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PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE EXPERIENCE-PHILOSOPHY.

THE object of this paper is to make clear what I conceive to be the fundamental fallacy of the experience-philosophy. Under 'experience-philosophy' I include all those theories which describe the world as exclusively a 'world of experience.' This, indeed, covers nearly all the philosophy of the present day and recent times, the subjective idealism of Berkeley, the phenomenalism of J. S. Mill, the empiricism of recent science, the present-day theories of pragmatism, humanism, and personal idealism, and the radical empiricism of Professor James. All of these deny that there is a world beyond experience; all, in substance, hold with Berkeley and Schopenhauer, that 'the world is my idea.'

In thus associating pragmatism and subjective idealism, I am conscious of ignoring the protest of those pragmatists who claim that the experience upon which they build is not subjective but prior to the distinction of subjective and objective. As my chief purpose is to show that experience is found only within this distinction, and exists only by virtue of this difference, I must leave the justification of this point to rest upon the argument as a whole. In the meantime, I may point out that, whatever be the distinction between experience and subjective experience, yet in practice, for both pragmatists and subjective idealists, reality is always precisely coextensive with the latter. The chair, when it disappears from thought, ceases also to be. And this limitation is all that preserves pragmatism — which is jealous of its idealism — from falling into the arms of naïve realism.¹

¹ See A. W. Moore in THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, May, 1905. Mr. Moore wonders why, in the critics' conception of pragmatism, it should be always the ob-

The fundamental proposition of the experience-philosophy is that experience — and experience only — is 'given' or 'immediately given.' All else, *i. e.*, the world of things in space and time, is derived, inferred, constructed, developed, from experience. It is my purpose to show that this position of the experience-philosophy is its fundamental error; that the thing *in space and time* is as good a *datum* as the experience; that, in fact, neither is an absolute *datum*; and that the search for absolute *data* is not only illusory but logically unnecessary.

I. *The Series of Experiences.* — We may begin with the series of experiences, often described as the 'series of phenomena.' The conception of such a series forms the working-basis of the experience-philosophy. Not, it might seem, the real basis; for how can a *series* be immediately given? Each member of a series is external to the others; it is given immediately to itself, but to the others it is given only representatively and mediately; consequently, we might say, the series as a whole is a construction. But in the practical exposition of the experience-philosophy this consideration is usually disregarded and the series is treated as if it were immediately given as a whole. Two motives may underly this method of treatment: (1) The *series* may be merely a convenient working-basis. It may be admitted that only the present is immediately given; that the past is given only representatively in the relations found within the present; and that, consequently, reality must at each moment be expressed wholly in terms of the present. But since the method of transposition is clear and the result obvious, each is left to make it for himself. (2) But more commonly, I think, the series is assumed to have a certain immediacy (or priority) of its own. Granting that the only strictly immediate *datum* is the present, still experience as a whole is a *datum* prior to the world of things. I cannot doubt that I think at present; I may be compelled, by an argument perhaps academic, to doubt the past; but in any case I am more certain of my experience as a whole than I can be of a world of things.

ject that disappears. This is just the point. The *object in space and time* does disappear and only the *conception* of the object, so far as it is found in some one's experience, remains.

Accordingly, we have these two questions : (1) Is the present experience immediately given? (2) Is the past experience more directly and immediately given than the world of things? Both of these questions I shall answer in the negative. The second will be dealt with in this section, the first question in the next.

On what ground, then, is the past experience claimed to be given more directly than the fact not in experience? We may answer this question by comparing the two from the standpoint of the present. On the first of the month I wrote a check to pay a certain bill, and I now have the picture of my doing so clearly in mind. Again, I stand before a fallen tree in a forest never before explored, and I know that at some time this tree has stood erect. Here we have a past experience and a past fact not in experience, both arrived at from present *data*. But the former, it seems, is mediated by the subjective method of memory, the latter by the objective method of reasoning, or inference from effect to cause. Now the series of experiences, regarded as an immediately given whole, presupposes a purely subjective connection. It is, indeed, not impossible that past experiences should be arrived at objectively. Thus, I may be unable to remember writing the check, but with the cancelled check before me I shall not hesitate to accept the experience as real. But, so far as the series is thus constructed, the past experience can claim no priority to the past external fact; for if I accept the cancelled check as evidence of a real fact, I must accept the fallen tree as evidence of a fact equally real.

The priority of the series of experiences presupposes, then, a broad and vital distinction between methods of representation. If this distinction holds, we must, I suppose, grant a certain unity and uniqueness to the series of experiences and a certain priority over the world of things. I shall endeavor, therefore, to show that the distinction will not hold; that the mediation of past experiences through memory, however governed by subjective motives (of which I shall speak presently), is also necessarily an objective process; that it is, indeed, the same process as that by which we infer the past fact not in experience; and that the past experience and the past fact not in experience rest upon precisely the same ground.

I remember an experience, but of course I may falsely imagine it. On what ground, then, is the genuine past experience distinguished from the spurious one, and what in general is the basis of distinction between memory and imagination? To this question the empirical psychology offers, I believe, a fairly unanimous answer: the memory is clear, vivid, intense; the mere image is obscure, faint, weak. But — to resolve these qualities into one — what is clearness? And how does the clearness of a present state point to the reality of a past? Must we, with so many psychologists, accept clearness, with redness, as an unanalyzable quality and its general coincidence with accepted reality as an unexplained fact, or may we attempt a further analysis of clearness which will lay bare its representative authority?

Now 'clearness,' as applied to mental processes, is a metaphor obtained from vision. A visual object — say, a diagram — is clear to the extent that each point is distinguished from and at the same time related to every other point. And so, in general, an experience is clear to the extent that it is definite in detail and coherent as a whole, — or, to the extent that its details form a minutely articulated system. A tone is clear so far as its partials are distinguished and harmonically related. A conception, such as the atomic theory, is clear so far as the details covered by it are so minutely distinct and so intimately related that each of necessity implies all the others.

Let us apply this to memory and imagination. My memory of drawing the check is clear because the circumstances of the action are presented with sharpness, fulness, and consistency of detail. The house in which I have lived is clear because the details, — windows, doors, walls, stairs, passages, — are present in multitude, in distinctness and spatial consistency; and thus it differs from the house that I would build. But this is not all. The memory-picture, to be genuine, must be clear not only in itself but clearly (*i. e.*, definitely and coherently) related to the whole body of clear experience; that is, it must fit snugly into the system of real things. The house in which I have lived had its definite location in the order of space, time, and cause. The house that I would build has no place on the map; and I cannot give it a place without completely destroying the map.

Now it seems to me that, when we thus analyze the conditions of clearness, we can see why clearness is the mark of a representative state. Were it merely a mysterious, unanalyzable quality, the preference for clearness as a criterion of reality would be purely æsthetic. But when it stands for closeness of articulation, then the relation of any detail to the whole objective system, so far as it is clear, is determined, and the reality of the detail — or the character of the mental state as memory or imagination — stands or falls with the reality of the system.

If the foregoing analysis is correct, then the process of remembering is of the same kind as the process of inference; and the process of mediating a past experience is of the same kind as that of mediating a past fact not in experience; both the past experience and the past external fact are the results of construction.¹ But this of itself might not prove that the results obtained in the two cases rest upon precisely the same ground. To make this clear we must recall the fact that the series of experiences is not merely a time-series but a personal series. And unquestionably it is this personal character of the series that forms the basis of its claim to priority. We have then to ask what there is in the past experience now remembered which makes it mine.

My answer is: the fact that it pictures my body in certain specific relations, which are spatial, temporal, and mechanical, to the object perceived. A fundamental criterion of a genuine experience is that *experience goes with the body*. No experience is accepted as genuine which is not confirmed, or assumed to be capable of confirmation, by correlative neural conditions and corresponding mechanical relations between the body of the experiencing subject and the object experienced. Unless the eye was within sight of the object or the ear within earshot, I did not see or hear the object, and I cannot now *remember* to have seen or heard it. Accordingly, the 'clearness' of the memory is in its last analysis a definiteness of *mechanical* relations between my body and the object perceived through the senses. In every memory-picture the central figure is the body of the subject, and,

¹ This does not deny that the process of construction may be more or less conscious and the terms of the construction more or less explicit.

whether consciously or not, the whole picture is constructed and tested from this point of view. If you ask a plain man, 'Are you sure that you heard Jones make this remark?' his answer will probably be, 'Why, of course, I was in the same room with him when he said it.' The certainty of the mechanical fact guarantees the genuineness of the memory. Now of course it may appear that the conditions are present without the experience; Jones may make the remark while my attention is directed elsewhere. But if he did not make the remark, I did not hear him. In other words, the mechanical possibilities are at any rate limiting conditions. But, in fact, they are not merely limiting but determining; and, so far as strict determination is possible, they furnish the only basis of determination. Suppose it becomes a matter of grave importance that, in testifying from memory to a certain event, I should be certain of my testimony. My whole effort will then be devoted to picturing the scene of the event, and its relations to the events before and after, with such definiteness and fulness of detail that the fact of the event, and the fact of my experience, shall be not merely possible or probable but nothing short of mechanically inevitable. And until I can do this it must remain a question, even in my own mind, whether the memory is genuine.

I have now to meet the following objection. It will be said that the series of experiences is not the bare cognitive series I have so far dealt with, but also a series of motive and feeling; and that the personal element in the series is not the agent's body but the continuity of motive and feeling. Accordingly, the past experience would be represented to the present not, or not only, on the basis of mechanical consistency, as the past external event is mediated, but on the basis of consistency of motive and feeling-attitude. In this objection is presented the genuinely subjective element in the series. But I have at no time denied (though for purposes of argument I have disregarded) either its presence or its influence as a criterion of reality. As in courts of law the question of adequate motive plays a part in determining the probability of an act, so, no doubt, the relation of a given situation to personal character, motive, and interest aids in the

determination of the series of personal experiences. But the question is, How far does this criterion prevail? Suppose a case of murder with motive clearly adequate; we should certainly not convict in the face of a clearly established *alibi*. Evidently the subjective criterion prevails only so far as it does not violate the mechanical conditions; and thus the question of genuineness is still, whatever else it may be, a question of mechanical cause and effect. Nor would this be the less true if, with the pragmatist, we should regard the whole series of experiences as completely connected by motive, and the conception of the mechanical world as itself the product of motive. The series of experiences is, for every one who assumes such a series to be given, a time-series. As a time-series it stands in the same system of things with external events in time, and thus in the same system with external events in space. An experience must then stand or fall with the possibility of finding a place within this system. In a word, you cannot have teleological relations without time-relations, and you cannot have time-relations apart from mechanical cause and effect.¹

It appears, then, that the past experience and the past fact not in experience are reached not only by the same process, but from the same grounds. It is not a matter in the one case of direct recognition, in the other of inference from effect to cause, but in both cases the process is inference and the argument deals with mechanical cause and effect operating in space and time. Consequently, provided the connection between present and past is made in both cases with equal degrees of clearness, the results have the same epistemological value. The tree that stood before it fell, the conversation that I listened to yesterday, are equally certain and equally real. The connection between experience and experience is of the same order as that between one external fact and another, and the series of experiences is in no wise prior to the series of external events.

¹ The pragmatist, anticipating this implication of the series, would perhaps refuse to stand for the series. Yet, if not in a series, or stream of events, how can the 'activity' be given? And if the activity is not given, and nothing is given, then what of pragmatism? For, in that case, what superior claim to reality is possessed by the activity — by motive and purpose — over other aspects of the world?

II. *The Present Experience.* — The second question proposed was, Is the present experience immediately given? It need hardly be observed that, in raising this question, we are attacking a position which the experience-philosophy, heartily supported by the plain man, regards as absolutely impregnable. I shall endeavor to show, then, briefly, that the present is just as much, and just as little, immediate, or given, as the series of experiences, — that, like the series of experiences, it stands or falls with the reality of material things.

The proposition before us is : This (present) experience is given. But what is the present experience? I find myself here writing; but at the same time I can and do think of myself as playing billiards, travelling abroad, listening to the opera, asleep in bed, — or anything whatever. Are all these real experiences? Are they all given? It may perhaps be said that anything found in experience is given. But, if so, how can we construct a world out of the given? How can we distinguish the given from the made, the material from the product? Still, it may be claimed, *something* is given; you cannot deny that something exists, that you have some experience, whatever the nature of it may be. But why not? I may ask. If the given is just given, and is nothing in particular given, — if I may just as well find myself doing anything else as sitting here writing, — then is something given? Can something utterly indefinite be anything whatever? And can you have anything definite without a process of distinction and definition?

But we need not go further in this direction, for, in practice the experience-philosophy makes a sharp distinction between what is given and what is made, between a 'real' experience upon which we may build an objective world, and an experience which is, by distinction, not real. The given is what is found in sensation, or, say, sense-perception; the not-given is found in imagination, inference, and, perhaps, in memory; and the latter is said to be derived, by a process of association or otherwise, from the former.

The question then is, In the presence of the two sorts of experience, how do I know which is given and which is derived?

How do I know that I am 'really' here writing and not playing billiards? Of course, if it could be shown that the derived refers to a previous given, but the given to nothing else whatever, the question might be regarded as answered; but this, if it can be shown at all, cannot be shown within the limits of the present experience. Accordingly, it cannot serve as a criterion for the present distinction. How, then, do I distinguish sense-perception from mere imagination? It will be seen at once that we have here the same sort of distinction as that presented in the last section between memory and imagination; the argument is consequently a repetition, with a change of terms, of the argument presented there. The empiricist holds that sense-perception and imagination are marked by differences of clearness. I maintain that clearness refers to definiteness and consistency of mechanical relations, in the present instance to the place of my body at the present time in the mechanical world. An experience is sense-perception; it is immediately given, only so far as this interpretation is guaranteed by the present mechanical relations between my body and the object of experience. I *see* the paper before me so far as I know that it is there; I *imagine* it so far as I know that it is not there. In other words, I perceive when perception is mechanically inevitable, and I imagine when perception is mechanically impossible. And thus the present experience is, like the past, given when the world of things gives it.

But now it will be asked, What of introspection? The present experience, I may be reminded, is not merely cognitive, but conative and affective. It includes motives and feelings which, so far as we know the mechanical conditions, cannot be ascertained to be either mechanically inevitable or mechanically impossible. There are also certain sensations, or what seem to be such, the mechanical conditions of which are far from being definitely known. Are we to treat all this as pure imagination? In other words, are we to ignore the 'results of introspection'?

Now I am not denying that we may make use of the subjective method and standpoint, however strongly I affirm that the objective standpoint is equally fundamental and ultimate. How far either may be regarded as fundamental, will be considered in the

next section. In the meantime, it may be noted that, whatever value we place upon introspection where the physical and physiological conditions of experience are indeterminable, we refuse to stand by it where these conditions are violated. Or, if we still accept it, we do so upon the assumption that after all the violation is only apparent, the conditions not having been correctly determined. A mere feeling is something which, as we all know, no critical mind can, with full conviction, either affirm or deny. It remains, then, not certainly a real experience or an imagined one, but simply undetermined. And if we look over the field of sensation, we find a significant parallelism between the sensations (such as the visual and auditory) that are subjectively distinct and those whose physical and physiological conditions are clearly determined. And with regard to 'introspection,' one who makes a critical examination of the so-called 'results' can hardly fail to note that much of what we are said to find there, especially what we find in sensation, is less what appears on the surface to be there than what, in view of the physical and physiological conditions, *ought* to be there, — such as the oblique-angled image from the rectangular table. It seems, then, that the mechanical conditions are after all the chief instruments in the 'introspective analysis.' In any case, it is clear that, whether, for the moment, we rely upon the subjective or the objective method, it is always with the assumption that, in the end, both must testify to the experience; and if this be so, the subjective experience is not independent of the objective thing.

The mere conception of immediateness is one of space and time relations. The more immediate is that which is nearer to a given point in space and time. In defining immediate experience, the empirical philosopher has before him the following relations. A man sees a tree. The tree sets up ether-vibrations, which cause chemical changes in the retina, which, again, cause physiological changes in the optic nerve, as the result of which the man sees the tree. But now, it is suggested, since the man has only the sensation, and the sensation is separated from the tree by a series of several terms, how can the man be said to know the tree? How can he know anything but the sensation? And since we

are all in the position of that man, how can we say that any tree exists? Here, no doubt, is a real difficulty, — nothing less, indeed, than the problem of knowledge. But to solve it by simply throwing away the tree is to stultify yourself. For without the tree, as well as the man, you could never have asked the question. Except for your knowledge of the physical, chemical, and neural operations concerned in the knowledge of the tree, you could never have known that the tree itself was not immediately given. Nay, except as you place the experience in this space and time series, you could never speak of it as either immediately or mediately given. And since we are able to make this distinction, it seems clear that we are not restricted to the standpoint of the man at the end of the series.

We arrive, then, at what I have called the fundamental fallacy of the experience-philosophy. The experience-philosopher builds the world upon experience. But, with the rest of us, he derives experience from the world. For experience, whether the present experience or the series of experiences, *goes with the body*; and the body goes with other bodies. Experiences and things are thus inseparably connected. If you cast out the things, in order to derive them later from experience, you have in the same act cast out the experience, and your 'solid foundation' is in reality nothing whatever. This fallacy is found in some form in all the varieties of the experience-philosophy.

III. *The Ultimate*. — If the foregoing is correct, experience is not immediately given. Shall we, then, reverse the relation and say that the external things are given? Or is nothing given? Yet how can we have a world without a *datum*? These are questions that I shall deal with briefly, and perforce somewhat summarily, in this closing section. My point is that nothing is absolutely given, and that, for purposes of knowledge, no absolute *data* are required.

The experience-philosophy, with its given experience, is but one expression of a very wide-spread and deep-lying logical tendency, which may be described as the search for the ultimate. The axioms of the geometer, the 'solid facts' of common sense and empirical science, the first cause of older metaphysics, and

the Creator of older theology, all presuppose a conception of the world and a method of knowledge in which some things rest upon others which are ultimate and absolute. Consequently, the first and most important duty of the scientist and philosopher is to find those ultimate facts upon which his world may be surely reared; and his next duty is to see that the structure is solidly erected, each fact resting squarely and surely upon the fact that immediately supports it. This view is clearly presupposed in the current systems of logic. The deductive logic bases facts upon principles and directs our search toward foundation principles; the inductive logic bases principles upon facts and directs us to foundation facts. By both a reversal of the process would be called reasoning in a circle and condemned as fallacious. Both presuppose a condition of one-sided dependence, — a system of foundation and superstructure, in which the latter rests upon the former, but the former is absolutely independent of the latter. The principles support the facts, or the facts the principles, as the case may be, but nothing is supported by that which it supports.

We need not go far in following up the consequences of this one-sided relation to suspect something wrong in the logic which bases all knowledge upon an ultimate. The ultimate is an *ignis fatuus*. If your ultimate is not to be criticised or even defined, it is without character, and hence nothing; and if it is subject to criticism and definition, or even to statement, it is not ultimate. And it is difficult to see why, if A , the foundation fact, leads necessarily to B , the superimposed fact, we may not by the same road travel from B to A . And, in that case, may we not regard B as the foundation of A ? As a matter of fact we travel quite as often from B to A as from A to B . The geometer bases his theorems upon axioms which, somehow or other, are merely postulated; but to one who has mastered the system of geometrical relations the axioms are as necessarily the consequences of the theorems as the theorems of the axioms; and if the theorems were not presupposed in the axioms, it is difficult to see how they could be derived from them. The truth is that no member of a system can be regarded as independently given.

For anything that you set out with is bound to owe just as much of its validity and reality to its place in the system derived from it as it imparts to this system.

The history of thought shows no traces of this supposedly 'logical' order of derivation. *Prima facie* it might seem that this order were reversed. The 'phenomena' upon which the fabric of science is supposed to rest are among its latest determinations, and, like the '*data*' of the introspective psychologist, are the product of highly reflective thought. Comparing earlier science with later, or the mind of the child with that of the man, we find nothing that can be expressed by the relation of foundation and superstructure. For, while the later thought refers to the earlier, it also corrects the earlier; and it is difficult to find any feature in the later which was not vaguely apprehended in the earlier. The conception of the conservation of energy may be found in the earliest reflective thought. It would be difficult to state precisely what its development has been, but in general the differences between the later and earlier conceptions seem reducible to those of coherence, definiteness, and thus of fulness and elaboration of detail.

To build upon perfectly solid ground is, accordingly, both impossible and unnecessary. A *datum* is not a finality but a convenient abstraction for purposes of further analysis, depending for its validity upon the results that it yields. Any point of view which makes clear any part of the world may be treated as a *datum*. The task of thought is not to search for exclusively valid *data*, but, using all the *data* at hand, to coördinate them so distinctly — modifying and correcting each by its relations to others — that, in the final determination, each may, through closeness of articulation, necessarily imply all of the others.

Now, in approaching the problems of modern metaphysics, we are confronted with two sets of *data*, or two standpoints, each of which promises an entrance into the maze of relations constituting our world. These are the standpoint of the agent, or percipient subject, and the standpoint of the external observer. These two points of view color, in varying degree, all of our views of mind, of life, and of nature. In our naïve thought they

remain indistinct and uncoördinated. When we become metaphysicians and attempt to make them distinct and coördinate, we discover ourselves in the presence of two worlds which apparently refuse to be related. From the agent's standpoint, his action is free, that is, it is the expression of choice and valuation; from the observer's standpoint, it is mechanically determined. Taking my feeling of activity as the criterion and foundation of reality, I make the world as a whole a living personality; if I survey impersonally the course of events, I make it a dead mechanism. And thus, from the one standpoint, I am an idealist, making the world the product of myself; from the other, I am a realist and materialist, making myself the product of the world.

It may then seem that I am called upon to accept one of these philosophies and to reject the other. But upon what ground? If choice is to rest upon the solidity and independence of the *datum*, then I may reply that in each case the *datum* is an abstraction. If you point to the epistemological priority of the agent's 'experience,' I can show that this experience is determinable only by reference to the scientific system of space, time, and cause. If, on the other hand, you point to the 'positive facts' of science, then I can show that these facts are the expressions of conceptions and theories developed by human thought in response to human needs. And if you claim that this combination of arguments involves a contradiction, I may then ask how we can have a contradiction between terms whose relation has not yet been made clear.

It may then be claimed that the *datum* is justified by the system built upon it. But (aside from the inconsistency of the argument) I may reply that in a complete system of philosophy we should have a democracy of *data*, and none would be valid exclusively; for, if your system were complete, you could not only find your way from your *datum* to every other point in the world, but from every other point back to your *datum*. And, in point of fact, how far can this be done? The realist tells us that all activity is subject, say, to the law of conservation of energy. He can carry this into detail and verify it with great (but not complete) exactness in the physical and chemical laboratories, with

much less in the biological laboratory, and with hardly any in the laboratories of psychology and neurology. The further we go from the physical laboratory, the more we are asked to take upon faith. Beginning with the conservation of energy, he can readily enough suggest how all consciousness might be subject to this law ; but starting from consciousness, he can never find his way back to the conservation of energy. And so of pragmatism. The pragmatist can show you very clearly how these external conditions which apparently obstruct your activity are really nothing but your previously organized habits ; he may then go on to show how your individual habits were formed, in response to consciousness and purpose, at an earlier stage of life, again translating the conditions which they met into habits formed at still earlier stages ; but at each step his thought becomes vaguer. Starting from the process of consciousness, he can suggest how the world might be interpreted as a unified teleological activity ; but starting from the world as it is, for science and common sense, he cannot show why we should choose such a world. The truth is that each point of view is illuminating as far as it goes, but in neither does the illumination spread over the whole field.

In view of this situation, I believe that we must accept each standpoint for what it gives us without pinning our faith to either. We should then, with the realist, hold that reality is not limited to experience, and that the progress of science represents, not merely the satisfaction of subjective Kantian categories, nor yet merely the demands of practical life, but an advance in genuine knowledge of an external world ; and, with the idealist, we should hold that nevertheless *our* objective world is a construction, and, with the pragmatist, that it has been constructed in response to the demands of practical life. We should then use these positions as foundations, more or less firm, more or less temporary and destructible, for further constructive thought. How the foundations are to be built upon, when they are to be regarded as firm, how and when they are to be reconstructed, is a matter for further discussion. But it seems to me that the attitude here proposed is the attitude not merely of practical reasonableness

and common sense, but of a truly sound logic. For logic must deal with the conditions under which thought operates, and under which it has operated in arriving at the knowledge so far attained. And thought has never operated by erecting a solid superstructure upon a solid foundation, nor yet by adding new facts perfectly clear to old facts already perfectly clear, but only by working over the world before it into a world more coherent as a whole, more definite and complete in detail.

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HUME'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORICAL METHOD.

OF all the progress which attended modes of scientific explanation during the nineteenth century, no single concept was developed, probably, which was comparable in importance for philosophical thought to the elaboration of the historical or evolutionary method. The essence of this method is the conception of historical continuity. Every institution, social or political, every art, science, or religion, in fact, everything which is the product of human activity, as well as every race or nation, has a history and is to be adequately understood only by a study of its genesis and course of development. A nation or institution as it exists at any single period, however self-sufficing it may be, is, so to speak, a cross-section of a long process which extends both into the past and into the future; though itself an individual, it is a member of a larger individual which extends beyond the limits of any single time. Moreover, — and this is the real meaning of historical continuity, — a series of historical events is a true individual. A mere succession of events in time is by no means adequate to form an historical sequence; a thread of connection, a relating principle, must run through all the particular events and give them a unity in the light of which alone the particular event can have any significance. History deals always with the progress or decadence of a unitary being which persists as an individual in spite of changes; it never deals with a collection of sequent but unrelated events. Unless this were the case, any fact would be of equal importance to the historian with every other fact; selection can take place only with reference to a universal.

Along with this conception of historical evolution, and perhaps preceding it somewhat in point of time, has arisen the notion of social solidarity. Not only is society continuous in its development but it is an organic unit at any given time. Its parts exist in such a relationship that any considerable change in

one part must have its effect upon the whole society. Without theorizing about the existence of a mind over and above the minds of human individuals, it is recognized on all hands that there exists very concretely a social consciousness which forms the psychic environment of every individual. To this *Zeitgeist*, as well as to individual genius, must be attributed the achievements of a people, whether in the practical affairs of government, politics, and commerce, or in such intellectual products as literature and art. For, from this point of view, the individual is seen to exist no longer as an isolated unit but to stand in the closest reciprocal relations with the society about him. The whole content of his life, — religion, language, profession, customs, — is made up of the heritage which the past life of his society has accumulated for him and from which he can no more escape than from the physical peculiarities transmitted to him by his ancestors. Every thought and act has its origin in his social relations; and in turn, in its effects on his fellows, it is a contribution to the life and consciousness of the society of which he is a part. Apart from his social connections the individual is nothing; his individuality consists not in isolation but in the uniqueness of his social heritage and of his relations to other individuals.

The close relationship between these two concepts is obvious. The fact of continuity of development could scarcely be perceived so long as society was regarded as an agglomeration of individuals living in the same time and place, but still essentially separate and distinct in interest, and only superficially affected by the community in which they lived. Unity of development necessarily implies the unity of that which develops. On the other hand, it is scarcely conceivable that the notion of a social organism should have failed to bring with it also the idea of the growth of that organism and of the unity subsisting between the successive stages of its growth. The obvious fact that innovations are gradual and that they are not haphazard, but are directed by the organic character of the society in which they take place, would inevitably suggest that they might be expected to occur in a rational sequence, and that a discoverable unity would be found to exist between the states of society at different periods of time. Ac-

cordingly it may be assumed that any theory tending to the recognition of the intimacy of the social relation was at the same time indirectly a contribution to the growth of the historical method.

That David Hume made an indirect contribution of this sort is shown by an examination of his ethical writings and political essays. At least the later form of his ethical theory, as developed in the *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, has transcended the abstract individualism of the current egoistic theories of his time.¹ The point upon which he insists is the necessarily social nature of human desires and propensities. His criticism of contemporary egoism is that, when the term egoism is stretched to include all human motives, it loses all its meaning. "Whatever contradiction may vulgarly be supposed between the *selfish* and *social* sentiments and dispositions, they are really no more opposite than selfish and ambitious, selfish and revengeful, selfish and vain. It is requisite, that there be an original propensity of some kind, in order to be a basis to self love, by giving a relish to the objects of its pursuit; and none more fit for this purpose than benevolence or humanity. The goods of fortune are spent in one gratification or another: The miser, who accumulates his annual income, and lends it out at interest, has really spent it in the gratification of his avarice. And it would be difficult to show, why a man is more a loser by a generous action, than by any other method of expence; since the utmost which he can attain, by the most elaborate selfishness, is the indulgence of some affection."² The real point here is not so much the denial of egoism as the only motive, for many English moralists after Cumberland had done that. The important fact is that Hume here adopts the view that man has a nature which may realize itself quite as much in acts which make

¹ The position of the *Treatise*, Part III, in this respect is a point of dispute. Cf. "Altruism in Hume's *Treatise*," by Professor E. B. McGilvary, *THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, Vol. XII, pp. 272 ff.

² *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, § IX, pt. ii, *The Philosophical Works of David Hume*, edited by T. H. Green and T. H. Gross, Vol. IV, pp. 255 f. See also § V, pt. ii, pp. 206 ff., and Appendix II, pp. 266 f. The same idea is to be found in the essay "Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature," Vol. III, pp. 150 ff. Cf. also E. Albee, *A History of English Utilitarianism*, pp. 96 ff.

for the good of society at large as in those which are dictated by egoism alone.

Again, the essentially social nature of the individual is one of the fundamental principles upon which government is founded. The changes which are constantly taking place in governments, by which small kingdoms consolidate into great empires and great empires divide into small kingdoms, are due, in Hume's opinion, chiefly to the exercise of force. He is much too acute, however, to make this the basis of these governments. "As force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is, therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as the most free and most popular."¹ Opinion is of two kinds: opinion of interest and opinion of right. Opinion of interest is the general belief that the existing government is the most advantageous that could easily be established. Right, again, is of two kinds: right to power and right to property. By opinion of right to power, Hume means the opinion, to which long custom and usage gives rise, that certain persons or institutions possess the right to rule and that all members of society are under an obligation to obey them. Thus men are always prodigal both of blood and treasure in the maintenance of public justice. The apparent contradiction that men in a faction neglect all ties of honor and morality in order to serve their party, and that a party established on a matter of principle is of all bodies most tenacious of justice, is to be explained by reference to the same social disposition.² Hume apparently means that government rests upon the natural docility and pliancy of human nature, which causes men always to follow a leader and to live and act in masses. Men are by nature subject to the influence of those about them; in short, they have a 'social disposition.' They hold their opinions in common. Thus the party, which is a society within the larger total society, is based upon a community of opinion, and this opinion is continually strengthened in the individual by the fact

¹ "Of the First Principles of Government," Vol. III, p. 110.

² *Loc. cit.*, pp. 110 f.

that it is common to a large body. The feeling of obligation to support the ends of the faction may, of course, either strengthen or negate the code of morality already established in society at large. It is to be regretted that Hume confines his explanation of this point to a single short and not altogether clear paragraph.

Hume approaches the question of individualism also from the social point of view, and in several passages he shows a marked appreciation of the corporate character of society and the dependence of the individual upon his social environment. With the bias of the time toward individualism, it was, of course, to be expected that he would allow an exaggerated importance to the influence exerted upon society by the individual ruler or law-giver, and would fail to appreciate, as we have since learned to do, the importance of social forces which are over-individual. A whole nation, he believes, may get a peculiar character by the imitation of 'a Brutus,' who happened to be placed in authority during the infancy of the state. Hence for Hume the course of history becomes to a great extent irrational and enigmatic. We can very rarely know the motives and purposes which actuated the conduct of the hero; for his character is usually lost to view in the dimness of the past, and, in any event, there is no certain way by which we can determine the real intention of an individual. Causal explanation in history is confined, therefore, to movements which involve a large number of persons. "What depends upon a few persons is, in a great measure, to be ascribed to chance, or to secret and unknown causes: What arises from a great number, may often be accounted for by determinate and known causes."¹ If a cause is at work to bring about a certain result among a people, its operation will surely appear if we are able to consider a sufficient number of cases, but any given individual may be exempt from its influence. It follows from this doctrine that a large portion of history is not susceptible of any explanation at all.

Even with this assertion of individualism, however, Hume does not fail to give some recognition to the corporate life of the community. While it is not possible to explain the causes which

¹ "Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences," Vol. III, p. 175.

produced the man of genius at one precise time rather than another, still there is observable a certain connection between the great writer or scientist and the society in which he appears. He cannot perform his work unless his environment prepares him to do so, and the nature of the society about him determines to some extent the form which his genius will take. "It is impossible, but a share of the same spirit and genius must be antecedently diffused throughout the people among whom they [men of genius] arise, in order to produce, form, and cultivate, from their earliest infancy, the taste and judgment of those eminent writers."¹ The taste and genius which appear brilliantly in the few is dispersed to some extent among the whole people. While Hume tends to throw great emphasis upon the share which the individual has had in the production of historical institutions, in this case he allows about as much to general causes as the facts will warrant. Hume, of course, had no notion of the results which the evolutionary study of literature has since yielded, nor the relation of literary production to other kinds of national activity which more recent historians have pointed out with varying degrees of success. But that he recognizes a relationship between the genius and his social environment is worthy of notice.

As usual in Hume's philosophy, the unexceptionable portions of his political writings are the destructive criticisms. The theory of divine right and the theory of the social contract are subjected to an analysis which leaves little to be said by the later critic.² Hume does not make the mistake of criticising the latter theory as an explanation of the genesis of the state. In fact, he is willing to admit that, in an attenuated form, it may express a certain amount of truth about the origin of government in a savage tribe. The essence of his criticism is, in fact, that the notion of a free contract implies a degree of individualism which is not actually found in any existing form of society; a contract between equal individuals misrepresents entirely the actual relation which subsists between individuals in the state. On every hand princes claim their subjects as their property, and in the

¹ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 176 f.

² "Of the Original Contract," Vol. III, pp. 443 ff.

vast majority of cases the subject admits that he is born under obligations of allegiance to a certain sovereign, just as he admits a filial duty to his parents. From the very nature of the case, government cannot rest on the voluntary choice of isolated individuals. "Did one generation of men go off the stage at once, and another succeed, as is the case with silkworms and butterflies, the new race, if they had sense enough to choose their government, which surely is never the case with men, might voluntarily, and by general consent, establish their own form of civil polity, without any regard to the laws or precedents, which prevailed among their ancestors. But as human society is in perpetual flux, one man every hour going out of the world, another coming into it, it is necessary, in order to preserve stability in government, that the new brood should conform themselves to the established constitution, and nearly follow the path which their fathers, treading in the footsteps of theirs, had marked out for them."¹ Human society is thus necessarily stable, just because each generation is the heir to the institutions and customs already established by its predecessors.

This passage suggests a view which we are now accustomed to see emphasized in social theories: the transmission of customs and institutions by 'social heredity,' and the importance of 'psychic environment.' Hume develops the point somewhat further in his discussion of 'national character,' by which he means the prevalence of some trait or habit among the people of a nation.² National character, he says, has been assigned to two sorts of causes: moral causes, which act on the mind as motives or reasons, such as the nature of government, the course of public affairs, the economic condition of the people, communication with neighboring peoples, and similar circumstances; and physical causes, such as climate, atmosphere, and food. Hume's conclusion is that, "if we run over the globe, or revolve the annals of history, we shall discover every where signs of a sympathy or contagion of manners, none of the influence of air or climate." Men are naturally imitative, and it is accordingly impossible for a set of men to be

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 452.

² "Of National Characters," Vol. III, pp. 244 ff.

associated together without acquiring a similarity of manners, and such a similarity, once established, naturally tends to persist. That national character is due to this kind of imitation, Hume shows by pointing out that it exists only where there is community among people, as, for example, where they have lived for centuries under the same government. Moreover, if a race live in the midst of another people and yet have little community with it, each race tends to retain its original character. Small states, if they are isolated from the neighboring states, even though they may be closely contiguous, have a character of their own which may differ widely from that of their neighbors, while, on the other hand, if a people be widely scattered but remain in close communication, they retain their character. In short, a similarity of character is always correlated with direct communication and opportunity for imitation rather than with similarity of physical conditions. Undoubtedly Hume narrows the meaning of physical conditions to an unwarrantable degree. Practically all that he discusses is the possibility of correlating national character with marked differences of temperature or climate, and he holds, properly enough, that this is impossible. Naturally he fails to recognize any hereditary similarities inherent in different races.¹ There is little doubt, however, that Hume was quite right in allowing decidedly the most important place to the psychic environment, even after all allowances have been made for physical heredity. The pertinent criticism of Hume's view lies rather in the opposite direction. He conceives imitation much too superficially. His psychology does not allow nearly enough importance to imitation, suggestibility, docility, and the similar con-

¹ Sir Leslie Stephen (*English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, Vol. II, pp. 182 ff.) regards Hume as the most characteristic representative of the individualistic view of society, and criticises him most severely because of his omission of the influences of race from among physical conditions, though his logic, as Stephen says, 'seems to cast it in his face.' In Stephen's view this omission reduces the race to 'a mere chaos of unconnected individuals.' Surely this criticism is too sweeping and results from the fact that Stephen himself ignores the possibility of social unity through the medium of imitation. Without denying the inadequacy of Hume's treatment of the influence of physical factors, the present trend of sociological thought appears to justify his emphasis on social heredity rather than Stephen's on physical heredity. One thinks, of course, of the theories of Tarde, Royce, and Baldwin.

cepts on which social psychology now makes so much. As we shall see, Hume's failure to appreciate the complexity of the social relations and the plasticity of the individual is the essential weakness of his attitude toward the historical method. In view of the nature of the individualism current in his time, however, it is important to emphasize his actual contribution in this respect rather than his shortcomings. His position on this point is undoubtedly an advance in the direction of what we now regard as essentially the historical attitude.

There would seem to be no doubt, then, that Hume contributed to the historical method a more adequate conception of the social nature of the individual and of the organic structure of society than was generally prevalent among his contemporaries. In his ethics he developed a consistent theory, of which his view of the relation of egoism and altruism was an integral part. His views of society never took a systematic form, and on this side his contribution to historical method is rather in the nature of keen insight and brilliant suggestion than of sociological theory. Of course, it is not to be denied that there are many passages in the essays which bear in the direction of the old, abstract individualism; this is invariably the case when an important conception is still at the stage of suggestion. But neither can there be any doubt that the germs of a better theory are present, or that Hume really had a share in the development of that new view of society with the inception of which the name of Montesquieu is generally associated.¹

If we turn now to the second side of our question and inquire concerning Hume's direct contribution to the historical method itself, the answer will depend to a considerable extent on the comparisons we institute between Hume and other writers. If, for example, we compare Hume's conception of historical continuity with that found in the works of the best historians of our own time, the contrast will be hopelessly disparaging to Hume. Again, if we compare his strictly historical work with that of the

¹ *L'esprit de lois* appeared in 1748. All the essays we have considered were published prior to that date except those "Of National Characters" and "Of the Original Contract," which appeared in that year.

best historians of his own time, the difference as regards the historical method will not appear very great in either direction. If, however, we consider Hume's critical attitude toward certain pseudo-historical theories of his day, we shall find that in historical sense, in appreciation of the distinction between a real genetic method and mere logical analysis, and in understanding of the actual motive forces of human nature, he was far in advance at least of the philosophical thought of his day. Moreover, his destructive criticism of these theories was itself an important contribution to a clearer understanding of historical problems. The criticism in question is that in *The Natural History of Religion* on the notion of a primitive, rational religion.¹

Besides the rational demonstrative theology on which the Deistic position rested, an equally essential side of the movement was an appeal to a supposed history of religion to support and illustrate the demonstrative portions of the system. Not only were the current proofs of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul supposed to be as certainly established as the demonstrations of mathematics, but the rational religion thus demonstrated was assumed to be a natural possession of the human race. It was assumed to belong to man as a rational being, and hence to have been held universally by all men so long as they remained in a pure state of nature, uncorrupted by sin and not misled by the machinations of an ambitious and designing priesthood. The universal assumption of Deism was that the true rational religion was at the same time common to all men and original in point of time. In short, the distinction between the method of logical analysis and the genetic method as modes of explanation had not yet appeared in clear consciousness. The simplest logical elements were assumed to be also the earliest genetic elements.²

In the very first of the English Deists this interest in the history of religion and this method of applying it were already in evidence. As early as the middle of the seventeenth century, Lord Herbert of Cherbury had examined the religions of the world and formu-

¹ *Works*, Vol. IV, pp. 309 ff. This treatise was published in 1757 but was written several years earlier.

² O. Pfleiderer, *The Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of its History*, Vol. I, ch. iv.

lated five propositions which he conceived to express the essence of natural religion and which he supposed had the sanction of universal assent.¹ Coming down to the better known Deists of the eighteenth century, we find the doctrine implied by John Toland, who argued that there is no Christian doctrine which is either contrary to reason or above it.² That is, Christianity is to be identified with purely rational theology, undefiled by the traditions of superstition and priestcraft. What doctrines ordinarily accepted as Christian were to be discarded as mysterious we are not told, but the confusion of Christianity as an historical belief with a rational theology assumed to be Christian is evident. The same position was explicitly taken by Tindal in *Christianity as Old as the Creation* (1730). The argument is briefly as follows : God is perfect and immutable, and accordingly we must assume that his law is of the same nature ; his ordinances are from everlasting to everlasting. Natural and revealed religion are coincident, 'like two talkers exactly answering one another.' This religion is completely rational and eternally the same for all men, the assumption being tacitly made that human nature is, in respect of religion at least, everywhere the same. That this natural religion does not now exist among men is due to the crafty machinations of the priests, who have fostered superstition as a means of gaining power. The advent of Christ added no new doctrine to the original religion, but merely purified it from the accretions of superstition which had formed around it.

Tindal thus showed the originality of rational religion deductively from the immutability of God. Two later and more obscure Deists, Thomas Chubb and Thomas Morgan, attempted to support the same position *a posteriori* by an historical examination of Christ's teaching. In *The True Gospel of Jesus Christ* (1738), Chubb tries to reduce to the lowest terms the doctrines of Christ as reported in the New Testament, and concludes that

¹ *De veritate, prout distinguitur a revelatione, a verisimili a possibili et a falso*, 1624 ; *De religione gentilium, errorumque apud eos causis*, 1645. The five doctrines are the existence of God, the duty of worshipping him, the importance of virtue as a chief part of this duty, the propriety of repentance, and the expectation of rewards and punishments in a future life. See E. Pfeleiderer, *Empirismus und Skepsis in Dav. Humes Philosophie*, pp. 426 ff.

² *Christianity not Mysteriorious*, 1696.

the Gospel is nothing but the reasonable morality of Jesus. Morgan¹ supports his religious philosophy by a crude historical theory. He attempts to show how the 'religion of the hierarchy' has been developed from the 'religion of nature.' His doctrine is an exemplification of the current theory, to be found in practically every writer on this subject of the period,² of corruption by the intrigues of ambitious priests. The natural religion of the golden age was corrupted by a sort of fetichism which regarded every event as due to a special providence. This condition of affairs was taken advantage of by the early priests, especially Moses and Aaron, and later by Mohammed. Christ taught the pure religion of nature again, as did the Apostle Paul, but the Judaized conceptions of the followers of Peter triumphed.³

The problem which Hume sets himself in *The Natural History of Religion* is to explain the 'origin of religion in human nature.' He first points out that the religious sentiment is so diverse among different peoples that no two nations, scarcely any two individuals, can be said to have agreed precisely. Accordingly, religion cannot be referred to an original instinct of human nature such as self-love, gratitude, and resentment, which are universal and are directed toward definite objects in all nations and ages. The principles of human nature which give rise to the original religious belief and the causes which direct their operation become, therefore, the objects of Hume's investigation.

The first and most ancient religion of mankind was polytheism; for, seventeen hundred years ago, with perhaps one or two insignificant exceptions, all nations were polytheists. That in an earlier and ruder age they held a pure monotheism is contrary to all that history shows us. Moreover, all our present experience with barbarous nations shows them without exception to be polytheistic. The notion of a perfect Being can come into existence only by degrees; men rise to it only from the notion of

¹ *The Moral Philosopher*, 1737-40.

² Cf. E. Pfleiderer, *op. cit.*, pp. 452 ff.

³ For the general accounts of English Deism from which the above summary is largely drawn see Sir Leslie Stephen, *English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, Vol. I, chs. iii and iv; E. Pfleiderer, *Empirismus und Skepsis in Dav. Humes Philosophie*, pp. 422 ff.; and O. Pfleiderer, *The Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of its History*, Vol. I, ch. iv.

many beings, superior to themselves but far from perfect. The arguments of natural religion may form a convincing proof of such an omnipotent and benevolent Deity, but this is not a consideration which could have had much influence on men when they formed their first rude notions of religion. We do not find these philosophical opinions among such savage tribes as we are acquainted with. Moreover, if this philosophical monotheism had existed originally, why was it suffered to die out? The same rationality which discovered it should have more than sufficed to keep it alive.

Not to reason must we look, then, to explain the origin of religion. Not the contemplation of a perfect and unitary nature, but the hopes and fears attending the varying and shifting events of human life were the sources from which sprang the original religion. The course of life, especially among savage and barbarous tribes, is at the mercy of a great number of ills and blessings which are distributed among mankind by the operation of unknown and uncontrollable causes. Life and death, health and sickness, plenty and want, success and failure, follow the acts of men at the behest of powers which the ignorant savage can neither understand nor direct. A propensity of human nature drives him on, however, to attempt an explanation which will give him at least partial satisfaction. A natural tendency leads him to conceive all beings like himself, and accordingly the unknown causes which make or mar his life are conceived to have the thought, reason, and passions of men, and sometimes even their limbs and bodies. Thus there arise a great number of deities, very limited in their powers, and possessing not only the weaknesses but even the vices of men. The gods of polytheism are in all respects like men, but gifted with only a little more power and reason.

Theism took its rise from polytheism, but again its origin is to be ascribed not to reason but to the passions. Ask any ignorant person even at the present time, says Hume, his reasons for believing in a Supreme Being, and his answer will be not the regularity and perfection of the universe, but the accidents and catastrophes of life, — sudden death, drouth, flood, and famine.

We may suppose that very often a single god out of the many became a special object of worship to a single nation, either as a local deity supposed to have special power over their fortunes, or as the chief among all the gods. This god is naturally propitiated by every form of worship and title of praise which the people think will please him. No flattery is too gross and no attribute of goodness or power too great to be bestowed upon him. The limited deity is thus gradually promoted to omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness. The Virgin Mary among Catholics and Jupiter among the Romans are patent examples of this process, according to Hume. Even after bestowing these magnificent appellations upon their deities, the mass of men are so ignorant of the rational meaning of the terms employed that they seek to gain the favor of their gods by practices which would disgust even an intelligent and cultured man.

History shows that these two chief forms of religion have a flux and reflux in the human mind, and that men have a tendency to rise from polytheism to theism and to sink back again into polytheism. The attributes ascribed to the single deity are too high to be retained long in their purity. Such a Being appeals neither to the comprehension nor to the affection of men, and He is soon surrounded with a court of intermediary powers which are the chief objects of devotion among men and hence tend to usurp the chief attributes of the Almighty. Pure monotheism thus soon degenerates into polytheism, which, in turn, destroys itself and turns the tide back toward monotheism.

It is not necessary to dwell upon the obvious philosophical criticisms to which *The Natural History of Religion* is open. Its strength lies mainly in the fact that it is the first important attempt to give the origin of religion a scientific treatment apart from a bias in favor of supposed Biblical revelation. Its obvious weakness is its complete divorce of the passions from reason, which leaves the history of religion without meaning in the development of truth. It is clear that Hume's purpose is not primarily to give a real history of religion, but rather a psychological or anthropological account of its origin from the constitution of human nature. Religion is regarded not as a miraculous gift from Heaven

or as a sort of innate idea of axiomatic certainty divinely impressed upon the mind of every rational being, but as a product of natural human tendencies and passions when placed in the environment in which all primitive peoples live. The analysis of human nature is thus pushed back one step beyond the point reached by the Deists. Hume attempts a genuinely scientific explanation of the existence of religion by showing its necessary dependence upon recognized facts in regard to the nature of men, the conditions and circumstances of the persons among whom religion originated, and the actual history of known religions. Crude as Hume's results undoubtedly are, there can be no doubt of the distinctly scientific character of his attempt or that it was an enormous advance beyond the position which he was criticising. The mere recognition of religion as a natural product of the human mind implies its relation to all other human institutions, and opens all the important psychological and anthropological problems which the scientific treatment of religions has since attempted to solve.

Hume's method, however, is not necessarily evolutionary. In such an inquiry as that attempted by *The Natural History of Religion*, the all-important problem is the meaning which is to be attached to human nature. Is it to be regarded as static or developing? Is it to be conceived as a complex of abstract, unchanging principles, blended in varying proportions in all individuals, or is the individual to be assumed as the unit and the uniqueness of his personality accepted? Upon the answer to these questions will depend our conclusion regarding the historical character of the investigation. Hume's psychological atomism forced upon him in this case the non-evolutionary view. For him the individual is merely 'a bundle or collection of different perceptions' which are distinct and separable. Moreover, he does not recognize that the real mental content is always unique and individual, as we have now learned to do. The abstract, conceptualized mental element is used at will as an actually existing psychic atom, existing, that is to say, in its generality, as an actual content of all minds. Thus the historical individual is regarded by Hume as a complex of psychological laws or principles which are universal and valid for all individuals. Individual differences

are to be explained only by the varying degrees in which the principles are blended in different persons. Thus the concepts with which Hume deals are ambition, self-love, gratitude, and similar generalizations which are not actually existent personal qualities at all, and which may, of course, be regarded as essentially the same in all persons and at all times.

There is, undoubtedly, a certain amount of truth in this view, and, as we have said, Hume's problem in *The Natural History of Religion* is not strictly historical. For the anthropological problem of the work such a conceptualized view of human nature was perhaps justified, though it is certainly much more abstract than modern anthropological methods. There is abundant evidence, however, that Hume applied the same conception to historical explanation.

"It is universally acknowledged, that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations. The same motives always produce the same actions: The same events follow from the same causes. Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit; these passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprizes, which have ever been observed among mankind. Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans? Study well the temper and actions of the French and English: You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former *most* of the observations, which you have made with regard to the latter. Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by shewing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials, from which we may form our observations, and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behaviour."¹

The remedy for this abstractness lay in the development of

¹ *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, § VIII, pt. i, Vol. IV, p. 68.

precisely those conceptions of the intricacy of the social relations and of the plasticity of the individual, of which, as we have said, Hume had grasped the first principles. He conceives his problem to be indefinitely more simple than it has actually turned out to be. Human nature has, with him, an artificial, idealized simplicity ; the individual is still too much man in the abstract. A juster appreciation of the manifold bonds of connection in which even the simplest and most isolated member of society stands, has shown later thinkers that the notion of man in general, as a complex of passions in general, has little significance for history. The events which history has to explain are always the acts of particular men who have been born and reared in a psychic environment of infinite complexity. Moreover, it is the unique and particular aspect of these acts in which history is interested. The conception of the plasticity of the individual under the influences of his social environment becomes, therefore, a principle both of universality and of individuality. Not only does it explain the necessary dependence of the individual upon the total condition of the society in which he originates, but, when the complexity of this manifold of relations is justly appreciated, it makes evident the fact that a given set of relations can never be duplicated. Individuality ceases, therefore, to mean isolated particularity, and becomes uniqueness of relation and function. As no two beings have exactly the same physical antecedents, so no two have precisely the same training and formative influences brought to bear upon them, and no two stand in exactly the same functional relations to other men. In a word, no two are precisely the same person. The problem of history is just the understanding and interpretation of this concrete particularity of the historical individual.

With this conception of real as opposed to abstract individuality has grown up a psychological method in history radically different from that of Hume.¹ Instead of aiming to understand the individual as a complex of universal psychological laws, it

¹ Examples of this method are not infrequent in the *History of England* ; e. g., the explanation of Joan of Arc's claims and successes, Vol. III, pp. 135 ff. Edition, London, 1825. Numerous examples are to be found in the political essays.

attempts rather a sympathetic appreciation of his motives and purposes. It does not analyze the individual into universal principles but endeavors to understand him as a person. The discovery on which modern history has rested was the realization by historians (*e. g.*, the awakening of Leopold von Ranke by *Quentin Durward*) that antiquity was peopled by actual human beings, with human desires and purposes, who could be understood and appreciated as one knows one's friends, not as lifeless abstractions, as pawns in a chess game of popes and emperors, but as persons whose lives can have a human significance. The task of the historian then became the re-creating of the men and women of the past, the entering into their feelings and desires, and the interpreting of their actions to posterity. By this method can be understood also the larger social movements of which history must take cognizance, for these exist only as a community of standards of value among individuals. By this method alone can the course of history be rendered really intelligible, for these are the actual forces by which it is determined.

The logical outcome of the development of such a method has been the transformation of history into a self-sufficing science, which means that the principles of historical unity must be found within history itself. The failure to appreciate the fact of historical continuity, the fact that history itself provides the threads of connection necessary to unify the chaos of historical data, is the weakness of the historians of the eighteenth century. The Age of Faith, and even the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, had for the most part found historical continuity (so far as the matter was theoretically considered) in the abiding purpose of a ruling Providence, who shaped the events of human life in accord with that purpose. The prevailing scepticism, or at best the lukewarm faith of the eighteenth century had completely undermined this conception. Or, perhaps, it would be fairer to say that its inadequacy for the purposes of history were becoming increasingly evident to historians. At all events, it was discarded and, for the time, no new idea had appeared to take its place. The facts were left hanging at loose ends. The single events and individuals were not seen in historical perspective and understood in the light of the social forces which they both exemplified and directed.

Accordingly, the historians of the Enlightenment were compelled to find their principle of selection outside the limits of history itself. This principle was the supposed utility of history as the basis of an exact social science. As we have seen, this is the service which Hume regarded as the chief value of history. Knowing something of the general laws of human nature, we can understand to some extent the course of history. Reciprocally, the study of history brings to light general psychological laws on which political and social science, and in fact all the mental sciences, can be based. Historical situations constitute the experimental data from which moral philosophers make their generalizations. History is the means by which the short span of human experience is extended to include the accumulated experience of all ages. "If we consider the shortness of human life, and our limited knowledge, even of what passes in our own time, we must be sensible that we should be for ever children in understanding, were it not for this invention, which extends our experience to all past ages, and to the most distant nations; making them contribute as much to our improvement in wisdom as if they had actually lain under our observation. A man acquainted with history may, in some respect, be said to have lived from the beginning of the world, and to have been making continual additions to his stock of knowledge in every century."¹

This application of history to political and social problems was very general among Hume's contemporaries. It is one aspect of the doctrine, so characteristic of the time, that "The proper study of mankind is man." As we have pointed out in Hume's case, it failed to reach, by reason of its abstractness, what we should call the essentially historical point of view. Nevertheless, it introduced a conception which all history since has been glad to retain. This was the notion that the important problem for history is not merely to portray battles and narrate the deeds of kings and courts, but is rather to study the progress of manners and customs. Culture, learning, and enlightenment were the special interest, even the passion, of the time, and *Kulturgeschichte* is its peculiar product. The progress which this view

¹ "Of the Study of History," Vol. IV, p. 390.

makes beyond mere chronicle history or beyond the history which claimed to be also a theodicy, can scarcely be overestimated. It brought the guiding principle indefinitely nearer to history itself, and therefore made history to a so much greater degree a self-sufficing branch of knowledge. Moreover, such a history observes a much better proportion in its assignment of value to the various departments of human activity. Manners and customs cover an indefinitely larger portion of the life of a people than its mere military history. The study of these matters, also, tended to develop a sense of that very historical perspective which was generally lacking among the historians of that time. This addition to the problem of history is, accordingly, to be regarded as a most important contribution to the historical method.

The *History of England* is an illustration both of Hume's interest in social questions and of his lack of the notion of historical continuity. The very plan of the work reflects both these qualities. The division is purely chronological ; that is, each reign is treated in a separate chapter, and in this chapter are narrated all the important events between the coronation and the death of the monarch. At the end of most of the principal reigns, there is an appendix dealing with the condition of the people, the chief laws enacted, important innovations or discoveries, economic conditions and financial policy, and similar subjects. To understand the difference between this mode of planning a history and that followed by recent writers, one need only read through the book and chapter headings in works like Ranke's or Green's histories of England. "The Charter," "The Parliament," "The Monarchy," "The Reformation," "Puritan England," "The Revolution," show at a glance the significant institution which gives meaning to a long train of events. They are the dominating ideas of their epochs, the guiding threads that bring order into an otherwise hopeless chaos, the principles of selection which determine what events the historian shall narrate and which give the events their significance.

Nevertheless, though The *History of England* shows this lack of continuity, it is by no means a history of the mere chronicle

variety. It does much more than narrate the acts of kings and the movements of armies, though these certainly occupy a prominent position. It is plainly the work of a man with a keen interest in social, economic, and cultural conditions, and, moreover, of a man with a strong philosophical bent who would gladly use his history in the interest of a political science if the opportunity offered. Hume's main interest is clearly in just these conditions: the character of the government, its power and the privileges and rights of citizens, the state of trade, the financial condition and policy of the kingdom, the extent and dissemination of learning, the customs and morals of the people. "Where a just notion is not formed of these particulars, history can be little instructive, and often will not be intelligible."¹ The value which Hume sets upon different periods of the history of England is clearly dictated by this principle. The portion dealing with the Stuarts is by far the most carefully prepared part of the work. Saxon England gets but very scant attention and, indeed, Hume promises in his Introduction to pass rapidly over this barbarous period.² The history of uncivilized peoples is always too obscure and uncertain, and too subject to violent and irrational revolutions, to be of interest to the enlightened student of history.

To Voltaire belongs the credit of having given the clearest expression to this method of writing history.³ Hume's *History of England*, however, is written exactly in the spirit of Voltaire's contention that in the progress of manners and customs lies the real interest which enlightened people feel in the study of history, and the fact of Hume's priority is accordingly worthy of note. The volumes of the history dealing with the Stuarts appeared in 1754, two years earlier than the publication of the *Essai*. So striking was the coincidence with Voltaire's point of view that Hume was asserted to have borrowed the idea of his appendices from fragments of the *Essai* published surreptitiously in 1753 under the title *Abrégé de l'histoire universelle*.⁴ There is no evi-

¹ *A History of England*, Appendix to the Reign of James I, Vol. VI, p. 93. Edition, London, 1825.

² Vol. I, pp. 17 ff.

³ *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations*, 1756.

⁴ Burton, *Life and Correspondence of David Hume*, Vol. II, p. 129.

dence for this, however, and no necessity for making such a supposition. The interest in manners and customs was a perfectly natural product of the spirit of the Enlightenment and cannot be regarded as Voltaire's particular property. He merely brought to the clearest abstract expression what was the dominant interest of the time.

In conclusion, to sum up Hume's relation to the development of the historical method, it may be said that he succeeded to a considerable extent in transcending the position of abstract individualism. He conceived the individual to be endowed with social tendencies and impulses and to be dependent to some extent upon his social environment for his character and powers. He accordingly conceives society as not merely a collection of isolated individuals but as a body organized to some extent through the medium of imitation and the direct transference of manners. In place of the abstract intellectualism which characterized the Deistic writers, and which regarded the essentially human in men as abstract rationality, Hume introduced a method of psychological explanation which found the real motive forces of human nature in the passions. Since, however, he conceived the individual to be compounded of unchanging and atomic psychic principles, he thought that the study of history should be directed ultimately to the discovery and elucidation of universal psychological laws. It was, therefore, to be the basis of political science and of all the mental sciences. By thus developing history with his attention directed chiefly toward manners and customs, Hume made a most important, if indirect, contribution to the historical method. Nevertheless, he missed the essentially historical point of view, because he was thus led to neglect the unique and individual aspect of historical events and persons. For the historian the individual must be a personality, not an exemplification of psychological laws. Hume, therefore, never attained the full conception of historical continuity by which later historians learned to conceive events as moments of an evolving organic unity, and which made history a self-sufficing discipline, worthy of study for its own sake.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

THE SELF-TRANSCENDENCY OF KNOWLEDGE.

THE problem of the self-transcendancy of knowledge is the one which is popularly couched in the following interrogative form: How do we come to know of an objective world? The older philosophers have wrestled with this matter within the psychological ring and have thereby developed several new conceptions, such as 'ejection,' 'reference,' 'intention,' and the like, which purport to have solved the difficulties. Schleiermacher, Sigwart, and Lotze, among others, hold to a theory of *Bewusstseins transcendenz*, whereby they are led to believe that judgments involve or contain both a reference to and a knowledge of transcendents. And numerous are those who have since maintained or combated this thesis. And yet there is in all results a certain lack of complete definiteness. Misunderstandings over the import both of the hypotheses and the terms involved still abound, in spite of the vast amount of study that has been directed toward the facts themselves. We even find one of the more recent controversies closing with these words from Professor James: "Is it not a purely verbal dispute? Call it self-transcendancy or call it pointing, whichever you like — it makes no difference so long as real transitions toward real goals are admitted as things given in experience, and among experience's most indefeasible parts."¹ And in the same passage he says that he and his critics 'are both defending the same continuities of experience in different forms of words.'

Nevertheless, in reading the various documents submitted by the opposing parties, I was impressed with the fact that each was defending something different. A vast group of heterogeneous things seems to have been spoken of indifferently as 'self-transcendent knowledges,' 'objective references,' 'ejections,' etc., — all of which suggests the horrible possibility that, instead of having a deep harmony ruffled only by the light play of warring words, we may find dissensions smoothed over with oily terminologies. And

¹ *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, Vol. II, p. 237.

closer inspection realizes the possibility, if I am not greatly mistaken. The following dissections will confirm or disprove this statement and, in either case, show clearly the crying need of a more extensive and sharper terminology. Nothing is more anomalous in the whole career of psychology than that quasi-philosophical conservatism of language which has resisted the natural and necessary trend of scientific thinking toward a finely differentiated terminology. A general polemic against the absurd vagueness of 'association,' 'will,' 'idea,' 'knowledge,' and so on is out of place here. It will be more profitable to prove this general inefficiency of psychological language by disclosing it in the particular case in hand. Nor need we justify our apparent hair-splitting here; those thinkers who do not discover in a highly differentiated terminology (*i. e.*, in a set of more than ordinarily clear concepts) at least an improved *means* to further research and theorizing need not trouble themselves with reading beyond this point.

Suppose we attack the matter from its more popular side. Professor Colvin has given us a good account of what self-transcendency of knowledge is often taken to mean. "There is an intention which ascribes an extramental reality to every noetic psychosis. It is that intention which sets up an object non-ideal or at least extra-ideal. . . . It is this intention that gives an object to our knowledge. . . . Take away all reference to that which transcends the present moment (and all else is extramental) and the content of my experience vanishes."¹ Now we are not concerned here primarily with a question of fact, nor yet with one of theory. Perhaps we can agree with what is back of the above interpretation, and perhaps not. What interests us above all else is to know precisely what state of affairs, what psychic phenomenon, Professor Colvin is talking about. This once known, we shall be in a position both to study the phenomenon itself and to fix up an adequate description of the same.

First of all, then, where is this intention, above spoken of, found? In every noetic psychosis are we *unawaredly* ascribing to this same psychosis an extramental reality? Nobody maintains

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 229.

this. The intention is not a phase of the conscious content of every knowing act. If we may be allowed temporarily to use a very unscientific description, we might say that a noetic psychosis is nothing but a knowing psychosis. Knowing is nothing but knowing : it is not affirming a relation between an unexperienced something and a mental content. We must therefore discover the supposed intention somewhere else than within the momentary experience itself. Now just where it must be searched for we shall not say here, reserving this problem for a later paragraph. Our first endeavor must be to show that, if such an act is not a phase *within* a given experience, then the term 'intention' is a dangerous one, meaning as it normally does the decidedly conscious act of intending or referring to something. Its use in the quoted connection is, in my opinion, even more irregular than the use of the term 'memory' in connection with 'unconscious associations.'

But this verbal objection is much less important than the one which I have to make with reference to the ambiguity in the phrase, 'ascribing an extramental reality to every noetic psychosis.' Let us even grant that there are conscious acts of intention ; we still are uncertain *what* is supposed to be intended therein, for the 'noetic psychosis' contains in all its worst forms the venerable equivocation of 'process,' 'content,' and 'awareness.' We need go into no details to show that, of these three 'things,' Professor Colvin can reasonably mean only 'content.' And yet how can this be made to harmonize with the succeeding statement, that 'it is this intention that gives an object to our knowledge' ? Using the simple method of substitution, we would discover from the above that the act of ascribing an extramental reality to every noetic content is what gives an object to our knowledge. Such a situation is too mysterious for me to grasp. Between 'content' and 'object' I am unable to draw any fundamental distinction. That there may well be a relative difference here is well-known, 'content' being the psychological term for the very same thing which in common parlance is the sensational phase of an 'object.' But granting this, it is still hard to see that that which makes objects known to us is just this particular *interpretation* of simple

contents. Such a view would, among other things, exclude us forever from knowing the simple contents of single experiences (sensations, feelings, fringes, etc.), for these are not primarily granted any extramental reality.¹

Another peculiarity of this hypothesis is found in its attempt to be thoroughly psychological, and yet at the same time to show a real transition to a world genuinely transmental. We need scarcely do more than to cite in conjunction two statements which, while supposedly made from the same standpoint, involve very conflicting views. On the one hand, it is held that the intention ascribing the extramental reality to the content is absolutely indispensable to experience itself. 'Take away all reference . . . and the content of my experience vanishes.' (We are left in some doubt here as to whether noetic experience alone or every type of experience is spoken of. Probably the former.) On the other hand, 'Knowledge-of-book is one total complex in which the knowledge and the book are separated only by a false abstraction.' Now, we may waive the question whether the real complex is such a thing as noetic awareness *plus* content; that this is not the real *given* complex is of course self-evident, yet there may well be a sense in which the scientific observer may justly regard the combination as more 'primitive' than either of its components. Quite aside from all this, however, does not the 'ascription of transmental reality to a content' mean that in the act of knowing we understand the content as being something more than a merely aware content? The character of the content, it is surely maintained, becomes by virtue of, and in the 'transmental intention' something different from, the *merely* given. But if so, how shall we reconcile this view with the second one that every separation of 'knowledge' and 'book' (to keep the original illustration) is accomplished 'only by a false abstraction'? Must we conclude that all knowledge is fundamentally deceitful?

These details are assembled here not for the sake of refuting

¹ On this point there may be some misunderstanding. The psychologist does ascribe a certain transmental reality to simple contents. The philosopher must do likewise, I think. But the way and the reason of this interpretation is obviously not so immediate and organically bound up with the very nature of the knowing process as some would have us suppose.

anybody's view, but solely in order to show that two or more wholly distinct things are being dealt with as if they were but one. Everybody, in reading that 'knowledge-of-book' is a single complex, feels more or less clearly that *some* real phenomenon is being referred to and described ; likewise in the case of 'transmental reference.' The vital point, though, is whether these phenomena are so closely related that they can both be used in one line of argument concerning either of them. Having discovered the impossibility of associating them as has been attempted above, we may ask what typical error was committed in that attempt. And it appears that no minor rôle is here played by the assumption that a theoretical interpretation of the way we get from the mediating psychical processes to the mediated transpsychical objects may be rendered in terms of a description of what is actually experienced. In other words, the psychologist, who starts as a naïve man from the usual data (contents) and arrives through scientific reflection at a theoretical knowledge of psychic processes, attempts to express the results of his discovery in a *reverse* formula. He tries to show that there is a way in which we do get from 'mere processes' or 'bare contents' to transpsychical things. Quite aside from the facts in the case, there is a theoretical objection he would have to answer before he could justify his attempt. Are we justified in ascribing an objective reference to each individual noetic act solely on the ground that a series of such acts yields such a reference ? Can we start with a series of contents and, upon reaching at its end a new peculiarity which is significant for the members of the series, turn about and say that this new peculiarity is an organic part of the individual contents (or that awareness and content are two parts of some higher primitive complex) ? This objection is a venerable one. It seeks to protest against the confusion of simple facts with interpretations. We cannot describe this confusion here as it ought to be described, yet it is not too remote from our purposes to give a brief sketch of it. In the series of contents, *A B C D E . . .* there is a summation or grouping of the elements which has its own peculiar significance. Suppose the series to be composed of such contents that at *E* the series is seen to indi-

cate that another series has been running parallel to it and functionally connected with it. We would now have a reference to something lying outside of the individual elements of the series as known, but we would not be exact if we were to say that *E* ascribed to itself a transmental reality or something like that. This reference is no more a peculiarity of *E* than it is of *A*, for the whole 'pointing' or 'implication' of the series was needed to realize that 'objective' reference. Hence, if we were to attempt a regressive analysis in the light of the reference appearing at *E*, we might easily fall into the error of supposing that some such reference (say to the series of 'psychic processes' or to the 'real material objects') was latent in each part of the series. And just this error is made doubly easy by the apparently axiomatic character of the statement sometimes made that 'whatever appears at any point in an organic series must have been contained in some form in the preceding members of the series.' In the present case, the chances of misinterpretation are again increased by taking the reference to a new series to be a quality or inner mark of the term in the original series that appears coincidentally with the reference. And such a confusion may be traced back, to a large extent, to the equivocations in that much-abused term, 'representative experiences.' Unfortunately we cannot carry this line of analysis on further here, but must return to the original problem.

The most remarkable confusion, to my mind, is found in the assumption that 'everything which transcends the present moment is transmental.' Were this true, then we would have a genuine transmental intention in every act of memory and of reference to the future, as Professor Colvin believes. Now, a consistent account of time-experiences is avowedly one of the most impossible tasks in all psychology, and yet certain confusions ought by this time to be regularly avoided. It is true enough that, in experiencing a content as 'past,' we do thereby refer away from the present. And what such a reference involves is not altogether easy to say. But how can such a reference possibly be called transmental? How does the immediately felt quality of pastness tear the object out of the mental setting it is supposed to have

when it is felt as present? Such a theory really states that transmentality is 'caused' by a change of one felt quality into another felt quality, in which case the transmental world seems to be only one special territory within the universe of pure experiences.

The error of definition back of all this lies in interpreting the merely mental as that which is given as merely present. And it is possible that this confusion traces back to a certain vagueness in the verbally similar terms, 'present' and 'presented.' Instead of taking the mental as identical with what is experienced 'immediately,' the theorist has taken it as equivalent to what is immediately experienced *as present*. To the psychologist this distinction between a content that is given at some absolute time and one which is itself dated must appear irreducible and obvious. Absolutely every content is, as content, immediately given at some absolute time, but the very same content may be given at an indefinite number of absolute moments and still have the same time-quality. If now we are going to eke out an objective quality from such a content, we surely can do so with much better grace if we look, not to the inner quality of the same — as past, present, or future — but rather to the content's peculiar independence with reference to its appearance and disappearance. It is an odd fact that the same object can come and go in the conscious world without gaining or losing in meaning or function thereby. If, as it were, there were some uniform variation of meaning discoverable in connection with every new appearance or disappearance of the meaningful object, we might perhaps doubt its more than 'merely mental' character. (Even such a fanciful variation, however, could not be known unless the object *also* returned each time with its own meaning intact.) For then we would have a series of objects combined in such a way as to yield a new significance which could not be given by any one of the same. But to think that some one single content, through its own immediate (*i. e.*, uninterpreted) qualities could possibly *be* transmental, is rather risky.

Back of the difficulties of the time problem and back of some of the perplexities of transmental reference lies the vast theoretical aggravation usually labelled 'the problem of representative experiences.' To this we must turn for a moment in order to

make clear to ourselves how all things not present may be construed by some thinkers as transmental objects. It seems to be a wide-spread assumption that past things, when re-experienced, are not truly given but only represented or functioned for by new present mental states. The things themselves, being past, are *eo ipso* — it would seem — absent, and so are at best symbolized by local agents, as it were. Closely connected with this notion is the one that past conscious experiences, as such, no longer exist. What is there to all this?

Past things are now not truly given, if by these things we insist upon meaning not merely the objective things themselves but also the particular way, medium, or process whereby they originally appeared. Thus, if by 'Paris' I mean the town itself *plus* the sensations I had when seeing it, then of course Paris is not given now as I now recall it. But, as a matter of fact, nobody does mean so much as this by Paris; if so, the meaning, *i. e.*, 'Paris itself,' would have to grow with every act of recalling it. But, as everybody knows, there is no parallel increase of meaning and meaning-reference; past a certain point by far the greater number of imaginative acts of reference to the object itself fails to add to or alter the meaning of the object. Professor Dewey's interpretation of 'mere sensations' and the like as instruments or tools used in attaining knowledge may be true; for our purposes we must describe the facts from another standpoint, namely the purely analytical one. And in so doing we must abandon the whole doctrine of representative experiences in order to make the identical recurrence of meanings intelligible. Instead of saying that, when I now think of Paris, there is a given content which by virtue of certain preceding contents (now non-existent, as contents) functions for these latter now, we must admit that part of the given content is the group meaning of all the various past contents which have 'contributed' to make up for me my Paris. In the series *A B C D E*, for example, we have a group-quality virtually parallel with the elements of this series. Schematically we might express it thus: *A, B (AB), C (ABC), D (ABCD), E (ABCDE)*, wherein the bracketed terms do not signify the recurrence of the elements as mere elements but rather their 'total

effect' (group-meaning) up to date. In the usual explanation of the phenomenon in question, — as, say, Professor Stout has developed it, — there seems to lurk the implication that, because the single elements are 'past,' they are therefore retained only through the good graces of the single conscious content that is still present. To me, this seems not only to involve a risky implication about the non-experienced character of past contents, but also to conflict with introspective results. It is quite correct that, as Schumann, Meinong, Stout, and other skilled observers agree, there is no trace of the past *elements* in the conscious content of, say, a series of beats, tones, or the like. There is no series of separate images of all preceding elements, and yet, as these theorists admit, the serial meaning or 'quality' is somehow given. We do know that there is a series 'going on,' even though the elements are not discernible. For our purposes we need not follow up this matter beyond the point of saying that, if we are aware of the serial character in such cases, then this serial character, however it may be analyzed or explained, is a conscious content. It must be confessed, however, that in saying this we are widening the meaning of the term, 'conscious content.' But this is preferable to holding the old meaning and falling into a fictitious theory as a result of loyalty to a word. The usual interpretation of 'content' impresses me as peculiarly one-sided, emanating as it does from the psychological laboratories, where, as a rule, only the most tangible and dirigible sensational and emotional qualities have thus far been dealt with. The sense of an understood word, the meaning we are on the point of expressing, and all such tremendously pregnant significances ought, I think, to be recognized as genuine contents quite as openly as the numerous sounds, feelings, images, etc., are. Could we but be brought to an agreement regarding the virtual identity of range between meaning and content, perhaps some of the difficulties encountered in our attempts to understand how relations can be contents might dwindle. There seems to be a middle ground between the theory of a one-to-one correspondence between phases of meaning and phases of content and the theory that relations are not 'given' at all in pure consciousness; a

theory of group-meanings would apparently fall within that ground and might prove a very efficacious compromise.

What applies to series holds good of remembered things. Usually the remembered object is highly complex and, what is more, substantially the same as the form-quality of a series of simpler objects (sensations, feelings, etc.). To use Paris again as an illustration, we may well say the following. There is, first, a series $ABC \dots N$, whose group-character at N becomes 'Paris.' Psychologically speaking, I see no difference between a 'Paris'-quality and *CEG*-chord quality in music, in so far as the specific peculiarities of each group-quality are overlooked and merely their structure with reference to certain elementary contents is taken into consideration. When I now 'recall' Paris, then, I really 'have it in mind,' grasp its meaning, quite as awaredly and as thoroughly as if I were seeing it immediately. The peculiar thing here, however, is that the form-quality, which originally grows up out of a group or series of simpler elements, can recur without the recurrence of these latter, and yet at the same time it can *refer back* to these same elements but without making them parts of itself. In other words, the past quality of the elements is not carried over bodily and bound to the form-quality of these elements as a group. And this peculiarity is clearly connected somehow with the fact that an indefinite number of element-groups or series can have one and the same total meaning, however much the time-qualities of those same groups (taken as elements) may vary among one another.

The bearing of all this upon the problem of transmental reference may be summarily stated as follows: Reference to past things is not, as many seem to think, a pointing toward something that transcends the present conscious content. The mistake of thinking the contrary seems traceable to the venerable confusion between 'present conscious content' and 'conscious content qualified as present.' This is the same typical error as that which Hodgson exposed, when he remarked that a succession of experiences is not thereby an experience of succession. So long as we are indulging in nothing save primary psychological descriptions, we must fall in line with those psychologists

who treat temporal differences as primarily differences in qualities of conscious contents, in which case, reference to a past object is no more transmental than reference to a present one is. Again, the reference is not from a given to a not-given but rather directly to a peculiarly qualified given thing. What are confused are the actual content, the peculiar meaning of the thing referred to, and the elements which we know entered into the process of manufacturing for us this actual content, the meant thing. And the psychological excuse for this confusion is found in the well-known fact that simple contents not only group into higher unities and 'persist' thus mentally, but also very often 'persist' as independent identities which, in spite of their independence, still may be referred to or 'implied' by the various group-contents to whose formation they have contributed. We need but allude here to the other much-discussed confusion between 'process' and 'content'; the latter is made up of the actual meanings themselves, while the former can be connected with the content only through the intervention of a series of other contents (*i. e.*, only through 'reflection').

The same general arguments used against the transmentality of time-references may obviously be used in the case of spatial ejection. It is curious how difficult it is even for psychologists to see that remoteness or 'out-there-ness' is not identifiable with transmentality. As Bergson, in the recent discussion upon parallelism and interactionism, well showed, so long as we are psychological and only descriptively so, we must feel quite as free to locate 'percepts' in the external object as in the brain. Put more exactly still, it is quite impossible to connect this 'localization of a percept,' however it be made, with the problem of extra-mentality. Failure to see this is one of the chief causes of many useless parallelistic schemes. It is, however, a wholly different thing to say that *series* or *groups* of spatial qualities reveal wholly new characteristics of spatiality. Or, in more usual language, it is much more than a mere psychological fact, and yet is describable psychologically, to say that the 'behavior' of extended objects in a tridimensional space leads us to conclusions about the nature of extension which are not discoverable in the simplest psychic space-contents.

Next appears the self-transcendency of which Professor James speaks. If the above remarks have any force, it seems that Professor James has not fallen into the vicious error of confusing process and content or into the still more vicious one of construing a 'pointing' *within* experience as a 'pointing' from experience to the transexperiential. He makes it very clear that he has in mind only the simple experiences, called 'pure,' and their own inner meaning. The simplest movement, as well as those more complicated non-spatial progressions symbolized by +, 'and,' etc., is a given content of which the 'pointing' is an inner characteristic. When we are expectant of a 'more to come' and before that 'more' has come, the pointing is experienced. Such a pointing is not toward anything definite, not a reference to something. The *terminus ad quem* is a qualification of the pointing which appears only when we reflect upon an already completed experience of transition.

In connection with this phenomenon and its theoretical import, two things are to be said, one with regard to the description itself and one with reference to its bearing upon the theory of self-transcendency. Take the pointing itself, to begin with. When I see a moving point of light in a dark room, I experience the movement without any suggestion whatsoever of the further path or goal of the moving point. I feel the movement with just as little implication of anything beyond the actually given moving point as I find in sensing red. The movement is pure movement and nothing else. Now it is of course natural, as the point moves on, to 'sum up' its course in a reflective way. (I say a reflective way, yet the process seems somehow different from that found in logical reflection.) In this summing up it is easy for associated characteristics of movement to creep in; especially if there is any irregularity in the movement of the point as compared with the induced eye-movements, etc. Only when such new elements enter in, am I able to discover the pointing phenomenon. Having discovered in all past (completed) movements either a distinct *terminus ad quem* or else a typical direction, I catch the suggestiveness in the immediately given movement. Of such relatively complicated experiences Professor James seems to be speaking.

So long as we remain on the plane of analytical psychology, must we not avoid interpreting the expected end of the movement as 'out of mind,' 'absent,' 'future,' or the like? It seems to me we have here precisely the same situation as that which we discovered in the case of time and space, namely, the confusion of content and content-meaning. If I now expect a *terminus ad quem*, it is vain for the psychologist who is describing contents to say that this expected *terminus* is not a present content. A meaning can be present in consciousness and yet that which is meant can, in the sense in which it is meant, be absent. We are not concerned here in working out this riddle; it is clear that the riddle is a fact of commonest experience. If so, however, I do not see how Professor James can feel that the kind of self-transcendency of which he speaks is related in any direct manner to that kind which most transcendentalists mean and believe in. Professor James says both parties are fighting for 'the same continuities of experience,' but I do not see any resemblance between the expectation of a thing-to-come and the interpretation of a given content as meaning something more and other than the momentary psychic *quale*. What each party is contending for is a wholly distinct fact; that emphasized by the psychologist is a last irreducible mental fact, while that championed by the so-called transcendentalist is the significance of an enormous number of very complex things considered together. To put the matter metaphorically, the one represents (or is) the least meaning of conscious contents, while the other represents the maximum. The former is a peculiarity of certain cross-sections of experience which it is the primary (and only primary) task of the psychologist to describe; the latter, on the other hand, is held to be — at least by some transcendentalists — the meaning of an indefinitely large group of *quales* which by their very nature are individually distributed throughout many 'cross-sections' (moments of consciousness) summing up into complex significance wholly different from the meanings of the elements. There are some transcendentalists who wish to square themselves with psychology by attempting to find all these complex significances given in each noetic psy-

chosis. But probably the majority are opposed to such an impossible attempt.¹

Suppose we try to fix upon the correct interpretation of the transcendentalists' contention. Is there any way of stating the case psychologically without falling into the error of supposing that there is a distinct mental content corresponding to every detail of a meaning? For my part, I think there is such a way; and the notion that, as Mr. Bode says, 'the validity of certain fundamental principles must be the presupposition of all knowledge,' I take to be altogether too sweeping, implying as it does that the psychological descriptions we may succeed in rendering are not the bases of scientific knowledge about the relation of experience to its own significance.² In the mere act of referring to a meaning, there is not given any motion-experience, save when the meaning itself is 'motion' or involves associatively such a significance,—in which case the motion-quality belongs to the meaning and not to the reference act itself. In other words, logical reference seems to be fairly describable as an act of rendering or grasping a meaning without at the same time involving for consciousness any motion (inner or outer) toward that meaning. Here there is a *terminus ad quem* given without the transition-quality. The common in-mixing of transition-qualities can be explained wholly by the inner character of the meaning itself; the so-called 'logical reference' appears thereupon to be misnamed in so far as reference is taken to involve some motion from one content to another. Such reference is the same as the brutal bobbing up of new sensational *quales*, so far as the matter of transition is concerned. Both cases illustrate that we experience sheer, ungraduated breaks or jumps quite as immediately and as often as we do transitions. Those transitions which, in the summing-up process called 'reflection,' pass

¹ To show that the 'pointing' explained by Professor James is different from the reference claimed by transcendentalists, we might also state that a transmental reference is conceivable within a single moment, whereas 'pointing'—at least of the sort involved in transition-experiences—involves reference to a later moment of consciousness. A further implication of this distinction would be that, in a partly discontinuous experience, a transmental reference is not inconceivable.

² Cf. "The Concept of Pure Experience," PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. XIV, p. 693.

over into 'relations' are for the most part not immediately given transitions such as 'and,' '*plus*,' 'then too,' 'next,' etc.; they are not *inner* peculiarities of all the moments which they finally serve to connect up, but are rather group-characteristics, appearing as *quales* only at intervals, *i. e.*, in certain moments and not in others at all.

This appears to be the sense of 'reflection' and 'reference,' when reduced to bare descriptive terms. We do have content series in which no transition is given as a part of the series save at certain 'nodes' in the same, wherein the arrangement of the parts up to date means 'one-after-the-otherness.' This does not involve any transmental reference as yet, for the succession-quality is surely a *quale* here quite as much as the parts of the series were. In order to find what the transcendentalist is looking for, we need to follow the same chain of experiences a trifle further. The very next step in the progression seems to give us a new version of an old story; in every grouping process where the elements have been given successively (or are distinguishable successively in reflection), we find awareness coming in that there are certain peculiarities manifested in the group which were not discernible in the individual components of the same. Within the ranges of elementary psychology this is, of course, the tritest of all trite remarks, and yet why will the psychologist persist in remaining within the narrow bounds of a simple succession of times or a group of light-points or the like? Why can he not convince himself that precisely this phenomenon is the one we really have in the highest flights of human thinking? For in these we have in the stead of the original simple experiences highly complex ones, so complex, indeed, that they are more safely describable as meanings than as bare contents; but the way these meanings group together, fall into certain series, and so on, so as finally to yield a new group-meaning is well known, though under a very different name, by logicians of all ages. To take the most striking and all-inclusive example, namely induction, is it not true that a series of highly complex, meaningful *quales*, by virtue of their contiguity or coexistence, 'point out' (*i. e.*, actually yield) a new group-meaning, which logicians conventionally label the

conclusion? And is it not once more strikingly given, sometimes in the very next moment of consciousness, that this synthetic result means something that was not actually meant in any of the single meanings involved?

Unhappily there are numerous problems whose solution is demanded by the above suggestions but which must be brutally ignored here. If we note merely the direct bearings of the matter upon the question of self-transcendency of knowledge, the following hints may serve to show its general significance. The group-meaning, it might be objected, really succeeds only in carrying us over to a new complex content and does not help us to leap out of ourselves. Experience grows more intricate, meanings deepen and broaden, as the summing-up process goes on; but it were idle to declare that the more elaborate meanings really transcend experience any more than the chord, which we analyze into five tones but without explaining it away, goes beyond mentality itself. In reply to this argument, however, we can do but one thing, namely, admit what the critics think is an absurdity, the transcendency of simpler group-qualities. But, in admitting this, there is need of great caution in distinguishing between the transcendency of the group-quality itself over the components and the transcendency of the implications discovered by comparing the group-quality with its components over both of these. In the former case we merely have an added *quale*; the five tones taken together yield something new: but in the second instance we have this new *quale* referred back comparatively to each of its components, with the result that the former 'goes beyond' each of these latter. It is none of these, and yet out of these has it arisen. Now it appears to me that in the very meaning of synthetic combination, as we have it here in its simplest form, there lies the implication that there is something, perhaps a 'function' or 'activity,' in the elements which is not given in them as pure momentary experiences. Only when they stand in certain relations to one another (within consciousness, of course) do they develop certain peculiarities.

It is, of course, quite immaterial and irrelevant to our present problem how these 'latent functions' are to be explained in the

various concrete cases; it may be that physiological conditions can be made to account for some of them. The only important point for us is that the explanation must be looked for and found outside of the bare given *quale* of the moment. This is all that any reasonable theory of self-transcendancy can ask for. The theory now current that all the live developments of meanings are really given in pure experiences, even though appearing clearly only at certain points in the stream of consciousness, is as full and as liberal a theory of the self-transcendancy of knowledge as one could wish for, *inasmuch as it admits openly that reinterpretation is not only possible but actually occurring constantly*. And reinterpretation is identical with re-grouping, which involves always the development of group-qualities unexpressed in the individual components. Such a theory, too, avoids the extreme of reading into every single noetic psychosis a transmental reference; only at certain intervals and simultaneously with a few non-referring *quales* do genuine references or interpretations occur.¹ The kind of transcendence championed by the pragmatists belongs under this head. The only difficulty with it is its narrowness; the 'doubt-inquiry-answer experience,' as Professor Dewey calls it,² is surely one reinterpretation of immediate experiences, but is it not one and one only? I do not see any difference in the *results* when I reconstruct voluntarily and when I 'sum up' a series in the most passive manner. In the latter case, the group-significance is referred back to its components in such a way that I feel immediately that it 'goes beyond' them. In the former case, interest gives a character to the components, making them coalesce somewhat differently than they otherwise would. But I fail to see how the process or the results are typically different from those found in passive experiences.

Let us sum up as follows: those cases of transcendancy found in spatial and temporal 'ejection,' logical reference, representative

¹ It would be an interesting task to show how time-qualities themselves, whose character is so shifting, lead us to reinterpret them as involving something more than what we find in them primarily. It surely can be shown that time 'involves' or 'contains' more than its immediately given fleetingness. Undoubtedly the very notion of time as 'moving forward' is an interpretation, *i. e.*, a group-quality, a meaning realized only through the summing-up of several different temporal signs.

² *Journal of Phil., Psych., etc.*, Vol. II, p. 657.

experiences, and so on, are by no means genuine cases of the transmental reach of experience, much as transmental implications may lie in many meanings described under the above classes. At best, such sorts of transcendence yield us richer meanings. These meanings do not involve any transmental reference, however, until they themselves are directly compared with their own constituent parts (phase-meanings). When this is done, a residual or differential significance appears which is hopelessly incapable of being correlated in a one-to-one fashion with the only conscious meanings that contributed to its formation. Whether we have recourse to a theory of the 'unconscious,' to a psychophysical hypothesis about 'synthesis,' or to a metaphysical doctrine of the 'self,' in any case a stride has been made away from the merely given to its ungiven significances. To call the transmental here attained only a postulate of the reflective and needy mind is to call the five-toned chord the same. And to read back the transcending function into every experience of the series culminating in a transcendent significance is virtually to deny the reality of the summing-up process itself. Each of these extreme views does violence to the facts.

And, finally, the contributions made by the 'serial activity' of the component contents indicate, when compared with these latter taken 'statically,' *i. e.*, with only their own inner time-qualities, some reality in the time-process which is more than the originally given simple duration and succession qualities. In saying this we are not advancing any theory, but leave open as a possible solution even the hypothesis that the act of backward reference or 'reflection,' in so far as it necessarily alters or reduces the original temporal qualities in bringing them together in a noetic synthesis, somehow involves necessarily a mutilation or abstraction of the other contents as well, so that a comparison between the new synthesis and its components shows up an unexplained residuum (either in the components or in the group-meaning or perhaps in both). This much is sure, however: the actual reflection in point does transcend its data, and this is enough for present purposes.

The ambiguities in the terms we have here discussed suggest another ambiguity, this time in that most loosely used term,

'reflection.' This term is sometimes made to mean merely an active reference to some past content, in which case reflection is only a case of reproduction. More usually it means the summing up of a series of contents which are themselves relatively complex group-qualities. Thus, when we follow an argument, we are supposed to reflect in some measure. Finally, reflection is the name given to the process of comparing a group-content with some of its components in such a manner that these latter gain an added increment of meaning. Thus, when we conclude that certain past facts 'really' indicated something more than what they did at first blush, we reflect most actively. Perhaps there are still other ambiguities in the term; only a special investigation can bring such to light.

The 'self-transcendency of knowledge' is taken to stand for at least five or six different things which we here enumerate:

1. The onflowing of experience toward an unknown. Primarily the *terminus ad quem* is not even suggested, pure transition alone being given. The direction and the concrete end or 'beyond' is first given when a series of simple contents fuse into one group-meaning.

2. The experiencing of things not 'here,' *i. e.*, either spatially or temporally remote. Here again the simple space and time contents contain no references in themselves, but gain them in synthesis. The phenomenon is curiously like the geometrical determination of a line, which demands at least the fixing of two points. How far this is more than a mere analogy might be worth looking into.

3. The non-deducible character of the order and way in which new contents appear. This is more than a refinement of No. 1 above. The brutal bobbing up of new sensational and other *qualies* means to us a constant broadening experience both from within and from without. Such a broadening, when due to new combinations of already acquired meanings, is called genuine self-transcendency; but when the stock in hand cannot account for the accretions, the transcendency is external. In No. 1 above, we referred to the peculiarly active, mobile character of the stream of consciousness; here we have to do with the significances involved. In the former case, we might have a constant onflowing

combined with an external reiteration and recombination of a certain small supply of contents; in the present case, we might (theoretically, of course) have constant new additions even without the transitional and active character.

4. The excess of meaning over process. This is the peculiar property of the modern psychologist; the processes he is forced to accept in order to account for the development of contents cannot be made to render up every peculiarity, every meaning that these contents have and are.

5. Representative or symbolic functions of experience. This interpretation plainly bases upon No. 4 and upon a narrow definition of what contents are. I do not refer here, of course, to the theory of representational meaning, according to which a signature 'stands for' the man who has signed, the printer's ink 'does duty' for the author and his ideas, money 'represents' food, etc. I refer to the theory that certain images, fringes, and the like are taken as representing other contents not actually given.

6. The superiority of concept over percept. This theory claims, first of all, nothing more than that immediate experience is, as such, translated by another form of experience. If it is carried out to its logical conclusion (*i. e.*, if this very fact be itself reflected upon and compared with the facts upon which it bases), we discover that this transcending power of one experience-type over another *means* that something besides the immediate experiences, *as known contents*, is at work. Whether this something be called 'soul,' 'synthetic function,' 'associative process,' 'interpretative tendency,' 'inner development of meanings and implications,' or what not, in any case there is a true self-transcendency, a going out beyond actual mental contents.

To make these distinctions wholly satisfactory, it would be necessary to draw certain distinctions in the use of the terms, 'knowledge,' 'consciousness,' and 'experience.' Such a task lies beyond the present one. But the interdependence of all these and other concepts only serves to discredit the claim that the whole matter of transcendency can be settled either by attention to some one difficult feeling-phase in some experience or by labelling the difficulties verbal.

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DISCUSSION.

HERDER AND FISKE ON THE PROLONGATION OF INFANCY.

Fiske's view of the prolongation of infancy in man is counted by others, as he himself considered it, his most distinctive contribution to evolutionary theory. In its earlier form it served to explain the socialization and moralization of man in contrast to the brute creation.¹ Later, as the religious side of Mr. Fiske's thinking became more prominent, it received new emphasis as a central element in his argument for theism and immortality.² The theory starts from a recognition of the change which came over the evolutionary process when natural selection began "to confine itself to psychical variations, to the neglect of physical variations." This necessitated a prolongation of the plastic period of infancy in order to the acquirement of functions whose complexity renders them impossible of attainment in the pre-natal stage. The lengthened infancy, in turn, reacted on cerebral and intellectual development, and gave rise to psychical progress. In particular it furnished the occasion for the development of the parental feelings, and for the organization of the primitive social group, the family or clan. With the establishment of these the transition was effected from the gregariousness of the higher animals to the rudiments of human society. In them sympathy would develop and the control of individual action by ideal motives. Thus the beginnings of morality were implied in the primitive social organization and engendered by it, — the change from the form of evolution which is predominantly physical to psychical selection issuing in the genesis of results characteristic of man.

Of late years several writers have taken interest in noting anticipations of Fiske's view in the work of earlier times. In 1893 Professor, now President, Butler of Columbia University, pointed out one such in a fragment from Anaximander.³ In this, as Dr. Butler showed, the

¹ *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, Part II., chap. xvi, xxi-xxii. The doctrine had been suggested as early as 1871 in Fiske's lectures at Harvard (*cf. Excursions of an Evolutionist*, p. 306 note), and first published in the *North American Review*, October, 1873 (*cf. A Century of Science*, p. iv).

² *Cf.* Royce in the "Introduction" to the new edition of the *Cosmic Philosophy*, 1903, pp. lxxx note, cvi, cxxii ff., cxxxvii-viii.

³ "Anaximander on the Prolongation of Infancy in Man," read before the American Psychological Association, 1893; printed in *Classical Studies in Honour of Henry Drisler*, 1894, pp. 8-10.

Greek evolutionist recognized at once the fact of prolongation and its basis in the time which is required "for the adjustment of the complex physical and psychical activities to their environment." Further than this, however, Anaximander does not seem to have advanced, by far the most important part of Fiske's conclusions lying outside his thought.

A closer anticipation of Fiske has recently been found in a modern writer, Herder, whose views in other respects as well foreshadowed later genetic theories. Herder's doctrine has been described, and in part translated, by Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy,¹ who also traces back the theory to the poet Pope,² and from Pope, in germ, to one of Bolingbroke's "Fragments."

There are three passages in Herder's *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* in which the prolongation of infancy and its bearing on human culture are considered. The first two of these occur in Book IV, which has for its general subject the peculiar nature and destination of mankind. The fifth section of this book argues that man is organized at once for the most delicate health and the greatest endurance, and consequently to spread over all the earth. In the final paragraph the discussion culminates as follows:

"And, O, what motherly care and wisdom it was in the divine economy which determined also the life-stages and the longevity of our species! All living earthly creatures which have speedily to reach perfection, grow speedily as well; they ripen early and are quickly at life's goal. Man, planted upright like a tree of heaven, grows slowly. Like the elephant he remains longest in the womb; the years of his youth last longer, incomparably longer, than those of any animal. So nature prolonged as long as she could³ his happy time for learning, for growing, for rejoicing in his life, and for enjoying it in the most innocent way. Many animals are mature in a few years, days, or even almost at the moment of their birth; but they are the more imperfect for it, and die the earlier. Man must learn the longest (*am längsten lernen*) because he has the most to learn, all with him depending on self-acquired skill, reason, and art. If afterwards his life should be shortened by the innumerable multitude of chances and dangers, — yet he has enjoyed a long youth free from care,

¹ *Popular Science Monthly* for August, 1904, pp. 332-3. The fact had been noted independently by the present writer before the appearance of Lovejoy's interesting papers, "Some Eighteenth Century Evolutionists," *Pop. Sci. Monthly*, July-Aug., 1904.

² *Essay on Man*, Epistle III.

³ *Die glückliche Zeit . . . zog die Natur so lang als sie sie ziehen könnte.*

in which, together with his body and his mind, the world around him also grew ; along with his slowly-rising, constantly-extended horizon, the circle of his hopes enlarged, and his noble young heart was ever learning to beat more ardently in quick curiosity, with impatient enthusiasm for all that is great, and good, and beautiful. The flower of the sexual instinct develops later in a healthy, unstimulated (*unge-reizten*) man than in any animal ; for he is to live long and should not dissipate too early the noblest essence of his mental and vital powers. The insect, which serves love early, dies early also ; all chaste monogamous species of animals live longer than those which live without marriage. The lustful cock soon dies ; the constant wood-pigeon may live fifty years. Thus marriage too is ordered for nature's favorite here below ; and the first fresh years of his life he should live to himself, like an unopened bud of innocence. Then follow long years of virile and most cheerful powers, in which his reason ripens, which in man, along moreover with the generative powers, flourishes to an advanced age unknown among the animals ; till at last death gently comes and releases the falling dust as well as the shut-in spirit from a union foreign even to themselves. Thus nature has expended on the fragile habitation of the human body all the art which a creature of the earth could receive ; and even in that which shortens and enfeebles life, she has requited the *briefer*¹ with the *more sensible*¹ enjoyment, the consuming with the *more ardently-experienced*¹ power."²

If the rhetorical, not to say rhapsodical, form of the argument is disregarded, it will be seen that the passage contains several suggestions of the later doctrine. The connection of childhood with longevity, and of both with the life of sex, bear no relation to Fiske's formulation of the principle. But the view that man matures slowly, that his infancy is prolonged because he has so much to learn, is distinctly suggestive of the theory which Fiske worked out somewhat less than a century after the appearance of Herder's work. The contrast between man and animal also deserves notice, although it is less definite than it became in Fiske's treatment of the subject.

The next section traces the "formation of man for humanity (*Humanität*) and religion." As in the case of every organism, it is held, man's impulses have reference to self-preservation, on the one hand, and to sympathy or communion (*Theilnehmung oder Mittheilung*), on the other. Sexual love in its finer development leads with him to the life-

¹ Italics of the original.

² Translations by the writer, in comparison with Churchill's English version, 2d. ed., London, 1803.

long communion of two beings who feel themselves one. His organic constitution itself fits him for participation in the feelings of others. Parental sympathy, furthermore, and his long infancy have supplied the conditions requisite for the origin of society :

“ Beautiful is the chain by which the all-sentient Mother supports the fellow-feelings (*Mitempfindungen*) of her children and builds them up from link to link. Where the creature is still insensible and rude, scarcely able to care for itself, there the care of its offspring is not entrusted to it. The birds hatch and rear their young with maternal love ; the stupid ostrich, on the contrary, commits her eggs to the sand. ‘ She forgets ’ says that old Book, ‘ that a foot may tread upon them or a wild beast destroy them ; for God has deprived her of wisdom, and imparted to her no understanding.’ In virtue of one and the same organic cause through which a creature receives more brain, it receives more heat as well, bears living young or hatches them out, gives suck and acquires maternal love. The creature that is born alive is as it were a plexus of nerves from the mother-being (*ein Knäuel der Nerven des mütterlichen Wesens*) ; the self-suckled child is an offshoot of the mother-plant, which she nourishes as a part of herself. On this most intimate sympathy (*dies innigste Mitgefühl*) are founded in the domestic economy (*Haushaltung*) of the animal all the gentler impulses to which nature could uplift his species.

“ Among men maternal love is of a higher kind, an offshoot of the humanity of his upright build (*eine Sprosse der Humanität seiner aufgerichteten Bildung*). Under the mother’s eye the suckling lies upon her bosom and drinks the most delicate and finest nourishment ; it is an animal custom, and one even which deforms the body, when tribes, driven by necessity, suckle their children from behind. The greatest monsters (*Unmenschen*) are tamed by paternal and domestic love : even the lioness is kind to her young.¹ In the paternal house the first society arose, united by ties of blood, of confidence, and of love. Thus to break the wildness of men and to accustom them to domestic intercourse, the infancy of our species had to last long years ; nature brought and held it together in gentle bonds, so that it might not scatter and forget itself, like the early-maturing animals. Then the father became the instructor of his son, as the mother had been his nurse ; and so a new link of humanity (*Humanität*) was joined. For in this lay the ground for a necessary *human society*,² without which no man could grow up, no plurality of men exist (*keine Mehrheit von Menschen sein*

¹ From here to the end the passage is quoted by Lovejoy, *loc. cit.*

² Italics of the original.

könnte). Thus man is *born*¹ for society; this the sympathy of his parents tells him, this tell him the years of his long infancy."

Very notable here is the emphasis with which Herder grounds human society in the sympathy of the home, and this in turn in the lengthened childhood of the species. In the concluding sentence his anticipation of the modern doctrine becomes almost a series of epigrams. *Der Mensch ist also zur Gesellschaft geboren; das sagt ihm das Mitgefühl seiner Eltern, das sagen ihm die Jahre seiner langen Kindheit.* Than this the theory could hardly be more tersely or more plainly put. Nevertheless the consequences of the doctrine are not fully drawn. For, as he goes on to argue in the sub-section immediately following, sympathy is not sufficient to complete the humanizing process. There is need further for "the rule of justice and truth," which is written in the breasts of all men; while religion is made another universal possession of the race, as it springs from the use of the understanding and the impulses of the heart. Even the argument for immortality varies from the evolutionary type.

The third reference to the doctrine of infancy is briefer, being contained in the summary with which the last book of the *Ideen* opens:

"Our nature, as we have seen,² is organized to this evident end;³ for it our finer senses and impulses, our reason and freedom, our delicate yet lasting health, our speech, art, and religion are given us. In all conditions and societies it has been entirely impossible for man to have anything other than humanity in mind, to cultivate anything else, however he might conceive it. For its sake nature has so ordered the arrangements of sex and the periods of our life that our childhood might last longer, and learn a species of humanity only by the aid of education."

In view of the clearness with which Herder perceived the doctrine, it is remarkable that he failed to make a more substantive and more extended application of it in his system. A partial explanation of the neglect may be found in his relation to evolutionary theory at large. Here, as in the special case, he was a forerunner or anticipator, rather than a framer of principles. In fact, if evolution is understood in the modern sense of transformism, it is more than doubtful whether he was an evolutionist at all.⁴ In the change from the static to the genetic conception of things his work, especially the philosophy of

¹ Italics of the original.

² The reference is to Th. I, B. IV, from which I have quoted above.

³ *I. e.*, *Humanität*.

⁴ As Lovejoy has cogently argued (pp. 327, 333-6) against Von Bärenbach and Osborn. Cf. Haym, *Herder*, II, pp. 209-210.

history which is given in the *Ideen*, played an honorable and useful part.¹ But to make him out a Darwinian before Darwin, as some have done, or more generally, a chief discoverer of the evolutionary view of the world, is to obscure his real services by exaggerated praise.²

There remains the question of Fiske's indebtedness, or lack of indebtedness, to Herder. It is hardly possible that he was unacquainted with the *Ideen*. And in addition to the correspondence between their respective doctrines of infancy, analogies exist between Herder's religious speculations and the evolutionary theism which the American author worked out in his later writings. But here the suggestions of dependence end. The negative evidence, on the contrary, is very strong. There is great diversity in the use and application which the two philosophers make of the doctrine, beside differences of considerable magnitude between their formulations of the doctrine itself. Fiske's repeated accounts of his own authorship form a body of unimpeachable testimony which excludes the possibility of conscious derivation.³ The hypothesis of unconscious influence encounters a difficulty whose importance is increased by its indirectness: the absence from Fiske's writings of allusions to Herder's system. Such allusions may indeed exist. But the present writer has been unable to discover examples of them either in Fiske's philosophical or his historical works. Whereas, if one author is working out his views under the inspiration of another, incidental references inevitably creep in to show the relation of his results to the thinking of his predecessor. The balance of probability, therefore, is markedly in favor of the theory of independent origination rather than of conscious derivation or even of unrealized indebtedness. Unless resemblance in doctrine be held in principle to prove dependence, the evidence warrants the conclusion that similar theories of human infancy were independently developed by two thinkers of different nationalities at dates separated by almost a century of intellectual progress.

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¹ Cf. the writer's *Transitional Eras in Thought*, pp. 166-167.

² Cf. Von Bärenbach's *Herder als Vorgänger Darwin's*: "Alles, was zum innersten Kern der Theorie gehört, vom Kampf ums Dasein bis zur Urzelle finden wir deutlicher als in irgend einem Werke der vergangenen Zeiten in den 'Ideen' Herder's ausgesprochen" (p. 24).

³ E. g., *Cosmic Philosophy*, Preface, p. viii (new ed.), Vol. IV, p. 161; *A Century of Science*, pp. iii-vii, 106. Cf. p. 59, note 1 above, and the first and third references to Royce in note 2.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie. Mit Unterstützung des k.k. Ministeriums für Kultus und Unterricht in Wien, herausgegeben von A. MEINONG. Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth, Leipzig, 1904. — pp. xi, 634.

A publication such as the one before us presents unusual difficulties to the reviewer. Containing, as it does, six hundred pages devoted to eleven distinct contributions, ranging over a wide field of philosophical and psychological subjects, which, although not without their important relations to the larger currents of investigation, are nevertheless conceived in a singularly individual way, requiring a terminology created almost *de novo*, it does not lend itself easily to the critical judgment of the reader. Were it not for the unity of point of view which pervades the whole, an adequate presentation of its contents would be well nigh impossible.

That point of view is, of course, Meinong's, and, as he tells us in the introduction, the work represents ten years' activity of the philosophical seminar and psychological institute of the University of Graz, and, we are modestly told, reflects the *genius loci* — in reality the *genius hominis*. It is this *genius hominis* which gives unity to the work. "Ob dieser Genius freilich ein guter war und ist — oder ein schlimmer?" — his own question — will undoubtedly be answered in both fashions. For a point of view which requires us, if we are to grasp it, to use new instruments, to learn practically a new speech, must indeed approach that of genius, if it is to receive wide notice and be pronounced good. That a novel good does appear in Meinong's work, an individual distinction approaching close to genius, has been the conviction of some of those who have mastered his important work in worth-analysis, his contributions to logic and epistemology in his work "Über Annahmen," to say nothing of his earlier "Hume-Studien" and his work on the Weber-Fechner Law. That novel good, which, to put it briefly, may be described as a genius for radical empiricism, for the analysis of experience without presuppositions, has brought to light new conceptions which promise to become permanent, has disclosed new aspects of experience which must be taken into account in any adequate reconstruction of that experience.

This conviction of the fruitfulness of his more fundamental conceptions is on the whole deepened by the further extensions and applica-

tions of them in the present work. But with the increase of the high lights has come also a deepening of the shadows of the picture ; for it cannot be denied that the tendency to over-minute analysis and creation of new terms characteristic of the master has degenerated into a sort of scholasticism in the disciples. The saying of the master that "a good term is half a discovery," a dangerous half truth at best, seems to be in danger of being raised to the dignity of a revelation in the minds of his followers. Nor can complete indifference to the relations of new concepts and new terms to other philosophical developments be considered as other than an evil, — at best, perhaps, a necessary evil. But, despite these shadows, how far necessary incidents it is difficult to say, these papers show the essential fruitfulness of the master's method.

The first contribution, a paper by Meinong himself, constitutes a distinct advance on his previous work in that it claims to establish a new science, *Gegenstandstheorie*. The first object of all philosophical science, in the broadest sense, has for Meinong always been the study of objects of experience as such, their isolation, analysis, and classification. This, his radical empiricism, led him out of the earlier *Psychologismus* in that it showed him objects which are not identical with psychical content, the objectives or complexes built upon psychological content, and upon which the processes of judgment and assumption are directed. The essence of an object is that it is something upon which some psychical process is directed ; it may be sensation, perception, presentation, assumption, judgment, feeling, will. These objects may be physical or psychical, or neither, that is, may transcend this distinction which applies only to existents ; they may be real or ideal, and to all objects whether real or ideal the predicate 'being' applies, although not necessarily that of 'existence.' It is at this point that Meinong seems to see the necessity of a new science. The argument runs thus. All knowledge is directed upon objects, but, as we have seen, these objects are not all real. Besides the objects which exist, there is a large group which are ideal ; they do not exist (*existieren*), but merely subsist (*bestehen*), are immanent in existent reals. "Our natural prejudice in favor of real objects," physical and psychical, has led us to identify knowledge with processes directed upon real, transcendent objects, although, as a matter of fact, as mathematics should have taught us, much of science is concerned only with objects which are ideal, have being, but not existence. They subsist, merely, in the simple reals. *Gegenstandstheorie* is concerned then with the object itself, its *So-Sein*, not its existence.

But are not these ideal objects, certainly the objects of knowledge, already provided for in other sciences? Meinong's answer is "No." Not in metaphysics; for that is the universal science of the real. Not in psychology; for, while the ideal objects are the products of psychical process, psychology is interested in them, not as such, not for their 'what,' their *So-Sein*, but for the sake of the actual processes directed upon them and involved in their production. Nor in pure logic; for, while logic is not psychology, it is still a science of processes. Nor in epistemology, although this, it is admitted, is the science most nearly related, since even here there cannot be identity of function; for while epistemology involves the analysis of objects of knowledge as such, it also involves, since knowledge is *Erlebniss*, a study of actual processes, and therefore psychology. An independent problem and method cannot, therefore, be denied to *Gegenstandstheorie*.

In this claim to establish a new science much of importance is involved. If it were merely a question of definition, it might properly be passed by as fruitless for our general comprehension of these studies. But the complete distinction between being (subsistence) and existence, between the 'what' and the 'that,' the actual and the ideal, which underlies it has significant implications. To these questions we shall return, but in the meantime we may glance at the material and methods of the proposed new science as developed in succeeding papers.

Two articles, "Beiträge zur Grundlegung der Gegenstandstheorie," by Dr. Rudolf Ameseder, and "Zur Gegenstandstheorie des Messens," by Dr. Ernst Mally, carry out in developed form and in the spirit of the introductory article the germs of Meinong's thought. If *Gegenstandstheorie* is concerned "with the given entirely without reference to its existence," then "that which can be known directly from the nature of the object, therefore *a priori*, belongs in the science." What, then, may be inferred directly from an inspection of the objects? Their class, in the first place, and their significant attributes; quality, positive and negative, and modality, necessity, possibility and impossibility, or non-existence. If we examine the classification of objects, — and it should be noted in passing that both the material and method are incomplete, the material, in that psychical objects are not included, and the method, in that it is found necessary to resort to empirical analysis for the significant classes of objects, — we find the most important classification of *Gegenstände* into 'objects' and 'objectives.' The objectives are always propositions, existential or relational, about objects, and therefore presuppose them and are immanent and inhere in them. To the class objects, on the other hand, belong the sensa-

tion objects, the simples and certain complexes, such as numbers, distances, times, temporal and spatial forms, which, as complexes, inhere in the simples but are the objects of *Vorstellungsproduktion*, as the objectives are the objects of judgment and assumption. The simple elements, the form qualities, founded in simple elements, the relations of similarity, difference, connections, etc., all belong to *Gegenstandstheorie*, which deals with the 'what' of the object. But can we by direct inspection infer the necessity, possibility, or impossibility of these objects, or their existence or non-existence? It would appear not. We are told that the objectives imply necessarily the *inferiora* upon which they are founded, and have therefore necessary being; but because the *inferiora*, or existents in which they inhere, do not necessarily imply the superior objects, the latter are not existents. Now it is true that psychologically, as will be seen later, the elements or *inferiora* may be perceived without the presentation or judgment of the objects and objectives of higher order, founded upon them, but it is not clear that logically the implication is thus one sided. But it is upon this conception that the absolute distinction between existence and necessity rests. Any terms must have some relations, and the relations they have are as necessary to them as the terms to the relations. It would seem impossible, then, that we should distinguish by any merely *a priori* method between objects and objectives that are necessary and those which are mere matter of fact. It is in this conception of necessity and its use by the Meinong school that the root of its criticism must be found.

Despite this doubt which presents itself as to the possibility of the new science, with a distinctive *a priori* method, in the second of these two articles, "Zur Gegenstandstheorie des Messens," Dr. Mally gives a valuable application of Meinong's method and principles and a striking illustration of the capacity of his instruments of analysis for opening up fruitful points of view. Of this theory of measurement, about which, it is safe to predict, the mathematical logicians will have considerable to say, it would be impossible to treat adequately in the limits of this review. It will be sufficient to note two points: (1) his conception of its relation to pure mathematics, and (2) his conception of the nature of quantity and the criterion of measurement. While mathematics has as objects only quantities as such, and in addition one type of determined quantities, spatial, the theory of measurement as part of *Gegenstandstheorie* is concerned with the other attributes in which the abstract quantity is implied. Quantity is an ideal quality, an objective which inheres in elements and in other objects and ob-

jectives, — in all subsisting objects in so far as they fulfil the criterion of quantity. Now any complex or objective may be either explicit, or implied in the *inferiora* of which it is the founded quality. If such a quality, when made explicit or abstracted from its *inferiora*, shows variability with zero as its limit, it is a quantity. Quantity is an attribute of any objects which as *inferiora* imply this attribute, that is, determine it. The different types of quantity thus implied by objects, number complexes, and continua are then studied in detail and their laws determined. Especially interesting to the general reader will be found the application of the criterion of measurement to certain so-called fictitious quantities, objectives founded upon or subsisting in other objects or objectives, such as capacity, energy, force, work, worth, probability, etc.

The psychological investigations included in the volume gather about Meinong's two most important contributions to psychology, both of which, apart from their relations to ultimate philosophical theory, have in them elements of independent and permanent value; first, his theory of intuited objects of higher order, the complexes, form-qualities founded in perceptual elements but going beyond them, having as their corresponding psychical process *Vorstellungsproduktion* (as objectives have, as their corresponding process, judgments and assumptions), and, secondly, his theory of worth as feeling with certain psychical presuppositions. The first of these conceptions underlies several detailed studies, an analysis of the process of *Fundierung*, "Über Vorstellungsproduktion," by Rudolf Ameseder, and experimental studies of optical illusions (the Müller-Lyer and Zöllner), "Psychologie des Gestalterfassens," by Dr. Vittorio Benussi and Wilhelmine Liel, in which the illusion is conceived to be due to inadequacy neither of perception nor of judgment, but of processes of *Vorstellungsproduktion*.

The standpoint in psychology which lies back of these detailed investigations, already suggested in connection with the problem of the relation of psychology to epistemology, or, if we admit the existence of the new science, to *Gegenstandstheorie*, is in opposition to certain current tendencies. Psychology is the science not of any objects as such but of the processes involved in the experience of those objects, sensation, perception, presentation, judgment, assumption, feeling, desire, etc., directed upon these objects, through which the objects are presented, grasped, constructed, valued. These studies are not based upon that conception of psychology which finds its chief function in the analysis of objects, the exploration of the manifold of sensation

objects, colors, tones, etc. (or, indeed, more extremely still, in the breaking up of these processes themselves into hypothetical objects, in order to connect them with physical objects), but rather upon that which finds its chief interest in the processes by which objects of higher order are constructed on the basis of the simples of sensation and perception. Psychology has distinctly to do with attitude (*Verhalten*), not with objects. And with this comes the use of two conceptions, 'representation of the psychical' as such, and 'psychical activity' or energy, which some would banish from psychology.

And these concepts of attitude and psychical activity are actually used as explanatory principles in accounting for certain facts of analytical and experimental analysis. Thus in the paper, "Über Vorstellungsproduktion," where we are given the psychology of those ideal objects of a higher order, founded upon sensations but themselves not sensed, we find the following argument. If sensation and perception are directed upon real objects, ideation is directed upon ideal objects founded upon the reals of sensation and perception. Now many of these objects or complexes, such as spatial and rhythmic forms, are neither the objects of perception nor judgment; they show an additional aspect which is not sensational but yet presented, — the form (*Gestalt*). "But all in these complexes which is not sensation and yet is presentation must be produced." Thus the distinctive *Vorstellungsproduktion*. In relation to the sensations, the *inferiora*, the founded objects are *superiora*. The *inferiora* may be presented without the *superiora*, but the *superiora*, although they may have different *inferiora*, nevertheless require some *inferiora* for their presentation. The justification for making *Vorstellungsproduktion* a distinct object of investigation, beside perception, representation, etc., is that, while the latter always presuppose particular content, the former, although it presupposes some content, is relatively independent of particular content. A second point of difference, — and this is important for the following study, — lies in the fact that, while perception is necessarily involved in sensation, these complexes are products of a given attitude; they may or may not be produced. They depend upon psychical activity or volition.

The psychology "des Gestalterfassens," an experimental application of this conception, and of which the study of the Müller-Lyer figure may be taken as an illustration, consists, as usual, in the study of the quantitative variations in the illusion; but in this case the conditions introduced are of a new kind, changes other than in the form of the figure itself. These variations are of two sorts: (1) difference

in attitude (*Verhalten*) toward the figure ; (2) differences in color and brightness intensity between the figure and the background and between the primary horizontal line and the secondary oblique lines. The difference in attitude consists in (*a*) requiring the subject to grasp the figure as a whole, and in this attitude to compare the main line with a line that can be varied mechanically (the *G*-attitude), and (*b*) in making the comparison when the presentation of the figure as a whole is avoided as much as possible (the *A*-attitude). In the latter attitude there is, on the theory of the experiment, a perception of all the sense data, the *inferiora*, of the object without a production of the form.

The results of these experiments, the details of which, it may be said in passing, show the experiment to have been carried out with all necessary care and completeness, are in themselves striking. It was found, first of all, that the illusion is independent of the changes in the *inferiora*, that is, of the angles. The figure remaining constant, the illusion can be varied with the attitude. With reference to the two attitudes it was found that the illusion is in general greater with the *G*- than with the *A*-attitude ; that these attitudes are susceptible of practice, and that ultimately, with practice, the illusion in the case of the *A*-attitude sinks to zero. The variations in color and brightness differences show equally interesting results. To take merely the brightness differences as illustrative, in the case where the difference is between figure and background, the amount of the illusion varies inversely with the amount of the difference. When the primary and secondary lines differ in brightness, the amount of the illusion is directly proportional to the amount of difference and inversely proportional to the difference between the primary and the background.

The interpretation of these results is an unusually good piece of constructive work. Briefly put, the positive inference is that the illusion depends not upon inadequacy of stimuli but upon inadequate or equivocal processes of *Vorstellungsproduktion* or *Fundierung*, as indicated by the dependence of the illusion upon the two attitudes. The significance of the color and brightness conditions lies in the fact that certain contrasts are favorable, others unfavorable, to the processes of form production. On the negative side, the critical rejection of the perception and judgment hypotheses, based, it should be noted in passing, upon what is perhaps the best historical and critical résumé of the explanations of the figure which has yet appeared, presupposes certain psychological concepts characteristic of this entire point of view. The criteria of *perceptual* illusion, of which color induction is

taken as typical, that the illusion is unequivocal, uniquely and necessarily determined by the stimulus, that it is not affected by practice or attitude, do not apply here. Nor does the criterion of judgment illusion, that, with knowledge of inadequacy of the judgment, the false judgment disappears.

Whatever expert criticism may have to say of the details of the experiment and of the theoretical presuppositions underlying it, it is safe to say that this new theory must take its place among the important explanations of the Müller-Lyer illusion, and with it must come an overhauling of our concept of perception and of our experimental results. If the *A*- and *G*-attitudes are really significant, as they appear to be, then the equivocal results which have appeared in experimentation on the eye-movement theory, the irrelevant eye-movements which photographic studies have disclosed, may be easily understood. The author himself, in criticising Wundt's theory, points out that the illusion arises in mere fixation as well as in exploration of the figure and, under circumstances (the *A*-attitude), the movement of the eyes over the primary line is followed by decrease of the illusion.

These methods of experimentation, it should be added, have been applied, with the same general results, to the Zöllner figure; and in an additional paper by Wilhelmine Liel, Münsterberg's figure (the shifted checker-board figure) is treated as a modification of the Zöllner figure, and Münsterberg's irradiation hypothesis subjected to critical attack.

The two psychological contributions, which constitute an extension of Meinong's psychology of feeling and will, illustrate clearly the point of view in psychology. The first, a critical attack upon Schwartz's voluntaristic worth theory, by Wilhelmine Liel, has in view the maintenance of the original position of Meinong in worth psychology, that the psychological worth fundamental is to be found in feeling, more particularly in judgment feelings, later modified to include assumption feeling. On the view of psychological method already described, it is precisely because worth is an attitude, a specific type of direction upon objects, that worth experience may be the object of psychological analysis. The analysis of feeling and will, as Meinong had already said in his *Psychologische-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werththeorie*, is impossible unless approached through the worth problem, that is, the objects upon which feeling and will are directed. But whether this attitude should be described as feeling or will has been a question upon which worth psychologists have differed. It is precisely because worth (*Werth-halten*) is attitude that Schwartz felt impelled to

substitute *Gefallen* for feeling, on the ground that feeling is content, not attitude, and the object of worth attitude. That the grounds for this are to be found in an inadequate and false view of feeling Liel's criticism shows clearly. The fact that feeling may, in certain cases, be the object of valuation, is no reason why it may not also be the attitude itself. We find judgments with judgments as objects, and desires directed upon desire. The distinction made by Schwartz between feelings as passive and *Gefallen* as active attitude, rests upon an identification of feeling with sensation feelings, whereas feelings which have as their presuppositions judgments and assumptions are not passive. Likewise the argument that feeling, as passive, displays a manifold of qualities not reducible to the two fundamental positive and negative directions of worth attitude, and displays merely degrees of intensity, while worth shows degrees of satisfaction not identical with intensity, is shown to be no sufficient argument against the feeling theory.

The recognition, moreover, that feeling as worth may have other modifications than intensity, which is made possible by the new element in Meinong's worth theory, assumption feelings, is an important extension of the old conception. The view that these assumption feelings, or phantasy feelings, show degrees of satisfaction (*Sättigung*), to use Schwartz's term, independent of variations in intensity, opens a way to an understanding between the two theories as well as to the inclusion of the æsthetic among the worth attitudes.

Closely related to this is the second contribution to the psychology of feeling, "Über die Natur der Phantasiegefühle und Phantasiebegehungen," by Dr. Robert Saxinger. The position taken here is that those phenomena, often described as generalized feelings or affective abstracts, are really *Phantasiegefühle*. The distinction between real and imagined feelings is already familiar to the readers of Meinong's "Über Annahmen" and Witasek's *Æsthetik*. It will also be remembered by all who have followed the discussion of affective abstracts (Ribot, Paulhan, Elsenhans, and the present writer) that a distinguishing characteristic of the affective abstract or affective sign, is that it does not follow, as particular feelings, the law of dulling of sensitivity with repetition, but may actually increase in depth of feeling tone. Saxinger recognizes this exception to the general law as stated by Elsenhans, but finds its explanation in the fact that they are feelings with assumptions as presuppositions, *Phantasiegefühle*. Now it is not clear to the present writer, despite the arguments presented, that the term 'emotional abstracts' is not a good term for these phenomena. To argue the question would necessitate the raising of the entire prob-

lem of the nature of generalization and abstraction as a psychological process, as well as translation into the terms of this school, which is obviously impossible here. It will be sufficient to suggest that, genetically viewed, the process of passing from judgment to assumption is precisely what constitutes generalization and abstraction, the transfer of attention from the 'that' to the 'what.' And, after all, the significant thing is the recognition, although in different terms, of the essential facts which the theory of affective abstracts sought to do justice to, as well as their functional rôle in the experiences of worth.

Throughout this review we have deliberately limited our treatment to an exposition of the more significant extensions which Meinong's point of view and method have received in the papers before us. Any detailed criticism, to be adequate, would of necessity involve a criticism of Meinong's position as a whole, which is presupposed throughout. Such a criticism, as readers of this REVIEW will know, has been presented, on the whole adequately, in the three articles by Russell in *Mind* for 1904. Nevertheless, an expression of a general attitude of doubt and questioning, called forth by the claim to establish a new science and intensified in following the attempts to develop the program of that hypothetical science, will not be out of place. Inevitably such a claim raises a suspicion of inadequacy or over-subtlety in analysis. New sciences do, indeed, appear, but the magnification of a novel point of view by an individual into a new science is normally associated with a too exclusive preoccupation with a limited point of view. Now, whatever may be said of that method, that radical empiricism which seeks an exhaustive analysis of objects as such, — and of its value for logic and psychology the present writer is assured, — we may well question whether there may be a science of pure objects as such, irrespective of their existence or non-existence, whether the absolute distinction between *Sein* and *So-Sein*, between the 'that' and the 'what,' upon which such a science must rest, is ultimate. The doubt which was raised as to the possibility of an *a priori* method, which by mere inspection shall distinguish the proposition, or the objective, which is merely necessary or possible from that which exists, deepens into a more fundamental doubt, whether there can be any knowledge, real knowledge, of an object which is merely immanent in existents, has merely *So-Sein* and is not in some sense an existent itself, — whether the absolute distinction between the real and the ideal does not arise from an over-emphasis upon a method valuable in itself but which, when pressed to an extreme, reverts to a narrow view of reality and of experience which we had thought to

have transcended. Is it not a truer conception of reality that it is in some sense coextensive with experience, and a truer conception of experience that it includes all processes of apprehension so that ultimately the distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* vanishes? Such, at least, would seem to be the point of view toward which the best thinking of the present is approaching.

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La philosophie de Charles Renouvier. Introduction à l'étude du neo-criticisme. Par GABRIEL SÉAILLES. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1905. — pp. ii, 400.

This very able book, which contains not only a clear and full résumé of Renouvier's philosophy but much excellent critical comment upon it, will appeal to all who are interested in studying the various manifestations of the genius, so complex and so many sided, of the French people. For unlike though Renouvier's method of thought is to those systems of speculation which we are wont to regard as most typically Gallic, yet the extent and strength of his influence in his own country, — an influence which, if waning, is by no means exhausted, — shows that in his philosophy there is something which finds ready acceptance in the national mind. This element we may guess to be the tendency to make direct application of the results of even the most abstruse speculation to the actual problems of individual and social life. Yet it is probable that future historians of philosophy will be less likely to classify Renouvier as an original French philosopher than as the last, and as one of the most important, of the direct inheritors of the Kantian tradition. With such a classification it is probable that he himself would scarcely quarrel; 'neo-criticism' was his own title for his system, and, though it grew into something very difficult to harmonize with the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, yet even in its latest development it claims to rest on principles which Kant was the first to firmly and permanently establish.

As M. Séailles points out, it was the aim of Renouvier to effect a synthesis of the fundamental doctrines of Kant and Hume; or rather, one might say, to correct and purify the Kantian system by importing into it that pluralism and phenomenalism which resulted from Hume's rigid analysis of human experience. The noumenon or thing-in-itself of the Critical Philosophy is expunged wholly from the French neo-criticism. But, unlike Hume, perhaps we must say less logically than Hume, Renouvier accepts, along with the phenomena themselves, and

as equally real with them, the laws which regulate them. It is the law, at once constitutive of and formed by thought, which is the *a priori* element in experience. These laws are imposed by the practical as well as the speculative reason, so that the exigences of the moral order, implying freedom, are dominant over physical relations, and a place is thus left for liberty in the sense of indeterminism. But pluralism, as Renouvier has understood and expounded it, in at least the earlier stages of his philosophical career, is essentially a mathematical concept, and rests for its validity on the discreteness of quantity. The infinite is a non-entity ; whatever exists, exists numerically, and the world consists of discontinuous limited phenomena, and is finite in space and time. With the denial of a plenum of substance and of the infinite, neo-criticism claims to have established a place for intermittent action, for original causes, and so for moral liberty.

Nothing could be better than the synopsis and explanation given by M. Séailles of this which is probably the most dry and difficult part of Renouvier's philosophy, as to many minds it is the most unsatisfactory. It is hardly necessary to point out how the argument here advanced, if carried out to its furthest logical consequences, must lead to Pyrrhonism. The author's criticism goes to the root of the matter : " Si tout est nombre, rien sans doute n'est infini, mais la conséquence suppose la prémisse, c'est-à-dire la philosophie de Renouvier." If, however, we hesitate to grant this fundamental assumption to Renouvier, we cannot question the ingenuity and speculative genius with which he has built up his metaphysical and ethical theory upon it ; and his teaching in regard to developing and training the power of deliberation and rational thought, and of checking the tendency to confuse the unreal with the real which is due to passion and impulse, deserves particular attention. It is refreshing to find an apostle of pragmatism stating " la dernier mot d'une education rationelle, celui qui comprend tout quand ou la creuse, est *Savoir douter, apprendre à douter*. L'ignorant doute peu, et le fou ne doute jamais."

The interest attaching to Renouvier's libertarianism lies less in the strength of his position than in the clearness with which he recognizes, and the vigor with which he endeavors to overcome, the logical difficulties which that position involves. He admits that, in abrogating the notion of necessary connection, he implies the existence of self-caused phenomena ; but this he regards as already given as the result of Hume's analysis. To admit indeterminism is to admit that a fact can arise independently of conditioning antecedents ; but this is in harmony with the neo-critical conception of the world as consisting

of discrete and discontinuous phenomena. Whether it can be reconciled with the conception of 'law,' which Renouvier himself lays down in other connections, may be open to doubt. Renouvier, aware of the difficulty of proving freedom, in his sense of the word, rather claims the right to assume it. We are free to believe that we are free, and in willing our freedom we establish it, for the voluntary element is the essential one in knowledge, which is an act rather than a state. We notice, however, that Renouvier seems in his earlier philosophy to state his doctrine of pragmatism with the most careful regard to the interests of the intelligence ; he does not deny the right and duty of each man to think ; but he emphasizes the essentially voluntary character of the thought process itself, while pointing out the limitations that most frequently force us to content ourselves with probable explanations instead of intellectual proofs. On this latter point and on some others, his teaching is in accord with that of Newman in his *Grammar of Assent*, which still remains the most cogent argument for probabilism that has ever been promulgated. Yet the old homely objection to all such reasoning remains apparently irrefutable, namely, that just in so far as any conclusion, whether as probable or certain, is reached under the influence of external authority, passion, moral aspiration, or individual preference, in so far does it rest on an unsound basis ; it is the partizan not the judge who has decided the case, and his sentence is neither valid nor final. The utility of a doctrine is one thing, its truth is another, and to accept it on evidence that does not satisfy the reason because of its beauty, its pleasantness, or its practical results is to choose darkness rather than light.

With the later developments of Renouvier's thought, in which his philosophy approximates to the teaching of liberal Protestantism, M. Séailles shows some not unnatural impatience. It is, indeed, hard to see how the author of the earlier book bearing Renouvier's name could without formal recantation teach the fanciful idealism of his later works. That the philosopher whose fundamental doctrine was the denial of substance, of the noumenon, and of the infinite in any form, should be a theist is startling enough ; for if there is any speculative system which may be called antitheistic, it is of course a thorough-going pluralism ; and it is equally surprising to find a consistent phenomenalist justifying a belief in the immortality of the soul. But such incongruities are as nothing when compared with the strange and fantastic cosmic history which the author of neo-criticism has constructed in order to account for the present moral, social, and physical

condition of the world. The reader of even the short summary given by M. Séailles of these speculative vagaries may be tempted to draw the moral that, if an indulgence of 'the will to believe' leads a brilliant mind into such a confusion of wild imaginings, if probabilism run to seed results in the acceptance of crude improbabilities, it is better to wait patiently and humbly for the guidance of reason even at the cost of the most long-continued and painful doubts.

Nothing but praise can be given M. Séailles for the way in which he has performed his task. Neo-criticism, as its originator presents it, is a somewhat dry and crabbed system, but it becomes lucid and interesting as presented in the volume before us, which may be confidently recommended to all students of philosophy who are not already familiar with Renouvier's writings.

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HALIFAX, N. S.

System der Philosophie. Zweiter Teil: Ethik des reinen Willens.

VON HERMANN COHEN. Berlin, Bruno Cassirer, 1904.—pp. xvii, 641.

In the general system of philosophy upon which Professor Cohen is engaged, the first part treats of the logic of the pure knowledge, and the present volume, forming the second and complementary part, deals with the ethic of the pure will. The world of knowledge Professor Cohen grounds upon mathematics, which furnishes the underlying basis for the various natural sciences. Following this general method, he finds the home of ethics within the sphere of jurisprudence. As the elemental principles of mathematics form the ground for the whole superstructure of knowledge, so in like manner the principles of ethics fall back upon the ground principles of jurisprudence. This fundamental relation, he insists, is seen when we contemplate the essential concepts which characterize the basal elements of ethics. Of these concepts the most central is that of man; man is essentially the ethical object. But at once the question is raised, Is man to be regarded as the individual man or men in general? There is no necessary antithesis, however, between man and men; for the seeming antithesis exists only between the one and the many. There is no antithesis, moreover, between the individual and the all, *i. e.*, the universal of which he is a distinct representative. The ethical relation of man to his fellows in society is essentially a relation of the one to the universal of which the one is a particular manifestation. Were the individual considered solely as an individual, he could not be regarded as the subject of ethical relations. Unless the individual is

correlated with the universal, there can be no ethic. This universal may be illustrated in the common traditions and customs of a tribe or clan, or in the ordinances of a village community or city, but most adequately and satisfactorily in the solidarity which is embodied in the unity of a true state. The demand of ethics is that there shall be a central unity within a manifold diversity, every individual a part, and an organic part of the whole; and, as Professor Cohen insists, it is the state alone which can furnish a proper ethical environment.

Moreover, inasmuch as the individual can become an ethical person only so far as his individuality expresses some phase of a universal, where shall we look for an adequate representation of that peculiar kind of person who thus embodies an individuality within a universal? As we regard any individual man, we find that his individuality is so emphasized that we fail to apprehend the universal within which the individual realizes his true ethical significance. Where, then, is the person that may be regarded by us as essentially the type of an ethical person? This question Professor Cohen answers unhesitatingly, and his answer is the corner stone of his system of ethics. He insists that the prototype of every ethical person is found in the juristic person; for the juristic person represents always the unity which obtains within a group of the many. The juristic person represents the oneness of corporate rights and of corporate obligations. Such a concept is one which serves to represent the ethical person in his *Reinheit*, because it represents a person freed from the petty particularities which cling to the individual, his passion and prejudice, his desire and appetite, his caprice and whim. As a pure abstract concept, it completely expresses the central ethical idea of the individual as universal. Professor Cohen is very urgent in insisting that the ideal of the ethical person is not found in the so-called unity of a mere corporation; for the corporation at best represents a *Besonderheit*, and it is only the state that can be said properly to represent an *Allheit*. And the oneness of humanity is a unity which grows out of the relation of man to man as fellow members of one and the same state. The state is the element in which man, the ethical individual, lives and moves and has his being. The unity which binds all members of such an organism together is, according to Professor Cohen, of the nature of an all-pervading informing spirit. As Plato regarded the world-soul as manifesting itself in a state-soul, and this state-soul in turn manifesting itself in man, in some such manner Professor Cohen holds that there is within the state a juristic personality to be interpreted after the manner of a soul. The essential principle of such

a soul is will, and it is of the essence of will to manifest itself. This will, however, must be a pure will. Because essentially universal, it is freed from all that is particular, and therefore manifests itself in forms which admit of universal formulation in the laws of the state.

Moreover, every individual is ethical in so far as his inner will shows itself in conduct. It is in conduct, in the external act, that the ethical value of the man is determined. It is conduct, of course, in the sense that conduct reveals the inner man and not that conduct which fails to express the inner man. Here is another common point of ethics and jurisprudence. The state recognizes conduct as that with which alone it has to do. The 'soul of the state' is essentially will, the willing of certain kinds of conduct as expressing its ideals. The individual will, which in a sense is a reflection of this general will, or is the general will in miniature, has its ideal set in the larger will of the state. In this connection, reference may be made to the difference which, Professor Cohen holds, always obtains between a purely intellectual activity and an activity which possesses ethical significance. Every pursuit of knowledge, every activity of the reasoning processes, involves will. The knowing process is essentially a true form of activity. Its end, however, is that of knowing the object. The end of ethical activity is not concerned with any object whatsoever, but with that conduct which terminates upon the object. Moreover, such ethical conduct always possesses another essential characteristic. The object towards which the conduct is directed always involves some relation to another person. The very idea of a person, the *ego* as the embodiment of morals, rights, and obligations implies an *alter-ego*. Such a relation, again, can occur only in an organized society which is worthy the name of the state.

Inasmuch as all conduct which has moral significance is to be regarded as the outer manifestation of the inner disposition, it is to be regarded as a form of self-manifestation. As the state is primarily a legislator, so also the individual is a self-legislating personality, that is, in so far as there is in his individuality a reflection of the universal which renders him one with his fellows. Conduct should be in accord with a universal, and not with anything which is merely individual. Conduct is to be regulated by law. But law can never have anything particular about it; and therefore, while it is expressed by each individual as a law which is self-imposed, the self which imposes it is the self which possesses an affinity with the universal. Here, again, the universal finds concrete expression only in the existing state, of which the individual in question is a member. The will is pure in so far as

it is the expression of a law, that is, of a universal rather than anything particular. The moral life, therefore, is essentially one of self-manifestation ; but not the self which expresses the individual impulse, the passing desire, the ignoble appetite or passion, rather the self which is the ideal self, the self which ought to be according to principles which are universal in nature and in scope.

The author indicates four phases in which the manifestation of self is revealed. (1) There is first of all the process of self-legislation. According to Professor Cohen, autonomy is normal ; heteronomy always the mark of the abnormal. The idea of self in its universal capacity is a natural correlate of a self as law-giver. (2) Then follows a process of self-realization. This is brought about through a series of individual acts of conduct. Each individual act is a revelation of that purposing self which is the spring of the action. And it is only in each concrete act that the terms will, freedom, self, conduct, possess any real significance. Without the concrete act in which these ideas find concrete expression, they would remain forever empty abstractions. (3) The third moment in the ethical process is that of self-responsibility ; and the idea of responsibility is correlated with that of self-determination. Responsibility would have no significance were it not for the possibility of a determination of one's own activities freed from any but an inner compulsion. (4) The fourth phase of the activity of the moral self is that of self-conservation. The self in all forms of its various activity must seek to preserve its own integrity and autonomy. The chief end of punishment is not to destroy but to restore the true self.

Professor Cohen regards certain theories of the universe as inimical to the essential principles of ethics. He finds in naturalism a tendency to reduce the self-determination of the ethical person to a nature determination, and in pantheism a tendency to absorb the human in the divine, the finite in the infinite. Moreover, there is a certain phase of pantheism which is merely a disguised form of naturalism. In order, therefore, to preserve the integrity of an ethic, it is necessary to postulate the transcendence of God as the necessary correlate of His immanence. By means of the idea of the transcendence of God, the seeming antithesis between nature and morality is overcome. For inasmuch as God transcends nature and likewise transcends the moral person, then nature cannot be regarded as transcending morality, or morality transcending nature. The two find their synthesis in the God idea which underlies both the world of nature and the world of morality.

This is a brief and necessarily superficial sketch of the main features of Professor Cohen's *Ethik*. The volume contains upwards of six hundred pages, and there are many interesting topics discussed by the author which, in the brief space allotted to this review, cannot even be mentioned. The most striking and the most central feature of the book is certainly the correlation of the moral and the juristic person. The precise significance of this correlation it is difficult to determine. Professor Cohen evidently means to express far more than the close and intimate relations which are generally recognized as existing between the science of jurisprudence and that of ethics. The juristic person he regards in the light of a prototype of the moral person, and the universal which the juristic person illustrates he maintains is the universal which gives to the moral person his value as a moral being. Now the question which will suggest itself to every reader of Professor Cohen's work is this: Is the moral person, the individual in his capacity of universality, in legislating a law to himself which he would wish at the same time to be law to all, merely reflecting in his own consciousness the will of the state as expressed in positive law?

If this is so, then moral right and moral obligation become coextensive with legal right and legal obligation. In this case, ethics is absorbed in jurisprudence. This Professor Cohen would not allow. But, on the other hand, can he mean merely that the universal element in every moral act of every moral person finds a very significant illustration and analogue in the juristic act and the juristic person? He surely means more than this; for he speaks time and again of the grounding of ethics in jurisprudence. There is still another possible interpretation of the relation of ethics to jurisprudence in his system, and it is this, that the universal which renders an act of the individual a moral act in virtue of his oneness with his fellows is the central spirit of the organism, the state, and that the individual as a part of this organism is merely the vehicle for the manifestation of the all-controlling and informing spirit of the whole. But such a view proves too much. It would signify, in a certain sense, the personification of the state and at the same time a corresponding loss of the individual power of self-determination which is an idea central to Professor Cohen's entire system. He fears that the moral person may be lost in a system of naturalism; but is there not an equal danger lest the moral person become a mere fiction by being absorbed in the juristic person? Instead of the juristic person being the fiction, is it not the moral person who is playing this rôle? The author either proves too little or too

much : too little, if the relation of ethics to jurisprudence is merely a relation of intimately related and closely coördinated sciences ; but too much, if he means, as he evidently does, to ground his ethics upon the foundations of jurisprudence. Again, the state whose 'soul' is the juristic person in his universal significance, Professor Cohen declares, is not to be regarded as the state historically revealed in any one particular form or place or age, but the state ideally conceived. The universal which is the life of the state is, after all, according to the author's statement, that universal which has in it a touch of the eternal, which needs the idea of God to give it constancy and authority, and whose laws are the unwritten laws that know no change. Is not this after all the true universal, the real prototype both of the juristic person and the moral person ? The relation of ethics to jurisprudence is thus the relation which arises from the possibility of a common reference to one and the same source. Moreover, in a relation which is essentially one that is coördinate and not a relation of subordination, Professor Cohen certainly overestimates the dependence of ethics upon jurisprudence, and underestimates the dependence of jurisprudence upon ethics.

On the other hand, we are in complete agreement with the author's contention that only in society can man be regarded as an ethical person, and that the only foundation for a society which has moral significance is the state. But he evidently wishes to prove a more intimate relation than that of determining the proper ethical environment, an almost mystical relation between the individual and the *Staatsseele*, and it is at this point that his system seems to feel the stress and strain of its own weight.

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Greek Thinkers : A History of Ancient Philosophy. By THEODOR GOMPERZ. Translated into English from the second German edition by G. G. BERRY. Vols. II and III. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905. — pp. xii, 397 ; vii, 386.

The first volume of the English translation of Gomperz's *Griechische Denker* was published in 1901, and was reviewed by Professor Fairbanks in the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW for September of the same year. Two volumes of the German work have so far been published, the first volume concluding with the Sophists, and the second volume carrying the subject through Plato. Volumes II and III of the English translation correspond with Vol. II of the German original. The

second volume (German) was published in March, 1902, and so considerable was the demand for the work that a new edition, with minor alterations, was issued in December, 1902.

The work of Gomperz belongs to a very original and extraordinary type. It could have been written only by a man rich in knowledge, of mature scholarship, and unusual temperament. When the second volume issued from the press, Gomperz was seventy years of age and Professor Emeritus at the University of Vienna. At the beginning of his career, he had trained himself for jurisprudence, but, turning aside to philology and philosophy, he at once established an enviable reputation by publishing in 1865-66 two volumes of "Herculaneum Studies," and in 1867 became privat-docent at the University of Vienna, where in 1873 he was made Professor *Ordinarius* of Classical Philology. His works cover a wide range of classical subjects, and include a translation of the works of John Stuart Mill into German. What strikes one especially, in reading the volumes on Greek philosophy now before us, is the extraordinary range from which Gomperz draws his illustrative materials. These materials are in large measure taken from modern philosophy, ethnology, anthropology, and the natural sciences of both the ancient and modern worlds. No work on Greek philosophy is comparable with that of Gomperz in the matters of illuminating illustration and apposite citation. The work to which one instinctively turns in order to compare and measure the labors of our author is Zeller's *Philosophy of the Greeks*. Here we are struck with very interesting contrasts. Both works are high types of German scholarship, and of monumental dimensions. While Gomperz by profession and training is a philologist, Zeller by profession and training is a theologian and philosopher. Yet in the two works under comparison the philologist gives us an essentially philosophical *Kulturgeschichte*, while the philosopher gives us an objective narrative of facts and data based on the sanest and most thorough philological inquiries, and his work bristles with textual annotations, emendations, and criticisms. The one is a philosophical interpreter, evaluating his facts in terms of his temperament, his knowledge, and the envining conditions of the facts; the other is the critical historian, sifting evidence with the help of philology, and systematically presenting the results as an objective quantum. The primary object of Gomperz is to illuminate, interpret, and vivify the fact; the primary object of Zeller is to authentically determine and clearly present the fact. While it is not the reviewer's present purpose to weigh and evaluate the relative advantages of these two methods, it is clear that Gomperz's method is

better for an audience in an academic lecture room or for the general reader, while Zeller's method is better for the scholar or trained specialist. And so it seems to me that the two works are adapted to two distinct classes of readers, and each has a different *raison d'être*. I do not wish to be misunderstood as indicating by the above comparison that Gomperz's work is what is commonly stigmatized as popular. It is a work of prodigious scholarship, of fine appreciative and expository qualities, of brilliant and eloquent manner, of great breadth of treatment and purview, and, by virtue of these last-named qualities, it is popular in a high and legitimate sense, *i. e.*, it is interesting to a larger body of readers than a bald, pragmatic statement would be, whose appeal is exclusively to the historical and logical faculty. Indeed, one may go further and say that the writing of a treatise that shall maintain a just balance between the claims of scholarship and the claims of literary statement, the claims of content and the claims of form, of scientific matter and interesting investiture, is the most difficult of all forms of expression, demanding as it does rare qualities of both head and heart. This method, however, as exemplified by Gomperz, suffers one great disadvantage; it pushes aside a vast mass of detail, which might impede the narrative or be excluded for lack of space. As a matter of fact, the three volumes now published in English are poor in details, when compared with Zeller's work. Consequently no one would think of going to Gomperz's treatise as a work of reference. Zeller's work, on the other hand, is a great repository of facts and data, from which neither the consulting historian nor philologist is sent empty away. The volumes of Gomperz can in no way rival the older work in this respect.

It was the intention of Gomperz to include in his second volume the later Academics and the Peripatetics, but the space was taken up by an unexpected extension of the analysis of the Platonic dialogues. If the work is continued on the present scale, it will occupy at least six volumes in the translation. Every student of ancient thought who has read these preliminary volumes, will ardently wish that the aged savant may have the strength to complete the task, which has now been brilliantly carried to the middle point.

Preliminary to his account of Socrates, the author devotes a chapter to the changes in faith and morals that took place between Homer and the Enlighteners, and another chapter to the ethico-political genius of the Athenians, exhibiting in these the external conditions that make the life, the work, and fate of Socrates intelligible. These external conditions are the persistence of a conservative popular religion,

the leaven of radicalism introduced mainly by the Sophists, the contention of political factions at the close of the fifth century, the struggle between tory and liberal, in the midst of which colliding forces Socrates was crushed. Particularly impressive is Gomperz's account of the relation of Socrates to the State, and of the occasion when he sat as prytane, where preëminently he merited the apt title (originally applied to Benjamin Franklin): "An enthusiast of Sobriety." He was the sole member of the minority and the only judge who had not succumbed to the political debauch. In this coolness of the head and warmth of the heart, Gomperz has hit on a good analysis of the Socratic character. We see it in the last lines of the Symposium, in the words in the prison with Crito, in his conduct in battle, in his discourse with his disciples on the destiny of the soul, and in his many jousts with the Sophists. Touching the Socratic use of induction, Gomperz points out that the word is employed here in a sense different from the meaning it bears in modern times. "Socratic induction, like ours, proceeds by the comparison of individual instances, but its goal is the attainment of a norm, valid, not for nature, but for ideas. Its chief aim is the determination of concepts, that is, definition" (II, p. 55). In other words, Socrates was not concerned with the derivation of a rule regulative of a whole group of facts, but with the establishment of the content of a concept (its definition) by noting the characteristic marks of particular instances.

As to the sources of our information regarding the character and philosophy of Socrates,—Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle,—Gomperz gives Xenophon rather scant courtesy (II, pp. 76, 87, 90). With certain historians this has been the fashion since the time of Schleiermacher, who protested against basing a philosophic estimate of Socrates on the nonphilosophic *Memoirs* of Xenophon. However, in the opinion of the reviewer, while the early dialogues of Plato must always remain our portrait of Socrates the philosopher, the account of Xenophon is hardly less important for the description of Socrates the man and citizen. In regard to the *δαμόνιον*, Gomperz has no theory to offer, beyond regarding it as a species of instinct or some dim estimate "emerging from the sub-conscious undercurrents of psychic life." The Socratic identification of virtue with knowledge is treated very unsympathetically, and the one-sidedness of this intellectualistic theory of morals emphasized even to exaggeration. It is quite true that Socrates underrated the affective side of consciousness and the motor quality of feeling in conduct, but this is characteristic of almost the whole of Greek philosophy. The Stoic ideal of the passionless sage

is scarcely more than the Socratic doctrine of intellectualism concretely stated. The central idea of the Socratic teaching, viz., that the "unexamined life is not worth living," that good living is right thinking, that sound morality is the morality of sound principles, that the quality of the act is determined by the reasonableness of the motive, is dismissed with a too cursory examination.

One of Gomperz's notable powers is that of historical imagination. He has an extraordinary ability for reconstruction, and has the poet's gift of seeing things concretely. His descriptions are, therefore, often graphic, picturesque, and realistic. When exercised within the limits of authentic details, such an artistic gift for the presentation of verisimilitude is highly useful. When, however, the play of the reconstructive imagination takes on such proportions as are witnessed in the following somewhat characteristic passage, the reader is confronted with the problem of how far literary art is justifiable in the presentation of historical facts. "It was a fine spring morning in the year 399 B. C. The dewdrops glittered brightly, as on other days, in the cups of the anemones, the violets shed their wonted fragrance. But that day's sun was not to reach its meridian height before an unholy deed had been accomplished. It was not a holiday in the legal calendar. Great numbers of Athenians, for the most part aged and of slender means, had risen early that morning. They desired to do service as jurors, for which office they were qualified by their more than thirty years of life, their unspotted record, and the taking of the juror's oath," etc. (II, p. 98). A still more striking example is found in Vol. III, p. 137, where on the banks of the Alpheus the political exile, Dion, and Plato carry on an interesting, but purely fictitious conversation. This type of literary imagination, while perhaps justifiable in a work like Carlyle's *French Revolution*, in a history of philosophy comes dangerously near being inadmissible romance.

With the exception of the chapter on Xenophon, which might be entirely omitted from the work without detriment, the treatment of the minor Socratics is very skilful and instructive. I am unacquainted with any presentation of the doctrines of the Cynics and Megarics that is so good. The Cynic conception of virtue as knowledge *plus* the Socratic strength of will, the revolt against the artificialities of civilization and the gospel of return to nature, the theory of *ἀδιαφορία*, and the political vision of the passing of the city-state into a cosmopolis, are ideas that Gomperz has understood how to expound and illustrate with consummate skill. And here, by the way, I may remark that the translator has performed his work with unusual exactitude in re-

spect of the meaning of the original and with appreciation in respect of the niceties of form. The latter comes particularly to light in the clever, metrical rendering of numerous poetic quotations. For example, Crates of Thebes, in the following hexameter, parodying a passage in the *Odyssey* (referring to the Island of Crete) glorifies the *πύρα* or beggar's wallet of the Cynics, which is symbolic of their mode of living (II, p. 153) :

"Pera, so name we an isle, girt round by the sea of Illusion,
Glorious, fertile, and fair, land unpolluted of evil ;
Here no trafficking knave makes fast his ships in the harbour ;
Here no tempter ensnares the unwary with venal allurements.
Onions and leeks and figs and crusts of bread are its produce.
Never in turmoil of battle do warriors strive to possess it ;
Here there is respite and peace from the struggle for riches and honours."

Gomperz calls cynicism the "philosophy of the Greek proletariat," and aptly compares it with Russianism as exemplified in Tolstoi's *War and Peace* (II, p. 147). He further sees in the fact that the cynics, the "begging friars of philosophy," came from the geographical fringe of Greece, an explanation for their revolt against the civilization of the center and for their "abnormal manifestation of political liberalism" (II, p. 149). The Megarics are characterized as the "ancient Herbartians," because of their similarity of view regarding the problem of predication and judgments of identity (II, p. 177). A detailed analysis of their logical puzzles is a very useful contribution to this chapter in the history of thought.

In his account of the life and philosophy of Plato, which occupies the main portions of Volumes II and III, Gomperz devotes two introductory chapters to Plato's "Years of Study and Travel" and the "Genuineness and Chronology of Plato's Works." The following sixteen chapters are taken up with *résumés* and analyses of the several dialogues, and the last chapter is called "Retrospects and Anticipations." These analyses are not bare summaries of the dialogues, but a restatement of their essential philosophical content accompanied by exposition and illustration. They are incomparably better than the well known *Introductions* of Schleiermacher, which in their time did excellent service for the furtherance of Platonic studies.

When Gomperz says (II, p. 254) that "from the beginning, Plato wrote all his works in the form of dialogue," and that it is "improbable that Plato's career of authorship should have begun early," it might have been well to qualify the statement ; for he is evidently referring exclusively to his philosophical writings. The well

attested tradition that Plato wrote dithyrambic verse, perhaps even a tragedy, before he came to Socrates, is not denied by Gomperz (II, p. 252). He assumes, rightfully I think, that the composition of the dialogues did not begin until after the death of Socrates. Great stress is laid on the travels succeeding 399 as a source of the mathematical, social, and political ideas that are employed in the Platonic works. Particularly Egypt, where, in the opinion of Gomperz, the founder of the Academy spent a considerable period (II, p. 255), made a "profound impression on Plato." The division of labor, hereditary transmission of employments, the sovereignty of the priestly educated caste, the compulsory character of education and the fixity of its content, are ideas discovered in the Nile valley and echoed in the Platonic commonwealth. While there is intrinsic probability in all this, the historical authority on which the statement is based is of very late date (Strabo, Cicero, Augustine, Diogenes Laertius), when the romancing tendency was given free reins.

In regard to the Platonic canon and the chronology of the writings, Gomperz takes a conservative position. He is greatly influenced by that solid old German scholar, the man of "blunt and homely common sense," Karl Friedrich Hermann. He rejects, however, three of the dialogues regarded by Hermann as genuine. *Hippias I*, *Ion*, and *Alcibiades I*. He adopts a tripartite division of the works into (1) a Socratic Period, (2) a Metaphysical Period, and (3) a Period of Mysticism and Political Readjustment. In the first group he places (the order representing approximately the chronological succession) *Hippias II*, *Apology*, *Laches*, *Charmides*, and *Protagoras*; in the second group, *Gorgias* (*cf.* II, pp. 352, 386) *Euphyphro*, *Meno* (in these three transitional dialogues, the doctrine of ideas is in inchoation and mingled with Orphic-Pythagorean elements), *Symposium* (*circa* 384 B. C.), *Phædrus*, *Phædo*, *Menexenus*, *Crito*, *Republic*, *Euthydemus*, *Parmenides*, *Theætetus*, *Cratylus*, *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Philebus*; in the third group, *Timæus*, *Critias*, *Laws*. One of the striking things about this chronology is the position assigned to the *Crito*. The ethical refinement displayed in this dialogue, the contrast in political doctrine between it and the *Apology*, the fact that it is not presupposed by the *Phædo*, the theory that it is a defense against hypothetical attacks aroused by the political innovations in the early books of the *Republic*, are considerations that have led Gomperz to push it forward to this extremely late date (III, p. 51). Further, to account for the present position of the *Phædrus*, which violates the evidence from stylometric criteria, Gomperz has recourse

to the theory that the Phædrus of our canon is a redaction of the original dialogue (III, pp. 29, 328). In other respects the canon and chronology of Gomperz offer nothing radical. Coming as he does from the school of the philologists, Gomperz lays great weight on linguistic statistics ; but it seems to me that he has held the balance justly between the evidences of style and the evidences of content for the determination of the inter-relationship of the dialogues and the order of their composition.

