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Philos

I

THE  
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

EDITED BY

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OF THE SAGE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY, CORNELL UNIVERSITY

WITH THE COÖPERATION OF

JAMES SETH

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH

VOLUME XVIII — 1909

120679  
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NEW YORK  
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.

1909



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THE  
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

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CHANGE AND THE CHANGELESS.

I.

WITH few exceptions, philosophers have pronounced holy ban upon change. They have driven it forth from the halls of the gods and compelled it to wander disconsolate on a shard-strewn earth.

“ Seemed to the holy festival  
The rash word boded ill to all.”

Where its defenders have appeared, the very vehemence of their loyalty has been testimony to the indignity.

Ordinary thought has approved the summary expulsion. For most men, at most times, *reality*, — behind, or above, or beyond our experience, wherever or however it was thought to be, — has meant the permanent as against the transient. Indeed, even at the present day, deeply as we are possessed of evolutionary conceptions, we still hold the ‘fundamental,’ the ‘essential,’ to be the over-and-above, the eternally-beyond all change. And on the whole, there seems good ground for a certain summary dismissal of change as too poor for reality. That my experience, for example, ‘grows’ from day to day, that in meeting the situations of my life, I become increasingly intelligent, may, indeed, be encouraging; but it surely cannot argue in me perfection of being. That after certain years, my power of insight diminishes, that I grow more helpless of judgment and of control, must still less argue perfection of being. To be sure, striving and partial attainment may be better than complete absence of effort; but it is a question whether it is better than a life where, by reason of completeness of being, striving has no

place. However we may rejoice in the fact that we are of the stuff

“To go on forever and fail,  
And go on again ;”

we can conceive of conditions more nearly ideal, in which the being is so completely equipped that failure and lack, and consequently the necessity for striving, are absent. It is doubtless this consideration that has wrought the conviction that perfect being knows no change.

And yet there is a serious difficulty which has always been present in the effort to think change as defect. The logical implication of the thought is that the real is the changeless. But to think the real as the changeless is, first of all, to repudiate experience, for experience changes. In the second place, it is to make the repudiation in behalf of a concept, ‘the changeless,’ which not only seems incapable of being either real or realized, but which appears above all to contradict the deepest values of life. The changeless, apparently, is the static : the very significant fact about life, on the contrary, is that it is dynamic.

Can changelessness be reconciled with activity, permanence with power ? The problem becomes vital when we try to conceive God as an eternally realized being. As such, it would seem, he has ‘nothing to do’ ; he is the euthanasia of complete rest. We find ourselves confronted, then, with the religious necessity of relating him to imperfect human endeavor : he must take cognizance of the world of time and change ; nay, he must ‘do’ something in that world, if he is to exhibit his godhood. So, from the point of view of religious needs, men have framed the notion of an active God that is in time and change, and even of bodily members. How, now, can the permanence of perfect being demanded both by metaphysics and by ordinary thought be reconciled with the religious doctrine of his participation in impermanence ? Within this problem, indeed, lies the essential conflict between philosophy, with its main roots in the idealism of Greek thought, and Christianity, with its main roots in the naturalism of Hebraic thought.

Obviously, the problem is to be solved, not by widening the



gulf between the changing and the changeless, not by making each completely excludent of the other, but by finding in them community of being. If the changelessness of perfect being is the *total absence* of all that is of the nature of change, it is metaphysically impossible for perfect being to be in any wise effectively related to a world of change. Such a changeless God must either be an absentee God, keeping his sacred skirts clear of polluting change, or forego his immaculate godhood. Likewise, if change has nothing whatever of the nature of the changeless, it is impossible for beings of change to be effectively related to perfect being. Plato, with all his Eleatic sense of the changelessness of the perfect, saw the necessity for transcending the plane of opposition upon which the changing and the changeless, the static and the dynamic, are mutually excludent. As he contemplates the Eleatic and Heraclitean opposition, he sees that it is constituted of one-sided views. Neither sheer permanence as excludent of change, nor sheer change as excludent of permanence can be the nature of reality, — not changelessness, for, he declares: "Can we ever be made to believe that motion and life and soul are not present with perfect being? Can we imagine that being is devoid of life and mind, and exists in awful unmeaningness an everlasting fixture?"<sup>1</sup> Nor, again, is perfect being solely change: "Then the philosopher cannot possibly accept the notion of those who say that the whole is at rest, either as unity or in many forms; and he will be utterly deaf to those who assert universal motion. As children say entreatingly, 'Give us both,' so he will include both the movable and the immovable in his definition of being and all." In other words, for Plato, the static and the dynamic, as contradictorily opposed, are not adequate expressions of reality. The perfect static must at the same time be the perfect dynamic. With Plato, however, the conception remains little more than a fruitful suggestion. In Aristotle we find an expression which considerably clarifies the problem. Aristotle makes a distinction between *κίνησις* and *ἐνέργεια*. *Κίνησις* is, indeed, *ἐνέργειά τις, ἀτελής μέντοι*.<sup>2</sup> That is, motion or change, in our ordinary sense, is only an im-

<sup>1</sup> *Sophist*, 248E. (Jowett.)

<sup>2</sup> *De Anima*, ii, 5, 417a16. Cf. a brilliant article by Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, "On the Conception of *ἐνέργεια ἀκινήσις*," in *Mind*, N. S., Vol. IX, p. 457.

perfect form of *ἐνέργεια*: it is *ἐνέργεια* in the process of realizing its end. On the other hand, *ἐνέργεια* in its perfection is an *activity* that is a perfect 'realizedness.' It therefore has not *κίνησις*. But this, again, does not mean that it is static, but simply that its activity is an 'all-realized' activity. It is *ἐντελέχεια* in so far as it is *ἐνέργεια ἀκινήσιος*.

If, then, change is not 'wholly wrong,' if it is simply an 'incomplete' (*ἀτελής*), it remains to ask precisely wherein the incompleteness lies.

## II.

What, fundamentally, is there in or about change that should lead us to regard it as defect? There would seem to be nothing in the mere fact of change that is evil. To be sure, with a kind of immediate assurance, we regard the permanent as alone truly real; but when we are pressed to define our concept of the permanent, we are in sore straits to distinguish it from the wholly static. If the concept of the permanent is to be dynamic, we seem compelled always to retain some meaning of change. If, now, we examine closely, we find that we condemn change, not because it is change, but because it is *a certain kind of change*. When, for example, we say that the change of a pencil, as it loses particle after particle, is indicative of a defect of being, we have in mind a conceivably more perfect condition. What is this? The unchanging pencil would not be more perfect simply and solely because it was unchanging; it would be more perfect only if the absence of change, in the sense of disintegration, meant *the superior effectiveness of the pencil in the fulfilment of the purpose for which it existed*. If the pencil had no use or meaning, it would make absolutely no difference, so far as perfection was concerned, whether it changed or not. There is nothing in permanence that is *in itself* more worthy than change: permanence is more worthy only where it is indicative of a condition of greater effectiveness. So, also, with the human body: a permanent body is not more perfect simply because it is permanent, — its permanence may mean death, — but because permanence, in this case, is a condition under which the purpose or function of the body is more successfully realized. Thus, with respect to

change of any kind or in any situation, it is not in itself that it is a defect, but simply in so far as its presence indicates *a failure completely to fulfil the purpose or function of the being or situation in question.*

Change, as we experience it, is of two kinds, disintegrative and augmentative.<sup>1</sup> Let us note in what respect each kind indicates a relative failure in the being in which it is present. When a thing disintegrates, it is gradually losing its wholeness of being. The very fact, however, that it does disintegrate, indicates, — and upon this we would lay the utmost emphasis, — that it never was, *through and through*, or *thoroughly*, a whole. That which is through and through a whole is not a whole by aggregation. In an aggregate, the whole is only accidental to the parts; in that which is thoroughly (I do not mean 'exclusively') a whole, on the contrary, the whole is essential to the parts; it is a whole in every 'phase' or 'member' of itself. Whether such a whole exists is not now the question. All that we would point out is that such a whole could never change by disintegration, for it could lose no part of itself without losing the whole.

However we may doubt the actual existence of such a whole, we nevertheless imply that there is an approach to it when we compare organic unity with quantitative or aggregate unity. And, moreover, we estimate the former as of a higher grade of being when we agree that the unity of a brick wall, in which the parts are relatively indifferent to each other, and in which the wholeness is constituted largely by our subjective attitude, is not as fundamental a unity as that of the human body. Unities like the human body, however, themselves fall short of *thorough* wholeness. To be sure, the parts are intimately and essentially related; and in each unity there appears to be an 'activity of the whole' in and through the parts, without which the parts are not organic parts. The very fact, however, that these unities

<sup>1</sup>Change of locality may be regarded as falling under both heads. Where body *A* moves from *X* to *Y*, there is augmentation with respect to its approach to *Y*, disintegration with respect to its removal from *X*. But local change offers no serious difficulty not presented by other forms of change, nor does it throw any considerable light upon the solution of the problem of change. Hence a special discussion of it may be dispensed with.

are dissoluble indicates that they still fall short of the ideal of *thorough* unity. They are not wholly organic, but partly aggregate ; they are not a perfect unity, but a quantitative dividedness.

The fact of disintegrative change, then, indicates the absence of essential wholeness. It is the sign of aggregate or divisive wholeness. Let us recall, now, a previous conclusion. We declared change to be defective only in so far as its presence indicated a failure in the being in question completely to fulfil the purpose or function for which it existed. It should be clear that disintegrative change indicates such a failure. A being that is not thoroughly *itself*, that is a whole only by courtesy, cannot be said in reality to *fulfil* anything. *We* may fulfil purposes by means of it, but then *we* are the wholes. But it may even be that *we* are not wholes. It must follow, then, that as long as we are not wholly *ourselves*, we cannot be said truly to *fulfil* ourselves. Disintegrative change, then, in so far as it is sign of aggregate wholeness, is sign of defect of being.

The same will be found true of augmentative change. To-morrow, for example, I shall learn what I do not know to-day ; and after ten years I shall doubtless have added so to my store of knowledge that, looking back upon my present state, I shall note a change of considerable moment. Wherein lies the defect of this process of change ? It lies, first, in the fragmentariness of the process. The knowledge that I add to-morrow will be 'tacked on,' so to speak, to what I have had up to that time. It will not be an essential or organic addition in the sense that it becomes for me an indis severable part of myself, a part in which my whole self finds expression. It is a relatively accidental addition. I may make a greater or less number of such additions without vitally affecting or altering myself. We express this by saying that much learning does not make wise. The fact, however, that we make such a criticism indicates our awareness of an ideal of knowledge which we find scarce realized in ourselves, that condition, namely, in which each phase of conscious life involves the whole of the life, where the parts of knowledge are not fragmentary, externally appended, but are through and through the expression of the intrinsic self.

And yet, although our process of knowledge-attainment is thus fragmentary and does not always deeply involve our essential personality, the growth of knowledge does, in another sense, have its effect upon our essential selves. This brings us to the second defect indicated by augmentative change, the fact of a completeness yet to be attained. The achievement of knowledge is for the sake of making ourselves more nearly complete. To-day we have certain ideals and purposes. To-morrow we reach a new insight; and our ideals and purposes change. Our life, indeed, is a constant effort both to discover more truly what our ideals should be and to adjust ourselves to the new discoveries. In short, we are seeking to find ourselves, and "we cannot rest content until we rest" in our deepest selves. In this process, we reject phases of ourselves, we transform, we readjust ourselves. We are not complete selves; we are aiming to be complete.

We have, indeed, a dim prefiguring of what completeness of self may mean. As we grow from childhood to maturity, each new experience, each new insight, has its transforming effect upon our lives. But we have known certain persons, whom we call great, who have so achieved character that they face experience almost as gods. They are no longer, or hardly at all, subject to the teaching of experience; experience is subject to them. With a power of character and a greatness of insight they *see through* the situation; they grasp its essential secret. The dominant trend of their lives is not altered by the new experience; but the experience is taken up and made to serve in the achieved character. To be sure, since they are human, there is all the while, even with them, a transforming of their essential selves; but it is so much less than with us, because the life is so like an infinite power, that it can hardly be compared to that transformation, — rejection, addition, readjustment, — which, in our ordinary life, is made almost with violence, at any rate with strange surprises and unexpected turns. As our life goes on, it approaches more nearly the realization of such complete knowledge of ourselves and perfect control of our experience. If we should be able to reach the goal, the 'change' in our life, which now is *ἀτελής*, since it means growth, a constant transformation and readjust-

ment of our dominant aim, would be change without imperfection, in so far as every detail of the change, far from causing us to reject our former selves and to alter the direction of our lives, would simply hold its perfectly intelligible place in our dominant life.

As in the change which is disintegrative, then, augmentative change indicates a lack of *essential wholeness* of the self. The self is not *whole* to-day, and to-morrow, and forever; it is aiming to be whole. It is not through and through *itself*; it is aiming to find and to be itself.

### III.

In brief, then, where there is not essential wholeness, change, as disintegrative and as augmentative, is a defect. Reality which is truly whole, therefore, must exhibit neither disintegrative nor augmentative change. Is there any sense, now, in which change is conceivable as non-disintegrative and non-augmentative?

The fundamental difficulty appears to lie in the fact that we seem unable to think of change except as a passage from some manner of incompleteness. Is there not, however, a sense in which change may be conceived as present in a being *that is complete in and through the change*? This, now, is our problem.

In all our human experience, the presence of change indicates the fact that 'work' is being done. Is there any sense in which 'work' may be conceivably predicated of perfect being? Human energy operates as a transforming process. Whatever we do, we are manipulating a material that is given to our hands. This is true both of our physical and of our mental work. We do not *make* the physical; we simply make it over into forms more adequate to our purposes. So, too, we do not consciously and voluntarily *make* our mental equipment. We are born into our world with a 'given' mental life; our whole empirical initiative is concerned with the *making over* of our mental equipment into forms more adequate.

We must note, however, a distinction between two kinds of transformative work. In the first kind, the material with which we work dominates us. It makes its demands upon us; it holds us subject to its laws and conditions, visiting disobedience with

disaster or death. Such, for example, is the work of producing foods. The man who tills his field must comply with the physical conditions of soil, nurture, sunshine, etc. He may not decide to grow potatoes in the fish-pond, or to plant corn on the roof-tree. His success is proportionate to his knowledge of the physical conditions involved and to the fidelity with which he conforms himself to his knowledge. In the whole process he is only in slight degree expressing his own self. He has needs, to be sure; and the fact that he works to supply these is a kind of expression of himself. But in the main, his acts are the expression of demands made upon him by conditions external to himself. The goal of such work is perfect knowledge of the conditions and perfect control. So long, however, as there is not such knowledge and control, work of this character exhibits, not the dominance of the person (his spontaneous self-expression), but the dominance of the material.

Obviously, where work is of this character, the self is not an essential whole. Its activity is directed upon that which is indeed necessary to its life or comfort, but which nevertheless is largely external and foreign. Thus there is no realization here of a life that is *itself* in all its activities.

In the second kind of work, instead of being dominated, we dominate the material. We make our demands, we shape our material as we desire; we make of it a subject, willing or unwilling, but a subject nevertheless. As soon as we pass beyond a mere obedience to external conditions and impose *our* methods of control, we transcend the first kind of work. We still more effectively transcend it when, as we say, we work 'creatively.' When, for example, we put our will and our purpose into the world of possible sounds, bringing forth our symphonies, we are dominating our material. To be sure, we are not completely its master: the sound waves have their stubbornnesses and their revenges. But in intent, at least, we are dominant. In other words, we mean, always, in creative acts, to *express ourselves*; we do not mean simply to respond to the demands of an external world.

In human life, we rightly regard the second kind of work as

the higher, because it is more nearly the activity of self-expression. Moreover, it includes the first kind, even as it passes beyond it. The creative artist must know his medium of expression, must approach it to learn of its ways. But he need not stop there. Knowing it, he may use it not as *it* demands but as *he* demands.

If we carry this notion of creative work to the goal implied, we have the conception of work which is simply and solely self-expression, work in which the material used is not a foreign, hindering somewhat, but is the perfectly flexible, responsive medium of expression. If, in addition, the self that expresses itself is not a disjunct, isolated self, speaking in *its* own way for *its* own self, but is a self that lives in and through all others, creative work, while uniquely the expression of the individual self, is yet, also, essentially the expression of all selves.

Perfect creative work would seem to mean, then, first, self-expression; and second, the absence of everything from the means of expression that is not perfectly of the expression. It would seem to follow that such perfect creative work is thoroughly consistent with a life of essential wholeness. In the first place, it is *self-expression*; *i. e.*, it is concerned with nothing foreign or external to the self; it neither adds something not of the self to the self, nor makes something of the self into that which is not of the self. Again, it is *self-expression*; *i. e.*, it is an activity in which the inner self is distinguished from its outer self or sign (its *ex*-pression), and in which there is nothing in the sign or outer which is not thoroughly of the inner self signified. Whereas, then, the first kind of work is a toil and an incompleteness, the second, when it is realized, is the joy of perfect activity.<sup>1</sup>

#### IV.

It would seem, then, that in the ideal of creative work (self-expression) we have a conception which answers to what we

<sup>1</sup> So Aristotle says of God: "And its free life is altogether equal to our brief best moments. For this is its normal condition (whereas this is impossible for us) because its energy is at the same time joy." *Meta*, Δ vii; 1072 b 14. (Trans. by Thomas Davidson.)



require of a perfect *dynamic* being.<sup>1</sup> We return now to our problem of change. Must we regard perfect being as one unvarying act of creative work ; or may we regard it as varying its creative expression ? The first view requires definitively the absence of change ; the second not only allows but requires change.

The view that perfect being changes in the sense that it varies its creative expression seems on the face of it to be absurd. If such being is complete, only one expression may rightly serve. On the other hand, the view that perfect being is one unvarying act plunges us again into the despair of the static. Where there is in no conceivable sense a change of quality or condition, where the act is as it is and has been and always will be, nay, as it super-temporally is, there seems no possibility of distinguishing the act from that which is static. We may, if we wish, call it 'act,' but we may, with equal propriety call it 'being.' In other words, there is nothing in the situation to distinguish the so-called 'act' from static being, *save the assertion that it is act.*

It remains, then, to make trial of the alternative view, absurd as that view may seem. Let us note more particularly what the absurdity is supposed to be. If being is complete, it is said, it can have but one complete expression of itself ; for if it expresses itself variously, each of these expressions must be different from the other, and no one of them, consequently, can be that which expresses the *all* of the self.

Let us note, however, that the objection has a suspiciously quantitative ring. It seems to imply that the self is a sum total, and, therefore, that only an expression of totality can be adequate. If, now, the self *is* a sum total, it must certainly be true that only one expression can rightly comprehend it. But philosophy has been learning with increasing clearness that the self is not a quantitative whole. In a total, a part is only a part ; in the self, a part is more than a part. In a peculiar way, — one which, to be sure, we are not yet quite able to express, but of which, nevertheless, we have in ourselves constant experience, — each real part of the

<sup>1</sup> Whether such a perfect being is actual *now* (super-temporally), or is the ideal *to be actualized*, the goal to be striven for, is a question beyond the range of the present paper. We are simply asking whether perfection of being and change are compatible.

self expresses, more or less adequately, the intrinsic or 'whole' self. Even the human person, with all his fragmentariness, is not an aggregate, like a brick wall or a heap of stones. Each act that is really *his* is in some respect the outflow of his intrinsic or qualitatively whole self. Thus, for example, in one act, as we sometimes say, we can 'know the man.' The opposing view must hold that a man is simply the aggregate of his acts, that in no single act may he be *thoroughly* himself. It is true, indeed, with Aristotle, that no single act is the completed character; but it is also true that, as the character matures, each single act is more and more nearly the expression of what the character thoroughly is. But even in its own terms the quantitative view defeats itself; for if the sum that is the man has meaning and purpose, if it is more than a haphazard jumble, each particular that is part of the sum has not only its particular meaning, but has also its fuller meaning in terms of the place which it holds in the sum.

We must therefore repudiate the 'sum-total' view of the self, and, for lack of better counsel, accept the 'organic' view. However difficult it may be to conceive the latter and to express it, the view has at least this advantage: it enables us, to a certain extent, to understand *how a being may have many parts or phases and still be 'entire' in each of them.* Hence, as against all quantitative views of the self, it would seem to be the view in terms of which we must, if we can, solve the problem of change in the changeless.

There is another and graver difficulty involved in the view that perfect being can express itself only in one unvarying act. If diversity of act seems incompatible with such being, for the reason that no single act can express the whole perfection, there is equal ground for holding that diversity or manyness of any and every kind is incompatible. For in so far as the being is complete, it must be complete in all respects. Where, however, there is a many, there is difference; and where there is difference there is limitation. Hence each member of the 'many' is incomplete. If, then, the perfect is to be complete through and through, manyness must be eliminated. This reduces the perfect to

blank, meaningless unity. Our only escape from such a conclusion lies, as philosophy has long since learned, in a courageous inclusion of the many in the one. But, as Hegel showed, the inclusion must not be as of *qualities* in a substance, but as of *activities* in a subject or spirit. A quality is a quality and nothing more; it *belongs to* the substance; an activity, on the contrary, is more than a particular activity; it *is* the subject. Thus, Hegel showed, the only 'many' that can be incorporated in the one without destroying the completeness of the latter, are *the many which are themselves the one*. In other words, to return to the language already employed, the 'many' must be regarded as organic members of an organically whole self.

It should not be difficult, now, to see that the denial to perfect being of diversity of act is made upon the same false grounds upon which the denial of the 'many' is made. Our first mistake is to regard perfect being quantitatively; then the second error follows that, seeing in each of the many parts only a limitation of the whole self, we conclude that no one of them can be, in any sense, adequate to the whole. So, likewise, with respect to diversity of act: regarding perfect being quantitatively, we can recognize each single act only as partial. But as, in the first case, the quantitative view brought us to blank unity, so, in the second case, it brings us to the sheer static. But again, as the escape from the first absurdity was found in the conception of the self as organically one in many, so like escape may be found from the second absurdity.

To put the argument most briefly, then, we would say that just as it is possible to conceive of a part which is, in its special way, the whole self, so it is none the less possible to conceive of one act of a many acts which is, in its special way, the whole self. Or, to use the language of the preceding discussion, just as each essential phase of a life may, in its way, be expressive of the life in its intrinsic wholeness, so each act may likewise be, with qualitative wholeness, expressive of that life. Perfect being may then vary its creative expressions and still be *itself* in all its expressions.

It may help to clarify the argument, if we take refuge in a

concrete example. Since the example is from human life it is correspondingly imperfect and must be so regarded. We never say, for example, that a truly creative work is the work of a *part* of the artist. Although, to be sure, it does not express the total of his ideas and emotions, the work is creative in so far as, even in its particularity, it is the voice of the artist's very self. It is only a part, and yet, in a manner, it is the whole. This is the peculiar miracle of creative work that, particular, circumscribed, local, it yet holds within itself its whole essential world.

## V.

So much, then, for the conception of perfect being as a self which varies its creative expressions. There remains a serious difficulty. Even when change is understood as we have endeavored to understand it, as a succession, not of fragmentary parts, but of parts-in-whole, of particulars-in-universal, it nevertheless remains that the succession, with all its organic wholeness, involves 'before' and 'after,'—time, in short, with all the imperfections that attach to it.

The difficulty, at first blush, seems an insurmountable one. And yet there is sufficient ambiguity in our meaning of time to give hope that by clarification of the concept relief may be found. In a paper published in this journal some months ago,<sup>1</sup> I discussed the so-called 'illusion' or 'defect' of time. It was there shown that, *in the time of our experience*, there is a serious element of defect. But it was also shown that the defect was only a disappearing factor of our time experience, not its essential reality. It was suggested that, freed of its imperfection, time might readily be conceived as of fundamental reality. Time, in this *real* sense, would, of course, be considerably, *although not radically*, different from the time of our experience. We may now pursue the argument with reference to our problem of change.

It certainly would seem that wherever there is change there is 'before' and 'after.' But let us note that the 'before' and 'after' *of a pure succession* are very different from the 'before' and 'after' of our human time experience. In our temporal suc-

<sup>1</sup> "The Ground of the Time-Illusion," PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. XVII, pp. 18 ff.

cessions, a 'before' is not simply a 'before'; *i. e.*, a prior in succession. A temporal 'before' is also a 'past,' or a 'now.' But a 'past' (and the same argument, *mutatis mutandis*, applies to a 'now') in addition to its being a sequential 'prior,' is always, besides, a *transformation of values*. The 'past' is not of the same intensity and intimacy of value as the present; it has 'faded out'; and, as it recedes, it fades out increasingly, until it becomes almost, and even entirely, lost. Again, time as an 'after' is more than an 'after': it is a 'future.' The 'future' is distinguished from the 'now' and the 'before now,' not simply by the fact that it is to follow in the succession, but by the fact of its well-nigh utter indefiniteness and uncertainty. The future is unknown; and no searching by us can bring its evil or its good to clearer present apprehension. And all the while, the 'now' holds the centre of the stage, with a value accorded it, an interest attaching to it, wholly out of proportion to the mere fact of its sequential place. Present and past and future, therefore, differ from 'before' and 'after' in so far as they hold experiential values that are over and above the mere fact of sequential order.

Let us suppose, now, that the 'before' and the 'after' were all of equal clearness, equal intimacy, equal value for our lives: let us suppose, first, that, the self expressed itself wholly in each of the 'befores,' maintained itself in permanent intimacy with these expressions of itself, so that the 'befores' did not fade out and become lost, but were permanently of the most intimate life of the self. It is clear that such 'befores' of a pure succession would not be temporal 'pasts.' Suppose, again, that the self were in clear possession of all the possibilities of its being, so that no 'after' could come quite darkly and unexpected. Clearly, such 'afters' would not be temporal 'futures.'

What is above all true of our temporal experience is that it is always the expression of a divided self. Only a part of ourselves is in any one moment of time: we leave a vague part of ourselves behind in the past; we send a vague part skirmishing into the future. Could we overcome such dividedness, our whole self would be present in each phase of our life. With such

wholeness, time, as a past, present, and future, would disappear. It would not follow, however, that pure succession, — above all, a succession in which the self maintained itself a whole in every stage of the process, — would likewise disappear.

In brief, the error of time is not its successiveness, but its fragmentary successiveness. All arguments hitherto directed against the temporal process have been, in reality, directed against the dividedness of life of which time is the expression.

If the ideal suggested is true, it offers an important hint as to the nature and destiny of time. Reality, we conclude, is fundamentally dynamic; and, as such, it is a pure self-expressing succession, a succession that is at one with itself throughout the process. Our experience, too, is dynamic; time is the sign of its dynamic quality. But our experience is fragmentary; time is the sign of its dynamic fragmentariness. Time, then, it would seem, is a defect just to the extent that it expresses fragmentariness, not to the extent that it expresses dynamic sequential quality. Thus, if the conclusion be correct, the destiny of time is not to vanish, to give way to the timeless, in the sense of its contradictory opposite; its destiny is rather to be transmuted into the true expression of an unhindered and undivided dynamic life. The time-order, thus transmuted, would seem, if our argument stands, to be the order of pure creative succession of a self which, throughout the succession, maintains its intrinsic permanence.

There remains, however, a spectre still to lay, one, indeed, of no mean powers to terrify, — the ancient spectre of the infinite regress. If we accept pure succession as real, we must take the consequences of our temerity; we must face the question whether the succession has or has not a beginning. If we accept the first alternative, the successional series is finite. But in so far as the reality that is the source of the succession is infinite, such a finite series, it would appear, cannot rightly express it or belong to its being. We seem forced, therefore, to take refuge in a series that is without beginning; in short, in a series infinitely regressive. But this refuge soon proves too absurdly unstable to hold us long; hence, dissatisfied, we return to the more com-

forting shelter of the finite series, only to find again that the comfort is a fool's paradise. So we pass back and forth seeking but finding no place of rest.

We should note, however, that we are enacting here precisely that movement from thesis to antithesis which is preparation for and promise of a solvent synthesis. Such a synthesis seems in view when we note a subtle duality of meaning of one of our terms. Infinity applied to perfect being is *infinity of power or function*: such infinity is perfectly compatible with definiteness; nay, it presupposes definiteness.<sup>1</sup> Infinity applied, on the other hand, to the successional series, means *serial indefiniteness*. At once it is clear, then, that the antithesis is not a true but only an apparent contradiction: a finite (or definite) series is not necessarily incapable of expressing infinite activity. Finiteness of series may indeed involve precisely the definiteness requisite for infinity of function. The fact that ought really to astonish us would be the finding an indefinite (infinite) series expressive of perfectly definite (infinite) being.

In so far, then, the contradiction is shown to be unreal. Nevertheless it will doubtless still seem impossible to conceive of infinite being as adequately expressing itself in a series that *has a beginning*. What, we may ask, was the nature of the infinite being *before* the series began? Was it in a Leibnitzian 'swoon' state, and did it waken, once upon a time? The question, however, indicates the error of the point of view and suggests the further way of solution. When it is asked what was the nature of infinite being before the series began, it is assumed *that the being which is the source of the series is itself wholly within the series*. If, on the other hand, we hold in mind that the serial process does not 'embrace' all being, is not itself reality in the most comprehensive sense, but is only the activity of the real, we see that its definiteness of character is no more and no less than the expression of the definiteness of its source. Indeed, our main conclusion has been that the successional series is the *expression* of infinite being. If infinite being is definite in its nature, as it must

<sup>1</sup> The writer is indebted to Professor Howison for his grasp of this point. See the latter's *Limits of Evolution*, 2d edition, p. 422.

be, the series must be correspondingly definite. *Just what* the definiteness is must depend upon the definiteness of its source.

The seeming necessity for the infinite *regressus* arises from our failure to remember that the series is not independent, a being-by-itself, but is a mode of infinite activity. Taken by itself, of course, any series,—numerical, causal, temporal, spatial,—presses on to infinity. But such infinity is false precisely because it is regarded as a reality in and by itself. When it is seen to belong to self-active being, it at once loses its hopeless indefiniteness,—ever and ever beyond,—and assumes the nature of its source.

But in fact the very question whether the series has or has not a beginning is, from our present point of view, illegitimate. The question proposes to consider the series in and for itself, to ask whether, *in the serial order as such*, there is beginning or no beginning, when we have decided that the serial order has its whole source and meaning in the self-active life. The question is just as illegitimate as that other puzzling question whether the world has a first cause or whether the series of causes is infinite (indefinite). The latter question cannot be answered just because we have no right to ask it. For in asking it, we seek to apply in a final and all-embracing sense, a category that is obviously only partial. And yet, because the question in the form in which it is put is illegitimate, we do not declare the category of cause to be completely invalid; we simply refuse it full, independent sway. Again, like difficulty arises out of the misapplication of the category of number. Reality is at least a unity of differences; it therefore involves plurality, and so number. Is, now, the number infinite or finite? Obviously, from the point of view of number taken by itself, there is every reason why it should be infinite (indefinite). But the real is not *just* number; it involves number; and the number must be definite as it is definite. Thus, again, we do not repudiate number; we simply repudiate the misapplication of the category. So with succession. While succession is real, it is not the completely comprehensive reality; it is a mode of the activity of the life that is wholly real. Hence, for the question whether the succession has or has not a beginning,



must be substituted the question, In what manner is succession the expression or 'mode' of a life of perfect activity?

Finally, even when we regard the series as 'within' or 'of' the active infinite, we may still have difficulties if we understand the relation between the series and its source as 'contained' in a 'container,' as a 'phase' or 'mode' of a 'substance.' So regarded, the series has a kind of meaning in itself, and this meaning pushes into the infinite regress. The series must be regarded, on the contrary, as the 'activity' of a 'subject.' In that case, it is simply the subject in its dynamic definiteness.

## VI.

We may now sum up the view presented. We began by showing the difficulties involved in denying to change ultimate reality. We saw that the real must be conceived both as changeless and as changing; and we proceeded to ask how we might conceive change as a condition of perfect being. We noted that our indiscriminate condemnation of change was really a condemnation of a certain kind of change, change that either disintegrates or augments. We saw, moreover, that such change was defective because its presence was a sign of non-wholeness of life. We proceeded then to ask whether change might be conceived of a kind consistent with thorough wholeness of life; and we seemed to find a suggestion of such change in creative work. Creative work in its perfection, we saw, would mean unhindered self-expression; and we found no contradiction in attributing such work to perfect being. There arose then the question whether such self-expression was unchanging and one, or many and changing. The first alternative we rejected because of the impossibility of distinguishing it from the purely static. The objections to the second alternative we answered by showing that they were based upon a false, namely, a quantitative view of the self; that an organic view of a dynamic self not only permitted but required manyness of act, and therefore change. Thus we seemed to establish the right of change to a place in perfect being, making it operative as the process of self-expression or creative activity of a changeless self. Finally, we disposed

of the objection that this would subject perfect being to time by showing that time was defective only in so far as it was the expression of fragmentary succession; that pure succession need not involve the defect attaching to our human time-experience; that change, therefore, in a perfect being, might rightly be regarded as change in pure or non-illusory time.

It remains only to indicate very briefly the bearings of the view. One of the persistent difficulties of philosophy has been the apparent impossibility of giving to our changing experience ultimate dignity and value. In so far as our experience is 'change,' it has been regarded as 'all wrong.' In view of this defect, men sought from of old for that in experience which does not change. When, however, they found this,—the laws of thought, the categories,—they seemed to have lost out the very substance of reality. Men could hardly live and work in a world of pure thought forms. So, loyal to a more substantial reality, they proceeded to reject the pure thought forms and placed their faith in the 'concrete' and the changing. The present view, if true, is a reconciliation of both tendencies. It declares the reality of the changeless; for if there is to be self-expression, as the view holds, there must be a self to express itself; but, in so far as expression means the 'outwarding' of the self, the distinguishing of its inner from its outer self, means, therefore, 'act' and 'difference,' it declares, likewise, the reality of change. Thus, while it maintains the 'forms,' it supplies the 'content'; while it holds to the reality of 'universals,' it finds for them a real application in a world of 'particulars'; while it maintains the 'permanent,' it supplies all the fullness of life in the actively varying. Thus it finds change to be, not a sad and inexplicable blemish, but the expression of a fundamental phase of reality.

The view gives dignity and worth to the conception of personality. Where the desideratum is absolute permanence, the tendency is to regard the real as 'law'; as, therefore, impersonal. Where the desideratum is absolute impermanence, a pure flux, the tendency is to regard the real as impersonal, purposeless transition. The person, or self, on the contrary, is that in which there is permanence in change. Moreover, in the person, change,

instead of being a mere flux, is order and purpose; while permanence, far from being lifeless rest, is vitality and power. Thus the notion of the person wins its value as the ultimately reconciling and solvent notion.

The view of ordinary thought that the real is the permanent has always held this undeniable truth, namely, that reality is not mere, unordered flux. But the view, in its positive expression, has come short of the completer truth because it has conceived permanence to be the permanence of *substance* rather than of *spirit*. Permanence, conceived as substance, cannot also be change, for substance is too poor a category to permit of a unity of opposites. It is a category essentially positive; its ideal is affirmative being, that *which is*, which underlies, which supports. Hence when, in terms of it, men have fashioned their ideal of perfect being, they have conceived such being as the perfectly stable, perfectly self-subsistent, the wholly *be-ent*. In the main, although there are flashes of the meaning of spirit, we are still, even in the present day, in the shadow of the substance-category; the reals of our world are still for us of the nature of 'things,' substantial beings which possess attributes, and in which the reality is that mysterious positive somewhat *in which* the attributes inhere. The course of philosophy, however, has been almost solely the struggle to win emancipation from this category. The Greek period was a brilliant, swift phase of the struggle, with the victory almost in sight in Plato and Plotinus. It is noteworthy that in the case of these men, language, framed as it was and still is in the spirit of the substance-category, was racked and torn to yield some vague suggestion of the meaning of spirit. Scholasticism, on the other hand, was, in the main, a period of defeat and of allegiance to the lower category, an allegiance which was, indeed, the real ground of scholastic barrenness. But even in the middle ages, in all the prose of Latin thought, the struggle to spirit was continued, cheered on by far rumors of aid from Athens and Alexandria. In modern times, the advance from Descartes and Spinoza to Kant and Hegel has been precisely the recovery of the ground won by the Greeks and lost by the Schoolmen. And again, as with Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, so with the German idealists, we find language racked

and torn to yield some vague meaning of spirit. The long struggle has accomplished at least one result: it has taught us that reality is not a simple, positive thing, the easily describable *that which is*, but that it is rather paradox of paradoxes, which language, nay, even thought, in its ordinary course, is not able quite to master. The unity of opposites, the one in the many, the life that is itself and yet is other than itself, the self that changes and yet is permanent in the midst of change, these are expressions that to the matter-of-fact substance-category are the wildest folly; yet they mark, in fact, the real achievement of human thought.

The vital difference between the notion of perfect being conceived under the category of substance and under that of spirit may perhaps be expressed somewhat more concretely as the distinction between the idea of quantitative and of functional perfection. Quantitative perfection is a perfection of state; functional perfection is a perfection of activity. A being is quantitatively perfect if it *has* perfectly; it is functionally perfect if it *does* perfectly. Quantitative perfection is the perfection of a box, say, which has in it all that it is meant to contain, — it is full to overflowing; functional perfection is the perfection of an organism, say, which performs its work precisely in view of its structure and end. If, now, we speak of a being functionally all-perfect, we mean, not that it is completed, static, all-fulfilled; but rather that it is active, — active, however, in such manner that in every detail of its activity it meets, in complete degree, the purpose of the activity.

Thus the view gives dignity and worth to human personality and striving. If perfect being is to operate spiritually, that is, by final rather than by efficient or mechanical causality, it must be that kind of life which we ourselves aim to be. If, however, it 'toils not neither does it spin,' it offers no ideal for human labor save cessation. If, on the contrary, its life is creative work, a pure, unhindered self-expression, it stamps with truth the long struggle of human persons to win their way from the labor which is subjection to the work which is a conquering joy.

H. A. OVERSTREET.

## THE INTERPRETATION OF THE *APOLOGY*.

THE traditional view of Plato's *Apology*, in both ancient and modern times, — maintained in the last century by such scholars as Ueberweg, Grote, and Zeller, — has been that it is substantially a reproduction of the actual defense made by Socrates at the time of his trial. This interpretation is now generally acknowledged to be untenable. The actual defense was, according to the joint testimony of Xenophon and of the Platonic *Apology* itself, an absolutely extemporaneous effort. The Platonic *Apology* is distinctly a work of art both in its general structure and in its least details. If based upon the speech of Socrates, as can hardly be doubted, it must have undergone no mere revision or alteration, but a thorough remodeling. In its finished form it is to all intents and purposes a dramatic monologue.

But while this fact is now generally recognized, such recognition has had a very limited effect upon the minute interpretation of the writing. Thus the Socrates of the *Apology* has continued to be treated, not as the hero of a drama, but as the subject of an historical essay. Now such a procedure is unwarranted, even if it were wholly clear that the ideas expressed are without exception such as the historical Socrates might have entertained, and probably did entertain. It is as if the *Andrea del Sarto*, known to be founded upon a careful study of documents since destroyed, were to be used as a source for the biography of that painter, and the question remained unasked, what Browning meant by the poem.<sup>1</sup> Gomperz, for example, while fully recognizing the Platonic authorship of the *Apology*, treats of it only in his discussion of the life of Socrates, and makes not the slightest attempt to bring it into relation with his account of the development of Plato's philosophy. Natorp and Raeder, it is true, place it distinctly at the beginning of that development. But Natorp finds its whole significance in the picture of Socrates and his teachings, as they appeared to Plato at the outset of his own

<sup>1</sup> A remarkable exception is to be found in an essay by Professor G. H. Howison, printed in Bulletin 3 of the Philosophical Union of the University of California.

independent philosophical development. And Raeder, too, regards the work simply as a description of the personality and theory of life of the master; and he accordingly proposes to use agreement with the *Apology* as a test for the assignment of dialogues to the so-called Socratic group.

When, however, the essentially dramatic character of the *Apology* is admitted, the critic is not justified in overlooking a certain other important consideration, namely, the probable purpose of the writing. In former days this point needed scarcely to be raised. Zeller, for example, set down quite dogmatically: "The chief purpose of the *Apology* is to give the speech of Socrates in his own defense." But such a statement will no longer pass unchallenged. One obvious motive is the defense of Socrates's reputation. But among the aristocracy of Athens Socrates scarcely needed a defense; and the speech put into his mouth was ill adapted to conciliate the prejudiced multitude. Circulating in other cities, or among men of a younger generation in whom the old rancor had died out, the *Apology* might be an effective plea; but, even so, such a work as the *Memorabilia* was far better adapted to that end. More important must have been the design which Natorp and Raeder assume, — that of portraying the character of Socrates. In so surmising we are supported by the obvious presence of a similar design as a leading motive in at least three other dialogues, the *Crito*, the *Phædo*, and the *Symposium*. For in these dialogues Socrates is not a mere appropriate mouthpiece for ethical and metaphysical arguments, contributing by the picturesqueness of his character to the charm of the conversation; but the interest in his personality is scarcely, if at all, secondary to that in the subject-matter under discussion.

But here the question becomes complicated with a new one; namely, that as to the nature of Plato's interest in Socrates which led him to attempt so elaborate a portrayal. The answer, no doubt, is easy; but it will not do to simplify it too much. The remembrance of personal affection, and the loyalty of the disciple to the author of his fundamental convictions, must have mixed with the keen delight of the dramatist in the exploitation of such excellent material. Another element, however, must have had

a considerable influence. Plato doubtless idealized his master, not only in his books but in his heart. Socrates stood to him as the very incarnation of the spirit of philosophy. To depict his personality meant to show to the world how a true philosopher had lived and died. His defense, we would accordingly infer, is not his alone, but that of every man who follows in his footsteps. It is an apology, not alone for the historical individual, however loved and respected, but for the philosophical life.

Whether this inference is correct can be determined only by a detailed examination of the *Apology* itself; and that we shall shortly undertake. But first we would remind the reader that in the study of any real drama, or of any work in which the dramatic spirit is present, no interpretation can be safely accepted which conflicts with the first plain impression of its significance that is received by an unprepared and unprejudiced reader or auditor. That is why so many ingenious interpretations of Shakespeare are rejected with scorn by the experienced theater-goer. Repeated hearing or thoughtful after-reflection may, indeed, deepen and broaden that first impression. New and unsuspected meanings may rise up endlessly in the student's mind. But the old meaning, the first meaning, the obvious sense of the spoken lines, must not be impaired. Now in the case of the *Apology*, in which the dramatic illusion is carried to the uttermost, this surely forbids our taking the work as a mere allegory. Whatever universal significance it may be found to contain, it is first and foremost a supposed speech of Socrates in his own defense, on the occasion of his historic trial.

Now the fact, that, designedly or undesignedly on its author's part, the *Apology* contains a momentous universal significance, is indisputable. The charges against which Socrates defends himself, both the ancient prejudices and the legal accusations which have grown out of them, are precisely the charges which in every age, since the beginnings of independent thought, have been brought against the philosopher; and the arguments which Socrates advances in his own defense are, with exceptions which Plato would not have recognized, precisely the arguments to which the philosopher in every age has confidently appealed. That the

philosopher inquires into things too deep for human intelligence to fathom ; that his reasonings are permeated with willful sophistry ; that, while pretending to make men wise, he in reality corrupts the youth of the nation ; and, finally, that he is at best a heretic, and probably at heart an atheist, — these are charges from which the epistemologists of our own day are not immune ; and they were old in Plato's generation. And if the accidents of time and circumstance be stripped from Socrates's defense, the essential remainder may be condensed somewhat as follows :

‘The philosopher has no weapon and no defense except the truth. The common prejudice under which he suffers, and of which each special accusation is but an incidental expression, is founded upon a complete ignorance of his occupation, aims, and professions. With a supposed science of nature he has nothing to do ; and he claims to possess no such knowledge of the conditions of human excellence as would warrant him in professing to be able to make any man morally better. The veritably human knowledge which he does possess consists essentially in this : that he has learned to draw the distinction between knowledge and opinion, and has discovered that the great mass of the most assured beliefs of respected men in all classes of society are mere opinions, — that the whole mass of established truth is infinitesimal in comparison with the unrevealed remainder. Putting aside all personal considerations and believing that the cause of the advancement of science requires the critical testing of dogmas of every sort, he has spared none ; and it is this that has brought him into general infamy. The feeling against him has been increased through the imitation of his critical methods by irresponsible men without serious aims.

‘As to the special charge that the philosopher is a corrupter of youth, — that is ridiculous upon several scores. For he is, perhaps, the only man who has given serious consideration to the problem of moral education, and realized its extreme complexity and the skill and care which even a partial solution requires. Furthermore, that he of all men should seek to corrupt his fellow-citizens is inconceivable ; for better than any other man he realizes how intimately their welfare is bound up with his own. If,



therefore, he so injures them, it must be unintentionally; and the proper course to pursue with him is not to punish him but to convince him of his error. Again, the imputation of atheism, which is the real animus of the charge of heterodoxy, is, as aimed at the philosopher, a direct self-contradiction. For his unlimited aspiration after knowledge is evidence of his belief in a divine (though sadly obscured) principle in human nature, which again must obviously have its source in a deity.<sup>1</sup>

'The task of the philosopher is to him a supreme duty, which no danger, even of death, can justify him in deserting. His work is of supreme value to the state; for it is a constant incitement to the self-improvement of his fellow-citizens in wisdom, from which all other goods, public and private, spring. True, he takes no part in politics; for, since he cannot compromise with evil, that would soon cut short his life and his work. But his services are free to all and the same for all who will avail themselves of them. He has no doctrine to impose upon his disciples. What the effect upon each individual shall be depends upon himself. But the students of philosophy and their friends bear testimony to the benefits conferred.

'The philosopher's independence of popular sentiment may perhaps give offense. But it would be beneath his dignity and contrary to his profession to make any appeal except to the bar of reason; and his fidelity to truth is the best proof of his profound belief in the deity.

'The philosopher does not expect popular appreciation; but he is worthy of an assured and honored place in society. The critical pursuit of ethical knowledge in which he is engaged is man's highest good, without which human life misses its real aim. He cannot connive at a false estimate of himself.

'The death of the philosopher is not that of his cause. He stoops to no opportunism, for it is better to suffer, than to do, in-

<sup>1</sup> It may be worth while remarking that, in the whole passage which is here paraphrased, no allusion is made to the peculiar character of the *δαίμωνιον* in which the historical Socrates actually believed. The passage presents every appearance of having more than a literal significance. The interpretation which we have adopted is, as far as possible, in harmony with the famous allegory of the *Symposium*, and connects closely with the concluding phrases of the first part of the *Apology* itself.

justice. He will not lack successors. To escape the criticism of philosophy society must reform.

‘Death is not an evil, whether it end all or not. Human life, if there be no hereafter, were well cut short; and, if there be, the good man is safe whether living or dead. The philosopher asks no better everlasting life than a continuation of his search for truth.’

So much, at least, stands out as the universal significance of this supposed speech of Socrates, whether Plato intended it so or not. How much did he really intend? For we must admit the abstract possibility, that a considerable part of the significance of an epic or dramatic composition may in later times be due to circumstances wholly outside its author’s field of view. Thus, as the critics tell us, the story of Antonio and Shylock may well have acquired a profoundly deepened import since the aristocratically minded Shakespeare dressed it up for the stage. How far is this the case with the *Apology*? Is not the plain fact of the matter this: that the historic trial of Socrates was, indeed, a typical event; and that, without attributing to Plato any other purpose than the dramatic reproduction of that event, we might well recognize in the *Apology* all that ulterior universality of application which our present inspection has revealed?

There are two things to be said in reply to this. In the first place, considering what manner of man Plato was, — the idealist *par excellence*, — the supposition that he overlooked, or had not definitely in mind, the universal (or ideal) aspects of his theme is, to say the least, somewhat dangerous. It is not always the part of critical prudence to stick to the letter in the interpretation of a writing. That depends on the writer, and depends too, we may add, on the standards of literary interpretation which were prevalent in his time and which he must therefore have expected to be applied to his own work. In the second place, the general significance of the *Apology* is, in one most important feature, expressly indicated, and furthermore is developed in a fashion which betrays the artist’s forethought. We have said that this is a defense not of Socrates alone but of the philosophical life. Now let it be observed that in the first part, indeed, this life is treated

as the divinely appointed mission of a certain remarkable individual. To this man his peculiar task appears as a supreme obligation, ranking above every other occupation public or private; and in serviceableness to the state it surpasses every other. But the extreme rarity of such a man is in every way emphasized, though a hint is dropped that the divine providence may send another in his place. In the second part, however, we find it stated in the most famous words of the whole *Apology*, that the philosophical life is the greatest good to man, and that no other life is fit to be lived by a man, — meaning, no doubt, that no other life is a sufficient realization of his distinctively human nature. Beyond this one might think that praise could not go. But in the third part what is from the dramatic point of view a yet higher climax is reached. The philosophical life is an immortal life, and that in a double sense. It cannot be cut off by the death of him who lives it. “For if you think that by killing men you will prevent anyone’s reproaching you for your evil lives, you are mistaken; for that way of escape is neither wholly possible nor honorable.” And it is the type of the everlasting happiness of the just. All this, to be sure, is couched in more or less mythical form, — Socrates prophesying before his death; the absence of the warning voice that would have checked him, if his defense had been ill-advised; and the old story of the just judges in the lower world. But this is precisely in Plato’s usual manner, — to suggest as myth the crowning doctrine which he is unprepared to prove as science.

If this interpretation be correct, why have recent expositions of Plato’s philosophy overlooked it? Mainly, perhaps, because they have continued to accept the view of a previous generation of scholars, that the *Apology* is one of the earliest, if not the very first, of Plato’s writings. The strongest of the old supporting arguments no longer, of course, remains, — that, as a report of Socrates’s actual defense, it must have been put together almost immediately after the trial. But other arguments have been forthcoming.

In the first place, there is the argument from stylometric tests; but despite the immense service which these tests have rendered

in the establishment of Platonic, as well as of Shakespearian chronology, their application to the *Apology* has not yet been made very decisive. The *Apology*, as a set of continuous discourses in which the personality of the supposed speaker is kept ever prominent, offers an awkward comparison with the other dialogues. The fact that Lutoslawski's figures show it to be farthest removed from the style of the *Laws* may well mean only that in the former dialogue Socrates is almost the only speaker, while in the latter he does not enter at all.

In the second place, there is the alleged presence in the *Apology* of logical fallacies that betray the writer's immaturity of mind. The accusation of sophistry has been brought, for example, against all three arguments in the examination of Meletus. The critics, however, have strangely overlooked the fact that in the first and second of those arguments Socrates's thesis is, not that the charge of corrupting the youth is false, but that it is beneath contempt, that it has been brought by a man who has never given any thoughtful consideration to the subject. And surely he does prove that. Jowett suggests that Socrates utters a sophism (excusable only as so much irony), "when he says that it is absurd to suppose that one man is the corrupter of youth and all the rest of the world the improvers of youth." Is it not rather a truism? But let us hear Jowett further. "Truly characteristic of Socrates is another point in his answer, which may also,"—if not otherwise excused,— "be regarded as sophistical. He says that 'if he has corrupted the youth, he must have corrupted them involuntarily.' But if, as Socrates argues, all evil is involuntary [*he adduces nothing of the sort*], then all criminals ought to be admonished and not punished [*he draws no such conclusion*]. In these words the Socratic doctrine of the involuntariness of evil is clearly intended to be conveyed." How Jowett, with the words of his own translation before him, could have written this, would pass comprehension, if the misunderstanding under which he labored had not been widely prevalent. We have not space here for a general discussion of the doctrine of the involuntariness of evil, as it is represented in the writings of Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle; and fortunately there is no need,

for the present passage is clear enough on its own account. The fundamental assumption of Socrates in this argument is, not that no one intentionally commits what he knows to be a wrong act, nor that such a wrong-doer ought not to be punished, — the contrary is implied, — but simply that no man will deliberately and with clear consciousness *injure himself*. The argument, then, runs as follows: 'If you, Meletus, know that to corrupt one's fellow citizens is to injure oneself, surely I am not ignorant of the fact. It is absurd, therefore, to suppose that I would intentionally do such a thing; therefore, if I have done it, it must have been unintentionally, that is to say, innocently, and I deserve only to be convinced of my error.' The plea is so far from being fallacious that it is the indispensable defense of every intelligent laborer for social reform. The objection has been made that Socrates might have some compensating profit in view in his corruption of the youth. But no such motive is adduced by the accuser; and elsewhere in his defense Socrates gives ample proof of the general purity of his motives.

With regard to the third argument of the refutation, we must remark that it is aimed at a real weakness in the indictment. It points out that this is unclear, and that it hints vaguely at an accusation which it does not express; and furthermore, that when this insinuation is put into plain terms, the indictment contradicts itself. For it ran: "He believes not in the gods in which the city believes, but in other strange spiritual agencies," — which, in view of the change of term, presumably were not gods. Thus the language presents a false antithesis, which Socrates was perfectly right in denouncing. The common criticism, that the original indictment was consistent enough in itself until Meletus was trapped into putting an extreme interpretation upon it, is thus seriously at fault. The original indictment was consistent, only until its ill-concealed animus was fairly exhibited. So much for the literal signification of the passage. That it has a further import will, we believe, be acknowledged, when it is considered whether "bastard sons of the gods, born either of nymphs or of any other mothers of whom they are said to be," and, in homelier phrase, "mules, the offspring of horses and asses," are not sug-

gestive of the imagery elsewhere employed by Plato in illustration of his conception of *human nature*. Of course, if this be correct, the *Apology* cannot well belong to the earliest period of his productivity.

A fourth alleged fallacy is pointed out in the words: "And whether any of these turns out a good man or not, I should not in justice be held responsible, for to no one of them did I ever either promise any lesson or teach any."<sup>1</sup> How, it is asked, can Socrates (or Plato) imagine that such a plea as this is a sufficient answer to the charge that Critias, Charmides, and Alcibiades had all been companions of Socrates and under his influence? Probably no one has ever so imagined, — certainly not Plato. The critics have apparently forgotten that the portion of a sentence thus singled out for ignominy is incidental to a protestation on Socrates's part, that his peculiar services had been absolutely open and free to all, and *the same for all*. And this follows immediately upon an elaborate profession of the uncompromising rectitude which he had maintained throughout his whole career, public and private. The argument may be paraphrased as follows: 'I never stood in the individual relation of master to pupil with any man. But in the prosecution of my own work, I have permitted all who desired, to be present or to coöperate with me, and this without distinction of person. I have never promised [as the sophists do] to impart any special knowledge [and thus, as was generally understood, to make men morally better], nor have I actually done so [the sole business being a coöperative search]; and so I cannot justly be held responsible for the outcome in any case. And my whole practice has been open and above-board and absolutely the same for all.' Now, we would not say that this argument is rigidly conclusive; but we protest that it is as strong as any *a priori* argument on such a point can be. And, what is more, it is immediately supplemented by ample *a posteriori* evidence to the same effect.

To resume: our examination fails to discover in the *Apology* any of the alleged marks of logical immaturity. The fallacies are the work of the critics themselves, and are due either to forgetful-

<sup>1</sup>33 B.

ness of the thesis to be proved, to a preconception as to what Socrates ought to say or mean, or to the wresting of a single consideration from the context in which it rightfully belongs.

In the third place, it has been held that the *Apology* must be many years earlier than the *Phædo*, because its treatment of immortality is much less developed. In the latter, it is said, immortality is supposedly demonstrated; in the former, it is held as an abstract possibility. Now it is generally admitted that there is not the least logical incompatibility between the two positions; on the other hand, the existence of an important partial identity has not been sufficiently recognized. In both dialogues the condition of mankind in the hereafter is regarded as a matter which transcends present human knowledge. "If I should say that I am in anything wiser than another man, it would be in this: that not having adequate knowledge of the things in Hades, even so I think that I have not."<sup>1</sup> So the *Apology*; and in the *Phædo* the account of the secret places of the earth is thus introduced: "That these things are true, however, seems to me to be too difficult for even the art of Glaucus to prove."<sup>2</sup> In both dialogues, therefore, the teaching upon these matters is confessedly mythical,—no doubt with the justification in mind which the *Phædo* offers, namely, that "the risk is a noble one."<sup>3</sup> But what of the belief in immortality itself? Upon this point there are two considerations to be noted. In the first place, the dramatic setting of the *Apology* practically excludes the possibility of introducing into it any such theory of immortality as is set forth in the *Phædo*. Not only is there no appropriate place for it, but the audience is one entirely unfit to understand or appreciate it. For the theory is inseparably bound up with the doctrine of the ideas in its most recondite form. Even had the author of the *Apology* been already familiar with the main lines of thought developed in the *Phædo*, he could scarcely have handled the subject of immortality otherwise than as he did. It would be absurd, of course, to hold that the *Apology* is the later of the two, for as such it would present a monstrous anticlimax.

<sup>1</sup> 29 B.

<sup>2</sup> 108 D.

<sup>3</sup> 114 D.

But there is no apparent reason for supposing that it antedates the other by any considerable interval. In the second place, the *Phædo* itself bears the marks of a persistent agnosticism in its ultimate attitude upon this question. When the great argument is finished, and Cebes and Simmias can discover no further specific ground for doubt, the latter nevertheless confesses that he cannot help feeling doubt by reason of the magnitude of the subject and his distrust of human weakness. And Socrates not only assents, but insists upon the necessity of a reëxamination of the fundamental premises and a retracing of the argument, until the whole shall be made as plain *as human reason can make it*.<sup>1</sup>

It remains to inquire whether there are any positive reasons for assigning a comparatively late date. Frankly, we know of none that are of decisive value; but there are at least two that are suggestive. In the first place, a certain aspect of the ethical content of the dialogue must be noted. It is well known that, according to the Xenophontic account of Socrates, his conception of the value of morality was that of a supreme *usefulness*. Not only may particular passages be cited to prove this, but the whole tone of the moral teaching, and especially the motives to which Socrates appeals in exhorting others to right conduct, are undisguisedly utilitarian. Even in that last conversation (for which the authority of Hermogenes is claimed), where the noble sentiment, that it is better to die unjustly than to kill another unjustly, is expressed, the ensuing explanation is disillusioning. Socrates has seen "that the estimation felt among posterity with regard to such as have done wrong and such as have suffered wrong is by no means similar."<sup>2</sup> How far a radical injustice is done to Socrates in this account, we cannot now determine; but it would be rash to assume that such injustice has been thorough-going and entire. Certainly one of the most important features of Plato's ethics was the distinction which he effected between the internal and the external effects of virtue, and the vindication of good character itself as the essential content of happiness. There are

<sup>1</sup> 107 A, B.

<sup>2</sup> *Memorabilia*, Bk. IV, ch. viii, § 10.



hints of this both in the *Alcibiades I* (if that be genuine) and the *Protagoras*. But these hints are feeble. It is in the *Gorgias* that we first find anything like an adequate treatment of the question. Now in the *Apology* this question is not expressly discussed, but a definite attitude is taken toward it,<sup>1</sup> which is identical with that which we find defended in the *Gorgias*; and the language and the ideas of the *Apology* show some striking correspondences with those of the related portion of the *Gorgias*.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, this attitude is taken in no doubtful or hesitating fashion, but boldly and with an air of assured mastery. Everywhere the sentiment appears to be that the good of virtue and the evil of vice are essential to them, whatever the consequences may be. In fact, the only knowledge (apart from that of his own ignorance) that Socrates here claims to possess<sup>3</sup> is along this very line. Thus, whereas he is not sure whether death be not the greatest of goods, he *knows* that undutifulness is an evil. The post at which, as he believes, the god has placed him, he will not desert for fear of any possible consequence whatsoever.<sup>4</sup> There are two instances in which the doctrine is given a definitely religious coloring; first, the expression, "I do not think it is *permitted* that a good man should be injured by a worse";<sup>5</sup> and, secondly, the phrase upon which we should otherwise lay the greatest weight, — "to meditate upon this one thing as true, that to a good man no evil is possible either in life or in death, and that his concerns are not neglected by the gods."<sup>6</sup> For this reason, doubtless, some have held that in the *Apology* we have only to do with a religious

<sup>1</sup> In this respect the *Apology* shows its close affinity with the *Crito*, to which widely different dates have been assigned, but which, on the ground of a well-known allusion (45 B, 52 C; cf. 37 C-E), may be considered later than the *Apology*.

<sup>2</sup> It will be remembered, for example, that the *Gorgias* contains a discussion by Socrates of the possibility of his being brought to trial and of the probable consequences which would then ensue, in which various characteristic ideas of the *Apology* occur. The *Gorgias* is also the earliest of the dialogues proper, in which the peculiar use of myth (above noted) occurs; and its myth is only another form of that of the *Apology*.

<sup>3</sup> Note, too, that the *Gorgias*, which defends this thesis, is the first of the dialogues (with the doubtful exception of the *Crito*) to reach a positive conclusion.

<sup>4</sup> *Apology*, 29 B, 28 E.

<sup>5</sup> 30 D.

<sup>6</sup> 41 D.

conviction, which was in later years given a genuinely philosophical basis. Still the word 'true' (*ἀληθές*) is emphasized, and that, considering the general argument of the *Apology*, cannot be lightly passed over. The doctrine is presented not as a hope but as a ground of hope. Moreover, the religious coloring is by no means wholly absent from the *Gorgias*. But the most significant passage of all is that at the beginning of the third part of the *Apology*, in which the old man contrasts himself and his slower pursuer death, with his false judges and their swifter pursuer wickedness, — swifter, evidently, because it overtakes the wrong-doer in the very moment of his evil deed. "And now I shall depart, condemned by you to the penalty of death; but these shall depart, having brought upon themselves condemnation by Truth to depravity and injustice.<sup>1</sup> And I abide by the award, and they too."<sup>2</sup> There is no thought here of any further punishment, whether by god or man. Now we cannot say that this could not possibly have been written by Plato at an early date, or even that something like this may not have fallen from the lips of Socrates himself. But it is at least more suggestive of the author of the *Gorgias*.

In the second place, the very value of the *Apology* as a work of art points to an advanced date of composition. In this respect it is above comparison with the *Laches* and the *Charmides*, or even with the *Protagoras*. In beauty and eloquence it stands beside the *Phædo* and the noblest passages of the *Symposium* and the *Republic*. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the comparative excellence of the *Apology* may in part be due to the greater simplicity of its æsthetic problem; for a good speech is far easier to write than a good dialogue. And, too, the subject of the *Apology* was of itself a tremendous inspiration. The facts are not such as to warrant a certain inference; but, as has been said, the later date is from this point of view the more probable.

<sup>1</sup> So literally; but a classical friend suggests that the last words are a mere rhetorical hendiadys, in which *ἀδικίαν* corresponds to *δίκη* in the balanced phrase of the preceding clause; and he proposes the rendering, "to a life-sentence of spiritual turmoil."

<sup>2</sup> 39 B.

The reader has perhaps forgotten that this long and inconclusive discussion of the time of writing of the *Apology* was introduced with a purpose, namely, to remove a certain antecedent improbability that might be conceived to attach to the interpretation which was set forth in the first pages of this article. But, indeed, we have had a second object in view, without which the length of the digression might have been inexcusable. As the Platonic controversy now stands, it is not too much to say that the question of the date of the *Apology* has become one of the most momentous in the whole history of ancient philosophy. For this work is looked upon as an appropriate point of departure for the study of the development of Plato's thought; and upon the correct tracing of that development the solution of many important problems now turns. We have tried, therefore, in an incidental way, to show that this use of the *Apology* is at least dangerous, and calls for a far more elaborate justification than has yet been given it.

As for the interpretation of the *Apology*, that after all must rest upon the document itself; and, in conclusion, we can but repeat the two leading questions. Has this defense of Socrates *for us* the broader meaning which has been indicated? And, if so, is it probable that the great idealist himself overlooked, or did not clearly have in view, this aspect of his writing?

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## SOME NOTES ON THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION.

THE tracing of some sort of an evolution in religious belief and practice has long been a favorite task with those engaged in the scientific study of religion. It is the purpose of this paper to point out certain limitations to the problem, and to indicate, if possible, the direction in which a genuinely scientific solution may be possible.

The point of view of most students of this subject has, unfortunately, been more or less determined by systematic considerations, and the procedure has often amounted to little more than a series of attempts to find in various religions of different periods and stages of culture an embodiment in greater or less degree of some concept, such as monotheism, the meaning of which is predetermined by the investigator, that is, carried over bodily as a perfectly determinable quantity from his own universe of ideas. It has also been common to work out in the same manner some supposedly evolutionary series such as the following. Beginning with fetichism, religions are said to pass through animism, naturalism, higher pantheism, henotheism, and ethical monotheism. All such schemes have a certain rough and ready merit, but at their best they fail to take into account important facts regarding religion, not the least of which is the great complexity of the data involved; and thus the series, so painstakingly elaborated, is apt to be entirely spurious.

By other students, the view is held that there is a certain germinal idea or instinct present in the lower religions, which, by degrees, attains a fuller and fuller expression,<sup>1</sup> or that there have been successive revelations of a certain concept among different peoples and at different times. The phenomena of the ethnic religions then divide themselves into real religion and superstition. They are significant in proportion as they reveal some trace of this instinct, revelation, or whatever the primordial datum is taken to be, otherwise primitive beliefs are largely neg-

<sup>1</sup> E. g., Max Müller, Tiele, Jastrow, and others; also H. R. Marshall, *Instinct and Reason*.

ative quantities. These views are really the direct descendants of the once prevalent idea that true religion was in all essentials originally revealed to man, and that, in so far as there has been any evolution, it has been in the main negative.<sup>1</sup> The adherents of the instinct type of theory can, of course, stand for a positive evolution, but, if they ever faced the problem in a detailed and thoroughgoing manner, they would apparently have some difficulty in showing how an instinct with no natural history could evolve in the terms of an unrelated economic, social, and intellectual *milieu*.

