, yet one may produce the other, and so they may have immutable and necessary relations as cause and effect. In fine, tho’ substances have distinct attributes, yet as representative of the same archetype they may have something analogous. Thus tho’ spiritual and material substances have not the same attributes, yet they have something in common as representative of the same original. From all this it follows that this proposition taken in the sense Spinoza gives to the word Substance is reducible to this; ‘two self-existent substances that have different attributes, have nothing in common with each other:’ for they have neither common natures and properties; nor are they causes and effects; nor archetypes or representations, and so have nothing similar: yea they are two chimeras; for two absolute infinities are impossible.

P R O P O S I T I O N III.

‘When things have nothing in common, the one cannot
‘be the cause of the other.’

P R O P. III.

Quae res nihil commune inter se habent, earum una alterius causa esse non potest.

DEMONSTRATION.

‘ If they have nothing in common, they cannot be conceived one by another, by the fifth axiom, and therefore the one cannot be the cause of the other, by the fourth axiom.’

E X A M E N.

This demonstration is founded upon the fourth and fifth axioms, which we have shewn to be false or equivocal. There are no beings in nature but what have something in common, either as substances of the same nature, or as effects of the same cause, or as representations of the same original. Besides Spinoza’s conclusion does not follow from the fourth axiom: for tho’ the knowledge of an effect supposes some knowledge of the cause, yet it does not suppose a perfect knowledge of the manner how the cause operates. Tho’ therefore we do not conceive the connection betwixt the cause and the effect, yet its efficiency is not to be denied. Thus we cannot deny active force, neither does Spinoza deny it, tho’ we do not know how its effects are produced. Now as we do not deny moving force, because we cannot conceive it, so neither ought we to deny creating force because we cannot conceive it. It is here that the systems of Spinoza and Malebranche begin to resemble each other. The one denies creation in the first cause, and the other denies action in second causes; because they cannot conceive the manner of their operation.

DEMONSTRATIO.

Si nihil commune cum se invicem habent, ergo per ax. quintum nec per se invicem intelligi possunt, adeoque, per ax. quintum, una alterius causa esse non potest.

PROPOSITION IV.

‘ Two or more things really distinguished, can be distinguished only by their different attributes or different modes.’

DEMONSTRATION.

‘ All things, by the first axiom, exist either in themselves or in others, that is, according to the third and fifth definition, there is nothing really existent but substances and modes; therefore things can only be distinguished by their substances (that is, according to the fourth definition, by their attributes) or by their modes.’

EXAMEN.

This demonstration is founded upon the first axiom, and upon the third, fourth and fifth definitions, which being all equivocal or false, it must be so too. Further, it is absolutely false that substances can be distinguished only by their attributes and by their modes. There may be a third distinction, and that is by their separate existence. The several kinds are distinguished by the general different attributes that belong to them. Thus spirits and bodies differ by their various attributes. The particular species of substances of the same kind are distinguished by their different forms and modes. Thus wood is different from gold by the different configuration of its parts, tho’ both be equally matter. Individuals are distin-

P R O P. IV.

Duae aut plures res distinctae vel inter se distinguuntur ex diversitate attributo-

DEMONSTRATIO.

Omnia quae sunt, vel in se vel in alio ergo extra intellectum datur per quod plura sunt, per ax. 1. hoc est per def. 3. et 5. res res distingui possunt, praeter substantias earundemque affectiones. Nihil earum attributa, earumque affectiones.

guished by their separate existence, for tho' two pieces of metal have the same attributes, and tho' they may have the same modes, yet they subsist separately and independently one of another, so that the one may exist tho' the other were annihilated. Beings therefore may be distinguished either by their attributes, their modes, or their separate existence. Now before Spinoza can establish his principle concerning the unity of one only substance; he must shew that these three distinctions are chimerical, that all Beings of the same kind are the same individual substance; and that the distinction hitherto received of genus, species, and individual, is not founded in reason, or in nature. This he proves no where.

PROPOSITION V.

' There cannot be in nature two or more substances of the same nature or attribute.'

DEMONSTRATION.

' If there were many distinct substances in nature, they must be distinguished either by their attributes, or modes, according to the fourth proposition. They are not distinguished by their attributes, since they are of one common attribute or nature: now if they be only distinguished by their modes, they are not substantially distinct, since by the

P R O P. V.

In rerum natura non possunt dari duae aut plures substantiae ejusdem naturae sive attributi.

DEMONSTRATIO.

Si darentur plures distinctae, deberent inter se distingui vel ex diversitate attributorum, vel ex diversitate affectionum, per prop. 4tam. non ex diversitate attributorum, quia supponuntur ejusdem esse naturae sive attributi. At si ex diversitate affectionum tantum distinguuntur, eum substantia sit prior suis affectionibus per

‘ first proposition, a substance is prior to its modes; therefore
 ‘ by laying them aside, and considering the substance in itself,
 ‘ it cannot be conceived as distinct from another of the same
 ‘ nature. Therefore there can be but one substance in na-
 ‘ ture that has the same attribute.

E X A M E N.

All the force of this demonstration is founded upon the foregoing proposition, which we have shewn to be false; for tho’ things be neither distinguished by their attributes nor by their modes, yet they may be distinguished by their separate and independent existence; the one may exist, while the others are destroyed. Spinoza will perhaps say that space and matter are the same, and no part of space can be destroyed: but I have shewn the falshood of this principle, and Spinoza must demonstrate the contrary, which he does no where. Since he understands by substance that which is self-existent, this proposition is then reducible to the following axiom; ‘ there cannot be in nature two or more self-existent substances.’

P R O P O S I T I O N VI.

‘ One substance cannot produce another.’