In discussing the Platonic conception of the soul and the doctrine of ideas, Gomperz points out certain interesting affinities between the Greek philosopher and primitive animistic theory. He cites the Indians of Peru, whose views in this connection had been noticed three centuries ago by Father d'Acosta and are quoted by Tylor : " Among the comparatively cultured Peruvians, Acosta describes another theory of celestial archetypes. Speaking of the star-deities, he says that shepherds venerated a certain star called Sheep, another called Tiger protected men from tigers, etc., and generally, of all the animated birds there are on the earth, they believed that a like one lived in heaven, in whose charge were their procreation and increase, . . . so that in a manner it appears that they were drawing towards the dogma of the Platonic ideas " (Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, Vol. II, p. 244). What d'Acosta points out in regard to the animism of the Peruvian aborigines, has been paralleled by De Brosses in regard to the Red Indians (*Ibid.*, II, p. 246), *i. e.*, to explain the existence of species, the one and the many, primitive people refer to a common ancestral stock, to an original archetype, to a species-deity, or to a combination of these notions. Their uniformity is explained by unity of origin or by some paradigmatic original, which is the fundamental significance of the Platonic hypostasized idea.

The limits of this review prevent comment on a great variety of interesting matter presented by Gomperz, but I do not wish to lay down these learned, stimulating, and eloquently written volumes without saying that their writer, in a degree true of no other historian, has understood how to take the history of Greek thought out of its isolation, to relate it to the whole culture of the Greeks, and to illuminate it by the civilization of modern times.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Miscellaneous Essays and Addresses. By HENRY SIDGWICK. London, Macmillan & Co.; New York, The Macmillan Company, 1904. — pp. viii, 374.

Admirers of the late Professor Sidgwick, — and the phrase should include all readers of English who can appreciate simplicity and grace of style, high intellectual sincerity, and keen critical insight, — will be glad to possess this volume of reprints from his occasional contributions to the reviews and magazines. The contents of the book are naturally varied, and may be expected to appeal to more than one class of readers. Probably the most valuable of the fifteen papers which it comprises is the reprint of an essay on "The Theory of Classical Education," originally published in 1867. The cause for which Professor Sidgwick was pleading, as one of the advanced few, forty years ago may be regarded as definitely won by this time. Neither in America nor in Great Britain would it now be seriously disputed by those of us who think the main basis of ordinary school education should be literary rather than scientific, that the literature which it is most imperative for a boy to know and understand is that of his own language. Yet Professor Sidgwick's essay has even now lost little of its point, and still deserves the careful study of all persons who are interested in the theory of education for its luminous and impartial discrimination between the real and the merely fancied merits of classical literature as a medium of general education. Closely akin in subject to this paper are the essay on "Idle Fellowships," and the "Lecture against Lecturing," acute criticisms of defects in university methods; the protests of the latter paper are, possibly, even more *à propos* in America than in Cambridge. An Oxford writer may perhaps be excused for taking pleasure in the reflection that, at least in the School of 'Literæ Humaniores' of that University, the formal lecture has long been relegated to a merely secondary place.

The papers just mentioned are preceded by half-a-dozen essays and addresses which deal with questions of the relation of economic science to political and social speculation, a topic upon which Professor Sidgwick's native caution, common sense, and quiet humor combined to make him a singularly sober guide. No better example could be found of the difference between a scholar's modest and tentative interpretation of historical facts and a sciolist's confident perversions of them, than the essay, reprinted as No. 9 in the present volume, on "Political Prophecy and Sociology," in which the writer deals gently and yet faithfully with one of those crude and half-informed 'sociological' theories which are to genuine historical study what the 'dime novel' is to self-respecting fiction.

The five opening papers (which include two previously unpublished lectures on Shakespeare originally delivered to the students of Newnham College),

deal with topics of pure literature. Besides the lectures just mentioned, they comprise a forcible and suggestive review of "Ecce Homo," a discriminating study of Matthew Arnold as a "prophet of culture," and a particularly subtle and delicate appreciation of A. H. Clough.

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Gedanken und Denker. Von WILHELM JERUSALEM. Wien und Leipzig, Wilhelm Braumüller, 1905. — pp. viii, 292.

Der kritische Idealismus und die reine Logik: Ein Ruf im Streite. Von WILHELM JERUSALEM, Wien und Leipzig, Wilhelm Braumüller, 1905. — pp. xii, 226.

The two books in question are different not only in their scope and general style of treatment, but also in the value to be assigned to them. *Gedanken und Denker* is a collection of short essays nearly all of which have previously appeared in newspapers or other periodicals, and which consist for the most part of book reviews. These are obviously written for the general public, and in so far as they are intended to give a popular summary of certain writings of a technical nature, such as those of Wundt or Mach, they are well enough adapted for their purpose. At times, however, the supply of pedagogical commonplaces seems overabundant even for a newspaper, and the criticism is not of so illuminating an order as really to demand a second publication.

The other book by the same author, *Der kritische Idealismus*, gives the impression of having been written from interest in the subject rather than for the mental improvement of the reader, and presents a corresponding increase in serious thinking and original suggestion. Written as a critical study preparatory to a school text-book in logic, it falls naturally into two parts, the first of which is an argument against the standpoints of critical idealism and pure logic, while the second sets forth the author's view of logic as merely a theory of method with a strictly empirical basis. Of the two, the negative portion of the book seems the more successful; for the author seizes with great skill upon every defect in his opponents' arguments. The dangers that beset every critical idealism are cleverly pointed out, and proper emphasis laid upon the difficulty of explaining upon an idealistic basis the existence of any other consciousness besides one's own. The assumptions necessary for pure logic are also clearly stated, though always with the counter-assumption that any procedure not strictly empirical is *ipso facto* condemned. The constructive chapters, on the other hand, are too much of the nature of a table of contents to be altogether satisfactory, but the paragraphs in which details do appear, present matter that deserves a fuller treatment. The position with regard to knowledge and the laws of thought is almost exactly that of Ernst Mach, and accordingly may be characterized as pragmatic. The accompanying metaphysics is a realism described by its author as "healthy," and vouched for by the direct ex-

perience of the "healthy understanding." Knowledge is both subjective and objective, colored by the nature of consciousness, yet not wholly so ; while the modes of judgment, natural laws, the very conceptions of truth and falsehood are generalizations of the individual's reaction upon his environment and simply the expression of what has been found useful in the course of racial development with no implications of an unrelated or absolute validity. The entire tendency of the exposition is in the direction of complete acceptance of the logical consequences of the initial position, and as such is of value. To be sure, the contradictions resulting from such a consistent empiricism seem rather patent ; but the program given is perhaps too brief for any just estimate of its significance, and a further development of the views in question is much to be desired.

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Der doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie. Von MARY WHITON CALKINS. Leipzig, Veit & Comp., 1905. — pp. 80.

Professor Calkins here repeats, with some shift of emphasis and detail, the views upon certain methodological questions already set forth in her *Introduction to Psychology*. Her object is twofold : "erstens die Darlegung der Berichtigung beider Ansichten, der Vorgangspsychologie sowohl als der Ichpsychologie, und die [der] sich daraus ergebende[n] Möglichkeit, jedes Gebiet der Psychologie konsequent von beiden Seiten aus zu behandeln ; zweitens, die Erbringung des Beweises, dass die Ansicht der Ichpsychologie doch die gründlichere ist, und dass sie auch das Nötige der Vorgangspsychologie in sich einschliesst." A necessary preliminary to the discussion, however, is the establishment of the nature and number of the conscious elements ; and it is, accordingly, to this problem that the first of the three chapters is addressed. Professor Calkins is obliged, by limitations of space, to write dogmatically ; she is also justified in this regard by her previous publications in English. As I have, in the following criticism, to meet the same obligation, I may perhaps be allowed to plead a similar justification.

The author's table of elements is well-known, and need not here be reprinted. The reason that I cannot accept it is one of the principal reasons urged in its favor : the fact that it serves equally well for the two kinds of psychology (pp. 35, 38, etc.). How a process-consciousness and an ego-consciousness can be analyzed into the same elements, without the reduction of the latter to the former, I cannot see. And I believe that the setting up of relational alongside of sensational or substantive and affectional or attributive elements is a mistake directly traceable to this initial confusion. No psychologist would deny the occurrence of relational functions in consciousness ; but I cannot understand how one can maintain the existence of specific relational structures. At any rate, I have

never come across a relational function the structure of which could not be analyzed, at least in schema, — minute analysis is oftentimes very difficult, — into the 'substantive' and 'attributive' elements. With the admission of relational elements into a psychological system, the system ceases to be psychological, and becomes so far logical. Take an instance : the feeling of familiarity analyzes into the relational feelings of 'same' and of 'past.' The former is "relatively simple" (p. 55), — whatever that may precisely mean. The latter is made up of the feelings of temporal 'moment' and of 'unchangeableness.' Well ! But why should not this, again, analyze into the feelings of duration and of stability ? And so one might go on. And if one took, instead of *Unveränderlichkeit*, the terms of the *Introduction to Psychology*, 'irrevocable,' 'unrevivable,' one's analysis might turn out very differently. The relational element, in my opinion, is born of the spirit of the older functional associationism, the besetting sin of which lay in its confusion of fact with meaning.

The second chapter seeks to validate the distinction between process-psychology and ego-psychology, the 'science of ideas' and 'science of selves' of the *Introduction*. The distinction is of the same type as that which I have myself drawn between structural and functional psychology. Process-psychology and structural psychology are, indeed, to all intents and purposes the same. There is, however, a difference between the standpoints of ego-psychology and functional psychology. While the latter discusses the office of mind in the economy of the psychophysical organism, the former searches out the 'self' in every consciousness, and determines the attitudes or phases of this self. I am not sure that I completely understand Professor Calkins's position in this chapter. If, however, she means not simply that every consciousness is epistemologically 'referable' to a self, 'implies' a self, but that selfhood, the self-attitude is introspectively discoverable in every consciousness (pp. 77, etc.), then I can only say that her mind must differ from mine not specifically but generically. Self-consciousness is, certainly, part of the subject-matter of psychology ; but it is, I think, of comparatively rare occurrence. And it would seem more natural, after structural analysis, to treat of it as one among the whole number of mental functions than to make it the differentia of a whole psychology. In other words, if we confine ourselves to psychology, — and the epistemological reference is irrelevant to psychology, — functional psychology seems to me to include the science of selves, and thus, as the wider, to be the preferable phrase. I notice in passing that process-psychology is set down as causal (pp. 33, 37, etc.). Whatever the author's belief (p. 38), this statement should have been less peremptorily made.

The third chapter attempts to prove, by a series of comparisons, that ego-psychology is more fundamental than, and 'includes' the essentials of, process-psychology. The latter point is very simply proved. It turns out, despite the possibility of reduction of the process- and the ego-consciousness to the same elements, that the ego-consciousness — has extra

elements of its own. These additional elements (save the mark !) are 'attitudes,' *Phasen* or *Haltungen* of consciousness (p. 37). Now, of course, if you define physiology to include anatomy as well as physiology proper, you make physiology wider than anatomy. We are back again at the question of the elements. A total function can be analyzed, in my judgment, only into simpler constituent functions ; and among these there may be ultimate 'attitudes.' But I do not assent to the bracketing of the ultimate functions with the elementary processes as 'components' of a single consciousness. The other point, of the more fundamental importance of ego-psychology, is treated in connection with volition and belief. If I rightly comprehend these sections, the difference between the two psychologies here consists in the fact that ego-psychology reveals, not only elements, but also an active personal relation of the self to other selves, or to the general environment, which is wholly inaccessible to process-psychology. This is a revelation of something deeper, more far-reaching, more fundamental, than are the results of analysis. The issue, doubtless, is a fair one. Elsewhere, in speaking of structural, functional, and genetic psychology, I have said : "No one of these three psychologies is 'better' psychology — psychology in a more real sense of the word — than any other." I am still inclined to maintain this thesis. Functional psychology may be the psychology to follow if one desires to proceed into logic or ethics or æsthetics or theory of knowledge. But, once more, we are, as psychologists, talking psychology ; and, for a psychology, the process-psychology and the ego-psychology of the author must, surely, be considered equally essential.

The book is well printed and indexed, and the footnote references are judiciously chosen. But why does the author refer to Lipps's "Tatsachen" and to Müller's "Ueber die Aufmerksamkeit?" There are no such books.

E. B. T.

Essai sur les éléments et l'évolution de la moralité. Par M. MAUXION.
Paris, F. Alcan, 1904. — pp. vi, 169.

This little work is an expansion of two articles published in the *Revue Philosophique* in 1903, and summarized in the January, 1904, issue of this REVIEW. It contains a polemic against the French sociological school of ethicists (prominently represented by Dr. Julien Pioger), with which it takes issue on two grounds ; first, because of abuse of the biological analogy and of the fiction of a social consciousness ; and, secondly, because of the reduction of all morality to the sole principle of solidarity. The author, as a true positivist, makes his appeal to the facts as they are, and finds morality (in the sense of the moral ideal, not of moral practice) to consist of three distinct elements, — one æsthetical (individual perfection), one logical (justice in its various forms), and one sympathetic (pity and love). These are conceived, not as mere aspects of a unitary whole, but as separable

elements of a complex. It is the importance ascribed to the first of these elements that is the most striking feature of the essay ; for the evolution of justice is shown to depend throughout on that of the æsthetico-moral ideal ; and the sympathetic element, while having a separate origin and generally independent development, is found at various stages of history to have been profoundly influenced by the æsthetic element, — noteworthily, where asceticism has prepared the way for universal charity.

The essay is remarkably well written, and brings together in well-arranged form a prodigious quantity of material. Certain defects lie upon the surface. The author deems it possible, from a study of the past history of morality, to forecast the progress of which it is yet capable, and to prescribe the means by which that progress may be facilitated ; and the various reflections into which this conception leads him are as untrustworthy as might be expected. Furthermore, he accepts somewhat uncritically various hypotheses which are not above question ; for example, the advancement of man in intellectual and emotional capacity within historical times. The account of the evolution of punishment is decidedly inadequate, any departure from its originally retributive nature being either ignored or hastily condemned. But the feature that will probably meet with most widespread disapproval is precisely the main thesis of the essay ; namely, the denial of any fundamental and essential connection between the various elements of the moral ideal. The author's own account of the strictly parallel development of the ideas of justice and individual perfection may suggest a very different conclusion to many of his readers ; and they may not be inclined to condemn all discriminating charity as a ' confusion ' of justice and love. Nevertheless the essay is of unusual interest and importance, and will be found valuable as a basis for seminary discussions.

THEODORE DE LAGUNA.

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The following books also have been received :

The Life of Reason, or the Phases of Human Progress. By GEORGE SANTAYANA. Vol. III, Reason in Religion ; Vol. IV, Reason in Art. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905. — pp. ix, 279 ; ix, 230.

Experimental Psychology : A Manual of Laboratory Practice. By EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER. Vol. II. Quantitative Experiments. Part I. Student's Manual. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1905. — pp. xli, 208. \$1.40.

General Sociology : An Exposition of the Main Development in Sociological Theory from Spencer to Ratzenhofer. By ALBION W. SMALL. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press ; London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1905. — pp. xiii, 739.

The Problems of Philosophy. By HARALD HÖFFDING. Translated by GALEN M. FISHER. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1905. — pp. xvi, 201.

Philosophia Ultima, or Science of the Sciences. By CHARLES WOODRUFF SHIELDS. Vol. III. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905. — pp. lxxvii, 227.

The Psychological Review, Monograph Supplements, No. 30. The Theory of Psychical Dispositions. By CHARLES A. DUBRAY. New York, The Macmillan Co., October, 1905. — pp. 170.

The Continuum as a Type of Order: An Exposition of the Modern Theory. With an Appendix on the Transfinite Numbers. By EDWARD V. HUNTINGTON. Reprinted from the Annals of Mathematics, Vol. VI, No. 4, and Vol. VII, No. 1. For Sale by the Publications Office of Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

Der Vitalismus als Geschichte und als Lehre. Von HANS DRIESCH. Leipzig, J. A. Barth. 1905. — pp. x, 246. M. 5.00.

Der soziale Optimismus. Von LUDWIG STEIN. Jena, H. Costenoble, 1905. — pp. vii, 267. M. 5.00.

Die Stellung Gassendis zu Descartes. Von HERMANN SCHNEIDER. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1904. — pp. 67. M. 1.50.

Die Metaphysik in der Ostwald'schen Energetik. Von FR. WOLFGANG ADLER. Leipzig, O. R. Riesland, 1905. — pp. 47.

Le langage: Essai sur la psychologie normale et pathologique de cette fonction. Par EUGÈNE-BERNARD LEROY. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1905. — pp. 293. 5 fr.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych. u. Phys.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*.—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

Atomistik und Energetik vom Standpunkte ökonomischer Naturbetrachtung.

H. WOLFF. *V. f. w. Ph.*, XXIX, 1, pp. 1-25.

There is an evident dissatisfaction among many modern scientists, such as Kirchhoff, Helmholtz, Mach, Helm, and Ostwald, with the large hypothetical basis of the physical sciences, a dissatisfaction which has expressed itself in the abandonment, in some quarters, of the molecular theory in physics and chemistry, and the substitution therefore of a more descriptive scheme, in terms of energy and its transformations. The question whether the new program, as outlined especially by Ostwald, is any more serviceable or economical, from the scientific standpoint, than the old scientific system, based upon the molecular hypothesis, is answered in the negative by the author of the present article; on the ground, mainly, that the epistemological principle of the conservation of the individuality or substance of bodies, a principle fruitful in scientific procedure, is able to be maintained only upon the hypothesis of individual constituents like molecules that maintain their identity through whatever changes the body which they make up may undergo. That the proposed view has some advantages over the traditional one cannot be denied. It represents a healthy reaction against a theory which has to a large extent lost its feeling for the world of actual experience, and it endeavors to free itself from superfluous hypotheses of every kind. Whether these advantages, however, are greater than the difficulties, conceptual or practical, which come with the newer interpretation of reality is very questionable. Much of our experience, in fact, such as the law of the conservation of mass, cannot be described at all in the terms of the new language, and the mere existence of energy about us is not a sufficient explanation of our experience. It is not mere energy that we need, but energy-differences.

EMIL C. WILM.

The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience. WILLIAM JAMES. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., II, 11, pp. 281-287.

As has been shown in previous articles by Professor James, the distinction between subjective and objective is not one of substance but of relation within experience. Affectional experiences, commonly supposed to bear upon them the stamp of subjectivity, are not an exception to this principle, but, when rightly understood, strengthen the position. Emotional experiences are not mere affections of the mind but are ambiguous in their reference; they may be taken as either objective or subjective. The emotions tend to remain relatively 'pure' because no urgent need has arisen in practical life requiring them to be assigned rigorously to one class or the other. A similar case is found in the so-called secondary qualities in the history of philosophy. Affectional attributes are without influence upon all physical nature beyond the limits of our own bodies. Since, however, they produce immediate bodily effects upon us, they get an ambiguous status. The existence of this ambiguous class of experiences proves that subjective and objective are not absolutely different substances, but are contexts within experience.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

Phenomenalism in Ethics. F. C. DOAN. Mind, No. 54, pp. 221-234.

Two attitudes may be taken toward experience: (1) phenomenalism, which does not seek absolute consistency but accepts as relative truth whatever best serves to explain the detailed course of facts; and (2) the metaphysical attitude, which attempts to give every experience its setting in a metaphysical whole. These two attitudes are closely related to, if not identical with, the naïve and reflective attitudes toward the world. They represent fundamentally disparate worlds: the world of actual or possible experience, and the world which is the metaphysical condition of thought, but which can never be converted into a world of possible experience. The sanctions of the moral life are dependent not upon the reference of morality to a metaphysically complete world-life, but upon an extension of the world of possible experience. *A priori*, phenomenalism rests on the conviction that isolation is the very inner nature of things. *A posteriori*, it rests on the fact that the individual is unaware of his relation to the world of metaphysical reality. Phenomenalism does not preclude the concept of freedom, which may be regarded as an attitude toward phenomena necessary for purposes of practical living but impossible from the standpoint of psychology. This freedom is phenomenal. The world of noumenal freedom is not the world of real experience. For phenomenal purposes, freedom requires no greater verity than that it should be felt. The feeling of identity which, for naïve thought, constitutes the self, is sufficient for the purposes of ethics, as for those of psychology. The absolute attitude gives a self which is only the logical back-ground of the phenomenal self.

Pluralism is the legitimate issue of phenomenalism. Monism results from emphasis upon the speculative rather than the practical attitude ; not what the situation is but what it implies is taken as constituting its philosophical significance. Concrete monism holds that the real is coterminous with the rational and that the ethical is the completely rational. But the real of possible experience is not rational, and the rational devices by which the world of possible experience gets its absolute interpretation are only ideally real. No enlargement of a partial organization of the world can give completed organization, and the ethical act can be evaluated by its own inner meaning in passing experience without reference to metaphysical totality.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

The Meaning of the Time-Direction. R. A. P. ROGERS. Mind, No. 53, pp. 58-73.

This article is an inquiry into the meaning of the time-*direction* (the difference between past and future), as distinguished from the time-*order* (time as a continuum wherein direction is indifferent). Kant regards the time-direction as an expression of cause and effect, the only category expressing an irreversible relation between objects. This category as *intellectual* means that, given the cause, intellect can deduce the effect, but not *vice versa*, i. e., given the past, the present and future can be foretold, but given the present or future, the past cannot be uniquely deduced. Otherwise there would be for Kant a time-order, but no time-direction. But actually the time series is unique, and all its parts are necessarily connected ; hence omniscient intellect could deduce from the present the only possible past as well as the only possible future. Therefore the *intellectual* relation between past and present is *reversible*. Thus, e. g., the fundamental laws of rigid dynamics, $s = \frac{1}{2}ft^2$, etc., are reversed by changing the sign of t . Since the time-direction is psychical, its explanation must begin from the subjective difference between past and future. Consciousness is always a present, within which memory and expectation (in a general sense), more especially desire and aversion, give a meaning to the distinction between past and future. The future is that which can be an object of desire, and is the direction in which will moves ; the past has only a theoretical interest. The objectivity of the time-direction necessarily implies objective will. The future is the direction in which objective will necessarily moves, and through this motion time ceases to be a mere continuum. The motive actuating objective will is the continuous and progressive development of an 'absolute and common good,' since objectivity of will implies universality. The assumption of a Supreme Spirit immanent in Nature delivers us from the solipsism which arises from the conception that any individual human will can guide the processes of Nature. The human will becomes rationally objective through submission to the Divine.

F. D. MITCHELL.

A Philosophical Confession. HARALD HOFFDING. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., II, 4, pp. 85-92.

The author in this 'confession' defines his position as a 'critical monist.' He adopts monism because connection and continuity seem to him more important facts of experience than difference and multiplicity. The importance of pluralism, he says, lies in its power to raise problems. A problem, however, is a demand for further unity. Hence pluralism can never afford a final solution. On the other hand, the impossibility of a complete synthesis of knowledge makes monism the unrealized ideal of philosophy. Hence the author's monism is 'critical.' The incompleteness of thought may be explained by the supposition that reality itself is in process of development. One element in reality at least, thought itself, is not yet complete. The contention of idealism, that reality is essentially an expression of thought, is questioned by the author as involving an unverifiable analogy between what is merely a part of the world and the whole of existence. The article is concluded by an expression of sympathy with empiricism and pluralism in their emphasis on the lack of harmony and rationality in existence, and the reality of the struggle toward them.

GRACE ANDRUS DE LAGUNA.

Kant's Doctrine of the Basis of Mathematics. JOSIAH ROYCE. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., II, 8, pp. 197-207.

For Kant, the contrast between mathematical and philosophical method is absolute. Mathematics, by means of the necessary laws of pure perception, constructs objects of synthetic knowledge; philosophy, because the procedure of pure thought is analytic, must justify its concepts by a transcendental deduction. The modern logic of mathematics has abandoned the Kantian doctrine that mathematical certainty depends upon a universal and necessary form of perception. The logical and mathematical necessity of tri-dimensionality and of the principles of the Euclidean geometry is not maintained. Experience is economically describable in those terms, in the same sense as in terms of the physical theory of energy. Strictly mathematical necessity belongs, however, not to any system of principles, but to necessary inferences from principles. Mathematical method is applicable to any conceptual system whose relations are exactly definable. On the other hand, modern mathematical theory supports the Kantian doctrine that constructive synthesis and observation of its results are necessary for mathematics. Productive thinking is itself a kind of experience, essentially synthetic and constructive. Mathematical truth is reached by observing the necessary consequences of abstractly universal ideas, *i. e.*, by observing a process of ideal construction and its results. Since the observation is of an abstract process of construction, not of an individual phenomenon, the truth discovered is of abstractly universal application to all things which conform to the constructions. Mathematical truth is con-

cerned with the consequences of ideas apart from the decision whether these ideas are expressed in individual realities. The whole truth of things, moreover, is individual, and hence not definable in mathematical terms.

MARY WINIFRED SPRAGUE.

Professor Baldwin on the Pragmatic Universal. ADDISON W. MOORE.
Psych. Bul., I, 12, pp. 415-423.

This article is in reply to the charge made by Baldwin, in an article entitled "The Limits of Pragmatism" (*Psych. Rev.*, XI, 1), that pragmatic logic is unable to deal with universal judgments. Baldwin holds in his article two concepts of the universal: one that the general stands for the particular in the sense of organizing it with other experience; the other, that the universal judgment apprehends truths which essentially transcend the experiences of real life. In neither case, according to Baldwin, can appeal to the concrete situation test the universal. The test must lie in the laws of thought, or in 'some analogous self-applying criteria of sound thinking.' But every experience has two values: (1) A unique value of its own as immediate experience; (2) a value as the basis of further experience. Only in the latter function do such categories as organization, universality and particularity, truth and error, apply to experience. Systematization is a process relative to further experience. The persisting elements which form the basis of further experience, are, *ipso facto*, the general aspects of the experience. Universality is the relation which a content has to the development of experience. The 'concrete' experience is precisely that in which the general and particular disappear, and must be the test of the universal. The universal exists only as a mediating function, and its test of reality cannot therefore lie within itself. This view, moreover, excludes a conception of the universal as a mode of apprehension of reality transcending the test of fact. The reality in which thought plays its part is, for pragmatism, the world of instinctive, emotional, volitional, and social 'real life.'

MARY WINIFRED SPRAGUE.

ETHICS AND ÆSTHETICS.

Mechanism and Morals: The World of Science and the World of History.
JAMES WARD. Hibbert Journal, IV, 1, pp. 79-99.

Science, starting from the manifold in the world of actual experience, has attempted to reduce it all to terms of mechanism. Particular events are not considered except as they are subject to universal laws. History, starting from the same manifold, however, views facts, individuals, purpose, and meaning. Causation is only considered as far as it springs from individual motives and preferences. In history we distinguish what is from what ought to be, while for science they are the same. This is the supremecy on-

trast between mechanism and morals. In the historical world we can recognize only individual agents ; things which do not act are but the product of things that do. Since, then, mechanism is fixed, and morals imply guidance, we have an antinomy. Using Kant's distinction of phenomena and noumena, we may say that the world of history is the reality of which the world of science is the appearance. But science may demur, and even say that material mechanism is the only reality. This materialistic view, however, fails when we consider that, if the conscious subject and his deeds are phenomena, the percipient and percept become the same, which is a contradiction. Nor does the idea of self-consciousness help us out. If, however, the world of minds is the real world, if we view the world from an historical standpoint, and regard its uniformity and development in the light of the uniformity and progress in concrete individuals, we get a more adequate view of the world. Such pan-psychism does not involve knowing all the types of individuals, nor do the results of science exclude this interpretation. In fact, science seems now to find evolution in atoms themselves. Even so, the historical world cannot actually assume even the appearance of such unmitigated necessity as mechanism implies, and Kant's distinction does not solve the antinomy. The solution rather lies in distinguishing between facts and the fundamental principles of science, which, though true, are not truths of *fact*. Science cannot tell us that the world is *necessarily* mechanical ; it is merely hypothetical and tentative. Science needs other and higher categories than those of mere mechanism, such as notions of end, purpose, and value. These will aid in solving the antinomy between mechanism and morals.

R. B. WAUGH.

Pascal's Wager. ALFRED W. BENN. Int. J. E., XV, 3, pp. 305-323.

The one distinctly mean method of salvation is that proposed in Pascal's celebrated 'wager.' We must bet, he argues, for or against the existence of God ; not to bet is to bet for his non-existence. If he does not exist, in either case death ends all ; but, on the chance that he does exist, we have everything to gain and nothing to lose by betting in his favor. To bet in his favor, we find, means to stupefy one's reason (*s'abêtir*) and facilitate belief by taking holy water, attending Mass, etc., and may do good, while it cannot do harm ; whereas backing the wrong side means, if God exists, exchanging eternal felicity for everlasting torment. But even granting God's existence, the probability is infinitesimal (since we are appealing to reason alone, not to revelation) that he has precisely the attributes assigned by Pascal's Jansenist theology ; and the possibilities of benefit and of harm are, in the absence of definite knowledge, equal. Moreover, Pascal has insisted that human morality is arbitrary and variable, and that true morality depends solely on the inscrutable will of God ; what security have we, then, that God will keep his promises of felicity to believers and tor-

ment to unbelievers, especially since, according to our best human standards, deceit and treachery, cruelty and injustice, are among his revealed attributes? This argument that orthodox Christianity is safer to believe than to disbelieve has been traced back to Arnobius. It is the keynote of Butler's "Analogy," and was used by Newman in favor of Catholicism. But Keble found something "cold and ungenerous," not to say mean, in the argument, which in any case proves too much, since it makes for any equally exclusive religious system. Mansel, in his famous Bampton lecture, without specifically arguing *ad terrorem*, follows Pascal in denying that our moral distinctions apply to God, and insists that every other religious system is open to as many objections as Christianity. Finally, Mill, in his famous declaration that he would cheerfully bear eternal torment rather than worship an immoral deity, once for all gave the quietus to this argument. To incur intellectual or moral degradation for the sake of salvation would be not only mean, but unavailing; our conduct must be determined by considerations independent of the existence or non-existence of the supernatural.

F. D. MITCHELL.

The Argument for Immortality. A. K. ROGERS. Int. J. E., XV, 3, pp. 323-338.

Excluding the proof from Christian revelation and the spiritualistic argument (since, fraud apart, we cannot rule out the alternative hypothesis of telepathy), we find three general aspects of the argument upon immortality: the metaphysical argument from the substantial nature of the soul, the scientific argument against immortality, and the moral argument. Modern philosophy has discarded the first, along with the meaningless conception of the soul as a substance. The scientific argument is simply an appeal to ignorance; apart from a crude and discredited materialism, science can at most show only the general improbability of immortality, leaving its possibility an open question. The moral argument no longer centers around future rewards and punishments; yet, whatever the value of virtue apart from happiness, something is lacking unless the two ultimately correspond, unless virtue is bound up in the innermost constitution of things. The crucial question is, will the gradual achievement of the race, the triumph of ethical values in the large, without individual immortality, meet this demand? Is the ethical world a real possibility apart from the continued participation in it of the connected individual life? Other-worldliness is not here in question; the future may be made to enhance the value of the present without displacing it. Can righteousness or progress, the defender of immortality will ask, have any real content, save as grounded on the personal relationship which on the side of feeling is love? Are not the terms in which we express value mere abstractions apart from permanent personality? Could we respect a God whose ends were realized only in his own self-centered consciousness, and for whom love was merely a temporary incident, whose object was called into existence only to be dismissed again from the scene?

F. D. MITCHELL.

La moralité indirecte de l'art. F. PAULHAN. Rev. Ph., XXX, 5, pp. 445-473.

The essential immorality of art (elsewhere shown by the author) proves nothing against its occasional morality, for the value of things varies greatly with their application. The harmonizing tendency which produces art is the same which under other circumstances produces morality. Arising from a dissatisfaction (itself essentially moral) with the disharmonies of the world, the art-impulse results in the creation of a world more systematized, at least in certain respects, than the real world. But a grave discordance is involved, — the creation of a fictitious world in opposition to the real world. Art satisfies the suppressed desires which give it origin, without being concerned with their (ethical) correlation with the totality of desires ; which, indeed, morality itself but imperfectly accomplishes. The ideas suggested by art, like other ideas, tend to self-realization. Thus art, though contrary to its essential principle, tends to influence conduct. Yet it exerts a certain inhibition upon the ideas and feelings which it excites ; these remain apart from the ideas and feelings of real life. But often the barrier is broken down. For the ideas and feelings of art are often too like those of real life not to influence them greatly ; nay, the same ideas and feelings appear now on one side of the barrier, now on the other. In this way, it is art representative of human life that is most influential, — the realistic perhaps less than the vaguely idealistic. As for non-representative art, music, when joined to words, adds to their effect ; but its higher forms have a less direct relation to practice. They may help to develop a spirit of taste, a need of harmony in general, and thus affect life ; but this generalizing tendency is not to be counted on. The art-impulse dominates and organizes a great number of different functions of life, and thus may have a high moral value. The dilettanteism that leads to the contemplation of a religion or philosophical system may turn to serious study of it. Art contributes to the formation of the moral ideal. The genesis of the moral and æsthetic ideals is very similar, though the latter is less unified and self-consistent, and æsthetic types may be immoral as well as moral. The æsthetic ideal like any other, has the danger of being visionary and impracticable, but it has the advantage of being less forcibly imposed than the moral ideal. It is infinitely more simple, broad, and variable, and leaves room for choice and free development. It may thus contain the elements of a higher morality than the present, and may tend to relieve moral fanaticism. It provides for the development of new ideas without harmful experimentation. It has the further advantage of making forcible appeal to feeling and imagination rather than to mere abstract intelligence. It is thus that art has often been pressed into the service of morality ; and even in the most purely artistic writers one may often easily discover a conception of life, and thus the elements of a morality. Thus the fundamental immorality of art and its accidental morality are closely interconnected, as,

indeed, general psychological and sociological analogies would lead us to expect. For psychical and social systems are quick to avail themselves of the most diverse phenomena; and art itself ministers to love, patriotism, and religion as well as to morality.

THEODORE DE LAGUNA.

PSYCHOLOGY.

An Analysis of Elementary Psychic Process. ARTHUR ERNEST DAVIES.
Psych. Rev., XII, 2-3, pp. 166-206.

The problem raised here, viz., the nature of the most elementary conscious experience, grew out of an earlier investigation by the author of simple æsthetic reactions, which was published in the *Psychological Review*. The results of this study seemed to imply that there are some forms of reaction more elementary than cognitive reactions. The experiments were conducted in a dark room. The observer was seated before a screen on which were exhibited varying series of illuminated figures. The exposures were momentary, and between them the observer was engaged in conversation to avoid the effect of undue expectation. Each observer reported as accurately as possible what took place in consciousness during each experiment. A general unanimity of results was obtained, although twenty-two observers were used, including students of all grades and members of the faculty. The results of the introspection were briefly as follows: (1) A time-interval elapsed between the consciousness of illumination and the perception of form. (2) A preparatory stage existed before the awareness of the light, expressed variously as a 'startle,' 'jolt,' 'blank,' etc. (3) There was a distinct growth in perception regarded both as a psychic process and as a psychic product. (4) Certain physical and physiological changes were connected with the initial stages of the experiments. These included movements of nearly every organ. (5) Supplementary items included (*a*) interest of the observers; (*b*) suggestions of likeness to familiar objects; (*c*) associations with other experiences; (*d*) judgments of preference attached indifferently to the illumination and the perception of form. The author's discussion which follows excludes the theoretical consideration of the series of problems suggested by the experiments. In the first place, the distinction between the illumination consciousness and the form perception would seem to rest on positively psychological and not logical grounds. Further, perception is not an act, but a process. The content must grow before it can be defined. While one throughout, the process exhibits two aspects, a mental intent, and a mental content. The content seems not to be determined by association, which should be considered the outcome of the perceptual process and not its determinant. Suggestions developed within the process itself tend to act as clues to the meaning of experience. The more difficult question relates to the character of the primitive consciousness before its differentiation into definite prod-

ucts. It obviously does not develop out of previous processes, but is initiated from without as an 'intrusion.' The purest forms of this primitive experience are either simply psycho-physiological, or æsthetic; the cognitive element is at first lacking and develops only later under the influence of interest. The development of the primary psychic material seems to be related to our practical attitudes arising from a break in the conscious process. The results of the investigation are summed up by the author as follows: "(1) That our most elementary psychic processes are feeling processes which are not contents but intents of consciousness. (2) That feeling process eventuates in physiological changes which involve movements of the special sense and other organs, that these movements are, on the one hand, practical attitudes toward a present situation, the character of the reaction depending on the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the feeling processes. (3) That these adjustments have psychological importance because of the kinæsthetic sense material which through them become functional. (4) That with the complication of sense data there develop 'suggestions' which operate, under the guidance of feeling, as principles of its organization into definite products or perceptions."

GRACE ANDRUS DE LAGUNA.

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

Spinoza et ses contemporains. L. BRUNSCHVICG. Rev. de Mét., XIII, 5, pp. 673-705.

The problem that faced Spinoza and his contemporaries was how to unite the truth of science and that of religion. In the seventeenth century this problem took a precise form, that of defining the relation of the finite to the infinite. Under the influence of Descartes, Malebranche, Fénelon, and Leibniz, the infinite and finite became intelligible notions, not objects given to the imagination; they were united by an inner relation, not in space and time. Spinoza may be taken as a point of convergence for all these systems, carried out to their logical conclusions. First, however, Brunschvicg compares Pascal, though not a Cartesian, with Spinoza. Though Pascal's *Pensées* and Spinoza's *Tractatus theologico-politicus* appeared the same year, and dealt with the same subject, namely, the relation of the Old and New Testament, yet their conclusions were entirely opposite. Pascal, as a geometrician, deduced his conclusions mathematically by reasoning from certain principles and definitions. The annihilation of the finite in the presence of the infinite is the annihilation of our spirit before God. The word of God comprises God, and cannot be understood by human reason. For Spinoza, however, reason is all. Even history must be treated from a rational standpoint; it can never become the equivalent of science. What the Hebrews recorded must be viewed rationally, by taking into account their characteristics. In Pascal, then, we see dogmatic orthodoxy, in Spinoza, rational criticism. For Pascal his-

tory is divine when it speaks of God, for Spinoza it is mere history. But for Spinoza this fall of traditional orthodoxy does not involve true Christianity. We must rather interpret its images as symbols, not as realities. God is not, as for Pascal, a person, whose love involves self-renunciation, He is rather a spirit in and through us, and one loves Him best by loving himself. Asceticism is repugnant to the essence of Christianity. The Church is no sect, but rather invisible; the true God is absolute unity seen by the soul. For Malebranche, too, faith is subject to reason. All abstract science is the basis of religion; the infinite space of geometry manifests the existence of God. But where Spinoza saw unity Malebranche saw only a duality. Mathematical idealism suffices when the idea and its object are one, *i. e.*, it applies to God, but not to things in the material world. To reach things we must know God in a new aspect, we must know His wishes and acts which have created a material world. This notion gives the key to the moral life. We have, then, a parallelism of metaphysics and morality; a realm of reason and of faith. As metaphysician, then, Spinoza is an idealist, for he affirms the identity of adequate ideas and their objects; Malebranche is a realist, for he places a barrier between them. He distinguishes between intelligible and material extension. If God, as Spinoza says, manifests himself in the material world of extension, how can there be wrong, since God cannot hate himself? But here Malebranche entirely misunderstands Spinoza. Man is not devoid of all spontaneity; he is only *Deus quatenus*, but he has the power to approach God without limit. We have not to explain how the perfect becomes imperfect, for there is no separate truth and error; they vanish with the individual illusion of which they are born.

R. B. WAUGH.

The Naturalism of Hume. NORMAN SMITH. *Mind*, No. 54, pp. 149-173; No. 55, pp. 335-347.

Green's interpretation of Hume's philosophy as pure scepticism, denying permanence, activity, and identity, is unfair. The determining factor in Hume's philosophy is the establishment of a purely naturalistic conception of human nature by the thorough subordination of reason to feeling and instinct. Hume does not deny the existence of the external world and the self, though he regards them as unknowable in themselves. The universal acceptance of them is a 'natural belief,' due to the ultimate instincts and propensities which constitute human nature. Reason, according to Hume, does not explain any of the ultimate characteristics of experience. Certain beliefs are indispensable, and hence are beyond the reach of sceptical doubts. Thus are established causal connection, external reality, the self, appreciation of beauty, and good and bad. The function of knowledge is always practical rather than speculative; our beliefs, when regarded as the outcome of natural tendencies, show a wonderful adaptation to the needs

of life. If they are regarded as conclusions from supposed inferences, however, they are found to rest on theoretically unjustifiable assumptions. Hume's contention in ethics, that reason is the slave of the passions, has its exact counterpart in his theory of knowledge. His main argument in the *Treatise* and *Inquiry* shows the practical value and the theoretical irrationality of the ordinary consciousness, and, conversely, the practical worthlessness and equal irrationality of the philosophical reinterpretation of it. Thus the contradiction of substance and attribute is rationally unjustifiable, but rests on a 'blind and powerful instinct.' In a similar manner, Hume deals with the self, causality, and the uniformity of nature. These mental operations are instincts which are as natural and necessary in their operation as breathing, and reason can neither control nor explain them. Belief is not purely intellectual, but precedes knowledge and cannot be destroyed by doubt. Reason is in reality not distinct from these natural beliefs but is only the necessity of following them. The understanding is nothing but imagination according to its most general and most firmly established instincts and habits. Because the instincts conflict when they are theoretically developed, the understanding is at variance with itself. From these contradictions we must conclude that the mental instincts are applicable only to practical affairs. In the facts of the moral life, Hume finds confirmation of his naturalistic view of reason. He is not inconsistent, as Green holds, in admitting the existence of disinterested passions. Pleasure is not the sole object of desire, though it is the efficient cause of action. Pleasure is conditioned by desire, not *vice versa*. Reason in Hume's ethics depends on natural passions exactly as in his epistemology it depends on natural belief. Reason in itself neither produces nor inhibits action. Since, however, social life demands organization, we learn to govern particular passions in the light of those general utilitarian considerations which constitute the rules of prudence and social justice. This theory of instinct and reason enables us to reduce Hume's system to unity. His fundamental sensational hypothesis is consistent with the most divergent views of the constitution of complex experience. Hume rather than Kant is the father of positivism and naturalism, as later developed by Comte.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

NOTES.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals :

MIND, No. 56 : *R. F. Alfred Hoernlé*, Pragmatism *v.* Absolutism ; *Bertrand Russell*, On Denoting ; *W. R. Boyce Gibson*, Predetermination and Personal Endeavour ; *S. H. Mellone*, Is Humanism a Philosophical Advance ? Critical Notices ; New Books ; Philosophical Periodicals ; Notes.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL, IV, 1 : *M. Anesaki*, How Christianity Appeals to a Japanese Buddhist ; *Editor*, Is the Moral Supremacy of Christianity in Danger ? *Henry Jones*, The Working Faith of the Social Reformer ; *P. T. Forsyth*, Authority and Theology ; *James Ward*, Mechanism and Morals ; *Sir Oliver Lodge*, Life : A Hypothesis and two Analogies ; *C. T. Ovenden*, Thought and Force ; *J. Ellis M' Taggart*, The Inadequacy of Certain Grounds of Belief ; *Edward Lyttelton*, The Teaching of the Christian Religion in Public Schools ; *A. H. Keane*, The Moral Argument Against the Inspiration of the Old Testament ; *A. R. Gordon*, The Religious Value of the Narratives in Genesis. Discussions ; Reviews ; Bibliography of Recent Literature.

THE MONIST, XV, 4 : *Charles S. Peirce*, The Issues of Pragmatism ; *Editor*, Chinese Occultism ; *W. S. Andrews*, Magic Squares (concluded) ; *Henry B. Mitchell*, The Problem of Unity and the Noetic Power of the Heart ; *A. H. Godbey*, The Semitic City of Refuge ; *R. W. McFarland*, A Mathematical Analogy in Theological Reasoning ; Criticisms and Discussions ; Book Reviews.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XII, 6 : *James H. Leuba* and *Winifred Hyde*, An Experiment on Learning to Make Hand Movements ; *G. M. Parker*, A Study of Motor Phenomena in Chorea ; The Effect of the Brightness of Background on the Extent of the Color-fields and on the Color-tone in Peripheral Vision ; Editor's Announcement.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, II, 10 : *G. A. Tawney*, The Nature of Crowds ; Psychological Literature ; Books Received ; Notes and News.

II, 11 : *Felix Arnold*, Interest and Attention ; Psychological Literature ; Discussion ; Announcement ; Books Received.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XVI, 4 : *H. C. Stevens*, A Plethysmographic Study of Attention ; *I. M. Bentley* and *George H. Sabine*, A Study in Tonal Analysis ; *Edmund H. Hollands*, Wundt's Doctrine of Psychical Analysis ; *Arnold L. Gesell*, A Case of Symbolistic Writing with

Senile Delusions ; *Alice Heywood* and *Helen A. Vortiede*, Some Experiments on the Associative Power of Smells ; Psychological Literature ; Book Notes ; Index to Vol. XVI.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, II, 21 : *Wendell T. Bush*, An Empirical Definition of Consciousness ; *W. B. Pillsbury*, An Apparent Contradiction in the Modern Theory of Judgment ; Discussion ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

II, 22 : *S. I. Franz*, The Reëducation of an Aphasie ; *John Dewey*, Immediate Empiricism ; *W. B. Pitkin*, Universals : A Criticism ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

II, 23 : *Kate Gordon*, The Relation of Feeling to Discrimination and Conception ; *Irving King*, The Real and the Pseudo Psychology of Religion ; *W. P. Montague*, Panpsychism and Monism ; Discussion ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XVI, 1 : *James H. Hyslop*, Why are we Imperialistic ? *Helen Bosanquet*, The Intellectual Influence of Women ; *Robert A. Woods*, Social Work : A New Profession ; *W. R. Benedict*, Greek Thought-Movements and their Ethical Implications ; *H. W. Wright*, Evolution and Ethical Method ; *M. V. O'Shea*, The Development of Ethical Sentiment in the Child ; *Henry S. Salt*, The Ethics of Corporal Punishment ; *J. Lineham*, Sin and Sacrifice ; Book Reviews.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE, XXXIX, 6 : *Wilhelm Peters*, Aufmerksamkeit und Zeitverschiebung in der Auffassung disparater Sinnesreize ; *Roswell P. Angier*, Die Schätzung von Bewegungsgrossen bei Vorderarm bewegungen ; *C. E. Seashore*, Die Aufmerksamkeits-schwankungen.

XL, 1 u. 2 : *A. Marty*, Über Annahmen ; *Gisela Alexander-Schäfer*, Zur Frage über den zeitlichen Verlauf des Gedächtnisbildes für verschiedene Sinnesreize ; *Aloys Müller*, Über den Einfluss der Blickrichtung auf die Gestalt des Himmelsgewölbes ; Literaturbericht.

XL, 3 : *Robert Saxinger*, Beiträge zur Lehre von der emotionalen Phantasie ; *Stanislaw Loria*, Untersuchungen über das periphere Sehen ; *W. Lohmann*, Über den Wettstreit der sehfelder und seine Bedeutung für das plastische Sehen ; Literaturbericht.

ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE, XI, 3 : *H. Leser*, Über die Möglichkeit der Betrachtung von unten und oben in der Kultur-philosophie ; *Adolf Müller*, Quellen und Ziele sittlicher Entwicklung ; *J. J. Hoffmann*, Exakte Darstellung aller Urteile und Schlüsse ; *Hermann Planck*, Das Problem der moralischen Willensfreiheit ; *Eugen Posch*, Über einige metaphysische Ansichten ; Jahresbericht.

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, XII, 1 : *Karl Weidel*, Mechanismus und Teleologie in der Philosophie Lotzes ; *R. Salinger*, Kants Antinomien und Zenons Beweise gegen die Bewegung ; Jahresbericht.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE, V, 10 : *J. Grasset*, Le psychisme inférieur et la responsabilité ; *L. Desvallées*, La science et le réel (fin) ; *W. M. Kozłowski*, La conception de force est-elle un défaut de la mécanique ? *J. Cartier*, Revue critique de morale (3^e article) ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Périodiques ; L'enseignement philosophique.

V, 11, *Paul Hermant*, La conscience ; *F. Warrains*, La logique de la beauté ; *V.-L. Bernies*, L'origine des idées ; *C. de Lubecki*, Caractère de l'esthétique polonaise ; Correspondance ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Periodiques.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XIII, 5 : *L. Brunschvicg*, Spinoza et ses contemporains ; *Dwelschauvers*, De l'individualité ; *G. Belot*, En quête d'une morale positive (suite) ; *C. Hémon*, "La vraie religion selon Pascal" de M. Sully-Prudhomme ; *M. Bernès*, L'éducation religieuse de l'enfant ; Supplement.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XXX, 10 : *Sollier*, La conscience et ses degrés ; *C. Bos*, Les éléments affectifs du langage ; *Draghicesco*, De la possibilité des sciences sociales ; *Matienzo*, La logique comme science objective ; *F. Paulhan*, L'idéalisme d'aujourd'hui ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Revue des périodiques étrangers ; Livres nouveaux.

XXX, 11 : *G. Richard*, Les lois de la solidarité morale ; *Dugas*, Sur les abstraits émotionnels ; *P. Gaultier*, La moralité de l'art ; *C.-G. Picavet*, Le matérialisme historique et son évolution ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Revue des périodiques étrangers ; Livres nouveaux.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

BELIEFS AND REALITIES.¹

I.

BELIEFS look both ways: they are the original Mr. Facing-both-ways. They form and judge — either justify or condemn — the agents who entertain them and insist upon them. They are of things whose immediate meaning they supply. To believe is to ascribe value, impute meaning, assign import. The collection and interaction of these appraisals and assessments is the world of the common man, — that is, of man as an individual and not as a professional being or class specimen. Thus things are always characters, not just entities; they behave and respond and provoke. In the behavior which exemplifies and tests their character, they are things which help and hinder; disturb and pacify; resist and comply; are dismal and mirthful, orderly and deformed, queer and commonplace; they agree and disagree; are better and worse.

Thus the human world, whether or no it have core and axis, has both presence and transfiguration. It means here and now, not in some transcendent sphere. It moves, of itself, to varied incremental meaning, not to some far off event, whether divine or diabolic. For such immediate meanings are the bases, the 'predicaments' of human conduct. Conduct is the real, and thus the logical, working out of the commitments of belief. That believed better is held to, asserted, affirmed, that is, acted upon. The moments of its experience are the natural 'transcendentals'; the decisive, the critical, standards of further estimation,

¹ Read as the Presidential Address at the fifth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, at Cambridge, December 28, 1905.

selection, and rejection. That believed worse is fled, resisted, transformed into an instrument for the better. Characters, in being condensations of belief, are thus at once the reminders and the prognostications of weal and woe; they concrete and they regulate the terms of contact with objects.

For beliefs, made in reality, reciprocate by making reality still farther, by developing it. Beliefs are not made *by* reality in a mechanical or logical or psychological sense. Reality naturally—that is, metaphysically—instigates belief. It appraises itself and through this self-appraisal manages its affairs. As things are surcharged valuations, so ‘consciousness’ is ways and ends of believing and disbelieving. It is interpretation; not merely reality aware of itself as fact, but reality judging itself, approving and disapproving.

This double outlook and connection of belief, its implication, on one side, of beings who suffer and endeavor, and, on the other, its complication with the meanings and worths of things, is its glory or its unpardonable sin. We cannot keep connection on one side and throw it away upon the other. We cannot preserve significance and decline the personal attitude in which it is inscribed and operative, any more than we can get anything but vanity by making things ‘states’ of a consciousness whose reality is to be an interpretation of things. Beliefs are personal affairs, and personal affairs are adventures, and adventures are, if you please, shady. But equally discredited, then, is the universe of meanings. For the world has meaning as somebody’s, somebody’s at a juncture, taken for better or worse, and you shall not have completed your metaphysics till you have told whose world it is and how and what for—in what bias and to what effect. Here is a cake which is had only by eating it, just as there is digestion only for production.

So far the standpoint of the common man. But the professional man, the philosopher,¹ has been largely occupied of late in a systematic effort to discredit the standpoint of the common man, that is, to disable belief as a metaphysical principle. Philos-

¹ I have found much instruction in Dr. Lloyd’s article in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, Vol. II, p. 337, on “The Personal and the Factional in the Life of Society.”

ophy is shocked at the frank, almost brutal, evocation of beliefs by and in reality, like witches out of a desert heath—at a mode of production which is neither logical, nor physical, nor psychological, but just metaphysical. For modern philosophy is, as every college senior recites, epistemology; and epistemology, as perhaps our books and lectures sometimes forget to tell the senior, has absorbed the Stoic dogma. Passionless imperturbability, absolute detachment, complete subjection to a ready-made and finished reality—physical it may be, mental it may be, logical it may be—is its professed ideal. Foreswearing the reality of affections, and the gallantry of adventure, of the incomplete, the tentative, it has taken the oath of allegiance to a reality, objective, universal, complete; made perhaps of atoms, perhaps of sensations, perhaps of logical ideas or meanings. This ready-made reality, already including all, must then swallow and absorb belief, must produce it psychologically, mechanically or logically, according to its own nature; must in any case, instead of acquiring aid and support from belief, resolve it into one of its own preordained creatures, making a desert and calling it harmony, unity, totality.¹

Philosophy has dreamed the dream of a knowledge which is radically other than the propitious outgrowth of beliefs, developing aforesaid their ulterior implications in order to recast them, rectifying their errors, cultivating their waste places, healing their diseases, fortifying their feeblenesses:—of a knowledge which has to do with objects having no nature save to be known.

Not that their philosophers have admitted the concrete realizability of their scheme. On the contrary, the assertion of the ab-

¹ Since writing the above I have read the following words of a candidly unsympathetic friend of philosophy: "Neither philosophy nor science can institute man's relation to the universe, because such reciprocity must have existed before any kind of science or philosophy can begin; since each investigates phenomena by means of the intellect, and independent of the position and feelings of the investigator; whereas the relation of man to the universe is defined, not by the intellect alone, but by his sensitive perception aided by all his spiritual powers. However much one may assure and instruct a man that all real existence is an idea, that matter is made up of atoms, that the essence of life is corporality or will, that heat, light, movement, electricity, are different manifestations of one and the same energy, one cannot thereby explain to a being with pains, pleasures, hopes, and fears his position in the universe." Tolstoi, essay on "Religion and Morality," in *Essays, Letters, and Miscellanies*.

solute reality of what is unrealizable is a part of the scheme ; the ideal of a universe of pure, cognitional objects, fixed elements in fixed relations. Sensationalist and idealist, positivist and transcendentalist, materialist and spiritualist, defining this universe in as many differing ways as they have differing conceptions of the ideal and method of knowledge, have been at one in their devotion to an identification of reality with something which connects monopolistically with passionless knowledge, belief purged of all personal reference, origin, and outlook, into pure cognitional objectivity, — mechanical, sensational, conceptual, as the case may be.¹

What is to be said of this attempt to sever the cord which naturally binds together personal attitudes and the meaning of things? This much at least: the effort to extract meanings, values, from the beliefs which ascribe them, and to give the former absolute metaphysical validity while the latter are sent to wander as scapegoats in the wilderness of mere phenomena, is an attempt which, as long as "our interest's on the dangerous edge of things," will attract an admiring, even if suspicious, audience. Moreover, we may admit that the attempt to catch the universe of immediate experience, of action and passion, coming and going, to damn it in its present body expressly in order to glorify its spirit to all eternity, to validate the meaning of beliefs by discrediting their natural existence, to attribute absolute worth to the intent of human convictions just because one is so sure of the absolute worthlessness of their content — that the performance of this feat of virtuosity has developed philosophy to its present wondrous, if formidable, technique.

But can we claim more than a *succès d'estime*? Consider again the nature of the effort. The world of immediate meanings, the world sustained in beliefs, is to be sorted out into two portions, metaphysically discontinuous, one of which shall alone

¹Of course I except Hegel from this statement. The habit of interpreting Hegel as a Neo-Kantian, a Kantian enlarged and purified, is a purely Anglo-American habit. This is no place to enter into the intricacies of Hegelian exegesis, but the subordination of both logical meaning and of mechanical existence to *Geist*, to life in its own developing movement, would seem to stand out in any unbiased view of Hegel. At all events, I wish to state the debt to Hegel of the view set forth in this paper.

be good and true reality, the fit material of passionless, beliefless knowledge ; while the other part, that which is excluded, shall be referred exclusively to belief and treated as mere appearance, purely subjective, impressions or effects in consciousness, or as that ludicrously abject modern discovery — an epiphenomenon. And this division into the real and the unreal is accomplished by the very individual whom his own absolute results reduce to phenomenality, and in terms of the very immediate experience which is infected with worthlessness, and on the basis of preference, of selection, which are declared to be unreal ! Can the thing be done ?

Anyway, the snubbed and excluded factor may always reassert itself. The very pushing it out of reality may but add to its potential energy, and invoke the more violent recoil. When affections and aversions, with the beliefs in which they record themselves, and the efforts they exact, are reduced to epiphenomena, dancing an idle attendance upon a reality complete without them, to which they vainly strive to accommodate themselves in mirroring, then may the emotions flagrantly burst forth with the claim that, as a friend of mine puts it, reason is only a fig leaf for *their* nakedness. When one man says that need, uncertainty, choice, novelty, and strife have no place in metaphysical reality which is made up wholly of established things, behaving by foregone rules, then may another man be provoked to reply that all such fixities, whether named atoms or God, whether they be fixtures of a sensational, a positivistic or an idealistic system, have existence and import only in the problems, needs, struggles and instrumentalities of conscious agents and patients. For home rule may be found in the unwritten efficacious constitution of experience.

That contemporaneously we are in the presence of such a reaction is apparent. Let us in pursuit of our topic inquire how it came about and why it takes the form which it takes. This consideration may not only occupy the hour, but may help to diagram some future parallelogram of forces. The account calls for some sketching (1) of the historical tendencies which have shaped the situation in which a Stoic theory of knowledge claims

metaphysical monopoly, and (2) of the tendencies which have furnished the despised principle of belief opportunity and means of reassertion.

II.

Imagination readily travels to a period when a gospel of intense, and, one may say, deliberate passionate disturbance appeared to be conquering the Stoic ideal of passionless reason; when the demand for individual assertion by faith against the established, embodied objective order was seemingly subduing the idea of the total subordination of the individual to the universal. By what course of events came about the dramatic reversal, in which an ethically conquered Stoicism became the conqueror, epistemologically, of Christianity?

How are our imaginations haunted by the idea of what might have happened if Christianity had found ready to its hand intellectual formulations corresponding to its practical proclamations!

That the absolute principle is affectional and volitional; that God is love; that access to the supremely real is by faith, a personal attitude; that belief, surpassing logical basis and warrant, works out through its own operation its own fulfilling evidence: such was the metaphysic of Christianity. But it needed to become a theory, a theology, a formulation; and in this need, it found no recourse save to philosophies which had identified reality with the proper object of logical reason. For, in Greek thought, after the valuable meanings, the meanings of industry and art that appealed to sustained and serious choice, had given birth and status to reflective reason, reason denied its ancestry of organized endeavor, and proclaimed itself as self-conscious logical thought to be the author and warrant of reality. Yet how nearly Christianity had found prepared for it the needed means of its own intellectual statement! We recall Aristotle's account of moral knowing, and his definition of man. Man as man, he tells us, is a principle which may be termed either desiring thought or thinking desire. Not as pure intelligence does *man* know, but as an organization of desires affected through reflection upon their own conditions and consequences. What if Aristotle had only assimilated his idea of theoretical to his notion of practical knowl-

edge ! But just because practical thinking was so human, Aristotle rejected it in favor of pure, passionless cognition, something superhuman. Thinking desire is experimental, is tentative, not absolute. It looks to the future, and to the past for help in the future. It is contingent, not necessary. It doubly relates to the individual : to the individual thing to be experienced by an individual agent ; not to the universal. Hence desire is a sure sign of defect, of privation, of non-being, and seeks surcease in something which knows it not. Hence desiring reason culminating in beliefs relating to imperfect realities, stands forever in contrast with passionless reason functioning in pure knowledge, logically effected, of perfect being.

I need not remind you how through Neo-Platonism, St. Augustine, and the Scholastic renaissance, these conceptions became imbedded in Christian philosophy ; and what a reversal occurred of the original practical principle of Christianity. Belief is henceforth important because it is the mere antecedent, in a finite and fallen world, a temporal and phenomenal world infected with non-being, of true knowledge in a world of completed Being. Desire is but the self-consciousness of defect striving to its own termination in perfect possession, through perfect knowledge of perfect being. I need not remind you that the *prima facie* subordination of reason to authority, of knowledge to faith, in the mediæval code, is, after all, but the logical result of the doctrine that man as man, since only reasoning desire, is merely phenomenal, having his reality in God as God, as the complete union of rational insight and being, — a Being the term of man's desire, and the fulfillment of his feeble attempts at knowing. Authority, 'faith' as it was then conceived, meant just that this Being came externally to the aid of man, otherwise hopelessly doomed to misery in long drawn out error and non-being, and disciplined him till in the next world, under more favoring auspices, he might have his desires stilled in good, and his faith yield to knowledge, — for we forget that the doctrine of immortality was not then an appendage, but an integral part of the theory of knowledge and of its relation to man and to God — perfect content of perfect thought.

For my part, I can but think that mediæval absolutism, in its provision for authoritative supernatural assistance in this world and assertion of supernatural realization in the next, was more logical, as well as more humane, than the modern absolutism, which with the same logical premises, bids man find adequate consolation and support in the fact, that, after all, his strivings are already eternally fulfilled, his errors already eternally transcended, his partial beliefs already eternally comprehended.

The modern age marked a refusal to be satisfied with the postponement of the exercise and function of reason to another and supernatural sphere, and a resolve to practice itself upon its present object, nature, with all the joys thereunto appertaining. The pure intelligence of Aristotle, thought thinking itself, expressed itself as free inquiry directed upon the present conditions of its own most effective exercise. The principle of the inherent relation of thought to being was preserved intact, but its practical locus was moved down from the next world to this. Spinoza's 'God or Nature' is the logical outcome; as is also his strict correlation of the attribute of matter with the attribute of thought; while the combination of thorough distrust of passion and faith with complete faith in reason and all absorbing passion for knowledge is so classic an embodiment of the whole modern contradiction that it may awaken admiration where less thorough-paced formulations call out irritation.

In the practical devotion of present intelligence to its present object, nature, not only was science born, but its philosophical counterpart, the theory of knowledge. Epistemology only generalized in its loose, although narrow and technical way, the question practically urgent in Europe: How is science possible? How can intelligence actively and directly get at its object?

Meantime, through Protestantism, the values, the meanings formerly characterizing the next life (as the opportunity for full perception of perfect being) were carried over into present-day emotions and responses.

The dualism between faith authoritatively supported as the principle of this life, and knowledge supernaturally realized as the principle of the next, was transmuted into the dualism between

intelligence now and here occupied with natural things, and the affections and accompanying beliefs, now and here realizing spiritual worths. For a time this dualism functioned as a convenient division of labor. Intelligence, freed from responsibility for and preoccupation with supernaturally realizable truths, could occupy itself the more fully and efficiently with the world that now is; while the affections, surcharged with the values evoked in the mediæval discipline, entered into the present enjoyment of the delectations reserved for the saints. Directness took the place of systematic intermediation; the present of the future; the individual's emotional consciousness of the supernatural institution. Between science and faith, thus conceived, a bargain was struck. Hands off; each to his own, was the compact; the natural world to intelligence, the moral, the spiritual world to belief. This (natural) world for knowledge; that (supernatural) world for belief. Thus the antithesis, unexpressed, ignored, *within experience*, between belief and knowledge, between the purely objective values of thought and the personal values of passion and volition, was more fundamental, more determining, than the opposition, explicit and harrassing, *within knowledge*, between subject and object, mind and matter.

This latent antagonism worked out into the open. In scientific detail, knowledge encroached upon the historic traditions and opinions with which the moral and religious life had identified itself. It made history as natural, as much its spoil, as physical nature. It turned itself in upon man, and proceeded remorselessly to account for his emotions, his volitions, his opinions. Knowledge, in its general theory, as philosophy, went the same way. It was pre-committed to the old notion: the absolutely real is the object of *knowledge*, and hence is something universal and impersonal. So, whether by the road of sensationalism or rationalism, by the path of mechanicalism or objective idealism, it came about that concrete selves, specific feeling and willing beings, were relegated with the beliefs in which they declare themselves to the phenomenal.

III.

So much for the situation against which some contemporary tendencies are a deliberate protest.

What of the positive conditions which may give us not mere protest, like the unreasoning revolt of heart against head found at all epochs, but something articulate and constructive? The field is only too large, and I shall arbitrarily limit myself to the evolution of the knowledge standpoint itself. I shall suggest, first, how the progress of intelligence directed upon natural materials has evolved a procedure of knowledge in its own aims, conditions, and tests which renders untenable the inherited conception of knowledge; and, secondly, how the result is reinforced by the specific results of some of the special sciences.

1. First, then, the very use of the knowledge standpoint, the very expression of the knowledge preoccupation, has produced methods of procedure which, when generically formulated, intimate a radically different conception of knowledge, and of its relation to both reality and belief, than the orthodox one.

The one thing that stands out is that thinking is inquiry, and that knowledge as science is the outcome of systematically directed inquiry. For a time it was natural enough that inquiry should be interpreted in the old sense, as just change of subjective attitudes and opinions to make them square up with a reality that is already there in ready-made, fixed, and finished form. The rationalist had one notion of the reality, *i. e.*, that it was of the nature of laws, genera, or an ordered system, and so thought of concepts, axioms, etc., as the indicated modes of representation. The empiricist, holding reality to be a lot of little discrete particular lumps, thought of disjointed sensations as their appropriate counterparts. But both alike were thorough conformists. If reality is already given and completely given, and if knowledge is just submissive acceptance, then, of course, inquiry is only a subjective change in the 'mind' or in 'consciousness,' — these being subjective and unreal over against the objectively real.

But the very development of the sciences served to reveal a peculiar and intolerable paradox. Epistemology, having condemned inquiry once for all to the region of subjectivity in a sense metaphysically invidious, finds itself in flat opposition in principle and in detail to the assumption and to the results of the sciences. Epistemology is bound in detail to deny to the results of the

special sciences any ulterior objectivity just because they always *are* in a process of inquiry — always *in* solution. While a man may not be halted at being told that his mental activities as his are not metaphysically real, many men will draw violently back at being told that all the discoveries, conclusions, explanations and theories of the sciences share the same fate, since they are products of a discredited mind. And, in general, epistemology, in relegating human thinking as inquiry to a merely phenomenal region, makes concrete approximation and conformity to objectivity hopeless. Even if it did square itself up to and by reality it would never be aware of it. The ancient myth of Tantalus and his effort to drink the water before him seems to be ingeniously prophetic of modern epistemology. The thirstier, the needier of truth is the human mind, and the intenser the efforts it puts forth to slake itself in the ocean of being just beyond the edge of consciousness, the more surely the living waters of truth recede !

When such self-confessed sterility is joined with consistent derogation of all the special results of the special sciences, some one is sure to raise the cry of ‘dog in the manger,’ and of ‘sour grapes.’ A revision of the theory of thinking, of inquiry, would seem to be inevitable ; a revision which should cease trying to construe knowledge as an attempted approximation to a reproduction of reality under conditions which condemn it in advance to failure ; a revision which should start frankly from the fact of thinking as inquiring, and purely external realities as terms in inquiries, and which should construe validity, objectivity, truth, and the test and system of truths, on the basis of what they actually mean and do within the inquiry activity.

Such a standpoint promises ample revenge for the long damnation and longer neglect to which the principle of belief has been subjected. The whole procedure of thinking as developed in those extensive and intensive inquiries which constitute the sciences, is but rendering into a systematic technique, into an art deliberately and delightfully pursued, the rougher and cruder means by which practical human beings have in all ages worked out the implications of their beliefs, tested them and endeavored

in the interests of economy, efficiency, and freedom, to render them coherent with one another. Belief, sheer, direct, unmitigated personal belief, reappears as the working hypothesis; action which at once develops and tests belief reappears as experimentation, deduction, demonstration; while the machinery of universals, axioms, *a priori* truths, etc., is the systematization of the way in which men have always worked out, in anticipation of overt action, the implications of their beliefs with a view to revising them in the interests of obviating the unfavorable, and of securing the welcome consequences; observation, with its machinery of sensations, measurements, etc., is the resurrection of the way in which agents have always faced and tried to define the problems that face them; truth is the union of abstract postulated meanings and of concrete brute facts in a way which circumvents the latter by utilization as means, while it fulfills the other by use as methods, in the same personally active experience. It all comes to immediate experience, personally initiated, personally conducted, and personally consummated.

Let consciousness of these facts dawn a little more brightly over the horizon of epistemological prejudices, and it will be seen that all that prevents the giving of genuine metaphysical reality both to thinking activities and to their characteristic results, is the notion that belief itself is not a genuine ingredient of reality metaphysically taken — a notion which itself is only a belief, but a belief, which unlike the convictions of the common man, and the hypotheses of science, finds its proud proof in the fact that it does not so unworthily demean itself as to work.

Once believe that beliefs themselves are as metaphysically real as anything else can ever be, and we have a universe in which uncertainty, doubtfulness, really inhere; and in which personal attitudes and responses are real both in their own distinctive existence, and as the only ways in which the as yet undetermined factor of reality takes on shape, meaning, value, truth. If 'to wilful men the injuries that they themselves procure, must be their schoolmasters' — and all beliefs are wilful — then by the same token the propitious evolutions of meaning, which wilful men secure to an expectant universe, are at once their compen-

sation and their justification. In a doubtful and needy universe elements must be beggarly, and the development of personal beliefs into experimentally executed systems of actions, is the organized bureau of philanthropy which confers upon a travailing universe the meaning for which it cries out. The apostrophe of the poet is above all to man the thinker, the inquirer, the knower :

“ O Dreamer ! O Desirer, goer down
Unto untravelled seas in untried ships,
O crusher of the unimagined grape,
On unconceived lips. ”

2. Biology, psychology, and the social sciences proffer an imposing body of concrete facts which also point to the rehabilitation of belief—to the interpretation of knowledge as a human and practical outgrowth of belief, not of belief as the state to which knowledge is condemned in a merely finite and phenomenal world. I need not, as I cannot, here summarize the psychological revision which the notions of sensation, perception, conception, cognition in general have undergone, all to one intent. ‘Motor’ is writ large on their face. The testimony of biology is unambiguous to the effect that the organic instruments of the whole intellectual life, the sense-organs and brain and their connections, have been developed on a definitely practical basis and for practical aims, for the purpose of such control over conditions as will sustain and vary the meanings of life. The historic sciences are equally explicit in their evidence that knowledge as a system of informations and instructions is a coöperative social achievement, at all times socially toned, sustained, and directed ; that logical thinking is a reweaving through individual activity of this social fabric at such points as are indicated by prevailing social needs and aims.

This bulky and coherent body of testimony is not, of course, of itself metaphysics. But it supplies, at all events, facts which have scientific backing, and as such are as worthy of regard as the facts pertinent to any science. At the present time they would seem to have some peculiar claim just because they offer facts largely ignored in prior philosophic formulations, while those belonging to mathematics and physics have so largely wrought their sweet will in systems. Again, it would seem as if, in phi-

losophies built deliberately upon the knowledge principle, any body of known facts should not have to clamor for sympathetic attention.

Such being the case, the reasons for ruling psychology and sociology and allied sciences out of competency to give philosophic testimony have more significance than the bare denial of jurisdiction. They are evidences of the deep-rooted preconception that whatever concerns a particular conscious agent, a wanting, struggling, satisfied and dissatisfied being, must of course be only phenomenal in import.

This aversion is the more suggestive when the professed idealist appears as the special champion of the virginity of pure knowledge. The idealist, so content with the notion that consciousness determines reality, provided it be done once for all, at a jump and in lump, is so uneasy in presence of the idea that empirical conscious beings metaphysically determine reality now and here! One is reminded of the story told, I think, by Spencer. Some committee had organized and contended, through a long series of parliaments, for the passage of a measure. At last one of their meetings was interrupted with news of success. Consternation was the result. What was to become of the occupation of the committee? So, one asks, what is to become of idealism at large, of the wholesale unspecifiable determination of reality by or in consciousness, if specific conscious beings, John Smiths and Susan Smiths (to say nothing of their animal relations), beings with bowels and brains, are found to exercise influence upon the character and existence of metaphysical reals?

One would be almost justified in construing idealism as a Pickwickian scheme, so willing is it to idealize the principle of consciousness at the expense of its facts, were it not seen that this reluctance is the necessary outcome of the Stoic basis and tenor of current idealism as a knowledge theory — its preoccupation with logical contents and relations in abstraction from their *situs* and function in conscious lives.

IV.

I have suggested to you the naïve conception of the relation of beliefs to realities : that beliefs are themselves real without discount, manifesting their reality in the usual proper way, namely, by modifying and shaping the reality of other real things ; that in their reality they connect the bias, the preferences and affections, the needs and endeavors of personal lives with the values, the characters ascribed to things, whereby the latter are made worthy of human acquaintance and responsive to human intercourse. This was followed by a sketch of the history of thought, indicating how beliefs and all that they insinuate were subjected to preconceived notions of knowledge and of reality as its monopolistic possession. Then I traced some of the *motifs* which make for reconsideration of the supposed uniquely exclusive relation of logical knowledge and reality ; *motifs* which make for a less invidiously superior attitude towards the convictions of the common man.

In concluding, I want to say a word or two to mitigate — for escape is impossible — some misunderstandings. And, to begin with, while possible doubts inevitably troop with actual beliefs, the doctrine in question is not particularly sceptical. The radical empiricist, the humanist, the pragmatist, label him as you will, believes not in fewer but in more realities than the orthodox philosophies warrant. He is not concerned, for example, in discrediting objective realities, or logical or universal thinking ; but in such a reinterpretation of the sort of reality which these things possess as will authorize the accrediting, without depreciation, of concrete empirical conscious centers of action and passion.

My second remark is to the opposite effect. The intent is not specially credulous, although it starts from and ends with the radical credulity of all consciousness. To suppose because all the sciences are ultimately instrumental to human beliefs, that we are therefore to be careless of the most exact possible use of the most extensive and systematic scientific methods for testing the meaning and worths of beliefs, is like supposing that because a watch is made to tell present time, and not to be an exemplar of transcendent, absolute time, watches might as

well be made of cheap stuffs, casually wrought and clumsily put together. It is the task of telling present time, with all its urgent implications, that brings home, steadies and enlarges the responsibility for the best possible use of intelligence, the instrument.

For one, I have no interest in the old, old scheme of derogating from the worth of knowledge in order to give an uncontrolled field for some *special* beliefs to run riot in, — be these beliefs even faith in immortality, in some special sort of a Deity, or in some particular brand of freedom. Any one of our beliefs is subject to criticism, revision and even ultimate elimination through the development of its own implications into intelligently directed action. Because reason is a scheme of working out the meanings of beliefs in terms of one another and of the consequences they import in further experience, convictions are rendered the more, not the less amenable and responsible to the full exercise of reason.¹

Thus we are put on the road to that most desirable thing, — the union of fullest acknowledgment of moral powers and demands with thoroughgoing naturalism. No one really wants to lame man's practical nature; it is the supposed exigencies of natural science that force the hand. No one really bears a grudge against naturalism for the sake of sheer obscurantism. It is the need of some sacred reservation for spiritual interests that coerces. We all want to be as naturalistic as we can be. But the 'can be' is the rub. If we set out with a fixed dualism of belief and knowledge, then there haunts us the uneasy fear that the natural sciences are going to encroach and destroy spiritual values. So we build them a citadel and fortify it; that is, we isolate, professionalize, and weaken beliefs. But if beliefs are the most natural, the most metaphysical of all things, if knowledge is an

¹ There will of course come in time with the development of this point of view an organon of beliefs. The signs of a genuine as against a simulated belief will be studied; belief as a vital personal reaction will be discriminated from habitual, incorporate, unquestioned (because unconsciously exercised) traditions of social classes and professions. In his *Will to Believe* Professor James has already laid down two traits of genuine belief (viz., 'forced option,' and acceptance of responsibility for results) which are almost always ignored in criticisms (really caricatures) of his position. In the light of such an organon, one might come to doubt whether *belief* in, say, immortality (as distinct from hope on one side and a sort of intellectual balance of probability of opinion on the other) can really exist at all.

organized technique for working out their implications and interrelations, for directing their formation and employ, how unnecessary, how petty the fear and the caution. Because the freedom of belief is ours free thought may exercise itself; and the freer it is the more sure the emancipation of belief. Hug some special belief and one fears knowledge; believe in belief and one loves and cleaves to knowledge.

We have here, too, the possibility of a common understanding, in thought, in language, in outlook, of the philosopher and the common man. What would not the philosopher give, if he did not have to part with some of his common humanity in order to join a class? Does he not always when challenged justify himself with the contention that all men naturally philosophize, and that he but does in a more conscious and more orderly way what leads to harm when done in an indiscriminate and irregular way? If philosophy be at once a truly natural history *and* a logic — an art — of beliefs, then is its technical justification at last one with its humane justification. The natural attitude of man, said Emerson, is believing; “the philosopher, after some struggle, having only reasons for believing.” Let the struggle then enlighten and enlarge beliefs; let the reasons enkindle burnt out forms of belief and engender new.

Finally, it is not a solution, but a problem which is presented. As philosophers, our disagreements as to conclusions are trivial compared with our disagreement as to problems. To see the problem another sees, in the same perspective and at the same angle — that amounts to something. Agreement in solutions is in comparison perfunctory. To feel the same problem another feels — that is perhaps the only agreement possible on strictly intellectual matters. In a world where distinctions are as invidious as comparisons are odious, and where intellect works only by comparison and distinction, pray what is one to do?

But beliefs are personal matters, and the person, we may still believe, is social. To be a man is thinking desire; and the agreement of desires is not in oneness of intellectual conclusion, but in the sympathies of passion and the concords of action.

JOHN DEWEY.

PSYCHOLOGY, NATURAL SCIENCE, AND PHILOSOPHY.¹

ORIGINALLY, before the division of labor, the kingdom of knowledge formed an undivided whole, and philosophy was monarch of all she surveyed. In the course of time different fields of study were marked off, but the unity of the whole was not lost sight of. Philosophy remained the mother science for more than two thousand years, and the special sciences that sprang up came within the sphere of her influence. The Greek and mediæval philosophers knew all that was known in the theoretical domain, and even a Christian Wolff felt competent to lecture on physics, mathematics, and political science in addition to psychology, logic, ethics, and metaphysics; while Kant was willing to accept almost any chair in the faculty of philosophy except the professorship of poetry, which, all will agree, he very wisely declined.

But in our day all that has changed. The labor has been divided and subdivided until at present the individual worker hardly dares to claim a knowledge of anything but the narrowest strip in the field of truth, and the college professor, who was formerly a jack of all trades, now modestly confesses that he is master of none. The world has been chopped into little bits and each investigator must see to it that he leaves his fragment of reality smaller than he found it. Philosophy, the sometime queen, has become a dowager; her children have deserted her, all but a few barren daughters, we are often told, for whom nobody cares. The only members of the original household left are psychology, logic, æsthetics, ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics, a paltry remnant of a once brilliant and numerous crew.

And now the demand is frequently heard that psychology too cut loose from her old-fashioned sisters, and set up an establishment of her own or go to live with the natural sciences. The

¹ Read before the American Philosophical Association, at the Cambridge Meeting, Dec. 27, 1905.

motives for this demand are various. The introduction of laboratory methods into psychology has given it a scientific savor, and the experimentalists are often ashamed of the company they are forced to keep. They have greater respect for the kind of work done by the natural scientists, who are apt to smile at the pretensions of the philosophers, and are therefore eager to flock with them. Or it is held that psychology is itself a natural science and belongs by right to that field. Mental processes cannot be understood without a knowledge of their physical and biological environment and must therefore be given over to men trained in these lines of research. Or the reasons for separation may be of a more practical nature. The psychologists may complain that the philosophers do not sympathize with their aims, that they do not comprehend their needs, and that association with them is apt to be detrimental to their interests. And here and there a philosopher may argue in favor of expelling empirical psychology, or at least psychophysics, from the philosophical union for similar reasons or because the expense of establishing laboratories should be borne by the scientific departments.

The proposed separation, however, would, in my opinion, be beneficial neither to philosophy nor to psychology itself. The affiliation is to the advantage of both parties. Of course the relation between these branches of knowledge is not to be one of absolute dependence on either side. By no means is psychology to be the handmaiden of metaphysics ; the purpose cannot be to neglect the facts of mental experience and to offer an *a priori* system of psychology. Psychology must do its work along the general lines marked out for it in modern times, and continue to enjoy the independence which it has achieved within the domain of philosophy, and which, so far as I can see, no one dreams of curtailing. But independence here is not identical with disunion or even affiliation with another power. There are cogent reasons against such a change, and these I shall attempt to outline in what follows.

In the first place, we may argue against the affiliation of psychology with natural science on the ground that the subject matter of the former differs from that of the latter. Whatever may

be the ultimate essence of matter and mind there is difference enough between them to justify the distinction which has come to be made between mental and physical processes and has led to the development of two groups of sciences, the mental and the natural. The science of psychology is primarily interested in thoughts, feelings, and volitions; natural science, in material objects. As Professor Münsterberg says: "Psychology examines no body when it analyzes the ideas of bodies, physics examines no ideas when it analyzes the perceived body." These thoughts, feelings, and volitions form a more or less connected series of events, a domain in which we can discover law and order, and are therefore capable of scientific treatment. It is because such an orderly body of unique facts exists that a special science called psychology has grown up and is possible. Now the other philosophical branches, logic, æsthetics, ethics, the theory of knowledge, and metaphysics are likewise fundamentally interested in the mind, and their affiliation with the science of mind is therefore not only historically but logically justifiable.

It is true, the facts of mental life do not appear in isolation, but are somehow related to a physical and biological environment. Hence they may be studied in connection with the occurrences which constitute the special subject matter of the natural scientist. Here the ideal will be to discover the particular material processes with which particular psychic states are connected. But in psychology the interest will always be centered upon mind; the facts of physics and biology will be drawn upon simply in order to throw light upon the inner world. The interest of the natural scientist, on the other hand, is directed toward external nature, and he refers to the inner world only when a proper understanding of this will aid him in understanding the ways of matter. For ages and ages, down through the mediæval period, he believed that mind or soul alone could explain animal or human movements, and therefore introduced it as a principle of explanation. When he felt able to account for *all* physical occurrences without having recourse to anything mental, he abandoned the principle and ignored mind as lying wholly outside his sphere.

The fact, however, that mental states can be studied in connection with matter does not make psychology a branch of physics or biology, any more than it makes the latter a branch of the former. A perfect knowledge of the physical and physiological counterparts of mind would not give us a knowledge of the mind as such. Even if we could tell all about the brain and what takes place inside and outside of it, we should never come face to face with a thought or a feeling in this field, for a thought or a feeling is quite different from a molecular motion in the brain or anywhere else. "The most accurate knowledge of the processes in the nerve substance could not give us an idea of the corresponding psychical facts if we did not possess it otherwise."¹ The physiologist, limiting himself to a study of the brain, would, to quote Professor Jodl, know as little of mind as a deaf and dumb man would know of music by studying the score of a musical composition. So long as there are thoughts and feelings and volitions, and so long as these can be reduced to law, there will be room for a specific science with the business of studying these phenomena in its own way. Whether the physiologist regards the mind as a principle of explanation, as he once did, and explains all animal and human movements by means of it, whether he casts it aside as useless for his purposes and seeks to reduce all such activity to brain machinery, or whether he makes consciousness a by-product of the brain to be accounted for mechanically, his chief interest lies in the domain of matter, while "the distinctive aim of the psychologist is," as Professor Stout says, "to investigate mental events themselves, not their mechanical accompaniments or antecedents." Call mind what you please, call it an effect or another aspect of matter, call it a distinct principle or entity alongside of matter, or a manifestation of something behind them both, call it the sole reality and matter its appearance, it is a unique fact and deserves to be investigated as such. You can ignore it if you choose; you can decide to pay attention only to its material accompaniments and antecedents, but you cannot do this and be a psychologist.

But, says an objector, the physiological processes are, after

¹Cornelius, *Psychologie als Erfahrungswissenschaft*, p. 3.

all, the real things, and the mental states are dependent on them. The real causes are the brain operations. Hence knowledge of brain action is real scientific knowledge. It is the business of the scientific thinker to explain these states of consciousness by referring them to their causes just as he explains sound and light. Colors and tones are the effects of ether and air waves respectively, ether and air waves are not the effects of colors and tones. Similarly, states of consciousness are explained by, but do not explain, brain states. The ideal of the physiologist must therefore be what Exner conceives it to be: "I regard it as my task," he declares, "to explain the most important psychic phenomena by degrees in the excitations of nerves and nerve centers, hence to reduce everything in consciousness that appears to us as a manifoldness to quantitative relations and different connections in otherwise essentially homogeneous nerves and centers."¹ This view represents the climax of the mechanical theory of the world, which, after having conquered the inorganic realm and laying claim to the organic sphere, now proposes to take possession of the mind as the natural appendage of the latter.

Disguise it as we may, however, this argument rests upon the questionable metaphysics of materialism. If it were true and the ideal held up were realized, psychology would in a certain sense play second fiddle to physiology. So would logic and ethics, political and social science, history and philology; all would find their ultimate explanation in a mechanics of the brain. Physiology in turn would be reduced to physics; physics would be the mother science, and we should be back again in metaphysics.

And still there would be room for psychology. The psychologist would keep right on studying the so-called effects of brain action, the states of consciousness; he would seek to analyze and describe them and discover the order that is in them. However complete our knowledge of the brain motions might be, this would not tell the whole story; indeed, it would not touch the real problem of psychology at all. Only in case there were no states of consciousness, or if they could not be reduced to any form of law, if there were neither rhyme nor reason in them,

¹ *Entwurf zu einer physiologischen Erklärung der psychischen Erscheinungen.*

would psychology, as we have conceived, it find its occupation gone. There would be no science of psychology to affiliate with the natural sciences; it would have about as much standing in court as a science of augury. "Wo nichts ist hat der Kaiser sein Recht verloren."

The ideal, however, is far from realized. We possess no such astronomical knowledge of the occurrences in the nervous system as is here dreamed of. Our knowledge of the processes on which the elementary forms of psychic life are said to depend is far from certain, exact, and complete; while of the higher forms of mind we have no physiological knowledge worth speaking of, so little indeed as to prompt physiologists themselves to deny the existence of a science of cerebral psychology. "It would of course be a great triumph," Du Bois-Reymond once said, "if we could say that a particular motion of particular atoms takes place in particular ganglionic cells and nerve fibers corresponding to a particular mental process. It would be immensely interesting if we could turn the gaze inward and watch the operations of the brain mechanism that is going on when we are working out a problem in arithmetic, just as we can watch the mechanism in an adding machine, or even if we knew what dancings of atoms of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, phosphorus, and other elements corresponded to the joy of musical sensation, what whirlings of such atoms corresponded to the highest pitch of the pleasures of sense, what molecular storms accompanied the maddening pain occasioned by injury to the *nervus trigeminus*. . . . At present we do not even know whether only the gray matter or also the white matter of the brain thinks, or whether a definite configuration or a definite movement of brain atoms or molecules corresponds to a particular soul state."

Here we are forced to speak, for the most part, in figures of speech. We do not know what is going on in the brain, we do not even know that all mental states have their physiological counterparts. We can form hypotheses concerning what is happening, but, let it be remembered, these hypotheses cannot be formed without due regard to the thought world which they undertake to explain. If the phenomena of consciousness are

the symptoms of hidden brain action, it would seem rational to study the symptoms in order to get at the underlying causes ; indeed, that would seem the only possible way. In short, the brain physiologist cannot take a step in the construction of his hypotheses without a knowledge of mind, that is, psychology. If his psychology be crude, his brain theories will be crude : they must needs conform to his psychological beliefs. One of the most glaring examples of this truth is the theory of phrenology. To quote from Professor Höffding's recent book on *the Problems of Philosophy* ; " If it is desired to supersede psychological definitions by physiological, it is evidently presupposed that psychological definitions are already in existence. The creation of these definitions must be the part of psychology ; and if it can itself make no clear-cut definitions, assuredly physiology cannot ascertain for it what it should seek in the brain an explanation for. If what is to be superseded be vague and uncertain, then what supersedes it will likewise be vague and uncertain. And we cannot derive certainty from the fact that we have actually discovered the brain states which correspond to psychical manifestations observed in the act. The independence of psychology must be recognized in any event, since it prescribes — like a kind of symptomatology — the work of physiology. It is a long and difficult task to find adequate definitions in any experimental science ; they only become possible when the science has actually reached completeness ; they come at the end, not at the beginning of the investigation. Only too often have crude psychological definitions been considered trustworthy starting points for the investigations of brain physiology." ¹

If, however, our knowledge of the physiological causes were so profound that we could deduce from them their psychical effects without paying any attention to the mental processes as we now do in psychology, then indeed the physiologist could afford to ignore psychology. But there would still remain another way of studying the mind, a more direct way, in which we should come face to face with the states deduced by the scientist, and this too would be interesting if only as an experimental verification of the

¹ Pp. 33 f. (English translation by Galen M. Fisher.)

results of brain physiology. In the meanwhile, there is no such science as is here spoken of, and it would be unreasonable to ask us to postpone the consideration of the problems of logic, ethics, metaphysics, and all other subjects rooted in psychology until we can deduce them from the mechanics of the brain. Professor Stout is right: "Such a demand is logically parallel to a demand that history or biography, or the practical estimation of character and anticipation of men's actions in ordinary life, shall come to a standstill until they have a sufficient physiological basis. On this view Carlyle should have abstained from writing his *French Revolution*, because he did not know what precise configuration and motion of brain particles determined the actions of the mob who stormed the Bastille."¹

We have said that so long as there is coherence in the mental world, uniformity of coexistence and sequence, psychology will have work to do. But, the objection is urged, the mental series does not form a continuous line, there are breaches in it, and you cannot therefore explain mental states by themselves. Unless you are willing to assume creation out of nothing, you must go to physiology for help. In the one case, you have no science at all; in the other, it becomes a branch of natural science. Not only can no uniformity be discovered in the psychical realm, there can be none in the very nature of things. For the cortical processes depend on the subcortical processes; therefore the excitations in the cortex do not form an unbroken causal series, because many of their causes lie in the subcortical region. And hence, since the subcortical activities are not accompanied by consciousness, the conscious processes of the cortex must show gaps. The mental world, in other words, does not form an unbroken causal nexus and cannot be understood without reference to matter. In external nature alone can there be a closed causal chain, here alone can there be true science. In order to be scientific psychology must become physiology.

The following answer may be given to this argument. The appeal of one science to another for aid is not equivalent to a surrender of its autonomy. By referring certain mental phenomena

¹ *Analytic Psychology*, p. 35.

to their physical conditions or concomitants, psychology does not become merged in or subordinated to physiology. Moreover, the fact that our knowledge of the psychic line is broken does not prove that the line itself is broken. More careful observation may lead to the discovery of the missing links. And where observation leaves us in the lurch, we can have recourse to hypotheses, and here it is to be noted that the physiological hypothesis is not the only possibility. Besides, our knowledge of the physiological chain is not continuous either ; here too there are gaps, and here too the gaps are bridged over by theory. The physiologist simply assumes continuity ; his fundamental hypothesis is that there can be no gaps in the material world. Formerly he had recourse to animal spirits, vital force, and soul to fill out the gaps, and even to-day many scientists refuse to rest content with the purely mechanical theory of the world. Finally, if there is not a certain amount of discoverable uniformity on the mental side, the physiologist has no clue to the study of the brain processes upon which the phenomena are said to depend. If there is no coherence or order in the effects, how can there be coherence or order among the causes ? If psychology is impossible because there is no law on the mental side, then cerebral physiology is impossible because there is no law on the physiological side, and also because we have no key with which to open the secrets of the brain.

The argument is often made in favor of affiliating psychology with natural science on the score of method. Psychology, it is held, must investigate its facts as the natural sciences investigate theirs, by the methods of observation and experiment. It must also measure its phenomena or apply the method of numerical determination wherever this is possible. The methods of observation, experiment, and measurement are the methods of science, their employment is what makes a science exact, and presupposes thorough scientific training on the part of those who use them. Psychology is therefore a natural science and belongs in that field.

This reasoning does not seem to me to hold good. True, the general method of psychology is the same as that of every other.

department of research ; the psychologist seeks knowledge and must employ all possible methods of knowledge in order to realize his purpose. Of course it is logically possible to make the empirical method the principle of union and to subsume all sciences employing it under one head. But that would be a superficial arrangement, neglecting, as it does, very important differences. There is a specific difference between the method of psychology and that of natural science. The method of psychology is primarily subjective or introspective, the method of science is objective. The psychologist studies the facts of the inner world, the physicist and physiologist those of the outer. The fields of study are different and the ways of handling them different in this specific sense. It is true the psychologist also uses the objective method, he pays attention to physical antecedents and accompaniments of mind, but his chief interest lies in consciousness ; for the sake of this he regards the physical world. Even when he is occupied with the child and animal mind, introspection forms his basis and his guide. Only in case introspection is ruled out as worthless will this view fail, but in that event there can be no science of psychology, at least not in the sense in which this term has been understood down to the present time.

The introduction of the experimental method into psychology does not change this relation. It does not aim to do away with introspection ; its object is rather to facilitate introspection, to render it more exact, to correct it, to bring it under control, to verify it. And as for measurement in psychology, well, we do not really measure mental states, but their physical concomitants. Besides, the measurement of the physical counterparts forms but a small and unimportant part of the problem of psychology. More or less exact numerical determination of this kind is possible only on the borderline of physics and psychology ; only physical stimuli can be quantitatively determined, and such quantitative determination does not throw much light on the real problems of psychology. It is due to the appreciation of this fact that the trend toward psychophysics which characterized the beginnings of experimental psychology has been

interrupted. "It is not at all surprising," says Professor Wundt, who certainly speaks with authority in this field, "that psychology, which has become an independent discipline only within comparatively recent years, should be mainly occupied with elementary problems, with problems largely to be found on the boundary line between physiological and psychological research, but it goes without saying that its final vocation must not be determined by its present status."¹ And Professor Titchener declared in his address before the Congress at St. Louis: "You know without my telling you . . . that the course of experimental psychology in recent years has been away from simple numerical determinations, and towards introspective analysis; and that the experimental method has been continually extended from the simpler processes to the more complex, whether to complexes hitherto untouched, by experiment, or to unfamiliar phases of familiar mental formations."² "I have little sympathy or patience with those experimentalists who would build up an experimental psychology out of psychophysics and logic; who throw stimuli into the organism, take reactions out, and then, from some change in the nature of the reactions, *infer* the fact of a change in consciousness. Why in the world should one argue and infer when consciousness itself is there, always there, waiting to be interrogated? This is but a penny in the slot sort of science. Compared with introspective psychology, it is quick, it is easy, it is often showy. We have been a little bit corrupted by the early interest in psychophysics, or, perhaps more truly, we have not all learned instinctively to distinguish between psychophysics and psychology proper, and so we are apt to take the tables and curves of reactions for psychological results, and the inferences from them for psychological laws. Now the results, where they are not purely physiological or anthropometrical, are psychophysical results. As such they have their usefulness; and the psychological laboratory is their right place of origin. But there is no reason why one should gain psychological credit for them

¹ *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, pp. 72 f.

² "The Problems of Experimental Psychology," published in *The American Journal of Psychology*, April, 1905, pp. 210 f.

—still less for erecting a speculative psychology upon their foundation.”¹

My conclusion, therefore, is that psychology is not a natural science either in subject matter or in method, and that there is no reason for affiliating it with natural science. Its task is to study the facts of mental life, and its fundamental method is that of introspection. Now it is conceivable, of course, that it should cut loose from its historical association with philosophy and proclaim its independence. But there is no good reason why this should be done. Indeed, it is to the interest of both parties that the old friendly relations be continued. Philosophy needs the companionship and example of psychology to do fruitful work, and psychology cannot fail to benefit by such association herself.

By philosophy we here mean the subjects taught under that name by the philosophical departments of our universities, logic, æsthetics, ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics. All these are mental sciences, all are primarily concerned with mind. Psychology is indispensable to these fields of investigation, so indispensable that many writers have been tempted to regard them all as branches of psychology. Though they are not that, psychology may be said to hold the key to the situation. Not one of them can neglect psychology with impunity. Logic, æsthetics, ethics, and the theory of knowledge are interested in mind, and it is essential that they understand the mind. And metaphysics, though it is interested in all the facts of existence, in the physical as well as the mental realms, has a particularly vital interest in the inner world. Its concepts, methods, ideals, and evaluations are products of the human mind, and it must reckon with the source from which they spring. All these subjects are so intimately bound up with psychology that separation would mutilate them all. The close relation existing between them has its practical consequences also. The students in a department of philosophy cannot afford to neglect the study of mental life: ignorance of psychology will make itself felt in the work of the related subjects. And the needs of the department would not be satisfied by courses in psychophysics and physiological psychology given by natural scientists.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 221.

On the other hand, the aims and problems arising out of the philosophical disciplines help to give direction to psychology and thus influence it. The interest in logical, ethical, epistemological, and metaphysical problems arouses interest in certain phases of mind and leads to a psychological study of the same. (Perhaps we can partly explain the trend away from psychophysics in this way also.) It fastens the attention on processes of mind which the natural scientist is apt to ignore because he can find no physical antecedents for them. Such philosophical study also acts as a safeguard against a false mental atomism and tends to keep in view the unity of mind. As these remarks apply with even greater force to metaphysics, the especial bugbear of some scientists, it may not be out of place to discuss this point a little further.

The relation of psychology to metaphysics is not to be conceived in the old-fashioned sense of an *a priori* construction of the facts of psychology from metaphysical principles. If the thing could be done, if the facts discovered by empirical psychology could be deduced from a few fundamental principles, without any regard to experience, there would be no objection whatever to doing it. But no system of metaphysics exists that can shake out of its sleeve all the mental phenomena with which we become acquainted through observation, and so far as I know no system has ever attempted such a thing. But if dependence on metaphysics means that psychology must start out with some broad assumptions or general principles, then psychology, like every other science, is metaphysical. To refuse to start out with any epistemological and metaphysical assumptions is not to start out at all. The only question here is with what assumptions to start out, and most of the trouble is due to the fact that one man's assumptions are gall and wormwood to another. And often the psychologist is not conscious of having any assumptions, or his assumptions seem so self-evident to him that he takes them for what he is pleased to call facts, while his colleague's presuppositions strike him as unwarranted metaphysical fictions. So enamored are we of our own pet notions! If, finally, the introduction of hypotheses makes psychology metaphysical, psychology cannot escape metaphysics; indeed, no

science can. Psychology cannot get along without hypotheses ; hypotheses are always in a certain sense confessions of ignorance, and where we are ignorant there is nothing to do but to confess. Here, again, the quarrel is not so much about introducing hypotheses as about the kind of hypotheses introduced. Where we do not know we are forced to guess, and though one man's guess is not as good as another's, there is usually room for difference of opinion. But one man's guess seems so plausible to him and so satisfactory, that he can see nothing in the other man's, and he shows his contempt by calling the latter's metaphysical. The Germans define a professor as a person who does not agree with you. In the same way we might define a metaphysical theory as one which does not agree with our own. The physiologist, for example, insists that the introduction of certain hypotheses into psychology is metaphysical, and repudiates the kind of psychology that is guilty of such behavior. He will have nothing to do with soul or psychic dispositions or unconscious processes because these concepts are metaphysical. But the question here is simply, Do these conceptions or theories really explain the facts? If they do not, they are to be rejected, not because they are metaphysical theories, but because they are inadequate theories. As a rule the thinkers who proclaim such a violent dislike for metaphysics are not so hostile to it as they say ; their bark is worse than their bite. They simply repudiate a certain kind of metaphysics, the other fellow's ; with their own system they are well pleased ; for them it explains the facts and is a fact. A wise remark of Heinrich Hertz, a scientist of no mean repute, is in place here : "No problem," he says, "that makes any impression upon us can be disposed of by being designated as metaphysical ; every thinking mind has, as such, needs which the natural scientist is in the habit of calling metaphysical."¹

The truth is we cannot advance very far into psychology

¹ All the discussions concerning the place of psychology are influenced by certain presuppositions upon the acceptance or rejection of which the outcome depends. In order to answer the question, we must first form some conception of the relation between psychology and natural science. We cannot do that without defining psychology and natural science. How shall we differentiate them? Is their subject

without having metaphysical and epistemological problems thrust upon us. In this field more than in the natural scientific domain questions of a philosophical nature come up which cannot be brushed aside. By refusing to consider them or branding them as absurd the investigator does not silence them. Unconsciously he assumes some attitude toward them, which guides him all along the line. The questions are not always openly asked, but they are generally silently answered, and the answers are assumed without further ado. All this becomes evident enough when we call to mind that the different psychologists accuse each other of being metaphysicians. The empirio-criticists, who claim to have escaped the contagion, flout Wundt as a metaphysician in psychology, and Wundt lays bare the metaphysical assumptions of the *Kritik of Pure Experience*. They are both right. There is no absolutely presuppositionless psychology, and there never will be such a psychology. The sooner we accept this fact and examine the presuppositions of our science, the less inclination will we show to break away from philosophy and join the ranks of the natural scientists.

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matter the same or different? It is impossible to answer these questions without making assumptions of a metaphysical and epistemological nature. That is what Professor Münsterberg means when he says: "The approach to psychology must proceed from philosophy. . . . With the psychological problems themselves philosophy has nothing to do; the question, however, what is psychology, what can it be, what ought it to be, is a wholly philosophical question." *Grundzüge der Psychologie*, Vol. I, pp. 1, 2.

EVOLUTION AND THE ABSOLUTE.¹

TWO principles of modern science — conservation and evolution — seem to come into fatal conflict. It appears as if we were driven to accept one of two alternatives: the universe is either a closed system or a progressive growth. Yet either view taken by itself involves us in grave difficulties.

The arguments for the former alternative are found in the facts and law of conservation of energy, upon which is based the mechanical theory of nature. The arguments for the latter are found in the facts and law of growth, which seem to support a teleological interpretation of the universe. On the one side, we are compelled to conceive of the world as a completed whole and to regard all apparent evolution as simply redistribution of parts with no increase in amount. This is the doctrine of the conservation and convertibility of energy. There is nothing new under the sun. There is nothing quantitatively new because there can be no addition to the sum of existence. And there can be nothing qualitatively new because all differences of quality ultimately reduce to differences of degree or quantity.

On the other side, we have the doctrine of evolution. It appears as if things *came to be* what they are. It seems as if at first they were not and later came into existence by a process of development. Growth from childhood to maturity seems to be a process of becoming, in which something which was not enters into being, in which something comes out of nothing. If evolution is not to mean mere universal undulation — a cosmic game of hide-and-seek — then in progress there must always be an increment, a reinforcement. But when we seek to generalize this idea for the universe at large in a doctrine of absolute evolution or creation *ex nihilo*, it is rejected as irrational and absurd. The whole history of science has been a search for the causes of things, and to suppose that some things are uncaused, produced out of the void as by magic, is to make science either a tragedy or a farce.

¹ Read in part before the American Philosophical Association, at the Cambridge meeting, December 28, 1905.

This is the problem of essence or nature *versus* origin, of being *versus* becoming,—a problem which has divided schools of philosophy from the beginning of reflective thought. The “conception of the eternity of the forms of things,” says Professor Royce, “is, historically considered, by far the most significant opponent that the philosophical doctrine of evolution has had or ever can have.”¹ Is reality eternal, complete, perfect, and the appearance of change and evolution merely illusory, or is it what on the surface it appears to be, a dynamic progressive achievement in which reality literally comes into being for the first time from moment to moment by the voluntary act of intelligent and free agents? Is it a block universe with all its events predetermined from the first, or is it an indeterminate equation some of whose elements are conditional upon facts not yet come to light? Here is the dilemma. We cannot believe that something has evolved out of nothing. This strikes at the rationality of the universe; it contradicts the best established principles of science. But to regard the universe as a completed system strikes at its morality, because it destroys all possibility of progress, initiative, freedom, and responsibility.

The problem of the absolute origin of anything is one of the time-honored puzzles of metaphysics. We of course see beginnings and endings of events or processes in a relative sense. But to conceive of a time in the past when nothing whatever existed, or of a time in the future when nothing will exist, seems not only beyond our powers of thought but actually self-contradictory. It seems to follow that because something is, something always has been and always will be. Apparently the conceptions of being and non-being are mutually incompatible.

The question of the origin of a thing, as Professor Baldwin has shown, cannot be considered apart from the question of the nature of the thing. “The nature — the ‘what’ — of a thing is given in, and only in, its behaviour, *i. e.*, in the process or changes through which it passes.” A thing *is* what it *does*. Its reality is exhausted in the statement of its functions. Now this behavior is not a fixed, finished-up event. It is a continuous, progressive

¹ *Herbert Spencer*, p. 29.

process. "A mere lump would remain a lump, and never become a thing, if, to adhere to our phenomenal way of speaking, it did not pass through a series of changes. A thing must have a career." Its full reality does not appear in a mere cross-section; it comes out only in a longitudinal view of the process. "The strict adherence to the definition of a thing in terms of behavior, therefore, would seem to require that we should wait for the changes to go through a part at least of their progress — for the career to be unrolled, at least in part. Immediate description gives, so far as it is truly immediate, no science, no real thing with any richness of content; it gives merely the snap-object of the child." The 'what' therefore can be stated only in terms of the 'how,' the existence only in terms of the growth of the thing. "Any 'what' whatever is in large measure made up of judgments based upon experiences of the 'how.'" Statements of the existence of the thing are ultimately simply abbreviated statements of the method of its operation.

The question arises then, "How far back in the career of the thing is it necessary to go to call the halting-place 'origin'?" "How much of a thing's career belongs to its origin?" It is clear "that origin is always a reading of part of the very career which is the content of the concept of the nature of the thing." How far back must we unroll this record of the behavior of the thing to get the origin of the thing? So "the question before us seems to resolve itself into the task of finding somewhere in the thing's history a line which divides its career up to the present into two parts — one properly described as origin, and the other not. Now on the view of the naturalist pure and simple, there can be no such line. For the attempt to construe a thing entirely in terms of history, entirely in the retrospective categories, would make it impossible for him to stop at any point and say, 'This far back is nature and further back is origin'; for at that point the question might be asked of him, 'What is the content of the career which describes the thing's origin?' — and he would have to reply in exactly the same way that he did if we asked him the same question regarding the thing's nature at that point. He would have to say that the origin of the thing observed later was

described by career up to that point ; and is not that exactly the reply he would give if we asked him what the thing was which then was? So to get any reply as to the question of the origin of one thing different from that to the question of nature at an earlier stage, he would have to go still further back. But this would only repeat his difficulty. So he never would be able to distinguish between origin and nature except as different terms for describing different sections of one continuous series of aspects of behavior.”¹

In other words, the answer to the question as to what we mean by origin is that this point is determined wholly by the need or interest or purpose of the investigation. Origin is not ultimate. There is no such thing as an absolute beginning of anything. The origin of a thing is always its beginning with reference to a certain end. The end and the beginning cannot be separated except methodologically. They are complementary concepts. Origins take place continually, and ends or values are achieved continually. As Professor Baldwin says : “The only way to treat the problem of ultimate origin is not to ask it, as an isolated problem, but to reach a category which intrinsically resolves the opposition between the two phases of reality.” Or, as Mr. Hobhouse says : “No event begins or ends ; but a process goes on which passes gradually from one phase into another. We ticket prominent or clearly distinct phases with separate names, and speak of them as different events ; but we must remember that, though in one sense they are different, there is yet no barrier.”² Or as he says in another place : “Reality is or includes a time process. Now if we take any time process, and consider its beginning, we are dealing with a partial fact, and for every partial fact, thought demands an explanation which will connect it with reality as a whole. For the cause of the origin of a process, then, we may look in two directions, to its results or to its antecedents. If we look to the latter, we are clearly going outside the process. But if the process is one in which the whole nature of our ultimate system is to be expressed, we cannot go outside it without denying the claim of our system to be complete. We are therefore

¹ *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, article on “Origin *versus* Nature.”

² *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 277.

thrown forwards towards the results of this system. But neither can the purpose achieved by the process stand alone, for the necessity of the process must also be made plain. If an unconditional purpose were the secret of the universe, there could be no explanation of the means, the process, and the effort through which the purpose is realized. From the conception of purpose, then, we are again thrown back on origins, just as these throw us forward to their purpose. We have, in short, to conceive a single principle not realized in full in any one phase, but pervading the whole world-process. In this principle, the possible and the actual in a sense come together, for what it is to be is an integral condition that goes to make the world what it is. We cannot take any phase of reality as an absolute starting-point and regard it as determining everything that follows upon it mechanically, or everything that precedes it teleologically. If we conceive any process as making up the life of an intelligible world-whole, we must conceive its origin and issue as dependent on and implying one another. That is, we must conceive it as determined organically."

It is impossible to think of the universe as a whole in an absolute sense. We use the words, and they have a defensible meaning; but they do not mean what they seem to in discussions of this sort. When we speak of the totality of the universe, the totality of which we speak is such only from the particular point of view implied in the discussion. The very fact that we so *conceive* it is sufficient evidence that it *is* not limited in an absolute sense, for in thus conceiving it we have ourselves in some sense transcended it. The concept of unity as applied to the universe has therefore only a relative truth. It is true only in the light of the correlative concept of continuity. That is, the distinction contained in the dilemma of essence *versus* origin is a functional one. One horn of the dilemma expresses a truth, the truth of the unity of the universe as a system, a truth which, however, is true only when interpreted in relation to the other horn of the dilemma, which emphasizes the self-transcending character of this same system. Reality is a state only when viewed relatively as the culmination of a past process or as the source of a future

one, while the essence of things is got by telescoping what they have been and what they are to be into a relatively timeless present value.

Thus viewed the antithesis of conservation and evolution disappears. According to the conservation doctrine, there is no addition to the sum of existence. The only novel feature is the new relation in which the existent stands. By redistribution of forces there is an evolution of new meanings with no addition to the substance or reality. But, one may say, a new meaning adds something to the sum total of the universe. And thus the doctrine of conservation seems to be infringed. The reply is that the *meaning here becomes an existence* just by reason of the fact that it is treated in this instance as *a* meaning taking its place along with other meanings in a system. Meaning as meaning is not an increment, for it is universal. It is not the last member of a series; it is the whole system reconstituted. It is inevitable that meaning shall be taken as existence in this sense, but thus viewed there is no real contradiction between the doctrines of conservation and evolution. Each concept has significance only in relation to the other. The evolution of meaning is the condition of the conservation of existence, just as truly as the conservation of existence is the condition of its having meaning. When science wishes to cure a disease, she assumes the uniformity of the system within which she is working, — the conservation of its existence, its matter or energy. It assumes that enteric epithelium performed the same function a thousand years ago that it does to-day. It goes back into phyletic history and traces the evolution of the vermiform appendix for the sake of controlling the diseased state of that organ in the present case. The historical or evolutionary principle presupposes conservation in its genetic statement, while in turn the conservation idea would remain barren and abstract were it not for the element of change which is introduced by evolution. It follows that the distinction of the closed *versus* the open system is not a fixed one, but one set up within reality or experience; and therefore it is illegitimate to attempt to interpret the totality of the universe exclusively in terms of either one of the pair of abstractions.

An examination from this point of view of the two opposed types of philosophy known as evolutionism and absolutism will disclose the real interdependence of the half-truths for which they respectively stand. Evolutionism, as embodied in Spencer's philosophy, seeks to explain the complex in terms of the simple, what is in terms of what no longer exists. It derives the definite from the indefinite, the coherent from the incoherent, the heterogeneous from the homogeneous. But evolution thus interpreted conducts us back ultimately through less and less complex modes of existence until we come to a hypothetical beginning which must be simply zero. Viewed in this way, it would appear that the marvelous variety of the universe as we know it to-day has developed out of primitive nebulous haze or finally from an absolutely simple beginning which is in no way different from a blank nothing. At the absolute beginning of things, from the point of view of a purely mechanical theory of evolution, being equals nothing. To this result we are forced if we look alone on that aspect in which it appears that the later, more highly differentiated, have unfolded from the earlier less complex types of being.

Such we might suppose would have been the method by which Spencer arrived at his conclusion that the ultimate nature of the universe is essentially unknowable. But, as a matter of fact, he develops an entirely different line of argument, completely overlooking this most natural basis for the doctrine. He grounds his philosophy of the Unknowable on the epistemological theory of the relativity of knowledge. And instead of recognizing the nihilistic implication of his mechanical conception of evolution, he inconsistently postulates the instability of the homogeneous. That is, he postulates diversity in the primal unity with which he starts the evolutionary process, whereas, on his own presuppositions, he is logically entitled only to an abstract and therefore empty unity. It is not so strange, therefore, that he finally takes out of the bag what he originally put in.

But apart from the inconsistencies in Spencer's particular system, the mechanical theory of evolution is indefensible on general grounds, whenever in the form of an agnostic naturalism it purports to give a philosophy of nature. It is impossible to

state the theory in an intelligible form without introducing teleological considerations. The scientist with positivist leanings glibly says that his business is to get at the facts. But how does he get the facts? By causal analysis, he will reply. But he here inconsistently introduces the teleological point of view. For, as we have seen, the only way to find out what *is*, is to find out *how it came to be* and what it *will do*. The only strictly mechanical statements of law are in the form of equations; and the philosophical scientist will himself admit that these are but conceptual shorthand for serial operations which are shot through and through with purpose.

The only antidote to a mechanical evolutionism is a deeper, more organic interpretation of evolution itself. Evolution is ordinarily conceived as a movement between fixed limits, a progress from a definite starting-point to a definite goal. But in a true conception the starting-point and the goal are not fixed. The ideas of beginning and end are wholly relative to the process from which they are abstractions. We must interpret the faintest beginnings of growth in terms of the ripest result as well as the later stages in terms of the earlier. I have not explained anything by simply tracing its connections with preëxisting entities — by an account of its genesis. I have not fully explained it until I have also disclosed its use, its function, in the present and in that career yet to be unrolled of which Mr. Baldwin speaks. If the former be called the mechanical explanation, it must be supplemented by the latter, the teleological. Strictly speaking, these cannot be separated. Genesis cannot be explained except by reference to function, and function can be understood only in the light of genesis. "The ultimate interpretation even of the lowest existence," says Dr. Caird, "cannot be given except on principles which are adequate to explain the highest."¹ "The true meaning of the lowest phases of evolution can be found only in the highest, just as the meaning of the acorn can be found only in the full-grown oak. . . . The first step will not be fully understood until the last is taken, which will never be."² Why there

¹ *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. I, p. 35.

² Davidson, *A History of Education*, p. 9.

should be reality and progress at all is doubtless a mystery. But meanwhile the truth seems to be that both empiricism and absolutism are in a sense true.

The essential feature of absolutism, as embodied for example in the systems of Mr. Bradley and Professor Royce, consists in its doctrine of an eternal or timeless reality. Both these writers rightly maintain that reality is experience, but they insist that all the diversity of the universe as we know it is taken up into an absolute experience. They say much that is suggestive and inspiring; but the difficulty with both theories (and they are the best exponents of this point of view) is that they seem to think of the absolute reality as all-inclusive and all-exhaustive in the sense of being already completed, — there once for all, all wound up or frozen into a solid block of perfection.

The greatest difficulty of the absolutist is how to get variety, change, and finite values into his eternal reality without infecting it with their phenomenal character. How, if the Absolute is such as he describes it, can there be any finite at all? Yet he insists that all finite appearances somehow belong to reality, all our fragmentary experiences are taken up into the eternal consciousness. The problem is, How can the Absolute have change belonging to it as a genuine part of its nature and yet not itself be subject to change? It never seems to have occurred to him to begin at the other end, and say that change in some way must have an absolute significance, since it is so fundamental a character of our experience.

Why should we deny to the Absolute the character which by common consent it is most disparaging to the relative and finite being to lack? Why should we attribute to ultimate reality the static character of completedness, when we regard this as indicative of death and decay in our own experience? Who of us would wish for an experience, no matter how large or how exhaustive, provided that this meant the end of all capacity for growth, expansion, — and evolution of the new? We wouldn't take the Absolute for a gift if it meant this, — if it meant that there would be nothing more to do, nothing more to feel, nothing more to think! What gives zest and interest and spon-

taneity to life is its eternal newness. Each fresh experience is a genuine evolution of some new reality. Each moment is unique. Nothing just like it has ever occurred in the universe before. This is how we wish to think of our own experience. Why should we withhold this character from the infinite and the eternal, from the universal absolute experience? Why should what to us is the sign of emptiness and the quiet of the grave be supposed to be the highest tribute we can pay to the Supreme Being? Are we not much nearer the truth when with Lessing we prefer the 'search for the truth' to the 'truth' itself, when we think of the Absolute rather in terms of a dynamic becoming than as static being? To be sure, it is not much of a search if it is a perpetual seeking and never finding; if it is an eternal becoming without becoming something positive and definite. But to find it once for all, to become it and all there is of it at last completely, — what a hell that would make of heaven!

We are not maintaining, however, that the Absolute is simply change, that there is no truth whatever in absolutism. On the contrary, we distinctly believe in the Absolute, — in a concrete or functional absolute. The Absolute, we hold, must be in, not beyond our experience. We are not arguing that the Absolute is imperfect. We are simply arguing against a static idea of perfection. Perfection means, not final consummation, but inexhaustible capacity for development. The Absolute is perfect in the sense of embodying infinite potentialities, potencies, promises for the future. "Be ye perfect" does not mean "be absolute" in the sense of completed or finished up, says Professor Dewey. It means: Be adequate in your present functioning; be all that your present opportunities permit you to be, so that you can be the most and best possible in future stages of your career. It means: Be perfect in the sense of so living now that you will be able to get the most out of the future which is dependent upon it. If I look for a tool in practical life, I want it relatively complete, perfect as relevant to a definite end. But I do not want my experience stopped, finished up at that point. I want it to be complete in the sense of adequate, but to secure just this I must have a constant stream of fresh experiences. Perfection

in the sense of maturity or ripeness is a purely relative term. Real perfection is the capacity and fact of life, of growth, of development, of evolution — not finality.

We all of us are continually having experiences which in a concrete and functional sense are absolute. This occurs whenever in any relatively satisfying activity we feel, for the time at least, that we have achieved something worth while. Any state of experience in which we feel that we have won a value that is relatively adequate, is, for that experience, absolute. Our search does result in finding, we do sometimes achieve our ends, get somewhere, accomplish something. To this extent and in this sense it may be said that we are of, with, to, for, in the Absolute. I work hard to earn a thousand dollars; and when I have it credited to me on my bank account I have a feeling of something attained, a goal won. This is the absolutism of realization. It may last but a moment, the end achieved being turned over into means to further ends; but while it lasts this feeling of accomplishment and achievement is an absolute experience. Derivation is only one way of viewing experience. We conceive of experience as a process which has a starting-point and a goal only when it is relatively inadequate. But in moments of satisfaction, in moments of relative absorption, in those moments which we may call absolute because they are relatively summative and consummative, the questions of origin and destiny become irrelevant, — irrelevant because in such moments there is no discrepancy, no contradiction, no problem. Validity collapses into immediacy. Experience everywhere assumes these two aspects. On the one side, it is always summing itself up in definite interests which for the time being are absorbing. But while these are empirically ultimate and complete, they in turn cease to be ends in themselves and become means for finding something else. Infinity of space and time simply means that there is no experience which may not be put to a use beyond itself, there is no end which may not become means to a further end. The universe is infinite in the sense that everything we get is converted into capital for getting more. "Experience is for the sake of more experience."

The æsthetic experience perhaps furnishes the best illustration of such a concrete absolute. The ideal of all art, says Pater, is the "perfect identity of form and matter, this strange chemistry, uniting in the integrity of pure light, contrasted elements. In its ideal, consummate moments, the end is not distinct from the means, the form from the matter, the subject from the expression; they inhere in and completely saturate each other."¹ Æsthetic appreciation tends toward a state of absorption in which the æsthetic image and its emotional content fall together into one indescribable experience which has its only analogy in the trance of the mystic, the reverie of the seer, or the play of the child. The æsthetic attitude represents the stage of the appropriation or realization of values as contrasted with the stage of tension or reconstruction in which they are worked out. But here likewise the state of saturation is absolute only in a functional sense. Value while it is appreciated in a relatively immediate way is nevertheless the product of reflection. It is sometimes said that "to feel beauty is a better thing than to understand how we come to feel it."² But this sets up a false antithesis between reflection and appreciation. Reflection and description are necessary processes in progressive appreciation. Pure appreciation would be a speechless, contentless attitude. It is through description that we enhance our appreciation, and it is the failure to realize the fullest appreciation that stimulates fresh description. It is only when we fail to appreciate that we begin to reflect, and that we set up the distinction between the world of description and the world of appreciation. Describing is trying to appreciate.

H. HEATH BAWDEN.

VASSAR COLLEGE.

¹ *Fortnightly Review*, Vol. XXVIII, p. 530.

² Santayana, *The Sense of Beauty*, p. 11.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL
ASSOCIATION: THE FIFTH ANNUAL MEET-
ING, EMERSON HALL, HARVARD UNI-
VERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,
DECEMBER 27-29, 1905.

THE fifth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association was held at Cambridge in the new Emerson Hall of Harvard University. In addition to the regular meetings of the Association, a joint session with the American Psychological Association was held on Wednesday afternoon, December 27, at which time Emerson Hall was formally opened by addresses from President Eliot and Dr. Edward W. Emerson. A discussion followed on the affiliation of psychology with philosophy and the natural sciences, in which Professor Münsterberg, President Hall, Professor Angell, Professor Taylor, and Professor Thilly took part. The President's address of the American Psychological Association on Wednesday evening was also attended by the members of the Philosophical Association. After this address a reception was given to the two Associations by Professor and Mrs. Münsterberg. After the morning session of Thursday the Association adjourned to hear Professor Ostwald's paper before the Psychological Association on "Psychical Energy." On Thursday evening the Psychological Association united with the Philosophical to hear the President's address by Professor John Dewey of Columbia, subject, "Beliefs and Realities." A smoker followed at the Harvard Union.

The business meeting of the Association was held on Thursday afternoon at two o'clock, President Dewey presiding. The following officers of the Association were elected for the year 1906: *President*, Professor William James; *Vice-President*, Professor Ernest Albee; *Secretary and Treasurer*, Professor John Grier Hibben; the two new members of the executive committee to serve for two years, Professor A. K. Rogers and Professor Frank Thilly.

The appreciation of the kindly hospitality of Harvard University and the generous provision made for the comfort of the members of the Association was expressed in a hearty and unanimous vote.

The treasurer's report was submitted and approved, and is as follows :

The balance on hand as reported by Professor Gardiner, December 31, 1904, was \$101.43. Professor Gardiner also received from dues of members \$21.00, making a total of \$122.43. Of this amount, he spent \$30.90 to defray expenses of the Philadelphia "Smoker," leaving balance of \$91.53.

JOHN GRIER HIBBEN, SECRETARY AND TREASURER, IN ACCOUNT
WITH THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION.

Receipts.

Received from Professor Gardiner, the former Secretary and Treasurer.....	\$ 91.53
Received from dues in addition to amount paid to Professor Gardiner.....	88.20
Total.....	\$179.73

Expenses.

New Era Printing Company.....	\$17.92
Stamps and Envelopes.....	11.00
Clerical Aid and Expressage.....	5.20
Travelling Expenses.....	3.00
	\$ 37.12
By balance.....	142.61
Total.....	\$179.73

The following were elected to membership in the Association :
Dr. Hartley Burr Alexander, Professor Charles M. Bakewell,
Dr. Halbert Hains Britan, Dr. H. C. Brown, Dr. Wendell T.
Bush, Professor W. P. Coddington, Mr. B. A. G. W. Fuller,
Miss Kate Gordon, Professor Willard Clark Gore, Professor L.
F. Hite, Dr. W. E. Hocking, Dr. Edmund H. Hollands, Pro-
fessor Williston S. Hough, Professor Eugene W. Lyman, Dr. M.
Phillips Mason, Mr. Walter B. Pitkin, Professor George L. Ray-
mond, Miss Eliza Ritchie, Miss Eleanor Harris Rowland, Mr.

George H. Sabine, Mr. David F. Swenson, Miss Anna Boynton Thompson, Dr. Luther A. Weigle.

The following are abstracts of the papers read at the sessions of the Philosophical Association, also abstracts of the discussion at the joint meeting of the Psychological and Philosophical Associations :

Beliefs and Realities. JOHN DEWEY.

[The President's Address, which appears in full in this number (March, 1906) of the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.]

Swedenborg's Influence upon Goethe. FRANK SEWALL.

The paper presented a brief sketch of the wide range of Swedenborg's achievements in science and philosophy as enabling him to furnish to Goethe the comprehensive survey of the world as a whole, including both its spiritual and its physical realms, which the poet demanded. Besides the references to the eloquent tributes of Emerson and of Henry James, Sr., an account is given of the close relation of Kant to Swedenborg, especially in their simultaneous publication of their doctrines of the "Two Worlds" — Swedenborg in 1769 in his treatise *De commercio animæ et corporis*, and Kant in 1770 in his Inaugural Dissertation on the *Mundus sensibilis* and the *Mundus intelligibilis*. The paper traces Goethe's acquaintance with Swedenborg through Kant, Herder, and Schiller, but especially through Fraülein von Klettenberg, a devoted student of the Swedish seer who in Frankfort in the early '70's at the beginning of the Faust conception introduced Goethe to the *Arcana* of Swedenborg and its other-world revelations. Quotations are also given from the Doctoral Dissertation of Hans Schlieper before the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Berlin in 1901 on Emmanuel Swedenborg's *System der Naturphilosophie besonders in seiner Beziehung zu Goethe-Herderschen Anschauungen*, showing the parallel drawn between Goethe's *Deutsche Parnass* and the profound and little known work of Swedenborg, *De cultu et amore dei*, in which is described man as the microcosm reflecting in his mental and moral development all the forces and activities of the universe for good and for evil. Mention is made of the careful study by Johann Niejahr in his

Kritische Untersuchungen zu Goethe's Faust in *Euphorion*, Vol. IV, pp. 272-287, where the Monologue, especially, is explained in the light of Goethe's discovery of the "Book of Mystery" and of his joy and relief at being delivered from the dungeon of dead nature and blind dogma and pedantry. Also of the extensive review by Max Morris of Charlottenburg in his article *Swedenborg in Faust*, in *Euphorion*, Vol. VI, pp. 491 ff., in which striking parallelisms are drawn between Swedenborg's *Heaven and Hell* and the Second Part of the Tragedy where Faust's translation into the spirit-world is described.

The Conditions of Greatest Progress in American Philosophy.

D. S. MILLER.

The social development of philosophy has only begun. We set out with individualizing, with systems that carry the cherished originality and personal stamp of their several authors. We must pass to coöperative action. In its social development philosophy must be on one side international, but this Association and other tokens show that a national branch may flourish with a growth of its own and with its own form and fruit. Philosophy is not a science till a tested method has been achieved, such as to produce, in some principles at least, a consensus of experts. To secure conscious advance to this end, philosophy must feel her public function, her responsibility as teacher. Roused by this responsibility, the prime aim must be to reach common ground. For American thought, the chief means for this end are: (1) To use as plain English as we can, (2) to practice a searching mutual criticism in the interest of an accurate habit, (3) to study the divergent temperaments that find satisfaction in philosophies, and (4) to draw ourselves on one side closer to life by recognizing in common as the ancients did, and as many impulses of thought in America inspire us to do, that *Lebensweisheit* is an essential strain in all philosophy.

The Influence of American Political Theories on the Conception of the Absolute. I. WOODBRIDGE RILEY.

The conception of the Absolute in America assumes three forms in three successive centuries; in the seventeenth being

monistic, in the eighteenth dualistic, in the nineteenth pantheistic. Under puritanism there is a belief in one, supreme, self-sufficient Being, the sole ruler and disposer of all things; under Deism, a belief in a deity whose powers and functions are limited by a law outside himself, — the law of nature which is inviolable and immutable; under transcendentalism, the Deity, becoming immanent, is submerged in nature, can scarce be distinguished from the cosmic processes. As with Spinoza so with Emerson, the concept of God and the concept of the world-ground are identical; the Absolute is one with the ordering and creative power of the universe. Our problem is to show how these conceptions were influenced by the current theories of government: under absolute monarchy, sovereignty being conceived to be given by God to the king, who thus rules by divine right; under limited monarchy, sovereignty being shared between ruler and subject in a dual control; under representative monarchy, sovereignty being vested chiefly in the people through the inalienable right of the law of nature. The sources are found in the creeds of the state-church, colonial charters, and state constitutions, but chiefly in the speculations of men like John Wise, Jonathan Mayhew, and William Livingstone who, depending on Puffendorf, Grotius, and Montesquieu, indicate the drift from monistic determinism to the deistic severance between the law of God and the law of nature, the latter being put over against the deity as a separate legislative entity. This law, which under Puritanism was a subordinate, and under Deism a coördinate source of authority, becomes under Transcendentalism an independent and ultimate law, *lex* being now substituted for *legislator*. The identification of the guiding, rational principle and the eternal operations of nature is made as early as 1784 by Ethan Allen in his *Oracles of Reason*. Or put in political terms, the sovereignty first granted to the king, then shared by the people, is finally lodged solely in the democracy. Hence the analogy between the pantheism of Emerson and the doctrine of popular sovereignty. As the universe governs itself, is sufficient to itself, and is itself its own end, so the federal government is declared of the people, by the people, and for the people.

The Kantian Doctrine of God as Compared with that of Plato and Aristotle. W. T. HARRIS.

A paper on God as Regulative Idea and God as the Absolute, discussing the actual difference between Kant's doctrine of God as a regulative idea and the old ontological doctrine based on Plato (*Laws*, Book X) and Aristotle (*Metaphysics*, XII, 7; *De Anima*, III, 3, 4 and 5; *Physics*, III and VI). In how far does a regulative principle in Kant's meaning equal the authority of the old ontological proof? What is its real significance in theology? The old ontological argument seeks the ultimate presupposition of motion in the world and finds it in a Being that is self-active in the sense that mind is self-active, self-thinking, self-realizing, or will. The difficulty with ordinary common sense in seeing the gist of this ancient thought, which has created so much history in the world during its career, is caused by the uncertainty in the middle term, which lies between the fact or event present to our senses and the ultimate, complete cause, which is demanded by our careful, painstaking reflection. We glance from the moved object to a second object which moves it, and we seem to have an effect and its cause. But further observation convinces us that the supposed cause is itself an effect quite as much as the effect which we started with. Neither of the two originates anything; the originating cause lies beyond. We carry back our search from link to link, and find only transmitters but no originators, no true causes. It was an important result of Kant's thinking on this problem that modern philosophy came to see that a First Cause cannot be a mere end-link to a series of conditions in time and space; for an original cause such as mind or will (human or divine) belongs to noumena and not to phenomena, and therefore cannot be coördinate with phenomena in a causal series. Hence he devised the four antinomies in his *Critique of Pure Reason* to show the conflict between these two orders of being and the possibility of two contradictory proofs, one of these proofs based on ordinary experience and one based on the idea of true cause, which Kant called "a fiction of the reason invented to correct the incompleteness of the regress of causes as found in experience." Kant's argument in the third antinomy has the following steps: (1) If

everything that happens presupposes a previous condition as stated by the law of causality ; (2) this previous condition cannot be a permanent (or have been always in existence) ; for, if so, its consequence or the effect would have always existed ; (3) thus the previous condition must be a thing that has happened, and thus presupposes another condition preëxisting, and so to infinity without finding an originating cause. (4) With this, however, the law of causality collapses ; namely, since each cause proves to be a mere effect, its causal power escapes into a higher number of the series, and unless the law changes, and we reach an originating cause, wholly vanishes and their results are an indefinite or an infinite series of effects with no cause. (5) But (in the antithesis) Kant finds another contradiction. "A dynamically primal beginning of action presupposes a state which has no causal connection with the preceding state of the cause and is not in any way a result or effect of that previous state. Transcendental freedom (an originating cause) is therefore opposed to the natural law of cause and effect, and destructive of the possibility of unity in experience and therefore not to be found in experience and is consequently a mere fiction of thought." But Kant's proof of the antithesis is incomplete as he gives it, and should have been concluded somewhat in this manner : Since the law of causality by itself never reaches a true cause, it really is not a progress towards a cause, and it therefore by its progress *ad infinitum* demonstrates its essential incompleteness ; it is worse than a case of accumulation of a long series of mere effects without causes ; it confesses that it never can arrive at its true originating causality, and that its boasted law of "every event has its cause" is therefore an idle fiction and ought to be abolished on its own showing.

A Philosophical Pilgrimage : Reflections of a Visit to the Homes and Abodes of Berkeley, Hume, Locke, and Descartes. FRANCIS B. BRANDT. (Read by title.)

The Significance of Methodological Principles. ERNEST ALBEE.

Rationalism has been a far more persistent tendency in modern thought than is commonly recognized. While the Critical

Philosophy, logically developed, carries one beyond rationalism, Kant's own system is rationalistic in important respects, both on the theoretical and on the practical side, and may be described as imperfectly critical rationalism. This is plainly true of his so-called 'constitutive' principles, in so far as these are involved with his table of quasi-logical categories; but his actual use of 'regulative' principles, as applied to the problems of ethics, is open to much the same criticism. Yet 'regulative' principles, in the larger sense of the methodological principles of science and philosophy, so far from being dangerous to idealistic philosophy, are its salvation, if properly interpreted. The question is: In what relation do these methodological principles stand to reality? If reality is beyond experience, the problem is insoluble; but, in spite of differences of terminology, we seem to agree that reality is identical with experience in the largest sense. In what relation, then, do these principles stand to experience? The difficulty seems to be that science becomes progressively abstract, while experience remains concrete. As our scientific principles become accurate, they appear to depart from the reality of immediate experience. This very difficulty shows the persistence of the rationalistic tendency even in recent thought. We forget that these principles have no real significance apart from their functional relation to experience; and since, taken by themselves, they are plainly abstract and schematic, we overlook the fact that, in proportion as they are practically helpful in organizing our knowledge, and thus enabling us to deal effectively with experience, they are necessarily informing us with regard to the organic constitution of reality. Not brute experience, but organized experience, is the real, though in a sense also ideal.

Induction and the Disjunctive Syllogism. W. P. MONTAGUE.

There are two ways in which a proposition can be proved — directly, by premises that imply its truth; indirectly, by premises that imply the falsity of its contradictory alternatives. In the deductive syllogism in which we can reason from universals, the direct method is the more natural. And it is generally assumed that the same is true in induction. When we consider, however, (1) that in induction we must reason from the particular propo-

sition furnished by experience, and (2) that a particular proposition can never of itself be adequate to prove the truth of the corresponding universal, although (3) it is entirely adequate to disprove the universal proposition that contradicts it, the possibility suggests itself that induction properly belongs to the indirect type of inference. The paper is an exposition and defence of this view. In answer to the question as to how the universals of science can be derived from the particulars of experience, it is maintained that the inductive process by which a hypothesis is proved is essentially and exclusively a process of eliminating rival hypotheses, and that this eliminative process is appropriately expressed, not by a categorical, but by a disjunctive syllogism, of which the major premise is a statement of the possible causes or universal connections of a given phenomenon, while the minor premise is a statement of the particular observations and experiments that eliminate all of these alternatives but one. The following advantages are claimed for this theory of induction: (1) It explains why it is that the weakness of an induction has nothing to do with the necessarily limited number of positive instances. (2) It enables us to locate (and therefore to measure and remedy) the source of weakness in every induction, which consists in the claim to enumerate all the concomitants or possible causes of a phenomenon. (3) It enables us to view Mill's inductive canons, not as a group of disconnected principles, but rather as an organic system, no one of them sufficient in itself, but each adapted especially to eliminate a given type of alternative and capable of supplementing the defects of the others.

Connection between Logic and Mathematics. MRS. C. LADD FRANKLIN. (Abstract not given.)

Experience and Thought. J. E. CREIGHTON.

It is maintained against Pragmatism that the logical problem cannot be defined completely or adequately in terms of the particular situation. Thought always has, in addition to the specific problem with which it is occupied at any particular time, a more general and ultimate end, the realization and maintenance of a rational life. It is only by reference to this end that the particu-

lar problems and acts of thinking get their significance. Again, the antithesis between thinking and 'concrete ways of living,' assumed commonly by the pragmatists, is criticised and the conclusion urged that experience is a single process throughout its various stages of development. It is only when experience is regarded as the development of a single principle which maintains itself in and through its differentiations that one can properly speak of the parts as 'functions' or 'in functional relation' at all.

Evolution and the Absolute. H. HEATH BAWDEN.

Two principles of modern science — conservation and evolution — seem to come into fatal conflict. We face the dilemma of viewing the universe either as a closed system or as a progressive growth, each of which taken by itself appears to be an untenable view. We cannot believe that something has evolved out of nothing; this strikes at the rationality of the universe. But to regard the universe as a completed system strikes at its morality; it destroys the possibility of freedom, initiative, progress. This is the antinomy of essence or nature *versus* origin. Professor Baldwin has shown that the question of absolute origin cannot be answered because it cannot intelligently be asked. The earlier stages of a process — origin — can only be stated in the same terms as the later stages which we regard as exhibiting its nature. A thing *is* what it *does*, and no reason can be assigned for marking off any part of the career of its behavior as origin except in a relative sense. It follows that the distinction of essence *versus* origin is a functional one, having meaning only with reference to the interest or purpose in hand. The ideas of unity (conservation) and continuity (evolution) are true, therefore, only when interpreted in terms of each other. Science must assume the conservation of the system within which she is working in order to make the genetic or evolutionary statement useful, while, on the other hand, the continual evolution of new meanings is necessary to make the conservation doctrine intelligible. From this point of view, it is possible to state the elements of truth in evolutionism and absolutism. The so-called evolutionary philosophy of Spencer is inconsistently based on an abso-

lute interpretation of the principle of conservation ; that is, it is not in a true sense evolutionary. It only escapes absolutism by its self-contradictory doctrine of the Unknowable. The absolutism of Mr. Bradley and Mr. Royce, in so far as it asserts the existence of a completed timeless reality, falls into essentially the same error. How can the Absolute have change belonging to it as a genuine part of its nature and yet not itself be subject to change? Only if the term 'absolute' be given a functional interpretation. Reality or experience is absolute, in the only defensible sense of the term, in moments of relative realization of purposes or ends. It is conceived as having a starting-point and goal only when it is relatively inadequate to those purposes or ends. In other words, it is conceived as absolutely conserved or as an evolution in time according to the demands of the specific and concrete situation.

Consciousness and Evolution. FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE.

To regard consciousness as an outcome of evolutionary processes involves a radical transformation of many of the fundamental problems of modern philosophy, because these problems have been controlled by an initial conception of consciousness which is not evolutionary. This conception involves the positing of the mind as an original capacity or receptacle endowed with certain constitutional powers and needing the operation of some agency to give it the content known as the content of consciousness. The mind is thus conceived as an end-term of a relation. Hume, by denying ascertainable character to the mind so conceived, and post-Kantian idealism, by giving it a character commensurate with the richness of concrete experience, represent the extremes to which the resulting philosophy went. To this line of thought the evolutionary conception of consciousness presents a striking contrast. Here the mind is not posited as an end-term, but rather processes of various sorts undergoing continual reorganization until they become conscious, and thus lead to the recognition that as conscious processes they are not original but derived. Although the evolutionary conception has not been as clearly worked out as the other, it tends to render the general philosophical problems arising from the end-term conception of

mind largely meaningless to the evolutionist. The body-mind controversy, for instance, with its metaphysical implications, appears to be wholly removed or radically transformed by evolutionary conceptions. So long as the mind is conceived as an end-term of a relation, we may inquire about its relation to the other term; and so long as consciousness is conceived as the mind's possession, we may speculate concerning its relation to the body and its physical efficiency. On this basis, interaction and parallelism are at least formally statable problems. Evolutionary conceptions, on the contrary, doing away with the end-term notion of mind, render even a clear formal statement of such problems difficult, and lack the motive for the main material difficulties connected with them. The end-term conception of mind has given rise to a doctrine of 'ideas,' 'mental states,' 'states of consciousness,' a doctrine of a mental series of existences, numerically and qualitatively distinct from all other existences and constituting the sole objects of consciousness, which doctrine is alien to the evolutionary conception of consciousness. Here the evolutionary theory has not freed itself from the older view. Yet we are to-day witnessing radically transformed definitions of psychical processes which aim at freedom from the confusion attending a doctrine of 'mental states' on an evolutionary basis. Since evolution proposes to trace the genesis of consciousness, evolution itself cannot be understood if consciousness, in its occurrence, involves the substitution of a new order of existences. When consciousness is brought within the sphere of evolution, it bids fair to transform some of our stock notions about evolution itself. For if in consciousness we have the process of evolution itself become conscious, we have grounds for claiming to have an immediate experience of what evolution is. That process would thus appear to be, not the unfolding of a past, but the successive achievements of an effective present whose achievements have the character and value they disclose wherever they become apparent, or are realized.

The Formal Fallacy in Subjectivism. A. E. TAYLOR.

Pure subjectivism, as expressed in the writings of many physicists and biologists, and some professional philosophers, is the

view that the object which a state of mind knows is its own occurrence as a mental process. This amounts to the doctrine that the relation between percipient and percept is logically such as to have itself, and nothing but itself, as its sequent or second term. But the existence of such a type of relation seems logically impossible, since it inevitably involves an indefinite regress, and this regress is of an illegitimate kind, inasmuch as its completion would be necessary before we could even say what we mean by the second term in any perceptual relation, *i. e.*, the perceived object. To escape the illegitimate regress, we are bound to assume that there is at least one instance of the perceptual relation in which the relation (the process) and its sequent (the perceived object) are not identical. Thus the theory of knowledge must necessarily start from the standpoint of natural realism, though it does not also follow that it must end there.

Pure Science and Pragmatism. E. G. SPAULDING.

The purpose of this paper was to examine some of the examples of pragmatic procedure in the sciences, especially those pointed to by the pragmatists themselves, discover their implications, structure, etc., and compare these with the claims of 'theoretical' pragmatism. For this purpose the 'new physics' was chosen as an especially good example. In this the qualities are accepted and treated as irreducible and objective. Symbolic methods prevail, leading up to abstractions, in which, in the form of equations, it is found that relations are known which are never given in perception. Epistemology has studied this point too little. Adequate images for the meanings of these symbolic judgments cannot be formed. Among many classes of 'needs' there is one upon success in satisfying which the very existence of other needs may depend, *viz.*, the need for a reliable means of conserving and furthering life itself. The need and the knowledge satisfying it best (science) are both alogical. Upon what does success depend? Upon a regularity outside the inference-prediction itself, outside of conscious events, and in a transcendent. Examination of the various kinds of cognition shows the knowledge experience in each case to refer to an 'other,' and that this 'other' may be 'independent of' and different in

kind from the cognitive act. This is supported by the fact of two kinds of implication, one based on 'success,' the other on formal correctness; the former is called biological, the latter logical implication. The success of a production implies a transcendent regularity, to which, now, knowledge refers as its object. The transcendent is 'in' experience in the sense that that which is implied is in the implier and 'beyond' analogously. The 'successful' system implies also an object for and distinct from the content of normal perception. This object is an element in the transcendent causal manifold. From this a definition of 'correct data' is obtained. In the scientific knowledge-experience four aspects are to be distinguished: symbol, meaning or content, image, and object known. The ground for the success and validity of knowledge is external to knowledge itself. The examination of the 'pure experience' position shows that at least some of its interpretations are not consistent with the dualism involved in the scientific pragmatic procedure.

Scholasticism and Reaction. BROTHER CHRYSOSTOM.

It is a mistake to consider the static side only of scholasticism; the dynamic side is more in harmony with our age. The root principle of action, according to the Schoolmen, is act in the broadest meaning of that term, or form if we limit our investigation to the sensible world. All that an entity does is derived from its form and expresses that form. If the entity be inorganic, its reactions are manifested in various forms of motion, all of which lack spontaneity. In the case of living organisms, the various tendencies arising from either heredity or environment are all subject to an inner unifying control looking to the development of the individual or the species. But it is in the theory of cognition that the doctrine of reaction plays a conspicuous part. The living organism, being essentially though not exclusively material, is in so far passive and plastic, *i. e.*, receptive of outward influences; but when so impressed, it reacts after the manner proper to its kind, and in this very reaction performs the act of perception and becomes aware of something other than itself. The broad lines of this theory are the same for sensation and intellection, and consequently determine in great measure such reactions as out-

bursts of passion and deliberate exercise of will. Resolves, habits, virtue and vice, the scheme of education and the plan of one's life are all inseparable from reactions, which are a condition of progress in the individual and in the race.

A Criticism of Psycho-physical Parallelism as an Ontology.

H. H. HORNE.

The theory of psycho-physical parallelism serves in three fields, viz. : (1) psychology, (2) evolutionary philosophy, and (3) ontology. As an ontology it does more or less service in the systems of Spinoza, Leibniz, Fechner, Lotze, Wundt, and Paulsen. This criticism will concern itself with parallelism as an ontology, touching the other uses only incidentally. Not to slight the strength of the position of parallelism, let it be noted that it agrees with 'common sense' that both mind and matter are real ; it agrees with the usual interpretation of the doctrine of the conservation of physical energy that the soul is not a cause ; it agrees with the current biology and physiology that consciousness does not move the body ; it has logical consistency in defending pan-psychism ; it provides working theories on the origin of life and mind ; it makes the microcosm analogous to the macrocosm ; it defends a world-soul or the God of religion ; it invalidates materialism ; and it asserts mind is more valuable than matter, and is so far idealistic. Passing to our criticisms of parallelism as an ontology, it is to be noted (1) it is too vague a system to satisfy any strict ontologist. The parallelist agrees with the materialist in asserting the reality of matter, with the idealist in asserting the reality of mind, with the dualist in asserting the reality of both, and with the agnostic monist in asserting the reality of neither. The inconsistency of parallelism at this point appears in its being dominantly dualistic as an ontology while becoming pantheistic in its cosmology. (2) In its dualistic ontological form, the same objections apply to it as to any dualism or pluralism, viz., the unity of consciousness gives unity to any proposed plurality ; and relationships must exist between the supposed plural parts, thereby making reality a unity ; and also, the infinitude of reality means reality is a unity, for if reality were dual, it would be two finites, but not one infinite. (3) Parallelism

as an ontology does not explain, it only formulates. It does not explain why there should be any reality at all, nor why it should take the parallelistic rather than some other form. (4) It makes a very poor formulation of the facts of reality when it declares the physical and the psychical processes are parallel to each other, for each process has one or more characteristics which exclude a strict parallelism in the other. What in the physical process corresponds to the individuality of the psychical? And what in the psychical process corresponds to the quantity, extension, and space of the physical? And what, indeed, is parallel to the fact of parallelism itself? Having these distinctions of the psychical and physical in mind, it would seem as if parallelism takes seriously a mathematical figure of speech. (5) In its denial of the causal relation between mind and body, affirming only concomitance, parallelism is in direct violation of Mill's method of determining causal connection by concomitant variations. Causality is more than concomitance; it is in its elementary form (after Höffding) an inevitable succession, and in its ideal form an equivalence or identity. (6) No parallelist has been able as yet to show how the unity of human consciousness can have arisen out of the fusion of the psychic sides of atoms, or out of the 'mind-dust.' Indeed, science to-day has altogether discarded atoms. Our conclusion on the whole, therefore, is that parallelism is not satisfactory as an ontology, and, positively, that the satisfactory ontology, when we get it, must be a unity, must be self-consistent, and must validate the experience we already possess.

Relation of Psychology to Philosophy in *Æsthetics*. ETHEL D. PUFFER. (Abstract not given.)

The Quality of Psychical Dispositions. E. A. PACE.

The paper reviews the logical aspects of the theory of psychical dispositions, under the following heads: (1) The concept of dispositions, though derived from the physical order, is applied to mental life, while the substance idea, because of its origin, is rejected. (2) Although the quality of psychical dispositions is said to be unknowable, they are postulated in explanation of

certain essential features of consciousness. (3) It is remarkable that mere dispositions, to which neither the character of substantial reality nor that of actual process can be ascribed, should exert so considerable an influence on the development and activity of mind. (4) The theory of psychical dispositions is not strengthened by the assumption that these dispositions are psychophysical.

Discussion: The Affiliation of Psychology with Philosophy and the Natural Sciences. HUGO MÜNSTERBERG.

The housing of psychology in the new Emerson Hall of Philosophy at Harvard is Harvard's answer to the question of affiliation. Psychology is to go on studying its phenomena in its own way, but it refuses to be divorced from philosophy. Professor Wundt, who is certainly competent to speak on this subject, is in favor of the arrangement and against turning over psychology to the natural sciences. I have always insisted on the value of experiment, physics, and physiology in psychology, but that cannot lead me to identify psychology with the natural sciences. Indeed, I must repeat the statements made by me in the *Grundzüge der Psychologie*: The way to psychology must proceed from philosophy. "With the psychological problems themselves philosophy has nothing to do; but the question, What is psychology, what can it be, what ought it to be? is a purely philosophical question."¹

G. STANLEY HALL.

Psychology is a branch of natural science and can be fruitfully studied only in connection with the phenomena of the material world. Its business is to examine the physical and physiological conditions of mental states, and this it can do only by employing the methods of the natural scientist. As an empirical science it has nothing to do with metaphysics. We cannot deduce the facts of psychology by metaphysical speculations, and *facts* are what we are after in psychology.

¹ The abstracts of Professor Münsterberg's and President Hall's remarks are given above as reported by the Secretary of the Philosophical Association. Professor Münsterberg's will appear in full in an article entitled "Emerson Hall," in *Harvard Studies*.

JAMES ROWLAND ANGELL.

Ought psychology to continue indefinitely its allegiance to philosophy, or should it enroll its name under the banners of the natural sciences? Professor Münsterberg has warmly defended the first alternative. President Hall is no less fervent in his espousal of the second. For my own part, I refuse to recognize either the necessity or the wisdom of taking any overt measures looking toward the one step or the other. And the absence of such a necessity I regard as eminently fortunate, for psychology is just beginning to gain the respect of the scientists, and she has not as yet wholly lost that of the philosophers. She is, therefore, in too delicate a position gratuitously to alienate the sympathy and support of either of these powerful allies. As a matter of fact, apart from the question of the label by which we shall classify psychology—and this is evidently a somewhat academic issue—I do not see how any serious divergence of opinion is possible upon the point under consideration. That our Harvard friends have put their psychological laboratory in this superb building devoted also to philosophy does not raise in my mind the question as to any impropriety in this cohabitation, but rather a sense of the gratification which each party to the contract ought to feel in such admirable companionship and in such stately and appropriate quarters. Certainly I should gladly accept for myself, were it offered, a laboratory so excellently appointed even though my neighbors in the building were such psychological outcasts as lawyers or doctors. Mere physical juxtaposition means little, unless it embodies an avowal of spiritual dependence or affiliation which evidently is no necessary part of it. In this particular instance, however, there is a high degree of spiritual intimacy which must make the companionship of the contracting parties extremely profitable to both. But this is by no means to maintain or admit that this companionship is the only one congenial and advantageous to them. Every one knows that psychology has for the most part a philosophical lineage and that certain highly important foundations of psychology, even when it is regarded as a natural science, must always be of a philosophical character. Any proposition, therefore, permanently to

estrangle these two must be regarded not only as ill-advised, but also as impracticable. On the other hand, every one is equally well aware that in many of its methods and most of its ideals modern psychology is approaching the position of the sciences, and especially the biological sciences. Consequently, unless one is ready to indict the whole spirit of the contemporary movement, it seems imperative to countenance and encourage the most intelligent appreciation by psychologists of those forms of scientific procedure which they are likely to wish to appropriate. Such intelligent familiarity they can only attain through intimate association with these sciences. The general intellectual poise which philosophical training affords cannot be sacrificed by psychology without the most disastrous consequences. But at the same time psychology just as surely needs the invigorating contact of the natural sciences. Indeed, it does not seem too much to claim that psychology has a peculiar mission at this precise juncture in the bringing together of the interests of philosophy and natural science. Certainly no other science is in so strategic a position for the accomplishment of this purpose.

A. E. TAYLOR.

The affiliation of psychology appears to be with the natural rather than with the philosophical sciences. It is distinguished from the abstract philosophical sciences of formal logic and mathematics by its dependence on empirical premises ultimately based upon the testimony of direct perception and involving in their meaning a reference to a particular moment of time. In this respect, it resembles the empirical sciences of physical nature. Nor do the allegations that it deals only with 'individual objects' and non-quantitative processes afford a satisfactory basis for distinguishing it from the natural sciences. It differs, again, from both the abstract and concrete philosophical sciences (ethics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of history, etc.), in making no use of the concept of ideal norms of value.

FRANK THILLY.

The fact that mind can be studied in connection with matter does not make psychology a branch of natural science. Psychology is interested in a unique body of facts, and a perfect

knowledge of their material antecedents would not give us a knowledge of mind as such. The argument that the physiological states are the real things and brain knowledge the only scientific knowledge rests on the questionable metaphysics of materialism. Even if it were true, the psychologist would go right on studying the so-called effects of brain states, for knowledge of brain motions would not tell the whole story. But our knowledge of what is going on in the brain does not yet form a complete science. Besides, the brain physiologist cannot take a step in the construction of his hypotheses without psychology. If the psychical states could be deduced from their physiological causes, the physiologist could ignore psychology, but there would still remain a more direct way of studying mind for the psychologist. The argument is also urged that the mental series does not form a continuous line, that a closed causal nexus, and hence science, exists for external nature only, and that to be scientific, psychology must become a natural science. We answer: More careful observation may disclose the missing links, and where this fails we can have recourse to hypotheses. Besides, there are gaps in the physiological line also, which are bridged over by theory. Finally, if psychology is impossible because of breaks in the mental causal series, cerebral physiology is impossible for analogous reasons, and also because we then have no key with which to open the secrets of the brain. The view that psychology is a natural science because it employs the methods of science is also untenable. The psychologist uses the objective method, but introspection is everywhere his basis and guide. Experiment facilitates, corrects, and controls introspection. Measurement forms but a small and unimportant part of the problem. In conclusion, affiliation with philosophy is in the interests of both fields. Psychology is indispensable to the other philosophical studies, while the aims and problems peculiar to the latter help to give direction to the former. Interest in philosophical problems fixes attention on mental states which the scientist is apt to ignore because he can find no physical antecedents for the same, acts as a safeguard against a false mental atomism, and tends to keep in view the unity of mind. The relation of psychology to metaphysics is not

to be conceived as an *a priori* construction of the facts of psychology from metaphysical principles. But if dependence on metaphysics means that psychology must start out from some broad assumptions and must have recourse to hypotheses in attempting to explain, then psychology depends on metaphysics. There is no absolutely presuppositionless psychology.

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(Members are requested to notify the Secretary of any correction to be made in the above list.)

DISCUSSION.

EXPERIENCE AND SUBJECTIVISM.

'Subjectivism' continues to be the most popular indictment of pragmatism. And the favorite rejoinder of the pragmatist is that this subjectivism is gratuitously imputed out of the critic's own subjective connotation of certain categories — conspicuously that of 'experience.' Dr. Fite's interesting paper on "The Experience-Philosophy" in the last number of the *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW* seems to be a typical instance. In Dr. Fite's case, however, the imputation is especially interesting, and also somewhat difficult to account for, in view of the striking similarity between his conclusions and those of the standpoint which he criticises.

Dr. Fite allows that the pragmatist makes the distinction between "experience and subjective-experience." But he finds that, while the pragmatist thunders this abstractly in the index, in his practice in the context "reality is always precisely coextensive with subjective-experience." But nowhere does Dr. Fite point out where and how and for what end this substitution occurs. The only direct evidence for the charge is the very brief statement, unsupported by citation, that for the pragmatist "the chair when it disappears from thought ceases also to be" (p. 1). Even in this statement, as it stands, experience must be reduced (1) to mere *thought*-experience, and (2) to *my* thought-experience before it becomes subjective. And I do not see that Dr. Fite's observation in his footnote on my statement in the *REVIEW* of May, 1905, offers any further support to the case. It simply reaffirms that the pragmatist has discarded the world of space and time for a "conception" in "some one's experience." My statement was to the effect that, *if* the pragmatist really does discard the objective world (not the world in space and time merely), there can be, as Kant taught, no mere subject left to have a concept, and that the critics therefore should include in their charge the destruction of the subject as well as the object.