It is not, however, our purpose here to attempt a systematic criticism of these points of view, but rather merely to state that the resulting methods of treating religion throw over it a false simplicity and that the problem of evolution in religion requires further and more critical examination. The theories above referred to have borrowed their concepts and method more or less directly from the biological sciences, where it is doubtless legitimate to arrange in series various types of structure, such as reproductive organs, nervous systems, and what not. From this, some have come to the conclusion that the diverse forms of religion which have come into being represent necessary stages in the development of the higher types of religion. But, even in biology, there are limitations to the significance of the series which may be constructed. Each animal and plant form stands at the end of a long process of development, and is in no sense actually intermediate between certain other existing forms. In an even greater degree, the different manifestations of religion are discrete and non-continuous. Of course, it is possible to arrange types of religion in a series in the same way in which types of animal structure may be arranged, but, for reasons which we shall develop, the seeming connections between the members are more than likely to be imaginary. In this connection, the words of Galton are apposite :

“Whenever search is made for intermediate forms between widely divergent varieties, whether they be of plants or of animals,

<sup>1</sup>For recent expositions of this point of view, cf. Nassau's *Fetichism in West Africa*, chap. iii, and Trumbull's *The Blood Covenant*.

of weapons or utensils, of customs, religion, or language, or of any other product of evolution, a long and orderly series can usually be made out, each member of which differs in an almost imperceptible degree from adjacent specimens. But it does not at all follow, because these intermediate stages have been found to exist, that they were the very stages passed through in the course of evolution. Counter evidence exists in abundance, not only of the appearance of considerable sports, but of their remarkable stability in heredity transmission. Many of the specimens of intermediate forms may have been unstable varieties whose descendants had reverted; they might be looked upon as tentative and faltering steps taken along parallel courses of evolution, and afterwards retraced.”<sup>1</sup>

He who supposes that the method of biology can be applied off-hand to social phenomena certainly falls into a serious error. The strictures which Galton urges are particularly applicable in the science of religion. True, the stages of culture known to us may be serially arranged, but it does not follow that the low grade forms are preliminary steps to higher grades. Many of them are quite likely side-developments on some plane of arrest, or unfruitful exaggerations of planes of culture that in some way lost the cue to progress, or got detached from its main stream. Conditions of this sort would be entirely possible, even if religious development consisted in the unfolding of some primitive instinct or ‘perception of the infinite.’ If, however, it can be shown that the religious attitude is a differentiation from the more immediate aspects of the life process, that the one is an organic part of the other, neither possessing a primordial essence peculiar to itself, it would seem that the different phenomena called religious would be even more discrete than is the case with apparently related forms of animal life. So complex are the elements which constitute, and so subtle are the forces which coöperate in the determination of any given social fact, it is generally unsafe to compare one with another as one might compare the reproductive systems of various plants. Only the primary life activities of different peoples can be so compared. Variations in these ele-

<sup>1</sup> *Natural Inheritance* (1889), pp. 32, 33.

mentary processes bring about, on derived planes, indefinitely varied results. The forms of religion are so definitely parts of the social *milieu* which produces them that we cannot attempt to arrange them in a scale of higher and lower until we are able to evaluate the social background, and this is possible only so roughly that, with our present knowledge, the scaling of religions is scarcely worth attempting. That is to say, a group may be far advanced in certain aspects of its social organization, while, paradoxically enough, it may be very backward in its economic development. So of every other of its aspects: in some respects it may be progressive and in others backward or even degenerate. What, then, shall be the status of such a group as compared with others which are retarded in still different ways?

To illustrate the above statement and make clear its bearings upon the problem of the evolution of religion, we may refer to the Arunta of Central Australia. As far as tribal organization and the various means of social control are concerned, these people are relatively advanced for an ethnic race. Their marriage system is worked out with elaborate detail, and they count descent through the male. And yet, according to their observers (Messrs. Spencer and Gillen), they have no system of chieftainship, no theistic ideas of any sort, and their economic development, while it is in a way adapted to their natural conditions, is, nevertheless, most crude. Thus, while living in a climate that is sometimes very severe, they are unclothed, and their primary method of insuring an abundant supply of staple articles of food is based upon various and elaborate magical rites, so-called, rather than upon even a feeble reconstruction of their food environment. They are said to have no religion because they have no notions of gods, and yet, if religion consists in certain mental attitudes and social functions rather than in a certain conceptual framework, we believe a good case for their religion can be made out. Now, just as it would be difficult to determine, on the whole, the social status of such a group, because of the very unequal development of the various aspects of its life, so it would be hard to say where its religion belongs, comparatively speaking, or to say off-hand that it is related in

any sequential fashion to the religion of some other group. Such a religion, granted that it is one, though it lacks the conceptual framework that is usually associated with even primitive faiths, must be determined solely by its functional relationships to the various expressions of group life. An attempt to work out a statement of the Arunta religion would make it quite clear that religions generally are so definitely the outcome of particular social conditions that no such external characteristics as fetichism, animism, theism, and the like, can place the religions of different groups in any vital relationship. A people which possesses no gods is not necessarily in a pre-religious stage of development. It may have had deities and, through some peculiar turn in its social and economic development, it may have lost them (*e. g.*, the case of the Todas, mentioned in a following paragraph). Nor is a monotheistic belief an indication in every case of a high religious plane. A tribe in the interior of Borneo, of low grade in social development, is said to believe in a single supreme god, while tribes which are more advanced in many ways living along the coast are polytheists. Of this apparent anomaly, Hose and McDougall, the observers of these tribes, say: "We are disposed to regard this conception (*i. e.*, of the supreme Being) as one that, amid the perpetual flux of opinion and belief that obtains among people destitute of written records, may be comparatively rapidly and easily arrived at under favorable conditions, such as seem to be afforded by the Kenyas"; it may then, as easily, be lost or "remain as a vestige only to be discerned by curious research in the minds of a few individuals, as among the Ibans, or the Australian blacks, until another turn of Fortune's wheel, perhaps in the birth of some overmastering personality or a revival of tribal or national vigor, gives it a new period of life and power."<sup>1</sup>

Again, while the Arunta people, as before stated, have no theistic ideas, other tribes, on the southeast coast of Australia, have a concept of an 'All Father,' which, though remotely theistic in the tribes studied by Howitt,<sup>2</sup> attains among others the definite qualities of a deity who is revered and to some extent prayed to.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XXXI, p. 213.

<sup>2</sup> *The Native Tribes of S. E. Australia*.

<sup>3</sup> Parker, *The Euahlayi Tribe*, chap. ii.



In these cases, and others of the sort, we can scarcely say that the religion of one tribe is superior to that of another, but rather that the evolution of the concepts of higher values has followed diverse lines, and that the matrix of social life, of which each is a part, must be taken into account in all attempts to evaluate them. In other words, that there is no *direct* relation between the atheism of the Arunta and the monotheism of the Euahlayi.

One other illustration, out of many, may be given. The Todas of India, Rivers<sup>1</sup> tells us, have at present very vague ideas of deities; but they were once, he believes, quite definite. All of the attention of these people is at present centred in their dairies and the rituals connected therewith. They seem to be losing an old religion, in which there were deities, and slowly evolving a new one, in which their highest value concepts are symbolized in other than theistic terms. At least, their religious ideas are changing, and this much, at any rate, seems clear, that in some way in the not very remote past their interest in their old religion died out because that religion failed to express sufficiently the new interests which were gradually awakening among them. By some means, external conditions, possibly their economic environment, underwent radical change, and in time nothing was left in their lives to make the old ideas and rituals significant to them of any values. In the meantime, other objects of interest were appearing. Buffaloes became their chief means of subsistence, and the breeding and care of these animals became matters of absorbing attention. Their life now revolves about the buffalo. The milk is, to all intents and purposes, a sacred fluid, and all objects and persons associated with the procuring and care of the milk are also sacred. The dairymen are quasi-priests, and elaborate ceremonies have grown up about their ordination. The names of their old gods remain, but they interest the Todas very little, even where they have been associated, as by after-thought, with the dairy interest. It is conceivable that, under favorable conditions, definitely related to their present social life, a new set of gods might develop among the Todas.

In turning from these illustrations, let us emphasize again that

<sup>1</sup> *The Todas.*

terms like 'fetichism,' 'animism,' or even 'monotheism,' have no special significance as blanket concepts to be applied right and left to the phenomena of primitive religion. The developmental series which may be worked out in such terms is more than likely to be spurious. A comparative study, as far as it is possible at all, might, however, start from the assumption that in different social matrices there are specialized attitudes having functional elements in common, such as might be called religious. It seems that some criterion of religion might be formulated in terms of social psychology, which would at least serve as a working hypothesis, its validity to be determined through its use.

But, as far as the evolution of this religious tendency is concerned, it is clear, at least, that we do not have some constant element to deal with, an element which gradually becomes more and more explicit. We have rather an indefinite number of discrete attitudes which, within limits, bear a definite relation to the matrix of experience out of which they have evolved. These are alike and different. They are alike in respect to their religious character, which certain conditions in various stages of society have caused to develop. All of the results of these conditions may be called *forms* of religious consciousness because of the manner of their peculiar relation to the matrix of practical activities. On the other hand, they are different in so far as they have sprung from different grades of culture or from different sets of activities on the same grade of culture. In other words, from a given stage of culture, a corresponding religious attitude may be differentiated, the immediate precursors of which attitude are the more direct and, in the main, the more practical attitudes of the life of the group. Almost any conceivable practical adjustment may theoretically, and has, in fact, as a matter of history, served as the basis of a religious attitude. It is manifest, if the religious attitude is thus a secondary matter, or a product, and if these are the conditions of its appearance, that religious types are not related to one another in causal or sequential terms, but rather in the fact that they are all alike connected with certain cultural levels.

The problem of the evolution of religion is then the problem

of tracing the connection between various religions and the cultural matrix out of which they have sprung, of noting how, in certain environments, and in the face of certain life-problems, the religious type of attitude tends to develop in particular ways, and how, in like manner, its content and form vary with these external conditions. The point is not that a preëxisting religious instinct finds expression in the important practical activities of a group of people, but rather that these activities by their *very importance* produce a peculiar differentiation of consciousness that may be called religious, and hence, in so far, themselves become religious acts. Thus "worship of ancestors naturally predominates where family feeling is the strongest and where the head of the family holds the position of authority over a large number of dependents."<sup>1</sup> In the case of the negroes described by Ellis,<sup>2</sup> there is little family solidarity or family feeling, and consequently there is no-development of the religious attitude on this side of their life. Their chief matters of concern are the forces of nature manifested in ocean and river, in the falling of great trees, and in the pestilence. Certain adjusting activities cluster about these objects of attention, and out of them a religious attitude eventually grows.

The religion of the primitive Semites has been shown<sup>3</sup> to be directly connected with their dependence upon the date palm for food, and with their matriarchial organization of society. The central object of attention of the head-hunting Dyaks is, of course, the capture of enemies' heads with its accompanying perils. The activities clustering about head-hunting furnish the substrate of their religious consciousness. The heads are worshipped; they are the symbols of a successful raid and the bringers of blessing to the captors. Elaborate ceremonies attend the home-coming of the raiders; feasts are given in honor of the heads taken. The religious attitude of the Kwakiutl Indians is definitely connected with their complex system of secret societies. That of the Central Australians is evidently an outgrowth of their somewhat strenuous food conditions. In all the cases just

<sup>1</sup> Morris, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 24, p. 411.

<sup>2</sup> *The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast*.

<sup>3</sup> G. A. Barton, *Semitic Origins*.

mentioned, and many more might as easily be offered, we find a somewhat definite type of social interest about which most of the activities of the group centre. These activities may be called either practical or religious with almost equal justice from the standpoint of the people involved.

Now it may be urged that these instances afford no proof that the religious attitude is a differentiation out of certain types of activity, rather than an independent something which, however, finds expression in accordance with the dominant habits of a people. In reply, it may be said that no possible meaning can attach to an evaluating attitude which is, at bottom, independent of objective conditions. The point which we here desire to make clear, is that certain elements in the life of a people come to consciousness as having peculiar value, and therefore, that the religious attitude, a special case of this larger sense of value, is directly related to and is an integral part of the practical and spontaneous adjustments of the people concerned. If this is the correct view, there is no such thing as a permanently existing religious instinct, sense, or attitude, which continues independently of these objective conditions of life.

We may say, if we choose, that the human species is so organized that it has the faculty of realizing value; but nothing is gained by such a statement, any more than general psychology would profit by the dictum that man has a faculty of perception or of reason. Man does not perceive all the time or reason all the time, but if placed in certain situations, he does act in these characteristic ways. There has been no continuum of reason or perception, but merely various discrete acts related definitely to the objective conditions in which man is from time to time placed. We hold that the case is the same with religion. One has here to deal with peculiar kinds of reactions which appear with reference to all varieties of objective circumstances, provided the latter have acquired a certain relationship to a social group of some sort.

We should expect, then, to find that religious forms do not develop into other forms, but rather that they are the successive expressions of various ages and changing environments.<sup>1</sup> Thus,

<sup>1</sup> Höfding, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 242.

we venture to assert, the piacular sacrifice of the later Semitic religions can be said only in an external sense to have developed from the earlier sacrificial meal. These two types of religious expression are responses to two different types of needs, or conceptions of value. It is true that the objective form of the reaction was in all probability continuous throughout all periods of Semitic history, in other words, that the sacrificial meal gradually changed into certain later forms, but there was no continuity on the psychical side. The objective continuity was simply the vague one of habit or custom. As Semitic society met new problems and exigencies of life, the expression of the religious attitude, when it appeared at all, would naturally fall into the conventional forms, modifying them gradually, however. It is so of all religious development. The external form of expression may serve to keep alive or to reëxcite a primitive attitude, but more likely the attitude itself is different because it has arisen out of new circumstances, and, in the end, the traditional form of expression is itself gradually transformed. The only continuity then in religious evolution is, we hold, the continuity of the social background, which under varying conditions produces varying types of religious growth.

In speaking, then, of different stages of the religious consciousness, we cannot mean that a certain attitude has been continuously unfolding in the history of the race, but rather that here and there are to be found divers types of development which may, on the whole, be classed as religious. No religion is related to another except on the general ground that all are expressions of what man feels to be ultimate values, the expression of the most far-reaching appreciations of life and its problems which he is capable of feeling at his stage of culture and with his environment. Consequently, the forms of religion are as diverse as the infinitely varied circumstances of human life and struggle can make them.

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## THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY.<sup>1</sup>

THE first International Philosophical Congress was held at Paris during the Exposition summer of 1900, the second at Geneva in 1904. The third Congress met at Heidelberg, August 31–September 5, 1908, under the presidency of Professor Windelband, with Professor Elsenhans, Heidelberg, as Secretary, and an active and efficient *Büro* headed by Dr. A. Ruge. To the untiring efforts of these officers and to the hearty coöperation of the authorities of the university, the city, and the grand duchy of Baden, was due in large measure the success of the meeting. The inclement weather of the season on the Continent could not dampen the members' appreciation of the beauty of the historic town, nor their enjoyment of the various entertainments provided for their hours of leisure. In the University we felt at home not only as university men ourselves, but because of the interest taken in our work, and the philosophical atmosphere, in the largest sense of the term, by which we found ourselves surrounded. The civil authorities of the town and country welcomed us with cordial words and with material favors. For nearly a week the members of the Congress wore in their badges the colors of Baden; our interest in the land and in the Ruperto-Carola will far outlast our temporary citizenship.

The attendance at the Congress included three hundred active members, besides many visitors and the considerable number of enrolled members who were hindered from being present. Apart from the content of particular papers, certain general features of the session were of interest. The temper of the work was positive. The apologetic note was heard much less than in many discussions of recent times. Philosophy seemed no longer on its defense. It was rather addressing itself to its task, and conscious

<sup>1</sup> For data used in the preparation of this report the writer is indebted to Mr. Ray A. Sigsbee, the American member of the *Büro*, and Professor Thaddeus L. Bolton, of the University of Nebraska. To both of these gentlemen he begs to express his thanks for courteous assistance.

of the work in hand, no longer contending for its existence or its place in the family of the sciences. This pleasant consciousness was promoted by the circumstances of the meeting : by the agreeable surroundings, by the sympathy of many not philosophers by profession, by the momentum acquired in so large a gathering of scholars through the fact of their collective work. To the writer, however, the spirit seemed deeper grounded than in any incidental causes. It is evident that the crisis which began in the middle of the last century is passing. Philosophers feel less strongly the need for defending their type of thought, because, as a matter of fact, its position is more firmly established, and because it is accomplishing its work for the age. In particular, it has well begun its labors in digesting the enormous material handed over to it by the sciences of physical nature and in grappling with the non-philosophical or mechanical views of the world developed from scientific premises. This was shown in the work of the Congress itself.

A second agreeable feature was the consciousness that philosophy has a mission in connection with the culture of the age. At this point the Anglo-Saxon members of the Congress felt themselves upon familiar ground. It seemed a continuance of the best elements in our own tradition to have emphasis laid upon the work which philosophy may do in furthering the progress of civilization ; and this not merely in so far as culture is made up of intellectual factors, but also in that it is 'practical' and contains elements of 'life.' Here again, it may be added, a sign was given of renewed vitality on the part of our science and a proof that its work is in process of accomplishment. For philosophy to bear its part in the transformation of modern culture, for it to contribute to the solution of the problems with which modern states are grappling at the moment, or which their leaders perceive in the way before them, for it to share in the discussions of political and social questions as well as to influence the forms of later thinking or the progress of education, are tasks worthy of the best days of its history. And a philosophy which recognizes the duty laid upon it by these, its general relations, and which is busy with the labors which they suggest, is a philosophy which is viable, since it is at work.

It was inevitable that an International Congress should conceive the mission of philosophy in a generous sense; and very early in the Heidelberg meeting the cosmopolitan note made itself heard. The culture which philosophy is to foster was interpreted as the civilization that passes the boundaries of single states to include the various peoples who make up the world. Without derogation to the principle of nationality, it was felt that one service which philosophy, and in particular its International Congresses, may render, consists in the deepening of the sense of solidarity among the nations. To the development of this spirit the days of common work and friendship contributed in a practical way. No members of the Congress were more heartily welcomed than those who had come to Heidelberg from beyond the western frontier. The Germans in particular had arranged a graceful attention for their French colleagues. The anniversary of Sedan fell on the opening day of the session, but the usual celebration of the victory was this year omitted. In certain chauvinistic quarters criticism was aroused by the decision. It is safe to say, however, that few, if any members of the Congress shared this feeling. To us it rather seemed a cause for rejoicing that, in its measure, our coming together had made for the mitigation of international discords and tended to promote the peace of the world.

Among the special trends of philosophical opinion which the Congress exemplified, one was peculiarly noteworthy, the tendency to emphasize the selective, volitional, personal factors in thought and existence. This trend was shown in Croce's discussion of æsthetic intuition, for example, and by Windelband's use of the selective definition of phenomena in his analysis of natural law; it was notably illustrated by the prolonged and intense discussion of pragmatism and the pragmatic theory of truth, while in a different form it appeared in the "absolute pragmatism" of Royce's argument. No doubt this tendency is confronted by opposing forms of thought, as indeed it met with opposition in the discussions of the Congress itself. But its sharp distinction from many powerful currents of existing opinion only accentuates its significance. It is clear that the



movement of contemporary thinking has undergone a change. Already we are removed from the time when, in the interest of a boastful naturalism or from the side of abstract intellectualistic theory, it was possible to ignore the volitional and the affective aspects of human nature, and their importance for our views of the world and life. Philosophy has gained a broader conception of the data from which it must start in its attack upon the fundamental problems, and by so much at least it has come nearer to the truth. But the advance brings with it new responsibilities. Less clear in the discussions of the Congress than the emphasis laid on personality and will, or less fully formulated than this, was the recognition of the need to rationalize, to universalize, the purposive and volitional factors. Such momenta were emphasized, or criticism was offered of their individualistic and subjectivistic implications; the attempts were few to work out beyond these limitations to a view which should recognize the danger but transcend it.

At this point, therefore, fresh problems rise before contemporary thought. But the discussions which suggested them furnished aid also for their solution. The personal associations of the Congress, as well as its technical conferences, emphasized the relations of thought to social life. Philosophy has a duty toward modern culture, even with regard to the international phases of the latter. As it increasingly fulfills this mission, will not thinking men become more fully impressed with the broader developments of will and feeling which are wrought out in the life of civilized societies? And, on the other hand, as the modern nations, in part by the aid of reflective thought, more successfully develop their internal organization or their peaceful relations to other states, will not this better rationalized collective life contribute to philosophy new bases for its own constructions? For the present these are questions of a hypothetical kind. But their suggestions for the future are justified by an analogy from the recent past. May not the future of this phase of reflection furnish a parallel to the history of philosophy and science in the last age? Amid all the disturbance of the later thinking, no one can overlook the steadying influence which science has exerted. The

belief in a system of law has confirmed our confidence in reason, and the endeavor to comprehend it deepened our views of the rationality manifested in the world, at a time when faith in reason for its own sake stood badly in need of encouragement. It may well be that a similar result will follow as we continue to ponder the principles of social existence and the questions which society posits for the philosopher.

Four general sessions were on the programme, one for each of the four permitted languages, German, English, French, and Italian. Unfortunately this balance was disturbed by the illness of two of the principal speakers, Professors Henri Bergson, of Paris, and Lipps, of Munich. Thus the Congress missed the paper of the former on "L'idée de devenir" and the latter's discussion "Zum Begriff der Philosophie." In their places, as noted below, President Windelband and Professor H. Maier, Tübingen, consented to speak. Thus rearranged the programme of the general sessions was as follows: September 1, Opening of the Congress, Addresses of Greeting, etc.; paper by Professor Royce, "The Nature of Truth in the Light of Recent Discussions." September 2, B. Croce, "Il carattere lirico dell'arte e l'intuizione pura." September 3, E. Boutroux, "L'état de la philosophie en France depuis 1867"; Professor Windelband, "Ueber den Begriff des Gesetzes." September 5, Professor Maier, "David Friedrich Strauss"; conclusion of the Congress.

Royce attributed contemporary interest in the problem of truth to three motives, expressed respectively in instrumentalism, individualism, and the recent revision of pure mathematics together with the new logic attending it. The first two motives are related to pragmatism; the third is often confounded with intellectualism, but it may more justly be interpreted in voluntaristic terms, and so be called "absolute pragmatism." This motive involves deep interest in the exactness of mathematical method and a rigid ideal of truth, which the pragmatists, "from a distance," misunderstand. Its researches have developed a new logic, a logic of the relations on which all thinking must depend. The system of these relations has certain absolute forms. Such forms are not given us as intuitive certainties, nor are they discoverable by analysis, as

Kant supposed. They can be ascertained only by synthetic experiments in thought construction, which fundamentally include the moment of will. For the endeavor to deny them "inevitably implies the reassertion of the very propositions denied." Thus the third motive also issues in a type of voluntarism, reaching a definition of truth "at once voluntaristic and absolute." The principles which it discovers are formal in themselves, expressed in pure logic and pure mathematics, but when they have been found, it is inevitable that ethics and metaphysics as well as science should be thought out in conformity to them. Absolute truth is known to us regarding the form of the rational will.

Croce distinguished five types of æsthetics, empirical, "practicistic," intellectualistic, agnostic, and mystical. The serial order of these types is a logical and necessary one, in which the highest includes the rest. Hence a return is demanded to mystical æsthetics, last notably manifested in romanticism. We must return to the romantic æsthetics; but not remain there, since a still higher stage exists, "the æsthetics of pure intuition" or "pure expression." With the romantic æsthetics affirming the theoretical character of art and denying its logical character, the æsthetics of pure intuition makes art the most primitive and simple function of the knowing spirit. Here the objection is raised that not intuition is demanded from art, or not this alone, but feeling, the moved personality of the artist. The theory of impersonality, however, coincides with the theory of personality rightly understood; whence it follows that art has at once intuitive and affective, epic and lyric, classic and romantic, objective and personal character, and is the perfect expression of an emotion or sentiment. The resulting dualism of form and content is to be overcome by showing that pure intuition and the representation of a feeling, that epic and lyric, are the same. This is in fact the true view. The contrary doctrine is intellectualistic, springing from an abstract dualism of spirit and nature. Art takes hold on a spiritual, not a physical fact, since spirit, not *φύσις*, is reality.

Boutroux's account of contemporary philosophy in France began with 1867. That year was marked by a real transition in

thought. About this date the eclectic philosophy declined and a new development began, of "metaphysical philosophy" on the one hand, and "experimental philosophy" on the other. The phases of this development may be divided into the metaphysical movement (in three forms, rationalism, criticism, experientialism), the psychological movement, the sociological movement, ethics as positive science, the philosophy of the sciences, the philosophy of religion, historical inquiries. The most salient characteristic of the whole has been the separation of the special philosophical sciences from philosophy proper. Nevertheless, these encounter in their own work epistemological, cosmological, and practical problems, the problems of philosophy itself. The conjecture, therefore, is not hazardous that the two are tending towards a reconciliation, the special philosophical sciences recognizing that they cannot dispense with metaphysics, and metaphysics assimilating more and more the methods and results of the sciences themselves.

The idea of law was traced by Windelband back to its historical and its psychological origins: the Greek and Renaissance views of the order of the heavens, the conflict between the individual and social forms. To-day we differentiate the factual and the ideal order; but a common element in the concept of law remains, *die Bestimmung des Besonderen durch ein Allgemeines*. Lotze's use of the expression *Gelten* fails, as did Plato's theory of ideas, to explain the connection of the logical and the real in this relation. The nominalistic theories are confronted by the necessity for grounding the order of ideal contents in an objective order. Kant's conjunction of legality and causality, moreover, has made it peculiarly difficult to avoid ascribing efficiency to the "universal rule." A way of escape seems to open if, in each particular case, the moment of action is ascribed to a unique *Akt* of the causal nexus, and the moment of regularity to the observing intellect. But under the uniformities of nature we unquestionably seek reality. The particular can never be grasped in its completeness, nor reality be understood without remainder; but it is equally certain that in the inquiry into laws a part or side of reality forms the object of knowledge. So this expedient is

not fully successful. But help may be gained by considering the change in a correlative idea, the advance from the qualitative to the quantitative and selective conception of phenomena. From many directions we have all been converging towards the selective view of perception, conception, and theory. Every cognitive act is selective. *In dieser Weise ist auch alle Erkenntniss der Gesetze eine von dem Intellekt aus der Fülle der Wirklichkeit zweckvoll herausgearbeitete Erscheinung.*

Professor Maier in his lecture, "David Friedrich Strauss," outlined Strauss's development from the beginnings in romanticism to the culminating Hegelian phase. The Hegelian philosophy posits the rationality of religion as itself a product of the world-reason. But this view leads to the critical examination of the New Testament records and the special Christian doctrines. The results of such examination, given in the *Leben Jesu* and the *Glaubenslehre*, show religion and philosophy no longer identified in their content under a diversity of form, but philosophy substituting itself for faith. The position of Strauss, however, is not to be condemned, since his error consisted in his failure to appreciate the practical element in religion, rather than in his principle of rational criticism. During his last period, in *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, he went over to materialism. Nevertheless, he remained an Hegelian, working the results of science and the materialistic view of the world into the framework of metaphysical idealism. Thus there was no break in his development to the end.

For the discussion of special papers the Congress divided into seven sections: I. History of Philosophy, presided over by Xavier Léon (Editor of the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, Paris) and Professor Petsch (Heidelberg); II. General Philosophy, Metaphysics, and the Philosophy of Nature, Professors Külpe (Würzburg) and Drews (Carlsruhe); III. Psychology, Professor Münsterberg and Dr. Hellpach (Carlsruhe); IV. Logic and Epistemology, Professor Maier (Tübingen) and Dr. Lask (Heidelberg); V. Ethics and Sociology, Professor Lasson (Berlin), Dr. Bauch (Halle); VI. Æsthetics, Professors Cohn (Freiburg) and Vossler (Heidelberg); VII. Philosophy of Religion, Professors

Troeltsch (Heidelberg) and Schwarz (Halle). Some one-hundred-fifty papers were on the various sectional programmes, a few of which, however, were not presented. Of this mass the largest number fell to Section IV., Logic and Epistemology, which also, at least when the debate over pragmatism was on, enjoyed the largest attendance. Section VII., Philosophy of Religion, on the other hand, held but few sessions, while Section III., Psychology, showed by the number of the papers and the interest evoked the prevailing attention to psychological subjects on the part even of students of philosophy proper. Strenuous endeavors were made by the officers of the Congress to facilitate the work of the Sections and to prevent confusion amid the number of meetings going on at one and the same time in different rooms of the university building. In spite of this care, however, it was not possible to escape a sense of distraction and strain as one sought to hear at least the principal papers in his own field of study and neighboring fields.

No subject of discussion aroused so much interest as pragmatism. At the first general session, September 1, the argument was begun by Professor Royce. On the afternoon of the same day the matter came up at the first meeting of the Section of Psychology. The next morning the programme of Section IV., Logic and Epistemology, included a group of papers dealing with it, among which Schiller's "Der rationalistische Wahrheitsbegriff," read in German, at once occasioned an earnest, at times even vehement debate. The intensity of feeling, indeed, which marked the controversy, and some of the other discussions of the Congress, came as a surprise to the American members. The pragmatists themselves, however, were not in the first instance, nor chiefly, responsible for this feature. Schiller's paper was more than usually moderate. The discussion to which it led was marred by a bitterness of thought and of expression which did not wholly disappear in the two extra meetings to which the debate was adjourned.

In part, this intensity was motivated by the concern of the different speakers over the principle under discussion. To the English or American visitor it was a matter of interest to note

how profoundly Continental thinkers have been stirred by the pragmatic issues. Here was manifested the same depth of conviction, on the one side or the other, which has grown familiar among ourselves in recent years, and manifested also the same eagerness to defend one or other of the contrasted views. Familiar again were the arguments brought forward by the advocates of the doctrine, or by its ardent critics. Schiller's discussion of truth resembled a restatement, as it was probably intended to be, of positions familiar from his writings. The contentions of his opponents added little to the criticisms which of late have crowded the pages of the reviews and journals. Professor Jerusalem, Vienna, advanced a view relatively novel when he defended pragmatism by reducing it to a method for determining what problems merit investigation, and to this alone. But if the limitation stand, it is difficult to see why the method should be also praised as an instrument for solving the problems selected for study. Professor Pikler, Budapest, came near to propounding a question which deserves to be pressed, whether pragmatism is logically entitled to any theory of truth, either negative or positive, unless its scope is restricted to phenomena. The point was approached, however, or suggested, rather than distinctly made, so that the work of criticism along this line remains to be accomplished. It may be that some new positions escaped the notice of the writer of this report. In general, the intensity of the debate in form was paralleled by the wontedness of its content.

It was unfortunate that a number of American scholars who were enrolled as members of the Congress were prevented from coming to Heidelberg. In addition to those mentioned elsewhere the (probably imperfect) lists of the *Tageblatt* showed the following in attendance: Professors Bolton (Nebraska), Doan (Meadville Seminary), Dulles (Auburn Seminary), Kirschmann (Toronto), Major (Ohio State); Doctors Carus (Chicago), Franklin (Baltimore), Rogers (Harvard), Rousmaniere (Mt. Holyoke), Rowland (Mt. Holyoke); Miss Curtis (Worcester), Miss Henderson (Cambridge), Miss Meday (New York); Messrs. Sigsbee and Toll, students of philosophy at Heidelberg and Freiburg. Papers

were given by Professor Baldwin ("The Problem and Scope of Genetic Logic," read by title), Professor Fullerton ("A Proposed Reconciliation of Idealism and Realism," — the realist must acknowledge that the world is a world of experience, the idealist that there is an objective order), Dr. Husik ("Dr. Neumark on Aristotle and Maimonides" — a critical review of Neumark's discussion of matter, form, and motion in Aristotle), Mrs. Ladd-Franklin ("Epistemology and Psychology for the Logician," — there is need to determine, if possible, a settled body of philosophical doctrine; in relation to the theory of truth, "historgy," may be suggested, whose "watchword is that knowledge is a network"), Professor F. M. Urban ("Die psychophysischen Massmethoden,"), and Professor Armstrong ("The Evolution of Pragmatism," — pragmatism is both integrating and differentiating, of late differentiation has been gaining ground).

The date for the next Congress was fixed for 1911, an interval of three, instead of the usual four years being selected in order that the meeting might synchronize with the session of the Mathematical Congress. Bologna was chosen as the place of meeting, and Professor F. Enriques as president.

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## REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

*The Religious Teachers of Greece.* By JAMES ADAM. Edited with a memoir by his wife, ADELA MARIAN ADAM. Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark; New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908. — pp. lv, 467.

Dr. Adam, well known to scholars by his critical and exegetical edition of the *Republic*, died while engaged in preparing for the press these lectures, which are edited with a memoir by his wife. He himself, with characteristic candor and modesty, said that he had no illusions as to their scientific value. The implied judgment is true only in the sense in which it would apply to almost any general survey of the religious aspect of Greek literature in the present state of our knowledge. The 'science' of Greek myth and cult is still in the making, and must rest on many monographs yet to be written. Meanwhile, no essay based on the literary sources alone can be expected to add much to our knowledge or to suggest startlingly novel points of view. The field has been repeatedly worked over, the significant and classical passages have all been excerpted and quoted again and again, the true and obvious generalizations have all been made, the apt parallels drawn, the illuminating comparisons suggested.

Dr. Adam's theme, topics, and chapters are in the main those of Professor Campbell's *Religion in Greek Literature*, also originally prepared as Gifford Lectures. The differences are due chiefly to the fact that Campbell is on the whole the more brilliant and suggestive writer, Adam the more cautious and painstaking student; that Campbell permits himself more excursions into the outlying domains of comparative mythology and religion; and lastly, of course, that there are some topics in which the one, some in which the other scholar is by his previous studies more at home. For Campbell's preliminary chapters on "Antecedents and Survivals" and the associated problems of folk-lore and anthropology, Adam substitutes a disquisition, suggested by his Platonic studies, on the "Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry in Greek Literature." Each gives fifty or sixty pages to Homer. Campbell devotes separate chapters to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, glances now and again at the Homeric question, and in his desultory, unsystematic exposition lets fall a number of interesting observations of detail noted in his own reading or borrowed from the Germans. Adam omits all reference to the Homeric problem, and, ignoring the

alleged differences between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* on the ground that they were not felt by the Greeks themselves, proceeds directly to the discussion of the Homeric ideas of God, worship, prayer, sacrifice, sin, and the life to come. He dwells especially on the familiar opposition between Homer's general anthropomorphism and the germs of a higher monotheism contained in the religion of Zeus, and on the gloominess of Homer's picture of the future life. In compensation for this insistence on what he terms the darker side of the Homeric religion, he touches lightly on what is for us, though he does not venture to say so, the real religion of Homer, — his idealization of man. A certain temperamental sympathy with mystic and sentimental expansion (strangely contrasting with the sobriety of Adam's scholarship) which manifests itself throughout the volume, especially in the treatment of Orphism and Plato, may be noted already in this chapter in the slight exaggeration of the naïvete and childlike quality of Homer's "faith." Adam altogether overlooks the element of Ionian irony and scepticism so brilliantly brought out in Professor Murray's *Rise of the Greek Epic*.

The perfunctory fourth chapter, "From Hesiod to Bacchylides," is merely a bridge to carry us across the Greek middle ages to the more attractive world of Pindar and the Orphics. It contains an error that renews my perpetual amazement at the mistakes of interpretation committed by European scholars who accomplish labors of erudition and display a virtuosity in verse composition that seems incredible to our less robust scholarship. Hesiod speaks of the men of the golden age as living an *πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ὁμοῖοι*, that is, remaining ever the same with vigor of limb unimpaired (in hands and feet). Adam actually translates this "with hands like feet and feet like hands," and suggests that the "obscure words" may be illuminated by the androgynous men of Plato's *Symposium* who rolled about the earth on eight limbs, four hands and four feet (p. 76).

The chapter on Orphism compares favorably with Campbell's treatment of the same theme, and has the advantage of having been written ten years later. It is a convenient résumé of the investigations of Rohde, Dieterich, Gruppe, Abel, Maass, Miss Harrison, and others. I have no criticism to offer except in matters of opinion. Without going so far as Mr. Alfred Benn, who sees in Orphism only a recrudescence of superstition and the "poisonous breath of reaction," I do not share Dr. Adam's sympathy with the mystical side of Greek philosophy and religion. Plato as a universal literary artist made use of Orphic imagery and coloring when the mood was upon him. But his serious thought was little affected by it.

On the well-worn themes of Pindar and the dramatists, Adam writes pleasantly but with no special originality. Quite enough is said of Pindar as the first poet to proclaim a moral judgment in the world to come; perhaps not enough of the essential conventionality and commonplaceness of his ethics. Accepting the received view that Æschylus, in the *Agamemnon* at least, protests against the crude Herodotean conception of the divine jealousy, Adam tries to show that Pindar too in the Seventh Isthmian Ode reinterprets in a higher sense the popular idea of *φθόνος*, and makes the envy of the gods apply only to unrighteous success. But there is no hint of explicit or conscious protest in Pindar's language, and the popular idea itself does not exclude the thought that it is the prosperity of the wicked that more especially provokes the divine jealousy.

The solution proposed for "the riddle of the *Bacchæ*" is that Dionysus in the poet's intention is not a personal god, but a symbol of the spirit of enthusiasm. The play, then, is not precisely a recantation of rationalism in favor of popular orthodoxy, but it is a tardy recognition by Euripides of what Professor James calls "this added dimension of emotion, this enthusiastic temper of espousal," — in short, "the will to believe."

In the survey of the Pre-Socratics, we need only note that this same temper reads too much meaning into the poetical and pantheistic epigrams of Heraclitus.

To Socrates and Plato, with whom the book closes, Adam gives much more space than Campbell, and treats of some topics, *e. g.*, Plato's theory of education, whose connection with the main theme is but slight.

Of Socrates we really know little except the fact of his enormous influence and his dæmonic personality. Cautious critics will speak only of the Platonic or the Xenophontic Socrates. Adam, however, not only accepts the *Memorabilia* as a record of actual conversations, but believes that we may safely attribute to Socrates the special form in which Xenophon casts the argument from design. He is therefore able to construct for Socrates a theology which, not accepting his critical premises, I need not discuss.

The last hundred pages of the book on the religious teaching of Plato conform to convention in approaching Plato's religion from the side of metaphysics. But it is quite impossible to present Plato's religion in its true perspective from this point of view. One might as well treat the religion of Schleiermacher, Jowett, or Matthew Arnold as a system of metaphysics. The Platonic religion is ethical, social, contro-

versial, poetic, mystical, anything except metaphysical and theological. In some thinkers, metaphysics and theology coalesce, and the metaphysics originates in the theology or as *ancilla theologiæ* ministers to it. In others, metaphysics grows out of a serious attempt to grapple with the ultimates of logic, psychology, and cosmogony, and theological language is merely the expression of ethical and poetical feeling, or, at the most, of an intense distaste for crude and dogmatic materialism. The lines, of course, are not drawn with absolute rigidity. And thinkers of the second category may sometimes attempt to harmonize the two tendencies by symbolism and allegory.

But the fundamental distinction abides, and Plato is rightly understood only when we have classed him with those whose metaphysics has its roots in epistemology, and whose religion is an ethical and social postulate. Adam dwells almost exclusively on Plato's poetic symbolism, ignores the epistemological sources of his metaphysics, and altogether overlooks Plato's life-long combat against contemporary materialism and ethical nihilism. He has nothing to say of Plato's willingness to play providence to the vulgar, of his conviction that the principles of natural religion are indispensable to the social and moral order, of his readiness to make concessions to ethically harmless forms of popular superstition, provided only he can save what he deems the essential spiritual content of religion. Instead of tracing the history of Plato's metaphysical ideas and religious moods, he pieces together the symbolisms of the culminating poetic passages into an abstract system of theological metaphysics or metaphysical theology which he attributes to Plato. It is the usual method; but it merely puts a veil of words between the reader and Plato's real meanings.

In affirming God or gods, however vaguely and variously, Plato declares his belief in the necessity of preserving in some form the religious sanction of conduct, his abhorrence of superficial popular atheism, his faith in some higher spiritual meaning of the world. The idea of good, on the other hand, is the point in which certain definite lines of epistemological and ethical thought converge, and is unintelligible without them. The identification of God and the idea of good, however plausible so long as we merely equate phrases and compare symbols, is meaningless as soon as we look below the surface. And this conclusion is not affected by the fact that in supreme poetic and religious passages God is good and goodness is God, and that, if Plato believed in both as concrete entities, he could reduce his 'system' to unity only by identifying them. All such rigid and mechanical

reasoning proceeds upon the assumption that belief in a metaphysical postulate, and belief in God, and belief in the existence of the man in the next room, are on the same psychological plane. Plato believed in God because he was a Greek of conservative and religious feeling and abhorred the atheistic temper of the Sophistic 'enlightenment.' This was a far more intuitive and primary belief than his belief in the hypostatic reality of the idea of good. This latter he would always have affirmed, if challenged, because it was the inevitable outcome both of an epistemological theory that demanded the hypostasis of all general notions, and of a social doctrine that postulated in the rulers of mankind the conscious possession of a unity of purpose dependent on a consistent and completely reasoned ideal of good. To say, then, that because both are in our metaphysical terminology supreme transcendental entities, therefore the idea of good *is* God, is merely to cheat ourselves with words and substitute for the apprehension of Plato's meanings a juggling with his symbols.

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*The Science and Philosophy of the Organism.* By HANS DRIESCH.

London, A. and C. Black, 1908. — pp. xiii, 324.

This volume consists of the Gifford Lectures of 1907; but, since it is to be followed by a second volume containing the lectures of this last summer, it offers only an incomplete development of the author's position. For this reason, and because of disconnected presentation, of frequent repetition, and of hesitating argumentation, the volume is somewhat unsatisfactory. However, it contains much that is of value by way of summarizing recent work, and much that is suggestive by way of criticism.

Professor Driesch is certainly nothing if not persistent; his position, as developed in a number of writings, was presented and discussed in this REVIEW two years ago,<sup>1</sup> and in these lectures the same main purpose is again found to be actuating him, namely, that of arguing for a vitalistic view of the organism and for the existence in it of an entity which is called "entelechy." Accordingly, so far as this general viewpoint is concerned, the criticisms of two years ago could only be repeated and again insisted upon as valid. Indeed in the present volume very little if any new evidence is presented; possibly something more conclusive will be offered in the second volume, but this is hardly to be expected.

<sup>1</sup>"Driesch's Theory of Vitalism," by E. G. Spaulding, PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. XV, pp. 518 ff.

The two volumes, it is announced, will be divided into three "Sections," on "The Chief Results of Analytical Biology," "Die Seele als elementarer Naturfaktor," and "The Philosophy of the Organism," respectively. The first makes up the whole of the present volume, and is subdivided into two "Parts": I, on "The Individual Organism with Regard to Form and Metabolism," II, on "Systematics and History." Although issue must be taken with Professor Driesch's main position, recognition must be made of his paramount philosophical interests, of his lack of dogmatism, and of his wide yet accurate technical knowledge of subjects outside biology, characteristics found all too seldom among biologists in general.

In fact, Professor Driesch acknowledges having a definite philosophical position, although he does not make much use of it and is not always consistent with it. He is a Kantian, and yet biology is for him the highest of all sciences, since it embraces as its final object the action of man. His definition of life seems to make three characteristics essential, namely, specific form, metabolism, and movement; but it is the first of these that, in his opinion, occupies the very centre of biological interest at present. Accordingly, it is to the physiology of developing living forms, of morphogenesis, that he first directs his attention; from this he derives proof for an entelechy, etc. Thus in Part I, containing four subdivisions, after giving a very good outline of normal embryological processes, he discusses some of the recent important experimental results, including those in which he himself has been the pioneer. Emphasis is placed on the fact that each cell of the early division-stages of the sea-urchin (*Echinus*) will itself, if isolated from the others, produce a typically whole gastrula; or, if not so isolated, it will coöperate either with an abnormal or with the normal number of cells to give the same result.<sup>1</sup> Likewise, if the spatial relations of the cells are altered by pressure, normal organization still occurs. This is considered to be proof, both that the cells are each 'æquipotential,' and that evolution in the strict sense of the term, viz., as preformation, cannot be true; epigenesis in some form and to some extent must be admitted. On the other hand, it is well known that the ovum has a definite polarity and that certain eggs at least have distinct protoplasmic layers; in these it is possible to make a cut at different angles to the axis, so that, according as this cut is parallel or approaches right angles, whole or partial development occurs. Such experiments show a polar-bilateral structure, an organ-

<sup>1</sup>Such phenomena are found in the eggs of echinoderms, medusæ, nemertines, amphioxus, fishes, and some other forms.

ization in the egg. There must be preformation to some extent, as well as epigenesis, he concludes. The fact that such results are obtainable in quite a number of forms leads Professor Driesch to introduce some new concepts which stand, in his opinion, for real entities, and upon which much of his subsequent argument is based. Thus, the real fate of each embryonic element in a definite line of morphogenesis is called its "prospective value"; its *possible* fate is its "prospective potency." The potency contains more than the value; there are more morphogenetic possibilities contained in each embryonic part than are actually realized in any one development.

To be distinguished from the potencies are the internal and external means of morphogenesis, such as secretion, surface tension, osmotic pressure, heat, etc. These processes do not constitute life, nor can their laws, although still holding in the organism, account for the specific, the individual element in every organism. Here Driesch implies that there is no problem of individuality in the inorganic realm, and on the basis of this assumption implies that the organism must differ from anything inorganic by the presence of a potency, an agency, an entelechy which will account for individuality, — all fallacious argumentation! The potency is made an agency; it "is the truly immanent cause of every specification affecting single organogenetic processes"; everything else, all external and internal circumstances, are simply "means" and conditions. But the potency is also a formative cause; it finds something upon which to act in those parts which contain the potencies for the next ontogenetic stage; there is a harmony between "formative cause and cause-recipient." With this we are brought to the central point of the first part of these lectures, to the author's formulation of his vitalism.

The important question is: Can the organism be a machine either in its functions or in its origin? The answer is as follows: It is certainly a system in which, as experiment shows, the rôle played by any part, *i. e.*, cell or group of cells (the "prospective value"), is a function, (1) of its position, *l*, thus implying coöperation with other parts, (2) of the absolute size, *s*, of the system, (3) of something else, *E*, which, with position and size the same, determines the specific development, a factor, therefore, "embraced in the prospective potency and implying order." This is formulated:

$$p \cdot v \cdot (X) = f(s \cdot l \cdot E).$$

Next, both the necessity for, and the nature of, the factor *E* are shown by the elimination of external and internal stimuli, of "means" of

chemical agencies, of machine-structures as possible explanations for localization of structure, for typical form, for regeneration, etc. Of course this is the very question,— whether such organic phenomena can or cannot be thus explained, — with neither position to be refuted by assuming the other. Yet our author does not quite *assume* this position ; he presents some arguments. Thus he considers that a *chemical* theory of form-building cannot account for regeneration ; for that would imply the reëxistence of some compound to be disintegrated anew after disintegration had taken place already ; but this reëxistence is impossible. But the question is begged when it is asserted that atoms and molecules can account only for crystallographic form, and that specificity of organic form does not go hand in hand with specificity of chemical composition and therefore cannot depend on it.

Only one more possibility remains to be eliminated, the view, namely, that the properties of the organism are due to a machine-like interaction, physical as well as chemical, among its parts ; but in his refutation of this Driesch is guilty of the fallacy of *ignoratio elenchi*. He first throws dust in our eyes by defining machine, in a manner quite acceptable, as including both physical and chemical constituents and their interactions. From this standpoint, a mass of substances undergoing chemical reactions would be a machine, and that such a machine would have parts like the whole is implied by a number of the most fundamental laws of chemical reactions. But next, losing sight of this definition, he argues that a machine has a typical construction with regard to the three dimensions of space and, therefore, no part like the whole ; consequently, that the organism, which experimental embryology has shown *to have parts like the whole*, cannot be a machine. Thus he ignores the possibility that, although not a machine in this narrow sense, the organism may, nevertheless, be a machine as he himself first defined the term. Yet he boldly commits the fallacy of failing to argue to this point, and concludes, because the organism is not a machine in the second sense, that it cannot be a machine in any sense, and that the factor *E* is a new and distinct element of nature. This he describes here and elsewhere as psychical in character, as acting on the physical and chemical constituents as means, and as having the end within itself.

This concludes what is regarded as the most important part of the proof of vitalism, or of the autonomy of life, as our author is willing to call it, although I am not sure that the two are identical, as he would have them. But concerning the position maintained by the author and the more usual mechanistic one opposed to it, it is of interest to



note that they again illustrate the variability of conclusions which different men will get from the same data, conclusions, which, though seeming to be very different, are really so only in their terminology and not in their practical scientific outcomes. Thus there would be almost universal agreement among both physicists and chemists to-day that the various properties of the organism cannot be explained in the sense either of deriving them additively from the chemical and physical properties of the parts or by any other method of deduction, although, once found, their functional connection with the two sets of properties may be established empirically. Yet, in perfect agreement with this admission, the position may be taken that the organism is a specific complex of certain physical and chemical constituents; that, by their coöperation, etc., new and specific properties are determined in a non-additive manner; that, at the same time that the laws of the constituents still hold, new laws for the phenomena at each higher level are also valid; and, finally, that certain functional parts are like the whole. Such a position is only a special case of a principle which must be accepted, I believe, in every instance both of experimental synthesis from constituents and of ideal synthesis following on ideal analysis, a principle which makes recognition of universal epigenesis, of genetic modes, of critical points, of creative synthesis. Now such a position is indeed actually taken, if not by all, at least by the majority of those biologists who call themselves mechanists. But it is a position which admits both that there are parts like the whole and that the organism has certain properties which the parts do not have, — call this autonomy if one will, — but which does not find therein, since an analogous epigenesis is found in the inorganic realm, any reason for distinguishing the organic from the inorganic by such terms as ‘vitalism’ and ‘entelechy.’ It is the position, furthermore, which in its general scheme, finds metaphysical and epistemological grounds for the limitation of explanation, so far as this means deductive derivation, of all other properties from those of ultimate elements like masses or electrons. Accordingly, in the case of the specific problem under discussion, it is a view which cannot discover that any further explanation is made by using terms like ‘vitalism’ and ‘entelechy’ for the designation of ‘autonomy’ than by not using them. Such terms are seen to be, at best, but names for our difficulties, for an ultimate non-rational element in things, so that a theory thus employing them will differ from one not doing so only in terminology, and not in practical outcome. This, in fact, is the only difference, — an entirely arbitrary one, — that Driesch is justified in making on the basis of the facts

which he shows constitute the autonomy of life. If, in order to designate this, he wishes to use the terms 'entelechy' and 'vitalism,' he certainly has the right. Any other use of them, however, as meaning, for example, the existence of a sort of psychical entity over and above the physico-chemical complex in the organism, will amount *either* to employing a symbol for something that does not exist, *or*, if something does exist, to transforming the problem, with all the same difficulties and details, from its original in the physico-chemical complex to its attenuated copy. Such a duplication of problems is, however, hardly good scientific method.

The remainder of the volume need not detain us long, for, although it is perhaps more valuable than the part just criticised above, it is, evidently, not so regarded by the author.

Quite a long "division" is devoted to Adaptation, and some interesting points are made. Only to regulation of functional disturbances is this name given, *i. e.*, adaptations are adaptations only by being *correctives* to the functional state. Certain morphological adaptations take place only in regard to functional changes which come from the very nature of functioning, *i. e.*, by functioning the tissues become better adapted for functioning. Adaptations are to be distinguished from adaptedness, which means that something is well fitted to perform a specific part in normal general functioning.

One of the most interesting adaptations is the immunity against abnormal chemical stimuli, *i. e.*, both inorganic and organic toxins. It is well known that the organism produces an antitoxin to combat in some way the toxin produced by bacteria, etc. But there is also an overproduction of the antitoxin that conditions both active and passive immunity. Our author thinks that this renders impossible any merely chemical theory of these facts, though why he does not say.

In the fourth and final "division," on "Inheritance," what is called a second proof of vitalism and entelechy is presented. It assumes, however, the validity of the so-called first proof. It is argued that, since genetic continuity extends from the mature individual back through the fertilized egg to the sexual cells of the preceding generation, and so on, *ad infinitum*, and since the development of the egg demands an entelechy, the process of the egg's formation, in fact, the whole line of inheritance processes, likewise demands such an agent. Further comment on this is not necessary.

In Part II there are discussed "The Principles of Systematics," "The Theory of Descent," and "The Logic of History." Biological classification is a mere catalogue; there is nothing *a priori* rational in it as there is in the science of space.

Descent means transformism and yet a prevalence of similarities over differences; the former are to be explained as due to inheritance, but even this does not give us much by way of uniformly accepted phylogeny. Darwinism and Lamarckism are discussed and criticised; each is to be distinguished from the original opinions of its originator, and each fails as a general theory. They must be completed, in the author's opinion, by the hypothesis of a morphogenetic power at the root of all transformism, a power which we do not understand, but which we see manifested, — a suggestive admission.

The "division" on "History" is rather interesting. Real history stands between mere enumeration and ontogeny. In it there is *cumulation*. But since history deals with the individual *qua* individual, with the single and not with the general, it cannot touch our philosophy, our view of the world, for this demands rules, laws, concepts. Any logical or moral development towards an end is therefore not to be found in human history. There is only a cumulative result which may be lost and have to be acquired again. Nor can history be saved, as Rickert attempts, by making it relate to values, for there is no standard of value, and, if there were, history would become unhistorical by becoming a mere collection of instances. Accordingly, the singularities of history must remain, and they can be only of practical and emotional interest and not of philosophical value.

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*Kant's kritischer Idealismus als Grundlage von Erkenntnistheorie und Ethik.* Von OSCAR EWALD. Berlin, Ernst Hofmann & Co., 1908. — pp. ix, 314.

As the title indicates, the author aims to present a constructive view in connection with the idealism of Kant. The book thus naturally falls into two parts, in the first of which the emphasis is placed upon criticism, while in the second the writer's personal views become more prominent. It should be stated, however, that the criticism never assumes an unfriendly tone, its aim throughout being to discover and hold fast to that which is good.

To consider the discussion of Kant in detail is a task of too great a magnitude for the reviewer, but it is fortunately not indispensable for the purpose of a general survey. In general, the contention of the writer is that Kant is right in his insistence upon *reine Erkenntnis* and *reine Anschauung*, but that this insight is constantly misinterpreted and misapplied. In the first place, Kant shows an unmistakable tend-

ency to treat the forms of experience as the peculiar property of the subject, which are imposed by it upon experience. When followed out, this tendency culminates in subjective idealism. The subject in question may be identified with the individual soul, in which case solipsism is the inevitable deduction. Or it may be regarded as an all-inclusive consciousness, a view which destroys all fixity in experience, since the subject produces natural law and is not itself subservient to it. Both forms of idealism, moreover, presuppose a formless, atomistic mass of impressions, upon which the categories operate. The reason for Kant's subjectivistic proclivities must be sought in the fact that perception is not treated by him as a given, as a datum that presents form as well as quality, but as a product, the creation of the synthesizing categories (pp. 64-72).

The basal error in Kant's system lies not primarily in his doctrine of knowing (*Erkenntnis*), but rather in his doctrine of perception (*Wahrnehmung*). The problem of knowing arises from the fact that there is a divergence between perceiving and knowing. Thus we perceive only succession, but we construe the succession in terms of causation. Hence the question is inevitable how our concepts are to be legitimized. In Kant's treatment, however, we find that a second problem is raised, which is based upon the divergence between the hypothetical atomistic impression and the completed perception. The first of these problems is real, the second is gratuitous. If, however, we once admit this suppositious raw material of experience which the categories are required to reduce to order, the forms of experience necessarily find their origin in the subject, and subjective idealism is the inevitable result.

If, moreover, we thus make prominent the problem of perception, as Schopenhauer, for example, has done even more explicitly and consistently than Kant, our procedure is at bottom destructive of the transcendental method. When the problem of knowing has been focused in the pseudo-problem of perception, the door has been opened to all forms of psychologizing, the problems of which are mistaken for those of *Erkenntnistheorie*. An instance of this is the supposition that the problem of empiricism *vs.* nativism in the theory of space-perception is in some way related to the question that is treated in the Transcendental *Æsthetic*. For this state of affairs Kant himself is partly responsible, since his assertion that perception as such involves the categories, implies that the latter are embodied in sense-perception in such a way as to take on a sensuous form, *i. e.*, so as to become *anschaulich*. In this way he himself breaks down

again the wall that he has built between inner and outer perception, between what is merely subjective and what is of objective import, between the position of transcendentalism and that of Schopenhauer and Berkeley. Owing to this twofold tendency in Kant's thinking, the categories are treated both as a set of real agencies by which the manifold of experience is brought to unity, and as ideal standards by which experience is judged and evaluated (pp. 99-101).

This fact explains why Kant thought it possible to deduce the categories. If these categories condition perception, then they do, indeed, possess a legislative character, and the general forms of experience may be determined in advance. But, on the other hand, if we view them rather as a set of ideal standards, as concerned only with the problem of knowing in distinction from the problem of perceiving, then they can be discovered only by processes of induction. The attempt to deduce the categories must be set down as a failure. To translate the abstract relations of formal logic into the concrete laws of experience, as Kant attempts to do, is at best only a *tour de force*. Nor can the categories be derived from a single supreme principle, furnished through logical reflection or through mystical intuition, for the simple reason that such a principle would furnish but a single premise, and we should lack the second premise necessary for inference. Nor, finally, can the categories be obtained through the dialectical development of concepts (a method of which traces are undeniably present in Kant), for the period immediately subsequent to Kant has shown conclusively that such development is barren of results.

The difference, therefore, between knowing and perceiving, in their relation to the categories, must be maintained in order to give significance to pure *Erkenntnis* and pure *Anschauung*. On the side of the former, the principle of identity, the ability to mean the same amid differences, is fundamental; on the side of the latter, the fundamental principle is that of multiplicity. Or, since there can be no mere multiplicity, it appears that pure *Anschauung* is only a limiting term, that *Anschauung* is a *moment* rather than a principle of experience. To it we are indebted for the fact that multiplicity is a feature of our experience, but concerning this multiplicity no assertion can be made that does not involve the understanding. Identity and multiplicity together form the foundation for the number system. Or, more generally, concrete objects present the aspect of identity, upon which formal logic is based, and of multiplicity, which pertains to *Anschauung*. We may therefore say that transcendental logic and transcendental knowledge contain as their constituents formal logic and *reine Anschauung*.

Our starting-point, then, is empirical *Anschauung*, which presents both quality and form. It furnishes us geometrical figures like triangles and circles, in so far as physical objects happen to take on these forms. Why our experience should be as it is no one can say; to attribute particular spatial forms to a space-form inherent in the mind is inadmissible for reasons already indicated. But given these data of experience, the understanding is able, by processes of abstraction and by its ability to mean the same throughout differences, to set up standards of number and measure. The triangles and circles of geometry, therefore, are merely empirical perceptions purified through the application of measure.

In connection with the category of causation, number again appears, as is evident from the persistent efforts of science to state causal connections in terms of quantitative equivalence. We have here an extension of measure to a new domain. This, however, does not mean that measure is the whole story; for in order to give an adequate account of this new category appeal must be had to a new principle, that of sufficient reason. From the strictly quantitative point of view the order of occurrences is a matter of indifference, which shows sufficiently the inadequacy of the principle of identity, taken by itself, to account for the nature of causation. The category of substance, on the other hand, requires no new principle, being covered by the principle of identity and the principle of sufficient reason. These two principles are not strictly coördinate, for there can be no two supreme principles of the understanding. Although the principle of sufficient reason is no deduction from the principle of identity, it presupposes the latter. In order to view *A* and *B* in the relation of cause and effect, a concept must first be formed of each, and this involves the principle of identity (pp. 165 ff.).

When we compare pure knowing with empirical perception, we find that the two kinds of knowing are radically different. The disparity, for example, between the circle of geometry and any empirical circle cannot be expressed by any finite number. Yet, on the other hand, the empirical circle shows a capacity for endless approximation to the other, *i. e.*, for attaining to a higher degree of perfection. With regard then to the question how pure knowing is applicable to experience, we can only verify the fact that the concepts of pure knowing as a matter of fact do guide and control the judgments that we pass upon the subject-matter of sense-perception. Further than this it is not possible to go, Kant to the contrary notwithstanding. That there is pure knowing and that it is applicable to empirical

objects is a fact which can be seen and understood within its proper limits, but which cannot be deduced from anything else. Pure knowing is such, not because the subject possesses certain forms to which experience is bound to conform, but because concrete experiences can be made, through processes of analysis and abstraction, to reveal the structure of objective reality. For us, therefore, Kant's problem does not arise in anything like its original form, since no attempt is made to give objective validity to purely subjective concepts. For although these concepts never find complete realization anywhere, they are nevertheless objective from the start (pp. 223, 235).

The assertion that these concepts are objective takes us at one step to the farthest limit of explanation. How perceptions can be infinitely removed from the perfection of our ideal concepts and yet approximate them without limit, is something which can be seen, and must be seen, in connection with concrete experiences, but which cannot be further reduced. If we insist upon a *ground* for this connection between appearance and (ideal) concept, we must resort to hypothesis. We must assume a structure of reality which corresponds to this connection and upon which it is based, *i. e.*, our logic at this point passes into metaphysics. The ontological substratum of phenomena must seemingly correspond to our logical ideals, such as those of identity, sufficient reason, continuity, etc. (pp. 235 ff.).

In line with this is the assumption that the qualities revealed in perception have metaphysical significance, and that they are not to be set aside as mere phantasmagoria. If the ideal forms to which we assimilate our sense-experiences have ontological validity, the same is presumably true of these experiences on the side of their content. This is, of course, not equivalent to a justification of naïve realism, since the question of the precise character of this validity may be left in abeyance. It simply expresses the conviction that the world without reveals its character to us in a measure, not merely through our ideal concepts, but also through the play of sense, which is more than mere symbolism (p. 251).

The position of psychology differs from that of physics, in that psychology is limited to the one directive concept of time, whereas physics employs the concepts of both time and space. In this is involved the inability of psychology to construct causal connections in which quantitative equivalence is maintained. The doctrine of apperception does not help out the situation in the matter of causation, since it must choose between an illegitimate 'substantial' causation and causation as a guiding principle (p. 290). For the theoretical knowledge of

the psychic, however, such a guiding principle is fruitless. It is not applicable in the same manner as in physics; and the appeal to processes in the nervous system is a tacit acknowledgment of defeat. Hence psychology is pure description, unless it ventures into the field of morality. Here the conception of causation, which has just been discarded, is reestablished. We cannot indeed prove the unity and freedom of personality. "But the whole of our psychic processes gives us the impression that an agent is immanent in them all, that the whole is directed from an intangible, omnipresent center called the ego" (p. 296).

The distinction between the problem of *Erkenntnis* and the Kantian problem of *Anschauung*, which is so sharply drawn, and which is kept in view throughout the book, is instructive and suggestive. Yet, in spite of the author's extended and occasionally prolix development of this distinction, and of his personal views regarding the relation of *Verstand* and *Anschauung*, the reader is not left with a sufficiently definite conception of their respective natures. The categories are not involved in the constitution of perception; still, we must assume that a certain activity of *Verstand* is implied in perception, since pure perception (*Anschauung*) is said to be merely a *Grenzbegriff*. The precise make-up of empirical perception is left more or less in the dark. Whether we take it as a function that is logically (though not necessarily factually) independent of *Verstand*, or as organically related to the latter, we seem to be involved in difficulties. In the former case, we have the repeated assertion that pure perception is an abstraction, that principles of a logical character must be present, that perception as such can give us only abstract multiplicity. In the latter case, it is not clear that the criticism of Kant has been substantiated. If *Verstand* and *Anschauung* interpenetrate each other so completely, one would suppose that Kant was correct in the view that the categories are embodied in our perceptions, that the latter are in some way constituted by the former. In brief, the author seems to treat *Verstand* both as constitutive of experience and as a function superimposed upon a previous experience, which is the precise point of his objection to Kant.

In the second place, it may be pointed out that the metaphysical interpretation of sense-perception, which the author merely touches upon as though it were a distinct problem, is far too intimately bound up with the whole epistemological situation to be treated in this detached way. Instead of receiving permission to approximate naïve realism indefinitely, we must know, before we can pass judgment upon



the rest, just what a realistic interpretation of sense-perception is to mean. Since its metaphysical bearings are the final test of epistemological theory, we can scarcely afford to make concessions until these bearings have been indicated in sufficient detail to be tangible. As regards theories of knowledge that have leanings in the direction of naïve realism, the problem as yet unanswered is what standard is to determine whether a perception presents its object as it is when not perceived. If this question should prove unanswerable, it would presumably involve the remodelling of all theories in which the possibility of this answer is taken for granted.

These comments are not intended to obscure the numerous merits of the book. The author writes in a fair, impartial style, and he shows not only great keenness but an enviable familiarity with his subject. His work is valuable as an aid both to the understanding of Kant and for purposes of *Orientierung* in the perplexing problems of epistemology, and it eminently deserves a careful reading.

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*The Roots of Reality: Being Suggestions for a Philosophical Reconstruction.* By ERNEST BELFORT BAX. London, Grant Richards, 1907. — pp. x, 331.

There are few intellectual ventures so rash as the attempt to sum up the 'established results' or 'accepted conclusions' of philosophical reflection. The next oscillation of the pendulum of speculation is sure to upset what had seemed firmly settled and to make disreputable doctrines that had but lately passed for incontrovertible, — if the prevailing tendencies of expert opinion are what determine the 'established.' Mr. Belfort Bax has unhappily been guilty of this rashness at the very outset of his attempt at metaphysical construction. He has undertaken to draw up a list of "the positions philosophy has attained that may be regarded as rock bases," as "indefeasible results." And, at a moment when, for better or worse, most of our younger metaphysicians are making haste to enroll themselves among the realists, Mr. Bax sets down as the first of these results the general "position of Modern Idealism — which is that of philosophy or metaphysic, properly so-called" — *viz.*, the doctrine that "every real is essentially object of consciousness," that "reality is synonymous with conscious experience, possible or actual," that "reality must mean knowableness and known-ness." Similarly, at a moment when a revival of pluralism, in more than one sense of the term, is a conspicuous phe-

nomenon, even in idealistic circles, Mr. Bax assures us that "pluralism as an ultimate formulation of the principle of reality is hardly adopted, at least explicitly, by any serious metaphysical thinker in the present day." In putting such affirmations in the forefront, and in treating these doctrines as premises to be employed without hesitation rather than as conclusions to be proved, the author was hardly well inspired, if he desired to reach the contemporary mind or to convince his readers of his acquaintance with the present situation in philosophy. He has much the air of one not at all *dans le mouvement*, a characteristic which militates against the interest and persuasiveness, if not necessarily against the soundness, of a writer's arguments.

But in point of fact this initial impression of Mr. Bax's philosophical position is not altogether just. His book is, in its own fashion, decidedly typical of certain characteristic present-day tendencies. That it is in a somewhat incongruous fashion is what constitutes the distinguishing singularity of the book, and gives it, as an episode in the history of ideas, a measure of interest of its own. The author's seemingly dogmatic idealism turns out to be of a pretty equivocal sort; for it requires only that an object, in order to be real, shall exist, not necessarily for an actual, but only "for a possible consciousness"; and it apparently even inclines to lapse into a sort of hylozoism, according to which all physical objects contain, at least "potentially," the "principle of subjectivity within themselves" (pp. 71-72), and so are real by themselves. Similarly, in spite of the identification of the real with "the knowable and known," the greater part of the book is an attack upon panlogism and an affirmation of the importance of alogical factors in the constitution of reality. Likewise, after dismissing pluralism as a theory of no consequence, Mr. Bax leans to the hypothesis that the neo-Kantian Absolute, the "synthesis of consciousness in general," is "a mere abstraction, which becomes realized solely in the finite individual mind" (p. 125). And finally, having mentioned pragmatism with scant appreciation or understanding, the author adopts one of the most serious and most intelligible of the contentions of the pragmatist, — his anti-absolutism and provisionalism, — and concludes the book with the emphatic declaration: "If there is one thing that we must learn to give up, it is the notion of finality. . . . The notion of direction, of tendency, must take the place of that of complete actualization. Full realisation is not for us, even as an ideal, in that stadium of consciousness in which we, finite individuals, . . . live and move and have our being."