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

‘ By the foregoing proposition, there cannot be in nature
 ‘ two substances that have the same attribute, that is, which
 prop. 1mam, depositis ergo affectionibus, concipi ab alia distingui: hoc est per prop.
 et in se considerata, hoc est, per def. 3tiam praeced. non poterunt dari plures, sed
 et 4tam, vere considerata, non poterit tantum una.

P R O P VI.

Una substantia non potest produci ab alia substantia.

D E M O N S T R A T I O.

In rerum natura non possunt dari duae substantiae ejusdem attributi per prop. pre-

‘ have any thing in common, by the 2d prop. and so by the
 ‘ third, the one cannot be the cause of the other.’

E X A M E N.

We have already shewn the falshood of the 2d, 3d and
 5th propositions, and so the demonstration founded upon
 them is false. We have also demonstrated that as active force,
 or the power of producing modes, must be allowed, tho’ we
 do not conceive it; so creating force, or the power of produ-
 cing substances, must be allowed, tho’ we do not conceive it.
 Spinoza’s proposition is therefore reducible to this, ‘ one self-
 ‘ existent substance cannot produce another self-existent sub-
 ‘ stance.’

P R O P O S I T I O N VII.

‘ Existence belongs to the nature of substance.’

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

‘ One substance cannot produce another, by the 6th prop.
 ‘ therefore it must be its own cause; that is, its essence must
 ‘ necessarily involve existence, by the first definition.’

E X A M E N.

We have already shewn the falshood of the first def. and
 of the 6th prop. and so the seventh must be false, unless it be
 reduced, according to the meaning Spinoza gives to the word

ced. hoc est per prop. 2dam, quae aliquid prop. 3tiam una alterius causa esse nequit,
 inter se commune habent. Adeoque per sive una ab alia produci nequit.

P R O P. VII.

Ad naturam substantiae pertinet existere.

D E M O N S T R A T I O.

Substantia non potest produci ab alia, necessario existentiam, sive ad ejus natu-
 per prop. preced. erit itaque causa sui, id ram pertinet existere.
 est per def. primam ipsius essentia involvit

substance, to this axiom; ‘ necessary existence belongs to the
‘ nature of the self-existent substance.’

P R O P O S I T I O N VIII.

‘ All substance is necessarily infinite.’

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

‘ There is but one substance in nature that can have the
‘ same attribute, by the 5th prop. now by the 7th, it belongs
‘ to the nature of substance to exist, it must therefore be fi-
‘ nite or infinite: if finite, it must be bounded by some other
‘ substance of the same kind, according to the 2d defin. and
‘ this bounding substance would also exist necessarily, by the
‘ seventh prop. and so there would be two substances of the
‘ same attribute, which is impossible by the fifth proposition.’

E X A M E N.

The force of this demonstration depends upon the 5th
and 7th prop. which are absolutely false, unless reduced to
the above-mentioned axioms, and then the sense of this pro-
position will be; ‘ the self-existent substance is necessarily in-
‘ finite.’

P R O P O S I T I O N IX.

‘ The more reality that a substance has, the more attributes
‘ it has.’

P R O P VIII.

Omnis substantia est necessario infinita.

D E M O N S T R A T I O.

Substantia unius attributi, non nisi unica alia ejusdem naturae, quae etiam necessa-
existit (per prop. 5.) et ad ipsius naturam rio debet existere (per prop. 7.) adeoque
pertinet existere (per prop. 7.) erit ergo darentur duae substantiae ejusdem attri-
ipius natura vel finita vel infinita: at non buti, quod est absurdum (per prop. 5.)
finita, nam per def. 2. debet terminari ab existet ergo infinita.

P R O P. IX.

Quo plus realitatis aut esse, unaquaeque res habet, eo plura attributa ipsi competunt.

DEMONSTRATION.

‘ This is clear from the fourth definition.’

E X A M E N.

Can any thing be more bold, than to give for a demonstration a definition that is false and equivocal? It is true that the more reality a substance has, the greater its attributes are in quality, not in quantity: for if these attributes necessarily suppose negation, we ought not to attribute them to absolute infinite, which excludes all defect, privation and negation; otherwise God would be the sum of all finites, not absolutely infinite. This proposition therefore if it signifies any thing, must be reduced to this, ‘ that the more perfect a substance is, the more perfect its attributes are.’

P R O P O S I T I O N X.

‘ Every attribute of a substance may be conceived by itself.’

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

‘ By the fourth definition, an attribute is that which the mind conceives of a substance, as constituting its essence, and therefore by the third definition it may be conceived by itself.

E X A M E N.

Spinoza defines a substance that which may be conceived by itself. He maintains by this prop. that an attribute may be conceived by itself. Thus he confounds the ideas of at-

D E M O N S T R A T I O.

Patet ex definitione quarta.

P R O P. X.

Unumquodque unius substantiae attributum per se concipi debet.

D E M O N S T R A T I O.

Attributum est id quod intellectus de constituens, per def. 4tam, adeoque per substantia percipit tanquam ejus essentiam def. 3tam per se concipi debet.

tribute and substance, and so there may be many distinct substances, since there may be many distinct attributes.

PROPOSITION XI.

‘ God, or a Being composed of infinite attributes every one of which express an eternal and infinite essence, exists necessarily.’

DEMONSTRATION.

‘ If you deny this, conceive that God does not exist, therefore by the seventh axiom his essence does not involve existence: but by the 7th proposition it belongs to the nature of all substance to exist, therefore God exists necessarily.’

E X A M E N.

Thus Spinoza demonstrates the greatest of all truths by an absolute falsehood. Moreover, it is absurd to say that God is a Being composed of infinite attributes: the divine attributes flow from the idea of his essence, but they do not compose it. In fine, all that we can conceive of absolute infinite is reducible to that of three consubstantial distinctions, as we have demonstrated, and therefore God is not composed of infinite attributes.