Returning to the pragmatists' countercharge of his critics' own inherent and subjective bias, confirmation of this is found at the very outset in the easy way in which Dr. Fite brackets "the subjective idealism of Berkeley, and the phenomenalism of J. S. Mill," with "pragmatism, humanism, and the radical empiricism of Professor

James." "All of these," says Dr. Fite, "deny that there is a world *beyond experience*; all in substance hold with Berkeley and Schopenhauer that *the world is my idea*" (p. 1, italics mine). Apparently these two clauses are equipollent in Dr. Fite's thought. This, of course, assumes again (1) that experience is *my* experience and (2) that it consists of ideas only — is merely cognitive. If Dr. Fite should say "the equipollence is not mine but one to which the various parties charged in the indictment are themselves forced in 'practice,'" then, in the case of the pragmatist at least, since he is the one under direct examination, this should be shown in detail, reinforced by citations, — not imputed as a general impression.

Nor do I see that Dr. Fite succeeds in showing *where* or *how* pragmatism is forced from the conception of 'experience' to that of "subjective-experience" in his next advance, in which he says: "The fundamental position of the experience philosophy is that experience and experience only is '*given*' or '*immediately given*'; all else, *i. e.*, the world of things in space and time, is derived, inferred, constructed, developed *from* experience" (p. 2, italics mine). The words '*given*' and '*immediately given*' are in single quotation marks. This may simply indicate that they are terms current in present discussion. If it means, however, that they are applied by pragmatists to the entire world of experience, as they are here, it would be interesting to have volume and page for this.

As for regarding the world of experience as '*given*,' I do not see how anyone, Dr. Fite especially, could have read, for instance, Professor Dewey's Chapters II and III, in the *Studies in Logical Theory*, without discovering that in pragmatism '*given*' has no meaning applied to experience as a whole; for the pragmatist '*given*' is a logical category applied only to some *specific* content in experience in its *logical* operations. If experience as such, as a whole, were '*given*,' it is difficult to see how there could be any possibility of derivation, inference, construction, etc. Conversely, how could the given '*from which*' something further is to be derived or inferred, be a whole? Some things in space and time may be inferred from others, *taken* as '*given*,' but no pragmatist ever dreamed of '*inferring*' the world of space and time from another world of '*experience*.' The world of space and time is part and parcel of the pragmatist's world of experience. What Dr. Fite says of "the things in space and time" being "as good a datum" as any other experience, and of "neither as absolute," and of "the search for absolute data as not only illusory but logically unnecessary" (p. 2), — these are the first principles of the pragmatist's logic.

Conceding, however, for the moment, that the world of space and time is 'derived from' experience, it is still a far cry to subjectivism. (1) *If* space and time are necessary to objectivity, they are equally necessary to the subject. Hence, in a world 'prior' to space and time, the distinction of subject and object would not exist. I say '*if*,' for (2) some may hold that 'things in space and time' constitute only *one* phase of both objectivity and subjectivity; that the distinction of subject and object does not depend on space and time as such, but is a differentiation running across the space and time world. This alleged 'prior world,' then, might be one in which the distinction of subject and object did not appear; or it might be one in which it did not have a spatial and temporal character. In neither case are we warranted in calling it 'subjective.'

Although in the first formulation this alleged 'datum' of pragmatism is 'prior' to the world of space and time, in the next paragraph it is described as a 'series' with distinctions of present and past (why not future also?) in it. To be sure, Dr. Fite says the pragmatist "in his practice" attempts to ignore the time distinctions, and to treat the series "as if it were immediately given as a whole." Once more, the first thing is to ask: From what writings are such doctrines as these gleaned? Or, if they are not directly expressed anywhere, where are they implied, and what interest of the pragmatist standpoint do they serve? Dr. Fite says the series may be, for the pragmatist, "merely a convenient working basis." But he does not show in what way it is 'convenient,' or for what it is a basis.

The next point the pragmatist would make is that if the attribution were correct it would still not bring us in sight of 'subjectivism.' What is there necessarily 'subjective' in the conception of a series conceived as a whole? Even if it exclude the space-world (and that is all it does exclude here since differences of time are admitted), that does not make it 'subjective.' Space surely is not the criterion of objectivity. Where, then, is this notorious 'subjectivism'? Thus far it has not shown itself in our critics' own versions of 'the fundamental position of the experience-philosophy.' It is, however, now ready to appear. And how does it appear? It simply appears. There is no introduction, not even a warning knock. It is quietly left on the pragmatist's doorstep without a syllable of explanation, clad in the scant but inevitable garb of the pronoun 'my.' Throughout the entire page (2) the conception of "experience as a whole," or as "a series taken as a whole," has appeared with no 'subjective' qualifications. But in the last sentence of the page, with no word of comment

or of justification, it appears as "*my* experience as a whole" (italics mine). It may be said: "At any rate, the bundle is left where it belongs." But in the face of the pragmatist's repeated and vehement disavowals of the 'monster,' some more substantial evidence must be submitted.

Perhaps it will be asked: If not 'my' experience, whose then? Again the question would only show how deep-rooted and ineradicable is the subjectivism of the asker. The inquiry assumes that the world of experience must belong, as a hat or a coat, to some particular individual, instead of being itself the world-process in which individuals, along with other 'things in space and time,' live and move and have their being. Doubtless much needs to be said from the pragmatists' standpoint of the nature and rôle of the individual in such a world. Meanwhile, aside from the bearing of pragmatists' discussions of other points on this question, it would seem that the repeated statements even of the bare outlines of the conception should be sufficient answer to charges of subjectivism equally bare and unsupported.

Most of the remaining portion of Dr. Fite's article is an excellent refutation of the subjectivism and absolutism charged to the pragmatist in the introduction, with some additional imputations in detail (*e. g.*, p. 8, on the basis of the pragmatist's distinction between real and not real) which the pragmatist could not accept. It is, therefore, in essence, first-class pragmatism. I say, 'in essence,' for owing to the subjective meaning given to 'experience' in the first two pages, it has to appear in the further discussion in correlative contrast with 'fact' and 'thing.' Whereas the pragmatist's correlative of 'fact' is 'idea,' experience being the unity within which these correlatives operate. Throughout much of this part of the paper, one feels as if the whole issue, as Dr. Fite draws it, were almost verbal. In the concluding paragraph of the paper, Dr. Fite says: "We should then hold with the realist that reality is not limited to experience." Most assuredly, if 'experience' is regarded simply as '*my* idea.' But if, instead of 'experience' in this sense, we say 'cognitive experience,' and for 'reality,' we say 'experience,' how much difference remains in the outlines of the standpoints? I cannot here stop to show why 'experience' seems a better term than 'reality.' One obvious reason is that the latter has a classic logical use as the correlative of 'illusion' which 'experience' has not.

What Dr. Fite says of the 'present,' as "no more given than the past," and of the present or past as internal, being no more given

than external things, and practically all of what he says in Section III on the vanity of an 'absolute datum,' pragmatism has zealously preached from the beginning. Thus we read (p. 11): "My point is that nothing is absolutely given and that for purposes of knowledge no absolute data are required." Again (p. 13): "A datum is not a finality, but a convenient abstraction for purposes of *further* analysis, depending for its validity upon the results that it yields." In *Studies in Logical Theory*, Professor Dewey says (p. 57): "The data are in truth precisely what is selected and set aside *as* present, as immediate. Thus they are *given to further* thought." Again: "The datum is given *in* the thought-situation, and *to* further qualification of ideas or meanings." "To take what is given *in* the thought-situation . . . as if it were given *absolutely*, or apart from a particular historical situs and context, is the fallacy of empiricism . . . [of the Mill type]. To regard the thought-forms of conception, judgment, and inference as qualifications of 'pure thought apart from any differences in objects,' . . . is the fallacy of rationalism" (pp. 61 f., parenthesis mine).

If, again, it be said, it is not by what it preaches but by what it practices that pragmatism is to be judged, a criterion to which pragmatists should be the last to object, then yet again and finally, the pragmatist must rejoin that this 'practice' of subjectivism appears so far to the pragmatist to be only alleged; it has not been exhibited.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

L'année philosophique. Publiée sous la direction de F. PILLON.
(Quinzième année, 1904.) Paris, Félix Alcan, 1905. — pp. 1-316.

The fifteenth volume of the *Année philosophique* contains four articles and ninety reviews of books which have appeared in France during the year 1904. The first contribution is by G. Rodier, "La cohérence de la morale stoïcienne" (pp. 1-37). Attention has long ago been called to certain inconsistencies in the ethical system of the Stoics. M. Rodier thinks that the criticisms are not well founded, that Stoic ethics, at least in its oldest and most authoritative representatives, was free from the contradictions which have been urged against it. Just as the Stoics attempted to establish a theory of knowledge doing away with the opposition between sensible and rational knowledge, so they tried to set up an ethical system by repudiating the dualism between nature and reason which Plato and Aristotle had taught. The primitive instinct of every creature is the preservation and development of its own nature. Now the proper nature of man is his reason; hence his highest good consists in living according to reason. To live according to our individual reason or according to universal reason is one. Every fault is an error and every error is a contradiction. To understand the events and to see their rational necessity is to submit to them and to wish them. The sage understands this necessity and wishes it; his desires are always in harmony with the events and with his conduct; there is always a perfect *ὁμολογία* between his acts and his character. In the fool there is discord between his desire, the things, and his acts. Our conduct, like everything else in the world, is rigidly determined. We can say that it depends on us in the sense that our moral nature is an indispensable element in its determination. Looking at things absolutely, there is nothing contrary to nature; a thing contrary to nature is impossible if we understand by nature the whole of existence and universal reason. The acts of the fool as well as those of the sage are necessary parts of the chain of events; the act performed is always necessary and good. From the moral standpoint, the matter of the act is always indifferent; that which counts is the form, *i. e.*, the inner attitude of him who does it. However contrary to the instinct of self-preservation, or any other instinct, the conduct of the sage may be, it

is nevertheless morally perfect because it is accompanied by the consciousness of its necessity.

From this conception, M. Rodier believes, follow the consequences which have always been called the paradoxes of the Stoics: The sage is supremely happy because he attains the perfection of human nature; he is free and all-powerful, for everything which he wishes is realized. The acts of the fool, however rational in themselves, always remain irrational in his eyes because he cannot penetrate to their causes. What seems a crime to us is an act of virtue when the sage performs it. A single act of virtue implies complete and perfect virtue, for to comprehend the necessity of the least of events in a whole like the universe, it is necessary to have absolute knowledge. There are no degrees of goodness any more than there are degrees of truth. Virtue is omniscience; the thought of the sage is identical with the divine thought, or at least it is its reflection.

As the Stoics themselves confessed, this ideal is almost unattainable. We cannot know in each instance what universal reason demands. Hence the thing for us is to note what are the ends aimed at by nature in a majority of cases, what is the *normal* object of the natural tendencies of man. To have desires in accord with these will keep us in harmony with universal reason sufficiently often. In this consists the *καθῆκον*; it is the search for the preferable things or the most frequent ends of nature. Here probability must be our guide. Hence the Stoics teach two sovereign goods, between which there is nothing in common. The one is not an attenuation or condition or application of the other. They do not concern the same persons. The first consists in a complete knowledge of things, which is supposed to be wholly lacking in the second. Of these two morals, the one ideal, the other practical, professed by the founders of Stoicism, the first was preferred by some of their successors, the second by others; still other followers, though adhering to the distinction, developed one or the other; others finally confused the two standpoints.

M. Rodier shows, what has often been shown, that many seeming paradoxes in the Stoic ethics really follow from certain fundamental premises. But he does not prove that there are no inconsistencies between the teachings of the different Stoics and that the original Stoic system is a self-consistent whole. The Stoic philosophy underwent changes in the course of time; it was influenced, positively and negatively, by other systems of thought and by the demands of practical life, as historians of philosophy have often pointed out. Though the earlier systems showed more logical consistency than the later

ones, they too contained doctrines not easily reconcilable with each other. The metaphysical and ethical teachings do not always harmonize; there is a conflict between the monistic principles of the former and the irrepressible dualism of the latter. The universe is a cosmos; everything in it is determined, a necessary part of a beautiful and perfect whole. If this is so, then every act and every desire is necessary and good and in harmony with the All, the wise man's as well as the fool's, the good man's as well as the knave's. Here we have monism, determinism, and optimism. But evidently human nature is not in full accord with universal nature, as witness the great preponderance of fools and rascals in the world. This is pessimism. The wise man's reason alone, we are told, is in harmony with the world-reason. But there seems to be a conflict in the wise man's soul also, an irrational, unnatural element which he must eradicate, pleasure and pain, desire and fear, which must be brought under the heel of reason. So there is a dualism between reason and sensibility after all. We can get rid of this difficulty by saying that the value of an act depends on the attitude of the agent, upon his knowledge and acceptance of its necessity. But in that case there is no reason why the wise man should eradicate his passions so long as he understands their causes and knows their place in the universal economy. The fool, on the other hand, who does not understand and will not submit, is something of a riddle; his acts are all formally bad and materially good, but his folly is just as necessary as the wise man's wisdom. Under these circumstances it would certainly be folly to be wise. Finally, it is not easy to reconcile the metaphysical determinism of the Stoic philosophy with its ethical freedom. The Stoic tells us to eradicate our passions and that we can do this, that it lies with us to do it or not. At the same time he tells us that everything is determined and that the proper attitude is to submit to this necessity. Freedom, in other words, consists in understanding necessity and submitting to it. On this teaching the man who understands his passions and submits to them is free, while he who conquers them is not free. It is no wonder that some of the later Stoics modified the system and sought to adapt it to practical life.

The second paper, "*L'union de l'âme et du corps d'après Descartes*" (pp. 39-50) is by O. Hamelin. His thesis is that, though occasionalism is a logical consequence of Descartes's principles, Descartes explicitly teaches the union of soul and body. This union, M. Hamelin asserts, he conceives as a substantial union: soul is not in the body as a pilot in his boat, but confused and mixed with the body so that

both form together a single whole. Hence it is necessary to conceive the soul as in a certain sense extended and the body as in a way partaking of the nature of the soul. This theory Descartes plainly borrowed from the School. It is a realistic, contradictory, and verbal hypothesis, for which reasons the logic of history neglected it and recognized occasionalism as in spirit and truth the sole Cartesian doctrine with respect to the relation of mind and body.

M. Hamelin is right in stating what everybody knows, that Descartes taught a kind of union of soul and body which was not consistent with his dualistic principles. But M. Hamelin lays too much stress upon certain passages in Descartes's writings which assert the *substantial* unity of mind and body. Such passages certainly exist, but so do many others contradicting this view. The fact is, the problem gave Descartes a great deal of trouble, and caused a great deal of uncertainty on his part. His extreme dualism makes interaction impossible, and yet the facts, for which the philosopher always had a wholesome regard, seem to contradict his theory. When questioned about the relation, he often dodges the issue or gives evasive answers, or tells us "that it is one of those things which are known by themselves and which we obscure every time we aim to explain them by others." "The human mind," he says in one of his letters, "is not able to comprehend clearly both the essential difference between mind and body and their union, for it would have to conceive both as a single being and at the same time as two substances, and that is contradictory." His metaphysics protests against interaction, but experience seems to prove it. How the mind acts upon the body, Descartes cannot quite make out, but he considers nearly every possibility, even the scholastic conception of substantial union. It is fair to say that he taught occasionalism, *unio substantialis*, and *unitas compositionis*, and that of all these teachings the old scholastic one is the least prominent. His successors saw the contradictions in the different doctrines and boldly came out for what the logic of the system seemed to demand.

The third article, "La critique de Bayle: Critique des attributs métaphysiques de Dieu, aséité ou existence nécessaire" (pp. 51-131), by M. Pillon, is a continuation of the papers published by the same author in the two preceding numbers of the journal. It examines and criticises, from the neo-Critical standpoint, the views and arguments of Bayle and a number of later philosophers on the notion of necessary existence. For the schoolmen *aseitas* was a necessary attribute of perfection and could belong only to God, the perfect being. Descartes

introduces into this teaching the notion of positive causality. But it is absurd to say that a being causes its own existence and that its existence follows logically from its essence. God can exist by himself only negatively, *i. e.*, God's existence has no kind of cause. Kant shows that we cannot demonstrate the existence of a necessary being; the notion of a necessary being is not a constitutive principle, but a regulative principle, an ideal. The trouble with Kant, however, is that he, like Descartes and Leibniz, is an infinitist; he holds that no principle of reason obliges us ever to suspend the chain of causes. It is meaningless, according to M. Pillon, to ask what is the cause of the first cause.

Caterus in his objections to Descartes, which Bayle reproduces, sees no reason for limiting the notion of negative *aseitas* to God. Why, he asks, can it not belong to something imperfect, unconscious? Kant compares it to space. Clarke conceives space as a necessary property of the substance which exists *per se*; the necessity of space leads us necessarily to that of God. Butler, a critic of Clarke, objects that space exists by itself as absolutely as anything can exist by itself. Gassendi holds that space is conceived as necessary and uncreated; it forms a special category which we can add to the traditional categories of substance and accident. Pascal agrees with this. Bayle submits the trilemma: We must say either, spatial extension is God himself, which is impious; or, it is nothing, which is absurd; or, it is an uncreated being distinct from God and the body and mind, which is both impious and absurd. According to Bossuet, space is a contingent reality; God created the receptacle as well as the content. Spencer in his last work says the theist and the agnostic alike must conceive space as "inherent, eternal, uncreated—as antecedent all creation, if creation has taken place, and all evolution, if evolution has taken place." "Without origin and cause infinite space has ever existed and must ever exist." Spatial realism thus leads us to make of space a first being, a passive God. According to M. Pillon the question, Whence comes space? can only mean, Whence comes the idea of space? Bayle ought to have recognized the doctrine of the ideality of space in the intelligible extension of Malebranche. The category of space should not be placed on the same level with the other laws of the human mind; it is, as Kant says, a form of the sensibility. Time, however, is not, as such, an intuition, as Kant holds, a real form of sensibility. Moreover, space is the *a priori* form only of touch and sight. But it is not a necessary form of the human or the divine mind; this law of representation, so different from the

others, is a free creation of the Supreme Being. The non-Euclidean geometries seem to our author to support this conclusion.

M. Pillon next takes up Bayle's criticisms of the atomic theories and shows that the hypothesis of solid atoms, like that of the void, is a necessary product of realistic logic. If, however, spatial extension is subjective, then the extension and movements of atoms must be subjective also. Idealism boldly suppresses the little, physically indivisible solid, leaving only the spiritual unity, the indivisible consciousness. Atomism gives way to monadism; space, the passive God, and the atom, the active God, give way to the sole reality, present in all things, to spirit. Necessary existence belongs only to one or more consciousnesses. The doctrine of the ideality of space also clears up the problem of infinity. The actual infinity of quantity does not differ from the infinity of numbers, which is but potential; it signifies not an infinite existence, but the infinite void of corporeal existence, and the infinite void is nothing but the totality of the undefined possibilities of coexistence. Pushed to its logical consequences, idealism leaves only a finite number of monad consciousnesses. But inductive logic does not permit us to rest satisfied with this hypothesis. It seems natural to regard the subconscious individualities which the inferior monads are, as *objets fabriqués* and *agents subordonnés*. They exist for the formation and development of higher monads or clear consciousness. Is there not here a finality which they do not know, which they have not determined, and which must have been conceived and determined by some spirit? Their antagonisms are dominated by a higher unity of order and harmony of which space gives us the sensible image, and which Leibniz felt bound to explain by the all-powerful causative action of a Supreme Monad. The principle of the subjectivity of space, boldly admitted with all its consequences, pierces the veil which has hidden this first cause from reason, and gives to the cosmological and téléological proofs, established upon new and surer foundations, the value of which the Transcendental Dialectic had deprived them.

M. Pillon's series of articles on the Evolution of Idealism in the Eighteenth Century, which was begun in 1893, and of which the present one is a part, forms a valuable contribution to the history of philosophy. Whether we accept the author's own philosophy or not, we cannot fail to be instructed by his expositions and criticisms, which are thorough, clear, and unusually interesting. His own metaphysical system, which is a modified Leibnizianism grafted on a Kantian stock, is open to most of the objections made against the monadology, but these need not concern us here.

“La logique du sentiment,” the last article (pp. 133-164), by L. Dauriac, is a discussion of Ribot’s *Logique des sentiments*, or rather an attempt to justify a *logic* of feeling. The author elaborates his views on formal logic as a kind of preface to Ribot’s book. A logic separated from the world of things is the most barren of disciplines, and a formal logic of sentiments would be inconceivable. But the logic of concepts is based on psychology; its material is derived from perception and sensation. In the same way, M. Dauriac thinks, we can have a logic of the emotions; in the sense, namely, that we reason under the influence of feeling with a material different from that which the intellect employs. The will to live is the source of this logic, and hence desire and belief; for we cannot live without desiring, and without believing the object of our desire to be good. M. Dauriac simply shows that there is such a thing as a psychology of reasoning, and that our reasoning is influenced by our emotions, our desires, and our beliefs. But why we should call this branch of study logic, I do not see unless, of course, we reduce logic to psychology. The rest of the volume (pp. 165-314) is devoted to reviews of books, nearly all of which are from the able pen of M. Pillon, the editor.

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Studies in the Philosophy of Religion. By GEORGE GALLOWAY. Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood & Sons, 1904. — pp. 328.

The book before us is a collection of six essays on various aspects of the Philosophy of Religion. A reading of the book, however, shows a unity of thought and exposition not suggested by the modest title or by the headings of the several essays. Instead of an aggregation of loosely related papers, we find in reality a systematic treatment of the subject. The central aim is to synthesize the opposing standpoints of rationalism and pragmatism.

The first essay is historical. It outlines the main tendencies in religious philosophy from Hegel to Professor James. Besides Hegel, Biedermann and Principal Caird are cited as representatives of absolute rationalism. Pfleiderer stands for a more moderate rationalism. He recognizes both the rights of the theoretical reason and the ideals of the practical reason. Lotze is next considered, and recognized as having materially influenced the subsequent development of the philosophy of religion. “Lotze’s continued reiteration of the view that the formal activity of thought could not give the content of reality, and that the categories of logic could neither do justice to the processes of

nature nor to the movements of history, gave strength and definiteness to the reaction against the Hegelian system. His insistence on the uniqueness of individuality tended in the same direction, and imparted vitality to the movement towards pluralism. And lastly, in setting the claims of the value-judgment in a new and fuller light, he made clear the right of spiritual consciousness to have a voice in the final interpretation of reality" (pp. 15 f.). The movement away from Hegelian rationalism has been still further aided, especially in theological circles, by the work of Ritschl. He excluded theoretical philosophy entirely from the domain of religion. In his view, the religious consciousness has to do only with value judgments, and the idea of God is not an object of speculative cognition at all.

Leaving now the Germans, the author turns to other nations, and finds that the principal workers in the field of religious philosophy for the past twenty years bear out his opinion that the newer attitude is distinctly critical and sceptical. The theories of the Dutch scholar Rauwenhoff, the French theologian Auguste Sabatier, the Danish professor Höffding, are briefly summarized. All three agree in pronouncing theoretical proof of the religious object impossible. Such proof as is possible for us is found in some form of faith, — a faith in the moral world-order, a faith in our spiritual intuitions, or a faith in the conservation of value. Höffding is criticised as giving only a "colorless common residuum" in his formula "faith in the persistence of value." This seems to me a mistake. Höffding is fully conscious of the futility of defining religion by a mere residuum. His theory is certainly a serious attempt to find the "constitutive idea," whether he has succeeded or not. His theory is correct in form, however far it may be from satisfying us as to content.

This historical sketch closes with Professor James. His pragmatism is the polar opposite of the Hegelian rationalism. Feeling has taken the place of reason. Belief is a matter of will rather than of intellect. Our author's conclusion is: "We cannot discredit reason without likewise casting discredit on religion. The self-conscious spirit demands to be in harmony with itself, and this it cannot be if reason is excluded from its deepest experiences. . . . On the other hand, it must be fully granted that pure thought can never give us the God whom religious consciousness demands. Hence those are right who urge that value-judgments are essential in religion. . . . The error which the religious philosopher must guard against is onesidedness" (p. 38).

The second essay, "The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion,"

gives the author an opportunity to set forth his conception of the main characteristics of religion and of a religious world-view in contrast with scientific and ethical conceptions.

The point of view of the third essay — “Religious Development ; its History and Interpretation” — is strictly psychological. The author discredits all attempts like those of Hegel and Caird to deduce religious history from universal categories. Our only hope of understanding the origin and development of religion is by psychological principles. The stages and forms of religious growth must in their characteristic features reflect the nature of their source, the thinking, feeling, willing mind of man from which they issue.

In the fourth essay, the author leaves the field of religion for the time being and turns to philosophy. Through a discussion of “The Distinction of Inner and Outer Experience,” he seeks a metaphysical foundation on which to construct his religious philosophy. Avenarius, Kant, and Caird are duly criticised, and the writer arrives finally at a standpoint in general agreement with Lotze and Professor Ward. The treatment is unsatisfactorily meagre. His conclusion is that outer experience is “the interpretation by self-conscious subject of the actions of reals which thought itself does not create.” What, then, is the character of these transsubjective reals? They are not physical events. The fundamental notion of externality is not to be found in physical events as distinguished from the subjective sequence of ideas. “For a physical event is by no means a primitive datum of consciousness, but implies ideal construction.”

In this last remark, the author seems to have fallen into the psychologist’s fallacy. The physical event is just what is the primitive datum, and, instead of being the product of conceptual thought as he elsewhere maintains, it is the immediate assertion of the perceptual consciousness. It is only the reflective, psychologizing, philosophizing self, that thinks of the percept as distinguished from the thing perceived. The perceptual consciousness recognizes the physical event as an outer experience, but in distinction not from the percept of the same which the psychologist discovers, but from subjective feelings and images that are not referred to objects at all. The objection to recognizing the real event as a metaphysical real is not because it is not a primitive datum, but because it is not a rational datum of experience.

The nature of the transsubjective reality is finally decided by two considerations : First, “Among the objects of our experience are other human subjects who we inevitably infer have a reality for themselves”; and second, if some reals are subjects, all are more or less subjects by

virtue of Leibniz's law of continuity. "Hence there seems to be no valid reason why one should not admit that our so-called external experience involves the presence to our consciousness of manifold spiritual substances which are subjects at lower planes of development. . . . On this hypothesis we do justice to the primacy and centrality of the inner life, while we avoid the absurdity of reducing external experiences to thought-relations, or of positing unknowable 'things in themselves' behind the phenomena of sense" (p. 192). To the objection that things are but ideal constructions, it is urged in defense of this view that they are the presuppositions rather than the products of ideal construction; for without them thought would not have data on which to work. To the objection that the individual real when thought out loses its reality in the Absolute, the reply is that a theory which makes the Absolute the one and all of reality does not account for even the illusion of individuals. The individual is not merely its relations. Experience is richer than thought, and the self as individual center of experience has a being for itself over and above its mere thought relationships. The very judgment in which we predicate thought of the self is made possible by the fact that the self is also the center of feeling and will and cannot be dissipated into the pure unity of thought. One difficulty not considered by the author may be mentioned: if the real in everything be a psyche of high or low degree, and the material form be but the outer manifestation of these psyches to other psyches, why with the passing of the spirit does not then the body pass too? Surely the appearance ought not to be more abiding than the reality. If it be urged in reply to this difficulty that the reason the body survives after the soul passes is that the body is composed of reals — cell-souls, atom-souls, ion-souls — we may ask why on this theory one psyche should manifest itself only through other and lesser psyches. In fact, the lower seem to be the more real, and this theory of spiritual monads falls into the fundamental error of materialism, the error of explaining the higher by the lower, an error too against which our author has already carefully warned us.

In the fifth essay, "The Ultimate Basis and Meaning of Religion," we find the culmination of the author's theory. Starting from the view developed in the previous paper that the external world is a system of monads, he first justifies the predication of activity to these monads, and then puts the question, What is the ground of their interaction? As Lotze has pointed out, if *A* and *B* are to interact, it must be that they are both parts of *m*; but this raises another difficulty for which Lotze has shown no sufficient way of escape. "Can we think

of a ground which is at once immanent in all individual centers of experience and at the same time does not reduce these centers to a mere appearance? Is it possible to conceive a connecting activity which explains the interdependence of spiritual substances and still leaves to them a being of their own? This condition can only be fulfilled by a ground which is both immanent and transcendent, a ground which, while it unites individuals, has also a being for itself, and so always distinguishes itself from the elements it connects" (p. 230).

Granted that no type of unity found in experience can adequately describe that which is the ground of experience, still the soul in the biological sense answers approximately to the condition required. Every organism contains a central activity, soul or will, which, as a formative principle, builds up the organism and manifests itself in it. We may think the ground of all interaction between spiritual substances as a supreme will. As mere principle of unity in an interacting system, this supreme will might be unconscious; but since experience discloses self-conscious subjects among the real, the fundamental will must be itself self-conscious. We cannot conceive of mere will and nothing more as evolving self-consciousness in the individual. No more can we conceive of a universal and unconscious will creating by its activity self-conscious subjects. "We live and act on the assumption that the self-conscious world, which is likewise the world of values, is the fullest development of reality. Yet if naked will is the ground and creator of this world, then an unconscious principle is the source of all value, and is itself the highest value. It is only consistent that those who hold this speculative theory should treat the kingdom of self-conscious spirits as a lapse from the unconscious, and advocate a revaluation in the interests of pessimism. The radical contradiction between this *Weltanschauung* and our most deep-rooted personal instincts is a strong argument against it" (p. 245).

Can the Absolute Self and the finite self both be real? After several pages of discussion upon this point, with criticisms of M'Taggart and Lotze, the conclusion is reached that, if we are to maintain the reality of both the divine and the human self, we cannot speak of God as the Absolute in the common philosophic sense of the term. "For if God be the all-inclusive whole of reality, a personal relation between Him and individuals is not possible, and there is no real place for religion. If we do use the term Absolute of God, it must be in a more restricted sense. We may speak of God as the absolute ground or condition of experience, not as the all-inclusive whole of experience." It is admitted that at this point there is a radical discrepancy between the ab-

solute of the philosophical idealist and the religious idea of God. Galloway does not agree with Lotze that an infinite personality can dispense with a not-self. We must think of God, he says, "as a unity which is differentiated but is at the same time a perfect harmony ; of a not-self which in no way impedes the activity of the self, and of a subject which fully realizes itself in the object." No explanation is vouchsafed us as to this "not-self." It is not, we are told, the world of finite things and persons, for that would make the divine self-consciousness dependent upon the existence of a world in space and time. As to the ethical character of the world-ground, pure thought cannot help us. It is only the faith that the Being who is the ground of all reality must satisfy our moral and spiritual needs and aspirations, that can justify us in regarding the infinite personality as having an ethical nature. Our moral and spiritual needs are not mere desires but normal characteristics of man. "Faith completes the formal determinations of reason, and the practical postulate of the highest good gives content to our conception of the self-conscious ground of things. . . . As it is by an act of faith we affirm the reality of the Absolute Value, so it is likewise an act of faith by which we affirm that it coincides with the Self-Conscious ground of all experience. Not reason, then, but faith gives ethical content to the idea of God" (p. 267). Thus our intellectual and practical categories are both made to contribute to our view of the world-ground.

The sixth and last essay — "Philosophy and Theology : The Ritschlian Standpoint" — has little organic connection with the central constructive aim of the work. It is rather an application of the principles of religious philosophy already established to a criticism of the Ritschlian School. The theological student will find the essay interesting and instructive. It adds nothing in the way of philosophy, however, to what has already been developed in the previous papers.

As a whole, the volume is a notable one. It is the work of a man both well versed in philosophy and deeply interested in religion. It shows a broad knowledge of the historical and current literature of the subject. Its frank recognition of the difficulties in its own positions, if at times weakening the force of its arguments, gives evidence of an engaging candor and a profound love of truth on the part of the writer. Its keynote is the conviction that no world-view can be permanently satisfying which does not provide harmoniously for both our theoretical and our practical interests. I know of no other book that gives in moderate compass such a fair-minded statement, and, on the

whole, so judicious a treatment of the present-day problems of the philosophy of religion.

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Fichte, seine Ethik und seine Stellung zum Problem des Individualismus. Von MARIA RAICH. Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1905. — pp. vi, 196.

The study before us comprises two main parts ; the first and longer deals with Fichte's ethical doctrine, while the second considers the position of the individual in the system and the relation of the individualistic and the socialistic tendencies. Chapter I of the First Part deals with Fichte's personality ; Chapter II gives a general discussion of his philosophical doctrine and of the relation of the practical to the theoretical *Wissenschaftslehre* ; Chapter III outlines his philosophy of rights ; and Chapter IV discusses his ethics, his doctrine of freedom, and the relation between morality and religion in his system.

The description of Fichte's personality in Chapter I is marred by a defect which is seen throughout the whole book, and which seems to me to constitute its most serious weakness. This is the lack of coherence, the failure to weave the various elements into a systematic whole. In general the discussions are characterized by scrappiness ; the different points which the writer brings out are not given to us as parts of a whole. Not only are they not presented as a whole, but also one has the feeling that the author has not herself grasped them as a whole, that she has not fully mastered the material which she has collected. In the chapter on Fichte's personality, for example, she says many things about Fichte, enumerates his various mental and moral characteristics ; but she gives us no picture of the man. The same criticism seems to me to apply to the whole book. It might be urged that this is largely a matter of the technique of exposition, and that, inasmuch as the author, not being a native German, is writing in a foreign tongue, much allowance should be made for her. But while I readily admit the obstacles in the way of one who would write a book in a foreign language, and while I have much admiration for the extent to which the author has overcome the purely linguistic difficulties of her task, it seems to me that the trouble here is something quite different. No one who can write German as well as Fr. Raich can, ought to be unable to give in German a coherent, systematic account of whatever he may wish to say.

In the chapter devoted to Fichte's ethics, the point of most interest is the discussion of the various phases of morality. The author points

out the distinction which Fichte makes, in the *Anweisung zum seligen Leben*, and the *Sittenlehre* of 1812, between the 'lower' and the 'higher' morality. The first consists in the production, in the world of sense, of the absolutely good will, that is, in the development of the moral character of the individual subject. The second, which is possible only after the attainment of the first, consists in the creation of an objective moral order; humanity, which is already dominated by the absolutely good will, must now become the image of the divine nature. In the first stage, the moral law introduces a certain order and arrangement into the sense-world. Sense furnishes the material for our duties, and the lower morality consists in the subordinating of this material to the moral law. In the higher morality the law is creative; it does not merely arrange a given material, but within the realm of the given it creates something altogether new. This something new the writer interprets to mean 'new values.' Not the development of a moral will (of a subjective morality) but the creation of new objective values (of an objective morality) is the task of this higher stage.

In addition to the higher and lower morality, Frä. Raich sometimes seems to recognize an intermediate stage, "the morality of the beautiful soul." Whereas, in the lower morality, the law is felt as a command imposed upon us from without and is obeyed only after a struggle with our inclinations, the beautiful soul recognizes this law as the expression of its own inmost nature and obeys it joyfully. The author's treatment of this concept of the beautiful soul is not altogether clear. Sometimes (*e. g.*, p. 186) she seems to regard it as representing an intermediate stage between the lower and the higher morality. In one place, however (p. 89), she speaks of "the higher morality, which may be called 'the morality of the beautiful soul,' " while at the same time she recognizes "the æsthetic view of the moral law," as mediating between this higher morality and the lower. Finally (p. 192, f.), she contrasts with the "forced, unæsthetic morality of the categorical imperative" the "ästhetisch-freie Moral der schöpferischen Vollpersönlichkeit." It looks somewhat as if she had not quite decided whether what she calls the æsthetic view of the moral law should be identified with the higher, creative morality, or should be regarded as forming an intermediate stage between it and the lower. Inasmuch as Fichte's own treatment of the subject is very inadequate, amounting to hardly more than a few hints, one may surely be pardoned for having failed to reach a settled conviction; but in the interest of clearness the uncertainty should be definitely admitted instead of being

slurred over. My own opinion is that we have no sufficient ground for recognizing an intermediate stage between the 'lower' and the 'higher' morality, as Fichte describes them. His discussion of the æsthetic attitude toward the moral law occurs in the *Sittenlehre* of 1798, when he had probably not yet made the distinction between higher and lower morality. If, however, the task of the latter consists in the development in mankind of the absolutely good will, then it must include the bringing of men to the point where the moral law appears to them, not as a command imposed from without, to be obeyed with reluctance, but as the voice of their own inmost nature,— and this is precisely Fichte's description of the æsthetic view of the moral law. (*Sämmtliche Werke*, IV, 353 f.) But the moment that mankind has reached this stage the lower morality has fulfilled its task, and the higher morality begins. Hence the 'beautiful soul' represents simply the culmination of the lower morality, but is characteristic of the higher throughout its entire development; it is, as it were, the *subjective* aspect of that higher stage which has been described as the stage of *objective* morality. For this recognition of the moral law as the expression of one's deepest self seems to be identical with that complete interpenetration of the personality by the Idea which, as Fr. Raich correctly points out, Fichte regards as the indispensable condition of the creation of new values. For the moral law and the divine Idea are for Fichte only two different aspects of the same thing. What appears to us, from the point of view of the lower morality, as a law, and hence as something foreign, is apprehended from that of the higher morality as the divine Idea, which lives in us and works through us; and it is just because the personality is completely at one with the Idea, because individuality, in Fichte's ordinary sense of the word, has been overcome, that there is no feeling of subjection to an external law.

The Second Part of the book deals chiefly with Fichte's attitude toward the problem of individuality. The first chapter discusses his conception of the origin, nature, purpose, and value of individuality. With regard to the origin of the individual, the author finds in Fichte three different deductions, which she calls the theoretical, the practical, and the teleological. In the theoretical deduction, Fichte seeks to show that, in order that absolute knowing may be realized, it must differentiate itself into a plurality of individuals. In the practical deduction, he maintains that morality is possible only when a finite will is opposed to other finite wills. In the teleological, he shows that individuals are necessary instruments in the realization of the divine plan.

The distinction of the teleological deduction from the others seems to me hardly justifiable. To say, as Fichte does, that the individual exists simply as a means to the self-realization of reason, is to say nothing which is not already included in the first two deductions. The author herself points out that the teleological deduction is closely related to the practical ; but she should have said that both the theoretical and practical deductions are teleological. Absolute knowing or the divine Idea must realize itself, and the means to this self-realization is a system of individuals. This is Fichte's theoretical deduction. It is certainly teleological in the broader sense of the word, in which 'end' is not necessarily an end for some consciousness. And in the narrower sense of the word *teleological*, according to which an intelligence conceives the idea of some non-existent state and employs means for the purpose of making it existent, in this narrower sense, we have no right to apply the word to Fichte at all. Only that literalism in interpretation which he himself deprecates, could lead one to suppose that the references to a 'divine plan,' in his more popular writings, is anything more than an attempt to adapt his doctrine to the needs of his hearers. And again, the practical deduction simply tries to show in a slightly different way, that a system of individuals is necessary to the self-realization of reason. One phase of the actualization of the Idea is morality ; and in showing that morality is impossible without a plurality of individuals, Fichte has simply given us a special form of the argument that has already been considered. What we really have, then, in his philosophy, is a teleological deduction of individuality, which appears sometimes as an attempt to prove that a plurality of individuals is essential to the self-manifestation of the Absolute, and sometimes as an effort to show that it is a necessary condition of that particular phase of the self-manifestation which we call morality.

In her discussion of the value of personality and of the part which the individual plays in history, the author emphasizes the fact that for Fichte the individual has worth only in relation to the whole. He recognizes, indeed, the important part which great men have played in history, but he insists at the same time that the great man is precisely he who has completely surrendered his individuality to the domination of the Idea. This interpretation seems to me in the main correct, but it does not go to the bottom of Fichte's later doctrine of the individual. That doctrine is not worked out by him, and we have only a few scattered hints to help us. What he seems to have meant, however, is something like this. An individuality which refuses to

identify its own good with that of the race, which finds its reasons for being in the gratification of its own desires, — this is the lower individuality, whose suppression is absolutely necessary to moral progress. Upon this point Fichte is uncompromising. The complete merging of the personality in the race, the feeling of oneness with the whole of mankind, the utter surrender of all desire for an individual good, this is his unqualified demand. From this point of view, it would seem that the individual can serve the purposes of the divine Idea only by ceasing to be an individual, — by giving up all that distinguishes him from other individuals. And thus, apparently, a perfected humanity would be a system of beings, each one of whom was simply a monotonous repetition of the others. For Fichte often seems to say that all which is of worth in men is that in which they are alike, the universal nature.

This is one aspect of Fichte's doctrine, and it is indubitably the more prominent aspect. But in certain of the later writings (*e. g.*, the *Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters* and the *Reden an die deutsche Nation*) we find this thought supplemented by another. In these works, as in the others which deal with the problems of 'Geschichtsphilosophie,' Fichte lays much emphasis upon the thought that the progress of the race means the constant appearance of the new. Not the dull repetition of the past, but a manifestation of the Idea in ever new forms, — this is history. And in this history the great man, precisely because he has given up his individuality in the lower sense, precisely because he has freed himself from all petty personal interests, is fitted to become the vehicle of a new revelation of the inner nature of the Idea. Purged of the lower, the sensuous, individuality, his whole being is interpenetrated with the divine life. And this life, in its perfect fullness, has no need to repeat itself in any of its manifestations. Rather does it pour itself out, through each of the beings who have surrendered themselves to it, in a distinctive form which never has been before, which never will be again. Thus the higher, the supersensuous, individuality, far from being, as the lower is, an obstacle to the self-realization of reason, is rather the form which this self-realization assumes.

This doctrine, as I have said, is a late development in Fichte's philosophy and appears only in germ; but it is essential to a full understanding of his conception of individuality. It seems to me also that Frl. Raich might have found here some clue to the deeper meaning of Fichte's conception of the higher morality as involving the creation of new objective values. She is quite right in saying that we have only

faint suggestions as to the nature of this higher morality ; but some help, it seems to me, we may get by a comparison with the doctrine of the individual. In commenting upon her distinction of the three phases of morality, we maintained that the morality of the beautiful soul is really identical with the higher morality. From the point which we have now reached, we can see that the beautiful soul or the absolutely good will is possible only when the lower individuality has been overcome. And when this is the case, then and only then is the individual fitted to be the medium for the actualization of a new value, *i. e.*, for the manifestation of the Idea in a distinctly new individuality. The purging away of the lower individuality, or, in other words, the completion of the lower morality, is the indispensable condition of the higher morality, which consists in the actualization of new values. To say that the overcoming of the lower individuality fits one to be the instrument of the divine Idea is only another way of saying that the attainment of the absolutely good will or the beautiful soul is the necessary condition of the actualization of new values. For whenever the Idea manifests itself without let or hindrance through a human life, then because of its infinite fullness, it manifests itself of necessity in a new form. Thus that higher stage which Fichte calls the objective morality is a continuous actualization of new values through the medium of the higher individuality.

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The Approach to Philosophy. By RALPH BARTON PERRY. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905. — pp. xxiv, 448.

The purpose of Dr. Perry's *The Approach to Philosophy* is not so much to introduce the reader to philosophical erudition, as to make him "more solicitously aware of the philosophy that is in him, or to provoke him to philosophy in his own interests" (p. viii). If philosophy is inevitable and perennial, it must be shown to issue from and to grow out of the interests to which the individual is already alive ; it must "appear in its vital relations to more familiar experiences." With this Socratic aim, the author has selected, for the first part of his work, various human interests as points of departure and pathways of approach, and has sought thus to introduce the general standpoint and problem of philosophy through its implications in practical life, poetry, religion, and science. "As the ultimate criticism of all human interests, philosophy may be approached by avenues as various as these interests. Only when philosophy is discovered as the implication of well-recognized special interests, is the significance of its function fully appreciated" (p. 24).

Chapter I attempts to lead the man who occupies the "practical standpoint," whatever the particular content of his dominant group of ideals, to a recognition of philosophy as a kind of reflection which differs only in extent and persistence from the reflection that guides and justifies his life and pursuits. "The complete justification of his ideal would involve a true knowledge of the essential character of the universe"; he cannot escape "thought about the universe in its totality, or in its deepest and essential character" (pp. 21, 22). In poetry, furthermore (Chap. II), the philosophical point of view is to be found by examining the intellectual factors of poetry. Of these the simple and more obvious is sincerity or clearness of representation, the rarer and more difficult is apprehension of the universal in the particular. The supreme philosopher-poets are such because the detail of their appreciation finds fundamental justification in a world-view. Their ideals and appreciation of life are the expression of a contemplation of the world in its unity and essence. The restoration to immediacy of the philosophical thought-structure is accomplished in part by poetry, but more completely by religion, wherein the universal is not only seen but also served.

The third and fourth chapters of the book are concerned respectively with "The Religious Experience" and "The Philosophical Implications of Religion." The relatively great space accorded to the discussion of religion is, in the author's belief, "fair to the general interest in this topic, and to the intrinsic significance of its relation to philosophy." Professor Perry's critical abilities are clearly shown throughout this discussion. He avoids the pitfalls in the pathway of those who would make belief a mere matter of temperamental or passionate determination, as well as the difficulties of those who can find nothing of value in the religious attitude save only its cognitive factors. Belief is here treated as the perfect case of the unity of knowledge, feeling, and volition. "The believing experience is cognitive in intent, but practical and emotional as well in content." "What I believe expresses itself in my total experience" (p. 58). The treatment may be outlined by the following concise statements: "It has been maintained that religion is closely analogous to one's belief in the disposition toward one's self of men or communities. In the case of religion this disposition is attributed to the more or less vaguely conceived residual environment that is recognized as lying outside of the more familiar natural and social relations. After the rise of science this residual environment tends to be conceived as a unity which is ultimate or fundamental, but for the religious consciousness it is

more commonly regarded as a general source of influence practically worthy of consideration. Such a belief, like all belief, is vitally manifested, with such emphasis upon action, feeling, or intellection as temperament or mood may determine" (p. 82). But if the psychology of belief is the proper starting-point for a description of the religious experience, it is nevertheless "misleading when accepted as a substitute for philosophical criticism." "Its subjective worth is due at any rate in part to the supposition of its objective worth." "For religion *means to be true*, and thus submits itself to valuation as a case of knowledge" (p. 83). The cognitive factor in religion is brought out by the carefully worded thesis that "To be religious is to believe that a certain correlation of forces, moral and factual, is in reality operative, and that it determines the propriety and effectiveness of a certain type of living. Whatever demonstrates the futility, vanity, or self-deception of this living, discredits the religion. And, *per contra*, except as they define or refute such practical truth, religion is not essentially concerned with theoretical judgments" (p. 97). The imagination, moreover, is indispensable to religion, because of "that faculty's power of realizing what is not perceptually present." "The religious imagination fulfills its function in so far as it provides the object of religion with properties similar to those which lend vividness and reality to the normal social relations" (p. 101). Hence there is an aspect of religion that is not directly answerable to philosophical or scientific standards. "But there is always, on the other hand, an element of hope which conceives the nature of the world, and means to be grounded in reality. In respect of that element, philosophy is indispensable to religion" (p. 112). It is "the justification of religion, and the criticism of religions."

The chapter on "Natural Science and Philosophy" is necessarily of a somewhat different character from the preceding chapters of Part I. Here we are concerned not only with a special interest, but also with a theoretical question regarding the relation, within the body of knowledge, of two of its constituent members. The expository treatment is inevitably modified, because "in the case of natural science one has to deal with a body of knowledge which is frequently regarded as the only knowledge." Accordingly, the author is forced to take "sides against" such "positivism," although he has indulged but little in the polemical spirit or method. Science springs from "the practical necessity of anticipating the environment." "This anticipation appears first as congenital or acquired reactions on the part of the organism. Such reactions imply a fixed coördination or

system in the environment whereby a given circumstance determines other circumstances; and science proper arises as the formulation of such systems. The requirement that they shall apply to the phenomena that *confront* the will determines their spatial, temporal, and quantitative form. The progress of science is marked by the growth of these conceptions in the direction of comprehensiveness on the one hand, and of refinement and delicacy on the other." Now it is a function of philosophy "to criticise science through its generating problem, or its self-imposed task viewed as determining its province and selecting its categories." The impossibility of embracing the whole of knowledge within natural science is due to the fact that the latter is abstract. This abstractness is unescapable because natural science is governed by a *selective interest* (pp. 134 ff.).

Part II undertakes "to furnish the reader with a map of the country to which he has been led," to provide "a brief survey of the entire programme of philosophy," "an epitome that shall follow the course of the *natural and historical differentiation* of the general philosophical problem." This part is subdivided into two chapters, "Metaphysics and Epistemology" and "The Normative Sciences and the Problems of Religion." The development of the order of philosophical problems depends upon the initial interest. "The point of departure will always determine the emphasis and the application which the philosophy receives. If philosophy be needed to supplement more special interests, it will receive a particular character from whatever interest it so supplements." "He, firstly, who begins with the demands of life and its ideals, looks to philosophy for a reconciliation of these with the orderly procedure of nature." His philosophy will be ethical or religious. On the other hand, for one who is primarily interested in the extension and correction of scientific knowledge, philosophy tends to be logical and metaphysical. Since it is not possible to exhaust the aspects of experience which serve as incentives to philosophical reflection, the divisions of philosophical problems are chiefly representative of the intellectual autobiography of the individual. The individualities may be in a measure eliminated and a general validity attained, if we name certain special problems that have appeared in the history of philosophy, and follow the course of historical differentiation (pp. 152 ff.).

Whereas Part II presents a general classification of philosophical problems and conceptions independently of any special point of view, Part III emphasizes the point of view, or the internal consistency

that makes a system of philosophy out of certain answers to the special problems of philosophy. We pass from a classification by problems to a classification by doctrines, and have presented to us the general types of historical philosophies. These types are enumerated as naturalism, subjectivism, absolute realism, and absolute idealism. The first and the third of these are asserted to be primarily metaphysical and only secondarily epistemological in character. This distinction, it would seem to the reviewer, is by no means clear. Since *positivism* and *agnosticism* are both treated as the critical phase of naturalism, the primacy of the metaphysical interest over the epistemological is not self-evident. And even if we are concerned with materialism, which our author regards as the dogmatic form of naturalism, it would not be obvious that such a system is primarily metaphysical rather than epistemological. When we remember that materialism has been oftentimes historically allied with and has sometimes apparently arisen from empirical subjectivism, the difficulty involved in Dr. Perry's principle of division becomes accentuated. It would not be relevant to remark that such an alliance, though psychologically natural enough and historically actual, is nevertheless logically impossible, inasmuch as the terms 'primarily' and 'secondarily' must refer in this connection to the "natural and historical differentiation of the general philosophical problem." The initial interest, we have been told, determines the standpoint, and the standpoint is that which gives systematic unity to the doctrine. In the case of absolute realism, the statement would perhaps seem to carry greater conviction until one discovers, as representatives of this doctrinal type of philosophy, Parmenides, Spinoza, Plato, Aristotle, and Leibniz. Classification does, indeed, resemble politics in the facility with which it brings about strange companionships!

Although this third main division of *The Approach to Philosophy* may perhaps seem to some readers the least successful as objective exposition, it would be manifestly unfair to comment at length upon the classification either of philosophers or their systems. The author, in common with all other philosophical writers, is abundantly aware of the arbitrary sharpness of boundary lines and the stubborn refusal of historical systems to adjust themselves to their allotted places. Moreover, the difficulty which has just received merely passing mention is more apparent than real. The formal perplexities disappear as we follow the progress of the detailed treatment, and finally reach the excellently critical conclusion. One closes the book with the conviction of having enjoyed and profited by a gracefully written, a skill-

fully planned, and a well-sustained discussion of the vital relationship of philosophy to practical interests, its inevitableness, its characteristic problems, and its representative systems. And the non-technical reader will doubtless find this approach well designed to lead to intimacy.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Einführung in die Metaphysik auf Grundlage der Erfahrung. Von G. HEYMANS. Leipzig, Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1905. — pp. vi, 348.

Dr. Heymans's *Einführung in die Metaphysik* is an exposition of the same standpoint as that of Professor Strong's recent book, and is altogether a clearly written and forcible volume. Starting frankly with the recognition of the representative aspect of knowledge, the task of thought is to pass from a relative to an absolute, or what is as nearly as possible an absolute account of reality. Metaphysics uses no method essentially different from those of science. It proceeds by the way of hypothesis, starting from what is directly given in experience; but it finds itself necessitated to reach out beyond experience, and to postulate an externally existing reality in order to overcome the incompleteness and relativity of its first object. The one chief fact which compels the construction of an hypothesis beyond the limits of scientific theory is the coexistence of consciousness along with the phenomena with which the physical sciences deal. The relationship of these two groups of facts sets a problem which obviously no special science is in a position to solve, and which is therefore necessarily a task for metaphysics.

The plan of the book is to take up the various fundamental philosophical standpoints, beginning with naïve realism, and to show by an immanent criticism that each in turn leads to fundamental difficulties, and fails to give a plausible way of accounting for certain essential aspects of the situation. A satisfactory theory should give a way of understanding psychical connections, physical connections, and psycho-physical connections; and the extreme complications involved in this three-fold demand furnish a severe test of any hypothesis. If an hypothesis can meet them all naturally and consistently, it is strong presumptive evidence of its truth. To the writer psychical monism seems to be the only conception which will satisfy the requirements without forcing, — the theory that psychical processes and their connections are the reality of which the material facts represented by the brain are only the appearances to a beholder, the world of physical science in general being simply a construction in terms of an ideal observer. The reality of psychical connections within the conscious life, the dependence of psychical processes upon the outside reality with which they are continuous when the facts demand this, and at the same time the non-interruption by psychical facts of the physical series or the special symbolic translation of reality for which the material stands, are in this way all readily provided for. In leading up to this, the author subjects to criticism

Realism and Dualism, Materialism, what he characterizes as the Doctrine of the Unknown Third and that of the Unknown Other, and, finally, Positivism and Scepticism. The main argument is separated from wider metaphysical implications and rests simply upon the interpretation of the limited piece of reality which stands in immediate connection with the psychological experience of a conscious human being. In conclusion, however, reasons are given for the extension of the same interpretation to the outlying reality with a considerable though not the same degree of probability. Altogether Dr. Heymans succeeds in making out a strong case for the theory which he adopts, although he cannot be said to meet all the difficulties in its way. For example, the conception of the ideal observer might well be subjected to a much severer scrutiny than the author thinks it necessary to give. It is not obvious that the system of knowledge which it represents has any localization within reality for which the theory provides, or can point to any satisfactory basis for its own validity.

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Grundlinien zu einer Kritik der Willenskraft: Willenstheoretische Betrachtung des biologischen, ökonomischen und sozialen Evolutionismus.
Von RUDOLF GOLDSCHIED. Wien und Leipzig, Wilhelm Braumüller, 1905. — pp. 193.

"The most pressing task of philosophy to-day is to mark off the limits of our faculty of will" (p. 3). But so far is this task from being done, that it is not even begun. "It is in fact interesting that hitherto almost no need has been felt of building up the theory of will as a special discipline. Whatever is brought to light concerning the will is found scattered in different special sciences, and it is solely as a branch of psychology that any attempt has been made to aim at a comprehensive exact science of the will. But between the science of the will (*Willenslehre*) and what is here meant by the theory of the will (*Willenstheorie*) there is a very essential distinction" (p. 3). Psychology inquires into the conditions under which will arises, but not into the results that may be brought about by will. "The theory of the will has for its task the direction of the attention to the active side of our nature. . . . It is our activity that has won us our place in nature. Therefore if the theory of the will investigates the fundamental conditions of our activity, it has therein alone an immense field of work and a most fruitful province conceivable" (p. 5).

This difference between the point of view of psychology and that of the theory of the will is for Goldscheid so important that he dwells upon it at length. "The exact theory of the will may not content itself, as previous psychology has for the most part done, with establishing the motives that condition the human will from birth, that influence it, form it, and then develop it. It must go further and, with all the means which modern science places at our disposal, ascertain what influence the will in its turn

can exert on the immediate environment, on external nature, on economic conditions, on social institutions, in a word on historical development. The will thus studied must be not merely the cultivated will, but also the uncultivated will and the perverted will. A further problem is as to when the will exerts a favorable and when an unfavorable influence, and how in general it must set about in order to work intelligently. But even all these are only preliminary questions for the theory of the will as a practical science. The theory of the will which should give the basis of all historical and social science has a much larger scope. Not only is it true that the innumerable questions which arise concerning the determination of the will form its most central problem, which it has to discuss, less in reference to freedom and unfreedom than in reference to active and passive, outer and inner determination. It must also analyze the actual voluntary relations found among individual peoples as well as in civilization generally, discover the different ends pursued, and find out what, under given conditions of intensity, distribution, and direction of will-forces in the social mechanism, is to be expected from natural evolution. In this way it should become clear what is the relation of man and of man's will to the order of nature, and also not only what are the obligations, but also what is the competence of the human will in view of the given natural, economic, and social conditions of existence. From these few suggestions it should be clear that just as everywhere an epistemological consideration of the given deepens our insight and enables us to reach brand new results in science, so in social science everywhere fundamental importance is to be given to the consideration of the theory of the will as well as to the theory of knowledge" (pp. 5, 6). In fact, "within the province of the theory of the will all fundamental problems of practical philosophy are to be discussed, and that because all problems of teleology have a character that brings them within the sphere of this science" (p. 7).

But the theory of the will is a much more comprehensive science than the criticism of will-force. The theory of the will is divided into three critiques of will, which stand to each other in very much the same relation as Kant's three *Critiques* do. The first critique of will deals with what the author calls "the original, as it were the *a priori* will." But "while the *Critique of Pure Reason* keeps the greatest distance from everything psychological and physiological, the critique of the original, as it were the *a priori* will, on the contrary, falls almost entirely within the realm of physiology, so that here every external analogy (with the *Critique of Pure Reason*) seems to fail. And yet there exists the most significant similarity. As the *Critique of Pure Reason* finally dissolves the psychic into the formal, so would the critique of the original will strive ultimately to reduce the physiological entirely into the energetic, so that at the extreme poles of the investigation of the human soul, on the one side, stands the formalism of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and on the other the energetism of the critique of the original *a priori* will" (p. 13).

The second critique of the will deals with the practical will, just as Kant's second Critique deals with the practical reason. By the practical will, Goldscheid means will directed by intelligence. Hence he also calls it "intellectual will" (*der intellektuelle Willen*). This critique of the practical will does not indeed prove the primacy of the intellect, but it postulates it.

The third critique of the will deals with will-force. While the term that Goldscheid employs here, *Willenskraft*, would in general be better translated the faculty or the function of will, it seems to the reviewer that this translation would leave unexpressed the *nuance* of the term upon which this critique lays greatest stress; namely, the *force* that the author finds in will, a force that brings will into competition with natural forces.

It is this critique of will-force that forms the special subject of the major part of the little volume under review. But the author does not attempt to treat the subject systematically. He merely furnishes a sort of prolegomena to the proposed science, showing that the attitude taken by this science toward the historical significance of the will differs from that taken in materialism, in philosophical liberalism (rationalism), in economic liberalism (the British School of economists), in Darwinian evolutionism, and in Nietzscheanism.

Of especial interest is the treatment the author gives to the problem of teleology. The world at large is not run on teleological principles. Indeed, one of the great dangers of an uncritical Darwinianism is that the concept of evolution should be conceived in the spirit of metaphysical teleology. "Because nature has given only a minimum of purposiveness to the conditions of existence, and because, besides, this minimum has such a precarious character for the individual species, that it all too easily becomes unpurposiveness and brings about their extinction, there has gradually developed in the more highly differentiated types a power of enhancing the purposiveness of the natural development. This is the power of knowing things in causal and logical relations" (p. 85). "The only reason why the world thus appears to-day to have a certain degree of purposiveness, is that we have the power to introduce purposiveness into it" (p. 85). This power, as it grows, makes us more and more independent of the natural process of development. Instead of conforming to the conditions of our environment, we make the environment conform to our ends.

We have thus something like the dualism between the cosmic process and the ethical order that Huxley brought out in his famous lecture on "Evolution and Ethics." But there is an attempt to transcend this dualism by dwelling on the fact that the power to act purposively is itself a natural result. For the critique of will-force, however, the important question is not how the power of acting with a purpose has arisen, but how it can affect the world in which it has appeared.

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Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant and Other Philosophical Lectures and Essays. By HENRY SIDGWICK. London, Macmillan & Co.; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1905. — pp. vii, 475.

The lectures on Kant, T. H. Green, and Spencer, which make up the first and largest part of the present volume, were intended by their author, as his friend Professor Ward informs us in a prefatory editorial note, ultimately to appear as a book on Kant and the Kantian philosophy in England. It must always be a matter for regret that Professor Sidgwick never lived to complete his projected plan. In the twelve lectures now published on the *Critique of Pure Reason*, we have what, in my own opinion at least, is perhaps the most stimulating examination of the Kantian doctrines in the English language.

English students of Kant have for the most part approached him either from a generally Hegelian point of view or from that of an uncritical empiricism. Neither attitude is altogether conducive to illuminating criticism. The Hegelian account too often tends to substitute for such criticism a kind of exposition which readers who have not previously committed themselves to Hegelianism may suspect of shirking the really fundamental difficulties, while the ordinary empiricist has usually been too wedded to his own dogmas to come within reasonable distance of a comprehension of Kant's problems. Professor Sidgwick's peculiar philosophical position protects him from both these dangers. He adopts here, as elsewhere, the attitude of a critical naturalist who is also a 'natural realist' but no empiricist in metaphysics. From this point of view he is naturally able to criticise with great force and felicity the 'idealistic' or subjectivist element in the Kantian doctrine. He makes it, I think, quite clear to an unbiased consideration that the kind of arguments by which Kant supposed himself, and is still supposed in some idealistic quarters, to have shown the subjective origin of the formal element in knowledge, have far less conclusive force, and are far more difficult to interpret consistently than is usually recognized. We see, in fact, in his subtle discussion, that 'natural realism' still has a very respectable case to present for itself. Personally I should, I think, be inclined to regard the lectures which deal with the 'analytic' as the best, and those which discuss the 'antinomies' as the weakest part of the course. The mathematical antinomies, in particular, cannot be adequately examined without an acquaintance with the modern doctrines of infinity and continuity which Sidgwick apparently did not possess. There is, however, a very striking suggested defense of the 'ontological proof' in the concluding lecture, that on 'Rational Theology,' which merits the careful attention of all who are interested in the theological side of philosophy.

The lectures on Kant and the English philosophers who have exhibited the Kantian influence are followed by half a dozen reprinted papers, among which one is specially glad to see one on the 'Philosophy of Common Sense,' in which Reid receives more adequate recognition than commonly falls to his share at the present day.

A. E. TAYLOR.

Studien zur antiken Kultur. Heft 1. Pythagoras und Heraklit. Von WOLFGANG SCHULTZ. Leipzig und Wien, Akademischer Verlag, 1905. — pp. 118.

The brochure before us announces itself as the first of a projected series of monographs on the Pre-Socratics from "a philosophic point of view." The author has apparently read widely, and the notes show him to possess a considerable fund of scholarship, but he sadly lacks critical judgment. His account of Pythagoras is made up from all sorts of sources of every conceivable date and degree of authenticity. These are used indiscriminately, without any attempt to distinguish what relates to Pythagoras himself from what refers to the latest members of the Order, and are further swelled by the entirely unauthorized ascription to Pythagoras of the Orphic theology of Empedocles. Dr. Schultz, like some of his predecessors, is carried away by the craze for mystical theological symbolism, and interprets even the obviously fetishistic taboos of the Pythagoreans, quite in the fashion of Iamblichus, as moral and religious allegories. The completest refutation of his conception of the system is surely afforded by the place which Aristotle gives it among the early cosmologies. The account in the *Metaphysics* alone is enough to show that Pythagoreanism as a philosophical system must be carefully distinguished from the fanciful religion of the Pythagorean Order. The interpretation of Heracleitus, though often clever, suffers from the same perverted ingenuity. Instead of recognizing that the sage of Ephesus was primarily intent on the explaining of physical processes, and starting in his exposition with the fragments which deal with physics, Dr. Schultz bases his whole account of Heracleitus on the notion that the latter's main object must have been to maintain the cosmic significance of the number three in opposition to Pythagorean veneration of the five and the seven. Now there is no trace whatever in the fragments of Heracleitus of any regard for numerical symbolisms in general, still less of any attachment to triadic groupings of things in particular, and this entire want of evidence is not compensated for by Dr. Schultz's speculations as to the recurrence of the triadic arrangement in the temple of the Ephesian Artemis. Nor does there seem to be any ground, beyond the mere assumption of the author about the devotion of Heracleitus to the triad, for his confident assertion that Heracleiteanism was constructed in special antagonism to Pythagoras. That Heracleitus refers disapprovingly to Pythagoras is true; but if that proves anything, his attack on Homer would equally prove that his main object must have been to discredit the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. The oddest instance of the author's defect of judgment, however, is perhaps his singular rendering of the 'Heracleitean' passages of the Pseudo-Hippocratean tract *de Diaeta* into German verse. The result, he remarks, is like Goethe, which is not surprising, as Goethe evidently supplied Dr. Schultz with the model for his translation.

A. E. TAYLOR.

Abhandlungen der Fries'schen Schule. (Neue Folge.) Zweites Heft. Herausgegeben von GERHARD HESSENBERG, KARL KAISER und LEONARD NELSON. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1905.—pp. 200.

The first volume of this series was noticed in this REVIEW, September, 1905. The present volume, in which the enthusiasts of the philosophy of Fries continue their endeavors to expound the system of their hero and to revive it as the philosophy of the twentieth century, contains five essays: on "Kant and Fries," by H. Eggeling; on "Fries and his Recent Critics" and on "The Non-Euclidean Geometry and the Origin of Mathematical Certitude" by L. Nelson; on "The Object of Knowledge," a criticism, from the Friesian point of view, of Rickert's book on that subject by E. Blumenthal; and on "The Critical Theory of Mathematics in Plato" by Carl Brinkmann. The first four taken together give, with a good deal of repetition, a clear exposition of certain essentials of the epistemology of the school, in the light of comparisons with Kant on the one hand, and with several recent writers on the other. The reasoning is sound and convincing in so far as it undertakes to show that our *a priori* knowledge (if, indeed, we have any) must consist in our possession of an immediate conviction of the truth of certain fundamental propositions which are not capable of any further proof; and that the recognition of the indubitableness of these propositions is purely a psychological discovery, a piece of introspection,—and, therefore, itself a case of empirical rather than of *a priori* knowledge. On the general relation of epistemology to psychology, the Friesian doctrine is clear and not really controvertible. But beyond this point the doctrine seems to be not easily distinguishable from a sort of dogmatic intuitionism. Granted that the ultimate criterion of *a priori* truth is psychological,—the discovery of one's inability to doubt a given general proposition, such as an axiom of mathematics,—still, not all propositions that any one thinks it impossible to doubt are valid *a priori*. The emotion of conviction confessedly often goes astray. The business of the epistemologist, therefore, is to seek some further generic mark,—that is to say, a logical mark belonging to the proposition itself,—of those propositions that appear to be universally and intrinsically indubitable for all minds under all circumstances. The Friesian theory of knowledge seems to specify no such criterion; and it therefore apparently includes among "immediately known truths" a miscellaneous assortment of theses, such as the "existence of a reality independent of consciousness" and the law of universal causation, which the introspection of the present reviewer does not discover to be "immediately self-evident" at all. It is, of course, painful to be assured that "solche Zweifel sind für den geistig gesunden Menschen unmöglich"; but the doubter is, after all, rather humbled than convinced by such an assurance. When, however, the authors continue, as in the previous volume, to appeal, even over the head of the supposed final court, *unsere unmittelbare Erkenntnis*, to a certain native "self-confidence of the reason," they seem

to tend, in a vague way, to give up the claim of psychological necessity for our *a priori* judgments and to derive such judgments merely from a natural activity of postulation. For "the reason" could hardly be said to manifest self-confidence simply in refraining from doubting propositions which it was absolutely incapable of conceiving as dubitable. If an extra-logical *Selbst-vertrauen der Vernunft* is really the last epistemological resort of the Friesians, they will turn out to be pragmatists under a very elaborate disguise.

The paper on Plato gives a new translation and discussion of two passages in the *Republic* which deal with the method and epistemological status of mathematics: 522E-527C and 509D-511D. To the latter passage the writer gives a meaning quite inconsistent with the context and with Plato's use of terms. The paper undertakes to show that in this passage Plato closely approaches the Kantian idealistic theory of the nature and grounds of mathematical knowledge, setting mathematics side by side with dialectic as a valid and certain body of *a priori* knowledge, which even has, in comparison with dialectic, the special advantage that its deductions are based upon a *reine Anschauung*, and thus are directly applicable to the objects presented in our *Sinnesanschauung*. To reach this conclusion the writer contends that the *ὑποθέσεις* of which, according to Plato, mathematicians make use, are conceived by Plato, not as arbitrary and unverified 'hypotheses,' but as ultimate and self-evident axioms. Unfortunately Plato does not ordinarily mean 'axioms' by *ὑποθέσεις*; and the writer has forgotten that his interpretation is expressly precluded by a passage a little later in the *Republic*, 533C: "As for geometry and such sciences, they only dream about Being, but never can they behold the waking reality, so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use undisturbed, and are unable to give any account of them." ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY.

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Die Bilder von der Materie: Eine psychologische Untersuchung über die Grundlagen der Physik. Von JULIUS SCHULTZ. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1905. — pp. vii, 201.

To understand is to interpret in terms of our own experience. Our experience is primarily of a self willing, *i. e.*, of a substance causing; therefore to understand the world is to interpret it as 'efficacious substances' and 'inevitable processes' (p. 1). From this psychological starting-point, Dr. Schultz develops the basal concepts of science, assigns their philosophical status, and finally offers a physical system which should unify the field of science under the substance-cause schema more completely than has yet been done. The discussion is erudite and subtle, the style is epigrammatic, the author's constructive power is unusual, and many of his analyses (*e. g.*, of action at a distance, of motor sensations, of energetics) are strikingly original. We do not think he has succeeded in developing all his main concepts out of his starting point, but his results must certainly be heeded by all who work in the field of *Naturphilosophie*.

Understanding is anthropomorphizing, necessary because acquired through ages of inheritance; it is more than economical description, because we feel that when our will moves our limbs we know not only the *how* but also the *why*. We get here no ontological predicates; neither *are* there active substances in the world nor *is* the self an active substance. We have rather a command, 'See things thus if you will conceive them' (p. 9). But the anthropomorphism must be consistent. Scientists may accept conflicting hypotheses for different sets of facts, but this will not do for a philosophical account of science (p. 13).

Kant, who taught us the necessity of this anthropomorphism, taught also that its detailed application is determined by the nature of the given. So we find that, when we have alternative modes open to us of formulating the substance-cause schema, experience decides which one we adopt. Thus we can formulate events dynamically or kinetically. Either causes reside in the substances themselves, or they lie in the changes of substances (motions). The former view, dynamism, allows force to reside in a body and to act irrespective of where the body is, and thus permits action at a distance. The latter, kinetism, does not.

Before the choice is made, further concepts are developed in Section 2. (1) Quantity (extensive) is used for simplicity's sake. Qualitative differences leave us in the complex and are as explanations 'occult' (*verborgen*). We submit that this concept has not its origin in our experiences of self-willing, but is derived from external observations; it is not anthropomorphic. (2) All change must be reduced to motion, the only mode of inner experience suited to anthropomorphism; we do not experience how it feels to be red or fragrant, but we do know how it feels to move and how a substance can cause motion (p. 20). (3) Matter is a projection of the category of substance. (4) Action at a distance is a good consistent category. The axiom which supposedly contradicts it, that a body cannot act where it *is* not, does not tell us the meaning of 'where it *is*.' A body *is* where it exerts repulsion. Of course it cannot attract where it repels. But the axiom does not show that it may not attract where it does not repel, *i. e.*, at a distance (p. 31). We subscribe to this; but, again, this is no anthropomorphism, for we do not ourselves attract bodies to us. It is a matter of external observation. (5) Forces of attraction must act in a straight line; otherwise their direction is indeterminate. Here, too, we agree, but must deny the anthropomorphism. We do not feel ourselves to move in straight lines, but external perception furnishes them (though as illusions). Once for all, we must say that the anthropomorphic starting-point is infertile. The subjectivity of the scientific categories does not enable us to understand all their variety of meaning.

Another antinomy now appears. Is rest natural and motion alone to be explained, or is uniform motion natural and change of motion to be explained? Not self-feeling, but experience, shows that the latter permits a far simpler explanation of actual motions (p. 25). The views of dynam-

ism and kinetism are then developed. Since to the latter mass and elasticity remain 'occult' qualities (p. 45), the former seems, on experiential grounds, the better view. The next antinomy (Sec. 3) is between atomism and plerotism (continuism). Combining these with dynamism and kinetism, four alternative views appear. Dynamic plerotism does not explain the distinction of substances; kinetic atomism is inconsistent, since atomism must be dynamic (p. 53). The main objection to dynamic atomism rests on the dubiousness of action at a distance. Section 4 examines five possible ways of accounting for this by contact-action, and finds them untenable. As action at a distance is in itself tenable and dynamism is preferable to kinetism, we are driven to a dynamic atomism. Section 5 on "Chimæras" disposes of all theories which assert bunches in a continuum (*Klosssuppentheorien*, p. 93). Section 6 condemns Energetics. It either banishes substance and cause, — a psychological impossibility, if we are to understand anything, — or, keeping them, fails to explain their changes as atomism does. Moreover, since energy moves, it is not so different from matter after all.

The last two sections (Sec. 7 on Matter and Sec. 8 on the Ether) sketch the author's system of dynamic atomism, his *Naturphilosophie*. *Naturphilosophie* is a link between science and epistemology. The last states the demands to which all science must conform; it contains commands but no assertions. These have already been set forth. Science makes assertions, *e. g.*, the atoms of chemistry exist — alas, that they are too small to be verified by sight (p. 123, 147, 148)! *Naturphilosophie* shows under what hypotheses the facts asserted by science may be construed so as to conform to the demands, *e. g.*, the hypothesis of dynamic atomism. The atoms of this system do not exist, but are postulates or possibilities (p. 123). We have not space to outline the system; suffice it to say that it posits an atomic ether (p. 149) whose atoms are close to one another, agglomerations of which, in the form of hollow spheres, are our chemical atoms. These are practically indestructible on account of great surface-tension (p. 126). Gravitation is ultimate; affinity is a function of size and shape of the atoms (p. 128) and electrons are constituted by thinning or thickening of clouds of ether-atoms about a chemical atom (p. 157). A clear summary and a thorough and useful bibliography complete the book.

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Psychologie und Pathologie der Vorstellung: Beiträge zur Grundlegung der Ästhetik. Von RICHARD WALLASCHEK. Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1905. — pp. x, 323.

Wallaschek's name has been familiar to psychologists since the publication in 1893 of a series of essays on *Primitive Music*. The present work is likewise devoted to the æsthetics of music, but on the psychological and not the historical side. The author conceives æsthetics to be "die Naturwissenschaft vom künstlerisch geniessenden und produzierenden Men-

schen," and he announces in his preface that "die Methode, die wir bei solcher Forschung einzuschlagen haben, ist zunächst die der physiologischen Psychologie; unsere Untersuchung erstreckt sich aber auch auf das pathologische Gebiet und benützt die Ergebnisse normaler Erscheinungen, die beim Studium der Lebensfunktionen des Menschen dieselben Dienste leisten, wie die Vivisektion bei der Betrachtung seiner Organe."

It is peculiarly difficult to give in a few words the contents of the book. The work is most orderly but highly unsystematic, and its psychology stands much nearer the popular than the scientific type. The main subdivisions are as follows: I, Mental Expression and its Disorders; II, The Mental Life Itself (*Das innere Geistesleben*); III, Memory; IV, Natural and Artificial Disorders of the Idea; and V, Natural and Artificial Sleep (Hypnosis). The title of the book seems, to the present reviewer, to be both unfortunate and misleading. The book is a collection of essays whose dominant interest centers in music, — its production, its technique, its appreciation, its masters, its anomalies, its psychology, etc.; but it is not, as its name indicates, a monograph on the 'idea.' The first third of the book, *e. g.*, is only incidentally concerned with the 'idea'; it deals, instead, with various forms of motor expression (speech, song, writing, gesture, etc.) and their derangements, with special and frequent emphasis laid on 'musical' disorders and defects. Another long section (pp. 149–192) is occupied with 'secondary sensations' (for which the author offers a crude vaso-motor theory); a section which is, again, only remotely or incidentally connected either with the 'idea' (a term, by the way, which is nowhere properly defined) or with æsthetics. A similar criticism might be passed upon the part devoted to dreams and hypnosis (pp. 258–309). On the other hand, the book is full of interesting 'cases' and instances and illustrations and musical lore and well-classified bits of information, which will make it useful for reference on a variety of special topics. It contains, besides, a good account of the relation of 'musical' to ideational types (pp. 117–149).

I. M. BENTLEY.

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Der Begriff des Attributes bei Spinoza, in seiner Entwicklung und seinen Beziehungen zu den Begriffen der Substanz und des Modus. Von ERICH BECHER. Halle, Max Niemeyer, 1905. — pp. 61.

In this essay an attempt is made to throw light on Spinoza's doctrine of attributes by a study of the origin and development of this concept in his thought. Reference is first made to the influence on him of several historic systems, Judaistic theology, Scholasticism, and Cartesianism. Secondly, his writings are examined with especial reference to the doctrine of substance and attribute. The author reaches the conclusion that Spinoza, in the development of his views on this subject, passes through a series of positions from dualism to monism. But even in the *Ethics* he does not steadfastly adhere to the monistic view. Rather he relapses frequently into the Cartesian dualism, or even into a corresponding pluralism, in

which the single attributes are said to exist in and for themselves. The author makes no attempt to remove the contradiction which he thus finds in the Spinozistic philosophy. He regards it as an essential feature in Spinoza's thought, and hence not to be explained away. He believes, however, that he renders superfluous a theory like that of K. Thomas (*Spinoza als Metaphysiker*, 1840; *Spinoza's Individualismus und Pantheismus*, 1848), which attributes to Spinoza a deliberate falsification of his own views. Thomas held that the philosopher, in order to avoid danger and to make his system popularly acceptable, concealed his pluralistic pantheism under a monistic pantheism. Dr. Becher regards such an hypothesis as, on its face, highly improbable, because a monistic pantheism was liable to arouse as much hostility at that time as a pluralistic one. The fate of Giordano Bruno is witness of this fact. Moreover, he believes that he finds a satisfactory explanation of the existing contradiction in the origin and development of Spinoza's own views.

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The following books also have been received :

The Life of Reason or the Phases of Human Progress. BY GEORGE SANTAYANA. Vol. V. Reason in Science. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906. — pp. ix, 320. \$1.25.

Congress of Arts and Science, Universal Exposition, St. Louis, 1904. Edited by HOWARD J. ROGERS. Vol. I. Boston and New York, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1905. — pp. ix, 627. \$2.50.

The Philosophy of Religion : A Critical and Speculative Treatise of Man's Religious Experience and Development in the Light of Modern Science and Reflective Thinking. By GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. 2 Vols. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905. — pp. xx, 616; xii, 590.

Life and Matter : A Criticism of Professor Haeckel's " Riddle of the Universe." By Sir OLIVER LODGE. New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1905. — pp. ix, 175.

Comparative Religion : Its Genesis and Growth. By LOUIS HENRY JORDAN. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905. — pp. xix, 668. \$3.50.

The Testimony of St. Paul to Christ, Viewed in Some of Its Aspects. By R. J. KNOWLING. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905. — pp. viii, 533. \$3.00.

Science and Hypothesis. By H. POINCARÉ. Authorized translation by GEORGE BRUCE HALSTED. New York, The Science Press, 1905. — pp. xxxi, 196.

Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion. Von RUDOLF EUCKEN. Zweite umgearbeitete Auflage. Leipzig, Veit & Comp., 1905. — pp. xii, 452. M. 9.00.

Psychologische Studien. Von THEODOR LIPPS. Zweite, umgearbeitete und erweiterte Auflage. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1905. — pp. 287. M. 5.00.

- Masonia : Ein Blick in eine andere Welt.* Von DIEDRICH BISCHOFF. Leipzig, Max Hesses Verlag, 1905. — pp. x, 488. M. 6.00.
- Das Naturrecht und der Entwicklungsgedanke.* Einleitung zu einer positiven Begründung der Rechtsphilosophie. Von GUGLIELMO SALVADORI. Leipzig, Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1905. — pp. viii, 108. M. 3.00.
- Critique de la doctrine de Kant.* Par CHARLES RENOUVIER. Paris, F. Alcan, 1906. — pp. v, 440. 7 fr. 50.
- Maine de Biran.* Par MARIUS COUAILHAC. Paris, F. Alcan, 1905. — pp. viii, 304. 7 fr. 50.
- Les éléments sociologiques de la morale.* Par ALFRED FOUILLÉE. Paris, F. Alcan, 1905. — pp. xii, 379. 7 fr. 50.
- Les principes des mathématiques.* Par LOUIS COUTURAT. Paris, F. Alcan, 1905. — pp. viii, 311. 5 fr.
- Le caractère empirique et la personne.* Par LOUIS PRAT. Paris, F. Alcan, 1906. — pp. 452. 7 fr. 50.
- Le rêve : études et observations.* Par MARCEL FOUCAULT. Paris, F. Alcan, 1906. — pp. iii, 304. 5 fr.
- Le succès auteurs et public.* Par GASTON RAGEOT. Paris, F. Alcan, 1906. — pp. 228. 3 fr. 75.
- Principes de morale rationnelle.* Par ADOLPHE LANDRY. Paris, F. Alcan, 1906. — pp. x, 78. 5 fr.
- Les concepts de cause et l'activité intentionnelle de l'esprit.* Par A. BEL-LANGER. Paris, F. Alcan, 1905. — pp. viii, 242. 5 fr.
- La théorie physique : son objet et sa structure.* Par P. DUHEM. Paris, Chevalier & Rivière, 1906. — pp. 450. 8 fr.
- L'âme et le corps.* Par ALFRED BINET. Paris, Ernest Flammarion, 1905. — pp. 288. 3 fr. 50.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scholastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych. u. Phys.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*.—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

Über Annahmen. A. MARTY. *Z. f. Psych. u. Phys.*, XL, 1 u. 2, pp. 1-54.

In a former work (*Beiträge zur allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie*) the author divided the forms of psychic activity into three classes: (1) Ideas, (2) judgments (of acceptance and rejection), and (3) interest. Meinong ("Über Annahmen," *Zeit. f. Psy.*, Erg.-Bd. II, 1902) inserts between idea and judgment an intermediate class, viz.; assumption. The purpose of the present article is to test and criticise this new class of processes. Meinong uses assumption in a narrower sense than that of ordinary and ambiguous usage. He means the positing or feigning of something in order to draw consequences from it. The principle of classification here used is the same as that used by Brentano, viz., the mode of intentional relation to an object; after making an assumption we proceed 'as if' we believed it. In the class of assumptions Meinong includes many processes not ordinarily called assumption, *e. g.*, the representation of another's judgments, the attitude toward a story, etc. In assumptions the act of acceptance or rejection takes place without the conviction which accompanies judgment, while at the same time they are clearly more than mere ideas. This middle class is to be rejected (1) on grounds of antecedent improbability. Assumptions and judgments cannot form different genera of psychic processes, for in that case it would be impossible to give them the same species (acceptance and rejection). Neither is it possible to make judgments and assumptions species of a genus 'thought,' for there is no differentia for this genus. Meinong has given up his earlier position that conviction is intensity of judgment and now holds that, as a moment of judgment, conviction itself can vary in intensity. But this is

impossible, if conviction is to remain a moment of judgment and not to become an independent act. Degrees of conviction are to be understood objectively or subjectively. In the former case, the difference lies in the matter judged to be true, in its evidence or in a lack of opposition to the act of judging. In the latter case, it lies in the subjective appeal which the judgment makes to desires, to habitual tendencies of thought, etc. Conviction may, however, be used in a broad sense in which no degrees are possible; *i. e.*, as indicating the general character of all acceptance or rejection as distinguished from mere idea. Meinong denies that conviction in any of these senses is common to judgment and assumption, but does not supply the two with a common character. Activity does not constitute such a differentia of thought. Meinong's treatment of the evidence and obscurity (*Blindheit*) of assumptions is confused, for he denies them conviction, but allows them a relative evidence. This confusion arises from his failure to distinguish between the two meanings of conviction given above. The question arises, also, of the relation of the apodictic and assertorial characters to assumptions. It seems that certain assumptions must be regarded as apodictic, but Meinong denies to them the character of conviction. Since Meinong attributes acceptance and rejection to assumptions, he is forced to hold that in making opposite statements the mind takes opposite attitudes toward the same objects in the same relation. But if this is to be admitted, it can be ascribed as well to judgments as to assumptions. The relation which Meinong finds between assumptions and ideas is an objection to his theory. Assumptions have all the genetic laws and characters of ideas and all the descriptive marks of judgments. Descriptive peculiarities, however, are the more fundamental, and genetic marks attach to these as consequents. The false feelings and desires (*Scheingefühle und -begehrungen*) which Meinong assumes as analogous to assumptions (*Scheinurteile*) are open to all the objections urged against the latter, while the division of false ideas is a wholly anomalous class. The analogies, therefore, by which Meinong tries to support his class of assumptions, fail of their purpose. (II) A special class of assumptions is unnecessary. Negative concepts, which Meinong regards as explicable only by assumptions, can be explained as ideas of negations. Equally unnecessary is Meinong's view that an affirmative assumption is presupposed in every negation. All that is required is the idea of the affirmation of the content to be denied. Neither is assumption necessary in the formation of such ideas as contrary and contradictory, for these are ideas formed by reflection on predications and are not themselves predications. The representation of another person's judgments does not require assumption, for it is merely a non-perceptual idea of the content of the judgment and of the person judging, in which the attention may be directed particularly to the first. Explicit assumptions (such as are made in mathematics, for example) are not a special class of psychic processes, but are merely ideas of judgments from which we judge that certain conclusions follow. The idea may become

a judgment if we lose sight of the fact that we have posited it. Assumptions are not sufficient for art, as Meinong supposes, because conviction is a necessary element of all real æsthetic enjoyment. The false feelings and desires which Meinong connects with æsthetic assumptions are not to be found in experience ; for a time, at least, what is to give æsthetic pleasure must be accepted as real. Play, likewise, contains nothing which cannot be explained in terms of ideas and judgments. We must conclude, therefore, that all the facts which Meinong explains by his new class of psychic relations are as well or better explained without it.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

On Analogy and its Philosophical Importance. HARALD HÖFFDING.
Mind, No. 54, pp. 199-209.

It is a tendency of modern epistemology to find the validity of the first principles of science in their applicability to the task of relating phenomena. Truth requires not an identity but merely an analogy between principles and phenomena. Hence our knowledge is merely symbolic ; entirely different principles might solve the same problems. In another sense knowledge is symbolic. We think by means of images, and thinking is always the interpretation of a given material which is transformed in the process of thought. Moreover, thinking consists in a comparison of different domains of experience. It is, therefore, full of analogies. The formation of every concept proceeds by analogy. There is no identical element in all the individuals of a genus, but only a constancy of relation between the different qualities. Principles and axioms, also, are the products of analogy, as is seen in the reduction of qualitative relations to quantitative, and in the assimilation of all experiences to the form of reason and consequent. In special sciences, analogy has been manifested in the extension of such conceptions as 'undulation' and 'organism' to a wide range of phenomena. Science has grown by the application of concepts useful in one field to another set of facts, and the gradual adaptation of the concept to its new data. The problem of philosophy is to develop a view of the world as a whole. Can concepts be adapted from a part of experience and transformed to fit the whole? Analogy cannot work here, for the whole is never given. The attempt to reach such a total view can never be given up, but it should be made always with the critical consciousness that symbols can never be made into scientific systems. Idealism is the most important hypothesis here. Two forms are to be distinguished : Speculative idealism, which denies its debt to analogy and assumes thought as the necessary form of the real ; and metaphysical idealism, which admits that it is founded on analogy. Formal as well as material difficulties arise in the way of conceiving the world as a totality. Religion also works by analogy in its efforts to discover an absolute system of values in spite of the continual change of all particular values.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

Mr. Bradley's "Absolute Criterion." H. V. KNOX. *Mind*, No. 54, pp. 210-220.

The principle of contradiction, as Bradley interprets it, is self-contradictory. Every significant judgment is more than identical, and hence, according to Bradley, is untrue and self-contradictory. But, on this ground, the principle of contradiction itself, if it means anything, is untrue. Self-contradiction, therefore, is at once inapplicable to reality and a necessary feature of every true judgment. Moreover, the claim of the principle to be an absolute criterion can be attacked. For the contradiction in any given appearance must be real, if the principle is to be applicable; but if it is true, the principle cannot be true. If self-contradiction is possible, the principle is false; and if self-contradiction is impossible, the principle has no possible application. Bradley's argument needs to prove not so much that reality cannot be self-contradictory, as to show that appearance must be so, and this is not attempted. Otherwise the principle cannot claim to be a criterion of reality. As a criterion, it rests avowedly on the inconceivability of self-contradiction, and, accordingly, it represents appearance as at once antithetical to thought and reality. But if appearance be opposed to thought, it gains reality in the form of the thing-in-itself; and if it be opposed to reality, it is identified with thought. Accordingly, if self-contradiction be denied of reality, it must be denied also of appearance. A necessary law of thought, by its very nature, is incapable of serving as a criterion for distinguishing appearance from reality. Only experience can show that an alleged self-contradiction (in the sense of incompatibility) is really so.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

La science et le réel. L. DESVALLÉES. *Rev. de Ph.*, V, 9, pp. 257-277; 10, pp. 413-432.

Science is commonly regarded as dealing directly and solely with the real, while philosophy contents itself with airy abstractions. The latter foists its conceptions on reality; the former stands passively observant, concerned only to learn what is. This conception is as old as science itself, and has gained modern vogue in the philosophy of Comte. Does science, however, attain to the inner nature of the real? Is its method such that it can? The world of experience is given to us under two aspects: quantity, extensive or intensive, and quality. Science begins by viewing things in this qualitative aspect, but works away from that, and finally comes to regard them solely from a quantitative point of view. Quality, at first regarded as immediately given, as easily determinable, and therefore relatively unimportant, comes to be looked upon as accidental and superficial compared with the quantitative determination. Finally it is excluded from the real nature of things, and quantity is regarded as in some sort alone constitutive of their being. Where the vulgar says color, sound, etc., the physicist says movement and modes of movement. Movement necessarily involves the conceptions of principle and subject. It is, moreover, measurably

definable and spatially expressible. Body is thus reduced to merely extensive quantity and movement, be it simple change of place, or exhibited in chemical combination, even in the evolutive world development, to a simple spatial process. Science thus alters and impoverishes our conception of the world. The science of a world reduced to quantity necessarily postulates an absolute geometrical determinism. From a mechanical cosmos contingency, and consequently liberty, are excluded, and everything is brought under a rigid, absolute, and universal determinism. Such is the price of science. But is this the very inner nature of the real? On the contrary, quantity is exterior to the real and quality is constitutive and determinative of its real being. Science, operating on the phenomenal plane, analyzing the diverse outward manifestations of reality, and indicating a provisional order for the superficial movement of things, is forced to reduce quality to a mere subjective appearance, or make of it a metempirical phenomenon of a transcendental order. Quality is thus put beyond all scientific determination or even approximation. Science at least points it to a place beyond the phenomenal plane, and only symbolically hints at the deepest truth of being. In its own field, its results hold good of appearance, and appearance is appearance of the real. But the enormous success of science must not blind us to the fact that its results have not ultimate ontological value.

W. L. BAILEY.

PSYCHOLOGY.

Beiträge zur Lehre von der emotionalen Phantasie. R. SAXINGER. Z. f. Psych. u. Phys., XL, 3, pp. 145-159.

In an earlier article the author demonstrated the existence and ultimate character of imagined feelings (*Phantasiegefühle*), basing his proof on an analysis of the affective aspect of the general and verbal idea. Examination of the 'feeling abstractions' of Ribot, and the 'feeling generalizations' of Elsenhans reveals similar phenomena. The emotional quality attaching to the concrete substrate of a recollection presents the characteristics not of a revived or actual but of an imagined feeling. These characteristics are priority in time to the affective qualities of individual ideas, judgments, or assumptions; greater persistence, lesser sensitiveness to preceding affective conditions and slighter influence on succeeding ones; independence of the presence or absence of any individual idea or judgment of the recollection substratum (*Substratsvorstellungen*), general resemblance to the affective coloring of the original experience. Since these are the characteristics common to the imagined feelings of the verbal and general idea, the instances of Ribot and Elsenhans represent analogous processes. The problem of the origin of the associative link between imagined feeling and recollection substratum next arises. The imagined or feigned feelings in the illustrative cases offered by Ribot are similar in coloring to those correlated in the original perceptual experience with the assumptions (*Annahme*) which arise through the play of fancy. Since in recollection

they are independent of these elements, their adherence to the group of concrete supporting ideas is to be explained as a case of feeling transference, conditioned on the previous simultaneous occurrence in consciousness of the two sets of elements, ideas and assumptions. The transference consists in this case in the acquisition by the concrete supporting ideas of the ability to evoke the specialized predispositions of the imagined feelings. A third point concerns another elementary process, the imagined or feigned desire, which differs from the actual in its lack of any inherent tendency to realization, and in its ability to persist or reappear after gratification. This imagined desire possesses also the function of representing a previously experienced and realized desire.

ELSIE MURRAY.

Analyse de l'attention. M. SÉROL. Rev. de Ph., V, 12, pp. 597-620.

In voluntary attention motor inhibition and excitation play important rôles; the one in economizing energy, the other, directly or indirectly, in intensifying conscious process. Similarly, psychic inhibition and excitation operate to annul or further the formation of associations. Attention may be divided into two types, sensorial and reflective. The former manifests itself as the extension and enrichment of perception by means of the incorporation of new details and by successive fusions with new associations. Reflective attention may take the form of recollection or invention, each in turn subdividing into abstract and concrete phases. In concrete recollection, recall of images is mediated either by fixation and reinforcement of associated images or of general impressions relevant to the end proposed, or by the procedure of hypothesis. In abstract or rational invention, there is, first, analysis or extension of a concept through recall of associated particulars, or through the addition of new similars; and secondly, construction, or the discovery of new philosophical relations or the formulation of new concepts. Throughout, verbal, and above all, sensorial imagery, constitutes an important factor. In its formal or selective aspect, attention may be said to be governed through volition by a determining idea or memory image of the end proposed, and by the inductive judgment of the means appropriate to this end. In sensorial and reflective attention alike, reason and volition collaborate, either in the reinforcement of sensory characteristics, or in the control of the train of ideas and images. The feeling of effort arises out of this struggle of the rational faculties with psychic autonomy and the tendency to ceaseless flux.

ELSIE MURRAY.

Le rôle du jugement dans les phénomènes affectifs. V. GIGNOUX. Rev. Ph., XXX, 9, pp. 233-259.

The author tries to effect a reconciliation between the intellectual and physiological theories of emotion by emphasizing the function of judgment in the affective life. He believes that organic reactions are the direct causes of all emotions from the lowest to the highest; but he finds that these organic reactions are determined by judgments, and so concedes to the intellectualists that judgments are the indirect but final causes of all

emotions. Purely physical pleasures and pains involve the activity of judgment only after the rise in consciousness of the distinction between the Self and the not-Self. Before and just after birth, consciousness is purely affective, and during the whole of life there are many organic sensations which are at first exclusively affective. The rôle of judgment is seen in an exaggerated form in hypochondria, where slight disorders, wrongly judged to be symptoms of a disease, are developed into the disease with its accompanying pains, and in hypnotism, where suggested ideas and judgments implanted unawares in consciousness cause organic changes which may bring with them either pleasure or pain. Such emotions as anger, fear, shame, pride, and despair are based on the desire to live and increase one's activities. They depend more or less immediately upon judgments, for it is only when stimuli or situations are judged to be favorable or unfavorable to the preservation of life that those organic activities arise which are the immediate causes of the emotions. A similar chain of causes is found in the production of ethical emotions like remorse, indignation, and admiration. When we judge that certain actions conform to our ideas of duty, justice, or right, organic reactions are set up which in turn cause these emotions. Feelings of sympathy and aversion depend partly upon judgments of the moral value of our associates and the intellectual and æsthetic satisfaction we get from their presence and intercourse, partly upon unconscious organic hereditary tendencies independent of judgments. Often the conscious judgments and the hereditary inclinations conflict, and we have a sort of dual personality and a state of 'psychological misery.' Judgments of the meaning of objects and their fitness to express this meaning lead to organic reactions which cause the æsthetic emotions. These emotions thus depend directly upon organic reactions, and indirectly upon judgments. When we judge ourselves capable of examining any truth and give ourselves up to its investigation, the act of attention is accompanied by various muscular and organic sensations, the difficulty of the search and its success or failure involve cerebral activities which are sensed as pleasant or unpleasant, and from this complex of reactions, sensory, muscular, and organic, the intellectual emotions arise.

SAMUEL P. HAYES.

Das Ich im Traume, nebst einer kritischen Beleuchtung der Ich-Kontroverse.

C. M. GIESSLER. Z. f. Psych. u. Phys., XXXIX, 4 u. 5, pp. 294-313.

In everyone there are two opposite mental forces constantly operating, the tendency to adapt one's self to the outer world, and the tendency to preserve one's own peculiar characteristics in spite of the outer world. For the normal functioning of mind and body, these two forces must be kept in equilibrium. In dreams this equilibrium is lost, and the dream-self tries to regain it by a rudimentary sort of thinking which consists in seeking for known and tested items of past experience to which to relate the experiences of the dream. It is this attempt to regain the known content of

consciousness which is the basal tendency of the dream-self. In the dream state we are conscious of a series of sensations and ideas, and of the power to regulate them. Upon the former rests our belief in an objective world; upon the latter, our idea of a Self. Next comes the incorporation of the dream-self into a situation, and the building up of the idea of a dream body. The material content of the dream-self includes all psychical events of sufficient intensity to involve the activity of the motor centres, perceptions of external stimuli and of the motor reactions upon such stimuli, with recognition of the part of the body so reacting, ideas of the dream body in various situations, many ideas which are conceived as the product of the thinking activity of the Self as distinguished from thoughts put into the mouths of the other personages in the dream, various unstable ideas of one's own personality, and certain ideas carried over from the waking state. Equally incomplete is the formal content of the dream-self. The higher regulative norms of logic and morality, and the characteristic life purposes of the individual are almost wholly inoperative. Self-preservation, enjoyment, and escape from harm are the chief motives. Regulative ideas arise at the appearance of deep-going incoördinations which endanger self-existence and in effective dreams. They exercise a sort of attracting and repelling influence upon the association of ideas. Dreams show us the Self in process of forming; they represent a transition period in the evolution of the Self out of that embryonic state of impersonal sensation and confused ideas which characterizes subconsciousness, into the full consciousness of normal waking life. In dreams there is a dissolution of the bonds which hold mental elements together and a lapsing into a condition in which the Self is still interwoven with organic elements. This makes it possible to discover in the dream-self various bodily conditions and mental connections which, though quite unknown, yet play an important part in normal mental activity. Dreams founded upon such bases may sometimes give forewarning of coming organic or mental disorders, or even give an index of the future thoughts and actions of the individual. In the light of his investigations of the dream-Self, the author now replies to Ziehen's recent adverse criticisms of the theories of knowledge of Schuppe and Avenarius. In the regulative feeling of the dream consciousness, Giessler finds a third conscious element like that of Schuppe, — a formal regulating factor which works over the content of consciousness, the permanent 'substance' of the self. This feeling of a regulating influence emanating from the Self accompanies practically all our thoughts and actions. The author thinks Schuppe quite right in attributing to the principle of identity a certain 'prehistoric' character. We have seen that it is the basal characteristic of the poorly-developed dream-self to seek to regain its accustomed conscious content, that is, to identify its present fleeting dream-self with the permanent Self of the normal waking life.

SAMUEL P. HAYES.

Wundt's Doctrine of Psychical Analysis and the Psychical Elements, and Some Recent Criticism. I. The Criteria of the Elements and Attributes.
EDMUND H. HOLLANDS. Am. J. Ps., XVI, 4, pp. 499-518.

The purpose of this paper is to state Wundt's teaching concerning the nature of psychical analysis and the definition of the psychical element, with incidental reference to some recent criticism by Dr. Washburn. To this end it reviews in chronological order all the pertinent passages in Wundt's writings, which are found to group themselves conveniently into four periods, according to the place given to the feelings, — 1862-1880, 1883-1885, 1889-1895, and 1896-1902. This first section of the paper confines itself to the statements concerning the criteria of the elements and attributes. Dr. Washburn states that Wundt has not made clear whether by 'analyzability' he means simply independent variability or actual separability in experience; yet only the second meaning would justify his refusal to make his attributes themselves elements. The critic holds that by an attribute Wundt means a character of a sensation which neither has its source in, nor is influenced by, the context of the sensation; yet this definition is either insufficient to exclude *clearness* as an attribute, or else would rule out quality and intensity as well. In the light of the review undertaken, however, these criticisms seem inadmissible. For Wundt analyzability means separability, and what defines the element is the fact that while no breach can be made in it, yet it can be experienced in different contexts. And he actually uses four criteria to distinguish the attributes, instead of merely the one to which the critic refers. These are: (1) The necessity and also sufficiency of the two attributes quality and intensity to make the element structurally independent; (2) independent variability, which distinguishes the two attributes from each other; (3) the invariable connection of these two attributes with all elements in introspection; (4) their independence on the relation of the element to the complex. Wundt holds that clearness is ruled out as an attribute under both of the last two heads, inasmuch as the sensation comes above the limen before clearness attaches to it.

EDMUND H. HOLLANDS.

ETHICS AND ÆSTHETICS.

La philosophie sociale de G. Tarde. R. WORMS. Rev. Ph., XXX, 8, pp. 121-156.

The purpose of this article is to give a general view of the philosophy or sociology of Tarde. In his principal work, *Les lois de l'imitation*, Tarde maintains the possibility of a social science, finding in the 'repetition of social phenomena through the medium of imitation,' the general element necessary to the establishment of a science. Imitation, acting through the medium of education and conversation, plays in society a rôle similar to that of heredity in biology. It is the source of the analogies in the institu-

tions of different nations, often falsely ascribed to community of needs and nature. According to the first law of imitation, 'the superior is imitated by the inferior.' But this unilateral imitation afterwards becomes bilateral or reciprocal, and the inferior is also imitated by the superior. The second law of imitation is: imitation works from within outwards; the mental effect precedes the material. The theory of Tarde differs from that of Spencer in making the process of evolution a progress from heterogeneity to homogeneity; it accords with that of Spencer in emphasizing both the unification and the differentiation, the variety and the interdependence, *i. e.*, the 'coördinated heterogeneity' of the ultimate civilization. In *La logique sociale*, Tarde sets himself to support the theory of imitation by a theory of invention. The invention is defined as "a volition, judgment, or purpose, expressive of a certain amount either of belief or of desire." Inventions, as Tarde uses the term, are new ideas in æsthetics, religion, morals. The two factors, belief (or opinion) and desire, represent the two elementary social phenomena, and are capable of quantitative treatment by indirect methods, the psychophysical and statistical. Social logic deals with the conflict of opinions, and employs the syllogism of action. In this syllogism the major premise formulates a desire, the minor an opinion, the conclusion, a duty. But all desires do not terminate in action. They give rise to conflict and harmonization of ideas, from which result decisions. An invention is such a decision. While each invention is subject to the general law of historical development, it is not determined by necessity, but by the individuality of the inventor. In *L'opposition universelle*, Tarde maintains that the theory of competition is allotted too high a place in sociology, and is the least perfect means of adaptation. The harmonization, rather than the opposition of wishes, assures the conditions most favorable to the progress and existence of humanity. *Les lois sociales* coördinates the doctrines of the three above-mentioned works, and reduces the essential factors of society to three, repetition, opposition, adaptation. In *Psychologie et sociologie*, Tarde maintains that the key to sociology is to be found not in the comparative, but in the psychological method. In *La criminalité comparée*, he attacks the doctrine of the Italian criminologists, and maintains that the criminal represents, not an ethnical, but a professional type; *i. e.*, education and environment are the all-important factors in crime. In *Transformations du droit*, the development of the conception of private rights is sketched, demonstrating the gradual extension of the sphere of reciprocal rights and duties from the family to the nation, and ultimately to humanity as a whole. In *Les transformations du pouvoir*, political authority is shown to rest on 'opinion' and 'desire': so-called legitimate authority is based on opinion; tyrannical, on desire. Here, as also in *La psychologie économique*, Tarde applies his three principles of repetition, opposition, and adaptation. In the latter he insists somewhat too strenuously on the unimportance of competition, and on the limitation of capital to the sum of accumulated industrial ideas. He has

made similar application of his doctrines in the spheres of language, art, science, religion, and morals. In his private life he was tolerant of traditional religion and morals, indifferent toward socialistic doctrines, and, above all, enthusiastic in the elaboration and diffusion of the intellectual patrimony of humanity. While he exercised slight influence on his contemporaries, and leaves no school of followers, he has made, in his laws of imitation, a permanent contribution to sociology.

ELSIE MURRAY.

L'accident et le rationnel en histoire d'après Cournot. G. TARDE. Rev. de Mét., XIII, 3, pp. 319-347.

The title of the last of Cournot's important works, *Les considérations sur la marche des idées et des événements dans les temps modernes*, gives an idea of his philosophical treatment of the last four centuries. He studies the movement of science, philosophy, arts, institutions, civil and religious, and politics. Mathematics, he points out, was the earliest science to reach maturity, then physics and chemistry, next the natural sciences, and finally the social sciences. He continually tries to distinguish the accidental from the rational in history. Thus the Reformation was caused by the interruption of a humanistic transformation of Catholicism by a Luther and a Calvin. When one looks at it closely, there has not been a single revolution not the resultant of a series of accidental facts. A revolution is never a crisis. History tends, however, to free itself from disorder and become stable. But can we define in objective terms that relative stability towards which history tends? Cournot is mistaken in thinking so. The passage from a state of instability to one of stability can only be understood in a subjective sense. History is a great social argument. What happens in an individual mind happens in history. The state of agitation caused by conflicting ideas resolves itself into harmony and stability. So society tends always from a state of relative warfare to one of relative agreement, always with more or less fermentation. History presents itself as a series of interlacing problems, solved by the opposition of ideas or desires into reciprocal or one-sided adaptation. The history of language, religion, science, or industry shows a number of crises separated by periods of peace, gradually settling into quietude, as language, at first troubled and confused, becomes organized and relatively fixed. Previous to this warfare of the accidental and rational, there were in the prehistoric past, Cournot thinks, only uninteresting facts; and after the triumph of reason there will be but a succession of regular consequences unworthy to be called history. Accident, however, plays more than a transitory rôle; and, when the prehistoric first appears, it is picturesque and full of movement. An observer of a game of chess might call many moves accidental, had he no knowledge of the purpose of the players. So the movements of history, however diverse, are subordinated to interpsychic law.

C. WEST.

The So-called Hedonist Paradox. FELIX ARNOLD. Int. J. E., XVI, 2, pp. 228-234.

In their zeal to show that pleasure is not *the* end of life, moralists have often spoken as if it could not be *an* end of pursuit at all. The most familiar arguments are those drawn from the bodily limitations of sensual pleasure; here it seems clear that he who seeks pleasure shall lose it. But this argument confuses pleasure as *an* end with pleasure as *the* end; only by actually attaining the pleasures he seeks does the sensualist ruin his health. Moreover, man is no more capable of unintermittent virtue than of unintermittent pleasure. In pursuing pleasure, we aim at a concrete pleasurable condition of the self, not at a mere idea of pleasure. That pleasure has no psychological existence apart from the conscious self, does not prove it unreal; objections of this sort confuse pleasure as a 'thing-in-itself' with pleasure as an empirical reality. The pursuit of pleasure as *an* end, so far from being paradoxical, is a simple fact of experience.

F. D. MITCHELL.

Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen und sozialpolitischen Bedeutung der Naturwissenschaften, besonders der Biologie. W. SCHALLMAYER. V. f. w. Ph., XXIX, 4, pp. 495-512.

Recent sociologists have been very little interested in biology in the sense of a national biology. They confine themselves almost exclusively to national economy, and consider all other phases of sociology dependent upon it. But national biology is fully as important for the growth of nations as national economics, and its problems are not to be solved by the mere following out of social economic ideals. Now in Europe to-day is seen an antagonism between the growth of economic prosperity and that of population. The problem, then, for the biological sociologist is how to harmonize these two antagonistic tendencies. Sociology cannot then stand aloof from natural science as has been the case hitherto. We may trace the small progress of Chinese culture to a lack of interest and cultivation in natural sciences, while the Japanese, after the introduction of western technique and science, have become much more progressive and cultured. The growth of the mental sciences is due to the progress of the natural sciences. But it is an astounding fact how undervalued are the natural sciences, especially in Germany. In all schools natural science is slighted, and we find nearly all public offices filled by men primarily versed in the so-called mental sciences. It is said that a natural science interpretation of mental life takes away all human endeavor; that the application of Darwinism to social phenomena would lead to political quietism. Such complaints as to consequences have no value, and, moreover, a clear understanding of the theory of evolution proves this objection false. As to the objection that causality rules in nature, but finality in culture, we may note that Darwinism does not deny teleological action to the individual organism. Further, this distinction is too sharply drawn, and the so-called

fundamental opposition between the phenomena of nature and those of social life is based on an error. The study of biology, then, will do much to develop many hitherto neglected phases of sociology.

R. B. WAUGH.

La moralité de l'art. P. GAULTIER. Rev. Ph., XXX, 11, pp. 486-510.

Art almost throughout its entire history has been subjected to moralistic criticism. Religious leaders and moralists of many shades of opinion have decried its influence as immoral. On the other hand, there have not been wanting those who have regarded its influence as in the contrary direction. We must look to the facts and analyze æsthetic emotion. Our conclusion is that art must not be subjected to moralistic criterions. Beauty is a fundamental aspect of reality, and must not be smothered out under the application of a category from another sphere. Art is in itself neither moral nor immoral, but non-moral. It is the outcome of, and conduces to, æsthetic emotion. Any object is capable of being revealed as beautiful. If the art is pure, any object will do; but the moment it would teach or moralize, it is liable to, and must in justice come under, other standards of criticism. While in itself art is non-moral, it is not so in the sense of being so abstracted from life as to have no moral significance. Rather, in the beautiful object and in the æsthetic emotion or charm it induces, there is a suggested surety of the living transcendence of moral conflict.

W. BAILEY.

Mr. Balfour as Sophist. HENRY JONES. Hibbert Journal, III, 3, pp. 452-477.

The task of defining Mr. Balfour's real attitude towards natural science, naturalism, nature and spirit, has hitherto proved insuperable. Parliamentary dialectics in metaphysics have seemed to be as baffling as metaphysical subtleties in politics. His thought, however, seems to circle around the notion that the premises and the instrument of scientific or philosophical knowledge vitiate each other. His argument (*Foundations of Belief*, and "Presidential Address to the British Association," 1904) begins with non-rational conditions as constituting experience, for these *are* experience, as he tells us. It deduces from these conditions both sense-perceptions and reason; but the former are illusory and the latter defective, and this defective reason has nothing to work upon except illusions. It imposes upon science an impossible task; for out of these illusions and by means of a defective reason it is to extract from experience what experience contradicts, and to infer the spiritual from the natural. But, although its premises are illusory, its instrument is defective, and its task is impossible, all ends well. For science is bidden, and authorized, to borrow the conception of a Deity, — bidden by the needs of our ethical, religious, and æsthetic experience, all to be regarded as authoritative because they rest upon 'authority.' Then science is made to recognize within itself the need of this Deity, and permitted to define the Deity in accordance with

its own needs ; and ethics and religion and æsthetics are granted the same privilege. Thus, at last, we get all we can desire, namely, a world directed so as to answer to all our preconceptions, and with science, ethics, art, religion all reconciled. How comes it about that theology can be made to yield whatever science may happen to want in order to help it to the right conclusions, and that science, itself, demands just those things which theology can yield? Science and religion are reconciled, but is it possible that their contents are defined by reference to one another? It must be charged that Mr. Balfour has adopted, not the method of scientific or philosophic, but of uncritical, thinking : it is the method of the Sophist, who employs reason, not in order to discover the truth, but to prove his prejudices. According to the idealistic view, natural science is attempting to interpret an aspect of a world which is intelligible, and therefore a manifestation of reason. From this point of view, justice to the facts of nature demands a spiritual postulate. With this method that of Mr. Balfour is in sharpest contrast ; for it is unsystematic, uncritical, dogmatic. For him, apparently, science is the drunkard who teaches temperance by exhibiting the horrors of drunkenness. It is at the same time the naturalistic negation of religion and the guide to religion : an atheist proving the existence of God.

MATTIE ALEXANDER MARTIN.

NOTES.

The Senatus Academicus of the University of Edinburgh has appointed the Rev. Professor Flint, D.D., LL.D., Emeritus Professor of Divinity in the University, to be Gifford Lecturer on Natural Theology from October, 1907, to October, 1909.

Professor James Seth, M.A., of the University of Edinburgh, delivered the Dunkin Lecture in Sociology at Manchester College, during the autumn term of 1905. The subject was "Principles of Social Ethics : Individualism and Socialism."

Messrs. Houghton, Mifflin, & Co., have recently issued the first volume of the Report of the Congress of Arts and Science, held at the Universal Exposition, St. Louis, 1904. The entire Report will be in eight volumes and is edited by Howard J. Rogers, A.M., LL.D. Volume I contains a History of the Congress by the Editor, The Scientific Plan of the Congress by Professor Münsterberg, and the Proceedings of the Departments of Philosophy and Mathematics, making an octavo volume of six hundred and twenty-six pages. The price is \$2.50 *net*.

We give below a list of articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals:

MIND, No. 57: *Bernard Bosanquet*, Contradiction and Reality; *Norman Smith*, Avenarius' Philosophy of Pure Experience, I; *W. H. Winch*, Psychology and Philosophy of Play, I; *Henry Rutgers Marshall*, Presentation and Representation; *A. E. Taylor*, Truth and Consequences; Critical Notices; New Books; Philosophical Periodicals; Notes and Correspondence.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL, IV, 2: *Ameer Ali*, A Moslem View of Christianity; *R. H. Newton*, Outcome of the Theological Movement of Our Age; *James Troup*, A Japanese Buddhist Sect; *Henry Jones*, The Working Faith of the Social Reformer, II; *Sir Oliver Lodge*, The Material Element in Christianity; *F. C. S. Schiller*, Faith, Reason, and Religion; *E. Armitage*, Who Makes Our Theology? *James Iverach*, Christ and Cæsar; *F. S. Turner*, Do I Believe in the Resurrection? *St. George Stock*, Infinity; *A. S. Furnell*, Religious Knowledge as a School Subject; *W. Manning*, Are the Clergy Honest? *G. H. Fox*, The Plea for Mysticism Once More.

THE MONIST, XVI, 1: *Ferdinand Lindemann*, On the Form and Spectrum of Atoms; *W. S. Andrews*, Manifestations of the Ether; *D. T. MacDougal*, Heredity and the Origin of Species; *C. J. Keyser*, Mathematical Emancipations; *Editor*, Fechner's View of Life After Death; *G.*

Gore, A Scientific Sketch of Untruth ; Criticisms and Discussions ; Book Reviews and Notes.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, II, 26 : *F. C. French*, The Relation of Psychology to the Philosophy of Religion ; Discussion ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News ; Index.

III, 1 : *W. E. Hocking*, The Transcendence of Knowledge ; *J. A. Leighton*, Psychology and the Logical Judgment with Reference to Realism ; Societies ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

III, 2 : *Henry R. Marshall*, The Nature of Feeling ; *John Dewey*, The Terms 'Conscious' and 'Consciousness' ; Discussion ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE (1905).

I.

PRAGMATISM, which has been making such a stir in English-speaking countries, has presented a somewhat different aspect in France. It was favored by the earlier works of the 'neo-critical' school, of which Charles Renouvier was the head. This school has always ardently defended the doctrine of free will. It is with this school that we must connect the work of M. Boutroux on *La contingence des lois de la nature* and *L'idée de loi naturelle dans la science et dans la philosophie*; and M. Boutroux's ideas have, in their turn, exercised a great influence on the epistemological conceptions of M. Poincaré, his near relative and friend. Something of the same indeterminism is found in M. Bergson's doctrine; and when these writers are considered as a whole, it is evident that they belong to the same movement of thought,—the reaction against Hegelianism, and the cult of science which has dominated in France since the decline of the metaphysics of the school of Cousin. And it is known that the theories of MM. Le Roy and Wilbois, in their turn, are related not only to the scientific doctrines of M. Duhem, but also to M. Bergson's philosophy, although the latter has distinctly refused to subscribe to them in their entirety.

By a very natural affinity of ideas, which we now understand better after a lapse of years, it was also the neo-critical school which introduced Mr. William James to French philosophy. His reputation in France dates from his studies on 'Effort,' published in *La Critique Philosophique*, edited by M. Charles Renouvier. It has sometimes been said that M. Bergson received his primary

impulse from Mr. James, and that he, in turn, must have been influenced by M. Bergson's metaphysical ideas; and recently the reviewer of the Congress at Rome reproduced this idea in the *Revue Philosophique*. But M. Bergson has written to M. Ribot, editor of the *Revue*, to point out the incorrectness of this appreciation. "The report of the congress," he says, "presents as an accidental and local fact, and as the result of a combination between a *French philosophy* and an *American psychology*, a movement of ideas which, for some years, has appeared to some extent everywhere, and which results from causes that are of deep and general significance. The need is felt by a great many thinkers in all countries of a philosophy more truly empirical, and more closely allied with the immediately given than was the traditional philosophy, which was elaborated by thinkers who were primarily mathematicians. When I wrote *Les données immédiates de la conscience*, I only knew Mr. James by his excellent studies on 'Effort' and 'The Emotions.' I had not even read the article which appeared in *Mind* in January, 1884."

We must, therefore, regard all these similarities as the expression of the same general state of mind. We do not yet know how it is that some ideas are 'in the air,' but we can no longer doubt that they are there. The very name 'pragmatism,' which was invented by Mr. Peirce and popularized by Mr. James, was created anew in France some years ago by M. Blondel, who then knew nothing of the sense in which it had been employed by either of the others. M. Blondel is the author of a suggestive and vigorous work entitled *L'action*,¹ which is mainly religious in character though greatly influenced by M. Boutroux's philosophy. Its aim is "To discover what is involved in our actions, in the ultimate recess, where unconsciously and even in spite of ourselves we support existence and cling to it." He starts with a criticism of philosophical dilletantism quite analogous to that which Mr. Peirce follows in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear."² But he does not continue in the same manner, and his conclusion is very dif-

¹ *L'action, essai d'une critique de la vie et d'une science de la pratique*, by Maurice Blondel, former pupil of the Normal School, Fellow in Philosophy, and Doctor of Letters, Paris, Alcan, 1893.

² *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. XII, pp. 286 ff.

ferent. Rejecting all philosophical formalism, he puts his trust in moral experience and consults it directly. He thinks that moral experience shows that action is not wholly self-contained but that it presupposes a reality which transcends the world in which we participate. Finally, he maintains that we are unable, as Pascal already said, either to live or to understand ourselves by ourselves alone. So that unless we mutilate our nature by renouncing all earnestness of life, we are necessarily led to recognize in ourselves the presence of God. Our problem, therefore, can only be solved by an act of absolute faith in a positive religion (Catholicism for M. Blondel). This completes the series of acts of faith without which no action, not even ordinary daily acts, could be accomplished, and without which we fall immediately into absolute barrenness both practical and intellectual.

Such is the doctrine to which he gives the name 'Pragmatism.' In 1902, when the first number of the *Vocabulaire philosophique* was prepared according to the method which I described in this REVIEW last year, the proofs of the word 'Action' were naturally sent to M. Blondel. His doctrine was there mentioned, and, inasmuch as it admitted the existence of a reality above intelligence not reducible to concepts and going beyond understanding, I called it an 'alogism.' He wrote then to the Philosophical Society: "Far from opposing or preferring action to knowledge and seeing in it something alogical, I consider: (1) That knowledge is a partial epitome of the former (reduction, projection, inadequate plan or anticipation); (2) that the progress of action causes the progress also of thought, as the progress of thought conditions and determines the progress of action. Thus, in a wheel which advances by turning, the spokes sometimes precede, sometimes rise above, sometimes follow, and sometimes support the axle-tree; some turn backward while the others go forward, and this regressive movement is one condition of the propulsion of the whole system. Just so intellectual reflection is a moment of the general dynamic of life. . . . Just as the name 'physical' is applied to the object of a science which deals with what is by nature sensible without being entirely or directly perceptible by the senses, so to desig-

nate the object of a science which would methodically study and systematize actions in such a way as to show all their particulars and to unite them with determinism, which is intelligible, though at first not recognized, the word 'pragmatic' would be suitable, and the term 'pragmatism' might be applied to the doctrine which would consider the philosophical problem from this point of view as from a centre of perspective."¹

This proposition was, however, very coldly received, as is seen in the Report of the Society: "It seems to me," the general secretary said in reading the above letter, "that we might accept this word, which is new in philosophy, and which would escape the danger of equivocation incurred by 'action.'—M. Brunschvicg: "I am not entirely of that opinion. By accepting M. Blondel's term we are led into his domain, and give a kind of consecration to a doctrine which in reality we do not admit."—M. Rauh: "The objection seems to me just. One must not accept formulas which imply the legitimacy of beliefs considered as superior to intelligence. . . . In short, for this school the higher source of truth is unconscious. Intelligence, before being clear intelligence, presents itself in an unconscious and synthetic form. That is an interesting idea and one of which we must take account. We 'live' intelligence before thinking it. But is a special word necessary to designate this idea?"—M. Couturat: "It would seem that the word 'activity' in the classic sense, as distinguished from sensibility and intelligence, might be applied without ambiguity to the idea in question."

One sees how the word and the thing seemed new and unusual three years ago. When they began to become popular, I begged M. Blondel to explain to us how he had come to choose this expression. "I decided upon the name 'pragmatism,'" he replied, "as early as 1888, and I was quite conscious that I was coining it. . . . In *L'action* (p. 204 *et passim*) I pointed out the difference between $\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$, $\pi\rho\tilde{\alpha}\gamma\mu\alpha$, $\pi\omega\iota\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$, and I have chosen this name 'pragmatism' in order to specify the exact nature of my study."

French pragmatism, as may be seen from the fragment quoted

¹ Published in the appendixes of the *Bulletin de la Société de Philosophie*, 2d year (1901-1902), pp. 190-192.

above, has always maintained an intimate connection with religious ideas. M. Bergson confines himself to a spiritualistic metaphysics, but he is surrounded by disciples who go further and who make every effort to bring him to the confessional faith. M. LeRoy seems by method to avoid mixing mere apologetics with criticisms which he addresses to rationalistic science; but his religious philosophy is well known, and, indeed, he makes no secret of it. M. Wilbois, more imperious and contentious in spirit, ended his work on *L'esprit positif* by conclusions which were entirely religious. By his theory of action and scientific liberty he implies morality; by this morality a spiritual authority which is a teaching power, a power subordinating the intellectual to the moral, a power "which destroys ephemeral spontaneity in the interest of true liberty." A Church with dogmas, sacraments, a liturgy; the eucharistical ceremony which symbolizes the communion of souls and actualizes our participation in the permanent resurrection of Christ,—such appear to him to be, not exactly the necessary deductions, but at least the normal complements, of a pragmatic view of knowledge. *La Revue de Philosophie*, which is directed by ecclesiastics, recently extolled pragmatism as a means of proving orthodox beliefs. In the July number (which opens with a fragment by Mr. James, in which philosophy seems somewhat underrated as compared with religion), this *Revue* thus develops the benefits of the method which judges doctrines by their effects. "The advantages of the pragmatic system are numerous and are evident enough without being insisted upon, especially in abstract discussions. We are accustomed to judge a tree by its fruits; this is only a new and more systematized form of the old argument *ex consequentiis*. This system solves a great many difficulties in philosophy; it explains the necessity of principles marvellously. We desire them, we want them, therefore they are necessary, just as bread is necessary to sustain corporeal life. It solves directly the problem of psychological liberty where the means to the end are not necessary. The existence of God, Providence, and Immortality are demonstrated by their happy effects upon our terrestrial life, and the proof has the advantage of being

simple and comprehensible to any one who knows the rudiments of history. . . . Have not the scholastics always defended, perhaps rather by instinct than reason, the identity of truth and goodness: *bonum=verum*? If we consider the matter carefully, it will be seen that the Good is the useful; for not to be good in anything, is synonymous with being bad, and everywhere the true is the useful. It is in this assertion that pragmatism consists." ¹

This represents the most exaggerated form of pragmatic fideism. It is clear that there would be few philosophers, even among the most religious spirits, who would be willing to subscribe to such a declaration. But even the excesses of the theory have been useful, by awakening, a little tardily perhaps, the feeling among rationalistic thinkers that there was something to be done, and that the movement of scientific criticism menaced not only the extremes of intellectualism.

In M. Brunschvicg's *L'idéalisme contemporain* one may profitably read in this connection the chapter entitled: "La philosophie nouvelle et l'intellectualisme." There the author refutes pretty thoroughly some of M. LeRoy's more extreme propositions by endeavoring to show that rational intelligence is much more pliant than the adversaries of reason would wish to believe. On the other hand, the men of great learning who were named as sponsors of this 'new philosophy' have more and more testified what reservations they make, and how greatly their conclusions differ from those which are currently attributed to them. M. Poincaré has followed *La science et l'hypothèse* with a second volume called *La valeur de la science*, of which the title is sufficiently characteristic. "When we discover the place held by hypotheses in the sciences," he wrote in the preface to the first work, "we ask ourselves if all these constructions are well founded, and we believe that a breath would destroy them. Yet to be sceptical in this way is still to be superficial; to doubt everything and to believe everything are two equally uncritical modes of solution, both of which free us from the necessity of thinking. If such were the case, science would be powerless;

¹ Dessoulavy, "Le pragmatisme," *Revue de Philosophie*, VII, p. 94.

but, in fact, we see its conclusions verified before our eyes. That would not be possible if it did not reveal to us something of the nature of reality." It is this thought which is further developed maintained in *La valeur de la science*. It is here not only expressed in a logical manner, but takes the form of a profession of and practical and moral faith in the validity of reason. "When I speak here of truth, I of course wish to speak first of all of scientific truth; but I also want to speak of moral truth, a single aspect of which is justice. It may seem that I misuse words in thus uniting two objects which have nothing in common under the same name. It may be maintained that scientific truth, which rests on demonstration, cannot in any way be brought into relation with moral truth, which depends upon feeling. But, nevertheless, I cannot separate them, and those who love the one cannot but love the other. In order to discover either of these truths, one must strive to free one's mind completely from prejudice and passion, and must attain to absolute sincerity. Once discovered, these two kinds of truth afford us the same satisfaction; both, as soon as they are perceived, shine with the same brilliancy, so that one must either see them or close one's eyes.

"It must be added that those who fear the one will also fear the other; for there are people who in all things are interested primarily in consequences. In a word, I connect the two kinds of truths, because the same reasons make us love them and the same reasons make us fear them."¹

Let no one mistake the term 'profession of faith,' however; all the third part of the work is a justification of it. And it is at the same time a rehabilitation of 'social discourse' and a strong criticism of the somewhat anarchistic individualism which dominated philosophy some years ago. You remember the ingenious and subtle force with which M. Bergson urged the importance of what is ineffable and unique in experience in *Les données immédiates de la conscience*. The deep-lying ego, the true ego, does not lend itself to the exigences of the social life nor to language which is its expression; in order to find it, we must forget words, give up communicating with each other, and

¹ Introduction, p. 3.

free ourselves even from the idea of communication. The word is stable, brutal, banal, common ; to name experience is to falsify it and make it a dead thing. "If we lived a purely individual life, if there were neither society nor language," we would approach that ideal state analogous to a dream in which we should know reality as it is in its true nature "extraordinary and alogical."

M. LeRoy goes still further in this direction, and applies to physical science itself what M. Bergson maintained concerning the spiritual life. He holds that all science is a well-made language, a combination of formulas, a '*discours*' which deviates from the real in proportion as it is better organized and more nearly perfect. To make a discovery is to break this deadening crystallization at some point, to regain contact with reality, to feel the true nature of the object known to be individual and singular like the knowing subject. Such was the thesis which has been currently called 'scientific nominalism.' (I do not, however, think the name was quite just. What we really have is an anti-logism, related on the one hand to the hostility to discursive thought which Jacobi and Schopenhauer affected, and on the other hand to an intellectual pride and the same contempt for the flock of sheep and parrots which the Nietzsches and the Gobineaus have professed). It is that against which M. Poincaré protests. The real, he says in substance, is the objective, and the objective is community among thinking beings. The only criterion of reality is comparison of individual thoughts. The real is not manifested, like Spinozistic truth, by a feeling of direct contact ; it is only established *a posteriori*, and is defined solely by what is common to different minds. There is no reality in the amorphous and indefinable mass which constitutes the mental content of an individual. The very idea of an external world proceeds from the social postulate of knowledge which makes into a *thing* independent of you and me that which is the common element of our representations. Accordingly, nothing is more respectable than that famous '*discours*' so long anathematized. It was the classical philosophers, on the contrary, who were in the right in identifying God, the

Word, and Reason. Consequently, "no 'discourse,' no objectivity. Whether we take the ethical, the æsthetic, or the scientific point of view, the result is the same; nothing is objective but that which is identical for all. Now one can only speak of such an identity if a comparison is possible and can be translated into a 'standard of exchange' capable of being transmitted from one mind to another. Nothing will then have any objective value except that which is transmissible by 'discourse,' that is to say, intelligible."¹ Yet is not this construction common to all external and illusory, since it does not touch things but deals only with their relations? Not at all! To say that science can not have objective value because it only makes known relations to us, is to reverse the true order of ideas, for the relation is the very type and origin of objectivity. "External objects, for which the word object has been invented, are really objects, and not transient and imperceptible appearances, because these are not only groups of sensations, but groups cemented by a constant bond. It is this bond and this bond alone which is object in them, and this bond is a relation."²

Therefore when we ask what is the objective value of knowledge, this means: Knowledge makes us know the real relation of things; and by real relations we can only understand this: relations which are the same for everybody. "The essential fact is that there are some points upon which all those who are familiar with given experiences may agree,"³ and that this agreement is permanent notwithstanding appearances. "To sum up, the only objective reality is constituted by the relations of things; and from this results a universal harmony. It is obvious that these relations and this harmony could not be conceived outside a mind which perceives and feels them. But they are nevertheless objective, because they are, will become, or will remain, common to all thinking beings."⁴

One could not wish a stronger expression of modern rationalism. I may perhaps be excused for having insisted so much on this point, not only because of the intrinsic interest in the sub-

¹ Poincaré, *La valeur de la science*, pp. 264, 265.

² *Ibid.*, p. 266.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 271.

ject, but also because for ten years I have often urged the social character of objectivity, and sometimes before a philosophical audience which was singularly unsympathetic.¹ I am greatly rejoiced and have good hopes of the progress of philosophy by finding this theory confirmed by a great contemporary scholar who has doubtless been led to it by very different paths.

M. Poincaré's book has this year most energetically vindicated the rights of the understanding, but it has not stood alone. M. Milhaud has just combined a number of contributions into one volume, entitled : *Etudes sur la pensée scientifique chez les Grecs et les modernes*. He prefaced the volume with a general study on "L'idée de science," which also takes as point of departure the exaggerated claims of contemporary fideism, and which shows from what point he refuses to follow this doctrine. Borrowing from M. Durkheim an expression and a concept which he employs primarily in ethics, M. Milhaud rests the whole idea of knowledge on the existence of *normal* thought. This he does not exactly define, but its collectivistic nature is seen from the use which he makes of it. "Science is made by all the resources at the disposal of the human mind leading to a kind of *normal objectivity*, whose pursuit alone constitutes in the last analysis the essential mark of scientific effort."² Science does not consist exclusively of facts. It was only a narrow positivism which could for some years maintain this barren idea. But that which the mind adds to facts, in interpreting them and acting upon them, is not an arbitrary and convenient classification in which the tendencies and various tastes of individuals play with perfect freedom as in a scherzo. There is freedom in the ways and means, and order in the result to be attained. "These different tendencies may coöperate in a single truth which is valid for all in proportion as they are able to find a *normal response* in the minds of all, and

¹ See *Revue Philosophique*, May, 1902, and especially *Bulletin de la Société de Philosophie*, May, 1903 ("Sur l'apparence objective des perceptions visuelles"). I tried to express the general theory of intelligence implied by this view in *La Dissolution*, Chapter IV. : "Dissolution psychologique." The title is unfortunately chosen. I was wrong to follow Spencer in that, who opposes dissolution to evolution, and consequently to individualization. A more exact term would be : "Assimilation psychologique."

² *Etudes sur la pensée scientifique*, p. 2.

when these tendencies are directed by the scholar with the scrupulous desire to reach an objectivity which surpasses him. The mind is like an instrument with a thousand strings. To make it vibrate in unison with all men, it is not necessary to strike any unique chord; it is only necessary to try to have all the vibrations normal, the harmony pure, the chords exactly attuned, so that only an imperfect instrument is incapable of reproducing them." ¹

The criterion of knowledge is therefore "that formulated assertions are found to be justified by reasons which are *normal enough to be accepted by every man of sound mind*, to whatever order of ideas these ideas may belong." ² In this sense the discovery and the demonstration of even a single fact, such as the date of a document, is truly a work of science. History thus reënters the ranks of science from which it was excluded by the current definition in a somewhat paradoxical manner. Ethics itself can take this form and thus escape by the same criterion the indeterminism of individual faith. This is brought about (as we hold) by the fact that our moral experience "is more and more regulated by normal principles, — not by principles which *are* actually recognized by all, but by the principles which our practical reason in the course of its development points out to us as those that ought to be recognized by all. . . . We desire that by our efforts the ideal postulates of human conduct should be formulated, as the fundamental principles regulating the attitude of the geometrician and physician are formulated in their speculations concerning the universe." ³

The same criterion is applied finally to religious truth itself. The guiding idea of religion, the future possibility of universal communion, is also that of science. Under this influence dogmas are constantly losing their importance by becoming the more and more plastic symbol of an inner feeling which recognizes all men of good will. In this way, divergences become less "by allowing the unity of the human consciousness, which is another name for reason, to express itself more and more each day." ⁴

Mr. James wrote in *Mind* last year that M. Poincaré and

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 17.

M. Milhaud were pragmatists. And in a certain sense he was right; but it is evident that the specific differences are here more important than the genus. The thought of both men is doubtless related to the pragmatism of Mr. C. S. Peirce. They would agree with the theory (at bottom rationalistic) which he has maintained in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" and in some articles in the *Monist*. They differ greatly — and the difference is increasing — from Mr. F. C. S. Schiller, M. LeRoy, and M. Wilbois, and from all the fideist party of the pragmatic school, of which we have spoken earlier.

II.

The same effort towards the rehabilitation of a rationalism which shall be acceptable to the modern spirit, is shown also in the ethical movement, which is becoming more and more active, and whose character is now shown more distinctly than it was at first. The first attempts were theoretical and individual. This year there has been a tendency toward the concrete, that is to say, to the organization of a well defined moral system of education.

Circumstances render this task very necessary and very difficult. Parliament has just voted the separation of Church and State. It is difficult to know who really desired this, the Catholics or their opponents. Both, perhaps; for while both are bemoaning it for form's sake, both parties have acted as if they wished it. It is still more difficult to know where it will end; but it has produced for the moment an atmosphere of defiance and tension in regard to religious questions which has extended to all related fields. Twenty years ago the relations of philosophy and religion were, in our country, dominated by a benevolent scepticism, which allowed liberty of thought to all, without detriment to the amenity of individual relationships. The orthodox Catholics, with rare exceptions, followed the rites of their religion, but refrained from discussing the subject with their relatives and friends; while the philosophers, on their part, respected the form of the spiritual life and moral feeling in religion, which they deemed often of practical value though a trifle antiquated. That was the time when Fustel de Coulanges, himself a very free thinker, nevertheless expressed a desire to be buried according to

the Catholic rites, "in order to give evidence of his high esteem for the tradition of his ancestors." The first blow to this amiable tolerance was given by the Dreyfus affair. For the most part, the Catholics, moved by a complex feeling of nationalism and anti-semitism, decided this question *a priori* without any historical examination of the facts. On the other hand, the spirit of critical discussion and intellectualism led to the formation of an opposite party, who insisted as a matter of principle that all sentimental belief and all practical interest should be eliminated from the discussion. Between the two parties the question was therefore much less that of the guilt or innocence of a man than that of the moral principle of thought : voluntarism and religion on the one hand, criticism and rationalism on the other. When the affair had subsided, the tension was relieved ; but the quarrel of the confessional education against laical education, and the question of the separation of Church and State revived the opposition. Hence the question which now confronts us under the most various forms : How found and establish, outside religious faith, a morality which can be taught ? For such a morality must be impartial among the different religions and systems of philosophy, so that its presence in scholastic programmes may not be tyrannical for any one, believer or unbeliever. Moreover, it is also necessary that this system of morality should have the power of appealing to reason in such a way as to gain influence over conduct, and also that its effects may be of such a nature as to fill the place of the divine sanctions by which the ancient religious morality was accompanied.

The moral movement this year has primarily found expression in collections of lectures and articles. I may mention as in the front rank a fine book by M. Séailles, *Education ou révolution*. At the beginning of this he has mentioned, as a characteristic *leit-motiv*, the title of his preceding work : *Les affirmations de la conscience moderne*. M. Séailles, Professor at the Sorbonne, is doubtless known to the readers of this REVIEW as a writer on æsthetics, as the author of *Leonard de Vinci*, of *Carrière*, and of *Watteau*. But he has another side familiar to the universities of the people. He frequently speaks to working men and in their

behalf. He devotes all his energy to the intellectual, artistic, and moral education of the democracy. He has faith in the people and in the possibility of making them the conscious instrument of reason. He has resolutely sacrificed to this task his personal interests and the academical honors to which he would otherwise naturally have attained. Hence his discourses have a tone of sincerity and energy, they are truly works of good faith, of hope and solidarity. I will also mention *Solidarisme et libéralisme* by M. Bouglé, a collection of lectures that were held at Montpellier, Toulouse, Bordeaux, and Montauban. Finally, an interesting collection of articles of the same nature may be found in a series published last year by the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* under the common title, "Questions pratiques." But these practical questions very often lead back to their point of support in theory, whether it be a question of the religious education of children, the rights of the father as opposed to the rights of the child, concurrence in the matter of education, or even the proportional representation of political parties.

The School of Advanced Social Studies organized this winter a course of lectures on the non-theological teaching of morality under the direction of M. Alfred Croiset, Dean of the Faculty of Letters at the University of Paris, and Professor of Greek Literature in this faculty. But the ethical question is at present so urgent and general that it cannot be restricted to specialists. M. Croiset opened this course the ninth of last November by a lecture which defined very well the state of the problem, and pointed out a solution of it.¹ Moral and just men, said he, disagree concerning the philosophy by which they justify their morality. There exists nevertheless for each epoch, and even in a form general enough for the whole of humanity, a body of morality which is not contestable. The moral ideal taught in the schools must therefore be that which, in the social domain, is impressed on the conscience of honest men to-day, outside the quarrels of sect or party. Doubtless this ideal is widespread and springs from

¹ This lecture appeared in the first number of a new review called the *Revue du Mois*, edited by Emile Borel, Professor of Mathematics at the Sorbonne (librairie Le Soudier).

the most diverse sources. The object of the science of morals is to reduce it to history and to discover the successive strata through which morality has been built up. But morality can be taught without entering into this history, as one teaches the child the language of his country — something equally traditional and social — without troubling his mind at the same time with studies of historical grammar and criticism of the imperfections which may actually exist in our manner of speaking. Likewise the State may constitute a non-theological and impartial morality which will influence the public conscience only, without affecting any religion or philosophy. A grave question remains, that of sanctions. What answer can be given to the man of ill will or even to the sceptic who will say: "Your teaching proposes to us a way of moral living that is good. But what if it please me not to conform to it? If I wish to revolt against the tyranny of the public conscience, what objection can you urge?" Three things: First, the legal sanctions. They are insufficient, it is obvious, but nevertheless they cover a large field. Then public opinion, whose power we learn better every day. Finally, our own conscience and reason which the progress of science tends constantly to maintain, stimulate, and render more delicate, although in its nature science is most objective and foreign to morality. There is a moralizing virtue in all study, in all work done seriously, thanks to the good habits of mind which this engenders. It is sufficient, therefore, to feel the moral need and not to deny its proper feelings by a superficial and verbal criticism. The rewards and penalties necessary to virtue are immanent in civilization.

M. Durkheim in a later lecture went still further: he wished to prove that both historically and practically *God is Society*, and that society, conceived in a positive manner, furnishes to morality all the supports one ordinarily expects from revealed religions. What is God for his followers? A Creator, a Sovereign, a friendly and terrible force in the midst of which we live, in whose image we are made, and to whom we owe language, the condition of thought, and the knowledge which enables us to act on the world. He is a mysterious force also, which transcends us and is the source of our union, a force whose will determines what is

good and bad for us, whose ways are unfathomable and whose final aims surpass us infinitely. He is the Eternal, who survives passing generations and maintains the continuity of their spiritual life. In desiring him, we only wish to attain to the highest realization of ourselves ; by separating ourselves from him, we fall into nothingness, we deny ourselves . . . Are not these indeed attributes of God ? And are there any of these that do not apply in the most literal way to the society in which we live ? Even the details of the rites of external worship itself can be explained by this identification. When we weaken morally, when we feel doubts, it is to God that we go to strengthen us, it is to his grace that we appeal to enlighten and fortify us. What does this signify, if not that feelings are weak and inconstant, and that the only means of animating and strengthening them is by calling out a solemn and collective assertion of them, by putting our mind in unison with the social mind where the center of the moral life and of the good will are maintained in a transcendent spirituality ? There is in civilization a powerful tradition, which is not inscribed on the individual organism, and which only results from the solidarity of minds ; the faithful have need of God, God has need of the faithful ; sacrifice supports the reciprocity of their relation. For barbarous people there is an ethnical God who fights against the neighboring Gods ; for civilized people there is only one God who makes all men brothers. The broadening of the social life has broadened the conception of God and has given rise to monotheism. The positivist cult of humanity, imperfectly realized, expressed, nevertheless, a most profound and truly religious thought ; for it is not God that disappears in humanity, it is rather humanity which discovers God in itself, and which does not for that reason adore him with any the less fervor.

There is, therefore, a rational basis for the connection of religion and morals, and we cannot secularize the latter without changing the character of religion at the same time. Finally, this change made, there is no other characteristic of morals which we ought to change.¹ Thus supported by reality which transcends the indi-

¹ Of course, it is a question here of the general characteristics of morality and not of the detail of its laws. M. Durkheim, on the contrary, sees many reforms which are desirable.

vidual, duty remains what it was for Kant. It cannot be reduced to any other terms, as is shown by the fact that it does not permit of being put in the balance with any other interest, even with scientific or artistic interests. It is categorical, and demands that it shall be fulfilled with respect, and for its own sake. Every act performed in view of an advantage may be materially conformable to the law, but is not for that reason moral. Finally, duty is a good thing which may be loved: it is addressed to one part of our being with which it may be identified, but on another side it transcends us infinitely. It exacts pain and sacrifice, it forces the individual to conquer and in some measure to surpass himself. To deny all that is to deny moral reality itself, as it is furnished us by immediate experience. To recognize it is to recognize also the necessity of an external basis which the history of morals and religion abundantly confirms.¹

M. Durkheim has numerous disciples, especially in the new philosophical generation. Moreover, his personal influence is tremendous. But this grandiose conception of morals and society has up to the present time met with a very emphatic opposition on the part of philosophers. Some see in it a dangerous resurrection of the metaphysical spirit. (M. Durkheim, however, has never expressly formulated his metaphysics, and holds to what he calls a spiritualism of fact, the non-coincidence and irreducibleness of the laws of the mental and social life in their relation to physical and biological laws.) Others see in it a social mysticism which would take away from the individual all proper value by subordinating him to collective aims superior to morality itself—as intelligible consequently as the impenetrable ways of the traditional God! Moreover, moral endeavor has not been lacking in other directions. M. G. Richard and M. J. Segond have published a general review on recent ethical works

¹ This lecture has not been published. I summarize it here from memory. It may be that I misrepresent this or that detail; but what I believe I represent exactly, and what everybody around me is impressed with, is the intensity of moral and religious feeling which resulted from it. In my article last year, I referred to the saying of M. Lévy-Bruhl that stranger as he was to the little church of Monsieur-le-Prince Street, M. Durkheim was yet the real successor of Auguste Comte, and, indeed, he delivered on that day the discourse of a High Priest of Humanity.

in two installments, in the *Revue Philosophique* of this year.¹ M. Landry, in his *Principe de morale rationnelle*,² attempts to set forth a moral doctrine which may also be a true science. He hopes to find the solution of this problem in an original method which is to give the authority of practical reason as a form to morality, and the pursuit of pleasure as subject matter for this morality. Placing thus in a clear light what is implicit in Stuart Mill and Spencer, he shows us how the respect for reason, conceived as an irreducible principle and entirely autonomous, can give to the pursuit of pleasure a universal value, and enable us to pass from the individual to the social standpoint. Instinct reveals to us the value of pleasure, and reason approves it; but in approving it, it imposes its own specific condition, which is to make no difference between individuals, to judge between myself and another as I would judge between two others. This is not the place to discuss this theory; I will only remark that it has a transitory character, so to speak, and that it seems to require a more ultimate synthesis. For if reason has the right to impose its conditions on the instinctive love of pleasure, has it not also the right of criticising this instinct, and of rejecting the very principle of pleasure, even though universal, if it is found to conflict with rational finality, with the supreme value which is shown in the authority of reason?

M. Belot, in a series of articles in the *Revue de Métaphysique*³ has criticised in succession all the contemporaneous theories of ethics, in his attempt to reach certain conclusions, which may serve as a basis for ethical teaching. I do not wish to dwell on

¹ January and May, 1905. Among others they make abstracts of the works of Höffding (*La morale*, a French translation); of Roberty (*Nouveau programme de sociologie, introduction à l'étude du monde surorganique*); Albert Bayet (*La morale scientifique*); Mauxion (*Essai sur les éléments et l'évolution de la moralité*). To these we must add the courses of ethical studies published by MM. Pécaut, Dugas, Cantecor, and a great many other works or pamphlets on the same subject. It is quite certain that the center of philosophical activity in France still rests on that point.

² Paris, Alcan, 1905.

³ "En quête d'une morale positive," *Revue de Métaphysique*, January, 1905, and following numbers. These articles will very soon be published in one volume. I am able to state their conclusions through the courtesy of the author who has kindly communicated them to me in advance.

his discussion of metaphysical ethics, of Kantian ethics, of utilitarian ethics, and of sociological ethics; the interest of his articles is primarily in the doctrine which he wishes to establish. By a positive ethics, he understands a morality which is neither a simple pedagogical art, on the one hand, nor a pure science of manners or even of moral judgments, without pretension to regulate conduct, on the other. Our point of departure is precisely the antinomy of idea and fact, of external rule and conscience. The problem is to bridge the abyss which separates learning from acting, knowledge from will. How can this be attained? At first by analysis of the facts of morality as they are given to us. Morality is formulated and explained, not created. (This point, which was not appreciated by the eighteenth century, but already brought forward by Kant in the preface to his *Practical Reason*, appears to me to command the assent of all French philosophers at the present time.) Therefore the first step ought to be to take cognizance of what morality is; it is a matter of induction. Humanity wants something which morality expresses. And it desires this very strongly; for we constantly see the greatest sacrifices made for the realization of this end, at the expense of pleasure, health, and the happiness of individuals. This end, often unknown even to those who are most devout, and which induction alone reveals to us *a posteriori*, is the social life. But it is not sufficient to state in this way the will of humanity; for once the secret is revealed, might not this instinctive moral will become like the will to live of Schopenhauer, which is destroyed in coming to consciousness of itself, by discovering the tremendous dupery of which it is the victim? No, we need not fear that this will happen when the idea of the good is revealed. In reflecting upon it, we necessarily accept the principle when we discover it, because life in society is the common condition of all aims, the necessary means and antecedent of all that we can ultimately wish. There can be no reasonable liberty except in society. Whatever you may wish, you therefore wish this first of all, and consequently your reason once enlightened cannot fail to approve the strong impulse of conscience and moral sentiment. From the strictest pedagogical point of view, concludes M. Belot,

ethics thus understood is seen to be capable of furnishing a satisfying moral discipline. It is efficacious, for it is based on deep-seated feeling, constantly supported by the social life. It presents an aim sufficient to arouse and sustain our activity; for society is yet very far from being society in the full acceptation of the term, and we perceive clearly the great value of improvements which might be introduced into it. It is capable of rousing our minds and wills, since more than anything else it justifies the effort in a real and practical form. It rejects by its objectivity the dangerous sophisms of subjectivism, of internationalism, and of special self-culture, and, while taking account of the real, it allows full liberty to individual initiative. It is therefore the proper morality for a true democracy which demands at the same time action and reason.

Such are the principal tendencies which the morality of the present time shows. Among the special problems of morality and politics, there is one which occupies a large place in public interest: the problem of patriotism, of peace and war. As M. Charles Richet¹ has justly remarked, progress in the social domain is often so rapid as to outrun the interests of philosophers. Such has been the case in the antipatriotic peace movement. Its beginning dates from M. G. Hervé's² book entitled *Leur patrie*. This movement has also been currently called 'Hervéism.' Hervé himself maintained, however, that his book only contained the watchword of a quite spontaneous and popular philosophy which he had learned from workmen and peasants. 'Leur Patrie' means the country of the burgesses, the rulers, and the rich. For them there is one country, because society is truly their good mother; she guarantees their fortunes, lands, manufactures, and houses of commerce. They are right to defend her. But for the workman, without patrimony or fixed interests, and living only by his work, the idea of country is a pure absurdity. His compatriots are the workmen of all countries. He

¹ "La paix et la guerre," *Revue Philosophique*, February, 1905.

² Hervé was professor of history in a secondary institution. He was obliged to abandon his career on account of the anarchical character of his doctrines. The readers of this REVIEW doubtless already know of the recent trial in which he was the principal defendant.

has nothing to lose or gain in the political confusion of the European map, and consequently has only one thing to consider : that war is a menace to his work, to his life, and to that of his children. He will, therefore, oppose it by every means, without caring at all about the duperies which they adorn with the name of national interest or political honor. And if a gun is put into his hands, he will refuse to march to the frontier and use it against other proletaires as unfortunate as himself. He will turn his arm first against his real enemies and cause a social revolution.

This appeal to the military strike has been adopted by all the socialist party. It even excited a momentary enthusiasm among the masses of the peace party, which, however, was very soon chilled by obvious reflections. The recent trial of the anti-militaristic protest, which was terminated by a severe sentence against the author, has not sufficed to revive faith in this somewhat too naïve solution of the problem of war. But there remains a more serious aspect of this problem, and its echo was heard in the discussions of last winter. M. Charles Richet, in the article already cited, refuted vigorously and in detail the well-known theories which maintain that war would develop individual dignity, the spirit of sacrifice and solidarity ; and assured peace would engender, on the contrary, the corruption and degradation of citizens ; and that history would condemn peace-loving people. The question of internationalism has been brought to the front by *L'Union pour la Vérité* (*Ancienne Union pour l'Action Morale*) which has just been reorganized with a new program. Already several reunions have been held in which MM. Paul Desjardins, Buisson, Darlu, Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl, Rauh, Belot, Andler, Pécaut, Brunschvicg, and the author of this article — to mention only philosophers — have taken part. M. Vandervelde, the Belgian socialist leader, and M. Lutoslawski, the well-known critic of Plato, have contributed their personal opinions concerning the causes and evolution of internationalism.

Finally, the question is scarcely begun, and I do not wish to anticipate the solutions which these studies will be able to give. Perhaps you will be more interested in the program of the reor-

ganization of this Society, — a program doubtless very symptomatic, for in a few weeks it attracted such a number of writers, philosophers, historians, business men, Catholic dignitaries, Protestants, and free thinkers that the organizers themselves were surprised to find such a response in contemporary conscience and good will.

“ 1. Name of the Association. Under the name of *Union pour la Vérité* there has been founded at Paris an Association for mutual philosophic and civic education.

“ 2. The object of this Association is : (a) To maintain among its members, by a discipline of judgment and manners, the perpetual liberty of thought which the investigation of truth and the struggle for the right demand ; (b) to uphold in public life, by its example and propaganda, the active love of truth and right, and to promote the adoption of critical methods in general practice.

“ 3. The Association aims at exercising its criticism freely in the various philosophical, religious, moral, social, political, and judicial domains ; and it therefore is forbidden ever to adhere definitely and without reserve, as an Association, to any church, any philosophical school, any political party, and, in short, to any grouping organized around a fixed doctrine.”

This appears to me very interesting and also very characteristic of a state of mind which belongs at the same time to the two movements which I have analyzed in this article. On the one side is decided rationalism, on the other the defence of morality undertaken anew in essential principle by the scientific spirit, and with absolute sincerity. One of the first publications of the Union was an extract from M. Poincaré's book *La valeur de la science*, from which I quoted some passages above. This concerned the energetic vindication of the self and the duty of subordinating to it everything else. “ The pursuit of truth ought to be the aim of our activity : it is the only aim which is worthy of it. Doubtless we must at first exert ourselves to solace human sufferings, but why ? Not to suffer is a negative ideal, and would be more surely attained by the annihilation of the world. If we wish to free man more and more from his material needs, it is in order that he may employ his recovered liberty in the study and contemplation of the truth.”

III.

We may conclude with some remarks about the works which are less directly dependent upon one or the other of these great movements. I will mention at first in psychology the series of articles published by M. Georges Dumas in the *Revue Philosophique*. The last especially is very characteristic in spirit and method. It is entitled "Le préjugé intellectualiste et le préjugé finaliste dans les théories de l'expression." This title might lead to a misconception. What he understands by intellectualism is not in any respect the opposite of fideism. The article is rather a criticism of voluntaristic prejudices. His thesis is as follows: Before making appeal to all the conscious reasons and final causes by which Darwin, Spencer, Wundt, and Mantegazza have attempted to explain the expression of the emotions, one must first of all exhaust all that can be learned from the simple mechanical point of view. It is needless to have recourse to the principle of useful habits to explain the dilation of the nostrils in wrath, or the wrinkling of the eyes in smiling, if this dilation or this wrinkling can be explained by a simple diffusion of nervous discharge which sets in motion the most mobile muscles or those whose connections facilitate common action. The principle of Dumas is therefore opposed by its Cartesian character to the principles ordinarily invoked in such a case, and can be summed up somewhat in this way: "The fundamental phenomena of expression reside in the general variations of the muscular tonus, and where this variation consists in an increase of tonicity, the discharge takes place along the lines of least mechanical resistance."

It is obvious how thoroughly intellectualistic this thesis is, inspired as it is by a truly scientific belief in the logic of things, in the possibility of reducing the indeterminate to the determinate, the qualitative to the quantitative, complex phenomena to a combination of simple elements which the mind of the psychologist can apprehend objectively, and which are combined in reality exactly according to the laws of our rational thought. Those of our readers who would be interested in the detail of the experiments made by M. Georges Dumas, I can only refer to his articles, which he will soon republish in a single volume. But the con-

trolling idea of his work seemed to me sufficiently philosophic to be mentioned here in its relations to the entire analogous movement with which it is allied.

A number of very important works have also appeared in the field of æsthetics. Among the most noteworthy is *Essai sur l'esprit musical* by M. Lionel Dauriac, which makes a transition from the psychological to the æsthetic standpoint. This work represents very well the new method in æsthetics, upon which philosophers are beginning to agree, and which resembles the new methods in ethics. This consists in presenting the determination of the beautiful, not as a problem which can be solved *a priori* by a set of conceptions, but as the distant result of analysis of a special nature, psychological in form, appreciative in content, and which gradually leads us by careful observation of æsthetic facts to the explanation of artistic judgment. M. Dauriac proceeds as a methodologist who is at the same time a good musician. He distinguishes first of all psychological acoustics from musical psychology, then the musical ear from musical intelligence. He pauses in the study of the latter to define its degrees and evolution, and to discover its relation to imagination and memory. He goes on to apply the same technical and psychological method to the analysis of musical pleasure, and thus leads to the properly æsthetic question on whose threshold he stops for the time being, for he outlines later an explanation of the reasons why one musical form does better than another. Here the pure judgment of appreciation begins.

In the *Revue Philosophique* a group of articles dealing also with questions of art have appeared. Madame Vernon Lee has written "Sur la méthode introspective d'observation individuelle dans l'esthétique." This deals with descriptions of æsthetic emotions (painting and sculpture), minutely analyzed in all their psychological, physical, and mental bearings, and leading to general observations on observed facts. M. Jean Pérès wrote "Sur le réalisme et l'idéalisme esthétique." M. Paulhan has written "Sur la moralité indirecte de l'art" a very remarkable thesis and powerfully sustained: things do not always act according to their essence; art, such as it is, is essentially opposed to morality, but

in principle it comes from the same source, and by its effects is a precious auxiliary of it. M. Souriau, the excellent æsthetician of Nancy, in his new work entitled *La beauté rationnelle*, has maintained the very radical thesis that art is in all its bearings harmonious with morality, and that conflicts always arise either through an imperfection of the work itself or a prejudice of morals. His work is essentially normative. Alongside of this experimental science of æsthetics, which shows us what is admired by man or even by animals, there is another æsthetics which sets a problem of a very different order. What value have these preferences of taste? Are they directed to that which is in itself preferable? Do we admire what is truly worthy of being admired?