The resultant combination of ideas is undeniably a somewhat curious

one. Primarily, Mr. Bax exhibits to perfection the manner of the representative British Hegelian, suckled at the twin breasts of the Dialectic, confident that the profoundest insight in philosophy is that "reality lives only in the union in synthesis of what are *per se* antithetic and contradictory elements" (p. 223), and ready to dispose of unacceptable doctrines in short order by the simple reiteration of the fatal words "one-sided abstraction." It is in keeping with this side of his intellectual affinities that we find him settling a number of difficult problems in metaphysics by the familiar method of double-entry book-keeping. Thus, human action is from one point of view necessitated, from another it is free; both are valid points of view, and either alone is 'abstract' (pp. 182-188). In all this there is nothing novel or distinctive. The book's peculiarity is that it employs the devices, the phraseology, the intellectual mannerisms of neo-Hegelianism in an attempt to destroy that type of metaphysics, that it turns the method of the Dialectic into a weapon against panlogism and absolutism. For the two primary "antithetic elements" in the "conscious synthesis" that constitutes the "concrete world," are "the logical and the alogical elements"; and the error of much modern idealism, the author contends, lies in a failure to recognize the importance of the latter. The possibility of experience, — and, therefore, the nature of reality, — involves both matter and form, both content, which is simply 'given' as brute fact, and relating categories, both the particular and the universal. The alogical presents itself specifically at two points in the constitution of experience: in the "pure subject" of thought, which, though it is the ground of unity in our knowledge, may be identified with will (pp. 206-207); and in "the element of blind feltness or sensation" (p. 50). There is an irreducible 'thisness,' Mr. Bax finds, in both the Ego and the sense-datum; it is an error to suppose that because they reciprocally imply one another in the concrete synthesis of experience, their distinctive alogical character is thereby synthetized away. Having thus, in a good rationalistic and idealistic manner, deduced the necessity of the presence of a large measure of absolute contingency and non-rationality in the universe, Mr. Bax proceeds to those conclusions which, in spite of his protestations, bear so odd a resemblance to realism, pluralism, voluntarism, and even pragmatism.

'Alogical,' however, is a word that Mr. Bax plays poorly upon, as Shaftesbury said of Locke's use of 'innate.' An unequivocal definition of the term is nowhere given; the most frequent substitute for a definition is the vague remark that the antithesis logical-allogical "cor-

responds generally to the Aristotelian contrast of form and matter," though the two antitheses "are not quite coincident" (p. 302). Now, the assertion of an "alogical factor in experience" might apparently mean any of these five things: (*a*) that there is an *a posteriori* or non-necessary element in our knowledge; (*b*) that the meaning or whatness of some concepts is not intrinsically so mediated through their relation to other concepts that they can be understood fully, and only, through such relation, but that there are meanings that are disconnected and self-sufficient, — in short, that by knowing *what* the 'flower in the crannied wall' is you would not necessarily know all that God or man is; (*c*) that general concepts and conceptual necessities could not of themselves logically generate a world having a here-and-now character, a specific qualitative make-up and a determinate quantitative content, — since the concepts would admit, as such, of endless alternatives of further specification, and the necessities run out into infinite regressions of ulterior 'grounds,' — and that consequently the existence of a particular and individuated universe implies the presence of characters which cannot be reduced to conceptual terms, and of ultimate, opaque facts which can be recognized but not explained or in any way gone behind; (*d*) that for us reality in itself is inaccessible or unknowable, except as merely existing; (*e*) that the categories under which our minds inevitably apprehend and interpret reality break down into self-stultifying antinomies and contradictions when their full meaning is developed.

Which of these or perhaps of other imaginable meanings Mr. Bax usually has in mind, it is not easy to make sure. The last (*e*), indeed, he in one place expressly rejects; the alogical is not "illogicality" and does not involve self-contradiction "within a logical process itself" (p. 163). But it is also argued that the "law of probability" is self-contradictory (p. 91), and that mathematics, — which, it seems odd to learn, "deals with the realm of the particular, of the alogical," — always ends in antinomies, in "mutual impossibilities of thought" (p. 95); and the blame for this is laid upon the alogical element. It is true that Mr. Bax seems to wish to shift the blame by indirection to the logical element, in the suggestion that the latter tries to "invade" the alogical and through such trespassing causes all the trouble. But since the two are *ex hypothesi* knit together in an indissoluble synthesis, neither having any being apart from the other, it is hard to see how they can avoid interpenetrating; and, at the same time, it seems evident that the logical factor as such cannot be the source of violations of logic. The assertion, then, that reality

involves a synthesis of elements which are at once doomed to merge and incapable of doing so without self-contradiction, means nothing if it does not mean a Spencerian sort of agnosticism. Often, however, Mr. Bax might be supposed to have in mind meaning (*c*), which would lead to quite a different sort of doctrine, were it not for the fact that, while equating 'the logical' with the universal and 'the alogical' with the particular, he habitually describes the universal as the ground of determinateness, as the individuating and 'finitating' factor in the construction of concrete reality, and identifies the alogical particular with the infinite, with that which is capable of "endless repetition" (p. 179). It even appears that by virtue of this, its quantitative aspect, the particular "already touches the antithetic mode, namely, the universal" (p. 292). Yet, on the other hand, the alogical is the source of differentiation and variation from type (p. 315); and while the historic process may be brought to some extent under general laws, "in the concrete, the actual happening [*i. e.*, the individual phenomenon, in its totally determinate character] is always due to the actions and passions of individuals or social groups," which for Mr. Bax are alogical things. By this time, the problem of the author's meaning in his use of 'alogical' seems plunged into a sufficiently baffling confusion. The matter is not helped by the observation which looks most like a definition, that the alogical is "the factor which has change for its essence," especially since one gathers that the "pure subject," which is a prime example of the alogical, is, in contrast with the empirical ego, a non-temporal entity. Nor do the special applications made of the general doctrine of the importance of the alogical side of reality help us much to understand precisely what that doctrine signifies for this author. One consequence drawn from it is that "every concrete event contains an irresolvable chance element," though some events contain more of this than others (p. 88). Another detail of the doctrine is that all ethical judgments are "alogical" and "unphilosophical"; and that therefore there is no unreasonableness in condemning men of the sixteenth century as "monsters" for their failure to come up to the moral requirements of the nineteenth century (p. 318).

The present reviewer is unable to discover much sense or consistency in all this; and he cannot but suspect that Mr. Bax might with advantage have devoted more time to the thorough excogitation of his own primary categories, and that in the present volume those categories are still in a highly mixed condition. As one phase in the vicissitudes of Hegelian ideas in English thought the book will appear, to the

collector of historic types of transitional doctrine, a curious and interesting hybrid; and in its principal contention it voices in an independent fashion an opinion of importance and of growing influence in modern reflection. But the book can scarcely be considered a lucid and coherent piece of metaphysical reasoning.

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## NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

*Études d'histoire et de psychologie du mysticisme : Les grands mystiques chrétiens.* Par HENRI DELACROIX. Paris, F. Alcan, 1908.—pp. xix, 472.

The aim of this work is to derive general conclusions concerning mysticism from the study of a selected group of mystics. The method is a good one ; it avoids the abstraction and vagueness almost inevitably attaching to a discussion of mysticism in general. There is no claim that the conclusions apply, without qualification, to all the varieties of mysticism ; they apply directly only to the type represented by the group. But it is by just such studies of types as we have here that we may hope to advance to a better understanding of mysticism as a whole.

The group selected by the author in the present work consists of the three great Christian mystics, Saint Teresa, Madame Guyon, and Heinrich Suso, and incidentally one or two others naturally associated with these. They represent a distinct type of mysticism, the Catholic Christian, while at the same time they are sufficiently different in age, race, and personality to afford material for comparison. Moreover, in studying them the student has the peculiar advantage of abundant documentary evidence of their experiences at first hand.

The plan of the work is carried out with considerable fulness of detail on the historical side, with too great fulness, perhaps, in the case of Madame Guyon, where the account of her mysticism tends to lose itself in the side issue of the controversy between Bossuet and Fénelon. Suso, on the other hand, is treated somewhat too briefly to produce the perfectly clear impression that he too belongs with the great mystics, as he undoubtedly does. The commanding personality of Saint Teresa, her fine spiritual discernment, her high intelligence, her remarkable power of introspective analysis, her practical organizing and administrative efficiency, are well brought out in the three chapters of the book devoted to her ; Madame Guyon appears in comparison, with all her talent, as a sort of seventeenth century French orthodox Mrs. Eddy. On the psychological side, the book presents an unusually full analysis of the facts and an interpretation at once sympathetic and critical.

One general, but important, conclusion is that the state of ecstasy, which is often regarded as the essence of practical mysticism, appears in these great mystics as but a transient phase in a process. The process includes, typically, four distinct stages : (1) a preparatory period of restless, unsuccessful striving to surrender self and become completely passive ; (2) a period of beatitude and vision, with a variety of connected phenomena, differing in the different cases, following the attainment of the state of pas-

sivity, which is generally experienced suddenly ; (3) a period of more or less acute and prolonged depression and distress in which the joys of the preceding stage are lost ; (4) a period of expansion, with the sense of an infinite repose and of a sovereign energy seeking active expression in the world. This final term of the process, the settled consciousness of an indwelling, all-transforming divine energy impelling to, and, in the case of the qualified, organizing an apostolic activity in the world, is a characteristic distinction of the great Christian mystics which takes us far beyond occasional ecstasies and visions and their fluctuating delights.

In considering how far this process is determined by tradition and affected by Christian doctrine, the author admits, indeed insists, that we have to do here, not with pure experience, but with an experience intellectualized and reflected on, and the parts which tradition and doctrine play in the construction are carefully pointed out. But it is held that these factors alone do not account for the experience, and that the initial tendency to mysticism is the fundamental factor, a tendency involved in the 'passive intuitionism' of the mystic's temperament. In a chapter on mystical experience the author shows how the vague content of the mystic's 'intellectual' intuition of the divine gets connected, in the subject of them, with the Christian conception of God, the most interesting point, perhaps, being that in some cases positive ideas function, not directly, but in a sort of 'emotional abstract' which represents them. But reflection is also at work, for however much the mystic may be led to attribute instinctively ontological value to his experiences, he very well knows that intuition without reflection is blind. In seeking to comprehend his experiences and to make use of them in action, he explains them, therefore, in terms of the Christian system, nicely discriminating at times between what is merely natural and what he passively experiences as divine, or again as diabolical.

As against the mystic's interpretation of the phenomena, modern pathology is apt to treat them as symptoms of disease, and modern psychology to assimilate them to lower forms of psychological automatism : his higher consciousness is an approach to unconsciousness, his sense of transcendent reality is a result of over simplification ; in brief, the mystic is either a 'hysteric' or a 'psychasthenic.' M. Delacroix takes middle ground. He, too, claims a neurotic basis for the mystic's experience and freely admits the pathological character of many of its phenomena. Nor does he attempt any defence of the minor mystics. But the intuition of the great mystics, who advance from the second to the fourth stage of the mystic life, he regards, in virtue of its organizing and constructive character, as not properly belonging to the lower, pathological forms of mind, but as assimilable rather to the constructive genius of the great artist. The great mystic is the genius *par excellence* of the religious life. The author, therefore, claims for the type of mysticism with which these studies deal high practical value. On the other hand, he rejects the supernatural explanation and substitutes that of 'the subconscious.' In his own words,



“this whole work is an attempt to establish [the view] that a profound activity, interior and subconscious, sustained by the solidity of a tradition, the power of a constructive and critical intelligence, and a high moral energy, produces both the wealth of intuition and of action and, on a neurotic basis, the hallucinatory experiences and all the pathological phenomena that are so abundant with the mystics. This creative activity, set in motion by auto-suggestion through the idea of the ends it pursues and the representations it organizes, is not, moreover, an arbitrary phantasy : it obeys a rigorous order ” (p. 408 n.). The influence of logical control and ascetic discipline on the subconscious life, with its aptitude for intuition and automatism, in effecting a methodical development, is the subject of a concluding section.

The book is an important contribution to the psychology of mysticism and of religion, so far as mysticism is a source and element of religion. The principal difficulty in the author's main theory appears to lie in the obscure conception of the subconscious. He uses this term as though it were one of recognized meaning, but in current fashion describes the subconscious now as an obscure consciousness, now as the region of unconscious mental processes, now as a source of mental energy, — a power intervening, *e. g.*, in the form of various automatisms, higher and lower, — in the course of conscious experience. Now, unquestionably, the subconscious in some form or other, whatever the term employed may be, is an indispensable psychological category. The stream of conscious experiences does not explain itself. The energy which is displayed in the activities of a conscious being is derived, in part at least, from a source, or sources, beyond the individual's modes of consciousness at the time. But the question is, what is the nature of this mysterious background? Is it entitative and actual, or merely a complex of ideal possibilities? Is it conscious or unconscious, psychical or physiological? Again, are we to regard it as a detached accompaniment of each individual, subject only to modifications from his private experiences, which it in turn affects, or does it perchance have wider social, or even cosmic, relations within its own realm? If the former, what is its relation to the universality of the social values of the activities it determines? If the latter, in what sense of the supernatural is the supernatural discarded when a phenomenon is referred not to that, but to the subconscious? Or has the conception perhaps only methodological value and no metaphysical significance? In that case the fact needs more than merely pointing out, for there is certainly a tendency to treat the doctrine as a dogma. We are confronted here, no doubt, with some of the deepest problems of personality, and the author is not to blame if he has not completely solved them. Still, it seems a pity that a conception so central to his whole thesis should not have received something more than it has of that careful and discriminating treatment which in other respects marks the book as one of exceptional value.

H. N. GARDINER.

*Logik: Eine Untersuchung der Prinzipien der Erkenntnis und der Methoden wissenschaftlicher Forschung.* Von WILHELM WUNDT. II Band. Logik der exakten Wissenschaften. III Band. Logik der Geisteswissenschaften. Stuttgart, Ferdinand Enke, 1907-1908. — pp. xv, 653; xii, 692.

The second and third volumes of Wundt's *Logik* in its third revised edition have recently appeared, the second volume in 1907, and the third in 1908. Together with the first volume, which appeared in 1906, the *Erkenntnislehre*, they form the familiar triad of Wundt's logical series. In such a work as this, it is natural to expect a notable addition in the way of supplemental material, especially when we consider not only the marvelous achievements of science since the publication of the second edition in 1893-95, but also the new methods and points of view which scientific investigation has evolved in this same period. But this expectation, I am bound to say, meets with disappointment when the third edition is compared with the second, and a balance is cast.

In the second volume, *Logik der exakten Wissenschaften*, the new material of the third edition may be indicated as follows: In the first chapter there is a slight section added, consisting of two pages, entitled "Die wechselseitigen Beziehungen der Untersuchungsmethoden," being an account of the reciprocal relation of Induction and Deduction.

To the two chapters of the First Part on "Die Methoden der Untersuchung," and on "Die Formen der systematischen Darstellung," Wundt has added in this third edition a new chapter, entitled "Das System der Wissenschaften." This is an excursion into the general field of the classification of the sciences, with a cursory notice of the classifications of Bacon, Comte, Spencer, and others.

In the second chapter of the Third Part on "Heuristische Prinzipien der Naturforschung," Wundt has added a short section on "Die heuristischen Postulate der Naturlehre und die subjektivistische Erkenntnistheorie."

In the Fourth Part there have been added to the second chapter, on "Die Logik der Chemie," two brief sections on "Die Elektronentheorie und die Hypothese der Zusammensetzung der Atome," and "Die chemischen Elemente und das Prinzip der Konstanz der Materie." The discussion in these two sections is far from adequate.

In the third chapter, on "Die Logik der Biologie," there has been a rearrangement of the material, and a few paragraphs added, referring to the work of Pasteur and Virchow. Wundt has also given in the table of contents a number of new headings to sections, but nothing whatsoever of additional material appears in the corresponding portions of the text. In this same chapter, there is an additional reference of some two pages to the "Mutationstheorie" (p. 584) which impresses one as an exceedingly inadequate and unsatisfactory account of a theory which merits a thorough and painstaking examination, especially as regards its bearing upon the newer methods of investigation in Biology. Moreover, there is no adequate

appreciation of the more recent experimental methods of investigation in this science. Turning now to the third volume, on "Die Logik der Geisteswissenschaften," we find supplementary material as follows.

In the third chapter of the First Part, on "Die Logik der Psychologie," there is a short section added, entitled "Allgemeine Regeln für die Anwendung des Experimentes in der Psychologie." In the same chapter, in the discussion on "Völkerpsychologie," there has been added a section entitled "Die Methoden der Völkerpsychologie."

In the Second Part, and in the third chapter on "Die Geschichtswissenschaft," there is some slight additional material in the section entitled "Die Prinzipien historischer Beurteilung."

In the Third Part, and the first chapter on "Die allgemeinen Gesellschaftswissenschaften," the section on "Die Soziologie" has been rewritten with the addition of some new material also. A number of sections in the table of contents have been rearranged and new titles appended, but here again, as in the second volume, there is no corresponding addition to or change of the text itself.

This account embraces the sum total of revision which has been given to the old *Logik* of Wundt in order to constitute the new. Even from the standpoint of quantity alone, the new material is insignificant relative to the total bulk of some 1345 pages, which the second and third volumes together contain. Moreover, the material which has been added is not sufficiently significant to justify the publication of a new edition. There should be some very special reason for the appearance of a revised edition of any book. In this age of an indefinite multiplication of books, and where in most libraries, public as well as private, a rigorous self-denial and frugal economy must be practiced, an author should not lightly undertake the task of presenting a new edition which it may seem to many necessary to procure.

The author has evidently been affected by the wave of reform spelling, and has made several changes in this new edition, as a uniform change of *c* to *k* throughout, and the dropping of the final *s* in such words as *Erkenntnis*, so that it appears simply as *Erkenntnis*. There are other minor changes of a like nature. The whole question of the utility as well as the ethics of revised editions would make an interesting subject for discussion. This, however, is not the place, or the occasion to undertake it.

JOHN GRIER HIBBEN.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

*Darwinism To-Day: A Discussion of Present-Day Scientific Criticism of the Darwinian Selection Theories, together with a Brief Account of the Principal Other Proposed Auxiliary and Alternative Theories of Species-Forming.* By VERNON L. KELLOGG. New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1907. — pp. i-xii, 403.

The scope of Professor Kellogg's book is clearly indicated by its title. His efficient performance of the promise there held out lays both the edu-

cated layman and the professed biologist under a heavy debt of gratitude. It is only fair to say that, if the English-speaking reader desires some one book to supplement his Darwin, and correct what are only too likely to be his incomplete and mistaken notions of the present state of evolutionary theory, this is the book for him to get. The popularizations of Natural Selection are no longer adequate, and though we have some useful books discussing the new theories and debates for the general reader, none of them covers the whole field so fully as this. While the text itself has been kept fairly free from the interruption of references and citations, the voluminous notes appended to the various chapters show how fully Professor Kellogg has gone through the literature of the subject, and incidentally that since 1870 this has grown enormously. These notes contain a valuable bibliography, quotations in many instances long enough to give an authentic idea of their writer's position, and details of the author's own experiments and observations. They add distinctly to the value of the book.

After two introductory chapters follow three on "Darwinism Attacked," then two on "Darwinism Defended," and four on "Other Theories of Species-Forming." The book is concluded by a brief chapter on "Darwinism's Present Standing," and the needs of modern biology. This plan of treatment involves a certain amount of repetition; but this is rather an advantage than otherwise, particularly for the general reader for whom the book is designed, as it ensures that each important element in the debate shall be seen from the standpoint of all the parties. The author's final estimate of the result of this debate may be stated in his own words: "Darwinism . . . as the natural selection of the fit, the final arbiter in descent control, stands unscathed, clear and high above the obscuring cloud of battle. . . . But Darwinism, as the all-sufficient or even most important causo-mechanical factor in species forming and hence as the sufficient explanation of descent, is discredited and cast down" (p. 374). Lamarckism, in its most general form, has precisely the same logical coherence as an hypothesis which commends Darwinism, apart from experimental proof; but, in the present state of our knowledge concerning heredity, it can neither be affirmed nor denied (pp. 381-384). The "principal desideratum in present-day investigation" is "the intensive study of variability." Three problems await an answer from this study: the original causes of variations, the causes of their cumulation to a stage where Natural Selection can act upon them, and the causes of adaptation.

Weight is added to these conclusions by the generous tone of the whole discussion. Professor Kellogg is no partisan, and it is only in one or two cases that he seems in any degree to fail in justice to any of the theories under review. This impartiality is further guaranteed by the citations in the appended notes, which are so copious that the reader may almost hear each party to the debate present its own case *ex ore proprio*, without going beyond the limits of this one book.

There are three points in Professor Kellogg's discussion of particular interest to the philosophical reader. He is perfectly clear as to the hypothetical character of the Darwinian theory, and of evolutionism as well. The evidence for both is, to use his own words, "nearly completely subjective"; that for descent is "of satisfying but purely logical character." In a word, evolution is quite as metaphysical a notion as, let us say, Professor Royce's Absolute. This is not a novel truth; but it is one which is so often overlooked in the popular English literature of the subject, that it is valuable to have it so clearly stated by a professional scientist. Another caution especially valuable from such a source is that against generalizations in other sciences based upon specific theories of the mode of evolution, as distinguished from its general truth. Certain theories in pedagogy and sociology are cited as glaring examples of such prematurity, and we are warned that "biology is not yet come to that stage in its development where it can offer many solidly formed generalizations on which other sciences can build."

Professor Kellogg's abhorrence of introducing teleology into the domain of science comes to the surface often, especially in his criticism of Nägeli and Driesch. The "thorough-going evolutionist" must, he is sure, seek "for a *causo-mechanical* explanation." This attitude on the part of the scientist is undoubtedly that with which the modern metaphysician is most at home and comfortable. He knows where to put it, so to speak, in his classic list of categories. But this should not make him endorse it unreservedly. After all, there is some meat left in Kant's 'Critique of the Teleological Judgment.' In so far as the scientists of Professor Kellogg's way of thinking oppose the introduction of some mystical teleological principle as a particular cause operating and interacting with physical causes, they must have the sympathy of the metaphysician; but the latter will not, on the other hand, be surprised if ultimately most biologists admit, as some now do, that no "*causo-mechanical* explanation" which excludes purpose is entirely adequate for all the phenomena of life. The decision between Neo-Vitalism and Mechanism, as to the facts, is one that only biology itself can render; but the debate seems at present often to miss the real question at issue, and for this the Neo-Vitalists are probably responsible.

It may seem ungrateful to criticise the manner, where one is indebted for so much matter, which, on the whole, is very clearly arranged. But Professor Kellogg will be unjust to his very valuable book if he permits it to go into the second edition which should soon follow, without a thorough revision. Many of its pages show that he can write lucidly and attractively; his argument is clear throughout. But a great deal of the book is written in an awkward and involved fashion, as though the labor of classifying and controlling the material, obviously great, had pushed aside all thoughts of style. One feels that the author's notes have been in some instances inserted in his manuscript without much more change than the addition of connective sentences. The book is well printed, but there are several errors which should be corrected; in particular, the omission of a

clause in the third sentence on page 144. The index is good within its limits, but should be expanded to contain the names of all the authors cited in the notes and elsewhere. Among those it omits are the names of Driesch and Wigand.

EDMUND H. HOLLANDS.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

*The Study of Nature and the Vision of God, with Other Essays in Philosophy.* By GEORGE JOHN BLEWETT. Toronto, William Briggs, 1907. — pp. ix, 355.

The essays in this volume are more closely connected in argument and content than its title indicates, for all were written as studies in the historical relations and interaction of Idealism and Mysticism, a subject which Professor Blewett had once hoped to treat in a more detailed and continuous way.

The title-essay, which is also the longest, is a statement in popular form of the contrast between that Mysticism which "to find God, denies the world," and the fully concrete Idealism which finds God in the world, and the world in God. It will be noted that Professor Blewett uses the term 'Mysticism' in its more usual acceptation, which identifies it with that *via negativa* which seeks a One that excludes every difference. Newman and Wordsworth are used as modern types of the Mystic and Idealistic tendencies. The statement of Idealism which follows is after the manner of T. H. Green, and somewhat over-psychological. The reader's suspicion of this is heightened by the statement in a note appended to the introduction (p. 3) that "any one who passes from psychology to metaphysic is at once in position to argue that, since the process to be explained is altogether psychical, that which explains its possibility must likewise be psychical." This is rather too easy a method in metaphysic to be convincing. Perhaps the best portion of the essay is its conclusion, which states the value of philosophy and the philosophic mind for the practical life both modestly and effectively.

The second essay, "The Metaphysic of Spinoza," is somewhat more technical, and also more convincing. In a brief historical review, in which Parmenides, the Upanishads, Neo-Platonism, and the German mystics are cited, Professor Blewett shows that a realistic metaphysic, and a use of the categories of Substance, underlie all Mysticism of the negative type. Of the three views of ultimate reality found, often in immediate juxtaposition, in Spinoza, the first, according to which *omnis determinatio est negatio*, is a precise case of this negative Mysticism, and a logical development of the substantialistic Realism of Descartes. The second, according to which there is one substance with infinite attributes, is the response of Spinoza to the contemporary advance in the natural sciences, and an attempt to connect all things in the chain of causal necessity. It is this second philosophy which, having been idealistically interpreted, has done most for modern

thought and religion. But Spinoza has also a "third metaphysic," a real though inchoate Idealism, which appears especially in his ethical discussions. Here we find organic and concrete conceptions of individual and social good, dimly apprehended it is true, and in constant conflict with an abstract intellectualism, which in the last analysis overlies and suppresses them, issuing in an ethical individualism, an absolutistic theory of the state, and a dualism of reason and imagination in the field of religion. The distinctions so clearly drawn in this essay are of real value in the study of Spinoza, and the author's discussion of them is very suggestive. The present reviewer, however, must disagree with his view that the "second metaphysic" has not some basis in Cartesianism as well as the "first." It seems odd, also, that in the discussion of Spinoza's inchoate Idealism no mention is made of the *idea ideae mentis* passage in the *Ethics* (Bk. II, prop. xxi), which so strikingly transcends the mere parallelism of the two attributes.

The four remaining essays are devoted to the same conflict of Mysticism and Idealism, as seen in the thought of Plato, of his followers, of Erigena, and of St. Thomas.

In the case of Plato, the first contrast is between his Idealism of the Good, Professor Blewett's outline of which is remarkably clear, in spite of its brevity, and the mystic tendency of his second period, which sets the Ideas apart in a world of their own. The motives for this Mysticism are both practical and theoretical. Plato's lofty moral and religious ideals had been rudely disappointed by the actual state of Greek life, and he tended to conceive the universal as the result of abstracting from all the differences of its particulars. Yet he was never a thorough Mystic, for he always thought of reality as the perfection of reason, not as above reason. And in his last period, especially in the *Philebus* and the *Timæus*, he at times described the Good as self-conscious spirit, and the Ideas as the modes of its self-communication, of which the world is the process. Yet he did not even then reach a fully concrete Idealism, for the pressure of the problem of evil compelled him to set Necessity or Non-Being by the side of the Good, as an explanation of the imperfections of the world.

Greek Idealism culminated, in Aristotle and the Stoics, in a further sharpening of the problem left unsolved by Plato. Aristotle, far more the true follower of Plato than is commonly recognized, held that the highest reality is self-conscious spirit, but separated this absolutely from the imperfect world. The Stoics held that Reason is immanent in the world, but were unable to articulate this insight. Christianity prepared the way for further advance by its emphasis on the value of the individual soul, while not failing to hold that the world is everywhere united to God. But this very intensification of the religious spirit involved a still sharper conflict between the opposing tendencies. Of this Erigena's system, based on a union of Christian theology and Neo-Platonic mysticism, is an interesting example. Origen's theology of the Logos and the Trinity tempers Erigena's

Idealism, and makes it more concrete than Neo-Platonism ever was. Nature is for him a communication of God. But his lack of the organic and developmental categories makes it impossible for him to deal adequately with the great problem of the Many and the One, especially when it presents itself as the problem of Evil. The result is that being too great a mind to give up any of the aspects of the truth which he cannot fully grasp, he is Mystic, Pantheist, and Idealist by turns. In his discussion of the first of his four forms of Nature,— Nature as One,— he looks back to Plotinus and Proclus; when he turns to Nature as Manifold, created and creating, there are many traits to remind us of Spinoza's "second metaphysic"; but when he arrives at Nature as "returned" to God, and eternally one in Him, his theology is affirmative, his Idealism as complete as his place in history permitted, and he plainly anticipates Hegel, even seeing that self-conscious spirit is "an active principle of synthesis," though he cannot clearly express his insight.

St. Thomas offers a somewhat different case of the same conflict. God is for him essentially intelligence, and intelligence includes its objects. Further, God knows the world. It would then follow that the world is "the objective consciousness of God." But there are two great difficulties in the way of this conclusion. In the first place, the world is imperfect and evil; and, in the second, St. Thomas holds that the divine nature is *omnino simplex*. He has failed to grasp the full meaning of that *manifold* unity of self-conscious intelligence which he has himself partially stated. The result is a separation between God and the world, between Grace and Nature. The forms of being, as they exist in the mind of God, are perfect; but in particular things, they are imperfect. The world is good, since it comes from God; but to gain God, men must renounce the world. It is the old difficulty of Plato and Aristotle over again, intensified by the pathos of Christianity, and by the thorough monism of St. Thomas's own teleology. Intellectually, the modern world is better prepared to meet this problem; but practically, there is danger lest we lose the One in the Many.

While Professor Blewett's statement of Idealism offers nothing essentially new, he has succeeded in presenting it in a clear and attractive way, and has made his historical discussions assist in its elucidation with much skill. These essays deserve a permanent place in the English library of philosophy. It is to be hoped that he will some day return to his former plan of a longer and more elaborate work upon the same subject. His style has the defects of its merits. It is never commonplace, and at times rises to impressive eloquence. The refined but vigorous moral enthusiasm which pervades the whole book is most appealing. But there are a few passages, especially in the first essay, which are somewhat turgid and periphrastic, and some have a slight tinge of homiletic sentimentalism. The book is well printed, and the proof has been carefully read.

EDMUND H. HOLLANDS.



*The Problem of Form in Painting and Sculpture.* By ADOLF HILDEBRAND. Translated and revised with the author's coöperation by MAX MEYER and ROBERT MORRIS OGDEN. New York, G. E. Stechert and Co., 1907. — pp. 141.

The translation appears to have been made from the fourth German edition of Hildebrand's monograph; the preface to the third edition is reproduced in the present version. Hildebrand enjoys a wide reputation throughout Germany and Austria, where many of his sculptures are found in municipal or national galleries or in public squares. His work is strongly influenced by antique plastic art, and although he is German in birth and temperament, his long residence and study in Rome and Florence have left unmistakable impressions on his art creations. In the monograph before us, Hildebrand discusses the problem of Form, chiefly from the sculptor's point of view and with reference to the sculptor's materials. The topics treated are: vision and movement, form and appearance, the idea of space and its visual expression, ideas of planes and depth, the conception of relief, form as an interpretation of life, and sculpture in stone. These topics are handled partly from the technical point of view of the artist and partly from the point of view of psychology.

The author rejects, at the start, the postulate that sculpture and painting are merely imitative arts; he describes the artist's method as fundamentally architectonic. By this he means that the artist's function is reconstructive, idealistic. Only by superimposing idealization on imitation can "sculpture and painting emerge from the sphere of mere naturalism into the true realm of art." The creation of mere illusion is not the artist's primary function.

Ideas of form are derived from visual and kinesthetic sensations. The sculptor's specific mental material consists in the latter. The visible world, excluding kinesthetic factors, is purely a color-world, made up exclusively of color, including light and shade, and the outlines or boundaries created by chromatic differences. Further, we have actual form and perceptual form. As our kinesthetic ideas develop, we come to ascribe form to objects. The actual form is obtained either by direct movement or by inference from appearance. The perceptual form is the visual appearance modified by illumination, environment, or shifting point of view of the observer. The former is stable and absolute, while the latter is variable. The perceptual form is consequently richer in content than the actual form because of subjective relationships existing between its elements (p. 41). These interrelationships tend to influence the visual idea whenever we think of the object. Certain elements are more significant and more essential than others, and reappear clearly in the visual image. Artistic representation consists in the clear reproduction of these values of form as psychological values, in distinction from mere knowledge of actual form. The positivistic conception of art, which regards exact reproduction as the problem of art and considers any influence of the interpreta-

tive faculty as a falsification of natural truth, detaches the momentary impression from our general ideas, although apart from these general ideas visual perception would, as a matter of fact, be impossible. Instead of seeing mechanically, the actual process is to make a significant picture out of the retinal image by the contribution of ideas, and this is true of kinaesthetic sensations in sculpture as well as of visual sensations in painting.

Form acquires visual expression by foils of light and shade; varying degrees of brightness and darkness model, as it were, the object. In our visual experience these represent to us spatial values. Spatial effects in nature are the product of several factors,—the object's actual form, chromatic perspective, degrees of illumination, and the observer's point of view,—and these factors are unified only for the eye, but are otherwise isolated. In this visual unity we have otherwise separate conditions working simultaneously. The specifically artistic skill of the painter consists in his ability to discover the visual values of space, and on these depends the unity of his image and its power to create in the beholder an idea of space.

Seeing is a combination of the optical function and the mental act of understanding. Similarly, we say a child can read only when the word presents not merely letters but meaning. The spatial content of a work of art is so arranged as to present that appearance of an object or group of objects "which is recognized as of all possible appearances the one most readable" (p. 100). Art is not a panoramic nor a photographic reproduction, in which the aim is mere illusion or mere imitation.

Ideas of organization, function, or movement, are derivative factors of already established spatial ideas. What is meant by the 'life of nature' is, in reality, the animation of nature through our ideas. The life of a hand is felt whether it be in repose or in motion; in the resting form we conjecture the mode of functioning; "the organic body we conceive as a complex of forms bearing the impress of certain functional possibilities." To these spatial ideas and forms we attach certain organic and functional factors, imported into them from our knowledge. The unity of functional values can be represented only as a unity of spatial values; the visual impression is the artist's goal. The crudity of realism is due to its not transforming functional into spatial values.

The book is translated into clear English and is a valuable addition to our literature on the psychology of art.

W. A. HAMMOND.

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*The Philosophical Works of Leibnitz: Comprising the Monadology, New System of Nature, Principles of Nature and of Grace, Letters to Clarke, Refutation of Spinoza, and his other important philosophical opuscles, together with the Abridgment of the Theodicy and extracts from the New Essays on Human Understanding.* Translated from the original Latin

and French, with notes, by GEORGE MARTIN DUNCAN. Second Edition. New Haven, The Tuttle, Morehouse, and Taylor Company, 1908. — pp. ix, 409.

In the "Prefatory Note to the Second Edition," the relation between this edition and the first is clearly stated as follows. "The translations have been revised; the Preface to the *Codex Diplomaticus Juris Gentium* has been removed from the notes to the body of the work, where it properly belongs; the extracts from the *Nouveaux Essais* have been inserted among the other pieces in chronological order; and a few bibliographical changes and additions have been made in the notes, including a full list of the English renderings of Leibnitz's writings. With these exceptions the work is substantially unchanged."

It would be gratuitous to write a critical notice of a book that was first published in 1890, and that has been constantly used by teachers of the history of philosophy ever since, except for the brief interval during which it was out of print. The present writer was doubtless only one of many teachers of philosophy who wrote at once to the publishers, when the first edition was exhausted, representing the importance of publishing a new edition of this book, which has become practically indispensable for classes working in early modern philosophy. Mr. Langley's translation of the *Nouveaux Essais*, while very useful for other purposes, was no proper substitute for Professor Duncan's book, not only on account of its length (nearly six hundred closely printed pages being devoted to the translation of the *Nouveaux Essais* alone, the whole book numbering over eight hundred and fifty pages), but because the briefer essays translated by Professor Duncan are really much more representative of the various sides of Leibnitz's philosophical activity, as, indeed, is plainly evident from the constant references made to them in all histories of modern philosophy. Professor Latta's translation of certain of the same essays (with notes that the advanced student will find helpful) is not an adequate substitute for Professor Duncan's book, as it includes hardly more than a fifth as many essays. In short, it is a genuine pleasure to see again in print a book that has proved itself nearly indispensable for the use of general classes; and it may be taken for granted that the revision of the translation and the other changes are such as one would expect from the scholarship of the translator.

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The following books also have been received:

*The Philosophy of Gassendi.* By G. S. BRETT. London, Macmillan and Co., 1908. — pp. xlv, 310.

*A Theory of Mind.* By JOHN L. MARCH. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908. — pp. vi, 453.

*The Philosophy of Kant Explained.* By JOHN WATSON. Glasgow, James Maclehose and Sons; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1908. — pp. xi, 515. \$3.75.

- The Problem of Logic.* By W. R. BOYCE GIBSON with the coöperation of AUGUSTA KLEIN. London, Adam and Charles Black, 1908.—pp. xii, 500.
- The Reflections of Lichtenberg.* Selected and translated by NORMAN ALLISTON. London, Swan Sonnenschein and Co., 1908.—pp. 168. 2s. 6d.
- The Philosophers and the French Revolution.* By P. A. WADIA. London, The Times of India Office, 1908.—pp. 203. 4s. 10d.
- Combination Tones and Other Related Auditory Phenomena.* By JOSEPH PETERSON. (The Psychological Review, Monograph Supplements, Vol. IX, No. 2.) Lancaster, Pa., The Review Publishing Co., 1908.—pp. xiii, 136.
- A Handbook of Christian Ethics.* By J. CLARK MURRAY. Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark, 1908.—pp. xiv, 328. \$2.25.
- The Ethical Aspects of Evolution Regarded as the Parallel Growth of Opposite Tendencies.* By W. BENETT. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1908.—pp. 220. \$2.00.
- A Study of the Influence of Custom on the Moral Judgment.* By FRANK C. SHARP. Madison, Wisconsin, The University of Wisconsin, 1908.—pp. 144. \$0.30.
- St. Paul's Epistles to Colossæ and Laodicea.* With introduction and notes by JOHN RUTHERFURD. Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark, 1908; imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.—pp. 207. \$2.25.
- Buddhism and Immortality.* By WILLIAM S. BIGELOW. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1908.—pp. 75. \$0.75.
- A Short History of Puritanism.* By JAMES HERRON. Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark, 1908; imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.—pp. viii, 236. \$0.50.
- Race Questions, Provincialism and Other American Problems.* By JOSIAH ROYCE. New York, The MacMillan Co., 1908.—pp. xiii, 287. \$1.25.
- The Precinct of Religion in the Culture of Humanity.* By C. G. SHAW. London, Swan Sonnenschein and Co.; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1908.—pp. xiii, 279. \$2.00.
- Philosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart.* Von LUDWIG STEIN. Stuttgart, Ferdinand Enke, 1908.—pp. xvi, 452. M. 17.
- Der Skeptizismus in der Philosophie und seine Überwindung.* Von RAOUL RICHTER. Zweiter Band. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1908.—pp. vi, 584. M. 8.50.
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- Über Theodor Lipps' Versuch einer Theorie des Willens.* Von JULIUS PIKLER. Eine kritische Untersuchung zugleich ein Beitrag zu einer dynamischen Psychologie. Leipzig, Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1908.—pp. viii, 50.

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- La philosophie moderne.* Par ABEL REY. Paris, Ernest Flammarion, 1908. — pp. 372. 3 fr. 50.
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- Insuffisance des philosophies de l'intuition.* Par CLODIUS PIAT. Paris, Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1908. — pp. 319.
- Psycho-physiologie de la douleur.* Par I. IOTAYKO et M. STEFANOWSKA. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. 251. 5 fr.
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- L'adolescence. Études de psychologie et de pédagogie.* Par GABRIEL COMPAYRÉ. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. 195. 2 fr. 50.
- Démocratie, patrie, et humanité.* Par J. GIROD. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1908. — pp. 172. 2 fr. 50.
- Éthique, droit et politique.* Par ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER. Première traduction française avec préface et notes par AUGUSTE DIETRICH. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. 187. 2 fr. 50.
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- L'intolleranza e i suoi presupposti.* Per GIOVANI MARCHESINI. Milano, Torino, Fratelli Bocca, 1909. — pp. 266.
- La parola nella vita e nella scuola.* Per ANTONIO MARCHESINI. Torino, Roma, G. B. Paravia e comp., 1909. — pp. 154.
- L'individualismo nelle dottrine morali del secolo xix.* Per GIOVANNI VIDARI. Milano, Ulrica Hoepli, 1909. — pp. xx, 400.

## SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Neo-Sc.* = *Revue Neo-Scholastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.*: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

### LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

*On Memory and Judgment.* F. H. BRADLEY. *Mind*, No. 66, pp. 153-174.

The object of the article is to throw light on the ultimate value of memory as a test of truth. Doubt drives us to reflection; and if we go on to find truth, we will have a judgment which, when we reflect, satisfies us. Our last judgment, that is, our present judgment, must be treated as infallible. Further reflection may reject our judgment, but until further reflection comes, we must hold the judgment as true, for while making a judgment we cannot entertain the possibility of its error. The presence of an idea contrary to what is judged would prevent the making of the judgment or would destroy it if made. After a judgment is made, we may by reflection re-affirm, deny, or doubt it; but in either case what was our judgment has become part of another judgment and ceases to exist as our original judgment. It has become an element in a new logical present and its significance is dependent upon the content of the new present. Thus reflection on a judgment destroys the independent value of the judgment, makes it subordinate to the present judgment, and while it is obvious that I cannot go beyond my present judgment while it remains present, it cannot therefore possibly be doubted. A judgment made conditional by being made subject to a doubt is still, as a present judgment, made unconditionally. Again, a judgment may be fallible only in its general character as being one judgment among others. Taken otherwise, the possibility of error is antecedent and abstract, and it cannot be applied to this case as this case actually exists. So if judgment is supreme, memory cannot have independent worth, nor can judgment depend on memory. But it is urged that thinking depends upon past experience as memory gives it. This is true only in a sense. We depend upon the past only for materials, with

regard to which the decision of the present is supreme ; otherwise memory is absolute. But memory is not independent, for, as a fact, memory fails. Moreover, if past connections are absolute, then is the present determined. And, again, memory is frequently corrected, which is evidence of its fallibility. So if memory is fallible, there must be a higher criterion, or we are plunged into scepticism. But memory, wherever corrected, is corrected by a judgment. If it be objected that it is only through memory that a judgment is one, the reply is that though time and memory are necessary for the formation of a judgment, this applies only to the psychical aspect of a judgment, besides which there is the logical aspect. This latter aspect, or the logical content of what I assert, is independent of my state when I assert, that is, is independent of the psychical character of the judgment. What I take as one judgment is, psychologically, a matter of convenience. But, logically, and with reference to content, what is meant by one judgment is an ideal determination of reality in which for my mind the subject remains one and unbroken. This one and unbroken experience is one judgment just because, and just in so far as, it admits nothing disconnected and independent. It therefore excludes anything like memory.

E. JORDAN.

*Radical Empiricism and Agnosticism.* ALFRED H. LLOYD. *Mind*, No. 66, pp. 175-192.

In this day of empiricism and pragmatism, it is well to turn our attention to the inevitable negative which positive experience always suggests, and to ask whether there is any meaning left for the unknowable. It is the purpose here to indicate the pragmatist's attitude toward agnosticism. There are many forms of agnosticism, the more typical of which may be designated as follows : (1) absolute agnosticism, for which reality as outside of all knowledge is essentially unknowable ; (2) transcendent agnosticism, for which reality is unknowable to human minds, but knowable to some other mind or minds ; (3) transcendental agnosticism, which holds that the knowable and the unknowable correspond to two different natures, also to two different faculties of human nature ; (4) positivistic agnosticism, which views the unknowable as the infinitely distant yet-to-be-known ; (5) empirical agnosticism, for which the unknowable is the direct and immediate reality of positive experience. This last view is held by the author. The first three views misinterpret the limitations of knowledge, and fail to take account of that something which not only in form but also in essence is distinct and apart from knowledge. The fourth view assumes reality as essentially knowable, but regards it as practically unknowable, because complete knowledge of it is infinitely remote. This view mistakes the nature of infinity, which, however truly continuous and possible, cannot be the same in kind as the finite. The fifth view argues through Kantianism to radical empiricism or pragmatism. Kant's thing-in-itself has been destroyed by his own *a priori*, which has made the knowable and the for-

mally unknowable vitally and inseparably one. Kant's unknowable becomes, then, the knowable's own native realism, the direct and immediate reality of positive experience. The pragmatist's unknowable is his immediately real experience. The immanence of the unknowable within the knowable is illustrated by reference to the history of thought, to the sciences, and specially to psychology. The theory is defended against the charge of solipsism.

E. JORDAN.

*Individualisme et philosophie Bergsonienne.* GEORGES AIMEL. Rev. de Ph., VIII, 6, pp. 582-593.

Whether individualism be regarded as the necessary consequence of the doctrine of evolution, or as a perilous factor of disintegration, the fact remains that it is an ever growing tendency in modern thought. The purpose of the present article is to trace the relation of individualism to the philosophy of Bergson, which seems to be the order of the day in France. The Bergsonian philosophy is, first of all, a critique of Kant's Transcendental *Æsthetic*. For Bergson space is the only homogeneous medium. Time, duration, is the medium of pure consciousness. There are two selves : the one being the exterior projection of the other, its contaminated, spatial, social representation. Our inner life is a whole formed of qualitative multiplicity. If we try to determine its elements by separating them from that which gives them their particular coloring, we render them unknowable. Hence the individualistic principle : *omne individuum ineffabile*. We must protect our inner self from all external influences which tend to alter it. The goal of our inner life must be liberty, activity in pure duration, unimpeded by any external spatial elements. Become yourselves, as Nietzsche puts it in his *Zarathustra*. Individualism may oftenest lead to immorality ; it does not necessarily imply it. He only is moral who creates his own values, who draws from his own spiritual substance the rules of his conduct. And Bergson is not the only contemporary philosopher whose psychology is, at least implicitly, individualistic in tendency. Thus Höfding speaks of the formal and the real self, distinguishing between the two in a manner strikingly similar to Bergson's. His ethics is decidedly individualistic. James also shows us the impossibility of discriminating clearly between the various elements that go to form the stream of consciousness. Allied to this is the theory of the subliminal self, now attracting some attention. One clearly sees this individualistic attitude in the pragmatism of to-day. That religion is true for me which best expresses, is most in harmony with, my own inner self. I am the measure of all things. Man is creator of values, no less than creator of truths. In pragmatism individualism is implied ; in Bergson's psychology it finds its most complete and most precise expression. It is rather curious that a Latin mind should have given individualism, an essentially Germanic notion, its clearest statement and its soundest psychological basis.

R. A. TSANOFF.



*Le Dieu de Spinoza.* V. BROCHARD. Rev. de Mét., XVI, 2, pp. 129-164.

Spinoza did not vary in his conception of God, as is sometimes supposed. The *Tractatus theologico-politicus* is concerned with the relation of reason and faith. Reason alone is the direct communion of the soul with God. Faith, depending upon revelation, represents God as a legislator to whom man must conform his will even when he cannot understand it. God, who adapted truth to the feebleness of man, is not only a thinking and extended substance, known by reason, as the *Ethics* teaches, but a benevolent God, bent on the reign of justice and charity. Yet there is no contradiction here, for Spinoza identifies will and intelligence; *i. e.*, will is active intelligence. God's will is necessarily determined by his intelligence. In this sense only is God either free or determined, that He must obey His own reason, and that there is necessity in everything. Reason, for Spinoza, includes morality; and both reason and morality are but means to the reign of justice, charity, and the love of God. But, again, the conception of God in the *Tractatus* is not incompatible with that of the infinite, universal, and unchangeable substance of the *Ethics*. This God, with the attribute of extension, which has branded the philosophy of Spinoza as pantheistic for so long, is pantheistic if immanence in the world is pantheistic; but is not pantheistic, unless that God can be called pantheistic who is at the origin of things, perfect, all powerful, endowed with reason, self-consciousness, self-determination, distinct from the world as substance is from its modes, or cause from its effects, and capable of interesting himself in the affairs of the world and of revealing himself to the world in order to bring on the reign of justice and charity. For extension, as a divine attribute, is not what is perceived by the senses, but what is conceived by the understanding. Spinoza's great contribution, however, is not that extension is an attribute of divinity, but his denial that God is a final cause. Perfection is defined by reality, conceived by categories of quantity, not of quality. The basis of God's being is the particular thing, which exists in the act. God is an efficient cause which draws from itself by its own initiative the multiplicity of its effects. Force or power appealed most to Spinoza's mind; for the philosophy of Spinoza is an adaptation to modern forms of thought of a very ancient philosophy. If he shows Cartesian influence, he shows still deeper influences, Greek, Hebrew, and Arabian, especially through Plotinus.

C. WEST.

*Le problème de Dieu d'après la philosophie nouvelle.* N. BALTHASAR. Rev. Néo-Sc., XV, 1, pp. 90-124.

According to LeRoy, the merit of the teleological argument is the affirmation of the God of the moral and religious life, the preceding proofs having said nothing of the moral attributes of God. This is incorrect since all the arguments refer indirectly, if not directly, to these attributes.

If God is pure Act, He is Infinite Perfection, and consequently Goodness and Intelligence. Moreover, the teleological argument offers the only adequate explanation of the order in the world. As regards the proof from the aspirations of the human soul, one allows that a desire is not a proof. But an ever-recurring and ever-unsatisfied desire is a manifest sign of the imperfection, and therefore of the contingency, of man. The content of the ideas of good and bad changes, as LeRoy claims, but the imperative, absolute character of duty is always the same. The voice of conscience is a revelation of God. LeRoy, on the contrary, finds in the changing aspect of the moral order, in the Thought-Action which always tends to pass beyond itself, what he considers the affirmation of the divine. Now common-sense defines reality as external to thought. It affirms the existence of God and of the Soul, because these are necessary for the explanation of the phenomena which we experience. Idealism declares that it is impossible even to think of anything outside of thought. According to LeRoy, the real is defined by these two characters: (1) by its maintaining itself against criticism, and (2) by inexhaustible fertility. The idea of God answers to these two characteristics. It has always, in one form or other, played a most important part in the world. Therefore the idea of God must have some divine reality corresponding to it. But LeRoy does not seem to allow to the idea of God any more than a symbolic or pedagogical value. For God is Thought-Action and the principle of growth and moral reality, transcendent, because He is above the abstractions of matter and of reason, immanent, because He realizes Himself progressively in action. This belief in God is, then, not the outcome of logic, but is a living experience. There can be no atheists, since no one is content with what he has and is, but wants other things. God is a person because He is the spring of action in my personality. At bottom Nature, Duty, and God are the same thing; and God is infinite Becoming. LeRoy claims that his proof of the existence of God is accessible to the multitude; he claims that this God is the God of the multitude. But surely God is not Becoming, but is the All-Perfect Being. The logical arguments for His Existence are accessible to all. Does not the Cosmos need someone to order it? Does not the world demand an author? And is not the Church present to supplement reason?

M. MOLLOY.

*Will-Force and the Conservation of Energy.* W. E. A. WILKINSON.  
The Monist, XVIII, 1, pp. 1-21.

Mind directs the motions of matter; for (1) it alone can furnish a foundation for ethical ideas, and (2) we cannot imagine that the experience of conscious beings would have been the same without consciousness. The direct argument from the consciousness of the control of events is often answered by saying that, because we get our desires, we think we have brought them about. But the fact that action always follows desire can be explained neither as an accident nor as an illusion. Mind, then, directs

the motion of matter. To do this it must originate motion. This can be reconciled with the theory of the conservation of energy. The total amount of energy in the universe is constant but infinite. It exists in two forms, spiritual and material. The former, which is infinite in quantity, can be transformed into the latter, which is also probably infinite in quantity. Though material energy is indestructible, it exhibits a tendency to pass from kinetic to potential form, and so would result in stagnation, if the interference of will-force did not prevent this. For this purpose only a very small amount of motion is necessary. Its very smallness has led scientists to doubt its existence. The attempt is often made to explain all animal action as habit, therefore as mechanical. The author has shown that many actions cannot be explained as habitual. Moreover, habit itself, including instinct and reflex action, may be explained as originating in action performed by conscious effort. It has been fixed by long process of repetition. There is some difficulty in conceiving the origin of force in consciousness, but this is true also of matter. These ontological entities are bound together in a harmony, thus constituting a monism. This theory introduces a second force into evolution, guidance through the conscious efforts of the organism concerned. Shorter periods of time will afford results. From individual guidance we infer universal guidance and thus reach the idea of God. To argue more strictly, if some material energy originates in will-force, all originated so, though the transformation had no beginning in time. The universal will-force is one aspect of God.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

*The Function of Philosophy as an Academic Discipline.* GEORGE R. DODSON. *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.*, V, 17, pp. 454-459.

Philosophy has not the influence in our universities that it ought to have. The difficulty is increased by the various views as to the nature of the subject itself. The emphasis in teaching it should be, not upon the special disciplines, but upon its unifying function. It should assist the student to a world-view. For a long time this world-view will be merely tentative; it will have to be constantly broadened. The teacher of philosophy cannot carry out this plan if he is merely a specialist. He should be thoroughly acquainted with at least one science and should know the main problems of all. Now that scientists are examining the substructure of their various fields, they are finding themselves in the field of philosophy. They need the previous experience of philosophy to guide them, and philosophy, in turn, needs their help. The teacher of science can aid in this work of unification by pointing out the larger relations of his subject. Nearly all research is stimulated by the desire to solve the great problems of life. Philosophy should be presented in such a way as to show the progress in the development and solution of these problems. It would be well for the student to become thoroughly acquainted with some one system in order to have a basis of comparison. If this system is mechanical, he will have to

supplement it so that life and mind can find place ; if it is moral, he will have to provide room for physics. In short, philosophy should assist the student in getting his bearings in the universe, and most minute special investigations should be handed over to the special disciplines.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

#### PSYCHOLOGY.

*Über psychophysische Wechselwirkung und das Energieprincip.* ALOYS MÜLLER. *Z. f. Psych.*, XLVII, 2, pp. 115-140.

The author first reviews the various objections made to the theory of interaction and the attempts to refute them. He classifies the latter under three headings, *viz.*: the psychological type, as represented by v. Grot, Stumpf, Ostwald, Külpe, and others ; the physical type, as given by Busse ; and the functional type, recently attempted by Geyser and by Becher. The first two types, he thinks, are absolutely disproved by Atwater's and Rubner's careful measurements of energy in living human and animal bodies, which experiments have shown beyond doubt that the living organism is itself a closed system of physical energy, allowing of no interference by any kind of postulated psychical energy. The functional type alone is not affected by these disproofs of psychical energy, because it simply postulates a change in the direction of physical energy by means of the psyche without changing the amount of physical energy itself. Geyser has upheld interactionism on this basis, arguing that, so far as the energy is concerned, it is indifferent in what direction it is spent, that the physical impossibility of pure change of direction without any change of energy does not mean a logical impossibility, and that laws concerning physical causality do not necessarily hold for non-physical phenomena. But, our author objects, a physical change depends not only upon the nature of the cause, but also upon the nature of the thing affected by the cause. Hence, if one member of a causal series belonged to the non-physical phenomena, a physical cause would not affect it. Besides, the psyche, in order to bring about a certain change in the direction of the physical energy, must know beforehand the effects of its own influence. Hence Geyser's arguments presuppose what he wants to prove. The same objection must also be made to Becher, whose argument, though otherwise logically correct, unfortunately implies two absolute physical impossibilities, *viz.*, a frictionless medium and the complete isolation of a moving particle. Hence interactionism requires a new proof of an entirely different character.

L. R. GEISSLER.

*The Methods of the Naturalist and Psychologist.* H. R. MARSHALL. *Psych. Rev.*, XV, 1, pp. 1-24.

Naturalists as a body have held the psychologist's method of introspection in contempt ; yet each step, which all scientists take in their work, is

in the end based on introspection. The data which we are called upon to examine in introspective psychology are presentations. Of these, sensations are the most emphatic. The characteristics which always belong in common to all forms of presentation are : intensity, manifoldness, realness, the algedonic quality, and the time quality. If we could isolate psychic elements, and could observe them in reflection as thus isolated, we should discover in connection with them elemental intensity and elemental pain and pleasure. Presentations must be more or less real. Between their minimum and maximum realness they must display all manner of grades of psychic stability. There thus appear diverse worlds of reality. Realness must thus attach to concepts, and these concepts must appear as more or less real according to the nature of the contexts in which they appear. It is necessary to draw a sharp line of distinction between the objective concept reality and realness which is a subjective characteristic. The appreciation of the existence of each of the general qualities of presentation is determined by the appearance in consciousness of a special form of presentation, each of which is *sui generis*, and is one of the 'senses of relation.' All of these general qualities are in a measure given together in connection with each presentation. Where certain of the phases of these general qualities are coincidentally emphatic we should expect to observe the appearance of new and distinctive *combinational* 'senses of relation.' But there are other qualities which are not appreciable in connection with all presentations. The existence of each of these special qualities, of which the spatial is the most important, will be due to the appearance of a special 'sense of relation' presentation. But there are specific presentations which seem to be clearly differentiated from one another, — sensations, percepts, concepts, instinct experiences and emotions, and acts of will. The presentations given in reflection are only part of the whole of the state of consciousness considered, and in any given instant the part of consciousness which we call Self is existent, although it is not presented, and, in fact, is non-presentable. This Self, and the presentations of this Self, must always affect each other. No distinction can be made between voluntary and involuntary attention. Belief appears as an establishment of realness by that simulacrum of the Self which we call the empirical ego. Whenever we experience an act of belief, we actually must experience an act of will.

F. A. PEEK.

*Les éléments moteurs de l'émotion esthétique.* G. DROMARD. Rev. de Ph., VIII, 1, pp. 5-16.

The work of art is not the copy of reality ; it is reality digested through a temperament, and rendered to an ideal form, that is to say, to the form of forms, to a form which does not exist, and yet includes in itself all existing forms. There is, therefore, in every work of art, a universal as well as an individual element. The latter proceeds from the elaboration of objective reality through a temperament, while the former is the effect of generali-

zation and abstraction. The individual element transmits personal tendencies of the composer, while the universal element expresses general aspiration toward an ideal, which is nothing else but the sentiment of infinity in the finite. All artistic work can be defined as the transmission of the emotion from one temperament to another through the schema of reality. This schema of reality, which serves as a bridge between an artist and the admirer of his work, is nothing else but the ideal ; and the reconstitution of that ideal into sensible reality, opened to infinity, is the whole secret of our emotion of art. Here is the value of the motor element, the rôle of personal activity, as the substratum of all our emotions of the æsthetic order, especially our poetic emotions. The majority of æstheticians think that poetry consists above all in suggestion, and this opinion is in perfect accord with the rôle which is here granted to the personal activity in the emotion of art.

TAIZO NAKASHIMA.

*L'objet de la psychologie.* L. M. BILLIA. Rev. de Ph., VIII, 4, pp. 353-371.

The author was inclined to believe that the reality of mental life was sensation while self was pure abstraction. But, after careful study, he came to the conclusion that elementary sensation does not exist, that the abstraction is just that isolated sensation, and that the reality, if it exists at all, is Ego or self. The author thus came to the conclusion that the only veritable object of psychology is self, or soul, if we want to call it so, as Plato and all his followers have done. There is no internal fact which may not be the fact of self ; all mental facts must be conceived as the facts of self in their condition of being. One could even go a step further and say that, since all sensible things, all external facts, are only apprehended as perception, the other series of facts, the movements, the external universe, as far as we know them, can also be reduced to the states and modes of self. But this last inference belongs to a different thesis from the present one, to the thesis according to which all descriptive sciences can be brought to unity in psychology. Of course, the author's conception of psychology is wholly different from present empirical (analytical) psychology.

TAIZO NAKASHIMA.

*Attention and Interest.* W. H. BURNHAM. Am. J. Ps., XIX, 1, pp. 14-18.

The word 'interest' is used in two senses : (1) to denote our permanent habits of perception ; (2) to represent a temporary affective state, complex in character. Attention is a reaction of the whole organism, comparable to the tropisms of plants and animals. We must suppose an affective state correlated with this reaction. This affective state is interest. The least we can say in this case is that interest is correlated with attention. If we use the word 'interest' in the sense of a permanent habit of preper-

ception, what we mean is that our attention of the moment as preperception depends on our habits of preperception. If, however, we use the word 'interest' in the other sense, meaning the affective state of the moment correlated with attention, to say that attention depends upon interest is not in harmony with modern psychology.

TAIZO NAKASHIMA.

*Psychology as Science of Self.* MARY WHITON CALKINS. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., V, 1, pp. 12-20; 3, pp. 64-68; 5, pp. 113-122.

One view regards psychology as the science of the functions of the psychophysical organism. This view is inadequate, since it considers together functions which must be distinguished as physiological and psychical. A second view, that of mind without body, seems to be held by no one to-day. A third and more satisfactory view holds that the self is distinct from the body but related to it. The objection that this view creates a gulf between mind and body is not effective, for the psychologist does not have to bridge it. Moreover, the objection would apply quite as well to either of the opposing views. The further objection, that psychology cannot be the science of the self because self-consciousness arises at a late stage in experience, is due to a failure to distinguish between the inchoate self-consciousness of each experience and reflective consciousness of the self. In the former sense, self-consciousness is always present when there is consciousness at all. But it will be asked: What is the nature of the relation existing between mind and body? In reply it can be said that psychical facts may be partially explained by physical and physiological facts and more fully by biological facts; but that none of the three can adequately explain consciousness as such. Such explanation must always remain secondary to the main purpose of the psychologist, the description of psychic facts *qua* psychic facts. The structural analysis, though essential, fails to include certain positive characteristics, persistence, inclusiveness, uniqueness, and relatedness, which do not belong either to ideas or to functions, but which are immediately experienced. The author appends an annotated summary of the results of a description of consciousness in terms of self. In this a careful distinction has been made between the immediately experienced factors of consciousness and those reflectively attributed to it. The other-than-self has also been distinguished as personal or impersonal. To the author's general view it has been objected that self-psychology has no right to the use of structural analysis. To this she replies, that, since the conscious self is the concrete reality of which the idea is an abstraction, analysis is an essential though not an exhaustive account. Another criticism holds that the description of consciousness in terms of self is unnecessary. But the critic seems to yield the case by admitting that a consciousness of the personality of another belongs to sympathetic joy; for a structural analysis cannot account for this.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

## ETHICS.

*La morale des idées-forces.* D. PARODI. Rev. Ph., XXXIII, 4, pp. 337-366.

Fouillée's *La morale des idées-forces*, Vol. I, presents the long-delayed positive part of that author's philosophy, which was promised as early as 1887. It is an attempt to give a scientific synthesis of all past ethical theories on the basis of the central thought of his philosophy, that of *idées-forces*. The essence of this theory is the contention that all thought is impulsive in nature. All ideas tend to realize themselves in action. They only fail to do this, when they are hindered by some other idea which is stronger or equally strong. Thought is thus the beginning of all action, and moral conceptions are the source of moral actions. Moral actions, however, react upon moral ideals, and make them clearer. This fundamental conception of *idées-forces* is applied to the specific problems of ethics in four books as follows: (1) the moral subject, and the altruism of conscience; (2) the moral object, and the theory of objective values; (3) the relation of subject to object, and the theory of the highest good; (4) the relation of subjects to each other, and the *idées-forces* of society. These books are preceded by a long preface, and an equally long introduction, which twice repeat their substance. This confusion of plan is one of the faults of the book. The subject-matter also shows great confusion, especially in the treatment of the question whether ethics is a science, and in the criticism of the Kantian conceptions of autonomy and obligation. In spite of these faults, however, the book is suggestive, and often brilliant.

A. H. JONES.

*Du rôle de la logique dans la formation scientifique du droit.* E. MEYNIAL. Rev. de Mét., XVI, 2, pp. 164-189.

In the juridical method, the rôle of logic is great, but not greater than that of feeling; for the progress of logic must be retarded, accelerated, or directed by the course of impulsions which lie outside of reason, and which must be respected. Indeed, the supremacy could not be given to logic without risking loss of the authority of logic over the human mind, and, consequently, its social utility. Though the instrument of great currents of human sensibility, logic is, none-the-less, indispensable, particularly in the genesis of concepts of right. For the juridical concept of right began with a collection of isolated precepts, followed by a generalization of the common points which justified prohibitions. This can easily be traced in the genesis of Roman law. Next, there is substituted for prohibitions the concept of right, a purely logical element. Rights, thus abstracted, are compared and combined, and logical ties are established between them. All this is a logical work for social protection; but, though a creative work, it is yet instrumental in the hands of sentiments of justice, of pity, and of the need of peace, indeed, of all the moral forces of an epoch. Logic only seems to make it acceptable, to consecrate the moral change



effected by society. But in this respect its value is great. Even the Roman acceptance of a sophism in order to maintain the appearance of logic was useful in order to preserve tradition. But logic, if unrestrained, may lead to absurdity if not to monstrosity. For instance, the principle of justice which made it necessary, in an age of false testimony, to obtain the confession of crime from the accused, was perverted by logic into a system of torture in order to get confession of crime. Moreover, logic has not only engendered social errors, but has consolidated and legitimized others by giving them a logical armor that has endured long after the popular sentiment which provoked them.

C. WEST.

## NOTES.

### EDWARD CAIRD.

Edward Caird and Thomas Hill Green, as all students of philosophy know, were the first to introduce into England a Rational Idealism of the general type of Hegel. Green died in 1882 and Caird, who had since that time carried on alone the work at first shared between them, passed away on Sunday, November 1, at the age of 73.

They were born within a year of each other : the former at Greenock, Scotland, in 1835, and the latter at Birkin, Yorkshire, in 1836. Both were directed to Hegel by the occasional references of Jowett, then a hard-working Tutor in Balliol ; both were Fellows of an Oxford College, the one of Merton and the other of Balliol ; they each began their philosophical career by an article in the North British Review, Caird on Plato (Vol. 45, No. 86, 1865), and Green on Aristotle (Vol. 45, No. 89, 1866) ; and both were applicants for the chair of Moral Philosophy in Glasglow in 1866. Caird, who received the appointment, only left for Oxford after twenty-seven years' service, when in 1893 he went to Balliol as Master in succession to Jowett. In his new sphere he had to bear the heavy burden both of administration and of teaching and writing, which had previously been divided between Green, Jowett, and himself. It is not surprising that this Herculean task, probably too great for any single man, at length forced him to resign the Mastership in 1907 and helped to break down an unusually strong constitution.