P R O P. XI.

Deus, sive substantia constans infinitis et aeternam exprimit essentiam, necessario attributis quorum unumquodque infinitam existit.

DEMONSTRATIO.

Si negas, concipe si fieri potest, Deum prop. 7mam hoc est absurdum. Ergo Deus non existere, ergo per ax. 7mum ejus essentia non involvit existentiam; atqui per necessario existit.

PROPOSITION XII.

‘ We can conceive no attribute of a substance, from whence
‘ it follows that it can be divided.’

DEMONSTRATION.

‘ The parts in which a substance can be divided retain the
‘ nature of the substance or not. If they retain the nature of
‘ the substance, then by the 8th prop. every part ought to be
‘ infinite, and so by the 6th prop. its own cause, and by the
‘ 5th prop. have different attributes, and so in one substance
‘ there might be many substances which is absurd by the
‘ 5th prop. . . . If they do not retain the nature of the sub-
‘ stance by this division, then the divided substance would
‘ cease to be, which is impossible by the 7th prop.’

E X A M E N.

This demonstration is founded upon the 5th, 6th, 7th and
8th propositions, which being all false, it must be so too.

PROPOSITION XIII.

‘ The absolutely infinite Substance is indivisible.’

DEMONSTRATION.

‘ If it were divisible, the parts into which it could be di-

P R O P XII.

Nullum substantiae attributum potest vere concipi, ex quo sequatur substantiam
posse dividi.

DEMONSTRATIO.

Partes enim in quas substantia divide- 5.) est absurdum. . . . Si secundum, ergo
retur, vel naturam substantiae retinebunt cum tota substantia in aequales partes ef-
vel non. Si primum, tum (per prop. 8.) fet divisa, naturam substantiae amitteret
unaquaeque pars erit infinita, et (per prop. et esse desineret, quod (per prop. 7.) est
6.) causa sui, adeoque ex una substantia absurdum.
plures constitui poterunt, quod (per prop.

P R O P. XIII.

Substantia absolute infinita est indivisibilis.

‘ vided, would retain the nature of the absolutely infinite substance or not. If the first, then there would be many substances of the same nature, which is absurd by the fifth proposition. If the second be affirmed, then the absolutely infinite substance might cease to be, which is absurd by the eleventh proposition.’

E X A M E N.

Thus Spinoza demonstrates again an eternal, immutable truth by an absolute falsehood; and from this true proposition he draws the following corollary; ‘ that no substance, and consequently that no corporeal substance, in so far as a substance, is divisible.’ In the scholium of the fifteenth proposition he reasons thus. ‘ If corporeal substance could be divided into parts really distinct, one of these parts might be annihilated while the others subsist, and so there might be a void in nature; but this we have demonstrated elsewhere to be impossible, and therefore it is plain that corporeal substance is indivisible. If it be asked, why we are so apt to divide quantity or extension? I answer, because we conceive it in two manners, either by imagination, or by pure intellect. Imaginary extension may be conceived as finite, divisible and composed of parts; but intelligible ex-

D E M O N S T R A T I O.

Si enim divisibilis esset, partes in quas divideretur vel naturam substantiae absolute infinitae retinebunt vel non. Si primum, dabuntur ergo plures substantiae ejusdem naturae, quod (per prop. 5tam) est absurdum. Si secundum ponatur, ergo poterit substantia absolute infinita definire esse, quod (per prop. undecimam) est etiam absurdum.

C O R R O L A R I U M.

Ex his sequitur nullam substantiam, et consequenter nullam substantiam corpoream, quatenus substantia est, esse divisibilem.

‘tension, in so far as it is a substance, is infinite, one, and indivisible. This will be easily understood by those who know to distinguish betwixt imagination and intellect; especially when we consider that matter is every where the same, and that its parts are only distinguished modally not really.’

Thus Spinoza, to avoid the imputation of corporalizing the Godhead, destroys the very essence of matter, and reduces all to the idea of an infinite, intelligible, indivisible extension. It is true indeed that when he talks of motion, he contradicts himself visibly, and seems to insinuate that bodies are really moved: but this cannot be if matter be indivisible; for since it has no real parts, the one cannot be separated from, nor transported by the other. Spinoza had not sufficiently digested this part of his system. He had no notion of the Malebranchian or Berkleyan schemes, which give a mighty light to his dark principles. According to the former scheme matter does not act upon us; and according to the latter there is no third substance betwixt God and spirit. As colours, tastes, and smells are nothing real without us, but sensations in us; so figures, divisions and motions are nothing real without us; but only sensations excited in the soul by the infinite, intelligible, indivisible, unmoveable extension, that acts upon us efficaciously, and shows itself to us only by parcels. Thus we imagine virtual points, figures, divisions, and motions in the divine immensity, tho’ there be really none. This is the use which the modern Spinozists have made of the Cartesian, Malebranchian, and Berkeleyan maxims.

PROPOSITION XIV.

‘ Besides God there is and can be no other substance conceivable.’

DEMONSTRATION.

‘ God is an absolutely infinite essence of which no attribute can be denied that expresses the essence of substance, by the sixth definition; and he necessarily exists by the eleventh proposition. Now if there were any other substance but God, it must be explained by some attribute of God; and so there would be two substances having the same attribute, which is absurd by prop. fifth; therefore there can exist no substance besides God, nor consequently any other be conceived.’

E X A M E N.

This great proposition is the essence, basis, and scope of the whole system; and it is founded upon a false definition of God, as if ‘ no attribute could be denied of him that expresses the essence of substance,’ and upon a most ridiculous, absurd proposition, ‘ that there cannot be in nature two substances of the same kind, and that have the same attributes.’