It is obvious that this problem is exactly the same as that which exists between rational morality and the science of manners. M. Souriau is concerned to prove that there is an æsthetic truth, which is at the same time a truth and judgment of value (these are his own terms), just as M. Belot tried to prove that there is a moral truth which presents precisely these same two characteristics. And the remarkable thing is that the solutions are not essentially different. Here are M. Souriau's three principal theses: Beauty consists in perfection, that is to say, in the evident conformity of things to their uses; degrees of perfection are measured by the relative value of the ends to be attained; the highest end which we can conceive is the complete development of the conscious life.

Thus, under all forms, logical, moral, and æsthetic, we are led to the affirmation of a judgment of fundamental value, discovered by induction and sustained both by its experiential origin and by its intrinsic evidence. The great human interest, the only one which can afford us lasting and genuine satisfaction, is the realization of the rational life, that is to say, of the social life, not merely in so far as it repeats the biological organism on a higher scale, but in so far as it is the condition of moral liberty and intellectual objectivity.

It seems, indeed, that thinkers of the most various antecedents, and who are most jealous of their entire independence, are, without concerted action, coming to agreement on this point.

Must we not admit that general philosophy, after so many incoördinate and fruitless movements, is beginning to discover in itself, as through successive stratifications, some really valid truths upon which we can henceforth find support? I earnestly hope and desire that this may be true. But for this very reason I ought to refrain from asserting it. Time alone can tell us if these stepping-stones are indeed what they appear to be, and if they have the solidity of the immovable strata upon which are slowly raised physics and biology, creating by degrees unanimity of view on the part of men competent to deal with these problems, which have been for a long time in controversy and subject to the conflict of individual opinions;—or if they are, on the contrary, merely provisional agglomerations, due to the accidental unity of the same time and environment, and destined soon to be dissolved like the great mountain ranges which the mists of morning form at the horizon of a hopelessly flat country.

ANDRÉ LALANDE.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.¹

THERE is an evident tendency in contemporary philosophical discussion to regard rationalism as a defunct method. We all recognize the shortcomings of traditional empiricism, and yet, in a sense, we are nearly all empiricists; for we practically agree that philosophy, like physical science, is really from first to last dealing with experience and with nothing else. But the case of rationalism seems wholly different; the high *a priori* road has become a byword, and serious students of the history of philosophy find much difficulty in thinking themselves back to the time when it could be calmly assumed that the order and connection of ideas corresponded in detail to the order and connection of things.

And yet, as a matter of historical fact, rationalism has died strangely hard. Even the cautious Locke, founder as he was of eighteenth century empiricism, was still enough of a rationalist to suggest a deductive treatment of ethics in a line with his own mainly rationalistic conception of mathematical method; while Kant himself, in the very act of transcending rationalism, was so much under the influence of that method that he practically retained the rationalistic conception of truth, with all the limitations that implies. And, strangest of all, in modern scientific methodology we find assumptions made, which, upon inspection, have a surprisingly rationalistic appearance. But of this later.

In order to understand either the original aims or the present significance of rationalism, we must free ourselves to start with from a popular, but strangely persistent, prejudice, viz., the view that rationalism was unscientific, while empiricism was scientific. It is to be remembered that not only were all three of the most prominent early rationalists profoundly interested in contemporary science, but two of the three, Descartes and Leibniz, were them-

¹ Read before the American Philosophical Association, at the Cambridge meeting, December 28, 1905.

selves scientists of very considerable reputation. As much could hardly be claimed for any one of the three most prominent eighteenth century empiricists, though in his theory of vision Berkeley was, of course, an important contributor to science. This is not intended as the slightest reflection upon empiricism, but merely as a passing reference to known facts. And when we consider the opposed methods themselves, it is only too evident that rationalism and empiricism were equally theories of experience, and that therefore neither could rightfully assume to speak for concrete experience as such. Moreover, as theory of experience, rationalism was quite as much interested in scientific methodology as was empiricism; but the science to which it mainly pinned its faith was mathematics, as was natural, since that was the science at the time most in evidence. It is true, we now agree that rationalism misconceived the nature of mathematical method; but so, for that matter, did empiricism, when it finally faced the problem. Indeed, as already suggested, so convincing was the rationalistic interpretation of mathematical method to contemporary thought, that it was inadvertently adopted in large part by Locke himself.

It would hardly be worth while, in the brief compass of the present paper, to attempt to dissect out the rationalistic thread that runs through the *Essay concerning Human Understanding*. The case is in no sense peculiar, but rather a typical instance of the difficulty which a pioneer in philosophy nearly always finds in differentiating his own method clearly from the methods employed by his contemporaries. At the same time, it is not to be forgotten that it was partly this very rationalistic tendency, of which Locke himself was doubtless unconscious, that concealed both from himself and from his contemporaries the destructive logical consequences of his method.

We must, however, pause to examine with some care Kant's relation to rationalism, which is much more difficult to define. His often quoted remark that it was Hume who 'woke him from his dogmatic slumber' is seriously misleading, not only because it emphasizes one influence at the expense of others only less important, but because it inevitably suggests that the transition from the 'pre-critical' to the 'critical' period of his thought was

at once abrupt and definitive. Such, however, was very far from being the case. On the one hand, Kant's 'dogmatic slumber' seems never to have been a very sound one, while, on the other hand, he cannot be said to have ever escaped from the trammels of rationalism himself, though he doubtless made this possible for his successors. It must never be forgotten that the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770,—commonly counted as the first of the writings of the 'critical' period, since it was here that Kant first developed his characteristic view of the nature of space and time,—was really written from the standpoint of rationalism. His original position seems to have been that, since space and time are subjective, in the sense of being pure forms of intuition belonging to the mind itself, it is most important to take account of this fact, in order that we may allow for it in the attempt to attain a truly objective or rational conception of the nature of ultimate reality.

The *Critique of Pure Reason*, however, did look like the death-blow of rationalism. The very arguments that Kant used in support of the validity of synthetic judgments *a priori* proved conclusively that, if such judgments were to be accepted as valid, they could apply only to the world of possible experience. But, for one starting with his presuppositions, this involved the fatal dualism of appearance and reality, phenomena and things-in-themselves. The whole form of experience is supplied by the mind; hence the pure forms both of intuition and of thought are, in the literal sense, 'constitutive' of experience,—though impotent to tell us one iota with regard to things-in-themselves.

But Kant was anything but a reckless theorist, and he did not relax his grip on reality thus easily. Since moral scepticism was impossible for him, and since, moreover, he was dogmatically certain that our moral experience must be of the real as opposed to any form of appearance, he held that we may postulate of the real, *i. e.*, of things-in-themselves, just so much as is necessary 'for purposes of Practical Reason.' Hence his well-known postulates of Freedom, Immortality, and God, which are treated as 'regulative' principles, as opposed to the 'constitutive' principles of concrete experience. We need to assume these 'regula-

tive' principles 'for purposes of Practical Reason,' therefore we do assume them; their practical necessity is their theoretical justification.¹

This thoroughgoing distinction between 'constitutive' and 'regulative' principles was, of course, fundamental to the Critical Philosophy as worked out by Kant himself, and we know from his own repeated statements that he regarded the recognition of this distinction as sufficient to put an end forever to the pretensions of dogmatic rationalism. But dogmatism and rationalism were not necessarily bound up together, and the 'critical' method, in its original form, may well be called an imperfectly critical rationalism. As regards the 'constitutive' principles, in so far as they are involved with Kant's own list of categories, frankly derived from the table of logical judgments, this is only too evidently the case. In truth, the older rationalism had only claimed that 'the order and connection of ideas' in some way corresponded to 'the order and connection of things.' Here we have the audacious attempt made to prove that quasi-logical relations actually constitute the form of concrete experience. But, without insisting upon the artificial character of Kant's particular

¹ It will be noted by the reader that, in the present discussion of Kant's use of 'constitutive' and 'regulative' principles, some liberty has been taken with the philosopher's terminology for the sake of simplification. Even the uncritical reader of Kant will probably have noticed that his use of the terms 'constitutive' and 'regulative' is neither uniform nor consistent. The present writer, however, is by no means insisting upon his own slightly different terminology, but merely employing it to emphasize a distinction which Kant himself is always anxious to make as clear and unambiguous as possible, viz., that between (1) those forms of intuition and functions of thought which, together with the productive imagination, determine the form of concrete experience, and (2) those rational assumptions which, though not implied by experience as such, are nevertheless necessary in order to explain both the moral order and the æsthetic and the teleological judgment. While Kant was certainly wrong in surrendering 'the world of possible experience' to the dominion of the mechanical categories, and therefore relegating morality to the supersensuous sphere, he was as certainly right in refusing to explain morality in terms of such categories. His positive and aggressive use of 'practical postulates' as regulative principles in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, — not to insist upon his more guarded use of analogous principles in the *Critique of Judgment*, — is so much more characteristic than his merely formal employment of the so-called 'regulative' principles in the *Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason*, and so much more significant for the development of philosophical methodology, that it has seemed desirable to adopt the terminology used in the text in order to abbreviate the discussion.

list of categories, which is almost universally acknowledged, it is easy to see that his whole attitude toward the problem was rationalistic. Our knowledge of the organizing functions of experience, *i. e.*, the categories—whatever these may turn out to be—must be obtained, not by actually dealing with experience, but by an abstract logical analysis of experience as such. Only thus can we hope to obtain a list of categories at once systematic and complete.

It is rather strange that Kant's confidence in his success should have been based upon his wholly justifiable assumption of the organic unity of experience. For, surely, if experience really is an organic whole, no one of its manifold constitutive principles can be understood or explained apart from its relation to all the rest; so the problem, instead of being the abstractly simple one that Kant supposed, plainly involves all the indefinite complexity implied in the very conception of that which is organic. Assuming that the organic character of experience is to be conceived in rational terms, the really 'constitutive' principles of experience must be so indefinitely complex as to require an infinite intelligence to comprehend them. In fact, strictly speaking, 'constitutive *principles*' is a contradiction in terms.

Turning now to the 'regulative' principles employed in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, we seem at length to be forsaking rationalism; for if traditional rationalism professed to do anything, it was to inform us with regard to the nature of reality, and it was precisely for this reason that it was so important to assume that the order and connection of ideas corresponded to the order and connection of things. But philosophical methods have strange vitality; and, in this case, the principles of dogmatic rationalism, even after they were shrunk to the three 'as ifs,' viz., Freedom, Immortality, and God, were still sufficient to form the basis of the most consistently rationalistic system of ethics ever formulated. For, surely, no professed rationalist—of those that have survived in the history of philosophy—ever went to the same lengths in separating reason from feeling and in placing the whole truth and meaning of morality in the super-sensuous sphere. After hastily surrendering the goodly realm

of 'possible experience' to the dominion of the mechanical categories, Kant claimed nothing less than the absolute nature of reality for the abiding-place of morality, though in this workaday world it might not find place to lay its head. It is true that our knowledge of the ultimate real is 'only for purposes of Practical Reason'; but what looks like a modest disclaimer is really of the very essence of dogmatism, since it means that neither we nor others may understand, but only believe.

Such, then, is the fatal dualism of the Critical Philosophy, if we look to the letter of the system and not to the spirit of the method involved. In the *Critique of Judgment*, of course, Kant made a serious attempt to bring appearance and reality into some intelligible relation; but the ambiguous conception of 'purposiveness without purpose' was by no means equal to the strain put upon it, and this very attempt to transcend the fundamental dualism of the system only made it the more evident. In fact, this last 'as if,' *i. e.*, 'purposiveness without purpose,' pointed rather to the subjective nature of the human mind than to the organic constitution of reality.

But the salvation of the Critical Philosophy — and of modern Idealism as well — lies in the regulative principles after all, futile as these seemed in their original application. Not that a more cautious use of the assumption of 'the primacy of the Practical Reason' can help us out of the speculative difficulties just mentioned. The perfectly justifiable assumption that, if anything has significance in this perplexing world, the moral ideal itself must have significance, by no means warrants us in holding that ultimate speculative difficulties are to be solved by the uncritical application of moral categories. The moral ideal itself must stand or fall with the organic unity of experience. In fact, the hard and fast distinction between Theoretical and Practical Reason is, in the last resort, as artificial as the metaphysical dualism of phenomena and things-in-themselves. If regulative principles have any significance, it is because they are, at least in some degree, essential to the procedure of reason itself, and not because they are convenient in some particular sphere of the employment of reason.

It is strange indeed that it was in his futile attempt to transcend experience that Kant first developed a practical method of dealing with experience. Moral experience, he tells us, is *as if* there were Freedom, Immortality, and God; to explain morality in terms of the mechanical categories is not to explain it at all, but to deny its very existence. We are not here concerned with the validity of this particular argument, but rather with the validity of the method involved. In dealing with experience, then, from the point of view of any science or discipline, — and plainly we can deal with nothing but experience, — our only justification for making any assumptions whatever, is that they promise to be practically helpful in organizing our knowledge; and the truth of these assumptions is precisely in proportion as they do thus enable us to deal effectively with experience, regarded from a particular point of view. Hence the ultimate justification of the nebular hypothesis, the principle of the conservation of energy, the theory of organic evolution, or whatever postulates we may finally adopt to explain the moral or religious experience, will be precisely the same, viz., that they enable us to think clearly and act efficiently, — and thought and action are, of course, in the last resort, not two things, but one.

But does this mean that we begin and end with ‘as ifs,’ even though these be not merely ‘for purposes of Practical Reason,’ but for all purposes whatever? I shall not urge that this would be a comfortless doctrine, for the comfortableness of ‘the will to believe’ has, as it seems to me, been unduly emphasized. We are here concerned not with edification, but with truth. The question, then, is: In what relation do these methodological postulates, these ‘as ifs,’ stand to reality? If reality is beyond and apart from experience, we have little enough reason to assume that they stand in any relation to reality at all. But this is an academical problem; for, in spite of our healthy differences of opinion, we are practically agreed that experience and reality are the same. Granting, then, that we have to do with experience alone, what do these principles mean in terms of experience?

The sophisticated scientist is inclined to be very non-committal at present, having come to realize that science has been reck-

lessly ontologizing in time past. That science, the exponent of experience, should have reduced experience to non-experiential terms, and claimed that such was the very nature of objective reality, is, indeed, a matter to suggest caution. In truth, our sophisticated scientist now goes to the other extreme, and tells us that any developed science is a symbolic affair, admirably adapted for dealing with experience, regarded from a particular, abstract point of view, but not professing to inform us in the slightest degree as to the true nature of reality. Now the sophisticated scientist may not be a philosopher, but he certainly is contributing his fair share of philosophical problems. What, then, do his methodological principles mean?

In the first place, they would not be really methodological or truly regulative, unless they had some very definite relation to the nature of experience itself, which we have agreed to equate with reality. Yet the relation is a perplexing one, for, as is often remarked, science becomes progressively abstract, while experience remains concrete. We ask for reality, and the scientist gives us symbols and ratios. But the case is not so hopeless as it looks. All unconsciously, the scientist is the true rationalist of modern times, who boldly assumes that 'the order and connection of ideas' — though not strictly corresponding to 'the order and connection of things' — yet affords an instrument for dealing with this order and connection of things, no matter how indefinitely complicated. And he has the advantage of his dogmatic predecessors, for he has proved to his own satisfaction, and to our admiration, that rationalism works.

How, then, once more, is this possible? It is too late in the day to assume 'preëstablished harmony,' even as a methodological postulate. Our conceptual dealing with reality *must* throw some light upon the constitution of reality itself. Shall we, then, after all, resort to Kant's conception of 'constitutive' principles? Shall we say that the 'regulative' principles of science and philosophy, while, of course, not strictly corresponding to the 'constitutive' principles of experience, nevertheless tend more and more to approximate to these with the development of the sciences or disciplines in question? In a certain

sense, yes ; but what *are* these 'constitutive' principles ? It would be ridiculous to assume that the instrumental or regulative principles of recent science or philosophy, representing, as these do, the net result of the intellectual coöperation of centuries, are to be tested by their correspondence with the 'constitutive' principles set forth by Kant or even by Hegel. For are not those 'constitutive' principles themselves precisely 'regulative,' in the sense in which we have used the term 'regulative' ?

We seem, then, to be forced to this discouraging conclusion, that 'regulative' principles can have no really philosophical justification except in so far as they presuppose, and in some sense correspond to, the 'constitutive' principles of experience ; and yet, from the very nature of the case, these 'constitutive' principles can never be formulated. As finite beings, we can only formulate general principles ; and no multiplication or concatenation of general principles can exhaust concrete experience. In truth, as science and philosophy advance, these principles become more and more abstract and schematic, and so seem to take us further and further from the reality of immediate experience.

Thus regarded, the problem is, indeed, not only difficult in the extreme, but insoluble. But the very existence of such a problem is a striking evidence of the persistence of rationalism even in recent thought. We demand of our scientific and philosophical categories or methodological principles that they shall directly, and, as it were, intuitively, inform us as to the nature of reality. Failing this, they are held to have only an abstract and schematic significance, and we perhaps take refuge in the conception of 'absolute experience,' — which, alas, though professing to be concrete, is more abstract still.

If, however, we drop this rationalistic conception of truth altogether, and realize that our methodological principles are meaningless except in their functional relation to concrete experience, the problem takes on a very different aspect. Every permanently helpful methodological principle, whether of science or of philosophy, does inform us with regard to the nature of experience or reality, and this in proportion as it tends to organize our knowledge and thus enable us to deal efficiently with experience ;

and, as each science or discipline becomes rationalized into a coherent system, by virtue of some unifying principle like that of the conservation of energy or organic evolution, we shall more and more be able to appreciate, from different points of view, the organic character of experience. Our particular laws of nature will not become less abstract in their formulation, and they will remain, as they should, 'hypothetical universals'; but every such law, as Professor Bosanquet has pointed out, must be understood as implying: 'The real is such that' — the formula in question holds.¹ Moreover, the formula itself will lose much of its abstract character, when we learn to think of it always in terms of the functional application to experience which alone gives it significance. We begin, then, with concrete experience, and we never forsake it, so long as our methodological principles are really helpful in our theoretical and practical dealing with experience. And it is not merely knowledge that is progressively organized, but experience itself, which involves implicit interpretation from beginning to end.

But can such knowledge claim ultimate validity? Is there a known goal to which it can forever approximate? This brings us to consider in closing the one ultimate methodological principle which implicitly underlies the whole procedure of science and philosophy, viz., the inevitable assumption of the organic unity and immanent rationality of the world. If this also seem like an abstract conception, let us remember that it points out the only intelligible way in which we can conceive the concrete itself in its totality. It may be called an ideal, and such it is; but it nevertheless represents the unifying and energizing principle of all that we have a right to call real. Professor Santayana has recently reminded us that reality itself has 'an ideal dimension,' and the phrase is a happy one; but we may go much further than this, and hold that the concrete ideal, — the world as a unique system, of which all particular methodological principles are functional expressions, — is the true and ultimate real.

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¹ *Logic, or The Morphology of Knowledge*, Vol. I, p. 282. Cf. p. 290, where Professor Bosanquet holds that, in so far as hypothetical judgments are made, "they must rest upon, and involve the affirmation of, properties of reality."

THE RELATION OF SCHILLER'S ETHICS TO KANT.

ATTENTION has frequently been called to the fact that certain leading features of Schiller's later thought appear more or less clearly revealed in the writings of his school period, and in certain other works which may be broadly designated as pre-Kantian. The full significance of these writings for the solution of the vexing problem of the relation of Schiller to Kant has not, however, I think, been sufficiently recognized. A careful comparison of these early writings with those written under the Kantian influence will reveal one fundamental motive running throughout them all: the stream of the poet's thought, we may say, was only clarified and deepened, rather than turned into other channels, by contact with the Critical Philosophy. The one problem which seems to have been uppermost in his mind in the academic dissertations,¹ particularly, but also in some of the minor writings both of the school period and afterwards, was to conciliate, as it were, the different factions or interests in human nature, and to offer some sort of mediating term by which the chasm which was supposed to exist between the natural and the spiritual might be spanned. This middle term he had in his metaphysical writings found to be a substance which partook in a way of the character of both the physical and the spiritual, — *Mittelkraft*, he called it, — a substance at once penetrable and impenetrable, and thus equally susceptible of being acted upon by the material world and of acting upon spirit. He came early to inquire into the comparative importance of the mind and the body, and, between the extreme 'idealists,' who regarded the body as only a prison-house of the spirit, checking its flight toward perfection, and the extreme 'materialists,' who treated knowledge and virtue as only a means to happiness, and who held that the whole perfection of man consists in "the amelioration and perfection of the body," Schiller was concerned to maintain an intermediate position; and,

¹ *Die Philosophie der Physiologie*, 1779, and *Ueber den Zusammenhang der tierischen Natur des Menschen mit seiner geistigen*, 1780.

while holding spirit to be the higher term, he undertook to champion the rights of that part of our nature which, as he thought, had been underrated, and to show, by appealing to the actual development both of the individual and of the race as a whole, "the great and real influence of the system of animal feelings upon the spiritual life." This great importance he found to consist not only in the biological function of the preservation of the organism in an unfavorable environment, but in the fact that it was through the influence of these same animal feelings and impulses that man's spiritual nature is developed from its lowest and most primitive to its highest forms. Body, in short, is the indispensable companion of spirit in this present world: "Man has to be an animal before he can, like Newton, dare the flight through the universe."¹ Almost at the same time that we find Schiller seeking to mediate between the natural and the spiritual by the aid of the intermediate metaphysical agent, we have occasion to notice another attempt at this mediation by the forms of beauty. The problem here is the refinement of the primitive and merely natural instincts of the savage until they become the instruments for the production of the noblest qualities of the human spirit. "Music softens the savage breast, beauty ennobles morals and taste, and art leads man to science and to virtue."² In the essay, *Die Schaubühne als eine moralische Anstalt betrachtet*, some four years later, the æsthetic state is characterized as an intermediate condition, a gentle harmony into which the tension due to the one-sided activity of our sensuous or our spiritual nature is resolved; and we find the author insisting in a rather one-sided way on the pedagogical value of art, recommending it in the highest terms as an instrument of intellectual and moral education. It is in the contemplation of the forms of art that there is induced that happy condition in which the spiritual is mixed, as it were, with the natural, the former being humanized and softened, the latter refined and spiritualized in the process.

Having thus traced Schiller's rather persistent attempt to maintain an intermediate position between an extreme natural-

¹ *Werke*, Goedeke ed., Vol. I, p. 158.

² *Ibid.*, p. 156.

ism, on the one hand, and a one-sided spiritualism, on the other, we are somewhat prepared to anticipate the attitude which he will finally assume toward the rigorism of the ethical system of Kant. That this attitude is one of independent criticism and that it marks an advance upon the Kantian position, that this advance, finally, consists in a fuller recognition of the desiderative side of man's nature, — all this must be the broad result of an unbiassed reading of Schiller's later writings. The broad result: for when we come to determine precisely some special aspects of Schiller's moral doctrine, or attempt a definite formulation of his relation to Kant, the problem is by no means a simple one, and the reading of the different writings of the post-Kantian period yields no single or unambiguous result. Nor will the careful reading of the extensive literature which has been written on the Schiller-Kant problem help us materially. Writers of equal ability have arrived at the most diverse conclusions, from those who, like Drobisch¹ and Meurer,² maintain that there is no essential difference between Kant and Schiller at any point of the latter's development, to those who, like Grün,³ and Kuno Fischer,⁴ find a radical divergence between their views from the outset, — a divergence which results in the complete repudiation, on the part of Schiller, of the moral point of view, and in the substitution for this of a purely æsthetic ideal.

The fundamental question at issue would seem to be, whether Schiller conceives the progress of human development as passing from the natural through the æsthetic to the moral stage; that is, whether he conceives the æsthetic condition as one in which man is merely freed from the bonds of physical necessity, and thus made capable of realizing his moral ideals, or whether the progress is rather from the natural through the moral stage to that final condition in which man is not merely natural or merely moral, but in which every part of his nature will have its due. If we find that the question cannot be answered one way

¹ *Ü. d. Stellung Schillers zur Kantischen Ethik*, in *Ber. ü. d. Verh. d. k. sächs. Ges. d. Wiss.*, Leipzig, 1860.

² *Das Verhältnis der Schiller'schen zur Kant'schen Ethik*, Freiburg i. B., 1880.

³ *F. Schiller als Mensch, Geschichtsschreiber, Denker u. Dichter*, Leipzig, 1844.

⁴ *Schiller als Philosoph.*, 2 ed., Heidelberg, 1891-92.

or the other without qualification, the clear formulation of it will at least aid us in the reading of the passages, and in arriving at some sort of result.

It is quite impossible to gain an adequate comprehension of Schiller's historical significance as an ethical thinker unless the poetic quality of his nature and his æsthetic point of view are clearly apprehended and constantly kept in view. This æsthetic interest, which manifested itself in the earliest metaphysical writings in the effort to harmonize various antitheses, reveals itself in the ethical writings in the two distinct judgments which Schiller passes upon human conduct, one from the point of view of morality, the other from that of the æsthetic observer. The double demand which Schiller invariably makes of an act or a character is grounded upon two fundamental traits running throughout his entire nature. There was in his make-up, to quote the words of Windelband, "that wonderful blending of the artistic spirit in which lay his affinity with Goethe, and of the strenuous character in which he resembled Fichte, and which prepared him, as it did Fichte, for the understanding of Kant."¹ The deep vein of the heroic or Stoical in his nature was tempered and refined by close contact with the Greek spirit into which his study of classical literature had brought him; and, while he always retained what seems to be almost an inspired enthusiasm for the morally heroic, he also developed that exquisite sensitiveness for the external shapes of beauty, a shock to which could not be atoned for by any act or situation, no matter how self-forgetful or sublime. The full recognition of this dualism in point of view will help to clear up those passages in which Schiller seems prepared to accept without qualification the Kantian position that the only proper motive for a moral act is respect for the moral law, but in which he is no less intent on demanding recognition for those inclinations without which, as he sometimes says, the character can perform isolated moral acts, but can never attain to complete moral perfection. Man, that is, has other than merely moral interests, and while for purposes of logical analysis we may separate man's moral interests from his

¹ *Geschichte d. neueren Phil.*, Vol. II, p. 248.

æsthetic or other interests, and pass judgment on an action or a character first from one point of view and then from another, such a separation is never actually made in practice, and man has as much right to demand that an act shall satisfy his æsthetic sense as that it shall measure up to the ideals of morality. And his æsthetic sense is never satisfied, if the moral act is accomplished only after a severe conflict and at the sacrifice of a part of the entire nature. If such a struggle is inevitable, the sensitive observer, at least, has a right to demand that its ugly features and uncouth traces shall be hidden from his view. This two-fold attitude which the spectator may assume toward human conduct is clearly illustrated by the whole tenor of Schiller's writings, and is explicitly recognized in more than one place. Thus, in *Anmut und Würde*, after describing the expression reason requires of the human features as belonging to a moral being, he goes on to say: "But man as phenomenon is at the same time an object of sense, and when the moral feeling is satisfied, the æsthetic sense will not consent to a sacrifice of its own interests; the agreement with an idea must not lessen the beauty of the phenomenon. Thus, as much as reason demands an expression of morality, just so persistently does the eye demand beauty. Inasmuch, then, as both these requirements, though made by two distinct judgments, address themselves to the same object, both the one and the other must be granted satisfaction by the same cause. The disposition of man which fits him best for fulfilling his mission as a moral being must also permit an expression that will be most advantageous to his beauty as a phenomenon. In other words, the aptitude of his moral activity ought to reveal itself by grace."¹

Another precaution may not be out of place here, and may save us from much unnecessary confusion. I have just alluded to the fact that under conditions the moral struggle will be inevitable, and referred to the demand which the spectator may, even then, make of the agent in such a time of moral stress. Now a careful discrimination must always be made between those passages in which Schiller speaks of an ideal which is suited to our

¹ *Werke*, Vol. X, pp. 92-3.

present state, and which the conditions, as they exist here and now, permit us to realize, and an ideal, on the other hand, which man may approximate more and more, but which, owing to the limitations of human nature, is forever beyond the possibility of complete attainment. The distinction will be supported later by reference to passages in point. It was thought necessary to call attention to it explicitly at the outset; for only by keeping it clearly in mind can we hope to introduce some order and consistency into what may seem at first sight a hopeless confusion and a fundamental contradiction in Schiller's writings.

The complete blending of moral and æsthetic interests, so characteristic of Schiller, is nowhere seen more clearly than in *Anmut und Würde*, to the examination of which we must now address ourselves. Schiller was just fresh from his investigation into the nature of the beautiful, and had at length fixed upon "the objective principle upon which all taste is founded," and "about which Kant had racked his brain without success." Beauty, he announces to Körner, December, 1792, is nothing else than freedom-in-the-appearance. And in succeeding letters he attempts to apply his new discovery to an exposition of the relation between the objects of beauty in nature and art, and the æsthetic observer. In order to be beautiful, the object must not appear to suffer any determination from without, but must convey, by its form, a suggestion of freedom. A law, indeed, there is; but it is the law of the object's own nature, and each beautiful object thus represents, as it were, a kingdom of freedom.

This theory he attempts to apply also to his favorite subject of morality. The concept of beauty is too general, however, when applied to the human being with his dual nature. We must here distinguish between fixed or architectonic beauty which man has in common with natural objects, and movable beauty, *i. e.*, beauty of voluntary movements "which express some sentiment of the moral order." It is this beauty of movement, this graciousness of behavior, the outward expression of an inner harmony, that Schiller calls *Anmut*. It is a personal quality, may be acquired or forfeited, and if sympathetic, *i. e.*, not directly aimed at, may become the truest test of character and moral worth. Architect-

tonic beauty does honor to the author of nature ; grace does honor to him who possesses it. The former is a gift, the latter a personal merit. So far Schiller has spoken of grace as a quality of movement, and has contrasted it with architectonic beauty, which is a product of necessity. But he goes on to modify his position in an interesting way, from our present point of view, and grants that features fixed and in repose may also possess grace. This he explains as due to the frequent repetition of graceful movements, as the durable traces of habitually beautiful conduct ; and since it represents the aptitude of the soul for beautiful feeling, even esteems it, of all the species of grace, the most precious.¹

We are now fairly in possession of the critical apparatus with which Schiller met the Kantian morality, and when he goes further and states explicitly that, in order to have grace or beauty of conduct, no sort of restraint must be exerted either by the will or by passion, by spirit or by nature, one feels that the decisive word has been spoken, and that it needs only the moral to complete the tale. The action which is prompted solely by respect for the moral law is good as far as it goes ; and there are times when such action is demanded. But it does not fulfill the conditions which Kant himself demanded of moral activity, namely, that it shall be self-determined. One kind of slavery is as humiliating as another, and perfect freedom is found only when the act proceeds from the character of man in its entirety ; from a character in which reason and sense, inclination and law, are in harmony. The ideal moral organization is that in which nature is so thoroughly disciplined that it executes with ease and precision those actions which, if it were not so disciplined, reason would, in its capacity as intelligence, be obliged to demand. Inclination to duty — that is the heart of Schiller's ethics, and the gist of his criticism of Kantian rigorism.

Schiller is never tired of trying to enforce his favorite thought, and he repeats it in a variety of ways and with a number of telling illustrations. We can conceive of a three-fold relation, he says, in which the sensuous part of man's nature can stand to his reason. Man may either repress the demands of sense in order

¹ Cf. *Werke*, Vol. X, p. 79, note.

to live conformably to his reason, or he may subordinate the rational phase of his being to the sensuous, and allow himself to be carried away, like other merely natural objects, by the stream of physical necessity ; or, finally, the inclinations may place themselves in harmony with law, and man be one with himself.¹ The beauty of conduct of which we are in search is not found in the first case, for where the sensuous nature offers an obstinate resistance, it must be met by an equal effort on the part of spirit ; but under this stern discipline sensuousness will appear repressed, and the inner conflict will reveal itself outwardly by constraint. A condition of pure morality, then, cannot be favorable to beauty of action, which nature cannot produce except in so far as it is perfectly free. Still less do we find beauty of action in the second case. Whereas under the rule of reason the freedom of form was only restrained, here it is completely crushed by the brutal force of matter. Here the inner autonomy has vanished, and every external evidence of this autonomy is entirely effaced. "Man in this condition not only revolts the moral sense. . . . but the æsthetic sense also, which is not content with mere matter, but seeks true pleasure in form, will turn away from such a spectacle with disgust." "Of these two relations between the moral nature of man and his physical nature, the first makes one think of a monarchy where the strict surveillance of the ruler restrains every spontaneous movement ; the second resembles an ochlocracy, in which the citizen, in refusing obedience to his legitimate sovereign, finds he has liberty quite as little as the human features have beauty when the moral autonomy is suppressed. . . . Now, just as liberty is found between the extremes of legal oppression and anarchy, so also one will find beauty between dignity, which bears witness to the domination exercised by mind, and voluptuousness, which reveals the domination of instinct." ²

The criticism of the Kantian morality with which Schiller follows up the delineation of his own ideal of 'beautiful morality' is characteristic, and shows in every line the great reverence which he has for the master, a reverence which doubtless kept him, at

¹ Cf. *Werke*, Vol. X, pp. 95-6.

² *Ibid.*, p. 97.

this time, from going the full extent of his convictions in his opposition to the Kantian rigorism. "In the moral philosophy of Kant," he says, "the idea of duty is expounded with a harshness which is enough to frighten away the Graces, and could easily tempt a feeble mind to seek for moral perfection in the somber paths of an ascetic and monkish life. However much the great philosopher may have endeavored to guard against this false interpretation, which must be repugnant more than all else to so cheerful and independent a mind, he has nevertheless given occasion for it, as it seems to me, by placing in such strict and harsh opposition the two principles which act upon the human will."¹ The meaning of Kant, Schiller thinks, is perfectly justifiable, and the conclusions which Kant reached were reached on purely objective grounds; it was only when he came to the exposition of the truths he had gained that he appears to have been "guided by more subjective maxims," which, Schiller believes, can be easily explained by the state of moral opinion and practice of his time. "He was the Draco of his time, because his time seemed to him as yet unworthy and unprepared for a Solon."

But what have the children of the house done, he adds, that Kant should make provision only for the valets? It is true, as Kant holds, that inclination is often an uncertain guide, and may prompt to evil as well as to good. But must we on that account reject it altogether? "Because impure inclinations usurp the name of virtue, is that a reason why the disinterested feelings in the noblest heart should also be placed under suspicion? . . . Under this imperative of the law the pure will is under no less restraint than the depraved; man is accused and humbled, and the law which ought to be the most sublime witness of our grandeur becomes the most crushing argument for our frailty. The law which man has imposed upon himself comes by this imperative form to have the aspect of a positive law from without, an appearance which is not entirely unjustified by the alleged radical tendency in human nature to act in opposition to it."²

¹ *Werke*, Vol. X, p. 100.

² Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 101 f. The reference here is to Kant's doctrine of radical evil, developed in a paper with that caption published in the *Berliner Monatsschrift*, April, 1792, and afterwards embodied in his *Relig. innerhalb d. Grenzen d. blossen*

The question whether reason as such can supply a motive to action, — a question which has come in for so large a share of attention in modern ethical literature, and a discussion of which would seem to be of first importance in any discussion of the Kantian morality, — was not overlooked by Schiller, though he does not seem to have been sufficiently impressed with its importance to discuss it at length. The will, he remarks, stands in a more immediate relation to feeling than it does to cognition, and it would be in a bad plight if it had to appeal to pure reason in every case for guidance. At any rate, he is ready to suspect the man who can trust his instinct so little that he must bring it before the bar of the moral law on every occasion. The man whom we esteem most highly is the man who can surrender himself to his impulse, and who need not be in constant fear of being led astray by it. That he can do this is evidence that the two principles of his nature have already attained that condition of harmony which is the seal of completed humanity, and which constitutes the 'beautiful soul.'

It would seem from the doubt which Schiller casts upon the efficiency of abstract reason when compared with feeling to supply a motive for effective action, especially in times of moral emergency, that he proposed his ideal of disposition and character in the interests of objective morality, as well as in the interests of æsthetics. Just as that state, he says, is never secure which is based upon force rather than upon liberal principles, so morality is not secure so long as the triumph of one faction of man's nature depends upon the suppression of another. "It is only," he says in a rather striking passage, "when man's moral attitude results from the united action of the two principles, and thus becomes the expression of his entire humanity, when it becomes his second nature, — that it is secure. For as long as the spirit employs violence, so long must the instinct use force to resist it. The enemy who is only overpowered and cast down can rise again, but the enemy who is reconciled is truly vanquished."¹

Vernunft, published Easter, 1793. Schiller, it appears, had read advance sheets of this as early as February 28, 1793. Cf. *Schiller's Briefwechsel mit Körner*, Goedeke ed., Vol. III, pp. 42-3.

¹ *Werke*, Vol. X, p. 100.

As much, however, as Schiller is disposed to claim for the moral instinct and for 'beautiful conduct' on behalf of objective morality and in the name of taste, he is never willing to allow that any moral worth attaches to them. On this point he and Kant are, verbally at least, in complete agreement. The phenomenal value of an act may therefore be in an inverse ratio to its moral value in the sense of Kant. Schiller maintains the Kantian distinction between legal and moral, the only difference being that, for reasons already adverted to, Schiller is inclined to rate legal conduct much more highly than Kant, from his more restricted point of view, was enabled to do.

In thus waiving any claim to the value or merit (*Verdienst*) of an act, when it appears as the result of natural inclination or a good disposition, and is judged independently of its material consequences, Schiller is no doubt justified by common usage. Just as we do not say that a man has merited or earned external possessions or personal talents which have come to him by inheritance or as a gift of nature without any expenditure of energy on his part, so we do not attribute merit, or, to use a term with perhaps a still stricter signification and corresponding more nearly with the German *Verdienst*, we do not attribute 'desert' to an action for the performance of which is required no expenditure of energy or sacrifice on the part of the agent. The double judgment which we pass on conduct: first, from the point of view of the sacrifice involved or the energy expended in its production; second, from the point of view of its material consequences (a judgment which, as has been shown, may be still further complicated by æsthetic considerations), finds its parallel in economics, where an object is evaluated both on the basis of its utility and also on that of the cost of its production, or the effort expended or sacrifice made for it. It is on account of this constant association between sacrifice and meritorious action, that, by a common confusion of thought, what is a necessary means, or a constant concomitant of the means, often comes to be regarded in the light of an end worthy of pursuit for its own sake; and that any action, if only it involves sacrifice or effort, is assumed to have moral value. Thus fasting, as Simmel points out,¹ though originally adopted

¹ Cf. *Einleitung in die Morawissenschaft*, Vol. I, pp. 219 ff.

merely as a necessary means to spiritual ends, came as early as the time of Tertullian to possess an independent religious value, and self-denial and ascetic practices of all kinds, because recurring as the constant element in virtuous actions of the most various kinds, have often been regarded as highly meritorious. And when one reads Schiller's *Würde der Frauen*, in which he contrasts the unconscious grace of woman with the unruly and tempestuous temper of the sterner sex, one is reminded that the term virtuous, etymologically considered, is perhaps more significant, from the standpoint of the genesis of ethical concepts, than might at first thought be supposed. The conduct, at any rate, which is deemed virtuous, in the sense of meritorious, by the moral judgment of to-day, though not of course distinctively associated with man, is nevertheless that conduct which emerges, not from the harmonious disposition, but from that conflict of opposing forces in which the manly or heroic traits of humanity find their completest manifestation.

However much verbal agreement there may be between Schiller and Kant on the matter of 'morality' and 'legality,' it is after all the difference between the two men that strikes the reader as important, and this difference, broadly stated, consists in the circumstance, as I conceive the matter, that Kant was interested almost exclusively in the 'morality' of the act, while Schiller's interest lay primarily in its legality. Kant had regard for the subjective motive and the form; Schiller, for the objective effect, the freedom and the life. The moral yields to the æsthetic ideal, the dutiful to the beautiful soul, submission to expression. While Kant had unbounded confidence in the power of reason, and was jealous of its prerogatives, Schiller was rather inclined to doubt the capacity of reason, considered in independence of the emotional nature, and had unlimited confidence, on the other hand, in the possibility of the education of feeling to the point where the will might surrender itself completely to its guidance, and have no occasion to fear for the consequences. It was the 'children of the house' whom Kant had neglected for the valets, those exquisite natures that have been purged of fierce passions and conflicting interests, whose quick and sensitive instincts shrink

from the coarse and unbeautiful in conduct, and furnish guidance through those complex moral situations whose finer points reason is unable to discern and law too cumbrous to decide ; for whom, in short, duty has become a grateful task,

“ Glad hearts ! without reproach or blot
Who do thy work, and know it not : ”

it was these who, after all, came in for the largest share of Schiller's interest.

It is the ‘ beautiful soul ’ that the poet celebrates in a number of poems whose dash and finish bear witness to the enthusiasm with which he contemplated this ideal of his poetic nature. The complete blending of freedom and law is symbolized in the well-known poem *Der Tanz*, whose noble ease and smoothly flowing rhythm is itself the best illustration of the ideal it glorifies. The buoyant movement of the dance represents primarily the entire domain of the fine arts, in which submission to rule and glad freedom of expression are united as in the playful movements of the dance forms. And as in art we obey the law of nature with gladness, so also should it be in conduct, which, from one point of view, may be considered as one of the fine arts, and not the least noble. Perhaps the most significant of these poems, from a philosophical standpoint, though less perfect in workmanship than the little poem just mentioned, is *Der Genius*, at first called, perhaps more appropriately, *Natur und Schule*. Can knowledge only and the wooden systems, the question runs, lead to true peace? Must I mistrust impulse, the law which nature herself has written in my bosom, unless it squares with the rule, “ till the school's signet stamp the eternal scroll ? ” The time, indeed, when feeling was a sufficient guide is gone ; nature now yields her truth only to the inquirer who seeks it with a pure heart. But the genius adds, if thou hast not lost thy guardian angel from thy side, if thy heart's childhood can yet rejoice in sweet instinct with its warning voice, then go hence in thy innocence :

“ Dich kann die Wissenschaft nichts lehren. Sie lerne von dir !
Jenes Gesetz, das mit ehrnem Stab den sträubenden lenket,
Dir nicht gilt's. Was du thust, was dir gefällt, ist Gesetz . . . ”

These thoughts are repeated in endless variety, and may be found in many places, both in the shorter poems and in the dramas. One or two of the *Votive Tablets* may be reproduced in conclusion :

“Über das Herz zu siegen ist gross, ich verehere den Tapfern ;
Aber wer durch sein Herz sieget, er gilt mir doch mehr.”

From the last poem Schiller wrote, *Die Huldigung der Künste* :

“Doch Schön'res find' ich nichts, wie lang ich wähle,
Als in der schönen Form — die schöne Seele.”

But this ideal of completed humanity, we learn from several explicit statements, is only a task, which is forever beyond the reach of perfect fulfillment. “It has indeed been prescribed to man,” he says at the beginning of the second part of *Anmut und Würde*, “to bring about a complete union of his two natures, and to form a harmonious whole, so as to be able to act with his entire humanity. But this beauty of character, this last fruit of humanity, is but an idea, to conform to which he can strive with constant vigilance, but to which he can with all his efforts never completely attain.” Again, in the *Æsthetic Letters* : “This reciprocal relation between the two impulses [the material and the form impulse] is indeed only a task of reason, which man is able to accomplish only in the perfection of his being. It is, in the strictest signification of the term, the idea of his humanity, an infinite to which he can approach nearer and nearer in the progress of time, but without ever reaching it.”¹

The reason for this lies in the natural limitations of humanity incident to the dependence of his existence upon natural conditions. Nature, unwilling to entrust so momentous a matter as the preservation of the individual and the race to man's doubtful intelligence, provided him with an instinct which impels him, by an almost inevitable necessity, to avert those situations which threaten his existence, and to seek those which make for his preservation and well-being. And though it is the prerogative of man to rise superior to his momentary desires, yet in its own sphere feeling must always continue to hold powerful sway, and to demand the recognition even of reason. The possibility, therefore, of a con-

¹ *Werke*, Vol. X, p. 320. Cf. also *Ibid.*, pp. 328-9, 413.

flict between the law of spirit and the law of nature is never entirely excluded. When, however, this conflict occurs, when nature takes the will by surprise, as it were, and tries to force it to give allegiance to her, the moral character must manifest itself by its resistance, and in order to keep from being restrained by instinct, must restrain instinct itself. In these cases beauty of action, which is impossible when inclination and law are thus at war, rises into grandeur or sublimity, and 'dignity' is its expression in appearance. It is in these times of stress that the difference between merely temperamental conduct and beautiful conduct clearly reveals itself. In the merely temperamental character, in which inclination is on the side of duty because duty is accidentally on the side of inclination, the will will yield to the force brought to bear upon it by sense, and, if any sacrifice is to be made, it will itself be obliged to make it. The beautiful soul, on the other hand, which has merely entrusted sense, as it were, with the guidance of conduct, will take back this trust the moment nature seems inclined to betray it, and sense, as the lower term, must subordinate itself to reason.

It is true that Schiller speaks at times as if the union of 'Anmut' and 'Würde' in the same person were the mark of human perfection, and as if he proposed this as the ideal of completed humanity. So in *Anmut und Würde*: "If grace and dignity . . . were united in the same person, the expression of humanity would be completed in him: such a person would stand justified in the intelligible world and acquitted in the natural."¹ So also in *Ueber das Erhabene*² he speaks as if the development of the ability to act sublimely must be a part of æsthetic education, as well as the development of the capacity to act in accordance with the demands of taste. But the meaning we must attach to these passages, in the light of other and apparently contradictory utterances already noticed, is that along with the refinement of the natural instincts there must go such an education of the moral feelings that, if nature should at any time fail us, as it almost inevitably will at some time in human experience, we may still

¹ *Werke*, Vol. X, p. 117.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 229-30.

have recourse to the imperative of the moral law. It certainly cannot be the task of æsthetic education to bring about a 'complete union' of man's dual nature, and at the same time to develop grace and dignity side by side; and if Schiller speaks almost in the same breath of the complete fusion of man's natural and moral powers and of their due coördination as the mark of human perfection, he must speak of human perfection in different senses. And this indeed he does, as has been pointed out. The difference is that between an absolute ideal, a poet's dream, forever beyond the reach of realization in consequence of the limitations of our humanity, and an ideal, on the other hand, which lies within man's possibilities, and the attainment of which constitutes his highest trust. The difference between the ideal and the actual demand made upon humanity is clearly brought out by placing side by side the passages in the *Æsthetic Letters* in which the author says that "man must learn to desire more nobly in order that he may have no need to act sublimely," and the passage in *Votive Tablets* to the effect that, if man cannot desire in accordance with the demands of beauty, he will nevertheless, as spirit, have it within his power to do what lies beyond the power of his humanity.

The best poetic expression of this human ideal, as we may call it, is found in the poem, *Die Führer des Lebens*, which, on account of its familiarity, does not perhaps need to be reproduced in this place.

It would be an interesting task to follow Schiller through the details of his theory of æsthetic education, of the possibilities of which for human culture he entertained such an exalted opinion. But to do this would carry us beyond the range of our present purpose.

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SCHLEIERMACHER'S DEVELOPMENT OF SUBJECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS.

IT has long been customary to regard Schleiermacher as almost the precise antithesis of his greater contemporary Hegel. The reasons for this are sufficiently obvious, and the contrast is at first glance broad and striking. On the one hand is Hegel, the philosopher of the Universal, his Absolute a process of pure thought, and known in, and as the completion of, the process of finite thought. On the other side stands Schleiermacher, the individualist, for whom the Absolute is the indifferent unity of thought and being, and present to us as such only in feeling. The difference is particularly clear in the philosophy of religion, and seemed in their own time even greater than it really was, because of Hegel's persistent and rather unfair polemic against what he took to be Schleiermacher's position. It also comes out very clearly in the development of Schleiermacher's epistemology, as we have it in his *Dialektik*. While the method of Hegel was one of universal process, in which thought included its object at every stage, that of Schleiermacher is static and individual. For him the forms of thought are given as such, and his speculative task is to find in what the faith of individual thinkers, in their claim to apprehend being, may be grounded.

In spite of the common opinion, however, and of these very good reasons for it, the difference between the two philosophers is not so great as it seems at first. Schleiermacher's system was after all one of absolute construction, no less than that of Hegel. It followed the general speculative tendency of the time, and the encyclopædic scope of Schleiermacher's philosophic activity is in itself sufficient to distinguish him from such 'faith-philosophers' as Hamann and Jacobi. His Kantianism saved him from any attempt to make feeling a source of knowledge, either speculative or practical. And in the most original part of his

system, his account of the nature and development of *subjective* consciousness, it appears in great measure as the complement of Hegelianism rather than as its adversary.

A recent commentator¹ has insisted that Hegel unjustifiably identifies the immediacy proper to knowledge, with which the dialectic process begins, with that of experience as a whole. The truth is, he urges, that the cognitive process begins, as it ends, in thought. It cannot, by the laws of its existence, transcend it. But thought is only one among the many immediates of experience, and the identification of Knowledge with Reality is therefore the great error of Hegel's philosophy.

Now, whether or not we accept all the implications of such a criticism, it is at least true that Hegel does not fulfil his promises concerning the development of his immediate. We are to suppose that thought, in its broad definition as including both cognition and will, takes up into its living movement all the elements of experience. Not one is disregarded or left behind, but all are mediated and share in the universal process. In the actual exposition of the system, however, the only element of experience whose development is explicitly traced is that of objective cognition. The implication that there must be a development on the subjective side of experience as well, interrelated with that on the objective, is disregarded. At least, Hegel gives us no account of such a development; and where he has occasion to attack the appeal to 'feeling' in speculation, ethics, or religion, he does so always on the ground that feeling is equivalent to unrelated particularity and immediacy, which has not been 'taken up' into the thought-movement.

It is in this matter that Schleiermacher appears as the complement to Hegel. The development of objective thought he has almost entirely neglected; but instead he has given us the account of the development of subjective experience which Hegel omits. The method and form of this development also present some analogy to those of Hegel. It is a process of increasing differentiation which is at the same time one of increasing comprehensiveness; and it falls into three stages, of confused

¹ J. B. Baillie, *The Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic*, pp. 337 ff.

unity, opposition or dualism, and inclusive self-consciousness respectively.¹

It is impossible within the limits of an article to do more than outline Schleiermacher's treatment of this subject. While an attempt will be made to follow the argument as closely as possible, it would not perhaps be advantageous to reproduce all the peculiarities of its form. Schleiermacher's special mode of exposition, by means of a double *Gegensatz*, results in a certain formal artificiality of structure which hides rather than reveals the merits of its content to the modern reader. Nor can the application of the theory in æsthetics, ethics, and philosophy of religion be included. We must confine ourselves to the *development* of subjective consciousness in general, which is precisely the neglected portion of the system.

According to Schleiermacher, the peculiar content of the feeling-consciousness is "the relation of particular vital functions to the unity of the consciousness of life." Life is here not to be understood as merely physical. What we experience in feeling is our direct reaction to certain functions, which may be either organic or intellectual, this reaction varying according as the ease or difficulty of their performance indicates a widening or a narrowing of the sphere of vital activity. Feelings may thus range from the sensuous to the intellectual and highly complex.²

It must be remembered, as a consequence of this, that feeling is no less intellectual than objective thought, though belonging rather to the passive side of mental life. This is the fact indicated by Schleiermacher's use of the terms subjective and objective consciousness. It is, within its own limits and according to its own laws, a real knowledge, an *Erkennen* if not a *Wissen*. Nor are we to understand by it anything confused or ineffective. It is strongest in the moments of greatest vital activity, and is,

¹ The *Psychologie*, notes of Schleiermacher's lectures on psychology, furnishes us with the outline of this development, which we can use as a syllabus to arrange the material found in the other works. Its late appearance—for it was not published until 1862—is doubtless one of the chief reasons why this side of his system has received less attention than it deserves.

² *Psychologie*, *Philos. Werke*, Vol. VI, pp. 184-185, 428-429, 506; *Æsthetik*, *Philos. Werke*, Vol. VII, pp. 67-74.

mediately or immediately, the source of all volition; and it can be made the object of reflective thought. We also find that in all subjective consciousness the source of the particular feeling-determination is implicitly included. While this inclusion is not an objective knowledge, yet the being of the subject in itself and its coexistence with another are thus held together in consciousness.¹ Accordingly, feeling falls in its development into the same forms as reflective or objective thought, save in so far as its subjective character makes a distinction.

The course followed by the evolution of consciousness in general is for Schleiermacher determined by the fact that it is rooted in social life.² In the case of objective thought this dependence is so close that its development is practically identical with that of language.³ But just as this involves an advance from 'sense-images' into conceptual thought, so this same social experience arouses on the subjective side widening feelings of sympathy in which the merely 'organic' and 'personal' or 'selfish' feelings are transcended. This brings with it both "an extension of self-consciousness in general" and also "an intensification of the feeling of life."

This result of the first expansion of feeling seems to have been selected by Schleiermacher as typical of the whole growth of subjective consciousness. It expands as experience in general does; and every stage is both a broadening of sympathy and an intensification of individuality. The widening feeling of unity with other beings is at the same time an intensified (immediate and subjective) consciousness of self as the focus of this unity.

The feelings of the child and of the savage give us an idea of the first stage in the development. Sensuous feelings predominate, and there is no clear distinction between the egoistic feelings and the social. Yet it is the same capacity for feeling which grows from the one into the other. The first recognition of other human beings is linked to the personal feelings aroused in the in-

¹ Cf. *Christ. Glaube*, 6th ed., pp. 13-15.

² *Psychologie*, pp. 45-46, 217-219, 227-228; *Dialektik*, pp. 453, 460; *Ästhetik*, pp. 44-47, 106-107; *Christ. Glaube*, pp. 21-22.

³ *Psychologie*, pp. 133, 137-138; *Ethik*, p. 107; *Dialektik*, pp. 448-449.

fant by its dependence on its mother. The savage feels sympathy only for the members of his own tribe. The advance in sociality is slow, and dependent for a long time on personal needs.¹

This, however, should neither make us mistake the real difference between egoistic and personal feelings, — a difference certified to us immediately in the feelings themselves, — nor the fact that an advance does take place. The subjective consciousness has expanded, and the merely individual feelings have been sublated in the social. And from this stage we can see that the very first feeling-impulse aroused by the as yet undifferentiated environment is the same tendency which later becomes the impulse to feel *with* others. Thus “the soul, even at the first beginning of its feeling-impulse, tends toward the construction of an impersonal self-consciousness, just as even in the first perception it is tending to realize the idea of the cosmos.”²

Nevertheless, the ‘identity of life’ in which the social consciousness is rooted at its first appearance in the child is still present as it expands to include family and clan, or even nation and race. In all this extension it is still bound up with personal and ‘selfish’ feelings, just as, in the first stages of its development, objective thought is bound up with the sense-images. Accordingly we ask whether anything corresponding to conceptual thought presents itself as a means to free the development of subjective consciousness from what is merely personal. And we find that such an advance does take place, in which the social consciousness is completed by its expansion to include all men as men. We find examples of this in the feelings which arise from the relation of man as such to his terrestrial environment, and also in those having their source in the elective affinities of friendship and hospitality. But its most notable manifestation is in the feelings attaching to fellowship in *religion*.

At first the religious relation is bound up with that to the family or tribe. But as soon as *one* people is divided in religion, we find different peoples also adhering to one religion. It is true that, if the religious relation were conceived as abstractly

¹ *Psychologie*, pp. 185-190.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 458-459.

spiritual, it would be a mere negation of the dependence of the individual upon society. But the world-religions, such as Christianity and Mohammedanism, involve the erection of a religious society, tending to subordinate to itself all the differences of secular societies. It is especially in becoming religious, therefore, that the social feelings transcend all that is merely personal. The relationship of man to man in a religious society is based on "the (subjective) consciousness of the identity of our divided human existence in its relation to the Absolute Being."

Now this advance on the subjective side of consciousness precisely corresponds to that which takes place in objective thought when the concept is freed from the particular sense-images. Moreover, as in the case of the preceding development, the later stage of feeling is implicit in the earlier. Schleiermacher holds that the universal opinion that *pietas* has as its objects the gods, one's native land, and one's parents, and that ὕβρις, the insolent exaltation of the individual above his natural or social environment, is most contrary to it, shows us that "the seeking for humanity is already in its real essence a seeking for God."¹

So far the development of feeling appears as the widening of our subjective self-consciousness to embrace all mankind, a gradual extension of the sphere of our affective life accompanying the expansion of our interests, activities, and knowledge. But as yet we have heard nothing of the feelings aroused by our relations to nature, which must have been active long before this stage. Schleiermacher brings in his discussion of them here because they are needed for the complete explanation of the religious feelings. While it is true that the social feelings become religious at their greatest extension, it is also obvious that the religious feelings involve a reference which transcends humanity. This they derive from the 'nature-feelings.'

We have not space to follow all the details of Schleiermacher's discussion of these feelings, but must confine ourselves to the general outline of their development. This follows the same course as that of the social feelings, and, like it, falls into three stages, if we include the religious.

¹*Op. cit.*, pp. 190-195, 461.

The primitive form of these feelings is seen in the organic feelings of vital exhilaration and depression caused by our principal relations with the natural environment. By a transition which Schleiermacher does not make very clear, these pass into the higher æsthetic feelings of beauty and sublimity, which involve an implicit intellectual appreciation, and are independent of merely organic pleasures and pains. It is especially in the feeling of sublimity that we see the affinity of the æsthetic feelings with the religious. "What we designate as devotion is precisely such a finding one's self in subjection to another, a sinking before the inexhaustibility of an object and yet being again attracted to it. It is a losing of one's self in the infinite, with the consciousness that here any reaction whatever is completely excluded."¹

The transition is made clearer when it is remarked that these feelings involve a still wider extension of subjective consciousness than the social. Yet it is important to notice that this involves no break in the development, since this extension is already implicit in our feeling for ourselves as men. "We are conscious of ourselves as parts of the world, and this is the same as finding ourselves placed in a universal system of nature." This is implicitly a consciousness of what is *not* us, in so far as we are thus related to it. In this way, then, the whole universe is included in our self-consciousness, and this would be true even if we were conscious of ourselves only as thinking beings; for a system of being would be posited in subjective consciousness as corresponding to the system of concepts in objective consciousness.²

Thus the nature-feelings appear both as parallel to the social feelings, and also as implicit in them from the first. They also transcend them, since in them takes place the extension of our subjective consciousness to embrace all finite being. "Sympathy with the powers of nature is present in the feeling of the sublime, and annuls fear in it. Thus there is also possible an extension of the self to a sympathy with all individual and finite being as such." In other words, "according to the analogy of the previous development, a tendency must appear to establish also a

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 198-212, 461-462, 520-521.

² *Christ. Glaube*, pp. 168-169.

common consciousness between one's self and nature." Now, in doing this, we pass into the religious consciousness ; for this will appear as " the consciousness of the absolute unity of all life, that is to say, of the Godhead, and the relating of all the conditions of life to this consciousness will then be the religious feelings."

At their greatest extension, then, the nature-feelings, like the social, merge in the religious. They prepare the comprehensive character of the religious feelings, though it is the social feelings which open the way to their higher development. But it is all one movement on the subjective side of consciousness, a movement analogous to the development of the ' world-consciousness ' on the objective. " The seeking for humanity implied in the social organization, even the organic feeling-tendency, is already a seeking for God. It is all the same tendency of the soul passing by degrees from the less to the more conscious." ¹

In passing, it should be noticed that there are also other feelings on this plane, but these are attached more closely to the development of objective knowledge as such. These Schleiermacher calls feelings of conviction. They appear as the subjective completion and validation of all acts of knowledge regarded as true, indicating that the mind rests in them. They also underlie certain indemonstrable yet necessary postulates, or ' regulative ideas.' ² The idea of the world, for example, can neither be constructed from the data of perception, nor inferred by reasoning. It is really a product of fantasy, of creative imagination, which is the active side of the subjective consciousness. It is under the guidance of this principle that feeling expresses itself in art. ³

Like the other modes of feeling, the lower forms of the religious consciousness appear before the complete development of the other feeling-series. However, while it always rules over the whole complex of feelings which have as yet arisen, it must advance or remain undeveloped along with them. It follows that we can discover a parallel evolution of the social and of the re-

¹ *Psychologie*, pp. 460, 546-547 ; *Christ. Glaube*, p. 170.

² *Dialektik*, pp. 28, 52-54, 74-79, 397, 489, etc.

³ Cf. *Psychologie*, pp. 195-197 ; *Reden über die Religion*, 3d ed., pp. 178-179 ; Bender, *Schleiermacher's Theologie*, Vol. I, pp. 28-29.

ligious feelings. Fetichism corresponds to a semi-animal state of society, in which the contrast between persons is as yet undeveloped; polytheism, to a condition of strife between the egotistic and social feelings; and monotheism, to the reconciliation of these feelings in a completed social consciousness.¹

In the religious feeling, we have a conjunction of the nature-feelings and the social feelings. Now this union embraces the totality of subjective experience. Accordingly, this feeling represents the tendency immanent in consciousness to abolish the opposition between being *as* consciousness and being *in* consciousness, between subject and object, the ideal and the real, thought and being, — though this abolition is “entirely on the subjective side of consciousness.” Such an “identification of one’s self with being as such” is an essential property of human nature, since it is the sole condition on which being in its entirety “can become consciousness.” It is “not produced, but only aroused from without, and has just such an internal source in the nature of finite self-consciousness in general, as social self-consciousness has” in human nature.²

From every other form of subjective consciousness there is an immediate transition to the religious, since this is just its inmost nature, as the tendency to universalization just mentioned. Religious consciousness has therefore the same continuity as subjective experience in general. But this continuity is not always obvious, because the changing feeling-states at times prevent us from apprehending the ever-present tendency to unify all being. In this respect the subjective religious consciousness is like the objective idea of the Absolute. Neither is ever present in the mind unaccompanied, but always as connected with other feelings or ideas.³

This is the highest development of subjective self-consciousness. In it all that is merely personal, or even merely human, disappears. Pleasure and pain are not aroused by it directly, as by the other feelings; but only by the relation of these other feel-

¹ *Psychologie*, pp. 198, 211–212, 460–461, 522.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 212–213, 547.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 213, 522, 547; *Christ. Glaube*, pp. 21, 24–26; *Reden*, p. 197, note.

ings to it, as hindering or promoting its appearance. Furthermore, this is the one feeling aroused by an absolute experience, according to the well-known dictum of Schleiermacher. Those feelings aroused by our relation to the world are necessarily feelings of reciprocal determination. But in this, which includes and, as it were, *feels for* the totality of being, the experience is one of *absolute* dependence.¹

"When from this standpoint," says Schleiermacher, "we look back over the whole process of (subjective) self-consciousness from its first beginnings, we have in it the whole series of the evolution of the spirit in itself. At first receptivity appears to us under the form of the soul of a particular body, bound merely to this, and only to be aroused by the organic function. But, as we proceed, each new form of self-consciousness is a renewed finding of itself by the spirit, until we come to the point where it finds itself on the other side of the finite in the infinite. When this tendency of self-consciousness has once been aroused, all else appears not only as subordinated to it, but also as so much the more removed from it, the more it is involved in opposition, and farthest of all in that primal state where the opposition is still undeveloped."²

Let us try to put Schleiermacher's idea, as briefly as possible, in more modern language. It is plain enough that subjective consciousness is for him in some sense cognitive. That is to say, it is distinguished, as immediate conviction or feeling, from mediated knowledge, and not as mere sensuous reaction from thought in general. As such it has two sides. As the immediate unity of the individual conscious life, it is constant and unvarying. Yet as the life widens, it too must change, broaden, and develop. The self-consciousness of the man will differ widely from that of the newly-born infant. While the latter will include only the feelings of sensuous pleasure and pain set up by the child's immediate surroundings, the former will embrace affective and emotional reactions caused by the man's relations to mankind at large, to nature, to the world; even, in the last resort, to being

¹ *Psychologie*, pp. 213, 461; *Christ. Glaube*, pp. 14-17, 27-28.

² *Psychologie*, p. 214.

as such. Still, potentially at least, the consciousness is the same for both, a consciousness of the unity of our life, whether the relations it involves be many or few.

Now our experience is both sensuous and intellectual, and it also involves a constant connection of ourselves with the external world of men and of things. Accordingly, an immediate feeling of the unity of our experience is really one of the unity of Spirit and Nature, both in ourselves as individuals and in the world at large. This is equivalent to a conviction of the oneness of Being as such, Schleiermacher thinks, and therefore immediate self-consciousness is at the same time potential religion. It is in this sense that he at times says that all feelings are religious. All have an equal possibility of explicit relation to this central unity of feeling, though all may not be equally capable of expressing it. The unity is always present, though not always equally manifest.

Religious feeling is, then, one side of subjective consciousness in general, that aspect of it which connects the unity of the individual life with the universal unity in which it is grounded. As such, it will develop along with it. In the first stages of the development, it will be as partial and limited as the experience which expresses itself in it, and only in the final expansion of self-consciousness will it fully realize itself.

The development falls into three stages, or four, if we count the preliminary stage of confused indistinction. First in order come the particular sensuous feelings (*Empfindungen*) aroused by the sense-experiences of the individual. Next we have the feelings aroused by social life and by nature (*Gefühle*). Consciousness expands, individuality is defined, and the unity of self and the conscious and unconscious world is felt. Finally, the completed 'self-consciousness' appears, in which is included the unity of the self with all finite being.¹ These three classes of feeling, of course, coexist in consciousness; and, as has just been said, religious feeling in some form is present throughout the development, as the unifying and dominating factor. But the complete development of each is in the order named.

¹ *Christ. Glaube*, pp. 21-23; *Ästhetik*, pp. 67-74; cf. *Bender, op. cit.*, p. 36.

The analogy of all this to Hegel's account of the movement of thought is obvious. But such an attempt to trace a development in feeling has at once to meet the Hegelian objection which is given in its typical form by D. F. Strauss in criticising Schleiermacher's theory of religion.¹ It is said that the movement of feeling is after all only secondary and derivative. The actual advance is all the work of thought, and without the dynamic of thought feeling would be inert. What appears as a movement in feeling consciousness is then but the subjective reflection of the objective dialectic. This is true; but it is only a half-truth. It is precisely the strength of Schleiermacher's account that he recognizes the inseparable unity of cognition and feeling in one process of constant interplay. Human experience is a process of gradually widening relations and increasing unification; and this process is apprehended both in cognition and in feeling. Were it not for the cognitive apprehension, our feelings would nowise differ from those of the brutes. But our feelings are not only reflections of the advance of our knowledge. They are also immediate and vital convictions, which come into being in the course of experience, in accordance with the laws of our nature, and subjectively validate and complete objective knowledge. It is from this point of view that Schleiermacher partially traces for us the development of the *subjective* ideas of humanity, nature, and the world in our feeling consciousness. He may be said, in this respect, to have attempted a sort of deduction of the subjective categories. Such subjective convictions are for the individual the vital energy of his thought. They supply its defects, and direct its course. Apart from the advance of thought, they could not come into being; but without them as postulates, thought could not proceed.

As Bender remarks, it is the really original contribution of Schleiermacher to have pointed out the part which subjective convictions play in unifying and completing our experience.² It is also his peculiar merit that this recognition of the function of such convictions involved no "appeal to the heart against the head." Any claim of feeling to give objective knowledge he has

¹ Strauss, *Characteristiken und Kritiken*, pp. 154 ff.

² Bender, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 44, 77, 96.

entirely denied. He gives no place to it as a principle either of speculation or of action. The conviction of the unity of thought and its object, as present in the subjective "consciousness of God," gives living energy to the movement of our thought. In the "feelings of conviction," as the immediate surety of its having attained truth, it finds resting-points in its activity. In such subjective constructions as "consciousness of humanity" and "world-consciousness," the completion of knowledge is anticipated and ideals set up as norms for its development. But while such 'feelings' are essential to the vitality of objective thought, they come into being only in its process. Nor do they, in themselves, furnish any knowledge. They rather point out tasks for thought to accomplish.¹

It is true that Schleiermacher's attempt to exhibit the development of subjective consciousness is not as thorough as one could wish. It has not the broad outlook upon history and experience which are necessary for the satisfactory solution of such a problem. But it is the first attempt of its kind, and its recognition that such immediate convictions arise in the course of experience in as definite conformity to its laws as the categories of objective thought is a really important contribution to epistemology.

It may be noted that little has been said in this brief *résumé* of the peculiarities of Schleiermacher's metaphysical and epistemological theory. No mention has been made of the function assigned to the feeling of absolute dependence as mediating between thought and its object. The omission was intentional, as it was desired to show that when these points of difference were disregarded, Schleiermacher really appeared, in his theory of subjective development, as supplementing rather than as opposing Hegel. And the very fact that this is so makes plainer that dis-

¹ Schleiermacher criticised Kant's position that the postulates of practical reason had a constitutive force not to be allowed to those of theoretical reason. See the early essays in the appendix to Dilthey's *Leben*, Vol. I. His own later position seems to have been that such subjective convictions as those mentioned above are entirely 'constitutive' in subjective experience; and 'constitutive' of objective experience in so far as they (1) direct its course, and (2) can themselves become objects of reflective thought. The precise relation of the division of ideas as regulative-constitutive to that as subjective-objective is, however, not made clear; nor is the relativity of both distinctions noticed.

regard of the subjective side of consciousness on the part of Hegel which was mentioned in beginning. In accordance with his principles, there must be a subjective movement as well as an objective. Yet he persistently speaks as though it were all on one side. Even religion must have its forms arranged from without, according to their approach to "pure Idea." Hegel's predominant objective interest has misled him here; and Schleiermacher's attempt is sufficiently successful to show the general direction which corrections of this defect must take.

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DISCUSSION.

THE INTENTION OF THE NOETIC PSYCHOSIS.

IN a carefully elaborated article in the January number of the REVIEW, Mr. Walter B. Pitkin takes occasion to criticise certain statements made by me in a paper entitled "Is Subjective Idealism a Necessary Point of View for Psychology?"¹ Mr. Pitkin's criticisms appear to me to have no little force, and yet I feel that he has hardly grasped the meaning of my thought, and has attributed to me a thorough-going transcendentalism when my point of view is hardly to be classed as such. Therefore, I take this occasion of stating more definitely my position, especially as, in the article which has brought forth his criticism, I was not primarily concerned in establishing a point of view, but in pointing out certain seeming contradictions in the theoretical tendency in contemporaneous psychology, which on the whole leans, it appears to me, towards subjective idealism.²

My own position is contained in the statement that in *every noetic psychosis there is an intention which points to an extramental reality*. By this I do not mean that knowledge actually transcends itself in the sense of reaching an object that is outside itself. I have not in my mind the 'copy theory' of knowledge, which holds that the internal state is in some way a picture of an external reality, and that truth and falsehood depend upon the approximation of the picture to the original, with the further assumption that completed knowledge is a thorough-going correspondence between the external and internal, the reality and the mental image. Such a conception is, in my judgment, entirely untenable, and I attribute no such miracle to thought as a bridging over such a gulf as is assumed to exist in naive realism between subject and object. Neither do I mean by transcendence the arriving at some extra-experiential and *a priori* truth.

I designate by the intention in the noetic psychosis that attribute which tends to make static and universal the immanency of the immediate present, which gives to the content of the passing psychic state more than a fleeting existence, which in a word objectifies this

¹ *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, Vol. II, p. 229.

² I say this fully understanding that the school of Pragmatism categorically denies the impeachment of solipsism.

state. This is to my mind an extramental attitude,¹ and one without which knowledge is impossible. The most rudimentary state of consciousness that we can conceive of (possibly the pure experience of the pragmatist in its purity) lacks this, at least in a developed form, and therefore may be called feeling, or sensation, or immediate reality, or what you will. As the noetic psychosis becomes more and more developed, as we progress from mere sensation to perception, and as we go higher in the conceptual and rational psychoses, this intention becomes more and more marked. It is what gives a content to knowledge, and a relation between contents. Whether this objectification of experience actually gives to us a reality beyond experience (in the shape of a universe of reals or an absolute thinker) is a problem for metaphysics.

My interest in presenting the view is primarily psychological and not ontological. It seems to me, however, that without such an attitude in conscious experience, knowledge as such ceases, and we are reduced to the condition of pure psychic immanence, which rests entirely within itself and which points to no beyond, which in other words is no knowledge at all, call it whatever else you will.

Mr. Pitkin asks where is the intention in the noetic psychoses to be found. He urges that 'nobody maintains that the intention is a phase of the conscious content of every knowing act.' Continuing, he says, "We must therefore discover the supposed intention somewhere else than within the momentary experience itself." I quite agree that there is no full awareness of such an intention in every noetic state, but urge that there are degrees of awareness from the most dimly subconscious up to the more fully illuminated focal states. I believe that a dim awareness of this intention can be found in every state of knowing.²

All noetic states possess a content, simple or relatively complex, and to recognize this content means psychologically to have an attitude (an experienced attitude) toward it. As I analyze this intention I find it to be largely a matter of attention, which again means,

¹ I use the words 'extramental attitude' as meaning an attitude of extramentality and as equivalent to a transmental attitude, an attitude that points to a beyond — not a beyond that comes in a future experience, but a beyond that is outside the present experience. The attitude itself cannot be outside the mind. That would be a contradiction in terms.

² Indeed, if no such awareness existed, this fact would not prevent the intention from being actually there. It seems to me that here Dr. Pitkin is falling into an error, — namely, that he assumes that to be conscious you must be conscious that you are conscious. This involves an infinite *regressus*.

as far as I can discover, muscular adjustment to the object of knowledge ; or, from another point of view, will. The more the content becomes clearly defined and differentiated, the more this sense of adjustment to it comes into evidence. And this means that I endeavor more and more to make it permanent, and to divorce it from the fluctuations of my psychic states. Take such a simple matter as the visual perception of the table before me. As it becomes for me more and more an object of knowledge I adjust myself to it more persistently. My wandering eye movements are checked, I follow its outline, I place my body more completely in a state of attention in relation to it, its parts become more clearly defined. Thus content grows in complexity and the attentive state becomes progressively pronounced, as muscular adjustments and inhibitions register themselves more persistently in consciousness. Here we have the intention and the psychic correlate in terms of experienced sensations of muscular adjustments, and here also we have the permanence which gives objectivity to the content ; which makes it extramental, if you will.

Mr. Pitkin is quite correct in assuming that I mean to refer to content as that which is intended in the conscious act. He then asks the question : " And yet how can this be made to harmonize with the succeeding statement ' that it is this intention that gives an object to our knowledge ' ? Using the simple method of substitution, we would discover from the above that the act of subscribing an extramental reality to every noetic content is what gives an object to our knowledge. Such a situation is too mysterious for me to grasp."

This objection may have logical force, but I fail to find any psychological difficulty involved in my position. Content and object are the same thing. The content is born in the objectifying tendency, and the objectifying tendency becomes a conscious fact as the content appears. There may be a logical prius between content and object, but there is a psychological identity. To know, is to objectify ; to have a content ; to intend ; to make extramental. These are not separate elements. They are one and the same thing.

My critic finds difficulty with the statement that " knowledge-of-book is one total complex in which the knowledge and the book are separated only by a false abstraction." He urges that the transmental intention makes the content something different from the *merely* given, and concludes that under such circumstances I have made knowledge deceitful by maintaining that the object of knowledge cannot be legitimately separated from the knowledge itself. Now this objection doubtless would hold if I had ascribed to the intention a transcen-

dental function such as Mr. Pitkin evidently thinks that I have in mind. But when I hold simply that the intention makes permanent the fleeting character of the merely given, I believe the objection to have little force. I can look at the noetic state as knowledge, or I can objectify it as a book. It is the same thing, as James would say, viewed from two standpoints.

Mr. Pitkin believes that the most remarkable confusion is found in the assumption that everything which transcends the present moment is transmental, and urges in opposition that reference to a past object is no more transmental than the reference to a present one is. If, for example, one recalls the city Paris, the object of his mental state is present just as really as if Paris were present in the actual sensory experience. With this I should certainly most heartily agree. The object of a memory experience is present in exactly the same sense in which all objects of knowledge are present to the noetic state. Indeed, the object of a state of pure productive imagination (a centaur, for example) is present in this sense, just as is the object of my present consciousness, the paper on which I am writing.

But what does it imply to recall in memory the city Paris? It seems to me that in this recall there is contained as an essential part of it the implication that Paris has existed all the time between my last experience of it and my present memory. It has not gone out of existence when it has left my mind, it has not followed the course of my conscious experiences. This means that I have made of Paris an extramental reality. Suppose again I imagine a city once in existence, but now destroyed. Here again I assume that my consciousness is not identical with the city; otherwise my memory image would recreate it. It seems to me that every memory state thus has in it an extramental reference in the sense in which I am using the term, that is, in the sense of intending to give an independence to its content,—an existence apart from the *mere* state of consciousness in which this content exists. Even if I imagine my centaur, I give to that object an existence external to my passing fancy in so far, at least, as I recognize that the parts which compose it are independent of the fluctuations of my caprice.

At the end of his article, Mr. Pitkin sums up very conveniently and clearly the various kinds of noetic transcendence which he has set forth in the discussion; but I fail to find, in any of them, the meaning which I have attempted to give to the term 'intention of knowledge.' I do not mean by intention either a going out toward an unknown goal or a leap from the present now and the spatially here to something be-

yond ; or the experiencing of some new sensation, or the excess of meaning over process ; or, finally, the completion of experience by itself in ever higher and more universal terms (the transcendence of the pragmatist). I had in mind quite a different thought, which implied no such separation between knowledge and its object as any of these theories suppose, — a separation which makes knowledge always unattainable. Instead, I wish to present the thought that transcendence can mean no going beyond experience, but the giving to experience of a quality which in the moment of knowing takes away its fleeting and temporal character, and equips it with a permanence and a reality which make it possible to be known.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Problems of Philosophy, or Principles of Epistemology and Metaphysics. By JAMES HERVEY HYSLOP. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1905.—pp. ix, 647.

The main contentions and most general points of view of this very elaborate treatise may be briefly indicated as follows: Epistemology is a special 'orthological' (normative) science, one of a group which includes also hygiene, æsthetics, deontology, and jurisprudence (see the classification, p. 27). It is defined as 'science of the conditions of conviction' (p. 58), the principal object of which is 'the determination of criteria for the rational acceptability of certain judgments as facts.' The leading antithesis in epistemological theory is that of idealism and realism, the one denying, the other affirming the ability of the mind in knowing to transcend its own states. Idealism, in the sense defined, is logically solipsism, a doctrine theoretically irrefutable, but one which nobody, probably, has ever seriously held. 'Objectivity,' of some sort, is a rational postulate in all thinking. The cognitive process is characterized, broadly, by two distinct functions, apprehension, or the immediate awareness of presented fact, and judgment, or cognition proper. Judgment involves categories, principles of connection and interpretation, and one of these in particular, the category of cause (to which that of substance is, in a way, subordinate), refers the present 'phenomenon' to something other than itself as its ground. Even if the 'phenomenon' be regarded as nothing more than a fact of consciousness and the 'other' as but another fact of consciousness, the judgment of cause (and substance) still implies a transcending of the immediately apprehended fact. To the indefinite 'otherness' of the objectivity secured by the principle of causality, the sensory datum of space gives clearness. The criteria of truth (validity) are various, since truths are manifold. In formal logic, quantity is a negative criterion (Dr. Hyslop accepts the extreme Hamiltonian doctrine of quantification), the primary test here, as elsewhere, being the subject's own 'perception' of the truth. In apprehension, knowledge—if such it can be called—is absolute. But in judgment also, so long as the reference is to particular presented fact, we have the certainty no less absolute of some kind of reality other than the immediate datum of consciousness. The criterion of general truth is perception of identity of conditions. This identity

cannot be asserted *a priori*, and there can consequently be no guarantee of necessary and universal truth, except in mathematics and in judgments of a formal type, *e. g.*, definitions. In a world of change the only evidence of identity is found in observation of actual uniformities of coexistence and sequence; accordingly, empirical generalization "will be mnemonic or that of simple enumeration, but is not previsionary or predictive beyond a certain degree of probability" (p. 256).

Epistemology ends with the insight that 'knowledge' is a process transcending itself (p. 333), but decides nothing concerning the nature of objective reality. This is the task of special sciences and of metaphysics. Epistemology prepares the way for a clearer discussion of metaphysical questions, but does not condition their solution. This distinction is insisted on. Hence it is maintained that idealism and realism, the principal antithesis in epistemological theory, have no essential bearing on the questions of spiritualism and materialism, the principal antithesis in metaphysics: an 'idealist' may be either a materialist or a spiritualist, a materialist may be either an 'idealist' or a 'realist' (p. 76). Metaphysics as 'noumenological' (see the classification, p. 27), has nothing to do with things-in-themselves, but only with facts transcending the events or phenomena under investigation, so far as these facts are included under the material or the efficient cause. There is no hard and fast line to be drawn between metaphysics and the other sciences that deal with causes; metaphysics is simply the most fundamental of all investigations of phenomena. The ultimate question here is whether all phenomena result from the composition of elements called matter, or whether there is some other reality, of which consciousness is a function, and which is therefore called immaterial. This is the real question at issue between materialism and spiritualism. With the modern refinements in the conception of matter, ideas of 'matter' and 'spirit' tend to assimilate; but no merely speculative decision can be reached on the main issue, the mutual strength and weakness of the two theories can only be balanced over against each other. The decision must be looked for in the scientific evidence of the soul's survival of the dissolution of the body in death.

In the development of these positions, Dr. Hyslop displays a sturdy honesty and independence of thought in keeping with the best traditions of British philosophy. He is determined not to be the victim of high-sounding words; he means, in spite of a certain proclivity on his own part to rather forbidding neologisms, to eschew all speculative

jargon. He insists on 'scientific method' in philosophy, and seeks to heal the breach between philosophy and science, which, as he conceives, the prevailing 'idealistic' mode of thinking has brought about. Thus, as we have seen, he gives to 'science' the final word in the solution of the problem of metaphysics. His analysis of a given problem is thorough and minute; he carefully discriminates its various aspects and points out, with painstaking effort at clearness, the ambiguities of the terms employed in discussing it; where necessary, he gives to these terms a precise, and occasionally a novel, meaning. In elaborating his material he spares neither himself nor — it may be added — his reader in patience and labor, pushing his analyses with dogged pertinacity to the exhaustion of his subject, and richly illustrating it with historical and critically handled examples. And though in the end he succeeds in producing at least as much dissent as conviction, he rarely fails to set one a-thinking.

The most radical criticism of the book would be to deny the possibility of making any such ultimate distinction as is here made between the theory of knowing and the theory of being. Epistemology may be defined, of course, in any way one chooses, and Dr. Hyslop is quite within his rights in defining it, virtually, as the science of the estimation of evidence. But this is ordinary (not 'school' or 'formal') logic. The *theory* of knowledge has, however, to consider a broader question. It has to consider, namely, not only the question, what marks are suitable in a given case to produce the conviction that my thought is valid, but the question generally, how must ideas be conceived as related to reality and reality to ideas in order that 'knowledge' and 'truth' and 'being' may have any meaning for us at all. This problem is clearly no more epistemological than it is metaphysical; it may be called indifferently either. The modern idealist has his solution. It consists, substantially, not in denying that the things and events in space and time are 'real' and declaring our supposed 'knowledge' of them illusory, nor in asserting that they are merely 'states of consciousness,' but in the doctrine that the only meaning that can be given to 'reality' is that it is that which genuinely embodies the meanings and purposes of a mind or minds. This general solution may be, and is, variously carried out. It may be nonsense, but it is at least the reasoned conviction of many able thinkers and deserves examination on its merits. But to be criticised, it must be understood, and here, it seems to me, Dr. Hyslop shows a conspicuous lack of sympathy and comprehension. He never seems fairly to have grasped what idealism really means. His 'idealist' is a solipsist that,

on his own showing, never, probably, existed. It seems a pity, therefore, that so much labor was expended in refuting him by the attempt to show that we pass from the immediate data of 'apprehension' by the application of the categories of 'judgment,' when any live idealist, who knew what he was talking about, would have granted unequivocally that it is with such transcendence that we have to begin.

As regards the criteria of truth, it is strange to find no mention in the book of the 'pragmatic' tests or of the self-consistency of thought. By which of the criteria he mentions would Dr. Hyslop have us test the truth of his doctrine of truth? Mere 'perception' of the truth, the primary test, as we are told, in all cases, seems to be a little abstract.

As to staking the metaphysical issue on the 'scientific' evidence for immortality, it involves no lack of appreciation of the importance of enquiries in this direction to say that no such evidence seems even conceivable as would logically justify, apart from such 'practical' considerations as are already available, the inference suggested. Continued existence after death and immortality are quite distinct conceptions. Evidence of the former would prove indeed that the soul was not indissolubly bound up with the functions of ordinary matter, but it would not prove it to be immortal in its own right, it would not prove that it was not the resultant of the composition of some finer stuff, possibly a by-product of the coarser organism, thrown off like the 'eidola' of Democritus only to maintain a precarious existence so long as the cohesive forces of its parts outbalanced the destructive forces of the environment. In spite, therefore, of the soul's survival, there might be no ultimate conservation of spiritual values. A universe with 'spirits' in it is not necessarily more of a spiritual universe than the world of our common experience.

To these general criticisms it may be permitted to add one or two of a more special character. I have said that Dr. Hyslop makes abundant use of historical material. One cannot, however, always agree with his interpretations or allow his references to be correct. As illustrations of inexactness may be cited the following. On p. 594, Kant's argument for immortality is said to be based on the disparity in the present life between virtue and happiness. This was Kant's reason for postulating God. P. 120 declares that there is nothing in Kant to show that he meant his categories as modes of interpreting experience, he only thought of them as systematizing it. Against this must be set the well-known statement (*Proleg.*, § 30): "They serve, as it were, only to spell out phenomena, that we may be able to read them as ex-

perience," *i. e.*, the categories have the function of an interpretative synthesis. On p. 121, we have the surprising assertion that "Kant gave no illustrations of causal judgment, and one is puzzled to know what could be given for it." In reply to this, Dr. Hyslop may consult *Prol.*, § 20 n., § 29, and *K. d. r. V.*, pp. 202 f. (ed. of 1781, the section treating of the 3d Analogy). Again, p. 271, we are told that Kant 'simply asserted' the ideality of space 'without specific or experimental proof,' such as Berkeley offered. Such 'specific' proof was perhaps for Kant's own conception of his doctrine unnecessary, but he has in fact presented it, *Prol.* § 13. On p. 264, the doctrine of perception by impact of eidola on the sensorium is attributed to Empedocles. But the Empedoclean word for the effluences affecting sense is not *εἴδωλα* but *ἀπορροαί*, and his account of vision is different (see fr. 316 ff.). Allowances may be made for differences of interpretation, and especially in the case of so ambiguous a writer as Kant; but it is hard to accept Dr. Hyslop's account of Spinoza as a monistic materialist (p. 361), or of Leibniz as one who worked out into its most consistent form the doctrine of 'parallelism' and explained the unity by a theory of 'occasional' causes (p. 399).

Another point of criticism is the author's rather too frequent lapses in the matter of his English. He can write clearly and forcibly; the last chapter especially contains many passages of real power and charm. But then, on occasion, we have such sentences as these: "It was still assumed that the brain could originate functional action as a center wherever the theory of materialism existed and which supposed . . ." (p. 511); "this [certitude] is the conception of it [knowledge] as applied to certain doctrines which scepticism takes of it" (p. 194); "in divisional quality they [space and time] determine individuation, points that in space and moments that in time" (p. 215). (Parenthetically it may be noted that points and moments are treated as respectively the individual *units* of space and time.) "Our concepts and terms must have identity and constancy of meaning, whether nature is such or not" (p. 217).

Finally, the book is much too long. One chapter alone (Ch. XI) runs through 104 closely printed pages, and the whole work extends to nearly 650. It is no excuse to say that it was designed for the general reader as well as for the professional student; it is just the general reader who is most likely to be repelled by its bulk and wearied by its really unnecessary elaborateness. Authors have yet to learn that the half is sometimes more and better than the whole. *Addo dum minuo.*

The work, as the writer happens to remember, is the embodiment of twenty years of stimulating philosophical teaching, and it is dedicated to the pupils among whom its reflections grew up. May 'the bridle of Theages,' which now keeps the author from the active work of the class-room, still keep him long attached to philosophy and to the dissemination in other forms of expression of that same free spirit of honest and patient enquiry which animates his book!

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The Unity of Plato's Thought. By PAUL SHOREY. (Reprinted from Vol. VI. of the *Decennial Publications* of the University of Chicago.) Chicago, University Press, 1903.—pp. 88.

The main thesis of Professor Shorey's essay, which is supported by great learning and a remarkable wealth of textual citations, is one with which the present reviewer is delighted to profess himself in complete accord. "Plato," he says (p. 88), "belongs rather to the type of thinkers whose philosophy is fixed in early maturity than to the class of those who receive a new revelation every decade." For students of Plato who have seen the ingenious attempts of certain Cambridge scholars to invent a 'later' Platonism with a watchword of *μύμησις*, as opposed to the 'earlier' Platonism of the 'immanent' idea, and of Lutoslawski to read Berkeleyanism into the *Parmenides* and *Timæus*, such a pronouncement is as timely as it is wholesome. For my own part, I cannot conceive how either of these doctrines can survive such a minute demonstration of the fundamental accord of the leading Platonic dialogues of all 'periods' in their main philosophical teaching as is here presented. Professor Shorey, it is not too much to say, proves beyond disputation from the Platonic text, that there are not two Platonic philosophies but only one, as we might long ago have learned from Aristotle, and that in that philosophy, both early and late, the 'ideas' are always 'transcendent,' and sensible things always related to them by 'participation.' As this result is also that of Dr. Adam in his magnificent edition of the *Republic*, we may trust that it will not lightly be disputed again.

To myself, at least, Professor Shorey speaks also *μάλα κατὰ νοῦν* in his protest against the extraordinary arbitrariness with which some students, notably Lutoslawski, have employed supposed allusions to contemporary events as a means of dating individual dialogues. I am altogether of what seems to be his opinion that almost the only reasonably certain result of the inquiry into the order of the dialogues is the

relatively late character of the 'dialectical' group, including the *Philebus*, and that the importance of this result for a study of Plato's thought has been unduly exaggerated. There are one or two matters of great, though still secondary, importance in which I feel that students of Plato may find it difficult to follow Professor Shorey. I could wish he had not lent incidental countenance to the view that Plato's conception of the 'ideas' culminates in poetical mysticism. To me it seems clear that, wherever Plato speaks of the being of the 'ideas' and their relations to each other, his language is as straightforward and free from mysticism as the multiplication table; the element of myth and fancy only comes in when he approaches the connection of the 'ideas' with the world of 'generation,' and then only because the world of 'generation' has not in Plato's eyes enough reality to be the object of genuine science, not because the 'ideas' are too exalted to be rationally cognized. This point is of some moment, since the mystical interpretation appears to be the chief obstacle which prevents students from seeing that the problems with which the doctrine of 'ideas' is concerned are one and all fundamental problems of exact logic, and meet us again, in a different phraseology, in the modern calculus of logic. *E. g.*, the difficulty raised by Aristotle and a host of his successors about the 'participation' of 'ideas' in other 'ideas' is really solved, in a sense favorable to Plato, the moment it is translated into such a modern symbolism as that of Peano.

I could wish also that Professor Shorey had faced the question whether, without any change in the fundamental doctrine of 'ideas,' there is not in such dialogues as the *Philebus* and *Timæus* a new development in the direction of a more pronounced theism than that, *e. g.*, of the *Republic*.

On the question as to Professor Shorey's well-known rejection of Aristotle's testimony as to the 'ideal numbers,' and the position assigned by Plato to τὰ μαθηματικά, I must confess I share the incredulity of Dr. Adam. That Aristotle only half understood the doctrine he was criticizing is, I think, indisputable; but if I am to believe that his emphatic and reiterated statements are no evidence for what his master *said*, I feel that I can no longer put any faith in the testimony of one man to the utterances of another. Surely it would have been impossible, in the lifetime of Plato's immediate successors in the Academy, for Aristotle openly and repeatedly to attribute to him a whole series of statements as to his principal doctrine which had never really been made without laying himself open to a damaging exposure. Against all such considerations Professor Shorey has nothing to set but

his conviction that the doctrines ascribed to Plato in the *Metaphysics* are inconsistent with the dialogues. He does not refer to, and seems not to have studied, the important work published five or six years ago by Professor G. Milhaud, *Les philosophes géomètres de la Grèce*. Professor Milhaud, whose general interpretation of Plato is very similar to that of Professor Shorey, there attempts to show, I think with considerable success, that the doctrine ascribed by Aristotle to Plato is both consistent in itself and in close accord with such dialogues as the *Philebus* and *Parmenides*; and that Aristotle's strictures upon it arise from that philosopher's incompetence in mathematics, an incompetence of which there is abundant evidence. I cannot but regard any discussion of the Aristotelian account of Plato which neglects to reckon with Professor Milhaud's arguments as putting itself out of court.

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Biographia Philosophica: A Retrospect. BY ALEXANDER CAMPBELL FRASER. Second edition. Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood and Sons, 1905. — pp. xiv, 335.

The popularity of this work is strikingly demonstrated by the fact that it has passed into a second edition before the publication of this notice of the original edition, which appeared in the summer of 1904. It presents, with all the literary skill which we have learned to expect from its author, the story at once of his life and of his philosophical development. "It may appear to some," says Professor Campbell Fraser in his modest preface, "that in the following pages the *Biographia* is too prominent, to others that the *Philosophia* is in excess, and perhaps a larger number may think that there is too much of both. When I remembered how the modesty of David Hume confined his narrative of the events of his own really memorable life within about a dozen pages, I was ready to agree with the first of these opinions, and to resolve that this Retrospect should remain unpublished. But I reflected that here the *Biographia* was introduced for the sake of *Philosophia*, so that it was not a story of personal incidents for their own sake. The narrative is intended partly to infuse some familiar human interest into this account of a philosophical endeavor to deal with the riddle of the Universe; and partly to show how racial, educational, and social influences, as well as changing phases of thought and national sentiment, in the last eighty years of the nineteenth century, have tended to direct the issue of that intellectual endeavour. Besides, as my former publications have been largely fragmentary, it seemed

that their latent unity and general drift might become more apparent through a medium which, I fear after all, is too autobiographical." This is a fear which no reader of the book is likely to share with the author; it will be prized not least for the living impression it gives of the personality of one of the most distinguished philosophical thinkers and teachers in Great Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century.

"I have lived," says the author, "under five British Sovereigns and I have seen six Principals in the College of Edinburgh. When I was an undergraduate, George Husband Baird was the Head of the College, a philanthropic ecclesiastic, who reigned for nearly half a century. He was a professorial colleague of Robertson, and afterwards his successor in the principalship, thus connecting the Edinburgh of my youth with the Edinburgh of David Hume and Adam Smith. So generations are linked and pass away" (p. 217). The opening chapter gives a charming picture of early days in "the isolated peninsula of Lorne, with its old world society, in the days when George IV. was king." The solitude of Lorne was exchanged by the young student for "the publicity and collision of a Glasgow classroom," where, he tells us, "I felt myself a foreigner among my new associates. . . . Of my fellow-students I distinctly remember one, Alan Ker, . . . who indulged me with a speaking acquaintance. . . . Another, unknown to me at the time, now an honoured friend, was James Hutchison Stirling, whose *Secret of Hegel* is a landmark in the history of philosophic thought in Scotland in the second half of the nineteenth century. . . . Educated as I had been in solitude, I was disposed to silence and self-consciousness, and averse from varied intercourse or collision with mankind. Nevertheless, I now fondly cherish the memory of college life, on the old high street of Glasgow, in that far-off winter—in quaint dingy courts, on dark winter mornings, as we gathered soon after seven to the sound of the college bell." Next year (1834), "I was transferred to the University of Edinburgh, and first saw the city which was to be the home of my public life." "I entered the logic class in the following winter. It was taught by Dr. David Ritchie, one of the ministers of Edinburgh, and was treated more as an appendage to his ministerial charge than as the professor's supreme interest, after a fashion not uncommon in philosophical professorships in Scotland about that time. The winter of 1835 was Ritchie's last, in a professorial reign of twenty-eight years, during which he had delivered to undergraduates in a diluted form the psychology of Thomas Reid and the logic of Watts and Duncan. . . .

I seem to see the pale anxious face of the feeble old man as he made his daily entrance into the riotous classroom. Two volumes of sermons on *Romans* was, I think, his only contribution to the world's stock of books." "In 1836 philosophy was at a lower ebb in Scotland than at any time since the advent of Francis Hutcheson from Ireland to Glasgow, rather more than a century before, when the country was becoming diverted from ecclesiastical warfare, and turning to literary pursuits. . . . In 1836 Thomas Brown had passed away sixteen years before, Dugald Stewart eight years, and Sir James Mackintosh nearly four. The Scottish chairs of philosophy were no longer occupied by philosophers." "Thomas Brown, not Ritchie, was at first my chief teacher. In the previous summer by accident I found his lectures on mental philosophy in the manse library; they led me to his ingenious book on the relation of Cause and Effect."

"The summer of 1838 was an era in my life. In the preceding winter I had graduated. The examination for the master's degree had introduced me to Sir William Hamilton. In the spring of the year I read an essay in the Diagnostic Society on 'Cause and Effect,' the subject which then filled my mind. . . . In that summer, too, I increased my acquaintance with Berkeley, and was introduced to Coleridge, besides listening to echoes of Kant. Berkeley helped to make living mind instead of dead matter prominent. I began to think of the world as rooted in living mind, with matter subordinate; and also to feel the insufficiency of mere invariableness in sequences of events as the final interpretation of causation. The moral philosophy lectures of Wilson had called attention to free agency of intending will, as involved in moral responsibility; thus showing that something more and other than 'invariable sequence' was involved in active causation. This was ably reinforced by Coleridge, whose 'Aids to Reflection' was a favourite companion that summer, serving more than any other influence to disenchant the shallow causal conception of Brown" (pp. 53-4).

Having completed his course of study in the Faculty of Arts, Campbell Fraser took what would now be called a 'post-graduate' course in theology and philosophy, under Chalmers and Hamilton. Of his winter in Hamilton's newly-started "select class for metaphysical devotees, an attractive novelty in the university," he speaks as "the happiest in my student life." "Never, I suppose, were the ultimate questions about man and the universe, which constitute metaphysics, approached in a Scottish university in a more disinterested and earnest temper than by the band of students then united through com-

mon sympathy in the morning of life ; inspired by the directing intelligence of one who unfolded before our wondering eyes the ancient, mediæval, and modern world of thought. Intercourse in the classroom by day was followed by frequent reunions in the evening at 11 Manor Place, then the abode of Hamilton, where all were encouraged to express difficulties and to debate doubts. . . . I owe more to Hamilton than to any other intellectual influence. He moved us all to think out questions for ourselves. . . . The metaphysical writer helped me in many ways. It was the beginning of congenial companionship with students, and of the life-long friendship of Hamilton."

The completion of a course of theological study was followed by ordination to a quiet country parish neighborhood of Edinburgh, in which the young philosopher fondly hoped to realize his ideal of a "self-contained life of religious thought," such as Arthur Collier had lived in his quiet Wiltshire parish. "I soon found that an Arthur Collier-like life, in a rural parish in Scotland, in the heat of a Scottish ecclesiastical war, was an illusion of one inexperienced in life. One has to be one's self in order to be or do anything, whatever the character of the self may be, and my bent was too strong to be turned aside. War about non-intrusion under the shadow of an unsettled final problem seemed like Nero diverting himself when Rome was burning." In 1846 an escape was found "from ecclesiastical strife into the tranquil if obscure region of philosophy" by an invitation to occupy the Chair of Logic in the New College, Edinburgh, founded by the Free Church, into which Fraser had followed his father at the Disruption. Three years later came the appointment to the editorship of the *North British Review*, which he held for the next seven years, and which brought him into contact with many distinguished men, of some of whom he gives graphic pictures in these pages. On the death of Sir William Hamilton in 1856, Campbell Fraser was appointed, after "a contest of unexampled severity," to the vacant Chair in the University of Edinburgh.

His brilliant career of thirty-five years in "the Chair of Hamilton" is well-known to the readers of this REVIEW. The substance of his teaching from that Chair is familiar to students of his *Philosophy of Theism*. In the present volume he thus describes that "*Via Media*, repelled alike from an agnostic science wholly ignorant of God, and from a gnostic science which implied Omniscience," which he gradually adopted as his philosophical point of view. "The thought grew upon me that the reasonable human attitude towards the universe, in the apparent contingency of appearances in which it presents itself to

us, must have at its root not speculative reason only, but rational faith-venture, — the ‘faith’ composed of the entire complex constitution of man — man emotional, and man morally responsible, as well as man finitely intelligent — the venture involving an assurance that this complex constitution of man need not be finally put to confusion in the universe in which he lives and moves and has his being” (pp. 186-7).

Berkeley had long been a favorite author, and his philosophy had been an important influence in determining the ultimate bent of our author’s own thought. It was therefore with much satisfaction that he accepted, in 1863, the invitation of the delegates of the Oxford Clarendon Press to prepare a Collected Edition of Berkeley’s Works, and for some years thereafter this became his chief literary occupation. In the meantime his directly academic activities did not flag. In 1865 he opened an advanced class similar to that by which, as conducted by Hamilton, he had himself so much benefited. “In the following quarter of a century more than 400 students entered in this class. In those lectures I avoided final system, and unfolded some of the great philosophies of the past, constructive and destructive; in the faith that human thinkers differ, not totally, but in the degree of their approach to the perfect philosophy that is fully reached by none.” “This attempt to educate independent thinkers,” he tells us with a modest pride, “was not unsuccessful. The young metaphysicians of the university soon formed themselves into a society for weekly discussions, and the class-room, aided latterly by this ‘Philosophical Society,’ has sent not a few professors and books of philosophy into the world, in the later decades of the nineteenth century. It has given two professors of philosophy to Edinburgh, two to Glasgow, three to Aberdeen, two to St. Andrews; one to Oxford, and another to Cambridge; besides a still larger number to American universities, and to colleges in India and Japan and Australia.”

The long vacations were devoted to literary production, and resulted in the publication not only of the Clarendon Press edition of Berkeley’s Works, in 1871; of the Life and Letters of Berkeley, in the same year; of the Selections from Berkeley, in 1874; of the volume on Berkeley in Blackwood’s Philosophical Classics, in 1881, and of that on Locke in the same series, in 1890. Since his retirement in 1891, he has added to this list of publications the Oxford edition of Locke’s *Essay on Human Understanding* (1894), his Gifford Lectures on “The Philosophy of Theism” (1898), besides a revised edition of his Oxford “Berkeley,” and a little volume on Reid.

“Some weeks in most of those years of retirement at Hawthornden have been spent in the Land of Lorne, the home of my youth. I returned in old age to scenes, familiar in the morning of life, when inquiry was beginning to move uneducated common-sense; . . . The perplexing doubts about the universe, in which I newly found myself in youth, have led to deeper faith in the immanent Divine Spirit, transforming death from a movement in the dark into a movement in Omnipotent Goodness; trusted when it withdraws us from this embodied life, still unable to picture what lies in the future. ‘It is not yet made manifest what we shall be.’ And a philosophical pilgrimage in this life seemed to return upon itself, but to an old world presented in a new light.”

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The Metaphysics of Nature. By CARVETH READ. London, Adam and Charles Black, 1905.—pp. viii, 354.

One's first impression, on opening this book and glancing at its table of contents, is one of surprise at the range and scope of the discussion undertaken. The part of the book that is concerned directly with the consideration of Cosmology is but one of its four main divisions, and fills less than a fourth of its pages. The three remaining subdivisions deal with Epistemology, Psychology, and the Categories. Under these rubrics one finds practically all the philosophical problems that have ever arisen, excepting only those which fall under what the author calls the Metaphysic of Ideals. The wealth of interests compassed in this comparatively brief volume gives the work inevitably at times a somewhat sketchy character, as if it were a generous syllabus of a course of university lectures, or of several such courses, rather than a complete discussion of the problems raised.

The work also traces throughout the history of philosophy, from the early Greeks to the present time, the fate of each of the chief topics considered. These topical sketches of the history of philosophy are, considering their brevity, remarkably well done; and yet the result is often far from satisfactory. The difficulty is rooted in the very nature of the undertaking. To isolate from their full context the views which a philosopher holds on a particular question is usually unfair to the doctrines of any considerable systematic thinker. The chapter and verse method may be applied fairly well to a simple and sun-clear philosopher like Berkeley; but when applied to a Plato or a Kant, a Hegel or a Green, the result is pretty sure to be misleading, and to

give the impression of unfairness. Hegel, who seems to be the author's pet aversion, is treated with pity and contempt,—“poor Hegel,” as he is condescendingly called. The philosophical doctrine that tries the author's patience most is that of ‘innate ideas.’ Its mention is always the signal for abuse which precludes the possibility of fruitful criticism. Kant, the philosopher most frequently quoted in the book, is subjected at times to captious criticism,¹ and his central doctrines are never quite fairly presented.

The general purpose of the book is to present a new hypothesis concerning reality which shall do justice alike to the demands of philosophical reflection and to the results of scientific investigation. This hypothesis involves the revival of *Dinge-an-sich*, called, for lack of a more colorless name, Transcendent Reality, or Transcendent Being. Professor Read undertakes to show why such a reality must be assumed; that it is not unknowable; how it may be known, though dimly, by inference from the sample of reality that we directly know; and how it is related to consciousness on the one hand and to phenomena on the other. Thus it will be seen that his consideration of the Metaphysics of Nature inevitably entails a discussion of Psychology (Consciousness, the conscious Subject and Reality) and of the Categories.

Historically, the view, according to its author, bears a closer resemblance to monistic doctrines, like those of Spinoza, Schopenhauer, and Spencer, than to any others,—doctrines which, we are told, have multiplied of late years, and “may now be said to predominate in the speculative world.” (P. 170. Fechner, von Hartmann, and Häckel are also called in evidence.) And it comes perhaps closer to Spinoza's view than to the rest. Spinoza's Absolute has been, so to speak, pulverized, and the many transcendent reals thus obtained are supposed to change, and in an orderly and uniform manner, and to co-exist.

All philosophers, Professor Read thinks, have been forced in the end to a tacit or explicit recognition of Transcendent Being. But some philosophers, and apparently all idealists, have lacked the courage

¹ See *e. g.*, the attempt to pit Kant against himself on pp. 54 and 56. And on p. 68, the implication that Kant attributes “existence” to space and time apart from the series of phenomena, falsifies his doctrine of their “empirical reality.” (Cf. p. 176. If Kant's meaning be grasped, the criticism here made is again a quibble about words.) And if Kant is not to be allowed to distinguish what cannot be separated *in existence*, how would our author justify his own distinction between “Transcendent Being,” “phenomena,” and “consciousness”? In the passage cited Professor Read writes: “The laws of Reason are an abstraction and generalisation of perceptions and reasonings.” Does this mean any more than, the laws of Reason are a result of reasoning about reasoning? And was it not just to avoid such absurdities that Kant's doctrine of the *a priori* was developed?

of their convictions, and have given such Being a name that belied its intended character. The author holds that mind and matter are not on the same level (whence he concludes that interaction and parallelism, as usually affirmed, are alike meaningless), and that matter, Empirical Reality, constitutes a world of phenomena in consciousness. Still, we are forced to believe that Empirical Reality is more than this, and to refer phenomena to a reality other than the consciousness in which they appear. "The phenomenon is constructed by the Subject, but is not subjective" (p. 209). And this is taken to mean that it points to Transcendent Being.

Transcendent Reality, or Being, is defined as "the substance which all appearances or phenomena are said to depend on, or inhere in, but which is never directly known" (p. 22). We cannot approach it "entirely by the physical method, proceeding from percepts through analogous concepts to empirical verification." And as this is the only valid method for investigations deserving the name of science, the concepts of the Transcendent World are "not concepts of science or knowledge, but of that background of Belief out of which knowledge has been differentiated as science has been out of knowledge. If such concepts are to be justified, it must be as appertaining to the necessary background of our picture of the world; and it should appear possible by fair inferences (though imperfect because unverifiable) to trace in that obscurity a few faint outlines of resemblance to things that stand in the foreground and are more distinctly known" (pp. 32-3). The conception of Transcendent Reality is held to be necessary in order to "complete the system of Empirical Reality." We are driven to its recognition, partly, by an "instinctive belief in something not ourselves that consciously moves and strives"; and partly, in order "to account for changes of phenomena that go on in the absence of any known percipient," and also to account for the "fact that the external world is believed to be common to oneself and others." It is true that all physical theories of nature "assume the presence of the subject as a latent term in all their propositions. . . . But if we admit a state of the world in which no organic consciousness exists, there is no longer a possibility of organised percepts. How then shall we conceive or express that state of the world?" (pp. 137, 159-60). The notion of such a substance has its function then "in giving coherence to the system of experience," and "as a refuge from solipsism and nihilism."

Briefly put, and in the author's words, the opinion defended in this book is: "That in our own consciousness we have an immediate

knowledge of ultimate Reality, and that the remainder of Empirical Reality, including our own bodies and the external world, is a system of phenomena constructed in consciousness and in some manner representing the ultimate Reality. That Reality is universally conscious, but its whole being cannot be fully expressed by consciousness; so that as to the remainder of its being it is transcendent, and can only be understood, partly, from the laws of phenomena, which represent it objectively, and partly, from the laws of self-consciousness, which does not represent it and is not a phenomenon but the Reality itself subjectively conditioned." "Matter and consciousness cannot be wholly reduced to one concept.—The concept of ultimate Reality is not simple but contains a duality, namely, Consciousness and the Transcendent Being or Idea that is conscious" (p. 115).

We have thus (1) consciousness, in which ultimate reality is immediately known; (2) phenomena, supposed in some way to represent ultimate reality in consciousness; and (3) reality that is universally conscious, but is also something more, and in that something more transcendent. Passing by the many lesser puzzles which the view at once suggests, the chief difficulty arises when we attempt to put any positive meaning into the concept of the transcendent. Professor Read admits the difficulty, and apparently does not hope for much clearness of vision, hardly more than enough to make darkness visible (*cf.* p. 172). Such a reality is not consciousness. It cannot be an immediate object of consciousness, for that would make it a phenomenon. And yet it is to be known, and, if known, it must have some ground of resemblance to the cognition of it. This is the author's way out: There are certain "fundamental relations" in which Transcendent Being may agree with the cognition of it through phenomena. That is, if I have caught his meaning, one has no right to affirm that what is not consciousness must be unknowable unless it can be made content of consciousness, or phenomenon. It is enough for knowledge of it if there be a "representation in consciousness." And if, as by hypothesis, phenomena are the "manifestation" of such reality in consciousness, we may, by considering ultimate relations of phenomena, draw a few fair inferences concerning the "necessarily hidden" transcendent; and, similarly, we can transfer to it something from its correlative consciousness (pp. 134-5, 171). We are the more readily inclined to do this in the case of phenomena, because then we can conceive of the growth of such a representation in life and mind as a function of the evolution of nature. And this is the result which Professor Read reaches from his particular selection of

“fundamental relations”: Transcendent Being is to be thought as characterized by succession, change, coexistence, and order,—a confessedly meager result, but one which he thinks may be enriched by further philosophical reflection. We cannot call it subject, “for that term is applicable only to conscious activity”; nor substance, for that “suggests that consciousness is an attribute and therefore a degree less real.”

But what use shall we make of the concept of the transcendent; how is it to prove of service in “completing the system of empirical reality,”—that is, how is it related to phenomena and to consciousness? Before turning to this problem, however, it will be necessary to state briefly Professor Read’s theory about consciousness. The subjective region of experience gives, we are told, besides the direct contents of introspection, something analogous to the conceptual world which science constructs out of perceptual experience—a conceptual system of consciousness “designed to connect and complete the inadequate and fragmentary contents of introspection.” In framing such a system, one but follows the lead of Leibniz with his *petites perceptions*, Spencer with his atomic feelings, and Fechner with his subliminal consciousness. And here, for lack of any other way, biological and physical analogies must help us out (pp. 29–31). It is, of course, more difficult for us to imagine the lowest terms of such a conceptual system of consciousness than it is to imagine molecules and ether, and we have not the much-to-be-desired introspective magnifier. Still this is no ground for rejecting the simples of consciousness. “The same possibility of infinite refinement should be recognized in consciousness, as already has been acknowledged in the case of ‘gross, dead, brute matter.’” This granted, the way is open for the “hypothesis of the universality of consciousness in nature.” It “everywhere accompanies the movements or activities of that which is manifested to sense-perception and which, conceptually, is figured to exist as atoms and ether, but which itself is necessarily transcendent” (pp. 202–3). There is no occasion to seek a substance for consciousness, consciousness being itself reality. The belief in the subject as substance is simply a survival of the belief in ghosts. It is equally inadmissible to speak of consciousness as simple or unitary. “Organic totality is the character of an individual Subject” (p. 209). And there are innumerable degrees of complexity in the consciousnesses that emerge in the course of evolution, corresponding to the varying degrees of simplicity or complexity of the physical bodies which are the manifestations of the same Transcendent Reality of which the consciousnesses are the activities.

How, now, are we to think the relation of Transcendent Being to phenomena and to consciousness. We cannot speak of this Being as cause of phenomena, for causality is a category only applicable to phenomena. The relations of substance and attribute, noumenon and phenomenon, are "incurably static and otiose; and therefore it may be better to name a new Category—Manifestation—and to recognise fully its one-sided character. It stands for a relation of which there is only one term in experience: it is therefore an Imperfect Category, not constitutive but only indicative or orectic; for the other term, lying beyond experience, is inapprehensible" (p. 153). Do we fare any better with regard to consciousness? Hardly. It can be regarded neither as the phenomenon nor as the attribute of Transcendent Being. "Perhaps to think of consciousness as an activity of Transcendent Being may be least misleading" (p. 211). But Professor Read thinks his hypothesis gives him a great advantage over both materialism and spiritualism in stating the relation of consciousness and phenomena. There is a correspondence, in fact an intimate parallelism, not between consciousness and phenomena, but between consciousness and "the rest of Being which is manifested in phenomena, such that consciousness may be considered as an activity of Being." This is the way the story reads: "Sensation arises when a disturbance in the transcendent Being of the brain is set up by changes in the Being of other phenomena; and perception is the integration of sensations that takes place under certain conditions in which one sensation becomes a sign of the others. An idea consists of perceptions and their associations centrally excited; that is, accompanying disturbances propagated from other parts of the Being of the brain. Volition, or the acting upon the idea of an action, implies a specific disturbance in the Being of the brain corresponding with the idea of the action, and a propagation of this disturbance by the Being of nerves and muscles into the outer world" (p. 241, *cf.* 334). It took courage, we are assured, to write that story. Still, Professor Read thinks this is the way most people conceive the matter, provided they "have given any attention to Psychology and also to the recent progress of the physical and biological sciences. For they hold (1) that consciousness has no mass or energy; (2) that it cannot be explained by any other mode of existence; (3) that phenomena do manifest mass and energy; and (4) that phenomena (as such) are not the reality of Being," and the above account follows from these propositions.

Materialistic interpretations of nature have been given a certain plausibility in the modern world by the theory of gravitation. But

they have met a check in the theory of natural selection, for by that theory every property of organic life is acquired and developed for its usefulness. Consciousness therefore, if acquired, must be in the same case. But if it is useful, it must be a mode of energy, and to speak of it as a mode of energy "is next to nonsense" (pp. 149-50). Our author's view suggests a way out of this apparent conflict of science with itself. Consciousness is not an acquired property. It is an activity of Transcendent Reality, or of that portion of it whose phenomenon is the particular organism with which the consciousness in question is in some way associated, though neither as epiphenomenon nor as product. We can speak of it then as arising in the individual in the development of nature according to natural laws, and as coming into being at the time when Transcendent Reality, or a portion of it, is in such state that this brain, for example, is its appropriate phenomenal manifestation. Consciousness should not therefore be spoken of as useful, but rather as necessary or essential, inherent in nature. Thus it "must appear in its organic form when organised animals appear, as a matter of course and because it cannot be otherwise" (p. 149). This view Professor Read applies to the interpretation of volition. We are free, but in the same sense in which everything is free. Everything acts according to its nature, and so do we. A man's nature is his character. This his actions follow, for his character is expressed in his body. And so by his body "man is a cause in Nature to the full extent of his Reality." But character is a growing thing, and our desires to alter it are symptoms of its growth. We are thus, and cannot help being, joint causes of our actions; for the actions are manifestations of the reality which always has for its correlate consciousness. And Professor Read adds, "moralists seem justifiable in their tenet that we have more power over our characters than over circumstances." (But how this is possible, if a man's character is expressed by his body, and if this is determined by physical antecedents, is not explained.) Physical causation and teleology may perhaps be reconcilable; for it is possible that "in the inwardness of Nature, physical and final Causation may be the same principle" (pp. 337-46).

The ingenious hypothesis which this book presents seems to bristle all over with difficulties for which its author offers no adequate solution. The chief of these difficulties I find in his attempt to put positive meaning into the notion of the 'Transcendent.' In this it does not seem to me that Professor Read has succeeded. He tells us that he will not be content unless he can give some answer to Berkeley's

question, "How is it possible to predicate anything of that which is other than consciousness?" And then he proceeds to enumerate four points in his position, as if they furnished an answer to that question. Here they are: (1) Consciousness is reality, but not the whole of reality; (2) consciousness is a factor of all reality; (3) an organism's consciousness is not on a level with the organism itself; and (4) since all speculation points to Transcendent Being, we can give "this vacuum some body, or at least a skeleton, by transferring thither something from its correlative consciousness" (pp. 170-1). The first three points seem to be irrelevant, and the fourth only becomes relevant in so far as that which shall be other than consciousness is allowed to borrow its whole meaning from consciousness. The four supposed characteristics of Transcendent Being, succession, change, coexistence, and order, are clear enough in the region of consciousness or phenomena; but who shall say what they mean in this Transcendent World? We are told (p. 105) that Transcendent Being is not unknowable, and that we get into the Spencerian difficulty by supposing that the world-process is unconscious. But, asks Professor Read, what if this be an error, "what if the world-process has its own consciousness comparable with ours?" Then we should be able to predicate likeness between consciousness and the real world-process. But surely not, except in so far as that world-process *is* consciousness. As transcendent and other than consciousness, the reply to Spencer is not pertinent. Nor can I find that our author has adduced any convincing reasons for believing in Transcendent Reality. The most his arguments may be said to show is, that we cannot rest content either with solipsism or nihilism. His own Transcendent Being remains utterly unknown, "empty" as well as "hidden," so long as it is kept transcendent; it gets as much meaning as we are willing to carry over to it from consciousness and phenomena, and by just so much it ceases to be transcendent. I cannot see that Professor Read has made his way out of this dilemma.

And we are in equal difficulties when we attempt to make any use of the concept in completing the system of Empirical Reality. What does it mean to say that "consciousness is the activity of Transcendent Being"?¹ If ever there were a survival of the primitive 'ghost theory,' it would seem to be in the notion of Transcendent Being serving in this capacity. And what does it mean to speak of phenomena as the 'manifestation' of Transcendent Being? Is not the

¹That is, I suppose, in so far as Transcendent Being is other than consciousness, for in so far as it is consciousness it *is* the activity in question.

word 'manifestation' as bad as Plato's 'participation,'—just a metaphor to cover up our ignorance? Nor, finally, are we able to put any meaning into the supposed relation of the assumed Transcendent Beings to each other. Professor Read is inclined to attribute to Transcendent Being "something equivalent to that which we know in phenomena as causation." But what "something equivalent" can mean remains a mystery. The category of causality, we are taught, "is an exclusively physical category" (p. 331). When forced to speak of the relations of these reals, Professor Read speaks of a "disturbance" in Transcendent Being as "setting up" changes in other Transcendent Being, or of changes in such Being as "transmitted" to other such being. If this is not carrying the category of causality into the Transcendent World, what do such expressions mean?

The conception of consciousness offers also many perplexities. Objective empirical reality and physical reality, that is, the world of percepts as directly apprehended and as conceptualized in science, is, according to the theory, a world of phenomena, and phenomena are declared to exist in consciousness. Then, apparently, this world of phenomena as elaborated by science is conceived as if it had independent existence, and thereupon we discover consciousness arriving behind time. And as this won't do, we then suppose consciousness to run back all along the line, clear back to primitive protyle and to the ether in its faultless purity. But inasmuch as ether and protyle, and the like, are concepts in the construction of physical reality for a highly organized consciousness, what could ether be, or aught else, to an etherially simple consciousness? Does the difficulty come from the fact that our author speaks of phenomena as existing in consciousness, as if they existed in consciousness in general, and not always in individual consciousness? Or shall we say that the whole of empirical and physical reality exists in every consciousness, in that which is supposed to be correlative to the Being manifest in the molecule, as well as in that correlative to the Being manifest in the brain of man?

Again, how is the organized consciousness, say of man, which is, by the hypothesis, the activity of the Transcendent Reality whose manifestation is the brain, related to the innumerable minute consciousnesses which are, by the same hypothesis, the activities of the Transcendent Realities whose manifestations in phenomena are the molecules of the brain? And how is one such organized consciousness related to other similar consciousnesses? The category of causality, we are told, does not apply. That of activity is substituted, but it is certainly left very vague. In one place Professor Read speaks of uni-

versal consciousness, and in another he tells us that the different consciousnesses are not discrete but form a continuum ; but not much is made of these suggestions.

These are a few of the difficulties that suggest themselves to the reviewer. It is certainly a fair criticism of the book to say that it does not take sufficient pains to establish and clarify its own peculiar positions, and that it would have been better to spend more time on the constructive parts and less on the histories and the polemics. In discussing the criterion of truth, Professor Read writes : " In every study, in proportion as definiteness of conception, rigour of verification, or systematic coördination is wanting, in that proportion a good mind does not experience necessary conviction " (p. 79). In the author's theory the marks are, I think, all lacking. But Professor Read would reply, in the present state of metaphysics such virtues are not possible, and metaphysics for a long time to come must be content with much less than necessary conviction.

The book is full of good things, of pertinent criticisms and fruitful ideas, which I have been forced to pass by in order to consider more fully its central thesis. I have found it the most stimulating and entertaining work in philosophy that I have read for some time, and this in spite of the fact that I find its most ambitious undertaking unsupported by argument, vague and futile. The style is delightful, and the discussion is throughout enlivened with a refreshing sense of humor, which, it must be admitted, occasionally descends to ridicule and caricature. And there are some passages whose only excuse for being is in the clever turning of the phrase, and these might well have been pruned out. Let this sample suffice : " Future generations may have reason to thank those who left them something to do, more than those who anticipated everything. How many grateful monuments may hereafter commemorate the men who did nothing and discovered nothing " (p. 134).

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Der soziale Optimismus. Von LUDWIG STEIN. Jena, H. Costenoble, 1905. — pp. vii, 261.

In this volume the editor of the *Archiv für Philosophie* adds another book to the series of three or four he has already published upon social philosophy or sociological philosophy. The two editions of the *Soziale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie* have already been noticed in this REVIEW (the last edition as recently as Vol. XIV, pp. 504–5), and also (in Vol. XIII) the book by Professor Stein to which this present treatise is most closely related, — *Der Sinn des Daseins: Streifzüge eines Optimisten durch die Philosophie der Gegenwart*.

The most relevant thing to say about this book on social optimism is that it makes perhaps a good deal more of an attempt than the *Soziale Frage* (the defect of this work, in the writer's opinion) to consider the relations existing between sociology and the deeper questions of philosophy about the relation of knowledge to reality. It is still, however, merely the pragmatic or the 'mental shorthand' view of knowledge that evidently characterizes the *Sinn des Daseins*, the general serviceableness of ideas and ideals to human thinking, that is here again put forward as Dr. Stein's philosophy. In other words, the lack of the book is still a rationally satisfactory theory of reality. For although Dr. Stein is certainly explicit enough in stating that the evolution of the race, the overcoming of all obstacles that thwart social evolution, is the outcome of cosmic evolution, there is still absent from his book a successful attempt to relate philosophy conceived as the science of 'valuation' to philosophy conceived as the complete theory of reality, as (also an interpretation of his own) the complete synthesis of the thought of an age. This complete synthesis, to be sure, he finds in the philosophy of energetics and its phenomenalism, — its view of 'bodies' as the 'dynamic systems' and of the Absolute as only 'relations,' and of 'matter' as a function of energy. But we are not shown how this energy-philosophy is related to the epistemological (Kantian) idealism implied in Fichte's practical philosophy (the true parentage of energetics, according to Stein). Nor are we shown how Hume's biological philosophy (another ancestor) is to be retained as a real thing, if we are to reject, as we evidently must, the phenomenalism or the sensationalism of the *Treatise of Human Nature*.

Apart from this defect there is, undoubtedly, in this little book a more complete attempt to present the case for optimism and the "laughing lions" of optimism, for the optimism proper to us men of to-day, as the "laughing heirs" of all the ages (with power to take from or leave in the past exactly what suits us), than is to be met with in any book that one could

name off-hand in contemporary literature. It is the conviction of Professor Stein that we have had as yet no complete system of optimism, — Leibniz he mentions and promises to take up, but he is passed over probably on account of his finding reality in the individual, — no complete presentation of the history of optimistic thought. He has here entered *con amore* upon this hitherto unattempted task, and the student will certainly find material for his information and his reflections that at least gives the book its right to exist. Its cheerful confidence and its triumphant acceptance of the doctrine that the ideal world is neither in Heaven nor in Nirvana, but *here* [there?] in our future socialized planet, will no doubt be a tonic to the readers of the pathological literature (scepticism, pessimism, illusionism, and what not) of the close of the Nineteenth Century. But whether the philosophical student can be content with a theory of ideals as generous illusions on the part of the individual in so far as he is merely a sharer in the *Bewusstseyn überhaupt* upon which reality depends, is a question he must decide for himself after perusing the book.

Its text is the following reflection from the economist Gustav Schmoller: "The time will come when all good, normally developed men, will know how to combine individual work and a legitimate effort at individuality and self-assertion with the most complete kind of social justice and the highest sense of the common weal. Let us hope that we will not be obliged to wait so long for this consummation as we have had to wait for the development of our present civilization from the savagery and animality of primitive men." *The subject matter* is not "individual optimism" but "social optimism." This rests for Stein on the doctrine of energetics or energetic monism. The world, as Fichte saw, is the world of work, not of enjoyment. This is of course anthropomorphism, but the 'ideas' after all are not, with Plato and the Platonists of the Nineteenth Century (*e. g.* Cohen, Natorp, and others), pure thought-functions but *instincts*, instructive cognitions, — things that man has invented to comprehend and express the evolving life that is to be seen everywhere. We are empiricists, says Stein, as to the origin of ideas and ideals, but rationalists as to their validity. (Valid of what? we ask. Of our experience, or of reality? Or is our experience reality?) *Nihil est in intellectu quod non antea fuit in instinctu*. What Descartes and others have regarded as intuitive, ought to be regarded as instinctive. Scepticism and its correlate, pessimism, are both the fruit of Individualism, and with the death of Individualism the day of both will be over.

There is a very interesting chapter on Kant and Hume, in which the biological instincts which Hume really trusted are put forward as far more important than the pure ideas or "preëxisting concepts" to which Kant attached supreme importance, — despite the naturalistic and evolutionistic character of his views on astronomy, physics, etc. As we have indicated, however, the doctrine of *validity* is not put upon an objective basis by this mere natural history of thought.

The ultimate source of optimism is the Parsee light-religion as the ultimate source of pessimism is the Buddhistic Nirwana. Just as the pessimists have their phantasy directed in a backward direction, so have the optimists theirs in a forward one (*vide* Lessing and Nietzsche). But if Stein admits (as he does) that both the backward and the forward direction of thought are incidental to "valuation," is not even individual personality somehow more of a thing in itself—persisting through the Heraclitean flux of things—than his enthusiastic optimism takes it to be.

The book is worth reading on account of its freshness alone and its raising of the question of the epistemology and the ontology of the philosophy of energetics. Mention is made throughout of Mach, Ostwald, and their predecessors and their intellectual associates.

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Goethes Philosophie aus seinen Werken. Ein Buch für jeden gebildeten Deutschen. Mit ausführlicher Einleitung herausgegeben von MAX HEYNACHER. (Philosophische Bibliothek, Band 109.) Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1905. — pp. viii, 428.

The object of this book is to offer a number of appropriate selections, for the most part from the prose writings of Goethe, which will give, particularly to the student in the higher class of the gymnasium, an insight into the great German poet's *Welt- and Lebensanschauung*. The selections (pp. 111-422), which are arranged according to the date of their production, are preceded by an introduction (pp. 1-110), in which Dr. Heynacher traces the history of Goethe's philosophical development. It is an instructive guide to a proper understanding of the poet's world-view. Indeed, the entire work will prove profitable reading, not only to students of German literature, but to all persons interested in the conceptions of a great personality.

Goethe did not offer a philosophy of his own making, nor did he ever slavishly follow any particular philosophical creed; indeed, he held that philosophy was contained in poetry and religion, and that a separate philosophy was unnecessary. His versatile nature made it impossible for him to rest content in any one mode of thinking. "As a poet and an artist," he said in a letter to his friend Jacobi, "I am a polytheist; as a natural scientist, I am a pantheist; and one of these as decidedly as the other. If there is need of a God for my personality as a moral being, He too is provided for. The heavenly and earthly things form so wide a realm that the organs of all creatures together can alone comprehend it."

But although Goethe cannot be counted among the systematic philosophers, he naturally gravitated toward certain conceptions, and these found frequent expression, not only in his prose writings, but in his poetical creations. There are, in my opinion, several characteristic features in his attitude toward things which seem fundamental. His whole thinking is rooted

in the world of sense-perception ; he cannot get away from his senses ; his thinking is *Anschauung*, it is *gegenständlich*. At the same time it is conceptual, synthetic, organic ; his goal is always *der anschauende Begriff*, as he calls it ; he sees the unity in things, the whole in the parts, the concept or idea in the concrete facts. It is for this reason that Schiller called him a rational empiricist. Nor could he get it into his head that things existed only for the knowing subject : “ *Ich bin als anschauender Mensch ein Stock-realiste.* ” “ What,” he once said to Schopenhauer, “ light is to exist only in so far as you see it ? No ! You would not be here if the light did not see you ! ” And to Schiller he wrote : “ However the idealist may protest against the things-in-themselves, before he knows it he hits upon things outside of him,” etc. But whereas Kant regards the thing-in-itself as unknowable, Goethe believes that we approximate the truth the more closely, the more deeply we penetrate into the laws of the phenomenal world. Everything, he thinks, depends upon what he calls our *aperçu*, our perception of what really underlies the phenomena. This *aperçu* is the knowledge of the *Urphänomene* ; a direct, intuitive perception of nature, which, contrary to Kant, Goethe looks upon as possible to man.

This intimate union of *Begriff* and *Anschauung* seems to me to form the starting-point of all Goethe's conceptions, of his pantheism, his theory of æsthetics, his notion of organic life, his plea for action ; he searches for the form in the matter, but protests against the separation of the two. “ Whoever cannot get it into his head,” he once exclaimed in a letter to a friend, “ that mind and matter, soul and body, thought and extension, or . . . will and action were, are, and ever will be the double ingredients of the universe . . . ought to have given up thinking long ago and spent his time in general world-gossip.” For him, therefore, God and nature are one, God is in nature, nature in God ; nature is *der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid* : *Ihm ziemt's die Welt im Innern zu bewegen, Natur in Sich, Sich in Natur zu hegen*. Artistic creations and organic products too represent a synthesis of form and matter. Artistic style is the clearest, purest expression of the essential, and rests “ upon the deepest foundations of knowledge, upon the essence of things, in so far as we are permitted to recognize it in visible and tangible form.” In the organic world he seeks to understand the living forms as such, to comprehend their outward visible parts in their relations or connections, to master the whole in the *Anschauung* ; and then, finally, to find the original idea or type of which all the others are the manifestations : the *Urpflanze* and *Urthier*. It was this conception which guided Goethe's work in biology and made him an important predecessor of Darwin.

We must call attention to another trait in Goethe, a mystical trait, an anti-rationalistic tendency, which he shared with Jacobi. Existence divided by reason leaves a remainder, as he says ; and “ there is a mystery in philosophy as well as in religion.” “ The true, which is identical with the divine, can never be directly known by us ; we see it only in its *Abglanz*,

in the example, in the symbol, in particular and related phenomena": God is nature plus an unknowable centre. The innermost principle of the universe we cannot fathom after all; all that we can do is silently to adore what cannot be explained.

There is something so wholesome, sane, and inspiring in Goethe's thought, something so manly, truthful, and ethical in his attitude, that we cannot fail to be benefited by the study of a book like Dr. Heynacher's in more ways than one.

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The Freedom of Authority: Essays in Apologetics. By J. MACBRIDE STERRETT. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1905. — pp. vi, 319.

This book consists of several chapters, critical and constructive, on such varied themes as "Sabatier, Harnack, and Loisy," "The Historical Method," "The Ethics of Creed Conformity," "The Ground of Certitude in Religion," etc., all bound together by the unifying principle of an interpretation of ecclesiastical development in terms of a Hegelian philosophy of history. The first chapter, entitled "The Freedom of Authority," emphasizes the dependence of the individual for his intellectual, moral, and religious development on the community. In the community and institutional life, there is present an objective reason, and the rationale of authority lies in the organic relation of individual and institution. From this standpoint of an immanent objective reason, present as an organizing principle in historical institutions, Professor Sterrett proceeds to criticise Sabatier, Harnack, and Loisy. Sabatier and Harnack are criticised for being purely subjective and individualistic in their attitude towards historical Christianity. They regard the history of the church since its foundation as a prolonged aberration. In other words, they do not recognize the principle of teleological evolution at work here as everywhere. They vainly try to separate essence from appearance, vainly endeavor to determine the personal religion of Christ apart from its historical development. Professor Sterrett finds that Loisy's attitude is much more philosophical, since he does recognize an objective reason at work in the historical development of the church. But he tends towards subjectivism in his too sharp separation of historical Christianity from the Jesus of the Gospels. It might be inferred that the latter is a creation of the church, although probably Loisy does not mean this. The fundamental difficulty is that Loisy narrows the application of his objective view of development to the Roman church, which in turn rejects the true catholic and philosophically valid elements in Loisy's standpoint.

There follows a discussion of the historical method. Materialistic evolutionism is sharply criticised, and it is argued that the only adequate foundation for the historical method is a philosophical idealism. In the chapter on "The Ground of Certitude in Religion," this idealistic principle is stated

to be an absolute self-consciousness or triune Personality, who by the free necessity of his nature manifests himself in a world of nature and of persons with whom he stands in organic relations. The church is defined as an eternal organism of persons. Everywhere emphasis is put on the historical and organic point of view. Professor Sterrett rightly identifies Ritschlianism with the new pragmatism, and in a brief appendix offers some pertinent criticisms of the latter.

The work gives evidence of having been written in haste, as, indeed, the writer confesses in the preface. It is not very well put together and sometimes declamation is offered as a substitute for patient criticism. There is a good deal of mere repetition. But Professor Sterrett has the faculty of delivering hard blows in telling phrases. He effectively lays bare the weak points of Sabatier and Harnack especially; and, in my opinion, he propounds a much truer and sounder philosophical standpoint for the interpretation of Christianity than one finds in those whom he criticises. His work may have the effect of calling more general attention to the value for the Hegelian philosophy of church history and of creed.

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Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre in ihrer Bedeutung für Vergangenheit und Zukunft. Von CARL CLEMEN. Giessen, J. Ricker'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1905. — pp. 132.

This is the work of an author interested in Schleiermacher the theologian rather than in Schleiermacher the philosopher. It shows knowledge of the general position which is presupposed in his theological system, but its explicit discussion is confined, for the most part, to the particular positions adopted by Schleiermacher in the *Glaubenslehre*, and, among these, to those which have, either positively or negatively, had effect on the subsequent development of Protestant theology in Germany. Copious references to the parallel passages in the literature of that theology are given, and the book should be of value as a syllabus to students in this field.

In common with most commentators, Professor Clemen regards Schleiermacher's metaphysical definition of God and his psychological definition of religion as his two great errors. The definition of God as unity without difference has "determined and obscured his conception of Christianity." The definition of religion in terms of feeling alone has resulted in his exclusion of apologetics from dogmatic theology, and his definition of the latter as an historical discipline only. Hence Schleiermacher's care to retain the terms of the confessional formulæ. But behind this terminology he was forced, by the logic of his definitions, really to depart from the position of historical Christianity. This deviation is especially noticeable in his Christology; for his Christ is an ideal construct, to be found neither in the creeds nor in the biblical account.

There are, however, elements of lasting value in the *Glaubenslehre*.

Among these the author notes particularly the perception that the definition of the nature of religion in general is the necessary introduction to special dogmatic theology ; the emphasis on the social character of religion ; and the suggestion, in reference to the problem of evil, that evil is, as it were, the reverse side of the good of finite and limited beings in a state of development. (Surely it is too much to claim, however, as on p. 48, that Schleiermacher was *the first* to make this suggestion !) It is because of these and other more special suggestions, derived often rather from Schleiermacher's insight than from the logic of his system, and because of the depth and fertility of his thought even when defending conclusions now rejected, that the *Glaubenslehre* has retained so much influence. That influence has been especially apparent in the Ritschlian school ; but the author believes that the value of the work as an incentive and guide to further theological development is still far from exhausted.

The book is well printed, but a 'nicht' is inserted at p. 88, l. 7, which exactly reverses the obvious meaning of the author. A list of misprints in the *Glaubenslehre* is given in an appendix of three pages. This is a useful addition, for the periods of that work are quite complicated enough in their correct form ; but its length is amazing, when one remembers that there have been at least six reprints by Schleiermacher's own publishing house, since his final revision in 1830-31.

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Wie ich wurde was ich ward. Von JULIUS BAHNSEN. Nebst anderen Stücken aus dem Nachlass des Philosophen herausgegeben von RUDOLF LOUIS. München und Leipzig, Georg Müller, 1905. — pp. lxxvii, 274.

Julius Bahnsen was a philosopher of the school of Schopenhauer, a man of earnest moral convictions, keen intelligence, many idiosyncrasies of character, and a profoundly melancholic temperament. The editor of the present work points out that he was an even more thorough-going and consistent pessimist than his master ; since even the sorry comfort of Nirvana was stigmatized by him as illusory, and an effective negation of the will to live is itself denied. The essentially moral character of his thought, however, appears as the consequence that he draws from this gospel of despair. For the recognition of the uselessness of all endeavors after the annihilation of the will is to give rise to an earnest and never-ceasing struggle for its self-maintenance and satisfaction, — a struggle which, though in its very nature hopeless, since it can never reach the blessed consummation of peace and satisfaction, must still be heroically and faithfully carried on ; and in it alone, though tainted ever by the bitterness of failure, can man taste such joy as his nature permits. The resemblance to Carlyle's philosophy will strike every English reader, and, in spite of essential differences, there is much likeness in the temper and genius of Bahnsen to those of the great Scotchman. The present volume includes Bahnsen's

autobiography, — as the picture of a temperament not without interest,— and a number of short essays and sketches on philosophic and literary subjects. The latter include some notes of Shakespeare's women in which that hackneyed theme is treated with not a little vivacity and originality.

E. RITCHIE.

The Free-will Problem in Modern Thought. By WILLIAM HALLOCK JOHNSON. (Columbia University Contributions to Philosophy, Psychology, and Education, Vol. X, No. 2.) New York, The Macmillan Company, 1903. — pp. 94.

In the introduction the author of this monograph refers to the wide-spread interest shown at present in the free-will problem, making it "at the beginning of our century one of the prime subjects of philosophic discussion." The bearing of psycho-physical theories upon the question of freedom is considered in the opening chapter. Automatism and parallelism are discussed and rejected in favor of interaction. Parallelism is criticised in some detail and quite effectively, the many objections to the theory being forcibly presented. But the argument in defense of interaction is not convincing, most stress being laid on the contention that the difficulty of admitting interaction is less than the difficulty of denying it. Certainly parallelism has no greater difficulty than that involved in conceiving of a causal interaction between two minds, which the author asserts may exist. The effect of recent evolutionary ideas upon our belief in freedom is next considered. "In recent discussions of the evolution problem three points not unfavorable to libertarian belief are observable. The attempt to show that consciousness has been evolved from the unconscious is now generally discredited; the efficiency of consciousness as a factor in organic evolution is widely recognized; and, it may be added, the gap between animal and human intelligence has been widened rather than filled by the recent studies of animal psychology." With reference to the "consciousness of freedom," Dr. Johnson maintains that we are more certain of the existence of the self of which freedom is predicated than of anything else, although it is "admittedly the great mystery." The necessity and significance of "freedom as an ethical postulate" are ably treated in a separate chapter. While motiveless choice is emphatically disavowed, still it is held that free-will implies an element of pure wilfulness or caprice. In a concluding discussion of "free-will and theology," recognition of divine foreknowledge is said to be compatible with belief in human freedom. That many of the arguments appear cursory and insufficient is the inevitable result of attempting to consider so large a problem in so narrow a compass. However, the author gives evidence of a wide acquaintance with the literature of the free-will controversy, and demonstrates his thorough comprehension of the various aspects and many perplexities of this celebrated problem. The book contains an unusual number of typographical errors.

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Psychologie de deux messies positivistes, Saint Simon et Auguste Comte.
Par GEORGES DUMAS. Paris, Felix Alcan, 1905. — pp. 314.

The volume traces the similarities between the lives and aims and the philosophical systems of the two great French positivists. Both are alike in that they believed themselves prophets called to lead in the crusade to substitute science and industry for the old feudal system of society. Each is sufficiently impressed with his own importance to believe that anything which will help him will help his cause. We see Saint Simon exhausting his own fortune in the propaganda, and then begging from his friends and pupils to support him that he may have an opportunity to finish his great work. Comte also accepted financial aid from Mill and his English followers in the name of his cause, that he might be left free from sordid work to continue his writing. Each, again, late in life invested his doctrine with a religious symbolism. Saint Simon sketches a sacerdotal hierarchy which shall minister in the name of the new scientific religion to its feeble and less self-dependent devotees. Comte after the death of Clotilde de Vaux canonises her and makes the feminine saint the centre of a scientific religion with an elaborate ritualism. Dumas denies that either man was insane at the time his great work was produced. Saint Simon's attempted suicide was the logical outcome of his belief in the failure of his life work. Comte completely recovered from his early insanity, and his work before and after shows sufficient similarity to indicate that it was in no way influenced by the attack. Our author insists that the debt Comte owes to Saint Simon was much greater than he was willing to admit. While the latter lacked the scientific training necessary to enable him to write with his pupil's effectiveness, he nevertheless established all the essentials of the system that Comte later developed. The volume furnishes the key to an understanding of the systems of the two men considered.

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

Le mécanisme des émotions. Par PAUL SOLLIER. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1905. — pp. 303.

This volume is essentially an extended criticism and refutation of the James-Lange, or peripheral, theory of emotions. In brief, the author's view is that we must look to the brain rather than to the viscera as the real bodily seat of the emotions. Cases of extended anæsthesia, both pathological and induced by hypnotic suggestion, which James insists are crucial for his theory, are subjected to careful tests. In general, the results support the peripheral theory until examined more closely. It is usual in cases of extended anæsthesia for emotions to be weakened or to disappear. But there are exceptions to the rule. Even where the law holds, it is insisted that the real cause for the disappearance of emotion is to be found in the amnesia and general cerebral inhibition that is characteristic of hysteria, in turn the cause of the anæsthesia. Dr. Sollier would insist that we must dis-

tinguish two forms of emotion,—the dynamic, and the static, but both find their explanation in cerebral mechanics. When any body suffers resistance to its motion, heat is given off and there are other by-products of energy not present in a smoothly running machine. Similarly, when there is any check to the flow of ideas, there must be an accompanying waste of energy, and this constitutes the ordinary, or dynamic, emotion. We are also conscious of the molecular state of the cortex, and that is the static form of emotion. Emotion is the consciousness of the molecular state of the cerebral cortex (tactile area or organic region) produced by the diffusion of an excitation in the cerebrum, transitory or permanent, accompanied by increased activity or by inhibition. Where James states that the elements in the emotion occur in the order : stimulus, somatic reverberation, sensation, and emotion, our author makes the order : representation or sensation, emotion, somatic reverberation. What is characteristic of the emotion is primarily the confusion of ideas, not the trembling or other peripheral manifestations. The latter is an almost universal accompaniment of emotion, but is not necessary to its occurrence. Pain and pleasure are distinguished from emotion in that they are the accompaniments of the furtherance or checking of the passage of sensations, not of the molecular changes in the cortex itself. Joy and sadness, on the contrary, are emotions, since they correspond to an increase or decrease in the potential energy of the cortex.

The volume is one that must be read by all who desire to come to a conclusion on the problem of the emotions, but some of the statements concerning the relation of consciousness to the cortical activities are not altogether convincing.

W. B. PILLSBURY.

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The following books also have been received :

Descartes : His Life and Times. By ELIZABETH S. HALDANE. New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., 1905. — pp. xxviii, 398. \$4.50.

The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas. By EDWARD WESTERMARCK. Vol. I. London, Macmillan & Co., 1906. — pp. xxi, 716. \$3.50.

The Philosophy of Religion. By HARALD HÖFFDING. Translated from the German edition by B. E. MEYER. London, Macmillan & Co., 1906. — pp. viii, 410. \$3.00.

Some Dogmas of Religion. By JOHN MCTAGGART ELLIS MCTAGGART. London, Edward Arnold ; New York, Longmans, Green, & Co., 1906. — pp. xx, 299.

Sex and Character. By OTTO WEININGER. Authorized translation from the Sixth German Edition. London, William Heinemann ; New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1906. — pp. xxii, 356. \$1.75.

- Poetry and the Individual.* An Analysis of the Imaginative Life in Relation to the Creative Spirit in Man and Nature. By HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER. New York & London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1906. — pp. x, 240.
- Congress of Arts and Science, Universal Exposition, St. Louis, 1904.* Edited by HOWARD J. ROGERS. Vol. II. History of Politics and Economics, History of Law, History of Religion. Boston and New York, Houghton, Mifflin, & Co., 1906. — pp. ix, 661.
- A New Interpretation of Herbart's Psychology and Educational Theory through the Philosophy of Leibniz.* By JOHN DAVIDSON. Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood & Sons, 1906. — pp. xviii, 191. 5s.
- Symbolic Logic and its Applications.* By HUGH MACCOLL. New York and Bombay, Longmans, Green, & Co., 1906. — pp. ix, 141.
- Individuality and Immortality.* By WILHELM OSTWALD. Boston and New York, Houghton, Mifflin, & Co., 1906. — pp. 74. \$.75.
- On Life After Death.* From the German of GUSTAV THEODOR FECHNER. By HUGO WERNEKKE. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1906. — pp. 134.
- The Subjection of Women.* By JOHN STUART MILL. Edited, with introductory analysis, by STANTON COIT. New York and Bombay, Longmans, Green, & Co., 1906. — pp. 128.
- Principles of Animal Understanding.* A Constructive Essay on the Inter-course in the Animal World. By HERMANN TOENJES. Handled by G. E. Stechert & Co., New York. — pp. 61. \$.60.
- The Freedom of the Will.* A Study in Materialism. By ALEXANDER PETRUNKEVICH.
- Völkerpsychologie: Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetz von Sprache, Mythos und Sitte.* Von WILHELM WUNDT. Zweiter Band: Mythos und Religion. Erster Teil. Leipzig, Wilhelm Engelmann, 1905. — pp. xi, 617. M. 14.
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- Gehirn und Seele.* Vorlesungen von PAUL SCHULTZ. Herausgegeben von HERMANN BEYER. Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1906. — pp. viii, 189. M. 5.60.
- Kritik der Freiheitstheorien.* Eine Abhandlung über das Problem der Willensfreiheit. Von JOSEPH MACK. Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1906. — pp. viii, 287. M. 450.
- Beiträge zur Einführung in die Geschichte der Philosophie.* Von RUDOLF EUCKEN. Zweite umgearbeitete und erweiterte Auflage. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1906. — pp. v, 195. M. 36.0.

- Abhandlungen zur Didaktik und Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft.* Band I, Heft 6. Über die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens. Von A. MEINONG. Berlin, Julius Springer, 1906. — pp. 113.
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- Le problème du devenir et la notion de la matière dans la philosophie grecque depuis les origines jusqu'à Théophraste.* Par ALBERT RIVAUD. Paris, F. Alcan, 1906. — pp. viii, 488. 10 fr.
- Les notions d'essence et d'existence dans la philosophie de Spinoza.* Par ALBERT RIVAUD. Paris, F. Alcan, 1906. — pp. viii, 216. 3 fr. 75.
- L'imitation de Jésus-Christ.* Traduction nouvelle par JOSEPH FABRE. Paris, F. Alcan, 1906. — pp. xxvi, 416. 7 fr.
- Questions esthétiques et religieuses.* Par PAUL STAPFER. Paris, F. Alcan, 1906. — pp. 208. 3 fr.
- La psychologie des individus et des sociétés chez Taine historien des littératures.* Par PAUL LACOMBE. Paris, F. Alcan, 1906. — pp. ii, 374. 7 fr. 50.
- Art et psychologie individuelle.* Par LUCIEN ARRÉAT. Paris, F. Alcan, 1906. — pp. viii, 158. 2 fr. 50.
- La coscienza estetica.* Per GIUSEPPE FANCIULLI. Torino, Fratelli Bocca, 1906. — pp. 319.
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- Disarmonie economiche e disarmonie morali.* Per MARIO CALDERONI. Firenze, Francesco Lumachi, 1906. — pp. 110.
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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych. u. Phys.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

On Denoting. BERTRAND RUSSELL. *Mind*, No. 56, pp. 479-493.

This article advocates a new theory of denoting, different from that already set forth in the author's *Principles of Mathematics*. A denoting phrase is such solely in virtue of its form, and may denote nothing, one definite object, or one of several objects ambiguously. The notion of the *variable* is here taken as fundamental; " $C(x)$ " means a propositional function with an undetermined variable x , and the notion " $C(x)$ is always true" is taken as ultimate and indefinable. " $C(\text{everything})$ " then means " $C(x)$ is always true," " $C(\text{nothing})$ " means " $'C(x)$ is false' is always true," and " $C(\text{something})$ " means "It is false that ' $C(x)$ is false' is always true," or, more briefly, " $C(x)$ is not always true." By means of these formulas, denoting phrases can always be eliminated from any proposition in which they occur; they are not, as such, integral parts of the proposition, and never have any meaning in themselves, but every proposition in which they occur has a meaning. Out of any proposition we can make a denoting phrase, which denotes an entity if the proposition is true, but not if the proposition is false. Meinong's theory is objectionable because it infringes the law of contradiction. In Frege's theory the relation of the meaning to the denotation of the phrase is artificial and unsatisfactory; the two either become hopelessly separated, or else coincide without distinction. In conclusion, the author examines certain familiar logical puzzles, which for other theories of denotation present an inextricable tangle, but which seem to be satisfactorily solved by the theory here explained.

F. D. MITCHELL.

La conscience et ses degrés. P. SOLLIER. Rev. Ph., XXX, 10, pp. 329-354.

There are several reasons why a scientific study of consciousness is difficult. The first reason is that the psychological and the philosophical aspects of the question have not been clearly distinguished. A second difficulty is the lack of an adequate definition of consciousness. A third disturbing factor is the failure to distinguish between consciousness of 'self' and brute consciousness, which does not involve the feeling of personality. The improper application of the epithet 'unconscious' to certain phenomena, as reflex and automatic acts, which are rather aspects of 'latent consciousness,' is a fourth source of confusion. The fifth and greatest difficulty is the absence of an objective criterion of consciousness. To meet the second difficulty, every phenomenon must be considered as conscious which we know to be perceived or produced by us or in us at the very moment at which it is perceived or produced. And though there is no objective criterion of consciousness, an indirect one may be found in the knowledge given us by the subject himself concerning what he thinks or does at the very moment. In the discussion of the degrees of consciousness, we look first for its beginning. Both in the evolution of the race and in that of the individual its appearance is hypothetical. So we are restricted to a consideration of its relation to cerebral activity. Here we are led to conclude that consciousness is a product of evolution, and that its various degrees are conditioned by the divers degrees of cerebral activity, the gradations varying either with the intensity of the excitation or with the rapidity of the nervous processes. And so consciousness, arising thus gradually in the evolution of the cerebral physiological processes, varies with the states and conditions of these processes rather than with the intensity of disintegration, as was assumed by Herzen. The processes that give rise to consciousness seem to converge in Wundt's centre of apperception. However, consciousness is itself independent of cerebral energy, though its greater or less clearness is a function of this energy. But it is not an autonomous faculty; rather is it a fact of experience developing by degrees with an organic evolution, its rôle being to deal with impressions received by the brain.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

Was können wir heute aus Schiller gewinnen? RUDOLF EUCKEN. Kantstudien, X, 3, pp. 253-260.

The unexampled progress in outward things which has been achieved in the century since Schiller's death has not been attended by an equal growth of the inward life, which indeed has become more perplexed and unsettled as the forces and interests without have increased in complexity and volume. There is manifest in many quarters an uncertainty about the content and meaning of human life, a lowering of spiritual energy at the centre with all the gain at the periphery; the spiritual life is not able to maintain itself

against the opposing forces which have been created by the outward movement of civilization. As we become more clearly conscious of the dangers which threaten our deepest interests, we become sensible of the strength and inspiration we may gain from our poet for the solution of the problems which are seen to be of paramount importance. Schiller's whole life was one of concentrated energy; he was of all our poets a man of deeds, a man who did not drift with the stream of forces in which he found himself involved, but who met it with persistent effort at every point. It is this which in his dramatic productions forges into unity the wealth and variety of his material, which characterizes also his scientific writings where a few leading problems dominate and impart interest to the smallest details, in which also contrasts and opposition are clearly articulated and defined, so as to challenge the will at every point. But this formal aspect of Schiller's life is of no greater significance to us than its content. In the course of the century, our interests have become more and more anthropocentric. But a peculiar confusion and contradiction has made itself felt in this new field. For zest and efficiency of life there is necessary a happy faith in the significance and dignity of humanity; but this threatens to vanish before our increasing knowledge of man's place in the natural universe, and of the littleness which characterizes his dealings with his fellows. Now no one has accorded man a higher plane than did Schiller, at the same time justifying his estimate by a philosophical theory of man's freedom and rationality. It is man in this higher, non-empirical, capacity who challenges our highest faith and optimism. In the moral sphere, particularly, where, with all the hopeful dissatisfaction with present achievements, there is felt an impotence to transcend the opposition between the one and the many, the individual and society, and in the æsthetic striving, so general in our time, Schiller's wisdom and high example may serve as our guiding star and inspiration.

EMIL C. WILM.

Schillers transscendentaler Idealismus. W. WINDELBAND. Kantstudien, X, 3, pp. 398-411.

The significance of Schiller's philosophical studies for his personal development is pretty definitely ascertainable and fairly well understood, as is also his importance in the popularization of the Critical Philosophy among the German speaking people. But as to what Schiller meant for philosophy, what part he had in the further development and the transformation of Critical Idealism, there seems as yet to be no general agreement. One thing must be kept distinctly in mind in the discussion of the relation of any of the disciples of Kant to the master, and that is that the Critical Philosophy was no hard and fast system whose underlying principles were not capable of any further development in one direction or another; the whole course of German Idealism may, indeed, be regarded as only a development of the rational system founded by Kant, and whether we regard any thinker as a Kantian or not will depend upon whether we

have in mind the general position of the thinker in question, or emphasize the particular detail or specific issue which he may have developed beyond the immediate intention of the master. The transformation of the world into objects of consciousness is the decisive step of the Critical Philosophy, and this Schiller understood as fully and accepted as unreservedly as did Fichte. It was this fundamental note to which all the philosophical activity of Schiller was attuned. But what, precisely, this consciousness is, for which only objects had existence, whether it is individual consciousness, the consciousness of the race, or consciousness as such (*Bewusstsein überhaupt*), is a question which admits a variety of answers, and the particular shade the resulting idealistic system will take on will depend upon whether one or the other of these interpretations be given. If individual consciousness is emphasized, the idea of personality will come into the foreground, and the autonomy of the will, the self-determination of conduct and life, will appear as the ideals of the spirit which recognizes no values other than those of its own creation. It is this proud philosophy of individuality which constitutes perhaps the most significant of the personal motives in the philosophy of Kant, and which found the most hearty reception among his followers. No word, said Schiller, has ever been uttered by mortal man more significant than this, 'Determine thyself,' and this he declared to be the whole message of his own philosophy. It is because the form, the beautiful appearance (*Schein*), is man's own creation that he can move in the world of beauty with the perfect freedom of a sovereign. How far Schiller was removed from the boundless subjectivism to which these views might seem to lead is nowhere shown more clearly than in his efforts in the *Kallias Briefe* to fix upon the objective concept of the beautiful. It is just here that Schiller takes up an independent attitude toward Kant, who was concerned only with the purely transcendental problem of the possibility of synthetic judgments *a priori* in the æsthetic realm. But in this he was not turning his back upon the Critical Philosophy, but was espousing it in its completest form. For beauty as freedom-in-the-appearance, the autonomy which must be an objective characteristic of things because it remains although the (individual) subject is not there to perceive it, is intelligible only if the phenomena with the objective marks of the beautiful upon them are already thought of as objects of consciousness as such. Schiller was never closer to the highest development of Transcendental Idealism than in this attempt to fix upon an objective definition of the beautiful. The fuller development of these ideas, however, he left to the systematizers, turning his own attention from these metaphysical considerations to the anthropological problem of showing the intimate, organic, relation between rational values, ethical and æsthetical particularly, values which Kant, in the purity of the critical process, had left more or less separated from each other.