No teacher of Philosophy has ever produced a greater influence on his students, a result which was mainly due to the utter veracity of the man, his quiet but assured faith that all things work together for good, and the simple yet felicitous phrases in which ideas by no means easy to comprehend were expressed. His published writings are devoted to the establishment of the principles of an idealistic philosophy, to their application and defence, or to an estimate of rival systems. The central idea of his philosophy was the principle that the various stages in the history of man, and especially in the history of philosophy, exhibit the progressive evolution of reason. In this faith he never wavered, but as time went on he sought more and more to adapt it to the facts of experience,— economic, social, political, and religious. In his criticism of others he was never content simply to dwell upon their inconsistencies and defects, but invariably sought to discover the element of truth contained in their doctrine. This is the spirit which animates his first published essay, on *Plato and the other Companions of Socrates* (North British Review, No. 86, 1865), and it is especially manifest in his first great work on *The Philosophy of Kant* (1878) and even more so in his *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant* (1889), which con-

tains the fullest systematic statement of his philosophy. In 1883 he wrote a preface to a volume of *Essays in Philosophical Criticism* written by v younger adherents of Idealism, and in the same year he contributed to the pages of *Mind* (No. 32, 1883) a valuable article on *Professor Green's Last Work*, the *Prolegomena to Ethics*, in which he indicates his divergence from what he regards as the imperfectly developed Idealism of his late friend (Green died in 1882)—a point which he afterwards developed more fully in the Memoir of his brother, Principal Caird's, *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity* (1899). In 1883 appeared his *Hegel*, a small but golden book, which is perhaps the best short exposition of a philosophy anywhere to be found, and in 1885 his *Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte*, a work which the followers of Comte admit to be an eminently fair and sympathetic statement of the doctrines of their master. In 1901 he contributed to *The Progress of the Century* (Harper & Brothers) an article on Philosophy, in which he gives a brief but comprehensive statement, distinguished for its urbanity and sympathetic tone, of the main contributions to philosophy of the nineteenth century; and in 1904, in a paper contributed to the Queen's Quarterly (Kingston: Uglow & Co.), entitled *Idealism and the Theory of Knowledge*, he makes a calm and reasonable attempt to defend Idealism, as he understood it, against the current *Erkenntnislehre*, which, as he believed, was a natural off-shoot of the indefensible phenomenalist aspect of the Critical Philosophy.

Besides these books and articles, devoted to the statement and defence of Idealism, Caird wrote a number of papers dealing with the application and illustration of idealistic principles. The earliest of these was an article in the North British Review (Vol. 45, No. 88, 1866) on *The Roman Element in Civilisation*, in which he deals with the contribution of Rome to the unification and progress of man. In 1888 he gave an address to the Ethical Society on the *Moral Aspect of the Economical Problem*, and in 1897 he spoke to the Civic Society of Glasgow on *Individualism and Socialism*, seeking to show that by the gradual blunting of the sharp antithesis between them, these opposite doctrines had at last ceased to be separated in principle. In no subject, however, did Caird take so deep an interest as in that of religion, a subject with which he was largely occupied for the last twenty years of his life. The fruits of his reflection are shown in his *Evolution of Religion* (1893), a work that raised the discussion of the origin and history of religion to the highest level, and in his *Evolution of Theology* (1903), in which the contributions to a rational theology made by the Greek philosophers from Thales to Plotinus are set forth and critically estimated. Besides these important works, Caird contributed an article on *Christianity and the Historical Christ* (New World, Vol. VI, No. 21, 1897) and another on *St. Paul and the Idea of Evolution* (Hibbert Journal, Vol. II, 1903), while his Biographical Introduction to W. Wallace's *Natural Theology and Ethics* belongs to the same class of writings, as well as his last work, *Lay Sermons and Addresses* (1907), delivered in Balliol College,

which reveal the wide sympathy and tenderness of a naturally reserved nature and are by some regarded as the finest of all his works.

In addition to the essays on Dante, Goethe, Wordsworth, and Carlyle, contained in the *Essays on Literature and Philosophy* (1892), attention may be drawn to a very suggestive article on *Some Characteristics of Shakespeare* (Contemporary Review, Vol. 70, 1896). Caird was accustomed to devote careful study to some great poet during the long vacation, and these essays are partly the result of his studies. He took a special delight in Homer, whom he knew almost by heart; in Dante, who for years was his almost constant companion; in Shakespeare, whom he delighted to amend in play; in Tennyson, who was the friend of his earlier years; in Browning, to whose powerful intellect he did full justice, though he regarded much of his works as imperfectly poetic; and indeed nothing human was indifferent to him. To him we may apply the apt words in which Nettleship characterized Green; his was "a life in which philosophy was reconciled with religion on the one side and with politics on the other; the life of a man to whom reason was faith made articulate, and for whom both faith and reason found their highest expression in good citizenship."

JOHN WATSON.

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY.

#### ATTENTION : A REPLY.

In spite of the courtesy that Professor Judd shows me in his review of my book *Attention*, in the November number of the REVIEW, there are several statements that I believe will give an incorrect impression of the position that I hold, and I am therefore unwilling to let them pass as representing my attitude in that volume. There are six points upon which the reviewer criticises me, and upon which I desire permission to say a word. Three he himself enumerates as his main points of criticism, three he mentions by the way. In the first group I am charged (1) with teaching some sort of permanence of sensation entities, resembling Herbart's, (2) with failing to do justice to relations, as opposed to sensations, and (3) with ignoring modern representatives of the motor theory. In the running criticism I am said (1) to hold explicitly the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism, and thereby to deny any causal relation between body and mind, (2) to make a self out of a collection of discrete, permanently existing elements of experience, and (3) to write a book on attention without anywhere saying what I mean by attention. I may for clearness' sake discuss these points in order, one by one, and then turn to the more general charge that I have failed to do justice to recent advances in functional psychology.

The statement that I teach that a recalled impression is always identical with its original, that 'remembered redness is always red,' seems to have its basis in an introductory account of the doctrine of peripherally and centrally aroused sensation. Here, it is true that I make the statement, on

the authority of Külpe's experiments, that a central process may be mistaken for an actual sensation. But if he had read farther in the same chapter, the reviewer would have seen that it is asserted, just as explicitly, that the recalled impression seldom fails to undergo some change. And if he had turned to the chapter on reasoning and on memory, he would have seen that I am fully as awake as he is himself to the fact that very many different sorts of material may do duty for 'redness' either in recall or in imagination. If I have failed in any degree to make clear my attitude on this point, it is because it seemed to me only incidental to the problem of attention, which is essentially a problem of how the selection is made, no matter whether what is selected is an actual counterpart of the original or merely something that will functionally do duty for it.<sup>1</sup> In other connections, where it seemed in place, I have gone fully as far in recognition of this principle as has Professor Judd himself. As for the implied view that I would make conscious elements persist, as conscious elements, I had no idea that one need safeguard oneself against that particular form of misunderstanding at this late day. That the recall is more than the reinstatement of an old neural function, on the basis of nervous predisposition, had never occurred to me, and I doubt if it would occur to any reader not obsessed by the idea that it were impossible for anyone but a functionalist to hold a rational point of view on the question. This theory, that what persists is the neural function, and that the only questions for the psychologist are such as arise from the comparison of the first functioning of the nerve elements with later functionings of the same elements, is the theory that, so far as I know, is avowedly held by both functionalist and structuralist. I cannot see that Professor Judd can mean anything else by his own statement that what persists is a function. If a function can persist, it must be as the function of something. If this something is other than the nervous system, it must be a disembodied sensation, and to assume that would commit Professor Judd to the theory that he ascribes to me and that he himself deprecates. With the reservation of some uncertainty as to what is meant by the statement that functions are what are retained, I would humbly request to be permitted to believe the same facts as does Professor Judd. And I cannot see how my critic can lay claim, either for himself or for the functionalists, to a monopoly in the belief that remembered red is not necessarily red, in view of the work and opinion of Lehmann, Marbe, Bentley, Whipple, F. Angell, and Woodworth, to mention no others. Certainly not all of these men are functionalists.

To the charge that I do not pay sufficient regard to relations, or (specifically) that I nowhere give a list of relations, I would reply that my concern was not with the constituents of consciousness, but with the processes of selection. Another critic might charge, just as truly, that I nowhere give a list of sensations; and this charge might be more difficult to refute, because there are fairly complete lists of sensations, while no one so far as

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Meaning and Image, *Psych. Rev.*, May, 1908.

I know has ever attempted to give a complete list of relations. Certainly no two men would agree on a list of the kind. In this connection, also, we should have to consider two meanings of the term. Professor Judd would make relations in his *Psychology* the 'fusions of sensations' that give rise to space, the unity of objects, and time. Professor James and most writers would keep the term for the transitive states of consciousness, the results of comparisons of different kinds, the feelings of 'but' and 'if.' If Professor Judd means that I omit the first, he must have overlooked the chapter on "Attention in Perception" which is devoted to a discussion of that topic. If he means the word in its more usual application, he is also inaccurate, for in two connections I discuss, briefly at least, the ways in which attention is effective in bringing out relations. On page 11, I discuss the relation of analysis and synthesis to attention, and state that not parts but aspects of wholes may be given prominence. And in the discussion of the judgment, I devote a page to the elucidation of the similarity between the process of comparison that results in the appreciation of relation, and the more usual effects or processes of attention. If it is this kind of relation that my reviewer intends to accuse me of neglecting, the charge is the more ungracious because he himself in his *Psychology* nowhere, that I can find, gives a list of relations, in spite of the fact that his is a complete treatise while mine is devoted to but a single topic. I certainly have never thought of attempting to get relations out of the elements themselves, as Professor Judd has accused me of doing. In fact, my main criticism of much of the discussion of relation, even by avowed functionalists, would be that they endeavor to find the relation in some sort of structure. They are on the look-out for some 'feeling' of relation, that should be on the same level as sensation, and they fail to see that all that can be made of relation psychologically at present is a statement of the conditions out of which it arises and of the function that it fulfills.<sup>1</sup> The structural side seems to be either entirely lacking or to be indifferent to the function, to consist in a word or other arbitrary symbol that is more or less irrelevant to the relation itself. All that can be said of relation is that, when one looks at the presented, whatever that may be, with a question of relation whether in space, time, intensity or what not, there presents itself an appreciation of the corresponding relation that would otherwise pass unnoticed. Up to the present time, however, no one apparently is able to say what essential imagery is involved in the appreciation.

I attempted to safeguard myself against the possible charge that I had omitted representatives of any of the different theories of attention by avowedly restricting the treatment to certain men who might fairly be taken as typical of schools. At the time of writing the chapter, I regarded Ribot's theory as sufficiently like the more modern motor theories to do duty for them in the discussion, and I still regard it as a fair question whether enough has been added since Ribot wrote, apart from the incor-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. R. S. Woodworth, *James Memorial Volume*, p. 485.

poration of advances in neurological knowledge, to require that each theory be given separate discussion in a work of the limits of mine. I did, however, make use of the facts that have been contributed by the three men mentioned, in many different connections in my own discussions. In so far as these motor explanations are to be regarded as central, 'and not unlike my own associational processes,' I should, of course, have no quarrel with them except as they are often vague rather than explicit. I should certainly have no desire to underestimate the importance of movement in all forms as the end toward which consciousness tends. I have in fact devoted a chapter to that topic. The only difference between my reviewer and myself on this point is that I am throughout concerned to point out conditions and to explain results and connections, rather than to emphasize the importance of, or to indulge in rhapsodies of any kind over the ends and purposes of psychological mechanism, and perhaps have less inclination to explain mental state in terms of its outcome rather than in terms of its antecedents. Both of these remarks, it is but fair to say, were prompted, so far as they refer to Professor Judd, by his attitude in the review rather than by any of his other writings.

Replying to the less developed criticisms, I should like to be permitted to repeat what may seem a hair-splitting distinction between my attitude toward the relation of body and mind and the ordinary form of psychophysical parallelism that is attributed to me. I am made to deny a causal relation between body and mind, while the most that I do is to assert that we cannot assert it without getting into certain difficulties with principles of the natural sciences. To deny that one can assert a causal relation is not identical with asserting that one can deny it, and it seems to me much safer than either of the other currently recognized possibilities.<sup>1</sup>

Professor Judd's statement of my theory of the self is also made slightly inaccurate by his regarding my experiences as too fixed and permanent. As I have said in answer to his first charge, I have never believed, and have not believed that any one else could believe to-day, that sensations or other conscious elements persist as conscious entities. That would be certainly almost as unscientific and dogmatic as to explain the self by a permanent soul-entity. Its only advantage, from a scientific point of view, would be the ease with which it could be disproved. The sole evidence of persistence that there is, and the sole kind of persistence that I meant to imply, is that which rests upon the fact of recall or reinstatement, or functional revival of experiences, or whatever vague term it may be desired to employ. I assumed that the fact of recall, *plus* the fact that men seemed to be different because of experiences to which they had been subjected, might serve as some justification for the statement that the reactions that we ordinarily know as personal might be controlled by or depend upon earlier experiences. It seems to me possible to recognize these various facts, and at the same time to steer between a permanent self on the one hand and a

<sup>1</sup> Cf. "The Psychology of Causality," *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, XIII, 409.

Humian mass of discrete, permanent sensations or impressions on the other, and that without taking refuge in a purely neurological explanation. It is, of course, not an easy task to be perfectly certain that one has guarded oneself from the danger of being placed in some one of the schools that one's doctrine somewhat resembles; but I thought I had safeguarded myself carefully from the particular form of misinterpretation that Professor Judd has given. In fact, on p. 176 I definitely state that "the pure sensation of the psychologist has existence only as another interpretation or meaning which the psychologist gives or applies as his interpretation of experience," and this is in harmony with all the discussions that I give of the nature of sensation. How any one could assume that an interpretation could be regarded as a permanent thing in 'no metaphorical sense' I cannot see. What I intended to describe was approximately the mental correlate of von Kries's cerebral disposition.

As to what is perhaps the most serious charge, that I have written a book on attention and have nowhere stated what I believed attention to be, that too seems to have grown out of the fact that Professor Judd expected too much structure from me, or else that he himself is too much of a structuralist. As if attention were a single thing that could be described, rather than a single name for a number of manifestations or functions with common characteristics! I have discussed the changes in consciousness that characterize attention, both the changes in clearness, the more structural side, and the functional processes, analysis and synthesis, together with the vaguer increased effectiveness. I devote another chapter to the feeling accompaniments and their occasion on the physical side, and finally I attempt to trace the conditions that bring about the changes, the correlate of attention in the popular use of the term as a 'force.' In concluding a discussion of the theories of attention, I try to guard myself against this very criticism, by pointing out that the theories of attention are for the most part one-sided, that they neglect to recognize that the term is used in many different senses, and that they neither limit the use of the term to one meaning, nor carefully discriminate and keep distinct the many uses that are given the term popularly and in the history of the science. In short, in this connection as in several others, it has seemed to me that Professor Judd's method has been to first make up his mind that I am a structuralist, and then to argue that I must hold certain doctrines that he believes essential to structuralism. These he then proceeds to criticise as mine without taking pains to discover whether I actually hold them or not. I should say that Professor Judd's difficulty in understanding my position is that I have too many baskets rather than too few, and that *he* insists in crowding all my classes into one. Certainly a writer who rejects this particular basket altogether is not in a position to reproach one who recognizes at least three.

More important than any of the special points that either of us has discussed is the general question of the connection and position within the



science of the structural and functional treatments. My own personal opinion is that recent discussions have tended at once to over-emphasize the distinction and to cloud the issue. That it is possible to understand either structure or function alone and apart I cannot see, whether in psychology or in biology, whence we borrowed the distinction. There seems to be no difficulty in being functionalist and structuralist at once; in fact, the difficulty seems to lie, theoretically, in being the one without the other. How can one adequately develop a knowledge of structure without keeping an eye to use that alone gives it importance? And even more, how can one discuss function in any but the vaguest way without paying some regard to that which functions? Differences of emphasis are bound to arise. One man is interested in the description of mental states as they present themselves, while another is more interested in the external use to which they may be put, in the rough outcome of behavior; but the one is certain to be influenced by the other, and each would be much less valuable if in any degree divorced from the other.

I think, too, that it would be difficult to draw any very general difference in actual attitude toward current problems between the men who are classed as structuralists and those who are classed as functionalists; and where differences do exist, it would be a question whether they were not due to general temperament and knowledge rather than to this particular grouping. If we take only the problems under discussion between Professor Judd and myself, we find both structuralists and functionalists who are parallelists, who are interactionists, who have selves that are metaphysical entities and selves that are developed out of experience to explain experience, and who have much and little to say about movement processes and relations; and I doubt if one could find any modern representative of either school who taught that sensations persist unchanged in memory and imagination.

There does, however, seem to be a certain amount of ambiguity about some of Professor Judd's uses of the term 'function,' in which he apparently tries to separate it off from structure altogether. It is very difficult, in interpreting any man's theory, to be sure that one is not mistaking metaphor for fact; but I cannot see what can be meant by a disembodied function that is not a pseudo-structure. Of course it is possible to write a psychology from the outside that shall be a mere record of behavior, such as we get in genetic psychology, and there are many cases where we know function better than we know structure, as in Woodworth's and Ach's imageless ideas: but how one can speak of pure isolated function, I cannot see. In two of the conclusions that Professor Judd has reached in his criticism, he seems to mean by function something very much like this. He speaks of what is retained as a function and not as an idea, and he assumes that the relation is something apart from the sensation and not something that grows up out of the same general conditions that give rise to the sensation and is a part of the same larger whole with the sensation. It

seems to me that unless a term of this kind is carefully defined and delimited, it is likely to confuse thought and retard progress, to say nothing of serving as a veil behind which popular superstition may hide, with the self-assurance that it is garbed in scientific form.

That there should be difference of opinion in a science is probably a guarantee of scientific vigor. Certainly no advancing science is without it. Witness the publication in *Nature*<sup>1</sup> recently of two Vice-Presidential addresses of the B. A. A. S., the one in physiology, the other in physiological botany. The one, by Haldane, argued for vitalism; the other in botany, by Blackman, rigidly rejected everything but mechanism and attempted to apply that in new fields. Similar instances might be cited from any science. While structuralism and functionalism are not so definitely opposed as mechanism and vitalism, probably only good will come from their rivalry, unless the one or the other goes so far in the 'holier than thou' attitude as to attempt a monopoly of all psychological truth.

W. B. PILLSBURY.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

#### A REJOINER.

I agree so fully with many of the statements that Professor Pillsbury makes with regard to the relation of function and structure that it would be difficult without a long discussion to come to any final adjustment of opinion on those theoretical matters. Nor would it be profitable to take up in great detail the grounds for the various assertions which I made in the review of his book. This would unnecessarily extend the exchange of opinion which has already taken place.

I cannot refrain, however, from citing passages from the book under discussion which may I hope remove once for all the impression that the book was not carefully read before the review was prepared. To this end I beg leave to submit the following quotations which relate to the first long paragraph in Professor Pillsbury's rejoinder.

"The treatment of centrally aroused ideas is rendered easier by the present day assumption that memory images and the original sensation are of precisely the same character. The memory of the face of a friend seen years ago is of precisely the same kind as the visual impression of the face" (p. 95).

"Persistent self-identity finds its explanation in the fact that no experience is ever entirely lost, and that new experiences are never entirely new but are new arrangements of old experiences about a new element" (p. 218).

This latter statement is sufficiently important to be included as one of the five paragraphs summarizing the chapter on "Attention and the Self."

In the light of the above passages, the following detailed statements are pertinent to the discussion:

<sup>1</sup> *Nature*, Oct. 1, 1908, pp. 553, 536.

“The sensations that you receive from any article of furniture form only patches of colour upon the retina, but the object that you see is hard, smooth, has solidity and strength. Each of these qualities comes not through senses, but from association. The smoothness is a tactual element that arises by association with the visual impression, and could not come at once from the eye” (p. 115).

“We have unity in mind, because all experiences, past and present, interact in the control and constitution of every apparently discrete act. Not merely, as Professor James insists in his chapter, do two or three succeeding states unite in a single one, but in some degree or other all experiences, no matter how far separated in time, combine into a single element in each moment’s experience. . . . The first elements are retained for ever, and are constantly growing with each later experience. . . . It is an identity from which nothing is ever lost, and persists with, if not through, growth. This unity and identity is not only constructive, but actual” (p. 203).

CHARLES H. JUDD.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

The Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association was held at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, December 29-31. A full report of the Meeting, together with the President’s address, delivered by Professor Münsterberg, on “The Problem of Beauty,” will appear in the next number of the REVIEW.

Professor G. S. Brett, who formerly occupied the chair of philosophy at the Government College, Lahore, India, has been called to Trinity College, Toronto, as lecturer in classical philosophy. He is the author of a recently published book on *The Philosophy of Gassendi*.

Professor George S. Fullerton will return to America in January after two years sojourn abroad, and will resume his lectures in Columbia University during the second semester of this year.

Mr. Asa Gifford of Yale University has been appointed instructor in philosophy at Bryn Mawr College.

The September number of the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* contains articles describing the present tendencies and problems of philosophy in Germany, England, the United States, Italy, Scandinavia, and South America. The account of American philosophy is by Professor Frank Thilly.

Professor Hugo Münsterberg has delivered a series of lectures on “The Principles of Æsthetics” during the first semester of the present academic year at Wellesley College. These will be followed in the second semester by a series of lectures on “Systems of Æsthetics, by Professor George Santayana.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals :

MIND, No. 68 : *J. Ellis McTaggart*, The Unreality of Time ; *Professor Baillie*, Professor Laurie's Natural Realism ; *T. Loveday*, Studies in the History of British Psychology, I : An Early Criticism of Hobbes ; *W. Temple*, Plato's Vision of the Ideas ; Discussions ; Critical Notices ; New Books ; Philosophical Periodicals.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL VII, 1 : *P. Râmanâthan*, The Miscarriage of Life in the West ; *Charles Johnston*, A Chinese Statesman's View of Religion ; *F. W. von Herbert*, The Moslem Tradition of Jesus' Second Visit on Earth ; *Charles Plater*, A Great Social Experiment ; *William James*, Hegel and His Method ; *F. C. S. Schiller*, Infallibility and Toleration ; *C. S. Pierce*, A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God ; *Bertrand Russell*, Determinism and Morals ; *Caroline Stephen*, Pain ; *T. K. Cheyne*, The "Jerahmeel Theory" ; *A. C. M'Giffert*, How May Christianity Be Defended To-day ; *James Moffatt*, Bookless Religion ; *J. P. Hopp's*, Evangelical Bargaining ; Discussions ; Reviews ; Bibliography of Recent Books and Articles.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XIX, 1 : *Alfred W. Benn*, The Morals of an Immoralist — Friedrich Nietzsche ; *Thomas Davidson*, Savonarola ; *Miss F. Melian Stawell*, The Modern Conception of Justice ; *J. B. Baillie*, The Dramatic and Ethical Interpretations of Experience ; *C. W. Super*, Ethics and Law ; *W. M. Salter*, A New Type of Naturalism — Montgomery ; Book Reviews.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XIX, 4 : *F. L. Wells*, Normal Performance in the Tapping Test Before and During Practice, with Special Reference to Fatigue Phenomena ; *C. E. Ferree*, The Streaming Phenomenon ; *J. Carleton Bell*, The Effect of Suggestion upon the Reproduction of Triangles and of Point Distances ; *Margaret Ashmun*, A Study of Temperaments as Illustrated in Literature ; *H. E. Houston* and *W. W. Washburn*, The Effect of Various Kinds of Artificial Illumination upon Colored Surfaces ; *E. B. Titchener* and *L. R. Geissler*, A Bibliography of the Scientific Writings of Wilhelm Wundt ; *J. W. Harris*, On the Associative Power of Odors ; *L. G. Winston*, Myself and I : A Confession ; Psychological Literature ; Index to Vol. XIX.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XV, 6 : *C. H. Cooley*, A Study of the Early Use of Self-Words by a Child ; *M. Meyer*, The Nervous Correlate of Attention, I ; *H. C. Stevens*, Peculiarities of Peripheral Vision, II : The Perception of Motion by the Peripheral Retina ; *B. Sidis* and *H. T. Kalamus*, A Study of Galvanometric Deflections Due to Psycho-physiological Processes ; *F. J. E. Woodbridge*, Discussion : Consciousness and Meaning.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, V, 10 : *H. C. Warren*, Hedonic Experience and Sensation ; Psychological Literature ; Discussion ; Books Received ; Notes and News.

V, 11: *O. Nagel*, The Evolution of the Senses; *J. Mark Baldwin*, Genetic Logic and Theory of Reality ('Real Logic'); Psychological Literature; Reports and Discussion; Books Received; Notes and News.

THE MONIST, XVIII, 4: *D. T. Suzuki*, A Brief History of Early Chinese Philosophy, III: Religion; *H. Chatley*, Mediæval Occultism; *G. Cator*, "Id Quo Majus Cogitari Nequit" (A Scholastic Essay); *D. J. H. Ward*, The Classification of Religions; *B. Laufer*, The Jonah Legend in India; Criticisms and Discussions; Book Reviews and Notes.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, V, 20: *H. Heath Bawden*, A New Scientific Argument for Immortality; *R. W. Sellars*, Critical Realism and the Time Problem, I; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

V, 21: *J. A. Leighton*, Time, Change, and Time-Transcendence; *Taizo Nakashima*, The Time of Perception as a Measure of Differences in Sensations; Societies; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

V, 22: *E. B. McGilvary*, The Chicago "Idea" and Idealism; *R. W. Sellars*, Critical Realism and the Time Problem, II; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

V, 23: *A. Schinz*, Professor Dewey's Pragmatism; *H. C. Brown*, Infinity and the Generalization of the concept of Number; Discussion; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

V, 24: *A. C. Armstrong*, The Evolution of Pragmatism; *June E. Downey*, Automatic Phenomena of Muscle Reading; Discussion; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, XV, 1: *J. Stilling*, Über das Problem der Freiheit auf Grund von Kants Kategorienlehre; *Otto Gilbert*, Aristoteles' Urteile über die pythagoreische Lehre; *Max Schlesinger*, Die Geschichte des Symbolbegriffs in der Philosophie; *A. E. Haas*, Ästhetische und teleologische Gesichtspunkte in der antiken Physik; *Professeur Bréhier*, La théorie des incorporels dans l'ancien stoïcisme; Jahresbericht.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE, XXXII, 3: *K. F. Wize*, Eine Einteilung der philosophischen Wissenschaften nach Aristoteles' Prinzipien; *E. Lehmann*, Idee und Hypothese bei Kant; *G. von Glasenapp*, Die Leviratehe, Eine soziologische Studie; *G. Hessenberg*, "Persönliche" und "sachliche" Polemic; Besprechungen; Erklärung; Philosophische und soziologische Zeitschriften.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, XLIX, 3 u. 4: *Anathon Aall*, Über den Massstab beim Tiefensehen in Doppelbildern (Schluss); *K. Marbe*, Über die Verwendung russender Flammen in der Psychologie und deren Grenzgebieten; *B. Eggert*, Untersuchungen über Sprachmelodie; *Gertrud Sal-*

ling, Assoziative Massenversuche; *J. Plassmann*, Astronomie und Psychologie; *Otto Lipmann*, Ein neuer Expositions-Apparat mit ruckweiser Rotation für Gedächtnis- und Lern-Versuche; Literaturbericht.

XLIX, 5: *E. Dürr*, Über die experimentelle Untersuchung der Denkvorgänge; *Erich Becher*, Über die Sensibilität der innere Organe; Literaturbericht.

XLIX, 6: *Karl Groos*, Untersuchungen über den Aufbau der Systeme; *G. Heymans* und *E. Wiersma*, Beiträge zur speziellen Psychologie auf Grund einer Massenuntersuchung, V; *A. Müller*, Zur Geschichte und Theorie des Telegrammargumentes in der Lehre von der psychophysischen Wechselwirkung; Literaturbericht.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XXXIII, 10: *H. Piéron*, Les problèmes actuels de l'instinct; *W. M. Kozłowski*, L'énergie potentielle est-elle une réalité? *A. Schinz*, Anti-pragmatisme, II: Pragmatisme et Vérité; Revue critique; Analyses et comptes rendus; Revue des périodiques étrangers.

XXXIII, 11: *Ch. Lalo*, Le nouveau sentimentalisme esthétique; *J. Segond*, La philosophie des valeurs; *Th. Ribot*, L'antipathie: étude psychologique; *H. Delucroix*, Le III<sup>e</sup> congrès international de philosophie; Analyses et comptes rendus.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE, VIII, 10: *G. Fonsegrive*, Certitude et vérité (premier article); *Séraphin Belmond*, L'existence de Dieu d'après Duns Scot (fin); *E. Peillaube*, L'organisation de la mémoire, IV: La reproduction des souvenirs; *Mgr. LeRoy*, Chez les primitifs africains (fin); Analyses et comptes rendus; L'enseignement philosophique.

VIII, 11: *P. Geny*, Sur la position du problème de la connaissance; *D. de Vorges*, Comment avons-nous l'idée d'objet? *G. Fonsegrive*, Certitude et vérité (deuxième article); *P. Duhem*, Le mouvement absolu et le mouvement relatif (onzième article); *H. Trouche*, L'"évolution créatrice" de M. Bergson; Analyses et comptes rendus; Périodiques.

RIVISTA FILOSOFICA, XI, 4: *G. Gentile*, Il concetto della storia della filosofia; *E. Lugaro*, La base anatomica dell'intuizione; *L. Sualì*, Un trattato elementare di filosofia indiana (continuazione e fine); *E Di Carlo*, Il concetto della natura ed il principio del diritto; *P. F. Nicoli*, La riforma della scuola media; *G. Vidari*, Terzo congresso filosofico internazionale; Rassegna bibliografica; Attraverso le riviste Italiane; Discussioni; Notizie e public; Sommari delle riviste straniere; Libri ricevuti.

THE  
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

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THE PROBLEM OF BEAUTY.<sup>1</sup>

THE masterly presidential address of my predecessor in this office was devoted to "The Problem of Truth." He spoke with authority a unifying word in the struggles which characterize the American Philosophy of to-day. He focused the interest of our Association on the one central point from which our discussions in recent years have been derived, and there certainly can be no higher mission for such presidential addresses than to give expression in this way to that which stands in the foreground of our thoughts. Yet, is it merely the law of psychical contrast which makes me believe that there is one thing not less important than the center of our interests, namely, the center of our neglects? Am I entirely wrong in thinking that if such a presidential address has to accentuate a certain problem, it may be right to work against philosophical one-sidedness by emphasizing not those problems which are daily with us but those which we have forgotten and almost lost? One-sidedness is nowhere more dangerous than in philosophy, for every true philosophical question and answer is related to the whole philosophical universe. To give attention to a fraction only must always lead to a distorted view of reality. In every other field of intellectual effort, the division of labor may demand a one-sided concentration, and perhaps without serious harm. In philosophy there never was, and never can be, a movement which does not pay a grave penalty for the neglect of any fundamental side of life. Truth and morality, beauty and religion give meaning to our life; and the experience which philosophy seeks to interpret and to understand

<sup>1</sup>Delivered as the presidential address before the Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association at Johns Hopkins University, December 30, 1908.

is falsified, if you substitute one single color for the rainbow of reality, if you discuss the question of truth alone.

Surely, I have no right to say that this has occurred wholly. The philosophical problems of morality and religion have been unduly suppressed by the interest in the problem of truth, but they were never really brought to silence. Their inner life energy makes them heard even where they seem to be unwelcome. Only one ideal has suffered the full severity of the situation; while no one in his fights about truth has dared entirely to forget that there is morality in the world too, American philosophers, with two or three notable exceptions, have not cared to remember that beauty also is interwoven in the life we aim to understand. I claim that, without forgetting that the empirical psychology of the sense of beauty, the experimental analysis and the physiological explanation, have given us some strong contributions to a psychological æsthetics. The psychologist has not to speak the last word here, and nobody would suppose that he has, if we had not so carelessly and so persistently neglected the philosophy of beauty.

Of course, whoever approaches the problem of beauty to-day is inclined to start with the study of the psychological processes in æsthetic enjoyment. Here alone is evidently solid ground. It was the great day of emancipation for æsthetics when at last it became liberated from metaphysical speculation and when Fechner's patience laid the foundation for an æsthetics "from below," for an æsthetics which simply gathers the empirical facts, describes them with scientific exactness, starts with the simplest elements and leads slowly from the most elementary æsthetic experience to the appreciation of the highest treasures of art. It was the hour of birth for experimental æsthetics, which in the last decades has found greater and greater access to the psychological laboratories of all countries. Its spirit harmonized well with the ethnological discoveries of the same period, and with the folk-lore studies which have shown us the primitive origins of human art.

What biology and ethnology and history of art have yielded there, offers evidently no difficulty as far as principles are con-



cerned. It is the same simple story which the last fifty years have told us in every department of human endeavor, the story of slow, natural development. Artistic creation and artistic appreciation have grown as language and religion, as customs and law have grown. More difficulty and therefore more controversy belong to the contributions of the empirical psychologist. Certainly the psychologist's starting-point was very simple and natural too. He had to begin with the question: What are the impressions which we prefer to others? Which colors and which color combinations, which tone successions and which chords, which lines and angles and curves, which rhythms and which movements, are more or less pleasant? The experiment alone can give the answer, if one seeks exactitude. It was short-sighted to claim that such experimental æsthetics would remain unsatisfactory, because it could never lead beyond an analysis of the simplest pleasant stimuli. That was the same narrowness with which, at the cradle of experimental psychology, it was prophesied that the psychological laboratory could never grow beyond the study of sensations and reactions. Meantime the psychological experiment has conquered the whole field of mental life; and in the same way we may not merely have a vague hope, but we may confidently expect that the psychological experiment in æsthetics too will lead from the simple stimulations to the most complex objects of appreciation. Yes, it cannot be denied that much has been reached, and that the strictly experimental method has been applied in recent days to æsthetic material which far exceeds the elementary beginnings, to pictures and poems and melodies.

But more important was the increasing insight into the fact that the character of the outer stimuli is not sufficient to explain the pleasure which their perception offers. From year to year the experimental work has turned more and more to a careful study of the subjective factors. We may think here of the investigations which refer to the psychophysical conditions: how far, for instance, do different positions or fatigue or drugs or repetitions influence our enjoyment? Or we may think of the investigations which refer to the psychophysical effects, for instance, to the

motor responses or to changes in pulse and breathing during the æsthetic state. Or finally we may think of those studies which examine the associations and inhibitions, the memory processes and organic sensations in the æsthetic affection. It cannot be denied that the experimental results along these lines have so far been meagre. We are only at the beginning of the laboratory task, as far as the subjective factors of the æsthetic state are involved.

Yet the shortcomings of the laboratory work are not harmful, as we can fill the blanks of our knowledge by the results of careful self-observation in our daily enjoyment of works of art. Every artistic experience works here as a kind of experiment. The psychologists have, therefore, not waited until the laboratories have furnished us with exact data: most various psychological theories have clamored for acceptance.

We know the theory which says that the physical stimuli awaken in us a system of motor responses, and that we feel pleasantness whenever these physiological tensions and excitements and movements harmonize with the structural conditions of the organism. On the other hand we have theories which refer to psychical factors only, and seek the source of pleasantness in the similarity and likeness of mental states. We like it that the mental response which one element awakes is in some respects the same as the other elements are producing. Other theories again arise from quite different starting points. That which is really pleasant, they say, is the feeling that the perceived object of art does not make demands on our practical activity, that is, that our impulses to real actions are inhibited. That gives us a pleasant feeling of freedom from the necessities of practical existence. We are in a playful attitude which awakens an agreeable emotion. Quite near to this stands the theory which emphasizes that the work of art inhibits whatever is not contained in it. All associations which carry our mental life away from the æsthetic perception are thus inhibited and suppressed, and this hypnotizing power of the work of art overcomes us with a restful feeling of pleasure; we are liberated from the real chain of events. But if such theories emphasize the feeling of unreality, others

point out how this state of mind alternates with the opposite : it has been insisted, indeed, that the whole pleasant effect of art lies in this constant fluctuation between the feeling of reality and the feeling of unreality, a kind of pendulum movement, which gives us a particular pleasure.

Other theorists again insist that we project our own mental states into the æsthetic object. We enjoy it to be thus free from the feeling of our own personality, to feel, instead of ourselves, the actions of nature. Or, on the contrary, it may be said that our self enjoys itself because it becomes the richer, the more it absorbs the external impulses and energies. Is it necessary to gather still more types of psychological theories, to speak further of those which emphasize the pleasure from associated ideas of practical advantage or of moral satisfaction, or the pleasure of mere imitation, or the pleasure of overcoming technical difficulties, and so on? May we not rather notice that every one of them points to important parts of the experience and that they are in no way contradictory to one another? Yes, perhaps all of them ought to enter as factors into an ultimate psychological theory of the pleasantness of beautiful objects. But more important to me is the fact that they all belong together in still another way : they all, without exception, are nothing but psychological theories.

Their common presupposition is this : the works of art or the beauties of nature are physical objects, lights and sounds and so on in a physical world, and they have a certain causal effect in human organisms, they stimulate the sense organs and the brain and awake there a series of physiological and mental phenomena of which the last is a feeling of pleasantness. The various theories disagree as to the most important links in this causal chain between the sensory stimulation of the brain and the feeling of pleasantness, but the principles and the purposes of the theories are, after all, the same throughout. They are fundamentally not different from the psychological explanation of the enjoyment of fruit and coffee and candy. The psychophysical processes between the sensations in eating an apple and the pleasure we have in the fruit may be simple ; those between the impression of a

painting by Rembrandt and the pleasure in the picture may be complex. But the interposition of all those associations and inhibitions, fusions and impulses does not really change the character of the psychological task : it is an individual pleasure feeling which is to be explained by causal means. The æsthetic enjoyment in every case means a certain pleasant feeling stirred up in the individual organism, and the beauty of the object is nothing but an illusory objectification of this mental phenomenon of pleasure. Things of beauty have themselves no value, they are themselves ultimately physical molecules, mechanical atoms, air-waves, and ether-waves. Their only æsthetic import lies in the fact that they are the causes of pleasant effects in psychophysical individuals.

But have we really a right to stop here and to accept such psychological analysis as the last word of æsthetic inquiry? Has beauty really no further meaning for us than that it gives us a pleasant feeling? Is our enjoyment of Leonardo's *Mona Lisa* or of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, of Hamlet or of *Antigone*, really nothing but a more complex pleasure of the kind which chocolate and perfumes may awaken in us. Yes, have I ever been near at all to the altar of beauty, if my personal pleasure, my individual state, my passing enjoyment was all that I meant by the meaning of beauty? If I enjoy the pleasures of life I seek my own comfort, my own tickling sensations, in short, I seek states of myself. If I worship at the shrine of beauty I know that nothing depends upon me, the chance individual, that I reach out there to a reality which must be valuable for every one who is able to feel it, that it comes to me as an ought to which I submit, that it comes as a perfection which belongs to the truest meaning of the world and which cannot be otherwise. I may not be able to hold it, I may not be worthy to enter into its endlessness, but if it ever spoke to me at all and unveiled its beauty, it did not ask me whether there was pleasure in my consciousness, it asked only whether I grasped its harmony and through it the perfection of the world.

The well-trained psychologist has a condescending smile for such metaphysical cant. He shivers at the thought that he

might be thrown back to the speculative æsthetics of pre-psychological times, to that æsthetics 'from above' which begins with vague speculation instead of the facts of real experience. Yet he is not afraid of any danger, because his psychology can quickly give a full account of such mystical moods. Of course, he says, in excitable personalities the psychophysical emotions caused by the pleasant object may overflow into secondary channels and produce semi-religious associations and feelings. The psychologist is perfectly satisfied with this solution of the problem and simply asks us to inhibit those vague associations and to stick to the real facts.

I agree with him fully, but I ask: What are the real facts? What is my real, immediate, unreconstructed life experience? I have before me the drawing of a simple beautiful arabesque. Its halves balance each other, a rhythmical movement pervades their interplay, they move away from the center and come back, and the longer I follow their energies, the more I understand their perfect harmony. What are the facts? You say the drawing is a physical distribution of white and black points; they produce in my mind a visual idea through the agency of my sense organ and my brain, and this idea by associations and reactions awakes a psychical idea of movement and energy which I project into the physical ornament, and from this finally arises in my content of consciousness a feeling of pleasure. All of this I deny: I say that nothing of the kind enters into my experience. In seeing this ornament, I have not the double experience of the physical thing outside of me and the mental visual idea of it in me, enclosed in the capsule of my consciousness; I do not know that ornament as being in me at all, nor do I know of my brain, nor do I feel my feeling as an experience of which I simply become aware, nor do I know of those energies as states in me, nor do I know of any causal connection between those various factors; in short, no one of those so-called facts of physics and psychology present themselves to me as expressions of my real experience. I do not say that they are not true; that means I do not deny that it may have logical value to look at the situation as if it presented itself in those physical and psychological categories

and thus to reshape for certain purposes the facts of life in the way to which physics and psychology are accustomed. I insist only that their truths so cloaked and masked are not the naked facts of life, and that if we really want an æsthetics 'from below,' that is, an æsthetics which begins where no complicated thinking has remolded the facts, then we cannot possibly start from the results of physiological psychology. They may be necessary for certain ends but they are artificial, and to leave them behind and to come back at last to that which we really experience is certainly not a neglect of facts, but a true regaining of facts, from which the causal sciences lead us away not less than the meta-physical speculations. What are the facts? I ask again.

This ornament on paper is to me not two-fold but one, neither a physical thing made up of atoms, nor a visual image made up of sensations. It is a still undifferentiated pre-physical and pre-psychological object. On the other hand, I myself take attitude toward it not as a passive subject of consciousness which becomes aware of feelings and emotions, ideas and volitions, as conscious phenomena, but I myself am living through those attitudes, I am the will which reaches out directly toward those real objects. The antithesis of the subject of will and of the object is primary; it is a far way from it to the quite different antithesis of psychical and physical. Yes, I can go further. That object of my interest is not even a 'thing' in the sense of physical existence. If I speak of my object as a thing, I mean by it more than my immediate impression; I mean then that it will be a possible object for later experience and was an object for previous experience. In short, I have introduced thought relations which lie in the direction of physics, but which transcend the actual fact of my æsthetic experience. Neither the ornament before me, nor the picturesque church tower I see, nor the melody I hear is more than an impression which comes to me as a meaning, as a manifoldness of energies, of suggestions, of demands. I do not ask whether it will lead beyond the present experience, whether it is a thing; the impression stands for itself and every element in it wants me to take part. I feel uplifted with the noble upward movement of the tower, that is, the will of my personality wills

with the tower itself, and with the tones of the melody my will excites itself and longs for the other tones. Let us for once banish the reminiscences of physical knowledge, let us for once face reality as we experience it, naïvely and purely, and every difficulty disappears for understanding the self-expression of this world of objects as a concrete fact. It may be ever so valuable to turn from reality in the other direction and to connect experiences until they give us things and causal connections, but it is certainly not less justified to resist such an impulse, and to seek to understand instead what we hold in the present experience itself, before we transcend it.

In such immediate experience every part comes to me as a suggestion for my will. I grasp it in willing with it. But to live through a will is of course in itself no satisfaction, no joy and no value; yet only one more step is to be taken and we reach beauty. It is a decisive step, the step which gives meaning to our life and allows us to speak of a world at all. It is the act which constitutes the meaning of a world as against a mere dream and a chaos. Impressions come to us, but scattered impressions as such are never a world, and it is our share, it is our eternal share to decide whether we are satisfied with a scattered chaos of impressions or whether ours is a world which asserts its inner independence.

If you decide that your experience is to you nothing but a dream, each impression, each suggestion, nothing but an impression, nothing but a suggestion, without connection, without agreement, without mutual relation, then there is no need of asking whether there is anything valuable in the world, because you have no world. There is no need of thought then, there is no need for discussion, because there is nothing which lasts and nothing which is shared and nothing but a chaos of bits of which no one can reach the other. But if you decide to seek in this chaos a real world, then the constitution of that world is determined by the demand of your own seeking will, because nothing else can constitute that world but what you intend to understand as belonging to such a world. Vice versa, whatever your will requires as necessary to constitute a world is then

acknowledged beforehand as a feature of the world which you are seeking. It belongs to the world and cannot be eliminated from it, however far you may be from having reached it. It is eternally bound up with the world, as long as the will is posited to affirm such a world at all and to transcend the chaos of dream-like impressions.

Those absolute properties of the world are then for us no longer mere experiences, but they are the fulfilments of our own will to have a world, and every fulfilment of a will is a satisfaction. As this will to have a world is the one condition of the world which cannot be eliminated, therefore everything which constitutes the world as such offers an absolute satisfaction for every possible subject. Such satisfaction does not indeed depend upon the individual desire of the one or the other, does not depend upon the chance situation of personalities, and is thus no satisfaction of a merely personal desire: in short, it is an over-personal enjoyment and thus an absolute value. The will for the pleasant object is different with every personality and with every experience. The will for a world which is more than a dream is the presupposition for everyone whom we acknowledge at all as a subject. Whoever denies the decision in favor of a world has no longer any relation to our inquiry as to the constitution of this world; whoever makes that decision, performs the step which leads from the chaos of experience to eternal values.

Here we ask for one value of the world only, for that of beauty. We said the bits of experience come to us as suggestions for our will. Every color and every tone, every angle and every curve, every rhythm and every word has an expression which we understand. If we now transcend these single suggestions with the aim to find a world, then our first demand must be that such expression does not remain a chance experience without support and agreement. Our will to get a glimpse of a world is satisfied as soon as we discover that the one will which speaks to us finds an equal in another will, that the one demand is satisfied by the agreement of another demand, that the purpose of the one line coincides with the purpose of the other line, that the desire of the one tone is harmonizing with the aim of the other tone,



that the striving of one word is welcomed by the desire of the other. It is a long way from the mutual sympathy of a few tones in a simple melody and of a few lines in a simple ornament to the complete harmony and unity of life and world, but it is a straight way without turning of the road. Wherever a manifoldness of will is experienced, there every agreement of the various parts is the fulfilment of our demand for a non-chaotic, for a self-agreeing world, and thus satisfactory for every possible subject which wills a world, and thus eternally valuable.

This value is then independent of the question whether this self-agreeing experience satisfies at the same time still other demands of merely personal character, and gives thus pleasure or relief from displeasure. The beautiful may be pleasant and agreeable but it is never beautiful because it is agreeable. It is beautiful because it is perfect, because every demand which is raised in its manifoldness is completely satisfied by the will of the other parts. The objective satisfaction resulting from the will to have such a perfect self-agreeing world is the only æsthetic attitude ; the subjective satisfaction resulting from the chance desires of the personality is the practical attitude which may change with every man and with every hour and which lies below the level of æsthetics. The absolute value of the beautiful as belonging to the eternal structure of the only possible world is thus also entirely independent from the empirical fact whether particular individuals are able to take this æsthetic attitude and are thus able to understand the beauty of the world. It may be that the will of the object does not reach their will, that they deal with the object merely as material for the fulfilment of their practical desires. Their individual inability cannot possibly interfere with the entirely different question as to the objective value of that which they do not understand. Whether the unmusical person finds that music is to him an agreeable noise or a disagreeable noise has no bearing on the beauty of music. He knows no music at all, but only sounds, and the pleasure or displeasure which these sounds stir up in him by organic sensations or associations is a by-product which has no internal relation to the striving of the great composers. Our life involves a manifoldness

of attitudes towards the world. If we are to have a world at all, it must be ultimately the same world for all of us, but the world character of the experience can be reached in many ways. The æsthetic approach is only one. You may reach the world by merely ethical or logical attitudes, and a life may find its unity without taking an æsthetic attitude towards experience at all ; that surely does not interfere with the absolute value of the æsthetic completeness.

I have said that the absence of æsthetic attitude does perhaps not necessarily mar that unity of life which we all are seeking, but is not this unity of life itself such an ideal of completeness and harmony, and therefore ultimately an æsthetic value ? If we seek principles, we have indeed no right to overlook the fact that the æsthetic attitude is not at all confined to works of art, and that the artistic efforts of historic civilization only bring to a focus the same energies and attitudes with which we meet the world in its natural flow. It would be a mere quarreling about words if we were unwilling to speak about beauty where the experience has not been reshaped by the genius of the artist. Are we not accustomed to speak of the beauty of the sunset and of our æsthetic attitude towards the ocean ? We have no right to avoid the word when the same conditions are fulfilled in other spheres of experience. I do not hesitate to claim that friendship and love and peace in mankind are æsthetic values, yes that the unity of ourselves, that every inner completeness, that every happiness has its true meaning in its æsthetic perfection.

Indeed for a moment let us abstract ourselves from that systematic heightening of the world completeness by the means of art, and let us evaluate the immediate beauty of life. There are three spheres of experience for everyone. There is a world of outer objects, there is a world of other subjects, there is a world of the own inner personality. The scientist would like to substitute for those outer impressions the physical things and for the inner purposes he would substitute the psychological phenomena : we know that both lead us away from immediate reality. But still more are we removed from real life when science makes us believe that those other personalities come to us as physical objects, as

organisms, into which we introject mental phenomena by analogy with our introspection. In the life experience from which we start, other people come to us as subjects of will, as personalities with whom we agree or disagree, whose attitudes we understand and who are not at all in question as objects. If thus our original experience is restituted and freed from the reminiscences of a remodelling physics and psychology, then the world becomes for us a world of suggestions through outer impressions, a world of demands through other personalities, a world of purposes in our inner life. Every one of these three groups may show us inner agreement and unity.

If the purposes of the outer impressions harmonize, we have the æsthetic value of natural beauty ; if the will of the various personalities harmonizes, we have the æsthetic value of love in all its shadings ; if the totality of our inner demands is in harmony, we have the æsthetic value of happiness. Now we easily see why beauty of nature is to us a rare experience. It is possible only when nature suggests to us its own will and thus makes us feel with her desires and intentions, with her excitements and rhythms ; and that again can be realized only when those outer impressions do not come in question for us as starting points for action and as material for the satisfaction of our personal demands. If we fight with the waves of the ocean, they are to us only a dangerous object ; they have no meaning to us because our personal interest demands from us that we treat those impressions in their causal connectiveness and thus as non-living physical objects. But if we stand on the safe rock, each wave and the foam of the surf suggests to us impulse and energy and we feel the perfect symphony and the mutual agreement of the acts of the excited ocean. It is not an abstract idea which nature tells us and still less a moral, it is nothing which stands mystically behind nature ; that which is expressed is the energy and the strength and the impulse, the excitement of the colors and of the lines and of the rhythms and of the sounds. Whether any such element of nature is comforting to ourselves or painful, is agreeably tickling or disagreeable, does not influence the beauty of nature. Beauty demands only that we feel ourselves into the

will of nature and that we find a fulfilment of each desire in the agreement which the other parts of nature offer. Or course, the richer the manifoldness of such will, the more intense the beauty of the landscape.

It is not otherwise when we understand the mutual agreement of a human manifold. If two personalities agree in friendship or millions of wills are harmonized in peace, it is not at all the question whether such will satisfies our own personal desires ; no, the value lies here again entirely in the fact that two are agreeing and that the chaotic state of experience has thus been organized into that unity of will which means the world. Wherever two wills are felt by us as one, there something absolutely valuable speaks to us and its harmony has entered into the eternal meaning of the world. Love and harmony of souls, devotion and peace, are misplaced in the system of values if they are classified, as they usually are, among the ethical virtues. That two souls unite in love and that their will becomes one, without struggle and without resistance, following the deepest impulse of their will, cannot have any moral value. It has no right to claim ethical praise ; but it is endlessly beautiful and the world is eternally richer by such perfect harmony of personalities.

But still more is this misplacement habitual with the æsthetic value of happiness. Utilitarian ethics, using vaguely the word happiness for mere pleasure, has always tried to smuggle happiness into the system of morality. Idealistic ethics separated morality from happiness and believed therefore that it had to remove happiness entirely from the world of absolute values. Certainly happiness lies outside of the field of ethics, but an absolute value it is. It is the æsthetic completeness and harmony of our own strivings. Just for that reason it is endlessly more than, or rather something entirely different from, mere pleasure. The pleasure which satisfies my particular desire extinguishes the will. There is no longer any will when it is satisfied. True happiness wants the full richness of continuous striving, and yet the full agreement of all inner energies. There may be no value in any one of these particular desires, but their complete mutual harmony constitutes our inner life as an absolute æsthetic value.

The offerings of the outer world will thus the more enter into this happiness, the more they become themselves starting points for new and ever new demands and endeavors. Nature and the inner life of mankind offer us incessant gifts of beauty through their external harmony, through love and through happiness, and there is no human life into which never a ray of this perfection of the world penetrates.

The history of civilization is the great human effort to realize systematically and to bring to consciousness the absolute values of the world. Science and religion, law and economics, each is serving that task for different groups of eternal values. It has been the function of art to strive systematically towards the realization of æsthetic values. The fine arts do it with reference to the outer world, the literary arts with reference to the relations of personalities, music with relation to the inner world ; thus we have the same three groups which we found in immediate life experience. The purpose of the visible arts is indeed to give us a piece of the outer world in such a way that we completely understand the mutual agreement of all the intentions in this given manifoldness, and feel thus in this single piece the eternal perfection of the universe. Every possible rule and principle of art can be deduced from a clear understanding of this ultimate aim of the artist. One demand stands in the foreground. To find an inner agreement in the outer world it must come to us as will, because only intentions can agree. Thus it must cease to be simply material for our practical work, simply object for our interest. It must therefore be cut off from the chain of practical events, it must not be the effect of previous or the cause of later happenings, it must be disconnected from the remainder of the world ; in short, it must be entirely isolated. The isolated alone eliminates every connection, and thus every practical attitude, and this isolation is reached by art. In the painted landscape there are no people behind the mountains, and the road does not lead beyond the frame ; the lion of marble cannot spring upon us ; the dying heroine on the stage does not expect that we rush to her help ; the persons of the novel will never interfere with our daily life. Art gives us isolation, and just for that reason our demand

for complete agreement in that experience can be satisfied. Whether it will be satisfied completely depends upon the question whether we have a perfect work of art, whether a genius moulded the experience.

This isolation alone constitutes the unreality of art. Of course, the bronze statue fills a real space just as much as a living man, and the Hamlet on the stage is even a real living man himself. It would also be misleading to say that the painting is unreal because it is not itself the real landscape but only a representation of reality ; and that the novel is not itself the real love affair but only its report. No, the illustration of a natural history book or the historical biography are in the same way representations only, and yet they are not at all in question as unreal. That which is meant is rather this. To be unreal in the aesthetical sense means that the object of this experience does not transcend itself, does not awake any expectations for future changes or any reminiscences of previous stages. The waves in the painted ocean are not expected ever to move ; the hero in the marble monument is not expected ever to speak. No artistic experience points away from itself. It can never be grasped in a later stage and was never known in a previous one, and lacks by that all those characteristics which constitute the physical existence and in this sense the reality.

In order to suppress in this way every expectation of practical connection many means are possible. The painter gives us nature in the richness of its colors but eliminates the third dimension. The two-dimensional landscape suggests to us still every impulse which its colors and forms and contents, its trees and meadows and people may express, but the wanderer on that meadow will never advance on his way. The expectation that he may advance is not destroyed because the painter was unable to reproduce the landscape in its plastic form, but the painter projected his landscape into the plane because he wanted to eliminate the expectation that the wanderer ever may advance. The sculptor keeps that third dimension but he eliminates the color ; the colored wax figure which deceives us and thus stimulates the expectation of movements, stands on a level far below

real art. In the same way the poet uses rhythm and rhyme to exclude the expectation that his verses should be taken as reports of occurrences and of moods which enter into the chain of actions. Not otherwise the life on the stage. Its frame cuts off every expectation that those persons with their ambitions and their intrigues may have an existence beyond that which they show to us.

This unreality of the artistic object detracts nothing from the richness of the experience. That which is superadded in the real object is only its pointing beyond itself. The unreal offering of art has thus never to deceive us with the illusion of reality, as such illusion would eliminate the æsthetic attitude. But such absence of reality does in no way put the unreal object on a lower level than the real object, as if something were lacking. The unreal is something entirely different but not at all less valuable than the real. The usual predominance of our practical life interests may mislead us and may make us feel as if the real is positive and the unreal something negative, as if the unreal would become more valuable if reality might still be added. But with the same logical right, we might reverse the relation. The unreal is that which offers itself in its entirety, which is complete in itself and which thus needs no reference to anything beyond itself. The real, on the other hand, has its meaning in the expectation which it awakens and in the connections which lead beyond its own limits. The experience of the real is therefore that which in itself is incomplete, in itself imperfect, in itself unsatisfactory. The real is then the negative and that which lives in art becomes the positive. The real in its incompleteness strives to reach by its development and changes and connection that self-perfection which belongs at once to the creation of the artistic genius. It is a one-sidedness in our view of the world if we usually presuppose that the reality character of the world is fundamental and the perfection character a rather accidental addition. With the same one-sided over-valuation, we might consider that which is united in itself, harmonizing and complete in itself and therefore beautiful, as the only true and valuable world; it would then be an accidental side-fact that there are

some experiences which have no perfection, but stir up expectations of connection and have therefore scientific existence, and thus gain a certain value by their objective reality.

If the visible arts bring out the inner harmony in the manifoldness of nature, the literary arts deal with the will of man; and as man's life has that threefold relation to the outer world, to the other men and to his own personality, we have three fundamental forms of literature. The epic narrates the hero's strivings in the outer world, the drama represents his relation to his fellowmen, and lyrics give expression to that experience of man which is bound up with his inner life. But in all three cases the poet gives us a manifoldness of excitements and intentions and purposes which is in complete agreement. Every sound of every vowel and every consonant, every rhythm and every line, every syllable and every word, every metaphor and every thought has there its own intention which resounds in us, its own will which we feel with it, and if they are all in harmony, the poem is perfect. Of course, that does not mean that literature deals only with men who stand in harmonious friendly relations with one another. On the contrary, the sharp conflict of antagonistic will belongs to the deepest meaning of the drama, and yet it has been said rightly that the true tragedy leaves no disharmony. That is the necessary difference between art and life; the conflict of personalities on the battlefield of life is disharmonious because all the practical connections are working, no unity is reached in such hostility. But the drama has cut off those relations, the manifoldness which it offers is isolated through the frame of the stage, and in this limited manifoldness every single will serves perfectly the intention of the whole. The tragic conflict which wants to express itself demands the will of both the hero and his enemy. The will of the one has no meaning without the antagonistic will of the other. If we want the one we need the other, and thus they are all in perfect agreement, bound together in one unity. It is the same as in the fine arts; the painter may create a perfect painting of complete beauty of which the content is the ugly beggar. That which is ugly and disharmonious in nature and life may be the content of the most beautiful creation of art. As



soon as the expression of this dirty beggar is recognized as the purport of the offering complete harmony is reached, if every line and every color every movement of the figure and every suggestion of the background agrees in bringing out this aim. The unreal content can thus reach complete unity of experience where the same manifoldness felt as reality would be disharmonious and repulsive.

The harmony of our inner movements, which in the reality of life comes to us in moments of complete happiness, is reached in art by the experience of music. The tones do not describe and do not depict anything. They only liberate our own self which may live itself out in the movements and rhythms, in the longings and fulfilments of the tones. To bring to us such rich inner emotion, we need the tone-material just because those tones are not things; they have no practical value in the world, and while they come from instruments our attitudes do not refer to those external objects. Pictures and words speak to us of nature and other men, tones do not speak of anything. Their meaning is just their mutual relation which we feel and which thus fills our mind with an endless inner movement, with a striving and reaching, and yet all in that inner harmony of intentions which is the happiness of perfection. In music alone, in the completion of the simplest melody, in the unity of the simplest chord, complete repose is brought to us, and yet a repose not by lack of will, but by the complete equilibrium of over-rich inner excitement. Music thus expresses the harmony of ourselves, as poetry unveils the harmony of mankind, and fine art the harmony of nature. Yet this inner self is isolated again and cut loose from the practical emotions which may rush to our mind, because music substitutes the unreal world of tones for the real world of things.

Thus art demands many factors. The manifoldness of the content must be unreal; it must express a will; this will must be important; this will must be felt by us; our own will must be extinguished; every relation to anything beyond the content must be cut off; the whole must be entirely isolated; it must have its own form; this form must harmonize with the content;

all the suggestions of the parts of form and content must agree with the aim of the whole. But all these factors are not found there together by chance ; they are all controlled by the one fundamental aim of art, that the internal agreement of the experienced manifold shall come to expression. Only because we seek agreement, we must understand it as will ; only to understand the will of the experience, we must eliminate our own personal will ; to eliminate our personal will, the experience must be cut off from the world and be isolated and thus unreal : if this isolated will-manifold is in perfect unity, we have a work of beauty. This unity of will, on the other hand, represents an absolute value, as we have recognized from the start. If the will which comes to us as a suggestion is to be more than a chance flash, is to be the expression of something self-dependent and self-existing, in short, of a world, it must agree in itself, and only as far as it agrees with itself has it a meaning which is more than a chaotic dream. We want to reach in our experience such a self-asserting world, or else every discussion about the world is by principle meaningless. We receive, therefore, the single experience with a demand for an identical intention in the other parts of the given manifold, and when the identity is found, we are satisfied. But as this satisfaction refers entirely to the impersonal demand for a world, a demand which necessarily belongs to every subject as a subject, this satisfaction is over-personal ; the identity of will in the factors which constitute a work of art is thus valuable in an over-personal sense ; it is an absolute value. As such it is entirely independent from the other question whether the whole artistic work or parts of it satisfy at the same time a personal demand for pleasant feelings and agreeable advantages. The work of art may be pleasant but it *ought* to be beautiful. That the world demonstrates its self-assertion through the inner harmony of its will expressions, is a demand which constitutes the meaning of every possible subject that seeks a world. The satisfaction of this demand must thus be a general and necessary value ; there cannot be a subject which does not acknowledge this value ; there cannot be a world without this value. Our personal pleasures vary and may pass by ; the value of beauty is eternal.

From this highest point, we easily see the fundamental difference between æsthetic and logical value. They lie in opposite directions and yet the ultimate principle is the same. The satisfaction of the logical demand is another fulfilment of the same postulate. The subject wants to transcend the chaotic flashes of experience. From the chaos he reaches out for a world which asserts itself. In beauty we found it by the mutual agreement of the parts of a manifold. But this same self-assertion of the world can be reached in an opposite way : if we do not consider the manifold and the identity of the aims in its parts but if we consider the single experience and seek its identity in new and ever new situations of life. That alone is the logical attitude. In immediate life experience, we reach by such logical act at once the values of practical existence, of objective reality. We hold the single experience of the outer world and seek now its identity in the experiences of other subjects or in new experience of our own. The impression is thus constitutive of a physical thing. Or we meet a suggestion and we understand the will which expresses itself there as identical with a will in other experiences, and we constitute by it the existence of a personality. Or we meet in ourselves an experience of will and again we find it not fleeting but recognize it as identical in every new experience, and we then constitute it as a really existing norm. Things, persons, and norms are thus experiences to which we give the value of objective existence. But this again is an absolute value because it is again the satisfaction of the over-personal demand that the single momentary flash of experience remain identical with itself and that thus a world is with us.

Just as the æsthetic attitude was leading from natural beauty and love and happiness to those artificial creations of civilization in our art, in the same way the logical attitude leads from the mere, immediate values of existence and reality to the systematic efforts of civilization which we call science. Yet the logical attitude remains the same. Knowledge is a systematic reconstruction by which every thing and every person and every norm is understood as remaining identical with itself throughout every possible experience. For that purpose the things are linked into

a chain of causal events which make up the physical universe, the personalities are embedded in history, the norms are set into logical systems. Whether we deal with physics or with history or with mathematics, it is an endless remolding of experience until everything is transformed into a system of identities, until the universe is made up of indestructible atoms which remain identical with themselves or energies which cannot disappear. Science must thus connect these experiences until everything is a part of the systematic whole in which it can assert itself as identical with itself, while art isolates the experiences and cuts off all the relations of the one given manifold from the remainder of the world.

The æsthetical value of beautiful unity and the logical value of connected existence are thus equally fulfilments of the over-personal, absolute demand for the self-realization of a world in this chaotic experience. Our insight into such connections makes us, of course, able to calculate from that which is given that which is not yet experienced, that which is to be expected, that which thus becomes important for the practical deed. Our appreciation of beauty never leads beyond the given manifold, and is, therefore, useless for practical purposes, but it teaches us to understand the inner meaning of the world. As our knowledge thus offers us the vehicles for practical success, we subordinate ourselves to science and through our subordination we master the world. Beauty we serve by devotion, but in surrendering ourselves to it, we overcome the world and liberate ourselves from its struggles and griefs ; for the service of beauty demands that we feel with the will of nature and inhibit the chance will of our own. Through our service to knowledge, we grasp the self-assertion of the world by the everlasting identity of each single element ; in the service to beauty, we grasp the self-assertion of the world in the identity of purposes in a given manifold. The real value lies in both cases in this recognition of the identity, in this fulfilment of the demand for a more than flash-like experience, in the grasping of a world through a chaos.

The self-agreement of the world in real beauty does not contradict the fact that its whole or its parts may satisfy also individ-

ual desires, may tickle our senses, may give us a pleasant feeling of play, may carry agreeable memories ; the beautiful is then at the same time pleasant. The same relation holds for the logical values ; also their real meaning lies in that fulfilment of the absolute postulate for a self-identical world ; and their value is thus over-personal and absolute. But the fact that the discovered connections which lead from the present experience to new ones must help us for the calculation of the future and thus for particular achievements, gives to knowledge, too, a pleasant individual effect. The individual demand for personal advantage can be satisfied. The absolute logical value may thus be coupled with a relative value of practical advantageousness just as the absolute æsthetic value is coupled with the relative value of agreeableness. But as the pleasant tickling of our senses does never constitute the real meaning of beauty, so the pleasant experience of advantage does never constitute the real value of truth.

It would lead us too far to ask in what other ways the postulate for a world which asserts itself, and is thus in unity with itself, may be fulfilled. We should then have to turn first of all to the identity between intention and action. We should there easily see that every progress in the universe and every moral self-realization involve just this fundamental harmony. Yes, we might see that nothing else is the ultimate meaning of law and technical civilization. And finally we should recognize that the world is after all not a self-asserting reality, if the demand for identity has led to such different worlds as the world of inner agreement in beauty, the world of systematic connection in truth, the world of self-realization in morality. They all demand absolute value without being united among one another. And therefore the postulate for a world involves a last value by which all these valuable worlds themselves are recognized as agreeing and ultimately identical. This last over-personal demand is fulfilled by the belief in a transcendent will through which the world of æsthetic happiness, of logical existence, and of moral striving are recognized as one ; then we have religion. And if this ultimate self-identity is recognized by going not beyond experience, but by grasping that ultimate act through which the

over-personal will in us posits at all the absoluteness of beauty, truth and morality, we have philosophy.

Indeed, only if we take this last step, is philosophy in question. To recognize beauty and truth and morality and religion in their eternal meaning as the deeds of our over-personal will is a true philosophic endeavor. To deal with the pleasant feelings which beauty awakens is nothing but a psychological research, world-far from philosophy. And just where this psychological inquiry into the pleasantness of beauty has its place, there belongs also the much favored study of the advantageous effects which truth may have for us, or the inquiry into the usefulness which moral actions may have, or into the comfort which the consolations of religion may carry to the individual mind. They are all psychology, untouched by the philosophical problem.