As the preceding definitions, axioms, and propositions have been proved equivocal, sophistical or false, all the system founded on these must fall to the ground. It is therefore needless to continue any further, a particular confutation of each proposition. We shall now proceed to shew the consequences Spinoza draws from the foregoing principles, and expose the monstrous impieties of his system in all its extent, not only as it lies in his writings, but as it has been or may be improved by the modern Spinozists, that know how

to make a right use of scholastic, Cartesian, Malebranchian, and Berkeleyan principles.

THE SPINOSIAN SCHEME.

I. The great legislator of the Jews defines God **THE BEING THAT IS**, to signify that he is the only substance truly existent and that all other beings are only modes, forms or emanations of the **GREAT ALL**. The eternal, self-existent, sovereignly intelligent and infinitely active substance, may be considered either according to its absolute essence, or according to the effects it produces in itself, by its immanent action. When we consider God according to his absolute essence, there is in him no time or succession, no measure or bounds, no numbers or multiplicity. When we consider him as acting in and upon himself to express by infinitely different modes, his numberless attributes, hence arise the ideas of time, measure, and number. This absolute, active, immense essence of God is what I call **NATURA NATURANS**, or Na-

1. Unde clare apparet nos existentiam substantiae toto genere a modorum existentia diversam concipere; ex quo oritur differentia inter aeternitatem et durationem. Per durationem enim modorum tantum existentiam explicare possumus. Substantiae vero existentiam per aeternitatem, hoc est infinitam existendi sive essendi fruitionem.---Porro ex eo quod durationem et quantitatem pro libitu determinare possumus; ubi scilicet hanc a substantia abstractam concipimus, et illam a modo qua a rebus aeternis fluit separamus, oritur tempus et mensura. Tempus nempe ad durationem, mensura ad quantitatem tali modo determinandam, ut quod fieri potest eas facile imaginemur. Deinde ex eo quod affectiones substantiae, ab ipsa substantia separamus, et ad classes ut eas facile imaginemur, redigimus, oritur numerus. Ex quibus clare videre est, mensuram, tempus; et numerum nihil esse praeter cogitandi, seu potius imaginandi modos. Epist. xxix. p. 466, 467. Per 'naturam naturantem' intelligo id quod in se est, et per se concipitur, sive talia substantiae at-

ture producing; and the consubstantial, eternal forms and modes produced in and by this only substance, is what I call *NATURA NATURATA*, or Nature produced. All is one and the same substance considered as cause or effect, producing or produced, source or emanation, attributes or modes.

2. The schoolmen grant that the ideas or essences of all possible finites are eternal, immutable, and necessary; and that they existed eternally, immutably and necessarily in the divine mind. Now the ideas of the infinite essence, are not like the ideas of finite; they are not transient, variable and fugitive, but unchangeable, permanent and eternal. They are not substances separate from God, but distinct personalities, coessential forms and consubstantial beings, which inhere in, subsist by, depend upon and flow from God's all-containing, all-producing essence. As God understands all things necessarily, so he wills all things necessarily and pro-

tributa quae aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimunt, hoc est Deus, quatenus ut causa consideratur. Per 'naturam' autem intelligo id omne quod ex necessitate Dei naturae, sive uniuscujusque Dei attributorum sequitur, hoc est omnes Dei attributorum modos, quatenus considerantur ut res quae in Deo sunt, et quae sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt. Eth. pars prima, scholium prop. 29. Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens non vero transiens. Ibid. prop. 18.

2. Dei intellectus quatenus Dei essentiam constituere concipitur est revera causa rerum, tum earum essentiae, tum earum existentiae; quod ab iis videtur etiam fuisse

animadversum, qui dei intellectum, voluntatem et potentiam unum et idem esse asseruerunt. Eth. pars ima. schol. prop. 17. A summa Dei potentia sive infinita natura, infinita infinitis modis, hoc est omnia necessario effluxisse assero, vel semper eadem necessitate sequi, eodem modo ac ex natura trianguli ab aeterno et in aeternum sequitur ejus tres angulos aequari duobus rectis, Ibid. schol. prop. 17. Siquis statuit substantiam creari, simul statuit ideam falsam, factam esse veram, quo sane nihil absurdius concipi potest; adeoque fatendum necessario est substantiae existentiam, sicut et ejus essentiam aeternam esse veritatem. Ibid. schol. 2. prop. 8.

duces all things necessarily: for his power, will and understanding being his essence; if he could change his ideas, wills or acts he might change his essence. We must always reason of these three attributes according to the rules of analogy. As the acts of his understanding are infinite, eternal and necessary; so the acts of his will and power are infinite, eternal and necessary. As his understanding cannot be augmented, diminished or changed, so neither can his will, or his power be augmented, impaired, or altered. Thus his infinite luminous, and active essence knows all, wills all, and produces all by an equal necessity. There is however no blind fatality in God, because all things flow from him by necessity of nature in the same sense that he understands himself necessarily.

3. God contains infinite attributes of which every one denotes an eternal and infinite essence. We have no distinct ideas but of three of these attributes, infinite extension, infi-

Ex necessitate naturae divinae, infinita infinitis modis, hoc est omnia quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt, sequi debent. Ibid. prop. 16. Omnes quos vidi philosophi concedunt, nullum in Deo dari intellectum potentia, sed tantum actu. Cum autem et ejus intellectus et ejus voluntas ab ejusdem essentia non distinguantur, ut etiam omnes concedant; sequitur ergo etiam quod si Deus alium intellectum actu habuisset, et aliam voluntatem, ejus etiam essentia alia necessario esset, ac proinde si aliter res quam jam sunt a Deo productae essent, Dei intellectus ejusque voluntas, hoc est ejus essentia, alia esse deberet, quod est absurdum. Ibid. schol. prop. 33. Volo hic paucis

explicare qua ratione ego fatalem omnium rerum et actionum necessitatem statui. Nam Deum nullo modo fato subjicio; sed omnia inevitabili necessitate ex Dei natura sequi concipio, eodem modo, ac omnes concipiunt, ex ipsius Dei natura sequi ut Deus seipsum intelligat, quod sane nemo negat, ex divina natura necessario sequi, et tamen nemo concipit Deum fato aliquo coactum, sed omnino libere tametsi necessario seipsum intelligere. Epist. 23. ad Oldenburg. p. 453.