EMIL C. WILM.

The Psychology of Eternal Truths. W. B. PITKIN. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., II, 17, pp. 449-455.

Eternal truths are generally regarded as pure hypotheses, a special necessity, or a personal convenience. There is, however, another line of approach, the investigation of our immediate experiences of the meanings expressed in the so-called 'eternal truths.' Is the quality of eternality given or derived, a peculiarity of immediate experience or of reflective constructions? It is important to make a distinction between eternal and timeless. The first means 'having unlimited duration'; the second, 'having nothing to do with time.' In any experience moment we have meanings of the sensational order which are timeless in the strictest sense of this word. The same may be found in reproduction; the persistence of a quality in mental life is not colored by any temporal qualities in connection with which it may have occurred. Also these may be shifted, as meanings, from one complex to another, without affecting their significant identity. Passing to those experiences containing meanings which in retrospect are called 'eternal truths,' we hold that here, too, it is not all a matter of reflection. In each case the same unitary meaning is expressed. The conclusion seems to be, that we do gain the mastery over our world of meanings by the simple device of meaning the something and trusting to its own efficiency to carry us through. The ultimate practicability of anything is its ability to be referred to as an identical meaning.

MATTIE ALEXANDER MARTIN.

The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism. JOHN DEWEY. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., II, 15, pp. 393-399.

The postulate of immediate empiricism is that things are what they are experienced as. Knowing is one mode of experiencing; the philosophic demand is to find out what sort of an experience knowing is. It is a mistake to assume that, since things are what they are known to be from the knowledge experience, therefore, metaphysically, everything in its reality is what a knower would find it to be. A noise is frightful to me in one experience moment. In another it lacks this element, for, in this experience, another thing is known and I realize that what was fearful in the first is changed to something innocent. There is a distinction between a thing as cognitive and as cognized. The fright above was cognitive; in a later experience it may or may not be cognized. An experience of lines as convergent when they are truly parallel, does not make the experience any the less *that* experience. The question of truth is not as to what is experienced, but as to the worth of that experienced thing. Because this is a concrete 'that,' it later can be developed into a corrected experience. No philosophical proposition can be deduced from the postulate of empiricism, but rather a method of philosophical analysis.

MATTIE ALEXANDER MARTIN.

PSYCHOLOGY.

A Reconciliation between Structural and Functional Psychology. M. W. CALKINS. Psych. Rev., XIII, 2, pp. 61-81.

In a recent address, G. H. Darwin distinguishes two fundamental scientific procedures : the study of the scientific phenomenon as a complex of elements, and the study of it as related to its environment. The object of this paper is to show that a combination of these two procedures, the structural and the functional, is possible in psychology. Let the basal fact of psychology be conceived as a conscious self, the plain man's self which is realized, implicitly and not reflectively, as fundamental to the perceptions and ideas of the moment, and as related to its environment. This choice of the conscious self rather than the psychic event or idea as the basal fact of psychology is justifiable for two reasons. First, as recognized directly by Lipps, indirectly by other psychologists, the idea is an abstraction which invariably implies a self. There is no consciousness which is not self-consciousness. Secondly, the conscious experiences of a related self are not adequately to be described in terms of the succession of its own ideas. This 'self-psychology' harmonizes the essential features of both structural and functional psychology. It rejects the unjustifiable doctrine of the structural psychologist that the idea is the immediately observed, basal psychic phenomenon, and the equally erroneous assumptions of one group of functional psychologists that the psycho-physical self is the basal unit. It retains both the functional doctrine of the inherent relatedness of the self to the environment, and the analytic procedure which is the cardinal feature of both methods, maintaining that structural and functional analyses are mutually supplementary. It makes room also for the subordinate tasks of the two methods : the relation of mental complexes to the physical or physiological, and the description of psychic content as promoting efficiency or giving meaning. In further support of reconciliation of the two methods, it is urged that certain actual experiences, such as perception and imagination, emotions and the experience of activity, can be adequately differentiated only in terms both of structure and of basal personal relations.

ELSIE MURRAY.

Aphasia. A. MEYER. Psych. Bul., II, 8, pp. 261-277.

In *Der aphasische Symptomencomplex*, Wernicke brings the available data of aphasia to bear on the problem of psycho-physical elements, subjecting the possibility of separate reading and writing centres to searching criticism. His central issues are the intimate functional relation of spoken and written languages, and the significance of the 'word-notion.' The facts of aphasia, he maintains, are readily explicable by reference to two word centres (auditory and motor) and their connections, these constituting the physical basis of the 'word-notion' or 'word-concept.' This 'word-notion' arises from the acquisition of the appreciation of sound and its sense, and of word utterance, the amalgamation of the three forming a

functional complex. As to the actual make-up and localization of the substratum of this complex, W. is ambiguous, and the value of his schema of elements seems dubious. His classification of the clinical types is clear and definite. Aphasias may be classed as cortical, subcortical, transcortical, or conductive, according as the symptoms indicate lesions of cortical centres, of projection systems, of connections between word centres and the concept region, or between hearing and utterance centres. Partial defects in motor or sensory aphasia are ignored in this classification, and the term 'word-notion' is accorded varying interpretations. W. next attacks the problem of the occasional occurrence of isolated agraphia or alexia, and of the warrant this affords for the assumption of special reading or writing centres. Written language is acquired late, and is therefore not provided with a uniform brain mechanism, as is speech. Being merely spelled language, it is a transcortical function subordinated to the centers of speech, dependent on the integrity of the word concept, and in turn the best criterion of this integrity. In the main, disorders of written language run parallel to those of spoken. Motor execution is not, however, roused directly by the concept mechanism, as in the case of speech, but through the mediation of the optic memory of letters, *i. e.*, through a visual letter centre. The facts of pathology refute, not merely unilateral localization of this center, but any narrow localization of it whatsoever within the visual sphere. Isolated simple alexia, or word blindness, and pure isolated agraphia appear to be subcortical in origin. The rare cases of isolated literal agraphia would seem to be analogous to conduction aphasia. In conclusion, the study of asymbolia and apraxia, and the work of Storch promise to do away with much of the brain-cell mythology with which aphasia is afflicted, and with the hazy dogmatism about the relation of concept and word.

ELSIE MURRAY.

La psychologie de l'argot. R. DE LA GRASSERI. Rev. Ph., XXX, 9, pp. 260-290.

The writer discusses the origin of upper and lower class modes of speech in France, and then begins an analysis of the psychological elements of lower class slang. He distinguishes three classes of slang. The bourgeois jargon employs words found in no dictionary, but full of color, movement, and relief; popular slang is often coarse, but free and honest and full of images; the slang of the criminal has been formed as a means of self-protection and has a sinister picturesqueness. One of the most apparent needs of slang is that of a group sign hidden from strangers and inferiors. This satisfies three instincts, that of cryptology, that of least effort, and the desire for greater union among members of the same group. Another need of slang is the need of the uncultivated mind for the concrete and material, and the need of a people to express its energy by the force of imagery. Related to these is the tendency to express through slang the qualities of a thing for the thing itself. Archaisms indicate a conservative love of the

past ; anthropomorphism, a necessity to draw nearer to the world of animals and things. Elliptic slang serves the desire for brevity, as well as the desire to express intimacy, suggested *rapprochement* between two speakers. Then there is the jealous desire to abase the unattainable which expresses itself in coarse slang ; the kindred desire to belittle the superior through ironical slang ; and a more honest contempt for the fastidiousness of the refined, with its appropriate slang. On the other hand, there is euphemistic slang springing from an instinct of decency. The writer continues the further analysis, giving abundant illustrations.

C. WEST.

Les éléments affectifs du langage : ses rapports avec les tendances de la psychologie moderne. C. BOS. Rev. Ph., XXX, 10, pp. 355-373.

The coming period of psychology may be styled 'psychological,' in distinction from early periods of psychological thought and from that characterized by Comte the 'scientific period.' The latter was a period of analysis ; this a period of synthesis. The coming period is a reaction against this intellectualism, this tendency to divide, classify, evaluate. The former period was quantitative ; this may be called qualitative. This development corresponds to the history of the individual. Such are the three moments : primitive indetermination, their artificial divisions, and finally, a return to a synthetic unity. We wish to show to-day that language is such a unity. Wagner holds that language and music have the same source, that they are the issue of a primitive natural melody. This serves to explain the intimate relations between one's tone of voice and his vocabulary ; the former expresses what the mere word alone could not. After the formation of words, around them begin to cluster associations, a 'fringe.' Again, an individual, finding a language unsuited to his needs, changes the signification of words and gives to them his own affective tone. This suggests the possibility of a choice of a language being allowed a child in the school : if there is between an individual and a language a certain affinity, might this not be allowed to develop ? When a stranger learns a new language, it is not until he has a feeling for it that he can be trusted to use the right word ; the logically correct may be at the same time the offensive. The possibility of a universal language, except for technical purposes, seems distant, in view of the different affective values of different languages, values which translation eliminates. Even in one's own language, it is oftentimes only by a sort of 'symbolic knowledge' that words convey the meaning intended ; the hearer must have this sentiment of analogy in order that he may understand.

MATTIE ALEXANDER MARTIN.

ETHICS AND ÆSTHETICS.

Über die Möglichkeit der Betrachtung von unten und von oben in der Kulturphilosophie. H. LESER. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XI, 3, pp. 249-288.

The recent treatment of religion is both historical and psychological, and may be called a treatment 'from below.' Although this has become an

independent science, and is a natural outcome of the change from the idealistic to the naturalistic movement in the nineteenth century, yet it is by no means complete, and must be subjected to a critique. Now the realism or naturalism of the past century has tended to depreciate, or even remove entirely the value of religion. Natural science traces the evolution of the whole universe from its original elements according to universal natural laws, and shows how for a comparatively short period life has appeared on this earth. During this period man as a self-conscious creature has developed, who is able to reflect all reality in himself, thus forming the realm of thought as opposed to that of matter. The third stage is seen in the communion of these thinking individuals in society and culture life, forming the state, morality, art, science, religion, etc. But as the earth cools, all this conscious life will pass away, and thus for natural science such temporary mental activity is but a secondary product of the cosmic process, and not a special and independent reality. Looking now at this treatment 'from below' more in particular, we find that the method gained its power from the extension of the genetic phase into the doctrine of evolution. Biology, using the analytic-synthetic method of chemistry and physics, came to seek not only the elementary substances and processes, but also the first, second, etc., and to inquire how present processes arose; and further, this investigation became phylogenetic as well as ontogenetic. We then have protoplasm and cells corresponding to atoms and molecules of physics and chemistry, and the so-called laws of evolution. This shows more completely still that all higher organisms are nothing new, but merely a secondary product of the first and original elements. The so-called principle of 'life force' is only a fiction; by the genetic biological method all such principles are derived from the elementary factors. When we turn to mental life more in particular, it may be observed that, while it is not reducible to material processes, yet it is dependent on them. Certain physiological processes are accompanied by sensations and feelings, out of which elements all mental life is composed. These elements also are treated ontogenetically and phylogenetically, giving rise to individual and social or 'folk' psychology. Further, since these psychical processes depend on physical processes, the fundamental treatment 'from below' remains biological, and the psychological functions are merely a higher means for biological existence. In social existence the biological-psychological processes only become more complex. The consequences of this treatment are obvious. Moral and religious life loses its ground and content; all the unity of culture life is denied. We find, however, as a striking fact, the existence of moral and religious ideals; society proceeds *as if* mental life were original and independent. In order, then, to prevail, the treatment 'from below' must explain these phenomena by its own principles. And this may, perhaps, be done. In regard to the seeming independence of mental life, Eucken offers a solution in his idea of the 'isolation of consciousness.' The secondary psychical processes turn in upon them-

selves and lose their original connections ; they become isolated and independent powers. The unity and altruism of society may also be explained as more highly complex stages of the struggle of the individual for existence, and nothing in themselves independent of biological principles. Under this treatment, then, all so-called independent reality is reduced to that which aids adaptation in phylogenetic development ; truth is merely the best and most complete adaptation.

R. B. WAUGH.

Die Gliederung der Gesellschaft bei Schleiermacher, ein Beispiel der genetisch-konstruktiven Klassifikations-methode. GERHARD STOSCH. V. f. w. Ph., XXIX, 1, pp. 67-110.

This article is a summary of Schleiermacher's theory of the origin of the various forms in which the social life of mankind is organized. These forms are the products of the ethical process, which is defined as a taking-up of the merely natural into the life of reason. This activity of reason has two functions. On the one hand, it organizes natural data ; on the other, the products of this organization become symbols, or manifestations, of this rational activity. In this primary meaning of the terms, the two functions coincide. But the writer points out that, in the last resort, it is the consciousness which is developed in the course of this activity which is the real symbol of reason, and the symbolising function of reason is that which has to do with this development. Rational activity has also two characters : that in which it is common to all agents, the objective, analytic, and scientific ; and that in which it is peculiar to the individual, the subjective, affective, æsthetic, synthetic, and religious. As each of these functions appears under both characters, we have four chief forms of social activity : the state, free sociability, the academy, and the church. A statement of the origin and nature of each is given, based chiefly on the various revisions of the ethical writings. The writer's conclusion is that Schleiermacher's classification of the social forms is, in the terminology of Wundt, genetically constructive, but not genetically reconstructive. Their evolution is described, but they are defined on the basis of a preconceived notion. The characters and functions of reason are also established speculatively rather than empirically. Nevertheless, at various points empirical observation guided and supplemented the speculative construction, so that much is empirically true for which a valid speculative deduction is lacking. This is especially true of the place given to individuality. And, though Schleiermacher's method may be antiquated, his chief ideas are of permanent value to social science, which needs the unifying influence of such a broad outline.

EDMUND H. HOLLANDS.

Les rapports de l'histoire et de la science sociale d'après Cournot. C. BOUGLÉ
Rev. de Mét., XIII, 3, pp. 349-376.

Cournot is *par excellence* the theorist of chance. History, he claims, is made by accidents; order does not become sensible except through disorder. Representing the chain of causes producing a phenomenon by a line, the result of the intersection of that line by another such line is chance, *i. e.*, the meeting of two series of causes. But Cournot is far from thinking history a record of coincidences. The work of the historian is not only to separate the accidental from the necessary, but to show the importance of each; to show in which cases the two intercepting series are really independent, and in which derived from the same system; to note which of their causes are passing and which remain. If incidents have far-reaching effects, it is because they fall in with forces more profound. He should discern by what slow evolution the abrupt catastrophe is prepared and be able to calculate what this evolution would have accomplished without the catastrophe. There are cases where the issue is only a matter of time; the balance of forces are in its favor; incidents can only accelerate or retard it. In other more undecided cases, a large margin is left to chance. Whether there is law or no law in history, there are always facts to be subordinated to other facts. And it is to be hoped the historian will also formulate empirical laws. In reality, living bodies and social bodies are subject to the same laws of organization. But Cournot shows that the rôle of the mechanical more and more overshadows the rôle of the organic, and custom becomes code. So the economist's point of view prevails. With the triumph of the mechanical over the organic will come the triumph of the universal over the particular, the permanent over the ephemeral. Does not nature tend to stability in disembarassing herself successively of accidental causes of disorder? It is between the two extremes of development that superior men exercise the greatest influence on their times and that the strokes of fortune fall with the greatest force. It is this stage that makes history. All history is an increase and a decrease. A people gains freedom through courage and frugality, and loses this courage through the self-indulgence bred of the fruits of victory. The power created in order to expel an enemy, becomes through the pride of that very victory a menace. The ardor with which a nation carries out an enterprise is followed by lassitude and inability to meet a new set of conditions. An empire having been formed by the absorption of little states, the inconvenience of centralization is felt and decentralization begins. One should seek to find the conditions which normally would permit the establishment of such and such an institution, or insure the success of such an idea. There should be tables of equivalents and values. Cournot claims not only the possibility, but the necessity of organizing the social sciences.

C. WEST.

Evolution and Ethical Method. H. W. WRIGHT. Int. J. E., XVI, I, pp. 59-67.

The aim of this article is to suggest an interpretation of morality which makes full use of the illuminating concept of evolution, without having recourse to those biological principles and analogies which are inapplicable to the field of ethics. The field of conduct is coextensive with the sphere of intelligent or purposive activity. Purposive activity is an organizing process, inasmuch as it is continually integrating new objects and elements into the complex unity of personal character. The end of this organizing process, as revealed in moral experience, is the complete adjustment of the individual into the social system. That this end, the goal of moral evolution, may be attained, certain forms of activity must be put forth by the individual. These forms of purposive action, which are required as steps in moral evolution, are hence seen to possess necessity. Such are the several virtues which have acquired authority in moral development. Thus, in order to distinguish these virtues, we look for different forms of purposive activity which are necessary stages in moral evolution. All purposive activity has the negative aspect of *differentiation* in the introduction of new ends into the life of the individual, and the positive aspect of *integration* in the attainment of these ends. We may distinguish three general forms of purposive action, which are necessary stages in moral development: (1) That in which the single impulse is gratified; (2) that in which total individual welfare is pursued in distinction from the single object of desire. This activity involves, on its negative side, *Temperance*, on its positive, *Prudence*. (3) That in which the welfare of society is promoted in distinction from narrower individual interest, involving negatively *Justice*, and positively *Benevolence*.

H. W. WRIGHT.

NOTES.

A new periodical, *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, is announced to begin publication April 1, 1906. It will be edited by Professor Morton Prince, of the Tufts College Medical School, with the coöperation of a board of editors. The new journal is primarily intended to publish articles embodying clinical and laboratory investigations into abnormal mental phenomena, and will endeavor to subserve the interests of both medicine and psychology. The publisher is The Old Corner Book Store, Inc., 27-29 Bromfield St., Boston.

Beginning with Band XLI, Heft 1, the *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane* will be published in two parts. The first, entitled *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*, will be edited by Professor Hermann Ebbinghaus; the second, entitled *Zeitschrift für Sinnesphysiologie*, by Professor W. A. Nagel. The division is occasioned by the increasing scope of the journal and the consequent difficulties of a two-fold editorship.

The first number of the *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeinen Kunstwissenschaft*, edited by M. Dessoir, has been published by F. Enke at Stuttgart.

The Western Philosophical Association held its annual meeting at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, April 13 and 14, 1906.

Dr. Hans Dreisch, of Heidelberg, has been appointed Gifford Lecturer at Aberdeen for the sessions 1907-1909.

Dr. James Ward, of Cambridge, has been appointed Gifford Lecturer at St. Andrews for the sessions 1906-1908.

Professor G. H. Palmer, of Harvard, has been appointed Lecturer in Ethics, and Dr. Henry Rutgers Marshall Lecturer in *Æsthetics* and Psychology, at Yale next year.

Dr. James Burt Miner, of Iowa University, has been appointed Assistant Professor of Psychology at the University of Minnesota.

Professor E. I. Badgley, of Victoria University, Toronto, who died recently, has been succeeded by Professor Blauvelt, of Wesley College, the University of Manitoba.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals:

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XIII, 2: *M. W. Calkins*, A Reconciliation between Structural and Functional Psychology; *G. M. Stratton*, Symmetry, Linear Illusions, and The Movements of the Eye; *R. MacDougall*, On Secondary Bias in Objective Judgments; *J. E. Boodin*, Mind as Instinct.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, III, 2: *Wm. Harper Davis*, Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, Cambridge, December, 1905; Meeting of the American Philosophical Association; Books received; Notes and News; Discussion.

III, 3: *Raymond Dodge*, Recent Studies in the Correlation of Eye Movements and Visual Perception; *E. B. Holt*, Titchener's Experimental Psychology, II; Psychological Literature; Books Received; Notes and News.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, III, 4: *F. C. S. Schiller*, Is Absolute Idealism Solipsistic; *Edwin Tausch*, The Interpretation of a System from the Point of View of Developmental Psychology; *J. W. Baird*, A Reply to Dr. Miner; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

III, 5: *G. A. Tawney*, The Nature of Consistency; *Kate Gordon*, Feeling as the Object of Thought; *W. P. Montague*, The Meaning of Identity, Similarity, and Nonentity; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

III, 6: *J. Dashiell Stoops*, The Moral Individual; *George M. Duncan*, On 'Feeling'; Societies; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE, XL, 5 u. 6: Literaturbericht; *Karl E. Schaefer*, Bibliographie der psychophysiologischen Literatur des Jahres 1904; Namenverzeichnis der Bibliographie; Namenregister.

I. Abt. ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, XLI, 1: *A. Meinong*, In Sachen der Annahmen; *E. Bleuler*, Psychophysischer Parallelismus und ein bisschen andere Erkenntnistheorie; *G. Heymans*, Untersuchungen über psychische Hemmung; *K. Goldstein*, Merkfähigkeit, Gedächtnis und Assoziation; *B. Hammer*, Zur Kritik des Problems der Aufmerksamkeitschwankungen; Literaturbericht.

KANTSTUDIEN, X, 4 u. 5: *G. Gerland*, Immanuel Kant, seine geographischen und anthropologischen Arbeiten (Fortsetzung und Schluss); *Maximilian Runze*, Karl Rosenkranz' Verdienste um die Kant-Forschung; Recensionen; Selbstanzeigen; Mitteilungen.

XI, 1: *Georg Huber*, Graf von Benzel-Sternau und seine "Dichterischen Versuche über Gegenstände der kritischen Philosophie"; *M. Rubinstein*, Die logischen Grundlagen des Hegelschen Systems und das Ende der Geschichte; *F. Behrend*, Der Begriff des reinen Wollens bei Kant; *W. Lütgert*, Hamann und Kant; Recensionen; Selbstanzeigen; Mitteilungen.

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, XII, 2: *Ferdinand Tönnies*, Hobbes-Analekten, II; *Wm. Romaine Newbold*, Philolaus; *Wilh. M. Frankl*, Zum Verständnis von Spinozas *Ethik*; Jahresbericht.

ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE, XI, 4: *N. Leser*, Über die Möglichkeit der Betrachtung von unten und von oben in der Kulturphilosophie; *Adolf Müller*, Quellen und Ziele sittlicher Entwicklung; *Ernst Schwarz*, Über Phantasiegefühle; Jahresbericht.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XXXI, 2: *A. Lalande*, Pragmatisme et Pragmaticisme; *Palante*, L'ironie: étude psychologique; *Rogues de Fursac*, L'avarice: essai de psychologie morbide; *Baudin*, Sur l'inhibition exercée par la pensée sur la tonicité et les réflexes musculaires; Analyses et comptes rendus; Revue des périodiques étrangers; Livres nouveaux.

XXXI, 2: *F. Paulhan*, Le mensonge du monde; *Pillon*, Sur la philosophie de Renouvier; *Ribéry*, Le caractère et le tempérament; *Brenier de Montmorand*, Hystérie et mysticisme (Le cas de Ste Thérèse); *Segond*, Le moralisme de Kant et l'amoralisme contemporain; Analyses et comptes rendus; Revue des périodiques étrangers; Livres nouveaux.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XIV, 1: *E. Boutroux*, La conscience individuelle et la loi; *H. Poincaré*, Les mathématiques et la logique (fin); *L. Brunschvicg*, Spinoza et ses contemporaines (suite); *A. Fouillée*, Synthèse nécessaire de la raison et de la conscience; *W. Kinkel*, Un nouveau fondement de l'éthique; *G. Lechalas*, A propos de Cournot: hasard et déterminisme; *G. Lechalas*, Note sur le nombre des dimensions de l'espace visuel; *J. Charmont*, Les sources du droit positif à l'époque actuelle; Supplément.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE, VI, 2: *A. Sertillanges*, Agnosticisme, ou anthropomorphisme? *L. Baille*, Genèse des premiers principes; *M. Gossard*, Linéaments d'une synthèse scolastique des mœurs; *J. Gardair*, *A. Charousset*, La formation des idées; Analyses et comptes rendus.

VI, 3: *J. Bulliot*, Pour lire M. Poincaré; *F. Mentré*, Qui a découvert les phénomènes dits "inconscients"? *E. Tassy*, Esquisse de l'activité intellectuelle; *Comte Domet de Vorges*, La philosophie médiévale d'après M. Picavet; Analyses et comptes rendus; Périodiques; L'enseignement philosophique.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA E SCIENZE AFFINI, XIV, 1-2: *La direzione*, Ai lettori; *R. Ardigò*, La filosofia oggi nel campo del sapere; *G. Marchesini*, L'equivoco della coscienza moderna; *G. Tarozzi*, L'ispirazione umanitaria nell'arte; *B. Varisco*, I diritti del sentimento; *L. Limentani*, Per una teorica della previsione sociologica; *M. Barillari*, Le nuove esigenze della filosofia del diritto; *R. Mondolfo*, Di alcuni problemi della pedagogia contemporanea; Analisi e cenni di filosofia e pedagogia; Per un nuovo metodo di critica; Notizie; Necrologio; Sommari di riviste.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

SOME CONTRIBUTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY TO THE CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE.¹

THE two general standpoints from which all attempts to define justice and rights proceed, are that of the individual and that of the social whole. From the standpoint of the individual, we have such principles as 'to every man according to his deserts,' or 'to every man according to his needs,' as well as the stubbornly surviving principle of natural rights, which is imbedded in our institutions even though discredited by philosophers. From the standpoint of society, we have the principle that justice means the determining of individual relations by the general order and the subordinating of individual to public interests. From the individualistic standpoint, rights come before justice. Rights are the positive factor; justice is merely a term for the sum of individual rights, or a negative restraint upon interference. From the other standpoint, right and justice come, logically, if not historically, before rights. Before I can say whether a claim is a right I must prove it to be just, to be right; but just and right are terms which historically spring from law and custom, and which logically imply a general standard or authority. The two standpoints are both employed by utilitarianism when it asserts, on the one hand, that every man is to count as one, and, on the other, that acts are right as they tend to the greatest happiness of the greatest number. They are curiously conjoined in the thinking of the man who claims for his own vested interests the utmost freedom and protection and at the same time condones

¹ Read as the Presidential Address at the annual meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, at Madison, April 13, 1906.

child labor or the sweatshop or the extermination of a race, on the ground that "individuals must of course be sacrificed to the general progress."

It is unnecessary to prove to a philosophical audience that neither standpoint by itself is adequate. An individual, apart from his membership in a social rational order, has no rights, divine, natural, or any other. Conversely, a society may not fix its concepts of justice in such a fashion as to deny the worth of personality to any of its members, or to treat them merely as means. The controlling conception from which all principles of rights and justice must arise, is that which may be stated either as that of the social individual, or as that of the society which recognizes individuality. It is only the rational and social individual who has any rights; conversely, a society has a moral status only as it is the organized community of free moral persons who are willing, through it, a general good, and therefore setting up a general moral standard, the right. The unsocial individual may by cunning or wealth "have a capacity of influencing the acts of another," to use Holland's phrase, "by means of the opinion or the force of society." But this gives him morally no rights. Society may pass laws which treat individuals as though they were less important than things, but this is not justice. It may neglect to provide for those aspects of individual development which are possible only through the general activity; if so, this is at best a justice which is immature and defective. In order to get a basis for settling any of the questions as to rights and justice which are now pressing upon us, we must therefore first of all, if possible, clear up the meaning of the conceptions 'social individual,' and 'a society which respects individuality.'

Just here, I take it, is the opportunity for psychology. I can imagine the reader of my title inquiring, What has psychology to do with justice? Does not psychology tell us what is, not what ought to be? Does it not illumine impartially the evil and the good? Does not its method fall with scientific impartiality upon the just and upon the unjust? My answer is: If justice deals with persons, then it is important first of all to know what a person is. If, in particular, justice needs to understand a social

individual, then we must find out the nature and meaning of individuality. Psychology studies just these problems. When we appreciate our facts we shall be able to state more intelligently how to meet the situation which they constitute. What, then, has psychology to say which bears upon our problem? What is the nature of persons in general and of social persons in particular? The more important doctrines of psychology upon these problems seem to be the following:—

First, the individual is complex, not simple. The soul as simple substance has been banished from metaphysics; the individual as viewed by law and common sense is still relatively simple. The complexity of the individual is a complexity of origin and of structure. Let us note each of these.

The individual is complex in origin. Physical heredity and variation, social heredity and more consciously directed education, and, finally, conscious volition, all contribute. While the share of each may be impossible of exact determination, it is none the less a reality. This excludes conceptions of purely materialistic determinism on the one hand, and of 'self-made' men on the other.

The individual is complex in structure. Instincts bred into the organism by the whole biological process, impulses which spring from a variable psychological and mental structure, other impulses due to suggestions from the complex environment, physical and social, come in time to be organized and controlled. We call this organized unit a person or an individual, but this is in many cases a fiction; in any case, complete control of all these urgent, conflicting, multiple interests and selves is an achievement, not a starting point. No one is definitively either bad or good in early years. Only the abnormal and pathological individual becomes so completely absorbed in one interest as to be incapable of responding to any other.

The second important doctrine of psychology for our purpose is that the individual is both habit and adjusting activity. On the one hand, there is continuity which forms the basis of responsibility; on the other, there is something new which means growth. On the one hand, there is a definite structure already built; on

the other, there is the living process which refuses to be identified with the structure already organized, and points forward to the future. On the one hand, is the seemingly solid reality ; on the other, the power of expanding life which is destined to condemn the present as outgrown.

The third doctrine of psychology which I select has various aspects, but they may all be brought under the head 'Forms without contents are empty.' The mind, the self, the person, the individual, is selecting, controlling, organizing, purposing, and willing activity ; but it cannot operate *in vacuo*. We know that it has come into being in the biological process, only through selecting from a varied environment, and through control of muscular movements. I cannot, merely by taking thought, will to be wise, to control passion, to enjoy the refinement of civilization, any more than I can will to add a cubit to my stature. It is not merely that mind, individuality, personality have been developed in response to an environment ; they are still dependent for the 'stuff' of thought, for the ideas which make thought possible, both upon material furnished to sense and imagination and upon actual practice in motor control.

Fourth, and most directly important for the conception of justice, is psychology's doctrine of the individual as social. It had, indeed, long been a commonplace that the individual owes much to language, to parental care, to education, and to community life. But recent psychology has brought to clear recognition a much more fundamental relation. Conscious personal life gets its stuff, its technique of control, largely through suggestions from other persons. Language affords it the medium for enlarging its life to past and future, to abstract and general. Contagious sympathy broadens the capacity for feeling ; home and all the later agencies of association both offer opportunity for impulses to find real development, and give steadying support to the gradually forming will.

But the social origin of the person is less important than the social nature. On the material side, it is obvious that the individual of to-day depends upon countless of his fellows for his daily food and clothing, for opportunities to work, and for peace

and security. All this, however, is but an external symbol of the social nature of his mental and moral life. He thinks in 'general' concepts and of objects; but this means, he thinks and interprets his experience, not as it feels to him privately, but as he can describe it to another, or as it would appear to anyone else. He exercises some rights; he owns a home or a coat. The legal right for this, of course, depends on society; but the very idea of 'my' and 'mine,' the very rudiments of personality, presuppose a 'your' and 'their' to give them meaning. It is needless to point out how the whole moral and religious life is a life in and through relations to others. Even the realm of feeling does not remain wholly private. For the moment we pass from a particular thrill of emotion to the objective valuing of beauty, we have taken a point of view which is not private but general. The world of science, art, commerce, law, morality, and religion is a social world. The individual may try to ignore certain aspects of these facts; but if he lives in any of these spheres, he can no more escape the social than he can escape his own person.

These considerations, however, would only exhibit the individual as involuntarily social. They say nothing explicitly as to the very essence of personality, the conscious will. In this respect the individual may or may not be social. He may take up into his purpose and will the whole social situation. If so, his will becomes a social will. Just to the extent to which he does this, will he become a completely social person. Just to this degree will his will not only accord with right, but itself determine the right. Just to this degree will his claims, his interests, coincide with law.

Right and rights will be as one. This does not mean that the individual will cease to have any private interests, or to recognize any in others. A society of persons is not a series of facsimiles. The very essence of progressive society, as of advancing life, is that it includes a multitude of different people with differing bent and talent. The very range and power of every individual in society is itself due to the fact that other and different individuals are breaking out new paths, opening new windows, pushing back the limitations from human experience, and build-

ing new interests. But, on the other hand, much of this originality and diversity which has in the past assumed unsocial or even antisocial forms will in the future find social channels for expression. Genius will not die with war; individuality is not dependent upon exclusive interests.

We turn now to the problems of justice and apply these psychological doctrines to a few typical situations: The problem of the just distribution of wealth, the just distribution of education and other mental goods, the administration of justice by the courts.

To begin with a brief note on the last. Corrective and criminal justice employs certain abstractions which are in part inheritances from a crude past, in part conceptions which have served a useful purpose and must in turn give way to a less abstract, more psychological point of view.

First, it makes that abstraction of all conditions except the bare act, of all circumstances of its litigants except the contract, the tort, or the crime, which we call equality before the law. Ancient law began with individual decisions passed by the old men or the chief. These were liable to be partial and arbitrary. It was a great gain when precedent and statute substituted uniformity and impartiality for caprice and favor. Equality before the law was in these respects a great advance from the inequality which it superseded. But when we consider how this actually works we may see that the abstract equality often gives real inequality. Forms without content are empty. "Is not the poor man at a hopeless disadvantage in court," I asked a lawyer, "in view of the resources which wealth may employ against him?" "No more so," said he, "than in every department of life!" The reply speaks for itself. The justice of the courts is no harder upon the poor man than are the other conditions of society!¹ The purely formal equality, impersonal and abstract, must give way in turn to a more personal and concrete equality if we are to have full justice, — full recognition of the individual.

¹ I am indebted to my friend, Rev. F. E. Dewhurst, for a particularly clear statement of the progress of justice from the personal as affected by extrinsic conditions, through the impersonal, to the personal in its intrinsic nature as individuality.

Or again, consider the criminal as to his supposed freedom and responsibility. In the eye of the law he is a criminal or he is not ; in committing the act he was free and responsible or he was not. Abstraction is made from all heredity and environment. This is certainly a case where forms without content are empty. Metaphysics used to discuss the problem of freedom in this purely formal way. Is man free ? You answered 'yes' or 'no.' But the psychologist may see that freedom in any case is a matter of content as well as form. It is a matter of degrees, not of yes or no. Am I free to prefer Beethoven to 'rag time' ? Certainly not, unless I have heard Beethoven. Is the boy of the slums free to think of things pure, noble, and of good report ? Am I free to play a crack game of tennis ? I must first learn the existence of a host of new muscular 'feels' before I can control and organize the movements. Is the boy coming to manhood free to control passions ? Not unless he has ideas of genuine interest in something better to set over against passion ; not unless he has had training in the actual resistance to passion and mastery of himself. Responsibility has gradually moved from the extremely abstract to the more concrete views. In early Germanic law the person was held responsible with little if any regard to his intent or personal agency. The owner of a weapon left for repair might even be held liable for a crime committed with it. A cart might be brought to trial and adjudged 'deodand.' The history of law has been a gradual introduction of a more psychological standpoint. That is, it has dealt more with the real man, less with a fictitious self analogous to the old metaphysical substances and essences ; but there is still room for progress.

Finally, our criminal law, until recently, has abstracted from all but the self of the past, the self of the habit. It has taken no account of the self as activity. To treat any human being as though what he deserves is measured only by his deed, by what he has been or done, is, as Professor Dewey has pointed out, to make a monstrous assumption. We may not ignore the past, but we must not ignore the future and its possibilities of reform and reshaping of life. The parole system is a step in this

direction. The juvenile courts permit the judge to treat the boys and girls as real persons, not solely as abstract criminals. May we not hope, and shall we not, as philosophers and psychologists, labor for the wider recognition of individuality and full personality in all our criminal law, — for the banishing of abstractions which wrong humanity?

We come now to the problems of distributive justice. I shall not discuss the question whether any private property is just. I for one want my own coat and my own shoes; and though I do not expect to own much else, this admits the principle. I must be able to control enough of my surroundings to do my work efficiently and live in decency, if not in comfort. But the just distribution of property, — that is another story. Our present system of distribution is not, of course, the product of any intentional plan by society to secure a just distribution. It is a combination of the old theory of seisin or possession with the theory of free bargaining. It is subject to some slight restraints, but these have been, in the main, intended to favor competition. It results in such vast inequalities that we no longer count our millionaires, on the one hand, and, on the other, there are estimated to be in this most favored country ten millions of persons in poverty; that is, ten millions who cannot procure food and other necessities sufficient to keep them in full efficiency. In England apparently over twenty-five per cent. are in this condition of want.

Few would say, if the total wealth of the country were placed in their hands for distribution: We will give the bulk of the whole to a small fraction, we will divide a lesser portion among a great many, and will leave a minute fraction to be distributed among a quarter of the people. The situation certainly seems to demand some justification.

Such justification is frequently attempted from the standpoint of society as a whole. "It depends on what use is made of the great fortunes. It may be to the advantage of society to have certain large accumulations which can be devoted to financing great industrial undertakings, supporting educational and philanthropic institutions, and fostering the arts." But this answer

no longer satisfies society. It seems to neglect the individuals of which society is composed. Society is asking now, not only whether wealth is justly used, but whether it is justly acquired, — justly, that is, to the other individual members of society. The question : “ Is it justly acquired ? ” may be proposed from two points of view.

1. The economic process may be considered as one in which individuals are to be treated by society on some supposedly moral principle. The theory here would be that, as society is made up of its members, it must have their real welfare at heart. Its justice will be so to distribute its goods as to recognize personality and promote it.

2. The other theory would be that the economic process is to be viewed solely as one of contracts between free and independent individuals. Society has no concern and takes no responsibility except to enforce these contracts. It cares not whether they mean weal or woe. It views economic life purely as a game which is certain to enrich some and ruin others. Its justice is only to enforce the rules.

We will consider each of these theories. The first, which seeks some moral basis for the distribution of wealth, will naturally use either a principle of equality, — a fair field and no favors, free competition, free bargaining ; or a principle of inequality, — to each according to his merits, or his efforts, or his needs.

Let us examine these maxims.

Equality we certainly believe in. Fairness, justice, seems to be in essence, equality. Indeed, both parties who object to ‘equality’ as a maxim are opposing not real equality, but an apparent equality which means real inequality. The individualist objects to equality of distribution because this would be treating men as if they were all alike. But to treat the useful and the useless alike is not equality. True equality is to treat usefulness alike and to give to equal units of utility equal rewards. On the other hand, the socialist, — and indeed every one whose eyes are open, — objects to so-called equality of competition on the ground that it is not real equality. It is treating the people as if they were all alike. But to treat the rich and poor, strong

and weak, educated and uneducated, alike is not equality. Our psychological analysis shows the precise fallacies of both these supposed systems of equality. Either the bare equality of distribution or the bare equality of competition treats the person as an abstract unit, — the simple substance of old metaphysics. No system of justice can be adequate which rests on such an unreality.

We turn, then, to another set of maxims which aim at least at a less abstract conception of personality. 'To every man according to his deserts,' 'To every man according to his efforts,' and 'To every man according to his needs.' Each of these recognizes the complexity of personality. The psychological principle which exhibits the strength and weakness of the first and third of these maxims is the second. The self is both habit and ideal; both a structure and a reconstructing activity.

Evidently the first and third of these principles, as usually interpreted, seize each one half of this fact and ignore the other. 'To every one according to his deserts,' recognizes the continuity of mental life. But, as usually interpreted, it stops here. It treats men as if they were dead, as if their structure, their past, were the only things of importance. There is no quicker way to kill a man morally than to treat him as though he were already dead.

Moreover, as applied to the question of just distribution of wealth, the maxim of reward according to deserts usually involves other psychological absurdities.

1. The first abstraction which this principle of reward according to merit usually makes is that it gives a man credit for all he achieves, or charges him with all his failures, without recognizing the threefold origin of these achievements or failures. Heredity, society, personal choice, have each had some share in the result. But, in considering the ethics of competition from this maxim, there is evidently no attempt to discriminate between these several sources. The man born with industrial genius, presented by society with the knowledge of all that has been done in the past, and equipped by society with all the methods and tools society can devise, certainly has an advantage over the man of moderate

talents and no education. To claim that the first should be justly rewarded for his superiority would imply that the reception of one gift constitutes a just claim for another.

2. Secondly, the maxim as applied to our present system is guilty of a further abstraction in assuming that the chief if not the only way to deserve reward is by individualistic shrewdness and energy.

3. It measures desert by service rendered without taking any account of motive or even of intent. The captain of industry performs an important service to society ; therefore, it is argued, he should be rewarded accordingly, quite irrespective of the question whether he was aiming at social welfare or at selfish gain. It may even be plausibly argued that to reward men financially for good motives would be bribing men to be honest. I grant freely that financial rewards will not make good citizens, but this is irrelevant. The point is that whatever other reasons, — expediency, difficulty of estimating intent and motive, — may be urged for abstracting from everything but the result ; the one reason which cannot be urged is, such abstraction is just. A person has rights only because he is a social person. But to call a man a social person because he incidentally produces useful results, is to say that purpose and will are negligible elements of personality.

The maxim 'To each according to his efforts,' corrects this last abstraction just reviewed. It is true to one aspect of personality — voluntary purpose. But this again is to be narrow. It ignores the element of the future. It is too apt to forget, in the second place, that even 'efforts' are not solely a matter of free choice. As pointed out in our first part, the efforts which a man makes are really to a great extent dependent on his training and environment. It therefore needs to be supplemented by the third maxim : 'To each according to his needs.'

This recognizes individuality in its aspect of possibility. It would give unfolding personality the chance to develop. This has sometimes been regarded as benevolence rather than as strict justice. But such a view assumes that the person has no claim upon the social whole as a constituent member, whose welfare is

indispensable to the welfare of the whole. It assumes that the only basis of claim is what the member *has* done. The maxim 'to each according to his needs,' has a sound basis in the psychology of the living, growing person. But, if taken abstractly, if the continuity of the self is forgotten, the maxim cannot serve as a basis for distribution. It must be combined with the principle of continuity — the man's past is a part of his personality ; it must be further modified by the conception of the social self — only those needs are rights which are in the interest of the social individual.

If, now, with this corrected conception of personality we ask whether our present distribution of property based on seisin and competition can be called just, we need not delay long. It evidently can make no pretence to be a distribution according to merit, effort, or needs. It can, therefore, make no pretence to be just in the sense that it recognizes full personality in determining rights.

We turn, then, to our second theory of society to see if it affords a basis on which we may consider the present distribution as at least not unjust. If we regard a contract or exchange as fair, if both parties agree to it,—irrespective of any other consideration,—then we may say that any system of distribution to which the parties consent is fair and just. Society names its conditions in the form of laws. Hence any individual who acquires property legally may be regarded as justly entitled to it. Or, to put the same thing in another form : every one wants to receive for his labor or skill what it is worth, and conversely, when I want goods I should give what they are worth. Now, what better way of deciding the value of goods can be afforded me than by the test of what I am willing to pay? They are worth that *to me*. In other words, the law of supply and demand locates the measure of value, and therefore the whole control of property, in the free choice of individuals. What can be fairer than this? Both these statements of the theory make an abstraction in another form. Whether such law as obtains and such consent as exists have any value, depends on how the law was made, or whether the party to the supposed contract had any real alternative. If supply and demand were perfectly fluid, that is, if space and time, habit and

training, responsibilities and duties, to say nothing of monopolies and black lists, had no existence, — then the theory would be more plausible, though it would still abstract from any larger view of the individual than his present want measures. But, under conditions as they are, we must admit that the abstraction is a gross one. It is possible to say of a game : the players know the rules, and consent to them. They cannot complain if they do not win, nor need they feel unjust if they are successful. But in the game of the industrial process there is no option. One must play or starve. And usually there is no chance to consent to the rules. They are already made ; and, when they are changed from time to time, it is not usually the loser who has the chief voice in the change. The world applauds a good loser, but when the player must stake not only his own welfare but that of wife and children, he can no longer greet its issues with the 'frolic welcome' of independence. To base the justice of our distribution of property upon naked, abstract consent, — whether we call it open shop, or freedom of labor, or free contract, or competition, — and take no care as to whether there is real freedom, whether there is real respect for personality, is too abstract a procedure to deserve the name of justice. It is more abstract and metaphysical than metaphysics ever was. We must ask : Does the system or law recognize the full individuality of its members, or does it deal only with fictions and abstractions ?

In this full sense of justice, I think no one can fail to see not merely that our system is not just, but that no distribution of property is likely to be just. We may remove some of the inequalities, we may require decent sanitation and honest food, we may heed 'the bitter cry of the children,' handicapped by premature toil and indecent surroundings, we may give to all the best of education, we may even, if we please, attempt to restore equality by taking over as a community the land, or the means of production ; but even then I believe no system of distribution in property can be devised which will be true to all the complex life of its members — which will be fully just.

Indeed, we may go on to say that the American people does not care very strongly that this is so. This may be due in some

cases to a religious conviction that the social order with all its inequalities is divinely ordained; in others, to an optimistic blinking of the facts: but I believe that there is a more widely operative reason. The American prefers an economic order in which there are prizes and blanks, to an order in which every man will draw out in proportion to what he puts in. He prefers an exciting game to a sure but tame return of his investment. He may call for a 'square deal,' but we must remember that 'a square deal' in the great American game from which the metaphor is taken is not designed to make the game less one of chance. It is designed to give full scope to luck and nerve. A game in which every player was sure to win, but also sure to win just what he had put in, would be equitable, but it would not be a game. The American suspects that the measures advocated as giving juster distribution may somehow rob life of its excitement and its passion. Possibly he may even think that the very strain of the process develops some elements of character which he fears to lose. But whatever the motive, in the hope of better luck next time, or of a better start for his children, or in the very stress and struggle, he thinks little of the justice or injustice of it all. Psychology seems thus to lead us to a hopeless conclusion.

If life were wholly made up of exclusive interests, the outlook for any satisfying degree of justice would be hopeless. But it is good psychology as well as good scripture that man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth. Many of the ends and interests in the complex life of humanity are not exclusive but social. Satisfaction in knowledge, in art, in association, in freedom, in service to man, is not diminished but increased when it is shared. Impulses towards these ends began to appear early in the process of human development, but at first had little chance; organization of life, institutions, and the progress of civilization were necessary to give them opportunity and power. The older philosophy of property laid stress upon the importance of property as necessary to the full realization of personality. This corresponded to the fact that at one time private property was not merely an important aspect of the assertion

of the self or personality, but also a necessary means to most of the other goods of life. Neither of these is true to the same extent as formerly, and the future is likely to see still further progress along the same direction.

Consider first the intrinsic value of possession, as a psychological activity.

To seize, master, and possess is certainly an instinct inbred by the biological process. It is necessary for life; it is a form of the *Wille zum Leben* or *Wille zur Macht* which need not be despised. At the same time, it is relatively simple. It starts low down in the process of animal evolution. It cannot be compared in rational value with the instinct of workmanship. In itself, it neither beautifies nor ennobles. It is power, but power in brute nakedness and simplicity.

Consider next possession when it is no longer the mere animal instinct, but through expression in a social medium and by a social person it becomes a right of property. This is certainly a far higher capacity; for, like all rights, it involves the assertion of a super-individual personality. It means the controlling of others. In early society this was, if not the only, at all events the most general and important right. It was therefore of undoubted value in the formation of personality. But democracy has formed new ways for developing the social consciousness and the personality of its members. The responsibility and power for law and government which falls to every citizen directly is sufficient, even if he has little reminder of his capacity of ownership.

But, it may be said, few would place great importance upon bare ownership as such. It is because ownership is a necessary means to so many other goods, that it is itself a necessity for individuality. It is in just this respect that the situation seems to be changing.

Modern man has been in past times largely compelled to own the goods he would enjoy. To sit down on a piece of ground and enjoy a fine landscape, he must own it. If he would have a plot where his children might play, he must own it. If he would travel, he must carry his own lantern, and furnish his own pro-

tection from thieves. If he would have water, he must sink his own well. If he would send a letter, he must own or hire a messenger. If he would read a book, he must not merely own the book, but own or hire the author or copyist. If he would educate his children, he must own or hire the tutor. In the case of persons living in rural districts, this is still true to some extent. But in the case of urban communities, where the extremes of property distribution are greatest, and the feeling of injustice provoked by them is keenest, progressive democracy is finding and providing through public agencies satisfactions for both bodily and mental wants. Fewer and fewer city dwellers can own a yard or play ground, but the parks are providing for old and young agencies for health and enjoyment. Few can own books, but all may read them. May we not expect that all the arts, — music and drama included, — will be brought within the possibilities of all?

The intellectual life and the means for its gratification are also entering broad paths. The fraternal relation increasingly manifest in the republic of science and letters, is but emblematic of a far deeper socialization of all knowledge. Medical science is finding new avenues of bringing itself to bear upon every member of the community. Campaigns against tuberculosis and diphtheria are allowed to go unhindered by even the fiercest of individualists. The knowledge that frees from superstition and fear is permeating widely. The positive knowledge which gives a sense of power over nature, and makes man free of his world will follow.

The average teacher or preacher has little if any more property than the average wage worker. Yet in spite of the fact that he has no property, he has less feeling of injustice, — and less reason for it. His life is less meagre, because he can enjoy more of the social goods which civilization brings. This is partly a matter of education. He has wider and more social interests because these were stimulated at the proper time in home or school. The basis for social justice in this sphere of mental goods is therefore an education which shall awaken mental and social interests; the superstructure of justice which we may hope will rise is a satisfaction of these interests by social means.

Three objections to our demand for broader education and fuller social satisfactions may be briefly noticed. The first comes from the optimistic and self-satisfied American who says: Of course education is good, but we have it already — grades, high schools, universities; why speak of this? I speak of it, because, as every one knows who has looked into it, a pitifully small number ever get into the high schools. The subjects and the methods of instruction, due partly to educational narrowness and partly to financial limitations, afford interest to only a part, — and in the case of boys, to an apparently small part. As a Chicago judge is said to have remarked: A boy has to commit a crime before the city will give him a chance for a broad education. With salaries so small that we have almost no men in our teaching force, with the number of pupils to each teacher so large, and with equipment so meagre that proper methods of instruction are impossible, with a curriculum which emphasizes learning so much and doing things so little, with little or no provision for boys and girls of promise whose parents are too poor to keep them in school, we cannot claim to be more than at the beginning of our educational programme. We are only crudely and partially just to the individuals of our society. Some human beings have small capacities for education, but that every boy and girl should be given the opportunity and the needed aid to a development of his capacities through at least the high school age, — this seems a minimum of social justice.

The second objection may come from several sources. From the sincere aristocrat and from the sincere, — though in my judgment narrow, — student. It runs: Most men and women must walk the common paths of life, must do its manual labor and have only the satisfactions of food, shelter, and warmth. To awaken desires for more is to bring misery instead of increasing happiness. The answer to this objection is that it comes too late and in the wrong part of the world. It would be a fatuous policy to attempt to limit men to the sphere of simplest material wants, in which there is least that is social, most that is exclusive; least justice and least hope of justice. But this cannot be publicly and avowedly attempted. The American people may be

careless, may be unconscious how inadequate their justice is, but they will not tolerate a theory which bluntly and openly denies the essence of democracy. They may permit the practical inequality; they will not admit that this should be frankly erected as a principle of justice.

The third objection comes from the orthodox individualist. Such a programme of satisfying wants through social and public agencies, instead of through private property, is paternalism. It leads to demoralization and pauperization. It is better, it is juster, to stimulate the individual's activity and do less for his wants, than to satisfy all his wants at the expense of his activity.

But this assumes, first, that what is done through public agencies is done for the people and not by the people. A democracy can do for itself what an aristocracy may not do for a dependent class. The greatest demoralization which is threatened at the present time is not to those who stand outside, looking hungrily at the board spread by the productive power of associated human invention and industry. It is rather to those who sit over-fed and complacent in the supposition that they themselves have alone created what they enjoy. The danger to democracy itself lies not so much in the effort to awaken and satisfy essentially social interests through the common resources, as in the disposition to appropriate common resources to private property. And here again the American people, more interested as they are in most respects in the stir of the game than in the justice of its awards, have shown that they may resent the use of public agencies for private gain. We conclude this consideration of distributive justice therefore with the hope, springing from what we already glimpse, that the goods which are not private, the goods which are so largely the product of social coöperation, may increase in value and may be the share of every member of society.

It is in the expansion of life along these lines that Plato's suggestive foregleam of a juster, because more social, order is to find interpretation. The social content and power of science, the interchange of material goods not only in commerce but in aid to the suffering, the communication of ideas and sympathy, the coöperation of countless associations to promote common wel-

fare — these are some of the ways in which “things which are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands,” have become common, “and all men express praise and blame, and feel joy and sorrow, on the same occasions, and the laws unite the city to the utmost.”

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THE PLACE OF PSYCHOLOGY IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.¹

It seems to me, though I only give my views with some diffidence, that the study of psychology properly belongs to the group of 'natural sciences,' and requires to be carefully distinguished from two branches of thought which may fairly be called philosophical, viz., the abstract or exact philosophical group constituted by exact logic and pure rational mathematics² on the one side, and the concrete philosophical group of the *Geisteswissenschaften* (ethics, the philosophical interpretation of history, art, religion, etc.) on the other. In fact, in my own opinion, the consideration which should make a respectable acquaintance with the methods of scientific psychology an indispensable part of the philosopher's mental outfit is that, owing to the relative recency of the separation between psychology and general philosophy, it is at present easier for him to get a first-hand acquaintance with the principal methods and working postulates of experimental science in the psychological than in the physical or chemical laboratory. That some degree of first-hand knowledge, both of the kind of precautions which have to be complied with in experimentation, and of the mathematical methods by which a series of isolated observations may be made to yield a trustworthy general formula (methods of interpretation, approximation, correction for probable error, interpretation of averages, etc.), ought to be acquired by every student of the critical problems of the theory of cognition is, I take it, hardly likely to be denied in the present state of philosophical thought; and, as I say, the psychological laboratory seems to be the most suitable place for its acquisition with a minimum expenditure of time and mental energy. (If I may be allowed to digress for a moment in order to make a remark which may possibly be interesting to

¹ Read before the American Philosophical Association, at Cambridge.

² This would embrace at least arithmetic and the whole theory of assemblages, finite and transfinite. Whether it would include geometry depends upon our view as to the disputed question whether the principles of geometry include extra-logical "existence-theorems" or not.

those who, like myself, have regularly to deliver courses of lectures on elementary logic, I have always held that 'inductive' logic can only be profitably taught in close connection with simple laboratory practice, and it is precisely the convenience with which this practice can be supplied in the form of psychological class experiments that, to my mind, justifies the system of McGill and some other universities where a half-year's course in psychology precedes a student's first introduction to logic.)

To return to our immediate subject. What, in my view, distinguishes the natural or empirical sciences from both groups of what I have called philosophical studies, is the presence among their data of empirical existence-theorems. By an *empirical* existence-theorem I mean the assertion of the existence at a particular moment of time of a fact which is believed in, in the last resort, simply on the testimony of immediate apprehension. Thus empirical existence-theorems, in the sense in which I am using the term, are identical, or nearly so, with the class of assertions which Leibniz calls "truths of fact." Their distinguishing peculiarity is that they are neither simply seen to be self-evidently true, as is the case, in my opinion at least, with the fundamental existence-theorems of logic and arithmetic, nor yet are they rigorous deductions by exact logical methods from a precisely enumerated group of premises which are themselves self-evident, as is the case with the conclusions of the different geometries, if we grant that these studies depend on no extra-logical existence-theorems. As Leibniz would put it, the denial of an empirical existence-theorem "implies no contradiction"; the theorem is believed simply because at a given moment we seem to find an example of it in our own immediate unanalyzed feeling or sensation, or infer from the utterances and gestures of others that they are finding one in theirs. In other words, an empirical existence-theorem is, from the point of view of logic, a complex existential proposition involving in its meaning a reference to a particular moment or interval of *time*. The general form of such a proposition is '*x* exists *now*,' in which the 'now' is a variable the value of which for any given assertion has to be fixed by reference to an arbitrarily assumed origin or standard

date from which our reckonings are made. (The existence-theorems of logic, on the other hand, precisely because they involve no such time-variable, are all concerned, in my opinion, with the cognition of simple self-evident truth, and the objects cognized by them constitute, to use an indispensable but shamefully degraded and misapplied term which it is high time to rescue from the sciolists, the veritable *noûmena* of philosophy.)

Now, I should maintain that all the observed and registered data upon which our psychological inferences are based, and all the conclusions which can be legitimately drawn from those data, are of the kind just described, and that there is so far no fundamental difference in character between psychology and such sciences as physics and chemistry. An objection might indeed be taken to this assertion on the following ground. Your description, it might be said, applies well enough to the course of our sense-percepts and the succession of our memory-images. They are, as you say, asserted to exist on the strength of our immediate and unanalyzed awareness of a given presentation, or rather a given presented *object*. Only these percepts and images are not, strictly speaking, *psychical* facts or facts of *consciousness* at all. They are all extra-mental objects in the only sense in which the term extra-mental has a definite meaning. That is to say, percepts and images are not *in* the mind at all, in the sense in which the terms of a series are *in* the series; they are not the elements of which the thing we call 'mind' or 'consciousness' is the total complex. (And hence, by the way, arises a possible doubt whether there can in strictness be *any* psychology of perception or thought.) But when you come to genuinely psychical facts, such as emotion, desire, volition, pleasure-pain, you are not dealing with extra-mental presented objects at all, but with processes which are the actual constituents of the complex I call my 'mind' or 'consciousness.' Can it, then, be said that I assert the existence of these processes on the testimony of an unanalyzed apprehension? Is not this to fall into the psychological fallacy of an extreme presentationalism? This objection has, I think, no real weight. What distinguishes experiences like those of pain or delight from experiences like those of red or sweet is surely not

that the former have *no* object, but that their object is itself an attitude of the percipient's mind. It is I who am pained or delighted, though it is not necessarily I who am red or sweet.

Psychology, it is true, can and does make use of assumed hypothetical elements which are not themselves legitimately regarded as data of actual personal experience. It does this notably when it assumes the existence of pure simple sensations, of subliminal and subconscious mental states, or of psychical 'dispositions' generally, as congenital mental raw material. But I do not see that in this, or in the still more liberal use of hypothetical elements characteristic of a psychology of the associationist type, psychology acts otherwise than such sciences as chemistry or physics. In both these studies the task of inferring the actual course of a continuous process from observations of isolated data is simplified by the assumption, for purposes of calculation, of simple hypothetical elements which cannot be actually exhibited in experience and may conceivably be mere methodological creations of theory. And the typical form of abstraction employed in this process seems, so far as I can see, to be the same in all three cases. It depends upon the assumption that minor individual differences between one electron, one chemical atom, one mind and another are negligible. Just as we treat, *e. g.*, all atoms of the same element as identical, at least within the range of our observations, in respect of their weight or chemical affinities, so we treat different minds as alike in respect of the ways in which they react upon typical modifications in their environment. Our generalizations are in each case obtained by the statistical assumption that individual divergences from a standard type, if they actually exist, will be too small to make an appreciable difference to the result. The only serious difference between psychology and the physical sciences, so far as I see, lies in the higher confidence with which we can infer that an actual physical process will be found to conform to the general typical law to which our hypothesis conducts us. Whether this is due to actual higher complexity in the structure of human mind as compared with that of the real elements of the physical order, or is merely a human illusion arising from the fact that we

are better acquainted with individual minds than with the individualities of the physical world I need not try to decide here.

It might perhaps be held that psychology is radically distinguished from the physical sciences by the fact that while they deal with objects equally perceptible to a plurality of subjects, psychology is exclusively concerned with what Professor Münsterberg calls *individuelle Objekte*, objects cognizable only in a unique act and by a single subject. But is the fact of this difference quite certain? If we are to hold rigorously to the distinction, must we not at least lay it down that there is really no such thing as the psychology of cognition, since the immediate *objects* of cognition (sense-qualities, physical things, memory-images, universal concepts) are all *überindividuelle Objekte*, while, as to the unique *processes* by means of which the individuals cognize these objects, it may at least be doubted whether careful introspection reveals certain evidence of their existence; *i. e.*, it may be that what we now call the psychology of cognition is a mere temporary stepping-stone to the cerebral physiology, on the one side, and the logic, on the other, of a more scientific future. In any case, the logical character of a science must be determined, not by the character of the assumed simple objects it cognizes, but by the nature of its methodological postulates. Judged from this point of view, psychology seems to make the same sort of use as the physical sciences of the leading concepts of mechanical science, *viz.*, the formation of complex wholes by the combination of simple elements and the law of uniform sequence. It is true that its 'laws' have as yet hardly begun to be expressible in exact numerical form, and hence the 'non-quantitative' nature of the science is frequently regarded as constituting a radical difference in kind between psychology and the physical sciences. But I must own to being dissatisfied with the reasons which are commonly adduced for regarding this as more than a temporary defect caused by the comparatively inchoate condition of the subject. I see in principle no difficulty in the determinate correlation of psychical functions with numerical values. Moreover, in the *duration* of mental process we clearly seem to have an obvious instance of a psychical function susceptible of numerical determination. And, again,

such researches as those of Ebbinghaus and others on memory and obliviscence seem to present us with the first beginnings of a truly mathematical treatment of psychical processes.

What does, as I conceive, absolutely distinguish psychology from the philosophical sciences is the kind of use which the latter make of transcendental noumenal ideals into which no element of empirical fact, — no time-variable, — appears to enter. The abstract philosophical sciences, logic and the pure mathematics, appear to be throughout concerned with relations between such noumenal ideals, and it is to these sciences a matter of pure indifference whether or not these ideals are even approximately imitated by the sensible objects of temporal experience. In other words, the only objects of which the existence is presupposed by these sciences are the suprasensible entities or *noûmena*, in the proper sense, of exact logic. In so far as use is made of sensible arrangements, diagrams, or models, except as mere incidental sources of suggestion and aids to imagination, I suppose we may safely say we are dealing with bad logic and bad mathematics.

The concrete philosophical sciences, indeed, — the so-called *Geisteswissenschaften*, — have in a way to consider temporal facts of biography and of history, and thus include empirical existence-theorems among their assertions. But they do not consider them, like the natural sciences, for the purpose of inferring further empirical existence-theorems, but in order to pass judgment on the intellectual, moral, and æsthetic worth of the objects in question in the light of transcendental ideal standards of value. In a much wider than the vulgar moralistic sense of the phrase, not only ethics and æsthetics, but logic and formal mathematics, deal with what 'ought' to be, but is not revealed by perception as ever actually existing at any given moment. There is, to be sure, an inveterate prejudice in modern, or at least in post-Hegelian, philosophy according to which only what has the guarantee of immediate unanalyzed perception really 'is,' and the ideals of the philosophical sciences are merely subjective 'ideas.' I must confess to an ineradicable bias in favor of the opposing Platonic conviction that it is precisely that which conforms to the ideal standard of what has the right to be which really, and, in the true sense of the word,

'is,' and that the discrepancies between the revelations of immediate perception and the demands of the ideal will be found on examination to be due to the fact that the vision of direct perception at any moment is at once limited by imperfection of organs and narrowness of attention-span, and distorted by all sorts of unconscious and untested metaphysical assumptions. Judged by the Platonic standard, we should have to say, the dependency of psychology upon empirical existence-theorems of itself deprives it of truth as a knowledge of human nature, when contrasted with biography or history and their revelations of the capacities and aspirations of the human spirit. It is not in the reactions of the laboratory, but in appreciation by an ideal standard of the ends to which human life can be devoted that we most truly learn what the mind of man *is*. "La vraie science de l'esprit n'est pas la psychologie mais la métaphysique."

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THE IDEALISM OF MALEBRANCHE.¹

IF one studies the fate of historical systems of thought, one usually finds that the philosopher resembles the prophet and enjoys the least honor in his own country. The reverse has been the case with Malebranche. In France he has been commonly ranked as second only to Descartes, and has been given, accordingly, at least his full due of attention, while elsewhere his work has been almost universally underestimated. In the histories of philosophy he is placed among the Cartesians and, after a brief paragraph or two upon the Vision in God, consigned to oblivion. To assert that he belongs among philosophical thinkers of the first rank would be absurd, but a position among thinkers of minor importance is no less undeserved. The amount of space given in his writings to theological dogmas has perhaps helped to conceal their philosophical importance. Moreover, Malebranche has also suffered from the natural tendency to overestimate the debt that he undoubtedly owed to Descartes.

Nevertheless, Malebranche was a thinker of force and originality. He was skilled in the scientific knowledge of his day, and however low an estimate he might, as a rationalist, be disposed to place upon concrete facts, he saw to it that his boldest speculations should never contradict the facts. He understood the scholastic philosophy without feeling himself bound by its methods or its conclusions, and he was more or less familiar with the philosophy of other periods. Though eager enough in the pursuit of the new knowledge, he apparently never felt any serious conflict between it and religious faith. Consequently, he neither broke with the Church nor preserved his connection with her through dissimulation, as some others among the philosophers were compelled to do; but he clung at the same time to knowledge and to faith with the firm conviction that both were true.

¹ The metaphysical theories of Malebranche are to be found in the *Recherches de la vérité*, and the *Entretiens sur la métaphysique*. The other works rarely add anything to what is found here, though they sometimes treat philosophical and theological questions at great length.

For these reasons he seems to me to represent his age more adequately than any other philosopher of the time, in that he unites without reconciling so many of its tendencies. His historical significance is not, however, his strongest claim to consideration. His philosophy presents us with an idealism which is in some respects unique, an idealism which, while it resembles that of Berkeley, is yet more akin to later systems. The present article is an attempt to set forth certain aspects of this theory, first in its epistemological, then in its ontological significance.

I.

Two hundred and fifty years ago men were still living in the light of the Renaissance, and it only occasionally entered into their minds to ask the epistemological questions that now seem forced upon us all. They had lost a little of the early trust in the powers of human reason and passion, but they rarely felt the need of a detailed examination of human knowledge in order to determine its validity. As a rule the possibility of knowledge was assumed by all those who were not professed and eager sceptics; the difficulty was to determine the method of attaining it. In accordance with this general tendency of his time, Malebranche nowhere suggests that all knowledge may be invalid, but starts with the assumption of a truth which depends upon the nature of things, and with which man may be conversant. His task took the more concrete form of an examination of the different kinds of human knowledge, in order to determine whether they were really worthy of the name. The investigation must have been lightened by a pleasant conviction, — also common to that age and impossible to ours, — the belief, namely, in some one all-powerful method, which, if it could once be discovered and rigidly applied, would make the attainment of knowledge almost inevitable. It was not alone Descartes and Bacon who preached the all-saving power of some infallible method which should make error impossible; their contemporaries also were seeking such a method with almost as great eagerness as men had once sought the philosopher's stone, and were even more inclined to believe that they had found it. Malebranche, like the rest, had his

method. For him the explanation of past errors and the hope of future truths both lay in the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible world. This distinction was existential; the intelligible world was not the reason's interpretation of a real beyond itself; nor was the sensible world on its side merely a term for expressing the distortions of the intelligible given by perception. Malebranche thought of each as existing in a relative independence of the other; and if his insight into the philosophical implications of his theories ever led him to hesitate in his assertions of the real existence of a material world so unknown to us as to require the evidence of revelation, he resolutely shut the door upon such doubts and proudly asserted that for him the revelation should be sufficient.

If one leaves out of account for the time being the metaphysical relations between the two worlds, and considers only our knowledge of them, one has in that distinction Malebranche's view of philosophical method. It consists in making and keeping clear of confusion the various elements of consciousness due to reason and to sensation respectively. That reason itself colors perception, he is ready to admit, and he does not altogether deny the dependence of ideas upon experience; but he thinks that nevertheless the two may be kept separate, at least by abstraction, and that only by doing so can man hope for knowledge. Of course, in insisting upon the necessity of such a separation, Malebranche is influenced by the rationalistic assumption of the inadequacy and particularity of perception; but, although he never really questions the assumption, he goes on to examine the products of sensation in order to determine whether or not these have a right to be regarded as knowledge.

Men usually consider that they owe to perception their knowledge of the external world, which includes not only material objects, but also other thinking beings. With the latter everyone will admit that we have no direct relations. We merely infer from the behavior of certain organic bodies that they are the seat of a consciousness like our own, and with the help of language our inferences reach such a degree of exactness that we can even form an approximately correct opinion of the particular ideas

present in such consciousnesses. Nevertheless, the accuracy of correspondence between our ideas and those of others is known only through the physical motions from which the latter are inferred; and, consequently, our knowledge of the existence of other minds is directly dependent upon our knowledge of other bodies. Whether or not it can be regarded as clear and distinct knowledge, is a part of the larger question that concerns the claims of perception to be regarded as such. If we have no knowledge, strictly speaking, of bodies, we certainly have none of the souls of other men.

According to the great master of the philosophers of the seventeenth century, the essence of body lies in extension, and Malebranche, though by no means disposed to accept the *ipse dixit* of the Cartesians as conclusive, was nevertheless in this case of the same opinion. The most adequate knowledge of bodies, then, must be a knowledge of the nature and properties of extension and be included in the science of geometry. Here we find a series of statements professing to be true at all times and under all circumstances, and, moreover, equally true if contradicted by the experience furnished through the senses. No thoughtful man would be willing to affirm that he had ever met with an actual figure possessing the properties of a triangle, yet those properties and the results following from them are no less certain. All that perception can do is to represent individual cases as they are here and now, and individual cases, even if multiplied by as high a number as one likes, can never give the universality and necessity possessed by every geometrical proposition. By means of the senses we should never get beyond the results of simple enumeration.

It is possible, however, that although perception is rigidly limited to particular cases, yet its testimony may be trustworthy as far as it goes. The generalizations of science may be beyond its sphere, without necessarily destroying all the claims of experience to be regarded as knowledge. If the particular case may be accepted, that is something; not much, to be sure, for a rationalist like Malebranche, but still a beginning. Unfortunately, here too we are doomed to disappointment. Even the

briefest consideration of the senses shows that they are not to be trusted. The most perfect of them, namely vision, gives a dozen different descriptions of the same object. The size, color, shape, and other properties all depend upon our relations to it. If we approach or withdraw, or vary in any respect the condition of the eyes, all is changed. We are all ready to reject the illusions of the madman, yet he too is depending upon sense perception, which seems no less certain in his case than in ours. We may seem to have an advantage in the fact that our perceptions are vouched for by others while his are not, but the advantage is only apparent. How do I know that your perceptions and mine are the same? I have no way of comparing them. In my own experience no object remains the same even for the briefest length of time, yet I call it by the same name; is it not extremely probable that between you and me the likeness in names represents a resemblance even less perfect? The identity may be sufficient for practical purposes, but it surely does not deserve to be called knowledge. No one can doubt the existence of perceptions, but these are so variable as not to justify the inference that they represent in any respect some reality beyond themselves. In fact, the supposition that there is no such reality is perfectly compatible with the existence of perception. An external world might be created or annihilated without one whit affecting what is usually looked upon as its copy. In a word, perception gives us no knowledge of qualities or even of the bare existence of reality. If the external world of men and things is vouched for in no other way, we must look upon it as the stuff of dreams.

What, then, is to be said with regard to the claims of those who profess by the process of induction to extract universal truths from these conflicting witnesses, for instance, to learn from particular figures the nature of figure in itself? The answer is simply that they are confusing the sensible and the intelligible, and that they are able to derive the one from the other because the experience from which they start already contains both elements. The initial error in analysis is a transgression of philosophical method which brings a multitude of errors in its train.

As long as perception is kept free from reason, it leads to no conclusions beyond itself, and need not be considered in the quest for knowledge. Yet it is not on that account worthless. Its value is altogether of a practical nature : perceptions tell us simply and solely how we should act in order to accomplish the results we desire. Their laws are entirely practical and have absolutely no relation to the nature of things. We may rely upon the senses when we wish to act, but must ever distrust them when we desire to know. Malebranche concludes that in the pursuit of truth his only concern is to point out the errors to which they lead ; and since in his time there were no pragmatic suggestions that theory and practice are one, he is enabled to turn aside with a quiet mind from their practical value to devote himself to that aspect of the mind that promises to yield the universality of which he is in search.

This he finds, as every good rationalist must, in the concept. It is of the very essence of knowledge to be conceptual, untainted by the particularity always clinging to the percept. As the concept exists in the individual mind, it is rarely free from sensations or mental images, or both ; but this extraneous matter forms no part of knowledge, and has not even the credit of providing a basis for it. In the pursuit of truth, all that gives color and life to the stream of consciousness must be ruthlessly discarded as a source of error. The concept and the concept alone is of value. To it Malebranche usually gives the name of 'idea,' and we shall see presently that there is a close affinity between his ideas and those of Plato. If, for the moment, all but their epistemological import be ignored, they may be described briefly as comprising everything mental that bears the aspect of generality or abstraction. As such, the idea is present in every experience, even that in which the senses have the largest part to play ; but if we would have it pure, as it must be for knowledge, we must put aside both senses and imagination and view the idea alone.

Is all knowledge, then, made possible only through ideas? Strictly speaking, Malebranche answers the question in the affirmative, although he sometimes uses language more loosely, and talks of different forms of knowledge, in three of which the

ideas play no part. The first of these is knowledge of a thing through itself, and we know God alone in this direct fashion. Just what Malebranche means here is not altogether clear. That he believes in some intimate contact between the infinite and finite mind is certain, but how this is knowledge it is difficult to see. Wherever any attempt is made to describe the nature or attributes of God, the ideas evidently come into play, and at times Malebranche seems to limit the immediate knowledge of God to his bare existence. On the other hand, his existence seems to involve the most important of his attributes, in which case there is an immediate consciousness of God and his attributes analogous to the Cartesian consciousness of self. As far as it goes, the knowledge of God is the most certain of all knowledge, as it is the most important; but the utter incommensurability of the finite and the infinite makes it impossible to give any definiteness to our notions of God and such knowledge can never be other than imperfect. A second form of knowledge, which does not seem to differ much from the first, is through an immediate and direct consciousness, immediate intuition, so to speak. Here comes the knowledge of self, which is also imperfect, and is less certain than the knowledge of God. Still, so far as mere existence of the soul is concerned, this form of knowledge stands next in certainty, and inadequate though it be, is never false. The similar knowledge of the body, however, is, as already intimated, both imperfect and false. The third form of knowledge is conjecture, and concerns the souls of other men and the existence of pure intelligence unconnected with bodies. Evidently no one of these three kinds of knowledge is on the same footing as knowledge through ideas; for either it is uncertain or it cannot go beyond bare existence. To pass from the 'that' to the 'what,' the idea is necessary. Here alone we have full and complete knowledge, because the ideas themselves are eternal realities. This knowledge includes all general propositions which the mind is constrained to accept as true, especially those mathematical relations that form the type and ideal of certain knowledge. Like Descartes, Malebranche demands that everything be clear and distinct, and he finds his demand satisfied only in the general concept.

Nevertheless, though truth is impossible without the idea, the idea alone does not constitute truth. In itself a concept is neither true nor false, these attributes may be predicated only of relations between concepts. Malebranche's treatment of this distinction is rendered obscure by the constant confusion between the epistemological and ontological uses of the word idea, but the distinction itself is clear enough. Not the concept, but the judgment, may be called true or false.

The point of view here is naturally that of the older logic which regards the judgment as the formal union of two concepts. According to Malebranche, the latter are brought together in a more or less constrained fashion according to the amount of knowledge already possessed. Where knowledge is complete, this union can take place in only one way; where it is inadequate, various modes of uniting the concepts are possible. All this is nothing more or less than the assertion, now grown familiar, that the necessity of the judgment is a matter of relation and is due to its dependence upon systematic knowledge as a whole. Freedom of judgment is the result of ignorance.

Truth, then, is a matter of relation, and there are various kinds of relationship to be considered: (1) that between two ideas; (2) that between an idea and a thing or between the intelligible and the sensible; and (3) that between two things. Since ideas themselves cannot change, being permanent entities, as will be seen later, the truths depending upon them alone are eternal and immutable. The relations between things or between things and ideas are likely to change, and with them their corresponding truths. The first class of truths, namely, those of the ideas, may be discovered by the exercise of the reason; to know the other two, the senses as well as the reason must be employed, a necessity which must render us uncertain as to any conclusion concerning them. Since the things themselves exist, there must be some relation between them; but just what that may be, we cannot be sure. Here, as always, Malebranche's position is that of the thorough-going rationalist. The reason alone is to be trusted, the senses vitiate the certainty of any statement to which they are necessary. He is without a suspicion that reason itself may

play us tricks. Such a possibility would be against his whole ontological scheme of the universe. Ideas exist quite apart from individual minds, and we become aware of them by means of a direct connection between God and ourselves. How can we doubt that which bears the sign of divinity? If we only will, we can see directly the ideas as they exist in the mind of God. This is the supreme knowledge; nay, for the finite mind, it is the only knowledge, for this alone is certain and incapable of change.

With regard to the means to be employed for the attainment of truth, Malebranche is explicit. After the fashion of his time, and of a much later time, too, for that matter, he regarded the division of the mind into faculties as the beginning of psychological wisdom. To-day we divide it instead into elements and pride ourselves upon our freedom from philosophical superstitions. Malebranche has a great deal to say about sensation and imagination, but since he regards them both merely as sources of error, all his acuteness in observation and analysis is useless in the present quest, and serves only as a more elaborate warning. The faculties concerned in knowledge are but two in number, the understanding and the will. The understanding is altogether passive, like Locke's sheet of paper, and receives impressions from without. When these impressions come through the sense organs, or through the simple action of the brain, we speak of sense perception and imagination, and with these we have nothing to do. Knowledge is concerned with the pure understanding alone, which sees the ideas as they exist in the divine reason. It has no power of origination, no activity of any sort. It is unmixed receptivity. This view follows naturally upon that of the independent existence of the ideas. Finite minds come in contact with truth only as they are enabled to perceive it in the mind of God, and perception is merely the passive instrument. The activity which Malebranche recognizes as involved in all knowledge, is supplied by the will. In order to see the ideas, we must desire to see them and must withhold our attention from all distractions. Again, although the understanding looks at the ideas, it is incapable of making any judgment concerning them. For that the will is necessary. Assent to a proposition is not really different

from consent to an action. The faculty is the same in both cases. In the formation of judgments, however, the will is not free; it is compelled to decide in accordance with the evidence presented. If the latter is sufficient, the judgment follows inevitably and is free from error; if the evidence is insufficient, the judgment, if there be one, is no less inevitable; but the will may suspend assent and refuse to make any judgment at all under such unsatisfactory conditions. Not to do so leads invariably to error, and error is sin. The rule to be followed in all reasoning, to withhold assent, namely, until forced to give it, is more than an hypothetical imperative. It is as binding as would be an infallible rule for attaining virtue. Knowledge is a good in itself. He who knows most is best able to comprehend God, and is, in his slight degree, like God. Of course no such high claim may be made for men who devote themselves to the study of particular things. Although conversant with the experimental and historical knowledge of his time, Malebranche considers it as dross when compared with the universal knowledge that may be gained by turning the attention within to contemplate the eternal ideas. For him metaphysics is still supreme and is the only intellectual pursuit worthy of a thinking being.

The combination of understanding and will, or, if one prefers the shorter term, the reason, is able to reach truth unmixed with error, and can be certain, too, that it has done so. Nevertheless, its limitations are many and of a serious nature. Since it is finite, everything infinite is beyond its comprehension, and accordingly the most important class of truths can never be known. From a large number of these the human mind is doubtless forever shut off, but those which are requisite for salvation are made known through revelation. Faith is free from the strict mode of procedure to which the reason is bound down, it has nothing to do with rules of evidence or with logical proof. It accepts without question. Yet faith and reason are often cognizant of the same matters, and faith never contradicts the reason. Rightly understood, the truths of religion are never an absurdity to the reason, although often beyond the reach of the unaided force of the latter. Faith must come first, and for many people is suffi-

cient, but the philosopher should go farther and understand as much as he can of what he believes. *Credo ut intelligam* is Malebranche's most orthodox conclusion.

II.

As has already been stated, the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible world is of the greatest importance for Malebranche's philosophy. His preliminary definitions are such as one would expect from a good pupil of Descartes; but when these definitions are explained and amplified, they are found to mean something radically different. He has no quarrel with Descartes's doctrine of the mutual independence of mind and matter, although his view of substance is nearer that of Spinoza; and he is equally convinced that thought is the attribute of the one and extension of the other. Created existences are classified in two great divisions, material objects and finite minds or thinking beings. Of these the latter are immeasurably the superior, if only because they are necessarily concerned in every attempt at an explanation of the corporeal world. Until the latter is known, it is nothing to us, and it can be known only as it is represented in consciousness. Of these representations some belong to the reason, while others are wholly or in part sense perceptions. The intelligible world is made up of the former and alone has reality. As an example, Malebranche selects the attribute supposed to belong peculiarly to matter, namely, extension. In such an object as a table or a chair no one regards the qualities usually called secondary as external, for they depend on the structure and position of the sense organs; it is no less an error to ascribe the particular figure and extension to the table itself, and for the same reason. These qualities vary constantly and in such a manner that the changes cannot be caused by corresponding alterations in the object, but must be due to the condition of the perceiving organism. Reality in any strict sense of the word belongs only to what is unchanging, to the universal and necessary properties of extension exemplified by the object, but independent of it. These alone are true, these alone have actuality, and would have it no less, were the object annihilated.

In fact, if the entire material world should suddenly cease to exist, we need not know it. Our conscious life might perfectly well go on just as it did before. There would be the same distinction between the intelligible and the sensible, the same truths for the reason, the same errors resulting from perception. Conscious processes do not testify to the existence of matter, and although the mind has a strong natural tendency to believe in that existence, it does so without a shred of evidence. Left to itself, the reason must regard matter as an entirely gratuitous assumption, brought in with apparently no other result than the confusion of a philosophy that would be simpler and more consistent as a pure idealism. Nevertheless, the supposition must be allowed to remain, for the external world is vouched for by revelation. The Bible and the mysteries of the Christian religion both demand that we believe in a corporeal world, existing altogether apart from consciousness. What its properties may be, we can only conjecture, and the purpose of its creation is no less closely hidden; but believe in its existence we must. If this point is once conceded, however, we need not concern ourselves further with the doctrine of matter; for matter has as little to do with the actual characteristics of experience as has Kant's *Ding an sich*. Since Descartes's distinctions between mind and body hold good inside of consciousness, it is of little importance whether or not they do so absolutely, and Malebranche goes on to describe the intelligible world of consciousness, careless of the unknown quantity that is forever staring him in the face.

The world of experience itself, however, is not a homogeneous unity, and its elements are by no means of equal value. Malebranche repeatedly maintains that a thorough-going idealism by no means affects the objectivity of the sensible world, since experience would be the same with or without a material substrate; but he apparently feels that the acceptance of such a substrate frees him from any necessity of accounting for the sensible world. Accordingly, he entirely ignores the latter in his account of reality, and passes directly to a consideration of the ideas.

This doctrine of the ideas is at once the most characteristic and the most confusing portion of Malebranche's philosophy. Under

the term 'idea' he includes all concepts, and these he regards as existing in complete independence of the finite mind. It is not only that concepts cannot be changed at the caprice of the individual, and that they would be no less true if the human race were suddenly annihilated, but that they possess an absolute existence much after the fashion of the popular conception of material things. Man did not create them, he cannot modify them, he does not even think them in any sense implying activity ; he merely gazes at them from a distance exactly as he might look at the stars. They belong to another world than his, yet so long as he can see, he has his portion in it.

Perhaps the nature of the mind's relation to the ideas is most evident when compared with the conscious processes confessedly individual. The latter are all connected with corresponding bodily processes, especially those of the brain. Here Malebranche writes very much like a modern psycho-physicist. Of course, he speaks of animal spirits instead of nervous processes, and his knowledge of physiological details is immeasurably less, but the general standpoint is the same. Changes in the physical environment set up corresponding changes in the body, and these are transmitted to the brain by means of the animal spirits, a volatile fluid extremely sensitive to the slightest stimulus. Once set in motion it tends to continue moving even after the original excitation has ceased to act, and it wears channels for itself in such a manner that the direction of the early movements determines to a large extent that of the later ones. When the initiatory impulse comes, as frequently happens, from within the body instead of outside it, the paths already present are of especial importance and determine almost invariably the entire course of the animal spirits. The series of movements is entirely corporeal in its nature, and its closed circle is not broken into by consciousness. On the contrary, the relation between mind and body is a parallelism, and the two sets of processes, physical and psychical, go on side by side, neither influencing the other, and yet each being the function of the other. This relationship is true of sense perception, of memory, and imagination ; but when we come to abstract concepts that require no concrete imagery for

their expression, the case is altogether different. These have no parallel bodily processes, and may be supposed to exist in purely spiritual essences. Concrete mental processes are connected closely with the body, and may easily vary from one mind to another; abstractions have no such individual and corporeal restrictions, they are always the same, and change neither with persons nor with times and circumstances.

The arguments advanced by Malebranche in defense of his position are hardly so convincing as one could wish. In the first place, the ideas must exist; for otherwise the mind would be thinking of nothing, which is absurd. In the second place, since mind and body are disparate, if the mind is to be conscious of anything besides its own modifications, ideas are absolutely necessary. Whether this means anything more than the truism that conscious processes are never unconscious is doubtful. Evidently a material object can never, *qua* material, be in the mind; that privilege is reserved for the conscious representation of the material object. Yet this would constitute no reason for distinguishing the ideas from other conscious processes and assigning to them a Platonic existence apart from individual minds. Probably the truth of the matter is that Malebranche sometimes thought of them as pure intelligible essences, and sometimes as individual conscious processes, without distinguishing between the two uses, and even without recognizing the ambiguity. The arguments for the separate existence of the ideas were probably convincing enough to a man who already believed in them, and perhaps that is as much proof as we should ask with regard to anything so ultimate.

If one starts out, then, with the existence of the ideas as an initial assumption, the question of origin immediately arises. Here there are five possibilities: (1) The ideas may come from the objects to which they correspond. (2) The individual mind may have the power of producing them. (3) God may have produced them with the mind at the time of the latter's creation, or he may produce them on each occasion on which they appear in consciousness. (4) The mind may have in itself all the perfections that it sees in the ideas. (5) It may be united with a

perfect being that includes all the perfections of created beings. The first four suppositions are all rejected for different reasons ; and the fifth, the famous vision in God, is accepted, on the ground that it alone is consistent with the independent existence of the ideas. God must have in himself the ideas of everything that he has created, for otherwise creation would have been impossible ; and in case God wills that finite minds shall see the ideas thus existing in him, he certainly can make them do so. It becomes necessary, therefore, to consider the reasons for supposing that God wills the vision of the ideas in himself. With regard to this point Malebranche is no doubt largely influenced by the conviction that the rest of his system demands the conclusion he is about to reach. The ideas exist as real entities, the finite mind is conscious of them, and such consciousness is possible only upon the supposition that the ideas are seen in God. No further proof that they are so seen is necessary. Nevertheless, an abundance of such proof is provided. The arrangement is the simplest possible, and therefore is probable according to the accepted principles of explanation. Again, the idea of an infinitely perfect being is impossible upon any other supposition ; and so is the mode in which the mind forms general ideas. It could never get the latter from particular things ; and, in searching for ideas that are not in the mind, it must have a confused impression of them, else it could not desire to see them. Clearly all ideas cannot be present to the mind unless God himself is so. Moreover, the theory of vision in God makes man completely dependent upon his creator, and places the divine being as the end of his intelligence as well as of his will,—all very satisfactory reasons to a rationalistic theologian.

The characteristics that were found to belong to ideas as logical concepts are even more emphatically theirs when we regard them from the ontological standpoint. The necessity and universality already attributed to them become unchanging and eternal qualities, the perfect archetypes of all limited existences, and not to be altered by God himself. Taken together, they constitute the world of reality, and the relations existing among them are the everlasting truths.

The ideas and God are related to each other in the same way that the conscious processes of an individual mind are related to the mind itself. God did not create the ideas ; they are not the result of a fiat of his will ; on the contrary, they are his models, the laws that he follows in creation. Indeed, they may be called a part of God, for they form the contents of his intellect, so to speak. He sees them just as the finite intelligence does, except that they are within his mind instead of outside and above it. They constitute his perfections and he could change them only by ceasing to be God. The created reason is like in kind to the divine reason, and thus is able to have the intercourse with the latter that is afforded by the vision of the eternal and immutable ideas.

The ideas form the archetypes of all actual and possible existences. One would expect accordingly to find ideas of the individual souls of men ; but apparently there are no such ideas. The different affections to which the mind is subject have corresponding ideas ; for instance, God knows pain through its idea, although he is free from the feeling of pain ; but the mind itself, which for Malebranche is more than the sum of its conscious processes, seems entirely unrepresented among the divine perfections. Possibly this is due to the doctrine that the human mind is formed after the likeness of God, and therefore needs no idea as its archetype ; but the omission seems to render any knowledge of the mind forever impossible, not only for man, but even for God. It is a curious supposition, and one altogether inconsistent with the rest of Malebranche's theories, but its difficulties do not seem to have occurred to him and he offers no suggestion as to their solution.

Historians of philosophy, giving little heed to that portion of Malebranche's theories vouched for by faith, have usually classed him among the idealists. The custom has recently received a decided check in a monograph by M. Joly, who argues stoutly that the system is realistic. The choice between the two opposed views must depend upon the amount and kind of emphasis laid by Malebranche upon the shadowy background of experience. So long as

we depend upon the reason, we are forbidden to assume the existence of a material world apart from some perceiving intelligence, and we are unable to conceive anything entirely out of relation to consciousness. Sense perception can be explained perfectly well upon an idealistic basis, and in fact that is the only supposition that yields any explanation worthy of the name. This is the deliberate verdict of the reason, and this is the view that Malebranche would have adopted, had he felt himself at liberty to do so. Christian theology, however, had declared that the doctrines of the Christian religion, especially the incarnation and transubstantiation, as well as the testimony of the Bible, make the existence of matter as an independent entity necessary. Malebranche was not only a devout Catholic, but a priest as well, and thus doubly bound to accept the teachings of the Church. That he did so honestly and without mental reservations, there is no doubt; and since he was not called upon to attribute any qualities to the unknown matter, he simply added it to his idealistic theory without making any change in the latter. The revelation concerned something altogether outside experience and there was no need to attempt to combine the two. Many students have felt that, because of their different sources, the idealistic and the realistic portions of the system should be regarded as totally disparate. Philosophy is concerned to provide a unified scheme of existence, and in doing so must rely upon the reason and the reason alone. Articles of faith can have no place in such a scheme and should be ignored in any evaluation of it. Malebranche the philosopher has been separated accordingly from Malebranche the Christian theologian, and the opinions of the latter have been disregarded. If one follows this procedure, there is of course but a single possible conclusion, namely, that the system is a form of idealism; but this does not appear to me to be justifiable. To be sure, the one set of doctrines were accepted by Malebranche on authority and the others were the reasoned convictions of his own mind; but he regarded them as forming a whole which would have been rendered incomplete by the loss of either. There was no contradiction between them. Malebranche was no advocate of a two-fold truth. He believed that true philosophy and true religion confirmed each

other. That he was a Christian undoubtedly colored his views, that he was a Frenchman probably influenced them also ; but in studying them one must take them all together as the work of a single man, and not isolate different doctrines as due, the one to religion, another to nationality. If such a method must be employed in order to prove that Malebranche is an idealist, the traditional classification must be laid aside, and the number of the realists be increased by a notable addition to their ranks.

It is possible, however, that the method of division and selection may be discarded, and nevertheless the system as a whole be found to be idealistic in tendency. We have here, on the one side, the intelligible world of experience, where we may distinguish between conscious processes that are purely individual and others that bear the marks of eternal truths, themselves the conscious processes in the mind of God. Besides these ephemeral and timeless conscious processes, there are the minds, divine and human, that think them. All this constitutes the world of reality, but opposed to it there is the material world, something hard and fast, back of experience but presumably not affecting it, since without the material substrate experience might perfectly well be precisely what it is now. Matter is not only without qualities, it is equally destitute of causation. All motion in objects and all sensations are caused directly by God. The corporeal world is nothing but an unknown quantity, an x which is not even a function of experience. It supplies a realistic element, but does not prevent the system from being on the whole idealistic. Although both realistic and idealistic factors must be reckoned with, the latter have all the positive characteristics and alone are made use of in the explanation of experience.

Such an idealism has many inconsistencies, and raises besides a number of questions which its author makes no attempt to answer. The relation between individual minds and the eternal ideas seems inexplicable, unless the former are regarded as portions of the mind of God, a solution of the difficulty dangerously near to the pantheism that Malebranche was always trying to avoid. Moreover, the reality of the sensible world hardly seems to be sufficiently regarded. After being constantly warned not to touch

the unholy thing, it is disappointing to discover that there is apparently nothing to avoid. Yet, with all its faults, Malebranche's account of one of the great problems of existence by no means deserves to be ignored. If his ideas had not been so static, if he could have considered them as activities rather than as things, many difficulties would have been lessened. He sometimes seems about to make them active, but never altogether succeeds in the attempt, a failure by no means surprising when one remembers that the entire logic and psychology of his time favored the static point of view. Even as it is, the union between intelligence and will in both the infinite and the finite minds renders reason essentially active; and the questions left by Descartes concerning substance and concerning mind and matter are answered in an original manner differing in important respects from the solutions proposed by Spinoza and by Leibniz.

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SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF PRAGMATISM AND RADICAL EMPIRICISM.

I SHALL assume that the readers of this REVIEW are sufficiently acquainted with the doctrines of pragmatism and radical empiricism ; and I shall, therefore, proceed at once to a presentation of the difficulties I have encountered in trying to accept this new epistemology.

The first of the difficulties is presented by the standpoint and method of this epistemology ; I mean in particular its attempt to unite the ruling conceptions and methods of psychology and logic. When I make this attempt, I seem to lose sight of what is essential to a clear understanding of both these sciences. The features which should be distinctive of each run together into a blurred conception, which is to my mind neither intelligible as logic nor as psychology. This epistemology, by taking away from me formal logic as I have been wont to understand it, has put nothing in its place that I can use effectively in my attempt to solve the problem of knowledge. I cannot dispossess my mind of the conviction that logic and psychology must deal with thinking and knowing in ways too diverse to admit of the sort of connection which, as I understand it, this epistemology tries to maintain between these sciences. To my thinking, this epistemology falls into a twofold confusion : (1) it confounds the situation in which thinking and knowing arise, with truth and knowledge themselves ; (2) it confounds the consequences, the practical experiences to which truth leads, with truth itself. Now, when the pragmatist assures me that these distinctions are only the barren fictions of my abstracting intellect, and that my difficulty here is due to my insistence upon a real difference wherever formal thinking can make a distinction, I must confess that to me these distinctions seem to lie so much in the matters themselves that, when I attempt to ignore them, or to treat them as mere abstractions, I find myself involved in confusion and contradiction in trying to make intelligible my cognitive experience. And

this leads to my second difficulty. It concerns the meaning of thought. I have no difficulty in regarding thinking in its psychological aspect as a mode of experience. Psychologically viewed, thinking, as every other conscious functioning, is an experience-process which, like every other psychical process, arises under definite definable conditions, goes on in a describable manner, and terminates in other psychical processes or states. But, when I am asked to see in this mode of experiencing the logical nature of thought, its significance as true or untrue, I confess I am totally unable to do anything of the sort. Experience, experience-content, and thinking, I cannot help regarding as different functions; even if it is the fact that we never *do* think and never *can* think about anything which is not matter of an actual or possible experience, it still seems to me that the logical process cannot be truthfully described or clearly understood as a mode of experiencing. Nor does it seem to me that the alternative to this identification of thought with experience is to make thought something that is foreign to experience, something that is outside of experience, and which can therefore have no interest and intelligible connection with it; on the contrary, I have found no difficulty in conceiving that thought lives, moves, and has its being within the tissue of experience; that thought and experience are co-substantial functions and inseparable. There may be no such thing as experience in which there is not thinking in some degree, and no thinking that has not to do with experience. This relation between thought and experience we may conceive as analogous to that of the patterns or designs which determine the combination of the threads out of which a fabric is woven. We may mark this distinctive function of thought in the web of experience by saying it is thought which gives meaning to experience, which makes it possible for the content of our experience to be more than a series of passing states, a mere aggregate of disconnected impressions.

But, once more, if following this new epistemology I identify thought with experience, I am forced to ignore most of those relations which logical thought recognizes and asserts. I find that the only relation which I, as a radical empiricist, can legitimately

recognize, is the relation of 'conjunctive transition' in experience-process. This relation is that of next-to-nextness, which I may take either in a spatial or a temporal meaning. And it seems to me that to be a consistent radical empiricist with Professor James, or a consistent immediatist with Professor Dewey, my thinking has exceedingly narrow limits, and my knowledge can only be of the this-here-and-now; of experience-content lying beyond *this* next, either in the direction of what is not yet, or in the direction of what is no longer my experience, and still less of anything which is experience of other minds or experience *überhaupt*, I cannot properly be said to possess any knowledge. Even of so elementary and fundamental relation as that of likeness and difference, I can give no account in terms of an experience-process which is only definable as a conjunctive transition from one portion of experience to another.

The judgments, 'This is identical with that,' 'this is not that,' stubbornly refuse to be resolved into mere experience processes. This judging consciousness seems to be a positive addition to the content of experience, a construction of the datum.

But what am I to make of those other more significant and richer relations, cause and effect, purpose and result, if I am to be a consistent empirical pragmatist? Try as I will, I cannot make these relations a part of experience-content. Doubtless the related terms are, or conceivably may be, contents of experience; but these relations are possible for my mental view only if the matters they connect are co-present in one act of representation or conception; though as matters of actual experience they may be far apart in time and in space. Now, I experience an insuperable difficulty when I attempt to resolve the logical judgment which asserts causal connection, or teleological connection, or the relation of reason and consequent, into experience-processes which have to be defined as a conjunctive transition from experience-contents to other experience-contents. True enough it is to say, I experience this judging function; but it is quite another thing to persuade my mind that this judging function is itself a mode of experiencing. Here, again, I am compelled, in the interest of clear thinking, to recognize that difference between psychical processes and logical functions which this new epistemology denies.

The third difficulty which pragmatism and radical empiricism present to my mind, is the explanation they give of truth and knowledge. The pragmatist teaches that the truth of an idea consists in the practical consequences to which this idea leads; these consequences are not only the criterion of its truth, but they are all that can be meant by the truth of the idea. Now, if this be the meaning of a true idea, it would seem to follow that no idea can be true until these consequences exist as facts of actual experience; prior to this experience, the idea is only potentially true (whatever that may mean). Thus, in Professor James's case of Memorial Hall, his idea of this building, while he remained in his study, was neither true nor false. Not until he was supposed to get certain visual, tactile, auditory, etc., experiences which meant Memorial Hall, could he say his antecedent idea was true. It would seem to follow from this meaning of a true idea that the only idea that is actually true is the idea that no longer exists; for, before the consequences of that idea exist, the idea is not true, and when these consequences are facts of experiences, the idea has ceased to exist; for that idea was just a passing moment of experience, which by conjunctive transition led into the next experience-moment, and that by a like process into the next, etc. Now, looking back upon this initial experience, Professor James's idea of Memorial Hall, I cannot say it was true while it lasted, nor can I say it was true when those truth-making experiences came, for the reason that the idea no longer lasted. Let me next try to make this idea of Memorial Hall cognitive. While it existed in his mind, Professor James tells me, 'this idea was cognitive,' *i. e.*, knew the subsequent experience, because it afterwards led into them, or they followed it in such wise as to fulfill, to explain, that idea, or to satisfy whatever need or incompleteness there was in that idea-experience. But, how did Professor James *know* that the subsequent experiences *did* so fulfill and satisfy that antecedent idea as to make it a true idea? How could it have been known that the judgment which asserted the cognitive value of that idea was true? Professor James, when in his study he had the idea of Memorial Hall, was then a virtual knower, before subsequent

experiences "salted down" his actual knowledge. Professor James was, as he explains, a virtual knower, because his idea was one which *could* lead to just those experiences which afterwards made him an actual knower. But here is my dilemma, when I would accept this explanation. How did Professor James come to know that he was a virtual knower of Memorial Hall, while he was in his study? The pragmatist teaches me, that, in this case, the experiences into which the idea of Memorial Hall led constituted the truth of that idea; and that the antecedent idea was a virtual knower, because these experiences were its consequences. But, my question is, how does my pragmatist teacher *know* that the given idea of Memorial Hall was a true one in his own meaning of truth? Now, it seems to me that the only possible answer to this question involves a conception of truth and knowledge which a consistent pragmatist cannot accept, — a conception which is virtually that of the much abhorred intellectualist, who will persist in making truth mean agreement or correspondence between thought and fact or reality which is not that cognitive thought itself. That those various actual experiences which meant Memorial Hall were the truth of Professor James's idea of that building, could have been a known fact only by means of a comparison between them and the experiences which that idea meant; in other words, by a comparison between the actual and the ideal order of experience. Now, such a comparison, with the resulting judgment about the ideal order of experience, is just the intellectualist's meaning of truth, a meaning which I am not permitted to retain, if I am to be a consistent pragmatist.

And the same thing is true when that antecedent idea of Memorial Hall is said to be a virtual knower of the building itself; this proposition can be true only if an ideal order of experience, now conceived as possible, is compared with an actual order of experience.

Thus, it seems to result, that the only way in which I can accept the pragmatist's proposition, that the consequences to which an idea leads are the truth of that idea, is by employing a conception of truth which the pragmatist rejects. I have tried to escape this dilemma by adopting the radical empiricist's explana-

tion of the cognitive process, which makes the present experience moment the knower, both of the experience which immediately precedes, and the experience that immediately follows it. Thus, in the case of the knowing of Memorial Hall, the initial experience, the idea which Professor James had while in his study, knows the next experience into which it immediately leads, and that next experience likewise knows this initial one, and the one that immediately follows it, and so on until the last experience, which contains the knowledge of all its predecessors; and 'salts down,' or 'nails down' their truth. This final experience is thus, that which not only *is* the truth of that idea of Memorial Hall, but immediately *knows* this truth. Here is a plausible solution of my difficulty; but alas! when I more critically examine it, I find I have still the same question to answer. How can the proposition that this last passing thought is the knower of all its predecessors, be itself true? I see no answer to this question, but by assuming a judging thought which does not itself pass, but to which all the passing thoughts are simultaneously presented; so that, just as in the other cases, an ideal possible order of experience is compared with an actual order of experience, and the agreement between them is the truth sought. To make, therefore, the passing thought the only knower may do for psychology, but it will solve no epistemological problem.

The fourth difficulty which this epistemology puts in my way is the difficulty of a logical escape from solipsism. If I am to accept radical empiricism, I must, it seems to me, elect to be very solitary. My world must be my experience, and my experience only. The only terms in which reality, whether that of minds or things, is definable to me, are terms of individual experience. If I am to have the society of other minds than my own, I must bag them, so to speak, before I become a pragmatic empiricist. I cannot legitimately reach these other minds after I have become one. There are three ways in which I may attempt this escape from solipsism.

1. I may attempt to reach the other minds by the inference from analogy. Apparently this is the way Professor James takes in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*,

October 13, 1905. Professor James reasons as follows: "Why do I postulate your mind? Because I see your body acting in a certain way, its gestures, facial movements, words and conduct generally are expressive; so I deem it actuated as my own is, by an inner life like mine." This argument from analogy is my reason, whether an instinctive belief runs before it or not. But, were I to grant the validity of this analogical inference, I must remind myself that, as a radical empiricist, I am not entitled to make use of it. Such an inferential process has no place, no relevancy, indeed no meaning in the radical empiricist's theory of knowledge. But, even were it admissible to recognize such a logical form of thinking, radical empiricism makes the inference incapable of establishing the existence of the other mind; for the reason that this body of my social *alter* is, to quote again Professor James, "but a percept in my field; and this field being *my* field only, why then need what I take to be the mind of my fellow be other than a percept in my field, and consequently as truly a part of my experience only, as is the so-called body of my fellow?"

2. But, I may attempt an escape from my loneliness by another pathway of radical empiricism, the pathway of conjunctive transitions, by means of which the portions of experience are 'joined at their edges,' so that there is no gap, but continuous transition when I set out with any given segment of experience, and travel in any direction. May I not reach the other mind thus by a strictly cognitive process? That other mind, having a like series of perceptual experiences, will meet my perceptual series in some reality that is common to both minds, and, as James says, is coterminous to both these series. But, unfortunately, this way of escape from solipsism is barred by that very piece of perceptual reality which is supposed to lie between our intercommunicating minds, and to be coterminous. Unless I first assume the existence of my fellow's mind, this perceptual reality is only a terminus to my cognitive experience. It breaks the continuity of that experience, and by doing so limits my possible knowledge; for knowing consists in the process of conjunctive transitions which are continuous. Where discontinuity

enters, knowledge ceases to be. It is no more possible to reach the other minds by this pathway, than it is possible to throw a bridge across a river with a supporting abutment upon the hither bank only.

3. The only remaining way of escape from my unwilling solipsism is the 'way of the postulates.' Why not take it, and say the other mind than mine is my postulate, which I first make for the purpose of satisfying certain needs, chiefly practical, that arise within my experience; and, by using this postulate, I make my experience harmonious and satisfying; and since the truth of an idea is in its working, my postulate is verified, known to be true by its fruits. But, alas, I have accepted an epistemology which no more permits me to make postulates of this sort than to draw inferences according to the canons of formal logic. To postulate is at least to think; and to think of some other reality than my own experience is to transcend that experience; and transcendence of experience which involves discontinuity in experience-process is not permitted one who will hold the pure doctrine of radical empiricism. I see no way, then, of avoiding this consequence of accepting the epistemology of pragmatism and radical empiricism, *i. e.*, I must accept with it my solitary existence.

I have dwelt too long upon my difficulties in trying to become a pragmatist to leave space for considering the possible answers my pragmatist friends might make, should they deem it worth while to make the attempt to save me from the error of my ways, and to bring me into the kingdom of the pragmatists. I will close this confession of my inability to believe with the ready avowal of my entire willingness to be saved; yes, I will go farther, and confess I would like to be a pragmatist. This theory of knowledge enables one so neatly to solve certain vexed problems, particularly the problems of ethical and religious belief; and pragmatism turns so strategically the flank of the skeptic and the agnostic, instead of making the frontal attack which the intellectualist must make, with a result which I confess seems at times to be hardly better than a drawn battle.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Some Dogmas of Religion. By J. E. McTAGGART. London, Edward Arnold, 1906. — pp. xx, 299.

Dr. McTaggart has produced a singularly delightful work which ought to be widely studied by that large class of persons who are at once convinced of the profound practical importance of fundamental religious issues and high-minded enough to require of their religion not merely that its conclusions shall be comforting if true, but that there shall be rational grounds for judging that they are true. Dr. McTaggart's subtilty and wit, as well as his philosophical learning, have been amply exhibited in the past in his volumes on Hegelianism, and in the present work these qualities are rather intensified than diminished by a tendency to formal dialectic, which it is perhaps not unjust to ascribe in part to the influence of Mr. G. E. Moore, to whom the author's preface records obligation. It should be said at once that the present work is not specially concerned with the problems of Hegelianism, and that its interest is in no way dependent upon the reader's acquaintance with or acceptance of the 'absolute' philosophy. While the author appears here, as in earlier works, as a representative of a generally Hegelian form of idealism, the questions he discusses are all such as must inevitably arise in any serious attempt to think consistently about the world of experience as a whole, and the arguments employed such as can be appreciated independently of any metaphysical *parti pris* on the side of the reader.

For the task of philosophic criticism of religious ideas Dr. McTaggart is admirably fitted by the double qualification of sympathy and independence of view. Religion is for him one of the most important things, though not the most important thing in life. At the same time, it does not mean to him in the least the traditional theories of a particular church or a particular body of theologians. As had already appeared from his *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, our author offers a rare example of the combination of a fervent belief in the fundamental righteousness of the universe and in human immortality with an equally fervent denial of the existence of God. He is that unusual thing, an atheistic believer in immortality and the fundamental decency of things.

This position Dr. McTaggart reminds us, whether that of Hegel or not, was pretty certainly that of Fichte during the best-known years of his life; it might be added that it was pretty certainly also that of

Shelley in his maturer manhood. Its very unfamiliarity thus affords a reason for working it out more fully, and comparing the reasons for its adoption with those commonly urged in support of better known types of religious belief, and I cannot doubt that the general verdict will be that Dr. McTaggart has shown that a religion of this kind must be reckoned with as a very serious possibility, and that in some respects it has fewer difficulties to meet from the point of view of the intellect than any widely advocated form of Theism.

In his first chapter, on "The Importance of Dogma," Dr. McTaggart begins by defining the two fundamental terms 'dogma' and 'religion,' and goes on to give reasons for the view that dogma, as defined, is indispensable to religion. A 'dogma,' we learn, is "any proposition with a metaphysical significance," and metaphysics means "the systematic study of the ultimate nature of reality." Now every writer is, of course, entitled to define his terms initially in any way he pleases, so long as the sense he puts upon them is intelligible. Hence no serious fault can be found with the author for employing the word 'dogma' in what he admits to be an unusual sense. But it may be doubted whether the sense which Dr. McTaggart adopts does not ignore one feature which is of fundamental historical importance for the understanding of religions. I find throughout the book little recognition of the social side of religion as one expression of the organized life of a community; religion is throughout treated as simply the convictions of an individual thinker on certain momentous questions. This comes out at once in the initial definition of 'dogma.' A thinker more alive, as Hegel himself was, to the social aspect of religion would probably object that, as the etymology of the word shows, dogma means primarily something which has been *laid down* (δεδογμένον ἐστί) by the legitimate representatives of a society as binding on the members of that society; as applied to the conclusions of an isolated thinker the term loses all its import. Thus, *e. g.*, Free Trade could not properly be called a 'dogma' of Cobden, but it is a 'dogma' of any political society which requires subscription to it as a condition of membership. The dogmas of a Church are thus simply the propositions which the recognized authorities of that Church have declared incumbent on its adherents. Now, historically, it is far from clear that all such dogmas have metaphysical significance. Thus, ever since the formulation of the Apostles' Creed, at least, it has been a 'dogma' of orthodox Christianity that Jesus "suffered under Pontius Pilate." But can it be shown that this statement has any metaphysical implications which would be lost if the name of some other procurator, say

Felix or Festus, were substituted for that of Pilate? This may seem a trifling matter, and I should not have dwelt upon it, except for the tendency it indicates to disregard *ab initio* any conception of religion in which its social side is made paramount. The same tendency is seen in the definition of religion which immediately follows. Religion is a form of emotion arising from a conviction of harmony between ourselves and the nature of ultimate reality. I confess that such a definition, with its exclusive stress upon emotion, strikes me as much too individualistic. The only instances of which I can think which exactly correspond to the definition are the 'contemplative life' of Aristotle, and the life of 'intellectual love of God' described by Spinoza. Every great historical religion, so far as I am aware, has departed from Dr. McTaggart's definition by attaching fundamental importance to something which has to be *done*, an end to be attained by the co-operation of the religious community.

Dogma and religion once defined, Dr. McTaggart has little difficulty in showing that all religion implies, as an essential, dogma in his sense of the word, *i. e.*, propositions of a metaphysical nature. Of so-called 'undogmatic' religion he is as scornful as the average 'Anglo-Catholic' theologian, and much more incisive and witty in the expression of his scorn. He perhaps forgets, however, that what is resented by many who call themselves enemies of dogma is not the contention that metaphysical propositions of some kind are essential to religion, but that the scheme of metaphysics officially promulgated by certain ecclesiastical authorities is a complete list of those metaphysical propositions which form the foundation of *true* religion. I venture to think that by missing a fundamental point in the character of dogma as such, Dr. McTaggart has been led to impute to the anti-dogmatist extravagances of which he may be, and often is, quite innocent.

In the second chapter, "The Establishment of Dogma," the author proceeds to ask by what means a dogma can be supported. He rightly sets aside many of the grounds often urged for belief in a particular metaphysical proposition, such as, *e. g.*, the allegations that many persons have thought it self-evident that it has been widely or even universally believed, that miracles have been performed by its promulgators in support of their assertions. That a statement which I do not find self-evident has been thought by someone else to be so is clearly no logical reason why I should stifle my own demand for proof. That all mankind have agreed in believing certain doctrines is probably quite untrue; the *consensus gentium* is always in fact obtained by

a preliminary elimination of all those *gentes* who happen not to concur with the speaker, and we have moreover to reckon with the logical possibility that if all mankind have agreed in a belief, they may all have been deluded. The evidence of miracle rests upon the previous admission of the dogma that there exists a God whose moral character excludes the possibility that he may, for one reason or another, work miracles on behalf of a falsehood. There remain only, as allegations in favor of belief without rational grounds, the argument from practical consequences, and the general exaltation of faith on the score of the innate infirmity of human reason. Both these favorite *τόποι* of the apologist are disposed of by Dr. McTaggart in one of the most incisive and wittiest sections of his book. Against the former it is happily contended that it is condemned out of its own mouth by the immorality of its consequences. "It makes us imperious in the wrong place, where our imperiousness is arrogance, and by an inevitable consequence makes us humble in the wrong place, where our humility is mean and servile." *E. g.*, if Tertullian's vindictive Deity should turn out to exist, the argument from consequences would compel us to conclude that he cannot be morally a wretch. "When the reality is certain we have [on this theory] to admit that the reality of a thing should determine our approval of that thing. I find it difficult to imagine a more degraded position." As for the mere argument from the incapacity of the intellect, it will equally prove anything, even incompatible propositions, and consequently is worthless as a means of proving anything in particular. In short, if dogmas are to be established at all, it must be by means of previous rational justification of a system of metaphysical truth. And, as a consequence, at present the vast majority of men, who have neither leisure nor capacity for metaphysical study, have no right to a religion at all. And this is undoubtedly an evil, but like many other evils, is unfortunately real, though we may hope that the amount of the evil will be diminished as opportunities of leisure and culture become more generally diffused. Meanwhile, if it is a misfortune for men in general to have no religion, it is at least a compensation to be delivered from false religions. If a loss of happiness would result from the loss of belief in God, there would be a gain, both in happiness and otherwise, in freedom from the belief that the creator of such a world as this was omnipotent and was yet to be worshipped.

Chapters III and IV approach the main dogma of Dr. McTaggart's own private religion, that of Immortality. In Chapter III, "Human Immortality," the author does not give the positive metaphysical grounds

which he regards as justifying the belief in immortality. These are to be sought in his earlier work on *Hegelian Cosmology*. The present essay seeks merely to remove certain current objections to a future life based upon (1) the apparent scientific reasons for regarding matter as the sole reality, (2) the apparent dependence of mental life upon physiological conditions, (3) the general transitoriness of empirical objects. Dr. McTaggart's anti-materialistic argument is of the type which has been common in philosophical literature since Berkeley, and turns upon the alleged subjectivity of secondary sensations. If secondary sensations are not real qualities of external objects, it is argued, we have no right to regard primary sensations as such, since we only know them in precisely the same manner as we know the secondary, and since we have no experience in which they are presented apart from the secondary. Our sensations thus only give us the right to infer the existence of an external cause of some sort; they afford no warrant for the belief that this cause consists of unconscious material particles, and thus can give no ground for rejecting the metaphysical arguments by which Hegel and others have sought to prove that all real individuals must be conscious minds. I doubt if Dr. McTaggart has been quite fortunate in the form which he gives to his immaterialist argument. The supposed 'subjectivity' of secondary sensation appears to me to be a false inference, based on the mere confusion between sense-qualities and the hypothetical processes by which they are cognized, a confusion which becomes palpable when the author speaks of the existence of the sense-qualities *as inferred from* the prior fact of the existence of the sensations. Any identification of the qualities which are the objects of sensation with the processes seems to me to lead straight to the precipice of Solipsism. And, since the metaphysical arguments against unconscious individuals to which Dr. McTaggart refers as the true logical basis of his idealism are independent of this psychologizing assumption, the confusion appears in him singularly gratuitous. His reply to the other two objections appears to me much more convincing and satisfactory. I could have wished, however, that a writer who builds so much upon the metaphysical conception that the individual mind is a *substance*, had subjected the concept of substance to a thorough examination, and also that he had considered how the perplexing facts of alternating and multiple personality bear upon his doctrine of the permanent and immutable identity of individual minds. Dr. Morton Prince's experiences with "Sally Beauchamp" ought surely not to be overlooked in the discussion of the possibility that 'one person' may be a temporary and perishable con-

stituent of a wider personality. Nor is it quite impertinent to ask what kind of position Dr. McTaggart assigns to the non-human animal species in his scheme of the universe.

In the fourth chapter, reasons are given for regarding as probable the doctrine that all existing persons have preëxisted through a long succession of incarnations, and possibly from all eternity. Dr. McTaggart, while offering no direct proof of this thesis, ingeniously shows that it might, if accepted, throw some light on perplexing facts of daily experience ; such as those of love and friendship at first sight, and offers some acute observations on the conditions which might conceivably determine the occasion and circumstances of re-birth. Again, however, I should like to suggest, the advocate of preëxistence ought to consider whether he means, with Plato, to declare that the number of persons in the universe is constant, and how he proposes to reconcile this doctrine, if he adopts it, with the ascertained empirical facts of population. A minor point suggests itself in connection with Dr. McTaggart's emphatic adherence to the view that all memories of each life perish at death. It does not appear why this should inevitably be so, since, as Dr. McTaggart himself has urged in the previous chapter, there is no conclusive proof of the absolute dependence of mental functions upon what we empirically find to be their nervous concomitants. And, moreover, Dr. McTaggart in that chapter expresses his personal belief in at least some of the alleged cases of spiritualistic *post-mortem* communications. Now surely these communications, if genuine, are just as good in proof of continued memory as in proof of continued personal consciousness. While an extension of our examination of facts to the Eastern world would surely show that some cases of alleged recollection of past lives are as well attested as the alleged cases of 'spirit-return.' In any case, it is, I think, clear that Dr. McTaggart's reasons for his advocacy of preëxistence are chiefly of that ethical kind of 'argument from the consequences' of which he theoretically thinks so meanly. His interest in the conception is that it promises a possibility of the indefinite renewal of loves and friendships which death has apparently cut short, and a chance of enjoying in succession instructive experiences which refuse to be united within the compass of a single life. To borrow his audaciously happy example, the same man in the same life cannot well be both Galahad and Tristram, but with a series of lives to draw on, the Galahad of to-day may be the Tristram of to-morrow, and *vice versa*. Thus, with a succession of lives in which to experiment, one may really hope to discover by personal experience 'whether tares be not grain.'

In the fifth chapter, on "Free Will," Dr. McTaggart turns aside from the main topic of his book to offer a plea for determinism on lines already familiar in philosophical controversy. On the whole, this seems to me the weakest as well as the least original part of the book. What the author desires to show is that there is no such thing as a volition which is not absolutely determined, that is, mechanically determined by antecedent events. It is assumed throughout the discussion that the indeterminist will allow that at any rate all events other than our volitions are so determined, and the burden is thus thrown upon him of establishing the reasonableness of admitting a solitary exception to this principle. Now, I must confess that I do not myself see how an intelligent indeterminist can be expected to make so suicidal an admission. And if he refuses to make it, the burden of proof surely rests on the antagonist who assumes that any actual event is completely determined in a mechanical way by antecedent events. Dr. McTaggart fails to see the magnitude of the determinist's assumption because he takes it for granted without enquiry that 'uniformity' and conformity to 'general laws' are more than methodological assumptions of experimental science, they are the actual truth about real individual events. I can find no indication in the essay before us that the author has fairly faced the questions whether such thorough-going determination is even conceivable as a fact, and, supposing it is, whether the experimental sciences really require the admission of it. I have tried elsewhere to show that there are conclusive reasons for giving a negative answer to both questions, and for holding that no real fact is ever completely determined by antecedent facts, and every fresh reflection upon the problem only serves to confirm me more in this conclusion. I cannot find in Dr. McTaggart's essay, with all its acuteness on points of detail, any grounds for abandoning this conviction. Indeed, his argument seems to me to neglect the very first condition of fruitfulness, the precise and exact definition of what must be *meant* by complete mechanical determination, supposing such a state of things to exist. Nor does he seriously consider whether teleological determination by purposes is really compatible with mechanical determination by antecedent events. If it is not, it will obviously be possible for voluntary acts to be one and all teleologically determined, and at the same time to be one and all not fully determined in the mechanical sense of the term employed by Dr. McTaggart and other opponents of free will.

I confess again that I do not understand the position ascribed by the author to 'general laws.' They seem, in spite of the excellent obser-

vations on p. 232, to figure with him as a kind of real individual agents which actively determine and bring about results, so that it is, *e. g.*, rational to suggest as alternative explanations of the occurrence of a certain event, the will of God *or* a general law. To me this hypostatization of approximately accurate mathematical formulæ appears the merest mythology, and I fail to see how genuine individual reality and actual complete conformity to 'general laws' can be compatible, especially in a system of philosophy which avowedly accepts the identity of indiscernibles. Where the question about freedom is thus from the first *mal posée*, can any answer obtained be better than a mystification? One suggestion I should like to make would be that in all fruitful discussion of the determinist issue it must be remembered that the question has no meaning except from the point of view of an ideal *spectator*. The real issue is: Could such an ideal spectator, if gifted with a perfect command of logical and mathematical method, always infer with certainty from data consisting entirely of assertions as to the sequence of events what the choices of an agent will be? It is because I find nothing in Dr. McTaggart's discussion which necessitates the abandonment of the negative answer to this question that his essay as an argument against indeterminism seems to me wholly beside the mark. The only indeterminist hit by it, so far as I can see, is the inconsequential half-thinker who has stultified himself in advance by wantonly accepting the imaginary 'uniformity of nature,'—a principle which can easily be shown to be quite superfluous in science,—as a fact.

The remaining three chapters of the book are perhaps those which will arouse the most general interest. Their general object is to show the superfluousness of theism as a philosophical hypothesis, and the incoherence of popular theological and philosophical argumentation on the theistic problem furnishes the author with occasion for many of his happiest and most incisive criticisms. For reasons explained in his previous work on *Hegelian Cosmology* (reasons, allow me to say, in which the present reviewer fully concurs), the author regards it as desirable to avoid any designation of the universe as a whole (unless, indeed, it be conceived in a way which he thinks indefensible, as a single person), as 'God.' The name 'God' is thus kept for the supreme person in the universe, supposing that person to be morally good. The question then arises: Are there grounds for believing that the universe contains a single person who is at once more powerful than any other and also morally excellent? Dr. McTaggart hereupon distinguishes three possible views which might be held about such a hy-

pothetical being. He may be regarded as the omnipotent creator of all other persons, or as a creator who is not omnipotent, but in some way limited by unknown conditions; or finally, he may be neither omnipotent nor creative, but simply, as it were, the headmaster of the school of the world, directing and controlling by the sheer force of superior mental power the activities of beings co-eternal with himself.

Dr. McTaggart, in his two chapters on "God as Omnipotent," and "A Non-Omnipotent God," submits the three hypotheses to examination in succession, with the result that the third (God as the cosmic headmaster) is found to be the least open to logical or ethical criticism. I do not propose to examine the author's arguments against the two forms of the doctrine of a creative Deity, inasmuch as I find myself in such complete accord with their general scope that I could do little more than cry *Euge!* to each of Dr. McTaggart's passes of fence. I will just note as a point of interest in the discussion that Dr. McTaggart, like some other idealists, has found himself forced to recede from his earlier position of extreme optimism, according to which the very existence of evil is a mere illusion. As one who also formerly held this exuberant doctrine, I am glad to associate myself with our author in his present retraction.

If the presence of evil in the world is a mere delusion, then as he properly urges, the very existence of that delusion is itself an evil, and thus disproves the thesis "all evil is non-existent." Another point of interest arises in connection with the discussion of the traditional 'proofs of the existence of God,' a discussion which will remind the reader, and is apparently intended to remind him, of Hume's profound and unduly neglected "Dialogues on Natural Religion." Dr. McTaggart acutely points out that, contrary to the common opinion, idealism distinctly weakens the theistic argument from the evidences of rational design in nature.

For if any part of the universe consists of unconscious matter, then the presence of adaptation to rational ends in this part of the universe is at least highly improbable in the absence of a managing director; but if the universe consists solely of intelligent beings, who of their own nature aim at knowing the true and effecting the good, then the rationality of its structure becomes an ultimate fact, and the hypothesis of the managing director is superfluous. Thus Dr. McTaggart's verdict on this, in his view, most reasonable form of theism, is that the hypothesis is unobjectionable but unnecessary, or, as he puts it, there is no reason why we should not believe in such a God, except the entire absence of reasons for believing in him. It will be observed

that no account is taken of what religious persons would call the 'experiential' ground for such belief, *i. e.*, the contention that in the peculiar experience of the (Christian or other) believer there is direct evidence of a personal relation of the believer's spirit to the divine spirit. Presumably Dr. McTaggart would say that this kind of evidence, if it exists, however convincing to the believer himself, is incommunicable and incapable of logical evaluation, and therefore is not evidence in the sense in which the term is being used throughout the present volume.

I am glad to note the trenchant way in which the author deals with the contention of some idealists that idealism requires the existence of an omniscient individual, who must therefore be God. To me it seems manifest that he is justified in both his contentions, that idealism requires no such omniscient individual, and that an omniscient person, if there is one, need neither be supremely powerful nor supremely good, and therefore need not be God. In his concluding chapter, "Theism and Happiness," the author subjects to much acute criticism the popular view that human happiness or human morality or both must be diminished if theism can be shown to be baseless. As to human happiness, as he powerfully urges, the existence of God can only increase human happiness, if it entails the final victory of good over evil on the whole. Now, this consequence does not follow unless with the existence of God you conjoin an idealistic structure of the universe, whereas, given the latter, the prevalence of good equally follows, whether God be supposed to exist or not. As to the latter, the value of the conception of God as an ethical ideal has been exaggerated by Kant and others. Socrates may not be so morally excellent a being as God, and yet my conception of Socrates may be a much better ideal for ethical practice, because I understand Socrates better than I understand God. "A boy's reverence for the captain of the eleven may be of much more value than his reverence for God. For it is possible that his idea of the captain of the eleven may be one much more adequate to excite reverence than his idea of God." And as to the happiness which comes from love. God, of course, cannot continue to be loved, if we cease to believe in him. But there are still men to love. "Whether the friends whom all men may find could compensate for the friend whom some men thought they had found is a question for each man to answer. It is a question which can never be permanently answered in the negative so long as there is still a future before us."

I trust this very inadequate review may do something to call atten-

tion to the great variety of topics of primary importance discussed in Dr. McTaggart's book. To the charm of its style and its fertility in searching and happy aphorisms I am conscious that I have done no justice at all. I can only take leave of the volume by most earnestly recommending it to all who are sufficiently interested in the most fundamental questions of religion to desire to think clearly about them. Whether one agrees with Dr. McTaggart's conclusions or not, the candor with which they are stated and the vigor and ingenuity with which they are argued gives his book a quite exceptional value as a provocative of thought.

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Experimental Psychology, a Manual of Laboratory Practice. By EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER. Vol. II, Quantitative Experiments. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1905. Part I, Student's Manual, pp. xli, 208; Part II, Instructor's Manual, pp. clxxi, 453.

The qualitative volume of Professor Titchener's *Experimental Psychology*, which appeared in 1901, has already been noticed in the REVIEW (Vol. X, pp. 645 ff.). The present volume completes the work, which is from every point of view a *magnum opus*. The author's purpose throughout has been to treat certain selected experiments fully rather than to list a great number. In the 400 pages of the two Student's Manuals we have, accordingly, sixty-four major experiments (thirty-seven qualitative and twenty-seven quantitative) carefully described, with explanation of apparatus, full directions for execution, and many suggestions for further thought and study. In the corresponding Instructor's Manuals we have set forth at length all the technical background of knowledge that an instructor ought to possess who would give such a course adequately. Professor Titchener may congratulate himself not only on having completed a long and arduous labor, but also upon having produced a veritable bible for his experimental colleagues.

The Student's Manual of the present quantitative volume begins with a prefatory note of Suggestions to Students, after which follows a forty-page introduction on Mental Measurement. The body of the work is divided into four chapters. The first (pp. 1-37) deals with twelve preliminary experiments, five auditory (highest and lowest audible tones, least audible intensity of sound), three dermal (least discernible pressure), and four, following an exposition of Weber's Law, roughly demonstrative of that law in the case of brightnesses and lifted weights. Chapter II (pp. 38-119) is concerned with the

Metric Methods, and covers eleven experiments. After a seventeen-page exposition of the Law of Error, the Method of Limits (Method of Just Noticeable Differences or Method of Minimal Change) is taken up, with experiments on the difference limen for brightness and for tone. Then follows the Method of Average Error, illustrated with visual estimations of extent, and, after the two subordinate methods of Equivalent and of Equal Sense Differences (Mean Gradation), the Method of Constant Stimuli (Right and Wrong Cases), with experiments on dermal discrimination with Weber's compasses, arm movements, intensity of sounds, and lifted weights. Chapter III (pp. 120-195), devoted to Reaction Experiments, is introduced by a general account of electrical instruments and their use in the psychological laboratory, especially the Hipp chronoscope. The experiments cover the three types of simple reaction; reaction with discrimination, cognition and choice, and association times. Chapter IV (pp. 196-198), a very short one with a single experiment requiring the reproduction of a time interval, brings the volume to a close, with the exception of the list of Materials Required and the full indexes.

The Instructor's Manual follows the same order of topics, but of course much more exhaustively, and with much more of suggestion in various directions. The introduction (158 pages), on the Rise and Progress of Quantitative Psychology, gives a critical history of psychophysics from Weber and Fechner onward, with many citations from the principal authors in the original tongues. A special historical section is also given to each of the metric methods by itself. Nowhere in English can anything like so full an account of the whole matter be found as in these two manuals of Titchener's; and nowhere in any other language except in the *Methodik* of G. E. Müller, by whom Titchener has been largely influenced, and whose results have been embodied in the present work. A fifth chapter in the Instructor's Manual, beyond the four corresponding to those of the Student's part, takes up the Range of Quantitative Psychology, and gives some account of typical experiments lying in other fields than those of psychophysics. Three appendices, with a list of materials and the indices, complete the volume. The appendices deal with Examination Questions, Books and Periodicals (including a list of fifty books, which, together with a similar list in the qualitative Instructor's Manual, make up the tale of the author's 'hundred best books' — from the point of view of the experimental laboratory), and, lastly, with firms recommended for the Supply of Psychological Apparatus.

The chapters thus outlined are filled in with a thoroughness and

fullness of detail worthy of Helmholtz in the *Optik*. Criticism of the subject matter, if criticism is to be made, would be an occasion for siege operations and not for a skirmish; and it is hardly worth while here to point out such small and hypothetical betterments as may have occurred to the reviewer. The author's expositions are everywhere clear, his arrangement good, and he has succeeded, in the reviewer's belief, in the by-no-means-small feat of making the quasi-mathematical portions of the work simple enough for the non-mathematical student.

Criticism from the pedagogical point of view is, perhaps, another matter, in particular with reference to the appropriateness of such a course for undergraduate students. And here the reviewer is inclined to dissent. Even if students be required, as is very likely the author's intention, to perform certain selected experiments and not the whole list, the question remains whether the time of an undergraduate cannot be better spent than in such intensive cultivation of so narrow a field. A half-year's laboratory work is a good part of a student's undergraduate course, and psychophysics, however important, is but a small part of a small part of psychology as a whole. With a graduate student, in training for a career as an experimentalist, the case would be in many respects different, though here again objections of other sorts suggest themselves.

The ideal laboratory course for undergraduates is something that we are drawing near to by approximations. Professor Titchener has brought us much nearer to it than we have ever been before, but has, perhaps, a trifle overshot the mark. This, however, is a slight matter in comparison with the importance of his present contribution to experimental psychology in general.

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L'idéalisme contemporain. Par LÉON BRUNSCHVIG. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1905.—pp. 185.

This volume is made up of a series of articles which have already appeared in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, with an additional chapter which gives the title to the book and forms the natural conclusion of the various discussions. In the first chapter on "Spiritualisme et sens commun," the author purposes to show how common sense, which has always been in bondage to words, may free itself and exchange its materialistic form of spiritualism for a form which is truly spiritualistic. "De quelques préjugés contre la philosophie" is an

attack on the philosophy of feeling and will. "De la méthode dans la philosophie de l'esprit" is a reply to criticisms directed by M. Cante-cour against the author's interpretation of idealism in his *Introduction à la vie de l'esprit*; and "La philosophie nouvelle et l'intellectualisme" is an attack on M. LeRoy's 'new philosophy' or 'new positivism,' which is really a form of pragmatism; and the subject for discussion in this last essay is essentially the same as that in the second chapter.

The reader who is unfamiliar with the controversies in the French philosophical journals would have much difficulty in following the argument in this book, were it not for a preface in which the author gives a clear statement of his main theses. His first thesis is that philosophy has ceased to be metaphysics and has become criticism. His Kantianism, however, does not go so far as to include the second critique: he is anti-voluntaristic throughout. Contemporary idealism is, then, in no sense a system of metaphysics. Idealism, and with it spiritualism and intellectualism, are, in his view, simply methods or constitutive forms of science. They do not pretend to go beyond science; they have no dealings with a transcendent.

The realism which rests on simple affirmation is no longer possible; a legitimate realism, the rational affirmation of the existence of the external world, — which M. Brunschvicg somehow or other seems to admit as possible, — presupposes criticism, that is to say, idealism. For this idealism is no more subjective idealism than it is absolutism; it is simply a method. And bound up with it is a spiritualism which, as already noted, is non-metaphysical, which professes to stay within the sphere of science, to be, indeed, a necessary part of science. For science contains something more than facts; it posits the law of matter, and by that very act shows that it cannot be subject to the law of matter, that it must be a reality distinct from matter. The element which matter does not supply is mind, spirit. This is related to matter, which is a mass divisible into parts each external to all the rest, as is the thought to the words of the phrase which express it. It is not an absolute; it is a living activity, a productive power, the capacity for producing ideas, something free, autonomous, never completed and never fixed. Individuality itself is not something stable and permanent; it is simply the starting-point for inner development. The problems which arise in connection with its activity are not to be solved if we conceive of truth, goodness, and God, as things possessing an absolute existence. Truth is that which is verified, virtue is progress of inner being; instead of an absolute God this new spiritualism finds an inner ideal principle which is constantly mani-

fested in us. This is the interpretation of idealism, which M. Brunschvicg recommends to common sense, and, until common sense shall have adopted it, he regards the complete rationalization of the human race as impossible.

It may be said in criticism of this view of spiritualism, that its advocate by no means convinces us that he has eliminated the Absolute. The Absolute which appeared as something fixed and transcendent has been publicly banished, but it is not so certain that an Absolute has not reappeared in this self-activity of unlimited possibilities. The author does not profess to banish 'being' altogether, there is spiritual reality, but it consists in a spontaneously active thought, and can, therefore, never be mere object of thought. He denies that this being is an Absolute, but, even granting that, it is by no means clear that matter, which is an object of scientific research, is not itself transcendent. For he denies that the explicative principle is at the same time a constitutive principle. Matter, apparently, is not mind, nor is it the product of mind. M. Brunschvicg certainly fails to avoid metaphysical implications, in spite of his preliminary denial of metaphysics.

To return to the author's development of his position. We find spiritualism further defined as intellectualism. This, again, is not metaphysical; it simply means that all reality can be explained according to rational principles; Harvey's theory of circulation, for example, was intellectualistic. Intellectualism is equally opposed to abstract formalism and to positivism. Herein it agrees with the 'new philosophy' advocated by M. Le Roy and others. But it does not agree with the positive part of that theory. M. Le Roy holds that thought alone can offer no solution. A system of ideas may be perfectly clear and consistent, and yet be false. The final appeal, he maintains, is to life itself, to the will; the final test is to be found in practice; action is the positive reality; it is in intuition that truth is given. M. Brunschvicg believes that this leads to scepticism and contradiction, and that M. Le Roy is no better than a materialist.

But, before taking up the points made in the controversy, it will be well to note first the author's treatment of the subject in the less polemical chapters. The problem is raised in the first chapter, where we are told that the philosophy of feeling and will do not really exist; for 'reasons of the heart' and 'principles of the will' are still reasons and principles. They involve ideas and the faculty of comprehension, and hence, intellection. In the next chapter the philosophies of feeling and will, — which 'respond to the desires of the crowd' and have

been very influential, — are examined more closely. Spinoza affirmed that “ ‘the modes of thought,’ as love, desire, or any other affection of the soul, are given only when there is present in the mind of the individual, the idea of the thing which is loved, desired, etc. But the idea may be given without any other mode of thought.” He believed this to be an axiom. M. Brunschvicg denies that there are axioms, yet holds that Spinoza’s statement is correct and can be sustained. He examines first the view that feeling and will can determine themselves immediately without the intervention of ideas, and finds that in the historical examples of the philosophies of feeling and will there is always involved determination, analysis and justification, hence ideas, etc. But it may be maintained that although intellection is present, it is subordinate to feeling and will; that it has a value, but a theoretical value only, while true value is practical. M. Brunschvicg reminds us that intellectualism does not desire to exclude feeling and will; they are, of course, present in the moral life, but moral life begins where the *end* of action is marked, where the value of the idea or feeling is judged. Feeling, it is true, goes beyond reason, but it is only confused consciousness; the difference between it and intellection is only a matter of degree. There is really no conflict of faculties, for there are no faculties. Thought is a function of the organism, and feeling and will are two of its movements. Man should philosophize with his whole mind, and all the aspects of thought should be involved. There can be, he repeats, no philosophy of feeling and will. Rational philosophy *is* philosophy.

A large part of the difference between M. Brunschvicg and those whom he opposes is due to the difference in the way in which they understand such terms as ‘thought’ and ‘mind.’ M. Brunschvicg wishes to include in them feeling and will, while the others use them in a narrower sense. It is all thought, says our author, and then he adds: “but clear thought is the ultimate court of appeal.” Here, there is a real difference of principle, and it can best be discussed in connection with the controversy contained in the chapter on “La philosophie nouvelle et l’intellectualisme.” Here we may take as a starting point M. Le Roy’s division of action into *l’action pratique*, *l’action discursive*, et *l’action profond*, analogous to Plato’s three stages of knowing; the first gives common sense; the second rules science; the third is the criterion of philosophy. In the second, discursive action, we have intellectual activity which is analytic and leaves discontinuity in our knowledge. M. Brunschvicg objects that intellection is synthetic as well as analytic; that it is the only possible ground of “profound

action," the condition in which we "live matter." He maintains that this kind of action, which is really æsthetic intuition, is quite unintelligible apart from clear thinking. Continuity, the only continuity which is of value as knowledge, is to be found by way of intellection. A feeling of identity with the object is not the real solution of discontinuity in knowledge. Intellectualism finds the test of judgments not in any such experience, but in their fitness (for knowledge) and their universality. He opposes the principle of immediate experience; as for the pragmatist formula, he prefers Spinoza's statement: *Mens nihil aliud utile esse judicat nisi id quod ad intelligendum conducit.*

In conclusion, it seems to the reviewer that, tested by the principles of intellectualism which the author professes, he has not triumphed over his opponents, and that his idealism has not finally disposed of metaphysics.

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L'âme et le corps. Par ALFRED BINET. Paris, Flammarion, 1905. — pp. 288.

This is a discussion of the psychophysical problem in rather sketchy and popular form, and dominated by the pleasant spirit of Montaigne; the issue is admitted at the outset to be a transcendental one upon which no man can speak with authority, yet about which everybody likes to speculate by applying empirical principles with care-free deftness. The first assumption to be made in a discussion of the relation of mind to body is that "we know only our sensations about the external world" (p. 10); "sensation is the intermediary placed between the object and our cognitive faculty" (p. 13). But in Binet's thinking this is not an idealistic assumption, but rather a realistic one; he takes it to mean that sensations are the only objective things we know. "The objects of the real word are, for us, only sensation-aggregates" (p. 51), but "the term object has two meanings, now that of sensation qualities and then again that of the cause of these qualities" (p. 17); and we know that there exist objects apart from our nervous system, because we do perceive the sensed objects in one place and the nervous system in another (*ibid.*). The writer does not seem to realize, however, that he is presupposing the transcendent reality of space in all these remarks; for he fails throughout to distinguish between spatial distribution and transmental existence. It is one thing to say that we experience truly the noumenon *X*, which is the objective cause of our sensations of it, in a given position which is not identical with the position of the nou-

menon X' , which is the objective cause of our perception 'body,' and a very different thing to say that each noumenon is known as noumenon because it has its own unique position; the former is a bare statement of introspective fact, the latter is no explanation nor justification of this fact.

The psychological ground for the insolubility of the psychophysical problem is given very satisfactorily. "We can never discover the whole nature of the nervous system because we have only sense-images of it" (p. 22). This statement, taken in isolation, is not true; for the combinations of sense-images surely give us much that is for us truly new, much as we may be inclined to claim metaphysically that such new facts were 'latent' in the original sense-images. Nevertheless, Binet's main idea is surely beyond challenge; our knowledge of the nervous system is limited absolutely by the results, in terms of knowledge, which that system itself can produce. This is probably as good ground for scientific agnosticism as can be found. Upon it Binet bases his objection to the materialistic claim that all experience is a mode of motion. We cannot, he well objects, suppose that the empirical factors yielded by operations of the nervous system by any means disclose every real feature and property of the system itself (pp. 33 ff.). After scoring this point, however, he lapses back into the language of that very subjectivism which at heart he seems disposed to reject. He says, for instance: "Physicists err in regarding motion as noumenal; every conception (including that of motion) is only a residue of sensations, even the notions of 'body,' 'matter,' etc., being hypostasized sensations; it is not the motion of the tuning-fork which causes sound sensations, for that motion is only a sensation" (pp. 33-37). But why, the critic would ask, cannot one admit the objective reality of motion and still deny that the whole (noumenal) nature of it is explicated in experience? Surely it is a disastrous way of proving the relativity of knowledge to turn everything experienced into something which it is *not* experienced as.

Curiously enough, when Binet turns, after a discussion of the nature of matter (pp. 1-52), to the discussion of mind (pp. 53-183), he is willing to regard the distinction between the act and the object of consciousness as something more than a sensation product. These are irreducible phases of experience objectively, not merely a distinction between sensation products. The author adheres to common sense convictions here at the expense of logical consistency; for how can we know the essential difference between two objects if one of these latter cannot be a 'mere' content of any experience? This question,

when answered by common sense, forces us to admit that at least some experienced things are not mere sensations, but rather empirical phases of transcendentals. In short, Binet is bound to admit that we can know an act of consciousness without thereby metamorphosing this act into nothing more than a thought-object. It is a serious criticism of his whole treatment of the psychophysical problem that he never faces and meets this issue squarely. As a result of this neglect, in large measure at least, Binet is led to put up the curious thesis, a modification of one held by Reid and Hamilton, that sensations are partly mental and partly physical; the act character is the mental, and the object-content is physical (p. 58). As a consequence, it is easy to reject all representative theories of consciousness on the ground that "what we call matter is nothing but sensation" (a part or phase of it), so that "sensation is not a medium of symbolizing matter but *contains* matter" (p. 66). It is little short of astounding that a good psychologist can indulge in speculations like these; that on one page we can be told that all differences are intra-sensational, and on the next can learn that the difference between process and content is not.

On much the same plane must be ranked the critique of Lotze's view that neural vibrations are heterogeneous to sensation qualities apparently induced by them. Much as one may believe that Lotze's point is an irrelevant, misstated one, it is impossible to accept Binet's reasons for rejecting it. He says: "Molecular movement is itself only sensation. Hence heterogeneity of movement and sensation-content only proves difference between sensations and not difference between mental and physical" (p. 72). How is it possible that a psychologist can declare that the experience of a difference between (assumed) sensations cannot mean something more than either of these latter, cannot indicate something about their nature which is not revealed within their own immediate qualities individually? We pass over the more strictly psychological weaknesses in the above view, believing the logical difficulty to indicate sufficiently the limitations of the argument.

Consciousness is regarded substantially as James views it: "sensation does not imply a knower but only the act of knowing" (p. 99). But, in developing this point, Binet throws caution to the winds by saying that "it is reflection which has constructed the notion of a subject; in sensation there is no knower" (p. 100). This indicates a radically sensationalistic view of experience which James would instantly disown: the old error of supposing that nothing is involved

in experience save the conscious content of experience need not be re-criticized here. The wonder is that Binet can say that "the subject is only a known thing" (p. 101) and still believe that the act-phase of experiencing is not. And it is a still greater wonder how he can censure idealism for denying that imagination and reasoning can give what sensation cannot; for he has committed just this same mistake. Into his view that "consciousness adds nothing to the existent" (p. 114) we need not go critically, for this has been discussed at length in numerous recent controversies.

An interesting classification of the definitions of psychology is given (pp. 139-183) together with a critique of these definitions, ending by the acceptance of Ebbinghaus's definition of psychology as the physical world as known by an individual (and not as revised by social criticism). To this definition, however, Binet will add James's view that the teleological peculiarity is the true mark of the mental which distinguishes it from the physical. "Psychology is the science of such matter as is pre-adaptive." The present reviewer is unable to see how this view is reconcilable with Binet's reiterated assertion that the act-character and not the contents constitute the psychical world; both Ebbinghaus's and James's views clearly refer to certain peculiarities of the objects of experience, their behavior, qualities, and so on. And, furthermore, if one regards consciousness as something which does not modify in *any* wise the existent, how is it possible to talk about the teleological character of the psychical? Surely there is a subtle vacillation here between content and act; the objects 'in' consciousness are material and not reducible to a mere act of knowing, but then psychology cannot be defined as the science of naught save such objects inasmuch as the act-function, whatever this may be called, cuts no inconsiderable figure in every existent theory.

The connection of mind and matter forms the theme of the last part of the book (pp. 183-265); a strict correlation is insisted upon, but not in the sense of parallelism. Aristotle's 'form and matter' indicates roughly the true relation; hence, "the phenomena of consciousness constitute an incomplete mode of existence" (p. 195). Parallelism errs because "experiences have objects and thus are just as material as our brains are" (p. 230). This is a most remarkable instance of identifying 'objective' in the psychological sense with 'material' in the physical one. And further on (p. 236) Binet plainly assumes that a perception of matter proves itself to be a partly material thing.

A perfectly amazing theory, admitted to be conjectural, is proposed

in the closing pages. Binet believes an answer must be found to the question why neural vibrations, which contain all perceivable physical qualities, should themselves differ so greatly from these qualities. Why are disturbances in the optic nerve so little like the light we see? The reason given is that "the neural disturbance is determined by both the object and the nervous structure" (p. 251). But then the author feels bound to explain why it is that we do not experience the molecular disturbances in the nerves; and he is forced to say that we really do; that we sense simultaneously the objective color *plus* the merry dance of optic molecules, but that, since this dance is incessant, a true constant, we become unconscious of it by the law of adaptation. The same is said of motor nerves; these, too, yield sensations of their own inner behavior, but lapse in early childhood into the realm of the unconscious! (p. 257).

In justice to the book, it must be added that the author confesses having written it to supply a personal emotional need. It seems rather brutal toward the reading public to publish a book of such length upon a problem which the author concludes is strictly insoluble, and a legitimate theme for emotionally colored speculations (p. 263). A comparison of the work with Busse's monograph would be invidious.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Beiträge zur Einführung in die Geschichte der Philosophie. Von RUDOLF EUCKEN. Leipzig Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1906. — pp. vi, 196.

Of late Professor Eucken has been recasting several of his earlier writings, and publishing them with altered titles adapted to their new forms. The present treatise is the second edition, revised and enlarged, of the *Beiträge zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, first issued in 1886. About one quarter of the new book is a substantial reproduction of the old. A second considerable section deals with subjects formerly discussed, — “Zur Erinnerung an Adolf Trendelenburg,” and “Parteien und Parteinamen in der Philosophie,” — but which are now treated in a different way. Two essays, “Bayle und Kant: Eine Studie” and “Gedanken und Anregungen zur Geschichte der Philosophie,” were not included in the original volume, and these constitute the chief interest of the later work.

In comparing Bayle with Kant, Professor Eucken has a double purpose in view. Rightly judging that we know less of Bayle to-day than were advantageous for our thought, he seeks to contribute to the desired end by presenting the results of his own inquiries as well as by stimulating others to independent study. To those who are acquainted with his historical methods it need scarcely be said that in this aim he has been entirely successful. But the second thesis, that Bayle was a forerunner of Kant, appears more doubtful. The argument is guardedly drawn, it is true, with careful attention to the differences as well as the likenesses between the two forms of thought. But the question remains, whether further deduction ought not to be made from the positive conclusion. The parallels are between Bayle's doubt and the negative criticism of Kant's theoretical philosophy, on the one hand, Bayle's reliance on conscience and Kant's doctrine of the practical reason, on the other. The comparison is interesting and suggestive. Ought the resemblance in doctrine, however, to be interpreted as an anticipation? Or should it be classed with those remoter analogies which are often discoverable between thinkers of different ages and types?

The concluding discussion applies the author's characteristic philosophical principles to historical investigation. Unless the history of philosophy is brought into correlation with the timeless spiritual process which forms the essence of the world, it loses itself in the study of details, or passes over into mere subjective judgments. In either case it yields no adequate guidance for systematic reflection. This is gained only when the historian rises above the succession of philosophers and systems to participation in the *Geistesleben*, for whose progressive realization he no less than the original

thinkers should energetically strive. Hence follow corollaries of a more special sort: The history of philosophy should consider 'life' as well as abstract speculation; it should have regard to personality as well as reflective results; it should value original and productive ideas more than completeness in systematic construction. By way of final suggestions, Professor Eucken proposes philosophical conceptions, terminology, and formulæ as promising subjects for individual or collective investigation. Many of these hints will prove of value to the historical student in his own investigations, and in his appreciation of the work of other men. From the general philosophical position the reviewer regrets to find increasing reason to dissent.

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Les notions d'essence et d'existence dans la philosophie de Spinoza. Par ALBERT RIVAUD. Paris, Alcan, 1906. —pp. viii, 216.

M. Rivaud's book is, if not quite the definitive exposition of Spinoza's metaphysics, at all events the most thorough most penetrating and clearest analysis of that elusive system known to the present reviewer; it will be an indispensable book to all future students of Spinoza. It tends, as every competent examination of the subject must, to show that the system which, more than all others, has the appearance and the popular reputation of extreme rigor, unity, and consistency, is really chiefly interesting because of the great richness of conflicting motives and unharmonized dialectical tendencies which are latent in it. "It is the condensation of the anonymous labors of generations. It fixes and crystallizes the conceptions prepared and elaborated by earlier philosophies, and it mingles them together in such a fashion that they are no longer recognizable. . . . We have no right to choose between the different doctrines proposed by Spinoza and to unify, by such choice, a system which its author has delivered to us as a collection of diverse possibilities." After the best efforts to reduce it to order, the doctrine remains "full of implicit contradictions." M. Rivaud's minute examination thus brings out the more clearly the true historic significance of Spinoza's reflection. He was engaged, with an intellectual energy and upon a scale that have few parallels elsewhere in history, in the business of putting new wine into old bottles; and the resulting contradictions are precisely what give its distinctive character to the system. What that new wine was, the intoxicating charm of which Spinoza had felt scarcely less than Bruno before him, M. Rivaud pretty clearly indicates. "Spinoza had felt more vividly than any other philosopher [Bruno should have been excepted] the complexity, the infinite variety of life," and had been profoundly impressed by a vision of the universe as a living, active, ever-changing, self-multiplying, organic unity. "The same life animates all creatures, and this life is most perfect, richest, most fruitful, just because it diffuses itself and transforms itself *ad infinitum*."

But this great early representative of the modern spirit had also the instincts of a schoolman : he must needs reduce this same concrete and moving universe to the terms of a completely rationalized formula, and conceive of it as characterized in every fiber of its content by the eternal fixity of the logical necessities which in reality belong only to the supra-temporal relations of abstract and general concepts. For this purpose, the scheme of ideas which the Middle Ages had inherited and elaborated from Neo-Platonism lay ready to his hand. That scheme itself expressed something of both tendencies, though the bias in favor of the assertion of the superior reality of the eternal and universal had been clearer in it. The very ambiguities of the scheme, and especially, as M. Rivaud shows, the multiple ambiguities of the notions of essence and existence, — both separately and in their relations to one another, — served Spinoza's dual needs the better. It will probably remain always debatable whether we can better represent the result by saying that Spinoza's new wine burst the old bottles, or by saying that the process of bottling destroyed the fire and flavor of the new wine. One cannot always agree with M. Rivaud's account of the relative distribution of emphasis between the two sides of Spinoza's thought ; and the author does not quite perfectly succeed, perhaps, in setting forth in sharp outline the precise articulation of all the main elements in Spinoza's reasoning. But the book must take an exceptional place among Spinoza studies, both for the insight and sound historic sense shown in the general conclusions, and for the scholarly thoroughness of its detailed analyses.

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Leibniz's Hauptschriften zur Grundlegung der Philosophie. Übersetzt von A. BUCHENAU ; mit Einleitungen und Erläuterungen herausgegeben von ERNST CASSIRER. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1906. 2 Bde. — pp. 374, 582.

These volumes contain an extensive, and for the greater part judicious, selection from the writings of Leibniz, arranged topically and in logical sequence, so as to exhibit the Leibnizian system in a connected form, such as Leibniz himself never took the time to give to it. The French and Latin writings are translated into German by Dr. Buchenau. This translation will not add to the value of the volumes for the English reader, who will naturally prefer to read Leibniz's original ; it is, indeed, hard to see why any student of the sort likely to use a work of this kind, should be supposed to require a translation of Leibniz's very clear and easy French and Latin into German not always quite so clear. Two other peculiarities of this collection further prevent it from serving (as it otherwise might) as the standard compend of the more indispensable Leibnizian writings. For some reason, nothing is included from either the *Nouveaux essais* or the *Théodicée*. And the range of selections is not sufficient to bring out ade-

quately the fact that Leibniz's thought upon certain problems underwent development, and that at certain points he remained to the end hesitant or self-contradictory. In particular, there is no sufficient representation of Leibniz's more or less wavering utterances in regard to the logical status and the demonstrative scope of the Principles of Contradiction and of Sufficient Reason. With these exceptions, however, the compilation is excellently done, and affords, in a convenient and inexpensive form, a well-ordered and detailed exposition of Leibniz's principal doctrines by Leibniz himself. Good use is made of selections from the correspondence, especially for the elucidation and amplification of the doctrine of monads, too briefly set forth in the several short formal treatises which Leibniz devoted to the subject. One of the once-disputed letters of Leibniz, — an extremely interesting one on the Principle of Continuity, — cited by Koenig in his famous controversy with Maupertuis, is here printed (both in the original French and in translation), for the first time in any edition of Leibniz's writings. Competent and instructive introductions, of an historical and expository sort, are provided by Dr. Cassirer for each of the sections into which the collection is divided.

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Life and Matter: A Criticism of Professor Haeckel's "Riddle of the Universe." By Sir OLIVER LODGE. New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1905. — pp. ix, 175.

We have here another criticism of Haeckel's *Weltraethsel*, this time from the camp of the scientists. The author seeks to counteract the harm done among unbalanced and uncultured persons by the spread of Haeckel's writings, and offers his book as an antidote against the speculative and destructive portions of the German biologist's work. He meets the world-riddle man on scientific ground, and shows "that he has underestimated some classes of fact and has stretched scientific theory into regions of guess work and hypothesis where it loses touch with real science altogether." "At present," he says, "the scheme formulated by Professor Haeckel must to philosophers appear rudimentary and antiquated, while to men of science it appears gratuitous, hypothetical, in some places erroneous, and altogether unconvincing."

The law of substance, establishing the eternal persistence of matter and force, upon which Haeckel bases his entire system and which he regards as axiomatic, is far from being self-evident, according to Professor Lodge. It may hereafter be possible to discover new forms of energy, in which case the definition may have to be modified. "But after all, this is not specially important: the *serious* mistake which people are apt to make concerning this law of energy is to imagine that it denies the possibility of guidance, control, or directing agency, whereas really it has nothing to say on these topics; it relates to *amount* alone. Philosophers have been far

too apt to jump at the conclusion that because energy is constant, therefore no guidance is possible, so that all psychological or other interference is precluded. Physicists however know better." Moreover, it is untrue that the modern physicist has grown so accustomed to the conservation of matter that he is unable to conceive the contrary. "In other words, the destruction and the creation of matter are well within the range of scientific conception, and may be within the realm of experimental possibility."