To say that such endeavors are psychological and move in a sphere where nothing can be gained for philosophy certainly does not imply that they are not highly important. To examine the individual and social, physiological and psychological effects of beautiful creations, of truthful propositions, or moral self-denial, and of religious inspiration is certainly a large part of scientific knowledge, and everybody will accept the results as long as such questions are not confused with the entirely different problem of what beauty and truth and morality and religion mean, and in what their value consists. Those psychological questions must, of course, be answered by the means of empirical science; biology, psychology, and sociology have to contribute. In the spirit of these memorial days in which our association gladly takes part in celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the *Origin of Species*, I point to the wide perspectives which have been opened by the genius of Darwin. The importance which belongs to the evolution of the æsthetic excitement cannot be overestimated. In the moral field, those social groups must survive which are held together by strong altruistic feelings or which are strengthened in their struggle for existence by intense religious belief. Above all in the logical field, we see clearly that those individuals must survive whose brains produce ideas which can be used for advantageous actions. The survival of the useful ideas is one of the

most immediate consequences of Darwinism in physiological psychology. And from there it is only one step to the interesting and stimulating studies in social psychology which are called pragmatism.

But all these valuable studies are parts of knowledge and thus have themselves a meaning only in reference to the ideal of truth, to the ideal of remolding the chaos into a system of self-asserting identities. That fundamental, over-personal, world-positing act which gives value to truth precedes thus the acknowledgment of every particular group of truths. In our search for absolute truth we construct science and in the midst of science for certain logical purposes we must choose a standpoint from which every human function, even truth-seeking, appears as a psychological phenomenon, and thus individual and relative. From such a standpoint everything absolute must impress us as unreal, inconsistent and grotesque. The absolute is then a kind of monstrous world-lump behind the clouds. To fight against such a conception of the absolute is an effort in which pragmatism is certainly on the right side, but it is an effort which ought to appear superfluous in any philosophy after Kant. Pragmatism in logic and in æsthetics alike, if taken as philosophy, not as psychology, is the latest pre-Kantian answer to a pre-Kantian problem. The absolute which idealism is seeking in beauty as in truth is not a ready-made world behind experience; it is a rule, it is a law, it is a norm, which binds our will if we are to have a world at all and the realization of which belongs thus to the eternal structure of our experience, if it is to become a world.

Let us do honor to Darwin, last century's leader in the study of scientific facts, and let us in his spirit acknowledge that every physical and psychical thing in the world, biological species and psychological truths, have their origin and their development and their ending; and thus their merely relative value. But let us philosophers not forget that the same century gave us Fichte's idealism. There is no conflict between these two views which are equally consistent in themselves. To be sure, if we raise the natural science of body or of mind to the dignity of a last philosophy, then we can never reach an absolute value, and a conflict

must arise. But if we recognize that science itself depends upon an absolute deed and an absolute value, then all conflict disappears. Idealism can embrace scientific truth in its totality without disturbing it ; yes, idealism alone can secure to it freedom and safety. The value of the pragmatic doctrine of relative truths and beauties is dependent upon the absolute value of beauty and truth. Darwinism and pragmatism and every relativism can and must enter into absolute idealism : the origin of species and the eternity of values belong together.

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## THE IDEALISM OF EDWARD CAIRD. I.

TO appreciate in its fulness all that Idealism meant for Edward Caird it is necessary to have some idea of the process by which he was led to adopt the philosophy that in its main purport he never ceased to regard as true in substance, however it may have been gradually modified and developed by further reflection. Born in 1835, Caird's 'apprenticeship,' to use Goethe's term, extended from his entrance to the Greenock Grammar School, about 1845, till the year 1865, when he first showed that a new power in philosophy had entered the world by the publication of an article in the *North British Review* (No. 86) on *Plato and the other Companions of Socrates*, ostensibly a review of Grote's work under that title, but really an independent treatise, displaying perfect familiarity and mastery of the whole philosophy of Plato in its inner development, and indicating an equal acquaintance, to those who could read between the lines, with the doctrines of Kant and Hegel. During those twenty years was laid that extensive and accurate scholarship which was so valuable an organon in the development of his thought. At the University of Glasgow, which he entered in 1850, Caird for some years gave his main attention to classics and mathematics. Philosophy was at that time represented by Robert Buchanan, irreverently known among the students as 'logic Bob,' who taught Logic and Rhetoric, *i. e.*, Formal Logic and English Composition, and William Fleming ('moral Will'), whose lectures on Moral Philosophy were of rather a commonplace character. Caird, therefore, not unnaturally directed his attention mainly to reading that had no very close connection with his academic work.

Among the writers by whom he was most powerfully impressed was Carlyle, to whom he always attributed the real beginning of his *Weltanschauung*. When Carlyle began to write England had not yet entered the main stream of European thought, and it was part of his task to interpret to his countrymen in broad out-

lines the meaning of the movement which began in France with Rousseau and culminated in the tragedy of the revolution, and in Germany with the great constructive philosophy of Kant and his idealistic successors. It is true that Coleridge had previously protested against the narrowness of the current English philosophy, but partly from a certain vacillation in his own thought, and partly because he seemed to more adventurous minds to be rather the mouthpiece of reaction than of progress, he left no indelible impression on the public consciousness. As John Sterling said of him: "His misfortune was to appear at a time when there was a man's work to do—and he did it not. He was lacking in firmness of character; he acknowledged doctrines in which he no longer believed in order to avoid the discomfort of a quarrel."<sup>1</sup> Even before the close of the eighteenth century Burke had given partial expression to the characteristic idea of the nineteenth century, the idea of organic unity, maintaining that the State does not rest upon a contract of individuals, but is the product of the reason working unconsciously in society; but the reflective ideas of the earlier part of the nineteenth century were mainly individualistic, the spiritualistic movement being poetic and literary rather than philosophic. Down to the year 1860 the prevalent philosophy was empiricist. On its practical side, indeed, this philosophy owed its power and influence largely to its rejection of theological prejudices, its opposition to class privileges, and its firm advocacy of the equal rights of all men. This was what gave convincing force to the formula of Bentham, that "every one is to count for one and no one for more than one," and to his assertion that the aim of legislation is to secure "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." What Bentham did not see was that he had not justified his assumption, that, if each individual seeks to promote his own happiness, the result must be such a harmony as will secure the greatest happiness of the community. He is able to reach this conclusion only because he endows the State with the power of punishing those individuals who violate its laws; but why the State should have the power to override what he has admitted to be the legiti-

<sup>1</sup> Höffding's *History of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. II, 376.

mate aims of individuals, he fails to explain. Thus, while Bentham's practical efforts in the reform of legislation, and in the development of the constitution into a democracy by the introduction of universal suffrage, were appreciated by all who had learned the lesson of the French Revolution, the principle of 'utility,' on which he based those reforms, overlooked the fundamental nature of the State, as not an arbitrary association of independent units, but an expression of the social nature of man.

His follower, James Mill, sought to apply the principle of 'utility' in many departments of philanthropy and politics, directing his efforts mainly to the enlightenment of the middle classes. To him is due the attempt to supply the psychological basis which was lacking in Bentham's ethics by an appeal to the principle of the 'association of ideas'; for, on this principle, as he argued, what are originally independent units of feeling may be so fused together as to become virtually inseparable. What is defective in this explanation obviously is, that it misrepresents the mind as made up of a number of separate units, not seeing that it is essentially an organism, which develops towards ever greater rationality and in developing comes to a better understanding of the world and of itself. The psychology of James Mill is thus open to the same objection as the ethics of Bentham: even if it could explain the origin of complex ideas, it furnishes no reason why the disinterested feelings should be regarded as higher than the interested. In harmony with his psychological analysis James Mill held that the moral degradation of the lower classes was not due to any inherent or insuperable defect in themselves, but to the influence of circumstances and imperfect education, and might therefore be removed by the 'enlightenment' which it was the duty of the State to provide. Create new 'associations' of feeling by disseminating an enlightened view of human life and things will right themselves. Thus the individual was first isolated from the spiritual atmosphere without which he could not live, and was then artificially restored to society, under the fiction that nothing was required but the influence of an appropriate environment; a conclusion which is only true, because under the ambiguous term 'environment' is

included a creative reason operative in the individual by which he realizes the universal.

In John Stuart Mill the individualistic philosophy of Bentham is widened by the incorporation of elements suggested to him by his study of Coleridge, Comte, Wordsworth, and Carlyle. Under his hands utilitarianism assumed a form inconsistent with its individualistic basis, and his remarkable candor of mind compelled him in his defence of the association psychology to acknowledge frankly the difficulties it has to face, the greatest being how a series of feelings can know itself to be a series; while in his Logic he unwittingly makes assumptions which are incompatible with his analysis of the mind into feelings and associations of feelings; and in his *Essays on Religion* he tries to save as much of Christianity as he thinks it possible to reconcile with his individualistic psychology and hedonistic ethics. Latent dissatisfaction with the narrow basis of the philosophy which he had inherited produced a crisis in his history, in which all the springs of feeling seemed to be dried up, and from this appalling apathy he was only aroused by an excursion into the realm of poetry. Familiarity with Wordsworth gradually renewed that sympathetic interest in the well-being and progress of humanity for which his philosophy supplied no justification. John Stuart Mill, in fact, though he was hardly aware of it, had virtually transcended the narrow creed in which he had been reared, and had already half unconsciously come under the influence of the new idea of development, no doubt suggested to him by Comte and the St. Simonians, an idea which was in the air and was soon to revolutionize all men's ideas of things.

In Scotland philosophy was at a low-water mark. Hume had in the eighteenth century aroused Kant from his dogmatic slumbers, but he had been less successful in his native land, where the so-called 'common sense' philosophy of Reid and Dugald Stuart allowed men to jog along contentedly, with no very strong faith and no very disquieting disbelief. Sir William Hamilton had indeed attempted a bolder flight, endeavoring to show that all attempts to comprehend the Infinite are foredoomed to failure from the fundamental impotence of the human intellect, but other-

wise he moved in the well-beaten paths of formal logic and introspective psychology. To him is due the unintentional *reductio ad absurdum* of formal logic; for, by his doctrine of the quantification of the predicate, he showed that, on the basis of that logic, a judgment is simply an empty tautology; while his endeavor in his lectures on psychology and his Notes to Reid to bring the mind into direct contact with external reality only resulted, as has been proved beyond doubt in Dr. Hutchison Stirling's examination of his doctrine, in confining it within the limits of its own organism, and thus converting the whole external world into a phantom.

Such was the intellectual atmosphere into which Caird was introduced during his student days in Glasgow. In the empirical philosophy he was interested as an attempt to explain the mind on the principle of pure individualism, but it never seems to have had any special attraction for him; and the logic, psychology, and metaphysic of Hamilton, he quietly set aside, as affording no solution to the problems in which he was interested. Carlyle, on the other hand, appealed to his higher instincts, and opened up for him a vista into a realm in which, as he vaguely felt, he could feel at home. For in Carlyle he found a writer who was neither an empiricist nor an intuitionist, but who, like his own *Teufelsdröckh*, "sat above it all, alone with the stars." Carlyle spoke, moreover, not only for himself, but with all the added weight of thinkers whose names were hardly known in England — Goethe and Fichte, Schiller and Richter and Novalis. Furnished with a fresh clue to the meaning of life, he gave a new interpretation to history, bringing to light the hidden spiritual forces which are ever at work beneath the life of association and custom. Carlyle also expressed that passion for social reform which was to issue later in many social and political movements. His influence upon Caird was all the greater, no doubt, that he appealed to the Puritanism so natural to a Scotsman who had been nourished on the Shorter Catechism and the Bible, though to a Puritanism freed from the narrowness of its first expression. Carlyle, it is true, rarely attempts to express his ideas in an abstract form, but by his pene-

trative imagination he has so entered into the historical characters he paints for us, — his Mirabeau and Danton, his Cromwell and Frederic, — that we seem to see the men as they really are, with their whole spiritual nature laid bare. In his *Sartor Resartus* Carlyle tells us that the world is no dead machine, but palpitates with the life of a single spiritual principle. In bringing this home to us, he makes no attempt to demonstrate anything logically: indeed, he usually speaks contemptuously of all metaphysical theories as absurd attempts to measure the immeasurable, though he admits that we cannot make things too clear to the understanding; but by the sheer power of his imagination he lifts us into a higher region. While he silently rejects all superstitious beliefs in the supernatural, he does so because he believes that the actual world is itself miraculous. We cannot, indeed, directly comprehend the divine principle manifested in the world, and are, therefore, forced to figure it forth by “symbols,” which pass away when they are outworn. The history of religion is thus an account of the rise and decadence of these “symbols.” His own age Carlyle regarded as one in which the “symbols” had lost their meaning; and it is for this reason that nature appears dead, and man a machine moved by the springs of pleasure and pain. But the germs of a higher faith are beginning to show themselves. For, after all, ‘might is right,’ in the sense that in the end “each fighter prospers according to his might”; the man dies, but his work lives, and thus even death is swallowed up in victory. In this imaginative creed Caird seemed to find the suggestion of a conception of life that must be true in the main, and indeed, later he found that it was identical with Idealism, in so far as it maintained that the sensible world is “itself in its deepest essence spiritual.”<sup>1</sup> The sciences deal only with the outward vesture of nature, and, as Schiller expresses it, *Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*.

Before he had completed his course at Glasgow University the delicacy of his health made it advisable that Caird should rest from study, and, no doubt with a view to familiarizing himself with the language of Schiller and Goethe, to whom he had been

<sup>1</sup> *Essays in Literature and Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 257.

directed by reading Carlyle, he went to Germany, where he stayed until he had mastered the language and made considerable progress in the study of its literature. The author to whom he gave special attention during this period was Goethe. In him Caird seemed to find one in whom poetry was truth and truth poetry. Not that poetry can employ the method of philosophy; on the contrary, they proceed by different paths and only coincide in their final goal. Philosophy must begin with abstraction and analysis — separating the spiritual from the natural, the subject from the object, the universal from the particular, the ideal from the real — and only reaches unity after abstraction and division have been carried to a further extent even than by science. Poetry, on the other hand, if it is to be true to itself, while it must never lose the idea of the unity and harmony of things, must keep close to the world of sense, exhibiting by the force of the interpretative imagination the law that is working in it and is hidden from the ordinary consciousness. “Only one who regards the abstractions of science as the ultimate truth of things, can take this process to be a mere play of subjective fancy, or can suppose that any great poetic creation is produced by an imagination which merely follows its own dreams and does not bend to any objective law.”<sup>1</sup> The difficulty of “widening nature without going beyond it,” as Schiller expressed it, was immensely increased in an age of reflection, especially an age in which there was on the one hand a lifeless orthodoxy, with its external world-architect and externally determined design, and on the other hand an external enlightenment which was gradually undermining it, but at the same time was reducing itself to a platitude. At bottom these apparent antagonists were really infected by the same untruth, for both conceived existence as a mere aggregate of parts from which all life and self-activity had fled. The poetic soul of Goethe, ever seeking for the unity of things, revolted against both. Nor could he be contented for long with the exaltation of ‘nature,’ as preached by Rousseau and Byron, especially when ‘nature’ was conceived as a power within man, which is self-justified against every restraint forced upon him from without; for at bottom, as

<sup>1</sup> *Essays in Literature and Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 59.

he showed in his *Werther*, the sentimentalist's rebellion against the conditions of human life is really due to the inner self-contradiction of his own state. Hence the period of revolt ended for Goethe when he seemed to learn from Spinoza that the true lesson of life is "renunciation once for all in view of the Eternal," or, in its practical aspect, that we must "do the duty that is nearest" to us, cheerfully renouncing what is beyond our reach and putting behind us "the blasphemous speech that all is vanity." 'Nature' Goethe therefore now conceived, not as a power that reveals itself at once in the immediate appearance of the world or the immediate impulses of the human spirit, but as a plastic organizing force which works secretly in the outward and especially in the organic world, and which in human life reveals itself most fully as the ideal principle of art. In this sense Goethe went on to apply the ideas of organism and development. There is in all existence a shaping and transforming principle, which comes to its clearest expression in the peculiar faculty of the artist. This idea of development Goethe used to throw light upon the animal kingdom, when as yet few or none of the professed biologists had reached such a point of view, and in himself he seemed to find the same principle at work, originating his poetic creations. Hence he shrank from all negation, controversy, and conflict, which he identified with the spirit of evil, as embodied in his wonderful creation of Mephistopheles, "der Geist der stets verneint." He could not reconcile himself to a war with nature even as the way to a higher reconciliation. Here, in fact, as Caird suggests, the limitation of his genius is to be found; for, had he carried out his principle of reverence for that which is beneath us, as well as for that which is above us and beside us, he would have recognized, more fully than he did even in his later days, that the Christian idea of self-realization through self-sacrifice is the only conception of life which fits the facts. At the same time Caird learned from Goethe the futility at once of a mere intellectual 'enlightenment,' which ignores the spiritual side of things, and of a supernaturalism, which turns away from the present world and puts all the emphasis on the world to come. The modern spirit can recognize the ideal



only when it presents itself as the deeper fact, but this deeper fact can be discerned only after "the earnestness, the pain, the patience and the labour of the negative" have done their perfect work. The physical sciences must carry the work of explanation to its furthest point, even when the result seems to be the reduction of the universe to a mechanical system. In fact, however, this danger is not a real one, as Goethe convincingly showed; for nothing short of the idea of a spiritual organism, of which the mechanism of nature is merely the outer form, can be ultimately satisfactory.

After this fruitful interregnum Caird returned to his native land, and in 1856-1857 he studied divinity at St. Andrews, with a view to entering the church; but, probably under the conviction that he required a wider sphere of operations, in the following year he attended for a sixth session at Glasgow, and in 1860 he obtained the Snell Exhibition, with which to proceed to Balliol College, Oxford. A man of his fine scholarship and training had no difficulty in obtaining a first class, both in 'Moderations' and in 'Literis Humanioribus.' In 1864-1866 he was Fellow and Tutor of Merton College, and in 1866 his 'apprenticeship' came to an end when he was appointed Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow.

The intellectual and spiritual excitement that was aroused during Caird's career at Oxford, was eminently fitted to call out his natural powers and to complete the development which, as we have seen, had already begun through the influence of Carlyle and Goethe. He was fortunate in having Jowett as a Tutor, and, even before he became a Fellow of Merton, in enjoying the close friendship of Thomas Hill Green. The publication in 1855 of Jowett's *Epistles of St. Paul* may almost be said to mark the beginning of a new epoch in the study of theology in England. The year before Caird entered Balliol (1859) saw the publication of Darwin's great work, *The Origin of Species*, and in the year following (1860) the *Essays and Reviews* aroused the ecclesiastical world from its intellectual torpor. But the greatest influence upon Caird was undoubtedly due to Green. The education of a Balliol man then, as now, included the study of the poets, his-

torians, and philosophers of Greece and Rome, special stress being laid upon a knowledge of Plato and Aristotle. Thus Caird, with his wide outlook on human life, came to be familiar with Homer and the Greek Tragedians, Virgil and Horace, and he also laid deep his knowledge of literature and history, and indeed acquired the reputation along with Green of being as well versed in those subjects as in philosophy. Part of the Oxford training was also directed to Logic, and especially to the Logic of John Stuart Mill. This, combined with the publication in 1862 of Herbert Spencer's *First Principles*, compelled the two friends to give their serious attention to the study of the empirical school of philosophy. The early reading of Caird naturally led him to see beyond the principle on which the philosophy of Spencer rests; for the unknowability of the Infinite he had set aside as untenable when he met with it in Sir William Hamilton; at least, if he had brought with him to Oxford any leanings in that direction, they were effectually quenched by his study of Kant and Hegel. On the other hand, he had perfect sympathy with Spencer's reference of all forms of existence to a single unity, and he was naturally attracted by the attempt to explain the movements of nature and mind by the idea of development, which Darwin had shown to be applicable at least to all the forms of life. Spencer's conception of the State, however, could not but seem, to one familiar with Plato and Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, even less satisfactory than the utilitarian; for, though Spencer avoids in words the defect of Utilitarianism by holding that Society is organic, he so interprets this idea as to maintain what Huxley happily calls an "Administrative Nihilism," and Carlyle "Anarchy plus the Street-constable." Caird was convinced that the State is in no sense a mere aggregate of individuals, but the expression of man's essential nature. Hence, while, like Green, his practical politics was and always remained liberal, he held that the Platonic idea of the State as a spiritual unity was fundamentally sound, though it could only in modern times be realized by a government which has a strong democratic force behind it. Freedom, in other words, is not an end in itself, but exists and indeed is possible only because the reason which operates in all

men cannot be realized except in a State that allows free play to individuals, while yet it suppresses all that is recognized to be contrary to reason.

The result of Caird's studies in Oxford was to carry him beyond the point which he had previously reached by the study of Goethe and Carlyle. As against the former, he was convinced that it is possible, and for all ordinary men necessary, that the spiritual unity which lies at the basis of things should be obtained by a slow reflective process, in which full justice is done to the divisions of the ordinary consciousness and especially of science; and this unity, he therefore held, must be compatible with the utmost division, and indeed can only be realized by man in so far as he goes down into the lowest depths of pain and evil, in order to transform the negative into a positive. In contrast to Carlyle, he refused to admit that religion is merely a system of "symbols," and that society can only be renewed by the superior insight of its great men or "heroes." Religion became for him, the process by which man comprehends, and comprehends ever more clearly and fully, the spiritual unity which combines all existence and manifests its power in that process, while the salvation of society and the influence of great men he ascribed to the free play of reason in converting all that seems foreign to it into a means of its own realization.

This doctrine was of course suggested to Caird by his study of the Greek philosophers, and more especially by the study of Hegel, to whom he seems to have been directed by occasional remarks of Jowett. Both Green and Caird, when they came to give the results of their reflection to the world, had the habit of conveying their ideas through the interpretation or criticism of some thinker from whom they had learned or from whose principles they differed. Green, indeed, was more directly polemical than Caird — not because he took pleasure in controversy for its own sake, but because he was never satisfied until he had tested his principles by confronting them with their opposite. And as the prevalent school of philosophy in England was the empirical, the two friends, either by agreement or by natural affinity, divided the work of criticism and exposition between them — Green devot-

ing his attention to what he afterwards called the 'anachronistic' systems of Mill, Spencer and Lewes, and endeavoring to show that when confronted with its own history it had refuted itself in the nescience of Hume ; while Caird, who as a rule steered clear of negative criticism, elected to expound and examine the Critical Philosophy, with the object of proving that, while it had transcended empiricism by demonstrating that experience is inexplicable from a mere series of feelings without the coöperation of thought, it had not carried out the idealistic or rational interpretation to its legitimate conclusion in the Absolute Idealism advocated by Hegel. The published writings of the two friends follow the lines indicated. In 1865 Caird began his philosophical career as an author with the article on Plato already mentioned, and in 1866 Green furnished a companion-study of Aristotle. These were followed up by Green's Introductions to Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* (1874), in which he analyzes in the most minute and pertinacious way the doctrines of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, dragging to light every incongruity, and seeking to demonstrate in this way the impossibility of avoiding the admission of the constructive activity of thought in even the simplest forms of apprehension ; and by Caird's *Philosophy of Kant* (1878), which draws in large and bold outlines the main features of the Critical Philosophy, being much more concerned to indicate what is wanting to transform it into a perfectly consistent doctrine than to convict its author of inadequate or self-contradictory statements. The point of view from which the book is written is that of Hegel, and it is therefore advisable to see what Caird had learned, or believed himself to have learned, from the study of this last of the great originative idealists.

The philosophy of Kant is in a sense an epitome of the individualism of the eighteenth century, which began by depressing man and ended by exalting him. For, though it admits, or rather contends, that as a finite knowing subject man is confined within the limits of space and time and therefore is only a link in the chain of natural causation, it yet holds that, as a subject to whom all objects, including his own finite individuality, are necessarily relative, he is lifted above these limitations by the operation in

him of the universal principle of reason. Especially in his moral life man is revealed to himself as a self-determining subject, emancipated from all sensuous motives and from the necessity of nature, and conscious of subordination only to the law of duty, which is the law of his own reason. This law man *ought* to obey, and therefore *can* obey, notwithstanding all the pressure of circumstances and all the allurements of passion. Thus Kant leaves us with the sharp antithesis of man as natural and spiritual, as limited to a finite individuality, hemmed in by necessities on every side, and yet as possessing a universal capacity of knowing, and an absolute power of self-determination. Now, the answer which the nineteenth century gives to this problem is, that the antithesis is not so absolute as Kant represents it to be ; and, in fact, that materialism and spiritualism, sensationalism and idealism, empiricism and *a priori* speculation, individualism and idealism, are not really absolute, but only relative, opposites. The principles or ideas which have effected this irenicism are those of *organic unity* and *organic development*. In the application of these ideas no thinker, in Caird's opinion, was so successful as Hegel. Schelling indeed had insisted that there is an identity which is below or above all distinction, and that the universe is one through all its multiplicity and permanent through all its changes ; but he seemed to assert the unity almost at the expense of the differences. This defect was remedied by Hegel, who maintained that the absolute is a self-differentiating principle, realizing itself in a world of difference which is no mere appearance, but is its own essential manifestation, while yet the various forms of existence are by no means all on the same plane, since there is a regular ascent from inorganic things, through organic beings, to the self-conscious life of mind. What Caird finds in Hegel is, therefore, in the first place, a principle of reconciliation, which had not been detected, or at least not clearly detected, by any previous thinker. Hegel's assault on the law of contradiction was no mere freak of an over-subtle intellect that had lost its hold of fact ; it was an absolute necessity, if the central principle of his philosophy was to be demonstrated. Hence he sought to show that no distinction of thought whatever is absolute, and that all the great controversies

which have divided the world have arisen from the abstract assertion of an element of truth taken for the whole, though these very conflicts have been the means by which a fuller truth has been brought to light. And, in the second place, Hegel conceives of the universe as an organic whole, every change in which is a phase of its self-evolution. We comprehend nothing adequately until we have seen it as the partial manifestation of a single principle. Lastly, this principle is spiritual, and therefore manifests itself fully only in the life of man, with his self-conscious intelligence. Hegel's doctrine thus seemed to himself to be the philosophic rendering of the essential principle of Christianity, the union or identity of the human and divine.

Caird, then, undoubtedly believes with Hegel that "the hidden being of the universe has no power in itself that could offer resistance to the courageous effort of science." On the other hand, he entirely dissents from much of the doctrine popularly ascribed to Hegel. Thus the charge that it is a *Panlogism*, or, as Mr. Bradley expresses it, a "spectral woof of impalpable abstractions, or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories," he regarded as an entire misunderstanding, and even an inversion of the Hegelian philosophy. No doubt Hegel, in his *Wissenschaft, der Logik*, treats the functions of thought in their isolation from the facts of experience, but he never intended, or supposed any one would imagine that he intended, to deny the reality of the concrete facts of experience, though he certainly refused to admit that they had any isolated or independent being. So, in regard to the notion that Hegel claimed that the contents of his logic could be spun out of his own inner consciousness as a spider spins its web, Caird remarks: "If Hegel or any one ever pretended, or could reasonably be interpreted as pretending, to construe the universe *a priori*, the pretence is futile. A true and valuable idealism can be reached only through the interpretation of the data of experience by the special sciences, and the re-interpretation of the results of these sciences by philosophy."<sup>1</sup> Hegel, it is true, was not altogether successful in his attempt to apply the ideas of his Logic to nature, or even to the different

<sup>1</sup> *Progress of the Century*, p. 169.

provinces of the spiritual life, mainly because the scientific interpretation of them had not been carried far enough to prepare for the final interpretation of philosophy. Thus, he refused to apply the idea of development, even in its Lamarckian form, in interpretation of the succession in time of the various forms of life, while Caird at once accepted the Darwinian theory as the only tenable explanation of the facts. Nor could Caird endorse Hegel's attempt to show that the current theological dogmas can be retained without any substantial alteration, or accept his strongly conservative political doctrine. In these cases Hegel did not seem to him to have been true to his own principles. Caird, however, refused to admit that for Hegel man is a mere *modus* of the divine, or God 'the poetic substantiation of an abstraction'; maintaining that the former is the fundamental defect in the philosophy of Spinoza, who refers all things to God, but does not recognize that God must equally be manifested in all things; and that the latter converts reality into a meaningless chaos by the withdrawal of the unifying principle which gives it meaning. But, while Caird definitely rejects the misinterpretations and inadequacies of the Hegelian philosophy, he never wavers in his conviction of the essential truth of its fundamental principle, that the universe is rational and that its rationality is capable of being proved. This is the main point in which he differs from Green.

In the *Prolegomena to Ethics* Green reasons backwards, like Kant, from our intellectual and moral experience to that spiritual nature in which lies the possibility at once of knowledge and of moral action; but he refuses to characterize the self-conscious principle to which he has referred all things, or to work out positively any view of nature and human history as the manifestation of spirit. In regard to the theoretical aspect of the subject Green tells us that, "as to what the eternal consciousness is in itself, or in its completeness, we can only make negative statements. That there is such a consciousness is implied in the existence of the world; but *what* it is we can only know through its so far acting in us as to enable us, however partially and interruptedly, to have knowledge of a world or an intelligent expe-

perience" (p. 54). Similarly, he denies that we can say what the practical ideal in its completeness is. "We cannot conceive it under any forms borrowed from our actual experience, for our only experience of activity is of such as implies incompleteness. Of a life of completed development, of activity with the end attained, we can only speak or think in negatives, and thus only can we speak or think of that state of being in which the ultimate moral good must consist" (p. 180). In harmony with this attitude, Green, in his review of John Caird's *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, while admitting that "the world in its truth or full reality is spiritual," yet denies that "such a knowledge of the spiritual unity of the world, as would be a knowledge of God," is possible for us. These two contentions, — firstly, > that the world is 'spiritual,' and, secondly, that a knowledge of it as a unity is impossible, — seemed to Caird to be mutually destructive. If we have no knowledge of the unity of all things, how can we know that it is 'spiritual'? On the other hand, if we have a knowledge of it, experience must be a process in which its actual realization is ever more fully discovered. No doubt we cannot explain the principle which itself explains everything else, but this can only mean that "our knowledge of the self is > rather the type to which all other knowledge imperfectly approximates, than an inferior kind of knowledge. And, on the other hand, if it is possible for us to carry back the world of experience to conditions that are spiritual, there seems to be nothing that should absolutely hinder us from regarding the world positively as the manifestation of spirit, and from reinterpreting the results of science by the aid of this idea, — however difficult it may be to realize satisfactorily such an idealistic reconstruction of science. And in like manner, if it is possible to carry back our moral life to its conditions, and to regard it as the realization of the self, there seems to be no absolute hindrance in using this idea positively, not only as a key to the history of the past, but also to determine, in outline at least, the idea of moral perfection."<sup>1</sup> No doubt "the work of science, and still more the work of philosophy, must always be a work of faith, meaning by faith, not believing any-

<sup>1</sup> *Mind*, O. S., Vol. VIII, pp. 560-61.



thing merely upon authority, but proceeding upon a principle the complete vindication or realization of which is for us impossible; for, obviously, nothing short of omniscience could grasp the world as a complete system."<sup>1</sup> But, though in one sense the principle of philosophy is a faith, it is in no sense an arbitrary assumption, but the essential faith of reason in itself. Caird, in all his speculations, while he never loses sight of this principle, yet keeps close to the facts of experience, conceived in the widest sense as the evolution of humanity. Provided with his main principle, he goes on to apply it to history, and especially to the history of philosophy, which he views as the reflective expression of reason as it evolves itself in time, through antagonism and conflict, in the successive phases of art, morality, politics and religion. Much has to be done in the detailed explanation of the world by the special sciences, including psychology and sociology and the concrete history of religion, but in the end it will be found, I think, that without a spiritual interpretation of existence, such as Caird contended for, we are left "with the parts in our hands," and are thus fated to live a divided life, in which we can neither frankly accept the results of the sciences, nor vindicate our spiritual interests on a rational basis.

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<sup>1</sup> *Queen's Quarterly*, Vol. XII, p. 101.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION: THE EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, DECEMBER 29-31, 1908.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY.

THE eighth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association was held at Baltimore, Md., in the Johns Hopkins University, on December 29, 30, and 31, 1908, in affiliation with the American Association for the Advancement of Science. The following report of the Treasurer for the year ending December 31, 1908, was read and accepted :

FRANK THILLY, SECRETARY AND TREASURER, IN ACCOUNT WITH THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION.

*Receipts.*

Balance on hand December 31, 1907 .....	\$261.17
Received from dues and sale of Proceedings .	194.00
Interest .....	9.80
	<u>\$464.97</u>

*Expenses.*

Proceedings of Association for 1907.....	\$ 18.65
Cornell Smoker .....	17.75
Stationery and Printing .....	30.93
Stamps .....	19.72
Clerical Aid and Stenographer.....	17.35
Telegrams .....	2.60
	<u>\$107.00</u>
Balance on hand, December 31, 1908.	357.97
Total .....	<u>\$464.97</u>

The following officers were elected for the ensuing year : *President*, Professor John Grier Hibben, of Princeton University ; *Vice-President*, Professor James H. Tufts, of the University of Chicago ; *Secretary-Treasurer*, Professor Frank Thilly, of Cornell University ; *Members of the Executive Committee* (for two years),

Professor Charles M. Bakewell, of Yale University, and Professor F. J. E. Woodbridge, of Columbia University.

Upon recommendation of the Executive Committee four new members were elected: Dr. G. W. Cunningham, of Middlebury College; Professor Bruce R. Payne, of the University of Virginia; Professor James B. Pratt, of Williams College; and Professor Norman Wilde, of the University of Minnesota.

It was voted that the place of the next meeting be selected by the Executive Committee, the Association expressing its preference for New Haven.

Professor Gardiner, Chairman of the Committee appointed at the last meeting to consider the advisability of appropriating funds for the publication of works of early American philosophers, submitted a report, the following recommendations of which were adopted after discussion and amendment: (1) That we coöperate with Columbia University, the University being willing, to get Johnson's "Elements of Philosophy" published under the auspices of the Association; (2) that a Committee be appointed whose function it shall be to encourage similar publications by the various institutions concerned, the Committee being empowered to authorize the use of the name of the Association in the publication of such works of American philosophers as it may deem suitable; (3) that this Committee undertake the preparation of a complete bibliography of (early) American philosophy; (4) that the sum of \$75 be appropriated for the use of the Committee in the preparation of this bibliography and in the work of inciting further publications. The present Committee, consisting of Professors Gardiner, Royce, and Riley, was chosen to carry out these recommendations and authorized to increase the number of its members.

The following resolutions, offered by Professor Hibben, were adopted:

*Resolved*, That the American Philosophical Association appoint a Committee of five members to act in conference with similar Committees of other learned bodies in preparing and presenting to the Carnegie Institution in Washington a memorial asking that properly approved projects of historical, archæolog-

ical, philosophical, linguistic, literary, and artistic investigation and publication be admitted, in the apportioning of grants, to a recognition similar to that given approved projects of research in the physical and natural sciences.

*Resolved*, That the Committee be authorized to take such other steps as may seem advisable to further this end.

President Münsterberg appointed as members of this Committee: Professor Hibben, Professor Baldwin, President Butler, Professor Creighton, and Professor James.

Upon motion of Professor Baldwin it was resolved that this Association urgently request the Committee on Ways and Means, or other body having the matter in charge, that the present duty on scientific books printed in English be removed.

Upon motion of Professor Royce the President was requested to appoint a Committee to consider the feasibility of the Plan for a Comparative Lexicon, suggested by Dr. Husik. President Münsterberg appointed Professors Royce, Gardiner, Newbold, Husik, and Hammond as members of this Committee.

It was voted to tender the thanks of the Association to Johns Hopkins University for its hospitality.

The following are abstracts of papers read at the meeting:

**The Problem of Beauty.** HUGO MÜNSTERBERG.

[The President's Address, which appears in this number (March, 1909) of the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.]

**Concerning a Philosophical Platform.** KARL SCHMIDT.

Philosophy may be considered from the point of view of evolution; but this flux, to be made intelligible, must be broken up into *definite stages* from which and toward which the evolution proceeds. Whilst this conception of definite stages is, though necessary, purely auxiliary, if evolution is the controlling idea, it is the predominating one if any *action* is required; and my thesis is that philosophy *is* called upon to act, which I show in typical instances, and that from this demand flows the necessity for philosophy to take a definite form, which must be comparatively invariant. But a definite form of philosophy as such, not of individual convictions, means a recognized doctrine and school. The

second part of the paper makes suggestions of what could be done to realize such a condition in philosophy.

**The Postulates of a Self-critical Epistemology.** E. G. SPAULDING.

[This paper will be published in full in an early number of the *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*.]

**A Substitute for Mill's Methods in an Introductory Course.** FRANCES H. ROUSMANIERE.

The fact that no datum has any meaning whatever except on the assumption that we know how to describe it correctly, is fundamental for inductive logic. In scientific work this assumption rests on theories as to the proper tests (for instance, for purity of substances and accuracy of measurements), and upon the principles already believed to hold in the field investigated. Thus all induction is virtually deduction, our earliest uncriticised generalizations being no true induction, but the expression of a habit of expectation. A second fundamental consideration is, that an especial kind of presupposition underlies any generalization consciously made on the basis of particular experience, — a presupposition as to the degree to which any example of a field is representative of the field as a whole, that is, as to the relative uniformity of the field. The study of Mill's methods crowds out, through lack of time, these more important questions, and classifications of scientific method based on these may well be substituted for the canons in an elementary course in logic.

A classification on the basis of the interrelation of theory and data will, among other things, bring out the difference between the described, and so already generalized and lifeless, experiment of the text-books and the experiment for the investigator as we find it in biographies and reports. A classification of scientific methods will show that a carefully selected group of representatives is chosen where the field has different kinds within it, a group of examples taken as they may come where there is believed to be some chance that a few individuals are eccentric ; that averages, means, etc., are artificially constructed representatives ; and that imperfections of technique complicate the question of the amount that must be tested in a given field.

**Knowledge of Persons and Religious Faith.** C. H. HAYES.

Knowledge dealing with things, forces, and natural laws is alone definitely considered in logic; but we have also, as a matter of every-day experience, knowledge of men and women, which we use effectively and find of vital interest. The method of this knowledge of persons appears to be a delicate induction, which forms reliable conclusions from comparatively few, but significant, data.

The hypothesis made by religious faith is that it knows a personal God. Criticisms upon this commonly assume that all knowledge must conform to the canons of natural science, and that we cannot work up from scientific generalizations to the idea of an absolutely supreme Being. As, however, religion seeks, not Energy, Motion, or Law, but God, possessing infinitely higher and more definite reason, will, and love than human persons possess, it may be possible to know him in ways like those in which we know persons, by an induction even more delicate than that by which we know men. And this is what religion supposes it does. Thus Christian faith makes a great hypothesis, which it finds verified in part by observation of nature and of man's reason and conscience, more fully by the experiment of living according to it, and completely by God's revelation of himself in the history of the Hebrew people and in the appearing of Jesus Christ. This revelation is given through divine acts, comparatively few in number, but significant of God's presence and nature.

This view makes faith not radically unlike science, though clearly distinguished from it by the difference in the objects of the two; and it respects religion's own account of itself, that it is the knowledge as well as the love of God. Thorough study of our knowledge of persons would give a proper basis for criticising the possibility of religious knowledge, and would in itself make clearer an actually existing realm of mental activity which as yet lies outside our accepted psychology and logic.

**Naturalistic and Theoretic Thinking.** E. S. STEELE.

Science, beginning with naturalistic data, endeavors not to annul but to explain them. The relation between the naïve apprehen-

sion and the explanation is similar to that between thought in figurative clothing and plain thought. This again is paralleled in some wise by thought distinguished as sensuous and as pure. All thought, however, is sensuous to the extent that it requires sensuous embodiment. Sense matter as clothing of pure thought may be called *intrinsic* embodiment, since its office is embodiment and nothing more. Figurative representation, on the other hand, is *extrinsic* embodiment, or symbol, since it must have a primary meaning before it can be a symbol. It is alone through symbols that non-extended objects are conceived.

The naturalistic thinker accepts the world in its every-day sensuous dress ; the theorist endeavors to separate the truth from its guises. The distinction between the classes, however, is only relative, since theoretic thinking is at first very crude. The imperfection of theory, moreover, is shown by its frequent disagreements. These arise from the fact that in seeking new and more interior symbols different minds choose differently. Theorists are of two classes, the scientific and the speculative. In true scientific thinking the embodiment is held in strict subjection to the fact ; in speculative thinking, the subject-matter is accommodated to a conception form which may be called a *schema*. The most imposing systems are apt to have for a schema some aspect of the logical function, as in Spinoza and Hegel ; an example of a different kind is afforded by the "will and idea" of Schopenhauer. All speculative systems are essentially symbolic creations, vast figures of speech. They have no scientific value, but like other symbols may serve as vehicles of truth. The only philosophy which has a scientific value is a critical dogmatism ; dogmatism, because it holds fast to the great self-sufficing insights ; critical, because, on the one hand, it clears away naturalistic crudities, and, on the other, keeps free from schematic perversions.

#### Paradoxes in Realistic Epistemology. BERNARD C. EWER.

A paradox, philosophically speaking, is an apparent self-contradiction which, if genuine, would disqualify the theory containing it. Dualistic realism contains paradoxes which are regarded by many as destructive of consistency. In particular there are two which may be called the spatial and temporal paradoxes.

The former is the puzzle, how 'what is evidently one reality should be in two places at once, both in outer space and in a person's mind.' The latter is the 'lateness' of perception, due to the fact that the physical and physiological processes involved occupy a certain length of time. These paradoxes are not sustained by reflection as permanent theoretic inconsistencies. In the case of the first, when we state the facts of perception with precision we do not say or imply that the same object is found 'in two places at once.' The distinctions made by dualistic realism between objective consciousness and real object are not self-contradictory. The second difficulty, *i. e.*, the alleged inconsistency between the apparent presence and the real pastness of the object as perceived, disappears if we recognize that perception, as a cognitive fact, does not imply the strict temporal presentness of the object. The pragmatic presence of the latter in perception is quite compatible with its temporal pastness; there is no contradiction in saying that we perceive the object as it was. In brief, the account of perception given by dualistic realism contains, with reference to spatial or temporal characteristics, no theoretic inconsistency.

#### The Present Meaning of Idealism. ERNEST ALBEE.

It seems fair to assume that neither materialism proper nor subjective idealism is an adequate philosophical theory,—the former, because it explains the relatively known in terms of an unknowable; the latter, because it gives no adequate account of objective reality. After the first too rapid success of Hegelianism in Germany and the thorough-going reaction which followed, the 'back to Kant' movement in its various forms tended to stereotype certain Kantian conceptions which were far from expressing the real logic of the idealistic position. These should be carefully examined before one presses the claims of idealism against those of realism. The Kantian conception of the *a priori* involves the difficulties of the older rationalism and, to a certain extent, those of subjective idealism. The progressive philosopher to-day, like the scientist, is looking, not for principles 'independent of all experience,' but rather for principles that will express adequately the various forms of interdependence within experience. The



categories of thought are always in the making, and their evolution is always determined by teleological considerations. Nothing in experience can be 'merely given,' and as little can the form of experience be supplied by the mind. What is 'given' is nothing less than experience itself as a living process, which must be treated as organic. If we rule out things-in-themselves as meaningless, since by hypothesis they are unknowable, and recognize that subject and object have no meaning apart from their functional relation to each other, what right have we to assume that space and time are merely phenomenal? They are forms, not merely of our intuition, but of concrete experience itself, objectively regarded, and therefore forms of the only reality with which we have to deal. This, naturally, is not to say that the mere space-time aspect of things exhausts the character of even physical reality, — for science, like philosophy, presupposes a permanent system of relations, — but it should be recognized that the technical abstractions of certain philosophical disciplines prove the unreality of space and (particularly) of time as little as do the instrumental abstractions of various other sciences.

#### The Notion of the Implicit in Logic. J. E. CREIGHTON.

This paper is primarily a discussion of Baldwin's canons of Actuality and Continuity as stated in the first volume of *Thought and Things*. It is maintained that the criterion of reality set up by the first canon, — actual presence, — cannot be literally applied to a developing logical series, which is a progression of functions and meanings, and not one of existences. Moreover, Continuity cannot mean mere psychical or temporal continuousness, but must be based on some kind of identity between the earlier and later, — *i. e.*, some form of the implicit. This can be made intelligible only when the development of knowledge is regarded teleologically, as a system of functions through which the rational ends which constitute the mind are progressively realized. Baldwin's discussions of the nature of a genetic series fail to bring out its teleological character as the essential mark which distinguishes it from a mechanical sequence of events.

**The Field of Propositions that have Full Factual Warrant.**

WALTER T. MARVIN.

This paper is a continuation of a paper read before the Association at the Cornell meeting.

The field of propositions that have full factual warrant, is bounded negatively by excluding from it all postulates or axioms, all causal and existential propositions, and any proposition that is an inference from these. The field itself may be affirmatively described by answering three questions: (1) What relations are asserted in factual propositions? (2) How far is generalization possible in them? (3) What place do these propositions occupy in the system of science?

(1) The relations asserted are of four types: (a) Likeness and Difference; (b) Various relations between a whole and its parts; (c) Relations of order and of magnitude; (d) The presence or absence of a term in the factual field. (2) Generalization is possible. The highest are intensive not extensive generalizations. But they are all lower generalizations than the propositions used in the foundations of logic and mathematics. (3) The purely descriptive parts of science come nearest to lying wholly in the field. The theories of value come next. In relation to mathematics and the pure causal sciences the work of these factual propositions is two-fold: (a) They form the logical bridge between non-existential, or pure science, and existential, or applied science; (b) They suggest, but do not give to science her vast array of premises, and by continually doing so, as science progresses, they keep pure science consistent with numberless factual propositions. That is, they do not give us premises from which causal propositions can be inferred or deduced. They are simply standards with which causal assumptions must be kept consistent.

**Analysis of Simple Apprehension.** W. H. SHELDON.

We examine cases of presentation with objective reference: *e. g.*, hear a noise in the margin of consciousness, which we cognize yet do not think *about*. Such simple cases are real facts, not abstractions. They are mostly marginal; for we generally think *about* what is focal. The problem is to analyze such cases,

to see what light they throw on cognition. The genetic study is omitted here. These cases contain : (1) Some content and its discrimination. This discrimination does not always involve another content from which the first is distinguished. Sometimes a content stands out against a background or margin, while yet we are not aware of that margin at all. The minimum subject-matter of apprehension is content + relation. (2) A disposition to believe against doubt or suggested disbelief. (3) A liability to error (for the content, while for itself indubitable fact, may be falsely discriminated) which justifies us in calling simple apprehension a primitive kind of judgment. (4) An adaptation between the structure of the subject-matter and the belief-side, such that only a content in relation *can* be believed, and all contents in relation *are* believed unless inhibited by other beliefs. There is no subject-predicate relation here : Brentano's theory and the predication-theory both fail to apply to these primitive judgments. The sufficient definition of the simplest cognition then is : a content in relation, plus a disposition to believe.

**The Concept of Substance and the Problem of Matter.** J. A. LEIGHTON. (Read by title.)

**An Outline of Cosmic Humanism.** FRANK C. DOAN.

What sort of world-view is pragmatism likely to breed, if allowed to produce its truths on a cosmic scale? What is the meaning of men's inveterate search for the eternal and universal? The present paper intends to examine merely the roots of this pragmatic tree of knowledge. It is certain that the eternal is not of the nature of *ideas* nor of *forms*. The infinitudes of the pure reason, as well as the infinitudes of the practical, are wanting in any ideational or formal content that would distinguish them one from another. 'Infinite' when attached to a substantive is the sign of a contentless, formless *function* of experience. There is no such *thing* as an infinite *idea*. In its roots the cosmic life consists in the instinctive coördination of blind impulses into an organism of experience, a fructification of unconscious will-impulses into organic life. The physical universe is now felt in the cosmic life as so much pull and haul and dead weight.

Meanwhile the humanist metaphysic need not postulate a cosmic experience *less* plastic than the human. Within uncertain limits physical processes are subject to control from higher, motor centers of the organism. There is in *human* organisms no inherent disability which would prevent the controlling of physical processes from volitional centers in the *cosmic* life.

It is conceivable that the function of consciousness even on a cosmic scale should cease to operate. The existence of the universal is in no active sense necessary. In 'absolute' idiocy and in coma the organism of experience seems to be slipping back into the abyss of totally blind impulses-to-be in which the cosmic life has its roots. The persistency of the physical universe in the midst of its ceaseless flux of being must be interpreted partly as the natural healthiness of a great cosmic animal, and partly as the conscious resistance of cosmic energy to the deranging forces of disease and fatigue.

This root or marrow of divinity should not be confused with the divine *character* which men connote by their more tender terms of infinitude. What this character is, how far conscious and how far subconscious, in what degree personal and in what trans-personal, God only knows. Humanism can only urge over-beliefs at this point.

### The True, the Good, and the Beautiful, from a Pragmatic Standpoint. W. P. MONTAGUE.

The 'pragmatic standpoint' is here taken to mean the attempt to interpret all forms of mental activity in terms of the process of adaptation of an organism to its environment. From this standpoint the logical, ethical, and æsthetical types of *value* should appear as differing forms of that vital *equilibrium* between organism and environment, the attainment of which is the goal of all processes of adaptation. This vital equilibrium may result: (1) from the organism conforming itself to the environment; (2) from the environment being made to conform to the needs of the organism; (3) from an unforced or spontaneous accord of each with the other. The paper suggests: (1) that the true, the good, and the beautiful may each be identified with one of these types of equilibrium; (2) that they are radically distinct from one

another ; (3) that therefore the pragmatic method yields a conclusion at variance with that pragmatic doctrine which treats the true as a form of the good.

### **Absolutism and Teleology.** A. W. MOORE.

The pass-word of the philosophical camp would seem at first glance to be 'purpose.' But a second look shows that the term covers wide differences. Indeed, the issue here is the same as elsewhere ; viz., the issue between completionism, — absolute perfectionism, — and evolutionism, which in the opinion of the paper is the fundamental point of the 'pragmatic' movement. In metaphysics, it is the question of whether there are forms or laws of change which themselves are unchangeable ; in logic, whether, as Hegel asked, there is a real evolution of the categories ; in biology, whether there can be a development of function with no corresponding development of structure, or conversely ; in ethics, whether the ideal is all-inclusive, fixed, and given, or constructed in the process in which it functions.

As the logical and metaphysical aspects of the problem have held the center of the stage thus far, the paper passes to the ethical phases of the issue where the conception of the all-inclusive, fixed ideal is supposed to find its strongest support. "If the absolute purpose finds no place in science, this only shows," says the absolutist, "the abstract, mechanical character of science." It is to be noted in passing, however, that, since Darwin, science has become steadily more and more teleological. This, the evolutionist maintains, is because Darwin in science, as Hegel in logic, made possible the conception of an evolutionary teleology. The mechanical character of pre-Darwinian science was but the counterpart of the absolute type of teleology which then prevailed.

The ethical support for the conception of the all-inclusive, fixed ideal, is found by the absolutist in its supposed necessity, as : (1) the standard of moral progress ; (2) the basis of objectivity necessary to moral responsibility and authority.

To (1) the evolutionist says : (a) that, since the content of this absolute ideal can be known to no finite being, it cannot serve as a standard ; (b) its all-inclusive character leaves no room for either progress or regress.

To (2) he replies: (a) that, aside from the psychological question of how an all-inclusive purpose can be selective, and the logical problem of the relevancy of a ready-made ideal, moral *responsibility* requires that the agent participate in the construction of the ideal which he is to help execute; (b) that objectivity is provided for in the fact that the whole process is social through and through.

With the precise limits or constituents of this social process the evolutionist's principle is not concerned. The process may include infra- and super-human agencies. The principle demands only that this social process be real and that reality be this social process.

### The Import of Pragmatism for the History of Philosophy.

J. G. HUME.

Pragmatism, controversially, is opposed to Intellectualism. Psychologically, it asserts the primariness of the vivid sensational or emotional experiences of the present moment, contrasting them with the theoretical constructions regarded as less real. Logically, it endeavors to reduce the ratiocinative process of mediation to successive immediate emotional responses, and defines truth in terms of satisfactoriness of this emotional reaction. Ethically, it uses the same method to get results and applies the same test for their validity. Will is the effort to secure satisfying emotional adaptations, Belief is the anticipation guiding such adaptive effort, Goodness is the successful adaptation. Attacks on Pragmatism follow these lines: defence of Intellectualism; denial of the accuracy of the pragmatic psychological assertions; disputing the correctness of the logical method and the sufficiency of the epistemological content; doubting the adequacy of the method and test, and the validity of conclusions, in moral and religious "belief." Pragmatism is a continuation and extension of Empiricism. It attacks Plato, defends the Sophists, reinstates David Hume, adds to Hume's "customary conjunction," the Darwinian doctrine of heredity, and accepts evolutionary utilitarianism.

Earlier Empiricism rejected both intellect and will, Pragmatism rejects intellect but asserts the will. Schopenhauer also

denies intellect and affirms will, but his will is transcendent-cosmic, the pragmatic will is empirical-humanistic.

Pragmatism, in separating the will both from the physical motor and the intellectual motive, approaches abstract mediæval 'liberty of indifference.' Modern intellectualists, affirming both intellect and will, give a more concrete account of will than the pragmatists, *e. g.*, T. H. Green's account of motive and unification of desire, intellect, and will. [Hegel, attacking the mere understanding, asserts concrete synthetic reason.] The materialistic-mechanical attack on Pragmatism has no pertinence, since the mechanical standpoint provides no basis for any distinction between good and evil, true and false, fact and fancy. The real controversy is between objective and subjective idealism, and the central issue is the will. Though pragmatism ostensibly defends empirical subjective idealism and attacks objective idealism, it is really reconstructing empiricism so as to approach more closely to objective idealism.

**A Plan for a Comparative Lexicon of Philosophical Terms in Greek, Syriac, Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin, Historically Treated.** ISAAC HUSIK.

The study of mediæval philosophy has long been difficult for want of (1) good editions of texts, and (2) adequate external help in terminology of the mediæval writers. The first want is gradually being remedied by publications such as those of Bäumer's *Beiträge*. As long as the second defect remains, students, translators, and editors of mediæval works, particularly of Oriental works, in Hebrew and Arabic, will find their task difficult.

As all mediæval philosophy is based upon the Greek writings, especially of Aristotle, which were translated first into Syriac, from this into Arabic, and from Arabic into Hebrew and Latin, or from Arabic into Hebrew, and from this into Latin, it is proposed to gather the terminology of these translations and other works based upon them into a lexicon, paying special attention to their historical development. Such a lexicon would not only enable the student, translator, and editor of a philosophical mediæval text to understand his author, and expound, translate, or edit him correctly, but would give us a history of mediæval phi-

losophy in schematic form, by enabling us to determine, (1) the genuineness of works attributed to a given author, (2) his relations to his predecessors and followers, (3) the center of his philosophical activity, (4) the influence of schools of thought upon one another. It would besides contribute important additions to the present Hebrew, Arabic, and Syriac lexicons, and encourage the study of mediæval philosophy.

The undertaking here proposed is a very large one, and beyond the powers of any one man to carry out. Moreover, it requires the moral and material encouragement of institutions and academies here and abroad. Its importance, however, should make it feasible. Dr. Pollak of the University of Prague has been interested in the subject for many years, and assures the author that given the proper support, coöperators will not be wanting. The field would be divided among specialists in their respective lines, who would prepare monographs in selected portions of the field to be covered. When these monographs have been got together they may then be combined into a historical lexicon of the philosophical terminology of the Middle Ages, thus filling a very sensible gap in the *Culturgeschichte* of Europe.

#### Reflections on Kant's First Antinomy. E. A. SINGER, JR.

The Problem: Only observation can determine the spread of bodies in space, their duration in time; and there is no finite series of observations that can decide between a finite and an infinite distribution or history. We seem to be presented with an *unknowable fact*.

But is each of these experimental series bound to be infinite? Can we not conceive of a law of force that would reflect distribution throughout an infinitive region in the behavior of bodies contained in a finite? At least, we may answer, no known law will do this, — the complete discussion presents insuperable difficulties. But can we not at least assume that the history of the system of nature is completely given in its behavior? If so, we could not distinguish between a behavior that meant an infinite past and one (shown to be definable) which would mean a finite, so long as a probable error of experiment remained. But to reduce this probable error to zero itself involves an infinite series of observations.



The problem is more general than Kant supposed. The discussion shows that not only the fact of the world's limits in space and time, but that any question of fact involves an infinite series. Yet Kant's solution of the particular case is a solution of the general. *Das Unbedingte*, become the bare datum of experience, is found not to be given *in* experience, but given *to* experience as a problem. It is never experienced, but stands for an *ideal* of empirical method. *The Ding-an-sich as ideal*, this is one way of expressing the outcome of the Dialektik, an idealism of the *a posteriori*, quite independent of the idealism of the *a priori* presented in the *Æsthetik* and *Analytik*.

### Kant's Doctrine of the *Summum Bonum*. M. A. COHEN.

In the first part of this paper an attempt is made to give a sympathetic interpretation of Kant's doctrine by calling attention to its essentially social character. The *summum bonum* is the ideal of a perfectly moral universe or commonwealth, which it is our duty to promote. In this ideal commonwealth happiness is distributed in accordance with the principles of retributive as well as distributive justice. The conception of the deity involved is not necessarily that of a *deus ex machina*. What is essential to the argument is the moral faith in a power adequate to bring nature into harmony with the demands of moral life.

In the second part of the paper several objections to this doctrine are considered: (1) The objection that the union of happiness with duty in the *summum bonum* is inconsistent with Kant's rigorism, is due to a confusion between rigorism and asceticism. In Kant's own words: "The distinction between the principle of happiness and morality is not an opposition between them." (2) The objection of Schleiermacher and others that happiness cannot enter into the *summum bonum*, because the latter is the object of reason while happiness is entirely an affair of our sense nature, is philologically untenable, and misinterprets the relation between sense and reason in Kant's philosophy. Happiness, like morality, is applicable only to a creature who is both rational and sensible. (3) The most important objection to the doctrine is that back of it there is involved a doctrine of rewards and punishments, and this is generally supposed to be inconsistent with the

principle of virtue for virtue's sake. But here again the supposed contradiction follows only from drawing the antithesis too sharply. A sympathetic interpretation of Kant's doctrine, indeed, would enable us to transcend the usual antinomies between conduct and its result, between the end and the means.

**The Idea of Justice in the Christian Ethics.** J. M. MECKLIN.

Unlike the Greek and the modern conception of justice, the Christian idea is essentially otherworldly and transcendental, rather than political or social. The just life is the result of a divine pronouncement upon human life and character, rather than the outcome of man's social and political relations. This was due largely to the centuries of oppression suffered by the Jewish people, which led them to look for justice not in existing conditions, but in a supernatural and catastrophic close of the present world-order when existing moral values would be reversed by a divine judgment and an ideal condition, "the kingdom of God and his righteousness," would be introduced. The large number of passages in the Christian sources of a distinctly eschatological nature show that the author of the Christian Ethics held to this prevailing conception of justice. Hence the very slight reference to questions of political justice, the insistence upon complete self-abnegation, and the emphasis of non-resistance of evil, as essentials in the just and righteous life. Had the author of Christian Ethics contemplated the continued existence, or at most the gradual moral transformation, of the existing political and social orders, it is more than probable that his teachings would have placed more emphasis upon justice as a social and civic virtue.

**The Doctrine of Histurgy: an Epistemology for the Scientist and the Logician.**<sup>1</sup> CHRISTINE LADD FRANKLIN.

Hitherto, philosophy has consisted of different, irreconcilable — in fact, incompatible — 'systems'; but this state of things is not necessarily permanent. The powers of the human mind have now become so sharpened, — notably by the discipline of the strictly reasoning sciences, logic and mathematics, — that it

<sup>1</sup> This paper was read in abstract before the Philosophical Congress in Heidelberg, August, 1908.

ought to be possible to secure some common, accepted body of doctrine having scientific character. Much of the philosophy of the past has already been shown to be a tissue of fiction and unreason; much of the philosophy of the present can be shown to be of the same character: it needs but a vigorous, concerted effort on the part of philosophers to rescue philosophy from the charge of being art, or poetry, but not science. Moreover, there is at present a greater need for an accepted philosophy among the non-philosophers than there has ever been before. The other sciences, — notably mathematics and logic, — are growing rapidly, not only forwards but also backwards, and as they dig down deeper into their foundations they feel the necessity for an established philosophy, that is, for a discipline which shall explain whatever is capable of being explained but has not yet been explained in any one of the special sciences.

Such a philosophy, I venture to predict, should consist of the following doctrines:

1. A theory of reality, — the theory (already wide-spread among philosophers later than Kant) that immediate, uninterpreted, unanalyzable experience is the type, — and also the entire content, — of what is, in the highest degree, the real, or the existent.

2. A reformed psychology; since philosophy is necessarily based upon what the not-farther-analyzable constituents of consciousness are, it is of the last importance that these constituents should be correctly made out. Not thought, not sensation, not will, is the groundwork of an adequate philosophical system; the fundamental content of consciousness is all that we have to build philosophy upon, but also we need it all.

3. A theory of truth.

4. Since truth is expressed in the form of judgments, a theory of the judgment.

Knowledge, — the *ensemble* of all true and non-trivial propositions, — acquires the immense validity which we attribute to it (over and above what simple isolated inductions would have) by means of the interconnections of truths and the fresh confirmations (through instances) which we are able to obtain of the con-

sequences of several truths when fused together by way of reasoning. Knowledge is a net-work, a woven tissue, a work of weaving.

This and not the pragmatic view is the true doctrine of consequences ; it is desirable to give it a name, in order that a doctrine which is simple and well known, but true, may the more readily make front against the vagaries of pragmatism — the name, perhaps, of *histurgy* (a work of weaving).

#### Discussion : Realism and Idealism.

JOSIAH ROYCE. (No abstract has been furnished.)

JOHN DEWEY.

The conclusion of the paper was that realism and idealism arise from differences in logical attitude and mode of attack, realism standing for the function and rôle of observation, description, definition and classification, while idealism sets store by the function of reflection, interpretation, reorganization of facts through the projection of ideas and hypotheses. Since, however, these functions are mutually cooperative and limiting in the pursuit of knowledge, the real problem of the realistic-idealistic controversy turns out to be why and how each of these *motifs* is isolated from the other, and thereby exaggerated into the basis of an independently complete system.

The answer is to be sought in historic considerations. The background of ancient thought was custom and habit ; a world of fixed characters, the world of natural and social acknowledgments, or observations, corresponds to custom and habit. Thus the logic of observation was entangled with a cosmology which was both false and irrelevant, and the result of classic thought was an ontology which even when idealistic *as a theory of existence* (as in the case of Plato and Aristotle) was realistic as a theory of knowledge.

Under the conditions of the origin of modern thought, the emphasis fell upon progress, and hence upon protest and rebellion against acceptance of the given and customary order, whether that of the senses or of institutions. The individual was magnified, and in the individual the power of projecting ideas, of discovery, of inferring the new and the different. The logical stress

was thus transferred to 'ideas' and interpretation at the expense of 'data' and observation, which were transformed from finalities into fragmentary raw material for thought. Individual consciousness thus took the place of the perceptible cosmos as the clue to the metaphysical characterization of Reality, and epistemological idealism was born.

Present indications are towards giving up the attempt at wholesale characterizations of 'Reality' as such. In this case, the coöperation and mutual limitations of observation and interpretation, of custom and progress, in the pursuit of knowledge will be recognized, and the absolutistic opposition of realism and idealism will become an historic episode.

FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE.

As a contribution to the discussion this paper proposed an examination of the nature of consciousness based upon considerations drawn from the study of the structure and functions of the sense organs and the nervous system. A superficial examination of the sense organs and the nervous system reveals a striking difference in structure and function, which becomes more striking the more thorough the examination is made. Thus the sense organs appear to be constructed and differentiated in relation to qualitative differences in the stimuli which may affect them, while the nervous system appears to be constructed and unified in relation to coördinated activity by the organism. While the sense organs put the organism in diversified contact with its surroundings, the nervous system prevents this diversification from resulting in disintegrated and isolated reactions. It is thus apparent that the nervous system secures to the organism individuality and unity of life in spite of very great diversity of stimuli and of environment. These considerations afford the means of stating the relational view of consciousness in biological terms. An organism so situated that it should be affected by specific qualitative differences in the world about it, but which should, none the less, react in a unified and coördinated manner no matter how it might be stimulated, might well be defined as a conscious organism. Its consciousness would be a relational system supervening upon its differentiated contact with its sur-

roundings. Furthermore, its consciousness would be marked by many of the characteristics usually attributed to consciousness. It would, for instance, be what we call private and personal, and, being unified, it would present features ascribed to a self or a mind. Different organisms could readily be conceived as exhibiting those varieties and even abnormalities of experience with which we are familiar.

C. M. BAKEWELL.

The first thing necessary in a discussion of realism and idealism is to get rid, once for all, of certain misunderstandings with regard to idealism which are very common even in the current discussions, and which would indeed turn idealism into a form of madness. (1) As to method. It is charged that the idealist rests his case against realism, or in support of idealism, on the physiological argument, and since this argument cannot be stated without taking it for granted that idealism is *not* true, the idealist is in the absurd position of supposing his philosophy to be the conclusion drawn from premises which that conclusion itself makes absurd. (2) As to results. It is charged that the idealist resolves physical phenomena into mental phenomena ; that he is logically forced to believe that the actual processes of nature are identical with his experience and knowledge of those processes ; that, in a word, he entirely obliterates the distinction between the subjective and the objective. These charges are all unsupported by the facts. They constitute a set of absurdities that may be extracted from certain statements of the *esse-percipi* theory, — most unfortunate phrase, — but they cannot even be laid to the door of Berkeley. The realistic theory of matter which Berkeley was opposing presents a parallel absurdity. And just as the modern realists do not attempt to revive this pre-Berkeleyan ‘hypothetical’ realism, so modern idealisms are equally innocent of early subjectivism, — if, indeed, there ever existed a subjective idealist. It is a significant fact that the first searching criticism of the *esse-percipi* theory was made by the first great idealist. And many of the criticisms he made are identical with those which the modern realist makes when he thinks he is attacking idealism, but is in truth attacking the common enemy, subjec-

tivism. And it is no less significant that the first great realist, Democritus, is the man who more than any other is responsible for the *esse-percipi* theory of his fellow townsman, Protagoras. The inference which these facts at once suggest is amply justified by the history of philosophy: that a realism which makes the reals lie outside of experience in an inaccessible beyond has subjectivism for its twin error; and that idealism, so far from being identical with subjectivism, is rather an attack upon it, and an attempt to make objectivism intelligible. It should be clear that any criticism of idealism which starts out with the assumption that we have two separate orders called mental phenomena and physical phenomena, and then proceeds to put ideas into the class mental phenomena and summarily rule idealism out of court because it has taken the half of reality for the whole, has no value, since it simply begs the question at issue, idealism being one continued protest against the finality of any such division of realities. If one could make such division it is plain that ideas would not belong exclusively to either group. The common motive underlying the efforts of science and philosophy alike is the desire in and through individual experience to reach universal experience. Every experience being characterized by the dual subject-object relation, there are two paths that idealism follows, one, the ontological, starting from the object side of this relation, and the other, the epistemological, starting from the subject side. In the resulting concrete or objective idealism the word *idea* is not given, as is charged, a strange and unusual significance, but is employed in one of its most commonly accepted meanings. But it is of course not equivalent to image, impression, state of consciousness, or mental phenomenon.