3. Nihil in natura clarius, quam quod unumquodque ens sub aliquo attributo debeat concipi, et quo plus realitatis aut esse habeat, eo plura attributa quae et necessitatem sive aeternitatem et infinitatem

nite intelligence and infinite activity. The extended substance, the thinking substance, and the active substance are one and the same substance, which we consider sometimes under this and sometimes under that attribute. In the same manner a mode of extension and the idea of extension, are one and the same thing, but expressed in different manners; and hence it was that some ancient Hebrews said that God, God's ideas and the objects of these ideas are the same. There are no real beings but God and his consubstantial modes, ideas, hypostases, or personalities, which we call finite spirits. There is no third substance betwixt God and spirits called matter. What we imagine to be bodies are only different sensations or perceptions produced in us by infinite, intelligible extension that affects us differently. Thus human nature is not a substance but an idea that has for its object a limited, determined mode of infinite extension: our soul is a part or idea of

exprimunt, habeat. Schol. prop. 10. Eth. pars 1. Porro ostendimus praeter Deum nullam dari neque concipi posse substantiam; atque hinc conclusimus substantiam extensam unum ex infinitis Dei attributis esse. Ibid. schol. prop. 15. Cogitatio attributum Dei est, sive Deus est res cogitans. Ibid. pars 2. prop. 1. Extensio attributum Dei est, sive Deus est res extensa. Ibid. prop. 2. Substantia cogitans et substantia extensa, una eademque est substantia quae jam sub hoc, jam sub illo attributo concipitur; sic etiam modus extensionis et idea illiusmodi una eademque res est, sed duobus modis expressa. quod quidam Haebraeorum quasi per nebulam vi-

dise videntur, qui scilicet statuunt Deum, Dei intellectum, resque ab ipso intellectas unum et idem esse. Eth. pars 2. schol. prop. 7. Res particulares nihil sunt nisi Dei attributorum affectiones, sive modi, quibus Dei attributa certo ac determinato modo exprimuntur. Eth. pars 1. cor. prop. 25. Ad essentiam hominis non pertinet esse substantiae; sive substantia formam hominis non constituit. Eth. pars 2. prop. 10. Quod actuale mentis humanae esse constituit, nihil aliud est quam idea rei alicujus singularis actu existentis. Ibid. prop. 11. Hinc sequitur mentem humanam partem esse infiniti intellectus Dei. Schol. ejusdem prop. Objectum ideae hu-

the divine intellect, and the object of this idea is body, or a particular mode of the divine extension.

4. Tho' God and Nature, the absolute infinite and finite Beings, be one and the same substance, yet they differ essentially as substance and modes. God is not composed of spirit and body, as if his mind were an intelligent essence and his body a distinct substance united in the same person. Infinite intelligence and infinite extension are equally attributes of the same infinite essence. God is not however intelligent as finite spirits are, nor corporeal as we imagine bodies to be. As no particular ideas, sensations, errors, loves, hatreds, or passions belong to NATURE PRODUCING, or GOD; so no particular forms, figures, divisions, or motions belong to the divine immensity, or intelligible extension. Matter and space being the same, and space being infinite, eternal, and indivisible, matter is the same with the divine immensity. We may indeed imagine in it virtual points, divisions, figures, motions, but all these qualities are simple sensations in us, as colours, tastes and sounds; and nothing real in the divine es-

manam mentem constituentis est corpus, sine certis extensionis modis, et nihil aliud. Ibid. prop. 13.

4. Intellectus actu sive is finitus sit, sive infinitus, ut et voluntas, cupiditas, amor, &c. ad naturam naturatam non vero ad naturam naturantem referri debent. Per intellectum enim non intelligimus absolutam cogitationem, sed certum tantum modum cogitandi: Eth. pars 1. prop. 31. Intellectus et voluntas qui Dei essentiam constituunt, a nostro intellectu et voluntate toto coelo differre debent, nec in ulla

re praeterquam in nomine convenire possunt. Non aliter scilicet quam inter se conveniunt Canis signum coeleste, et canis animal latrans: Schol. prop. 17. Sunt qui Deum instar hominis mente et corpore constantem, atque passionibus obnoxium fingunt; sed quam longe hi a vera Dei cognitione aberrant, satis ex jam demonstratis constat. Hos mitto; nam omnes qui naturam divinam aliquo modo contemplati sunt, Deum esse corporeum negant; quod etiam optime probant ex eo, quod per corpus intelligimus quaecum-

fence that produces them, and which is indivisible, unfigurable, and unmoveable. When we perceive bodies, it is not created, inefficacious, unintelligent, and unintelligible matter that acts upon us, nor any real, imaginary substance betwixt God and spirit that is the object of our perception. It is God's luminous, efficacious, only intelligent and intelligible essence that modifies us differently; and that being the only agent, has the sole, incommunicable power of acting in and upon us. Far be it then from me to confound God and nature, finite Beings with the absolutely infinite, and what imagination calls created matter, with intelligible extension. All the changes and alterations, generations and corruptions that are supposed to flow from figure, motion and division, are pure sensations that happen in finite spirits, and do not affect the eternal, infinite, incorporeal cause.