But there seems some reason to suppose that anything which actually *exists* must be, in some way or other, perpetual. This is what Haeckel was evidently groping after. Perhaps the atom may break up into electric charges and these may be resolved into pristine ether. But we cannot conclude therefore that nothing else exists. Perhaps life also is a constant. "When it disappears from a material environment, is it knocked out of existence?" "Is it a temporary trivial collocation associated with certain complex groupings of atoms of matter, . . . or is it something immaterial and itself fundamental, something which uses these collocations of matter in order to display itself amid material surroundings, but is otherwise essentially independent of them?" Haeckel's view is that life has arisen from inorganic matter without antecedent life. The experimental facts of biogenesis he discards in favor of a hypothetical and at present undiscovered kind of spontaneous generation. He also assumes easily and gratuitously that there is a material substance at the root of all mental processes whatever. That is, in order to explain life and mind and consciousness by means of matter, he simply assumes that matter possesses these unexplained attributes. "Instead of associating life, will, and consciousness with the organisms in which they are actually in experience found, these ideas are foisted into the atoms of matter; and then the properties which have been conferred on the atoms are denied in all essential reality to the fully developed organisms which those atoms help to compose."

According to Professor Lodge, life is a guiding and controlling entity which reacts upon our world according to laws so partially known that we have to say they are practically unknown, and therefore appear in some respects mysterious. It is neither matter nor energy, nor even a function of matter or energy, but is something belonging to a different category; by some means, at present unknown, it is able to interact with the material world for a time, but it can also exist in some sense independently; although in that condition of existence it is by no means apprehensible by our senses. An acorn has in itself the potentiality not of one oak tree alone, but of a forest of oak trees. There is no sort of law of 'conservation' here. It is not as if something were passed on from one thing to another. It is not analogous to energy at all; it is analogous to the magnetism which can be excited by any given magnet; the required energy, in both cases, being extraneously supplied, and only transmuted into the appropriate form by the guiding principle which controls the operation. So too the mind can direct and guide. "My contention then is, — and in

this contention I am practically speaking for my brother physicists, — that whereas life or mind can neither generate energy nor directly exert force, yet it can cause matter to exert force on matter, and so can exercise guidance and control: it can so prepare any scene of activity, by arranging the position of existing material, and timing the liberation of existing energy, as to produce results concordant with an 'idea or scheme or intention': it can, in short, 'aim' and 'fire.' "

Professor Lodge's book is another evidence of the fact that the mechanical theory of the universe is not satisfactory to all scientists, and that interaction and vitalism are being looked upon with greater favor than during the immediate past. The views set forth are not very popular with present-day philosophers, but that is perhaps because these thinkers are mortally afraid of being called unscientific. When the physicists concede the possibility of such a relation between matter and a guiding principle as is spoken of by Professor Lodge, the strictly mechanical theory of the universe will disappear from philosophy. At present, however, it is doubtful whether the great mass of his 'brother scientists' will accept him as their spokesman.

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The Concept Action in History and in the Natural Sciences. By PERCY HUGHES. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1905. — pp. 108.

Dr. Hughes's aim in this essay is to set forth the antithesis between historical science and natural science. The work evidently has been in part suggested by Rickert's *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*; but, while Rickert holds that history is the science of the individual and natural science the science of the universal, Dr. Hughes maintains that the antithesis is more fully and richly set forth by the contrast of *action* as the field of history and *law* as the field of natural science. "Action in antithesis to law distinguishes the field and purpose of history" (p. 23), and "action is internal determination" or "inner causation." Historical action is teleological (p. 44) and it resides in individual wholes as potentiality or tendency. Its source in an inner tendency of the individual distinguishes historical movement from the mechanical movement with which natural science is concerned. In history we always seek and find the explanation of movement in tendencies resident in an individual (a person, a nation, a phase of culture, etc.), whereas in natural science we go beyond the individual thing and find the explanation of its movements in the general circumstances and finally in the whole state of the world. Hence the naturalist strives to reduce things to passivity. Dr. Hughes gives several very pertinent illustrations of his meaning.

In Chapter IV., entitled "Action in Mechanics," he criticises in an interesting manner the inconsistencies involved in the retention of 'action' as a concept of mechanical science, in view of the elimination of 'efficiency' from

mechanics and the treatment of force as the circumstances of a thing. In the following Chapter, on "Action in the Sciences of Nature other than Mechanics," he calls attention to the historical element of *tendency* or *inner causation* involved in the qualitative distinctions or specific properties of chemism, heat, light, electricity, etc. He argues further that in the sphere of biology the notion of reaction to stimulus introduces the element of specific action and individual agent, and that it seems impossible that biological phenomena can ever be wholly reduced to mechanical terms.

In his very summary remarks on "The Logic of History" (Chapter VI), he asserts that the identity of a past fact with a present is necessary to historical knowledge. He remarks very pertinently on the necessity of defining the concept of each historical unity: *i.e.* reason, the nature of freedom, humanity, etc., and of determining the logical inter-relations of these concepts. I have not been able to make out clearly the meaning of his remarks on the relations of nature and history in the field of æsthetics. The last chapter emphasizes, rightly, I think, the historical character of ethics, although the matter might be developed with much greater clearness and force by bringing out the contrast between the formal sociological type of ethics and ethics as a comparative historical science of personal valuations. It is only by a development in the latter fashion that ethics can take a central position in the sciences of humanity. Dr. Hughes says that ethics is concerned with anticipated actions, and anticipation must be in terms of past experience. Hence the historical character of a concrete ethics.

One regrets the scrappy treatment of some of the problems in a survey covering so many important questions in philosophy. The style is in places somewhat awkward and at times obscure. But to Dr. Hughes belongs the merit of first treating in English the logic of the fundamental antithesis between history and natural science of which Windelband and Rickert have made so much in Germany. Dr. Hughes is not content with setting up a contrast. He also judiciously emphasizes the inter-relations of history and natural science. Still I do not think the difference between his own treatment and Rickert's is so great as he seems to think. Rickert also recognizes the historical element in the natural sciences and the moment of development in history. And Dr. Hughes has to define his concept 'action' in terms of the individual and teleological in contrast to law and mechanism. I suppose he means by 'action' movement that issues from self-activity, and this is surely individual. Whether so vague a term as action is likely to come into use in this specific sense is doubtful. Would it not be better to say that, wherever we have a determinate or individual whole that goes through development, either in its self-related wholeness or in relation to other wholes, there we have historical materials; and that history in the widest sense is the study of the development (with reference to ends) of determinate wholes in the fulness of their relations, whereas natural science emphasizes the apparent recurrence of the same phenome-

non and treats the individual simply as an illustration of a recurrent process, *i. e.*, as a mere example of a class or law?

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La sociologie génétique : Essai sur la pensée et la vie sociale préhistoriques.

Par FRANÇOIS COSENTINI. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1905. — pp. xviii, 205.

This book is a general study of social origins. It concerns, in the words of the author, "toutes les manifestations du monde primitif en relation avec la pensée primitive ou avec la vie sociale préhistorique." The topics taken up include: La sociologie génétique; les sociétés animales; les sauvages modernes; les races humaines et le polygénisme; les données de la palethnologie; l'homme primitif; la famille primitive; la société primitive; la propriété primitive; les idées primitives; les conceptions mythologiques; le langage et l'écriture; la religion; la morale; le droit; l'organisation politique et les classes sociales; and l'art, l'industrie, le commerce.

As a whole, the work is not an organic unity. It is not an attempt on the part of the author to reconstruct primitive society on the basis of some fundamental sociological concept of his own. It is rather an assemblage and somewhat critical examination of the current theories in connection with the various topics discussed. The author's own attitude may perhaps be described in most general terms, as a tendency to reject too simple and universal genetic explanations. This tendency appears, for example, in the discussion of polygénisme, the primitive family, the origin of property, and the genesis of myths.

In the main, the earlier chapters are methodological in character; the middle portion of the volume is almost purely descriptive, but as the data become more abundant, the treatment rises to the level of interpretation, and, especially in the later chapters, it sometimes reaches the highest level of sociological inquiry — the interpretation of the present in terms of genesis and process.

Looked at broadly, however, Professor Cosentini's discussion must be described as a popular treatment of the subject in hand. But this statement is not intended to be condemnatory or even critical. Popular sociological discussions in this field are a vital present need. In so far as they link the present with the remote past they perform a great social service, since they thus tend to break up the naïve, almost childish, acceptance of present-day institutions which, even in this era of evolutionary science, is characteristic of the 'educated' and well-to-do classes.

The introduction to the volume in hand by Maxime Kovalevsky, Ancien Professeur de droit publique à l'Université de Moscou, is suggestive and well worth reading. A useful feature of the work is the extensive bibliography which follows each chapter.

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Maine de Biran. Par MARIUS COUAILHAC. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1905. — pp. viii, 304.

This work appears in *Les grand philosophes* series. To Clodius Piat, editor-in chief of the series, was left the duty of final revision of the manuscript and reading of proof, as the author had been dead several months at the time of publication. At Couailhac's death, however, the task was so nearly completed that the book is in every essential feature his own.

The treatment falls into four divisions: The Sources of the Doctrine, The Self, The Theory of Knowledge, and The Spiritual Life. The first part deals with Biran's predecessors and his philosophical environment, and includes a description of his temperament together with a brief account of his life. It is very carefully worked out, and, if not quite so critical as one could wish, yet it faithfully represents the philosopher's own view of his relation to Descartes, Locke, and Condillac. In the second part we come face to face with one of the main difficulties in Biran's philosophy. The author shows in considerable detail how the self is established by a "primitive fact," the feeling of effort. It is on the peculiar nature of this fact that the philosopher depends to differentiate his position from both empiricism and rationalism. Couailhac has thus very fittingly devoted a chapter to the consideration of the consciousness of effort. If the objections drawn from the theories of Hume, James, Renouvier, and Taine seem to some readers more cogent than the refutation of those objections, — in other words, if the "hyperorganic" force in effort seems a logical abstraction rather than an experienced fact, — the fault is Biran's not Couailhac's. The theory of knowledge is the most important part of the exposition. Chapter I treats of the materials of consciousness, sensation and the unconscious, explaining how sharply they are marked off from thought itself. In the chapter concerning the form of consciousness, the author compares the Biranian with the Kantian view of the self. "The self of Kant does not allow us to go beyond phenomena, . . . it is closely related to the phenomenal world"; it comes from the categories. That of Biran, though it reveals itself only in the sensation of effort, is logically prior to that sensation. "The self of Kant is an empty unity; that of Maine de Biran an active energy." The author next proceeds to outline the distinction between general ideas and 'notions,' as given in Biran's *Psychologie*. After his estimate of the relation between the Kantian Ego and the categories, one could wish that he had taken up the corresponding question in Biran's philosophy and pointed out the exact connection between the self and the 'notions.' In Chapter III of this division, the reader who is familiar with the *Essai sur les fondements de la psychologie* will be grateful to Couailhac for giving us the "essential results" rather than the "minute and sometimes artificial analyses" which Biran makes in his theory of the four 'systems.' In one respect, however, the omission is unfortunate, for it is the general arrangement of the second part of the *Psychologie* which shows how closely Biran's theory is related to Condillac's philosophy

as stated in the *Traité des sensations*. The division on the spiritual life is an account of the logic of the philosopher's later development. Chapter IV of this part is especially interesting. Cousin, Janet, and Naville maintain that Biran was a mystic at the last. On the other hand, the catholics regard him as one of their own number. Didiot dates his conversion between 1815 and 1820. Couailhac concludes that though Biran had been friendly to catholicism for some time, he did not completely accept it until shortly before his death. In estimating Biran's place in the history of philosophy, the author does not claim that this form of 'will' philosophy has had any influence outside France. He very justly says that any resemblance between Biran and either James or Schopenhauer seems "vague and questionable." In France, however, he maintains that the influence is "more considerable than is ordinarily thought." To substantiate this view he refers to Cousin, Jouffroy, Ravaisson, and Simon. But even in these instances the influence is probably less than the author estimates it to be. For example, Cousin, while adopting Biran's account of the origin of the idea of causality, deplores his neglect of the distinction between the idea of causality as developed in experience, and the principle of causality — a truth to which reason is naturally subject.

As already indicated, this book is not in any sense a critical work. It will seem incomplete to the student as he looks in vain for a satisfactory statement of the relation of Biran to Condillac, to Kant, or to Cousin. In dealing with a philosopher who himself had very little knowledge of earlier speculation, a method more comparative and historical is certainly desirable. But with its limitations this is still a very useful exposition. It is a careful and faithful analysis of the system from Biran's own point of view. And anyone at all acquainted with that philosopher's writings will appreciate the advantage of possessing such a clear treatment from 'within' as Couailhac has left us. In fact, owing to Biran's obscure style, wearisome repetitions, careless use of imperfect synonyms, and slightly varying standpoint, we are under great obligations to Couailhac for giving us a readable, accurate, and sympathetic account of what Taine has so aptly called "a mass of abstractions, a thicket of metaphysical thistles."

N. E. TRUMAN.

Les mensonges du caractère. Par FR. PAULHAN. Paris, F. Alcan, 1905.
— pp. 276.

"Nothing is sincere in us. At any rate, nothing is wholly sincere. There is not one of our feelings that we can express without hypocrisy or restriction, not one of our beliefs that we can affirm without certain reserves or without falsehood more or less conscious." These opening sentences of the work are typical of the style in which the whole is written. There is a constant straining after extreme and violent modes of expression, which is apt to blind us to the author's real acuteness and justice of observation. "Perhaps Desdemona simulated fidelity in such a way as to deceive

Shakespeare." Such a statement might easily provoke a laugh of disgust ; and yet the author has a meaning in view which is well worth expressing.

The general theme of the work is sufficiently trite, but it is elaborated to an extent hitherto undreamed of. The 'lies of character' are investigated as to their function, their psychological mechanism, their principal varieties, and the circumstances commonly favorable to their development. The functional theory is indicated at the outset by a brilliant comparison with the imitative colorings of insects. "The character thereby takes on deceitful appearances, which disguise its true nature, and the confusion thus occasioned results, in general, to the profit of the individual or of society or of both at once." It is to the function of self-protection that attention is principally given, the social function being only occasionally considered.

Two opposed types of character-disguises are recognized, false indifference and false sensibility ; these are discussed in considerable detail in the first two parts of the book. A third part considers some interesting combinations of the two extreme types, and a fourth part summarizes the general conclusions reached, and furthermore gives suggestions toward a theory of "universal psychic simulation." In reference to this last, we may say that the author's procedure reminds us forcibly of other recent attempts to extend widely the commonly accepted meanings of terms — 'imitation,' for example. The author's tendency in this respect is shown even in Part II, where the point is made that every volition is essentially a lie, because, while allowing expression to certain impulses, it at the same time suppresses others (p. 115). In Part IV, the basis of argument is the assumption, that every misunderstanding involves a deceit. Now, as no perception, whether of our own traits or of those of others, is unmixed with error, it is easily seen how the scope of deception becomes at once truly universal.

The analyses of character with which the volume is mainly filled are always plausible and often quite convincing. At times, however, one can scarce avoid the suspicion that the author is pretending to an exactness of which the nature of his subject does not well admit, and that the formal precision of his language conceals a real vagueness in the significance of his descriptive terms. On the whole, nevertheless, the work is undoubtedly excellent of its kind, — a kind, which, as we cannot forget, has had some notable forerunners in the history of French literature.

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The following books also have been received :

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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scholastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych. u. Phys.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*.—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

Spinoza et ses contemporains (Suite). L. BRUNSCHVIG. *Rev. de Mét.*, XIV, 1, pp. 35-82.

In spite of Fénelon's criticism of Spinoza's real identity between the parts and the whole, they both agree in believing the perfect infinity of God and his union with man. Fénelon, however, tried to cling to ecclesiastical tradition, and for him this unity of God and man does not interfere with the idea of Christ as a mediator. But this unity with God is at the expense of the unity within man himself; there is a radical separation between the substance of the soul and that of the body. Spinoza, however, following Descartes more closely, conceives body first as a substance, then as a particular case of natural law, and thirdly, in its highest state of knowledge, as an affirmative essence, partaking of the divine; and it is not body as substance but body as essence which is eternal. The eternal actuality of the body is being contained in God, not as one part distinct from another, but as a part merged in the whole; and the soul, being the idea of the body, is also eternal. The adequate knowledge of self implies the adequate knowledge of God, and from this eternal knowledge which unites man to God comes eternal pleasure and love. Thus Spinoza, better than Fénelon, passes from the *union with* God to the *unity of* God. For Fénelon, man remains a subject different from God. In this union with God man never loses the idea of self, while the intellectual love which Spinoza describes does not go from man to God; the idea of God is rather in the thought of man as its intelligible principle. The love of God for man and the intellectual love of the soul for God are one and the same.

The mathematical discoveries of Leibniz, especially of the differential and integral calculus, gave him a great advantage over Spinoza, and introduced

into philosophy entirely new ideas of the infinite and its relation to the finite. The substance of Spinoza, while retaining its infinity, multiplies and becomes the monads of Leibniz, while the problem of the plurality of substances is solved by his conception of mathematical series. Leibniz, by his degrees of infinity, opposes many possible reals to the unique real of Spinoza. God has a necessary existence, for the existing essences imply God. He is the absolute infinite, the central monad in the hierarchy of monads. He causes those essences to exist which will form the best possible world ; all other systems of possibles are excluded by the will of God. Spinoza, using the connection between the equation and the curve to prove the relation between idea and ideation, constructs his philosophy geometrically. To this notion Leibniz opposes the infinitesimal calculus from which is derived the law of continuity in the monadology. Comparing the practical doctrines of Leibniz and Spinoza, we find Leibniz much closer to the Kantian idea of autonomy of the moral person. The soul seems for him a spontaneous concrete activity, not a mere idea as Spinoza maintains. Here Leibniz approaches modern idealism, but the monadology modifies this somewhat and shows each monad to be no longer a sum of interior states, but rather dependent on other monads ; a part of a series. Further, rejecting the intellectualism of Spinoza, Leibniz shows the intelligence to be only the faculty of representation. The monad is merely an active and vital mirror. God alone is perfect, and completely free ; he governs the monads and preserves their being. Here Leibniz seems almost to approach theological predestination. The parallelism of Spinoza finds no counterpart in Leibniz, nor can we find any similarity between the symbolism of the monadology and the dialectic of the ethics. Further, the God of Leibniz, who is an excellent geometer, a good architect, is most unlike Spinoza's idea of the Absolute. God for Spinoza is freed from all anthropomorphism ; he does not stand in relation to the individual as does the God of Leibniz. By identifying himself with God, man becomes free, partaking even of the freedom of God himself. Hence Spinoza and Leibniz, while often using similar formulas in solving particular problems, are in the main radically opposed to each other in doctrine.

R. B. WAUGH.

Les préoccupations métaphysiques des physiciens modernes. G. SOREL.
Rev. de Mét., XIII, 6, pp. 859-889.

Natural philosophers of to-day seem to be sceptical concerning the finality and validity of their own laws, and declare that we must be satisfied with an approximation that meets practical needs. This scepticism, which M. Poincaré combats in his book *Science and Hypothesis*, seems to be due to a belief that thus can science be placed on surer footing. Perhaps a solution of these difficulties of the philosophy of science may be given by an investigation of the rôle hypotheses play in the development of our knowledge, and by a comparison of this with the experimental

method. In such an investigation, we see that the hypothesis which is most nearly homogeneous with the experimental mechanism is the one which best aids science in its aim. And the aim of science is to construct an *artificial nature* instead of a *natural nature*, though, as M. Poincaré says, it continuously adjusts itself to experience so as to avoid existing errors. Experimentation being thus an application of the best methods of mechanics, and hypotheses being constructed with reference to a mechanism rather than a natural object, it is easily seen that between the artificial world (science) and the natural world (reality) there is a distance, a zone of chance, in which no definite law obtains. In astronomy, however, this margin is so narrow that it is negligible. But modern scientists do not permit themselves to think that science and nature form two worlds, hence their oscillation between exaggerated scepticism and overconfidence in the results of science. From this doctrine of science three axioms result: (1) Among phenomena, not explicable by mechanics, there exists a connection identical with that which would exist were a mechanical explanation possible; (2) each group of phenomena is produced as if it depended upon a mechanism so perfect that the movement of one point determined the movement of every other point; (3) the divers groups are as vitally and necessarily related as are the different parts of a group.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

Pragmatism v. Absolutism. R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ. *Mind*, No. 55, pp. 297-334; No. 56, pp. 441-478.

The conflict between Pragmatism and Absolutism is part of the wider conflict between Intellectualism and Voluntarism which began in the German reaction against Hegelianism. But English Voluntarism is epistemological rather than metaphysical or ethical; it emphasizes the unity and purposiveness of consciousness, and aims at a harmonious satisfaction of all sides of our nature. Absolutism tends to lay exclusive stress on the intellect, and in the end fails to satisfy even the intellect, since all our knowledge turns out to be mere appearance. Pragmatism, on the other hand, finds its difficulty in the relation between psychology and logic; psychology, itself one of the particular sciences, cannot establish laws of the true and the real, any more than of right and wrong. The first paper is devoted to an examination of Absolutism, mainly as represented by Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. For Bradley non-contradiction is the absolute criterion of ultimate reality. This involves the identity of being and thought; the ontological criterion of self-consistency is at the same time the logical criterion of non-contradiction. Instead of the dualism of subject and object, we have the dualism of the 'that' and the 'what,' of existence and content. Only in the Absolute does thought transcend this dualism and find its 'Other.' The problem is not how thought apprehends reality at all (this question would be self-contradictory), but why it does not apprehend it fully. Bradley identifies the *ens realissimum* with the

ens perfectissimum, yet in dealing with concrete experience treats his Absolute as more than a postulate. He is thus forced to the doctrine of 'Degrees of Truth and Reality,' as a means of reconciling immediacy and non-contradiction, his two criteria of reality. Inclusiveness and internal harmony are the tests of the degree of reality of any individual appearance. The Absolute must somehow include and reconcile all its appearances; we cannot prove that any of them are irreconcilable; hence it actually *does* include and reconcile them. For "what *may* be, if it also *must* be, assuredly *is*"; our ignorance of how it *can* be is no real objection. But can we argue thus until the Absolute has at least explained *something* positively? If all is appearance, even our thought about the Absolute, how can we ever get at reality? How can pain, *e. g.*, while still actually felt, cease to exist 'as such,' be 'neutralized' or 'merged' in the Absolute? Error is apparent discrepancy in the real. All appearance is partly erroneous, yet "contributes, we know not how, to the harmony of the Absolute." But for such a perfect Absolute all progress, all correction of error or realization of ideals, loses significance. What is the relation between the time process and the timeless experience of the Absolute? Even granting the tenability of Royce's analogy of the 'time-span', mere simultaneity would not give system, or make development intelligible. When freed from illegitimate spatial metaphors, this conception of the 'time-span' fails to render the timelessness of the Absolute thinkable. And why should there be an appearance of time at all? Even if we hold, with Taylor, that space and time manifest underlying logical relations, we are no better off; for logical relations only help us to understand and control the temporal, and are mere abstractions apart from it. In short, Bradley gives us no real explanation of appearances, but only 'on the wholes' and 'somehows' and metaphors of 'transmutation,' 'submersion,' and the like. If the Absolute is beyond all its appearances, it cannot be described in terms of them, and separates hopelessly from them; even our highest experience does not bridge the gap, and we have degrees of appearance only, not of reality. Appearances as finite have no place in the Absolute; but as transmuted in the Absolute, they have no meaning or value for finite beings. The second paper is an examination of Pragmatism, as represented by the writings of James and Schiller. The problem of Pragmatism is the nature of knowledge and truth. The philosopher and the plain man alike regard truth as determinate and independent of our thought. But we must remember that the 'facts' we oppose to false 'theories' are the facts *as we know them*. The 'necessity' of truth is a necessity of our own thought and experience, not something imposed from without. The 'independence' of truth consists in the fact that as knowledge advances, we feel a necessity to make the advance along certain lines, and on looking back, find the later stages implied in the earlier. To avoid the idea of an infinite process, we postulate a perfect ideal state realizing itself. But if truth

is eternal, what is the significance of knowledge? Or if truth and reality are not found outside knowledge and experience, must not reality share the character of experience? Such is the contention of Pragmatism. Its central doctrine is the *purposiveness* of our whole mental life. In knowledge, as in action, we seek to pass from an unsatisfactory situation to a satisfactory, consistent, harmonious one. There is nothing arbitrary about this process; the conflicting hypotheses grow out of the situation itself, and the one ultimately taken as 'true' is that which best solves the difficulties. Truth and the reasons leading us to recognize it are two sides of the one process, and cannot be understood in abstraction from each other. Where we deny any connection between a man's acceptance of a theory and its truth, it is because he is incompetent, and does not rightly see the problem; the expert, the man conversant with and keenly interested in the facts to be explained, is the real judge of the truth of a theory. The acquisition of knowledge depends on a definite interest in the problem. The 'given' is that which opposes our wills, checks our purposes; as soon as we master it, it becomes part of our world. The will is not something blind and irrational; rather, thought and will are inseparable, each involving the other. The 'objective' is that part of experience which is relatively independent of our wills, the 'subjective,' that which is more controllable by will; through the interaction of the two experience grows and develops. In saying that all axioms were originally postulates, the pragmatist need not hold that explicitly formulated postulates arose as 'variations' and 'survived' in a 'struggle for existence'; he means simply that the concrete assumptions of our experience, explicit or implicit, are not absolute, and that experience alone can determine the sphere of their validity. The law of contradiction, *e. g.*, is abstract; apply it to time and change, and its limitations at once appear. No axiom or scientific law is immutably true; all are subject to correction by further experience, though of course the longer any conception goes without needing modification, the less the likelihood of its needing it in the future. Our ethical and religious conceptions, too, begin as postulates, and the test of their truth is whether they 'work,' whether they make a difference in practical life. By acting as if they were true, we help make them true. Feeling and will play a legitimate part in deciding the issue where reason alone could not decide. In our active life, Prof. James holds, we must be indeterminists; the postulate of determinism is indispensable in science, but loses its heuristic value when applied to the concrete practical life of man. Teleology, not mechanical determination, rules our practical life. But when theories or values conflict, can pragmatism, based as it is on the *psychological* facts of cognition, afford any objective standard to reconcile them? Can it explain the different orders of 'fact,' from the merely 'given' to the abstract general laws of science? An ultimate reality is admittedly needed to harmonize our divergent purposes; but the pragmatist gives only a vague and unsatisfactory account of that reality. He would make ethical values

paramount, but it is hard to see by what right, since ethical values are only one of the many conflicting sets of values. As for truth values, the pragmatist gives us at best merely a psychology of belief, leaving the problem of validity untouched. Psychology, with its method of retrospective self-observation, can only analyze judgment as a mental process, but can never reach the living judgment with its claim to validity. Judgment is always, to be sure, a process in an individual mind; yet all individual minds are part of a common world. All human life and work, in thought or in action, forms a single whole. This whole, this *Arbeitswelt*, as Eucken has called it, is no unreal abstraction, any more than is science, the state, or society. In such a conception we seem to find a reconciliation of the claims of Pragmatism and Absolutism, taking account of the purposiveness and progress of our concrete life on the one hand, and of the need of a unifying standard of truth and value on the other.

F. D. MITCHELL.

The Total Context of Transcendentalism. C. V. TOWER. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., II, 16, pp. 421-428.

Beginning with the conclusions of a preceding paper, the author points out the difference between an object thought of as thing, process, or event, and the same object thought of as experienced in consciousness. Besides the object and the emphatic context, there is nothing in the experience of the moment but the indefinite fringes or unused associable material, and these 'fringes' are significant. The thought that this 'total context,' including the neglected experiences, constitutes a system which would be pertinent in the final definition of the object is the thought of the object as in or present to consciousness, and consciousness itself arises through the fact that there are two possible subjects or subject-contexts in any experience to which the object may be referred. One of these is the special context which defines the object, giving to it its specific character; the other is the 'total context' which defines it only as object of 'consciousness.' The enviroing 'fringe' constitutes the representative aspect of the concept and the 'pull of the fringe' the 'relational feeling.' In judgment also, we are under the control of an ideal complex or system of which subject and predicate are momentarily regarded as aspects, and with reference to which the relation is affirmed or denied. Among prominent characteristics of the total context are the following: (1) In so far as we are conscious, it is not simply a fringe, but in some sort a system; (2) as regards content, it does not differ from the minor systems; (3) it is essentially purposive in character. The reasons for one's assigning to consciousness a subjective function are two, an ethical and a psychological one. The first is the identity of oneself and the 'total context' in the matter of purpose; the second is the identity of the 'total context' and one's 'biography' because they look alike.

MATTIE ALEXANDER MARTIN.

PSYCHOLOGY.

Rôle des sensations internes dans les émotions et dans la perception de la durée. REVAULT D'ALLONNES. Rev. Ph., XXX, 12, pp. 592-623.

This article is a clinical study of a case of visceral anæsthesia with total loss of emotion and inability to feel the passage of time. As, however, the patient's expressions of emotion are normal and properly adapted to the circumstances which occasion them, and her sensations of muscular movements are intact, the writer concludes that a change of emphasis in the Lange-James theory of emotion is necessary. It is not sensations of muscular movement, but sensations from the viscera that are essential for emotional experience; for when all visceral sensations are lacking, the emotions become, as in the case studied, mere intellectual inclinations without affective tone.

S. P. HAYES.

Le préjugé intellectualiste et le préjugé finaliste dans les théories de l'expression. G. DUMAS. Rev. Ph., XXX, 12, pp. 561-582.

In previous experimental studies, the characteristic muscular contractions of the smile have been shown to represent not an acquired coördination, but a natural anatomical complex. Electric stimulation of the facial nerve and clinical observations of mania and melancholia tend to identify the smile with hypertonicity, the expression of melancholy with hypotonicity of the muscles innervated by the facial nerve. The customary appearance of the smile reflex in response to moderate, hence agreeable, stimuli justifies its treatment as an expression of emotion. Since, however, the laws of reflex response, of least resistance, and of conscious imitation suffice for the explanation of its origin and meaning, the retention of the rationalistic and teleological interpretations of Wundt and Darwin is inexcusable. While neither Wundt, Darwin, nor Spencer has utterly ignored the rôle of nervous excitement and depression in expressive movement, all have failed to recognize their fundamental significance. Analysis of the characteristic facial expressions of joy, sadness, fear and anger shows each explicable in terms merely of the variations of tonicity effected by physical or mental causes. As already observed by Lange, joy and grief represent moderate, fear and anger immoderate, excitement or depression of motor centers. The artificial intellectualistic and teleological interpretation of Wundt and Darwin, based either on the previous activity of judgment and reason, or on the action of natural selection in a remote past, involve the slighting of these simple physiological laws. Clinical evidence indicates that the organic correlates of gaiety and depression are likewise heightenings or depressions of internal metabolism, corresponding to alterations of central tonus. In these alterations vaso dilations and constrictions are effects rather than causes. The association of ideas and the general course of mental events is also determinable by the tonicity of the psychic centers. In summary, the fundamental laws of our

psychical and biological life are those of excitement and depression, expressing themselves in the suspense, slackening or acceleration of our organic and psychical functions.

E. MURRAY.

Qui a découvert les phénomènes dits 'inconscients' ? F. MENTRÉ. Rev. de Ph., VI, 3, pp. 255-273.

The purpose of this article is not to trace the history of the discovery of the subconscious world, but simply to determine the part of Maine de Biran in the discovery. His part is more important than has hitherto been recognized. As is seen in his writings, he himself did not mistake the importance of the theory of the subconscious, which was very dear to him; and he was jealous of his originality in the matter. Though perhaps he followed his predecessors in the metaphysical conception (*cf.* Leibniz), yet his glory is to have given the notion a psychological foundation—a task for which he was well fitted by temperament. In order to escape the difficulties inherent in the psychology of Descartes, on the one side, and that of Condillac, on the other, he posits a pure *état affectif*, a state psychic but not organic. And this hypothesis, he maintains, is supported by observation of the degrees of consciousness, by reasoning from the principle of causality, and by experimentation. In general, Mentré seems to insist that Biran is responsible for the psychological part of the doctrine of the subconscious.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

The Problem of the Subconscious. I. KING. Psych. Rev., XIII, 1, pp. 35-49.

A working hypothesis of the relation of the conscious to the subconscious, or unconscious, is needed. The theory recently advanced by Boris Sidis is objectionable in that it assumes the existence of concomitant conscious centers or moments of varying intensities, *i. e.*, a psychical substratum to self-consciousness. The assumption that every neurosis must be attended by its psychosis is harmonious neither with the accepted unitary nature of consciousness, nor with the evidence of automatic nervous action in ourselves. The theory advanced by the writer assumes as a background a continuum of neural processes and tensions, more or less definitely organized. When the automatic arrangements of the organism prove inadequate, consciousness supervenes, and functions as a synthetizing and adjusting activity. The conscious process itself is the unique accompaniment of a peculiar organization of neural processes, and is to be imaged as a point, not a configuration. The neural spatial figure of a system of graded intensities shading off into the subconscious represents a confusion of the neural and psychical. The subconscious is a merely physical mass of neural dispositions, tensions, remnants of habits, and actual processes which though unrelated to the central system of the moment may be in a measure

organized as a result of habit or hereditary predisposition. Chance establishment of connections with, or shift of, the center of activity may raise an unconscious neural system to consciousness, as in the case of hypnosis or of double personality.

ELSIE MURRAY.

Malebranche's Theory of the Perception of Distance and Magnitude.

NORMAN SMITH. Br. J. Ps., I, 3, pp. 191-204.

This article proposes to give an account of Malebranche's theory of the perception of distance and magnitude in connection with his general philosophical position, and as an anticipation of Berkeley's theory. Malebranche is closer to the facts in recognizing the immediacy of such perceptions and the intellectual processes involved in them. His occasionalistic explanation conceals the crucial problem as to the connection between the given sensations and the resulting perceptions, merely reducing perception to sensation. The signs of distance and magnitude, viz., the angle formed by the optic axes, the muscular sensations accompanying focusing, the magnitude of the retinal image, its distinctness, and the number and kind of intervening objects, are "compound sensations." He held that a mental estimate of perceived (not known) distance affects the actual perception of size, thus accounting for the varying size of the moon at the horizon and in mid-heavens. The judgments obviously involved in the perception of distance are irresistible and involuntary "natural judgments," formed simultaneously with the occurrence of the sensations, and interpreting various and complex data. They are not constructions of conscious activity, but are presented to the mind by God on the occasion of certain compound sensations produced in the body. Individual apprehension of the bodily signs, being intellectual, would play no part in the judgment, which is not an inference from them. This occasionalistic explanation is ultimately due to the Cartesian dualism between thought and sense. Perception must be sensational, since thought deals only with pure concepts. But occasionalism cannot give to the intellectual processes which Malebranche recognizes in perception, any true significance in a dualistic philosophy.

MARY WINIFRED SPRAGUE.

The Unity of Mental Life. FELIX ARNOLD. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., II, 18, pp. 487-493.

My present moment is all that I have and contains in itself all the unity possible for passing states. From the unity of the visual field and the awareness that my body is assuming certain attitudes, arises a disposition to view my present state of consciousness as unitary. Through my interpretation of the meaning of my present state as summing up the series of past states, representative unity is obtained.

S. P. HAYES.

Interest and Attention. FELIX ARNOLD. Psych. Bul., II, 11, pp. 361-368.

At present interest is considered sometimes as feeling, sometimes as attention, now as will, and again as sensationalist excitation. The author recommends that we restrict attention to cover that state of affairs in which there is the greatest clearness *plus* the motor adjustments, and interest to that meaning of the object which refers to the future. In the total attention-interest complex we have (on the side of attention) clearness and distinctness of the mental state, accompanied by felt tensions due to end organ and other adjustments, and associative processes aiding to hold the present moment in the focus; and on the side of interest, in addition to body tensions, a body attitude due to the tendency serially to realize the meaning in the present, with reference to the future.

S. P. HAYES.

ETHICS AND ÆSTHETICS.

The Knowledge of Good. W. R. SORLEY. The Hibbert Journal, 111, 3, pp. 543-557.

The immediate judgments of experience are judgments of fact and judgments of worth. The two kinds of judgment are always more or less connected in experience; the former are the foundations of science, but though the method is invaluable to ethics, it can never give any answer to the question: 'What is good?' The moral concept is expressed in various ways. We shall note particularly the concept 'duty' and that of 'goodness' and discuss two views as to their relation: (1) goodness is a quality having no immediate reference to volition and which acquires such only by circumstances; (2) goodness is a quality of things only by virtue of their production by a good will; it has reference to an ideal having claims upon the will also. The ethical concept is formed from moral experience, whose special characteristic is its critical attitude. The question is: Does our moral experience support the assignment of the predicate 'good' or 'bad' to things regarded as quite independent of volition or consciousness? Apparently not, but more serious are Mill's and Huxley's arraignment of Nature for 'injustice' and 'cruelty'; still careful thought will show that both are either only incidental in criticisms of philosophical theories, or imply consciousness in the things approved or condemned. Thus, the dictum of moral experience seems to be that the good is a quality only in relation to self-conscious activity. And, in so far, the peculiarity of the moral experience seems better represented by the concept 'ought.' Does this not, however, presuppose the antecedent 'goodness'? The 'duty' judgment binds the individual to a certain objective rule or end: he is connected with a larger purpose, becoming, in his consciousness, both ideal and law. It is impossible to distinguish between 'good' and 'ought to be.' The concept 'ought to be' becomes the concept 'ought to be done by me,' when applied to a special individual under special circumstances.

The latter gives the concept of duty ; the former the concept of goodness, — objective, universal, absolute. From this doctrine of the significance and application of the ethical concept, we see that, though the criticism of the latter proceeds upon the same lines as that of scientific concepts, the material itself is essentially different.

MATTIE ALEXANDER MARTIN.

Les lois de la solidarité morale. G. RICHARD. Rev. Ph., XXX, 11, pp. 441-471.

The social sciences are much differentiated. We need some synthetic mediating science which will have a practical bearing. Such is that of the laws of moral solidarity. There are two conceptions of the nature of that solidarity, and hence of the cause of moral evil or crime, which is the aspect of it we shall first consider. The critical theory which M. Richard assumes, holds that it is the consequence of organic taint and general social conditions. The positive theory, on the other hand, holds it to be the result of direct hereditary and special social conditions. History is the study of the development of social groups. The isolation of a group favors consolidation, but results in stagnation. Subjection to outside influences, if rapid, gives a marked increase in criminal returns. Rural groups, *e. g.*, in France, before and after the recent industrial revolution, show this clearly. Crime in such cases is the inevitable product of the psychological infantilism and social parasitism induced by the extreme soliditary, prohibiting adaptation to industrial variation. Perhaps there is something in Nietzsche's protest on this score. Religion, as a system of taboo, is a recognition of the weakness and strength of social solidarity. Note here Kant's dictum that the notion of evil is the motive of moral effort. The consciousness of crime, as the growing pains of a group, is the birth of moral effort in its members. The progress of a group is then at once in consequence of, yet in spite of, social solidarity, — or rather, social solidarity cures itself.

W. BAILEY.

NOTES.

I would like a little space for the correction of some misunderstandings in Professor Gardiner's review of my *Problems of Philosophy* in the last number of the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. On certain matters, differences of opinion may be legitimate enough for me not to invite discussion, and I do not intend to do this. I desire only to correct a few misapprehensions regarding my meaning on specific points criticised. I shall not take up the point about my distinction between epistemology and metaphysics as that would lead to discussion. I do not believe for a moment that epistemology has anything to do with the question "how ideas must be conceived as related to reality and reality to ideas." It was because I do not believe this that I distinguished between the two fields of inquiry. But let that pass.

The accusation that I seem never "fairly to have grasped what idealism really means" may be either admitted or denied as I please. I may first say that I very carefully stated that, as I defined it, I both accepted it and regarded it as a truism, but that I did not expect to solve any problems with it. I was careful not to say more because I think we have yet to find any clear ideas by the professed idealists as to what they themselves mean. I was not opposing idealism in my book except with a qualification. My whole polemic was a challenge to make the doctrine clear, and as I did not care a penny whether it was true or false, I could only take the course which would show its relation to realism and materialism in the discussions of most of our philosophers. I quite agree that there is no tendency of the idealists to be 'solipsists,' a fact which shows that their views do not oppose any but naïve realism, which no philosopher, not even Hamilton, holds. Then I undertook to show that it was not opposed to materialism in its meaning affecting the real problems of philosophy. Unless it is opposed to some view of the universe worth talking about, I do not see any reason for strongly insisting on its importance. Its assertion is like contending that the cosmos is held together by gravitation and not force. My idealist is not a solipsist. I merely said he would have to be this in order to give any definite meaning to his contention in terms of present thought. I knew very well, and said so, that he is not a solipsist, and for that reason I considered that he has still to show us what he means by his doctrine. When the idealist tells me clearly what his view is I shall say whether I agree with him or not. In the meantime I do not care whether he is right or wrong until I know what problems he expects to solve by it.

I did not "stake the metaphysical issue on the scientific evidence for immortality," and in making this denial I have in mind only the distinction which Professor Gardiner draws in regard to temporary survival and eternal persistence. I staked the metaphysical issue on the solution of a *future* life. I have found in recent years that many people, and I am sorry

to say that even philosophers, misunderstand what has really been meant by this question of immortality. In my book I treat usually the two ideas as the same, and am not thinking of eternity at all. I made that clear in identifying the two conceptions and discussing the whole problem as it centers about the phenomenon of death. I was using the term 'immortality' in its negative sense, the only sense of which it is rationally capable. That was the ancient and historical idea of it, in my opinion, that is, *not mortal*. Any other meaning is an evasion of the real issue in men's minds, and sets up a conception which would make it equally impossible to talk about the eternity of God, the indestructibility of matter, or the conservation of energy. It is curious to see men gravely admit the indestructibility of matter, and then, after admitting the possibility that the soul might survive death a short time, stickle on the question of its eternity and forget that they might as well discuss that of matter in the same sense. That would give metaphysics just the conception which the man of the world has of it. I was not discussing the "ultimate conservation of spiritual values," but the relative conservation of them, and I think that ought to have been clear to all who are not infatuated with useless metaphysical problems.

I still contend that Kant's argument for immortality was the disparity between virtue and happiness, while admitting that he used the same fact to prove the existence of God. I did not make it the direct conclusion, and I would only have to produce an *epicheirema* or a *sorites* to show it.

I want no better proof of my contention that Kant does not use his categories to interpret, but only to systematize experience, than the passage to which my critic refers (*Proleg.*, § 30).

On the matter of his not illustrating causal judgments my language is undoubtedly not so clear as it should have been. I had in mind illustrations of it as determining *formal* judgments. The context shows that I had this in mind. I was well enough aware that Kant had spoken of and had used examples of causal judgment in his works, but I should here have inserted the word *formal* to indicate my meaning more clearly.

The passages mentioned in which Kant is said to have given evidence of the ideality of space were never thought by me to be either evidence of it or relevant to the conception which he had advanced in the *Kritik*.

I am glad to be corrected about Empedocles. My error was a slip of the memory. I have Professor Royce to thank for the correction of an allusion to the *Apology* of Plato. I am equally thankful for corrections about slips in English, all of which were due to the effort at brevity, which it seems I could not effect even then to satisfaction.

JAMES H. HYSLOP.

Professor Frank Thilly, of Princeton University, has been called to Cornell University as professor of philosophy.

Dr. E. H. Hollands, of Cornell University, has been appointed instructor in philosophy at Princeton University.

Dr. J. W. Baird, of Johns Hopkins University, has been appointed to take charge of the work in experimental psychology at the University of Illinois.

The well known philosophical thinker, K. R. Eduard von Hartmann, died at his home near Berlin, June 6, 1906. He was born February 23, 1842, and was educated for the Prussian army, but resigned his commission in 1865, after sustaining an injury which incapacitated him for active service. He then devoted himself to philosophical writing. He produced many works, among which the following are perhaps the best known: *Die Philosophie des Unbewussten*, 1869; *Schellings positive Philosophie*, 1869; *Wahrheit und Irrtum im Darwinismus*, 1875; *Zur Geschichte und Begründung des Pessimismus*, 1880; *Deutsche Ästhetik seit Kant*, 1886; *Lotzes Philosophie*, 1888; *Kants Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik in den vier Perioden ihrer Entwicklung*, 1893; *Geschichte der Metaphysik*, 1899-1900; *Die Weltanschauung der modernen Physik*, 1902.

S. P. Hayes, Ph.D. (Cornell, 1906), has been appointed associate professor of psychology at Mt. Holyoke College.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals:

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XIII, 3: Frontispiece: Gustav Theodor Fechner; The Fechner Number: Editorial Note; *Lillian J. Martin*, An Experimental Study of Fechner's Principles of Æsthetics; A Case of Pseudo-Chromæsthesia; Announcement.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, III, 4: *G. M. Stratton*, The Character of Consciousness; *E. F. Buchner*, Psychological Progress in 1905; Psychological Literature; Books Received; Notes and News.

III, 5: *John B. Watson*, The Need of an Experiment Station for the Study of Certain Problems in Animal Behavior; Psychological Literature; *Frank N. Freeman*, Meeting of Experimental Psychologists; Books Received; Notes and News.

MIND, No. 58: *Norman Smith*, Avenarius' Philosophy of Pure Experience, II; *F. C. S. Schiller*, The Ambiguity of Truth; *W. H. Winch*, Psychology and Philosophy of Play; *A. O. Lovejoy*, Kant's Antithesis of Dogmatism and Criticism; Discussions; Critical Notices; New Books; Philosophical Periodicals; Note: Mind Association.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XVI, 3: *Josiah Royce*, Race Questions and Prejudices; *John MacCunn*, The Ethical Doctrine of Aristotle; *Hartley B. Alexander*, The Evolution of Ideals; *J. G. James*, Religious Revivals; *M. S. Henderson*, Some Thoughts Underlying Meredith's Poems; *Dickinson S. Miller*, Matthew Arnold on the "Powers" of Life; *Gustav Spiller*, A Method of Dealing with the Labor Problem; Book Reviews.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XVII, 2: *Alvin Borgquist*, Crying; *Edmund H. Hollands*, Wundt's Doctrine of Psychological Analy-

sis and the Psychical Elements, and Some Recent Criticism ; *Elsie Murray*, Peripheral and Central Factors in Memory Images of Visual Form and Color ; *James P. Porter*, Further Study of the English Sparrow and Other Birds ; *A. F. and I. C. Chamberlain*, Hypnagogic Images and Bi-Vision in Early Childhood ; *Lillien J. Martin*, The Electrical Supply in the New Psychological Laboratory at the Leland Stanford, Jr., University ; Psychological Literature ; Book Notes.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, III, 7 : *J. R. Angell*, Recent Discussion of Feeling ; *J. A. Leighton*, Cognitive Thought and Immediate Experience ; *W. H. Sheldon*, The Quarrel about Transcendancy ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

III, 8 : *Edward G. Spaulding*, The Ground of the Validity of Knowledge ; *Mary S. Case*, Professor Calkins's Mediation ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

III, 9 : *E. A. Norris*, Thought Revealed as a Feeling Process in Introspection ; *W. G. Chambers*, Memory Types of Colorado Pupils ; *F. C. S. Schiller*, Thought and Immediacy ; *Henry Rutgers Marshall*, A Note to Professor Angell ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

III, 10 : *John Dewey*, Reality as Experience ; *Edward G. Spaulding*, The Ground of the Validity of Knowledge, II ; Societies ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

III, 11 : *W. P. Montague*, On the Nature of Induction ; *Frank C. Becker*, The Final Edition of Spencer's 'First Principles : Part I' ; Final Statements in the Discussion between Professor Miner and Dr. Baird ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

THE MONIST, XVI, 2 : *Hans Kleinpeter*, On the Monism of Professor Mach ; *Alice Grenfell*, Egyptian Mythology and the Bible ; *George W. Shaw*, The Period of the Exodus ; *Editor*, The Soul in Science and Religion ; *J. Arthur Harris*, The Experimental Data of the Mutation Theory ; *Lucien Arréat*, France : Three Recent Works on Christian Thought and Catholicism ; Criticisms and Discussions ; Book Reviews and Notes.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL, IV, 3 : *D. C. Butler*, Is the Religion of the Spirit a Working Religion for Mankind ? *J. E. Carpenter*, How Japanese Buddhism Appeals to a Christian Theist ; *E. S. Drown*, Does Christian Belief Require Metaphysics ; *J. W. Diggle*, Mr. Birrell's Choice ; *Henry Jones*, The Working Faith of the Social Reformer, III ; *E. G. Gardner*, St. Catherine of Siena ; *W. Jones-Davies*, The Laws and Limits of Development in Christian Doctrine ; The Salvation of the Body by Faith ; *T. W. Rolleston*, The Resurrection ; *Sir Oliver Lodge*, Christianity and Science, II ; Discussions ; Reviews ; Bibliography of Recent Literature.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, XLI, 2 u. 3: *G. Heymans*, Untersuchungen über psychische Hemmung (Schluss); *Kurt Goldstein*, Merkfähigkeit, Gedächtnis und Assoziation (Schluss); *Max Foth*, Wie rahmen wir unsere Bilder ein? *Richard Hohenemser*, Die Quarte als Zusammenklang; Literaturbericht.

XLI, 4: *David Katz*, Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis der Kinderzeichnungen; *Erich Jaensch*, Über die Beziehungen von Zeitschätzung und Bewegungsempfindung; *Erich Jaensch*, Über Täuschungen des Tastsinns; Literaturbericht.

XLI, 5 u. 6: *Ludwig Burmester*, Theorie der geometrisch-optischen Gestalttäuschungen; *Anton Ölzelt-Newin*, Beobachtungen über das Leben der Protozoen; *Erich Jaensch*, Über Täuschungen des Tastsinns (Schluss); *Erwin Ackerknecht*, Zur Konzentrationsfähigkeit des Träumenden; Literaturbericht.

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, XII, 3: *Lewis Robinson*, Untersuchungen über Spinozas Metaphysik; *W. A. Heidel*, Qualitative Change in Pre-Socratic Philosophy; *Arthur Lovejoy*, On Kant's Reply to Hume; Jahresbericht.

ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE, XII, 1: *Kurt Geissler*, Über Begriffe, Definitionen und mathematische Phantasie; *B. Lemcke*, De voluntate: Metaphysische Axiome einer Empfindungslehre; *Hoffmann*, Exakte Darstellung aller Urteile und Schlüsse; *Richard Skala*, Bei welchen Tatsachen findet die wissenschaftliche Begründung der Erscheinungen ihre Grenzen; *Bernhard Witjes*, Humes Theorie der Leichtgläubigkeit der Menschen und Kritik dieser Theorie, nebst Versuch einer eigenen Erklärung; *Ernst Schwarz*, Über Phantasiegefühle; *Lorenz Pohorilles*, Die Metaphysik des xx. Jahrhunderts als induktive Wissenschaft; *James Lindsay*, Two Forms of Monism; Jahresbericht.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE, XXX, 1: *Siegfried Kraus*, Ein Beitrag zur Erkenntnis der sozialwissenschaftlichen Bedeutung des Bedürfnisses; *Richard v. Schubert-Soldern*, Über die Bedeutung des erkenntnistheoretischen Solipsismus und über den Begriff der Induktion; *H. Reybekiel-Schapiro*, Die introspektive Methode in der modernen Psychologie; Besprechungen über Schriften; Selbstanzeige; Philosophische Zeitschriften; Bibliographie; Notiz.

REVUE NÉO-SCOLASTIQUE, XIII, 1: *Edg. Janssens*, Un problème 'pascalien': Le plan de l'apologie (suite); *G. Ysselmunden*, L'induction baconienne; *Fr. A. de Poulpiquet*, Le point central de la controverse sur la distinction de l'essence et de l'existence; *Simon Deploige*, Le conflit de la morale et de la sociologie (suite); Mélanges et documents; Bulletin de l'Institut de Philosophie; Comptes-rendus.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XIV, 2: *J. Lachelier*, La proposition et le syllogisme; *G. Belot*, En quête d'une morale positive (Fin); *Mario Pieri*, Sur la compatibilité des axiomes de l'arithmétique;

L. Couturat, Pour la logistiquè ; *C. Bouglé*, Note sur les origines chrétien du solidarisme ; Supplement.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XXXI, 3 : *Fr. Paulhan*, Le mensonge du monde ; *F. Pillon*, Sur la philosophie de Renouvier ; *Ch. Ribéry*, Le caractère et le tempérament ; *Brenier de Montmorand*, Hystérie et mysticisme ; *Segond*, Le moralisme de Kant et l'amoralisme contemporain ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Revue des périodiques étrangers.

XXXI, 4 : *G. Compayré*, La psychologie de l'adolescence ; *G. Belot*, Esquisse d'une morale positive ; *P. Gaultier*, Le rôle social de l'art ; *Luquet*, Note sur un cas d'association des idées ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Revue des périodiques étrangers ; Livres nouveaux.

XXXI, 5 : *Adrien Naville*, La sociologie abstraite et ses divisions ; *Th. Ribot*, Qu'est-ce qu'une passion ? *Mauxion*, L'intellectualisme et la théorie physiologique des émotions ; *Probst Biraben*, Contribution du saufisme à l'étude du mysticisme universel ; *B. Bourdon*, Sur le rôle de la tête dans la perception de l'espace ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Revue des périodiques étrangers ; Livres nouveaux.

JOURNAL DE PSYCHOLOGIE NORMALE ET PATHOLOGIQUE, III, 2 : *Ingegnieros*, Les troubles du langage musical chez les hystériques ; *G. R. d'Allonnes*, L'explication physiologique de l'émotion ; Bibliographie.

III, 3 : *G. R. d'Allonnes*, Le sentiment du mystère chez les aliénés ; *A. Marie* et *M. Viollet*, L'envoûtement moderne ; *Cl. Charpentier*, Quelques temps de réaction chez les aliénés ; Bibliographie.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE, VI, 4 : *F. Warrain*, La triade de la réalité ; *José Ingegnieros*, La psychophysiologie du langage musical ; *G. Bertier*, La beauté rationnelle ; Périodiques ; Analyses et comptes rendus.

VI, 5 : *W. James*, Le pragmatisme ; *Baron Charles Mourre*, La dualité du moi dans les sentiments ; *F. Warrain*, Le principes des mathématiques de M. Couturat et la métaphysique ; *R. Meunier*, Une hygiène philosophique : Le végétarisme ; *C. G. Dubray*, Périodiques américains ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Fiches bibliographiques.

RIVISTA FILOSOFICA, IX, 1 : *C. Cantoni*, Sull'idealismo critico ; *B. Varisco*, Fisica e filosofia ; *G. Vailati*, La teoria del definire e del classificare in Platone e i rapporti di essa colla teoria delle idee ; *A. Pagano*, La sociologia e l'insegnamento secondario e superiore (fine) ; *A. Faggi*, A proposito di una teoria Epicurea ; Rassegna bibliografica ; Notizie e pubblicazioni ; Concorsi a premi ; Necrologio ; Sommari delle riviste straniere ; Libri ricevuti.

IX, 2 : *G. Calò*, L'etica di Giorgio T. Ladd ; *G. Chiabra*, La psicologia matematica dell'Herbart et la psicofisica moderna ; *G. Bonfiglioli*, La gnoseologia di Tertulliano nei suoi rapporti colla filosofia antica ; *A. Ferro*, Meccanismo e teleologia ; *O. Zanotti Bianco*, Schopenhauer e la gravitazione universale ; Rassegna bibliografica ; Notizie e pubblicazioni ; Sommari delle riviste straniere ; Libri ricevuti.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

EXPERIENCE AND OBJECTIVE IDEALISM.

IDEALISM as a philosophic system stands in such a delicate relation to experience as to invite attention. In its subjective form, or sensationalism, it claims to be the last word of empiricism. In its objective, or rational form, it claims to make good the deficiencies of the subjective type, by emphasizing the work of thought which supplies the factors of objectivity and universality lacking in sensationalism. With reference to experience *as it now is*, such idealism is half opposed to empiricism and half committed to it, — antagonistic, so far as existing experience is regarded as tainted with a sensational character ; favorable, so far as thought renders this experience even now prophetic of some final, all-comprehensive, or absolute experience, which in truth is one with reality.

That this combination of opposition to present experience and devotion to the cause of experience in the abstract leaves objective idealism in a position of unstable equilibrium from which it can find release only by euthanasia in a thorough-going empiricism seems to me evident. Some of the reasons for this belief may be readily approached by a summary sketch of three historic episodes in which have emerged important conceptions of experience and of reason. The first takes us to classic Greek thought. Here experience means the preservation, through memory, of the net result of a multiplicity of particular doings and sufferings ; and in such a way as to afford positive skill in maintaining further practice, and promise of success in new emergencies. The craft of the carpenter, the art of the physician are standing examples of its meaning. It differs from instinct

and blind routine or servile practice because there is some knowledge of materials, methods, and aims, in their adjustment to one another. Yet the marks of its passive, habitual origin are indelibly stamped upon it. On the knowledge side it can never aspire beyond opinion, and if this be true opinion, it is such only by happy chance. On the active side it is limited to the accomplishment of a special work or a particular product, following some unjustified, because assumed, method. Thus it contrasts with the true knowledge of reason, which is direct apprehension, self-revealing and self-validating, of its own eternal and harmonious content. This accounts for the regions in which experience and reason respectively hold sway. Experience has to do with production, which, in turn, is relative to decay. It deals with generation, becoming, not with finality, being. Hence it is infected with the trait of relative non-being, of mere imitativeness, characteristic of reality subjected to conditions of change ; hence its multiplicity, its logical inadequacy, its relativity to a standard and end beyond itself. Reason, *per contra*, has to do with meaning, with significance (ideas, forms), which is eternal and ultimate. Since the meaning of anything is the worth, the good, the end of that thing, experience presents us with partial and tentative efforts to achieve the embodiment of purpose, under conditions which doom the attempt to inconclusiveness. It has, however, its meed of reality in the degree in which its results *participate* in meaning, the good, reason.

From this classic period, then, comes the antithesis of experience as the historically achieved special *embodiments* of meaning, partial, multiple, insecure ; and of reason as the source, author, and container of *meaning*, permanent, assured, unified. Idealism means ideality, experience means brute and broken facts. That things exist because of and for the sake of meaning, and that experience gives us meaning in a servile, interrupted, and inherently deficient way — such is the standpoint. Experience gives us meaning as in process of becoming ; special and isolated instances in which it *happens*, temporally, to appear, rather than meaning pure, undefiled, independent. It represents purpose, the good struggling against obstacles, ‘involved in matter.’

Just how much of the vogue of modern neo-Kantian idealism, logically built upon a strictly epistemological, instead of upon a cosmological basis, is due, in days of a declining theology, to a vague sense that affirming the function of reason in the constitution of a knowable, or objective world (which in its own constitution as logically knowable may be anything you please, morally and spiritually), carries an assurance of the superior reality of normative values, of the good and the beautiful as well as of the 'true,' it would be hard to say. Certainly unction seems to have descended upon it, in apostolic succession, from classic idealism; so that neo-Kantianism is rarely without a tone of edification, as if feeling itself the patron of man's spiritual interests in contrast to the supposed crudeness and insensitiveness of naturalism and empiricism. At all events, we find here one element in our problem: Experience considered as the summary of past episodic adventures and happenings in relation to fulfilled and adequately expressed meaning; idealism as ideality against experience, as struggle and failure to achieve meaning.

The second historic event centers about the controversy of innate ideas, or pure concepts. The issue is between empiricism and rationalism as theories of the origin and validity of scientific knowledge. The empiricist is he who feels that the chief obstacle preventing scientific method from making its way is the belief in pure thoughts, not derived from particular observations and hence not responsible, to the course of experience. His objection to the 'high *a priori* road' is that it introduces in irresponsible fashion a mode of presumed knowledge which may be used at any turn to stand sponsor for mere tradition and prejudice, and thus to nullify the results of science resting upon and verified by observable facts. Experience thus comes to mean, to use the words of Peirce, "that which is forced upon a man's recognition will-he, nill-he, and shapes his thoughts to something quite different from what they naturally would have taken."¹ The same definition is found in James, in his chapter on Necessary Truths: "Experience means experience of something foreign supposed to impress us whether spontaneously or in consequence of our own exertions and acts."² As Peirce points out, this notion of experience as

¹ C. S. Peirce, *Monist*, Vol. XVI, p. 150.

² *Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 618.

the foreign element which forces the hand of thought, and controls its efficacy, goes back to Locke. Experience is "observation employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds"¹—as furnishing in short all the valid data and tests of thinking and knowledge. This meaning, thinks Peirce, should be accepted "as a land-mark which it would be a crime to disturb or displace."

The contention of idealism, bound up here with rationalism, is that perception and observation cannot guarantee knowledge in its honorific sense (science); that the peculiar differentia of scientific knowledge is a constancy, a universality and necessity, which contrast at every point with perceptual data, and which indispensably require the function of conception.² In short, *qualitative transformation of facts* (data of perception), not their mechanical subtraction and recombination, is the difference between scientific knowledge and perceptual knowledge. Here the problem which emerges is, of course, the significance of perception and of conception in respect to experience.³

The third typical episode reverses in a curious manner (which confuses present discussion) the notion of experience as a foreign, alien, coercive material. It regards experience as a fortuitous association, by merely psychic connections, of individualistic states of consciousness. This is due to the Humian development of Locke. The 'objects' and 'operations,' which to Locke were just given to, and secured in, observation, become shifting complexes of subjective sensations and ideas, whose apparent permanency is due to discoverable illusions. This, of course, is the empiricism which made Kant so uneasily toss in his dogmatic slumbers (which he took for an awakening); and which, by reaction, called out the conception of thought as a function operating not merely to elevate perceptual data to scientific status,

¹ *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, ch. 2, § 2.

² It is hardly necessary to refer to the stress placed upon mathematics, as well as upon fundamental propositions in logic, ethics and cosmology.

³ Of course there are internal historic connections between experience as effective "memory," and experience as "observation." But the motivation and stress, the problem, is quite shifted. It may be remarked that Hobbes still writes under the influence of the Aristotelian conception. "Experience is nothing but Memory," (*Elements of Philosophy*, Part I, ch. I, §2) and hence opposed it to science.

but as a function constitutive of the objective status, or knowable character, of even the perceptual data and their associative combinations.¹ Here emerges the third element in our problem : The function of thought as furnishing objectivity to any experience which has directly or indirectly cognitive reference or capacity, perceptual as well as scientific.

Summing up the matter, idealism stands forth with its assertion of thought or reason as (1) the sponsor for all significance, ideality, purpose, in experience, — the author of the good and the beautiful as well as the true ; (2) the power, located in pure conceptions, requisite to elevate perceptive or observational material to the plane of science ; and (3) the constitution which gives objectivity, even the semblance of order, system, connection, mutual reference, to empirical data which without its assistance would remain mere subjective flux.

I.

I begin the discussion with the last-named function. Thought is here conceived as *a priori*, not in the sense of particular innate ideas, but as a function that constitutes the very possibility of any objective experience, any experience involving reference beyond its own mere subjective happening. I shall try to show that idealism is condemned to move back and forth between two in-

¹ There are, of course, anticipations of Hume in Locke. But to regard Lockean experience as equivalent to Humian is to pervert history. Locke, as he was to himself and to the century succeeding him, was not a subjectivist, but in the main a common sense objectivist. It was this that gave him his historic influence. But so completely has the Hume-Kant controversy dominated recent thinking that it is constantly projected backward. Within a few weeks I have seen three articles, all insisting that the meaning of the term experience must be subjective, and stating or implying that those who take the term objectively are subverters of established usage ! But a casual study of the dictionary will reveal that experience has always meant "*what* is experienced," observation as a source of knowledge, as well as the act, fact or mode of experiencing. In the Oxford Dictionary, the (obsolete) sense of experimental testing, of actual 'observation of facts and events,' and 'the fact of being consciously affected by an act' have almost contemporaneous datings, viz., 1384, 1377, and 1382 respectively. A usage almost more objective than the second, the Lockean use, is "what has been experienced ; the events that have taken place within the knowledge of an individual, a community, mankind at large, either during a particular period or generally." This dates back to 1607. Let us have no more capacious criticisms and complaints based on falsely supposed linguistic usage.

consistent interpretations of this *a priori* thought. It is taken to mean both the organized, the regulated, the informed, established character of experience, an order immanent and constitutional; and that which organizes, regulates, forms, synthesizes, a power transcendent and noumenal. And the oscillation between and confusion of these two diverse senses is necessary to Neo-Kantian idealism. The first sense, if validated, would leave us at most an empirical fact, whose importance would make it none the less empirical. The second sense, by itself, would be so thoroughly transcendental, that while it would exalt 'thought' in theory, it would deprive the categories of that constitutional position *within* experience which is the exact point of Kant's supposed answer to Hume. Hence, an oscillation to the first sense, so that thought is supposed to be at once a deliberate, reflective, corrective, reorganizing function with respect to the defects of experience, while to it is also attributed an absolute and unconscious function in the original constitution of experience.

When Kant compared his work in philosophy to that of the men who introduced construction into geometry, and experimentation into physics and chemistry, the point of his remarks depends upon taking the *a priori* worth of thought in the regulative, directive, controlling sense, that of the importance of thought in consciously, intentionally, making an experience *different* in a *determinate* sense and manner. But the point of his answer to Hume consists in taking the *a priori* in the other sense, as something which *already* is immanent in *any* experience, and which accordingly makes no determinate difference to this experience as discriminated from that. So the concept first is that which makes an experience actually different, controlling its evolution towards consistency, coherency, and objective reliability; then, it is that which has already effected the organization of any and every experience that comes to consciousness at all. The fatal fallacy from which he never emerges consists in vibrating between the definition of a concept as a rule of constructive synthesis in a *differential* sense, and the definition of it as a static endowment lurking in 'mind,' and giving automatically a hard and fixed law for the determination of every experienced object. The concept of a triangle

taken geometrically, for example, means a determinate method for construing space elements; but it also means something which exists in the mind *prior* to all such geometrical constructions and unconsciously lays down the law not only for their conscious elaboration, but also for any space perception. The first of the meanings is intelligible, and marks a definite contribution to the logic of science. But it is not 'objective idealism'; it is a contribution to a revised empiricism. The second is a dark saying.

That organization of some sort exists in every experience I make no doubt. That isolation, discrepancy, the fragmentary, the incompatible, are brought to consciousness and function only with reference to some existential mode of organization seems clear. As against Hume, or even Locke, we may be duly grateful to Kant for enforcing acknowledgment of these facts. But the acknowledgment means simply an improved and revised empiricism.

For, be it noted, that this organization, first, is not the work of reason or thought, unless 'reason' be stretched beyond all identification, and, secondly, it has no sacrosanct or finally valid and worthful character. (1) Experience always carries with it and within it certain systematized arrangements, certain classifications (using the term without intellectualistic prejudice), coexistent and serial. If we attribute these to 'thought' then the structure of the brain of a Mozart which hears and recombines sounds into certain groupings, the psycho-physical visual habit of the Greek, the locomotor apparatus of the human body in the laying-out and plotting of space is also 'thought.' Social institutions, established political customs, effect and perpetuate modes of reaction and of perception which compel a certain grouping of objects, elements, and values. A national constitution brings about a definite arrangement of the factors of human action, which holds even physical things together in certain determinate orders. Every successful economic process, with its elaborate divisions and adjustments of labor, of materials and instruments, is just such an objective organization. Now it is one thing to say that thought has played a part in the origin and development

of such organizations, and continues to have a rôle in their judicious employment and applications, and another to say that these organizations *are* thought, or are its exclusive product. Thought which does function in these ways is distinctively *reflective* thought, thought as practical, volitional, deliberately exercised for specific aims — thought as an act, an art of skilled mediation. As *reflective* thought, its end is to terminate its own first and experimental forms, and to secure an organization which, while it may evoke new reflective thinking, puts an end to the thoughts which found expression in the organization. As *organizations*, as established, effectively controlling categorizations of objects in experience, their mark is that they are not thoughts, but habits, customs of action.¹

Moreover, such reflective thought as does intervene in the formation and maintenance of these practical organizations harks back to a prior practical organization, which is biological in nature. It serves to *value* organizations already existent as biological functions and instincts, while, as itself a biological activity, it redirects them to new conditions and results. Recognize, for example, that a geometric concept is the practical locomotor function of arranging stimuli in reference to maintenance of life activities *brought into consciousness*, and then serving as a center of reorganization of such activities to freer, more varied flexible and valuable forms; recognize this, and we have the truth of the Kantian idea, without its excrescences and miracles. The concept is the practical activity doing consciously and artfully what it has aforetime done blindly and aimlessly, and thereby not only doing it better but opening up a freer world of significant activities. Thought as such a reorganization of biological functions does naturally what Kantian forms and schematizations do supernaturally. In a word, the constructive or organizing activity of 'thought' does not inhere in thought as a transcendental function, a form or mode of some supra-empirical ego, mind or consciousness, but as itself vital activity. And in any case we

¹ The relationship of organization and thought is precisely that which we find psychologically typified by the rhythmic functions of habit and attention, attention being always, *ab quo*, a sign of the failure of habit, and, *ad quem*, a reconstructive modification of habit.

have passed to the idea of thought as reflectively reconstructive and directive, and away from the notion of thought as immanently constitutional and organizational. To make this passage and yet to ignore its existence and import is essential to objective idealism.

(2) No final or ultimate validity attaches to these *a priori* arrangements or institutionalizations in any case. Their value is teleological and experimental, not fixedly ontological. 'Law and order' are good things, but not when they become rigidity, and mechanical uniformity or routine. Prejudice is the acme of the *a priori*. Of the *a priori* in this sense we may say what is always to be said of habits and institutions: They are good servants, but harsh and futile masters. Organization as already effected is always in danger of becoming a *mortmain*; it may be a way of sacrificing novelty, flexibility, freedom, creation to static standards. The curious inefficiency of idealism at this point is evident in the fact that genuine thought, empirical reflective thought, is required precisely for the purpose of re-forming established and set formations.

In short, (a) *a priori* character is no exclusive function of thought. Every biological function, every motor attitude, every vital impulse as the carrying vehicle of experience is thus *apriorily* regulative in prospective reference; what we call apperception, expectation, anticipation, desire, demand, choice, are pregnant with this constitutive and organizing power. (b) In so far as 'thought' does exercise such reorganizing power, it is because thought is itself still a *vital* function. (c) Objective idealism depends not only upon ignoring the existence and capacity of vital functions, but upon a profound confusion of the constitutional *a priori*, the unconsciously dominant, with empirically reflective thought. In the sense in which the *a priori* is worth while as an attribute of thought, thought cannot be what the objective idealist defines it as being. Plain, ordinary, everyday empirical reflections, operating as centers of inquiry, of suggestion, of experimentation, exercise the valuable function of regulation, in an auspicious direction, of subsequent experiences.

Like God's rain, the categories of accomplished systematization fall alike upon the just and the unjust, the false and the true,

while unlike God's rain, they exercise no *specific* or *differential* activity of stimulation and control. Error and inefficiency, as well as value and energy, are embodied in our objective institutional classifications. As a special favor, will not the objective idealist show how, in some one single instance, his immanent 'reason' makes any difference as respects the detection and elimination of error, or gives even the slightest assistance in discovering and validating the truly worthwhile? This practical work, the life blood of intelligence in everyday life and in critical science, is done by the despised and rejected matter of concrete empirical contexts and functions. Generalizing the issue: If the immanent organization be ascribed to thought, why should its work be such as to demand continuous correction and revision? If specific reflective thought, as empirical, be subject to all the limitations supposed to inhere in experience as such, how can it assume the burden of making good, of supplementing, reconstructing, and developing meanings? The logic of the case seems to be that Neo-Kantian idealism gets its status against empiricism very largely by accepting as its own presupposition the Humian idea of experience, while the express import of its positive contribution is to show the *non-existence*, (not merely the cognitive invalidity) of anything describable as mere states of subjective consciousness. Thus in the end it tends to destroy itself and make way for a more adequate empiricism.

II.

In the above discussion, I have unavoidably anticipated the second problem: the relation of conceptual thought to perceptual data. A distinct aspect still remains, however. Perception, as well as apriority, is a term harboring a fundamental ambiguity. It may mean (1) a distinct type of activity, predominantly practical in character, though carrying at its heart important cognitive and æsthetic qualities; or (2) a distinctively cognitional experience, the function of observation as explicitly logical — as a factor in science *qua* science.

In the first sense, as recent functional empiricism (working in harmony with psychology, but not itself peculiarly psychological)

has abundantly shown, perception is primarily an act of adjustment of organism and environment, differing from a mere reflex or intrinsic adaptation in that, in order to compensate for the failure of the instinctive adjustment, it requires an objective or discriminative presentation of conditions of action: the negative conditions or obstacles, and the positive conditions or means and resources.¹ This, of course, is its cognitive phase. In so far as the material thus presented not only serves as a direct cue to further successful activity (successful in the overcoming of obstacles to the maintenance of the function entered upon) but presents auxiliary collateral objects and qualities which give additional range and depth of meaning to the activity of adjustment, perceiving is æsthetic as well as intellectual.²

Now this sense of perception cannot be made antithetical to thought, for it may itself be surcharged with any amount of imaginatively supplied and reflectively sustained ideal factors — such as are needed to determine and select the relevant stimuli and to suggest and develop the relevant plan and course of behavior. The amount of such saturating thought material will depend simply upon the complexity and maturity of the behaving agent. Such perception is strictly teleological, moreover, since it arises from an experienced need and functions to fulfill the purpose indicated by this need. The cognitional content is, indeed, carried in this affectional and intentional context.

Then we have perception as scientific observation. This involves the deliberate, artful exclusion of affectional and purposive factors as exercising mayhap a vitiating influence upon the cognitive or objective content; or, more strictly speaking, a transformation of the more ordinary or 'natural' emotional and purposive concomitants, into what Bain calls the 'neutral' emotion and purpose of finding out what the present conditions of the problem are. (The practical feature is not thus denied or eliminated, but the over-

¹ Compare, for example, Dr. Stuart's paper in the *Studies in Logical Theory*, pp. 253-256. I may here remark that I remain totally unable to see how the *interpretation* of objectivity to mean the controlling condition of action (negative and positive as above) derogates at all from its naïve objectivity, or how it connotes cognitive subjectivity, or is in any way incompatible with a common-sense realistic theory of perception.

² For this suggested interpretation of the æsthetic as surprising, or unintended, gratuitous collateral reinforcement, see Gordon, *Psychology of Meaning*.

weening influence of a present dominating end is avoided, so that *change of the character of the end* may be effected, if found desirable.) Here observation may be opposed to thought, in the logical sense in which exact and minute description may be set over against interpretation, explanation, theorizing, and inference. In the wider sense of thought as equalling reflective process, such a logical function is a constituent intentional division of labor within thought. The impersonal demarcation and accurate registration of what is objectively there or present occurs for the sake (*a*) of eliminating meaning which is habitually but uncritically referred, and (*b*) of getting a basis for a meaning (at first purely inferential or hypothetical) which may be consistently referred; and which (*c*), resting upon examination and not upon mere *a priori* custom, may weather the strain of subsequent experiences. But in so far as thought is identified with the conceptual phase as such of the entire logical function, observation is, of course, set over against thought: deliberately, purposely, and artfully so.

It is not uncommon to hear it said that the Lockean movement was all well enough for psychology, but went astray because it invaded the field of logic. If we mean by psychology a natural history of what at any given time *passes* for knowledge, and by logic conscious control in the direction of grounded assurance, this remark appears to reverse the truth. As a natural history of knowledge in the sense of opinion and belief, Locke's account of discrete, simple ideas or meanings, which are compounded and then distributed, does palpable violence to the facts. But every line of Locke shows that he was interested in knowledge in its honorific sense — controlled certainty, or, where this is not feasible, ascertained probability. And as a branch of logic, as an account of the way in which we by art build up a *tested* assurance, a rationalized conviction, Locke makes an important positive contribution. The pity is that he inclined to take it for the whole of the logic of science,¹ not seeing that it was but a correlative division of labor to the work of hypotheses or inference; and that he tended to identify it with a natural history or psychology. The latter tendency exposed Locke to the Humian interpretation

¹ This, however, is not strictly true, since Locke goes far to supply the means of its own corrective in his account of the "workmanship of the understanding."

and permanently sidetracked the positive contribution of his theory to logic, while it led to that confusion of an untrue psychology with a logic, valid within limits, of which Mill is the standard example.

In analytic observation, it is a positive object to strip off all mediate meaning so far as may be — to reduce the facts as nearly as may be to derationalized data, in order to make possible a new and better rationalization. In and because of this process, the perceptual data approach the limit of a disconnected manifold, of the brutally given, of the merely sensibly present ; while meaning stands out as the searched for principle of unification and explanation, that is, as a thought, a concept, an hypothesis. The extent to which this is carried depends wholly upon the character of the specific situation and problem ; but, speaking generally, or of limiting tendencies, one may say it is carried to mere observation, pure brute description, on the one side, and to mere thought, that is hypothetical inference, on the other.

So far as Locke ignored this instrumental character of observation, he naturally evoked and strengthened rationalistic idealism ; he called forth its assertion of the need of reason, of concepts, of universals, to constitute knowledge in its eulogistic sense. But two contrary errors do not make a truth, although they suggest and determine the nature of some relevant truth. This truth is the empirical origin, in a determinate type of situation, of the contrast of observation and conception ; its empirical relevancy and its empirical worth in controlling the character of subsequent experiences. To suppose that perception as it concretely exists, either in the early experiences of the animal, the race, or the individual, or in its later refined and expanded experiences, is identical with the sharply analyzed, objectively discriminated and internally disintegrated elements of scientific observation, is a perversion of experience ; a perversion for which, indeed, professed empiricists set the example, but which idealism must perpetuate if that is not to find its end in an improved, functional empiricism.¹

¹ Plato, especially in his *Theatetus*, seems to have begun the procedure of blasting the good name of perceptive experience by embodying a late and instrumental distinction having to do with the logical control of perceptive experience, with experience *qua* experience.

III.

We come now to the consideration of the third element in our problem ; ideality, important and normative values, in relation to experience ; the antithesis of experience as a tentative, fragmentary, and ineffectual embodiment of meaning over against the perfect, eternal system of meanings which experience suggests even in nullifying and mutilating.

That from the *memory* standpoint experience presents itself as a multiplicity of episodic events with just enough continuity among them to suggest principles true 'on the whole' or usually, but without furnishing instruction as to their exact range and bearing seems obvious enough. Why should it not? The motive which leads to reflection on *past* experience could be satisfied in no other way. Continuities, connecting links, dynamic transitions drop out because, for the purpose of the recollection, they would be hindrances if now repeated ; or because they become available only when themselves objectified in definite terms and thus given a *quasi* independent, a *quasi* atomistic standing of their own. This is the only alternative to what the psychologists term 'total reminiscence,' which, so far as total, leaves us with an elephant on our hands. Unless we are going to have a wholesale revivification of the past, giving us just another embarrassing present experience, illusory because irrelevant, memory must work by retail — by summoning *distinct* cases, events, sequences, precedents. Dis-membering is a positively necessary part of re-membering. But the resulting *dis-juncta membra* are in no sense experience as it was or is ; they are simply elements held apart, and yet tentatively implicated together, in present experience for the sake of its most favorable evolution ; evolution in the direction of the most excellent meaning or value conceived. If the remembering is efficacious and pertinent, it reveals the possibilities of the present ; that is to say, it clarifies the transitive, transforming character which belongs inherently to the present. The dismembering of the vital present into the disconnected past is correlative to an anticipation, an idealization of the future.

Moreover, the contingent character of the principle or rule

that emerges from a survey of cases, instances, etc., the fact that it has an 'upon the whole' character, instead of a fixed or necessary character, is also just what is wanted in the exigency of a prospective idealization, or refinement of excellence. It is just this character which secures flexibility and variety of outlook, which makes possible a consideration of alternatives and an attempt to select and to execute the more worthy among them. The fixed or necessary law would mean a future like the past — a dead, an unidealized future. It is almost exasperating to imagine how completely different would have been Aristotle's valuation of 'experience' with respect to its contingency, if he had but once employed the function of developing and perfecting value, instead of the function of knowing an unalterable object as the standard by which to estimate and measure.

The one constant trait of experience from its crudest to its most mature forms is that its contents undergo change of meaning, and of meaning in the sense of excellence, value. Every experience is in-course,¹ in course of becoming worse or better as to its contents, or in course of conscious endeavor to sustain some satisfactory level of value against encroachment or lapse. In this effort, both precedent, the reflection of the present into elements defined on the basis of the past, and idealization, the anticipation of the possible, yet doubtful, future, emerge. Without idealization, that is, without conception of the favorable issue which the present, defined in terms of precedents, may portend in its transition, the recollection of precedents, and the formulation of tentative rules is nonsense. But without the identification of the present in terms of elements suggested by the past, without recognition, the ideal, the value projected as end, remains inert, helpless, sentimental, without means of realization. Resembling cases and anticipation, memory and idealization, are the corresponding terms in which a present experience has its transitive force analyzed into reciprocally pertinent means and ends.

¹ Compare James, "Continuous transition is one sort of conjunctive relation; and to be a radical empiricist means to hold fast to this conjunctive relation of all others, for this is the strategic point, the position through which, if a hole be made, all the corruptions of dialectics and all the metaphysical fictions pour into our philosophy." *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, Vol. I, p. 536.

That an experience will change in meaning is the one thing certain. *How* it will change is the one thing naturally uncertain. Hence the import of the art of reflection and invention. Control of the character of the change in the direction of the worthwhile is the common business of theory and practice. Here is the province of the episodic recollection of past history and of the idealized foresight of possibilities. The irrelevancy of an objective idealism lies in the fact that it totally ignores the position and function of ideality in sustained and serious endeavor. Were values automatically injected and kept in the world of experience by any force not reflected in human memories and projects, it would make no difference whether this force were a Spencerian environment or an Absolute Reason. Did purpose ride in a cosmic automobile toward a predestined goal, it would not cease to be physical and mechanical in quality because labelled Divine Idea, or Perfect Reason. The moral would be "let us eat, drink and be merry," for to-morrow — or if not this to-morrow, then upon some to-morrow, unaffected by our empirical memories, reflections, inventions, and idealizations — the cosmic automobile arrives. Spirituality, ideality, meaning as purpose, would be the last things to present themselves if objective idealism were true. Values cannot be both ideal and given, and their 'given' character is emphasized, not altered, when called eternal and absolute. But natural values become ideal the moment their maintenance is dependent upon the intentional activities of an empirical agent. To suppose that values are ideal because they are so eternally given is the contradiction in which objective idealism has entrenched itself. Objective ontological teleology spells machinery. Reflective and volitional, experimental, teleology alone spells ideality.¹ Objective, rationalistic idealism, breaks upon the fact that it can have no intermediary between a brutally achieved embodiment of meaning (physical in character or else of that peculiar quasi-physical character which goes generally by the name of metaphysical) and a total opposition of the given and the ideal, connoting their mutual indifference and incapacity. An

¹ One of the not least of the many merits of Santayana's *Life of Reason* is the consistency and vigor with which is upheld the doctrine that significant idealism means idealization.

empiricism that acknowledges the transitive character of experience with the contrasts in value this transition brings, and that acknowledges the possible control of the character of the transition by means of intelligent effort, has abundant opportunity to celebrate in productive art, genial morals, and impartial inquiry the grace and the severity of the ideal.

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EXPERIENCE AND THOUGHT.¹

UNDER this very general title I wish to discuss certain fundamental doctrines regarding the nature of experience which are directly involved in the current discussion of pragmatism. The fact that some of those who have not been entirely swept from the old moorings by the strength of this 'new movement' still find it necessary at frequent intervals to take their bearings and define their position in relation to it, may be taken as a sufficient acknowledgement of its vitality and significance. Nevertheless, as Professor Moore has happily remarked, the differences in regard to pragmatism are still numerous enough to insure a long period of fruitful development.² But, in order that these differences may become really fruitful, they must be carefully defined, and the presuppositions on which they rest must be scrutinized and subjected to discussion. I shall try to show that the contentions of certain adherents of pragmatism regarding the nature of experience are based on principles that fail to take account of the significance of experience in its totality, or rightly to interpret its organic character.

It has been frequently maintained in recent discussion that the old epistemological problem has lost its meaning. The questions of the relation of knowledge to reality, and of the general problem and functions of thought, it is said, have no longer any significance. For, it is urged, the distinctions which these questions commonly imply are artificial rather than real. When rightly understood, they are seen to be distinctions of function or use that arise and have a real meaning only within experience. More particularly, it is to be noted that this 'new movement' is characterized by its identification of thought with the reflective process that arises as a definite response to a particular situation within experience. The whole meaning and significance of thought must, accordingly, be defined in terms of the particular experience

¹ A paper read before the American Philosophical Association at Cambridge, December, 1905.

² PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. XIV, p. 343.

out of which it arises, and of the immediate consequences to which it gives rise. There is thus no problem as to the nature of thought in general, and no reality apart from the specific situation in experience with which it is called upon to deal. The problem of logic consists in describing the instrumental function of thought in these definite situations, and thus exhibiting in detail its relation to the other aspects of experience.

This doctrine has been so clearly and persuasively set forth by well-known writers that it requires no further exposition in this connection. Nevertheless, I cannot persuade myself that the epistemological problem can yet be set aside as superannuated, though doubtless all schools of thought have got beyond the older formulation of it in dualistic terms. Students of the history of philosophy will scarcely concede, however, that to pragmatism belongs the credit for this advance. Dualism was definitely set aside by Kant and his successors in Germany a hundred years ago; and, thanks to the efforts of the so-called Neo-Hegelians, our English-speaking philosophy may be assumed to have abandoned that standpoint. But the truth that was contained in dualism must be retained, though the problem of experience has become radically transformed. This, it appears to me, has been largely overlooked by the exponents of pragmatism.

Nevertheless, one who criticizes pragmatism from the standpoint of idealism is confronted with peculiar difficulties. For his own watchwords are largely the same as those of the pragmatists. Like them, he is seeking to exhibit the unity of experience through the functional relation of its parts. And, in working toward this end, he has often to acknowledge the positive suggestiveness of much that is emphasized by certain representatives of the 'new movement.' But on the other hand, idealism can give no quarter to the conclusions in which pragmatists specially delight, — the irrationalism, showing itself in a depreciation of thought and ideas, the relativity and subjectivism, and the uncritical claim to base itself upon 'pure' experience, — for it recognizes in these doctrines its historical enemies under a new form¹.

¹ It is a significant fact that some of those representatives of pragmatism who hesitate to develop their doctrine into an irrational fideism are now attempting to connect it with realism and falling back on an uncritical and naturalistic theory of knowledge.

Now, in order to carry on this 'ancient quarrel' on equal terms, it is necessary at the present time to begin with an emphatic protest against the pragmatist's assumption that he and he alone speaks in the name of experience. The so-called 'radical empiricist' cannot be allowed to claim a monopoly of experience. The question of the nature of experience is the very point at issue. The idealist maintains that in his doctrine of immediate experience the pragmatist is appealing to an oracle that is dumb; or, in other words, that the conception of an immediate presuppositionless experience is a contradiction in terms. He has thus the ungracious task of thrusting presuppositions on the attention of those who have attempted to forswear all presuppositions, and of insisting on a method of procedure which shall be more adequate to experience than that of radical empiricism.

In order to make my criticisms more intelligible, however, I propose first to describe in outline the position from which they are made. This general point of view is, of course, not unfamiliar, though I hope that my statement of it may help to emphasize some points that are of importance at the present time.

It is necessary first of all to raise the question as to the concrete form of experience. In what terms are we to give the reading of experience? On the answer to this question our whole account will depend. Now, whatever may be the standpoint which psychology may find it convenient to assume, philosophy cannot begin with isolated mental states, but must recognize that experience consists from the first in an attitude of a subject to other subjects and to objects: We may for the present speak of this attitude as the subject-object relation. The subject and object are not, however, to be regarded as ontologically separate and independent, and as entering into external relations at this or that point of time. What we must insist upon is not a theory of dualism, but the essential duality of experience. What an experience could be without this form or prior to this duality I am unable to imagine. It therefore appears to me unjustifiable to regard the subject-object relation as derivative, as a functional relation *within* experience. For the relation of a subject

to other subjects and to a world of objects is the universal form, and not a particular fact or function at all. The demand that this attitude of the subject shall be exhibited as a particular fact of the content of experience, — as, for example, in the form of a definite process of will or feeling, — on pain of being declared unreal, is based on presuppositions that would render all experience unintelligible.¹ For though experience is life, its differentia is found in the fact that it is something more than life. Nor is it sufficient to say that experience is life that has become conscious of itself, if we limit that consciousness to an awareness of its own states. For experience is essentially a life consciously lived in relation to an environment. The inner life of the subject exists precisely in and through this relation to objects and apart from this it is nothing. To attempt to define this subject-object relation in terms of something more ultimate is to confuse the problem which experience sets with the fruitless task of trying to show how experience is made.

Now there are two objections which may be made from opposite sides to the view here advanced, and although neither can be fully dealt with here, it may be well to consider them in passing in order to render more definite what has already been said. On the one hand, it may be urged that the attitude of self or subject to reality yields only an individual and subjective experience. How can such an individual experience possess the universality and necessity which characterizes real objectivity? This objection can be met only by insisting that the subject of experience is not a mere capacity for sensations or feelings, but is essentially a process of objectification.

As we have seen, subject and object are correlative terms, and any defect in our conception of one of these terms is certain to involve a corresponding deficiency on the other side. Without a genuine subject, no objects, and without real objects, no possibility of a true subject. For example, the unsatisfactory

¹ The same judgment must, I think, be passed on recent attempts to define consciousness as a particular kind of a relation, as well as on Professor James's question regarding its existence. If 'existence' means being as a particular entity or thing, this cannot, of course, be predicated of consciousness. But are not forms 'real' as well as ideal, or is the term reality to be limited to what can be held in the hand as a definite particular kind of a lump?

character of Berkeley's idealism, its lack of objectivity, is the immediate consequence of the empirical view of the self and its functions which he inherited from Locke. The subject with which we begin expresses itself, however, in no mere immediacy of sensation, but is itself a process of interpretation in terms of ideas and universal relations. Experience is, indeed, teleological as the expression of a conscious subject; but the ends and ideals by which it is guided are not merely personal attitudes or desires operating at haphazard, but possess the form of universal demands, binding on all and also systematically related and connected. In other words, we are true to experience in our account only when we describe it as an effort to realize a rational life. And this rational life is something that is not realized in an individual consciousness as a thing apart, but implies both a relation to objects and to other subjects. The relation to objects is obviously essential both from a theoretical and practical point of view. Rationality implies an objective order to be known which at once may serve as the limiting term and the instrument of our practical activity. But the relation to other subjects is not a less important or a less essential constituent of our experience. A rational life can be lived only in relation to other subjects who are regarded from the standpoint of our life, not as objects or means, but as sharing with us a common experience and coöperating with us in the realization of common ends. The demand for a rational life therefore carries with it a demand for a social life. So far from being a subjective affair, then, experience involves those relations to objects and to other subjects. If we use the term 'consciousness' to describe this attitude on the part of the subject, we may then say that consciousness is a claim that experience while remaining *mine* is also objective, — valid beyond the present moment and not circumscribed by my mental states, — and thus constitutes a rational order that is shared with other individuals.

The other difficulty is urged from the opposite point of view. If we regard experience as objective, it may be said, we fail to take account of its quality as the inner life of a subject. After all, experience is the life of an individual, and takes the form of

his immediate sensations, and feelings, and desires. The question philosophy must face, then, is how to get objectivity from such an experience.

It is undoubtedly true that philosophy must view experience as the conscious life of a subject; and I have elsewhere maintained that this standpoint is that which essentially differentiates science from philosophy.¹ Nevertheless, the inner life of a subject is not subjectivity, but consists precisely in an attitude to objects and to other persons. Apart from this it is nothing. There is a sense in which thought is primary and overlaps and includes the object, reducing it to the form of its own 'glassy essence,' but this position is not identical with, but rather fundamentally opposed to the theory that makes mental states or feelings primary.

It is only by abstraction that we get the mere 'affection of the subject,' and such an abstraction has no proper title whatever to the name of 'inner experience.' The true inner experience is the rational life of a subject which, as such, includes and implies objective relations. It is not 'psychical fact' but interpretation and significance; and the 'psychological facts' of consciousness are abstract constructions from the standpoint of concrete experience. The tendency to abstraction is here so strong, however, and the historical influences so powerful, that our modern epistemology has not yet liberated itself from the doctrine of mental states.

In passing on to another point we may say that the attitude of the human subject to the world may be described as a demand for a rational life and that experience is the process in which that end is progressively realized. This attitude of the subject is, however, no abstract unity but takes many forms and realizes its end through various modes of functioning. Nevertheless, if we describe these diverse forms of functioning as feeling attitudes, will attitudes, and cognitive attitudes, we must not overlook the fact that they are all organically united as parts of one rational life. Thinking or rationality is not limited to the process of abstract cognition, but it includes feeling and will, and in the course

¹ PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. XII, pp. 602ff.

of its development carries these along with it. There is, of course, no such a thing as what we have called abstract cognition ; but the different moments are all united in the concrete experience which we may name the life of thought. Furthermore, we are perhaps justified in using the term 'thought' in this way, since the cognitive attitude is more universal than either of the others and, as a process of mediation and interpretation, may be said to overlap and include them. For not only are states of feeling and will *known*, but in a human life at least, they seem to derive their meaning and place through falling within the life of knowledge. This is not, however, to deny the reality or genuine function 'of feeling' and will, or to imply that in the development of experience they are transformed into abstract logical truths. It has been rightly urged recently from many sides that knowledge involves and implies feeling and will as parts of its own concrete process. But it is equally true that feeling and will, in a rational human experience, are informed and guided by knowledge, and thus without any loss of their own specific character are universalized and become real elements of the intellectual life.

We shall therefore use 'thought' in this concrete sense to express the concrete form of experience. And then we may at once go on to say that the activity through which the subject realizes its demand for a rational life is judgment. Moreover, as the conscious life is everywhere and always just such an activity, judgment and consciousness may be said to be identical conceptions. To be conscious, is to judge ; to be in consciousness, is, to some degree, to be already interpreted and universalized. The end and aim of judgment may be said to always be the same : the development and maintenance of a rational life. At any given point, then, we may describe the conscious life as a continuous judgment, which not only embraces and gives meaning to all the states of the moment, but includes and supports the whole system of our knowledge up to date. Of course, such a judgment is never completely coherent and harmonious, and therefore leads on to further processes of analysis and interpretation. Yet these subsequent acts of thinking, however special the problem which is the immediate concern, or however methodological their starting

point and procedure, are no merely detached and separate functions, but have a more ultimate significance as the means through which experience progresses towards its goal. The complete continuity of experience — if by this is meant the organic and functional unity of its various parts, — implies the subordination of the various ends of life to one all-embracing purpose, which can be nothing else than the attainment of rationality in all its modes of experience.

This bare sketch may serve as an indication of a standpoint which takes issue with pragmatism on several fundamental points. In the first place, it would seem impossible to resolve the problem of knowledge into a series of particular or specific problems which have reference only to some immediate situation, or to the requirements of some proximate end. Practically, such a procedure may possess the advantage of rendering the problem manageable and capable of solution in concrete terms. And for certain purposes the solutions which are offered in these terms may be found valid and satisfactory. In judging of the adequacy of any answer, one must always have reference to the nature of the inquiry. For certain purposes it may be legitimate and even necessary to limit the inquiry, and to define the function of knowledge in terms of its bearing on a particular situation in experience. This inquiry if carried out strictly under these limitations would not be logical at all, but would belong to the sphere of functional psychology. As a matter of fact, in the treatment of the pragmatists, there always is an unacknowledged reference beyond the specific situation to the larger purpose of experience, and therefore the result is, I think, always something more than functional psychology. However that may be, the specifically logical problem never refers *merely* to a definite situation in experience, but must always deal with this as the outcome and expression of the life of reason. The real *locus* of the logical problem, — to adopt Professor Dewey's term, — cannot be adequately defined except in the light of the object and end of experience as a whole. It may be conceded that an eminently useful, practical, or instrumental set of rules might be worked out without any such ultimate reference, just as we may have a practical ethics which describes

the type of conduct demanded by particular situations without any explicit consideration of the problem regarding the nature of the ultimate ethical end. But philosophy, whether as logic or as ethics, cannot thus limit the scope of its inquiry. As philosophy, it must insist on seeing the part in the light of the whole, and on interpreting the particular problem as an element and a stage in the process of attaining rationality. Its object is the complete analysis and description of experience, the discovery of the realm of pure experience, if this is anywhere to be found.

Again, it is not possible to accept the antithesis between thinking and 'concrete ways of living' which is assumed in much of the discussion of the present day. The distinction between reflective and unreflective experience, though only relative, is not indeed to be ignored. But, on the other hand, the distinction must not be stated as if it involved an absolute opposition in the form of experience. It seems to me that the pragmatists, in emphasizing this distinction, have converted it into a virtual antithesis — or at least that the result has been to obscure the essential unity of function which belongs to the nature of all experience. What is involved here is not merely a question of terminology as to whether we shall call the organizing principle of all experience 'thought' or by some other name; but whether we shall recognize *any* such unitary process at all. Can we regard experience as a single process throughout its various stages of development? It is evident that the unity of the process cannot be any simple abstract identity. Differentiation of function is the condition of development in the conscious life, as in an organic body. But in both cases, and even more emphatically in the case of experience, the process is the development of a *single* principle which maintains itself in and through the differentiations. It is *of* this principle that the parts are functions. In other words, it is only when we insist upon this unity that we have a right to talk about functions at all.

Now it is indeed true that the pragmatists emphasize the continuity of experience. My contention, however, has been that experience to be intelligible must be a unity, and not a mere *continuity*. But, it may be asked, is not a functional unity where

one part is shown to depend upon another the only kind of a unity or system that can be demanded for experience? It is certainly true that if the relation between the parts of experience can be shown to be functional in the full sense, the whole must be regarded as a real unity. It seems necessary to point out, however, that the mere dependence of one part upon another does not constitute functional unity. Even a reciprocity of dynamic elements is not yet organic unity. A functional relation in the full sense implies coöperation in the realization of a common end, and hence the bond of a common nature. Now, in reading the writings of my pragmatic friends I find it difficult to decide whether the 'functional relation,' to which they make very frequent reference, and which is in their hands a universal solvent of difficulties, is anything more than a dynamic relation of parts, or whether there is not a real though unavowed reference to a general end of experience through which it finds a unity. This point is of fundamental importance, and it is necessary to request an explanation of the sense in which the term 'organic unity' is to be employed. If the former interpretation is correct, then they are not functionalists at all in any real sense; while if the latter alternative is the true one, the difference between this view and idealism is one of emphasis rather than of difference of principle.

These general considerations may perhaps receive illustration by reference to one or two particular points. What, we may ask, is the character of the antecedent experience out of which thought comes? Now, at times the quality of immediacy and the merely presentative character of the experience are emphasized in the pragmatic account. Then the problem is to understand how this immediacy can put on mediation, or how any crises or problems arise in an experience so devoid of speculation. But again in other passages, so much is put into the immediate experience that its immediacy vanishes in everything but name, and the only real distinction that remains between it and the reflective process seems to consist in the degree of explicitness of purposive attention that is directed towards a particular problem. The impossibility of finding any point of contact between a mere datum of fact and reflective experience has been often demonstrated, and

this impossibility is emphasized by Professor Dewey in stating the points of agreement between his own doctrine and that of idealism.¹ But if we admit, as he does, that the antecedent experience is 'already organized,' if 'it is no mere existence but qualified as respects meaning,' if finally crises arise within it which set a problem for reflection, there would seem to be no ground for denying to this prior experience the title of thought. It is doubtless true that thought can select any part of its own content as a datum from which to proceed to further analysis. In this sense every judgment proceeds from a concept, and the description of the relation between them as one of function or use seems to me extremely suggestive. But, I would maintain, the distinction is one which falls, not merely within experience, but within thinking itself.

The same considerations, *mutatis mutandis*, may be urged in regard to the stage beyond thought in which the reflective process is said to issue. Although the act of thinking is supposed to cease with the solution of its definite problem, the experience to which it gives place retains and preserves the product of the transforming judgment. It has been reconstituted, adjusted, and harmonized in such a way as to solve the problem which gave rise to the particular process of reflection. But, if we have passed out of the territory of thought into a different realm of experiencing, it seems difficult to understand how the results of reflection still continue to exist. The new distinctions and relations which the thinking activity has introduced would surely cease to be if thought should entirely disappear, or should be occupied merely at some other 'point of tension.' That which has been constituted by thinking would seem to require thought for its support. The question, then, seems to force itself upon us as to whether the nature of thought can be adequately described as a mere process of transition from one unreflective experience to another. Is it not more consistent with our actual experience to recognize that thought has at once a conserving and a transforming function? These two moments seem to be present in every act of thought, though sometimes one aspect and sometimes the other

¹ *Studies in Logical Theory*, p. 44.

is predominant in experience. The rhythm or alternation, then, is never between an absolute resting place and an absolutely transitive state, but between a thinking experience where conservation is the main characteristic and another thinking experience which is predominantly a process of transition. But there is no suspension or interruption of thinking, no mere 'going on' of a life that is not sustained and directed by thought. Even when there appears to be no positive advance in knowledge, so long as consciousness persists, judgment as its universal form must support the ideal system of meanings and relations of which experience consists.

The main contention of my paper, accordingly, is that in order completely to transcend dualism and attain to a standpoint that is really organic or functional it is necessary to regard experience as the process through which a subject expresses and realizes a rational life.

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ETHICS, SOCIOLOGY, AND PERSONALITY.

THE determination in general terms of the nature of the 'highest good' or 'intrinsic good,' of the meaning of 'conscience' and 'obligation,' the definition of types of 'virtue,' the discussion of the relations of 'egoistic' and 'altruistic' tendencies in human action, etc., are all without doubt indispensable elements of ethical theory. Nevertheless, the doubt is legitimate as to whether such general philosophical concepts in ethics can have much value in application to the problems of the concrete ethical life unless they are supplemented and enriched by investigations of a much more empirical and historical character. And when one further considers that no single concept of the highest good or supreme ethical end that is either generally accepted or scientifically irrefutable has yet been attained, the further doubt may arise as to whether after all there may not be something in the nature of the subject-matter that makes it impossible to frame a self-coherent concept of the 'good' which shall at the same time carry the qualities of rational objectivity and compulsion, and be applicable to the indefinite variety and complexity of actual life.

That such a central concept or principle would be of the greatest practical value as well as theoretical significance, if it were possible of achievement, will hardly be questioned. It is the business of ethics to render systematic and rational, so far as may be possible, the actual principles of valuation that control ethical judgment. A careful observer of our social life will scarcely deny that, after many centuries of ethical investigation, confusion and even serious inconsistency still obtain in the ethical judgments of occidental civilization. There are, for example, inconsistencies between private morality and business morality, between private morality and political morality, etc. Perhaps shining examples of such confusion are the present status of social judgment on the marriage and divorce problem, and on the so-called problem of 'tainted wealth.'

Is it possible to define a system of universal or objective types

of ethical valuation, and, if not, is there for ethical investigation a limiting concept or indefinable ultimate? If there be such an ultimate shall we find it in the individual or in society? Or is this antithesis between society and the individual a false one? If the ethical ultimate be not wholly definable, is it still possible to give this limiting concept some concrete filling? And, if this be possible, by what method or from what point of approach may we best gain content for our concept? To discuss in outline these problems is the purpose of the present paper.

Now, of course, we must begin with the *fact of morality*, with the actual existence of the ethical life for and in self-conscious beings capable of self-determined, self-directed action. Moral action may not always be done with self-conscious deliberation and choice, but moral judgment always presupposes the possibility of self-conscious activity. Hence the starting point for the interpretation and systematization of ethical value-judgments must be found in these judgments themselves as actual attitudes of living persons. We must start from our own ethical experience, however confused and inconsistent it may seem, and whatever course of investigation we may pursue, its final term must be our own reinterpreted and clarified judgments. But it does not require a large acquaintance with the past, or much reflection on social evolution, to convince one that one's immediate judgments are in very great part resultants of social tradition. The confusion in contemporaneous ethical judgments is in part due to the application of traditional schemes of valuation to novel situations which have arisen through the rapid alteration of economic, scientific, and other conditions of social existence. Our civilization has undergone great modification through the agency of industrial, political, and intellectual factors that have worked on morality both directly and indirectly. The *personal attitude* in an ethical situation is determined by a complexity of factors. It is in part the resultant of the cumulative effects on the individual of past social situations and institutions, *i. e.*, of that complex set of conditions denominated 'social heredity,' and in part the resultant of the natural and biological factors of individuality. Furthermore, the *social aspects* of every ethical situation present

also a very complex problem for analysis. The social heritage of customs and maxims, of institutions and tendencies, that is tied up with every critical ethical situation seems to stand over against the individual with mandatory or prescriptive powers. But this social heritage is itself subject to alteration by the reactions of individuals as well as by change in economic, political, and other conditions of man's existence as a social and historical being.

In view of the exceeding great complexity of many critical ethical situations for the individual, we may rightly assert that the possibility of applying an inherited principle of moral judgment to new cases depends on a resemblance between the present situation and a multiplicity of other situations differing in the components of time, place, and history, as well as on an identity of mental character in different individuals. In short, the validity of generic types of moral judgments and the rational authority of social judgments on human conduct involve both a spiritual identity of nature among differing individuals and a continuity of moral and social evolution. It is clear that every specific type and single case of moral judgment, when reflectively considered, presents a complex sociological and historical problem. Hence a critical consideration of the rational foundation of specific ethical values would seem to be impossible without a comparative social and historical analysis of actually existing moral judgments. It is at this point that the treatment of ethics as a department of sociology gives promise of fruitfulness for practice. And there can be no doubt that the treatment of ethical problems from the standpoint of social evolution has thrown much light on the origin, mutation, and present meaning of moral ideas. The great bulk of generally recognized ethical judgments and commonly accepted maxims of conduct has a social reference and their history is intertwined with the history of society. The continuity and the variation in ethical ideas keep step with the continuity and variation of civilized institutions as a whole. We are told that 'the crimes of Clapham are chaste in Martaban' because Clapham and Martaban belong to entirely different types of social evolution. Spartans exposed

weak infants to death because the practice was indispensable to the permanence and well-being of their military type of society. For the same reason savage tribes practice female infanticide to-day, and lying is not a vice in military societies of the more primitive type. We in Christendom make efforts to preserve and protect the lives of the weak, the incurably ailing, the mentally unsound, because our social type is the result of a compromise between the 'struggle for existence' type and the type engendered by primitive Christianity as an ethics of universal sympathy. Nietzsche would tell us that the latter type was originated and enforced by the many weak to keep the stronger few in subjection.

It is evident that our current notions of justice, honesty, personal integrity, chastity in and out of the marriage relation, etc., have reference to the well-being of a type of social organization into whose composition there have entered in its long evolution many diverging strains of biological impulse, of persisting social types inherited from Greece, Rome, Judæa, primitive Germanic society, etc. And the evolution of our type of morality has been modified from time to time by physical environment, and above all by the alteration of economic and intellectual conditions. Leslie Stephen somewhere says that if lying were beneficial to society then lying would be a virtue. *It was* a virtue in militant societies of more primitive type. From this standpoint one may explain stealing, scalp-taking, infanticide, and sexual promiscuity, under certain social conditions as virtues. It is only the full extension of this method when some writers¹ maintain that the one remaining task for a scientific ethics is to trace the genesis of ethical feelings and ideas in the individual, and to interpret their values in terms of the actual social structure in its historical evolution and its present functioning. And, in the execution of this work, which we may call the 'sociology of ethics,' of course the social psychological concepts of 'imitation,' 'suggestion,' etc., will play a most important rôle. The awakening of the individual mind to a consciousness of obligation can be explained psycho-genetically in terms of suggestion and imitation working

¹ Notably Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl in France and Simmel in Germany.

through command and punishment, prescription and example. Imitation has been well defined as the motor aspect of sympathy, and sympathy is perhaps the most powerful and persistent factor in moral development. There can be no question that the contents of the moral consciousness in the individual can be shown to be for the most part of social origin. The outcome of such a completely sociological treatment of moral feelings and ideas would be, of course, the recognition of the thoroughgoing *relativity* of all actual moral feelings and ideas.

And yet, although the method of approach just mentioned is of the utmost value in the study of the facts of morality, both in their existing forms and in their genesis, I would maintain that there is a distinct field for ethics independent of sociology. Sociology is the comprehensive science of the principles or laws¹ of social structure and of its evolution. There is in any well-organized society a minimal framework of *institutions* on which the continued existence of this society depends. And, on the other hand, inasmuch as a society at any time consists of living individuals in relation to one another, the institutional framework of society is in constant evolution. Sociology investigates the fundamental structure of social institutions and traces out the principles of their mutation, and one may regard the term 'social institutions,' taken in its widest sense, as inclusive of the generally established and accepted principles of action current in a given society. 'Moral principles' are *socially recognized* standards of action. They are enforced by law and social opinion. They are transmitted by social tradition either in the form of explicit laws or in the more indefinite form of customary social opinion. And ethics, of course, includes amongst its data and problems these socially accepted or moral types of value-judgment. But the study of codified social morality forms only a part and, indeed, I would maintain, the peripheral part of the area of ethical enquiry. Of course, every attitude of an individual living in society has a social aspect. And many, perhaps most, of the actions of individuals are determined by socially valid or moral standards. But

¹ I cannot here undertake to discuss in what precise sense the term 'law' should be employed in sociology or social philosophy.

beyond these accepted social values are the critical attitudes of self-conscious persons. The individual spirit is an originating center of ethical judgment and action, and for ethics the reflective individual, capable of independent insight and self-determining action in the light of his own rational insight, should be the center of primary consideration and ultimate reference. Ethics is in part a comparative historical science, but it should find and investigate its fundamental problems, not only by emphasis of the institutional or social aspect of the individual, but as well by reference to the individual himself as the source of ethical value-judgments. It is a sociological problem as to how institutional morality is evolved and maintained. It is, *par excellence*, an ethical problem as to how in a changing or relatively stable social structure, as the case may be, the individual may realize and express *personal values*.

There are, it seems to me, three distinct levels of moral activity alike in the history of the race and of the individual. First is the purely reflex or unconscious social or tribal morality of unreflecting selves who are simply passive organs of the 'tribal self.' At this level men unthinkingly obey the conventional or customary morality of their clan, tribe, city, or nation. Their moral ideas are reverberations of tribal judgments of custom and utility. The passage from this first level to the second level is mediated by the conflict which ensues between the desires and interests of the individual and the morality of tribal custom. In and through this conflict self-conscious rationality is engendered. The second principal level of morality is that in which the individual consciously and reflectively identifies his own interests and standards of action with those of society. At this level the self becomes aware of the rationality of social or institutional morals. He has gained an insight into the *rationale* of custom. He finds a larger life for himself through action in harmony with the social reason, *i. e.*, with mind objectified in moral institutions.

But there now arises the consciousness of the imperfect rationality of existing customary moral institutions, and the transition from the second to the third level of moral activity is mediated by the discovery of a gap and, sometimes, of a conflict between

the principles and results of actual social morality and spontaneously generated ideals of life that transcend convention, or, in other words, by the failure of current valuations and practices to meet the ideal demands of the higher personal spirit.

At the third and highest level of morality the personal spirit fulfils the demands of the second level in so far as these are not in contradiction with the personal and spiritual values that transcend existing social conventions. But at this level the given customary and institutional system of values ceases to be ultimately authoritative and determinative. The ideals or values affirmed by the rational self-conscious spirit are indeed social as well as individual. But the distinction has now arisen, never to be obliterated, between the social as *given* and as *ideal*, between the moral life as *gegeben* and as *aufgegeben*. Historically ethical reflection, *i. e.*, a rational consideration of the principles of human conduct, has always arisen just where the social structure and its principles of customary morality have ceased to be authoritative and normative for the individual. In short, reflective ethics begins with the discovery of a rational self-consciousness in the individual. It was so in Greece, in Judæa, and at the beginnings of the modern world, in the Renaissance and Reformation. We may then have, with reference to the earlier stages of moral evolution in the race, a *sociology of customary morality*, and the general principles of such a science will be applicable to the practical problems of our own time in so far as primitive types tend to persist and reappear in the moral development of each succeeding generation. But the sociological method fails to be adequate just where reflective ethics begins, since this is precisely the point where the individual person becomes an independent center and source of ethical valuation. The very inception of ethical reflection is the cessation of absolute social authority, and the theory of society fails at this point to illuminate the ethical problem, since it is not primarily concerned with the individual as a principle of ethical valuation.

In approaching this problem one must not confuse the reflective and self-conscious person, who, as rational, recognizes over-individual meanings in thought and in social action, with the merely

natural individual as an unthinking center of desire and impulse. No doubt the relation of the individual to society is an important problem for systematic ethics as well as for politics. But the rational person, as I understand him, is always a *socialized self*, and *personal values* must include what are commonly distinguished as individual and social values. I mean by personal values all feelings and practical affirmations of intrinsic values which issue from and inhere in rational, self-conscious, individuals. In this sense the affirmation of self-sacrifice in the interests of science or of humanity is just as truly a personal value as the affirmation of an impulse to æsthetic activity in the face of a filial obligation.

Hence the scope of ethics is wider than that of the scientific study of social morals. The latter arises from the consideration of maxims and judgments which, however they may have originated, now prevail through the authority of the social will, and as such may be recognized by the individual will as rational or irrational. Its principles refer to generalized social types of action, *i. e.*, to a certain set of principles of practical judgment and obligation that have come to prevail by reason of their actual or supposed indispensableness to the maintenance and development of the social organization. In other words, the empirical study of *morals* is chiefly concerned with socially authoritative principles of action. Ethics, on the other hand, includes the consideration of all intrinsic personal valuations or goods, some of which, as, for example, æsthetic enjoyment or philosophical contemplation, may have no obvious social reference whatsoever.

When we pass beyond the standpoint of customary morality to the finer nuances of ethical thinking and feeling, we enter a realm of intrinsic values that can neither be fully explained from, or conceived in, terms of anything other than the inner reactions of rational persons to situations that call for conscious deeds. These personal reactions may be classified in three series, according as the attitudes refer predominantly to the doer's own inner condition as the determining end, or to the psychical states of other personalities, or to seemingly impersonal goods, such as art, science, etc. These three series of values refer to distinguish-

able types of intrinsic goods and, although they need not be mutually exclusive, their contemporaneous attainment may be incompatible for many individuals in certain situations of their lives. A social or impersonal end may claim precedence over a private end, etc. My own æsthetic culture may conflict with filial obligations, or my work as philosopher or scientist may conflict with both æsthetic culture and filial duty. Nevertheless, these three types of goods alike refer to value-judgments of persons. Ultimately their goodness derives from no other source than personal affirmations of value made in the light of rational consideration. In this sense all ethical valuation is a personal judgment, and there is no intrinsic worth whose norm can be found outside a personal attitude.

In this connection the comparative historical interpretation of ethical judgments, as recorded in action and in literature, with reference to the concept of personality as ultimate source of valuation, furnishes valuable illustrative material and suggestion for a theory of ethics that shall do full justice to the concrete character of self-conscious personality and shall allow fuller scope to individual diversity in the evolutionary movement of civilization. A comparative consideration of the ethical rôle of individuality in history must deliver us from rigid dogmatic conceptions of a single *highest good* or type of obligation definable in exact terms. We see that the highest 'good' is a purely formal concept. Ethics must become relativistic and teleological in content when it is recognized by a thoroughgoing comparative criticism that the final center of valuation is *personality in evolution*.

The comparative study of personal valuations in history will prove most suggestive when it is made with chief reference to the transformation of personal values that find utterance in *critical* and *significant epochs of spiritual evolution* and in the lives of men of world-historical spiritual significance. How instructive, for instance, it is to compare the self-consciousness which expresses itself in the feeling for honor amongst men like Dante and Petrarch with the attitude of representative mediæval men, such as St. Bernard or St. Francis of Assisi, to study the clash of two partly antithetical systems of value in Savonarola, and to com-

pare the genial and Epicurean worldliness of a Montaigne with the rigorism of a Pascal! What an instructive contrast may be drawn between Dante as the last great expression of mediæval views of life and Goethe as a supreme representative of modern humanism, etc. ! This historical material, of course, will furnish illustration and suggestion for that tentative system of value-judgments which it must be the aim of ethics to establish only in so far as there is some recognizable identity or continuity amongst ethical values now and then, and some degree of spiritual community of personal life traceable through the historical mutations of society. Every great historical ethical theory has expressed and summed up some potent and vital phase in the concrete spiritual evolution of man. Ethics must continue the endeavor to interpret and systematize intrinsic value-judgments with reference to their evolution.

The point I wish to make is that, since the past from which our general types of morality derive is a recorded past accessible to us and no longer, as for primitive man, a vanished and unknowable past, we can make progress in ethical insight by reflectively bringing our existent types of moral judgment into relation with their forbears.

The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle remains a model for ethical investigation to-day. In this work we find a systematic exposition and classification of the actual values that were normative for the best type of Greek in the best days of Greek civilization. What is needed to-day in ethics is a similarly empirical and systematic treatment of intrinsic values, but with reference to their historical evolution. The latter reference is absent from Aristotle, since he, like Greek thinkers generally, was devoid of the historical sense. Indeed, for the Greeks a definite historical consciousness scarcely existed, whereas history weighs on us as a burden which we hardly know how to lighten and certainly cannot cast off without due consideration. Let me illustrate this point very briefly. The controlling ethical notion in Greek life can perhaps be described as that of the fullest harmony of the intellectual and the sensuous elements in man. The fundamental aim was to realize and enjoy to the full all the natural capacities of action

and feeling. Not until the decay of civic life began in the Greek city-states did the antithesis between rationalism and hedonism appear in marked form. Primitive Christianity sharpened this antithesis. The sense-life was despised and regarded as altogether inimical to the realization of the highest good. The latter was conceived in supernatural, otherworldly terms, and in time, with the admission of the growing tide of pessimistic revolt against nature and of a Manichæan dualism into Christianity, the antithesis became complete.¹ Here we have, then, a well-nigh complete trans-valuation of values in contrast with those of classic Greek life, although not without an infusion of Greek elements, especially in Augustine's notion of the 'Highest Good,' the cardinal virtues, and the general mediæval notion of the hierarchy of virtues and duties.² Since the Renaissance the tide has been setting in the reverse direction towards a definition of ethical goods in terms of immanent and purely human ends, but with a stronger emphasis on the worth of the individual than one finds in classical Greek ethics. To-day ethical valuations are a more or less confused blending of Christian super-naturalistic or transcendent ideals with naturalistic and immanent conceptions of individual and society, strongly colored by the modern democratic movement.

In some directions there undoubtedly has been reached, since the time of Aristotle, a clarification and deepening of ethical values. *Justice* perhaps affords the best illustration of the universalization of an ethical value. Our idea of justice not only has a vastly wider application, but it also has a deeper and richer content, than that of the Greek. And the Greek ideal of friendship has been deepened and widened by the Christian notion of love into the ideal of a fuller social sympathy and beneficence. But in other respects ethical value-judgments are confused and narrow. Notwithstanding much fuss and talk about art, one does not find any widespread appreciation of the personal worth of beauty in nature, poetry, and the fine arts. The *utility* of science is generally recognized, but hardly the ethical quality of

¹ See Th. Ziegler, *Geschichte der Christlichen Ethik*, pp. 205 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 230 ff.

unstinted devotion on the part of scholar and investigator. The Greek love of *θεωρία* is not widely regarded among us as conferring ethical worth on persons.¹

The comparative study of typical and significant personal valuations at critical turning points in the evolution of ethical thought must, of course, be interpreted in the light of the rational value-judgments of persons under the actual conditions of the ethical life to-day. A comparative enquiry such as I have suggested would be meaningless were its outcome the submission of living problems and principles to past types of valuation. The results of such an historical investigation gain actual significance and application only in so far as they are taken up into a living ethical consciousness. On the other hand, our present instinctive and unreflecting intuitions have had a history, and are, in part at least, the resultants of moral evolution. No further progress in the direction of reflective harmony in the principles of conduct is possible without an understanding of their history. And, in so far as the inconsistency and confusion of our intuitive value judgments is due to warring elements of moral tradition, to understand the past is to be freed from it.

The critical study of the historical mutations of ethical values in the course of civilization most clearly points to the individual person as a center of origination and an ultimate criterion of those value-judgments in which conventional morals are transcended and higher levels of ethical insight established. No form of historical conflict goes deeper or is more frequently recurrent than that between customary morality and a deeper insight on the part of individuals.

The very confusion which obtains to-day in contrast with the greater simplicity and clearness of primitive Christian or mediæval ethics witnesses the truth of this principle. Just as the chaotic individualism of the Sophistic period was the pre-condition of a deeper and more rational ethical self-consciousness among the Greeks, so it is to-day. The last word of comparative historical

¹ I venture to suggest that the lack of respect for pure science in America is due in large part to the feminization of our educational life. As a rule women seem to lack *disinterested* respect for pure science or 'useless' truth.

ethics seems to be that in the inner nature of self-conscious personalities, and here alone, can be found the unfailing spring of ethical insight. Personality is an ultimate and irreducible principle for ethics. The latter discipline forgets the conditions of its birth and the specific character of its problems when it becomes merely a department of sociology. There exists outside the rational individual no institution of society or demonstrable principle of abstract reason that can be regarded as an ultimate and universal source of ethical judgments or final standard of authority.

The rational self, then, is a limiting concept for ethical investigation. All psychological and historical analyses of goods, values, or ideals, must have reference to selves from which they derive and in which they are realized. Hence the objectivity of ethical values or ideals cannot be grounded in the existing social order. A ground for ethical objectivity can only be found in a universal spiritual essence or principle manifested in and sustaining the multiplicity of individuals. And here metaphysics takes up the tale. The more radical ethical tendencies of contemporary literature, for example, the 'over-man' of Nietzsche, the poetry of Browning and Whitman, Ibsen's dramas, etc., and many minor currents that might be named, are vaguely indicative of the search for a fuller and more consistent recognition of the scope of personality. Whatever be the further value of these recent movements in literature, one principle they enforce and illustrate, viz.: That a primary condition for the fuller development of a spiritual individuality is, on the one hand, the systematization and simplification of social morality as embodied in law, custom, and sentiment, and, on the other hand, the clear distinction between this field and the undefined and indefinable field of action for the development of personality. Historically speaking, the greatest step in the spiritual evolution of man was the discovery and affirmation of inherent individual or personal values by Socrates, Jesus, and others.

Progress in ethical knowledge and practice depends on the recognition that that judgment or attitude alone has intrinsic worth which flows from the inner personality. The outcome of

the growth of personality in rational self-consciousness is a deepening of the sense of personal worth. This is the only intrinsic end which a teleological ethics can recognize, and when confusion exists or conflict arises between personal tendencies, the ultimate standard must be the principle of restitution, at higher levels, of personal harmony, which, of course, will generally be found to involve a social reference.

Hand in hand with the deepening of the sense of the inherent worth of conscious personality there goes a widening of the scope for individual development. A rationally constituted society must give play and opportunity for individuality, and it is better able to do so when there is, on the one hand, a clearer and more systematic knowledge of the indispensable minimal principles of social and constitutional life, *i. e.*, of social morality, and, on the other hand, a deeper insight into the nature of personal values.

The outcome of recognizing the fundamental distinction and relation between the social framework of conduct and the inward and personal nature of intrinsic values, must be the admission that there is no absolute standard of ethical valuation outside the reflective affirmations of persons. It follows that 'goods' are many in kind and have no common measure except their relations to conscious selves. It is true, of course, that all individual values have a *possible social aspect*. It is also true that social organization and life are instruments for the actualization of personal values. Hence those principles of social morality which are necessary to stable and harmonious social organization are relatively high teleological values. There are social qualities, not definable in terms of law or maxim, that are nevertheless normal conditions of the highest personal or ethical development, and that possess still higher value than the well-defined principles of institutional morality, since they are conditions of that harmonious intercommunication of persons which seems to be an integral aspect of the highest good. Such social qualities are urbanity of manners, the refined perceptions and feelings indispensable to the fullest friendships, etc. Many pleasures, too, such as those of æsthetic enjoyment and social recreation, and even those of physical well-being and recreation, have high ethical value, since under

normal conditions they promote the personal life. On the other hand, crises may arise when these pleasures, and even the exercise of the finer social qualities, must be foregone simply because they interfere with a good affirmed by a person to be at the time and place of greater worth, as, for example, a scientific investigation or a political reform.

There is, then, no objective and unfailing touchstone of ethical values. The generic concept of 'the *highest* good' can only be defined formally as a maximum system of personal and social values determinable by individual experience. Hence the 'good' must always involve an individual and seemingly contingent element, irreducible to the categories of *actual* social morality and not fully definable in its concrete character. It is doubtful if any common predicate can be established for things that are good except that of relation to a conscious self. Society may furnish both means for the actualization of personal values and stimulus for their affirmation. But *some* of these values at least originate from the inderivable and inexplicable¹ depths of the individual nature. Every individual who lives in part by reflective ethical insight is not necessarily a social innovator, critic, or rebel on a large scale. But every such individual is *in posse* an over-social or transcendent factor in actual society.

It might seem that the outcome of the above argument is really to reduce practical ethics to anarchy, and to leave no scope for objective ethical theory over and above sociology or social philosophy. But this is not the case. Notwithstanding the contingent and rationally irreducible element of the good as personal experience, there is a basis of common over-individual structure and tendency in individual spirits. The very existence of society and of science are evidence of this. Not only do individuals possess a common reason, but, through their very individualities, they embody in diverse proportions and relations common tendencies of feeling and action. In matters of justice, truth-telling, self-control, there is a general tendency common to civilized men.

¹ Inderivable, *i. e.*, from any actual social convention, and inexplicable in terms of a social consensus. The individual is the organ of practical reason but, in turn, the 'universal' of the practical reason is dynamic and concrete. It is actualized only in and through a series of individualities.

And the ethical life of a conscious and rational individual represents a series of oscillations about certain fundamental normative tendencies of action. Intrinsic ethical worth belongs only to persons. But the individual wins inner depth and harmony of spirit through choice and action in the direction of over-individual or rational tendencies. There are types or general standards of personal valuation which undergo mutation and development in the direction of clearness and harmony by the immanent activity of reason itself. The evolution of types of ethical value-judgment is the evolution of personality itself; and this means the evolution of psychic individuality through the instrumentality of reason. Ethical valuations are practical judgments of selves that are moving in the direction of an ideal spiritual type at once concretely individual and ideally social.

Hence an ethics on a comparative or historical basis will not have the endless task of registering a chaos of atomistic and unrelated affirmations of worth, but of tracing, in the shifting and oscillation of personal values from Greece and Judæa to the Mediæval world, and from the Mediæval world through the Renaissance to the present time, certain general tendencies of ethical movement that become more clearly defined and articulated in the course of moral evolution. Such an ethics should enable us more rationally to harmonize and control our actual ethical judgments. It may furnish methods by which concrete judgments can be made in the light of certain type-forms. From a concrete historical study of the actual evolution of ideals of conduct we may more definitely learn how justice, truth-telling and truth-doing, benevolence, continence, etc., may be defined with reference to specific situations. And, on the other hand, since ethical judgments appear in the light of this enquiry as practical expressions of an historical reason, working in and through individuals, or as phases in the conscious and reflective evolution of personal life towards greater harmony and permanence of type, the relativity of ethical judgments, revealed by comparative history, is at the same time interpreted in terms of the dynamic ethical universal embodied in the movement of the personal life through reason towards fuller reasonableness.

The movement of personality under the direction of reasonableness carries us over into metaphysical ethics. The nature of personality as the principle of reflective ethical valuation involves its ultimate relations in and to the cosmos. The rational self as center of judgment and action in terms of objective or universal values must be more than a member of a given social historical order. The reflective person cannot finally render account to himself for the principles of his own practical judgments without making reference to his place as a center of rational activity in a *system* which must be rational or spiritual. The ultimate centers of ethical judgment and action are persons, and, since persons judge and act in accordance with rational principles, they must be members of a rational order. Ultimately the principles of ethical valuation express the actual relations of persons to the world-order.

On the other hand, such a world-order, to afford place and function for ethical personality, must be itself active and moving. It must be a dynamic, spiritual cosmos in which the social and historical evolution of persons is an integral element. Historical ethics leads to metaphysics, but the type of metaphysics must in turn be such as to take account of ethical development.

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DISCUSSIONS.

THE INTENTION AND REFERENCE OF NOETIC PSYCHOSIS.

IN the May number of the REVIEW Professor Colvin restated his position on the problem of the 'intention of the noetic psychosis' with a view to clearing up certain misunderstandings of which I had been guilty in the course of a brief study of the various meanings and theories of noetic transcendence. In this rejoinder Professor Colvin explicitly rejects the 'copy-theory' and also the '*a priori*-truth' theory; to this extent at least I had not misunderstood him, for none of his remarks were so construable as to convict him of either standpoint. What concerns him first of all is the necessary viewpoint of the contemporary psychologist; and in trying to decide what this is, the current psychological method of description is rigorously adhered to.

I confess that Professor Colvin's position has been made much clearer to me by his last statement of it. Nevertheless, there seem to be implied in it a meaning of intention which neither the psychologist nor the logician can satisfactorily accept, and also an interpretation of 'extramentality' which includes a curious distinction between the mental and the psychical that is hardly advantageous. I would like to close my side of the case with a description of these two implications, as I see them. I shall take up the last one first.

It was said that "in every noetic psychosis there is an intention which points to an extramental reality," and that "extramental reference . . . is intending to give an independence to its content, — an existence apart from the *mere* state of consciousness in which this content exists." My difficulty in accepting this description is due to the fact that *the extramental world is hereby made to include all past and future pleasures and pains*. For the description forces us to regard every recall act as having (*a*) an extramental reference and (*b*) an extramental content (or 'object,' Professor Colvin drawing no distinction, so far as I can see, between content and object). And the same is true of anticipative experiences. It was this that led me to criticize Professor Colvin's view as assuming that everything transcending the present moment is transmental.

In his rejoinder, however, Professor Colvin agrees with me in condemning this assumption. But in doing so, does he not commit him-

self to one of two courses: either to revising the meaning of extramentality or else to admitting that 'pure experiences' now past or not yet arrived are, when given as the intentional objects in noetic psychoses, extramental? He states that everything is extramental which is not 'the immanency of the immediate present.' This strikes me as signifying that past feelings, which, as recalled, are not *given* in the same way as they originally were (although meant or *intended noetically* as identical), are extramental. Or does Professor Colvin mean that every reference-object is given *in the same way* as it originally was (*i. e.*, that the givenness of a recall object is indistinguishable from the givenness of a perceived one)? If he will not admit types of givenness, I fear we shall not agree precisely on the nature of noetic intention and identical reference.

The only escape from the perplexity of calling yesterday's headache a transmental thing seems to lie in drawing a distinction between mental and psychical; 'mental' shall be taken to mean 'the immanency of the immediate present,' while 'psychical' is taken more broadly as including all kinds of experiences, immediate and mediate. But would not such a distinction prove fruitless and also rob Professor Colvin's thesis of its point?

The other point of controversy is, however, by far the more important one, touching not only upon the mooted question about the nature of psychological description generally, but also bringing us face to face with the problem of the relation between psychological and logical analyses of noetic psychoses. A careful study of Professor Colvin's description of the 'intention' involved in noetic psychosis has convinced me that the usual psychological forms and terms of description are quite inadequate to the task of making clear the peculiarities of higher and more complex experiences. The fault is not with Professor Colvin or any other psychologist, but is a necessary result of the incomplete development of psychology itself, which has not yet mastered the problems of the 'elements' thoroughly enough to give detailed word-pictures of complexes. It is the same order of difficulty which confronts the botanist with his problems of 'unit characters' and the physicist with his doubts about the relation between forms of energy.

The statement that noetic intention is "that attribute (of the psychosis) which tends to make static and universal the immanency of the immediate present, — to give to the content of the passing psychic state more than a fleeting existence," is not free from possible equivocation. When it is added that this intention 'objectifies the state,'

makes it a stable thing, I find that this might have two totally different meanings. On the one hand, the mere persistence-function common to every *quale* might be so described; a feeling, for instance, becomes static and universal in the sense that I can always refer to it identically after it has once been 'given,' even though the feeling itself has lost its original immediacy (peripheral character, sensational nature, etc.). And, on the other hand, the same description might apply to the act of experiencing a *quale* as having more than a fleeting existence. Plainly this is an experience of a wholly new content or meaning; the difference between it and the state of affairs first mentioned is precisely the difference between an experience of persistence and a persistent experience.

Now, the point I would urge is this: That the mere persistence of a content does not *of itself* and necessarily involve the experiencing of that content as persistent. But this is precisely what Professor Colvin would have us believe, for he says: "But what does it imply to recall in memory the city Paris? It seems to me that in this recall there is contained as an essential part of it the implication that Paris has existed all the time between my last experience of it and my present memory." I must still confess that this baffles me. The supposed implication is not derived from the mere recall but from what I know of the typical behavior of people, building materials, taxes, and the like. The implication which might with some semblance of probability be drawn from the recall act is that a certain psychosis, or *phases* of such, tends to be repeated. But Paris, while perhaps a nightmare, is not merely a psychosis.

Professor Colvin's psychological description of the elements and procedure in an intention-act only confirms me in my belief that current psychology, in its subjective-idealistic tendencies, is seriously handicapped in the race for logical discoveries. The intention is found to be "largely a matter of attention . . . muscular adjustment to the object of knowledge; or, from another point of view, will"; the better our adjustment to a complex, the more "this latter is divorced from our psychic states, made more permanent, and hence objectified. . . . This permanence . . . gives objectivity to the content, *i. e.*, makes it extramental." Here too I can discover only the implication that one psychic state has become more persistent than others; of extramentality not a trace.

Is it not clear that two very different concepts have been allowed to blend? There is the object, the thing by virtue of being attended to and *meant*; and there is the object, the thing *experienced* as other

than a mere phase in psychosis. Objectivity in the former sense is the primary logic species, while objectivity in the second one is the other-than-psychic kind. On the one hand, we have simply a stable, identical reference-object, which, when studied in the light of its context, behavior, and implications, may prove to be either psychical or physical as the case may be. I am only urging the real difference between 'object of thought, or reference' and 'thing referred to as objective.' Will, effort, attention, illusion, sweetness, and so on are all objects in this sense but not *thereby* extramental. On the other hand, atoms, nerve-cells, and ether vibrations are objects by contrast with psychic states.

If space permitted, it would prove highly useful to show how the attention function is vitally involved in intention acts, as Professor Colvin has accurately found it to be; but also of no small value to show how intention cannot be reduced either to mere intensification or abstraction by the attention process or yet to an act of will ('intending to mean' taken as 'trying, wishing, or willing to signify'). But this is an arduous task, although the misunderstandings rife betwixt psychologists and logicians are so largely traceable to a failure on the part of both sides to analyze 'intentions' of logical order that the greatest efforts might well be spent in this direction with profit.

One question in closing. Is it precisely *the same thing* which from one standpoint is called knowledge and from another a book? If, as Professor Colvin says, 'knowledge-of-book is one total complex in which the knowledge and the book are separated only by a false abstraction,' the total complex is given *as content* and the knowing (*i. e.*, the intending) is itself (perhaps dimly) known in every state of knowing. Does not this involve the very infinite *regressus* of which Professor Colvin finds me guilty? If, as he says on the following page, 'to know is to have a content, to intend, to make extramental,' then the above statement is untenable. And I see no way by which the theory that makes knowledge itself an aspect of its own content can avoid contradictions like the above; the best device, therefore, seems to be that of denying that an objectifying intention is dimly felt in every state of knowing, and asserting that the difference between knowing and the known content is discovered by a simple inspection of the two-fold form of persistence and connection actually assumed by pure experiences. That is, pure experiences form a time-system and are here called 'acts,' and also form a system involving *all qualia* (temporal ones included) and here are called 'contents' or 'objects.' I do not dare attempt an elaboration of this suggestion.

It does help us to see, however, that knowing is not the same thing as known object seen from a different angle ; the 'act' is radically different from 'content.'

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REJOINDER.

The above analysis by Mr. Pitkin of my position on transmental reference as set forth in the REVIEW in a recent discussion,¹ — a discussion called forth by a criticism from Mr. Pitkin of an earlier article of mine,² — seems to me carefully drawn and in substance correct. He has found the essential points in the matter and has clearly stated the issue. I do not wish to contest his findings as such ; I do wish, however, to dissent from the implications he would draw from these findings. I cannot see in my position the inherent difficulties which Mr. Pitkin discovers there, and it is to these supposed difficulties that I venture to refer. In my reply I shall endeavor to take up substantially in the order of their presentation these difficulties as set forth.

My critic first urges that my view of intention makes the extramental³ world include all past and future pleasures and plans. To this I cheerfully agree, and will add all present pleasures and pains as well. I would insist that all affective states exist not merely as pure affective states, but as affection *plus* knowledge, and that they all appear in an objective form. Pure joy as such can no more be experienced (at least in adult consciousness, as we know it) than pure redness.

It is an object that the joy is referred to, and it is given thereby a transmentality. The headache of yesterday is a transmental thing. It is something located somewhere and at some time. So, too, is the present headache. It is not headache *überhaupt*, but this definite headache now and here. As far as I recognize it I give it this transmental setting, just as truly as I give a transmental setting to the paper on which I am now writing. I, of course, will admit that headache in a very true sense may be called a subjective affair, since I alone can experience this particular headache. This is true of all my bodily sensations. Yet in the sense in which I am using the term, the transmental attitude is present in just the same way that it is present in my perception of an object outside my body.

¹ "The Intention of the Noetic Psychosis," May, 1906.

² "Is Subjective Idealism a Necessary Point of View of Psychology?" *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, Vol. II, p. 229.

³ I believe transmental is the expression better suited to express my own idea.

To sum up my thought here. What I am contending for is that all consciousness, whatever its nature, has in it a content of some sort, and this content is by its very nature transmental. Pure experience, in other words, does not exist, so far as we know. It may be seen here that my use of transmental, extramental, and objective, is not to be taken as the opposite of subjective, if by subjective is implied that which is locked within the individual's experience, as, for example, a bodily feeling. Yet it is equally true that these states of consciousness must have an objective side in order to exist, just as truly as the pencil in my hand, or the dray horse on the street.

In a certain sense it is true that everything transcending the present moment is transmental, and I would urge that the present moment cannot be known merely in its immanency. Yet, on the other hand, I would deny that in the sense in which Mr. Pitkin is using transmental these objects are out of the mind. If I reverse the meaning of extramentality in doing this I believe that the meaning should be so reversed. I believe it to be impossible to conceive the mind as actually going outside itself to a non-mental object. Yesterday's experience, whether a headache, or the sight of Niagara, is, of course, present in a certain sense, yet my recognition of it as belonging to yesterday is an attitude of transmentality. The recall is a restating of the past experience in a way which is not identical with the original impression. I agree with Mr. Pitkin that there are different types of givenness, but fail to see how my view denies these.

Mr. Pitkin finds that my discussion has raised the question of the relation between psychological and logical analyses. I quite agree with him, but cannot find that the disadvantage is on the side of psychology, inadequate as its attempts may be. I believe that it is the province of psychology to translate into terms of actual experience such logical categories as I have discussed, and to find their reality as experiences of muscle-states does not take away from their value. The intention psychologically, however, must be the experience of intention. It can never be, as Mr. Pitkin seems to think my treatment implies, mere persistent experience; it must be experience of persistence. I do, however, believe that out of persistent experiences comes genetically the experience of persistence. At any given moment they are not to be treated as identical, however.

I believe that Mr. Pitkin draws a wrong inference from my statement which he quotes concerning Paris. I cannot consider a recall in memory as being a mere persistence in consciousness of a former experience. By memory I understand that, added to that persistence,

is the knowledge that it has persisted, or that it has come again into consciousness, having been previously experienced.

Again, I must protest that there is in my mind no such distinction as Mr. Pitkin makes between objects and the extramental. He asserts that will, effort, attention, illusion, sweetness, and so forth are objects but not extramental, while atoms, nerve-cells, ether vibrations, are objects by contrast with psychic states. That such a distinction is made I do not dispute, but from my present point of view I do not wish to make it,—I do not believe that it can validly be made. I would assert that will, effort, etc., are never experienced as such, but that objects are experienced in which there are will relations, sweet properties, etc. If I introspect in regard to an illusion that I have experienced, it is a particular illusion, not illusion as such. In other words, we never experience consciousness, but objects in consciousness, and in this sense objects and the transmental become identical.

Finally, as to the last criticism, which holds that I have set up a theory in which I have made knowledge itself an aspect of its own content, I fear that in the brief space allowed I cannot adequately reply.

Suffice it to say, however, that knowledge, or experience, is presented to us entirely in terms of its objects. What we call book is likewise knowledge of book, and I do not in the moment of knowing know that I know. In a succeeding moment I may recognize the book as an object of past experience, but I never have actually given in any experience knowledge *plus* book, simply book, or image of book. I do not believe that we ever experience an act apart from a content; the 'act' of attention, for example, is merely an experience which is related to and forms a constituent part of an experience which is of necessity objective.

The act of knowledge exists as an experienced fact only in terms of an object of knowledge; knowledge itself, or consciousness, or experience (call it what you will), is the pure being of the universe, the ultimate non-experienced reality which never in its purity can be brought before consciousness. Yet it is that which conditions all reality and through which the objective world appears, and by which this world is guaranteed a real existence.

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DRIESCH'S THEORY OF VITALISM.

THE three books by Professor Hans Driesch here under discussion¹ (with which there might be included both many papers and some earlier volumes), although they differ somewhat as to their content and the order and method of presentation, as the author's opinions have developed and he has desired to reach different classes of readers, are all written from a very definite standpoint with reference to a very particular problem. This may be stated simply: What is it which distinguishes organic phenomena from inorganic? And the answer thereto, defended from many sides, drawn from many sources, is a new, distinctive, and, in its methodological defence, interesting theory of vitalism. Accordingly, I have selected as the purpose of this discussion the digest of these distinctive features, the exposure of this central idea, and the critical examination of the support and proofs advanced, rather than the systematic outline of each volume.

The fundamental questions raised are stated, *e. g.*, in *Vitalismus*, p. 171²: "Are there, among the events which take place in living beings, those which cannot be reduced (*zurückgeführt*) to otherwise known natural phenomena or to combinations of these, but which are a law unto themselves and autonomous?" "And to what degree and extent does this autonomy exist, what does it mean, and what follows from it?"

In answering these, the author's methods are those, first, of purely biological experimentation and analysis (in the volumes *S* and *V*), and, secondly, of unification with, through the analysis and interpretation of, the principles and results of chemistry and physics (in volume *N*). He thus seems to believe that he has two rather distinct and independent foundations for his position. By the first, — and to anticipate his conclusion somewhat, — he is, in his opinion, led to the 'entelechy' as a 'Naturkonstant' in a manner wholly descriptive and without hypothesis and yet with as great cogency as, for example, were Pfeffer and Van 't Hoff to osmotic as a new kind of energy.

¹ *Die Seele als elementarer Naturfaktor: Studien über die Bewegungen der Organismen*, Leipzig, W. Engelmann, 1903. — pp. vi, 97. *Naturbegriffe und Natururteile: Analytische Untersuchungen zur reinen und empirischen Naturwissenschaft*, Leipzig, W. Engelmann, 1904. — pp. viii, 239. *Der Vitalismus als Geschichte und als Lehre*, Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1905. — pp. x, 246.

² In this discussion I shall designate references to the first of these volumes by *S*, to the second, by *N*, to the third, by *V*.

In his presentation of this, given in a more or less extended manner in each volume, five subordinate proofs are offered. The first, and for the author the most important, consists in certain phenomena which result from experimentation on developing organisms. To take an illustrative case: If the division-cells of the developing sea-urchin egg in the two- or the four- or up to the thirty-two-cell stage are separated from each other, each will develop into a small, though complete organism (*V*, pp. 185-199); or if the 'gastrula' of this and other echinoderm eggs is cut at right angles to its long axis, and with certain limits, then each part continues to develop and forms a typical, normal, though smaller animal. Or, again, a case typifying a great mass of genuine 'restitutions,' the hydroid-polyp, *Tubularia*, consisting of stem and head, forms, when its head is cut off, a new head; let the cut be made in various ways, then the remaining, yet in each instance differing, parts of the stem coöperate to form the different parts of a complete and perfect head.

The significance of the phenomena typified by these cases lies, he concludes, in this characteristic, common to them all, that freely chosen parts of a whole can produce a new whole, by means, *e. g.*, of each cell of the part remaining after the operation 'taking over,' in coöperation with other cells, the formation of a very definite part of the new whole. Accordingly, the rôle played by each such 'element' varies with that played by the others in the formation of the whole, which rôle, also, would be different in the case of the uninjured than of the 'operated' organism. A system of such elements, because of their varying yet coöperative functions, is called an 'harmonisch äquipotentiell System,' and each 'element' has a varying 'prospectiv Bedeitung.'

There are other proofs, but since it is this first one that the author emphasizes most, we may consider its formulation. Yet before doing this, and by way of criticism, it may be remarked that there has been a great deal of work done very recently in this embryological experimentation, *e. g.*, by Wilson, Conklin, and others, and that by no means all of this is wholly confirmatory of Driesch's own work.

The formulation is as follows (*N*, pp. 120-122). That which an element, cell, or 'crosscuts' does or becomes, *i. e.*, its 'prospectiv Bedeitung' is a function, (1) of its position, *a*, (2) of the absolute size of the system, *g* (for, as this decreases, say, from an operation, so is the size of the developed whole diminished), (3) of a constant quantity, namely, of the 'Spezifität' of that which can develop within the limits of this species, and which brings it about that all parts

coöperate to produce the normal; this quantity is ϵ . Therefore the 'prospective Bedeutung' is $S = \int (age)$.

Of what sort, now, is ϵ ? Is it the result of external factors? No! For these have no effect on the differentiation, which remains within the frame of the species. E would, therefore, seem to be something internal, namely, the physico-chemical structure, something machine-like in the 'broad sense' of this term. But against this the author argues that, when the organism is successively divided and certain final elements, *i. e.*, cells, etc., are reached, these do not possess an invariable 'prospective Bedeutung,' as would be the case with the parts of a machine. On the contrary, experiment shows for him that each part is a whole, and, as it were, an infinitely complex machine.

Now, in criticism of this, it may be said, first, that the author has juggled with the term 'machine,' using it first in a broad, and then in a narrower and even technical sense. Manifestly that which holds good of the second is not necessarily true of the first meaning. And, secondly, and contrary to what he would have his analysis imply, it would be admitted, even generally, that each element of a chemical-physical manifold can and does play a variable rôle, namely, so far as, and in the sense that, it enters into different complexes, but, therefore, also in a way which is quite compatible with invariability. Our author's conclusion, however, is that ϵ is a new 'Naturfaktor,' one *sui generis*, to be called entelechy,¹ and demonstrated by the method of elimination.

With the other proofs we need not concern ourselves at length. Suffice it to say that, on the basis of an analysis and classification of behavior, *i. e.*, organic movements, instincts, reflexes, etc. (*V*, pp. 208-216), an analysis, too, that is oftentimes meagre, the author finds that the organism is not a machine, and that that which determines the specific nature of this behavior in each case is an entelechy, which in some instances may be a 'psychoid.' Therewith is implied not only his acceptance of different kinds of entelchies, but also, since their activity as 'Naturfaktoren' is a directly participating one, his opposition to parallelism.

This completes the author's proof for his position regarding what might be termed 'the empirical laws of the organism' by means

¹ The presentation of the further details of the author's position will make it clear that the term 'entelechy' is used by him in a sense differing somewhat from the Aristotelian.

of experimentation and the analysis of its results. There remains what he regards as additional and supplementary proof drawn from an analysis of the principles and results of physico-chemical science. For he feels that it is incumbent upon him not only to show that the function of the entelechy is in thorough-going harmony with these principles, but also to demonstrate, by a sort of 'method of residues,' both the necessity of accepting such a cause, and the specific nature of its functioning. This is done in Volume *N* at length, in Volume *V* in epitome.

In this analysis the author appears as, in general, an adherent of the school of energetics of Ostwald, Helm, Wald, and others, and oftentimes his criticisms and elucidations are both clear and valuable, though frequently he finds no opportunity to apply them to his particular problem. He distinguishes four fundamental principles or laws: those, namely, of conservation, division into potential and extensity factors, entropy, and *Eindeutigkeit*; and it is important for the understanding and weighing of his arguments to notice that he explicitly accepts, of course in the sense of their meaning as he expounds it, their validity for the organism. (*V*, p. 231.)

Energy is not substance, but only the quantitative measure for causality. The first law, that of conservation, is in part *a priori*, *i. e.*, necessary for thought; it is empirical in respect to the 'things' for which it holds. So, likewise, the second law has an *a priori* aspect; there must be differences in order that something may happen; empirical science finds what these differences are, namely, that in the differences of intensities rests the condition for events. According to the third law every change must 'go out' from the highest intensity. Equilibrium exists when one potential compensates another opposed intensity. Disturb this, *i. e.*, create an 'uncompensated potential difference,' — this to be done only by the doing of work, — and 'something happens,' until equilibrium is again reached. From the first three laws the fourth is derived, at least in part, namely, that events are in a definite direction, unequivocal, and invariable.

In approaching his special problem, our author now states that "all events, etc., in the biological field are concretely the changes in the chemical and aggregative characters of matter." By aggregative is meant simply liquid, solid, colloidal, and such physical states. These characters, therefore, concern him especially, and his criticism, etc. here is also interesting and oftentimes well taken, though his position as to certain problems would not meet with universal acceptance. That which is most essential to his argument, and which is, further-

more, as I believe, that I can show, an erroneous interpretation, is his position that, *e. g.*, the 'chemical Energetik' has, in picking out the quantitative side, therewith excluded the peculiarly and distinguishingly chemical qualitative side; and that this latter, in the reactions and compensations involved, belongs wholly to the empirical field. It is of this principle that he makes use in his subsequent arguments as to the nature and implications of the peculiar qualitative side of the organism. This is defined (*N*, p. 163) as an 'heterogeneous complex' body, *i. e.*, one consisting of parts varying in number, and also as 'typisch,' because the specific and differentiating characters are repeated in many individuals and generations according to some kind of rule or law. The peculiar character of this 'Zusammensetzung' is, indeed, the center for his attention at this point; it gives a whole which as a whole is 'gesetzlich.' Briefly put, he argues: (1) the organism is composed of parts, chemical and aggregative or physical; (2) these follow inorganic laws, quantitative and qualitative, 'denknotwendig' and empirical, thus including, of course, the four fundamental laws; (3) but the whole as such has certain qualities which the parts have not; (4) these qualities are not to be derived additively from those of the parts.

Now all of this can be agreed to without hesitancy by the non-vitalist, the thorough-going mechanist. Such a 'creative synthesis,'—as this 'bringing about' by the parts of qualities of the whole which the parts have not may be called,—holds good of every chemical and aggregative compound. Therefore, in regard to this crucial point of his position, only the details of which receive his subsequent attention, it may be said that our author, in finding in the specific qualities of the organism as a whole those which no other complex has, and in seeing in this a basis for distinguishing the organic from the inorganic and for accepting an entelechy, is making a difference which does not make a real difference. It is, of course, a fact that every chemical compound, every complex of such compounds, is specifically different from every other compound and complex, and it may also be that each 'element' or part functions differently in different complexes,—which is a variability quite compatible with invariability under the same conditions. All this holds good of colloidal solutions, which protoplasts are. But through such a line of argumentation no theory of entelechies, of vitalism, of a fundamental difference between the living and the non-living, can be established. Either no phenomena are distinguishingly vitalistic, or the whole chemical and aggregative series is as much so as is the organic. Any difference thus made is only one of terms.

However, the author makes a quite different use both of 'creative synthesis' and of the specific character of each complex. For him the organism is a chemical-aggregative complex; the energy laws, he admits, are valid for both the whole and the parts, but include only the *quantitative* side, yet in a way, of course, not contradictory with the qualitative. As a result (?) of the creative synthesis, there is a 'wholeness' specifically different from the 'wholeness' of any other complex. This 'wholeness' is 'gesetzlich,' its laws being discovered empirically by such methods as he has previously emphasized. Now to account for such a 'wholeness,' — an effect, as he regards it, — there must be a cause, an agent. Thus he gets to the entelechy as a 'Naturfaktor.' To quote (*N*, p. 167), "all events in the organism can be regarded as, in the end, chemical changes"; "it is out of these that there result the regenerations, movements, etc." But it is to be emphasized that, with these taken as a whole, "there takes place something in accordance with a law according to which nothing in the inorganic realm happens, and for such a 'differential' change there must be a 'differential' cause."

Whence, now, comes the entelechy, or has it no origin? Here, I think, the author gets into a serious dilemma. It would seem that, if in the organism we have a chemical aggregative complex, the entelechy must be either (1) the *additive* result of the parts, or (2) something 'synthetically creative,' or, if neither of these, then (3) a new constant, free and independent, either previously existing or appearing quite 'out of nothing.' But here he vacillates. He rejects the first possibility, but accepts either implicitly or explicitly sometimes the second, at other times the third. For example (*N*, p. 186), he says: "Just as in each specific chemical aggregative fact something new is added, so here (in the organism) something new and specific is added to the totality (*Gesamtheit*) of the parts;" while again, taking the third position, he says (p. 195): "It is wholly unallowable to regard the entelechy as the '*Resultante*,' even of a new kind, arising from the working together of inorganic factors." Whether the entelechy then has previously existed as an entity or has appeared 'from non-being into being' is not discussed at length, though it is recognized that the first possibility, especially in the form of 'entelechy present and yet not expressing itself,' means its conservation, and is a spiritistic position.

The third of the above positions is, in general, taken *implicitly* in the scheme by which the specific function of the entelechy is developed. And yet here, too, I think, the argument is full of inconsistencies.

Driesch grants, first (*N*, pp. 160-162), that the chemical and aggregative events of the organism are each '*determined*,' in their direction, etc., in accordance with the four laws which he has expounded. It would seem, then, that at the same time when the principle of 'creative synthesis' is working the parts, with their compensations, etc., would suffice to determine the direction of the organism as a whole. But not so. Having been led to what he regards as a fact, namely, that in the 'Aufeinanderwirken' of the parts in the whole a specific and not merely a chemical 'Gesetzlichkeit,' *i. e.*, an agent, is coöperating with the parts, he finds it necessary to make room for its functioning, and to limit the rôle which the uncompensated intensity-differences, etc., of these parts play. (*N*, pp. 176-188.) All the most valuable information as to what this rôle in any case may be, is, he states, of empirical origin. Therefore, *empirically only*, he argues, can this rôle be farther limited or widened; only empirically can it be found what specific intensities compensate specific intensities or disturb specific equilibria. Therefore, first, it is possible to show in general, and, second, experience *does* actually disclose it as a fact, that the entelechy has just this function of compensating otherwise uncompensated potential differences or of disturbing otherwise compensated differences.

Here, then, clearly, the Entelechy is regarded as a *new* compensating factor, different from and in addition to those of the parts. And here, too, appears the crucial question: Do or do not the parts with their compensations, etc., suffice for the understanding of 'vital autonomous events'? To this I should answer (while also seeing in this, from the pragmatic standpoint, a simpler and equally efficient scientific means of describing, explaining, and controlling), that the scheme of constituent parts, chemical and aggregative, with their intensities, compensated or not, bringing about by their 'creative synthesis' new qualities of the whole, not only *entirely* suffices to account for all the compensations, 'directings,' etc., which experiments may bring to light in the organism as a whole, but also that therewith an invariability of events is guaranteed and any other compensating factor made superfluous.

But the author does not agree with this conclusion, though certain of his previous statements would allow of his so doing. Such a scheme, he holds, is *not sufficient* (*N*, pp. 176-188) to account especially for the 'Endziel,' for the 'persistence in the normal' under varying conditions. The entelechy has been set up as the 'differential' cause for a 'differential' effect, namely, for the qualities of the whole as over against those of the parts. 'Creative synthesis' being rejected or

overlooked, and therewith the first false step made, the second follows : The entelechy is held to compensate where, however, all compensation is already provided for, namely, in the parts. And then comes the third : If the entelechy compensates, it would seem, first, that it must be the intensity factor of a new, say vital, energy, and, secondly, to be derivable, according to the usual principle of transformation, from other energies. These last conclusions, however, the author denies explicitly (*N*, pp. 188-196) : he gives up or finds no advantage in speaking of 'vital energy,' and has stated that the entelechy could not be a 'result.' Here, then, were the entelechy to be granted even as an 'intensity,' it would be without its correlative extensity factor and, consequently, different from other intensities. Might not the difference extend as far as to its not being able to compensate after all ? In fact, the author himself seems to feel instinctively some such difficulties. His first false steps have now become a running gait (*N*, pp. 190-199). For he says that the entelechy has the function of 'linking' the 'Energiegetriebe' ; it is a cause but not energy ; it 'correlates' in the sense of 'being necessary' but not causal (*N*, p. 206) ; its function is an 'act' but not a 'Geschehensfolge.' Put briefly, my criticism is, that its 'compensating' function cannot be worked out in a manner consistent with the principles of compensation, etc., previously laid down. It finally appears emasculated to the extent that its quondam function (?) has volatilized entirely ; everything is already provided for.