NORMAN SMITH.

Two points may be contended for. First: a distinction between consciousness and its object, between process of apprehension and object apprehended, is the irreducible minimum which our theory of knowledge must recognize and for the possibility of which it must account. The subjective factors must be stated in specifically subjective terms; otherwise objectivity itself goes by the board. Secondly: the relation of mind and body is

the crucial problem through the treatment of which our theories, and especially those that claim to be realistic, can best be tested by the relevant facts. And it has this importance because it is the problem through which our theory of knowledge connects with the standpoints of physics and physiology.

Objective idealism, which proceeds by emphasizing the logical relation of necessary mutual implication between subject knowing and object known, or between both and an absolute self-consciousness, persistently ignores the problem of the relation of mind and body. The realistic theories seem open to criticism in so far as they seek to explain consciousness in purely objective terms, and consequently treat the problem of the relation of mind and body as if it raised the question only of the adaptation of the physical organism to its environment.

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(Members are requested to notify the Secretary of any correction to be made in the above list.)

## REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

*Philosophie der Werte.* Grundzüge einer Weltanschauung. By  
HUGO MÜNSTERBERG. Leipzig, 1908.—pp. viii, 486.

The present volume conducts us a long way towards the goal foreshadowed by Professor Münsterberg's last considerable contribution to philosophy, the still unfinished *Grundzüge der Psychologie*. It presents us in outline with a philosophical theory founded upon the Kantian 'critical' epistemology, and deriving in particular directly from the original position of Fichte, in which natural science, and more especially that youngest of the natural sciences, physiological and experimental psychology, is to take its place as part and parcel of an interpretation of the world which shall be thoroughly spiritual and teleological. No one who has watched the development of philosophical thought during the last generation can well doubt that Professor Münsterberg is justified in holding that the work of the twentieth century in philosophy will be the restoration of the *Geisteswissenschaften* to their rightful place in the scheme of human thought, or that this task will have to be accomplished by a sympathetic analysis which will concede to the full the worth and value of the great developments of the last hundred years in purely natural science. Nor will any one lightly deny that Professor Münsterberg, in virtue of his undisputed preëminence as a scientific psychologist, is exceptionally qualified to make an enduring contribution to the execution of the program which lies before us all. How far the present book can be held to have definitely laid down the main lines along which that program must be executed may be a matter for difference of individual opinion, but it will at least be universally admitted that, even if Professor Münsterberg has not provided a satisfactory solution for all the questions he raises, his treatment of them is always most suggestive. If it is, as some of us think, often a greater achievement to have raised the really significant question in the right form than to have answered it, it must be long indeed before Professor Münsterberg's book loses its value for all serious students of the philosophical problems of the present.

For my own part, so far as the author's solution of the great philosophical problems is concerned, I must say at once frankly that it appears to be affected by certain fundamental limitations of temperament. For one thing, he seems to me to share with the German

idealists who are his avowed spiritual ancestors the defects, as well as the merits, of the system-making type of mind. His work unmistakably reveals the tendency to cut up the field of thought and knowledge into a scheme of neatly-formulated and mutually exclusive departments. Now, no doubt, we have a right to expect of a final philosophy that it shall be systematic, but the unfortunate thing is that we are not at present in a position to construct a final philosophy *de omni scibili*, and consequently, in our attempts to rubricate the whole contents of experience under a logically complete scheme of categories, we are morally certain to leave out of account whole fields of familiar experience which will not fit in conveniently under our logical divisions. Unless we are careful to guard against this tendency to over-systematization, there will always be the danger that the fate which overtook scholastic Aristotelianism may await the "philosophy of the future"; we may lose altogether our grip on much of the richest and most significant human experience in our anxiety to admit no 'loose ends' in our philosophical constructions. And this is exactly, in my opinion, what Professor Münsterberg shows himself to be constantly in danger of doing. If it is not impertinent I would suggest that his work would have had a greater permanent value if he had been less completely under the influence of the system-makers of the 'critical' period, and had drunk deeper of the well of Greek philosophy. In Plato, in particular, he would have found the model of a philosophy which is all the more full of permanent value and suggestiveness because it keeps so constantly in the closest touch with a concrete experience which it knows itself incompetent to formulate once and for all under its provisional scheme of categories, and yet will not any the more ignore on that account. If it is true that every one of us is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian, the point of the antithesis will probably be found to be that some of us are constantly alive to the fact that there is so very much in the experienced world that we do not yet know, while some of us are not. Professor Münsterberg, like all the system-makers from Aristotle downwards, belongs preëminently to the latter class. The *omne scibile*, or, in view of his sharp distinction between *Erfahrung* and *Erkenntnis*, I might say, the *omne experibile*, constantly presents itself to him as a region so accurately charted and delimited, that he is prepared once and for all to tell us exactly what *must* be the precise demarcations between, *e. g.*, "nature, art, morals, religion," and what are the separate sub-compartments into which each of them falls. There is no room at all in his scheme for intermediate regions, half-lights, or mystery of any kind; 'in it is light, and in it is no darkness at all.'

A simple illustration of the kind of defect I am referring to may be taken from Professor Münsterberg's treatments of the 'values' of the fine arts. It is inferred from his *a priori* scheme of all possible forms of value that the *Schönheitswerte* must be exactly three in number and no more, to correspond with the distinction between the "outer world" of physical objects, the *Mitwelt* of our fellow-men, and the "inner world" of our own volitions. Accordingly, there must be exactly three forms of fine art, sculpture and painting to deal with the 'outer world,' poetry to deal with the *Mitwelt*, and music to correspond to the *Innenwelt*. The omission of architecture from the list of fine arts would, one might think, suggest doubts as to the value of a classificatory scheme of this kind, forced upon the contents of æsthetic experience from without. But Professor Münsterberg, having got his nicely adjusted schematism, is not the man to see it upset by the inconvenient existence of cathedrals like Lincoln or Amiens. Architecture must be degraded to the same level as house-decoration (pp. 237 ff.), on the plea that after all the architect is not "free" in the exercise of his art; he is limited by the primary obligation to turn out a comfortable dwelling-place. As if the structure of a great Greek temple or a great Gothic cathedral were rendered any more 'unfree' by limitations of a utilitarian kind than the structure of a drama or a symphony by the condition that it must not be too long to be seen or heard at a single sitting!

The same artificial schematism dominates the elaborate discussion of poetry and its values. Poetry is to be exclusively concerned with the *Mitwelt*, hence (p. 272) it has to do only with "the influence of Nature," conceived as an animated thing, "on the willing of man"; it may never attempt to reveal to us "the will in Nature" itself. That would be, in fact, a poaching on the preserve of 'plastic art,' to which the outer world has just been assigned as its province. Really, I cannot help asking myself whether Professor Münsterberg has ever heard of Wordsworth or Shelley, or Blake, and how he would bring, say, *The Cloud* under his formula. One thing is quite clear to any attentive reader of the poem; the "Wollungen" reflected in Shelley's verse are not at all those naturally aroused in the human spectator by the sight of a fleecy mass of cloud, but such as a person acquainted with the scientific facts about the formation of clouds might imaginatively ascribe to the cloud itself as making up its inner life. This constitutes a double offence against Professor Münsterberg's theory of the functions of poetry, since he lays the utmost emphasis on the doctrine that the Nature which is the object of the

poet's imaginative contemplation and the Nature which is studied by science have nothing in common but the name. And yet,—surely there must be something wrong about a theory of art which requires us to deny that *The Cloud* is a great poem. We meet the same difficulty again, in an exaggerated form, as soon as we come to the discussion of the different forms of poetry (pp. 276 ff.). Again, the distinction between outer world, *Mitwelt*, and inner world is made the basis for an exhaustive division of the possible forms of poetry into the epic, which deals with the relation of its hero to the outer world, the drama, which deals with his attitude towards his fellows, and the lyric, which directly expresses his 'inner world,'—a function which, by the way, had previously been assigned not to poetry but to music. (Does the author mean that a lyric, unlike a musical composition, must always express the will and emotion of some specific imaginary hero? And, if so, will the distinction bear serious examination? How does, *e. g.*, the *Te Deum* or the *De Profundis* differ in this respect from, say, a sonata?)

Now, I should have thought it impossible to devise a theory better fitted than this of Professor Münsterberg's own construction, to exhibit the weakness of such artificial system-making as his. To begin with, it really leaves no place for some of the very greatest poetry of the world. *E. g.*, in what class is Professor Münsterberg going to place *The Prelude*? Apparently, as its object is to describe the growth of the poet's mind, it ought to be reckoned as a lyric,—but how can we call it one without absurdity? Again, if the epic is to deal exclusively with a hero's relation to external nature, who has ever composed a genuine epic? Everything which usually passes under that name will have to be classed as drama, since the centre of interest in the great epics is always the influence of the hero's character and action upon that of his fellows, and of theirs upon his. Professor Münsterberg tries to evade this difficulty by the assertion that the subordinate characters of the epic "do not stand out with the free *Selbständigkeit* of the persons of a drama, but coalesce into a unity with their background of mere environment"; "in the drama the antagonists are thoroughly beings with an individual will, and therefore inwardly similar to the hero; the epic tones down their selfhood; they are there to represent the world in which the life of the one willing individual comes to its development" (p. 277). Again, I would ask, has Professor Münsterberg ever read the first book of the *Iliad*, and does he really believe that, say, Agamemnon, as there depicted, has not as much 'selfhood' as any 'dramatic'



character? So, again, when it is laid down that the lyric deals only and directly with the *Innenwelt*, I really want to know whether we are to deny that, say, the *Fourth Pythian* or Dryden's Ode on *Alexander's Feast* is a true lyric?

Surely the only satisfactory way of making a classification of types of poetry is the inductive method. We must start by a study of the actual achievements of the great poets, and any arrangement of them into kinds must be made along lines which are naturally suggested by the works themselves, and not forced upon the material from outside in consequence of some foregone conclusion as to what poetry ought or ought not to do. In any case, the attempt to read a philosophical significance into the Greek popular distinction between epic, drama, and lyric is bound to be a failure, because the whole classification is based on characteristics of a purely external kind. The only definite sense which the words 'epic poetry' have ever borne is, *e. g.*, 'poetry composed in hexameter verse'; lyric poetry, again, had once a definite meaning; it meant poetry composed to be sung to the lyre. It is the merest confusion to suppose that any satisfactory classification of forms of poetry based upon a deeper insight into spiritual affinities will turn out to correspond with one based upon such superficial distinctions.

The second peculiarity of temperament which, as it seems to me, largely vitiates Professor Münsterberg's work, is one which was already very prominent in the *Grundzüge der Psychologie*. I refer to the hard and sharp antithesis which is regularly drawn between knowledge and experience. My readers will probably be already familiar with the general attitude. Experience is essentially teleological, and knows nothing of causal connections between events. Knowledge, on the other hand, is to be dominated throughout by the concept of causal connection, and to have as its ideal a purely mechanical system of determinations of the later events of a series by the earlier, and therefore excludes all genuine recognition of the determination of events by end or purpose. So it comes about, not merely that besides the special interpretation of the experienced world as a mechanical system which is science, there are other equally valid interpretations which are not science at all, such as those of art, ethics, religion, but also that the physical world of unchanging mass-particles studied by the natural sciences, and the corresponding mental world of sensation-complexes studied by psychology are radically different from the Nature and the human life of actual experience. The Nature of actual experience is a system of objects

which interest us as instruments in or hindrances to the execution of our purposes, the humanity of real life is a social whole of partly cooperating, partly antagonistic, willing subjects. But the 'nature' of the physical sciences is not composed of objects of volition, nor has the 'consciousness' of the psychologist the character of a willing subject. The one is a mere complex of quality-less particles, the other a mere complex of 'states of consciousness,' which turn-out, in the last resort, to be unmeaning sensations. I am afraid I cannot contrive, try as I will, to put myself at Professor Münsterberg's point of view. With him 'nature' and 'consciousness' begin by being symbolical transformations of certain aspects of experience, undertaken for a specific end. But they end by ceasing to bear any kind of resemblance to that which they are supposed to symbolize. And thus, as it seems to me, the transcription of experience culminates in mere falsification. The physical and mental sciences cease to throw any real light on the 'real world' of experience for the better understanding of which they were originally devised. If this is so, surely we must ask whether the scientific scheme retains any further value. Thus, take for instance, the conception of the extra-organic world as a mere causal mechanism. It is easy to see that such a conception does subserve a useful end. As I have said elsewhere, if we want to control the course of events in conformity with our own purposes, the necessary first step is the construction of an hypothesis as to the way in which things would behave if we did *not* interfere with them. The assumption that, so long as we do not interfere, the course of things will exhibit a regular purposeless sequence is methodologically the simplest that we can devise, and actual experience shows that it may be depended upon to yield results which are accurate within the limits of our powers of observation. Hence there is a good reason for making it. But if it is really the fact that actual nature is through and through purposive, we surely ought to expect that at some point in our science this purposiveness will demand recognition. There will be some region of actual events which we cannot successfully treat as capable of expression as a purely mechanical sequence. And if all human experience is, as a matter of fact, recognizably purposive, we must expect that the facts of human social life will fall within this region. The psychology which we shall obtain by translating the facts of human volition into mechanical sequences of sensation-complexes will be a gross falsification. To what end then does Professor Münsterberg command us to go on drawing false results from consciously falsified premises? In other words, his theory seems to

rob truth of all its significance by cutting it off from any conceivable contact with actuality. Can we really be content to elaborate a fictitious science which, in the end, has only the same kind of interest as an infinitely complicated chess-problem, or to abstain from asking whether, on Professor Münsterberg's own showing, there is not a view of the world and life which is truer than that to which he would shut up science? Questions like this have surely to be answered, unless we are to fall back on the theory of a 'double truth' which has played so much havoc in the thought of certain past ages. Mechanism may be a good horse, and teleology may be a better, but I fail to see how they can permanently be driven together in double harness. Surely it would be wiser to start with the consideration of the part machines and mechanism play in our actual life, which is always that of subordinate instruments in the execution of purpose. If I may be allowed to repeat a remark I have made in another place, the devotees of the purely mechanical conception of science seem always to forget that you never find a machine without a man somewhere in the background to work it.

I come now to make a few remarks on Professor Münsterberg's general theory of the nature and origination of values. As readers of his previous works know, Professor Münsterberg is nothing if not a thorough-going voluntarist in his general philosophical attitude. It is this fact which lends considerable piquancy to his polemic against Pragmatism. The Pragmatists may probably complain, as has been suggested by a reviewer in *Mind*, that Professor Münsterberg has stolen his thunder from their armory; for myself, however, I believe that the main basis of his polemic is logically sound. He is anxious at one and the same time to assert with, as I suppose, the Pragmatists, that value of every kind is a concept which is unintelligible except in relation to a volition which evaluates, and also to avoid the view of values as purely relative and arbitrary with which Pragmatism, occasionally at least, coquets. If there are no absolutely and universally valid standards of evaluation, there can be no philosophy, and no ethics, art, or religion. Indeed, there can be no science at all, since 'truth' is notoriously one of the values which it is the present fashion in certain quarters to decry as purely provisional and relative. But if all value is created by the will of an evaluating subject, it is equally clear that if this will is that of the empirical individual, there can be no universal norms or standards of value, since the actual values affirmed by individuals are notoriously variable. Professor Münsterberg accordingly supplements his voluntarism by

the adoption of the old Kantian notion of 'man as noumenon.' The will which establishes all values is a non-empirical "supra-personal" will, present alike in all individuals, and consequently capable of furnishing universal norms and standards. It seems, in fact, identical with that "spiritual principle in man" of which we hear so much in the *Prolegomena to Ethics* of another illustrious disciple of Kant and Fichte, though there is perhaps this difference between Green's presentation of the concept and Professor Münsterberg's, that the element of voluntarism is less exclusively emphasized in the former, since the 'spiritual principle' appears in Green under a two-fold aspect, as intelligence and as will. With Professor Münsterberg, as with Green, this spiritual principle or "supra-personal will" is thought of not merely as elaborating our ethical, æsthetic, and religious standards of valuation, but as actually creating the world of experienced fact to which we apply them. For the existential judgment is itself a judgment of value, an assertion that the content of my experience is something more than a content of any experience, something which must be reckoned with by every other intelligence. Thus the very recognition of a world of real 'independent' objects is a result of the 'supra-personal' will that there shall be such a world. Similarly, the recognition of the existence of the social world of willing beings other than myself is traced back to the same source. It is the '*Wille zur Welt*,' the will that my experiences of coöperation and conflict with other subjects shall be more than my purely personal *Erlebnis*, upon which the recognition of the existence of 'others' depends.

Two points, perhaps, stand out more noticeably than anything else in Professor Münsterberg's development of this main conception. (1) The reality of the 'supra-personal' will, and the distinction between it and the purely 'personal' will which is peculiar to each of us, is connected with an interesting attack upon the psychological hedonism which still appears to be popular in German literature, though it has, we may hope, been finally expelled from serious English and American thought by the criticism of writers like Mr. Bradley. In his attitude towards the 'personal,' 'empirical' will, Professor Münsterberg is as complete a psychological hedonist as Kant. The motive force of such willing is supposed throughout to be derived solely from anticipations of our own private pleasure and pain. But since it is a notorious fact of experience that our will can be determined by objects of any kind of *interest* (which may have nothing at all to do with our private pleasures and pains), the reality of the 'supra-per-

sonal will' is taken as established. (2) What the 'supra-personal' will requires for its satisfaction is always the establishment of "identities" between the elements of experience. The recognition of the existence of the external world itself depends upon the recognition of an 'identity' between the contents of my own experience and that of my fellows; the recognition of the existence of my fellows themselves, as more than momentary contents of my personal experience, depends upon recognition of their wills as permanent identities not exhausted in the single experience. This identity-formula, which is thus exemplified in the simplest and most rudimentary form of valuation, the existential judgment, is further traced throughout the whole series of systems of valuation which furnish the body of our scientific, artistic, ethical, religious, and philosophical thought. Science, *e. g.*, is a great system of *Zusammenhangswerte*; it identifies the different stages in the course of events by exhibiting them all as interconnected by rigid causal determination. History has for its object the understanding of the course of human affairs, as teleologically connected by an underlying unity of purpose and will on the part of human agents, and such a comprehension amounts again to the establishment of an identity in what originally appeared as an unintelligible manifold. So again with fine art. The characteristic peculiarity of the beautiful composition is always the presence throughout all its parts of an identical will or purpose, which is directly apprehended in æsthetic experience as the 'will' of the object contemplated, the 'sense' or 'meaning' of the coloring and tones of the picture, the words of the poem, the notes and chords of the symphony.

It is, of course, out of the question to discuss the details of Professor Münsterberg's doctrine in a notice like the present. Adequate examination of his treatment of any one of the systems of valuation (history, art, religion) would require a volume to itself. There is no department of human life or thought upon which he has not something to say that is suggestive of profound reflection and that demands careful consideration. But I may be permitted to make a few remarks about the fundamental presuppositions of the whole theory. I confess that, for my own part, Professor Münsterberg's treatment leaves me after all in some perplexity as to the exact relation between the systems of valuation and the original *Erlebnis* which is their common presupposition. It is clear, on the one hand, that Professor Münsterberg's voluntarism impels him to the extreme view that the whole world of existence and fact is itself a creation of the will which imposes values on things. And yet, at the same time, without the original *Erlebnisse*,

this will would be objectless ; there would be nothing for which to postulate values. Have we not then, in this foundation of pure experience, a limit to the principle of voluntarism itself, something which is there, and without which evaluation would be impossible, but which is after all not itself a product of the will that creates values? And, if so, have we not abandoned the idealistic monism from which we started? It is much the same problem which confronts us when we examine the doctrine of T. H. Green. With Green, in the same way, all existence is resolved into relations between terms, and the relations are taken to be actually made by the all-pervading 'spiritual principle.' Yet we are reminded at every turn that the relations are always relations between terms, and these terms themselves do not appear to be the products of the intelligence which is supposed to manufacture the relations between them.

The contrast between the asserted monism, and the duality which is implied in every attempt to develop the sense of the assertion is, in fact, even more striking in Professor Münsterberg's scheme than in that of Green, precisely because Green, though manifestly influenced in his interpretation of Kant by Fichte, remains to the end fundamentally a Kantian. His 'spiritual principle' always has along with it an unexplained 'manifold of sensation' upon which to work. But with Professor Münsterberg, as with his master Fichte, what the one calls the Ego and the other the supra-personal will, seems to be expected somehow to manufacture its material out of itself. The lesson which Plato tried to teach the ancient world, that 'what is' is always both 'one' and 'many' and that its plurality is just as ultimate and important a truth as its unity, seems to have been only imperfectly assimilated. Thus, it is surely a fallacy of one-sided emphasis to insist that all valuation is "recognition of identity." It is really recognition of the presence of identity in difference, and the element of difference is just as prominent as the factor of identity. Take, for instance, the case of physical science with its 'causal laws.' Surely the very conception of connection by causal law requires that we should not think of the effect merely as identical with its cause but also as something different from it. There is an aspect of identity, the aspect which is brought out in the numerical formulæ of mathematical physics, but there is also the aspect of difference. Thus, from the point of view of energetics, the quantum of energy in a closed mechanical system is the same in the later as in the earlier stage, but it is true equally that the distribution of it, or the form of it, is different. And for this very reason, in any thorough mechanical treatment

of natural science, the denial of the objectivity of sense-qualities and the reduction of energy to the single form of mechanical energy really abolishes the category of cause and effect. There is no longer any sense in calling such formulæ as the first law of Thermodynamics 'causal'; they are nothing but numerical identities, unless you continue to believe that there is a real objective difference between the different kinds of energy. And so long as you believe this, you have not yet reached the purely mechanical standpoint which Professor Münsterberg insists upon regarding as the only right point of view for natural science. Indeed, I should like to suggest that the whole problem of the 'one' and the 'many' ought to be considered at a still earlier stage in connection with the fundamental principles of logic itself. It seems to me that if we are in earnest with the doctrine that identity is the only thing in which thought is interested, we ought not merely with Professor Münsterberg to insist on reducing physical science in the end to the single statement that natural process is the mere persistence of a system of unchanging elements. We ought to go further, and say that the whole scheme of logic is a mere development from the single law of Identity, as, in fact, Leibniz tried to show that it is. The impossibility of such a position is surely now patent to every one. Even the law of contradiction cannot be treated, after Leibniz's fashion, as an alternative formulation of the law of Identity without the most transparent logical absurdity, and the modern developments of exact logic have made it manifest that the mistake of the old scholastic Aristotelianism lay not in over but in underestimating the number of independent 'laws of thought' which are demanded to make inference possible. Professor Münsterberg's discussion of the ultimate presuppositions of logic is perhaps the least adequate part of his book, but a precisely similar difficulty presents itself in connection with his conception of the final ideal of a completed science of nature. Against the current view that the distinction between natural science and history is to be sought in the fact that the object of 'science' is the formulation of universal laws, but that of history the understanding in its full significance of the unique and individual, Professor Münsterberg maintains that the establishment of universal laws is a mere incidental means towards the real goal of the physicist. The true ideal of science is the elaboration of a single formula by the aid of which one perfectly individual fact (the complete configuration of the whole universe at one moment) might be deduced from a second equally individual fact (the whole configuration at some other moment). Now I should

have thought it fairly clear that such a conception of the aim of science is purely chimerical. For one thing, the end thus set up does not appear to be one towards which it is really possible to make any progress. No doubt, as science advances, we get more and more insight into the nature of the conditions upon which particular processes in the natural world depend; but will any one seriously maintain that mankind are now any nearer than they were in the days of Thales to the discovery of any formula from which it would be possible to deduce the whole configuration of the physical universe at a given moment, or that there is any reason to think that we shall be nearer the discovery in a hundred or a thousand centuries than we are to-day? And further, even if the formula were in our possession, is it not clear that it would be entirely useless? The infinite complexity of both sides of the great world-equation would prevent its application to the solution of any specific physical problem. Hence the splitting up of the unique given world-process into relatively isolated chains of sequence, which are not unique, still appears to me no mere incidental feature but a necessity imposed upon physical science by the very nature of its purposes. Here again, Professor Münsterberg's view seems to me to be dictated by an inadequate a priori metaphysic, and to fall under the censure which Plato passes upon the "partisans of the All" who persist in regarding unity and identity as more truly characteristic of "what is" than plurality and difference.

Space, of course, precludes me from dealing with the many interesting problems raised by Professor Münsterberg's application of his principles to art, ethics, and religion. There are only two remarks I must allow myself to make, in closing this very inadequate notice of a most interesting and stimulating book, and I make them merely to illustrate the way in which the author's devotion to formal system seems to me to lead him to ignore the real complexity of fact. It is interesting to see how Professor Münsterberg's sharp distinction between the "personal" and the "supra-personal" will leads him into extreme Kantian dualism in his general ethical position. He tells us, for instance, that in the transgressor both wills must always be operative at once. The thief, for instance, as a bearer of the supra-personal will must always actually will the system of social institutions. He must will that the moral imperative against stealing shall be obeyed. If, in spite of this, he steals, that is because he has also an empirical will motivated by private considerations of pleasure and pain. But what (p. 56) he thus wills is not the act of stealing, but merely the 'booty.' So that there is thus no real conflict between the two



volitions, because their objects are different. Is it clear that this account is really true to fact? Are there not thieves who would still choose to steal, even if the 'booty' could be got in some other way (by asking for it, or by honest work), because they actually prefer the thief's career for its own sake, as a life of excitement, or because, like the Artful Dodger, who, it will be remembered, "scorned to be anything else," they have been brought up to regard theft as the most honorable line in which to distinguish one's self. A good deal of our modern moral philosophizing seems to me to suffer from an over-simplification of moral facts due to our unwillingness to recognize the reality of what Aristotle calls ἀκολασία, the spirit of the man who does evil οἰόμενος δεῖν, "thinking it the reasonable and proper thing to do."

My last point shall be taken from the discussion of the nature of historical science. In accord with his well-known views about the timelessness of real mental life, Professor Münsterberg maintains that, since the real purpose of history is to discover identity in the course of events by representing them as issuing from a single self-identical volition, historical study has always to do with the timeless. As he puts it, "the will of Napoleon, which we wish to understand in the historical spirit, the will which overcame Europe does not present itself to us as an *object*. But it surely then is senseless to ask how many units of time long his will was" (p. 159). Of course, when stated in this way, such a question *does* appear senseless enough. But need we put it in this way at all? Surely there is sense in saying that the influence of Napoleon's will on the life of Europe was once more marked than it is now, that now, in many respects, European life has emancipated itself from that influence, or again that the will, say, of Ramses II was once very effective in determining the destinies of civilization, but is now ineffective. Or, to put it in another way, surely it is the business of the historian of Europe not merely to tell us what it was that Napoleon willed for Europe, but how he came to will it, how his ambitions gradually became more and more definite and self-conscious, how and when they asserted themselves successfully, how, perhaps, they afterwards became more confused, and, in consequence of successful resistance on the part of other wills, failed to effect their purpose. If all this is to be excluded from consideration, do we not end by expelling the characteristically historical from history?

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*Essays Philosophical and Psychological: In Honor of William James, Professor in Harvard University.* By his Colleagues at Columbia University. New York, Longmans, Green, & Co., 1908. — pp. viii, 610.

Several years ago, Professor James wrote of the present state of philosophy, "It is difficult not to notice a curious unrest in the philosophic atmosphere of the time, a loosening of old landmarks, a softening of oppositions, a mutual borrowing from one another on the part of systems anciently closed, and an interest in new suggestions, however vague, as if the one thing sure were the inadequacy of the extant school solutions." The present volume, published in honor of Professor James, comes as a signal verification of his statement. The volume is written by men who, for the most part and in their several ways, have broken with the past, who are thorough-going disciples of no systems, who are loyal rather to systems still unborn, the nature of which they themselves but vaguely foretell. Sceptical of past efforts after universal construction, the writers turn in the main to the careful analysis and tentative solution of special problems. Herein is found both the strength and the weakness of their position. The courageous zeal for free investigation, the repudiation of the too-easy solutions of the accredited systems, the willingness to narrow the field of philosophic enquiry even at the cost of constructive brilliancy, — these are indication of a spirit of finest promise for philosophy. On the other hand, it is a question whether these virtues, cultivated too exclusively, have not wrought their compensatory evil; whether the 'will to be free' has not brought to pass an attitude of hostility to historic views which has made impossible sympathetic understanding and fair criticism; whether, again, the distrust of comprehensive construction and the consequent restriction to particular problems has not resulted in a certain falsity of philosophical perspective. For example, the problem which bulks largest in the volume is the problem of the nature of awareness. It is the 'Columbia problem' *par excellence*. It is pursued with freshness of interest and a frank facing of what seem to the writers to be the pertinent facts. But one cannot help feeling that, suggestive as much of the work is, more adequate results would have been reached had the writers restricted less narrowly the field of their inquiry. With two notable exceptions, they pursue their problem entirely from the cognitive point of view. But awareness assimply a cognitive activity, — perception, conception, memory, etc., — can give no profound account of itself; it must be understood as ethical, æsthetic, religious consciousness if its deeper

function is to be learned. In this volume, the æsthetic and the religious consciousness,—and the ethical to scarcely less degree,—are almost as if they were not. Hence it is not surprising that there is little sympathy with the ‘metaphysical’ philosophers. The latter, however they may have been carried to enthusiastic extravagance, were responsive to super-cognitive appreciations and ideals; they were cosmically constructive because the fullness of their thought would stop at nothing less complete. With all the frankness and energy of the Columbia writers, it is a question whether their effort to hold themselves free of cosmic thought, of metaphysics, as if it were a dire poison, has not wrought seriously against their interpretation even of the relatively simple facts of perceptive consciousness.

The book is fittingly dedicated with the words: “This volume is intended to mark in some degree its authors’ sense of Professor James’s memorable services in philosophy and psychology, the vitality he has added to those studies, and the encouragement that has flowed from him to colleagues without number.” Nothing need be added to these words. The fact that Professor James has given us of the richness of his thought is an honor to us who seek to pay him honor.

The initial paper of the volume is entitled *The New Realism*. In this paper, Professor Fullerton presents a successful refutation of subjectivism. Unfortunately, however, he identifies subjectivism with idealism, and so claims a victory over the latter doctrine. Is it true, however, as the writer claims, that the idealist must be condemned to the hopeless doctrine that “what we know of desks” is that “they are made up of percepts and memory images?” Are all idealists “men who maintain that there is no existence save psychic existence, and who resolve ‘things’ into the perceptions or ideas of some mind?” Berkeley may have held such doctrines and been sadly in error in so doing; but this can hardly be reason for calling in question the more adequate views which have their source in Plato. Professor Fullerton holds that the idealist must repudiate an “objective order,” an “external physical world distinct from one’s ideas.” The very business of the great idealisms has been not only to accept the distinction but to explain it. Professor Fullerton, on the other hand, simply takes the distinction for granted, employing the phrases “physical world-order,” “external world revealed in experience,” “objective order,” “the physical system of things in time and space,” as if these were self-explanatory. What has brought the idealisms into being is the very fact that the meaning of these phrases is so far from being self-explanatory that men who proceed to understand their meaning can-

not, with all their best honesty, agree. As a polemic against subjective idealism the paper undoubtedly makes its points clearly and strongly; but it fails, unfortunately, to give an adequately differentiating account of the "new realism."

In the second paper, *Does Reality Possess Practical Character?* Professor Dewey writes that his attempt to refer to reality certain things characteristic of practical life and to show that "the function and structure of knowing were systematically connected with these practical features" was met by the cry of 'subjectivism.' He had thought that his own view, in repudiating apriorism, was the very foe of subjectivism. "I have been able to find but one explanation: In current philosophy, everything of a practical nature is regarded as 'merely' personal and the 'merely' has the force of denying legitimate standing in the court of cosmic jurisdiction. This conception seems to me to be the great and ignored assumption in contemporary philosophy: many who might shrink from the doctrine if expressly formulated hang desperately to its implications. Yet surely as an underlying assumption, it is sheer prejudice, a culture survival." The idea that knowledge makes a difference in and to reality,—that the knowledge-function is practical, and that reality, therefore, is itself practical can be antecedently objectionable, he holds, only to those "already committed to the belief that Reality is neatly and finally tied up in a packet without loose ends." "If," on the contrary, "reality be itself in transition . . . then the doctrine that knowledge *is* reality making a particular and specified change in itself seems to have the best chance at maintaining a theory of knowing that itself is in wholesome touch with the genuine and valid." Thus Professor Dewey indicates the view that is at the basis of all his thinking, that reality is changing, growing, coming-to-be. If knowledge, now, is itself reality, its business in a changing world is not to copy, for to copy is to fixate, but to be an effective agent in the process of change. Thus knowledge, to be true, must be practical; reality must be practical. And so the accusation of subjectivism, "the parrot cry of phenomenalism," is answered. The paper offers both a doctrine of meaning and a doctrine of truth. The meaning of an idea is its outcome, the difference that it makes in and to reality. The truth of an idea lies in the degree to which it is "the right, the economical, the effective, and, if one may venture, the useful and satisfactory reaction," rather than "the wasteful, the enslaving, the misleading, and the confusing reaction"; or again, in the degree to which it is "in such harmony with the consistent behavior of the organism as to

reënforce and enlarge its function." In short, the paper is another of Professor Dewey's strong pleas for the repudiation of the copy-view of truth.

Idealists must be grateful for the severe criticism passed upon their view by Dr. Bush's contribution. In his paper, *A Factor in the Genesis of Idealism*, Dr. Bush shows, especially by reference to the theological controversies in which Cartesianism lived and moved and had its being, that "modern philosophy has been, in the main, not free inquiry but Protestant metaphysics, and [that] its central problem, the problem of knowledge, has been determined, not by an examination of cognitive experience but by an elaboration of traditional preconceptions in harmony with the dominant interests of the later Reformation." He makes an effective protest against the classic idea of soul, "this immaterial, immortal cognitive entity," "separable from the body," "the vehicle of sin and the object of grace," and makes it abundantly clear that if idealism is to use the category of spirit, it must do more than re-furnish the old soul-substance, or soul-entity concept. "The recent metaphysics which has sought to guarantee a 'spiritual' conception of things has been erected on the foundation of an animistic survival from primitive culture." It is certainly time for idealists to make themselves clear as to the nature of spirit. There can be little doubt that they have been unclear by reason, mainly, of their lack of interest in the 'physical' world. They have been willing to make too easy a disjunction into the 'material' and the 'immaterial,' and to rest content with their world of unconditioned and eternal 'souls.' The modern effort to investigate "nature and man as humanly experienced," instead of "the soul, the world and the deity as metaphysically [theologically?] conceived" must mean a reconstructed idealism, not, as a number of the writers in the present volume seem to maintain, an abandoned one.

Professor Montague's paper, *Consciousness a Form of Energy*, is a striking attempt to overcome the "scandalous" dualism which postulates "a material world without qualities and a world of minds that lack spatiality and exist,—*nowhere*." "Suppose now that we are freed from the paradoxical antithesis of consciousness and space,—how does the psycho-physical problem present itself?" The first part of the paper is occupied with an attempt to distinguish, introspectively, between consciousness, and "the real though passing show of its physical objects." The second part, which contains the writer's noteworthy contribution to the psycho-physical problem, is an attempt to point out certain curious resemblances between potential energy

and consciousness. Potential energy, the writer defines as stress or force; and proceeds to show that it possesses precisely those qualities which the first part of the paper found to be characteristic of consciousness, viz.: (1) invisibility or privacy; (2) unity and indivisibility; (3) teleological nature; (4) 'redirection.' And the writer concludes: "On the strength of the four fundamental resemblances described above I propose as a possible psycho-physical problem the following theory: *What I, from within, would call my sensations are neither more nor less than what you, from without, would describe as the forms of potential energy to which the kinetic energies of neural stimuli would necessarily give rise in passing through my brain.*" The argument is brilliantly pursued, and the conclusion is stated with logico-dramatic force, yet, at the end, one cannot but feel that the "I, from within" and the "you, from without" have left us with the same old puzzle of the inner and the outer world. Moreover, suggestive as the comparison of consciousness and potential energy may be as an analogy or as a correspondence, it cannot be regarded as being more than that; and if it is no more,—if potential energy is the outer of the inner,—what the writer has done (and this itself is noteworthy) has been to present an important theory of the mechanism of redirection of neural currents. In other words, he has helped to supply a missing link in the chain of physical events, the link which, to all appearances, corresponds most fittingly to that peculiar activity which we call a 'psychosis.' It must be said, too, that when the writer speaks of the invisibility *or* privacy of potential energy, he is using privacy with 'psychic' connotation; so, too, when he says that such energy possesses indivisibility and unity, he is using these terms in one place with physical and in another with psychical connotation. Psychical unity is more than the impossibility of being "divided into pieces"; it is the fact of the presence of the parts *to* the unitary whole. So likewise with the teleological character of potential energy: such energy is *externally* teleological, if one may so speak, teleological *a tergo*, not intrinsically, as is consciousness. But the paper deserves attention for its brilliant suggestiveness.

Professor Woodbridge, writing on *Perception and Epistemology*, shows that epistemologies, even those of the extreme subjectivistic type which relegate perception to illusion (the writer instances Pearson, Poincaré, and Berkeley), make no real alteration in our perceptual behavior, neither rectifying nor supplementing the results of positive knowledge. The author would seem to indicate by this fact a queer

impotence of epistemology. Ethics, pointing out misconduct, may bring to pass rectification. On the other hand, that certain epistemologies declare the illusory character of our perceptual content, does not make us forego having or banking upon perception. But is this not simply indication that there is something wrong with the epistemologies, that they do not really interpret. Professor Woodbridge is himself aiming to express a truer epistemology, one which, instead of "chopping the world in two with a hatchet," into mind-substance and matter-substance, recognizes the continuity and homogeneity of the perceived world with the processes which give rise to it: "Even if the two worlds are numerically distinct, they are essentially alike. The problem of their relation to each other is not a problem of the relation between two natures radically different and heterogeneous." The problem of the relation of the perceptual process and its result, he says, is rather "a problem of reorganization and rearrangement, of new relations in one continuous world, not the problem of the reduplication of a world forever excluded from the place where it is known." In short, Professor Woodbridge substitutes for the subjectivistic epistemology of Pearson, Poincaré, Berkeley, and others, an epistemology which is more in harmony with the facts of our perceptual life. Such an epistemology, calling for the homogeneity of our world of experience, may give ground for an idealism or for a materialism. When the writer holds that our ideas are actually red and green, noisy and heavy and big, he must recognize equally that the red's and heavy's and big's *are ideas*. Whether they are *only* ideas (acts of awareness), or idea-stuff that is likewise heavy-stuff and big-stuff remains to be determined.

In the paper which follows, Professor Strong develops a theory of cognition which he names 'Substitutionalism,' although frankly confessing that the theory, in its essentials, is Professor James's. The main point of the paper is that cognition in every case is partly a resemblance of the thought (perception, conception, memory) and its object, and partly, as Professor James has it, an 'operation,' direct or indirect, upon the object, or, as Professor Strong prefers to express it, an "action with reference to the object," an "adjustment of our relations to it." Professor Strong distinguishes what he calls "the three fundamental epistemological categories," subject, content, and object, and shows how these are involved in the theories of the realists, the transcendental idealists, and the immediate empiricists: "The naïve realists are the special champions of the object — but they exaggerate the directness and adequacy of our knowledge of it; the

transcendental idealists are the protagonists of the content — but they mistake it for the object, and so are betrayed into declaring the latter a thing discontinuous and relative to the mind ; the immediate empiricists espouse the cause of (what they call) experience — but they overlook the fact that experiences are cognitive when they lead to reactions precisely because those reactions are adjusted to independent objects." Professor Strong disconcerts his reader at the outset by asking him to make an assumption which he can hardly understand, much less be inclined to accept: "To provide the metaphysical background necessary for a full comprehension of my theory, I must ask the reader to make with me a certain assumption. This is that our perceptive experiences are not *in* the order which they *reveal*, or rather not in the part or place of that order which they reveal, but in a place represented by that of the brain-events with which they are (as we say) correlated. The experiences . . . *are* the brain-events, considered in themselves." This is 'projecting' a god out of a pistol with a vengeance! Fortunately, the rest of the paper moves in delightful unconsciousness of the infelicitous deity.

The reviewer gives grateful thanks to Dr. Pitkin for a dialogue of charming dramatic power and saving humor. He is not sure that he sympathizes with the "sorcerer" quite as Dr. Pitkin does, — the "sorcerer" is the "misguided" advocate of a "picture-theory" of knowledge, — but he is willing to acknowledge that Dr. Pitkin, through the lips of his dramatic hero, has done much to make the picture-theory, in part at least, acceptable. Says the sorcerer, "There is a real world which is known only at intervals and partially . . . and experience asserts itself to be in some sort a picture of that world, though in what precise sense men are not agreed." Pictures, he goes on to say, are not "replicas of external things," "duplicates," "models." "We mean by pictures just what every ordinary man and every artist does ; something that presents an aspect of another ; or, to avoid philosophical disputes, an aspect of a thing." This is the strong point of the dialogue. "Bound up inextricably with the nature of a picture is the selection of a standpoint." Hence our experiences, with all their inadequacy, yes, by very reason of it, are "pictures," not mere symbols, of reality. The sorcerer goes on to confess, however, that he has long been in doubt as to whether experiences should not more rightly be called "aspects" of reality ; and he concludes, "the difference between pictures and aspects appears to be only a relative one, adapted to many practical ends, no doubt, but not suited to epistemological purposes." This is the modification



of the view which the reviewer would have had him carry out more fully. Experience is not picturing in the passive sense; it is rather, as Dr. Pitkin himself expresses it, picturing in the dramatic sense; *i. e.*, it is a representation that is at the same time a construction and a reconstruction, a 'syncosmifying,' as Aristotle would put it. Experience is the establishment, the *making*, of self-coherence, as much as it is the recognition of *de facto* coherence. But as Dr. Pitkin would doubtless agree with this position, the reviewer really has no quarrel with him.

In his paper, *Naïve Realism: What is It*, Professor Miller speaks with enthusiastic hopefulness of the recent "impulse to return to 'naïve realism.'" "A feeling has arisen amongst certain philosophers akin to what the cultivated world without has long felt about the whole industry of their class, an impatience of the extravagance of theory that marks the most irresponsible of the sciences." To embrace naïve realism "is to renounce the splendid follies of speculative imagination and return to intellectual seriousness." One is minded to question so sweeping an indictment; as a recent writer has expressed it, "He who would pierce below experience and explain it must have a spirit above mere experience — he must have that passion for reshaping the facts of life, or at least for imagining their possible arrangement in new combinations, which only practical interests, only the inspiration of the ideal can give." Professor Miller, however, hoping much from the renunciation of the "splendid follies," asks the question, "in what manner matter naturally appears to us," with the expectation that the answer may "forward us in solving the problem of what matter really is." The author finds little difficulty in expressing what the attitude of the naïve realism is with reference to present objects; our difficulty is to discover what its deliverances are with regard to abstract objects. The reviewer must confess, after three readings of the entire paper, that this part of Professor Miller's argument remains irritatingly unsatisfactory. It is clear in spots; for example, in its refutation of Berkeley's views, and in its analysis of consciousness; but it leaves one wholly in the dark as to the comprehensive aim of the writer. Professor Miller has evidently meant to discuss the meaning of naïve realism from the two points of view of realism and of idealism, and to give, finally, his own critical view. But idealism, at any rate, is so inadequately treated, — Berkeley and Fichte are the "idealists" criticised, — that one feels thoroughly suspicious of the adequacy of the views finally propounded. The reviewer still wonders what the deliverance of naïve realism as to absent objects is; and

further, in what respect this deliverance forwards us in "solving the problem of what matter really is." The last section of the paper, although not answering these questions, is a subtle and suggestive analysis of "consciousness."

Professor Lovejoy is still on the trail of poor Kant! In this paper, *Kant and the English Platonists*, the old gentleman, wheezing sorely and weary of leg, is almost run down. We eagerly await the finish! And yet, exciting as is the sport, one cannot but feel a qualm, born not so much of pity as of a sense of justice. Professor Lovejoy's claim is that "the Kantian doctrine was destitute of any radical originality;" and with this claim we may agree, in the sense that the doctrines, in one way or another, had been expressed by previous thinkers. But the expression of views in a form non-coherent, detached, is surely different from their expression as organic parts of an organic whole. The very comprehension of the views in their 'organic-wholeness' constitutes an understanding of them which is new and therefore "original." Professor Lovejoy confesses as much by contrast: he says of the English Platonists that they "are commonly very deficient in that critical and sceptical temper which Kant had learned from the long discipline of the Enlightenment." . . . "Cudworth and his school often write as if all sorts of miscellaneous general concepts might be supposed, like original Platonic ideas, to exist in the intellect *a priori*." Professor Lovejoy gracefully quotes Professor James's famous statement that "philosophy can perfectly well outflank [Kant]." Yet Professor Lovejoy himself admits that "it is quite accurate to call Kant the continuer of the modern Platonic tradition of which these English philosophers were the Early Fathers. . . . He is the elaborator and systematizer of the general doctrines of the English Platonists." Is there need then to outflank him? However, we may heartily agree with Professor Lovejoy that Kant himself has too much the complacent air of "a philosophical *nouveau riche*, of a self-made theorist." Certainly Kant's ignorance of preceding and contemporary systems was profound; and it is well for us now, for our own souls' good, to know that the conceit *ought*, at least, to have been taken out of him. Professor Lovejoy has done a good service in recalling us to the much neglected English Platonists.

Professor Felix Adler's paper, *A Critique of Kant's Ethics*, published originally in *Mind*, is an acute and careful exposition and criticism of Kant's doctrine of moral freedom. It is impossible to indicate here the important ethical and metaphysical objections which the writer brings forward against Kant's view, nor his own solution of the

problem of freedom. The latter is expressed briefly and with characteristic clearness on pages 336-340.

Professor Lord's paper, *The Abuse of Abstraction in Ethics*, is a criticism of Westermarck's contention "that the moral concepts are ultimately based on emotions either of indignation or approval." In addition, the paper voices opposition to "that method of conceiving the moral life of man, of which this contention of Westermarck is an example. It seems to the writer a method quite wrong from its abstractness, from its doing violence to the complexity of real life." Would it not be truer to say that it is wrong from its too extreme abstractness; for Professor Lord's own view of life is nothing if not abstract. Professor Lord quite rightly shows that the "ultimate" in morality must be sought in the later rather than in the earlier. In view of this he finds that "the ideational has as valid a claim to be the ultimate of moral consciousness as the emotional"; that, indeed, "there are other elements that seem to possess just as solid a claim for ultimateness" as the ideational and the emotional. In the end he indicates as most satisfactory, though difficult for its vagueness, the Greek conception of harmony.

Professor Tawney, in *Purposive Consistency, the Outline of a Classification of Values*, defines consistency to be "the property of reflective activities by virtue of which they tend to keep up and maintain themselves." After indicating the manner in which consistency has its roots in pre-reflective experience, the writer points out its development in reflective experience into constitutive, practical, and purposive consistency. He proposes, then, to make a brief study of the various kinds of purposive consistency. First, however, he attempts to make good his threefold distinction by showing that practical and purposive consistency may not be reduced (as has been attempted) to constitutive consistency. In this part of the argument, there is a suspicion that the writer drives his point too far. He is particularly happy, however, in his discussion of the æsthetic values. The latter half of the paper suffers from extreme condensation, which makes it, especially in the absence of a summary, difficult to hold the points in their intended proportion.

Dr. Harold Chapman Brown, in his paper, *The Problem of Method in Mathematics and Philosophy*, makes an exceedingly clear and sane contribution to the much disputed problem of the relation of philosophical and mathematical method. After determining the nature of mathematical method, he concludes that mathematics and philosophy do not present the radical diversity of method which Kant and others

have supposed. Philosophic method is hypothetico-deductive. This must be accepted frankly. "The nature of philosophic categories is such that the best we can hope for is an approximation." If philosophy is indeed an "hypothesis built on hypotheses," this does not make it the less hypothetical, a "supreme reality, the *inconcussum quid*." Philosophy, then, is subject to the same methodological requirements as the sciences: it must not be a "free creation"; it must be an adequate account of the facts; it must limit itself to the facts which it desires to include; it must be "simple." In all these respects mathematical method is a suggestive guide. The paper is of excellent service in establishing a closer relation between philosophy and the special sciences.

The six psychological essays which conclude the volume must be treated very briefly. Dr. Kate Gordon, writing on *Pragmatism and Aesthetics*, argues that æsthetic experience illustrates and confirms the teachings of pragmatism. The so-called 'disinterestedness' of art is rather its power to hold some (not all) interests in abeyance. This is finely said. Art "makes a difference," creates new values. In calling this, however, a "pragmatic" view of art, the paper uses the term so broadly that it gathers well-nigh all philosophical theories under its wing. The paper is clearly written and is both suggestive and stimulating. Professor Woodworth, in *The Consciousness of Relation*, presents the psychological companion to Professor James's statement that radical empiricism must take account not only of the experience of particulars but of the experience of relations. "It is then quite in the spirit of a pupil that I have urged the need of giving up a purely sensationalistic psychology, as neither adequate to the variety of mental facts, nor consonant with the probable functions of the brain." The writer adds to sensations *feelings of relations*. From a psychological point of view the paper clearly makes its point, while indirectly it casts light upon the epistemological problem of the nature of categories. Dr. Frederick Lyman Wells's paper *On the Variability of Individual Judgment* is an interesting attempt to ascertain a quantitative criterion of the subjective by a "study of variability in three classes of judgments; first, the highly subjective feeling of preference for different sorts of pictures, second, the more objective judgment of color differences, and finally of a type of judgment whose accuracy could be readily measured by objective means." The experiments show that "in the first class the judgments by each individual cluster about a mean which is true for that individual only, and which varies for that of any other individual more than twice as much as its own judgments vary from it; that in the second class . . . the

variability of the successive judgments and those by different individuals markedly approached each other, but still preserved a significant difference; while in the third class, with the weights, we found that there might be even an excess of the individual variability over the 'social.'” Dr. Naomi Norsworthy writes a suggestive paper on *The Validity of Judgments of Character*, in which she attempts to show that the ordinarily vague qualitative somewhat that we call 'character' may be subjected to measurement in numerical units. The writer easily makes clear our present haphazard method of judging character, and offers an interesting practical suggestion toward a method of judgment which will secure more systematic and trustworthy results. Professor Cattell, in *Reactions and Perceptions*, proposes a “thesis, which in certain aspects is analogous to the James theory of the emotions. This thesis is that perceptions are distinguished from images by the greater prominence of the conative or motor elements.” The paper makes a further analysis of Hume's criterion “to the effect that the superior force and liveliness of the impression as compared with the idea, or of the perception as compared with the image, is due in part to the greater prevalence of the motor elements.” And the writer concludes, “This appears to be at least one of the factors enabling us to construct the world in which we live; and the statement appears to be a step, however small, in the direction of passing . . . from theory of knowledge to knowledge of facts.” The criterion of physical reality given in the paper is entirely in the spirit of the modern emphasis upon the dynamic character of experience. Professor Thorndike, in *A Pragmatic Substitute for Free Will*, proposes to show that meliorism requires no doctrine of indeterminism for its support, that, indeed, “the natural constitution of the world makes meliorism possible, nay, in fact, necessary.” The writer, however, discusses the question from the point of view, not of the complete person, but of his physical structure. Can we conceive any “physiological processes paralleling the satisfying and discomforting aspects of states of affairs and capable of strengthening and weakening the conditions which preceded them?” The writer's view of the modification of neurones is an important and suggestive hypothesis as to the behavior of the physical mechanism; but it is difficult to see how a theory of the physical mechanism can solve the problem of meliorism in such a manner as to provide a *substitute* for free will. The theory outlined does, however, indicate how the physical life may operate mechanically and yet be consistently a factor in a progressively improving world.

H. A. OVERSTREET.

*Systematische Philosophie.* Von W. DILTHEY, A. RIEHL, W. WUNDT, W. OSTWALD, H. EBBINGHAUS, R. EUCKEN, FR. PAULSEN, W. MÜNCH, TH. LIPPS. Zweite durchgesehene Auflage. Berlin and Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1908. — pp. x, 435, quarto.

The appearance of a second edition of this work, which constitutes the sixth part of the first division of the great encyclopædic undertaking called "Kultur der Gegenwart," exactly a year after its first publication, is evidence of a revival of general interest in systematic philosophy in Germany. The present work naturally suggests a companion with the Kuno Fischer *Festschrift*, "*Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*," which likewise passed into a second edition in 1907 (See Dr. Oskar Ewald's article on German Philosophy in the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Volume XVII, pp. 400 ff.). In the latter work there is much more unity of spirit, with a somewhat closer adherence to the standpoint of the critical epistemology, and with a general prevalence of the Neo-Fichtean tendency towards a philosophy of values. While the work now under review has a special article on Metaphysics, whereas the Fischer *Festschrift* has none, in the second edition of the latter the gap is really filled by Lipps's article on *Naturphilosophie*. What different things *Naturphilosophie* can mean to two prominent men of science is strikingly illustrated by comparing Lipps's article with the one by Ostwald in the work now under review.

Notwithstanding that the contributors to *Systematische Philosophie* are not adherents of a common tendency, there is more unanimity in their attitudes towards constructive philosophy than might be expected. Dilthey, Riehl, and Wundt agree in giving the central position in philosophy to epistemology. Dilthey, Wundt, Eucken, and Paulsen all recognize the legitimacy and unavoidable nature of a metaphysics in some sense, and they would all regard some form of objective idealism as best satisfying the need. With Ostwald, *Naturphilosophie* becomes a metaphysics. Leaving out of account Ebbinghaus, Münch, and Lipps, the subjects of whose essays do not call for pronouncements upon general problems of philosophy, Ostwald is the one Ishmaelite in the lot. There is much humor (unconscious, I suppose, on the part of editor and writer) in the juxtaposition of Ostwald's sketch of his world-storming philosophy of energy and the charming essay by Wundt, in which Ostwald is treated as a striking (and horrible) example of a man of positive science turning metaphysician and giving birth to a system that belongs to the dialectical or pre-critical stage of metaphysical thinking.

The first essay by Dilthey is on *Das Wesen der Philosophie*. With wide outlook and fine insight he shows the manifold historical inter-relationships of philosophy and religion, poetry, art and literature, on the one hand, and of the positive sciences, on the other hand. He brings out the function of philosophy as a system of culture in the total historical movement of civilization; a system that is acted upon by, and in turn reacts upon, the other elements in the teleological and interconnected whole of human culture. In this respect, his essay supplies an adequate historical justification of philosophy. Metaphysics, the attempt to raise a world view to universal validity, has always failed, he says, and must continue to fail. Its problems are insoluble by scientific means. What remains then? Not only, says Dilthey, philosophy as theory of knowledge, in which capacity it occupies a central position in the entire work of science and culture, but, as well, philosophy as *Weltanschauungslehre*. For, although a final metaphysics be scientifically impossible, it still remains true that the last word of philosophy is, not the relativity of every world view, but the sovereignty of spirit, ever seeking and giving reflective expression, through a world view, to the unity of knowledge and the worth of life.

Riehl's essay on *Logik und Erkenntnistheorie* is remarkable for the ground he covers in the space of twenty-seven pages, and for the clearness of his treatment. The article is a work of art. Logic, he insists, does not depend on psychology at all. In its most universal form, as theory of the laws and elements of inferential thinking, logic is a kind of mathematics of knowledge. In this sense, the syllogistic logic of Aristotle is not invalid but imperfect and incomplete. Formal logic has been enlarged chiefly in two directions since Aristotle: (1) by algebraic or symbolic logic which has real value but is more artificial than linguistic logic; (2) by the development of the theory of judgment. The birth of modern science brought with it a new logic — that of induction, whose real founder was not Bacon but Galileo. The latter, Riehl says, had a very clear understanding both of scientific method and of the relations of deduction and induction. The progress of logic in modern times has been chiefly in methodology, and it is here alone that we may expect further progress. As against Rickert and Windelband, Riehl contends for the unity of scientific method.

*Erkenntnistheorie*, the science of the origin, validity, and limits of knowledge, together with logic, constitute *Wissenschaftslehre*, the most fundamental of sciences. Riehl finds *positivism* and *criticism* to be the two chief tendencies of epistemological thinking to-day. Posi-

tivism, in its most recent form as philosophy of pure experience, he rejects on the ground that there is no pure experience devoid of thought's activity. All experience is judgment. The world for natural science is indeed the world of outer experience, but this world is not outside the judgmental activity of thinking in any metaphysical sense. It is conditioned by the activity of our intelligence. The supreme formal and formative principles of experience, and, hence, of nature, are the unchangeable modes in which the unity of the thinking consciousness functions. Experience grows, but always under the control of these unchangeable functions. Riehl shows himself a good Kantian epistemologist.

Wundt, writing on *Metaphysics*, defines it as the attempt to satisfy, by a reflective, scientific procedure, the impulse of the human reason towards a unitary world view. In this sense, metaphysics is inexpugnable, though its form and fortunes may vary historically. The main outlines of every principal world view were developed early among the Greeks, and this because the fundamental principles of human reason do not alter. Wundt finds that metaphysics has passed through three chief stages — first, the poetic stage, represented by the pre-Socratic Greek philosophers; second, the dialectical stage, represented by Plato idealistically and by Aristotle realistically; third, the critical stage, of which germs may be found in Plato, but which was first explicitly developed by Kant in his criticism of knowledge. Kant's work, however, did not kill dialectic metaphysics, which again found powerful expression in Hegel. Taking up contemporary thought, Wundt finds it dominated by natural science. The latter is involuntarily, but none the less unavoidably, metaphysical. All three stages are represented contemporaneously to-day by natural scientists. Haeckel is a renewer of poetic, mythological metaphysics, an atavistic representative of pre-Socratic hylozoism. Ostwald is a representative of dialectic metaphysics. Mach, although he disclaims and contemns all metaphysics, is a critical metaphysician — a kind of inverted Kant. For, whereas Kant holds the *forms* of experience to be *a priori*, Mach makes the *matter* of his pure experience *a priori*. His logical principle of the economy of thinking is really an *a priori* principle, of subjective origin. Moreover, notwithstanding his assurances and protests to the contrary, Mach really reverts to poetic metaphysics and a mysticism of will when he makes the determination of positions in space dependent on our wills, and time-sensations a function of attention. Wundt's conclusion is that *Metaphysics* will not down. Its governing-motive is the removal of contradictions from experience. Its aim



is, not to find a mysterious higher reality beyond experience, but to unify the latter, to render it self-consistent.

It is impossible to summarize in a few words Ostwald's very condensed sketch of his *Naturphilosophie*. There are some interesting and true things said in regard to laws of nature, order, space, time, the place of mathematics in science, etc., etc.; but, on the whole, the essay is an exhibition of the futility of undertaking to set up a reasoned world-view without an adequate comprehension of the development of modern philosophy. When, for instance, Ostwald discusses the empirical origin of mathematics he misses entirely the meaning of Kant's inquiry in regard to the foundations of knowledge, and, when he develops his theory of energy as the unifying and all-explaining category for life, mind, self-consciousness, society, morals, etc., we are treated to the sad spectacle of an eminent chemist entering fields of whose peculiar character and significance for philosophy he has hardly an inkling. We are offered a barren abstraction, an  $x$  called 'energy,' a "night in which all cows are black." We are asked to believe that there is a philosophical import in calling society, morality, art, religion, and knowledge, and the minds that create these realities, forms of energy. If anyone regards this process of kalsomining the world of differentiated experience into dull monochrome as up-to-date philosophizing, for him, of course, Kant and Hegel, Plato and Aristotle, have lived in vain.

Ebbinghaus gives a comprehensive, and, in the main, sound outline of psychology. His treatment of the problem of mind and body is, however, open to criticism. If he offers the parallelistic theory simply as a methodological assumption for psychological inquiry, he should have said as much; if it is offered as a final or metaphysical theory, then alternative views are treated too cavalierly, and his arguments for parallelism are not adequate. One does not establish the final truth of parallelism simply by an appeal to the law of the conservation of energy and by a citation of the experiments of Rubner and Atwater on outgo and intake of animal energy.

In the essay *Philosophie der Geschichte* Eucken shows, first, the necessity of a philosophy of history, from the need that civilized man, with his historical culture, is under of settling his accounts with the past and determining in what relation the present should stand to the past. Eucken points out that the notions of the significance of history, of progress, etc., are of Christian origin. He traces the growth in modern times of the historical consciousness and of an explicit philosophy of history. After pointing out the weakness of the economic and positi-

vistic sociological interpretations of history and the dangers of historical relativism, he defines the problem. Truth and goodness are discovered, experienced, and partially achieved, in a historically conditioned life, but, if they are purely relative, they lose their meaning. The True and the Good must have their ground in an eternal time-transcending spiritual life. Now, history is not the external record of the past as past. It is the effective persistence of the past in the present. The very possibility of historical knowledge presupposes a persistent time-spanning unity or likeness of structure and function in the human mind. The very distinction of epochs and stages in history is possible only if there be a mental life that transcends and unifies these. History, then, means a constant struggle against mere time and change. If history be possible in any meaningful sense, there must be a supra-temporal spiritual life, a spiritual *present* rich in content that spans and persists through the succession of fleeting moments. And history has to do directly, not with the Eternal Spiritual life, but with man's relation to it and with his struggle toward it. The historical mode of viewing things must take a place secondary to a metaphysics which reveals the meta-historical time-transcending life of Spirit. There must be no arbitrary construction of the human world as the empire of absolute reason. The very contradictions and unreason of history drive man towards the life that is above history. In particular, the philosophical treatment of history will be directed towards the discovery and exposition of the specific culture-complexes or life-systems that are effective in the life of humanity. It should emphasize the ethical character of history and the creative significance of great personalities.

Paulsen gives a compact exposition of his well-known theory of ethics. He defends particularly his teleological conception of the good against Kantian formalism, and he emphasizes the necessity of a metaphysics of ethics. Münch's essay on *Pädagogik* seems as thoroughly competent and sane as it is comprehensive. Lipps, writing on *Ästhetik* gives a compact outline of his own theories, especially of *Einfühlung* as the fundamental psychological feature of æsthetic experience. Æsthetic sympathy is the essence of æsthetic enjoyment. The ground of æsthetic valuation is an ideal selfhood felt into the object. Lipps defines the formal features of æsthetic experiences, discusses the various methods of artistic expression and the different arts. He protests vigorously against the formula "art for art's sake," and against an æsthetic world view. Ethics should afford the final determinants of a world view. Finally, in *Die Zukunftsaufgaben der Philosophie*, Paulsen pronounces for an objective idealism of a

monistic-pantheistic type, as the fundamental and future form of philosophy as metaphysics. After outlining the arguments for such a view, he admits the limited character of our knowledge of the All-One, and leaves to religious faith the function of establishing a moral theology based on faith in the *Good as goal and ground of reality*. Religion remains the strongest power in life, and to philosophy falls the task of clearing a place for religion by showing the limitations and implications of positive science.

While the various essays in this volume have very unequal value for the trained student, all are interesting as expressions of the views of distinguished German thinkers, and they should bring home to the serious-minded layman a sense of the vital function of philosophy in the life of culture to-day.

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*Ethics*. By JOHN DEWEY and J. H. TUFTS. New York, H. Holt & Company, 1908.—pp. xiii, 618.

The many friends of the authors of this book will be glad to know that it has at length appeared, and that the teaching literature of Ethics has been strengthened by such a thorough-going introduction to the subject. It is of course altogether above the class of the mere compendium and that of the superficial or eclectic manual, being a genuine and successful attempt to present the realities of moral science and conduct in and for themselves, as things as deserving of study and investigation as the facts of any supposed science. It cannot fail to awaken that "vital conviction" at which it aims "of the genuine reality of moral problems and the value of reflective thought in dealing with them."

The work consists of three parts, 1) a confessedly sociological and descriptive part dealing with the beginnings and the growth of morality, 2) a theoretical part in which an admirable unification is effected of the teleological and the formal views of morality, and 3) a practical part in which the student is introduced to the "examination" of "unsettled political and economic" problems—it being to the authors "intolerably academic that those interested in ethics should have to be content with conceptions already worked out . . . rather than with questions now urgent."

Part I consists in the main of a fresh and instructive presentation of the facts and stages of instinctive and customary morality and of reflective (or social and rational) morality, along with illustrations (also very much in the usual manner) of the growth of morality

in the case of the Hebrews, the Greeks, and the Moderns. The morality of Early Group Life is also described in a convenient and summary manner for the beginner, or for the general student; and in general the main strength and resources of this part consist in the exhibition of the extent to which nearly all of our "conceptions for the moral" are taken from the group relations, or from the jurial and religious aspects, as these have been gradually brought to clearer consciousness." The "kind" man acts as one of the kin; the caitiff is a captive, the "villain," a feudal tenant, honor and honesty were what the group admired and so on. At the same time the defects as well as the values of customary morality are sharply dealt with, and the connection of all this formative, and transitional, and incipiently rational and social morality, with what in Book II is called the moral situation proper, is skillfully suggested and partly elaborated. The moral life is on the one hand a life of purpose and on the other a "transforming life," and there is always implicit in it the distinction between the "what" and the "how" — the choice between lower (personal) and "higher" aspects, and the recognition of "*some standard or some sense of duty and law*" [italics mine]. We shall inquire below whether the theoretical part adequately provides for such a standard or law.

In Part II we have first a careful preliminary attempt to get at the essence of the "moral situation." This arises, we are shown, when the ends of our actions seem to compete with another: conduct as "moral" may be defined as "activity called forth and directed by ideas of value or worth, where the values concerned are so mutually incompatible as to require consideration and selection before an overt action is entered upon." Then follows a *quasi* "phenomenological" treatment of the problem of the moral judgment. The questions a "thoughtful and progressive" individual must consider in his own conduct about the "meaning of his habits" and the "problem of moral advance" are (1) What is the Good? (2) How is this Good known? (3) When it is known, how does it acquire authority? What is the place of law and duty in the moral life? (4) What is the place of selfhood in the moral process? *etc.* Historically, we are shown, the problem of the nature of the Good became the problem of the Control of Affections and Desires, and this again became the Problem of the Control of Private Interests by Law, and this last the Problem of Individuality and Citizenship. All this, however, is, as it were, modestly recognized to be a mere "hap-hazard" method of treatment, and Professor Dewey goes on in true Pragmatist

fashion to select the principle which "seems most useful in conducting inquiry," warning us at the same time against the danger of "undue simplification." The three fundamental types of Moral Theory selected are those of the division into (1) Teleological and Jural, (2) Individual and Institutional, (3) Empirical and Intuitive. The first of these is (by a play of subtilty) immediately treated of as the division of Voluntary Activity into Inner and Outer, into the "What" and the "How" of moral action of Part I, and after much skilful argumentation in which the *pros* and the *cons* of the "consequence" and the "attitude" ways of judging of morality are set forth, along with the extent to which these two points of view cross and must cross in actual life, we learn that the "*great need of the moral agent* is thus a *character* which will make him as open as possible to the recognition of the consequences of his behavior," and that, consequently, the "appropriate" *subject-matter of the moral judgment* [obviously another "most useful" principle for conducting inquiry] is the "disposition of the person as manifested in the tendencies which cause certain consequences rather than others to be considered and esteemed."