5. The eternal, immanent, necessary activity of the divine essence in and upon itself produces in nature all possible forms, modes, and qualities, by immutable, eternal, and necessary laws, and by an uninterrupted chain of causes and ef-

que quantitatem longam, totam, et profundam, certa aliqua figura terminatam, quo nihil absurdius de Deo, ente scilicet absolute infinito, dici potest: Eth. pars 1. schol. prop. 15. Quare ii prorsus garrunt, ne dicam insanunt, qui substantiam extensam ex partibus, sive corporibus ab invicem realiter distinctis constatam esse putant.—Si ad quantitatem prout est in imaginatione attendimus, quod saepissime et facilius fit, ea divisibilis, finita, ex partibus constat et multiplex reperietur. Sin ad eandem prout est in intellectu attenda-

mus, et res ut in sese percipitur, quod difficillime fit; tum infinita, indivisibilis et unica reperietur: Epist. 29. p. 467. At tamen quod quidam putant, systema meum eo inniti, quod Deus et natura, (per quam massam quandam sive materiam corpoream intelligunt) unum et idem sint, tota errant via. Epist. 21. p. 449.

5. Ea res libera dicitur, quae ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit, et a se sola ad agendum determinatur: Eth. pars 1. def. 7. Deus ex solis suae naturae legibus, et a nemine coactus agit: Ibid. prop. 17.

fects, which determine, move, and produce each other from everlasting to everlasting. God by a physical premotion, and a predeterminating action produces all Beings and all their modalities. Nothing finite can exist, subsist, will, or act unless it be determined to exist, will, and act by another, and that by another, and so on till we mount up to the first, sole and only efficacious cause. Freedom therefore is not a chimerical indifference, or capacity to act or not to act, to will, or not to will; but an exemption from all constraint. In this sense God is the only free agent, because he alone exists and acts by the sole necessity of his nature. All other Beings exist, subsist, will, and act by his sovereign, absolute, unbounded determination. What we call contingent is only that whose necessity we do not discover in the idea of its essence; and what we call Necessary is that whose idea includes existence. Thus we say that the attributes of God, flow necessarily from the idea of his essence; but the modes by which he expresses these attributes are called free and contingent;

Hinc sequitur solum Deum esse causam liberam; quia ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit et agit: Cor. 2. ejusdem prop. 17. Res quae ad aliquid operandum determinata est, a Deo necessario fuit sic determinata; et quae a Deo non est determinata non potest seipsam ad operandum determinare: Ibid. prop. 26. Res quae a Deo ad aliquid operandum determinata est, seipsam indeterminatam reddere non potest: Ibid. prop. 27. Quaevis res quae finita est et determinatam habet existentiam, non potest existere, neque ad operandum determinari, nisi ad existendum et operandum determinetur ab alia causa, quae

etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam, et determinatur ad existendum et operandum; et sic in infinitum: Ibid. prop. 28. Deus tamen non potest proprie dici causa esse remota rerum singularium, nisi forte ea de causa, ut scilicet has ab iis quae ex absoluta ejus natura sequuntur distinguamus. Omnia enim quae sunt, in Deo sunt, et a Deo ita dependent ut sine ipso nec esse, nec concipi possunt: Schol. prop. 28. Res voco contingentes quatenus ad earum solam essentiam attendimus, nihil invenimus quod earum existentiam necessario ponat, vel quod ipsam necessario secludat: Eth. pars 4. def. 3. In re-

because they do not flow immediately from the idea of his essence, but from that of his unbounded action, which must necessarily produce all, even all that is possible. Both however are equally inevitable and necessary; because they both flow from the necessity of the divine nature, either as the only substance, or as the only agent. Thus there is in nature nothing really contingent; all things are determined to exist and operate by the necessity of the divine nature, nothing could happen but what is, nor happen in any other manner or order but as it is.

6. Men imagine most foolishly that God acts for some end, as if he wanted or desired something that he does not really possess. Unaccustomed to Geometrical reasoning which considers only the essence of things, they imagined the doctrine of final causes; as if God not being able to accomplish immediately and by himself, had chosen intermediate means to come at his end; which is destroying the perfection of the divine nature. God's perfection is to be measured by his ab-

rum natura nullum datur contingens, sed omnia ex necessitate naturae divinae determinata sunt ad existendum et operandum certo modo: Eth. pars 1. prop. 29. Res nullo alio modo, neque alio ordine a Deo produci potuerunt quam productae sunt: Ibid. prop. 33.

6. Omnia quae hic indicare suscipio praejudicia, pendent ab hoc uno, quod scilicet communiter supponunt homines, Deum omnia ad certum aliquem finem dirigere. Quae sane unica fuit causa, ut veritas humanum genus in aeternum lateret, nisi Mathesis quae non circa fines, sed tantum circa figurarum essentias et

proprietas versatur, aliam veritatis normam hominibus ostendisset. Haec doctrina de finibus Dei perfectionem tollit; nam si Deus propter finem agit, aliquid necessario appetit quo caret; et quamvis theologi et metaphysici distinguant inter finem indigentiae et finem assimilationis; fatentur tamen Deum omnia propter se non propter res creandas egisse. Adeoque necessario fateri coguntur, Deum iis propter quae media parare voluit, caruisse, eaque cupivisse.—Postquam homines sibi persuaserunt omnia quae sunt propter ipsos fieri, id in unaquaque re praecipuum judicare debuerunt, quod ipsis utilissimum;

solute power; which having no bounds, produces all possible forms by necessity of nature; tho' these forms be contradictory and mutually destructive of each other, yet they are no more inconsistent with the perfection of the divine essence, than contrary motions in bodies would be inconsistent with the nature of matter, if there were any such real substance existent. As an infinite force, acting upon an infinite matter, during an infinite duration would necessarily produce all possible, and so all contrary forms; in the same manner an infinite understanding acting upon its infinite ideas during all eternity must necessarily produce in them, all sorts of possible perceptions and inclinations. What we call therefore noxious or agreeable, laudable or contemptible, meritorious or sinful, good or evil, just or unjust, are all relative to finite, and nothing real in absolute Infinite; whose active nature necessarily obliges him to produce all that is and that can be, yea all without exception. This totality is absolutely necessary to the perfection of the whole, otherwise God would not contain all reality, and so could not be infinite.