The origin of this series of errors, as I regard them, lies, however, in a more fundamental error in his methodological analysis of the four laws. These he has interpreted as purely quantitative and as, therefore, saying nothing about, though compatible with, the qualitative side of phenomena, this remaining for empirical investigation. That this last is always necessary and that it cannot be replaced, I am quite ready to admit. But, even granted that the qualitative side is to be obtained by the empirical method alone, that which the four laws say and mean is, not simply that there is no contradiction between them and the empirical qualitative laws, but that every quality is at the same time also quantitative, and in this case quantitative in the manner expressed by the four laws. It may or may not be conceivable that there should be a quality which would not also be quantitative, *e. g.*, as an intensity, but this does not concern us here.

But to start with the four laws, and in an interpretation of them at once arbitrary and apparently incorrect (since it does 'not touch' the qualitative side) to find the grounds for a new factor called 'entelechy,'

to try to discover its functions, and finally to find these compatible with, because 'not touched' by, these quantitative laws, is to argue in a circle or worse. However, with one such case before us, perhaps it ought not to be surprising, too, that the author should discover no incompatibility between his admission on the one hand (*N*, Part I) that the operation of the four energy laws in general, and, therefore, by implication, in the chemical-aggregative parts of the organism in particular, should constitute an invariability of events, and, his view, on the other hand, that the function of the entelechy is a 'choosing, regulative one' (*N*, p. 205) whereby it is brought about that the organism, either in whole or in part (acting as a whole), makes for some end. Here, to be sure, there is another possibility, namely, that, given any energy-complex, each energy-form can be regarded as making for some end (*i. e.*, effect) different from what would 'be made for' without it, and were the entelechy actually established as a compensating factor, etc., it could well play this rôle, which is quite compatible with invariability and determinism.

But it is quite clear that our author does not mean this. Both in connection with his 'experimental embryology' and here he has in mind an actual variability, namely, that of 'the same end under different conditions.' To be sure, he need not make this interpretation of his experimental results, as I have previously pointed out, but as a matter of fact he does make it, and it is this which is inconsistent with the 'invariability' implied in his other statements. His teleology, therefore (for that, of course, is what his introduction of the *entelechy* means), need not concern us long. A 'statical teleology,' which he defines as 'a dependence on a specific order of specific parts and as an inversion of cause and effect', he rejects. Rather, his is a 'dynamic teleology,' for which there is an independence of this order, and a predominance of unity and wholeness. To effect this is the work of the entelechy, which is at least a 'Primärwissen and -wollen,' at the same time that, by previous definition, it is a compensating factor. Even granted the Entelechy, then, it would seem, either that this 'compensating' must be like that of other energies, with the result that the 'Primärwissen and -wollen' are superfluous, and there is no more opportunity for variability with than without them, or that it is different, so that, with the compensations of the constituent parts sufficing, its rôle is an entirely empty one.

In conclusion, therefore, it may be said that, although the volumes before us contain a great deal that is suggestive, interesting, and valuable, nevertheless the author has not established his case. He has cre-

ated illegitimately a 'Naturkonstant,' for which he fails to find a rôle that cannot be played by the 'constants' already at hand, and which also contradicts his own statements about the rôle of these 'constants.' 'The four energy-laws, *plus* the 'empirical' ones of the qualities both of the parts and of the whole, those, namely, which result from the 'synthetic creation' of the parts, with the recognition that both these sets, at the same time that they are qualitative, are also quantitative, account for the specific characteristics of the organism as a chemical aggregative complex as well as for every other such complex, and, of course, imply an invariability, a definiteness of direction, etc., in the events of such a complex. The difference is simply an empirical and specific one as between complexes, and there is no other difference between the organic and the inorganic; *i. e.*, it can be said and said truly, without embracing a vitalism of any kind, that the organism is a complex whose parts are to be found together nowhere else, and as a whole it possesses qualities which cannot be exactly duplicated elsewhere. Since there is as much or as little necessity, therefore, for an entelechy in the inorganic as in the organic, it is, if accepted, superfluous and functionless, a made difference which does not make a difference.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

The Philosophy of Religion: A Critical and Speculative Treatise of Man's Religious Experience and Development in the Light of Modern Science and Reflective Thinking. By GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. 2 vols. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905. — pp. xx, 616; xii, 590.

The nearly coincident appearance of these volumes with the announcement that their author is retiring from active university service will not fail to call forth reflection upon the long series of contributions to philosophy of which they are intended to be the consummation and crown. To few men is it given to carry through such a program of investigations as that represented by Ladd's works. From the beginnings of systematic physiological psychology in America, through general psychology, introduction to philosophy, theory of knowledge, metaphysics, and ethics, to philosophy of religion, — this is the long path that he has traversed, besides making considerable contributions to theology. Any reader of his works who stops to think of the rapid movement of research and of critical reconstruction that characterizes the last thirty years will recognize the almost prodigious industry, as well as the depth, sanity, and hospitality of their author's mind. The range of their subjects, the breadth of their scholarship, their grasp at once of details and of principles, and their live relation to current movements, give them a distinguished place in the American philosophy of the period.

It is not surprising to find Professor Ladd saying in the Preface that the religious problem has been an absorbing interest with him through his entire career. This was already known to his readers. But it is worthy of remark that Ladd, in considerable measure, represents his age in this respect. For, however far the newer points of view in biology, psychology, metaphysics, and ethics may have seemed to wander from what most great thinkers have regarded as the primary concern of philosophy, these last years are again demonstrating through many scientific philosophers the inextinguishable interest of the human mind in inclusiveness of view and in the interpretation of facts in the light of religious aspiration and need. What single phenomenon of our time in the whole sphere of the philosophical sciences is more significant than the number of prominent psychol-

ogists of the modern type who, after a long immersion in details, have now turned their attention to the philosophy of religion?

The volumes now before us speak the language of the time in still more intimate fashion. For, in place of speculation, supporting itself upon itself, we have, as the sub-title is intended to indicate, an effort to show that a philosophy of religion springs directly, — for the thinker, — out of the observable facts that may be summarized as the religious experience of man. Ladd is convinced that the truth about religion or anything else must be got at through analysis of the experienced facts. Hence, the philosophy of religion must begin with the history and psychology of religion. The whole work is pervaded with a sense of the concrete, and of the revelation of reality in concrete form rather than in thought divorced from the content of the world of becoming. "Indeed," says the author, in his discussion of the theistic argument, "from a certain point of view it may be claimed that the one and only argument *is* the historical. For the history of the evolution in humanity of the belief in God as perfect ethical spirit is the all-inclusive and satisfactory proof of the reality of the object answering to the belief."

This point of view makes extraordinary demands in the way of a knowledge of anthropology and of the entire history of religion and of religions. These demands Ladd meets by the firm mastery of a great store of facts. Undoubtedly such acquaintance with fact restricts the number of confident generalizations that one is inclined to make. Certainly Ladd will hardly be accused of unduly simplifying his conceptions. He finds the facts of religion everywhere and always extremely complicated, even in the earliest stages of history. He can find no one original form of religion from which all others have been derived, and no single line of development of religion as a whole. Much less does he reduce religion in its totality to any single mental process or form of reaction.

Another general characteristic, and one of the most prominent, is that the work not merely describes and metaphysically interprets religion, but also assesses the value of the different types of religious reaction. At every point the question is not merely the logical content and speculative validity of the idea, but also its ethical and spiritual worth. The standard of values is three-fold: psychological, historical, and speculative and ideal. The psychological test concerns the degree in which any religion satisfies subjective needs, intellectual, emotional, ethical; the historical test lies in the relation of a religion to social development and to self-purification and progress; the specu-

lative and ideal test is rationality, which includes conformity to ideals of beauty, righteousness, and blessedness, as well as truth. Naturally, the Christian religion furnishes the supreme type. Chapter after chapter, paragraph after paragraph, the types of idea, of cult, and of conduct are ranged in serial order from lowest to highest. The work might almost have been named "The Finality of the Christian Religion," albeit its movement, unlike that of Foster's book, is not chiefly within the bounds of historical Christian apologetics. If this structure of the chapters suggests that the treatment is somewhat cut-and-dried, nevertheless it must be said that Ladd's notion of the Christian religion is far from being that of conventional Christianity. For he subjects the Christian religion unconditionally to the forces and processes by which all other religions have come to be, and he points out with unrestrained frankness the great historical blunders of ecclesiastical and confessional Christianity.

The entire first volume, after some eighty pages of introduction, is given up to an historical and psychological analysis of religious phenomena. It divides itself naturally into three parts, namely, "Religion: An Historical Development"; "Man: A Religious Being"; and "Religion: A Life." The second volume also divides into three parts: "God: The Object of Religious Faith"; "God and the World"; and "The Destiny of Man." The great range and amount of the material, and still more the fulness of problems that the two weighty volumes discuss, render impracticable anything like an adequate description of the contents. I shall therefore limit the remainder of this discussion chiefly to two points, the general features of Ladd's psychology of religion and the method of his theistic interpretation of it.

Religion is defined as "the belief in invisible, superhuman powers (or a Power) which are (is) conceived after the analogy of the human spirit; on which (whom) man regards himself as dependent for his well-being, and to which (whom) he is, at least in some sense, responsible for his conduct; together with the feelings and practices which naturally follow from such a belief" (Vol. I, p. 89). The primacy here given to ideas or the intellectual factor is intentional. "In religion," says the author in another place, "there is always a certain amount of belief or knowledge, a predominatingly intellectual attitude toward its Object. But emotions and sentiments of a somewhat characteristic type are reasonably and indeed necessarily connected with this belief. . . . And the conduct of the believer, as expressive of his intellectual and emotional attitudes, is always determined by these beliefs, emotions, and sentiments" (Vol. I, p. 114).

The earliest known form of religion is an unreflecting spiritism, which may take any one or more of several forms, such as ancestor-worship, nature-worship, and animal-worship. How religion originated we cannot know, for our first glimpse of evolving humanity shows religion already there, and there is no way by which consistently to derive it from the non-religion of lower orders of life. The only sense in which the origin of religion can be determined is to study its sources in the structure of man's mind. What, then are the psychological sources of religion? "The psychological source of all the various forms of the religious idea is to be found in man's capacity and tendency to objectify his own Self-hood in such manner as to satisfy his deeper, most permanent, and most pressing, intellectual, æsthetical, and social needs" (Vol. I, p. 363). That is, we form ideals of various kinds, assign them reality because of the inevitable "ontological consciousness," and thereupon appropriate feelings and acts follow. Ladd insists that religion springs from the whole nature of man, — from "feeling, and every form of feeling; intellect, and every aspect and phase of intellection; will, and every species of the voluntary and deliberately chosen course of conduct" (Vol. I, p. 263). The causes that bring about religious belief in its earliest forms, however, are impulsive and emotional rather than rational; they are fear and hope, social feelings toward deceased ancestors, intellectual curiosity, ethical emotions, and so on.

According to this, apparently, no religious implicate is recognized in experience as such, but the immediate empirical circumstance gives rise to emotional reactions, which in turn lead on to the construction of certain ideas, which awaken other emotional reactions and, at last, a specific mode of conduct. This is offered as a genetic account of religion, and somewhere in this series of processes there is a "religious experience" that is made the basis of the metaphysics of religion. In spite of appearances, however, it would scarcely be fair to say that Ladd intends to separate experience into disparate parts or species. To him religion is man himself functioning as man, and again and again in Ladd's treatment of the development of religion he displays the unity of the religious and other forms of reaction. The physical environment, for example, yields man objects (or at least material symbols for the objects) of worship, and these objects vary with the physical environment. Not only that, but religious emotions acquire specific character from the same source. Further, not only does religion influence industry, but it is in turn modified thereby, as is evident, for example, from the number of gods that

represent agricultural pursuits and ideas. Similarly, the status of the family, the form of political organization, the methods of science, and the ideals of science, art, and morality that prevail at any time, all contribute to the determination of the then accepted religious ideas with their accompanying feelings and practices.

A further evidence that no real separation is intended is the statement that religion and morality, though they are not identical, are inseparable in fact. This is as much as to say that they are simply discriminable aspects of a single reaction. Moreover, Ladd makes it abundantly clear both in the present work and in earlier treatises that cognition, conduct, and æsthetical reactions contain an implicate of the *same* ideal being as that which religion worships. Interpreting Ladd by himself, then, we conclude that his definition of religion conveys a *prima facie* meaning that is not fully intended. It is not probable that one who leans as strongly as Ladd does toward a voluntaristic psychology would fully accept an intellectualistic definition of what he regards as the profoundest human reaction.

Unquestionably, however, there is here a group of ideas that need clearing up. They are: human nature, genetic account of religion, religious experience. Is human nature to be conceived of under the category of being or of becoming, or of both? Here the conception is clearly static; religion is referred to a certain "capacity and tendency" of the mind as a psychological ultimate. Now ultimates cannot be escaped, even in theories of development; something real that has a specific nature or law of action is the presupposition of evolution; and this ultimate, or some of these ultimates, might very well be found in human nature. In that case, a complete genetic account of any function, though it could not derive one function from another of a totally different kind, would nevertheless refuse to accept any historical limit. From animal to man, from the 'ordinary' experience to the religious experience,—these steps appear to be essential to a satisfactory genetic account of religion. Suppose that the earliest glimpses of man that we can obtain show him to be already religious; suppose, further, that we give over all effort to derive religious functions from non-religious, does it follow that religion is to enter into psychology blunt end foremost? Merely to trace religion to a "capacity and tendency" to form religious ideals is perilously near to giving up the genetic problem, and the result, as we have seen, is to make religion appear as an *addendum* to human existence in its primary forms. There is certainly some empirical material for forming a thoroughgoing genetic theory, by elimination, at least. There come

to mind at once types of investigation represented by Marshall's *Instinct and Reason*, Baldwin's *Mental Development*, and the entire literature of functionalism in psychology and pragmatism in philosophy. Not one of these is mentioned, nor is the religious development of the individual made any use of as throwing light on the origin and growth of religion in the race.

What, then, is the religious experience of man? To derive an answer from the work before us is not easy, albeit this conception is fundamental to the entire discussion. One would naturally understand by this term a group of specific processes such as conversion, visions, ecstasies, inspirations, the subjective aspects of prayer, and so on. The 'psychology of religion,' from Ladd's own point of view in psychology, would include an empirical analysis of these states. Yet the work now before us offers a psychology of religion in which no attempt at such analysis is made. Apart from a reference or two to Starbuck (one of which, Vol. I, p. 276, is so inadequate as to be misleading), the literature of the subject is ignored. This is true, even in passages that might have received confirmation from empirical studies already published. For example, Ladd holds that a normal development of religion is away from mere good fellowship with the gods toward a sense of sin and desire for redemption. Hence, a religion of salvation must be the culmination of religious development. This is in harmony with James, who holds that the "twice-born" or conversion type of religious experience represents, on the whole, a profounder grasp on life than the "once-born" or growth type. Yet James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* is unmentioned. In a word, though Ladd speaks freely of the psychology of religion, he has in mind something more like the 'old' psychology than the 'new.' Whether there is, in fact as yet a 'psychology of religion' in any strict sense may reasonably be questioned.

Turning now to the second volume, we note that it is less a metaphysical investigation than an application of metaphysical conclusions already set forth in earlier works to the specific problems raised by religion. This is the author's avowed plan. In particular, he assumes a real self for man, ability to reach valid knowledge of reality, the ontological validity of ethical and æsthetical ideas, and consequently the possibility of a gradually perfecting knowledge of the object of religion, or God. Even the treatment of the proofs for the existence of God is less an effort to construct a proof than a reflective analysis of the historical arguments, together with a summary and applications of conclusions already accepted. In

this respect the treatment would incur the criticism of Höffding, who says that a philosophy of religion "must not start from any ready-made philosophical system." To this Ladd could reply that his whole system of philosophy and, indeed, any system, is already a philosophy of religion, and that an effort, not to secure standing ground, but to understand the ground on which one stands, is fully entitled to be called philosophy of religion.

The distinctive characteristic of this part of the work, I should say, is its treatment of the place of faith in the evidence for theism. Faith is primarily religion itself as a subjective fact. But it is a state that asserts its own ontological validity. Hence its nature is fundamentally identical with that of knowledge. The difference between the two is one of degree, and each attains only greater or less probability. Religion is not required to offer apodictical demonstration for its beliefs, but only to exhibit the rationality of its faith, and rationality here can mean only the harmony of its faith with the conception of the being of the world that science and philosophy establish. How, now, is faith to show its rationality? In reply, Ladd appears to offer two different lines of argument. When he undertakes systematically to reconstruct the defective theistic arguments that have become traditional, he argues in the well-known metaphysical manner for the unity of the world, the identification of the world-force with will, the intelligence of the world-will, the personality of it, and the usual metaphysical attributes. But intertwined with this argument, or rather encompassing it as the sea encompasses a fish, is what may fairly be called his own deeper thought. It is that religious faith is itself, in a way, the supreme evidence for the rationality of religion. "The one inexhaustible source of evidences for the true conception of God is the experience of the race" (Vol. II, p. 38). This transfers the argument at once from the thin air of speculation to the solid ground of history. "Indeed, from a certain point of view, it may be claimed that the one and only argument is the historical. For the history of the evolution in humanity of the belief in God as perfect Ethical Spirit is the all-inclusive and satisfactory proof of the reality of the Object answering to the belief" (Vol. II, p. 105). Religion itself is revelation, and it is hard to see how, if there be such a God as the highest religion asserts, he could better make himself known than just by keeping alive in man an aspiration and a struggle toward such a faith.

Thus it is concrete religion that is most convincing as to the existence of God. This evidence attains its most convincing form for

mankind in general through the great leaders and inspired prophets in whom the reality of the world seems to speak with peculiar distinctness and authority. Such evidence, too, is not the merely impersonal accumulation of history ; it comes home to the individual with power because in the message of the prophet or the ideal of his people the worshipper finds expression for what he feels to be most deeply his real self. Nor is this evidence what has traditionally been called revelation, that is, a message taking primarily the conceptual form, but yet revelation as the workman reveals his thought by what he does. Ultimately, religion is an effect wrought in us by the world-ground, and, in general, revelation is always an historical event.

This conception of theistic evidence has the merit of recognizing the truth of such doctrines as inspiration and revelation without doing violence to psychology or to historic continuity. The idea of the supernatural underlying it is simply that the supernatural is the real ground of phenomenal experience. Nature and history are the sphere of a real purpose, a real providence. Miracle is a fact in the sense that the wonders that have led men's thoughts toward God were intended to do so, not in the sense that they deviate from the general order of nature. The idea of divine immanence is worked out as far as is possible without destroying the notion of personality, divine and human. God is the present as well as the ultimate ground of all that is, even of evil. In the elaboration of this notion, advantage is taken of recent movements in natural and physical science, especially the yielding of mere mechanical conceptions before the advance of such ideas as spontaneity, selective activity, and direction. The heartiness with which Ladd places himself in the movement of scientific thought can be inferred from his statement that without the notion of evolution the problem of evil would be utterly without light.

The total impression is that of a great drama which the author is opening to our vision rather than that of a chain or web of speculative notions. This concreteness, which is pervasive of the entire work, is perhaps its greatest merit. One can only wish that the evidential logic of it had been wrought out rather more systematically. At times the standpoint becomes obscured through such statements as that "all so-called proofs [for the existence of God] may be summed up in this: Religion itself could not be accounted for without God" (Vol. II, p. 32), where we have a simple causal inference ; or that the content of religious faith "affords to him who experiences it a guaranty of the reality" of its object (Vol. I, p. 495), where we seem to

have either a doctrine of religious intuition or else the ontological argument. On the whole, however, it is tolerably clear that Ladd's position is that religion is a real experience, a part of the commerce of men with their world, and that the validity of religious beliefs proves itself precisely through the vital, creative place that they occupy in advancing life, individual and racial.

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La philosophie pratique de Kant. Par VICTOR DELBOS. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1906. — pp. 756.

I have toiled through this extensive and scholarly work with the painful consciousness that the task of reviewing it should be undertaken by a Kantian specialist, and not by one who is more interested in the definitive results and general validity of Kant's practical philosophy than in the minutiae of its formation. M. Delbos, however, very clearly indicates the character of his work in the Preface, where he maintains that a knowledge of the successive steps in the development of Kant's philosophy must be an essential factor in its interpretation, and that it would often present a better appearance in the eyes of adversaries if the knowledge of its genesis were allowed to preserve it from the over-simplified schematic expression in which many of its partisans have encased it. If M. Delbos has not wholly escaped the danger of losing the wood in the trees, it should be sufficient to remind the reader of the nature of the author's undertaking.

He has not sought to write an introduction to Kant after the manner of Paulsen, nor a critical examination of the Kantian philosophy like Caird. There is indeed but little criticism in the book, and some of the chapters consist almost entirely of an objective restatement of Kant's argument. This is the case, *e. g.*, with the long chapter (ninety pages) on the *Critique of Judgment*. The latter half of this chapter deals with the Teleological Judgment; but there is no discussion of Kant's doctrine of Finality such as we find, *e. g.*, in Caird or in Janet's *Final Causes*. Sixty of the ninety pages devoted to *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason* are occupied with an abridgment of the contents of that treatise, and about the same proportions of exposition and commentary may be found in other chapters. Few people, undoubtedly, wish to read all of Kant's published writings. For the less significant of them an abridgment is probably sufficient. But to the present writer it does not seem that for works like the *Kr. d. U.* and *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft* such a full restatement as M. Delbos gives is either an adequate

substitute for the reading of the full text or essential to the description of the psychological genesis of the Kantian philosophy. In short, I do not suppose that M. Delbos intends his book as a substitute for Kant; and if not, he could have reduced its compass one third by curtailing his expositions and simply giving us the references. However that may be, the author's primary object is to expound and analyze in their chronological order all the works of Kant in so far as they relate to the development of his practical philosophy (Preface). For this purpose he has utilized not only Kant's minor as well as his major works, but the constantly increasing mass of Kantiana in the form of correspondence, lecture-notes, philosophical remains, etc., together with the most important treatises of every sort which deal in any way with the Königsberg philosopher. The work thus becomes a thesaurus of Kantian material, the usefulness of which is, however, considerably impaired by the lack of an index or even an adequate table of contents. This defect, so common in French books, is all the more inexcusable in view of the fact that the exposition is chronological rather than logical or topical, and the reader has no clue whatever to the whereabouts of any particular word or doctrine that he may desire to look into. Some amends is however made by the addition of numerous cross-references, which, besides revealing the author's scholarly acquaintance with Kant, help the reader to find and compare different passages, and thus to form his own opinion of Kant's essential meaning.

In the first two chapters of the Introduction M. Delbos gives a sketch, first, of the two great eighteenth century forces which combined to form Kant's character and develop his genius, viz., Pietism and Rationalism; secondly, of Kant's moral and intellectual personality. The essential theme of his moral speculations and the essential trait of his personality are found in the union of freedom and law. The object of the third chapter is to answer the question how Kant arrived at his philosophy, especially the practical part of it. The architectonic idea is not a gift, but a gradual acquisition. Kant first directed his studies to the different objects of philosophy; they later took a definite form, and led him gradually to the idea of a whole. He is the 'philosopher of antinomies.' We have Kant's own statement (in a letter to Garve) that his starting point was not discussion about the existence of God and Immortality; it was the antinomies which first awakened him from his dogmatic slumbers. A stronger case can undoubtedly be made for the view that the whole course of Kant's thinking was determined by his desire to conserve morality and re-

ligion, than for the view that his moral theology was an afterthought, created only to counteract the ruinous consequences of the *Kr. d. r. V.* Kant tells us that the origin of the Critical Philosophy is morality in respect to the imputability of actions; and again, that the doctrine of the ideality of space and time and the doctrine of freedom are the two pivots of his system, and that the former depends upon the latter. Nevertheless, M. Delbos thinks it worth while to defend Kant against misconception, perhaps even against himself. Thus, *e. g.*, Kant has certainly inverted the order of dependence of his two fundamental conceptions: Historically the theory of the ideality of space and time was established, by considerations derived from geometry and natural philosophy, before the theory of freedom, and was the necessary condition, not the consequence, of the latter. The conclusion would appear to be that Kant did not develop his system in the interest of faith, but that he wished to found his practical philosophy only in accordance with his theoretical philosophy. M. Delbos believes that an account of the development of Kant's moral ideas in the pre-critical period will make this plain.

Kant's writings prior to 1760 do not reveal any methodical pre-occupation with moral problems. He still adheres to the optimism of Leibnitz; he has not yet made any independent effort to subject the moral conceptions that he had received from the Leibnitzo-Wolffian School to rational criticism. In the *Nova dilucidatio* he is brought in contact with the problem of freedom in connection with the principle of the 'determinant reason,' but he still maintains the Leibnitzian position against Crusius. There is also an anticipation of the later doctrine that the only true good is the good will (Pt. I, ch. 1, pp. 73-90.)

Chapter II deals with the elements of Kant's practical philosophy from 1760 to 1770. In this period we find various anticipations of his later critical doctrine: *e. g.* (in the *Attempt to Introduce the Notion of Negative Quantity into Philosophy*, 1763), that the moral worth of conduct depends upon the virtuous intention of the agent (pp. 96-97), and the distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives, first made in the treatise *On the Evidence of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals*, 1764.

These are points of detail. More important is the evidence afforded by the latter work of the influence of the British moralists, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, to whom Kant owes the doctrine that the good is revealed to us by sentiment and not by cognition (p. 101), — a doctrine worked out more fully, after the English manner of

psychological analysis, in the *Observations on the Sentiment of the Beautiful and Sublime*, 1764.

The transformation of Kant's views on moral problems during this period is due to three principal causes: The critical revision of his metaphysical concepts, the influence of British moral philosophy which found the true source of morality in feeling, and the influence of Rousseau. The account of Kant's indebtedness to Rousseau is particularly good. But if the significance of Rousseau's influence upon Kant has sometimes been insufficiently emphasized,—as, *e. g.*, by Caird,—M. Delbos's patriotism perhaps leads him to do rather more than justice to this influence at the expense of the British moralists. Thus when he says (pp. 115–116) that Kant's famous expression about his awakening from dogmatic slumber is perhaps more applicable to Rousseau than to Hume, he surely goes beyond the mark. The period now under consideration shows a reaction from the moral conceptions of the Leibnitzo-Wolffian School and a temporary adherence to the moral sentiment standpoint under the combined influence of Rousseau and the British moralists; but we have to remember that Kant's awakening 'gave a new direction to his investigations in the field of speculative philosophy.' Whether we follow Benno Erdmann in holding that at this period Kant saw in Hume only the moral essayist and social philosopher and in dating the interruption of his dogmatic slumbers from 1772–1774, or whether we follow Höffding in assigning this awakening to 1762–1763, in either case it was surely Rousseau who, comparable to Newton though he was, remained for Kant the 'philosopher of human society,' while it was Hume who aroused the reflections which resulted in the Critical Philosophy. If any importance is to be attached to Kant's statement, quoted above, in regard to the antinomies, this statement can be reconciled with his expression in regard to Hume, but it would require more ingenuity to harmonize it with M. Delbos's claim in behalf of Rousseau.

If, however, it is fair to comment at all upon an *obiter dictum*, this should be taken in connection with what is said in Chapter III of Part II. The object of this chapter is to show that the philosophy of history was of extreme importance in the constitution of Kant's practical philosophy. But while M. Delbos follows Höffding in laying great stress upon the significance of the period between the *Kritik* and the *Grundlegung*, and upon the influence of Kant's anthropological studies in determining his ethical doctrine, he seems to me to take a less exaggerated and saner view than Höffding of the influence of Rousseau and of the development of Kant's thought at this period.

He avoids the temptation to read modern socio-psychological conceptions into the genesis of Kant's practical philosophy; and he points out that while we may accept 1784 as the date of the *Lectures on Anthropology* edited by Starke, there is an unedited manuscript of these *Lectures* dating from 1775-1776, in which Kant, under the avowed influence of Rousseau, gives expression to ideas similar to those of the historical essays of 1784-1786. (Note, pp. 128-9.) If we should be justified, in accordance with this hint, in pushing back Rousseau's 'second' influence upon Kant from the middle of the eighties to the middle of the seventies, this would weaken the claim that Kant's ethics took definitive shape under the influence of Rousseau in connection with the preparation of the historical essays of 1784-1786, while on the other hand it would add to the plausibility of the statement that Rousseau had more to do with Kant's awakening than Hume. M. Delbos, however, so far as I recall, does not tell in what Kant's real awakening consisted, nor at what date we are to place this significant influence of Rousseau.

Chapter III of Pt. I covers the dark ages of Kant's development, between the *Dissertation* of 1770 and the appearance of the *Kritik*. M. Delbos's principal source for this period is the *Lectures on Metaphysics* (published by Pölitx in 1821), the delivery of which he follows Heinze in placing between 1775-1776 and 1779-1780. The résumé of these *Lectures* emphasizes Kant's dualism of the transcendental and the practical, the metaphysical concepts of God, freedom, and immortality being here treated by Kant from this double point of view. M. Delbos does not here make use of the *Menschenkunde oder philosophische Anthropologie* (as Higler did) because he holds that this must be dated from 1784-1785.

When we come to Part II, "La constitution de la philosophie pratique de Kant," it is a pleasure to find that M. Delbos has some other clue to offer for the exposition of Kant's thought than that of mere chronological sequence. If we accept Kant's statement that the concept of freedom is the keystone of his whole system, the best way of orienting oneself in his practical philosophy is to study how he has defined and justified this concept (p. 191). Chapters I, II, and III of Part II, accordingly, deal with the *Kr. d. r. V.*, the *Prolegomena*, and the works on philosophy of history, with special reference to the development of Kant's idea of freedom. When it is said that Kant's idea of freedom is obscure and contradictory, it is sometimes forgotten that his different accounts of freedom express different points of view and different moments in his development. What is the

notion of freedom essential to the *Kr. d. r. V.*? Is it cosmological freedom conceived as idea of reason and independent of experience? Or is it practical freedom known directly by experience? To which of those two kinds of freedom is the freedom of the autonomous will to be related? And what relation has the intelligible freedom of the treatise *Die Religion* on the one hand with the autonomous will, and on the other hand with the intelligible freedom of the *Kr. d. r. V.*? How does it happen that in the latter freedom is first deduced as a principle and then admitted by postulate (p. 192)?

These are some of the questions that emerge and that M. Delbos is not here concerned to answer, his object being rather to show that the concept of freedom has not yet reached its full significance or its definitive form. Thus, *e. g.*, the concept of the autonomous will does not appear in the first edition of the *Critique* (p. 207), which also leaves ill-defined the relation of freedom as cause to the imperative as law (p. 269), and the way in which the moral law imposes obligation is insufficiently defined (p. 233). Kant's lack of decision in regard to the moral law results in a lack of harmony between the ethical doctrine of the methodology and that of the dialectic (pp. 234 ff.). The *Prolegomena* does not add anything essentially new on moral and religious problems, though it indicates the direction in which Kant's thought was moving. He does not yet seem to have determined the relation of the ideas that must constitute the system of morality, or clearly to have got hold of its organizing conception (pp. 248-256). The will is for Kant the faculty of ends; but it is in the studies on the philosophy of history (1784-1786) that he first definitely relates this conception of an order of ends to the idea of freedom (pp. 264 ff.).

I have not space to take up the remaining chapters which deal with the definitive form of Kant's moral and religious philosophy, but I have perhaps said enough to indicate the scope and general character of the work. The *Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion* (1783-1784), show us that Kant now has the idea of moral law, the idea of freedom, and the idea of a universal system of ends; it remains then to define their mutual relations according to some central organizing principle. How M. Delbos understands Kant to have worked out this problem I must leave to the reader to discover. My own opinion is that M. Delbos's analytical presentation of the external influences and internal changes through which Kant gradually reached the definitive form of his practical philosophy is clearer and better than his exposition of the mutual relation of the leading ideas which constitute that philosophy; but his conscientious attempt to

get at Kant's real meaning and his defense of Kant against certain popular misconceptions, add materially to the interest and the value of an able and scholarly work. M. Delbos maintains throughout a judicial tone which leaves nothing to be desired. He writes as a sympathetic interpreter of Kant, but in no partisan spirit. In the last chapter he sums up what he regards as the principal theses of the Kantian ethics, and concludes that Kantianism, when freely interpreted and purified from the imperfections which are largely due to a too rigid and formalistic method, is not opposed to the constitution of a positive science of morals except in so far as the latter pretends to furnish the supreme law of the determination of the will. A metaphysic of morals is however necessary; and Kant has given us one, which, when liberally and not too literally interpreted, is still valuable for contemporary thought, though it cannot now be superstitiously resuscitated under the form that Kant has given it.

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Geschichte der strafrechtlichen Zurechnungslehre. Von RICHARD LOENING. Erster Band: Die Zurechnungslehre des Aristoteles. Jena, Verlag von Gustav Fischer, 1903. — pp. xvi, 357.

The fundamental principles of criminal procedure and the theory of legal responsibility have never been either adequately examined or formulated. This neglect of the scrutiny of general principles on the part of European jurisconsults applies especially to the psychological side of criminal law, and that, too, in spite of the vast accumulation of criminological literature in the last decades. Owing to the prevalent confusion as to the psychological significance of crime, Professor Loening has undertaken to write the history of the doctrine of legal responsibility. In tracing the sources of contemporary theory and practice on this subject, he concluded that the real origin was not to be found in the positive law, but was discoverable further back in the evolution of ethical ideas. Pufendorf was the first writer to employ the term *imputatio* in its technical legal sense and to formulate in a system the subjective presuppositions of legal accountability. The whole body of modern doctrine on the subject of guilt and responsibility goes back to Pufendorf. At twenty-eight years of age (1660) he published his *Elementa jurisprudentiæ universalis* and it is not supposable that he originated his theories *de novo*. His ideas were not derived from the positive law of his time or from the Roman law, but rather from the moral philosophy of the seventeenth century, which went directly

back to Scholasticism, and more remotely to Aristotle. Aristotle appears to be the real and final source of the 'theory of *imputatio* as formulated by Pufendorf. Accordingly, Loening undertook to investigate the history of the subject, beginning with Aristotle as the ultimate source of the whole subsequent stream of European doctrine of legal responsibility. The pre-Aristotelian philosophy has nothing to show that is of primary significance for the problem. The cause of the neglect of Aristotle in this connection is due to the fact that Aristotle's main concern in the treatment of the notions of responsibility and crime was with their ethical rather than with their juristic or legal aspect. Further, the statements of Aristotle are scattered through a large number of treatises (Loening quotes from thirty-one), containing only isolated remarks on this subject, not brought together into any formulated body of doctrine. They required, therefore, a tedious collation and examination from the specific standpoint of criminology. Loening regards Aristotle as the real, if not the reputed, creator of the modern doctrine of criminal accountability (*Zurechnungslehre*), and this is the historical justification for the elaborate, exhaustive examination of Aristotle's ideas presented in the volume before us. The second volume will deal with post-Aristotelian antiquity and the Middle Ages down to Pufendorf, during which time no system of theory on legal accountability was developed. The most important discussion during this period concerned itself with the dogma of the freedom of the will. The third volume will be devoted mainly to the doctrine of natural rights.

The ideas of morality and civil rights are not sharply sundered in Aristotle's writings. The function of government is essentially a moral function,—the promotion of the welfare and happiness of the citizens. While morals and law have their common roots most obviously in the notion of justice, the main business of the state is not merely the protection of its citizens from injustice, but the constructive advancement of their general spiritual well-being. The state, in Aristotle's as in Plato's conception, is an educational institution. Its aim is to make its citizens virtuous and happy, not so much by safeguarding their liberty and property as by fostering their intellectual and moral life. Owing to this conception of the function of government, politics and ethics were not divorced disciplines at any time in Greek antiquity, and for the same reason juristic and ethical ideas are closely interwoven in the whole of Hellenic literature. The *summum bonum* for the individual is happiness; the *summum bonum* of the state is the happiness of its citizens collectively regarded. Hap-

piness (*εὐδαιμονία*, better translated 'welfare' or 'well-being') is analyzed by Aristotle into the three component elements of 'happiness' (pleasurable consciousness), 'rational activity,' and 'virtue,'—the last two elements being differentiated in the forms of intellectual and moral virtues. In other words, the intellectual and moral virtues are the activities of the theoretical and practical reason respectively. The *eudæmonia* of the individual and of the state are essentially identical; consequently, the good man and the good citizen connote fundamentally the same things. The doctrine of self-realization (intellectual and moral) as the chief end of the individual furnishes the keynote of Aristotle's views on legislation and juristic accountability.

The quality of morality (its goodness or badness) has its origin in the practical reason, which possesses an epitactic or mandatory character. The will as such is sheer activity, without moral quality. It is determined by two sets of stimuli,—the rational and pathic. In so far as it is set in motion by rationalized impulses, it is good; in so far as it is determined by irrational desires, it is bad. That is, the Aristotelian theory of right and wrong is essentially the rationalism of Socrates, modified by a truer account of the relation of the feelings to the will. Knowledge as such is not the source of goodness, but knowledge in so far as it becomes a regulative and penetrative principle for the feelings. The pathic springs of conduct were not given their due ethical significance by Socrates. Moral volition is rationalized desire (*ὁρεξις βουλευτική*). By repeatedly obeying the mandatory ideas of the practical reason, the individual develops a moral habit (*ἔξις*) or fixed tendency. This phronetic condition contains a cognitive element, discriminative of the right end and the right means, and a volitional disposition to execute the enactment of reason. Training and reiteration of the good in conduct (not merely Socratic insight) is, therefore, made significant as a moral principle. Character, as *ἦθος* is commonly translated, is the mass and energy that fixedly characterize the impulses and feelings of the individual with reference to action, or it may be described as the persistent disposition within the will to react in a given way to the complex of feeling and idea. Like temperament (*Gemüthsart*), it rests primarily on inherited qualities, though subject to modification by instruction and training (*Eth. Nic.*, 1144^b 4), becoming thereby good or bad, and for this the individual is accountable. The characteristic mare of the good is the 'mean,' *i. e.*, the avoidance of excess and defect; the measure of the mean is the subjective measure of right reason.

The evaluation of conduct is made in the form of praise or blame.

The subject-matter of praise or blame is an act or the psychical antecedent of an act (motive). Such moral praise or blame (consequently, moral accountability) rests upon the following conditions: (1) The agent must be free, the act must be initiated by him, and to do or refrain must be in his power. (2) The act must be done wittingly and deliberately. If the act is done either under compulsion, or in ignorance of its nature or reasonably predictable consequences (*error facti*), it ceases to be censurable; it may be an injury, not a wrong. (3) Feelings and passions are not as such either praiseworthy or blameable, but only in so far as they modify conduct. (4) Acts of negligence are construed as voluntary and censurable. (5) Acts done in ignorance of the law (*error juris*), knowledge in this case being readily accessible, are not construable as acts done unwittingly, and such acts are not condoned, and the agent is accountable. (6) Force in the form of psychical influences exerted by other wills or things is not construable as compulsion, and the agent acting under such constraining force is morally a free agent and his wrong is blame-worthy. (7) An act done under the constraining force of fear or other subjective forces or passions, in the hope of avoiding a greater evil, is a voluntary act and the agent is accountable. (8) When an agent does a wrong ($\delta\acute{\alpha}\ \mu\eta\ \delta\epsilon\iota$) to avoid sufferings which transcend the power of human endurance and which no one would withstand, the act is neither praiseworthy nor blameable, but should be pardoned (*συγγνώμη*). (9) Accountability does not exist where the resulting harm is such as could not reasonably be foreseen (*παραλόγως*). Such cases are construable as accidents or misfortunes.

As there are quantitative distinctions in praise and blame, these being moral values admitting of more and less, so Aristotle distinguishes four degrees of wrong, as follows: (1) Crime (*ἀδίκημα*) — (a) with deliberation, (b) in passion (the agent being responsible for his condition); (2) negligence (*ἀμέλεια*); (3) injury by accident or through ignorance (*ἀτύχημα*). Animals, children, and the insane have no moral responsibility.

The measures of criminal accountability are internal and external: (1) The motive of the agent; (2) the amount of injury done to the individual or the community.

Finally, the functions of punishment in the opinion of Aristotle are: (1) Retributive — the state punishes a wrong-doer because the state has been wronged; (2) corrective — the state corrects by an equivalent loss (punishment) such gain or gratification as the wrong-doer has evidently acquired by crime; (3) educative — the state indi-

rectly promotes virtue by chastizing vice ; (4) preventive — the state eradicates vice by threats of punishment implied in its laws and by the speedy execution of them ; (5) curative or medicinal — as diseases are often healed by pain, so punishment should be applied with reference to the moral health and regeneration of the wrong-doer.

No attempt is anywhere made by Aristotle to determine the measure of responsibility by universally applicable principles or rules. Such statements as he makes occur in the form of isolated remarks chiefly in the *Ethics*, *Psychology*, and *Politics*, and it is one of the chief values of the present work to have brought these together in an orderly way. The exposition is erudite and just, and the critical and polemical character of the numerous appendices attached to the several chapters show at every turn a detailed mastery of Aristotelian literature.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Principes de morale rationnelle. Par ADOLPHE LANDRY. Paris, F. Alcan. 1906. — pp. x, 278.

In this volume M. Landry presents a rationalistic utilitarian ethics. He attempts to show : First, that there must be a genuine theory about conduct ; secondly, that the control actually exercised in conduct is rational in the fullest sense ; and finally, that the criterion for solving practical 'situations' is invariably utilitarian. In developing his views the author has obscured his case to some extent by lapsing into lengthy criticisms of other theories, thereby minimizing his own contribution.

That there must be a scientific theory of conduct is shown by appeal to the moral need of (a) justifying and (b) unifying conduct in practice (ch. I). The reviewer finds a possible confusion in this appeal : We may have a scientific theory about a class of phenomena whenever we can account for the behavior of the same in the desired respect ; but such a class might be determined by several wholly different principles. So, too, in ethics, one might 'justify' conduct by the resulting self-pleasure, and 'unify' it by sheer appeal to authority ; in which case the scientific 'unification' would not have even the most superficial relation to the inner, individual 'unification.' That this is not a merely possible confusion, but a real one in M. Landry's system, seems to be made evident by his remark that philosophical theories of conduct seek to unify conduct by seeking an end good in itself (p. 14). In this remark we see that no sharp distinction is drawn between scientific explanations of human conduct, and the attitude taken by the acting individual confronted with a moral problem. 'To act consistently' is not distinguished clearly from 'to give a consistent theory of action.'

The author expressly rejects that kind of rationalism which makes morality a pure deduction from 'innate' propositions ; he retains rationalism in a subordinate position, namely, in that of a practical need. Practical reason is higher than theoretical reason, we are told in Kantian phraseology, because 'practical needs involve the satisfaction of a theoretical unification of conduct' (p. 30). This sort of rationalism is readily modelled into a genuine utilitarianism simply by showing that the data to be theoretically unified are essentially hedonic in one wise or another. For all this, the author shows more radical rationalistic leanings when he discusses the ethical concepts. For instance, "the moral imperative is a hypothetical one, in a sense ; 'you ought to do this' means simply 'if you wish to behave rationally, you ought to do this'" (p. 81). And again : "The sovereignty of duty means that reason itself is not criticized by anything, but criticize everything else" (p. 84). And finally: Liberty means "we are

free in so far as the facts show us to be, *i. e.*, in so far as reason controls conduct" (p. 102); "this does not deny determinism, for rationality is itself, as a force, determined genetically."

These citations show the more serious misconceptions which pervade a rather keen discussion. In the first place, reason is curiously hypostasized so that it is conceived of as a force; and this involves the second difficulty, that of refusing reason the power of self-criticism. Taken in combination, these misconceptions make possible the assumption that reason is more peculiarly our own than feelings are; the above conception of liberty rests upon this fallacy. The author says that "nothing can protest against the supremacy of reason because reason alone has the power of making objections" (p. 104). This old rationalistic argument confuses *loss* of supremacy with *objections* to supremacy. 'Impulse' might well be truly supreme over reason, not by raising a theoretical protest against reason, but by the simpler and commoner method of acting impulsively; if we take the supremacy of reason to mean 'theoretical supremacy,' we are guilty of letting the defendant act as judge at his own trial. If we mean by 'supremacy' real, live, factual supremacy, it seems clear that we must divide the honors equally between reason and her enemies, at least for the present. It would be much better, however, to drop the whole discussion about the respective merits of such reified activities. M. Landry has not noted clearly enough the organic relation between 'impulse' and 'reason.'

In Book II the ethical principle is discussed under the heads of individual and general utility. Here the writer endeavors to show that the hedonic criterion is really a rational one because it can do just what reason seeks to, *viz.*, justify and unify conduct. "The moral principle is that of pleasure. It alone is enough. . . . It is irrational to refuse pleasure and to suffer pain, in the absence of other considerations" (p. 127). To save us from sheer egoism M. Landry asserts the equal rationality of egoism and altruism. "Individuals (oneself included), as well as moments of time, are alike to reason" (p. 169). Thus there are two distinct demands in accordance with which we must act; the practical problem then becomes that of weighing pleasure against pleasure. The author recognizes at this point the strict incommensurability of different pleasures and endeavors to escape the *impasse* by appealing to common sense "which says there should be a perfect equality among all individuals, because equality is the solution most readily acceptable to all men" (p. 177). Utilitarianism, then, must be accepted; and a rough indirect method of measuring and comparing pleasures must be resorted to.

In all this there is much that merits discussion; we touch upon only one point, namely, the difficulty of reconciling the view that 'individuals are all alike to reason' with the other view that 'reason is nothing other than the expression of the whole individual' (p. 186). These may be reconcilable, but it is a pity that M. Landry did not attempt the reconciliation directly. He leaves us simply with the old assumption of the sociological ethicists that

'man is largely social.' And it is furthermore unfortunate that the non-emotional, non-impulsive character of reason was not squared with its power of expressing the whole individual, — feelings, impulses, and all the rest thrown in.

The latter part of the book is devoted to the problem of Duty and Good, and to practical applications of the theory advanced. 'Duty and Good are complementary aspects of the same thing' (p. 192). The positivistic character of the theory comes to light finally in the statement that "since morality depends upon a correct gauging of the immediate and remote consequences of acts for pleasure and for pain, a complete ethics must depend upon science, especially upon physiology, psychology, and sociology. . . . There is no perfect, static, ethical theory. . . . There are no moral laws in the same sense that there are physical ones" (pp. 245-248). The least settled point in utilitarian theory, namely, the principle according to which pleasures of different sorts and in different individuals are compared and evaluated, has been neglected; and the exact meaning of reason has nowhere been developed so as to show what is meant by the 'supremacy' of that mysterious 'power.' A tendency to reify reason makes many of the problems here discussed more complex than need be. By discarding 'egos' and 'reason' the author might have restated the whole matter in terms of an adjustment between feelings, impulses, ideas, etc., and found the nature of this adjustment in the very nature of the adjusting 'elements' or 'meanings.' Whether such an avoidance of hypostasized activities would give good grounds for utilitarianism is another matter; but it would surely bring about a confirmation of M. Landry's belief that conduct is essentially rational in the sense that 'conscious control' means a synthesis of all factors, impulsive, emotional, ideational, in the given situation.

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Psychologische Studien. Von THEODOR LIPPS. Zweite, umgearbeitete und erweiterte Auflage. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1905. — pp. 287.

This second edition of Lipps's *Psychologische Studien* is enlarged by upwards of one hundred pages, and it presents in collected and adapted form matter that has appeared elsewhere since the edition of 1885. The final essay, — "Das psychische Relativitätsgesetz und das Weber'sche Gesetz," — is new to this volume. The remaining two essays, the first and second respectively, retain their former titles: "Der Raum der Gesichtswahrnehmungen," and "Das Wesen der musikalischen Konsonanz und Dissonanz." The treatment of these last two subjects is brought up to date, and the author thinks that his former opinions are still further fortified by the additional discussions.

Lipps certainly has few equals in respect to the sheer delight with which he seems to enter into the minute analysis of a topic. And, assuredly, few

men more keenly enjoy than he a thorough *Auseinandersetzung* with an author who holds contrary opinions. The reader, however, pays the piper; for he usually finds himself entangled in analyses of what *might be* and of what *must be* before he reaches any statement of what *is*. Facts are, to be sure, the supposed materials of every discussion, but the reader soon gets the conviction that he is being led towards them through an arid wilderness of speculations and logical concepts. The stringency of the logic is commendable enough in itself but it is too often quite irrelevant. 'We cannot, therefore we do not,' is quite unconvincing when our experience tells us that we do. For example, in the first essay we are still told that depth cannot be visually perceived, — that the space of visual perception is an indeterminate two-dimensional surface. Readers of the first edition of the *Studien* will recall that this statement has a decidedly *a priori* basis. Argument precedes observation, and the conclusion is that we cannot possibly see depth any more than we can directly see hardness. The eye of thought sees the third dimensional characteristics of objects, not the eye of perception. For Lipps, therefore, the flapping of an equivocal figure must be due ultimately to thought changes, and the nearness of the mountain after the storm cannot be an affair of immediate perception. The question at issue is one of fact. Lipps seems to make it one of logic.

Criticism has more than once been brought against Lipps for his use of words in new and special senses when nothing important is to be gained thereby. Several instances occur in these essays, the most conspicuous of which is, perhaps, the following: The explanation of consonance is made to turn on relations between *Tonrhythmen*. These *Tonrhythmen*, however, are nothing else than vibration-rates; and the novel terminology has only this advantage that it can be played with logically more readily than the usual and more commonplace expression with the same meaning. The new term, too, together with its derivatives, seem to gain soon an occult explanatory power, and the theory based upon it seems to win an artificial value, as if some fresh principle were being introduced for the better resolution of old difficulties.

As readers of Lipps know, he does not scruple to talk of processes in the *Seele* as distinct from those in consciousness. On one occasion in these essays, when speaking of the final pre-conscious region where excitations set up by tones may come into relation, he is ready to allow the substitution of *cortex* for *Seele*, if the reader prefers. But usually the *Seele* is made the theater of processes whose denial is beyond the reach of the critic. For instance, in speaking of the continuity of the visual field, he argues that by reason of the actual separateness of the retinal elements, a discontinuity of impressions must reach the *Seele*, there to be fused into the spatial continuum of perception. Here, however, are alleged mental facts which one may neither verify nor disprove. The asserted facts are in their very nature unknowable. The general tendency with Lipps to operate with unknowable mental processes is closely connected, perhaps as effect, perhaps as

cause, with his preponderatingly speculative treatment of psychological matters.

In the first essay the author declares himself a nativist as far as the individual is concerned, genetic processes being acknowledged and insisted on as having been operative in the race. But, as seen above, this nativism does not extend to the visual perception of depth. The eye-movement theory of localization, of which Lotze and Wundt are made the chief representatives, is subjected to vigorous criticism, and in place of it, as of all others, is erected the flexible theory of adaptation, which runs as follows: The nearer together neighboring retinal points are, the more frequently will they be impressed by objectively similar stimuli; the farther apart such elements are, the more frequently will they be impressed by objectively dissimilar stimuli. A feature of the present edition is that this theory is now pitted against that of Wundt in its applicability to the facts of the correction of dioptric metamorphopsiæ, to the glory, of course, of the author's own theory on the basis of which these metamorphopsiæ 'correct themselves.'

In the second essay it is urged that just as we correlate the vibration-rate, — the tone rhythm, — of a tone with its pitch, so we should recognize that consonance and dissonance are the conscious correspondents respectively of simple and of less simple relations between the vibration-rates of the tones concerned. This is the theory of *Tonrhythmen*. Helmholtz's theory is characterized as now abandoned. Stumpf's theory is adversely criticised on the ground that the identification of fusion and consonance cannot be consistently carried out, the grades of fusion being, for one thing, no true measure of the degree of consonance. Wundt's theory, it is claimed, constantly presupposes a fundamental state of affairs which the author's theory alone meets. The more recent theories of Krüger and Meyer come in for their share of destructive criticism.

The third essay aims to establish a general law of relativity of which Weber's law is taken to be a special case.

As a whole this volume gives the reader much to think about, and there is much with which one may be in entire agreement. But upon the reviewer at least the impression is left that the constructive work done does not possess a value commensurate with the analytic and speculative labor expended. Lipps is strongest when pointing out the weak spots in his opponents' theories. He is less convincing when erecting his own. And indeed in respect to his own theories he displays a decided impenetrability to criticism, the chief effect of the latter being to cause him to wonder that his views are not understood and adopted.

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A. H. PIERCE.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. New Series, Vol. V, 1904-1905. London, Williams and Norgate, 1905. — pp. 188.

The eight papers which are included in this collection treat of a variety

of subjects, and, where the same subject is discussed by different writers, reveal a wide variance of opinion. Partly because of this diversity of subject and opinion, the volume furnishes stimulating reading for the student of philosophy.

In the first paper Mr. Hastings Rashdall maintains that the moral judgment, because it claims universal validity, is essentially rational and not a mere mode of feeling. As metaphysical postulates of the objectivity of the moral law he mentions the existence of a universal mind for whom our moral ideas are valid, and the "negation of an unqualified optimism." In the next paper "The Line of Advance in Philosophy," Mr. Henry Sturt predicts that the philosophy of the future will be a form of voluntarism resulting from the combination of idealism with the scientific doctrine of development. Mr. W. R. Boyce Gibson, in treating of "Self-Introspection," opposes the contention of present-day psychology that we can study our mental activities only as objects and in retrospect. Thus observed, the self is nothing more than a complex of sensations. But in actual experience personality or self-hood is the feature most vital and central. Hence we must hold that the psychological assumption in question is unsound, and that we do experience our subjective activities *qua* subjective activities. This fact of self-consciousness is fundamental to all philosophy. Both the Cartesian and the Hegelian philosophies have this common basis.

In the fourth paper Mr. J. L. McIntyre aims to "give a psychological description or analysis of the value-phenomenon." No objective system of ends exists which in virtue of its content appeals to the individual as true. The view which posits such a system contradicts our actual value-experience, which always emerges in the reaction of the living individual to his environment. The paper of Mr. A. T. Shearman is devoted to a consideration of "Some Controverted Points in Symbolic Logic." Mr. Clement C. J. Webb, in the paper which follows, seeks to discover what is meant by the "personal element" when it is said that philosophy is unable to achieve objectivity because, like poetry and religion, it cannot eliminate the personal element, as the sciences do.

Mr. H. Wildon Carr contends in the seventh paper that the metaphysical criterion of non-contradiction, which, according to Mr. Bradley and Professor Taylor, affirms that reality is a self-consistent whole, is purely formal in nature and can furnish no positive knowledge of the existence or content of any object whatsoever. Absolute scepticism, he further argues, cannot be excluded on logical grounds. In the discussion of this paper Mr. Shadworth Hodgson accuses the writer of bringing back "our old friend the thing-in-itself." To this charge Mr. Carr pleads guilty, saying that in his opinion "this old friend has never been satisfactorily got rid of." In the last paper, "Idealism and the Problem of Knowledge and Existence," Mr. G. Dawes Hicks defends the view that knowledge and existence are two aspects of one inter-connected reality, both being ultimate in the sense that neither can be produced by, or developed from, the other.

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H. W. WRIGHT.

The Problems of Philosophy. By HARALD HÖFFDING. Translated by GALEN M. FISHER, with a preface by WILLIAM JAMES. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1905. — pp. 201.

This little book is a statement of Professor Höffding's position in respect to the chief problems of philosophy. As always, these problems all reduce to the great problem of the one and the many; but as the author approaches it from the critical and psychological side, rather than the ontological, he states it as that of the relation of continuity and connectedness to discontinuity and disconnectedness. His own view is that complete continuity is the unattainable ideal both of thought and of practice. The surd remainder is always present in experience, however far our organization of it may go. More than this, its retention is demanded; for it is discontinuity which gives value to life, even to its continuity. Accordingly, he describes himself as a 'critical Monist'; and to the present writer the title seems a better one than that of 'empiricist,' which Professor James suggests in his preface, and which might on the same grounds be applied to Lotze.

Professor Höffding discusses in order four forms under which this problem of continuity and discontinuity presents itself—the problems of consciousness, of knowledge, of being, and of values.

In the case of the first, we are confronted by the opposition of personality to the elements of conscious life. Personality is an ideal, neither wholly realized nor completely known. The elements exist only as they are connected in it, and yet on the other hand we cannot conceive of it as creating them. Discontinuity between consciousness and consciousness, and even between different states of the same mind, also presents itself. To get rid of this latter difficulty, it is proposed to transform psychology into physiology. But even if we accept the proposal, it is useless to attempt this before psychology has completed its own task of definition. Meanwhile, will seems to be the type and central synthesis of conscious life.

All theories of knowledge, the author points out, are necessarily analytic. That has been settled for us by Kant. Yet we can never be sure that all the presuppositions of experience have been stated. Incompleteness is unavoidable. Professor Höffding inclines to accept the economic theory of knowledge and the dynamic test of truth. But he differs from many of its adherents in holding that a principle which 'works' must be held to correspond in some way to being. Nevertheless, there is an irrational relation always present between being and knowledge. We can never entirely absorb the discontinuity of quality into the continuity of quantity; we can never abolish the separation and incompleteness which the time-relation introduces into the ideal concept of causality; and above all, we can never take the object up wholly into the subject, nor yet conceive it apart from the subject.

In dealing with the problem of being, all our cosmological constructions are necessarily inadequate, because they must proceed on the analogy of some typical phenomenon, which itself is but a part of the whole that we attempt to construe. Thought, matter, evolution, are the chief of such phenomena recently used; and the last, since it implies the possibility of dissolution, brings the 'irrational remainder' in our cosmology clearly to light.

Professor Höffding disregards æsthetics in discussing the problem of values, and confines himself to ethics and religion. Ethics has to do with value in the field of human life; religion is defined as the belief in the persistence of values, in their significance for ultimate reality at large. The antinomies of ethical experience center about the relation of the individual to society, and of impulse to personality. In other words, the ethical problem is the *individualization* of the moral standard, which yet must be the same, in some sense, for all. This problem is still further complicated by the changes taking place in the standard itself. As for religion, that is the most concentrated expression of all our problems. As it embodies man's persistent belief in the reality of his values, it includes in its search for a solution all the antinomies both of his speculative and of his practical life.

The appended notes add to the suggestiveness of a most interesting and compact "philosophical testament"; though it might seem that Professor Höffding has drawn his impressions of British Neo-Hegelianism too exclusively from the writings of Mr. F. H. Bradley. This appears to be the reason why he criticises the standpoint of absolute idealism in general, as necessarily involving a denial that the time-relation is in any sense real.

The book, although small, is in no sense an 'introduction to philosophy,' or a manual for those beginning its study. It is full of allusions to the history of speculation, as one might expect from its author, and acquaintance with the subject is necessary to appreciate its argument, which is often in technical form. The translation is apparently "faithful, if not elegant," as the preface says. An occasional roughness in its style may be pardoned for the sake of its conciseness.

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The Philosophy of Religion. By HARALD HÖFFDING. Translated from the German edition by B. E. MEYER. London, Macmillan and Co., New York, The Macmillan Co., 1906. — pp. 410.

An account of Professor Höffding's philosophy of religion was published in this REVIEW (Vol. XI, p. 181) on the appearance of the work in German. The hope was then expressed that this valuable book might be put into English. It is a pleasure to be able to record the realization of that hope. The work is one which no serious student of the religious problem can afford to neglect. It is already recognized as one of the standard treatises on the subject. The reader may question the adequacy of the author's interpreta-

tion of religion, but he cannot fail to be impressed by the historical scholarship, philosophical acumen, and broadly humane spirit of the work. It is singularly free from every apologetic effort on the one hand, and all trace of antagonism on the other. Religion is one aspect of man's spiritual life. As such it is the office of philosophy neither to vindicate nor to condemn it, but simply to understand it.

There are two directions in which we may look in order to find the common principle in any group of phenomena constituting a progressive series. One way is to eliminate all the differences and seek the residuum. This is the method by which Herbert Spencer finds the essence of religion to consist in a recognition of the inscrutable mystery of things. The second way seeks the essence in the idea that is successively, progressively, but perhaps never completely manifested in the series. The first method attempts to explain the higher by the lower; the second method finds the meaning of the lower revealed only in the higher. The first seeks an elemental essence; the second an ideal essence. It is a preëminent merit in Höffding's work that he has adopted the second method. It is difficult to see how anything but a superficial reading can have led such writers as Dr. Galloway and Professor Ladd to characterize Höffding's definition of religion as a 'colorless common residuum.' So far is his principle (faith in the conservation of value) from being a mere residuum common to all, that its author does not claim to find it fully represented in any. It is rather an ideal essence which even the highest actual religion only partially realizes. However successful or unsuccessful one may esteem the result, it is at any rate a serious effort to interpret religion by its constitutive idea.

A comparison of the translation with a considerable portion of the German text shows the rendering to be reasonably correct. As is apt to be the case, however, the style does not escape the influence of the original. The index which the translator has supplied is a valuable addition to the book.

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Gehirn und Seele. Von PAUL SCHULTZ. Herausgegeben von HERMANN BEYER. Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1906. — pp. v, 189.

This book reproduces fifteen 'public' lectures given at the University of Berlin by the physiologist Schultz during the last few years of his life, and published now in accordance with one of his final requests. They are decidedly untechnical in character. In fact, the lecturer himself seems not to have had the usual German horror of 'popular' lectures, for he was accustomed to refer to these with that designation. The title is quite misleading to one who expects to find anything similar to what Flechsig, *e. g.*, produced under the same caption. For, as the author admits in his final lecture, the subject-matter of these lectures is more accurately to be described as 'comparative brain physiology.' This central theme, however, is developed out of and develops into many side-issues from the regions of

epistemology, anthropology, comparative psychology, and general philosophy. Kant represents the final philosophic appeal, and psychophysical parallelism is enjoined upon the reader as the only tenable relationship between mental and physical processes. With the latter in mind, the development of the central nervous system is sketched, the chief differences between man and the animals are outlined, a minimum of animal psychology is offered, and barely more of human mental life is referred to than is necessary in speaking of dreams, hallucinations, and other abnormal states.

The style of the lectures is well adapted to their character. Manifestly a wide reader and lover of poetry, the writer never hesitates to enliven his lectures by literary allusions and apt citations of poetry. And there is frequent indulgence in excursions into attractive side regions, — the agricultural value of the earth worm, the horror of early practices in hospitals for the insane, and the appositeness of popular proverbs or poetic lines being cases in point. This literary style it must have been, together with the oratorical gift which the author is said to have possessed, which made these lectures 'go' to the extent indicated by the editor in his introduction.

Various questionable doctrines are put forward rather too uncritically, — a thing to be expected when a lecturer departs so far from his *Fach* as was necessary in dealing with the various matters here touched upon. Thus 'unconscious judgments and inferences' are allowed to animals; 'intelligence' is bestowed upon the earth worm; and 'the inheritance of acquired traits' is emotionally advocated with almost no word of critical comment.

The book is decidedly not for specialists, nor does it pretend to be for them. In general the lectures are such as many men might give, — though perhaps with less literary form, — while few would think them of sufficient importance to warrant their publication. The book is best adapted, without doubt, to the use of those who heard the lectures as they were delivered. Still, any general reader of popular scientific literature could well get from it a good impression of the many and varied activities in the fields that the several lectures canvass.

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Diritto e personalità umana nella storia del pensiero. Da GEORGIO DEL VECCHIO. Bologna, Zamorani e Albertazzi, 1904. — pp. 32.

I presupposti filosofici della nozione del diritto. Da GEORGIO DEL VECCHIO. Bologna, Zanichelli, 1905. — pp. 192.

The first of these books is a lecture given as preliminary to a course on the Philosophy of Right at the University of Bologna. It traces in clear and untechnical language the development of the notion of right and the changes this conception has undergone in correspondence with the different ways of viewing human personality which have been predominant at various epochs among civilized peoples. The author claims that the true nature of the

concept of right can only be grasped when it is viewed in relation to the self-conscious person as the ultimate criterion and ground of all values.

The second and larger work deals with the conception of Right in a somewhat broader way and gives its history in more detail. Professor del Vecchio discusses with acuteness and learning the question of the relativity of right and of the relation between the various ways of regarding it and the historical conditions which have determined these. He insists upon the distinction between the matter or empirical content of the notion, which is largely dependent upon sociological and other phenomena, and varies with them, and the form, — the idea of right as such, — which is constant and is the logical *prius* of all our experience of particular rights. The author gives full credit to the historical school for introducing the notion of an historical development into the study of the theory of jurisprudence, but he claims that there is required a philosophical as well as a scientific examination into its fundamental notions, and maintains it to be essential to clear thinking that the logical priority of the idea of right to its empirical manifestations should be fully recognized.

E. RITCHIE.

A New Interpretation of Herbart's Psychology and Educational Theory through the Philosophy of Leibniz. By JOHN DAVIDSON. Edinburgh and London, W. Blackwood and Sons, 1906. — pp. xviii, 191.

This treatise, which was the author's thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, "is an attempt to give a general and . . . a new interpretation of Herbart's psychological and educational doctrines, and to show in particular, first, that Herbart's psychological standpoint is the only intelligible and workable standpoint for the practical teacher; and second, that from this standpoint such definite connotations can be given to the terms soul or mind, knowing, feeling, desiring, will, interest, and habit, that the terms so connoted become scientific and guiding concepts for educational practice."

The work falls into three parts: Part one, including Chapters II, III, IV, is an exposition of the Leibnizian philosophy and its implicit psychology, which, in the author's opinion, rather than the Kantian philosophy, furnishes the true standpoint for the interpretation of Herbart; part two (Chapters V–IX) considers Herbart's concept of the soul, theory of presentation, theory of feeling, theory of desire, theory of will; part three (Chapters X–XIII) explains the bearings of Herbart's psychology on educational theory. The principal conclusions of this part are: (1) "Apperceptive, many-sided 'interest' is a psychological organon or instrument of soul-life produced through habituated knowing activities; (2) curricula must be determined, not by the so-called formal disciplinary value of subjects, but by environment and practical interests; (3) individuality must be encouraged and strengthened by a state-regulated differentiation of the education suitable for different individuals and communities in the state; (4)

the principle of 'interest,' as pointing to the most definite and intelligible, and the highest kind of self-realization, must take precedence of the principle of 'self-realization.' "

The work is well written, and should prove of interest to students of educational theory who have philosophical training. Its practical bearings are too remote, and its subject matter is too difficult to be of direct benefit to the practical teacher.

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The following books also have been received :

Idola Theatri: A Criticism of Oxford Thought and Thinkers from the Standpoint of Personal Idealism. By HENRY STURT. London, Macmillan & Co., 1906. — pp. xvii, 344. \$3.25.

The Development of Symbolic Logic: A Critical-Historical Study of the Logical Calculus. By A. T. SHEARMAN. London, Williams & Norgate, 1906. — pp. xi, 242. 5s.

Harvard Psychological Studies. Edited by HUGO MÜNSTERBERG. Vol. II. Boston and New York, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1906. — pp. 644.

Science and Idealism. By HUGO MÜNSTERBERG. Boston and New York, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1906. — pp. 71. \$0.85.

Spinoza and Religion. By ELMER ELLSWORTH POWELL. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1906. — pp. xiii, 344.

The Vocation of Man. By JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE. Translated by WILLIAM SMITH. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1906. — pp. xiii, 178.

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The Fourth Dimension. By C. HOWARD HINTON. Second Edition. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1906. — pp. viii, 270.

The University of Colorado Studies. Vol. III, No. 3. Edited by FRANCIS RAMALEY. Boulder, Colo., The University of Colorado, June, 1906. — pp. 101-185. \$0.50.

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- Physiologie et psychologie de l'attention.* Par JEAN-PAUL NAYRAC. Paris, F. Alcan, 1906. — pp. xi, 223. 3 fr. 75.
- L'infinité divine depuis Philon le Juif jusqu'à Plotin.* Par HENRI GUYOT. Paris, F. Alcan, 1906. — pp. xii, 260. 5 fr.
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- Le sourire.* Par GEORGES DUMAS. Paris, F. Alcan, 1906. — pp. 167. 2 fr. 50.
- La maladie contemporaine.* Par E. DE LACOMBE. Paris, F. Alcan, 1906. — pp. 255. 3 fr. 50.
- Art et psychologie individuelle.* Par LUCIEN ARRÉAT. Paris, F. Alcan, 1906. — pp. 158. 2 fr. 50.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mèt.* = *Revue de Métaphysique*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych. u. Phys.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*.—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

Avenarius' Philosophy of Pure Experience. NORMAN SMITH. *Mind*, No. 57, pp. 13-31; No. 58, pp. 149-160.

In the pure experience which, for Avenarius's 'empiriocriticism,' is all that exists, the spatial world varies simultaneously with the brain, yet for physics and biology the two are causally connected, and hence not simultaneous. The problem of metaphysics is to reconcile these two standpoints without setting up a false dualism. Thing and thought differ as first and second experience respectively. We may view things 'absolutely,' apart from the self, or 'relatively,' taking account of their relation to the nervous system and to perception. Between the mental and the physical series there is a complete point for point functional correspondence. Consciousness can neither modify a brain process nor result from one. Experience has two inseparable aspects, 'character' (psychical) and 'content' (physical), each of which varies independently of the other. But the difference between them is relative; they constitute a duality, but not a dualism. The self is no more immediate than the not-self, from which it differs only by its greater complexity. Science finds the absolute standpoint usually more effective, though it must in some cases (illusions, color-blindness, etc.) adopt the relative standpoint. But the two are illegitimately confused when the abnormal is described as 'unreal,' and still more when all the mental phenomena are regarded as mere 'appearances.' The problem of the nature of objects in and for themselves is meaningless and contradictory. The logical functional relation between the brain's states and experience as a whole expresses the ultimate truth about the self in its relation to reality. Avenarius seeks to defend a crude realism, but his use of the term 'experience' is very loose, and his metaphysics suffers from the defects of

the subjective idealism he so suggestively criticizes. Despite disclaimers, his position involves an extreme psychophysical parallelism, while his term 'logical functional relation' exaggerates the degree of kinship of the two series. The original, self-consistent pure experience is falsified at an early stage, according to Avenarius, by introjection. Starting with an idealistic interpretation of others' experience, based on a realistic interpretation of my own, I find myself forced to extend the idealistic interpretation to my own experience as well, and so fall into contradiction. Such is the origin of subjective idealism. In *Der menschliche Weltbegriff* (1891) Avenarius seeks to explain by introjection the transition from pure experience through animism to subjective idealism; in his articles in the *Vierteljahrsschrift* (1894-5), however, the reference to animism is omitted, a difference which previous critics seem to have overlooked. In his view of animism Avenarius was unduly influenced by Tylor. Subjective idealism does not begin introjectively as a falsification of naïve realism, but is a necessary step in its correction. We must distinguish subject and object in our *own* experience before we can distinguish them in that of others. Animism rests, not on a dualizing of experience, but on a duplication into 'inner' and 'outer' of one of the objects of experience, namely, the human body. It originates as an explanation of the concrete phenomena of sleep, dreams, and death, and is not the source of the distinction between soul and body, but only the first and crudest attempt to define their interrelations. If introjection simply refers broadly to the distinction between 'inner' and 'outer,' it is the legitimate beginning of philosophy, not the cause of all subsequent dualism. If, on the other hand, it refers to that constant alternation between the realistic and the idealistic point of view, which is characteristic of subjective idealism, it has no necessary connection with animism, and is not the source of subjective idealism, which is a purely modern philosophic development based on physical and physiological considerations.

F. D. MITCHELL.

Plato's View of the Soul. ERIC J. ROBERTS. *Mind*, No. 55, pp. 371-389.

Plato's view of the soul is not developed in any single treatise but must be gathered from various passages in the Dialogues. The chronological order of these passages is therefore important, and on this point the author accepts Lutoslawski's conclusions. Plato regards the soul under two aspects: as the subject of knowledge, and as the principle of motion or life. At first these two functions are treated side by side, special prominence being given to the first in the early Dialogues. The antithesis of these two functions is sharpened into a dualism corresponding to the division of Plato's ontological scheme into being and becoming. The soul is akin to the world of ideas, while the body belongs to the world of becoming; in so far as the soul occupies itself with the things of sense it is untrue to its nature. On the other hand, the conception of the soul as the principle of motion implies its relation to the world of becoming as the source of movement.

But this connection of the soul with the two opposed orders of existence proves that the soul is distinguished by nature from both. In the earlier form of Plato's theory, therefore, the soul occupies an intermediate position between the two realms of existence. This anomalous position of the soul shows a defect in the Platonic ontology and at the same time suggests its remedy. The connection of the soul with both being and becoming might have led to the discovery that this opposition exists only for an experience which is the unity of both. In the later Dialogues we find some such change as this taking place; the ideas tend to become less transcendent and more dependent on the soul. Thus in the *Theatetus* and the *Parmenides* the objects of knowledge are represented rather as categories than as self-existent ideas, though the ontological scheme is not explicitly renounced. In the *Sophist*, motion, life, soul, and mind are regarded as concomitant in the highest reality, and in the *Philebus* Plato recognizes the importance of the world of becoming and shows that it may be regarded as to some extent intelligible. The soul here occupies a position of supremacy rather than of neglected intermediacy. In the *Timæus* and *Laws* the cognitive and motor functions of the soul tend to become identified. The net purport of the 'world-soul' is that the whole world must be accredited with a soul, because motion is rational. The dualism still remains in the assumption of a mortal and an immortal soul and of a good and bad world-soul. This dualism is never overcome, though there is evidence that Plato tried to qualify its absoluteness. The immortality of the soul is maintained in two senses by Plato: (1) as continued existence, proved from the function of the soul as a self-mover, and (2) qualitative eternity, due to its kinship with ideas. The truth to which Plato's theory of knowledge points — a truth which he himself did not clearly see — is that of the unity of nature throughout all existences and all processes, whether physical or psychical.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

Réflexion et introspection. H. LUQUET. Rev. Ph., XXX, 12, pp. 583-519.

There are three degrees in our appreciation of the objective world: common-sense, science, and art. Corresponding to these are three degrees of appreciation of the subjective world: spontaneous consciousness, reflection, and introspection. Science seeks the laws of the objective world, expresses them by symbols, and applies its discoveries to practical life. Reflection does the same thing for the subjective world. Psychology was first mere reflection with formal methods borrowed from the natural sciences, but when biology advanced from a classification of species to a study of functions, psychology also advanced (through the development of psychophysics and the association psychology) from a classification of mental states to a study of the laws of mental action. Introspection is to reflection what art is to science. Like science, reflection seeks laws and symbols, and puts

them to practical use. In introspection, as in art, we seek to know things directly and individually and with no eye to their usefulness. With this difference in purpose goes a difference in method. Reflection is analytic ; the contents of consciousness are split up into elements and arranged in classes. Introspection is synthetic ; it takes mental states as it finds them, and studies them in their complex relations to each other ; it seeks not their laws, but their harmonies. Only by adding introspection to reflection can psychology fulfil its mission.

S. P. HAYES.

A Neglected Context in Radical Empiricism. C. V. TOWER. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., II, 15, pp. 400-408.

James's declaration that consciousness as a metaphysical entity is non-existent has great possibilities, whether for metaphysics or psychology. In considering radical empiricism, the question turns on what this consciousness is. We accept its own answer : ' It is a context of experiences.' But the further question — ' What context ? ' — is the crucial one, and the main issue which now divides radical empiricism from a sober-minded and experiential transcendentalism. Radical empiricism neglects the ' total context ' ; it does not satisfactorily account for the relational experience which is involved in the process of knowledge. We should not ' brand empirical unions as sham ' merely because they are empirical ; but, on the other hand, the transcendentalist has his own very real experience, even if he did substantialize and unwisely name it.

MATTIE ALEXANDER MARTIN.

Is Humanism a Philosophical Advance ? S. H. MELLONE. Mind, No. 56, pp. 507-529.

Thought, feeling, and will are not opposed to each other, and no one of them can be made supreme over the other two. The older idealism explained away emotion and will into forms of thought, and failed to give a satisfactory account of the ' reference to reality other than thought ' which thought implies. But does not humanism, in effect, explain away intellect into will and emotion ? Does it not deny to the object any independence of the subject's will and action ? The answer to these questions must decide whether Humanism is a philosophical advance or not. Hegelian idealism developed the notion of truth as an organic whole, wherein the truth of any particular principle or set of principles is a matter of degree, not of absolute certainty. Here we come upon the pragmatist's contention, that the tests or evidences of truth always refer to concrete experience. Faith in a fact may help to create the fact ; for all consciousness is purposive activity, and all experience, so far as it consists of discriminated facts, depends on our personal activity. That truth is most true which serves the highest purpose. Axioms begin as postulates, and are sifted by experience according to their practical utility. But we must ask : What makes these postulates ? If intellect is presupposed from the start, the humanistic contention

reduces to the familiar Kantian position that the first principles of knowledge are postulates forced on us by the assumption that science is not illusory ; if intellect is not presupposed, how can a primitive chaotic pure experience 'set us questions' ? If humanism denies the existence of an ideal of truth and goodness that goes in advance of conduct, and has inherent superindividual worth, it sinks to the level of crude naturalism. Granting that reality is not static, and that consciousness helps make our world, the vital question is : *To what extent* is the world of our own making ? Even admitting that correspondence with reality is not the test of truth, yet if truth is to work at all, it must be in some sense a transcript of a determinate objective reality. It does not follow that because reality is not indifferent to our interests and agency, it is therefore merely the accumulation of our own intellectual inventions. That reality itself should be simply the result of a long process of trial and experiment, starting from a characterless absolute chaos, is unthinkable. As a methodological postulate the doctrine that the real is what we make it is justifiable within proper limits, and has always been acted on by scientific and inventive minds ; but as a complete philosophy it is fatally ambiguous. Any identification of reality, as such, with human experience, is indefensible ; on the other hand, a refusal to seek the character of reality elsewhere than in experience is entirely justified.

F. D. MITCHELL.

Empiricism and the Absolute. F. C. S. SCHILLER. *Mind*, No. 55, pp. 348-370.

The essence of evolutionism is the doctrine that the world is in process, and this view is inconsistent with the old metaphysic which regards reality as a closed, static system. Spencer, who is supposed to have applied evolution to metaphysics, failed to work out a real evolutionary philosophy because he started from static physical conceptions. Professor Taylor's recent work entitled *Elements of Metaphysics* is the first serious attempt to restate rational metaphysics in the light of the recent contention of humanism. Professor Taylor makes constant use of the language of purpose. Science, he agrees, constantly uses postulates which serve its practical purposes but which are not ultimately true. At times he even uses the language of radical empiricism, as when he says that 'the real is experience.' Nevertheless his attempt to convey the elements of humanism into a system of absolutist metaphysics has only inflicted damage on both. Thus his system still rests on the distinction between appearance and reality, which is radically inconsistent with his pragmatism. Moreover, he has both an empirical and an intellectualist criterion of reality. His conception of the relation of axioms and postulates is unclear, for he seems to hold that a postulate, though useful, is necessarily untrue. Moreover, he makes an absolute distinction between the origin and the validity of an axiom, and fails to see that the whole historical development of an axiom must be con-

sidered in order to discover its real nature. Professor Taylor quite fails to refute the pragmatist's appeal to practical results because he does not see that the real pragmatist contention is that the intellect itself is practical throughout. Accordingly, he is unable to overcome the intellectualism of his school. The Absolute is an essential part of Professor Taylor's philosophy. He derives it from the assumption that the world is ultimately a rigid system, a perfect and complete individual in the form of an infinite experience. The Absolute is out of space and time and hence cannot develop. The doctrine of degrees of reality is a pure assumption and is quite delusive, for it is impossible in any case for the finite to attain the Absolute and impossibility has no degrees. Nevertheless, we are bidden to believe that the Absolute realizes our aspirations and satisfies our emotions. The whole doctrine of the Absolute depends on the validity of the ontological proof; viz., the transmutation of a conceptual ideal into absolute fact. Professor Taylor's proof of this is a *petitio principii*. The question is whether a subjective claim of ours has *a priori* objective validity, for clearly the ontological proof cannot be empirical. The Absolute is a postulate of the extremest and most audacious kind, made in answer to our demand for the elimination of contingency from experience. It was put forward as an existing reality which no sane intelligence can deny, and it turns out to be an emotional postulate. It fails in this respect, however, because its use depends on its *a priori* certainty, which cannot be made out. Moreover, it does not satisfy our moral needs, for it regards evil only as the necessary incompleteness of the parts of a whole. The inability of man to identify himself with the universe is not the source of human misery, nor is it a common human longing. The Absolute, therefore, is a bad postulate because it does not work, and it can continue to exist only as a personal idiosyncrasy in a few philosophic minds.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

Issues of Pragmatism. CHARLES S. PEIRCE. The Monist, XV, 4, pp. 481-499.

The author restates his former maxim of pragmatism as follows: The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol. 'Critical Common-sensism,' which the author defended about nine years before his pronouncement of pragmatism, may be regarded as a consequence of the latter position. It is a variety of the philosophy of Common Sense but has six distinctive characters: (1) Critical Common-sensism admits that there are both indubitable propositions and indubitable inferences. These propositions and inferences are acritical. In reasoning we are always more or less aware of the logical grounds of our conclusions, but there are also cases where a belief is determined by another belief without the consciousness of a general principle. This is an acritical in-

ference. (2) The Scottish philosophy regarded original beliefs as unchanging, and investigation shows that the change is so gradual that one may substantially agree with Reid. (3) Original beliefs were always regarded as being closely connected with instincts, but the Scottish philosophers failed to see that they remain indubitable only in their application to affairs of primitive life. (4) The most distinctive mark of Critical Common-sensism as distinguished from the Scottish philosophy is its insistence that the acritically indubitable is invariably vague. A sign which is objectively indeterminate is objectively vague in so far as it reserves further determination to be made in some other conceivable sign. Anything is vague in so far as the principle of contradiction does not apply to it. (5) Critical Common-sensism attaches more value to doubt than did the Scottish philosophers. (6) It is critical because it criticises four opinions : its own, that of the Scottish School, that of thinkers who base logic or metaphysics on psychology or any other special science, and that of Kant. The scholastic doctrine of realism, another position which the author defended before he formulated pragmatism, is a necessary part of it. This means the acknowledgment that there are real general objects, real vagues, and especially real possibilities. The ultimate intellectual purport of anything consists in conceived conditional resolutions or their substance ; and accordingly these conditional propositions must be capable of being true, *i. e.*, independent of being thought to be so. Pragmatism may be illustrated by its answer to the question, What is time ? It is assumed that time is real and that it is a variety of objective modality. The past is the sum of *faits accomplis*, and acts on us precisely as an existent object does. The future is not actual since it acts only through the idea of it ; everything is regarded as destined or undecided. The present is the nascent state between the determinate and the indeterminate. The past works upon conduct by furnishing us the data from which we start. Future facts are the only ones which we can control, and those things which are not amenable to control are those which we shall be able to control. The present can only be conative, which proves it to be, as was said before, the nascent state of the actual.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

PSYCHOLOGY.

Wundt's Doctrine of Psychical Analysis and the Psychical Elements, and Some Recent Criticism. II. Feeling and Feeling-Analysis. EDMUND H. HOLLANDS. *Am. J. Ps.*, XVII, 2, pp. 206-226.

Two objections to Wundt's theory of feeling have recently been made. It has been held that his distinction between feelings as subjective and sensations as objective is epistemological, and not psychological. And it is also said that his reference of the unity of feeling to that of apperception, and his consequent definition of the simple feeling, make it impossible to

distinguish between simple and complex feelings, save by reference to their sensational substrate as simple or complex. The article attempts to get a clearer view of Wundt's theory by a review of its development, and concludes that this criticism is mistaken. The distinction between feeling and sensation in the two earliest works is epistemological, though it has a psychological basis as yet undefined. But this position is explicitly renounced after this time, and it becomes plain by a comparison of passages that Wundt means by the *psychological* contrast of feeling as subjective and sensation as objective, that between the tendency of the one to fusion, and of the other to remain persistently discrete. As for the analysis of feelings, though its method is necessarily different from that applied to sensations, the canon is the same. The simple feeling is one which can be experienced in different mental contexts while itself remaining non-decomposable. The reference to the sensational substrate involved is never regarded as directly settling the question of the simplicity or compositeness of the feeling, which is, on the contrary, determined by experimental variation of that substrate regarded as the feeling-stimulus. A simple feeling may be found to attach to a complex sensational substrate; and, — in the case of sensations belonging to multidimensional systems, — a simple sensation may possibly be found to underlie a complex feeling.

EDMUND H. HOLLANDS.

Psychophysiologie du langage musical. J. INGEGNIEROS. Rev. de Ph., VI, 4, pp. 386-408.

Musical language consists in the conjunction of sounds of which man makes use to express the primary musical emotions, and the emotional states which constitute the various forms of cultivated musical intelligence. The four constitutive elements of a fully developed articulate verbal language, its auditory, visual, phonetic, and graphic images, represent the two fundamental aspects of all neural processes, the sensory and the motor, and are localized in the centers of Wernicke, Kusmaull, Broca, and Exner, respectively. A marked parallelism exists between the genesis and the psychophysiology of verbal and musical language. Both take common origin in an initial phase in which the phonetic element and the musical cadence are undifferentiated, and the constituent elements are simple inarticulate monosyllabic sounds controlled by a reflex mechanism. These elementary linguistic phenomena undergo evolution and combination until the stage of simple articulate verbal language and of melodic inflection is attained. Speech and song then become differentiated, the one specializing itself for ideational, the other for emotional expression. The use of graphic symbols follows, and the functions of verbal and musical reading and writing develop, thus doubling the available forms of expression by adjoining visual images and motor images of graphic movements to those of hearing and utterance. To these two new functions of reading and writing technical education may, in the case of musical language, add a third, that

of instrumental execution. To each function corresponds a special set of images, accumulated in the cortex and constituting the auditory, visual, articulatory, graphic, and instrumental execution centers. That these centers of musical language are independent of those of common language is indicated by the occurrence of aphasia without amusia, and *vice versa*. The center for instrumental execution, which is of course a center of motor imagery, involves neural groups belonging to different motor centers, and must be regarded not as an anatomical center but as a functional coördination arising through education. The varying disturbances produced in different individuals by the same lesion indicate a varying predominance of centers according as the habitual imagery of recall is auditory, phonetic, or indifferent. Among musical analphabets the functional types are motor (phonetic), sensory (auditory), and complete (indifferent). Among the musically educated a visualizing type, and two motors, the graphic, and that of instrumental execution also occur. Within this second class there are four possible cases, visual-motor, audito-motor, sensitivo-motor, and indifferent, according as the coördinations of visual, auditory, or motor center with the appropriate movement is more perfect, or indifferent. The centers for musical language form subcenters or specializations within the centers for articulate language. The bimanual or bilateral character of all linguistic execution, verbal or musical, renders the doctrine of strictly unilateral centers improbable.

ELSIE MURRAY.

The Difference between the Mental and the Physical. G. M. STRATTON.
Psych. Bul., III, 1, pp. 1-9.

This problem may be divided into two parts: (1) What is the distinction between the physical and the mental life? (2) In what respect, if at all, is consciousness different from the field marked off as mental? The first only will be treated in this paper; the problem too, will be considered, not genetically, but as it actually exists now. Mental and physical existences are to be distinguished by their behavior; they are not to be identified by peculiar marks, but by modes of conduct, by their way of influencing their associates, by governing laws. Careful observation will show that the behavior of mental as well as of physical phenomena can be expressed in general laws, and that the former as well as the latter, have regular antecedents and consequents. The kind of continuity, however, is different in the two cases; just wherein the difference consists is for science to work out. Criteria of differentiation have been offered by Perry, Bush, and James, but upon examination they scarcely seem to stand the test of experience. The function of this paper is simply to suggest what seems to the author the most hopeful direction of progress in determining these differences.

MATTIE ALEXANDER MARTIN.

La religion comme fait psychologique. W. JAMES. Rev. de Ph., V, 7, pp. 5-20.

Religion, like government, is a complex, and therefore cannot be defined as a unique principle. For purposes of investigation we may distinguish between religious institutions and individual or inward religion. In the former sense, religion may be called a practical art; in the latter, it is the inner life of the religious man. From the latter point of view we shall make our investigation. Religion contains elements not found in pure morality, since, in our interpretation, religion means the impressions, sentiments, and acts of the individual in harmony with that which appears to him divine. And here the term divine is used in its broadest significance, and not as necessarily referring to a concrete divinity; else such faiths as that of Buddhism or such idealistic conceptions as that of Emerson could not properly be called religious. But can we not be more definite by saying that religion is the attitude man assumes in trying to appreciate the universe? Of course it is necessary to limit the term attitude here by excluding from its connotation the deriding and scornful attitudes of the Renans and Voltaires; for religion attaches itself only to serious states of mind. Though it presents the world as a tragedy, the tragedy ennobles and purifies. These religious states are unique, distinguishable from each other and from other states of consciousness. In morals, as in religion, we may say with Margaret Fuller that the essential is our manner of accepting the universe. In the one, however, the acceptance is with resignation; in the other it is even with enthusiasm. The world-soul of the Stoics may be respected; the God of the Christian must be loved.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

Expression numérique de l'intelligence des espèces animales. P. GIRARD. Rev. Ph., XXX, 9, pp. 290-300.

In seeking to account for the smaller relative weight of man's brain as compared with that of some of the smaller animals, Dupois worked out the following numerical expressions. Considering the brain as groups of reflex arcs connecting sensory and motor cells, its weight will depend on the number of these arcs, and the number of these on the number of sensory fibers. But the number of these fibers will vary as the total of the perceptive surfaces of the senses, that is, as the surface of the body. Then to compare animals equally developed psychically but of different size, it is necessary to evaluate the weight of the brain by the extent of the surface of the body. Two animals of equal organization and the same form, a and A , the weights of whose bodies, s and S , are known, will compare in extent of surface as $\sqrt[3]{s^2} : \sqrt[3]{S^2}$. This value, $S^{0.666}$ must be multiplied by a factor expressing degree of organization to compare differing in degree of organization. The writer qualifies and expands these statements.

C. WEST.

ETHICS AND ÆSTHETICS.

Une illusion de la conscience morale. G. TRUC. Rev. Ph., XXX, 9, pp. 300-314.

The primitive restriction on individual activity for social development is the basis of the illusion of moral responsibility. Responsibility is the affirmation of consciousness. It should say, 'I feel myself act'; it says, 'I act.' It makes the two terms of an act, subject and object, the cause of one another, forgetting that these words are but formulas summing up obscure forces within and without. Consciousness organizes itself without reference to the relative external. Sensations coming to us *en masse* we call one, because we cannot distinguish them. We incorporate their effects into ourselves. The nervous system, functioning under these sensations ever more easily, creates in us that *ivresse vitale* which deceives us. Moral responsibility thus appears as too much organic life, a hyperæsthesia. It is a gratuitous affirmation of consciousness, transforming its subjective infallibility into objective certitude, through the effects of *ivresse vitale*. This objective certitude is a notion slowly acquired through human evolution; a judgment affirming as absolute a natural product of contingencies.

C. WEST.

La logique de la beauté. F. WARRAINS. Rev. de Ph., V, 11, pp. 512-532.

The purpose of the paper is to set forth the logic of beauty. The basis of æsthetics is the principle that beauty carries with it its logical and moral justification. But this logical basis must lie concealed. The charm of beauty consists in mystery and suggestiveness. Its rationality passes formulation. When works of art are capable of being analyzed and understood, they have passed as things of beauty. The hierarchy of such is based on the time they have been able to retain their mysterious suggestiveness. Art is the product of a time when men cannot formulate laws but only intuitively grasp them. Thus the presentations of beauty in art serve as incentives to reason and virtue. Art suggests an antinomy between necessity and freedom. Two conflicts arise upon the application of logic to art. There is first an opposition between æsthetic sentiment and rational discernment; secondly, one produced by the inadequate realization of the æsthetic conception in the material. These conflicts are considered with reference to the internal organic structure, the end, and the ideal significance of works of art. Architecture and music, between which all the other arts are intermediary, serve as illustrations. The antinomy of art is solved by the genius of the artist. In his work he is true to a higher logic and a higher fact, which he discloses through the medium of the concrete.

W. L. BAILEY.

Le mensonge du monde. FR. PAULHAN. Rev. Ph., XXXI, 3, pp. 233-267.

Everything is changing in the world around us, and the question arises: What are the general forms of these transformations and what is their ten-

dency? The first great law of existence is the law of *systematization*, and among systems can be found two great classes, those whose systematization is accomplished and those in which it is in process of making. The latter present the phenomena of evolution and dissolution. Evolution is a systematization which effects itself and consequently is progress. To wish to separate evolution from progress is to consider it no more than a series of changes. The law of systematization is double: That which applies to the first class above is the law of conservation; that which applies to the second is the law of perfection. It is necessary, however, to recognize here the purely relative character of equilibrium. Nothing belongs absolutely to one class or the other. However diverse they may be, things existing in the same world are, to a certain extent, related. There is a certain coördination if existence is to be maintained; that which makes the reality of anything is the systematization of its individual elements. The second law is that of *evanescence*. Evanescence, in appearance, has much in common with death, but it is a superficial view which considers them alike. There are constant illustrations in the world around us of the working of the law of evanescence in things which give most evidence of strong vitality. Science itself gives very striking illustrations of it; its most important principles often serve only a temporary function, and thus give place to better formulations of their essential truth, or to a formulation of a larger truth. Evolution necessarily implies evanescence. It implies a disappearance of one form and the appearance of another. There is a constant process of transformation, hence of change, in all institutions, intellectual, social, religious, political. The third law is the law of *opposition*. It is expressed thus: All that exists exists only in opposing itself to something else. Contradiction is as necessary as systematization. There is always some harmony and some discord between the interests of two living beings or groups of beings. For the most intimate relations, even, there is opposition between interests, so that renunciation is necessary on the part of each. At times, divergence of interest is concealed when the strong uniting power of a cause or a personality is present. But let this be removed and individual opposition reasserts itself. Again, in the spirit of man the interests of one element are never entirely in harmony with those of other elements. Into one's life sometimes comes a crisis when elements in harmony prove inimical, and the contest is often terminated only by the defeat and subordination of one of the adversaries. The same sort of opposition exists throughout the organic and inorganic world. To exist together is to differ as well as to resemble. The universe is a vast chain of harmonies and oppositions. These tend toward the progress of the whole; if there were only the first, stagnation would ensue, if only the second, revolution. One fact in the life of humanity seems essentially characterized by the mixture of incoherence and of systematization, that is, the *lie*. This is an establishment of an opposition between reality and our thought as expressed. But this discord is to serve the real-

ization of an end, to find a harmony. But under such a conclusion, where is reality, where is truth? Our ideas in the concrete must be affected by this forced adaptation to circumstances. It is only by abstraction that we reach objective truth, valuable for the greatest number of intelligences. Progress is dependent upon greater elasticity of these ideas and the possibility of their being replaced by others serving the purpose better.

MATTIE ALEXANDER MARTIN.

De la possibilité des sciences sociales. DRAGHICESCO. Rev. Ph., XXX, 10, pp. 374-395.

The problem which we are to consider is the difficult one, how to reconcile instinct with reason, brute struggle with justice. First, what does social determinism require to realize itself? Time. When we consider the millions of years necessary to bring us to this present stage of physical development, the question naturally arises: Is it the same within the social sphere? The legitimate conclusion is that we now find ourselves in an epoch of social creation, of ebullition. We live in an epoch where social reality is only an aspiration towards being, and social determinism a simple desire. To seek for sociological laws merely by observation shows itself more and more to be useless. Knowledge and utilization of all the natural laws which govern the world are indispensable conditions of the social development of the human being. The acquisition of this new knowledge, if it be of great moment, for a time unsettles social conditions and makes readjustment necessary. Another disturber of social equilibrium,—which, like that just noted, may work for its final good,—is the conflict between communities, whether this conflict be political or economic; the victorious and the defeated alike suffer from the consequent social disturbances. As in physical and chemical laboratories conditions must be exact in order that there may be the desired reactions, so in social societies regularity is realized only under isolated conditions. Outside elements are religiously excluded in primitive societies, and stress and progress are excluded with them. The most interesting illustration of this crystallization of social conditions is found in China. The Roman Empire is as striking an illustration of the very opposite conditions, such conditions as might be seen in a mammoth chemical retort. One sees there the dissolution and disappearance of the bodies introduced; but finally grains of crystal are, as a result of this struggle, deposited in the bottom of the retort. Socialism, by the realization of internationalism and of equalization of the conditions of the individual, will have fully realized the conditions necessary for this ideal crystallization. The world will be the retort, and the elements which unite to form the ideal crystals of a perfect social organization will be the people and the resources of the world.

MATTIE ALEXANDER MARTIN.

NOTES.

A new lectureship in psychology, to be known as the George Combe Lectureship on General and Experimental Psychology, has recently been established at the University of Edinburgh. The first incumbent of the new foundation will be Dr. W. G. Smith, formerly professor of psychology in Smith College and more recently connected with the departments of psychology of King's College, London, and Liverpool University.

Dr. Warner Fite, of the University of Texas, was recently made an adjunct professor of philosophy in that institution. He has, however, accepted a junior professorship at the University of Indiana.

Professor Noah K. Davis, of the University of Virginia, has retired from active service and received an appointment on the Carnegie foundation.

Dr. Norman Smith, lecturer in Glasgow University, has been appointed professor of psychology at Princeton University to succeed Professor Frank Thilly, who has become professor of philosophy at Cornell.

Dr. C. S. Myers, of St. John's College, Cambridge, has been appointed professor of psychology at King's College, London.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals :

MIND, No. 59 : *John Dewey*, The Experimental Theory of Knowledge ; *J. S. Mackenzie*, The New Realism and the Old Idealism ; *W. McDougall*, Physiological Factors of the Attention-Process, IV ; *Foster Watson*, The Freedom of the Teacher to Teach — Religion ; Discussions ; Critical Notices ; New Books ; Philosophical Periodicals ; Notes.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XIII, 4 : *Felix Arnold*, The Psychology of Interest, I ; *Boris Sidis*, Are there Hypnotic Hallucinations? *H. Carr and J. B. Allen*, A Study of Certain Relations of Accommodation and Convergence to the Judgment of the Third Dimension ; *A. Vicholkovska*, Illusions of Reversible Perspective.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, III, 6 : *Edgar James Swift*, Memory of Skillful Movements ; Psychological Literature ; Discussion ; Books Received ; Notes and News.

III, 7 : *Howard Crosby Warren*, The Fundamental Functions of Consciousness ; Psychological Literature ; Books Received ; Notes and News.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL, IV, 4 : *Sir Oliver Lodge*, First Principles of Faith ; *Knox Little*, Denominationalism, Undenominationalism, and the Church of England ; *H. A. Garnett*, A Layman's Plain Plea for the Separation of the Creeds from Worship ; *Headmaster of Bradfield College*, The Teaching of the Christian Religion in Public Schools ; *Henry Jones*, The

Working Faith of a Social Reformer, IV ; *D. H. Macgregor*, The Great Fallacy of Idealism ; *Robert H. Smith*, Japanese Character and its Probable Influence Outside Japan ; *P. T. Forsyth*, A Rallying-Ground for the Free Churches ; *K. C. Anderson*, Why not Face the Facts? *C. E. Stephen*, Signs and Wonders in Divine Guidance ; *Edith Gittins*, The Suffering of the Saints ; *Benjamin W. Bacon*, Gospel Types in Primitive Tradition ; Discussions ; Reviews ; Bibliography of Recent Literature.

THE MONIST, XVI, 3 : *Friedrich Hirth*, Origin of the Mariners' Compass in China ; *Editor*, Professor Mach's Philosophy ; *Arthur O. Lovejoy*, The Fundamental Concept of the Primitive Philosophy ; *Lawrence H. Mills*, The Bible, the Persian Inscriptions, and the Avesta ; *W. S. Andrews*, Magic Cubes ; *Editor*, The Number π in Christian Prophecy ; Criticisms and Discussions ; Book Reviews.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, III, 12 : *Edward G. Spaulding*, The Ground of the Validity of Knowledge, III ; Societies ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

III, 13 ; *William James*, G. Papini and the Pragmatist Movement in Italy ; *Vivian A. C. Henmon*, The Detection of Color-Blindness ; Discussion ; Societies ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

III, 14 : *Kate Gordon*, Metaphysics as a Branch of Art ; *Edward G. Spaulding*, The Ground of the Validity of Knowledge, Conclusion ; Societies ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

III, 15 : *B. H. Bode*, Realism and Pragmatism ; *Arthur Ernest Davies*, The Personal and the Individual ; Discussion ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

III, 16 : *William Ernest Hocking*, The Group Concept in the Service of Philosophy ; *Frederic Lyman Wells*, Linguistic Standards ; *Thomas P. Bailey*, Snap Shot of an Association Series ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XVI, 4 : *James Oliphant*, Moral Instruction ; *Charles F. Dole*, About Conscience ; *Stanton Coit*, Humanity and God ; *E. E. Constance Jones*, Mr. Moore on Hedonism ; *A. Schinz*, Literature and the Moral Code ; *Max Forrester Eastman*, Patriotism, A Primitive Ideal ; *Henry S. Salt*, The Sportsman at Bay ; Book Reviews.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, XLII, 1 : *M. Rodakovic*, Über eine besondere Klasse abstracter Begriffe ; *Viktor Grünberg*, Über die scheinbare Verschiebung zwischen zwei verschiedenfarbigen Flächen im durchfallenden diffusen Lichte ; *V. Benussi*, Experimentelles über Vorstellungs-inadäquatheit ; Literaturbericht.

XLII, 2 u. 3 : *G. Heymans* u. *E. Wiersma*, Beiträge zur speziellen Psy-

chologie auf Grund der Massenuntersuchung ; *Max Levy*, Studien über die experimentelle Beeinflussung des Vorstellungsverlaufs ; *Otto Veraguth*, Die Verlegung diaskleral in das menschliche Auge einfallender Lichtreize in den Raum ; *A. Prandtl*, Eine Nachbilderscheinung ; Besprechungen ; Literaturbericht.

KANTSTUDIEN, XI, 2: *Bruno Bauch*, Chamberlain's "Kant" ; *P. Hauck*, Die Entstehung der Kantischen Urteilstafel ; *W. Meinecke*, Die Bedeutung der Nicht-Euklidischen Geometrie in ihrem Verhältnis zu Kants Theorie der Mathematischen Erkenntnis ; *E. Sultz*, Neue Mitteilungen über Fichtes Atheismusprozess ; *A. Görland*, Natorps Einführung in den Idealismus durch Platos Ideenlehre ; *E. Ebstein* und *F. Jünemann*, Ein unbekannter Brief I. Kants an Nicolovius ; *A. Höfler*, Zu Kants metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der Naturwissenschaft ; *E. v. Aster*, Der II. Band der Akademie — Ausgabe ; Recensionen ; Selbstanzeigen.

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, XII, 4: *Lewis Robinson*, Untersuchungen über Spinozas Metaphysik, II ; *Clodius Piat*, L'être et le bien d'après Platon ; *Albert Leclerc*, L'esquisse d'une histoire générale et comparée des philosophies médiévales de M. François Picavet ; *Andreas Freiherrn Di Pauli*, Quadratus Martyr, der Skoteinologe ; *James Lindsay*, Plato and Aristotle on the Problem of Efficient Causation ; Jahresbericht.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE, XXX, 2: *Emil Koch*, Über naturwissenschaftliche Hypothesen ; *Georg Wernick*, Der Wirklichkeitsgedanke, I ; *Paul Barth*, Zu J. St. Mills 100. Geburtstage ; Besprechungen über Schriften ; Selbstanzeigen ; Notizen.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XXXI, 6: *G. Compayré*, La pédagogie de l'adolescence ; *A. Binet*, Les premiers mots de la thèse idéaliste ; *Th. Ribot*, Comment les passions finissent ; *H. Delacroix*, La philosophie pratique de Kant, d'après M. Delbos ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Revue des périodiques étrangers ; Livres nouveaux.

XXXI, 7: *L. Lévy-Bruhl*, La morale et la science des mœurs ; *J. Sageret*, La commodité scientifique et ses conséquences ; *G.-L. Duprat*, Contre l'intellectualisme en psychologie ; *L. Dauriac*, Un historien de la philosophie grecque : Th. Gomperz ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Revue des périodiques étrangers ; Livres nouveaux.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XIV, 3: *A. Espinas*, Pour l'histoire du Cartésianisme ; *H. Poincaré*, Les mathématiques et la logique ; *L. Couturat*, La logique et la philosophie contemporaine ; *L. Weber*, La morale d'Épictète et les besoins présents de l'enseignements morale (suite) ; *D. Roustan*, La méthode biologique et les theories de l'immunité ; *F. Mentré*, A propos de Cournot : Hasard et déterminisme ; *G. Monod*, La thèse latine de doctorat de Jules Michelet : De percipienda infinitate secundum Lockium ; Supplément.

XIV, 3 bis (Numéro supplémentaire) : Six manuscrits inédits de Maine de Biran : Introduction, par P. Tisserand ; Notice, par P. Tisserand ; Conversation avec MM. Degérando et Ampère ; Discours lu dans une assemblée philosophique ; Objections à la théorie des idées de Locke ; Valeur du mot 'principe' dans le langage psychologique ; Comparaison des trois points de vue de Th. Reid, Condillac et M. de Tracy ; Notes sur Malebranche.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE, VI, 6 : *E. Baudin*, La philosophie de la foi chez Newman, I ; *J. Gardair*, L'être divin ; *Baron Charles Mourre*, La dualité du moi dans les sentiments, II ; *C. Dessoulavy*, Le dieu fini ; *F. Warrain*, Les principes des mathématiques de M. Couturat et la métaphysique, II ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Fiches bibliographiques.

VI, 7 : *G. Chatterton-Hill*, La physiologie morale ; *E. Baudin*, La philosophie de la foi chez Newman, II ; *E. Baron*, Le psychisme inférieur ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Périodiques ; L'enseignement philosophique ; Fiches bibliographiques.

JOURNAL DE PSYCHOLOGIE NORMALE ET PATHOLOGIQUE, III, 4 : *Dromard*, Les troubles de la mimique volontaire chez les aliénés ; *G.-L. Duprat*, Note sur la nature des éléments subconscients et inconscients ; *A. Lemaitre*, Tentative de suicide par suggestion ; Société de psychologie ; Bibliographie.

REVUE NÉO-SCOLASTIQUE, XIII, 2 : *Clodius Piat*, La vie future d'après Platon ; *Joseph Cevolani*, A propos d'une règle sur la conversion des jugements ; *A. Mansion*, L'induction chez Albert le Grand ; *S. Deploige*, Le conflit de la morale et de la sociologie (suite) ; Mélanges et documents ; Bulletin de l'Institut de Philosophie ; Comptes rendus.

RIVISTA FILOSOFICA, IX, 3 : *F. Bonatelli*, Intorno alle attinenze tra l'ideale e il reale ; *A. Ferro*, Meccanismo e teleologia (fine) ; *G. Della Valle*, Le nuove forme dell'etica irrazionalista ; *A. Aliotta*, La reazione al positivismo ; Rassegna bibliografica ; Notizie e pubblicazioni ; Necrologio : Eduardo Hartmann ; Sommarî delle riviste straniere ; Libri ricevuti.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

PROFESSOR JAMES'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

I BELIEVE most readers who have followed the recent discussions about Pragmatism would agree that they leave something still to be desired in the way of a determination, clearly defined and consistently held to, of what the precise point at issue really is. The present article will have to do only with Professor James's position, as represented by his recent articles in *Mind* and in the *Journal of Philosophy*. I shall try to indicate the queries which these leave with me personally, assuming that I am not alone in needing further light on the matter. I shall dwell only upon the particular points which are most puzzling to me, with the intent to discover, rather than refute, his position.

Professor James begins in the October (1905) article in *Mind* by distinguishing his own early doctrine of pragmatism from the more ambitious theory of reality with which the word has now become identified. This said no more than that truth must have some practical consequences to be worth discussing. If it makes no concrete difference to any one which of two statements be true, then there is really no difference between them. There is naturally some danger in the application of this doctrine, unless it be interpreted in a very sympathetic and catholic spirit. What shall be called a *practical* difference is a nice question; and, without doubt, the criterion may be used by the practically minded man as a club for dealing summarily with any matter of theory whose direct bearing he does not himself appreciate. Still I should myself, on a broad understanding of it, freely accept this aspect of pragmatism, and, therefore, I do not call it in question

here. I believe most strongly that the only way to keep sanity in our mental life is to recognize frankly the thorough-going connection between thought and conduct, and that whatever cannot be seen in the long run to enrich the concrete meaning of life, as this goes beyond the pure exercise of the intellect, will inevitably be discarded in the growing process of experience.

The newer Humanism is defined by Professor James as the further doctrine that truth *consists* in the consequences. But, before inquiring about this, there is one other aspect of the movement that should be clearly distinguished. It has a further methodological side about which also, I think, there need necessarily be no very serious dispute; at any rate, I am not inclined to dispute it. And as this has no apparent logical connection with any particular theory of reality, the two things ought not to be confused in discussion. This aspect of the method consists simply in the application of a genetic psychology, in terms of human ends, to the growth of our knowledge. It holds that our growing experience is guided in a teleological way. We come to take this or that view of reality, because it furnishes a means for giving expression to certain definite needs. Thus beliefs are hypotheses, adopted in the interests of these conscious or unconscious demands of life, held to because in some measure they meet the requirements, and modified and extended gradually till at length the complicated structure of our present intellectual world has emerged. And by looking back to its historical genesis, and interpreting its finished product in the light of its function, we get a better understanding of the nature of truth and of the thinking process.

The significance of this attitude I am very far from questioning. But I think that it should be clearly distinguished, as a method, from the further and metaphysical consequences with which in pragmatism it has been connected. Matters have been unnecessarily confused by mixing the two things together, and using the natural appeal which the first makes to our belief to justify the second also. But, as a matter of fact, the method may perfectly well be used without its committing us to the conclusion that it represents also the whole ontological fact. How

I arrive at my knowledge, is one question ; what is the nature of the reality which I know, may very well be quite another. And the fact that I arrive at it by a series of guesses and experimental tests, guided by instinctive needs, might be entirely consistent with the separate existence of the object of my knowledge, reproduced more or less exactly in my individual consciousness. If, then, pragmatism be taken as really a new philosophy — and the claim certainly is being made for it — the essential point of its divergence from the older view would seem to be this: that reality is actually in every sense created in the growing process of human knowledge. Reality *is* this process of experience, and there is nothing beyond. It is to this, or rather to the question how Professor James interprets this, that I wish, therefore, to confine myself.

In the first place, it is of some importance to know whether the statement that truth consists in the consequences, and that reality is created by our judging thought, is to be taken as absolute, or only as a partial aspect of truth. For, again, if the last is meant, we do not necessarily have a new or exclusive philosophy. For I judge that everyone would admit that in *some* sense our thought adds to reality. Professor James seems to yield here to the temptation of a too easy victory over opponents, when he attributes to them the doctrine that the *sole* business of our minds with realities is to copy them. If the only alternative of pragmatism is to hold that knowledge is a *mere* copying, then I am assuredly a pragmatist. But I doubt whether it would be any easier to find nowadays one who maintained the doctrine that knowledge is a *mere* copying, than to find the *mere* pragmatist whom Professor James regards as a figment of his critics' imagination. It is, once more, an undoubted advance to recognize the reality of the interplay between our knowing selves and the world we know. Our knowledge certainly does something ; and this something can hardly be entirely irrelevant to the object of knowledge. The complete account of the object would have to include this new relationship. But it *may* be, also, that this is not in any manner inconsistent with the existence of another as-

pect of knowledge, according to which it involves a recognition of what already is in existence, and is not made by thought. So that it is necessary to be clear about the limits of the creative power of thought, before we can discuss intelligibly a philosophy of which this is to be made the distinctive feature.

On the surface, Professor James's statements are not wholly unambiguous, particularly in his article in *Mind*. "That this drift of experience itself is due to something independent of all possible experience, may or may not," he says, "be true."¹ "Whether the Other has itself any definite inner structure; or whether, if it have any, the structure resembles any of our predicated *whats*, this is a question which humanism leaves untouched."² If our own particular thought were annihilated, the reality would still be there, though *possibly* in a shape that would lack something that our thought supplies.³ In view of the uncertainty of statements like these, I shall try first to analyze the situation a little, and to distinguish certain positions which I judge that the pragmatist might assume; and I will start from the most extreme expression of pragmatism — that each individual makes his own truth, and makes it in accordance with his own arbitrary pleasure. This is, of course, repudiated by pragmatists generally; but since it is a position at least capable of definite formulation and easy to understand, there is an advantage in taking it as a point of departure.

Now, in opposition to such a conception, there are two things, at any rate, which I understand Professor James to maintain. There is, first, reality to be taken into account other than our own personal experiences and beliefs (this takes more positively the form of 'other experience'); and, second, the process of growing truth is not indeterminate, but follows more or less definite paths independent of our arbitrary will. But the use made of these claims I do not fully comprehend; and as they are in some degree independent motives, which yet are closely entangled in Professor James's exposition, I find it not altogether an easy

¹ *Mind*, Vol. XIII, p. 463.

² *Ibid.*, p. 462.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 463.

matter to set forth the nature of my difficulties. I shall try, however, to indicate these, and I may take the last of the two motives to begin with, relating the other to it as well as I can.

To go back for a moment, the essential point of pragmatism as a complete philosophical system is, so far as I can see, this : That the qualifications of reality are actually made in every sense of the term, and first become actual, in the growing process of human experience, the qualifications which we call true differing from those we call false solely by their practical satisfactoriness. There is, accordingly, no need, in explaining the fact of knowledge, to call in for purposes of explanation any contemporaneously existing reality whatsoever, regarded as independent of the knower. And in so far as we do admit such an existence, we are not pragmatists, and are tampering with the purity of a pragmatic view of the world. The main problem, then, for pragmatism, is to explain the determinations of psychological experience without going beyond that experience itself.

What, then, concretely is the meaning and proof of this claim. I think it may fairly be contended, to begin with, that it is not enough simply to point to the fact that the process of experience is actually to an extent determinate and constrained, in order to overcome the force of the objection that on the principle of pragmatism it ought not to be so. Professor James seems to come pretty close to such an implied procedure.¹ Now, of course, everyone admits the fact of constraint within experience. But also the fact is that among these determinations there are some which seem to our natural thought explicable in immanent terms, and some which do not. What needs to be done, therefore, is to show that the latter cases can be reduced in an intelligible way to the former ; merely to appeal to the fact of determination is to beg the question.

Now the first and most obvious way of explaining determination is by making use of the undoubted fact that the structure of the mind is moulded by past experience into definite forms of perception and interpretation. This is a principle which is relatively clear and unambiguous. Furthermore, the right may be

¹ *Loc. cit.*

granted to extend this by means of the concept of heredity. There is, of course, some difficulty in carrying the continuity of experience from one generation to another, but this need not be pressed. So far as experience is a continuous line which transmits results to succeeding experience, the principle will come in play. But now it seems evident that, taken by itself, the explanation has a strictly limited field. It will not, unless extended in some unexplained manner, account for the aspects of novelty and of apparent contingency in life, and it is these which are of course the points that most need explanation.

There is another way in which the field of explanation may be enlarged. For we find reference not only to the past as a means of determination, but also to the future.¹ I should be inclined to distinguish two possibilities in the way of interpreting this, though I do not feel quite clear that Professor James makes the distinction, or would allow the second of the two. What he does bring forward explicitly is the doctrine of implied existence. Thus the number seven is implicit in the experience of the dipper constellation. It is not actual until some human mind counts the stars, but even before the counting the conditions of the result were present. The stars were actually seven, in that they must appear so whenever the question came to be asked.

To this conception also I shall not, in a general way, object. But there are several things which I think need to be said about it before we build much upon it. For it does not naturally, any more than the other, apply to any save a limited class of truths; and the cases where it fails are again those which are chiefly at issue. Certain qualities are implicit in a psychological experience which may afterwards, when they are attended to, be recognized as in some sense already there before they were noticed. Certain logical conclusions may be actually involved in premises, and yet not be drawn; and we say they really were there all the time. Or, again, granting the knowledge of certain facts, comparisons of various sorts between them are possible which only await the action of a comparing mind; and when the result appears, we recognize it as grounded in the facts themselves as they

¹ *Mind*, Vol. XIII, pp. 463, 472.

were already known. All this is fairly intelligible. Assume the facts as experienced to begin with, and knowledge about them which is afterwards brought to light may often be regarded as implicitly present. But neither the experiences, nor the active and productive aspects of their relationships, are implicit in anything like the same sense. The explanation may, perhaps, apply to the number of the stars in a group, but not to the appearance of the stars themselves. When these first present themselves to human vision, they are something quite new, which cannot be said in any natural way to grow out of past experience or to be implicitly present in it. It may apply to the comparison of a group of stars to a great bear, but it does not naturally apply to the effect which one heavenly body has upon the orbit of another.

But now, secondly, there is a way in which all aspects of reality, even the new and apparently fortuitous elements, might be said to be implicit in experience. But it is with a wholly different meaning, and a meaning which is frankly metaphysical rather than scientific. We may hold, that is, the conception of experience as an absolute system, including present, past, and future, which constantly is budding out into new manifestations of reality. Every new fact is, therefore, implicit in experience. But such a statement means simply that the mere fact that it appears is taken as proof that it belongs to the system which we have identified with reality. It need not, however, be seen to be implicit from the human point of view. But this is to give up all that concretely we mean by an appeal to experience. A reference to future experience which does not involve the ability, when the new fact arises, of detecting concretely its possibility in the known past, is merely an appeal to the fact without explanation.

So far as I can understand, then, an immanent philosophy is left with the two foregoing principles, and these alone, by which to explain concretely the determinations of experience. Whether they serve the purpose sufficiently seems to me very doubtful. Personally, I do not think the pragmatist gives sufficient weight to the insistence of the problem that arises in connection with that apparent character of sensation through which it seems de-

terminated from the outside. To take the mere fact that the sensation does actually appear, or even the added fact of its relation (sometimes, not always) to psychological ends in connection with which we are anticipating it, seems to me simply to be closing one's eyes to the problem and doing without an explanation. However, if one does not feel this, I suppose it is useless to insist upon it. I will only insist that it is desirable to choose our side definitely, and then stick to it, that we may all know where we stand. One who is proposing a new philosophy can hardly refuse to pronounce plainly upon an alternative which is the very point in controversy. Particularly puzzling to me, on the pragmatist hypothesis, are the passages in which Professor James deals with our common attribution of permanence and past existence to things,¹ as when he says that some things, if we ever suppose them, must be supposed to have existed previously to the supposing. If he really means by this what he seems to say, then, though he parts company with the metaphysical pragmatists, I am glad to think that he agrees with all that I should want to maintain. But I cannot interpret his words on the consistently pragmatic basis. In what way are we necessitated to think that which by the terms of the theory would seem to be the opposite of the truth? On the grounds so far brought into view, the common belief is only a practical convenience, a *taking as if* permanent and continuous. But there are complications when this tendency results in the use of a conception which contradicts the standpoint out of which it grows, and I do not understand the attitude of the pragmatist if he attempts the combination. He may mean merely to take it on occasion as true for practical purposes, recognizing its unreal character in reflective moments. But, in that case again, I fail to see the pragmatic basis on which this last denial is to be made. If pragmatism as a practical working force in experience pronounces in favor of the common beliefs, in what sense is there any ground left for accepting the quite opposite opinion to which pragmatism as a theory leads. On pragmatic principles of usefulness it would seem to be lacking in the essential characteristics of truth. Or

¹ *Mind*, Vol. XIII, p. 464.

if it still is true in theory though contrary to our practical convictions, how are we to escape the outworn conception of a truth that is true no matter what we believe? A pragmatist in method merely would have no difficulty. It would be quite possible to say: The concept of permanence and substantiality arises indeed out of practical needs; but, though it arises as an hypothesis, it yet is independently true and I accept it as such.

In what precedes I have tried to indicate my belief that a consistently immanent philosophy involves only a serial line of influence, and has no place logically for a contemporaneous reality. The determination which it allows is, whatever its nature, at any rate in terms of a succession within a single system of conscious experience, and it cannot hold between a fact of knowledge and some other coexisting fact. For, on the one hand, coexistence makes it out of the question that the reality should be created by the knowing experience, as the strict consistency of the theory seems to demand. And, furthermore, if such a reality does exist and is referred to in our knowledge, it seems somewhat captious to deny to it all share whatever in the explanation of the knowing experience. At least, it would apparently exercise some control over the guesses at truth which arise within experience, by helping select out those that are able to work.

Now I do not really suppose that Professor James would accept the full position which has here been set down as pragmatic. Apart from ambiguities, there seem to be enough assertions to the opposite effect to make his general attitude plain. He allows apparently, as has been said, for the validity of retrospective judgments. He seems to grant the reality of the object beyond knowledge.¹ At least this is true of other selves, whose lives, existing beyond the knowing act, are recognized as veritable realities; and this is enough to establish in principle all that I am concerned with here. The theory of pan-psychism, again, with which Professor James appears on occasion to be coquetting, certainly involves a coexisting object alongside the act of knowledge. Seemingly, then, all that he is really trying to maintain is this: That *some* knowledge, though not by any means all, adds

¹ Cf. *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 116.

to reality.¹ Even here Professor James fails to note clearly a distinction which I think is important. He uses as an argument the undoubted fact that knowledge enables us to act, and so to change reality.² But the claim was that knowledge, *as* knowing, creates reality, and it is not evident how this bears upon such a claim. That knowledge has *results* is what any philosopher might, probably any philosopher would, be glad to admit. But common sense would hold that it is just because knowledge as such does not add to the facts, but recognizes them as they are, that it is able to lead to effective changes. Personally, I am inclined to think that these changes which knowledge produces, not as belonging to its own meaning and intention, but as further consequences in the way of action, would meet all the requirements, and enable us to class all knowledge as retrospective. When, for instance, I count the stars of the constellation and call them seven, what has my knowledge added to the real objects? The act of counting is a new fact. So too, it may be, is a particular use of the word 'seven.' But neither of these are intended in the judgment itself. What we do mean by the judgment seems to me as clearly retrospective for the ordinary consciousness as the examples which Professor James would allow to be such. Of course every new judgment adds something to reality *as represented in human knowledge*. But such novelty is simply the concern of psychology. To make it directly significant for philosophy one must, I take it, make the complete identification of growing knowledge and reality itself, and set aside the retrospective aspect; and this is what I understand metaphysical pragmatism to do. However, the point is for my present purpose not essential. If even *some* knowledge is truly retrospective, it fixes Professor James's position sufficiently for the argument in hand.

Perhaps now, in view of this result, the foregoing analysis of pragmatism may seem to have turned out to be irrelevant, if Professor James cannot be accused of holding such a doctrine. I think not, however. Professor James is an important figure in

¹ *Mind*, Vol. XIV, p. 193.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, p. 473.

the world of philosophy, and it is worth while to know as clearly as possible to what scale his authority is to lend weight, and how much weight it lends. What I have tried to indicate is that there exists a clearly defined philosophical position which may be held as complete in itself. Professor James has sometimes given occasion for the belief that he is an adherent of this theory. Some of his colleagues at any rate, with whom he classes himself, would appear actually to hold it, *e. g.*, Professor Dewey. This theory maintains that the object of knowledge is to be wholly explained by the method of a teleological and functional psychology. The element of control in experience is to be regarded as entirely immanent, and so again recourse can be had to no principles which are not psychologically grounded. Professor James has so much in common with this tendency, both in method and in details of explanation, that he is bound to make it clear just how far he goes with it and where he stops. For the moment he abandons the purity of the pragmatic principle, there arise for him problems which he cannot refuse to face. Professor James says, for example, that about the nature of the object, supposing it exists, and whether it resembles our idea or no, humanism has no need to inquire.¹ But this is a compromise which seems to me quite untenable. As strict pragmatists the independent object does not exist for us at all; and so, of course, there is no question about its nature. But if it is allowed in any case to exist, what right have we as philosophers to decline the attempt to understand how its nature is to be understood? We have a real problem, and it is well to keep clearly in mind, too, that it is a quite different problem from the one that meets pragmatism, and has to be solved by a different method. For pragmatism, it is a matter of *explaining* the object, accounting for it in the full sense; for pan-psychism, for instance, of interpreting the nature of an object already supposed to be in existence.

I am going to assume, then, that Professor James believes in objects of knowledge in the sense I have tried to explain. I wish now to turn to a second point in his recent articles—which is a closely connected one—his analysis of this knowing experience.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 462.

I have myself found his treatment very illuminating, and I have practically adopted it here, or my understanding of it, for again I recognize that I may have failed throughout to get his meaning. And here also I find myself perplexed because I seem to see Professor James engaged from time to time in a polemic against what I should suppose were the natural consequences of his own position. It is to this, then, that I wish next to direct attention.

Professor James's earlier analysis, recently reproduced by Professor Strong, amounts to this: that knowledge can be reduced to resemblance which leads to beneficial reaction towards an object.¹ I am ready to accept this as far as it goes. In so far as it is meant to emphasize the fact that in ordinary sense-perception, for example, we have no consciousness of two things, object and copy, it obviously represents the truth. But also it seems clearly to fail to cover the whole situation. For the very statement implies that really there is a representation or copying there, and that we are able somehow to recognize this in knowledge. The explanation is, of course, that this recognition belongs not to the original act, but to a later and reflective one. This also I accept. Criticisms of the representative theory lose a good deal of their pertinency by assuming that it must be identified with this faulty analysis of the original experience. Of course, historically this is in part justified. But the real motive back of the theory has usually been its further implications about the nature of the world which we know. If we can retain these implications, the special epistemological form of the theory is not of great importance. In counting myself an adherent of the representative theory of knowledge, I shall wish therefore to be understood as holding that it is true as an outcome of reflective thought, and not as an account of the primitive anatomy of the direct experience of knowing.

In recent discussions this function of reflective thought has been emphasized, but its bearings have, in my opinion, often been misinterpreted. To revert for a moment, let me consider for example in the light of it the use of the term 'experience' which pragmatism makes. There is undoubtedly a sense in which all

¹ *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 254.

reality comes to us as experience. But in this sense we do not talk or philosophize about it ; we simply live it. As an immediate living present fact, it is always in Professor James's phrase 'pure' experience. In order to become philosophers, pragmatic or otherwise, we have to translate this entire reality into reflective terms. For us as philosophers the world is what we think it to be. The character we assign to it is the character which it gets in reflection. It is illegitimate, as it seems to me, to go back to the original pure experience, and because we do not find a certain distinction there to deny the distinction forthwith. This is to dip back again into mere living, to cease to philosophize by ceasing to trust to the results of reflection, and so to attempt an impossible mingling of two radically distinct attitudes. That is true for us, again, which is true for reflective thought. If thought did not add something true which we had not recognized as true before, we might as well have rested in our immediacy.

Now to apply this to the reality of 'experience.' When we are content with experience as the final word in philosophy, we either, it appears to me, mean something definite, and then the satisfactoriness of our explanation is questionable, or else we mean something entirely indefinite, and are simply ignoring problems instead of explaining them. When I speak of experience in a clear and verifiable sense, what do I mean? Always, I think, actual experience as it exists for me or for some other similar human being. For reflective thought, experience takes concretely the form of *psychological* experience. Into this flow of a connected life-history, everything to which my reflective thought naturally gives the name experience — pure experience, objective experience, subjective experience all alike — enters to form a part. The fact that a bit of pure experience did not recognize itself as mine, does not hinder me, in looking back upon it, from calling it mine. The essence of the term in the natural understanding is just this psychological connection which can be read back into it as existing between its successive stages. And this psychological connection is precisely what the pragmatist of Professor Dewey's type utilizes as the ultimate method of explanation.

But, now, if we still keep to the reflective stage, we must recog-

nize that there are many other objects of knowledge which we do not naturally call experience in this same sense. Experiences are only a part of the field of knowledge; along with them are many other things which we never think of as having any identification with psychology. Once more, we may say in a certain sense that we get them through 'experience.' But it is a different sense. We have gone back to our naïve unanalyzed meaning. For thought, things stand over against experiences. They are in a wholly different sort of connection. The indiscriminate appeal to experience is, therefore, almost certain to be confusing; for it almost always involves the transfer of a method got from what for reflection is only a part of reality, to what for reflection is a larger whole, while at the same time it utilizes the ambiguity of terms to ignore the distinction and deny that it exists. To content oneself with saying that, if not experience, it is at least *possible* experience, is to ignore this source of confusion. If it means literally that the object is *no more than* a future experience of mine, it is, indeed, consistent — consistent with the point of view which makes the psychological method final, by throwing out all the other reality which, in reflecting upon the world, we place alongside the reality of experience. But Professor James appears to mean more than this, and the moment he does mean more he ceases to be giving an explanation at all. Every reality that does not connect with my psychological experience in a psychological way is left unaccounted for. Experience stands for no more than what other people have always been accustomed to call reality, and this has commonly been supposed to represent the problem, not the solution. The statement that reality is 'experience,' then, means, either the truism that everything we have any right to consider real must somehow come within our range of experience, that nothing can be known to us which does not become an object of our knowledge; or else it is a leap without argument to a particular form of old-fashioned idealism, according to which we interpret a reality which we cannot get at directly as after all made of the same essential stuff as ourselves.

This, however, is in part a digression. What I chiefly wish to

consider is the outcome of Professor James's further analysis of knowledge. And it may be noted that the preceding account seems to recognize clearly the actual existence of an object beyond knowledge. It is the possibility of our being able to recognize this which has, therefore, in addition, to be examined, before we have a complete statement. This Professor James's later theory seems to me to accomplish. I myself accept the position as I understand it. My only purpose is to raise the question: Why the constant attack upon transcendence? To me the possibility of transcendence, in the only sense there is any reason to maintain it, seems a necessary part of the position.

What, then, do I mean when I say I know a given thing? Partly, at least, I mean that I am able to take account of it practically. I have habits of action with reference to it, and I can anticipate from the limited number of characteristics actually present to my senses the other characteristics that are to be expected under various circumstances, and can act accordingly.

In this statement there are two points involved — the habits of appropriate action, and the anticipation of definite experience. The strict pragmatist seems to me to look too exclusively to the first of these. It represents undoubtedly an aspect of knowledge. We do not really know anything until we know how to act with reference to it, and the sense of appropriate outgoing tendencies unobstructed is important for our consciousness of familiarity. It is not on the ground that it is wrong, but that it is one-sided, that exception is to be taken to the position. There is another and inner aspect of knowledge which refuses to be exhausted in terms of action, at least the sort of action that looks solely to the practical use to be made of the knowledge. This is the conscious reference which is present in the ideal anticipatory function, and which Professor James sets out to explain as the feeling of conscious transition.

The word 'anticipation' suggests the point at issue. I cannot see how any rendering of the facts can get away from the necessity for supposing a real ability to look forward into the future, to refer to something which is recognized as not yet a matter of direct experience; and the existence of such an anticipatory image

is all that it seems necessary to postulate in order to satisfy the legitimate claims of transcendence.

As I sit in my chair, I think of a book-case in the neighboring room. There is in this experience itself no diremption. My consciousness is simply the consciousness of book-case — a piece of 'pure' experience. When, however, I begin to examine it introspectively, I can point out its psychological structure, and this structure we may assume to consist essentially, as Professor James says, of a more or less vague image *plus* certain feelings of transition.¹

Now these feelings are, so far, not of actual but of ideal transitions, and very probably they involve no clear sense of a definite goal. We might, I should say, even at this stage, call the experience knowledge. But it is true that, if our experience had never gone beyond this, our description would remain necessarily incomplete. The end and verification of knowledge, at least, is the actual termination of these feelings of transition in an issue marked by the sense of satisfaction and attained meaning, as when I rise and walk into the next room and get the actual perception. This terminal feeling is undoubtedly another and important datum. I think that Professor James's use of it, however, is a little questionable. He seems to hold that knowledge as an experience is to be put primarily in terms of these actual transitions to the end and the end itself, as if the experience of knowing did not really exist till the feelings of transition lost themselves in the actual terminus.² Certainly, however, my actual movements into the next room are not necessary for a knowing experience. Nor do I feel clear that the sense of attainment either is an essential. Rather I should be inclined to say that it marks the point where knowledge ceases as such, and passes into something else — a new and direct experience, which may, of course, also be the starting point for new feelings of transition. In knowing as such, the sense of transition seems to me typically ideal and anticipatory, rather than completed.

Nevertheless, I grant that the sense of finished transition is

¹ *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 539.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 539-541.

needed for the completer description of knowledge. But I should prefer to state it as follows: If my experience of knowing is purely naïve, as I have supposed it to be hitherto, the description given above will be sufficient. But now, instead simply of thinking of the book-case, I think of *myself as knowing* the book-case. I reflect upon the act not merely as an experience, but as an experience of *knowledge*. I then should naturally tend to put the thing in a slightly different, at least in a more definite way. Two things now come directly within my view: The recognition that there is present to me now the vague idea of an object, *plus* the sense that under certain circumstances I should find this image blend in another and more vivid experience without any feeling of internal discrepancy. This new experience I recognize as a possible real experience, but as still in the future, and consequently as transcending my present knowing experience either in terms of the image, or of the immediately present transition feelings which mediate the knowing. I must, once more, have had an experience of completed transition before I have the data for a complete description of knowledge. But when I have once recognized just what takes place in a case of this sort, I have a sufficient means of interpreting other cases of knowledge, even where a similar issue has not been reached. And it is a description which, as it appears to me, will apply to any case of knowledge, when I reflect upon it *as* knowledge, and do not simply know. But now, as regards the implications of this, there are two or three points which may be noted separately.

First, the whole situation is, as Professor James maintains, describable in terms of experience. There is nothing essentially mysterious save as all experience is mysterious. If the upholder of the representative theory sometimes speaks as though some substantial state of consciousness could by itself get outside its own skin and point to something else — all as a part of its own isolated content — this is only an inadvertence. All that is required is that it shall play the part of an anticipatory image within a wider reach of experience, and this I cannot see how it is possible to refuse to grant.

Secondly, in the description of this experience there is involved

the idea of representation. In *some* more or less adequate way the early part of the experience resembles or copies the conclusion, or else it cannot anticipate it truly.

Finally, I do not see why, as I have said, we are not committed to the idea of transcendency, or why this should not be recognized frankly and unambiguously. And being recognized, it seems to me to furnish all that is required for understanding what is meant by the knowledge even of objects that exist beyond anything that is experience for me. It has been seen that, in thinking an object, there does not need to be the actual transition to the subsequent experience. Rather knowledge as such is essentially a case of *possible* transition, a mental and ideal experience and not one of practical accomplishment. When I think now of my thought as a true idea of the book-case in the next room, I think, indeed, of this thought as possibly issuing in a sense experience. I think of the two as able to blend harmoniously, and get thus a certain sense of fulfilled transition. But the whole process is confined to the realm of thought. But if now I can have a sense that my image *would* under certain circumstances issue in another experience, *e. g.*, a perceptual experience which would fulfill it, without the actual fulfillment taking place; if there may be a recognition that the series has not yet been completed, and that the knowledge is therefore problematic and unverified, there may equally be the sense that it cannot *ever* be completed, that the completion must forever remain apart from the ideal anticipation. When I say that I know a reality beyond experience, I should mean, then, that *if* my anticipatory image were to reach its goal, it would experience the same sense of fulfillment that I get when my thought issues in perception, *but* that I realize that this never will and never can take place. Of course, the question still would remain how we come to make this extension beyond experience, and to adopt the hypothesis of a reality which we never can reach directly to compare it with its anticipation. But the conception itself is neither unintelligible nor essentially mysterious.

I realize that it may again be said: But this break, this diremption, is, after all, not outside experience but within it. I cannot

go back to discuss further the ambiguity in the term experience on which it seems to me this objection is based. But I may call attention to the presence of the ambiguity once more in the discussion of our perception of the separateness of selves, where the extraneousness I am claiming is most indisputably involved. Professor James tries to reduce this to immediate transitional experiences.¹ But the comparison which he makes with the sense of personal identity brings out clearly, I think, the flaw in the argument. We find in this last a sense of smooth and easy transition, whereas in the case of two selves there is a break, an obstruction, and we have to shift from a perceptual to an ideal experience, the sense of the break constituting, according to Professor James, the meaning and actual being of the whole experience of duality. But there obviously is in the two cases a very important difference which cannot be overlooked. When I pass with the sense of unimpeded transition from one experience to another, both the experiences, as well as the conscious transition, are elements of a single conscious continuity. But when I pass to the idea of another self, the reality of the discontinuity cannot in the same way be identified with the feeling of blocked transition. For the very point of the matter is that the feeling does not connect the two terms, but involves reference to a second term which is not present at all. I might feel a jolt to my activity. But in that there would be no question of a second self. To be at all analogous, the other self would have to be—contrary to the original hypothesis—*within* the same continuity with the transitive experience, otherwise this could not be felt as transitive or relational. If the two cases are really on a par, then the *thought* of the other man to which the transition leads *is* the other man; and this I take it is the true outcome of the doctrine.

Actually Professor James seems clearly to believe in a real break, and in a real other self with its thoughts and feelings, into the neighborhood of which our transitive experiences lead, but which they do not actually reach. And if the attempt to put the whole meaning of the knowledge experience in terms of the psy-

¹ *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 536.

chological facts of feeling results here in denying this belief, and so fails to work, the same thing will be true of those other passages in which he tries to get rid of the transcendence aspect in the interest of these same transitive feelings. To this attempt it may, perhaps, be a sufficient reply that he does not himself pretend to be true to his theory, but talks continually in terms that involve the power of transcendence. It would, indeed, be quite impossible to speak articulately did we not presuppose at every step our ability to think of things not at the moment present. To say that knowledge is no more than immediate transitional feelings is not only to deny all reality for me beyond the immediate facts of my psychological experiencing ; it is to take away my ability to know even these. The fault, again, seems to me to lie in mixing two points of view. Psychological analysis reveals to me, indeed, the nature of the experience through which I know a given reality. But to take this as identical with the original meaning of my knowing experience is fatal. I have rather added a new object of knowledge, the knowing act, to the former object which I meant or knew. It is an adequate account of all that we can detect in the act as such. But if we allow it to result in the denial of that which underlies all knowledge alike as its original presupposition — that we can in thought have a definite *meaning* — we have brought the whole edifice of knowledge crashing down about our heads.

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CONTINUITY AND NUMBER.

THE problem of continuity enters into mathematics, physics, and philosophy in one guise or another. It seems to have reached a satisfactory solution only in the first-named field, where the theory of continua of higher order, and the Dedekind theory of the nature of irrationals, appear to have brought about that much-desired freedom from paradoxes which the physicist and philosophical geometer cannot attain. These latter investigators are, therefore, justified in investigating the mathematician's solution of the problem in the hope of gleaning some fruitful suggestion or analogy. It is in this spirit that the present study is undertaken, the aim being not so much to produce a mathematical criticism as to find what the bearings may be which the mathematicians' discoveries have upon the philosophical issues centering about continuity. The conclusion we shall reach is strictly a negative one, when viewed from the philosophical standpoint : The concept of continuity appearing in all discussions in the theory of numbers is totally un'like the concept similarly named which appears in geometry and theoretical physics ; it is, indeed, not continuity at all that is being spoken of. Accordingly, all higher forms of speculation which make use of the arithmetical concept (higher mathematics and metaphysics of the idealistic school, for instance) must be subjected to revision in the light of our amendments.

In criticising the theory of number we shall — perhaps with some injustice to mathematicians as a class — investigate only the well-known and widely accepted results of Dedekind's studies on the nature of number, which embody the most typical views of modern theorists, generally speaking.¹ The starting-point is the usual one, a statement of the symbolic nature of number. "The number concept," says Dedekind, is "entirely independent of the notions or intuitions of space and time, . . . an immediate

¹ It is only fair to state that some mathematicians, for instance Hilbert, are not content with the Dedekind theories ; yet, so far as I can understand their points of difference, none of them are free from the confusion of two or more concepts of continuity.

result from the laws of thought, . . . [numbers are] free creations of the human mind; they serve as a means of apprehending more easily and more sharply the difference of things.”¹ To the psychological reader of these words, the distinction between number as an immediately felt *quale*, and number as a sign of this *quale*, is not clearly drawn; it is hardly exact, moreover, to pronounce number, the quantity *quale*, entirely independent of the notions of space and time. With respect to this last point, however, we may well grant the correct intention of the mathematician, which is, it seems, to say that quantity, as such, is neither essentially spatial nor temporal. The concept of number, as expression of pure quantity, is such that the number symbols may be applied to anything which can be discriminated. On this point mathematician and psychologist may readily agree. For the present, we waive a discussion of some other peculiarities of pure quantity which are involved in the current mathematical concept; we may say that quantity is a phase of all thinkable things in some sense or other.

There is a second preliminary point which is not emphasized by the theorists, however, but which is vital to a logical discussion of arithmetical continuity; I refer to the commonplace fact that, if operations are to be performed with numbers in the number-system, whatever the base ($= 1$) is taken to represent in the particular series of reasonings, that same represented thing must be the sole true element in all groups symbolized by all the other members of the system. The schoolma'am expresses this by saying you must not add two apples to four chairs. I say that the higher theories of number have not given due weight to this fundamental rule of logic; in order to make good this assertion, we need but turn to our theme directly and see the curious results of the neglect in the discussions of numerical continuity.

Turning first to the whole-number series, we find the mathematician saying that this is discrete, full of gaps—in short, a poor apology for a continuum. In order to make it truly continuous, elaborate interpolations must be made; fractions and irrationals

¹ *Essays on the Theory of Numbers*, Engl. transl., p. 31.

must be inserted 'between' integers;¹ whereupon we have a true number continuum of which it may be said that "the four fundamental [arithmetical] operations are always performable with any two individuals in R [the system], *i. e.*, the result is always an individual of R "; and "if a, c are two different numbers, there are infinitely many different numbers lying between a, c ."² Now, from the way in which the perfect number continuum is built up and from what is said about it, I think it can be shown that mathematicians have not remained true to their first assumptions about the nature of number as a symbol. If it can be shown that interpolation between integers involves a primary logical difficulty, then the notion of arithmetical continuity must undergo revision. I think it can be demonstrated that there is involved the fallacy of equivocation, in that numbers are employed in a single chain of reasoning, with various symbolic values. In order to make this plain, it will prove expedient to explain in what sense a pair of numbers is said to be adjacent or proximate in a continuum.

Let us accept the mathematician's definition of continuity in number: "If the system R of all real numbers breaks up into two classes A_1, A_2 such that every number a_1 of class A_1 is less than every number a_2 of class A_2 , then there exists one and only one number a by which this separation is produced."³ This is stated about all real numbers as a system, *i. e.*, about the real-number system. But it is equally applicable to the system of whole numbers, provided we bear in mind the injunction that the base must have a constant reference in each particular chain of reasonings. For then, if the *number* 1 represents the group θ composed of the single element θ , and if every number in the series represents a group whose elements are θ and hence homogeneous, it follows that there is no group whose elements are each θ whose group-characteristic, *however this may be determined*, is in any sense of the word 'intermediate' between the characteristic of the group of $n\theta$ and that of the group $(n+1)\theta$. This means that, with a given meaning (refer-

¹ For a very brief popular presentation of the development of a higher continuum, cf. Poincaré, *Science and Hypothesis*, Ch. II.

² Dedekind, *Op. cit.*, pp. 5 f.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

ence) for the base (1), every whole number is the unique separator of two classes which comprise the whole whole-number system. We may even go farther and say that, in a certain sense, every whole number is the limit which those two classes approach; but this gives a meaning to the term 'limit,' which is somewhat at variance with its usual mathematical import, so that it is not advisable to urge it. All we wish to insist upon is that, whenever the base is made a true symbol (of anything whatsoever), then n and $n + 1$ are proximates in the system. For if all the groups represented by the numbers of the system are by definition composed of homogeneous elements θ , then no group not thus composed can find a representative number in that system.

Whatever the base symbolizes, therefore, fractional numbers cannot consistently be interpolated in the whole-number series. For, given any base-value whatsoever, such fractions are absolutely meaningless. Hence we may generalize by declaring that interpolation of 'values' between integers is an illogical procedure. It now remains for us to show what the actual and undeniable *meaning* of fractions (and irrationals) is. It will require considerable politeness on the part of the mathematician to listen patiently to the remarks I have to make in elucidation of these points; for it is no trivial thing for him to reject the orthodox proposition that "if α, γ are any two different numbers, then there exist infinitely many different numbers β lying between α, γ ."¹ Nevertheless, I think the kernel of truth in this misstatement may be separated from the chaff in such a way that the only kind of 'continuity' and 'infinity' needed by the mathematician will survive the winnowing.

Looking at the nature of the number-base (1) and its symbolic function, we discover that 1 may be taken to represent absolutely anything that can be, in any guise, an object of attention or reference. We must thus speak quite logically and mathematically of 'seven unthinkable things,' for all that is necessary for the mathematician is that he be able to *refer* to them.²

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

² We need not be disturbed by the following paradox: It is impossible to number unthinkable things because some unthinkable things are not amenable to the laws of

As every different element θ may serve as real base to the symbol 1, we may say that we have as many possible systems as there are possible elements. By 'system' we mean a genus whose species differ solely with respect to the number of identical individuals (elements θ) which each of these species contains. We are thus barring by definition such things as mixed systems, *e. g.*, those the elements of whose species are heterogeneous or those whose species are determined by some other principle than that of the mere number of identical elements.

With reference to any arbitrarily chosen element θ , we may then say that it can be the measure of all possible systems, because it may be regarded as the 1-group, the 2-group, or the n -group of a system; and, on the other hand, when regarded as the 1-group, each successive 'transform' — *e. g.*, the 2-group, 3-group, etc., having this element as base — may be regarded as a new base for another system. All such systems may then be named with reference to the original arbitrarily chosen basic element; *e. g.*, when θ is base, the system is $N(\theta)$; when θ is the 2-group, the system is $N(\frac{\theta}{2})$; when θ is the n -group, the system is $N(\frac{\theta}{n})$; and again, taking transforms of θ as bases, we have such systems as $N(2\theta)$, $N(n\theta)$, etc. Finally, inasmuch as absolutely anything may be chosen as arbitrary first base, it is clear that every possible pure system is capable of description in such a scheme; but in order to construct a system which shall include absolutely everything numerable, we must take as base for our universal measure simply 'an object of reference,' *i. e.*, 'a thing referred to (by the particular thinker).'

A peculiarity of such a system must now be mentioned. Calling each individual member of the system a 'group' — *e. g.*,

arithmetic. *E. g.*, a thing which, when added to itself once, gives thrice itself as result is an unthinkable thing. The student of logic will perhaps solve this without difficulty. It is then clear that anything which is part of some higher system may equally well be referred to and symbolized by 1. Hence whatever elements of whatever things there are, each one may be the object referred to by unity. And we need not construe elements in the narrow way a physicist or chemist might; we can signify thereby any 'aspect,' 'phase,' 'quality,' or 'fragment' of absolutely anything. Only, in doing this we must be very careful to retain the same base-value throughout every step in our reasonings which have reference to the same subject matter.

1 = the 1 -group, n = the n -group — we see that every group may be modified in two different ways :

1. By the addition or removal of n of its proper elements (*i. e.*, of those elements which are identical with the base of the system to which the group belongs), in which case it is transformed into another group of the same system.

2. By the addition or removal of n of the sub-elements of some of its proper elements, whereby the resultant aggregate is no longer a true member of the original system. Assuming as we do in this case that merely some part of an original element is added or removed, we see at once that the resultant aggregate cannot be described in terms of the definitions of the original system, but demands some other basic element. The smallest sub-element that was added or removed must now be taken as the base for that system to which the above-named resultant aggregate properly belongs. The new base must logically be symbolized by unity ; but, so long as we are reasoning at once about two systems, the old and the new bases must be distinguished, *e. g.*, by writing them 1 and $1'$ respectively. The unity appearing in a fractional expression, it will now be seen, is not the same as the unity appearing in an integral one ; the resemblance is a relative one only. Each unity is the base of a different system, and these systems are related in a way wholly accidental to arithmetic.

The logical meaning of incommensurability becomes apparent now, and we refer to it because it probably makes clear the meaning of fractions generally and the bad logic of talking about interpolation of fractional values. To say that 3 and 10 of any given system are incommensurable means that, if the 3 -group of that system be taken as base of a new system, then the 10 -group does not appear in this new system. This suggests at once that there are two degrees or types of incommensurability, one relative and the other absolute ; relative incommensurability is that found between groups neither of which can be converted into a base of any system in which the other appears as a true member ; absolute incommensurability, on the other hand, is that found between groups which cannot both be true members of any system what-

soever, be the base of such system what it may. Thus, to say that 1 and $\sqrt{2}$ are incommensurable means that, whatever the the base may be (symbolized by 1), no $\sqrt{2}$ -group appears in the system built up on this base. This is absolute incommensurability, because it lacks a characteristic of relative incommensurability, namely, commensurability in terms of some base other than the particular groups (numbers) termed incommensurable. The process of finding the least common denominator expresses the process of transforming incommensurables of one system into commensurables of another.

Bearing this in mind, we may see from a new standpoint the utter impropriety of constructing a number continuum by interpolation between integers. A fraction is, as Ehrenfels has well suggested,¹ a 'qualified number,' to be distinguished from pure number in that the former contains information about the qualities of the represented thing. That is to say, $\frac{1}{2}$ means 'the 1-group in that system whose base is one of the two like elements in the base of another system previously fixed upon, known, and referred to.' In short, paradoxically enough, $\frac{1}{2}$ means 1, but 1 of another system; it means 1', we might more accurately say. Its value is dependent upon that of pure unity, whatever that may chance to be, and it is meaningless save in reference to pure unity. Is it not a logical necessity to conclude from this that fractions do not belong to the same system as integers do, and that the attempt to unite fractions and integers into one systematic continuum at least involves some peculiar, extra-arithmetical assumptions about the material *represented*? This same suspicion has occurred to Poincaré, who has said: "Should we have the notion of fractional numbers if we had not previously known a *matter* that we conceive as infinitely divisible, that is to say, a continuum?"² In other words, the arithmetical systems of integers and fractions are suspected of belonging together only by virtue of the nature of the thing symbolized by them. But, curiously enough, it has not been seen that even that most continuous and dissectible object called 'pure quantity' cannot justify the construction of

¹ *Vierteljahrss. für wiss. Phil.*, Bd. XV, p. 308.

² *Science and Hypothesis*, Ch. II.

the conventional number continuum, inasmuch as the objects of reference of fractions with different denominators are different, so that in strict logic there is no conceivable sense in which $1/n$ and $1/(n + 1)$ belong to the same system or continuum. Only when we think of the reference-object itself as capable of continuous variation in quantity, do we think of each possible increment as homogeneous or as 'belonging to' that same object ; but what has this continuity and homogeneity to do with the number continuum? Plainly nothing more than this : The number system, being symbolic of quantities, represents numerically all quantitative differences in the represented matter ; but this infinite elaboration of quantitative differences can be logically represented only by means of a single base which shall symbolize 'the minimum increment,' more usually termed an infinitesimal, in which case we find the pure quantity continuum symbolized by the system of integers alone. Fractions, in other words, do not serve to symbolize pure quantity in the least, but express relations between different systems of (possibly) pure quantity. Their function being, therefore, different from that of pure number, which symbolizes in the limiting case pure quantity, fractional numbers do not belong logically to the same system as do integers.

We now have to ask the question, in conclusion, which is of prime philosophical interest : What does continuity mean in pure arithmetic? And how does it relate to the continuity spoken of, say, in geometry or physics? Our above observations lead to the view that the integral system forms as true a continuum as possible in the realm of number. Letting n = an integer, we can say that, with any accepted object of reference symbolized by the base (= 1) of the system to which n belongs, there can be no number referring ultimately to that same kind of object which is not an integer. Cast into logical language, this means simply that, within any given universe of discourse, the same term must refer to the same object. To say, in arithmetic, that there are infinite numbers between 1 and 2, is to use the word 'number' in a flagrantly ambiguous sense, now for an expression of pure quantity, and now for a sign of relation between different systems of quantities. On the other hand, to say logically that

between 1 and 2 there are no numbers is to use the word 'number' univocally; 1 and 2 are continuous or 'adjacent,' if you will in the purely logical sense that there are no numbers of the same kind (pure numbers) which are greater than 1 and less than 2. In still more logical phraseology, we might express this by saying that, in any universe of discourse, it is impossible to have more than one object of reference and less than two. The meaning of this remark, though abbreviated, is probably plain enough.

Our conclusion, then, is that arithmetical continuity, even when correctly stated in its simplest logical form, throws no light upon the meaning of geometrical and physical continuities. And no description of a real continuum in terms of one-to-one correspondence with the real number system *explains* the character of continuity; such a description is only a formal *confession* of the presence of continuity. And the reason for this is that arithmetical continuity is really nothing but a peculiar instance of logical consistency of reference. It seems clear enough that spatial and temporal continuities are incapable of any such reduction to a merely logical demand. For all this, strictness in use of reference terms may well be advantageous in discussing these genuine continuities. Numerical description may be correct so far as it goes, but at best it gives us an aspect of continua which is not that of their continuity. We do not have to regard the numerical aspect as 'merely subjective'; it is simply other than the aspect of real continuity.

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SOLIPSISM: THE LOGICAL ISSUE OF RADICAL EMPIRICISM.

RADICAL empiricism is both a theory of knowledge and a theory of reality. As a theory of reality, its fundamental proposition is: Reality is experience and experience only. As a theory of knowledge, its cardinal proposition is: Reality is known by experience only and known because experienced.

I shall maintain in this article that solipsism is the logical issue of this doctrine. The proposition I shall try to establish is: The radical empiricist's experience is his own experience only. In other words, my proposition is: Radical empiricism contains no principles by means of which it is logically admissible to reach other reality than the individual's own experience.

In the prosecution of my undertaking, I shall first show that solipsism is the logical result of the radical empiricist's meaning of experience and its processes. I shall, in the second place, show that the same result follows from the radical empiricist's explanation of *perceptual experience* and of the knowledge of other minds. I shall, accordingly, first examine the radical empiricist's meaning of the terms, 'thought,' 'transcendence,' and 'cognition,' or 'cognitive experience.'

It is the doctrine of radical empiricism that the originals of all those relations which logical thought recognizes are given in experience, and are experienced along with the things they connect. Thought, as logic regards it, is later than experience and wholly derivative from experience. The function of thought is representative, substitutional, experience itself being the original source of truth and knowledge, which are always matters of concrete situations. Thought merely abstracts and generalizes from these concrete experiences; and the products of these processes are those convenient and very serviceable things called 'ideas,' 'concepts,' 'judgments,' and 'inferences.' These, however, are in their essential nature substitutes for actual experiences. Thought, in relation to concrete experience, discharges a function which is

analogous to that which paper currency discharges in relation to a gold reserve. The validity and the value of thought are determined solely by its possible reduction to the terms of experience, which is the cash value in gold of all these functions of thought. Such being the nature and function of thought, it is obvious that it lives and does its work only within the tissue of experience; and consequently it can never transcend experience in any valid exercise of it.

But radical empiricism recognizes transcendence; transcendence is a part of the very meaning of experience. Every experience is self-transcendent; it is the very *esse* of each passing experience to look before and after; to mean, to intend, to seek, to will a *next* experience, a move that is ever on the point of becoming actual as this present moment is actual. Now, my position is this: Accepting this transcendence on the part of each passing moment of experience, it does not carry us beyond the *individual's own* experience. The experience from which this transcending starts, its *terminus a quo*, is undeniably just this individual's own experience; as such, it has for its defining character, its *quale*, a 'this-mine' quality; and my contention is that the experience to which this transcendence proceeds, its *terminus ad quem*, has necessarily the same attending consciousness of being this my experience. When this experience becomes actual, it becomes actual as this same individual's own experience. Consequently, the radical empiricist's meaning of transcendence involves him in solipsism. There is nothing in transcendence which permits the recognition of other reality than the individual's own experience.

If we turn to cognitive experience with the hope of a happier lot, I fear that hope is doomed to disappointment. Truth and knowledge, according to radical empiricism, are relations of a particular sort between experiences, or parts of a single experience; and they are consequently experienced just as the things they unite. Truth and knowledge are in their original character experience processes. They are described as conjunctive transitions, taking place between two or more experiences. They are an affair of 'transition and arrival.' Now my position is that,

if this be the nature of the cognitive relation, it can exist only between experiences of the *same individual*.

In whatever terms this cognitive relation may be conceived — meaning and its completion, intention and its fulfillment, purpose and its realization, dissentience and its removal, want and its filling — of whatever sort this particular relation may be, it can hold only between experiences of the same individual. This is so because, according to this doctrine, the knower is just an experience; and this experience, of course, being an actual one, can only be the this-my-here-and-now-passing experience; and since the cognitive process is one of conjunctive transitions which lead into another experience, the experience into which these conjunctive transitions lead cannot be of another sort than the experience from which they set out. The knower never gets beyond himself; he is condemned to be a solipsist, will he, nill he. It does not matter by what names the radical empiricist may call the object known — the *terminus ad quem* of the cognitive process — whether ‘fulfillment,’ ‘completion,’ ‘satisfaction,’ ‘ease,’ ‘peace,’ ‘harmony,’ ‘success,’ etc., these terms can only describe or name this individual’s own state of experience. We do not escape the merely subjective, the individualistic character of this experience by the mere use of terms that, in a different theory of knowledge, connote objective reality as something other than the knower’s own experience. If we hold *consistently* the doctrine of radical empiricism, we must say that the knower’s intention, purpose, want, etc., are fulfilled, attained, and satisfied in terms of experiences which are *all his own*. This knower never comes into possession of other reality than his own experience.