The second main inquiry of this Part II — But what is the Good by which we thus determine consequences [an inquiry that is evidently, with Professor Dewey's characteristic subtilty, put forward as an equivalent of the second of the above-mentioned three types of ethical theory], — is now taken up. The entire inquiry is indeed a fine piece of sustained, concrete, philosophical reflection, throwing much fresh interest into the old hackneyed controversies of my 'good' and my 'pleasure' and my 'desires' [the 'Individual,' I take it] and the good of all ('Institutional'?) and the 'objective conditions' of happiness and endeavor. And it reposes in an illuminating way upon the idea or the result already reached of a correspondence or a harmony between good in intention and good in result, — a correspondence, by the way, that of itself tends to bridge the old hiatus between individual desire and common good. "There is no difference (such as early Utilitarianism made) between good as standard and good as aim, because only a voluntary preference for and interest in a social good is capable, otherwise than by coincidence or accident, of producing acts which have common good as their result." And as for the result in general of this examination of the Good as Happiness, the harmony reached by the book between happiness or pleasure as subjectively desired by the individual and happiness as an objective thing or good, is worded as follows: "Happiness consists in the agreement whether

anticipated or realized of the objective conditions brought about by our endeavors with our desires and our purposes." And this conception of happiness [at bottom the Aristotelian, the dynamic, instead of the passivistic or the atomistic] is admirably contrasted in the appropriate sections of the book with the old notion, "that it is a sum or collection of separate states of sensation or feeling." As it is put on p. 301, the "true or final happiness of an individual . . . lies not in objective achievement of results, but in the supremacy within character of an alert, sincere, and persistent interest in those habits and institutions which forward common ends among men."

An equally ingenious introduction is now made of the third type of ethical theory, the distinction between the Empirical and the Intuitional. The very problem of moral knowledge raises, as it were, the question: Is there a distinct and separate faculty of moral reason? Here Kant is first taken up with the result (the usual result) that his formalism is wrong, but that his contention for the "true rationalization" of desire is justifiable. And then as for the conflict of duty (or a special faculty, or intuition) with desire, we are finally told that this "conflict" is an "accompaniment of a growing self," that disposition as manifest in endeavor is the seat of moral worth, "and that this worth [Professor Dewey's old point of a unification of the teleological and the formal] consists in a readiness to regard the general happiness against contrary promptings of personal comfort and gain." Having now been made to rest upon the needs of a *growing self* as the apparent explanation of all morality and all moral theory, we are now treated in this part to a disputation new and old upon the place of the Self in morality, — Self-Denial, Self-Assertion, Self-Regard and Other Regard, Self-Realization, etc., in which Nietzsche and Neo-Hegelianism and other things are admirably discussed with the result [the keynote of the book, the dynamic, the liberated, the progressive self] that the essential factor in morality is the "constant formation and reformation of the self in the ends in which an individual is called upon to sustain and develop in virtue of his membership in a social whole." "Our ideals, our types of excellence, are the various ways in which we figure to ourselves the outreaching and ever-expanding values of our concrete acts."

The third part, with its economic and political applications of ethical theory, had better now, — so far as the purposes of adequate description are concerned, — be left in the main to the reader. It is somewhat detailed in its treatment, taking up such specialized and controversial topics as the 'open' *versus* the 'closed' shop, the capi-

talization of corporations, unearned increment, and the minutiae of social legislation for wage earners. It will likely, therefore, be of service to students of the social questions of to-day, and it shows only too clearly how pressing these are upon the attention and the leisure of academic teachers in America. I am inclined, however, to doubt whether the impression it tends to create, that it is the business either of ethical science or of morality to furnish independent and formulated solutions of burning questions, is not calculated, after all, to rob morality of much of its interest, and the moral man of something of his very responsibility. There is for him no predetermined or formulated solution of any concrete difficulty apart from the precedent he may himself create, or apart from the attitude of his own will and the attitude to which it may lead on the part of others.

The reader will find in this part, however, the same cogency of argumentation, the same stimulating 'teaching' at which the authors successfully aim, the same closeness of grip on the realities of life and conduct, the same strong sense for concrete moral situations, the same power of shrewd moral observation, and the same acute perception of the drift of modern tendencies that characterizes the central theoretical portions of the volume, but at the same time,— I venture to suggest,— the same lack of definite characterization of the essential point of view, so far as right and wrong and the moral judgment are concerned, and the same Pragmatist tendency to regard that which 'works best' as the *desideratum* in the matter of a standard of conduct. It has too, I think, a somewhat disappointing and partial character, if we go to it (why should we not?) looking for not one or two but several more or less definite applications of moral theory. Economic and political questions, pressing although they may be, are not the chief or the only field for the application of ethical principles; and even if they were, the mere "setting free" of individual capacities in such a way as to make them available for the development of the general happiness or the "common good" does not seem to be anything very definite in the way of the application of ethical norms and ideas to contemporary economic and social efforts, especially when we remember the comparative absence from the theoretical portions of the work of a definite criterion of "consequences" and "good" apart from the very "voluntary" and "formative" tendencies of the individual to which reference is again made here.

The "more deliberate analysis and *experiment*" [?], what is claimed to be the "need of the hour" [it is surely something deeper than this] "against the *a priori* claims of both individualism and social-

ism" is not exactly the position we expect to see adopted in the case of philosophers at work upon the discovery of the light thrown by the moral ideal upon our present economic distress. Analysis and experiment may be good practical politics, or good sociology, or they may indeed be the one need of the student of social questions, but they are hardly important results for ethical theory, or even for "Applied Ethics," for both of which all mere "setting free" and all mere "experimentation" and all "good living" even (but we do not seem to find much about this in the book), are subservient to an ethical ideal — to a "moral criterion of political activity." And it is this last thing that Professor Dewey himself admits to be the object of the Practical Part. I mean that many things might liberate and "set free" character and capacity, but they might not be ethical at all; and the fault alike of our Western (or American) civilization and the general Pragmatist outlook on life and morals is their eternal belief in "experimentation" and "setting free," instead of in the *legitimacy* or the *illegitimacy* of certain kinds of "experiments" that are unfortunately continually made with human life and with conduct and with morality. And it is conceivable, even from the point of view of mere theory, that Professors Dewey and Tufts would have done more alike for ethics and for American students, if they had stood somewhat more above the economic struggle of to-day than they have done, and surveyed it all from a really higher standpoint — along with other things like moral disease, and character-building, and education, and moral training, crime, punishment, etc., that naturally come up for discussion or consideration in the Practical or the 'Applied' part of a book upon ethics.

After what has been said or implied it is perhaps unnecessary to quote from the book to indicate its explicit or implicit acceptance of the Pragmatist conception of first principles and of morality itself: "The classical conceptions of moral theory are of remarkable *importance in illuminating the obscure places of the moral life* and in giving the student *clues* [italics mine] which will enable him to explore it for himself." . . . "The aim has not been to instill the notions of a school or a ready-made system, but to show the development of theories out of the problems and experience of every-day conduct, and to suggest how these theories may be fruitfully applied in practical exigencies." But how does this general attitude 'work' in the matter of opening up an unequivocal answer to the question of the moral standard or the moral criterion — the article of a falling or a standing moral philosophy? Professor Dewey himself recognizes that "the perplexities and uncertainties of



direct [?] and personal behavior *invite a more abstract and systematic* [italics mine] impersonal treatment than that which they receive in the exigencies of their occurrence"; but where in the theoretical part of this work is this systematization or unification of conflicting standpoints effected? And is its suggestive and ingenious and interesting treatment of the "fruitfulness" and the "surveying power" of theories an adequate equivalent for that exposition of a relatively coherent body of truth which the student naturally looks for in a text-book setting forth the elements and the main conceptions and principles of a science? It may—strangely enough no doubt—such has been the treatment of ethical science for some thirty or forty years—be almost an unfair thing to accuse philosophers of reputation of an apparent inability to furnish in a treatment of the facts of conduct and the moral judgment, either a sharp or demonstratively operative criterion of the distinction between right and wrong or an explanation of the fact (or the illusion) that man seems to set up for himself and others a norm or rule of conduct in which he believes, in as persistent a manner as do æsthetically minded people in their judgment of the beautiful and the ugly. Yet this is only too true of the book before us, a thing that makes it, so far as the objectivity of the moral judgment is concerned, no better and no worse than the many books upon conduct and its principles that have appeared since the time of Green and Spencer.

Look how elusive and how dialectical is the following treatment of the question of a criterion or standard or central point of view in morals—without the attempt at a basal treatment of all alleged fundamental concepts that we are inclined to look for in philosophy. It is (1) the "*moral situation*" that is first suggestively but externally [it arises, we are told, when "ends" conflict, but what is "end" ?] described. On p. 263 the result is reached that (2) the "*appropriate subject-matter of moral judgment* [not just the same topic as the "moral situation"] is *disposition*" in view of the "consequences" it tends to produce. On p. 364 "moral situation" and moral judgment have become (3) "*moral worth*"; disposition as manifest in endeavors is the seat of moral worth. And on p. 393 it is (4) the tendency of the moral act to "*sustain a whole complex system of social values*" that has become the *problem of morality*, just as this again is explicitly said a few pages further on to be (5) the "*formation*" of a *voluntary* self out of "*original instinctive impulses*,"—the really recurring theme of the book, a "genetic," but not an ultimately explanatory point of view, so far as the moral judgment of right and wrong

is concerned. We are 'ever learning,' as it were, about morality, but never able to come to a "knowledge of the truth" of our tendency to dogmatize about right and wrong in ourselves and others. . . . To "growth," and "liberation," and the balance between intention and result, and to "fruitfulness" of apprehension on the part of the student, everything as it were is sacrificed. Is it not all, we might say, just too "modernistic," too aggressively "vital," and "practical," and too merely illuminating from a pædagogical standpoint? And would it not be better for the youth to learn that not everything practical and formative and liberative is really moral, that his needs as a student are not everything from the standpoint of existing or discovered theory, and that morality stands for something on its own account?

Are there not important omissions too in the book? One might reasonably demand the systematic treatment just desiderated, in some one place, either of the fundamental conceptions of ethical theory, or of the unification of the various illuminating points of view actually adopted in this book. And with this there should go a clear differentiation of ethical science from the sociology, and the morality as a personal effort, that bulk so largely in it, and also from the point of view of the natural and the descriptive sciences and from that of philosophy itself. Then there is the whole (actual or supposed) Evolutionary or Development theory of morals; much of it to be sure is not ethics at all, but this might have been indicated in a book which makes so much of personal and social development. And are not the psychological aspects of ethics made unduly subservient to the sociological? And lastly is it not — even upon any theory or any assemblage of fruitful points of view about conduct — somewhat unfortunate that a text-book upon ethics in an important series, by important philosophers, should leave the student without some sections upon ethical ideals as leading out of the realm of the so-called actual into philosophy as the supreme synthesis of facts and ideals.

If space permitted, attention might instructively be drawn to more than one illustration of the many conspicuous merits or results that are due to its clearly conceived and definitely instructive (or practical) point of view—its power, *e. g.*, to surprise and delight the reader with the most valuable kind of corollaries or suggestions regarding many of the tendencies in our present personal or social endeavors. The average reader will find it in fact a mine of acute reflection and information in this connection, and it will therefore have an influence outside the sphere of the mere university class-room. Still this relevancy to present fact and present tendencies is just the very thing we would

expect from the pragmatist attitude, and it does not relieve the book after all from the charge of its comparative failure to set up a definite picture of the attitude of the moral man, in our present transitional or would-be constructive age. Such a man, in common parlance, does not merely keep up with the procession, going in for its endless "formations" and "re-formations"; he seeks to lead it. And I do not think the book accounts for this. It would, in other words, have been even more edifying and more constructive if it had been less practical and less sociological. It is typical, of course, of much that is strong and valuable in the way in which American scholars and teachers are accustomed to present truth to their pupils, but there are, I think, aspects of ethical science that transcend altogether such immediate needs and purposes. One wonders, too, whether even the student should not have been given a greater respect for the great literature of the subject of moral philosophy than this manual — by its own procedure — encourages him to take.

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## NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

*Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart.* Der Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart, vierte, umgearbeitete Auflage. Von RUDOLF EUCKEN. Leipzig, Veit & Co., 1909. — pp. xii, 410.

The second edition of Professor Eucken's work was noticed in this REVIEW, May, 1893, the third reviewed at length in May, 1905. The present issue follows the last at an interval of four years and a half instead of twelve, and brings far fewer changes than those which were introduced in the edition of 1904. Nevertheless, there is abundant evidence in the present work of painstaking revision. The discussion has been worked over in many places where there is no alteration in the argument, or even in the arrangement of sections and paragraphs. The progress of thought in foreign lands has been more fully considered than was the case in the earlier issues. A considerable number of important sections have been remodeled and one or two of interest added to the list. In all this the author has taken account of the latest movements of opinion, though, of course, in ways suggested by his own philosophical tendencies. Among foreign writers he often refers to Bergson, Lodge, and James. Bergson's *L'évolution créatrice* and Lodge's *Life and Matter* have influenced in particular the discussion of mechanism and organic life (pp. 144-149) and the criticism of the doctrine of development (pp. 206-221). James's *Pragmatism*, unfortunately to the neglect of other writings of the school, has furnished the basis for various references to the pragmatic theory and the new section (pp. 47-50, cf. also pp. 51-52) in which Eucken's own "activism" is contrasted with the more recent doctrine. In certain respects, he sympathizes with the pragmatists' account of truth, and with their endeavor to bring thought into touch with life and action. But, in the end, the two philosophies fundamentally diverge: "*Wahrheit ist nur als Selbstzweck möglich, eine 'instrumentale' Wahrheit ist keine Wahrheit*" (p. 50); "*Wiederum kommen wir damit auf die Notwendigkeit eines selbständigen Geisteslebens als einer neuen Stufe der Wirklichkeit, als der Entfaltung ihrer eignen Tiefe*" (p. 52).

As sections in which the work of revision has been more fully motived by movements at home the following may be mentioned: the discussion of contemporary monism (pp. 183-191), of *Kultur* (pp. 235-252), of "Society and the Individual" (pp. 283-321), of morals and art (pp. 322-331), of freedom (pp. 366-375), of religion present and to come (pp. 398-403). A further interesting section which has been much remodeled is that entitled *Zum Begriff des Modernen* (pp. 273-282), while the longest addition to the book, *Der Wert des Lebens* (pp. 376-389) begins the consideration of the "Final Problems." This, in part, resumes the discussion of Optimism and Pessimism given in the first edition, but later omitted: the Greeks sought

to show the value of the world by conceiving it as a cosmos, the Christian view appealed to an ethical order, the modern man looks upon evil as a means to progress. But the idea of progress fails through the subordination of the individual to external nature and the disappointing outcome of later culture. Beyond a doubt the existing situation is confused and unsatisfactory. Nevertheless pessimism, in itself considered, implies a greater, desired, good. So at the present time. The maintenance of personality against the pressure of outer nature, the development of larger movements — science, art, humanitarianism — within the culture of the day, point to possibilities of a higher order, even when they do not bring these near. Professor Eucken here takes perhaps a more favorable view of later modern civilization than he has sometimes done. But probably the change is in appearance only. In all essential respects his conclusions remain unchanged.

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*Early Greek Philosophy.* By JOHN BURNET. Second edition. London, Adam and Charles Black, 1908. — pp. x, 433.

This volume of course displays the thorough scholarship, the penetrative insight, and the powerful constructive imagination, sometimes aberrant but prevailingly sane, that have made the first edition of this work so well-known as to render general comment here superfluous. It is issued in attractive form, with improved typography, the rational Greek type of the notes being especially acceptable.

The work has been largely rewritten, the most radical changes being in the treatment of Pythagoras and his school. Pythagoras is now with some hesitation credited with the beginnings of most of the lines of research pursued by his followers, and even with the theory that things are numbers. The chapter on the Pythagoreans is wholly new and is of great interest and importance; such new features as were introduced into the doctrine by Philolaos and his associates are attributed largely to the influence of the pluralism of Empedokles; an account is given of the Pythagoreanism of the early part of the fourth century; and an effort is made to disentangle the Pythagorean factors in the dialogues of Plato, among these factors being reckoned the theory of ideas in what is commonly known as its earlier form. Other welcome additions to the book are the pages devoted to Alkmaion in the chapter on Parmenides, and a separate and expanded chapter on Leukippos.

Though a few of the earlier conjectures are abandoned, the volume adheres in the main to the positions of the earlier edition, — that from the beginning there were regular schools of philosophy; that *φύσις* means primary substance; that Herakleitos did not teach a general world-conflagration; that the cosmological doctrine described by Parmenides is that of contemporary Pythagoreanism; that according to Empedokles we are liv-

ing in the period of increasing strife, etc. Of the numerous minor alterations several serve to make the historical relations clearer; *e. g.*, Hera-  
 kleitos is represented as stimulated primarily by Anaximander rather than  
 by Xenophanes, and of course many recently discovered connections are  
 traced between the philosophical and the medical schools.

Some details invite notice. The view about the early conceptions of air  
 is now so stated as to be rather bewildering. Doubtless what we now-a-  
 days call air might be regarded either as empty space or as vapor, and  
 the same thinker might vary from one identification to the other, but he  
 could hardly hold both at once. This latter feat is nowhere unequivocally  
 ascribed to any of the philosophers, but it is difficult to avoid feeling that  
 it is hinted at. The root of the confusion lies in adherence to the view that  
 Empedokles was the discoverer of atmospheric air, whereas it is more  
 natural to suppose that his experiment was used (at least by Anaxagoras, —  
 Empedokles is discussing a wholly different subject) to defend the existence  
 of air against attack. The air doctrine is entangled with that of the void.  
 It is now stated that the conception of an absolute void "was introduced  
 by the Atomists" (p. 336). If this be so, it is difficult to see the meaning  
 of the polemic of Parmenides. It is true, however, that there is no other  
 way to save the completely corporeal character of the earlier conceptions,  
 which is still maintained with undiminished ardor.

One new conjecture, the identification of the innumerable worlds of Anaxi-  
 mander with the stars outside the milky way, seems wholly untenable.  
 An immediately fatal objection lies in the fact that these stars visibly re-  
 volve about us and are *ipso facto* a part of our own world. Indeed, there  
 seems to be every reason to suppose that this diurnal revolution is precisely  
 what the hollow circles were intended to account for. The difficulty in  
 assigning all the stars to circles arises from the still uncorrected assumption  
 that "we only hear of three circles" (p. 69), whereas on p. 67 the passage  
 is quoted in which Hippolytos, after speaking of the circles of the sun and  
 moon, mentions τὸς τῶν ἀπλανῶν ἀστέρων κύκλους, and the succeeding passage  
 from Aëtios is equally explicit. Of course *we* are compelled to ask why the  
 circles of the stars do not conceal the more distant sun and moon, but  
 Anaximander might easily feel no such compulsion. His general astronom-  
 ical system, — which wrought into one coherent scheme phenomena so  
 various as evaporation under the influence of heat, explosion of confined  
 vapor, the need of a "breathing-hole" for fire, lightning, the regularity of  
 the celestial motions, eclipses, the moon's phases, perhaps the continuity  
 of the milky way, and also, one may guess, rainbows and halos, — was a  
 reach of splendidly scientific imagination hardly surpassed in the history of  
 human endeavor. His arbitrary guess about the relative positions of the  
 heavenly bodies belongs to a wholly different stratum of thought, and he  
 may never have brought the two theories together in such a way as to notice  
 the problems arising from the combination. Just so even college students  
 often hold that Heaven is literally over our heads, and are startled upon

being asked, "At what hour of the day?" Sunday-school and astronomy have never before collided in their minds.

Diels's arrangement of the fragments (and in general his text) is followed, except in the case of Herakleitos, where Bywater's order is retained, — for convenience of reference Diels's numbering might well have been appended to these also. The translation has undergone many improvements. The increased literalness and the undiminished tendency to what might be called partisan translation may make little difference to the scholar, but to the general reader the latter is misleading, while the former is a distinct advantage.

Professor Burnet's revision of his work has greatly increased the debt we owe him. There is only one reason to qualify our gratitude for it, — we so much more need from his pen a volume on the remaining period before Plato.

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*The Development of Greek Philosophy.* By ROBERT ADAMSON. Edited by W. R. Sorley and R. P. Hardie. Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood and Sons, 1908. — pp. xi, 326.

Students of philosophy, already acquainted with Professor Adamson's work through the publication of *The Development of Modern Philosophy* in 1903, will know what to expect from this volume. Like its predecessor this book is not strictly speaking a work by Professor Adamson; the matter has been carefully collected from notes of his lectures furnished by his students; the form is due to the editors, who are to be congratulated on the success which attends their efforts to produce a readable book.

In forming an estimate of the lectures thus reconstructed, we have to remember the limitations under which the book has been produced. It is obvious that the editors have not undertaken to correct or suppress any opinions that are either doubtful or more than doubtful. A note here and there (*e. g.*, pp. 162, 219) serves to indicate some erratic points and, at the same time, reveals a conservatism on the part of the editors which will be acknowledged very right and fitting. It is also obvious that, as a scheme of lectures, the whole is neither symmetrical nor complete in the sense in which a work should be if prepared by an author for the press. Professor Adamson's sudden death accounts for this. Accepting these extenuating circumstances, the reader, whoever he may be, will hardly fail to perceive the real merit of the book. The advanced student will profit by the clear and fluent exposition; the lecturer will see here a good example of the way in which the subject can be treated; the young student will find it an excellent companion to his Ritter and Preller. It would be easy to quarrel with many things in the actual exposition; the treatment of the so-called Pre-Socratic period seems too curt; such a technical point as the question whether or no Democritus ascribed weight to the atoms (p. 62) is given a

treatment likely to be misleading ; the section on Protagoras demands expansion such as we may assume the lecturer gave orally ; the Cyrenaics seem to have been postponed until the position of Epicurus was discussed and, as Epicureanism receives no treatment, remain unduly suppressed. Not only are isolated individuals or distinct aspects of the development thus left somewhat out of proportion, but certain lines of thought seem to have been cut short. The way in which motion is occasionally taken as a guiding line raises the hope that *κίνησις* will receive adequate attention, but the hope is not fulfilled, in spite of the lecturer's grasp of psychological problems and the possibility of making the exposition even more connected and clear by following this clue. The lectures which form this book hardly attain the level of the previous work ; they none-the-less convince the reader that their author had exceptional ability as a lecturer, and no better book could be given to the student beginning his study of Greek philosophy ; in some respects it has advantages over Zeller's *Outlines* and should prove extremely useful to all desirous of recommending or reading an introduction to the study of the Greek thinkers.

G. S. BRETT.

*Aristotle De Anima.* With translation, introduction and notes. By R. D. HICKS. Cambridge, at the University Press, 1907. — pp. lxxxiii, 626.

Mr. Hicks has prepared this edition of the *De Anima* in order to gather up the researches of the last quarter of a century and to incorporate them in a new work to succeed, in a sense, Edwin Wallace's translation and commentary, now out of print. The aims and ideals of the two editors are to some extent similar. Mr. Hicks, however, has made much more use of the Greek commentators and has laid considerably more stress on philological interests. His translation is based upon Biehl's edition (Teubner), from which it rarely departs. The Greek text, as in Wallace's edition, is printed opposite the English version.

The chief additions made to the *apparatus criticus* employed by Biehl are Vaticanus 1339 (Book II collated by Rabe in 1891), the text of Rodier, and the citations of Priscian (cf. Appendix, pp. 589-596).

In his introduction, Hicks gives a brief summary of the pre-Aristotelian psychological theories and folk-lore, the primitive popular beliefs, the Orphic doctrines, the views of Heraclitus, Empedocles, Alcmaeon, Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, the Atomists, and Plato, and then pieces together into a more or less consistent body of doctrine the scattered ideas of Aristotle. There is nothing especially noteworthy in this *resumé*, which is, for the most part, a serviceable and clear presentation of well understood conceptions. His interpretation of the much discussed subject of the Creative Reason is not very intelligible, and appears to me to identify the Creative Reason with awareness or attention in the field of conceptual thought, which is in ill accord with Aristotle's meaning. He says, to be sure, that Aristotle postulated an active reason "in order to provide a cause of that



transition from potency to act which takes place whenever we actually think" (p. lxiii). But on p. lxxviii, he appears to identify Creative Reason with the elevation of latent, subconscious thought into the focus of attention or awareness. The Creative Reason would then be merely the emergence of the subliminal forms, thoughts, or generalizations, into the field of active attention, and the Passive Reason would be resolved into their latent subconsciousness. It is, then, difficult to see in what sense the Creative and Passive Reasons are related to each other as form and matter (cf. *De Anima*, 430 a10). This essential aspect of the theory becomes intelligible, if one regards the body of stored images and particulars in the *Sensus Communis* as the matter or raw material in which the forms are immanent, and which the Creative Reason interprets, reconstructs, or abstracts in terms of concepts and generalizations.

The notes contain a great deal of erudite matter, of interest mainly to the student of philological and antiquarian predilections, and the translation is readable and, in general, skillful and accurate.

WM. A. HAMMOND.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

*No Struggle for Existence, No Natural Selection: a Critical Examination of the Fundamental Principles of the Darwinian Theory.* By GEORGE PAULIN. Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark; New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908. — pp. xxi, 261.

This book seems to be the work of a sturdy British amateur. Mr. Paulin is apparently not a biologist, nor is he much read in biological literature. The only authors he cites are Darwin, Romanes, Galton, and Haeckel; and he states in his preface that "no one, so far as (he is) aware, has ever before inquired into and examined the fundamental principles of the Darwinian theory!" Darwinism seems to him "immoral" and a "theory of demonism." The arguments he brings against it — that it is a fictitious hypothesis, that no such struggle for existence as it assumes goes on in nature, and that small individual variations must inevitably be eliminated by cross-breeding — are indeed weighty, but by no means new. Mr. Paulin himself espouses Lamarckism in the body of his book, though without at any time considering, or even perceiving, the difficulties involved in it. In the preface he informs us that since the body of the book was printed he has been obliged to abandon his belief that there is a connection of descent between the great genera of living forms, since the fossil record yields no examples of transitional forms for some of the most important stages in such a descent.

What is however new in Mr. Paulin's discussion is the check on over-reproduction which he proposes as that really at work in the case of vertebrates. The carnivora serve, he remarks, as such a check on most of the herbivorous animals in a state of nature. As adults, the carnivora very rarely attack one another. But the male is found in all species to possess

the instinctive propensity to devour the young at birth, if not prevented by the success of the female in hiding herself at that time. Provided they escape, however, the male usually becomes the protector of the brood very shortly thereafter. This rule holds good of all carnivorous species save the bear, which is also the least fertile; and it also holds good of all prolific herbivorous species. When the range of one or more pairs in a state of nature is for any reason extended, and the food supply thereby increased, the female for that very reason has a greater opportunity of concealment when about to bring forth, and the feral population increases until this is no longer true, when the majority of the young will again inevitably be devoured at birth. Similar checks operate in the case of raptorial birds and of fish, and Mr. Paulin believes that on further investigation they might be discovered for all portions of animate nature. This may be described as a process of selection; but it is one which operates without regard to individual differences, only on immature individuals, and which results in a survival of the average. — This conclusion is not new, but Mr. Paulin's argument for it is.

The second part of the book is devoted to a discussion of the so-called Malthusian law of population, which Mr. Paulin attacks as both false and immoral. In its stead he proposes the principle that "the general movement of population is determined directly by the ability of the individuals of a community to marry; and this ability again depends upon the state of the labor market. When the labor market is expanding from year to year, more people are enabled to marry," and the birthrate rises. This conclusion he supports by statistics of marriages, births, deaths, average life-terms, and immigration, compared by decades, for most of the countries of Europe; and altogether he seems more at home in this part of his subject than earlier.

The book is suggestive, in spite of its great deficiencies, and the singular ignorance it shows of what has been done during the last fifty years in the subjects with which it deals.

EDMUND H. HOLLANDS.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

*The Grammar of Philosophy.* A Study of Scientific Method. By DAVID GRAHAM. Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark, 1908. — pp. xi, 383.

Not only is the title of this book misleading — for it gives no analysis of scientific method, and is merely a defense of the attitude of 'common sense' in philosophy — but there is so little argument in it, and so much abuse, that the philosophical student will hardly care to spend much time with it. We give a few quotations that seem to us typical: "not even Bishop Berkeley himself ever really believed that a thunderstorm, say, was a mere disturbance within the region of his own episcopal ego!" (p. 26). Of Newman's mysticism we read, "Every man opposed to intelligence [!] belongs to the gibbering Brotherhood of Futilitarians" (p. 32). Hume's

reasonings are described as "perpetual stultiloquy" (p. 83), and Hegel's Philosophy of Religion "seems to be a prolonged Hum-m-m-m" (p. 205, footnote).

W. H. SHELDON.

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY.

*Identité et réalité.* Par E. MEYERSON. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1908. — pp. vii, 432.

In what does a scientific explanation of a given phenomenon consist?—this is the question with which M. Meyerson's study of the philosophy of science, or epistemology, is introduced. The historical answers to the question may be arranged in two classes: the first, represented, *e. g.*, by Comte and Helmholtz, reduces causality to mere law of sequence and maintains that any fact is adequately explained by subsumption under the general law; the second, as illustrated, *e. g.*, by Lucretius and Leibniz, makes the principle of causality fundamental, without which there could be no empirical laws. The two principles thus distinguished are that of "legality" — so to translate the "*Gesetzlichkeit*" of Helmholtz — and that of "scientific causality," the denotation of the two concepts being apparently coterminous with descriptive and purely empirical science on the one hand, and explicative and theoretical science on the other.

"It is not true that the sole end of science is action, nor that it is dominated by the desire of economy in that action. Science also aims to make us *understand* nature" (p. 353). The principle of causality, "*causa aequat effectum*," which is essentially one of permanence throughout the temporal series, is assumed continually in the thought of science, as well as of common sense, and its supposition is an inherent "*tendance d'esprit humaine*." Descriptive laws, however, while they are adequate to economy of action, do not give intellectual satisfaction. A notable historical example of this further demand of the intelligence is found in Newton, who, having formulated the laws of gravitating masses, still felt that he had not *explained* gravitation. The chapter on "Mechanism" presents the great historical attempts at explicative hypotheses, and the following chapters, "Principle of Inertia," "Conservation of Matter," and "Conservation of Energy," show the important rôle played by the conviction of identity in time in certain regions of science. But any mechanical hypothesis has two irrational limits: one, on the side of the subject, in that it cannot explain the facts of consciousness, and the other, on the side of the object, in that it has to leave unexplained the interaction of the ultimate quantities with which it deals. Under the caption of "Non-mechanical Theories," the author discusses the views of Aristotle and Ostwald, among others, while still sustaining the thesis, "*L'identité est le cadre éternel de notre esprit*" (p. 260). The chapter preceding the general "Conclusion," makes an analysis, more detailed than in previous portions of the work, of the concepts of common sense. The process by which the concepts of this lower stage

of reflection have arisen is unconscious, but in other respects strictly analogous to that by which scientific theories have been framed; the principle of identity in time plays a preponderant and determining rôle in each.

There is in the situation, however, a strange paradox. The end of science is knowledge of natural phenomena, yet in postulating intelligibility — *i. e.*, complete accord with the principle of causality — science annihilates itself; for if the principle of identity be universally applied and followed to its logical conclusion the result is a Parmenidean world with no ground for the explanation of phenomena. Nevertheless, we may not discard the principle; it is at least of use, indeed necessary, as a working hypothesis, but it is also something more. For nature is not merely ordered and subject to laws of sequence, but it is partly intelligible, although there may not be *complete* accord between our understanding and fact, *i. e.*, between the principle of identity and reality. The regulative principle, so to speak, which the author would seem to enjoin on science is to use the *a priori* principle of causality, or identity, as far as possible in the progressive approach to the highest possible degree of intelligibility, which is the goal of science.

The reader can hardly fail to be grateful for the unity and orderly arrangement, the perspicuity of thought no less than of style which characterizes M. Meyerson's contribution to the study of the philosophy of the sciences. And whatever attitude he may take toward the author's conclusions, he must admit the analysis to be clear and consistent. The extensive references to sources, ancient, mediæval, and modern, add greatly to the value of the work and make it, especially to the reader whose point of view is not wholly in agreement with that of the author, an inspiration and valuable guide to further investigation of the problem.

S. GUY MARTIN.

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The following books also have been received :

*The Science and Philosophy of the Organism.* By HANS DRIESCH. The Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Aberdeen in the year 1908. Vol. II. London, Adam and Charles Black, 1908. — pp. xvi, 381. \$3.00.

*The Metaphysics of Nature.* Second edition. By CARVETH READ. London, Adam and Charles Black, 1908. — pp. xiii, 372.

*The Psychological Phenomena of Christianity.* By G. B. CUTTEN. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908. — pp. xviii, 497.

*Some Eighteenth Century Byways.* By JOHN BUCHAN. Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood & Sons, 1908. — pp. 345. 7 s. 6 d.

*The Four Gospels in the Earliest Church History.* By THOMAS NICOL. Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood & Sons, 1908. — pp. xxii, 326. 7 s. 6 d.

- The Fragments of Empedocles.* By W. E. LEONARD, Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1908. — pp. viii, 92.
- Standards in Education with Some Consideration of their Relation to Industrial Training.* By A. H. CHAMBERLAIN. New York, Cincinnati and Chicago, American Book Co., 1908. — pp. 265. \$1.00.
- Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology.* By S. SCHECHTER. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1909. — pp. xxii, 384. \$2.25.
- The Essential Life.* By S. B. STANTON. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908. — pp. vi, 243.
- Pragmatism.* By PAUL CARUS. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1908. — pp. 41.
- Thoughts on Natural Philosophy and the Origin of Life.* By A. BIDDLECOMBE. Newcastle-on-Tyne, R. Ward & Sons, 1908. — pp. 31.
- Prolegomena to a Complete Exposition of Theism.* By JACQUES COHEN. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1908. — pp. viii, 92. 2 s.
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- Geschichte des deutschen Idealismus. Erster Band: Die idealistische Ideen-Entwicklung von ihren Anfängen bis Kant.* Von M. KRONENBERG. München, Oskar Beck, 1909. — pp. xii, 428. M. 11.
- Leib und Seele. Der Entwicklungsgedanke in der gegenwertigen Philosophie.* Von C. STUMPF. Zwei Reden. Dritte Auflage. Leipzig, Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1909. — pp. 62. M. 1.80.
- Vom ethischen Skeptizismus.* Von C. STUMPF. Rede gehalten in der Aula der Berliner Universität am 3. August 1908. Leipzig, Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1909. — pp. 30. M. 1.
- Das Gedächtnis. Die Ergebnisse der experimentellen Psychologie und ihre Anwendung in Unterricht und Erziehung.* Von MAX OFFNER. Berlin, Reuther & Reichard, 1909. — pp. x, 238. M. 3.
- Goethe und Pestalozzi.* Von KARL MUTHESIUS. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1908. — pp. vi, 275. M. 4.50.
- Friedrich Schleiermachers Weihnachtsfeier.* Mit Einleitung und Register von HERMANN MULERT. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1908. — pp. xxxiv, 78. M. 2.
- Kaiser Julians philosophische Werke.* Übersetzt und erklärt von RUDOLF ASMUS. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1908. — pp. 222. M. 3.75.
- Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie.* Von AUGUST MESSER. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1909. — pp. 199. M. 2.40.
- René Descartes' philosophische Werke. Die Prinzipien der Philosophie.* Mit einem Anhang von A. BUCHENAU. Dritte auflage. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1908. — pp. xlvii, 310. M. 5.

- Vergleich der Methoden Kants und Hegels auf Grund ihrer Behandlung der Kategorie der Quantität.* Von J. M. O'SULLIVAN. Berlin, Reuther & Reichard, 1908. — pp. vi, 129. M. 4.50.
- Die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Satzes von der Erhaltung der Kraft.* Von A. E. HAAS. Wien, Alfred Hölder, 1909. — pp. 116.
- L'anthropologie de Maine de Biran.* Par PIERRE TISSERAND. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. xi, 336, 148. 10 fr.
- Mélanges d'histoire des religions.* Par H. HUBERT et M. MAUSS. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. xlii, 236. 5 fr.
- Les problèmes de la science et la logique.* Par FRÉDÉRIC ENRIQUES. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. 256. 3 fr. 75.
- Les principales théories de la logique contemporaine.* Par P. HERMANT et A. VAN DE WAELE. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. 302. 5 fr.
- L'idéal du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle.* Par MARIUS-ARY LEBLOND. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. x, 328.
- Filosofia della pratica.* Per BENEDETTO CROCE. Bari, Gius. Laterza & Figli, 1909. — pp. xix, 415.

## SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*, I. Abt.: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

### LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

*Gedanken über den empirischen Ursprung der Kausalität.* OTTO JANSSEN.  
*Ar. f. sys. Ph.*, XIV, 3, pp. 318–352.

Causality is not an absolutely necessary category of thought. Induction from the experiences of causal connection cannot establish it as such; attempts to derive it from the principle of identity are futile, for, properly understood, this does not admit of deductions of any kind; while equally unavailing is the conception of the continuity of experience. Though it is perfectly evident that we cannot derive the actual events of nature from any laws of thought, it is sometimes urged that annihilation of any object or quality of an object is inconceivable. Ultimately this rests on a confusion of the identity and continuity of the object with that of experience. The former may well perish while the latter persists, varied and changing as are the sensations. The belief that objects, which have apparently vanished, still continue to exist in changed form is due to our observation that occasionally certain of the qualities persist, or is due to some principle such as the conservation of energy. This latter is not, however, a principle of pure thought but a rule of experience, which has, in the course of time, been developed into a scientific law. Deductions from the continuity and identity of consciousness apply to all successions of phenomena, and therefore fail to give us the distinguishing characteristic of causality. No doubt the origin of the causal idea as applied to the objective world is the moving object. But, while uniform motion as a whole may be considered as either cause or effect yet, in itself, it does not include both. In causal connection change must be exhibited — the resultant must differ from its antecedent. Causality is the application of a principle to events which succeed each other in time. In our thought we must think of cause and effect as simultaneous, for an object acting implies one acted upon. If we posit cause as ante-

cedent it is only by carrying over into it the idea of effect. Wherever there is simultaneity, as in the relations of the sides to the angles of a triangle, we cannot distinguish cause and effect. Thus, while succession fails to give us the full meaning of causation, yet it is only when we can conceive of temporal antecedence that we can have a true conception of cause. What especially differentiates causal connection from logical necessity or the mere change of appearances of phenomena? It is the notion of that power objectified which we feel subjectively whenever we move our limbs at will. Sigwart pointed out that we cannot derive the idea of causality from the will because this implied the former — the will is the causality of the self directed toward conscious movements. To get at the real essence of causality, therefore, we must determine the psychic elements of volition and ascertain that which characterizes the will as causal. The impulse which brings the effect to pass and without which we cannot speak of an act of the will gives us the clue. For, even where no action results, as when a paralytic would will to move his limb, there is yet an accompanying feeling of stress or strain. But it is only when it results in its appropriate action that we have an experience which adequately characterizes the will as causal. As this becomes more mechanical and approaches the causality of reflex action, the feelings of strain become weaker; when subjective causality becomes objective, the notion remains similar except that, instead of the feeling of strain and of power, that of mere succession is emphasized. We consider as causal, therefore, that which in its objective connection manifests regular succession and which contains this notion of power or objectified strain. The scientific principle of equivalence of energy applies to all succession whether there be causal connection or not. Therefore the principle of causation must maintain a functional equivalence of cause and effect, whereas in the idea of cause there is no implication whatsoever regarding a quantitative relation. In the psychic realm causality prevails no less than in the physical — sensations arouse ideas and emotions, ideas call up ideas, etc. Here, however, we are unable to trace any quantitative relation between cause and effect. So also the relations of the physical and psychical to each other are causal,—there is interaction and not mere parallelism. We cannot, of course, apply the principle of causation, because we cannot represent a quantitative equivalence of the cause and effect. We do not represent our psychic world as spatial and our thoughts as having weight and volume. However, this principle of science is not the only conceivable one with which our conception of causality could be connected.

EDW. L. SCHAUB.

*Idee und Hypothese bei Kant.* ERNST LEHMANN. V. f. w. Ph., XXXII, 3, pp. 327-378.

Kant's doctrine of ideas is characterized by an endeavor to solve many apparently factual problems by explaining them as problems of method.



For him ideas are heuristic, regulative principles. Hypotheses, however, aim at facts; hence, idea and hypothesis he regards as disparate concepts. Lehmann inquires into the apparently presuppositionless character of the ideas, with a view to determine whether they are altogether heuristic, or whether they involve empirical presuppositions. A detailed examination of twelve particular ideas results in a threefold division of the latter. (1) Ideas which can be verified by themselves, touching as they do no problem of an objective-factual nature. Here are included the ideas of the spatial universe, of the totality of past time-changes, of division of matter, of continuity, of uniformity of nature, and of the freedom of the will. As methodological maxims, these contain nothing factual; when they are hypostatized into Things, Powers, Forces, then problems of appearance arise. To these is added the idea of self-consciousness. (2) Ideas as heuristic principles, which involve definite presuppositions of a factual nature, whose validity can neither be established nor completely overthrown. These are either postulates or desiderata for the purposes of science. Here belong the ideas of causal connection and homogeneity in its particular forms. (3) Ideas containing problems of a factual nature. How is the relation of idea and hypothesis to be determined here? (a) To these ideas which arise from a series-process, correspond ideas of limitation. Such are the problems of the limits of the world in time and space and of the limit of division of matter; also the problem of the existence of an underlying matter and force in external nature. Hypothetic solutions here are idle and useless as absolute totality is not an object of experience. Hypotheses can deal only with limited, relative magnitudes in time and space and relatively simple forces and matters. (b) To those ideas which are not termini of empirical series, but products of spontaneous conceptual acts, correspond the Kantian transcendental problems. Here are classified the ideas of the uniformity of nature, in so far as a factual problem can be derived from it, and the problem of the relation of the psychical to the physical. The above investigation shows, therefore, that Idea and Hypothesis are distinct and sharply separated concepts. Absolute totality, spontaneity and unperceivability characterize the idea. The hypothesis seeks to explain limited factual complexes, relatively simple, constant elements, which can be presented to the sense-perception in space and time. Absolute assertions can either be established by themselves, or not all,—to make them probable, hypothetical, is self-contradictory. The idea of God, again, is separated from the list of principles which can be theoretically formulated. It cannot, therefore, be regarded as a hypothesis. Kant's sharp discrimination between idea and hypothesis is thus justifiable.

R. A. TSANOFF.

*Energy and Reality.* JOHN E. BOODIN. *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.*, V, 15, pp. 393-406.

We have been misled by the name 'energy' into supposing that we have discovered identity. But the concept of energy is in fact a very complex

one. It involves both process and the uniformity of that process. Energy is, then, such a uniformity of processes as makes the prediction of the behavior of things under definite conditions possible; and nature consists of such predictable processes as can appear in our actual or possible experience. Physical energy still remains an  $x$  so far as its internal nature is concerned and does not become psychological process. And the number of energies are as many as are needed to account for the diversity of facts. But, if we are to start from the known, we must start with purposive or conative energy, the most basic fact of our mental life, which is not, however, necessarily associated with consciousness. Yet, though there are many energies, there is one universal formula which can be laid down in regard to them all, viz., that all known energies are capable under describable circumstances of making a describable difference to each other. Yet, in order to describe the real world, we need more than energetic constancies. We need space and time as independent variables of reality; and reality must possess direction and a certain objective form. We must also add consciousness as a dimension, since at least part of the behavior of things is conscious behavior, and it is impossible to state consciousness as energy.

C. WEST.

*Consciousness and Reality. II: Consciousness and its Implications.* JOHN E. BOODIN. *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.*, V, 9, pp. 225-234.

If consciousness makes no real difference to our energetic processes, if mental processes depend on structure, what difference can consciousness make? There are real differences which do not involve quantitative equivalence. Take away from consciousness all that is energetic and we have an abstraction, yet the abstraction is a fact of its own kind. Space is such a reality; it has no causal relation to the energies in space, it is the condition of their interaction. Consciousness is such a reality; it makes only the difference of awareness, it is the precondition of awareness. This difference of awareness results from the action of consciousness under certain energetic conditions, which energetic conditions, or structures, determine the value of the awareness. Consciousness, being real, figures as a survival condition, and is a constant. With consciousness, physiological adaptation becomes purpose. Consciousness gives awareness to the process, and the awareness gives meaning. It is not a link in the chain of causality but rather like a medium in which the events travel, a fact over and above the physical changes. The distribution of consciousness is problematic, but for purposes of continuity we may assume it throughout. The problem of individual consciousness is avoided by regarding consciousness as one and undivided. The author goes on to apply this theory to the problems of value, knowledge, subjectivity, immortality, etc., and closes with certain claims for the theory.

E. JORDAN.

*L'existence de Dieu d'après Duns Scot.* SÉRAPHIN BELMOND. Rev. de Ph., VIII, 9, pp. 241-268; 10, pp. 364-381.

The writer believes that the philosophy of the Middle Ages should not fall into oblivion and that the philosophy of Duns Scotus, in particular, deserves a close study. The arguments of Duns Scotus concerning the existence of God are in answer to the following questions: (1) Is it necessary to prove the existence of God? (2) Is such a proof possible? (3) What is the rational basis for a belief in God?

(1) He rejects the evidence brought by his school in the name of facts, common sense, and logic. For him a proposition is "per se nota" only when proof would be both useless and impossible. Such a proposition must force the approval of the mind by its simple statement. That God exists is not self-evident, except to angels. Duns Scotus is careful to say that he does not wish to prove that God does not exist, but rather to establish a better foundation for the belief that he does exist. If we know God by means of the creation, we have no immediate evidence of Him. If we think of Him as the most perfect being, it is logically uncertain that the most perfect being exists. To argue, 'Truth exists, God is Truth, therefore God exists' would be to commit an error of the consequent. To show that God exists necessarily, proves nothing, for it is neither self-evident, manifest, nor simple.

(2) Without the aid of revelation, man may know God and prove His existence by means of rational argument from the effect to the cause. There is no place for 'a priori' proof. There can be nothing in the effect which is not contained in the cause. Therefore, in the presence of the effect we must infer the existence of the cause. This conclusion is for Duns Scotus a matter of science. He says, "I do not believe, I know," and knowing that God exists, he believes certain things about Him, that He is a Trinity, and so forth. Moreover, for Duns Scotus the multiplicity of species is reducible to a unity and there is a definite relation between that which precedes and that which follows. There are three kinds of orders: the order of the end, that is, the subordination of beings to a goal, the order of the efficient cause, or subordination of the effect to the cause, and the order in perfection, or the gradual subordination of the less perfect to the more perfect. In all three, it is alike impossible to suppose an infinite regress, hence, there must be a final goal, a first cause and a perfect being.

(3) *a*) This being which is first in the three orders, must be independent, incorporeal, formless and self created, otherwise non-being would have brought something into being, which is an absurdity. We may not suppose the cause of all causes to be less real than secondary causes, hence this first cause exists. Everything in the universe, being essentially limited and controlled by universal and mutual gradations, is placed under the control of a supreme cause, a cause unlimited and infinite in power, in being, and in perfection. *b*) It is the same being which is first in each

order. Every cause seeks a goal; the first cause seeks an ultimate goal and thus becomes identified with its goal. The first cause is not of the same nature as the beings which are caused, but the most exalted of all beings. It is the summit of three faced monolythe. c) This being we call God. Therefore, God exists. This conclusion rests upon the fact that the world exists; God is the postulate of contingent reality; therefore God exists. He is the subject in whom the three fundamentals of efficiency, finality, and eminency find themselves reunited. In answer to the question "Why does God allow evil?" Duns Scotus says that evil is necessary in order that man may have free choice. There is no necessity for a free creature to conform to the laws of instinct. They only are responsible who do evil.

HARVEY TOWNSEND.

*The Chicago "Idea" and Idealism.* E. B. MCGILVARY. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., V, 22, pp. 589-597.

The purpose of this article is to state the new meaning of 'idea' in Professor Dewey's writings and to ask some questions which this new meaning suggests. When ideas are used in antithesis to sensation, they have not only a structure and a genesis but also a function, *i. e.*, knowing; thus two abstract sciences are delimited, psychology and epistemology. The pragmatist, denying the necessity for this division, holds that the distinction between ideas and objects is simply instrumental; it is not one between meaning as such and datum as such, but emerges in both datum and ideatum as affairs of logical movement. The psychic and the cosmic are thus merely shifting values in the growing unity of experience. Sensation and image, also, are terms which mark instruments and crises in the development of inferential conclusions. Is not this scheme idealism,—idealism, that is, defined, not according to this new meaning of idea, but according to the current view that reality and experience are convertible terms? Furthermore, if Professor Dewey uses experience in the sense of a shifting thing from which unstable beings often vanish, or in the sense of experience out of which there is no exit, is he not a subjective idealist? Or if what has disappeared from experience still lives on and yet does so in no eternal experience, how does this differ from objectivistic realism? Finally, this scheme affords no means of expressing the difference which indubitably exists between the two kinds of data ordinarily denominated sensation and idea. Can pragmatism, which claims to keep close to experience, afford to ignore this distinction?

EDITH H. MORRILL.

#### PSYCHOLOGY.

*A Qualitative Analysis of Tickling: Its Relation to Cutaneous and Organic Sensation.* ELSIE MURRAY. Am. J. Ps., XIX, 3, pp. 289-344.

Are the ticklish sensations aroused by a light touch to be classed as cutaneous or organic? Do they represent pressure, a new pain quality, a

complex of tactual or muscular impressions, circulatory sensations reflexly aroused, or pressure and pain in combination? Upon what conditions or peculiarities of content does the subjective character of the tickle consciousness depend? To answer these questions, a preliminary investigation of pressure spots was made. The results indicated that pressure and contact differed in quality, but that contact and tickle were similar. The practical identity of points of maximal sensitivity to tickle and touch and the parallel effects of fatigue corroborate these conclusions for tickle. On the other hand, pressure and contact vary independently, are differently affected by fatigue and drugs, and possess different limens. Moreover, their points of greatest sensitivity are not always identical, and they occur sometimes in association, sometimes in dissociation. Again, contact was found to be indistinguishable from the weak stimulation of superficial pain points. Finally, the Goldscheider granular pressure was found to be a complex of brightness and dull components. Abstracting the dull elements, we have in granular pressure a fusion of points on the verge of disintegration because of temporal or intensive oscillations. A single brightness component of the pressure spot is probably best taken as the tactual unit, sensed in fusion as granular pressure, contact, tickle, and pain. Its nervous substrate is probably the Meissner corpuscle or the nerve endings of the hair follicle. Contact, tickle, and electrically aroused sensations also represent, then, different spatial, temporal, and intensive arrangements of the same elementary brightness sensation. The absence of objective reference seems to be a mark distinguishing tickle from contact. It cannot be so distinguished by faintness or by quality. Characteristic of tickle is vividness, inconstancy, and an ill-defined reference to the epidermis. Its vividness may perhaps be identified with effectiveness of attention; but a medium intensity and a medium amount of analysis are required for tickle, above and below which we have either a blur, a complex, or dull pressure, *i. e.*, we have disconnected sensations either indifferent or verging on pain and capable of individual projection, or complete fusion interpreted as contact and given an objective reference. Again, conditions are favorable for tickle when no one point of the sensation is in the focus of attention. With too slow a rate of oscillation, therefore, or with too high an intensity, the complex tends to fall into individual sensations. This instability of the tickle judgment indicates that tickle should be defined as a complex of intermittent sensations at a certain point of fusion. Tickling may finally be defined as an intensely vivid complex of unsteady, ill-localized, and ill-analyzed sensation, with attention distributed over the immediate sensory contents and the concomitant sensations reflexly aroused. Its power to excite muscular reaction is due in part, doubtless, to the greater effectiveness of intermittent stimulation in exciting reflex centres to action. And this motor reinforcement is probably partly responsible for its great effectiveness for attention. Structurally, tickle differs from touch in its characteristic of a 'feeling' rather than of a perception. By 'feeling' is meant, here, that mass of ill-

localized, ill-analyzed sensation, which, because of its cohesion and its persistence, exercises an intrinsic claim upon the attention and is distinguished by its peculiar vividness and its strong dynamogenic value. Tickle as a feeling is allied to the internal sensations or organic complexes, such as hunger or disgust. Tickle, however, fails of analysis and projection, not from lack of external associations at its command, but because of a lack of unity and a baffling swiftness and irregularity, with which the process of perception cannot keep pace. In addition, the kinesthetic sensations it gives rise to tend to amalgamate with it and bind it the more firmly to the subjective. So long as attention is unable to cope with the semi-amalgamated series of impressions which constitutes tickle, this content functions as a whole, the primitive sensori-motor path of least resistance is followed, and we get the reflex shudder, etc. When, however, analysis of the content into its individual components is effected, the energy is expended in the excitation of the sensory and ideational centers, the muscular reaction is largely effaced, and the perception of certain definite sensations of contact succeeds the feeling of tickle.

C. WEST.

*The Part Played by Consciousness in Mental Operations.* J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., V, 16, pp. 421-429. E. A. KIRKPATRICK.

The apparently prominent part that consciousness plays in all new and complex activities is probably in part illusory. Everything that mind does is the result of physiological functioning. Consciousness does nothing but adjust the mechanism by focalizing on one or another element and noting its relation to an end in view, and then note the results. If this be admitted, the phenomena of dreams, hypnotism, double consciousness, and so-called 'sub-consciousness' do not differ essentially from the usual mental operations. Were the term 'subconscious' used merely to indicate processes carried on without the knowledge of the normal consciousness it would be unobjectionable. When, however, the term is used to indicate states of consciousness unknown to the primary consciousness, we have an entirely different conception from the physiological one.

C. WEST.

*The Feeling Problem in Recent Psychological Controversies.* C. H. JOHNSTON. Psych. Bull., V, 3, pp. 65-78.

Starting from the well known distinction between the peripheral and the central theory of feeling, the author summarizes various theories and recent investigations. The greater part of the review is devoted to the French authors who take the feeling problem on its physiological side, especially to the researches of Piéron, d'Allonnes, and Pagano. On the basis of work done by François-Franck, Masso, Pagano, and Sherrington, Piéron seems to think that the results of these investigators are crucial in a way, and make it easier to think that emotions can be maintained inde-

pendently of the support of peripheral contributions. On the other hand, d'Allonnes, relying on Bechterew, has made claims similar to James's rejoinder to his critics. However, in the present state of neurological knowledge, Piéron thinks that a subcortical seat of the emotion is not *a priori* an untenable physiological theory. This enables us to distinguish emotion from the simple sensory results of a cænesthetic complex, as indeed introspection demands. Piéron knows surely that the affective aspect of experience should not be confused with 'somatic impressions,' sensational and cognitive contents. Piéron is dangerously near the plane of Descartes when the latter formulated his theory of the preposterous function of the pineal body. The exposition furnished by d'Allonnes of the serial character of vast central systems harmoniously functioning, and his conception of psychic centres in general, sound more modern and more plausible. It is, however, novel psychology, for example, to hold that intellectual or moral states, with no affective factor, can efficiently (or otherwise) influence conduct. This is almost a return to Platonic psychology.

TAIZO NAKASHIMA.

*The Function of Images.* W. H. WINCH. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., V, 13, pp. 337-352.

Not only may images be non-essential to conceptual processes, but they may even be a hindrance. Images certainly do not play the important *rôle* in perception they have been supposed to play; but images, if they come at all, come up slowly, *after* perception. Careful introspection of the processes of comparison and memory, as well as of voluntary movement, will discover the same lack of that imagery which psychologists have so often assumed. The over-estimation of the presence and value of the image is probably largely due to a confusion of image and sensation through imperfect analysis. The image, indeed, feels different from the sensation, but we have inferred images instead of feeling them. The twitchings one feels, for instance, when noting a movement one is about to make, are not images, as supposed, but sensations. It would be well to distinguish also more clearly between the words 'image' and 'idea,' and between the words 'imagery' and 'imagination.'

C. WEST.

*Plato's Psychology in its Bearing on the Development of Will.* MARY HAY WOOD. Mind, No. 65, pp. 48-73; No. 66, pp. 193-213.

The accusation that Plato's psychology is defective in that he divides the mind into 'faculties' is ill-founded. Plato constantly insists on the activity of the soul as a whole, and in applying the same term to each of the so-called 'faculties,' he clearly indicates that they are mere aspects of one and the same activity. In the *Timæus* mental development is presented as the gradual emergence of order out of a chaos of random movements.

The three divisions of the soul in the *Republic* are to be understood merely as kinds or forms of activity. The innate sense of self-direction is implied in all the processes of assimilation, and constitutes pleasure and pain. Appetite is the lowest form of mental activity, since it has no appearance of guiding principle. Emotion belongs to a form of activity peculiar to animals and man. It reaches its human development when reduced to order; it then becomes the expression of self as subject to law as a part in a whole. By the cultivation of the soul through rhythm, the soul becomes orderly; opinions become determinations. The full development of emotion is found in *ἔρωσ*. This is also essentially a self-feeling, and, as self-assertion, would find its own likeness in the surroundings. Thus emotion, while finding its nourishment in the world of appearance, has the impulse after something beyond appearance. Reason, which alone can grasp the whole, unites these two emotions. Of all emotions, the love of beauty conduces most to the development of reason. There are various degrees of development of the reason with respect to the ascendancy of the emotional element. In the lover of wisdom and in the lover of the beautiful, *ἔρωσ* has developed into knowledge. In characters of lower type *θυμὸς* is predominant. Though there is no fast line between the emotional and the reasoning activity, the mind does not exist as a unity until reason emerges. As *ἔρωσ* or *θυμὸς* expresses the nature of this transition state viewed from the side of desire, so its condition viewed from the side of knowledge is expressed by *δόξα*. *Δόξα* is incomplete and contradictory and does not tally with facts. It is inferior to *διάνοια*. The mind may possess all the elements in the form of opinions and impressions, and yet until it can fit all these parts into a whole and see the reason of them, it does not know them. The opinions, in order to become organized, have to be bound by the 'tie of cause,' that is, by reason, thought. In the *Philebus* this process is connected with memory. From this we must distinguish recollection, through the operation of which the soul realizes its highest development. The force which makes of self a consistent whole is the power of abstraction. This activity, once aroused, becomes a motive to itself; it becomes actual. *ἔρωσ* becomes a passion for truth. Truth is the unifying principle which gives form to what was otherwise formless, simplicity to what was complex, wholeness to what was discrete. This is called by Plato the 'Idea of the Good.' The supreme idea is the perfect form of knowledge which would render intelligible the whole of reality. Reason, by reference to the standard which it alone possesses, gives the clue to truth. The 'Idea of the Good' is not only the standard of reason and thought, but the aim of desire and conduct. It is in the expression of the whole self that Plato finds the exercise of the will. In order that the mind may be free to will, it must be directed as a whole towards the attainment of its object; and this can only be when thought and reason are in the ascendant. To say that all men will the Good is only to say that all men have reason. The relation between conduct and reason, self-control and self-knowledge, is



indissoluble. In its intermediate and unstable state, it is easy to recognize the characteristic features of *δδ5α*. Individual will seems necessary to transcend mere habit or custom. Law, in exacting unreasoning obedience, hinders the free development of mental activity. But law is the will of the community, and the will of the community makes the will of the individual. The development of the more complete activity issuing in reason and will is as follows: In the lowest stage all is taken to belong to self. On the entrance of order there arises a recognition of part and whole. The self is now a part of the body politic with its own proper function and limits. In the further development the self must recognize this relationship as tending toward the fulfilment of the good of the self. If this development does not take place, the good of the self does not embrace the good of the whole. All minds are not capable of this development. Both nature and training go to form the will. If both fail, it remains unformed. But even without the aid of surroundings, the soul may sometimes develop itself. In order to grapple effectually with the problem of heredity, and thus perfect the nature of offspring, Plato advocates state supervision of marriage. In another sense, therefore, the will of the individual is the outcome of the will of the community.

F. A. PEEK.

#### ETHICS.

*Die Ethik Herbert Spencers.* HEINRICH KARL SCHWARZE. V. f. w. Ph., XXXII, 1, pp. 1-61.

The author first outlines the fundamental principles of Spencer's metaphysic and epistemology, his definition of evolution, and the deductive and inductive derivations from the evolution-formula. According to Spencer, utilitarian ethics is empirical; it lacks a fundamental principle. He finds in the principle of evolution the needed principle of ethics. The absolutely moral state is the goal of human evolution. Criticising Spencer's view, Schwarze calls ethics an essentially practical science, a branch of philosophy; as such, it must be based in a measure upon all sciences. It needs, however, a supreme principle. Spencer believes that he has discovered this supreme principle in the theory of evolution; but the latter is a principle, not of being, but of becoming. It answers the question how something takes place, but cannot explain why. The logical basis of evolutionism is the principle of causality, which, as a purely formal principle, cannot be employed deductively in ethics. Spencer's evolutionistic principles press him to a radical determinism. This doctrine follows directly from his taking physiology as a basis for psychology. All will-processes, he says, have motion as a necessary presupposition. Yet the origin of the will-process is not thoroughly explained. Since the contents of consciousness, as psychical, stand outside mechanical necessity, the independence of the will may only be psychical. The scientific character of ethics, on the one hand, and the moral ideal, on the other, necessitate, for Spencer, a distinction between absolute and relative ethics. Ultimately, however,

his doctrine of absolute ethics is the expression of a utopian optimism. Adaptation and heredity, although mighty factors of human evolution, are yet inadequate to bring about the absolute ethical state. For Spencer, the goal and essence of moral activity, naturally defined, is the perfection of life, both of the ego and of society. Culturally determined, good and bad conduct are respectively conduct well or ill-adapted to ends, pleasurable or painful, developed or undeveloped conduct. The universal criterion of the worth of life is happiness. The writer presents Spencer's interpretation of ethics from the four scientific points of view: physical, biological, psychological, and sociological. The Spencerian position is then criticised in detail. Spencer begins his ethics here with the same question as in the *Social Statics*: What is the goal of morality? The evolutionary standpoint indicates as such a goal the perfection of life. Schwarze objects to the identification of the goals of ethical activity and universal activity, and regards the teleological interpretation of the latter as unjustifiable. For Spencer, culture is crystallized and objectified adaptation. Life is an end in itself. Then, self-preservation, in the Nietzschean sense, should have been regarded as the highest goal of action. Moral action cannot be explained in terms of adaptation to ends, since ends exist subjectively, and morality cannot be merely individualistic. Spencer's secondary definitions of good and evil, as pleasurable and painful, developed and undeveloped, indicate his inborn optimism and his confusion of the general meaning of good with its specific moral meaning. He really has two goals of moral action, happiness and life. That the two are not identical is evident to Spencer himself; hence, he makes the distinction between absolute and relative ethics, identifying life and happiness in the former. The dualism, however, remains for the latter. His 'physical view' is hardly tenable; for it is not true that greater coherence and manifoldness distinguish the moral from the immoral. The biological arguments do not explain the non-congruence of life and happiness, of the normal and the moral, in the relative ethical state. The psychological chapter, devoted especially to the relative state, is an acknowledgment of the supremacy of the will. The writer examines in this connection Spencer's theory of conscience, and compares it with Wundt's. The sociological view regards the individual's well-being as the goal of social life. Society and individual should be regarded as correlates. Schwarze's criticism of Spencer's ideal state, as being an evolutionistic Utopia, is followed by a discussion of the attempted compromise between egoism and altruism. The writer thinks that egoism is left still in the ascendent.

R. A. TSANOFF.

*L'indépendance de la morale.* PAUL GAULTIER. Rev. Ph., XXXIII, 3, pp. 256-273; 4, pp. 389-409.

Because of the weakening of beliefs and the extension of the scientific spirit, morality is being freed from the *a priori* principles and deduced

codes of duties upon which it long rested. As a consequence, it is losing ground even while attempts are being made to found it scientifically. Such attempts are not new; Spinoza explained ethics *more geometrico*, while Diderot and Holbach modelled it upon natural science; in fact, the various social forces and aspects of life have been employed. All these attempts are based upon hasty generalizations. Biology cannot reach the mental life, and appeal to it is unscientific. Nor can ethics be founded upon sociology, for society is only a fact, and it cannot be shown why I should sacrifice myself for it. Moreover, my relations to society show nothing resembling obligation. The evolutionary theory of Spencer holds that matters of conduct are directed by the process of development, that our individual inclinations will be converted into disinterested inclinations. But the law of evolution, being merely an abstraction, cannot teach us what we ought to do. All these attempts to found morality on science fail: (1) because they lack an ideal, which deprives morality of all direction, or motive; and (2) because the external method employed deprives morality of that which explains and constitutes it, *i. e.*, conscience. According to Lévy-Bruhl, morality is what one does, science is theory. The one acts, the other observes. Applied to morality, science should register customs or manners. Hence it follows that science cannot become morality without losing its scientific character, and morality cannot become science except on the condition of not being morality; for in morals the scientist cannot take the scientific attitude of disinterestedness, since he is engaged in the action which is his subject-matter. In spite of Lévy-Bruhl's contention, there can only result from the conviction of the illegitimacy of a science of morals a practical scepticism that permits the non-morality of which Nietzsche is an example when he reverses the scheme of values and denies to ethics the title of science. Objective science cannot found morality, but tends rather to abolish it; for a science is non-moral in that it does not reach the spirit of things. But are there not facts of morality, and cannot a science of these facts be formulated? There are such facts, known immediately and without any intermediary, and there is also a science of these facts. From the internal and psychological point of view, there is a morality. There is the fact of the conscience of man, of an ideal to be realized, which commands or forbids action; an ideal at first indistinct and confused, but becoming more and more clear until it becomes a moral ideal. In short, there is a will imposing a law upon itself and subordinating itself to the law. This fact is our guide and criterion, and its proof is the approval or disapproval with which we judge the actions of ourselves and others. It is not only a fact, but a practical necessity. It is not only a normal motive, but a motive necessary to all psychic life. Morality is given in human experience anterior to all systems, and moral action is prior to the science of which it constitutes the object. To explain morality by means of sociology is to regard the moral consciousness as an epi-phenomenon. Perfection is the

ideal of nature, not only of human nature, but also of all living nature, and, in a measure, of inorganic nature. Pleasure and well-being are not ends, but signs of progress towards perfection. We determine our ends or moral ideals by comparison and induction, and from the ends thus determined the moralist deduces the particular duties which are the objects of 'applied' morality. Ethics has for subject-matter not so much what is, as what ought to be. Its certitude is neither logical nor sensible, but moral; that is, it does not rest upon evidence of sense or upon rational evidence, but its evidence is internal. Ethics is thus a science of a special type because of the peculiarity of what it studies, and sciences of the external world are of little use either in founding it or supplementing it. Yet the reality upon which ethics rests is not only psychical, but a human reality, a social and cosmic reality. The biological, social, and physical sciences confirm morality, yet they cannot found it. Ethics is independent not only of the other sciences but also of metaphysics and religion.