et illa omnia praestantissima aestimari a quibus optime afficiebantur. Unde has formare debebant notiones, quibus rerum naturas explicarent; scilicet bonum, malum, ordinem, confusionem, pulchritudinem et deformitatem, et quia se liberas existimant, inde hae notiones ortae sunt, scilicet laus et vituperium, peccatum et meritum: sed ut modo dixi facile confundantur: nam rerum perfectio ex sola earum natura et potentia est aestimanda; nec ideo res magis aut minus perfectae sunt, propterea quod hominum sensum delectant aut offendunt; quod humanae naturae conducunt, vel quod ei repugnant---

Constat igitur naturam finem nullum sibi praefixum habere, et omnes causas finales nihil nisi humana esse figmenta. Omnia enim, naturae aeterna quadam necessitate, summaque perfectione procedunt; quia ex necessitate naturae divinae, infinita infinitis modis, hoc est omnia quae sub intellectum finitum cadere possunt, sequi debent: Append. ad 1. partem Eth. p. 33.

7. Porro haec inevitabilis rerum necessitas, neque leges divinas neque huma-

7. This doctrine does not however destroy the natural ideas we have of virtue and vice. Virtue consists in the love of God for himself, and not for any fear of punishment, nor hope of reward. This love flows necessarily from the knowledge of God. God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love, and the love that finite spirits have for God, is a portion of the infinite love, by which God loves himself. God is therefore not to be considered as an arbitrary judge that threatens pains and promises rewards. Virtue is its own reward, and vice its own punishment. The knowledge and love of God produce happiness, as a necessary consequence, and not as an arbitrary recompence. The ignorance and hatred of God beget misery, which is not a punishment, but a necessary consequence of vice. It is God alone that gives virtue to the good, and that refuses the same perfection to the bad; not by free choice and arbitrary decrees, which would be cruel and partial, but by the necessary laws of his infinite fecundity, which obliges him to produce beings of all degrees. God however is not the author of sin, for sin is a ne-

nas tollit. nam documenta moralia sive formam legis ab ipso Deo accipiunt, sive non, divina tamen sunt et salutaria; et sive bonum quod ex virtute et amore divino sequitur a Deo nunquam iudice accipiunt, vel quod ex necessitate nature divine emanet, non propterea magis optabile erit; et nec contra male, quae ex malis operibus sequuntur, ideo quia necessario ex his sequantur minus sunt timenda: Epist. 29. p. 555. Summum mentis bonum est Dei cognitio, et summam mentis virtus Deum cognoscere: prop.

28. Eth. pars 4. Deus seipsum amore intellectuali infinito amat: Eth. pars 5. prop. 35. Mentis ergo Deum amor intellectualis pars est infiniti amoris quo Deus seipsum amat. Ibid. prop. 36. Ex his clare intelligimus quae in re noxia sunt, seu bestitudo consistit: nempe in constanti et aeterno erga Deum amore, sive in amore Dei erga homines. Schol. ejsdem prop. Legis igitur divinae Summa, ejusque summum proceptum est. Deum ut summum bonum amare, non ex metu alicujus supplicii et poenae, nec gratia amore alterius

gation, a privation, a nothing; and so does not want a cause. God is the only efficient cause of all that is real in the criminal act, because he is the total cause of all that expresses reality or essence. But the defectuousity comes from the natures of things as finite, in which there are infinite degrees. Now to ask why God did not make all things equally perfect, is to ask why the divine nature is necessarily and infinitely productive? It is for the clay to ask the potter, why he made some vessels for honour and others for dishonour? it is to ask why boundless activity is not bounded? So vast, so ample, so fruitful are the perfections and powers of the divine nature, that they extend to and comprehend necessarily all degrees of Being from the highest to the lowest, the virtuous and the vicious, the good and the bad, the perfect and the defective; which tho' unequal and imperfect with regard to each other, yet are all equal with relation to him; neither of them honour

rei qua delectari cupimus; sed ex eo solo quod Deum novit; alioquin non tam ipsum Deum, quam id quod cupimus amaremus: Epist. 49. et Tract. Theol. polit. cap. 4. Statuo ergo Deum absolute et revera causam esse omnium quae essentiam et realitatem habeant, quaecunque etiam illa sint. Videor mihi sufficienter ostendisse id quod formam mali, erroris, sceleris ponit, non in aliquo quod essentiam exprimit consistere; ideoque dici non posse, Deum ejus esse causam: Epist. 36. p. 512. Mens quatenus ratione utitur, hoc tantum sibi utile judicat, quod ad intelligendum conducat, illud vero malum, quod impedire potest quo minus intelligamus: prop. 26, et 27. Eth. pars 4. Iis autem

qui quaerunt cur Deus omnes homines non ita creavit ut solo rationis ductu gubernarentur; nihil aliud respondeo, quam quia ei non defuit materia ad omnia ex summo nimirum ad infimum perfectionis gradum creanda; vel magis proprie loquendo, quia ipsius naturae leges adeo amplae fuerunt ut sufficerent ad omnia quae ab infinito intellectu concipi possunt producenda: Eth. pars 1. append. p. 39. Porro homines coram Deo, nulla alia de causa sunt excusabiles quam quia in ipsius Dei potestate sunt, ut lutum in potestate figuli, quae ex eadem massa vasa fecit, alia ad decus, alia ad dedecus: Epist. 23. p. 453.

or dishonour, please or displeasè, content or offend the divine nature, which is impassible.