Thus is it shown, as I think, that solipsism is the logical issue of the radical empiricist’s meaning of the terms, ‘thought,’ ‘transcendence,’ and ‘cognition.’

I proceed next to the second part of my undertaking, which is to show that the same result follows from the radical empiricist’s explanation of perceptual experience and of the knowledge of other minds. Taking first perceptual experience, I will examine the concrete case which Professor James employs.¹ There

¹ *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, Vol. I, pp. 481 f.

are two points which are vital to his explanation of perception in this instance : one of these points concerns the distinction he makes between knower and known object ; the other point concerns the possibility of a cognitive relation between these two experiences.

It is Professor James's doctrine that the same experience is both knower and known object, according as this self-same experience is taken ; in one context or set of associates it is knower, while, taken in a different context or with different associates, it is known object. Thus, in this case of the room, the percipient or knower is an experience made up of experiences so linked as to form a personal history, while the room as experience has associates of a different sort, or that run in a different direction. The percipient experience in this instance is made up of a series of antecedent sensations, memories, feelings, purposes, etc., terminating in these present sensations, etc. The object-experience, the room and building, runs back through such a chain of associates as mean building, painting, furnishing, etc., and on to possible changes in this experience which is the present building and its contents. But if the experience called room or building, *qua* experience context or stuff, is identical with the experience which functions as knower, then the cognitive relation is merely between parts or moments of the same individual's experience ; the percipient has no other objects than another experience of his own. If, on the contrary, this room is an experience of a different sort, is reality that is other than the experience which seeks to know it, then a cognitive relation between it and the percipient experience is impossible. For, since the cognitive process is one of experience, and this experiencing consists of conjunctive transitions, ever from a present experience to a next experience ; and the present experience, being, as we have seen, always characterized by the consciousness of its being mine, the transition can never be into an experience that is other than mine. No such process can ever lead into an experience which is of a different sort than is the experience from which it proceeds. Once it is admitted that the room is other than the percipient's own experience, it is, as object, as truly separated from the knower as is

the supposed object of the realist from his knowing thought. The two experience series — percipient experience series and object-experience series — never run into each other.

What gives to Professor James's explanation the appearance of being successful and satisfying, is his use of a terminology which is strongly tinctured with meanings and implications that are really quite different from those meanings which radical empiricism can bear. For instance, Professor James's description of the room, the building, its antecedents, etc., is largely in terms that imply an already existing and objective order or context of actual experiences, into which this particular experience is fitted. Now, of course, an already existing objective order of experience is something quite different from a merely individual experience, and whoever recognizes such a reality is not a solipsist. But radical empiricism can recognize no such constitution of experience, for that were to recognize an objective determinant of experience, and an objective determinant of experience cannot be itself a percipient experience ; it must be trans-experiential, and in the radical empiricist's world there is nothing trans-experiential.

Not more successful is the attempt of radical empiricism to explain the knowledge of other minds. The various individual minds in the pluralistic universe of Professor James are more hopelessly separated than are the monad beings in Leibniz's partially pluralistic universe. There can be something which will pass for inter action between the monads, because of a monistic basis on which the pluralism of Leibniz is made to rest. Pre-established harmony or some function of the Supreme Monad, God, secures something like intercommunication between the monads. But the pluralism of Professor James, being based upon his doctrine of knowledge, gives us only separate and incommunicative minds.

“ A God, a God their severance ruled !
And bade betwixt their shores to be
The unplumb'd, salt, estranging sea.”

It is only the pluralistic thinker, who, by forgetting his empiricism, can know these many minds ; no one of these minds can

know aught but that mind's own state. To be sure, Professor James has given a plausible solution of the problem of how minds can know each other, can know the same thing, etc.; but examination will show that this solution is ineffective. The use which Professor James attempts to make of the analogical inference to establish the knowledge of other minds is, for one who holds his doctrine, of no avail whatever; since this doctrine wholly removes the basis on which this inference must proceed, viz., the objective reality of the body of my social fellow. The other attempt which Professor James makes to reach the other minds is apparently more successful. The intercommunication of different minds is effected (such is the explanation) by the medium of an intervening reality of some sort, a thing which two or more minds are said to know, and to know because this object is a coterminous experience, the series of experiences which constitute each mind somehow terminating in this common object; and because this object is a coterminous experience, these different minds are intercommunicative. The cognitive car (if this figure can be allowed) runs along the track of the perceptual experiences of one mind, and, at this coterminal station it runs into the volitional-emotional-experience track, and thus arrives at the other mind without a possible derailment or failure to connect. Thus do simple conjunctive transitions lead from my mind into my neighbor's mind without a break anywhere; the transition sets out from my mind, and the arrival at my neighbor's mind is sure and without mystery.

But, unfortunately, this specious solution overlooks a fact which is of decisive moment; the *terminal* experiences of these would-be communicating minds are *different experiences*. We have different termini, but no *coterminous* experience. The perceptual experiences which are one mind, knowing, terminate in something which is not that in which the volitional and feeling-experiences of the other mind terminate. There is, consequently, no junction between these two minds, any more than there is between percipient experience and a thing which is not another mind. No conjunctive transitions can lead into the other mind; for the same reason, as we have shown, no conjunctive

transitions can lead into the sort of experience which means a thing or object in perceptual experience.

The conclusion from this second part of my undertaking confirms the conclusion reached from the examination of the meaning of the fundamental conceptions of radical empiricism. Solipsism seems to be the only logical issue of this doctrine.

I am, however, quite prepared to have the radical empiricist say, should he deem it worth while to notice this criticism, that I have fundamentally misapprehended his doctrine; that my argument proceeds from a narrowly intellectualistic point of view, one that presses a narrow interpretation upon the terminology in which his doctrine is set forth; and that the consequence is, I have missed the point all the way through. In particular, will he protest, I have narrowed his meaning of transcendence in a wholly unjustifiable way, and have quite misapprehended his meaning of cognitive experience.

Transcendence, he will say, is quite competent to reach experience that is other than the experience from which it proceeds. Distinct individualities or minds are no barrier to transcendence as radical empiricism conceives transcendence. There is, he will continue, no reason why experience cannot mean, refer to, intend, and seek something which is not just another moment or phase of the individual's own experience. The cognitive relation can join different minds, or minds and things, with no more difficulty than there is in linking the parts of the same individual's experience. Conjunctive transitions can run as easily into things and into other minds as they do into other experiences of the same mind. Why not? It is just these other minds and things, other sorts of experience which other minds and things really are, that are meant, intended, and demanded in cognitive experience; and, if there is in *actual* experience of the fulfillment of this intention, the satisfaction of this demand, why are not the other minds and things actually present in experience, in other words, actually experienced and therefore known? And if so, what becomes of my solipsism as the logical issue of the doctrine of radical empiricism? Should, however, the radical empiricist make such a

reply to my criticism of his doctrine, I think it will not be a difficult task to make good my contention, that he can really save himself from solipsism, only by abandoning his doctrine of knowledge.

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THE RELATION OF SCIENCE TO CONCRETE EXPERIENCE.

TO what degree, if at all, do the sciences bring before us reality in its concreteness? is a question which has of late years been discussed in many ways. The answers are various, according to the peculiarities of the schools from which they come. One replies that the scientific account of things is partial and abstract; another, that science is a tool, and its results are true only in an economic sense; still another, that scientific reasoning is confessedly mediate, while we get at reality only in immediate experience. All, however, seem to agree that the sciences, and especially the natural sciences, are abstract, and even artificial, and the epistemologists are the more unanimous in this opinion because the scientists themselves — at least those who raise the question — also hold it, if one excepts such adherents of Newtonian realism as Lord Kelvin and Sir Arthur Rücker.¹

This apparent unanimity is seen on examination, however, not to exclude very considerable differences in meaning. Such commonly-accepted positions have often appeared in the past development of philosophy. But they always prove nodes of intersection, rather than common conclusions. The various lines of thought unite in them only to immediately diverge, each on its own path, some to successfully urge their way to a higher level, and others to end, as it were, in a blind alley. It is as such a fresh point of departure that the 'unreality' of science seems to appear at present. All recognize it; but its meaning varies with the perspective of the various schools and teachers.

One division among those who profess this opinion may be stated at once. It does not necessarily follow — though this seems sometimes to be overlooked — that, if we hold science to be abstract and unreal, we must necessarily contrast this abstract-

¹ Cf. the address of the latter, cited in Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 2d ed., Vol. I, pp. 305 ff.

ness and unreality with the reality of an *immediate* experience, a *reine Erfahrung*. We may describe reality in other terms than this, and still hold that the constructions of science are in some sort unreal. The contrast of the complete with the incomplete experience is equally available. Nevertheless, in many cases these portions are connected, and appear, explicitly or implicitly, as interdependent.

Speaking generally, there would seem to be four typical schools of thought under which we may range those who hold that the descriptions of science are not descriptions of reality as it is. I am speaking, of course, of professed epistemologists and metaphysicians, not of those scientists who criticise the methods of their own science. These schools are voluntarism, the foremost representative of which at present is probably Professor Münsterberg; pragmatism, represented by Professors James and Dewey; positivistic sensationalism, as set forth by Ernst Mach and Karl Pearson; and absolute idealism, in its various shades of emphasis and meaning, as we find it held in common by such differing thinkers as, for instance, James Ward and Edward Caird.

It should be noted, however, that the adherents of idealism may vary greatly in the extent to which they hold that science is abstract and unreal. In the first place, they may regard different sciences as more or less abstract. This, however, is largely a question of detail. The more important difference concerns the meaning of this abstractness itself.

What may perhaps be called the orthodox party in this matter follows the example of Hegel in his discussion of the various categories. In the *Logic*, each category is seen as an imperfect statement of reality from the point of view of the one next beyond it in the advance towards the self-conscious idea. But that does not mean that it no longer has any reference to reality, or is abolished. Upon its proper level, it retains its validity. Were this not so, the next higher category would have no real content, since it appears as the completer realization of the lower. Accordingly, to cite the well-known example, when we pass from the standpoint of science to that of philosophy, from essence to

the notion, freedom appears as 'the truth' of necessity, and yet as presupposing necessity. Again, when he discusses the necessary transition from mechanism to 'chemism,' and from 'chemism' to teleology, Hegel expressly states that the import of mechanism is universal, and not to be confined to the physical realm. In a word, to use the current formula, the contrast between the categories is one of 'degrees of reality,' of the more with the less complete, or adequate, statement. And it is in precisely the same spirit that the party of idealists to which I have referred would lay stress on the incomplete nature of scientific description, and yet hold that a correction of this is possible without destroying the first data. But there is now opposed to them a growing school which would refuse to admit that the scientific account of things is 'true as far as it goes,' and would insist that its inadequacy is not merely due to incompleteness or one-sidedness, but to a systematic intention to deal with reality only in a very indirect and artificial way, and for a very special purpose.

But, in spite of the large range of possible and actual variance in this matter, most idealists are united in rejecting any contrast of scientific thought with an immediate experience of any kind. This separates them clearly from voluntarists, pragmatists, and sensationalists alike. In so far, therefore, as the common position that the sciences do not give us reality in its concrete fulness is admitted, a criticism of the contrast with 'immediate experience' would seem to be an indirect apology for the more usual idealistic view.

In the case of the voluntarism of Professor Münsterberg, we have an elaborate exposition of a theory of immediate experience for which knowledge is a means to an end. This theory is quite familiar, and it will be sufficient to recall that according to it the immediately real world is one of volition. In it subjects and objects do not exist; they are valid, the subjects as wills and as attitudes, the objects as ends and means. The existential world is a product of the real wills, devised for the realization of certain of their purposes. Truth is thus a secondary product of

reality, and knowledge is true, according as it meets the special purposes for which it is constructed.¹

If, however, knowledge is such a special creation, the question arises: How are its results available for the real life in the service of which it is produced? Knowledge and the results of knowledge are unreal and abstract. Yet knowledge arises within concretely real experience, as a function of that experience. The results of its analysis must then in some way enlarge that experience, and guide its activities. Yet the objects of this analysis are unreal. How, then, can its results become part of the immediate reality?

There seem to be only two brief passages in which Professor Münsterberg deals directly with this difficulty. They occur in the *Grundzüge der Psychologie*.

In the first we are warned that we must not think that analysis adds anything to our knowledge of that immediately given reality — abstracted, of course, from its context — with which it begins. What it really does is to *create new realities*. This statement must mean, according to Professor Münsterberg's use of the term *reality*, that such products of analysis become objects — ends and means, that is, — in immediate experience.²

The second passage begins with the statement that the analysis and abstraction necessary in science do not destroy the unity of experience itself. It then continues as follows: "The fact that a certain chemical produces certain effects upon the organism may be discoverable only by scientific research, and remain unknown to most men. As soon as I know it, however, the expected effect is an object which unites itself with the perceived object, so that my action deals with both as one. . . . The original unity of experience is not shattered, therefore, when the conceptual analyses of the objective sciences begin. This [process] is only a deepening and enriching of experience. . . . Our concepts and judgments are unitary factors of experience, which are inseparable from the perceptions of immediate experience and surround

¹ Cf. *Grundzüge d. Psych.*, pp. 23 ff., 45 ff. *Psychology and Life*, pp. 23, 31, 97 ff., 198-199, etc.

² *Grundzüge*, pp. 57-58.

them with a halo of interpretations and expectations, with logical overtones only to be perceived in isolation by the use of concept-resonators. The reality thought in concept is no longer pure experience; but the reality of the educated man, filled with such concepts, is just as much pure experience as the conceptless existence of the unlettered.”¹

The meaning of these passages appears to be this: The objects of science are, it is true, unreal and abstract, secondary. But its judgments and its concepts are parts of immediate reality. A judgment, so Professor Münsterberg frequently insists, is really a will-attitude. However unreal the world of science is, therefore, the *conclusions* of the scientists are always included in immediate volitional experience. They neither augment nor diminish the reality of the originally given; for all we can say of the immediately real is, that it is so, and not otherwise. To admit the possibility of its modification by reinterpretation would be to deny its immediate reality. But what these conclusions do is to *amplify* immediate experience, to “deepen and enrich” it. We have more of it. The original objects, in themselves the same, are now surrounded by “conceptual halos,” “logical overtones.” And as this amplification is at the same time a change in our “expectations,” it will involve a corresponding change in volitional attitude towards the objects.

In thus refusing to admit that there is any room for reinterpretation or for increasing organization in an *immediate* experience properly so-called, Professor Münsterberg shows a just sense of the implications of such a theory. His insistence on the primacy and immediacy of volition enables him the more readily to evade such an admission. Nevertheless, the evasion seems to be largely verbal. As far as results go, there would seem to be no difference between his ‘amplified’ experience, and the reinterpreted or more closely organized experience of the idealistic logician. The modification, whether of volition or judgment, which has taken place, cannot be described in terms of merely more or less.

Professor Münsterberg prefers to regard the judgment as a volitional attitude. From one point of view, it is rightly so

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.

regarded. But it is also something more. A judgment not merely states an attitude towards, or a demand upon, reality. It also describes, more or less explicitly, the structure of reality, in reference to which only the attitude or the demand has any meaning. No dividing line can be drawn in actual experience between cognition and volition ; the two are always interpenetrating and modifying each other. More accurately, the process of experience is cognitive and volitional alike. That growing purification from the merely personal, particular, and empirical which development involves on the side of knowledge, is equally present on that of will. Our purposes as well as our ideas clear up and steady as rational life advances, and, precisely because the process is essentially the same, the law of progress is the same on both sides. It is always an advance from a relatively incoherent and unorganized state, whether of volitions or of knowledge, towards a relatively coherent system. Both sides of our life are equally involved in this change, and there is no more immediacy to be found in the one than in the other.

Let us enlarge on this a little by returning to the text which has just been cited. From the point of view of the idealistic logician, our judgments about reality, at first comparatively separate and independent, become as our knowledge advances more and more systematized and interwoven, so that they approach an ideal limit at which the logical nexus is complete. The voluntarist prefers to use terms of purpose and will. Let us for the moment concede this to him. But is it not equally true, when we examine the matter, that the change in volitional attitudes that accompanies the 'amplification' of immediate experience which Professor Münsterberg describes, is in the direction of an increasingly systematic organization of our volitions ? At first they stand side by side, comparatively unrelated. But the changes which take place as experience enlarges involve increasing correlation and adjustment. To take an example suggested by his own of the chemical element : In a relatively non-scientific stage of experience, I might desire to eat all things indiscriminately which were pleasant to the taste. At the same time, I would have a desire for life much stronger than that for pleasant tastes, though

normally it would not be prominent in consciousness. Enlarged experience might teach me the conflict of these two desires. The result, then, of its increasing range, and of the accompanying changes in volition, would be a closer organization of these two volitions. The desire for pleasant tastes would be brought into conscious subordination to the desire for life, and whatever in it conflicted with the more inclusive desire would be eradicated. Similar examples might be multiplied. They are most striking, of course, in the history of the adjustment of the 'selfish' to the 'altruistic' desires in the social life of mankind. As experience develops, the primitive volitions do not remain the same, any more than do the primitive judgments. What takes place is not a mere addition to them of other volitions, equally 'immediate,' but a profound modification of both new and old. And this modification is a constant process of mediation and organization. Nowhere in it can we find any absolute immediacy, or any contrast in this respect with cognition. Indeed, the growing organization which I have described is really the same on both sides, and usually we can express it at our option in terms of either.

The voluntarists can hardly look for an abler expositor than Professor Münsterberg. Since his argument fails at this most important point, it seems fair to assert that the notion of an *immediate* experience is equally untenable, whether one prefers the intellectualistic or the voluntaristic emphasis. Its adherents are equally unable, in either case, to state what they mean by it without really abandoning the notion. It is true enough that experience has at all times an immediate aspect; but this immediacy is merely relative. Experience is a process, one throughout, no portion of which can be contrasted as absolutely immediate or concrete with another as mediate or indirect. What we really find is a difference in degree of concreteness or organization, and the later stage is always the product of mediation. Therefore we can say that immediacy in any valuable sense is always the result of preceding mediation. If the ethical ideals and volitions of the civilized man differ from those of the savage, both in adequacy and clearness, this difference is the result of a long history of the adjustment and organization of competing impulses

and desires. But those ideals may be said to be more 'immediate' than those of the savage, inasmuch as they are far more definite and individual. Again, the sense-experience from which the scientific experimenter takes his data is certainly quite as 'immediate' to him as that of the untrained observer is to him. But it is more valuable for his purposes, because it has been more completely organized; which is what we mean when we say that he chooses the 'significant' facts, and brings them to bear on one another. Both in volition and cognition, then, immediacy is a purely relative thing, and the more mediation underlies it the more useful it is.

Now this criticism seems to apply to the pragmatist as well, provided he would carry through his teaching to a consistent conclusion. He also, like the voluntarist, holds to an immediate experience, in the course of which thought appears when it is needed to solve a problem, or when it is useful. "Thinking," he tells us, "is adaptation to an end through the adjustment of particular objective contents."¹

How are we to understand such statements as these? The question at once arises: What is it that sets this end? Is it, on the whole, one which is determined by the nature of the thought-process itself, and internal to it? Can we assume that this is what is meant when the problem is stated as "the restoration of a deliberately integrated experience from the inherent conflict into which it has fallen"?² If this were the meaning of the pragmatist, the statement would be quite true, but not very new, save for the terms employed. Every step in the dialectic of Hegel's *Logik* might be defined as the exposition of such an "inherent conflict" and of the "deliberate integration" which it necessitates. That thought is a purposive activity, striving toward the realization of an end immanent in itself, and nowhere finding anything entirely foreign to itself in this striving, is the historical teaching of idealism. In so far, therefore, as the pragmatist insists from this point of view upon the functional unity of experience, the idealist sees in him an ally rather than an oppo-

¹ Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*, p. 81.

² *Ibid.*, p. 47.

ment, as has recently been emphasized in the pages of this REVIEW by Professor Creighton.¹

But, on the other hand, in so far as the end or purpose of thought is taken by the pragmatist to be external to thought, and presented to it as a datum from an immediate experience of some kind, there would seem to be only two courses open to him. If he chooses to remain an epistemologist, he must describe this immediate experience which sets the ends for thought. Sense, feeling, will are the terms at his command for this description; but of these he must make especial use of the last, since he has to account for purposes and ends. In a word, pragmatism, in completing itself as an epistemology, must pass over into voluntarism.² In so doing, it is equally open to criticism; the unity of will and thought must be admitted—I have already dwelt upon it—but that “it all comes to immediate experience,”³ in any sense of immediate other than that already conceded, cannot be granted. Will and thought are equally immediate; but they are also equally mediate. If will sets ends for thought, it is also equally true that thought sets ends for will. In neither case does this ‘end-setting’ come from without, since both are aspects of the same process. The argument need not be repeated. It is enough to say that to the present writer the theory of the pragmatist seems to break down at the same point as that of the voluntarist, that is, at the transition from the supposed immediate experience to the ‘dependent’ and ‘secondary’ process of thought.

Unfortunately, there seems also to be a tendency either to ignore this problem of immediate experience altogether, or else to evade it by appealing to biology. In the latter case, the ends of thought are described as set for it by the nature of the ‘struggle for life,’ and reason is regarded as a tool which has ‘survival value.’ It is unnecessary to point out that such a theory really throws epistemology aside, and takes refuge in an uncrit-

¹ Vol. XV, p. 483.

² Professor James illustrates this; but I would refer especially in this connection to the recent address of Professor Dewey, “Beliefs and Realities.” See this REVIEW, Vol. XV, pp. 113 ff., esp. p. 124.

³ *Loc. cit.*

ical realism. As metaphysics, biological pragmatism is no more respectable than any other form of naturalism.

No detailed criticism of the sensationalism of Mach and Pearson can be given here. The reputation of both is based upon achievements in other fields than that of epistemology, and it is quite safe to assume that this point of view is not seriously held by philosophical scholars at present. As an epistemological theory, it is thoroughly uncritical, and begs questions on all sides. Pearson explains both the particular perception, and the adaptation of conception to perception, by natural selection.¹ Both Pearson and Mach either take the organization always found in the data of knowledge, at however early a stage, for granted, or else explain it by a crude associationism,² the laws of which are again determined by survival value. In neither case, of course, are we given any adequate account of the immediate experience for the service of which thought is supposed to exist.

We return, accordingly, to idealism. I said in beginning that a rejection of the three theories involving some form of immediate experience would be after a fashion an indirect proof of the more usual idealistic theory, as that was the only important school of epistemology not holding such a view of experience which maintained the abstractness of science—and this abstractness we took as an admitted truth. But it should be noted also, that the acceptance of idealism sets a limit to the degree to which we can assert this abstractness. Scientific thought is for the idealist a part of the thought-experience as a whole, within which there are wide differences of concreteness, but no contrast of the merely abstract with the fully concrete. Nevertheless, as has already been noticed, very wide differences of opinion are possible among idealists as to the extent to which the results of science are available for the use of a constructive metaphysics. It may be well, in conclusion, to contrast briefly the radical view in this matter with the conservative. The radical would urge, as we have seen, that science is admittedly better science, the more abstract it becomes. It does not pretend, when it knows its own

¹ *Grammar of Science*, 2d ed., pp. 102 ff.

² Cf. Mach, *Analysis of the Sensations*, Engl. transl., pp. 20–21, etc., and Pearson, *op. cit.*, pp. 40, etc.

business, to describe reality as it is, but aims rather at a conceptual summary which is an artificial means devised for very special purposes of control within a carefully limited field. It may well be, therefore, that only the knowledge of the general methods and norms of thought gained in the work of the several sciences can be used in our final account of reality, while their special objective results must be rejected, as of no validity, except for the particular purposes of the science which states them.

Now there are many things to be said in favor of such a view. It is true, in the first place, that every science is a special construction. It commences by isolating a certain group of phenomena as its subject-matter. Thus physics deals with the phenomena of motion, and psychology may explicitly put on one side the problem of mind to deal with mental processes as phenomena. In considering such isolated phenomena, science assumes certain definitions as its necessary points of departure; and, as in the case of theoretical mechanics, these definitions are often highly artificial and not based on any definite actual experience. Once at work, it often employs hypotheses and conceptions which are admittedly of only methodological and instrumental validity, useful to organize and control its data for the time being. Such, for instance, is the more usual view taken by psychologists of the parallelistic hypothesis, or by physicists of the conception of a primordial ether. As a result of all these restrictions, the results of science are valid only 'under the rules of the game'; that is to say, as in the case of geometry, only when the particular conventions essential to its method and subject-matter are presupposed. And this view of the question seems to be borne out by the history of the sciences. The more sophisticated and aware of their proper task they become, the more they divorce themselves from metaphysics, and give up any claim to get beyond the phenomenal. So that at present many among scientists themselves regard their science as 'merely descriptive,' as having only economic validity in summing up observed phenomenal sequences.

But this view of the sciences has other reasons for its preva-

lence than the strictly logical and historical. It is attractive to many because it seems to offer a royal road, so to say, to the metaphysician. It would seem to absolve him from finding a place for mechanism in his final account of the universe. He is not obliged to make causal determination universal, and then laboriously arrive at a freedom for which this mechanism is but a universal means of expression and realization. Thus he can avoid the difficulties which many feel in accepting such strict Neo-Hegelian views as, for example, those of Edward Caird. That such a view is oppressive to many minds is certain; Professor James, for example, has voiced his discontent at a freedom which is everywhere and nowhere. Undoubtedly this consideration has been one of the sources of the popularity of the radical view, particularly as set forth by the adherents of voluntarism.

Nevertheless, there are some weighty arguments for the conservative view, which I can here only briefly touch upon. We must admit, in the first place, that science does claim to be in some sense an adequate description of the facts. However much a construction it may be, it is not an *arbitrary* construction. In so far, therefore, as it is based on the laws of experience in general, its results must be considered in any attempt to give a final account of that experience and its meaning. Of so much we may be sure, though this does not exclude a very radical transformation of those results in that final account. It is but stating this in another form to urge that, however hypothetical the judgments of science may be, they necessarily have a categorical basis of some kind. More concretely, science is true, even as construction, because it constructs *within* a reality of given, definite nature. It solves its problems because the conditions are definite, and it meets them. Every valid solution is, therefore, implicitly a statement of the nature of those conditions, and, as such, material for the metaphysician.

It must also be urged that no absolute separation between scientific and other experience is possible. The sense of reality is the same in both, however it may vary in degree, and there is a constant interplay between our scientific knowledge and our attitude towards reality in general. The one is profoundly affected by the

other. The classic instance of this is the effect of the transition from the Ptolemaic to the Copernican astronomy ; but it is sufficiently apparent in less striking cases. We do not carry our scientific judgments about with us quite separately from our attitude towards 'concrete reality' or 'living experience.' Science and the rest of life do not merely coexist, but make one whole of experience. The passages from Professor Münsterberg which I have just been discussing admit this interplay fully, and all of the criticism thus far advanced is an argument for it. But if the results of science have this vital significance in our experience, they cannot be excluded from the data of the metaphysician.

It seems, then, that Hegel has set forth the most profitable way of approaching this problem. The sciences are not superseded or rejected by metaphysics. On their own level, they retain their relative truth as accounts of reality. As steps in the movement of thought — concrete thought, which is both knowledge and will — towards its goal, they find the correction of their abstractness and incompleteness in that more adequate standpoint which it is the duty of philosophy to at least attempt to describe. In so far, therefore, as the advance of the belief that the sciences are abstract, among both scientists and epistemologists, means a clearer perception of their tasks on both sides, it is a welcome sign of the times. But if the attempt is made to open the way for metaphysics to entirely disregard the results of science, it can only end in the impoverishment of the former. We have a curious paradox, if 'humanism' seeks to exclude from the data of the philosopher a large part of the historically human in experience, and to make a gap between science and morals, between life and knowledge.

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DISCUSSION.

OBJECTIVE IDEALISM AND REVISED EMPIRICISM.

THERE appeared in this REVIEW for September a very able and suggestive article from Professor Dewey, on "Experience and Objective Idealism." I propose to discuss three points in this article: (1) Professor Dewey's criticism of objective idealism; (2) the revised empiricism which Professor Dewey puts in place of this idealism; (3) the significance of this revised empiricism for one's *Weltanschauung*, particularly for one's ethical and religious ideals and faiths.

To begin with Professor Dewey's criticism of objective idealism. It is in substance the following: Objective idealism is involved in contradictions in its explanation of experience. "Idealism is condemned to move back and forth between two inconsistent interpretations of this *a priori* thought. It is taken to mean both the organized, the regulated, the informed, established character of experience, an order immanent and constitutional; and that which organizes, regulates, forms, synthesizes, a power transcendent and noumenal." "The first sense, if validated, would leave us at most an empirical fact, whose importance would make it none the less empirical. The second sense, by itself, would be so thoroughly transcendental, that while it would exalt 'thought' in theory, it would deprive the categories of that constitutional position *within* experience, which is the exact point of Kant's supposed answer to Hume." ¹

Objective idealism, therefore, gives no explanation of experience. It is unable to do so, because, in one of its meanings of *a priori* thought, that thought reduces to an empirical function; while the other meaning of the *a priori* makes thought incapable of coming into any intelligible relation to experience. In particular does Kant's doctrine fall into a fatal fallacy, because of the contradictory meanings of *a priori* in his epistemology. This *a priori* worth of thought is taken in the sense of regulation, direction, controlling, *i. e.*, of consciously and intentionally making experience different; and this *a priori* is again taken as something which is already immanent in any experience, and, accordingly, it makes no determinate difference to *this* experience as discriminated from that. ² But not only is ideal-

¹ Pp. 469 f.

² P. 470.

ism self-contradictory in its meaning of *a priori* thought ; it is contradicted by the character of our experience. Error, inefficiency, and the need of revision and correction characterize our experience ; and the practical work of revising and correcting experience is not done by the idealist's *a priori* thought. "As a special favor, will not the objective idealist show how, in some one single instance, his immanent 'reason' makes any difference as respects the detection and elimination of error, or gives even the slightest assistance in discovering and validating the truly worthful." ¹ Were objective idealism true, the character of our experience as needing correction and revision would be inexplicable.

But objective idealism is untenable for another reason. It affords no explanation of ideality ; nay, it is even incompatible with the true meaning and serviceableness of human ideals. "Spirituality, ideality, meaning as purpose, would be the last things to present themselves if objective idealism were true. Values cannot be both ideal and given." ² Ideality as the good, the beautiful, not only does not need the presence of some immanent reason ; these are even incompatible with this transcendental origin.

I shall now examine this criticism of objective idealism ; and first, the alleged contradictory meanings of *a priori* thought. I confess I cannot find any such contradictions as Professor Dewey lays to the charge of idealism. Between experience as simply possessing an immanent, constitutional order, and that *a priori* thought which is supposed to effect this constitution of experience, I can see no contradiction whatever. Idealism teaches that this constitution of experience, its order, the systematic connection of its parts, etc., is explicable only if there be some principle of connection and order which is other than merely empirical content, but which, working within experience, moulds and determines these structural features which experience presents. I am also quite unable to find that "fatal fallacy," from which Professor Dewey says "Kant never emerges." I do not think Kant ever got into such a fallacy. I do not think Kant's doctrine vibrates between two discrepant meanings or uses of *a priori* thought. It seems to me that his point of view when he is speaking of the revolution which the *Critique* has effected in philosophy, and his point of view when he is meeting Hume's sceptical solution of the problem of causal connection, are the same. Kant met Hume's doctrine of causation by showing that the experience from which Hume professed to derive

¹ P. 474.

² P. 480.

the idea of causal connection, is itself possible, intelligible, only if the causal principle is presupposed.

Now this same meeting of the *a priori* underlies what Kant says about the revolution which he had effected in philosophy, or rather in epistemology. This profound change consisted, as the student of the Critical Philosophy knows, in reversing what had been regarded to be the relation of mind and object in knowledge. So long as determination was on the side of the object, and dependence on the side of the mind, the solution of the problem of knowledge was impossible. But if mind determines by its own nature the condition under which there can be objects *for* mind, then the question, How is knowledge of matters of fact possible? can be answered. Kant, as every student of philosophy knows, formulated the problem of scientific knowledge in the question: How are objects of experience possible? And his answer to this question consisted in showing, that such objects can exist for us, only if there are *a priori* conditions of possible experience within which all objects exist. I do not think Kant ever departs from this meaning of the *a priori* nature of thought. Kant's *a priori* principles present two aspects, according as we look at them at work in the making of knowledge, in weaving the web of objective experience, and again as logically prior conditions of possible experience. It is the oversight of this distinction that leads Professor Dewey to say that Kant has two contradictory meanings of *a priori* thought. Thus, in the case of the triangle, Professor Dewey says: "The concept of a triangle taken geometrically . . . means a determinate method for construing space elements; but it also means something which exists in the mind *prior* to all such geometrical constructions and unconsciously lays down the law not only for their conscious elaboration, but also for any space perception."¹ Professor Dewey finds the first meaning intelligible and accepts it, but finds in it only a "contribution to a revised empiricism." The second meaning is to him, however, a "dark saying." Now, Kant would say that this determinate method of construing space elements is an instance of the actual working of the *a priori* principles, the actual creation of an object of experience; while if, in abstraction from this actual functioning, we look at the *a priori* as a constituent factor in a possible knowledge, we shall say that this factor is prior (logically not temporally) to the existence of this triangle as an object of experience, or as purely geometrical object. It is this logical constitution, not the psychological origin of knowledge, that Kant has in mind. To say with Kant that something is in the

¹ Pp. 470 f.

mind prior to the existence of a known object, is not, it seems to me, to utter "a dark saying." My conclusion upon this point in Professor Dewey's criticism is, that he has not made out a contradiction in the meanings of *a priori* thought on the part of the objective idealist.

But the idealist's *a priori* thought, if it is not virtually identical with empirical thought, must, because transcendental, be incapable of coming into any intelligible relation to experience; it can consequently have nothing to do with our actual knowledge. This is Professor Dewey's charge against objective idealism. But this criticism misses the mark, it seems to me, by pressing upon idealism extreme alternatives. Thought need not be transcendental in the sense Professor Dewey takes it, in order to be *a priori* in relation to experience. Because thought is other than a merely empirical process or content, it does not follow that it cannot come into relation with experience-data so as to be one of the two factors in the constitution of knowledge or objective experience. Thought and experience data can be distinguishable — nay, be different in their *esse* — without being separable in actuality. Nor *need* thought be superhuman; indeed, Kant's *a priori* thought is human *only*. Kant's *a priori* principles and his categories are not transcendental things in the sense which Professor Dewey's criticism contemplates; they are supra-empirical, but only in this meaning, that they are other than, and not derived from, sensation or sense-presentation experience. That there is a supra-empirical consciousness or functioning in this meaning of the term, is by no means an impossible supposition. Nor is there a serious difficulty in holding that these supra-empirical functions should so deal with the sensation or presentative data of experience, as to make experience objective in the Kantian meaning of experience, viz., the sum total of objects and their relations.

Professor Dewey's second objection to objective idealism is a more serious one; and it seems to put the idealist in a difficult position. If error abounds in our experience, and there is much in its constitution that demands correction and revision (this must be admitted), and if it is not *a priori* thought which, in a single instance, corrects error, or revises the inadequate, or remedies the inefficient; if, in short, the idealist's theory of *a priori* thought contradicts the actual character of our experience, his theory would seem to break down completely. The only reply which the idealist can make to this objection is the following: Were it the case that our *entire* experience stands in need of correction and revision, that fact would not disprove the existence of *a priori* thought. *A priori* thought is not bound to be infallible,

nor to do work that needs no correction or revision. The fact that something is *a priori* is no guarantee of its inerrancy or its supreme worth. But it is *not* the fact that our experience is through and through in need of correction and revision; that there are no features of it that need not be altered; on the contrary, there are, in the constitution of our experience, certain constructive and determining lines which need not, and will not suffer correction or change, unless experience is to become a chaos of *disjecta membra*. Our experience is to some extent unorganized: the necessary and the contingent, the unchanging and the ever changing, the static and the flux, error and truth, finite processes and infinite things as ideals, partial and fragmentary actuality, and the absolute, the completing whole, as an ideally conceived thing; the partly good, good in the making, the absolutely good, good as final achievement in our idealizing thought — such is the world of experience. Now it is the doctrine of idealism that *a priori* thought supplies those elements in the constitution of our experience that need not and suffer not correction or revision; and likewise this thought is the source of those ideas, those postulates, and those appreciations in virtue of which any complete and satisfying revision of our experience is possible.

But idealism is incompatible with ideality in our human world. This is Professor Dewey's third objection. "Values cannot be both ideal and given." And if idealism is true, these values *must* be given things; they are already achieved, they exist in a Platonic world, and consequently they are not our human creations, living and warm with the life and passion of human struggle and achievement. The ideal good, like the ideal true, can have meanings and relevancy, only if it be *our* ideal and *our* valuation. But may not *both* be true, viz., the absolutely good and beautiful and true, existing as a life, as Absolute Experience, and ideality in us as purpose, and depending upon our endeavors for the measure of actualization it attains in our finite experience? Why may not the ideal significance of our lives and our human valuations be our own, and at the same time be the temporal embodiment of the Eternal and All-Good, "in whom we live and move and have our being"?

Why should ideality and values cease to be ours, because we recognize in them a greater purpose than we can realize in our fragmentary and ever changing experience? Why should anything lose its value, because, in achieving and valuing it, His hidden meaning lies in our endeavors, and our value judgment is the response to an absolute worth? What we call "Divine purposes," if there are such things,

need not be "automatically injected" into our human world in order to be with us; nor need they "ride in a cosmic automobile to predestined ends." Why cannot our own purposes ride in the same "cosmic automobile," and be inseparable from the purposes that include and complete them? Professor Dewey will find it a hard task to maintain against objective idealism his proposition: "Spirituality, ideality, meaning as purpose, would be the last things to present themselves if objective idealism were true."

I come next to Professor Dewey's revised empiricism. I am not quite sure that I rightly understand this part of his article; but if I do understand his doctrine, it logically leads, either back to the older empirical explanation of knowledge, or forward to an idealistic epistemology not materially different from that of Kant, according as one interprets the terms in which this new doctrine is set forth.

If that which Professor Dewey calls "reflective thought" is anything more than Hume's associative memory; if its function consists in anything else than "harking back to former experience," I fail to see how it can be materially different from a *a priori* thought. If "empirical thought" means anything more than just experience processes, biological activities; if it is something which newly directs, changes, revises, and reshapes experience, — why does not this thought perform essentially the same function which the *a priori* thought of the idealist performs? To call thought a "biological activity," a "vital activity," etc., describes well enough the practical value and service of thought for life; but that does not tell us what thought *is* or how it is able to possess this value for the ends of life. I confess it is not easy for me to recognize the truth of Kant's geometric concept in the definition which makes it "the practical locomotor function of arranging stimuli in reference to the maintenance of life activities *brought into consciousness*, and then serving as a center of reorganization of such activities to freer, more varied flexible and valuable forms."¹ Professor Dewey would hardly maintain that the mere existence of these stimuli, so arranged as to maintain life activities, is any explanation of the knowledge of this fact; nor is the problem of knowledge, in respect to this fact, solved by saying that a practical locomotor function of this description is somehow brought into consciousness, etc.; the essential problem is only propounded, not solved, by such a definition as the one just quoted.

Again, when a concept is defined as "the practical activity doing consciously and artfully what it has aforetime done blindly and aimlessly"² and thereby doing it better, etc. we are impelled to

¹ P. 472.² *Ibid.*

ask: What does this consciousness add to what was done aforetime unconsciously and aimlessly? How does consciousness change or better the situation? Would not Hume's associative memory do all that Professor Dewey seems to make consciousness do? If *not*, what different function of thought is it which makes this change in experience? Once more, when thought as "a reorganization of biological functions" is said to do "naturally what Kantian forms and schematizations do supernaturally," we ask: What is the relation of thought to the biological functions, and how does it effect their reorganization? I think the answer to this epistemological question must be found either along the line of the older empiricism, or in the direction of that idealism which Professor Dewey rejects. To conclude my discussion of this second point, I do not think Professor Dewey can hold a *via media* between Humian empiricism and Kantian idealism as solutions of the problem of knowledge.

I pass to the third point of this discussion: the significance of Professor Dewey's revised empiricism for one's *Weltanschauung*. It is Professor Dewey's doctrine that all ideals and values are created and sustained by our human activities; and, consequently, that they have significance and relevancy only in our experience.

Now, it seems to me that the consequence which follows from this meaning of ideality and value judgments is, that the world of our human experience is the only universe we can legitimately acknowledge; certainly the only reality to which we can sustain intelligible relations. The Infinite, the Eternal, the Absolute, the All-good — *these* are names empty of all real meaning, idle fancies for minds that will dream or idly speculate instead of seeking to know and to make better the only real world there is, the world of experience. This world permits no reference to a superhuman reality. We are thus left with reality that is fragmentary only, with experience that is made up of flying, ever changing moments, with thought that never wins final truth, with temporal processes, and no eternal to justify and give them meaning; with finite progress and no goal finally won; with a better and no best as the ultimate standard of value judgments. For the satisfaction of ethical and religious ideals and aspirations, we must look to our possibly better selves. Our idealized selves are our gods; and the cry after the Divine, the Eternal, the Complete in knowledge and in goodness, must be satisfied with that fragment of truth and goodness which is all that our finite lives can possess in their best estate. Such, I am compelled to conclude, is the metaphysical import of this new empiricism.

JOHN E. RUSSELL.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Science and Hypothesis. By H. POINCARÉ. Translated by G. B. HALSTED, with an introduction by JOSIAH ROYCE. New York, The Science Press, 1905. — pp. xxxi, 196.

In an essay of this kind, attempting to bridge the gap between two realms of thought, one source of weakness is almost inevitable — the difficulty of acquiring independent competence in widely divergent lines of research. In this respect M. Poincaré is most fortunate, being (as Professor Royce says) “as geometer, as analyst, and as a theoretical physicist, a leader of his age,” and “a great special investigator who is also a philosopher.” Certain defects in his equipment are, however, quite prominent. In the first place, he lacks psychological training. I do not mean that he is ignorant of the elementary facts of psychology; for that is not the case. But of what psychological investigation means — how its results are established, in what their accuracy consists — he appears to have very little inkling. Thus we find him speaking (in connection with mathematical induction) of “the power of the mind, which knows itself capable of conceiving the indefinite repetition of the same act when once this act is possible. *The mind has a direct intuition of this power*” (p. 13; italics mine). What species of hypothesis is this?

In the second place, M. Poincaré is handicapped by the lack of a general logical theory upon which to base his special logical investigations. Thus, for example, he has no general theory of induction: “I shall not have the presumption to discuss this question after so many philosophers have vainly striven to solve it” (p. 94).

In the third place — but perhaps to some readers this will appear to be an advantage — our author has no general theory of knowledge; and he passes by the most obvious epistemological considerations without so much as a nod of recognition. At times we are led to expect more, and our disappointment is proportionately great. Certain geometrical and mechanical principles are found to be, not true indeed, but maximally convenient (pp. 39, 98); and we pass on to other matters without once recalling that for an important school of thinkers truth is no more than economy of experience. In a very brilliant section on the “Meaning of Physical Theories,” M. Poincaré declares that real objects are unknowable; “nature will eternally hide from us. The true relations between these real objects are the only

reality we can attain to, and the only condition is that the same relations exist between these objects as between the images by which we are forced to replace them. . . . To those who find we restrict too much the domain accessible to the scientist, I answer: These questions which we interdict to you and which you regret, are not only insoluble, they are illusory and have no meaning" (pp. 114, 116). Yet the distinction here assumed between the nature of objects and the relations between them, and the conception of identical relations subsisting between radically different terms (objects and images) raise not a moment's suspicion — despite the fact that in the historical discussion which follows the distinction shrinks to a mere recognition of relevant and irrelevant elements in hypotheses (pp. 116, 117).

In a word, the whole machinery of M. Poincaré's mind is essentially mathematical. His mode of investigation — the problems which appeal to him, the analysis to which these are subjected, the ideals of demonstrative cogency which govern the whole process — is simply that of the modern logic of mathematics, such as the phenomena of a multiplicity of algebras and geometries have called into existence. The bridge between mathematics and epistemology is almost wholly from the former side of the gap.

As the title of the work indicates, the subject of the present investigation is the place and function of hypotheses in science. The net outcome is somewhat as follows:

There exist two very sharply distinguished classes of hypotheses.¹ The one class consists of certain of the fundamental principles of the mathematical sciences; the other embraces the gradually developing results of the experimental sciences. The former are really *disguised definitions*, framed by the human mind with perfect freedom, according to its greatest convenience; like other such definitions they are purely *conventional*, and hence neither true nor false; though arising out of experience, they can be neither verified nor refuted by experience. The latter are veritable inductions, through which anticipations of experience are made possible; they spring from a tendency of the mind to seek simplicity beneath apparent complexity — a tendency for which no sufficient logical justification can be given, but without which science would be impossible.

At the outset, a certain misinterpretation — which Professor Royce apparently commits in his otherwise excellent introduction — is not

¹ A third class, of which a very interesting account is given (*cf.* pp. 2, 109), but which we cannot here consider, consists of hypotheses made to facilitate calculations whose results they do not affect.

unnatural ; namely, that the theory of conventional hypotheses is to be conceived as a substitute for the Kantian theory of the *a priori*. But our author clearly does not so conceive it. On the contrary, the latter theory is held by him in firm conjunction with the former, and his first chapter is devoted to a demonstration of its indispensability. In the course of the work, two examples of *a priori* principles are given: the formula of demonstration by 'mathematical induction' (p. 13), and the 'group'-concept (p. 53). It is the former of these that is considered in the opening chapter, and the arguments employed are worth noting for the light which they throw on the author's conception of the relation between analysis and synthesis in thought.

The formula of mathematical induction is as follows: Suppose, first (major premise), that if a certain theorem is true of any positive integer x , it will then be true of $x + 1$; and suppose, secondly (minor premise), that this theorem is actually true of 1; then (conclusion) it will be true of all positive integers. M. Poincaré is to prove that this is a synthetic judgment *a priori*. Its *a priori* character he infers from the combined facts of its absolute universality and obvious independence of convention. The main point of the argument lies, therefore, in showing that it is truly synthetic, *i. e.*, not reducible to an identity; or, in other words, that demonstration by mathematical induction is not reducible to syllogistic form. To prove this, M. Poincaré shows that the demonstration may be expressed in the form of an infinite series of syllogisms (p. 11), and concludes (p. 12) that the syllogism is therefore inadequate to express its true nature. He fails to perceive that the major premise — quite apart from the minor — may be transformed to read: If a theorem is true of x , it is true of every integer greater than x ; when, if the minor premise be added — It is true of 1 — it follows in true syllogistic fashion that, it is true of every integer greater than 1. As for the transformation of the major premise, that may easily be justified as follows: If there be any integers greater than x of which the theorem is untrue, let y be the least of these; then the theorem is true of $y - 1$ and untrue of $(y - 1) + 1$, which is impossible; hence, if the theorem is true of x , it is true of all greater integers. The formula of mathematical induction is thus neither more synthetical nor less analytical than the concept of the number-system upon which it is based.

We pass on to the more interesting questions pertaining to the first class of hypotheses. The examples considered are: (1) The conception of a continuous number-system, (2) the geometric axioms,

and (3) the principles of the classic mechanisms and of the more recent energetics. The case of continuous number need not long detain us. M. Poincaré shows in the usual fashion that this conception implies the intercalation of new elements (fractions and surds) between the elements of the system of whole numbers; and, furthermore, that these intercalated terms are mere symbols, having no meaning apart from the processes which gave rise to them and the relations in which they consequently stand. "The mind has the faculty of creating symbols, and it is thus that it has constructed the mathematical continuum, which is only a particular system of symbols" (p. 23). He does not consider the possibility that the positive integers are neither more nor less symbolical—equally destitute of meaning apart from their origin (the counting-process) and their consequent mutual relations. Measurement, he tells us, requires "the aid of a new and special convention" (p. 24). Should we not rather say that measurement of some sort is essential to the counting-process itself; and that equality of units means simply their mutual replaceability for the purposes in question? The word 'convention,' as it is here employed, means so much and so little as to call for incessant re-explanation.

The treatment of the geometric axioms is to my mind the most valuable and suggestive part of the work. That its conclusions are not entirely satisfactory is mainly due to the author's fluctuating and half-hearted adherence to the doctrine of the relativity of space and of motion. As a philosopher, he feels compelled to adhere to it; but, as a geometer, the contrary doctrine would be very convenient to him (p. 89). Like Mr. B. Russell, he takes Newton's argument for absolute motion (the polar flattening of an isolated rotating sphere) quite seriously; but instead of capitulating wholly, as the English logician feels constrained to do, he finds that "all possible solutions are equally repugnant," and hence proceeds to the conclusion that the affirmation or denial of the rotation would be equally true, but that the former hypothesis would be more convenient as permitting a simpler expression of mechanical laws. Acceptable as this conclusion is, we wonder that he does not remark that the rectilinear components of the motion of each particle of the sphere would be entirely real in the most relative of spaces—even though the axes of reference should rotate with the sphere itself. The suppositious motion is thus resolvable into a complex of real and observable strains; it is these that would explain the polar flattening, *just as they would likewise explain it if the body were surrounded by all the hosts of heaven*; and the meaning

of the rotation, if it were asserted, would consist precisely in the reference to these real phenomena, analogous to the phenomena attending the rotation of smaller bodies upon the surface of the sphere. Where, then, would be the advantage, whether for physicist or geometer, in a theory of absolute space?

But M. Poincaré's position is more precarious than I have yet indicated. Though all motion be relative, he believes in a certain absoluteness of space itself. It is for him a real individual entity, thoroughly separate and distinct from physical objects — "objects, which," as he says, "have nothing in common with those geometry studies" (p. 99). It is on this ground that he declares: "Experiments only teach us the relations of bodies to one another; none of them bears or can bear on the relations of bodies with space, or on the mutual relations of different parts of space" (p. 60); and that is why, after all his precautions, such expressions as the "absolute orientation of the universe in space" and the "rapidity with which this orientation varies" retain such an attraction for him, even though he must add that "this orientation does not exist" (p. 89).

Over against the space of geometry, our author recognizes a 'perceptual space' with a three-fold form, visual, tactual, and motor. We have not leisure to examine the curiously dogmatic sensationalism upon which this notion of perceptual space is here founded. Suffice it to mention, as a specimen of the argument, that visual space is bi-dimensional because the retinal image is projected upon a surface (p. 41). Our concern is with geometrical space.

This space, we are told, belongs to no one of our representations individually, but is suggested to us by studying the laws according to which these representations succeed each other. These laws refer directly to the displacements of solid bodies; why indirectly they should characterize a further entity to be called 'space' we are not clearly informed. It is remarkable that these laws of displacements may in part be summarized by the statement that displacements form a 'group' — the general group-concept being one of the *a priori* forms of our understanding. (Of this latter proposition no proof is anywhere attempted.) However, a multiplicity of conceivable groups are each capable of satisfying the requirements. Thus, not only the Euclidean, but various forms of non-Euclidean geometry, afford a quite sufficient basis for the correlation of all possible displacements; and from the point of view of strict truth no one of these has any advantage over the others. The sole preëminence of the Euclidean geometry lies in

its greater simplicity and consequently greater convenience.¹ Systems of displacements are quite conceivable — mechanics can even make models of them — which would be more conveniently described in non-Euclidean terms; though, again, these could be perfectly, if somewhat cumbrously, described after the Euclidean fashion.

There is so much penetrating sagacity in these observations, that the element of falsity stands out with glaring distinctness. It is the superstition of absolute space. M. Poincaré does not realize that the hypothesis of (let us say) a Lobachevskian space and the compensating mechanical hypothesis which would then be necessary would simply cancel each other. It is as if one should say: Everything in the world is growing larger, and the acceleration which a given force produces in a given mass in a given time is increasing too. When one has said that, one has said nothing; it is a meaningless tautology: a is a . Now the Euclidean geometry, with its corresponding mechanics, is simply science stripped as far as possible of such tautologies. The important truth which M. Poincaré has thrown into striking relief is that geometrical and mechanical truths are correlative and mutually complementary; and this he can only express by saying that “experiments have a bearing, not on space, but on bodies!”

Thus, read in their proper connection, the Euclidean axioms are *not* mere conventional definitions, lacking truth or falsity. Comprehended as part of a larger system of relations, they represent a significant analysis of a certain aspect of experience. It is perhaps beyond the province of the reviewer to question whether truth is ever more than this. No doubt, if the ray of light, moving in an apparently homogeneous medium and the path of the apparently freely moving projectile returned upon themselves within the limits of our observation; and if an apparently taut and inelastic cord of a certain length could move freely, though its extremities were fixed — no doubt in such a case a more complex analysis would be necessary; but, in the absence of any such motive, the greater complexity would be so much sheer tautology.

We are now able to pass over very briefly our author's account of conventional hypotheses in mechanics. It is but his way of stating the truth, that force, mass, and density — yes, and space and time as well — are correlative terms without meaning apart from their mutual

¹ One slip occurring in the discussion of the non-Euclidean geometries is worth mentioning. “Many defective definitions [of the straight line] have been given, but the true one is that which is implied in all the demonstrations where the straight line enters.” And the author proceeds to define it as an *axis of rotation*! But has the straight line no significance in Flat-land?

relations. They represent an analysis of the phenomena of moving bodies — no doubt the simplest analysis possible. This simplicity, with the attendant convenience, is all the virtue that M. Poincaré finds in them as over against an infinite number of possible analyses. But here again we must be cautious. The principles of mechanics are indeed meaningless each without the others. But together they comprehend an induction of the highest significance, which can only be obscured, not obliterated, by the tautologies which an unnecessarily complex analysis would impose upon them.

A further logical confusion runs through this part of the discussion, and especially through the chapter on energetics. The principles of mechanics are said to possess two aspects: first, as “truths founded on experiment and approximately verified so far as concerns isolated systems”; and secondly, as “postulates applicable to the totality of the universe and regarded as rigorously true” (p. 98). But why this reference to the universe? And is any such distinction between inductions and postulates really called for? To be sure, the principles relate always to simple cases, that is, to isolated systems, and experiment knows no such. But surely the conception of the *limit* is entirely adequate to express all this; the ideal cases referred to by the principles are simply limiting instances. Now, though the mathematician sometimes for special purposes speaks of the infinite as a limit, he knows that it is really a very poor example — because it cannot be approached. So, unless we are wantonly to assume the universe to be finite, there is very little profit in referring mechanical principles to it. No, here as elsewhere it is as an instrument of *analysis* that the conception of limits is helpful. The phenomenon is a complex, of which our mechanics demands the analysis. Shall we say, into elements? Yes, if it be understood that the element is a category which simply expresses the restricted compass of present knowledge. Of absolute elements science knows nothing and has no need — any more than it has of a finite universe.

We must deal even more briefly with Part IV, treating of hypotheses of the second class — that is to say, inductive generalizations. We have space only for a word upon two important points. Induction, it is declared, rests upon a faith in the simplicity of natural law — “ordinarily every law is held to be simple, till the contrary is proved;” and yet in the history of science we find not only simplicity appearing behind apparent complexity, but sometimes also extreme complexity lurking behind apparent simplicity. How, then, is the faith in simplicity to be justified? And yet science cannot subsist without

it. I cannot see any real difficulty here. Our faith in simplicity, so far as science depends on it, is by no means a belief that the simple is as such more probable than the complex; we should in general even incline to the contrary opinion. Our faith merely declares that an unmotivated complexity is dangerous; or, more explicitly, that, other things being equal, the errors arising from a simple hypothesis will probably be less than those arising from a complex one; for even should the truth itself be exceedingly complex, the simple hypothesis is likely to be closer to it than the more complex one. But this is not paradox; it is common sense.

A chapter upon the "Calculus of Probabilities" is seriously weakened by an indefensible distinction between subjective and objective probability, the latter conception being a mere mass of direct self-contradictions. If one observes a game of chance "*a long time*," we are told, "he *will* find that events *have taken place* in conformity with the laws of the calculus of probabilities" (p. 132); and this is the phenomenon of objective probability which M. Poincaré confesses himself helpless to explain. But the phenomenon is simply a confusion of two points of view, the uncertainty before and the certainty after the event. The conformity to the calculus, if it occurs, is a fact and not a probability — a fact, moreover, with which science is quite competent to deal.

I fear that the reader has been given but a slight notion of the exceeding interest and suggestiveness of this work. If there is much that should awaken caution, there is also a rich fund of wise and penetrating observations. Those who are least attracted by the author's conclusions may well be repaid for the reading by the impressive survey which he gives of the present state of mathematical and physical science.

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Erkenntnis und Irrtum: Skizzen zur Psychologie der Forschung.

Von E. MACH. Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1905. — pp. ix, 461.

Science is part of the human animal's reaction to its surroundings. If so, it must demonstrably serve the common end of such reactions — that of self-preservation. But the ease with which a biological function is ascribable to this or that detail of behavior varies from reaction to reaction. Obviously, we may more readily establish the service rendered by eating to the general end of living, than detect in a work on differential equations the perfecting of an arm with which to carry on the struggle for existence. To give to these higher products

of our knowing a place among our 'reactions to environment' by catching the teleological aspect of each is, then, a task not only worth doing for the sake of a certain continuity thereby won for our thought, but, one suspects, difficult of accomplishment.

The idea is not of course new. As a matter of personal reminiscence, the reviewer would cite two little works of Schneider, *Der thierische Wille* and *Der menschliche Wille*, which attracted favorable notice in their day. But the problem has longer ancestry and larger relationship in the history of thought. The interest of seeking a function for bodily parts apparently contributing nothing to the purposes of life is as old as physiology; while the idea of bringing out the teleological aspect of behavior not associated with a special organ is beautifully illustrated in Darwin's *Expression of the Emotions*. Development of the problem consists, I take it, in the extension of the concept of 'behavior' to regions not contemplated by those who have previously interested themselves in the research of 'functions.' Hence the novelty of the work before us is to be judged by the generality of its ideal: "Der Naturforscher kann zufrieden sein, wenn er die bewusste, psychische Tätigkeit des Forschers als eine methodisch geklärte, verschärfte und verfeinerte Abart der instinctiven Tätigkeit der Tiere und Menschen wiedererkennt, die im Natur- und Kulturleben täglich geübt wird" (p. iv).

To contribute to the realization of such an ideal no one could be better equipped than Mach, with his unsurpassed command of the history of science. As some measure of his reach, we may take an example or two from his later chapters, "Deduktion und Induktion in psychologischer Bedeutung," "Zahl und Mass," "Der physiologische Raum im Gegensatz zum metrischen," "Zur Psychologie und natürlichen Entwicklung der Geometrie," "Die physiologische Zeit im Gegensatz zur metrischen." These sketches deal with the biological aspects of the more mathematical sciences; the problems of mechanics and physics, together with certain technical terms connected with the methods of those sciences (such as 'analogy,' 'hypothesis,' 'problem') having served as topics to earlier chapters.

In estimating the function of logical deduction, Mach has not advanced beyond the thought of Mill: deduction is not an instrument for the discovery of new truths; in the end it yields no more in the way of 'Erfahrung' than was furnished it at the outset. Its function is to serve as a labor-saving device. "Dieselbe (logische Operation) bringt uns die Abhängigkeit der Erkenntnisse von einander zu klaren Bewusstsein und erspart uns eine besondere Begründung für einen Satz zu suchen, der schon in einem andern enthalten ist" (p. 302).

If we are merely looking for some function that can be assigned to logic, no doubt one is here indicated. But if we ask of a discussion of logic that it contribute something to the settlement of historical issues, we are tempted at this point to lament lost opportunities. On the one hand, the 'psychology of logic' has never been more thoroughly threshed over than in current literature. This material Mach has simply ignored, and his results would be judged ultra-conservative by those most in sympathy with his motives. On the other hand, the anti-psychological tendencies of the older rationalism are dismissed, we may assume, with the observation that logic is no 'instrument of discovery.' Yet surely the psychology of rationalism would offer a beautiful illustration of the part that 'economy of thought' has played in inspiring human effort. And the outcome is somewhat more than a horrible example.

The treatment of number, the attempt "den Ursprung der Zahlvorstellung und des Zahlbegriffes aus dem unmittelbaren oder mittelbaren *biologischen* Bedürfnis psychologisch aufzuklären" (p. 318), is too detailed to admit of more than a limited reproduction. The needs of individual life demand a simple number concept; social intercourse, particularly trade, leads to the invention of a more or less economical notation for larger numbers; the operations of arithmetic are so many short cuts of counting; the later algebraic formulation of the laws of arithmetic facilitates and extends its application. The history of the development of our complex number system and its arithmetic, the construction of a number continuum, are easily shown to have an economical motive, as soon as we understand the more technical services they render the scientist.

All this is set forth with a wealth of illustration that makes the sketch instructive, paragraph by paragraph. But it may also seem in conclusion somewhat obvious unless it is saved by a certain polemical intention. This intention is indicated in the following remark: "Man bezeichnet die Zahlen oft als 'freie Schöpfungen des menschlichen Geistes.' . . . Das Verständnis dieser Schöpfungen wird aber weitmehr gefördert wenn man den *instinctiven Anfängen* derselben nachgeht und die Umstände betrachtet welche das Bedürfnis nach diesen Schöpfungen erzeugten. Vielleicht kommt man dann zur Einsicht dass die ersten hierher gehörigen Bildungen unbewusst und biologisch durch materielle Umstände *erzwungen* waren . . ." (p. 322).

Whose is the view with which Mach is here contrasting his own? The name of Kant is not brought into this (as it is into many another) discussion; yet if the author is not in his own mind opposing his re-

sults to an *a priori* theory of number, one is at a loss to place the historical reference.

Will the reviewer be judged captious, if, after complaining that the treatment of logic was too feebly historical in its reference, he now finds that the study of number is not justified in pronouncing on such an historical issue? And yet would not Kant, who insisted that experience is our only teacher, be astonished to find his doctrine of *a priori* number opposed on the ground that the progress of our learning from experience could be classed among the phenomena of an organism's adaptation to its environment?

On the other hand, a real issue seems to lurk somewhere in the implied attitudes of the Kantian and of the Empiricist. For Kant, number was a concept which no possible experience could fail to illustrate, seeing that experience involved manifoldness in its meaning. For Mach, "*würde die physische Erfahrung nicht lehren dass eine Vielheit äquivalenter, unveränderlicher, beständiger Dinge existiert . . . so hätte das Zählen gar keinen Zweck und Sinn*" (p. 324). We have only to accept the implication that 'Erfahrung' might, without thereby ceasing to be 'Erfahrung,' fail to reveal the existence of this manifold, just as it might fail to present Jupiter with four satellites, and the issue between the two schools is drawn. Only, to the deciding of this issue, the method to which Mach gives such elegant expression can contribute nothing. It surely throws no light on the question as to whether experience could exist otherwise than as a numerable manifold to point out, say, that an accident of human anatomy conducted us to a decimal system of notation; that, had we been a twelve-fingered race, we should probably have developed a duodecimal system, to which, as it is, other considerations of utility may yet conduct us. And the like of other analyses of the empirical needs that are reflected in our developed number system and its arithmetic. In a word, the *limits* to the variability of experience cannot be treated by any method which confines itself to showing that *if* the condition *A* varied, the result *B* would vary with it.

I have come perhaps too quickly to this estimate of what our author's method can accomplish, and in what respects it promises to throw no new light on historical problems. I am reduced to repeating much the same comment on the chapters that deal with geometry and chronometry. In both cases, to be sure, we have problems worthy of discussion for their own sake. Thus, confining ourselves to the first topic, we are aware that perceptual space and the space of geometry are different enough; indeed, when we come to compare

the two we are reduced to such points of correspondence as those which Mach enumerates: "Beide Räume sind dreifache Mannigfaltigkeiten. Jeden Punkt des geometrischen Raumes A, B, C, D . . . entspricht ein Punkt A' B' C' D' . . . des physiologischen Raumes. Wenn C zwischen B und D liegt, so liegt C' zwischen B' und D'. Man kann auch sagen: einer kontinuierlichen Bewegung im geometrischen Raum entspricht eine kontinuierliche Bewegung des zugeordneten Punktes im physiologischen Raum." The extent of this divergence of the two spaces introduces the question: "Wie kommt es nun, dass der physiologische Raum vom geometrischen sosehr verschieden ist? Wie gelangt man doch von erstern Vorstellungen allmählich zu den letzteren" (p. 337 f.)

Every elementary sensation consists of two factors: quality and local sign (*Sinnesempfindung* and *Organempfindung*). "Man kann sagen, dass der physiologische Raum ein System von *abgestuften Organempfindungen* ist." This arrangement of the discrete *Organempfindungen* in a coördinated system is the outcome of the organism's repeated reactions to stimulation . . . "Die vollkommenste gegenseitige biologische Anpassung einer Vielheit von Elementarorganen kommt eben in der räumlichen Wahrnehmung besonders deutlich zum Ausdruck" (p. 339).

It is the experiences which follow on locomotion that conduct us, by an imperceptible transition, from this anisotropic and limited space perception to the geometer's space concept. "Die beliebige Locomotion des Leibes als Ganzes und die Möglichkeit beliebiger Orientierung fördern die Einsicht dass wir überall und nach allen Richtungen dieselbe Bewegungen ausführen können, dass der Raum überall und nach allen Richtungen *gleich* beschaffen, und dass derselbe als unbegrenzt und unendlich vorgestellt werden kann" (p. 341).

This is an excellent portrayal of the experiences that guide us in the conduct of life to the construction, first of a physiological, then of a geometrical space. The progressive utility to the organism of these successive constructions is made obvious, and as the fixing of this utility is more difficult than in the case of the development of the number concept, the study has so much the more value for the psychologist. But here again the author does not feel that the interest of his effort is exhausted in having brought clearly to light the biological importance of the space concept and of its geometry. He feels that the outcome gives him a right to pronounce on certain historical issues, and now it is explicitly the Kantian doctrine that is placed in contrast. "Kant hat behauptet: 'Man kann sich niemals

eine Vorstellung davon machen, dass kein Raum sei, ob man sich gleich ganz wohl denken kann, dass keine Gegenstände darin angetroffen werden.' Heute zweifelt kaum jemand daran, dass die Sinnesempfindungen und die Raumempfindungen nur *miteinander* ins Bewusstsein treten und aus demselben wieder verschwinden können. Dasselbe muss wohl von den betreffenden Vorstellungen gelten. Wenn für Kant der Raum kein 'Begriff' sondern eine 'reine [blosse?] Anschauung *a priori*' ist, so sind die heutigen Forscher sehr geneigt, den *geometrischen* Raum für einen *Begriff*, und zwar für einem durch *Erfahrung* erworbenen Begriff, zu halten'' (p. 344).

Here, again, the student of the history of philosophy must, if I am not mistaken, have the impression that the author's method does not justify him in comparing his results with Kant's. Not but that he is warranted in calling the space concept used in geometry a 'Begriff', and insisting that the motives that lead us to the formation of such a concept are to be sought in the character of our experiences. What, then, one asks, is to prevent Mach from opposing 'Begriff' to 'Anschauung,' and further an 'Erfahrungsbegriff' to a 'reine Anschauung,' since Kant invites just this manner of contrasting portions of our knowledge?

I answer with enforced brevity that Kant and Mach are using different tongues. Kant meant, in distinguishing 'Anschauung' from 'Begriff,' to contrast two kinds of relationship whose 'formal properties' were as different as those, say, distinguishing 'between' from 'like.' Mach means by a 'Begriff' any notion that involves 'abstraction' from content (*Anschauung*). "Das blosse System der Raumempfindungen können wir nicht anschauen; wir können aber von den als nebensächlich betrachteten Sinnesempfindungen *absehen*, und wenn man diesen leicht und unvermerkt vor sich gehenden Prozess nicht genug beachtet, kann leicht der Gedanke entstehen, man habe eine reine Anschauung vollzogen'' (p. 344). Kant meant the phrase, "unabhängig von Erfahrungen," to denote any concept which is necessary to define what the term 'Erfahrung' means. Mach means by a 'durch Erfahrung erworbener Begriff' one that is developed in the individual and in the race in response to stimulation. Kant's 'Anschauungen *a priori*,' then, were no less abstractions from experience in this sense than are Mach's. But Kant had the ingenious idea of asking: Are there no limits to the variations we can suppose possible in experience? And he answered that if 'experience' has a meaning, all that is involved in this meaning is indispensable to experience. Individuality and manifoldness seemed to him to be thus involved, and with them the *principia individuationis*, space and

time. Now in both premise and inference Kant may have been quite wrong; but he put a question that had depth and dignity, he suggested a method of discussing it, and the philosopher with historical training finds it difficult to repress a certain impatience when he is asked to compare Kant's results with those obtained by a method which may indeed employ certain terms in common with Kant, but which has evidently been conceived with no comprehension of what this deep but crabbed old thinker was struggling to express.

If I have referred frequently to the contrast between Mach's empiricism and the results of Kant, it is because Mach himself has chosen this means of orienting himself historically. But Kant is an accident: had he not invented a certain way of putting the question, the mere evolution of the type of empiricism we are here dealing with would have forced *us* to invent one. In a characteristic chapter Mach pictures the growth of knowledge as an "Anpassung der Gedanken an die Tatsachen und aneinander" (p. 162 ff.). The phrase serves admirably to convey a truth respecting the evolution of science, and to call attention to an analogy between widely differing examples of adaptation. The scientific interest of this analogy can be appreciated by one who has never stopped to enquire what this term 'fact' means, to which our science and our organism equally adapt themselves. It is sufficient to assume that whatever 'fact' means in the one case it means in the other. But there are connections in which we are not content with establishing a sameness of meaning, but in which we demand the common definition of 'fact.' When the demand is brought to bear on any illustration the empiricist may offer of an "Anpassung der Gedanken an die Tatsachen," we seem to discover that the situation would serve equally well to illustrate an "Anpassung der Tatsachen an die Gedanken." Whither does this discovery lead us? It may not lead us to Kant, certainly,—he worked more than a century ago. But that Kant did his part in leading us to the discovery is one of his chief claims on our gratitude. Neither the general question nor Kant's peculiar contribution to it can be discussed on the basis of an empiricism that has never stopped to ask itself, 'What is a fact?'

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La moralisme de Kant et l'amoralisme contemporain. Par ALFRED FOUILLÉE. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1905. — pp. xxiii, 375.

According to M. Fouillée, contemporary ethical theories may all be classed under one of two heads, the moralism of Kant and his fol-

lowers or the non-moralism represented equally by the utilitarians and by Nietzsche. Widely as these two views of morality differ, they both imply a fundamental antithesis between law or reason and nature. Since the ethics of the Kantians is based upon the former, it is compelled to reject all consideration of ends and to be satisfied with a form bare of content. Their opponents, on the other hand, since they regard nature as the only reality, avoid the difficulties of the categorical imperative, indeed, but do so at the expense of the morality which they are seeking to explain and whose existence they end by denying. To choose between the two positions is difficult. If one accepts the constantly growing mass of scientific knowledge, one seems forced to regard morality as valuable, if at all, only as a means to an end. If one clings to the conviction that such a morality is not really moral, one must turn to the Kantian formalism, which denies all connection between ethics and the knowledge of the phenomenal world. Both standpoints are equally untenable. M. Fouillée proposes to solve the dilemma by showing that there is a middle ground, namely, the ethics of the *idées-forces*; but before doing so it is necessary to prove that the dilemma is an actual one and that both moralism and non-moralism are inconsistent with themselves. This forms the task of the present volume.

The three great difficulties of the Kantian system were stated by Kant himself and are as follows: (1) Can the categories be applied to the objects of the pure practical reason? (2) Can man be at the same time free in the noumenal and determined in the phenomenal world? (3) Is there a pure reason capable of becoming practical by its own power? Kant's solution of these problems is less satisfactory than his statement of them, and his treatment is criticised in detail.

That the existence of duty cannot be proved in any of the ordinary ways is of little importance, since duty, according to Kant, is a fact and needs no proof. We can become conscious of practical laws just as we can of theoretical principles, by observing the necessity with which the reason imposes them upon us, and by abstracting from all empirical conditions. The conception of a free will, likewise pure, is the result of such observation, in the same way that the concept of a pure understanding follows from the pure theoretical principles. The moral law itself is not a fact of consciousness; what is present there is the reason positing itself as sole legislator without any admixture of necessarily empirical motives and ends. We are asked to accept as a fact "a formal and universal law of which we can know *a priori* neither to what it corresponds, whence it comes, what it is,

and by what power it can cause determinations ; nor *a posteriori*, if it ever has caused or even if it has the power to cause any event in this world subjected to the causality of universal mechanism" (p. 56). Reality is accorded at a single stroke to a supra-sensible object of the category of causality, that is, to liberty, and as a result to the noumenal ego and all the other conditions of the moral world. Kant and his critics have seen the difficulty, but only partially, and have accordingly devoted themselves to considering whether the concept of causality can be applied to objects of the pure practical reason. M. Fouillée maintains that there lies a difficulty no less great in the application of the category of causality to the very conception and affirmation of the moral law. Every element belonging to such a conception is drawn from experience and has no meaning outside it. In short, the distinction between the theoretical and the practical point of view is made much too absolute. If the idea of the universal and unconditioned loses all value as soon as an object is attributed to it, how can it become a principle of action? Why should I sacrifice the happiness offered by the phenomenal world for a law which can neither be affirmed nor stated? The practical necessarily includes the theoretical and is subject to the same conditions.

In fact, the *Critique of Practical Reason* should rather be entitled a critique of experience, for in it the reality of the pure practical reason is asserted, not criticised. There is no adequate recognition that the reason itself constitutes a problem. The categorical imperative, the idea of duty, might be proposed as an article of belief ; but it cannot be shown to exist as a necessary condition of moral action, which may perfectly well be explained in other ways.

Going on to the formal nature of the Kantian ethics, M. Fouillée points out that, although morality implies a form that can be universalized and we have here a useful method of determining the moral value of an action, Kant is in error in regarding this criterion as constituting in itself the character of the moral good. A universal form always implies some content. We cannot conceive pure form altogether distinct from matter ; and if we could, such bare form would have no moral worth, unless some conception of ends were united with it. The objective value attributed to the universal form presupposes an object good in itself, although perhaps incapable of determination by us.

A second characteristic of the Kantian conception of duty is found in its imperative nature. A command implies law, which in this case exists for its own sake and is united only synthetically with the idea

of the Good. Yet such a union is an impossibility, and is defended by Kant only because he confuses the intelligible and the sensible will. He passes from the synthesis between the law and the intelligible or free will, which is unknown and unknowable, to a synthesis between the law and the sensible will, which is determined. An imperative which applies to the noumenal world is unthinkable, because if the latter exists at all, it exists eternally such as it is ; and, moreover, the very concept of liberty is merely the negation of determinism, and has no positive content. On the other hand, no less absurdity is involved in an imperative for the phenomenal world, in which every event, whether of object or subject, is linked causally with preceding events. Moreover, the necessary validity attributed to the imperative is possible only on the supposition that the human reason is the absolute reason, an assumption expressly disclaimed by Kant. Again, the conception of liberty as a spontaneous and intelligible causality in the noumenal world contradicts the initial presuppositions of the system, for it involves the transcendent use of half-a-dozen categories. The very existence of liberty has no proof save the assertion of the objective validity of the moral law with all that that implies. The categorical imperative is a fact of the reason and is free from every sensible element ; then when it determines the will, the action is that of the pure reason, and no further proof of the causality of the noumenon is needed.

Great as are these and other difficulties in the Kantian conception of liberty, they are as nothing compared with the problem of reconciling noumenal liberty with phenomenal determination. How can a supra-natural liberty find expression in an empirical case subject to natural necessity? Even if this is supposed to be made possible in some incomprehensible manner, a second question remains, namely, why the intelligible will does not always realize itself, but is sometimes fulfilled and sometimes not. Moreover, my intelligible liberty, if it exists, must be reconciled not only with my own phenomenal acts, but with the whole phenomenal world in which I find myself, and in which my very affirmation of our unconditioned duty and power to fulfil it is the direct result of the series of empirical causes.

To save himself from these absurdities, Kant supposes a single intelligible act which determines my character and of which all my empirical life is the consequence. Yet this recourse to a free act of the intelligible ego does not avoid the real difficulty. The intelligible ego is a word without meaning ; and even if one supposes that such an ego can lay down a law for itself in the intelligible world, how can it do

so for the empirical ego which is bound by necessity? Kant is constantly involved in circular arguments, in which unacknowledged presuppositions alone make it possible for him to reach the desired results. A true critique of the intelligible would have allowed him to go no further than the following proposition: "Morality consists in not acting according to the sensible appearances alone, but in acting in accordance with an inner and superior ideal to which we attribute an eternal foundation of reality, without being able with certainty to affirm that reality nor with certainty to determine its nature" (p. 190).

The limits of this review make it impossible to do more than touch upon the main points of M. Fouillée's arraignment of the Kantian ethics, but perhaps enough has been said to indicate the character of his arguments and to show their clearness and force. The great quantity of the literature concerning Kant almost forbids our modern critics to say anything absolutely new on the subject; but M. Fouillée has succeeded in presenting the matter from a somewhat new standpoint and in making evident the inconsistencies of Kant's position. Whether the solution of the difficulties proposed is any more free from like inconsistencies, is of course a different question, and one that can hardly be discussed before the publication of a complete treatment of the ethics of the *idées-forces*.

The chapters upon non-moralism are divided into two parts, the first of which deals with hedonism, the second with the ethics which substitutes power for pleasure. The author brings forward the usual objections to regarding pleasure, first, as the end, and second, as the cause of action; and, while he admits that it forms a necessary element in both end and cause, maintains that it is indispensable only in the sense in which every part is essential to the whole. The tenability of the doctrine of egoism is next examined and rejected, and the relations between egoism and altruism set forth as they appear in M. Fouillée's own theories. The section is then ended with a chapter on ethical as distinguished from psychological hedonism. The treatment of the main thesis of ethical hedonism, namely, that pleasure alone is of value, is neither as logical nor as suggestive as most other portions of the book. For instance, qualitative distinctions in pleasure are defended on the ground that quantity implies quality and without the latter is a pure abstraction (p. 234). True enough, but no hedonist has ever thought of asserting the existence of a pleasure possessing no quality, although many have considered the quality of all pleasures as the same.

With regard to the final division of the book, one need not accept

the doctrines of Nietzsche in order to feel that here they have been rather hardly treated. Yet if the tone of the discussion cannot be called that of unprejudiced calm, it may well be excused, when one remembers the extreme nature of the claims of Nietzsche's followers, who do not hesitate to ascribe to him all the logic and all the appreciation of æsthetic and other values to be found in the whole of the nineteenth-century philosophy. An account is given of Nietzsche's metaphysics, psychology, and ethics, and a like conclusion is reached concerning them all. Wherever Nietzsche has approached the truth, he has consciously or unconsciously stolen a leaf from one of M. Fouillée's own publications; but in nearly every case his overwhelming propensity to distortion has led him to pervert these truths in such a way as to make of them absurdities. Quotations of considerable length from both Fouillée and Nietzsche are given to substantiate this position; but the similarity does not seem to be greater than that to be expected between two writers who in different ways both emphasize activity. That the philosophy of the *idées-forces* is the more logical and systematic, that it recognizes certain aspects of reality ignored by Nietzsche, must, I think, be admitted; but such an admission need not carry with it the denial of all save a perverted value to Nietzsche's views. Moreover, M. Fouillée is wrong in making Nietzsche's ethics depend upon his metaphysics and psychology. The latter may be logically prior to ethics, but nevertheless for Nietzsche, as for many another thinker, metaphysics is an extension and application of ethical principles, rather than *vice versa*, and the two do not necessarily stand or fall together.

The conclusion of the whole criticism is, as has already been stated, that both moralism and non-moralism are false, and that the dualism inherent in both must be overcome by the monism of the *idées-forces*. Nature and experience are not so limited and so irrational as these dualists suppose, nor is reason so devoid of concrete content. The individual and the universal are not mutually exclusive but complementary. Whether the final thesis can be said to be sustained or not, will depend upon the forthcoming volume. That existing theories present great difficulties, and thus pave the way for the recognition of the need of something better is certainly proved, and with this the aim of M. Fouillée's book is attained.

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Ästhetik als Wissenschaft des Ausdrucks und allgemeine Linguistik, Theorie und Geschichte. VON BENEDETTO CROCE. Nach der zweiten durchgesehenen Auflage aus dem Italienischen übersetzt von KARL FEDERN. Leipzig, E. W. Seemann, 1905. — pp. xiv, 494.

To meet the demand of a wider circle of readers this important work, which originally appeared in 1901 and has already been extensively reviewed, has recently been translated into German. The book is divided into two parts. The first, occupying about one third of the volume, consists of the author's theory of æsthetics. To this is appended a history in which the development of æsthetic thought is concisely, though somewhat unsympathetically, presented. This latter portion really serves as a vehicle for tracing the origin of those views which the author himself entertains, the main contributors to which are: Aristotle, Giambattista Vico (hailed as the true founder of æsthetics), and Schleiermacher, — at first view a strange trio to the casual student of philosophy. For the rest, Croce's historical criticism is in the main destructive. The book is written clearly and forcibly throughout. Though I can hardly accept the author's philosophy at once, its suggestiveness, particularly with regard to matters of controversy, is undeniable. In this review I shall confine myself to Croce's main thesis together with certain points of criticism which it suggests.

Croce's system, for such it is, is based on the identification of art and intuitive knowledge, and the further contention that intuitive knowledge is the foundation of all knowledge. Intuition is particular in form, consisting of successive mental pictures all seeking expression. The expression is the work of art, and it is beautiful just in so far as it expresses its content with truth.

A second fundamental form of knowledge, the logical, is in a way dependent on intuition, yet finds its differentia in the *concept* which constitutes its true essence. The concept is a generalizing or relating activity of mind, and as such can never be adequately expressed, though what expression it may gain is of course æsthetic in form. Its reality, however, is rather to be found in symbols and suggestions which may be combined into propositions and definitions. True science is philosophy, and is, in fact, just this logical activity striving after definitions. It follows that the true logical activity is inductive, and all propositions containing no general term are by definition not logical but purely æsthetic.

Two sub-forms of activity complete the scale of human knowledge:

the economical and the moral ; the former is the desire for a goal, the latter the desire for a reasonable goal.

The complete mental activities may, then, be grouped as follows : (1) Intuitive expression, the original activity of the mind behind which there exists only unexpressed sensation or nature ; (2) the concept which abstracts or generalizes from the intuitive substrate ; (3) the economical desire depending both on a concept of usefulness and on an intuitive content ; and (4) the moral desire which depends on all three and is in addition reasonable.

Metaphysics is impossible, if by metaphysics we mean an operation of logical thought *sui generis*, for logical thought always works on intuitive factors. It is quite impossible to proceed from concept to expression or from the general to the particular, the bases of our knowledge being expressions, particulars. On the other hand, we may permit a metaphysics considered as the science of self revelation, which would be a logical treatment of æsthetic intuition.

Concerning 'feeling', which is generally supposed to play so large a rôle in æsthetics, our author conceives it to be a mere organic accompaniment which follows the æsthetic activity but of itself is passive in nature. Pleasure marks the successful expression, displeasure the unsuccessful, and corresponding judgments of beauty and ugliness result. All attempts at 'æsthetic hedonism' are vain, since an organic element is thereby magnified and made to dominate over real mental activity, whereas, in point of fact, it is but an accompaniment finding its expression in the intuitive truth of the whole.

With the denial of æsthetic feelings as such, go the 'pseudo-æsthetic' concepts of comic, sublime, tragic, etc. These are not subjects for æsthetic inquiry, says our author, but for psychology, being mere quantitative variations which psychology in its way attempts, rather vainly, to catalogue and investigate. For psychology is no true science, but should rather be termed one of the incomplete order, dealing as it does only with possible groupings of organic processes in varying intensities.

As the work of art is the result of the artist's expression for his intuitive mental pictures, so the appreciation of art consists in putting oneself in the artist's position and thus reproducing his mental activities. Judgments of taste which result are based on the degree of truth which the representation exhibits. History, which is really æsthetic both in content and method, since it has to do with particulars (individuals and events), never with generalizations, aids us in understanding and thus appreciating the art of various times by affording us a representation of those times.

Progress in science may be represented by a straight line, since it consists always in an inductive striving after more complete system and generalization. Progress in art, on the other hand, since its effort is to represent the moment, not the system, is in closed circles, — each phase, in a sense, being complete in itself. It follows that we can conceive of no human progress, because progress involves logical development, and humanity, as composed of individuals, cannot progress in this sense. The modern man penetrates further into the universe than did his forefather ; his intuitive content is greater, but that is all.

In conclusion. Croce identifies more particularly the problems of language with those of æsthetics, thus declaring the futility of logical treatment with respect to grammar and the uselessness of striving after a universal language.

To sum up, art is individual intuitive expression, and as such does not partake of the logical mode of thought. Being *prior* to the logical activity, it does not permit of classified treatment. Æsthetic enjoyment is found in expression and in the reproduction of expression. It follows that processes of imagination or sensation, when unexpressed, are not æsthetic, thus excluding what we term ‘beautiful thoughts’ and also beauty in nature, because neither have been expressed by man. Furthermore, a science of æsthetics is impossible, though one notes with a smile that the author does not hesitate to term his treatise such. Science always involves logical generalization. History is not a science, neither is æsthetics. What then is æsthetics? A term for describing intuitive mental activity. To be sure, the problem of investigating this activity is turned over to the *new metaphysics*, but this is apparently a science of the future. Aside from the general logical method which of necessity is that of all science, no particular methods for it are laid down, those of psychology, which one might hope to employ, being, in general, discarded as worthless.

The value of any system is measured by its ability to embrace those facts of experience to which it is related. The system which we have before us, despite its marked ingenuity and apparent logical coherence, is nevertheless dogmatic, and, in its insistence on the elemental nature of intuition, quite as mystical as any of those ‘transcendental’ philosophies which the author so forcibly discredits. Restoring psychology to its proper place in Croce’s system, *i. e.*, the place granted the ‘new metaphysics,’ and thence proceeding to investigate logically and introspectively the merits of the work, we find the facts of our experience frequently contradicted.

1. Intuitive and logical activity do not appear to be mutually exclusive with respect to the concept. On the contrary, it is rather generally recognized that the intuitive process is built on concepts, rudimentary or incomplete though they may be, quite in the same manner as is the logical. Indeed, there is essentially but one mental activity, and it is by a process of abstraction only that we proceed to analyze it at all. Therefore, it is incorrect to declare that such an expression as 'Peter goes walking,' involves only intuitive factors of expression and is not subject to logical or conceptual treatment.

2. Though Croce describes with considerable accuracy the productive activity of the artist, he can scarce be said to do full justice to the one who appreciates but does not produce art. Since the æsthetic enjoyment of the latter is limited to a reproduction of the artist's expressive activity, there appears to be no accounting for that beauty which is evident in certain aspects of nature. Yet one can scarcely deny that such pleasurable states do exist, and it is manifestly difficult to describe them adequately in terms of logical, economic, or moral activities.

3. If æsthetics be a science, it must form categories or concepts. From a psychological point of view, these are perfectly well justified both with respect to the mental factors which dominate and also with respect to the functional nature of the state. The author's critique of literary and artistic *genres* is in many respects salutary, but he seems to err by too sweeping generalizations. It is, of course, false to assert that painting, for instance, is an exclusively optic art, and as such depends entirely on visual factors. On the other hand, in the case of absolute music it is a notable fact that the association of visual ideas interferes with a full appreciation of the music. With respect to the 'pseudo-æsthetic' concepts — comic, tragic, sublime, etc. — these represent certain more or less well-defined functions of the æsthetic attitude, and consequently have a positive significance for the *science* of æsthetics.

4. Croce's definition of feeling, and especially of æsthetic feeling, is inadequate. As a passive organic factor which merely follows the mental activity, it means nothing. The evident presence of feelings as conscious factors seems to me best described in terms of a cumulative aspect of consciousness expressing the relative functional conformity or non-conformity of the mental factors present. As for differentiating the æsthetic from other feelings: the æsthetic denotes a conformity with respect to an end achieved; the logical, economic, and moral feelings, a conformity or non-conformity with respect to an

end desired. It follows, therefore, that, whenever an end is achieved, whatever may have been the activity by which it was brought about, the result, when present in consciousness, is æsthetic. Such a view does not prevent us from enjoying beauty in nature, in our own thoughts, or even in simple sensory states.

5. For Croce the æsthetic state is essentially active. But he has failed to distinguish clearly between mental activity and motor activity. Mental activity has for its general object the discovery of adequate motives for motor response. The motor response, in turn, has for an object the adjustment of the organism to its environment. A relative conformity of mental factors will, therefore, attend all such states of mind as denote unimpeded progress. But there will also occur intervals in which the end with respect to a certain situation is, or appears to be, achieved. This state will be marked by the absence of any dominant motor tendency, but not at all by the absence of a high degree of conformable mental activity. Such a state I should characterize as contemplative, or, in fine, an æsthetic attitude.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

The Nature of Truth. An Essay by HAROLD H. JOACHIM. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1906. — pp. v, 182.

Mr. Joachim's book is an interesting and notable sign of the reconstruction that is going on in the idealistic camp along the line of questions which only a short time ago were considered settled once for all. It claims no positive result, but is an acute, though rather involved and at times scholastic criticism of three current conceptions of truth, — truth as correspondence, as a quality of independent entities, and as coherence. An attempt to understand the nature of correspondence results in bringing to the front the idea of teleological structure, and so in pointing away from the correspondence to the coherence type of theory, while the introduction of the 'mental factor' emphasizes the inadequacy of the notion as a final one. In connection with the second conception, where he has in mind chiefly Mr. Moore and Mr. Russell, he tries to show that the assumption that experiencing makes no difference to the facts is either false or irrelevant; and that, if this is so, a theory which sets out to vindicate the independence of truth must end by making truth a merely private and personal possession. Then in what constitutes the larger and, as it seems to me, the most valuable part of the book, the coherence notion is examined, with the result that it is condemned as failing to be finally and fully intelligible, though it is regarded as being relatively truer than the others. The discussion is an honest and clear-sighted recognition of certain fundamental difficulties to which the older idealists commonly closed their eyes. Thus, it is pointed out that the system of judgments which is presupposed in a true human judgment is after all a body of knowledge *about* reality; it is not meaning in the sense which the ideal of the coherence notion demands, — a 'significant whole' as an organized individual experience self-fulfilled and self-fulfilling. We therefore are again forced back upon the correspondence notion, in which coherence is interpreted as a mere formal consistency such as would leave the solid reality out; and this dualism we are unable to overcome by showing how such an 'otherness' has its place as a real moment in ideal experience. So in the final chapter there is an admirable analysis which lays bare the defects in the ordinary, easy idealistic doctrine of error, and which emphasizes its ultimate unintelligibility from the standpoint of the coherence type of Absolute. The conclusion is a tempered confession of ignorance, since we are compelled by the coherence notion to recognize certain demands which both must be and cannot be fulfilled. It would appear to me likely to prove a more fruitful path, if we were rather to question whether the adequacy of the coherence ideal as a metaphysical account of reality had not been too hastily assumed.

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Über die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens. Von A. MEINONG.
(Abhandlungen zur Didaktik und Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft,
Band I, Heft 6.) Berlin, Julius Springer, 1906. — pp. 113.

The appearance of this new work of Meinong within a scientific series, along with monographs upon electric lamps and optical instruments, is both a warning and a challenge, — a warning to the scientific philistine and a challenge to the technical philosopher. If, as the editor of the series remarks in his general introduction, the recent attitude of the natural sciences, — viz., the tendency to look upon all reflection upon the foundations of scientific knowledge as a philosophical luxury (in the evil sense of the word), — has given place to a more and more general and urgent call for natural philosophy, the opportunity to contribute to the satisfaction of the demand, offered to this most subtle and inveterate of dialecticians, is also in a larger sense a challenge to technical philosophy to show its worth.

In a general way the critical and modest, anything-but-naïve, realism that is here presented may justly expect to command the interest and respect of science. And although avowedly directed primarily to the attention of the scientist, it has also, for that very reason, indeed, a special interest for the philosopher, because enforced abstention from detail and singleness of purpose have made possible a relatively simple and compact statement of a realism which, in contrast to the old naïve point of view, as well as to the more modern phenomenalism and idealism of such writers as Mach and Pearson, holds to the reality of the object of perception and the capacity of ideal relations founded upon perception to give us knowledge of the real.

The key-note of this realism is the identification of empirical knowledge with perception, and the formulation of an *ideal* of pure perception, and its immediate evidence, in the light of which our knowledge is tested. Fundamental to the understanding of this definition and ideal of experiential knowledge is the distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge with which the readers of Meinong are familiar. *A priori* necessity applies to judgments of relation, to ideal objects which have being but not necessarily existence. Perception, which alone is experience, properly speaking, has immediate evidence of certainty (or conjectural [*Vermutungs-*] evidence which approaches to certainty) but not necessity. Perception, whether inner or outer, always includes judgment of existence. The criterion of perception is, then, not the representative correspondence of presentation with object, nor the causal relation between object and presentation, but the immediate evidence of the existential judgment.

Fundamental again to this definition and ideal are the well-known distinctions between the *presentation*, the *object*, and the *objective* in perception, between the content and intent of perception. The object of perception is always a real, not an attribute; the objective is always existence. The immediate evidence which characterizes perception does not apply to

the presentation, to the attribute, but to the existence of the object apprehended by it. The ideal of pure perception is simultaneity of act and object of perception, *i. e.*, absolute immediacy to which alone certainty attaches.

All this is in the main a recapitulation of Meinong's former analyses of knowledge. But when the criterion and ideal of perception are applied to our concrete knowledge — and this is the new feature of the work — it is found that many *apparent* perceptions, 'aspects' of both inner and outer experience, do not satisfy them. They are what Meinong describes as only half-perceptions. There is a perceptual substrate, an existential judgment with its immediate evidence, but to this are added subjective, phenomenal aspects, sensational and ideal, which do not have immediate evidence and must frequently be supplanted by 'better' phenomena. Such half-perceptions are the so-called primary and secondary qualities of outer perception, both of which are subjective and without immediate evidence.

Immediate evidence of certainty, with its ideal of simultaneity of object and act of perception, is realized only in inner perception and there only approximately. In the inner perception of such psychical objects as the presentation-content involved in perception of external objects, or the fundamental psychical acts of presentation, feeling, conation, and judgment, the normal relation is that of succession of object and perceptual act. There is an ideal point or moment of togetherness, with its immediate certainty, but most of the aspects of inner perception are phenomenal content with only conjectural (*Vermutungs*-) evidence. Meinong's discussion of the relation of immediate perception to memory, the immediate evidence of the former and the conjectural evidence of the latter, is very interesting at this point. A statement of his conclusion must suffice. "The evidence of inner perception is, like that of memory, merely conjectural, and reaches the ideal limit of certainty only at the limiting moment of immediacy."

While the aspects of inner perception have a peculiar advantage in the matter of evidence, the situation in the case of outer perception is in principle the same. There is an outer as well as an inner perception. It offers very good conjectural evidence for the existence of things, but poor evidence for the existence of the appearing attributes. Both primary and secondary qualities frequently turn out to be illusions without evidence, phenomenal aspects for which 'better' phenomena must be substituted.

It is at this point that the most suggestive feature of the present work appears in the theory of the substitution of ideal objects, ideal constructions, ideal *superiora* (which apart from perception have being and necessity but not existence and certainty), as phenomena of a higher order for the lower phenomena without evidence. Meinong maintains that we have knowledge of reality through ideal *superiora*, that they are applicable to the noumenon. In other words, that the subjective origin (through ideational activity) of the relational elements in knowledge does not affect

their validity as vehicles of perception of the real. It is difficult to state in a word or two the elaborate reasoning which underlies this claim, but its general trend may be suggested. Ideal relations, when applied to the real, have perceptual evidence, are *quasi* perceptual, as are the other phenomenal aspects of perception. Thus, to take the most important ideal *superiora*, relations of similarity and difference, when a perceptual judgment includes the perception of difference, the same evidence of existence of an object holds of the judgment of existence of differences in the object. The differences are real although the particular phenomena in which these differences appear may turn out to be illusory and require the substitution of other phenomena. The possibility of the transference of these ideal relations (and besides similarity and difference Meinong includes number, form, movement, and cause and effect, closely connected with judgments of comparison) from one phenomenal aspect to another proves that they belong to the noumenal and have existence as their objective.

The essential task of every empirical science is, then, the discovery of the *best* phenomena as substitutes for the first aspects of perception; and phenomena are the 'better,' the more differentiated they are, *i. e.*, the more they further the relational judgments involved in perception. In the introduction of this worth concept of 'better and worse' phenomena, of degrees of reality, Meinong is apparently on the verge of a functional and developmental theory of knowledge, an aspect which he has always tended to ignore and which is only suggested here. The theory of evidence developed makes immediate evidence of the noumenal but an ideal limiting term. Practically all perceptions of concrete aspects of experience, whether inner or outer, have only probability, and the degree of their probability seems to be measured by their instrumental value in furthering the recurrent conceptual activities of comparison. Should not these recurrent activities be viewed in their volitional aspect, and the better or worse evidence of phenomena interpreted in terms of continuity of volitional process? And, finally, as to the nature of immediate evidence which constitutes the ideal of knowledge, has he really got to the bottom of it? His view is far enough removed from the naïve representative and causal theories of knowledge; but is the criterion of simultaneity less external? Meinong denies that we can go beyond this criterion, and criticises all genetic or 'selection' principles of evidence; but it is doubtful whether immediate certainty can be understood any more easily than probability, without the use of the concepts of volition and purpose.

WILBUR M. URBAN.

TRINITY COLLEGE.

Questions esthétiques et religieuses. Par PAUL STAPFER. Paris, F. Alcan, 1906.—pp. 208.

This volume comprises three essays. The first, "La question de l'art pour l'art," treats this supposed problem of esthetics both historically and

critically. The views of (1) the classicists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, (2) the poets and critics of the nineteenth century, and (3) the philosophers of the nineteenth century are admirably summarized. The author discusses realism and the relation of art to morality. He holds that "art is free, yet must draw the subject-matter to which it gives form from outside itself" (p. 70). Art is not primarily didactic or moral: "True inspiration is lacking in the artist who marches to two measures, in trying to give his creation at once an esthetic and a didactic form." This does not hinder, however, that "the esthetic value of the subject-matter is in proportion to its moral interest" (p. 72). Of realism M. Stapfer says: "Art is truly a mirror of everything in nature. . . . But ordinary realism is either caricature, preaching, or cynicism; each artist's 'true picture of the real world' is (usually) only a reflection of himself" (p. 86). All admiration is said to involve a moral judgment (p. 89).

The second essay, entitled "Un philosophe religieux du XIX^e siècle: Pierre Leroux," is a history and an appreciation of the life and thought of this unique, quasi-philosophical genius. The last essay, "La crise des croyances-chrétiennes," sets forth, in citation and argument, the nature and causes of the decline of religion (primarily in France). The writer's chief aim appears to lie in combating the one-sided fideism of Sabatier and kindred 'philosophers of religion.' M. Stapfer finds the essence of religion in the conflict between impulsive desire and the demands of reason and the mysticism resulting from this conflict. Like the Christian rationalists, M. Stapfer believes 'there must be an eternal basis to morality'; but he does not believe this basis can be found in any known facts or theories. Religion in its chastened form must still combine genuine enthusiasm with a conviction that there is some world principle of which human moral aspirations are a true expression. The writer goes one step farther in believing that esthetic values are likewise an expression of that same principle.

The volume as a whole suffers somewhat from a superfluity of quotations and a slight diffuseness. This is much less a fault in the first essay than in the other two.

WALTER B. PITKIN.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

Art et psychologie individuelle. Par LUCIEN ARRÉAT. Paris, F. Alcan, 1906. — pp. 158.

This volume consists of five short essays dealing with personal experiences and observations made upon acquaintances. The aim is "to elucidate or to exercise control over general esthetic theories by means of the particular experiences of individuals" (Preface). No attempt is made to prove or disprove fundamental points of theoretical interest; the book is intentionally a collection of data and nothing more.

The first essay (pp. 1-82) sets forth the author's record of his own mental peculiarities, impressions, and opinions in matters esthetic. In concluding,

M. Arréat defends himself against the charge of having founded esthetics upon perception (pp. 70 ff.). A series of anecdotes is given, illustrating the reinforcement or weakening of esthetic perceptions by associations (pp. 73 ff.).

The second essay is a review of recent works on esthetics (pp. 83-118). The third is again a 'confession' of the kind, origin, and control of imagery in literary creativeness; five short stories and two poems afford the matter for the observations made. M. Arréat explicitly denies every moral purpose in writing these; he states that "morality is a condition of dramatic pleasure, but could not be its immediate end" (p. 122). Attention is also called to the 'schemes of rendition' or 'images of interpretation' which characterize the creative imagination of literary men, giving the latter their 'easy syntax,' 'rhyming power,' 'flow of words,' etc.

The fourth essay is a collection of fifteen cases of persistent and (supposedly) peculiar associations (pp. 133-140). These do not appear to be remarkable as instances, nor yet to have been very well analyzed. The concluding "observations made upon a musical composer" (pp. 141-158) are fairly numerous, but do not appear either exact or extensive enough to serve as more than a simple illustration of general facts already fairly well known. The writer indiscreetly ventures to draw lengthy conclusions from this single case.

The volume contains many illustrations of standard esthetic 'phenomena' which are very well suited to class-room use.

WALTER B. PITKIN.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

Elemente der Psychologie des Urteils. Erster Band: Analyse des Urteils.

Von ERNST SCHRADER. Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1905. — pp. viii, 222.

Dr. Schrader has set himself the task of writing a comprehensive treatise on the psychology of the judgment. His introductory volume, *Zur Grundzüge der Psychologie des Urteils*, appeared in 1903; the task is to be concluded by a two-volume work, *Elemente der Psychologie des Urteils*, of which the present book constitutes the opening volume. The book now under review is entitled *Analyse des Urteils*; it proposes to analyze the judgment into its elements, and to show how these enter into combination to form the judgment. The closing volume of the series, *Tendenzen der Urteilsbildung*, will deal with certain general factors which are operative in the formation of judgments but whose presence cannot ordinarily be discovered in isolated instances; among these factors the author enumerates the influence of inherited tendencies, of training, of social environment, and the like.

Dr. Schrader's position is already familiar to readers of his introductory volume. The present volume is concerned, in the main, with a more detailed working out of the argument there presented. This is done under the following headings: "Introduction," pp. 1-34; "The Empirical In-

vestigation of the Judgment," pp. 35-67; "The Beginnings of the Concept 'False,'" pp. 68-90; "Critically Corrective Thinking," pp. 91-117; "Psychical Activity," pp. 118-147; "Verbal and Non-Verbal Thinking," "Substitution," pp. 148-155; "Subject, Predicate, Copula," pp. 156-200; "Appendices," pp. 201-222.

The author accepts Aristotle's definition of the judgment as that phenomenon of thought in which truth or error is or may be present. He points out that perceptions, memories, and other association-complexes are indifferent to truth and falsity. To mere groups of ideas we may or may not grant assent; and the phenomena of grouping are still identical in the two cases. Judgment is therefore something more than perception and association. And it follows that the psychological principles to which one has recourse in explaining perception and association are inadequate to an explanation of the judgment. It becomes essential, therefore, to introduce another psychological principle; but where is one to find it? Consistency forbids our appeal to a psychical activity, because the psychologist who commits himself to a purely empirical procedure cannot legitimately employ a principle which this procedure fails to reveal or to confirm. The experience of error furnishes a solution of the problem. If every mental process ran its course smoothly and without interruption, if we were never obliged to retrace our steps and correct our initial apprehensions, our mental life would find an analogy in the running of a well-regulated machine. And the laws which explain the mechanical grouping of ideas would explain the whole of the mental life.

But it frequently happens that we find ourselves in error. Having secured new evidence, we criticise and correct our previous apprehensions. An incident to which Schrader makes constant reference will illustrate this procedure. "I see in the distance a person whom I at first take to be a woman. On coming to closer range, however, I observe that the person is pushing a wheel-barrow. Then I perceive that it is not a woman but a workman." The experience of error is itself traceable to the *negative relation* which obtains between the ideas 'woman' and 'pushing a wheel-barrow.' This 'negative relation of ideas' is the *fons et origo* of the judgment. A closer scrutiny of the incident cited reveals to the author two interesting facts. One idea is expelled and permanently excluded from consciousness by another idea; the vanquished idea is dismembered in the struggle, and a portion of it (the colored clothing of the woman) is carried over and incorporated into the victorious idea (workman).

It is to be noted, however, that, on the lower levels of consciousness at least, mature judgment need not be involved in such a process as has been cited. But the germs of the judgment are present; for it is in the 'negative relation of ideas' that we find the origin of the concept 'false,' and the concept 'true' appears as a later product of the same factor. To the 'negative relation,' then, we owe our developed capacity for critical emendation, or critically corrective thought. In the higher stages of develop-

ment, the presence of the essential factor is obscured by the introduction of symbolic mental operations (in accordance with Taine's theory of substitution).

Ideas, then, are to be conceived as arranged in a hierarchy of mutual relationships. They possess the capacity to attract and repel each other in varying degree. When an idea enters consciousness, it is able to expel those which are incompatible with it; it is equally potent to bring to consciousness those for which it has an affinity. Dr. Schrader's theory may be brought into relation with the principle of association. He emphasizes the negative phases of mental grouping, and gives a wholly new aspect to the older theory. That he has been successful in his search for a principle which shall differentiate the judgment from the purely mechanical mental combinations can scarcely be maintained. In the author's conception of the mental life, ideas suppress each other, exclude each other from consciousness, lift their fellows over the threshold, and the like. The whole procedure is described in ultra-Herbartian terms.

In a word, Dr. Schrader finds defects in all of the current theories of the judgment. Those which assume a psychical activity he rejects outright; he would accept a theory of the association type, but only after he has made an important supplementation to the recognized laws of association. The familiar principles of perception and of association can do no more than explain how the raw material is assembled for the judgment. The judgment itself is a product of the 'negative relation of ideas.'

J. W. BAIRD.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

Critique de la doctrine de Kant. Par CHARLES RENOUVIER. Publié par LOUIS PRAT. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1906. — pp. iv, 440.

In the editor's preface we are told that this work was begun when Renouvier had reached the age of eighty-seven and that it was not quite completed at the venerable philosopher's death. In view of this, the mental energy, acuteness of critical faculty, and power of subtle analysis here shown seem marvellous. The book can stand on its own merits as a philosophical treatise of permanent value, and no allowance need be made by the reader for the shortcomings usually incident to old age. Renouvier's main purpose has been the exposure of the dogmatic element in Kant's philosophy, and especially the illegitimacy of his concept of the *noumenon*, on which depends his doctrine of the real as infinite and unconditioned. It is, of course, nothing new to find this by no means invulnerable side of the Kantian system made the subject of attack; but Renouvier's criticism not only is exceptionally keen-sighted, but is made from an unusual standpoint. For the most part it has been those whose philosophy leaned towards naturalism or positivism who have animadverted upon Kant's juggling with the notion of 'Ding-an-sich,' — using it now as the real cause or substrate of the phenomenal world, now as merely the limiting idea by which human

intelligence recognizes and respects the narrow boundaries of its own cognition. Renouvier makes his attack as an idealist who refuses to accept a metaphysics which, denying reality to the world of our experience and relegating it to the sphere of the unknowable, deprives it of all character and meaning and reduces it to a mere 'vast inane' of which he cannot even predicate existence itself. Similarly, it is as a libertarian that he argues against Kant's doctrine that human freedom can be asserted by virtue of the noumenal nature of the conscious being, — a representation of free will which would exclude its operation from the empirical world of time and space.

It is not possible here to follow out Renouvier's criticism in its details. While in many parts of his subject he has been anticipated by other commentators, in not a few instances he has succeeded in throwing fresh light upon obscure places in the Kantian philosophy, — as, for instance, on Kant's use and misuse of the principle of contradiction, on the deduction of the categories, and on the different meanings attaching to the notion of cause in the various relations in which the word is used. Renouvier's answer to Kant's arguments against the philosophy of Leibniz is worth study, though it is naturally determined by his own preference for pluralism over monism. But, in general, it may be noticed that the vigorous analytical criticism here offered of almost all the main conceptions of Kant's philosophy has a value quite independent of that system of neo-criticism which the author devoted so many years of his life to developing and defending. Helpful though the present work may be to the study of Kant, it offers perhaps a new indication that the time has passed in which thinkers could profitably devote themselves to the task of building up philosophical systems upon the foundations laid in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

E. RITCHIE.

Da Socrate a Hegel: Nuovi saggi di critica filosofica. Per BERTRANDO SPAVENTA. A cura di GIOVANNI GENTILE. Bari, Gius. Laterza & Figli, 1905. — pp. 430.

The book is a collection of critical essays selected from the contributions of Bertrando Spaventa to various periodicals of his time. The editor is Professor Giovanni Gentile, one of Spaventa's ardent admirers.

To the public outside of Italy a brief biographical account of Spaventa would have constituted a welcome introduction to his writings. As it is, our knowledge of the man, gathered from the book before us, is limited to the following facts: He flourished in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, was an Hegelian, a clear and earnest thinker, an attractive writer, and a valiant opponent of both the political and the spiritual tyranny which the nascent Italian nation was endeavoring to cast off.

The book contains the following essays: (1) "The Doctrine of Socrates," (2) "Thomas Aquinas's Doctrine of Right," (3) "The Life of Giordano Bruno by D. Berti," (4) "Eighteenth Century Sensationalism and Victor

Cousin," (5) "The Practical Philosophy of Kant," (6) "Rosmini's Refutation of Hegel," (7) "Concerning Certain Criticisms [on the preceding essay] by Niccolò Tommaseo," (8) "The Neo-Christian Philosophy and Rationalism in Germany," (9) "Sensationalism in France and the Philosophy of E. Caro," (10) "Italian Amateur Philosophers of the Nineteenth Century," (11) "On Psychopathology in General."

Any one desiring to become acquainted with philosophical movements in Italy during the last century will find this volume a valuable and interesting introduction to the subject. For most of the essays have to do with Italian thinkers; and even those dealing with German and French philosophy reflect the various ways in which these were received in Italy.

In the essay on "The Doctrine of Socrates," Spaventa, criticising a monograph on this subject recently published by Professor Bertini, of Turin, shows that to characterize Socrates in general terms as "representing the principle of conscience and morality," as "the Greek Descartes," or "the Greek Kant," etc., is superficial and inadequate. In this way, one makes of Socrates a naked abstraction. Really to comprehend the man and the historical place and significance of his thought, it is necessary to determine his relation to the concrete Greek life of his time. It is interesting to note that, according to Spaventa, the speculative interest was paramount in Socrates, the ethical interest being subordinate and secondary (p. 22). In the essay on "Thomas Aquinas's Doctrine of Right," the author objects in particular to the failure of the Thomists to recognize what he, as an Hegelian, calls the "objectivity of right" in the state. The article on "Berti's Life of Giordano Bruno" gives vent to the author's detestation of the Inquisition, an institution which Berti handles with too much consideration, he thinks. His glorification of Bruno seems rather extravagant when he says: "To be sure, Berti pronounces him, as a heroic spirit, superior to Socrates; but he has not the courage to say that he was, at least, not inferior to Jesus himself." "Eighteenth Century Sensationalism and Victor Cousin," is a criticism of Cousin's *Philosophie sensualiste au dix-huitième siècle*, which the author finds naïvely superficial. "The Practical Philosophy of Kant," reviewing Jules Barni's translation (with critical introduction) of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, takes occasion to state briefly the significance of Kant's doctrine, frequently dissenting from Barni. We have noted that Spaventa was an Hegelian. When Rosmini, the most eminent Italian philosopher of the nineteenth century, assailed the philosophy of Hegel in his *Logica* as no better than pretentious charlatanism, Spaventa naturally sprang to the defense of Hegel in an article entitled "Hegel Refuted by Rosmini," in which he very effectively exposed the latter's misinterpretations. "Neo-Christian Philosophy and Rationalism in Germany," first published in 1854, is a criticism of Stahl's recently published *Geschichte der Rechtsphilosophie*, which, it seems, sought the basis of political theory in the postulates of the Christian Faith. In "Sensationalism in France and the Philosophy of E. Caro," the author examines the naïve 'spiritual-

ism' which Caro would substitute for French sensationalism, the persistence of which in France is accounted for (according to Caro) by the corrupt state of French society! "Italian Amateur Philosophers of the Nineteenth Century" is a more or less facetious examination of the philosophizing of several laymen of distinction. In the last essay, "On Psychopathology," Spaventa assumes a substantial soul and attempts to make the dependence of psychical changes upon physical changes intelligible on the principles of interaction in general.

E. E. POWELL.

MIAMI UNIVERSITY.

Sociological Papers. By FRANCIS GALTON, E. WESTERMARCK, P. GEDDES, E. DURKHEIM, HAROLD H. MANN, and V. V. BRANFORD. London, Macmillan & Co., 1905. — pp. xviii, 292.

This volume is the first publication of the recently organized Sociological Society in Great Britain. It is a collection of miscellaneous material, consisting for the most part of papers or abstracts of papers read at the meetings of the society, together with the discussions, written communications, and pertinent press comments called forth by the papers. The editors have endeavored to impress upon the contents of the volume some sort of unity by suggesting that the discussions may perhaps be grouped under three main heads as follows: (1) "The History and Methodology of Sociology," — represented by papers "On the Origin and Use of the Word Sociology," by Mr. V. V. Branford, "On the Relation of Sociology to the Social Sciences and to Philosophy," by Professor E. Durkheim and by Mr. Branford, and on "Sociology and the Social Sciences," by Professor Durkheim and M. E. Fauconnet; (2) "Pioneer Researches in Borderland Problems," — represented by papers on "The Position of Woman in Early Civilization," by Dr. E. Westermarck, and on "Life in an Agricultural Village in England," by Mr. Harold H. Mann; (3) "Applied Sociology," — represented by papers on "Eugenics: Its Definition, Scope, and Aims," by Francis Galton, and on "Civics: As Applied Sociology," by Professor Patrick Geddes.

As a whole, this book is perhaps expository and illustrative of the Nature and Method of Sociology. In regard to the central subjects, however, it presents no distinct and consistent point of view. The most that can be said in this connection is that throughout the leading papers there run certain persistent undertones. Among these may be distinguished: (1) a general admission of the relative backwardness in England of frank recognition of sociology as a science and of provision and support for sociological investigation and teaching recognized as such; (2) the expression of the need for conscious coöperative effort among the students of the various sociological specialisms; (3) the conception of sociology as a science with a three-fold purpose, — the presentation of a scientific account of the social facts of the present, an explanation of the social present in terms of genesis

and process, and a forecast of the future ; (4) a voicing of the notion that one of the main purposes of sociological study is to furnish adequate guidance for social ameliorative effort.

The heterogeneous and somewhat informal contents of this volume do not prevent it from being a contribution of distinct worth to sociological literature. The student of applied sociology will find the paper by Professor Geddes on "Civics," and that by Mr. Mann on "Life in an Agricultural Village," to be especially suggestive and stimulating. On the whole, however, the most valuable portion of the work probably consists in the discussions and written communications in connection with the papers on the Value and Method of Sociology. Here the student will find the quintessence of the thought regarding these fundamental questions of many eminent specialists in many lines of research. It would be interesting, did not the limits of this notice forbid, to contrast the diverse opinions expressed by such authorities as Paul Barth, Marcel Bernes, James Bryce, Professor Cosentini, Alfred Fouillée, Professor Koralerski, Achille Loria, J. S. Nicholson, Professor Sorley, Dr. S. R. Steinmetz, Dr. René Worms, and many others of equal rank who contribute to the discussions. The mere mention, however, of these names is sufficient to indicate the wealth of suggestive thought which is here placed before the student of sociology.

It is to be regretted that a book which in so many respects is praiseworthy should suffer for an unnecessary lack of coherence in the arrangement of its contents and from careless proof-reading.

R. F. HOXIE.

Socialistes et sociologues. Par J. BOURDEAU. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1905.—pp. 196.

The single purpose of this book seems to be to show the errors and weaknesses, theoretical, practical, and personal, of the socialists. Superficially the volume has the appearance of a scientific work, though hardly a systematic one. As the discussion goes forward under the main heads, "Questions de sociologie," "Théoriciens socialistes" and "Le socialisme en action," it is the natural supposition of the reader that the author intends to offer a criticism of socialistic theory on the basis of a study of sociological fundamentals. This apparently is M. Bourdeau's aim, but it is hardly realized. As a matter of fact the book consists of a series of practically disconnected essays, in the main popular and polemical though not altogether unscientific.

The author's positive view-point as expressed in the volume is sufficiently indicated by the following quotations :

"A travers l'histoire, comme à travers l'histoire naturelle, les individus et les groupes, les classes sociales comme les espèces animales, se trouvent en lutte, en concurrence perpétuelle ; chaque groupe, chaque classe est menée par une élite, . . . qui comprend les mieux adaptés, les plus éner-

giques et les plus habiles, et tire à elle le profit principal. . . . Ce combat éternel qui a créé la civilisation varie en degré, en intensité, en complexité, mais ne s'arrête pas un seul instant, et nous ne pouvons prévoir qu'il cessera dans l'avenir, étant donné la stabilité du caractère humain. Les groupes les plus forts opprimeront toujours les groupes les plus faibles, s'ils sont incapable de se défendre, de tenir leur adversaires en respect, et le mond idéal de justice et de paix ne convient qu' à' un inscription de cimetière" (p. 145). "Sacrifier l'élite à la foule serait un crime de lèse humanité" (p. 72).

Armed with these notions M. Bourdeau has little difficulty in proving socialism to be the false dreams and tyrannical theories of inconsistent malcontents.

The volume is perhaps worth reading by those who have neither the time nor patience for serious study of the matter concerned.

R. F. HOXIE.

A Text-Book of Sociology. By JAMES QUAYLE DEALEY and FRANK LESTER WARD. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1905. — pp. xxv, 326.

This book "is based fundamentally on *Pure Sociology*" and contains "in epitome the essential elements" of Dr. Ward's sociological system. As such it aims to give "a clear and concise statement of the field of sociology, its scientific basis, its principles as far as these are at present known, and its purpose."

The authors of this work conceive of sociology as the synthesis of all the special social sciences, which thus constitute merely its data. Thus conceived, sociology is to them a true science, — a domain of force whose specific manifestations can be isolated and named, and whose operations under manifold conditions can be reduced to definite laws. The study of this science appeals to them as a study of social forces in action. The emphasis in this work, therefore, is on the genetic and functional rather than on the morphological aspect of social phenomena. Hence, aside from an introductory discussion of data, method, etc., it consists of a study of the origin, classification, nature, and action of social forces in the development of society.

An essential feature of the book is its emphasis on the idea that social development tends more and more to become conscious and teleological, and therefore on the practical value of the study of sociology. The work finds its justification "in the desire to present in simple and popular form, those scientific principles that must ultimately be used as guides for collective activity."

The treatment throughout the book is altogether constructive and non-controversial. The style is very clear and attractive, considering the character of the work. A well-selected bibliography follows the table of contents.

R. F. HOXIE.

The Philosophy of F. H. Jacobi. By ALEXANDER W. CRAWFORD. Cornell Studies in Philosophy, No. 6. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1905. — pp. 90.

Professor Crawford has given us a painstaking and appreciative account of Jacobi's philosophy. The first chapter presents a succinct review of his life and writings, and the four succeeding chapters take up respectively his standpoint and problem, the doctrine of immediacy, his realism or doctrine of actuality, and his metaphysics, theism, and philosophy of religion. On one point the author takes issue with Professor Wilde in his *F. H. Jacobi: A Study in the Origin of German Realism*. "It has been said that Jacobi is a realist, and his philosophy has been characterized as the origin of German realism. But he is at any rate not a materialistic realist; for, as we have just seen, he is a strict theist, believing also that man's nature is essentially spiritual. His language, moreover, is usually the language of realism, but we find it easier to interpret his thought as a groping and imperfect idealism. We have seen reason to regard him as having closer affiliations with the idealists than with the realists, for his thought is, that spirit is the final term of the universe, and that all things have their being only in the Absolute who is spirit, and not substance. It is this conception, then, that leads us to call him an imperfect idealist, and his philosophy one of the springs of German Idealism" (page 86).

An error may be noted in the date given for the publication of Jacobi's *David Hume über den Glauben*. The reference to the work on page 4 would seem to imply that it was published after the second edition of the work on Spinoza, which appeared in 1789. In the bibliography, page 87, the work is dated 1785. The correct date is 1787. Bibliography and index are valuable additions to this scholarly study.

Professor Crawford has confined himself strictly to historical exposition. It would be interesting to have had a discussion of the relation of Jacobi's Faith-Philosophy to certain present-day tendencies of thought. A rough parallel might be drawn between the prevailing types of philosophy a century ago and those of to-day. Modern agnosticism and positivism are like the English and French empiricism of the eighteenth century, at any rate in the denial of all knowledge of the supersensible; modern idealism not only shows the same spirit but is the actual historical descendant of the Kant-Fichtian movement; and have we not in Balfour's doctrine of faith as the foundation of all belief, scientific, philosophic, and religious, and perhaps in pragmatism, with its faith in will rather than in intellect, modern analogues of the faith philosophy of Herder and Jacobi?

F. C. FRENCH.

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The following books also have been received:

The History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century. By ALFRED WILLIAM BENN. 2 vols. New York and Bombay, Longmans, Green, & Co., 1906. — pp. xxviii, 450; xii, 533. 21s.

- Thought and Things: A Study of the Development and Meaning of Thought, or Genetic Logic.* Vol. I: Functional Logic, or Genetic Theory of Knowledge. By JAMES MARK BALDWIN. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1906. — pp. xiv, 273. \$2.75.
- Synthetica: Being Meditations Epistemological and Ontological.* By S. S. LAURIE. 2 vols. New York and Bombay, Longmans, Green, & Co., 1906. — pp. xi, 321; x, 416.
- Applied Sociology: A Treatise on the Conscious Improvement of Society by Society.* By LESTER F. WARD. Boston, New York, Chicago, London, Ginn & Co. — pp. xviii, 384. \$2.50.
- Essay on the Creative Imagination.* By TH. RIBOT. Translated from the French by ALBERT H. N. BARON. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1906. — xix, 370.
- Space and Geometry in the Light of Physiological, Psychological, and Physical Inquiry.* By ERNST MACH. From the German by THOMAS J. McCORMACK. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1906. — pp. 148.
- Leib und Seele: Darstellung und Kritik der neueren Theorien des Verhältnisses zwischen physischem und psychischem Dasein.* Von RUDOLF EISLER. Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1906. — pp. vi, 217. Mk. 4.40.
- Ciò che è vivo e ciò che è morto della filosofia di Hegel.* Per BENEDETTO CROCE. Bari, Gius. Laterza & Figli, 1907. — pp. xvii, 282.
- Su la teoria del contratto sociale.* Per GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO. Bologna, Nicola Zanichelli, 1906. — pp. 118.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *A. d. Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych. u. Phys.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

Pragmatisme et pragmatisme. ANDRÉ LALANDE. *Rev. Ph.*, XXXI, 2, pp. 121-146.

This article is a review of some recent publications by the leaders of the pragmatic movement. There is a tendency in philosophy toward dilettantism which causes it to be regarded rather as a literary art or religious faith than as a serious attempt to solve problems in a scientific manner. Revolt against this tendency is a common element in the pragmatism of Peirce and James, and with both it takes the form of a demand for a new standard of metaphysical truth. Both insist on absolute empiricism, the complete homogeneity of scientific and philosophical truth. Accordingly, they do not accept the classical Kantian arguments for the *a priori* character of the causal law, because their doctrine is a realism which finds the universal in the things experienced. As James insists, both the thing and its relations are equally empirical. For pragmatism, thought is primarily a function which enables us to deal with our environment. But this is not its whole definition, for pragmatism accepts as axiomatic the existence of a multiplicity of thinking beings. Peirce, therefore, makes the meaning of the idea of reality to consist essentially in that which puts an end to controversy. As Peirce uses the method, it is opposed to authority quite as much as to rationalism. Pragmatism appears in a great number of forms and this fact has led Peirce to coin the term 'pragmatism' for his own form of the doctrine. James accepts this indefiniteness as part of the movement; it is not so much a doctrine as a spiritual tendency, which could not, without detriment, be forced into a rigidly consistent form. James uses belief in a more subjective sense than Peirce and gives his thought a decided tendency toward fideism. Schiller, while rightly claiming community with James, goes still farther in the direction of voluntarism both in logic and

metaphysics. He is clearly opposed to Peirce, because he welcomes the existing variety of opinion among thinkers of the pragmatic school. His young Italian followers, the editors of *Leonardo*, who have formed a 'pragmatist club' in Florence, frankly accept pragmatism as a solvent of theories and beliefs, which they regard as purely instrumental. On the other hand, pragmatism has been made use of by apologists for various religious doctrines. Pragmatism seems to have arisen to meet certain weaknesses of intellectualism. The representational theory of knowledge is admittedly dead, and Kant's solution of the problem of knowledge rests on a static conception of the mind quite foreign to present evolutionary modes of thought. In both ethics and logic, indeed, pragmatism may result in a purely individual and anarchical solution of the problems, but this is not necessary. Individual action cannot be the criterion of truth, but collective thought and action may furnish a criterion to the individual. The true may be conceived as an ideal unity toward which our knowledge is directed, a limit not to be foreseen *a priori* but to be progressively realized. Peirce especially seems to base his pragmatism on the subordination of individual to collective thought. This view supports pragmatism upon an intellectual communism, and opens a *via media* between James's sharp antithesis of intellectualism and pure instrumentalism. Besides relating us to our environment, knowledge has also the function of removing the barriers which shut in the individual. Its goal is to correct the fragmentariness of the individual mind and to substitute a unified common thought for a multiplicity of individual opinions.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

The Ambiguity of Truth. F. C. S. SCHILLER. *Mind*, No. 58, pp. 161-176.

The use of truth is a habit peculiar to man. The true, as the logical norm, is closely analogous to the good and the beautiful. A truth is a proposition envisaged *sub specie veri (et falsi)*. But since every assertion as such involves a claim to truth, this term becomes ambiguous, referring either to the mere formal claim before verification or to the validated claim which has taken its place in a definite system of knowledge. How shall we distinguish these two? For the formal or intellectualistic logic the problem is hopeless; it can neither be dismissed nor solved. To reach the solution, we must ask how truth is made, how the systematic sciences are actually built up. Now in every science we find a definite subject-matter and method, and the truth of any answer depends on its relevance to the question raised in that science. The nature of the *purpose* pursued in the science will yield the deepest insight into the nature of the science. The objectivity of truth is guaranteed by its social character, and by its subordination to the final purpose, 'the Good.' In all actual knowing the question whether an assertion is true or false is decided by its consequences. A truth is what is useful in building up a science; a falsehood is what is noxious for this same purpose. This is the whole rationale of Pragmatism.

The conception of truth as logical value unifies experience and rationalizes the classification of the normative sciences. The article concludes with a twofold challenge to intellectualist logicians: How do they propose (1) to evaluate a claim to truth, and (2) to discriminate between such a claim and an established truth?

F. D. MITCHELL.

Predetermination and Personal Endeavor. W. R. BOYCE GIBSON. *Mind*, No. 56, pp. 494-506.

Is the actual itself completely determined, or does the issue depend, in part, at least, on what we strive to make it? Our first answer is likely to be that knowledge is predetermined, but not volition. Hegel offers an intellectualistic reconciliation of the two, bringing will around to the standpoint of intellect. McTaggart makes neither will nor intellect, but love, ultimate. According to the solution proposed in this article, intellect and will are not opposed; knowledge is rooted in volition, and we are carried beyond contemplation to action, beyond knowledge of objects to knowledge or realization of self. In knowledge of objects we deal with the predetermined or 'given,' though even here the significance of knowledge for *us* is not independent of its pursuit. In self-realization the motive lies not in an already accomplished, static ideal, but in the meaning and value of truth, so far as realized by and organized in us; the profoundest truths are not abstract psychological theories *about* experience, but the concrete truths of social life as they exist *for* experience. To make knowledge 'timeless,' however independent it may be of time-changes, is to render meaningless the notion of development. Failure to make and abide by the distinction between knowledge of self and knowledge of objects is one of the main sources of the current misunderstanding between intellectualists and pragmatists.

F. D. MITCHELL.

Contradiction and Reality. BERNARD BOSANQUET. *Mind*, No. 57, pp. 1-12.

The purpose of this paper is to insist on negativity as a fundamental characteristic of the real, as against those who, from a psychological view of experience and a confusion of negativity with logical contradiction, regard it as eliminative. Logical contradiction, which consists in the ascription of different predicates to that which has not been fitted to receive them, as unthinkable, plainly cannot be characteristic of ultimate reality. It may be and is, however, not merely subjective, but an objective existent in the world of actual life and fact. Witness the fact of progress in action and cognition. Progress implies its resolution and yet as constantly affirms its existence. It cancels while it maintains itself. Evidently there underlies it something which goes deeper than actuality. This is Hegel's view. For him it is the pulse of the world, a fundamental in all that is real. A view

like McTaggart's, which regards contradiction as a disappearing quantity in the progress of experience, and therefore as non-existent in the Absolute, seems to rest upon a confusion of logical contradiction and negativity. The current view of experience, which endeavors to interpret self-consciousness by reference to actual experience, is doubtless largely responsible. But while logical contradiction is an imperfection which in the progress of experience is as such being constantly eliminated, that which upholds the progress is negativity. It deepens with progress, and must therefore be an essential feature in the completeness of the Infinite. Pain, evil, and error are thus not to be conceived as illusory, but as fundamental to the real. The burden of the finite is inherently a part or rather an instrument of the self-completeness of the infinite.

W. L. BAILEY.

Über die Möglichkeit der Betrachtung von unten und von oben in der Kulturphilosophie (Schluss). H. LESER. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XI, 4, pp. 393-444.

In turning to a critique of the mere treatment 'from below,' it is to be noted first that the mental sciences have developed a relatively independent method in opposition to the natural sciences. Owing, however, to the recent extension of the term 'nature' to include realities of both the corporeal and mental sphere, these mental sciences still come under the treatment 'from below.' But this does not mean that culture does not contain a deeper content of truth in itself extending beyond the realm of nature. Mental life does possess something unique, a realm of original truth and reality which naturalism completely ignores. The connection of mental phenomena by mere association cannot explain the various mental complexes that are met with. Kant, as opposed to the English empiricists, emphasized this in his transcendental logic. For example, the naturalistic treatment recognizes no norms such as are met with in the moral and religious sphere. Further, the naturalistic treatment 'from below' works in a circle by assuming a mental principle which is later resolved into mere appearance. Now, while association undoubtedly plays an important part in the treatment of mental phenomena, it is merely scientific economy that leads one to view such phenomena as entirely explicable by association. Even while mental complexes have for science as such no independent meaning, the question is quite different in the case of philosophical treatment. Mental elements are not purely formal in their nature. Hegel himself did not recognize the full philosophical reality which is here met with. While Kant has been more fortunate, as may be seen in his distinction between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*, even he is too onesided; the mental powers are not so formal and dependent on experience. In the higher stages especially, they become more and more separated from sensible content and form an independent existence. Here the Kantian distinction of form and content fails; mental processes embrace both. We

may then say that our transcendental *a priori* faculty consists in living functions. Kant unconsciously expressed this in his epistemology, which looked to the functional laws of our reason. Now this *a priori* of course works on experience, but does not arise from it, nor can it act without giving to experience a meaning and connection, and bringing it over into its own sphere. As a consequence of this study, then, we may say that, however much mental life may depend on experience for its development, it is independent, and its various parts and phases are not to be understood 'from below,' but rather from the inner necessity of its own being. It brings experience over into its own sphere and gives it meaning. This is to be particularly noted in the development of culture. Science as such is right in taking the phenomena of personality and the state to be mere fictions, but we must admit and distinguish the philosophical side which treats such phenomena as independent realities. This does not mean that there is a sharp demarcation between 'nature' and 'mind.' These are bound up together, and one finds 'nature' in culture as much as 'mind' outside of it. Again, the empirical limitations of the human mind are necessary; they form the history of mind by making it an endless becoming. Last, the natural sciences, dealing with facts, have a positive method, while the mental sciences, dealing with worth and value, are preëminently normative and teleological.

R. B. WAUGH.

The Crux of Theism. W. H. MALLOCK. Hibbert Journal, III, 3, pp. 478-498.

Let us concede with Romanes (in a posthumous volume lately edited by the Bishop of Birmingham) the existence of intelligent purpose in the universe, and its active presence in every process of nature; let us concede that these processes admit of, even demand, a God; yet they are, we must contend, utterly inconsistent with a God possessing the character which it is the essence of Theism to attribute to Him, a God with fatherly love to the individual soul, the only God who could be an object of religion or interest to mankind. It is strange that Romanes failed to see the impossibility of reconciling the God of the Theist, who in a Christian sense is good, with a God who consciously and deliberately acts through evolutionary processes, producing individuals most of whom are doomed, congenitally or otherwise, to misery and spiritual death. Christianity itself is a type of evolutionary process. The race had grown old before its birth, and even now three-fourths of all human beings are without its blessings.

C. WEST.

La proposition et le syllogisme. J. LACHELIER. Rev. de Mét., XIV, 2, pp. 135-164.

This article is a study of propositions and syllogisms. It is divided into three sections. The first section, which is devoted to the division and sub-

division of propositions, finds that there are two general classes : propositions of inherence and propositions of relation. The latter of these may, the author maintains, be used in a syllogism, which, however, is quite different from that of the Aristotelian logic. The former class he subdivides into five species, viz., singular, collective determinate, collective indeterminate, universal, and particular. The next section, which deals with the first three figures of the syllogism in the light of the above division and subdivision of propositions, points out that there are really ten modes in both the first and the second figures of the Aristotelian syllogism, while in the third figure fourteen modes are possible. In the case of the first and second figures, the author argues, the premisses are susceptible, from the point of view of quality, of two, and, from the point of view of quantity, of five forms ; in the case of the third figure seven forms, from the point of view of quantity, are possible. The traditional modes of these figures the author explains to be a result of the failure of logicians to recognize his several kinds of propositions. The third section of the article is devoted to a practical application and confirmation of the above theory.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

Quality and Quantity. JOHANNES GROS. *The Monist*, XV, 3, pp. 361-375.

The dualism of self and non-self was established by accepting sensations as qualities of things apart from self. But the examination of sensation proves that sensation can give only what it implies, *i. e.*, a state of consciousness, and not the quality of a thing. A series of psychical states is all that sensation can give, unless we suppose a spontaneous postulate by thought of otherness, a psychological mystery. But we have a right to take into account all the creations of philosophic reflection. And in order to regard itself as a series of states of consciousness, thought must have something upon which to record these states. But it has no right to infer that, therefore, sensations are qualities of that something. We only attribute qualities to objects by a sort of illusion. The human mind knows only number adequately, can only clearly grasp what can be reduced to a ratio. Therefore quality, to be intelligible, must be reducible to quantity ; and the progress of knowledge will be proportional to the substitution of mathematical formula for intensive fact. This is the ideal of physics, to show that sensations, though qualities in ourselves, are externally modifications of motion, the reduction of quality to quantity. And by this reduction of a confused state to a clear idea, we manage adequately to grasp the real,—adequately, but in relation to our way of knowing. Quality considered as an inner state will always remain out of reach. The psychological inner self escapes any fixed determination, since it varies according to individual temperament. If, then, we may be said to mutilate things by setting them in mathematical formulas, we simply affirm that only so set are they

intelligible. Quality is objectively an illusion founded on reason, expressing the relation between objects and ourselves; it is subjectively a sensation whose certainty lies in our own psychical existence, the more or less confused feeling of something good or evil for our organism. Quantity is the irreducible point of view of thought in its effort to reflect and classify the world.

C. WEST.

The Nature of Consistency. G. A. TAWNEY. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., III, 5, pp. 113-123.

Consistency is an immediate sense of self-maintenance in activities; it is identity, though not mere abstract identity. Reality is probably simply consistent experience, continuous, self-maintaining. In actual experience, consistency results in a feeling of satisfaction. It is analogous to accommodation and habit, and partakes of the nature of both; but it differs from them in being conscious and reflective, free, purposeful, and self-determined. It is also akin to assimilation, but superior to it. The self maintained by consistency is the self of socially significant activities. Consistency is a matter of value rather than a matter of fact, and all values are social.

MATTIE ALEXANDER MARTIN.

Genèse des premiers principes. L. BAILLE. Rev. de Ph., VI, 2, pp. 166-178.

A genetic study of the principle of contradiction is requisite in order to vindicate its priority and objectivity. According to psychological evidence, intellectual knowledge takes its origin in the most general ideas, each of which constitutes the germ of an analytic judgment, the judgment of definition. The most extended and least determinate, and hence the earliest, of our concepts is that of being in the concrete (*ens*). The most general of perfections by which it manifests itself to intelligence is being (*esse*). Hence the first judgment must be the affirmation *ens est*, with its implicit rejection of the predicate of non-being. This rudimentary form of the first principle, which is at the root of all our judgments, is not a mere tautology, for in it the idea of being first comes to its full value, and the necessary union of intelligence and reality is effected. This first judgment is not an act of 'consciousness,' as relativism insists, but rather the establishment of the objectivity which must precede such consciousness. The misconception of this judgment as purely analytical has arisen out of a failure to recognize the concrete character of the subject, and from the erroneous conviction that thought being exists essentially and necessarily. Since the affirmation of the capacity for existence of a thought being suffices to distinguish it not merely from a purely subjective idea but also from simple nothingness, the principle next assumes the hypothetical form: If a being is, its existence excludes non-existence; the same being cannot at

the same time be and not be. At this stage of development the judgment manifests at once the essentially objective character of knowledge, and the two fundamental properties of intelligence, truth and unity. A third and more complex formulation follows. In the words of Renouvier: "The same subject cannot admit a definite qualification, and, at the same time and in the same connection, its contradictory opposite." This represents a universalization of the preceding formula. The analytic and objective character of the principle of causality may be vindicated on these same lines. For the original concrete idea of being is given as relative, in so far as the first judgment developing out of it implies its inability to actualize itself. Since the relative implies the non-relative, the mind is forced to distinguish between the actualized power and its source, thus passing from the principle of contradiction into that of causality. Hence the latter also has its root not in an immanent law of reason, but in the constitution of reality itself.

ELSIE MURRAY.

Consciousness and its Object. F. ARNOLD. Psych. Rev., XII, 4, pp. 222-249.

The problem is to examine how far it is possible to have direct awareness of consciousness, what is meant by a mental state, and to search for a formula with which one may work in dealing with object, reality, or consciousness. (1) Direct awareness of consciousness is impossible, for introspection deals with a present object. Even in dealing with a duration-block of consciousness, we are concerned with a present object; for it is impossible to introspect either a past mental state or self-activity. In emotion, too, the same truth is evident. Emotion, as defined by the James-Lange theory, is simply consciousness of our body in a peculiar way. (2) By an object of consciousness is meant simply what affects one at any moment, *e. g.*, a piece of paper, or one's own body. But in the so-called higher forms of mental activity consciousness seems to deal with images, with words and their meaning, and with relations. However, images are only the effect of something that formerly influenced consciousness. So, too, words and word-images are simply a number of impressions, while their significance is constituted by certain bodily attitudes connected with the words and so with actual objects. Finally, the relational consciousness is only consciousness of a body in a special manner. (3) But consciousness is known to us only in relation to something else, and is implied in the object. In fact the object is equivalent to consciousness in relation to the real. Consciousness and reality are abstractions from the object. The immediate object is all we have; reality, which we can never know, is in some way bound up with another reality, the self or consciousness.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

PSYCHOLOGY.

La conscience. PAUL HERMANT. Rev. de Ph., V, II, pp. 495-511.

In the discussion of consciousness, it is necessary to distinguish conscious and unconscious phenomena. Leibniz distinguishes two kinds of unconscious phenomena : (1) excitations which are 'below the threshold' ; (2) states unconscious as a result of habit. H's table of unconscious phenomena is as follows : (1) very feeble modifications of mental states, (2) habitual phenomena, (3) points intermediate between two conscious facts, (4) phenomena without reaction upon the whole self, (5) habitual composites of a very abstract state of mind. Some characteristics of consciousness, on the other hand, are : (1) attention (normal), (2) volition, (3) traces left in memory (in opposition to hypnotic states, etc.), (4) pleasure or pain. We can say that the state of consciousness responds to the psychic life of the being himself, to his individual evolution, to his growth or retrogression. In the last analysis, consciousness is a phenomenon of association between a new image and the whole of a former acquisition ; an acquired representation grows unconscious in so far as it undergoes very slight modifications. Around the automative actions are grouped those which, through habit, become less and less prominent in consciousness. Consciousness is the evolution of oneself, the realization of a new equilibrium. Consciousness and unconsciousness do not form in our personality two separate and independent domains ; our mental life is a unity, the different elements of which are in intimate relation.

MATTIE ALEXANDER MARTIN.

L'effort. B. BOURDON. Rev. Ph., XXXI, I, pp. 11-14.

As to the definition of the term 'effort,' thinkers are not agreed. For the physiologist it is a very precise conception. But eventually the physiologist reduces his definition to terms of that of the psychologist, for whom, as for common sense, effort is intense muscular contraction. Here, however, arises the difficulty of determining the degree of intensity necessary for effort. So we have to say effort is muscular contraction, weak as well as intense, or even the tendency toward contraction. As to the perception of effort, it would seem that the sensations come from the muscles. However, Goldscheider opposes this theory and holds that the tendons are the proper organs of perception. But his distinction between the sensation of effort and sensation of resistance seems to be unwarranted, the latter resolving itself into a sensation of pressure *plus* a sensation of effort. In the emotions this phenomenon of effort is found. So, also, in the moral and intellectual spheres there is no such thing as purely moral or mental effort ; there are often real sensations and always representations of muscular effort. Concerning the part effort plays in distinguishing the self from the external world, there is much difference of opinion. It would seem

however, that neither effort alone nor effort associated with the sensation of pressure can give us the notion of objectivity.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

L'ironie : étude psychologique. GEORGES PALANTE. Rev. Ph., XXXI, 2, pp. 147-163.

Though belonging to both individual and social psychology, irony is in origin individualistic. It is one of the principal attitudes possible to the individual before society ; it is here that it is interesting to the social psychologist. The generating principle of irony seems to be a sort of dualism which can take different forms and give rise to diverse antinomies. Laughter and irony have the same source,—an unexpected incompatibility between our preconceived idea of a thing and the real aspect suddenly shown us. Schopenhauer shows that what makes the gaiety of laughter is the revenge of intuition upon abstract thought. But why is laughter gay and irony often sad or bitter ? Schopenhauer's explanation is incomplete here. P. holds that it is due to this same *defeat* of our reason, which, when serious, becomes disquieting ; the defeat of reason is the defeat of ourselves. The most frequent source of irony is probably the dissociation in the mind between intelligence and sensibility. Irony is the passionate daughter of sorrow, but is also the proud daughter of cold intelligence. Again, the conflict between different passions engenders irony. This is shown in the theme furnished by the battle waged between the instinct of sociability and that of egotism, irony differs from cynicism in that the latter is a transcendent egotism, whereas the former treats itself as one among many ; cynicism presupposes a lack of nobleness of soul, irony presupposes an intelligence fine and subtle. To sum up the psychological characteristics of irony : it is pessimistic ; being essentially intellectual, it is aristocratic and romantic. It is a characteristic trait of art and romantic thought ; it represents the essentially æsthetic attitude, the antithesis to the rationalistic attitude. Irony, though held in abomination by dogmatic minds, has a function as a counter-balance to social and moral dogmatism, evangelism, and moralism.

MATTIE ALEXANDER MARTIN.

Sur les abstraits émotionnels. L. DUGAS. Rev. Ph., XXX, 11, pp. 472-486.

Not only is there, as Ribot has shown, an affective as well as an intellectual abstraction, but the general idea originates in feeling. If there is, however, a process of abstraction common to feeling and thought, it is not that of fusion. Galton's general idea cannot explain itself without feeling, much less explain the abstraction of feeling. Such a general idea as beauty is explicable only on the basis of a certain *rapprochement* between our nature and the various things which please us ; not on a fusion of images. Indeed, generalization is never a mechanical operation ; the law of affinity among

images must be sought in the feelings. Generalization means not merely to collect but to comprehend. A general idea is a point of view, and an interest originates and develops it. But not only is the general idea based on feeling, the emotions themselves can be generalized. The passions of avarice and love may be called abstract in that they apparently subsist independent of cause and condition. Feelings have an internal source and develop in both advantageous and disadvantageous circumstances. We generalize the passion of love when we recognize it as the same through all of its forms and phases. But the unity of this generalization lies in a common law binding diverse phenomena, not in community of characteristics between diverse phenomena.

C. WEST.

La haine : étude psychologique. E. TARDIEU. Rev. Ph., XXX, 12, pp. 625-635.

Hatred proceeds from an instinct of self preservation, and is the weapon of the egoist. Disparity of thought engenders hatred. Women more than men are its victims ; it is a sign of weakness. Sometimes it springs from physical antipathy, sometimes from mental and moral degeneracy. Its manifestations are frequent, but especially noticeable in the state of love, and in those of wedded and family life. Social hatreds arise chiefly from social inequalities. Though hatred is not to be commended, it has its value. Certainly it is sometimes a stimulant to talent, and a weapon in the hand of the ambitious. And if the hatred of foreigners conduces to the love of one's countrymen, one does well to defend it.

C. WEST.

ETHICS AND ÆSTHETICS.

La religion du doute. G. PRÉVOST. Rev. Ph., XXXI, 1, pp. 41-62.

Doubt is to be condemned only when it lulls us to sleep, for then it is synonymous with stagnation. In itself, however, it is the instrument of progress ; conscientious doubt, active and not resigned, is a veritable religion. Certitude concerning man's destiny would be fatal to him ; yet he seems justified in believing that the gradation, everywhere evident to him, is equally applicable to those beings who, included in the infinite, have neither beginning nor end. God, for man, is essentially the Unknowable, although we do have the idea of infinity of which the idea of God has been said to be a 'form.' It is better to doubt than to attribute to God human qualities ; and this we do when we speak of him without limiting ourselves to the affirmation of his existence. Concerning our destiny, moreover, the word *néant* has no significance. From the point of view of being, there are transformations, but life is continuous. To begin and to end imply an interruption of life, hence there is no beginning and no end. Matter is never destroyed ; only its form is modified. And why may not conscious force, constituting the individual, obey just as any other

force the universal law of transformation? Why may not this transformation be viewed as a gradation toward the infinite such as we see in every visible extension? Finally, even in reserving a place for doubt concerning the nature of these transformations, one can, by accepting this gradation toward the infinite, not only explain the evolution of all living beings, but also construct a very practical and very elevated morality with a sanction adequate to our sentiment of justice.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

Ein Beitrag zur Erkenntnis der sozialwissenschaftlichen Bedeutung des Bedürfnisses. SIEGFRIED KRAUS. V. f. w. Ph., XXX, 1, pp. 1-39.

Social science has for its object human activities directed to the satisfaction of economic and other needs arising from life in society. The basal factors in these are the individual subject and the environment. On which the emphasis is to be laid, or in which the moving principle sought, is the fundamental problem. The essay falls into two main parts: A critical part directed against the so-called materialistic interpretation of social phenomena, Karl Marx being taken as typical; and a positive part, being an inquiry into the general nature and causal basis of needs. From these opens up the wider problem of a system of needs. The basis of the materialistic interpretation is the fact of the essential relation of man to a material environment. To live, he must master it; he does this by tools; development, then, means better tools. Since all spiritual phenomena of society, as, *e. g.*, religion, art, etc., are dependent on the economic status of that society, the development in productive means indicates development here also; *e. g.*, economic status and political revolution in France. The materialistic interpretation, of course, lays emphasis on the economic factor as primal. Its plausibility rests on an uncritical causal concept and loose ideas of the individual and environment. A parallelism, such as it points to, does not indicate a causal priority of the material or economic. Kraus then deals with the nature and conditions of a need as such. In so far as needs are regarded as the causes of human activities, want (*Begehren*) and feeling (*Fühlen*) must be their constitutive elements. The unity of the individual imposes upon them a form-element giving unity and definiteness. All that is most fundamental in a need thus belongs to the individual subject. The environmental element may be and indeed is prior in time, but not logically. The system of needs is not merely a temporal one, but genetic and dialectical, and the formal or culture element is the independent, organizing, and directive variable in it.

W. L. BAILEY.

Le rôle social de l'art. P. GAULTIER. Rev. Ph., XXXI, 4, pp. 391-409.

A work of art is social, in the first place, in its constitution. It is a synthesis; for every work of art truly worthy the name is the product of the collaboration of the artist with the beings or the things which the work

represents. It is social, in the second place, in its origin. The artist's greatest productions picture the times in which he lives ; he is held, at least implicitly, by bonds of sentiment or of imitation to his time, his country, his neighborhood. The more original an artist, the more fully can he reflect the spirit of his time. Again, a work of art is social in its effects ; first, on the individual, and second, on the social whole. It takes the individual out of himself and brings him into sympathy with the author, his subject, and his surroundings ; it teaches him a wider tolerance by enlisting his sympathy with that which is new and different. Again, the fact that it arouses in individuals of a group much the same sentiments serves to unify them ; it takes hold of the common elements in their enthusiasm and itself becomes a common ideal. It unites by emphasizing common sentiments and by suppressing distinctions. A work of art is social because it is beautiful, because it appeals to the æsthetic emotion. The real artist differs from the dilettante in his ability to appeal to this emotion. There is a certain solidarity existing between beauty of works of art and their social character. On the other hand, in spite of their beauty, works of art may become anti-social in arousing emotions destructive to the social organization. They then serve an end radically opposed, not only to progress, but to society itself. Finally, the artist himself, if he be great, must be a man of his time and of all time, a man to whom nothing living is foreign.

MATTIE ALEXANDER MARTIN.

NOTES.

Associate Professor Alexander Meikeljohn, Dean of Brown University, has been made Professor of Logic and Metaphysics.

Dr. Frederick Tracy, Lecturer in Philosophy in the University of Toronto, has been appointed Associate-Professor of Philosophy in the same institution, the appointment to date from July 1, 1906. Mr. W. G. Smith and Dr. T. R. Robinson have been added to the staff as lecturers in philosophy.

Dr. W. K. Wright, of the University of Chicago, has been appointed Instructor in Philosophy and Psychology at the University of Texas, to succeed Dr. Warner Fite, who has been made Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at the University of Indiana.

Dr. Percy Hughes, of the University of Minnesota, is filling the chair of philosophy at Tulane University during the absence of Professor W. B. Smith, who will spend the coming year in Europe.

The Open Court Publishing Company has added to its series of Philosophical Classics a reprint of William Smith's translation of Fichte's *Vocation of Man*, with an introduction by Dr. E. Ritchie. The same firm reissues the reprint of Hume's *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, supplemented in this new edition by selections from Book I of Hume's earlier and completer work, the *Treatise on Human Nature*. The added sections are (1) the first, second, third, and fourteenth of Part III, which enlarge the teaching of the *Enquiry* concerning causality; and (2) Section VI of Part I, "Of Modes and Substances"; Section VI of Part II, "Of the Idea of Existence and of External Existence"; and Sections II and VI of Part IV, which include the important part of Hume's teaching about the existence of body and the 'idea of self.' The Open Court Publishing Company has also in press a revision of its edition of Locke's *Essay* (Books II and IV, in part). This issue will be prefixed by a reprint of the translation, published in 1706, of Leclerc's *Life of Locke* (1705). This intimate and appreciative biography by Locke's personal friend, is not elsewhere readily accessible.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical journals:

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XIII, 5: *Felix Arnold*, The Psychology of Interest, II; *F. Kuhlmann*, On the Analysis of the Memory Consciousness; *S. F. MacLennan*, Organization in Psychology.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, III, 8: *J. W. Baird*, The Contraction of the Color Zones in Hysteria and Neurasthenia; *Adolf Meyer*, The Relation of Emotional and Intellectual Functions in Paranoia and Obsessions; Psychological Literature; Books Received, Notes and News.

III, 9: *Percy Hughes*, The Term Ego and the Term Self; Psychological Literature; Books Received; Notes and News.

THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, II, 1: *G. F. Stout*, The Nature of Conation and Mental Activity; *W. G. Smith*, A Study of Some Correlations of the Müller-Lyer Visual Illusion and Allied Phenomena; *W. H. Winch*, Immediate Memory in School Children, II: Auditory; *Beatrice Edgell* and *W. Legge Symes*, The Wheatstone-Hipp Chronoscope; *C. Spearman*, 'Footrule' for Measuring Correlation; Proceedings of the Psychological Society.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, III, 17: *M. Phillips Mason*, Reality as Possible Experience; *G. A. Tawney*, Two Types of Consistency; *Lucinda Pearl Boggs*, The Relation of Feeling and Interest; *E. A. Norris*, Feeling; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

III, 18: *F. C. S. Schiller*, Idealism and the Dissociation of Personality; *Arthur Ernest Davies*, The Genesis of Ideals; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

III, 19: *Walter B. Pitkin*, The Relation Between the Act and the Object of Belief; *E. A. Norris*, Self as a Developed Feeling Complex; *A. W. Moore*, The Function of Thought; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

III, 20: *John E. Boodin*, Space and Reality: I. Ideal or Serial Space; *Wm. J. Newlin*, A New Logical Diagram; *Bernard C. Ewer*, Metaphysics, Science or Art; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Notes and News.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE, XXX, 3: *Georg Wernick*, Der Wirklichkeitsgedanke, II; *Max Frischeisen-Köhler*, Die Lehre von der Subjectivität der Sinnesqualitäten und ihre Gegner; Besprechungen über Schriften; Selbstanzeige; Philosophische und soziologische Zeitschriften; Bibliographie.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, XLII, 4 u. 5: *A. Pick*, Rückwirkung, sprachlicher Perseveration auf den Assoziationsvorgang; *G. Heymans* und *E. Wiersma*, Beiträge zur speziellen Psychologie auf Grund der Massenuntersuchung (Schluss); *D. Katz*, Experimentelle Beiträge zur Psychologie des Vergleichs im Gebiete des Zeitsinns; Literaturbericht.

XLII, 6: *H. Cornelius*, Psychologische Prinzipienfragen: I. Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie; *D. Katz*, Experimentelle Beiträge zur Psychologie des Vergleichs in Gebiete des Zeitsinns (Schluss); Literaturbericht.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE, VI, 9: *E. Mallet*, La philosophie de l'action; *E. Baudin*, La philosophie de la foi chez Newman, III; *F. Mentré*, La philosophie des sciences d'après Cournot; Analyses et comptes rendus; L'enseignement philosophique.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XIV, 4: *Sully Prudhomme*, Psychologie du libre arbitre; *A. Fouillée*, La doctrine de la vie chez Guyau, son unité et sa portée; *E. Halévy*, Les principes de la distribution des rich-

esses ; *Ch. Andler*, Un système nouveau de socialisme scientifique : *M. Otto Effertz* ; *M. Winter*, Application de l'algèbre de la logique à une controverse juridique ; Supplement.

XIV, 5 : *B. Russell*, Les paradoxes de la logique ; *Ch. Dunan*, Légitimité de la métaphysique ; *L. Brunschvicg*, Spinoza et ses contemporains ; *A. Mamelet*, L'idée de rythme, par *A. Chide* ; *G. Lechalas*, Logique et moralisme ; *G. Dwelshauvers*, A propos de l'idée de vie ; Supplement.

JOURNAL DE PSYCHOLOGIE NORMALE ET PATHOLOGIQUE, III, 5 : *W. Bechterew*, La personnalité ; *J. Grasset*, La responsabilité atténuée ; Société de psychologie ; Bibliographie.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XXXI, 8 : *F. Le Dantec*, Les objections au monisme ; *Roerich*, L'attention spontanée dans la vie ordinaire et ses applications pratiques ; *A. Chide*, La logique avant les logiciens ; *E. Tassy*, Le sympathique et l'idéation ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Revue des périodiques étrangers ; Livres nouveaux.

XXXI, 9 : *P. Gaultier*, Qu'est-ce que l'art ? *F. Le Dantec*, Les objections au monisme (2^e et dernier article) ; *R. De La Grasserie*, Les moyens linguistiques de condensation de la pensée ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Livres nouveaux.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA E SCIENZE AFFINI, XV, 1-3 : *R. Ardigo*, I tre momenti critici nella storia della gnostica della filosofia moderna ; *F. Severi*, Problemi della scienza ; *P. Rotta*, D'una psicologia pragmatica della credenza ; *G. Marchesini*, Miseria e incongruenze della pedagogia nazionale ; *C. Ranzoli*, Per l'originalità del pensiero italiano ; *G. Mazzalorso*, La *φιλία* aristotelica ; *G. A. Colozza*, Storia dell' istruzione e dell' educazione ; Analisi e cenni di filosofia el pedagogia.

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[N. B. — (a) stands for original articles, (b) for book notices, (d) for discussions, (n) for notes, (r) for reviews of books, and (s) for summaries.]

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
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