Thus I have given an account of the Spinosian system, in Spinosà's own words; that so there may be no doubt of his sense, or of my veracity. I have only mixed now and then some strokes of the Predestinarian theology, and Cartesian philosophy, which the modern Spinosists make use of to illustrate and perfect their master's scheme. I shall now shew the original sources of this monstrous chimera.

1. Spinosà derived his great and fundamental principle that all flows from God by way of emanation and not creation, from the Cabbalists; who talk thus, 'the first cause ENSOPH, produced immediately from his own substance the intelligible world called ADAM KAD MON, which contains all the productions of the first cause. God expressed in this production all his holy names, yea all the eternal letters of these names, which are the innumerable forms of things. For as of letters are composed words, sentences and discourses; so all individuals, species and kinds are formed from the different composition of the holy names; that is, of the divine attributes. The first production or ADAM KAD MON flowed from the first cause by an extension or expansion of the divine substance, and not by way of creation; so that all particular Beings are substantial rays or emanations of the first cause.' Thus the Cabbalistical Ensoph is Spinosà's Nature producing; their Adam kad mon his Nature produced; what they call the holy names, he calls attributes; and what they called the letters of these names, he calls the

modes of these attributes. The Chinese, and almost all the Orientals fell into the same errors; and hence proceeded the doctrine of the Pantheists, who looked upon God and Nature as the same, and the divine essence as the soul of the world.

2. Spinoza borrowed from his master Descartes that space and matter were the same, that a void in nature was impossible; and thence he concluded justly that infinite, eternal, uncreated extension was an attribute of God; and with Malebranche, that when we see bodies, it is not unintelligent, unactive, created matter we see; but infinite, intelligent, and intelligible extension, which acts upon us and modifies us differently; and so asserts with Berkeley that the creation of matter distinct from God is useless, superfluous and chimerical.

3. Spinoza maintained with the schoolmen that the knowledge of all finite ideas enters necessarily into the 'generation of the Logos;' that all that is in God is God; and that since all ideas are necessarily in God, they are God; and so consubstantial forms, hypostases, or personalities of the divine nature. He holds again with the Predestinarians, that all things flow from eternal decrees, and that all that is real in creatures is an immediate effect of the divine will, of his physical premotion and predeterminating action. From whence he concludes that there is but one agent, as but one substance in nature; that God is all, as he does all; and in fine that all things are consubstantial ideas or modes of the same eternal substance.

4. He learned from the same schoolmen of all kinds, that physical and moral evil would be eternal and indestructible;

blindly prepossessed and devoutly attached to this tenet, he chose rather to attribute this direful inequality betwixt beings, and the everlasting duration of sin and misery to the boundless extent of the divine power, that is necessarily obliged to produce beings of all possible kinds, than free, arbitrary decrees; persuaded that a God who acts by necessity of nature is less odious than a malicious God that renders beings for ever miserable, and leaves them eternally wicked by deliberate choice.

From all this it appears that Spinoza's monstrous system is composed of Cabbalism, Cartesianism, and Predestinarianism differently conjoined and interwoven. With regard to ideas; Malebranchism is Spinosism begun, and Spinosism is Malebranchism consummated. With regard to moral actions, the Spinosian errors are not so much abuses, as natural and necessary consequences of the Predestinarian scheme. If this be so, then it is possible that Spinoza did not think himself an Atheist; his principles lead visibly to atheism and immorality, because they despoil the divine nature of his three relative attributes, of creating energy, designing wisdom, and paternal goodness; of all power to produce substances distinct from his own; of all end in acting, and of all desire to make beings happy. Yea by denying all freedom and activity in finite beings, these same principles render all efforts to become virtuous useless, and make vice inevitable. Yet all this does not prove that Spinoza was an atheist. Atheism consists in denying that there is an absolutely infinite, eternal, self-existent Being, whose boundless power, understanding and will, produce, know, and govern all things. This Spinoza never de-

nied; but he confounded God and nature; God's absolute and relative attributes; the necessary, immanent generation of the Word with the free, emanant production of the universe; and the eternal procession of the Holy Ghost with the action of second causes. All these fatal errors, which by their natural consequences degrade the divine essence, and so lead to atheism, result necessarily as we have shewn from Oriental, Scholastic, and Cartesian principles; but as we ought not to accuse these divines and philosophers of atheism, so neither ought we to accuse Spinoza of atheism.

Those who have hitherto undertaken the confutation of this philosopher, have not as yet succeeded. All that Bayle says against Spinoza is unworthy of our notice. That ingenious author scarce ever dipt beyond the surface of things. He never understood the Spinosian system, but being an enemy to all demonstration, he declared himself with as much zeal against Spinoza, whom he looked upon as an atheist, as against Malebranche whom he knew to be a believer. Father Lamy judges of Spinoza by the impious consequences of his system; and tho' these consequences be justly drawn from the Spinosian principles, yet they ought not to be attributed to their author, as really believed by him; otherwise the Predestinarians must be accused of atheism, since the natural and necessary consequences of their system tend to render God author of sin, and so destroy all his moral attributes. The pious Poiret mistook also the Spinosian doctrine, when he supposed that the fundamental idea of this scheme was that God is only a metaphysical abstract idea of nature in ge-

neral, and not a true, real, physical Being, indivisible and undivided, intelligent and immense.

We have endeavoured to disclose the mysterious jargon of this dark system, represent it in its true light, and confute it in two different manners, by demonstrating truths diametrically opposite to its principles, and by proving that all its demonstrations are sophistical. We conclude with this sole remark, that till Predestinarian and Cartesian principles be banished from the Christian schools, Spinosism can never be solidly confuted.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