E. JORDAN.

## NOTES.

The Nobel prize for Literature was last year awarded to Rudolf Eucken, professor of philosophy at the University of Jena. A translation of Professor Eucken's latest work, *The Life of the Spirit*, has recently been published by Williams & Norgate in England and in this country by G. P. Putnam's Sons.

At the recent meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, held at the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., the following officers were elected for 1909 : President, Professor Albert Lefevre, University of Virginia ; Vice-President, Dr. Shepherd Ivory Franz, Government Hospital for the Insane, Washington, D. C. ; Secretary-Treasurer, Professor Edward Franklin Buchner, Johns Hopkins University ; To serve three years as members of the Council ; Professor James Franklin Messenger, State Normal School, Farmville, Va., Professor Robert Morris Ogden, University of Tennessee.

The Berlin Academy, in conjunction with the two French Academies, is about to undertake a complete edition of the works of Leibniz. The editors of this projected edition have reasons for believing that there are in America unpublished writings of Leibniz existing in the form of autograph collections or in manuscripts preserved in libraries. They ask any person who can give information regarding the existence of such writings to communicate with Professor H. Diels, Nürnberger St. 65 II, Berlin.

The publishing firm of Fritz Erhardt, of Leipzig, is bringing out the Selected Works of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The Schelling has already appeared in three volumes under the editorship of Otto Weiss and with an Introduction by Dr. A. Drews. The Fichte will be in six volumes, two of which have already appeared, and is edited by Dr. Fritz Medicus. Hegel is to have thirteen volumes, edited by Otto Weiss, and with an Introduction by Professor W. Dilthey.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals :

MIND, No. 69 : *R. B. Haldane*, The Logical Foundations of Mathematics ; *F. H. Bradley*, On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience ; *Harold H. Joachim*, Psychical Process ; *W. H. Winch*, A Modern Basis for Educational Theory ; Discussions ; Critical Notices ; New Books ; Philosophical Periodicals ; Notes.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL, VII, 2 : *G. W. Balfour*, Some Recent Investigations by the Society for Psychical Research ; *John Graham*, New Facts on our survival of Death ; *William James*, The Doctrine of the Earth-Soul and of Beings Intermediate between Man and God ; *H. Rutgers Marshall*,

Psychotherapeutics and Religion ; *V. Scudder*, The Social Conscience of the Future ; *The Bishop of Tasmania*, Is the Old Testament a Suitable Basis for Moral Instruction ? *J. H. Muirhead*, The Central Problem of the International Congress on Moral Education ; *R. Roberts*, Jesus or Christ ; *C. J. Keyser*, The Message of Modern Mathematics to Theology ; *Lucy C. Bartlett*, A Great Reform in the Treatment of Criminals ; *J. W. Burton*, Christian Missions as Affected by Liberal Theology ; *L. R. Farnell*, Religious and Social Aspects of the Cult of Ancestors and Heroes ; Discussions ; Reviews ; Bibliography of Recent Literature.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XIX, 2 : *Frank Thilly*, Friedrich Paulsen's Ethical Work and Influence ; *J. S. Mackenzie*, The Late Dr. Edward Caird ; *M. E. Sadler*, The International Congress on Moral Education ; *H. H. Schroeder*, Self-Esteem and the Love of Recognition as Sources of Conduct ; *Alfred W. Benn*, The Morals of an Immoralist — Friedrich Nietzsche, II ; *Wilbur M. Urban*, The Will to Make-Believe ; *Carl Heath*, Crime and Social Responsibility ; Book Reviews.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XX, 1 : *E. B. Titchener*, The Psychophysics of Climate ; *E. B. Titchener*, A Demonstrational Color-Pyramid ; *Robert M. Yerkes*, and *Charles S. Berry*, The Association Reaction Method of Mental Diagnosis ; *F. L. Wells*, Studies in Retardation as given in the Fatigue Phenomena of the Tapping Test ; *R. R. Gurley*, Chapters for a Biological-Empirical Psychology ; *J. H. Leuba*, On Three Types of Behavior ; *L. R. Geissler*, A Critique of Professor Wirth's Methods of Measurement of Attention ; *Alma de Vries* and *Margaret F. Washburn*, A Study of Retinal Rivalry in the After-image ; Psychological Literature ; Book Notes ; Notes.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XVI, 1 : *Boris Sidis* and *H. T. Kalmus*, A Study of Galvanometric Deflections due to Psycho-physiological Processes, II ; *M. Meyer*, The Nervous Correlate of Attention, II ; *E. E. Jones*, The Waning of Consciousness under Chloroform ; *J. E. Boodin*, Truth and Agreement.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, V, 12 : *C. A. Ellwood*, Professor Ross's Conception of Social Psychology ; Psychological Literature ; Discussion ; Books Received ; Notes and News ; Indexes.

VI, 1 : *E. F. Buchner*, Psychological Progress in 1908 ; Psychological Literature ; Books Received ; Notes and News.

THE MONIST, XIX, 1 : *E. Tausch*, William James, the Pragmatist — A Psychological Analysis ; *J. H. Leuba*, The Psychological Origin of Religion ; *C. S. S. Pierce*, Some Amazing Mazes. A Second Curiosity ; *E. Montgomery*, A Dialogue between an Idealist and a Naturalist ; *Editor*, The Philosophy of Personal Equation ; *Editor*, A Postscript on Pragmatism ; *D. J. H. Ward*, The Classification of Religions (Concluded) ; Criticisms and Discussions.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, V, 25: *J. A. Mac Vannel*, Edward Caird; *C. H. Judd*, The Doctrine of Attitudes; *F. N. Spindler*, Some Thoughts on the Concept; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

V, 26: *F. M. Urban*, On a Supposed Criterion of the Absolute Truth of Some Propositions; *J. L. Perrier*, The True God of Scholasticism; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News; Index to Volume V.

VI, 1: *H. R. Marshall*, Algedonics and Sensationalism; Discussion; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VI, 2: *R. B. Perry*, The Hiddenness of the Mind; *C. H. Judd*, What is Perception? Societies; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE, XIV, 4: *V. Norström*, Naives und wissenschaftliches Weltbild; *G. Tichý*, Altruismus und Gerechtigkeit; *E. Raff*, Über die Formen des Denkens; *Georg Wendel*, Prolegomena; Jahresbericht.

KANT-STUDIEN, XIII, 4: *N. von Bubnoff*, Das Wesen und die Voraussetzungen der Induktion; *R. Hönigswald*, Zum Begriff der kritischen Erkenntnislehre; *A. Marty*, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie; *H. Losskij*, Thesen zur "Grundlegung des Intuitivismus"; *E. Marcus*, Das Erkenntnisproblem; *P. Wust*, Kant und das Erkenntnisproblem; Rezensionen; Selbstanzeigen.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, L, 1 u. 2: *R. Müller-Freienfels*, Individuelle Verschiedenheiten in der Kunst; *Auguste Fischer*, Über Reproduzieren und Wiedererkennen bei Gedächtnisversuchen; *D. Katz* u. *G. Révész*, Experimentell-psychologische Untersuchungen mit Hühnern; Besprechung; Literaturbericht.

L, 3 u. 4: *S. Witasek*, Zur Lehre von der Lokalisation in Sehraum; *L. Burmester*, Theorie der geometrisch-optischen Gestalttäuschungen; *A. Pick*, Zur Pathologie des Selbstbewusstseins; Literaturbericht.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XXXIII, 12: *H. Bergson*, Le souvenir du présent et la fausse reconnaissance; *G. Belot*, La triple origine de l'idée de Dieu; *A. Chide*, La logique de l'analogie; *F. Picavet*, Thomisme et philosophies médiévales; Analyses et comptes rendus; Notices bibliographiques; Revue des périodiques étrangers; Table des matières.

XXXIV, 1: *E. Durkheim*, Examen critique des systèmes classiques sur l'origine de la pensée religieuse; *H. Beaunis*, Comment fonctionne mon cerveau: essai de psychologie introspective; *J. Sageret*, L'analogie scientifique; *E. Goblot*, Un cas d'association latente; *F. Picavet*, Thomisme et philosophie médiévale; Analyses et comptes rendus; Revue des périodiques étrangers.

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IX, 1 : *G. Fonsegrive*, Certitude et vérité (fin.) ; *P. Beaupuy*, Psychologie de la pensée ; *B. de Montmorand*, Saint Vincent de Paul ; essai de psychologie religieuse ; *Séraphin Belmont*, L'être transcendant d'après Duns Scot ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Periodiques ; Enseignement philosophique.

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THE  
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

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THE IDEALISM OF EDWARD CAIRD: II.

IN the last number of the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW an attempt was made to give some account of the mental development of Edward Caird, and to indicate the conclusion to which he was brought by a study of the great masterpieces of ancient, medieval, and modern literature and philosophy. The training to which he was subjected in Oxford, as well as the natural bent of his own disposition, which was modest in a large and impersonal way, together with his antipathy to all dogmatic utterances, led him to seek for truth by an assimilation of the highest products of all time, and by the construction of a system of thought that should reconcile the partial truth of opposite schools in something approaching to the calm and unimpassioned voice of reason. Those who take a less sympathetic view of his writings will naturally attribute this indirect method of presentation to the absence of the highest kind of speculative originality; and indeed he would have been himself the first to protest against his being ranked as more than a humble, though not a slavish, follower of the great masters of speculation; but it may be permitted to those who have found in his writings the insight and inspiration of a sane, well-balanced, and comprehensive mind to give him a foremost place among those thinkers of the nineteenth century whose power is best attested by their wide and far-reaching influence. However this may be, the manner in which Caird preferred to set forth his ideas was through the exposition and criticism of Plato and Aristotle, Plotinus and Augustine, Descartes and Spinoza, Kant and Hegel; and this makes it difficult, for one who would sum up his ideas with something of his own clearness and vigor, to present his philosophy in a short and concise form:

In my former article I pointed out that Caird did not shrink from carrying out to its only logical issue the principle, common to T. H. Green and himself, that the world is in its inner nature essentially spiritual. But, though he and his friend might differ in this and other respects, they were in substantial agreement as to the one-sidedness of empiricism and subjective idealism, or, as Caird sometimes put it,—perhaps in a slightly misleading way,—in regard to the radical defect of the ‘psychological’ point of view. Thus, in the Introduction to his *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, he remarks that the problem of Kant “seems at first sight to be identical with that which Locke endeavored to solve in his *Essay on the Human Understanding*,” whereas there is this important difference, that Locke “conceives the question as one of Psychology.” An incautious or unsympathetic critic is apt to take this and similar sayings as implying a contempt for psychology, whereas Caird had no intention of conveying that impression, but merely meant to point out that general philosophy or metaphysic has “to deal with the knowledge of mind only in so far as mind is presupposed in everything known or knowable,” whereas psychology, as he conceives it, or at least human psychology, has as its aim to supply a knowledge of man “as a human being, distinguished from other human beings, from the animals and from nature in general, and standing in definite relations to each of them.” Caird had therefore a rooted objection to any philosophy which ignores the fact that a conscious being, as such, is a subject of knowledge, holding that a due consideration of this fact “must essentially modify our view of his relation to all other objects in a world which cannot logically be considered as existing apart from such a subject.”<sup>1</sup> For him all questions run back into the problem of the relation of man as a self-conscious being to the Absolute. Holding this view, he could not admit that, in an ultimate synthesis,—whatever may be said of the provisional syntheses of special branches of investigation,—there can be any absolute distinction between the science of nature, the science of soul or mind, and the science of the Absolute. The physical sciences, whether

<sup>1</sup> *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. I, pp. 9–11.

they know it or not, must be regarded as really dealing with but one aspect of the whole : that aspect which is expressed by the term 'nature,' and which includes man so far as he is regarded as a 'natural' being. And as the biological sciences treat of organic beings, again including man as possessed of life, so psychology, to be really fruitful, must deal with man as at once an animal and a self-conscious being. The distinctive character of psychology, — or of a philosophical psychology, if we must distinguish it from what ordinarily bears that name, — must therefore be to enquire into the process by which man, as a knowing, willing, and feeling being, advances from his first immediate state to the most developed form of knowledge, will, and emotion of which he is capable. To Caird this problem did not seem soluble, unless it is recognized that "the intelligence is able to understand the world, or, in other words, to break down the barrier between itself and things and find itself in them." Hence he held that "the knowledge of things must mean that the mind finds itself in them, or that, in some way, the difference between them and the world is dissolved."<sup>1</sup> Moreover, Caird could not admit that *Epistemology* is a science distinct from *Metaphysic*, since a knowledge that is not in some sense a comprehension of reality can only be a knowledge of illusion. The prevalent opposition of Epistemology to Metaphysic he regarded as largely due to the way in which Kant was led to state his problem, and must disappear for any one who sees the logical consequences of a really idealistic view of the world. Epistemology, in other words, is properly a branch of Metaphysic or General Philosophy, dealing with the explicit comprehension of the real world, just as Logic also must be regarded as that branch of it which treats of the logical determinations of reality in their organic connection. Any one who admits that in us as rational there is a principle by which we are enabled to comprehend the world as it really is, will see that these conclusions are inevitable.

If the distinctions just stated are borne in mind, there will be no difficulty in understanding what Caird meant by "Idealism," — which is apt to be confused with what sometimes goes by that

<sup>1</sup>Caird's *Hegel*, p. 149; *Philosophy of Kant*, 1st ed., p. 553.

name, — and why no one who adopts its fundamental principle can possibly accept the “Radical Empiricism” which is at present making so bold a bid for recognition and acceptance.

For Plato an ‘idea’ was primarily the permanent objective reality, to which all our conceptions of goodness, beauty, and unity point; and therefore “Idealism” meant for him the doctrine that man is capable, in virtue of his reason, of comprehending reality as it actually is. No theory therefore which denies that we can attain to a real comprehension of things is entitled to be called “Idealism” in the Platonic sense of the term. And this is the sense in which Caird always speaks of it. Kant he therefore regarded as, in the letter of his philosophy, an opponent of “Idealism,” since, although he maintained that “the world of experience cannot be regarded as independent of consciousness in general, and, indeed, of the consciousness of man”,<sup>1</sup> he yet held that the objects of our experience cannot be identified with reality as in its own nature it is. At the same time, it is Caird’s contention that, had Kant consistently carried out the line of thought by which he endeavored to refute the so-called “Idealism” of Descartes and Berkeley, he would have been compelled to reconstruct the whole of his philosophy in the sense of an “Idealism,” the fundamental principle of which is that reality as it is, and not merely as it appears, is capable of being known, and indeed that, unless this is admitted, all experience, theoretical or practical, becomes inexplicable. Any so-called “Idealism,” therefore, which assumes that “we are first conscious of our ideas, as our ideas, and then that secondly we proceed to infer from them the existence of objects, inverts the order of our intellectual life, and tears asunder its constituent elements. It is to invert its order: for, though the unity of the self may be implied in all consciousness of objects, yet it is to the object in the first instance that our attention is directed, and we observe the outward world and construe its meaning long before we turn the eye of reflection upon the inner life. And it is to tear the elements of it asunder: for the outer and the inner life are at every point in close correlation, and there is no experience of ours, theoretical or practical, in which we have not to do with both.

<sup>1</sup> *Queen’s Quarterly*, XII, p. 94.

The growth of our inner life is just the development of our knowledge of the outer world, and of our interests in it, and the attempt to retire into ourselves and in a literal sense to make our mind a 'kingdom' to itself is suicidal. It would be like the attempt of the abstract pleasure-seeker to get pleasure apart from all interest in anything but pleasure itself."<sup>1</sup> Nor is the doctrine which, claiming the title of "Idealism," denies "the reality of any world but a world of spirits and their conscious states," a tenable theory; for "the denial of the reality of the material world will inevitably lead to the denial of the reality of any world at all."<sup>2</sup> Such a desperate refuge from "Materialism" is not only indefensible but unnecessary; for the true result of Kant's teaching is "not to cast any, even the slightest, doubt on the reality of the external world, but only to show that a new element must be added to all that we know of it as an external world, namely, its relation to the subject." No doubt, this new element brings important modifications into our previous views of objectivity. For, on the one hand, it absolutely precludes the attempt to explain the spiritual by the material, and, indeed, compels us to conclude that there is no material world which is not also spiritual. And, on the other hand, as the correlation between the self and the not-self is not one-sided, it brings with it also the conviction that there is no spiritual world which is not also material, or does not presuppose a material world. Thus the reality of that which is other than the self-conscious intelligence is seen to rest on the same basis with that of the self-conscious intelligence itself, and the one cannot be denied without the other."<sup>3</sup> No doubt there is "a sense in which all that is apprehended by the intelligence must have something of the nature of the intelligence in it."<sup>4</sup> For "every one who holds that the real is relative to mind, and, therefore, that the difference between mind and its object cannot be an absolute difference, must acknowledge that whatever is real (and just so far as it is real) has the nature of mind manifested in it. Reality cannot be alien to the subject that knows it, nor can the intelligence comprehend

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 94-5.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 96.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 96-7.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 97, note.

> any object except as it finds *itself* in it. In other words, objects can be recognized as real, only if, and so far as, they have that unity in difference, that permanence in change, that intelligible individuality, which are the essential characteristics of mind.<sup>1</sup> At least we can regard an object as an independent and substantial existence only in so far as it possesses such characteristics. It is not, however, necessary to infer from this that every object, which is in any sense real, 'thinks,' or is a conscious subject; for we do not need to take reality as a simple predicate, which must be attached to everything in exactly the same sense. We may, and, > indeed, we must admit that there are what Mr. Bradley calls differences of degree, or what might perhaps even be regarded as differences of kind, in reality. In its highest sense the term 'real' > can be predicated only of a *res completa*, of that which is complete in itself, determined by itself, and, therefore, capable of being explained entirely from itself. But this does not involve the denial of reality even to the most transient of phenomena, if it be but as a phase of something more substantial than itself. There is a certain graduation in the being of things, according to > the measure of their independence. From this point of view, every systematic whole must stand higher in the order of reality than an aggregate of unconnected or externally connected parts; and a living being in its organic individuality would be regarded as more real than any inorganic thing. In the sphere of the organic, again, we may find many grades of being, from the simplest vegetable cell up to the highest and most complex of animals. But, while all such beings are conceived as in a sense substantial in so far as their existence is referred to a centre in them- > selves, it is only in man that we find that permanent self-identity, that unity with himself in all difference and change, which is needed fully to satisfy our conception of substantial reality. He only can be properly said to have a self, since he only is fully conscious of it. And it is only as self-conscious that he is able > to refer all things to himself and so to generate a new world for himself; or, if we prefer to put it so, to reconstitute the common world of all from a fresh individual centre. Even here, however,

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Rep., 477 A. τὸ παντελῶς ὃν παντελῶς γνωστόν.

we cannot stop ; for no finite spirit is complete in itself. As finite, he is part of a greater whole, the member of a society which itself is but one phase of humanity, conditioned by all other phases of it, and, indeed, by all the other elements that enter into the constitution of the universe. We can, therefore, find that which is absolutely real or substantial only in a creative mind, from whom all things and beings must be conceived as deriving whatever reality or substantiality they possess. Now, if we adopt this point of view, it is possible to regard all objective reality as kindred with the intelligence, without going on to assert that nothing exists except minds and their states. In other words, it is possible to maintain that every intelligible object is a partial form or expression of the same principle which is fully expressed in the intelligence, without denying the relative reality either of the inorganic or the organic world, and without, on the other hand, treating every mind as an absolutely self-determined being.”<sup>1</sup>

Anyone who clearly apprehends the force of the passages just quoted will see that Caird’s “Idealism” is not only incompatible with what ordinarily bears the name, but is equally opposed to Realism, new or old, as well as to Empiricism in whatever form it presents itself. Caird indeed has not himself made any direct reference either to Realism or to Empiricism, in the forms at present in vogue, but some light may be thrown on his doctrine by a short examination of what has been called “Radical Empiricism.” For what is said on this topic the present writer is responsible, though he believes that Caird would have endorsed it in substance, had he broken his almost universal rule of allowing attacks upon his doctrine to answer themselves.

Empiricism, as we find it in the school of Locke, adopts the opposition of real things and states of the individual mind, and endeavors to explain how from these states a knowledge of real things is obtained. It further holds that such knowledge can only come to the individual through impressions of sense, and that universals or conceptions derive their meaning from what is discovered by a comparison of impressions with one another. Now, the objection which Idealism makes to this doctrine is, that it

<sup>1</sup> *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, Vol. I, pp. 193-5.

> assumes the independent or separate existence of things, and, in its endeavor to account for knowledge of them on the part of the individual, employs the idea of external causation, thereby making the knowledge of the individual the result of a purely passive apprehension on his part. Idealism rejects this whole method of explaining knowledge, maintaining that the separation of things and thought is inadmissible. Manifestly, therefore, no modification of Empiricism that continues to assume the separate reality of things can alter its fundamental nature. For, so long as that separation is made, the mind must be regarded as the inactive medium of impressions simply received by it. To say that the individual subject does in point of fact find before him, not unrelated feelings, but feelings that are 'conjoined' to one another, does not overcome the fundamental vice of Empiricism, which consists in viewing mind as if it were on the same level as other things, and may, therefore, be treated as a 'stream,' in which a new 'thought,' internally complex as it may be, perpetually displaces the old. For, though it is no doubt true that an absolutely simple feeling is a fiction, the mere complexity of feeling will not explain the universality of judgments, without which knowledge of reality is impossible. So long as the separate individuality of minds is assumed, and each mind is resolved into a temporal succession, the difficulty remains that there is nothing in a mind as so defined that entitles us to say anything about the nature of things, which are assumed to consist of a number of particulars connected only by external relations. The vice of Empiricism, therefore, is that it conceives of reality as a collection of separate things, and, applying the same idea to mind, is forced to reduce it, either with the older empiricists to a 'succession,' or with radical empiricism to a 'stream' of feelings. Whether we take the one view or the other is of subordinate importance, so long as the mind is practically defined to be a 'collection' of elements only related to one another by the superficial bond of time. A disconnected 'series' of feelings and a 'stream' of feelings have this in common, that the feelings are merely particular, and as such can yield no universal judgment. Surely it is obvious that a 'stream' of feelings is no higher characterization of mind than



a discontinuous 'series.' What is really characteristic of mind is that it is not single but dual ; so that it not only is, but is capable of comprehending that it is, and that other being is. A mind, on the other hand, which is conceived of as a single 'stream,' can neither comprehend itself nor anything else ; and if it seems to do so, that is only because the psychologist imports into it what is inconsistent with its character as he defines it.

The distinctive character of Radical Empiricism, as we are expressly told, is its refusal to admit that any absolute principles can be discovered which constitute the unchangeable nature of reality. We must in all cases go to "direct experience" in order to find out what as a matter of fact actually exists. As a result of this method we frame certain "hypotheses" in regard to facts, which enable us to reduce our experiences to a certain order, but we must not regard these as absolute "laws." Professor James, therefore, tells us that Radical Empiricism is "contented to regard its most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modification in the course of future experience."<sup>1</sup> Adopting this guarded attitude, Radical Empiricism "treats the doctrine of monism itself as an hypothesis" ; *i. e.*, it refuses to admit, as an ultimate or absolute truth, that the universe is a whole, all the parts of which are connected in a fixed and unchangeable way. In adopting this attitude, Radical Empiricism, we are told, "unlike so much of the half-way empiricism that is current under the name of positivism or agnosticism or scientific naturalism, does not dogmatically affirm monism as something with which all experience has got to square."<sup>2</sup> This form of Empiricism keeps so closely to 'experience' that, finding it impossible to reduce all facts to the unity of a single principle, it refuses to say whether or not they *are* all united in a single principle. So far as experience goes, Pluralism has the field. "*Prima facie* the world is a pluralism ; as we find it, its unity seems to be that of any collection ; and our higher thinking consists chiefly of an effort to redeem it from that first crude form. Postulating more unity than the first experiences yield, we also discover more. But absolute unity, in spite of brilliant dashes in its

<sup>1</sup> *The Will to Believe*, p. vii.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, p. viii.

direction, still remains undiscovered, still remains a *Grenzbegriff*. . . . After all that reason can do has been done, there still remains the opacity of the finite facts as merely given, with most of their peculiarities mutually unmediated and unexplained. To the very last, there are the various 'points of view' which the philosopher must distinguish in discussing the world; and what is inwardly clear from one point remains a bare externality and datum to the other. The negative, the alogical, is never wholly banished. Something, — 'call it fate, chance, freedom, spontaneity, the devil, what you will,' — is still wrong and other and outside and unincluded, from *your* point of view, even though you be the greatest of philosophers. Something is always mere fact and *givenness*; and there may be in the whole universe no one point of view extant from which this would not be found to be the case. . . . This is pluralism, somewhat rhapsodically expressed. He who takes for his hypothesis the notion that it is the permanent form of the world is what I call a radical empiricist. For him the crudity of experience remains an eternal element thereof. There is no possible point of view from which the world can appear an absolutely single fact. Real possibilities, real indeterminations, real beginnings, real ends, real evil, real crises, catastrophes, and escapes, a real God, and a real moral life, just as common-sense conceives these things, may remain in empiricism as conceptions which that philosophy gives up the attempt either to 'overcome' or to reinterpret in monistic form."<sup>1</sup>

Radical Empiricism thus denies that the universe can be shown to be a rational whole, maintaining that the character of our experience does not justify such an inference. And, naturally, holding this view, it also refuses to admit that any of the conceptions by which we seek to introduce order into our experience, can be regarded as more than 'hypotheses' or 'working conceptions,' liable to be superseded at any time. Radical Empiricism is therefore opposed to Rationalism, understanding by this term the doctrine that the universe is a rational whole. "Rationalism," says Mr. James, "tends to emphasize universals and to make wholes prior to parts in the order of logic as well

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. viii-ix.

as in that of being. Empiricism, on the contrary, lays the explanatory stress upon the part, the element, the individual, and treats the whole as a collection and the universal as an abstraction. . . . It is essentially a mosaic philosophy, a philosophy of plural facts, like that of Hume and his descendants, who refer these facts neither to the substances in which they inhere nor to an Absolute Mind that creates them as its objects."<sup>1</sup> It would thus appear that Radical Empiricism affirms that there is nothing in experience that entitles us to go beyond particular facts, a view which it identifies with the denial of "substances in which they [facts] inhere" or of an "Absolute Mind."

But Radical Empiricism differs, not only from Rationalism, but from "the Humean type of empiricism in one particular. . . . To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, *the relations that connect experience must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system.* Elements may indeed be redistributed, the original placing of things getting corrected, but a real place must be found for every kind of thing experienced, whether term or relation, in the final philosophic arrangement." This recognition of 'conjunctive relations' is the great superiority of radical to ordinary empiricism. For, "ordinary empiricism, in spite of the fact that conjunctive and disjunctive relations present themselves as being fully coördinate parts of experience, has always shown a tendency to do away with the connections of things, and to insist most on the disjunctions. Berkeley's nominalism, Hume's statement that whatever things we distinguish are as 'loose and separate' as if they had 'no manner of connection,' James Mill's denial that similars have anything 'really' in common, the resolution of the causal tie into habitual sequence, John Mill's account of both physical things and selves as composed of discontinuous possibilities, and the general pulverization of all Experience by

<sup>1</sup> *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 534.

association and the mind-dust theory, are examples. . . . The natural result of such a world-picture has been the efforts of naturalism to correct its incoherencies by the addition of trans-experiential agents of unification, substances, intellectual categories and powers, or Selves; whereas, if empiricism had only been radical and taken everything that comes without disfavor, conjunction as well as separation, each at its face value, the results would have called for no such artificial correction. *Radical empiricism does full justice to conjunctive relations*, without, however, treating them as rationalism always tends to treat them, as being true in some supernal way as if the unity of things and their variety belonged to different orders of truth and vitality altogether.”<sup>1</sup> It “finds no reason for treating either as illusory. It allots to each its definite sphere of description, and agrees that there appear to be actual forces at work which tend, as time goes on, to make the unity greater. The conjunctive relation that has given most trouble to philosophy is the *co-conscious transition*, so to call it, by which one experience passes into another when both belong to the same self. . . . To be a radical empiricist means to hold fast to this conjunctive relation of all others.”<sup>2</sup> . . . “In a picture gallery a painted hook will serve to hang a painted chain by, a painted cable will hold a painted ship. In a world where both the terms and their distinctions are affairs of experience, the conjunctions which we experience must be at least as real as anything else.”<sup>3</sup> Radical Empiricism, then, as it would seem, while it denies that we can find in experience a perfect unification of particular facts, yet insists that there are given in experience ‘conjunctions,’ connecting certain particular ‘facts’ with each other.

The difficulty in dealing with a doctrine of this kind is partly due to the element of truth that it contains. Nothing seems at first sight more reasonable than the contention that we must not go beyond what the facts of experience warrant. In the infinity of particulars ever crowding upon us, it is argued, we are in many cases forced to be content with mere ‘brute fact,’ without being

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 534.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 536.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 540.

able to show its reasonableness. Who will prove to us that a thunderstorm or an earthquake is rational? And if we cannot show the rationality of all the facts that we experience, how are we to prove the rationality of the whole? Does the rationality of the whole demand that there should be pain and strife, crime and guilt? Must we have a Catiline and a Cæsar Borgia? Is it not more reasonable to say that while these are undeniable facts we cannot explain them? Are we forced to hold that whatever occurs must be consistent with the rationality of the universe? Why should there not be 'chance,' 'accident,' 'matter,' or whatever term we employ to express our ignorance of the ultimate nature of things?

Now, it seems obvious that reasoning of this kind cannot be met by simply urging the probability that, as many things have been explained which once seemed inexplicable, there is good ground for believing that all things could be explained if only our experience were sufficiently enlarged. For it may be retorted with equal force, that, as many things always remain for us inexplicable, the probability is that they are by their very nature inexplicable. We must therefore attack the problem in another way, and enquire whether we are really compelled to leave the question as to the rationality or irrationality of the whole in a state of doubt.

The first thing to notice is, that the plausibility of the argument against the complete rationality of the universe implies that we can discern its *partial* rationality. Now, it may be shown, I think, that, with the denial of complete rationality even *partial* rationality must logically disappear. The changes which objects present are capable of explanation just in so far as they occur, not in an irregular way, but in a fixed order; and if this order is denied, there is no longer anything that admits of explanation. Suppose for a moment that our experience were so contradictory that there was absolutely nothing in any two experiences that we could call identical; and what would be the result? The result would be that no judgment whatever could be formed, since judgment rests upon a recognition of something *identical* in our experience. But the hypothesis of an experience in which

> there is no identity whatever is absurd, for the simple reason that the minimum of experience involves at least the distinction of 'this' from 'that,' and such a distinction is impossible unless  
 > there is something *identical* in 'this' and 'that,' whether it is identity in extension, or in time, or in quality, or in some other form. An absolutely chaotic experience, in fact, is no experience at all. Whatever element of 'opacity,' therefore, there may be in the universe, there must be *some* fixity or order in it. Now, fixity or order, from the nature of the case, is not something which can be limited in its application. For it cannot be established by any accumulation of particular instances of it. There is therefore nothing in Radical Empiricism to prevent us from supposing that *all* order should at any moment disappear, leaving us weltering in an absolute chaos of disconnected particulars. Thus the supposition of an 'experienced' world absolutely destitute of order, or absolutely irrational, is one that cannot be entertained without self-contradiction; in other words, the irrationality of the  
 > universe is an hypothesis which, by making *all* experience impossible, makes itself impossible. If the universe is only partially rational it is not rational at all, because partial rationality means that there is nothing in the nature of things to prevent the world from resolving itself into an infinity of separate particulars.

To these general considerations we may go on to add others. Radical empiricism, as we have seen, rests upon the assumption that experience presents to us a collection of facts, the relations of which to one another we are capable of partially discovering. The reason it assigns for refusing to admit the 'monistic' view of reality is, that the facts of which we have experience do not warrant that conclusion. Obviously, therefore, the doctrine pre-  
 > supposes the reality of the facts, while denying the inference that they warrant the conclusion as to the perfect unity of the world. Now, what is a fact? It is assumed to be something that presents itself within the experience of this or that individual, and so presents itself that he is forced to admit its reality. The assertion indeed of the reality of what falls within the 'experience' of the individual is the ground upon which the denial of Monism is attempted to be based. The character of the facts, it is alleged,

is such that they do not warrant the inference to the complete rationality of the world. If therefore there is any doubt of the facts, the whole negative conclusion based upon their character disappears. But the 'facts' are not momentary states of this or that subject, but *an identity of experience, either in the same subject, or in different subjects*. Deny this identity, and there is no 'fact,' and indeed nothing that we can call 'experience.' It is thus evident that Radical Empiricism presupposes a certain unalterable nature in the objects of 'experience.' What is this but an assumption that the world is a systematic whole? Deny that it is so, and there is no meaning in 'experience,' and therefore nothing upon which Empiricism in any form can be based.

We may see the same thing by looking more closely at Professor James's attitude towards psychology. In his *Principles of Psychology*, he takes it for granted that there are various individual subjects of experience, and that the experience of each forms a whole, the parts of which cohere with one another. Now, it is surely obvious that both of these assumptions,—the assumption of individual subjects, and the assumption that the experience of each is continuous,—disappear, if we say that reality has *no* fixity in its nature. How can we affirm individuality and continuity, if we are serious with the statement that we can affirm nothing beyond what particular experiences warrant? If that doctrine is carried out to its consequences, is it not plain that we can say nothing about reality beyond the moment in which a particular 'experience' is had? And as this particular experience is a guarantee of nothing but itself, to talk of a *continuity* of experiences, and still more of continuity in the experience of *different* individuals, is wholly unwarrantable. If there is no constancy in the nature of things, there can be no system of experience; if there is a system of experience, the world must be rational.

Rationalism, as contrasted with Radical Empiricism, Professor James tells us, "tends to emphasize universals and to make wholes prior to parts in the order of logic as well as in that of being. Empiricism, on the contrary, lays the explanatory stress upon the part, the element, the individual, and treats the whole as a collection and the universal as an abstraction."

The "Rationalism" to which Professor James here refers is, I believe, largely a creation of his own, due to want of appreciation of what is really maintained. If his characterization of it has any truth at all, it applies only to the pre-Critical Rationalism of Wolff; in any case the Rationalism, or Rational Idealism, of Edward Caird certainly does not "tend to emphasize universals and to make wholes prior to parts": what it does is to maintain > that particulars involve universals, just as universals involve particulars. Neither is 'prior' to the other, logically or really. Take the simple case of causality. What Idealism affirms is that > no change occurs in the world which does not occur as an instance of the universal and necessary connection of every element in the whole. It does not start from the 'universal,' and proceed to determine the particular by it, but it does maintain that the character of experience is such that every element is con- > nected with every other, and therefore that we are forced to treat any given element as having no existence except in relation to the whole. To isolate the 'universal,' giving it an independent position, is to destroy it; for the 'universal' has no reality > except as the order or system or unity of the particulars; to isolate the 'particular,' on the other hand, is to give it an apparent independence which destroys its connection with other particulars and with the whole. This latter fallacy is the one which besets all forms of Empiricism, and most of all what is called Radical Empiricism; for the latter, by making even the systematic unity of particulars problematic, removes the very foundation without which there can be no system of experience whatever. Thus setting up a mere chaos of particulars, it is no wonder that Radical Empiricism regards "the whole as a collection and the universal as an abstraction." The whole would be a 'collection' no doubt, if it were anything at all; but, since all > universality, *i. e.*, all identity, system, law, or unity, is denied, nothing remains but a rhapsody of particulars that cannot even preserve the appearance of stability.

It follows from what has been said, that Radical Empiricism has not got rid of the fundamental defect of ordinary Empiricism. A 'stream' of feelings, as felt by a single individual who is con-



ceived of as limited to his own feelings, does not bring us any nearer to reality than a 'series' of feelings. Grant that the individual subject, — if the radical empiricist could consistently talk of any individual subject, — experiences a stream of feelings; how does this account for the judgment that reality is constituted in a certain way? Within the stream appears what we ordinarily call 'fictions' as well as what we ordinarily call 'truths,' but there is nothing in the idea of a 'stream' to justify the distinction. We 'directly' experience, *e. g.* (to use the radical empiricist's language), say, color; is color, then, a property of things, or only a feeling in us? We 'directly' experience the heat of a stove; can we pass from the statement that a certain feeling arises in us to the statement that it is a true index of the nature of things? It is just because this question must be answered by the radical empiricist in the negative, that any knowledge of the ultimate nature of reality is denied by him.

Idealism, then, refuses to admit that the rationality of the universe as a whole is a debatable question. As Caird puts it: "The only reasonable controversy between philosophers must be, on the one hand, as to the nature of the all-embracing unity on which every intelligible experience must rest, and on the other hand, as to the nature of the differences which it equally involves. . . . The problem of knowledge is to find out how the real unity of the world manifests itself through all its equally real differences, and we can show that any abstract view, which would deprive us of any element of it, would make the progressive solution of it by science and philosophy impossible. But we cannot prove these presuppositions of all knowledge directly, or by making the system based upon them complete, if for no other reason, because with our increasing experience the problem itself is always enlarging. . . . It is involved in the very idea of a developing consciousness such as ours, that while, as an intelligence, it presupposes the idea of the whole, and, both in thought and action, must continually strive to realize that idea, yet what it deals with is necessarily a partial and limited experience, and its actual attainments can never, either in theory or practice, be more than provisional. . . . If in one sense we must call this

idea a faith, we must remember that it is in no sense an arbitrary assumption; rather it is the essential faith of reason, the presupposition and basis of all that reason has achieved or can achieve." <sup>1</sup>

The first principle of Idealism is thus the rationality of the real, a principle which is incapable of demonstration, in the ordinary sense, only because it is the basis of all demonstration. It may be objected, however, that, like the famous *Cogito ergo sum* of Descartes, to use Carlyle's phrase, it "takes us a very little way"; or the objection of a recent writer may even be raised, that it does nothing to settle "the problem of the relation of mind and body." The answer, however, cannot be difficult for anyone who has once put himself at the idealistic point of view. It might just as well be objected that philosophy does not tell us how to cure gout, or why a candle cannot burn in a vacuum, or establish the law of organic descent. The problem of the investigation into the conditions under which mind operates is a special branch of science, and can only be answered by a special investigation. At the same time, nothing could be further from the truth than to say that Idealism, as Caird understood it, pays no heed to the results of scientific investigation, and especially to the important problem of psychology; what it does is to point out, as I have already indicated,<sup>2</sup> that a psychology which ignores the distinction between the various forms of life, and treats the mind as if it were merely one object among other objects, violates the very nature of mind, and treats it as that which it is not. It is not necessary to enter into the at bottom verbal dispute whether 'psychology' is, or is not, a 'natural science'; for, granting this to be true of what is ordinarily called 'psychology,' there still remains the problem of determining its relation to other branches of knowledge and reality, and this problem cannot be settled by anything short of a comprehensive philosophy. If psychology, as Mr. Bradley says,<sup>3</sup> "deals with the facts immediately experienced within a single organism or soul," and excludes all metaphysics, its conclusions cannot be more than provisional, and it therefore becomes a serious problem whether, after this exclusion, we have

<sup>1</sup> *Queen's Quarterly*, Vol. XII, pp. 101-2.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*, pp. 260-1.

<sup>3</sup> *Mind*, O. S., XII, p. 354.

any right to speak of 'psychical events' at all; in any case, the so-called 'psychical events' cannot be those of a self-active or self-determining subject, and nothing less will explain 'experience.' On the other hand, if psychology claims to be a final rendering of the nature of experience, it is equally fallacious to base this form of it,—which is virtually a metaphysic of the conscious subject,—upon the subjective states of the individual conscious subject. Caird at least refused to admit the final legitimacy of this point of view, claiming that, while Dr. Ward, "in his able Lectures on Materialism and Agnosticism, admits frequently the correlation of subject and object," he yet "seems in effect to withdraw this admission when he speaks of each individual consciousness as having a subject and object of its own."<sup>1</sup> Much nearer to a really philosophic psychology is, in Caird's eyes, the main doctrine of the *De Anima*. For, though Aristotle never liberates himself from the false conception of 'matter' as a mere indeterminate possibility, yet, in the sphere of life, he conceives 'matter' and 'form' to be strictly correlative, and indeed to differ only as the 'potential' from the 'actual.' There is for him no living 'body' apart from 'soul,' the principle through which the latent capacities of body are realized, and therefore body and soul are not separable, but are properly only distinctions or aspects of the one single concrete living being. Moreover, as soul and body are essentially correlative, a specific body implies a specific soul, and therefore the more complex the body, the higher the functions of the soul. Aristotle, however, is unable to maintain himself at this level of speculation, and therefore, "for the most part he seems rather to regard the form as giving to the matter a unity which does not belong to it, and to which it is never completely subordinated."<sup>2</sup> Thus he declares that the soul neither grows nor decays, though all activities usually ascribed to it are conditioned by the growth and decay of the body. Hence he says that, "if the old man had the young man's eyes he could see as well as the young man," where he obviously thinks of the soul as an independent sub-

<sup>1</sup> *Queen's Quarterly*, Vol. XII, p. 101.

<sup>2</sup> *Evolution of Theology*, Vol. I, p. 281.

stance only accidentally related to the body; a doctrine that logically leads to the absurdities of metempsychosis, which is ultimately based on the fallacy that any soul may inhabit any body. In this superstitious conception of soul,— a conception which has led in our own day to the materialistic dualism and chicanery of “psychical research,” — Caird had no faith, though he came more and more to be convinced on general grounds of the immortality of the individual.<sup>1</sup> He was therefore unable to follow Aristotle when, passing beyond the life of plants and animals, he denied that imagination and discursive thought are modes or affections of reason; for, Caird argued, if reason is in its own nature entirely independent of all corporeal existence, the world of nature, including the sensitive and passionate life of man, becomes essentially unreal and irrational.

There is only one other point to which space will allow me to refer and with this I must bring these articles to a close. No charge has been more persistently made against Idealism than that of ‘panlogism,’ as Lotze calls it, the charge that it gives no place to the will or the feelings in its scheme of existence. The misunderstanding is due to a false opposition of intellect and will, and to the plausible, but fallacious, arguments by which the ‘primacy’ is given, now to the one and now to the other. If I have managed to convey at all Caird’s comprehensive conception of philosophy, as the science which includes all other sciences within itself, or which justifies the existence of all other sciences by showing that they are each and all but phases in the development for the rational subject of a rational universe, it will almost go without saying that any abstract opposition of intellect and will, and therefore any elevation of the one over the other, rests upon a forced and untenable separation of elements that “never can be sundered without tears.” This point is brought out in the most forcible way, where Caird shows the opposite defects of Aristotle and Kant, the former of whom ascribes the ‘primacy’ to intelligence, the latter to will.

Aristotle is led to exalt the theoretical over the practical reason

<sup>1</sup> See especially the remarkable address entitled “Immortality” in *Lay Sermons*, pp. 261 ff.

because, as it seemed to him, the only way in which reason reveals its essential nature is in the direct comprehension or intuition of universal and eternal principles; whereas practical reason "has to realize itself in a subject-matter which is not purely rational but mixed with contingency, and in which the universality of pure science is reduced to generality, and the absolute necessity of law to the hypothetical necessity of empirical fact."<sup>1</sup> Thus for him *θεωρία* is the only absolutely free activity of reason. In contrast to this 'intellectualism,' Kant,—and he has in this respect had, and still has, many followers,—maintained that the only world of which we can have scientific knowledge is one the law of which is necessity, and therefore that we can never, by theoretical reason, advance to an actual knowledge of the self, the world, or God. "A practical necessity, however, is found in the moral law which, as it issues unconditioned commands, compels us to believe in our own freedom. And the idea of an intelligible world is just the conception on which we must take our stand, in order to think of ourselves as self-determining beings."<sup>2</sup>

Caird refuses to admit that it is any real answer to Aristotle to say that his mistake was in assuming that we are capable of knowing reality as it is in itself, instead of recognizing that the whole idea of such a reality is an 'over-belief,' which we may feel compelled to accept although we are unable to convert it into scientific knowledge. Nor can it be admitted with Kant that what is a mere possibility or probability for theoretical reason is a rational faith for practical reason. The whole difficulty, Caird contends, is due to the untenable opposition of the phenomenal and the real or intelligible worlds. We can indeed distinguish between the world as imperfectly conceived and the world as more adequately interpreted. For their own purposes the special sciences treat the world as if the only explanation of it were that which traces out its relations of coexistence or succession; but, though it is true that the higher teleological view of nature presupposes the humbler work of the special sciences, we cannot admit any abstract contrast between the mechanical and the

<sup>1</sup> *Evolution of Theology*, Vol. I, p. 350.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 354.

teleological conceptions of the world, as if the one were contradictory of the other. Nor can we stop even with the determination of existence as involving purpose, for the world of necessity "stands in essential relation to the unity of the self that knows it," and thus "the external necessity which characterizes the objective world when we regard it as complete in itself (as it is generally regarded by science), must receive a new interpretation when we recognize that it cannot be separated from the unity of the intelligence."<sup>1</sup>

The effect of these considerations is to break down the opposition between the theoretical and the practical life; for, if the object cannot be separated from the unity of the self, neither can the unity of the self be severed from the multiplicity and externality of the object. If the world is not a world of mechanical necessity, and if the subjective unity of self-consciousness cannot be severed from the objective consciousness of the world in space and time, we "cannot suppose that the aspirations of the soul or the obligations of the will can carry us into a new region absolutely separated from that phenomenal world, which is the object of our knowledge. On the contrary, the practical must be viewed as continuous with the theoretical life. . . . The good cannot be opposed to the true; for they are only different aspects of the relation of the same self to the same all-embracing whole, in which the self finds its objective counterpart."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 365-6.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 368-9.

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## THE SPRINGS OF ART.

### I.

ART-PRODUCTION may be considered from either of two general points of view, the subjective or 'psychic' and the objective or 'psychological.' From the former, the psychic point of view, the artist's own interest in the thing he produces is considered.<sup>1</sup> In the latter, the psychological enquiry, we turn away from the artist's own psychic interest to the fundamental motives that lie back of it in human nature, — to the 'springs' of art. It is the point of view from which the movement of the æsthetic imagination is considered as part and parcel of the development of mind as a whole. What is the place of the æsthetic in our genetic account of mind, and of art itself in the development of racial and individual culture? From what simpler non-æsthetic impulses does it spring?

Taking a broad and general survey, we may say, in the first place, that the springs of art must be in some way those by which the imaginative functions of cognition realize themselves. Art production falls by common consent in the class of imaginative constructions. We find reason, however, on closer scrutiny, for saying that it is not all imaginative cognition that issues in or affords æsthetic pleasure, but only a certain restricted mode of it. So far as the imagination is simply a function of imaging, whether

<sup>1</sup> It is pretty well agreed that this, which is, of course, the spectator's interest as well, is not the same as the theoretical, on the one hand, or the practical on the other. It is not the interest of discovering truth or in getting gain. For both of these require processes of mediation, in which the 'idea' set up mediates, — serves as instrument or means to, — something else. The æsthetic interest, on the contrary, allows no such mediation; the idèa is not set up for what it mediates or secures. Æsthetic contemplation does not rest in mere truth or mere utility; it rests in the object itself and what it is and means for the individual's mental life. The interest is intrinsic and immediate — *autotelic*.

This position is fully worked out in Vol. III of the writer's work *Thought and Things*, of which the material of this article is also to be a chapter. See a preliminary statement of the nature of æsthetic interest in the article "Knowledge and Imagination," *Psychological Review*, May, 1908. An able discussion in the same sense is to be found in Mitchell, *Structure and Growth of the Mind*, Lect. VIII.

it mediates facts on the one hand, or suggests utilities on the other hand, it is not in itself æsthetic. There is a limit, also, at the other extreme, — in the production of mere fanciful and fugitive images. Mere memory, on the other hand, with its instrumental value for knowledge or practice is not of itself æsthetic; and fancy with its lack of instrumental value and of all systematic direction and control is equally unæsthetic.

We must find the spring of the æsthetic then in the production of what lies between the real and the unreal; that is, in the restricted sphere in which the sort of imaginative construction styled *semblant*<sup>1</sup> has its origin. And it becomes our problem to make out the springs or genetic sources of this type of individual and racial productiveness.

On this point current analysis seems to throw considerable preliminary light. We find the subjective criteria of æsthetic construction to reside not in the material of art, but in the form into which the imagination organizes the material, and in the control in which the organized material is held and interpreted. In each of these suggestions we come upon a valuable clue for the objective understanding of art.

First, we find the form of organization to be that of the original sphere from which the material is drawn, the reinstatement of it in the 'semblant' mode being 'imitative' or representative. And, second, we find that this imitative product is charged with ideal and personal meaning.<sup>2</sup> If now we read off the idealizing motive as belonging to the constructive imagination itself, in all its operations, then we have left over two great motive springs in which the movement of art production as such takes its rise and has its continued support. These we may formulate somewhat dogmatically, for the purpose of discussion, as follows:

1. Art arises and is carried forward by the impulse of imitative representation: it involves the imitative exercise of the imaginative functions.

<sup>1</sup> 'Semblance' is used in the writer's work (*Thought and Things*, Vol. I, Chap. VI; see also *Dict. of Philos. sub verbo*) to cover 'make-believe,' 'conscious self-illusion,' 'Schein,' etc., states having some sort of 'as-if-real' meaning.

<sup>2</sup> Both of these points are fully made out in the more extended text. The latter involves the acceptance, with certain important restrictions, of the current theory of æsthetic *Einfühlung*.



2. Art arises and is carried forward by the impulse of finding and embodying,—in a large sense of the term, as ‘expressing,’—the personal life: it involves the ‘self-exhibiting’ and self-exploiting uses of the imagination.

Putting these two general points together we may say that the springs of art as such, assuming the functions of imagination, are Imitation and Self-exhibition. That is, art is imagination determining itself through the impulses of imitative representation and self-discovery and expression. These two motives may be examined more closely.

## II.

The imitative character of much art is superficially in evidence, and what is known as the ‘imitation’ theory of art is very ancient. In its extreme statement, this theory finds in imitation the sole spring of artistic creation, whether merely for itself, for representation as such, or for the embodiment and expression of various sentimental meanings. We may accordingly point out that for a great series of art productions, imitative representation is the evident and essential instrument; the limits of its operation being only those necessary to allow the recognition of other actual factors. So true is this that there is justification for calling a very large series of arts and their products ‘imitative’ or ‘representative’ arts.

The imitative arts are those in which the content is imitatively derived in both a narrower and a broader sense, according to the meaning given to the term ‘imitation.’ In the narrower sense, imitation means a conscious copying of a model or ‘copy’ externally set up; in the broader sense, it means the achievement of results modeled after a ‘copy,’ whether or not that copy is external to the mind. In this latter case, all forms of ‘self-imitation,’—from auto-suggestion to the shaping of a psychical process upon self-erected models, standards, or ideals,—are included in the one term ‘imitation.’ There are important aspects of art in which it may be said in both these senses to be imitative.

Apparently it is in the more restricted sense that the term imitation is used in the anthropological discussions of the origin of art.

It is claimed that the arts, racially considered, have copied nature; that is, that the artistic impulse has been directed to the reproduction and representation of natural things and events. Detailed attempts are made to discover fundamental imitative processes to account for the selection of the material and the development of the more characteristic products of each of the arts. The imitative motive of music is found in the reproduction of emotionally expressive sounds, that of drawing and design in the reproduction of the actual forms of nature, that of the plastic arts in the imitative reproduction of things in the third dimension, and so on.

There can be no doubt that this more external interpretation of the imitative motive carries us a great way, especially in the earliest stages. If the material of art production is in a large sense imitative, we ought to be able to point out the specific models that have served in the progressive history of this art or that. There would seem to be only one reservation necessary, — apart from cases in which the presence of imitation at all is not too evident, — that, namely, in which it does not seem to carry us far enough. Direct reproduction of nature does not seem to exhaust the motives or methods of art. Is there, it may be asked, no more sublimated and subjective form of the imitative impulse, the models for which are not merely the actual objects of nature, but the imagined and ideal forms that arise to the mind of the artist himself?

That this question is to be answered in the affirmative as to the facts there is again no manner of doubt. Whether 'imitation' covers the facts is the question. We have either to broaden the concept of imitative function, or to account for the ideal aspirations and products of the artistic imagination in some other terms. We must allow for the more inward and subjective factor that an artist calls his 'inspiration.' The problem resolves itself then into that of finding, in more objective terms, something corresponding to the subjective idealization of the material of art. On the subjective side, we find this to reside in the formal and progressive completeness of the æsthetic meaning, and its further advancement, in the mode of reflection, by a

conscious and deliberate application of standards and ideals of beauty.<sup>1</sup>

This problem has had its statement in somewhat similar terms in recent psychology: in discussions of the nature and function of imitation. It has been found impossible to restrict the rôle of imitation,— however the term be restricted,— to its more external and directly social operation. The term 'self-imitation' has come into use to describe the carrying on of processes, distinctly of the imitative type, within the personal growth of the individual. There is a transfer of the motive of imitation from the pursuit of external models to the development of experience itself after internal models; the 'idea' or 'ideal' becomes the model set up for imitation, that idea or ideal being one erected by the individual himself, although of social origin. In this sense all the molding of experience, both as knowledge and as conduct, into better conformity to an ideal, is 'imitative.'

Holding that this transfer is real and that there is a gradation of processes from the external to the internal type of imitation, we find no reason to deny ourselves the resource that this affords us in the interpretation of the work of art. We accordingly find ourselves carried over to the larger definition of imitation considered as a spring of artistic production.

On this view the sphere and scope of imitative art is enormously extended. The artistic impulse proceeds in the direction of ideal

<sup>1</sup> These standards and ideals, however, are, as more thorough analysis shows, themselves functions of the organization already secured under the motives of truth and utility. They are formal statements or felt intentions of *more finished* results, as if they were more finished. In justification of this, we may cite our conclusion reached in the consideration of the universal and ideal modes of meaning (*Thought and Things*, Vol. II, Chaps. X, XI), to the effect that they are in all cases experientially and experimentally derived. The alternative would be a view which would invoke some sort of *a priori* or formal 'universals,'— in this case ideals or normative principles,— which are once for all imposed upon the materials. This issues in a form of absolutism in art, as it does also in the theory of knowledge: a view that does not lack able advocates, of course. As opposed to this, I hold that the ideals of art are of gradual development, of progressive transformation; and that this development is secured by processes of the imitative sort. The artist sets out to produce the best he can conceive, and this,— his ideal,— is itself a function of his actual achievements in imaginative construction. The sense in which the æsthetic does embody an 'absolute' meaning is brought out elsewhere: see the article "Knowledge and Imagination," *Psychological Review*, May, 1908, pp. 192 ff.

forms by a series of imitative reconstructions of meaning working upon the content once defined by the semblant imagination. The inspiration of the artist, and its successful embodiment, depend upon his power of imagination and his skill in molding his materials to the form of it. All art,—leaving apart certain questions of limits,—is imitative; that is, all art invokes an ideal model, and springs, in one at least of its essential motives, from the impulse to realize this model in a single concrete work of art. The art that merely copies an external model,—allowing that it is æsthetic in its appeal at all,—is principally skill of execution; and much of the admiration it gets is admiration of deftness of hand and brush. It is the art of the virtuoso. The transfer of the model to the realm of the ideal,—the more perfect form that might be realized with the same materials,—turns the slavish imitator into the creator, the copyist into the artist.<sup>1</sup>

The limitations just referred to, however, at once suggest themselves. They arise from the possibility of æsthetic experience which does not involve imitation at all, even when the term is thus broadly defined. It may be suggested that there are two modes of such experience, both seeming to lack the imitative factor. One is that which has in its content or object no suggestion of organization that can be supposed to imitate or represent any real form or actual pattern; the other is that thrill of artistic effect which seems independent of any organized material, but is still called æsthetic. The first of these may be illustrated by purely decorative effects,—a patch of paint on the person, a fleck of cloud in a clear sky, any bit of ornament having no 'design,'—the second by the emotional thrill of music felt when there seems to be in the mind no suggestion of a scheme of presentation or ordered content to give it imitative or representative significance.

These illustrations are presented to state problems whose consideration will bring into range the second great spring of art formally announced at the beginning of this discussion: that of self-embodiment and exploitation.

<sup>1</sup> In this we are really getting back to Aristotle's use of 'imitation' which included the idealization of natural models (cf. Tufts in the writer's *Dict. of Philos., Arts. "Art Theories,"* and "Classification of the Fine Arts").

## III.

It has been abundantly shown by recent writing on æsthetics that the motive of 'personalization,'—the discovery and embodiment of some form of self-hood or personal life, — is rooted in very profound psychological impulses. It is seen in the various forms of 'personification' of the primitive consciousness, in the 'animation' of the forces of nature, in the 'ejection' motive in early religious development. Anthropologically considered, it seems to be grounded in very important social and biological processes. Socially, there is the motive of 'self-exhibition,' showing itself as a sort of personal 'bluff.' The warrior finds it important to create and sustain a personal repute, for the sake both of his standing at home and his prestige abroad. He 'makes-believe' at being this, that, or the other sort of imposing and authoritative self. This is one of the weapons of social rivalry and selection. The marks of social identification, so far as individually adopted, are those which put the best foot forward; the signs of the self are those which make conspicuous to others the possessor's virtues, abilities, and rank. Further all this has its outward symbolism. It takes form in the various modes of crude and in itself perhaps meaningless decoration of the person and of the owner's personal possessions.

The social utility attaching to this is very evident. Personal decoration takes forms that attract attention, and excite wonder, admiration, and fear. And as social life advances, the personal and family arms or symbols become the decorative signs of office, rank, family, and caste.

Something analogous is found in the biological world. Darwin based his theory of sexual selection upon the attractiveness of the superficial markings, etc., displayed on the part of bird or beast to the enemy or to the mate. The highly colored cock has means of making a striking display of himself; this display attracts and excites the hen. Later theories, while minimizing, perhaps unduly, the importance of this factor on the biological side, nevertheless recognize the facts as important when the psychic side of the animals' habits is taken into account. The gregarious life of animals requires mutual recognition on the part

of companion and mate ; and in the organization of animal companies there are remarkable cases of prestige and personal authority maintained by individuals. Even in the mere instinctive equipment of the animals, we find notable and sometimes ludicrous self-exhibitions, which can only be accounted for as having the utility of personal display. The antics of the courting birds and animals, the puffing-up of pigeons and turkey cocks, the peafowls' spreading of tail and wing, the crowing of the rooster and the mating cries of animals, all seem to say to the discriminating fellow creature, at least, if not to the naturalist, "see me, how fine I am !"

It is not our part here to discuss the origin and extent of this self-exhibiting impulse. It undoubtedly arose and still has its roots in the biological conditions that exist in the quasi-social organizations of animal families and companies. It shows itself in the impulse of primitive man, rooted no doubt in the more instinctive functions of animal and family life, to display the best and most imposing self that he can get his fellows to accept. Its social signs, as is the case also of the birds and animals, are those of striking personal decoration. The head-dress displays the warrior, and the particular head-dress the Great Boar himself. The patch of color like that on the head-dress proclaims the ownership of Great Boar in all his possessions, and also in those he covets and steals, and the patch of paint on the chest of wife and children announces the protection and vengeance of the great warrior himself. So decorative symbolism develops. The claims of tribe or clan are symbolized in bizarre shapes of bird and beast, in shapeless masses of color, in nodding plumes, etc., — all serving the one end of maintaining personal and tribal identity and prestige.<sup>1</sup>

It is not difficult to see the place of semblant make-believe in all this. There is a sort of bluff in it. It is not the true self that it is most advantageous to show off. The defeated warrior exhibits

<sup>1</sup> I have pointed out elsewhere, with illustrations (*Soc. and Eth. Interpretations*, Chap. VI), the element of self-exhibition in the young child's bashfulness. He runs away, but returns with new devices, often those of grotesque and 'impressive' decoration of himself, to attract attention. He does naturally what, later on, as the gallant, he learns to do intentionally.

the scalps he has once taken, not his own shorn poll. The red patch on the warrior's chest symbolizes the blood of his enemies, not his own. His very name perhaps anticipates the glory of his coming exploits.

It would seem, then, that we have here a movement that would go very far toward fulfilling some of the requirements of æsthetic production, independently, too, of the requisites of form to which we have attached so much emphasis above. Certainly it goes very far toward fulfilling the demand that there be the embodiment of a sort of life or self in the æsthetic object, and also that this self or life be not the true self, but one having the character of make-believe, semblance, and ideality.

Before we come to any decision on the point, however, a certain distinction should be made ; its consideration will throw light upon the actual development of the decorative motive. It is the distinction between decoration as such and decoration which has evidently the intention to emphasize or exploit personality. Decorative art often does show a skeleton of design, in which the principles of formal construction seem to have a very decided place and rôle. The decoration on pottery, on plane surfaces, as illustrated in plateresque ornamentation and in the rococo architectural style, and that of time intervals in musical ornamentation, seems to embody the same canons of construction and of distribution of parts that the imitative arts also illustrate. The recurrent unit of decoration is generally, if not always, itself subject to the requirements of symmetry, proportion, and other rules of formal completeness. It is only at the limit, therefore, at which this element of form seems to disappear in a mere affixing of irrelevant structures or appendages, that the conditions of strictly non-imitative decoration would seem to appear.<sup>1</sup> It is just in such apparent non-imitative decoration,—decoration that merely *impresses* the observer,—that the self-exhibiting motive would most plainly appear.

In this state of things we might hold either that the non-imitative cases, if they exist, are not truly æsthetic in the effects

<sup>1</sup>There is also much imitation in the symbolism of purely social decoration : as the symbolism of blood by red, of power by size, of craft by figures of cunning animals, etc.

they excite, or that the motive of self-display may so override the imitative or representative motive, that the latter loses its place entirely. On the latter alternative, we should have to recognize two fundamentally different modes of art, springing from different impulses; on the former, to recognize as æsthetic only those cases of decoration which show the rudiments at least of imitative form.

There is, however, a point of view from which we are not driven to accept finally either of these alternatives, although the distinction current between decorative and imitative art seems to have so much justification. It is the point of view from which the impulse of self-exhibition may itself be construed as essentially imitative,—imitative, that is, in the sense of the projection of an imitative or semblant self into the object. This indeed opens the way to an essential reconciliation, and brings unity again into our theory of art. Besides the interest it awakens from the point of view of such unity, it suggests the recognition of a line of psychological investigation which is only beginning to receive the notice its importance would warrant. I refer to the theory of 'affective representation' suggested and worked out principally by M. Ribot and his followers, and called "affective logic."

The point of importance attaching to this idea is that it recognizes a movement in the affective or emotional life akin to the imitative reinstatement of cognitive states, and so allows us to read an essentially imitative and representative motive into the lower and more primitive stages of art production and appreciation. As this utilization of the theory of M. Ribot and his school in the interests of the unity of art has not before been made, to my knowledge, it will be well to state the theory of affective revival and representation in some detail.

#### IV.

The older and still very current view of memory and representation restricts these functions to 'images,' considered as cognitive states. Its advocates deny that emotion or feeling as such can be revived. They hold on the contrary that the feeling that



seems to be remembered is always a new feeling dependent upon the awakening of a cognitive image; this image stirs up anew the feeling which attended the original object. The feeling, therefore, is always a new function in some sense; it is only the memory image that is revived. The feeling cannot be reinstated except as the cognitive image is there to excite it.

Opposed to this is the point of view of M. Ribot and his followers. A great deal of evidence has been gathered from various fields to show,—and in my opinion it does conclusively show,—that there is a revival of feelings, affective states, as such. Cases are pointed out in great variety in which a definite and recognizable feeling or emotion is present with no accompanying image adequate to arouse it, or even with images which arouse different and opposed states of feeling. There are pathological cases in which the patient's defect seems to reside just in the dominance and insistence of an emotional state which has no reason or justification in the play of ideas. The patient casts about, with restless endeavor, to find some fact or thought to which to attach his errant and impelling emotion. Further, there is growing up a series of interpretations in the domain of the emotional and volitional life based upon the independent development and habituation of emotion. Interpretations of temperament and personal habit are made possible which promise to give results of the first importance for the theory of sentiment and of the higher meanings of worth.

M. Ribot himself, in a recent summary of the theory and facts,<sup>1</sup> states the case in the following words: "The only legitimate criterion of an affective memory is *recognition*, and . . . neglecting all others, I divide such cases into two groups: those in which a comparison is established between two affective states that coexist or succeed each other very rapidly in consciousness; and those in which the affective memory first appears in a vague form and then completes itself by the addition (adjunction) of intellectual elements."

<sup>1</sup> Ribot, "La Mémoire affective: nouvelles remarques," *Revue Philosophique*, Dec., 1907, pp. 589 f., a résumé with citations of the French writers. The papers of Urban (*Psychological Review*, May, July, 1901) and his book *Valuation, its Nature and Laws* (1909) give important developments in the direction of the wider applications, carried forward also by Ehrenfels, Witasek, and others.

Neglecting the first class of cases mentioned by M. Ribot, I wish to dwell a little upon the second class: cases in which a vague but quite recognizable feeling or emotion comes into consciousness by a process of revival or suggestion and develops itself by acquiring a positive intellectual body or content. I shall not attempt to prove the existence of such cases,—other writers have already done that; but I shall apply the point of view to certain problems of æsthetics, especially those which concern what is known as the emotional or expressive function of art.<sup>1</sup>

Writers on art have generally made a rather fundamental distinction between 'representative or imitative' arts and 'expressive' arts,—the latter including those already mentioned as involving the decorative motive. But the class of 'expressive' arts is broader than that of the merely decorative. It includes, in principle, all the arts whose fundamental spring or motive is the embodiment or expression of feeling, especially when this motive seems to work itself out independently of the representation or imitation of actual things,—that is, without any revived cognitive content or system of images. Besides decoration, in some of its forms, the arts of architecture and music are appealed to and characterized as being 'non-representative,' and in motive, largely 'expressive.'

It will be seen at once that this is only a different way of distinguishing between the two great springs of art we have discussed above under the terms 'imitation' and 'self-exhibition,' provided the latter be understood in a broad way to include all forms of 'expression,' as imitation is taken broadly to include all forms of cognitive reinstatement or representation. Expression broadly considered is self-revelation or self-exploitation; and its embodiment can be traced back to the elementary forms of personal and social self-exhibition and appeal. These are developed in the interests of intercourse and art. Thus understood, we have a broader statement of the question as between the two great motives or springs of art: the imitative serving to convey an intellectual content and meaning, as seen in the representative

<sup>1</sup> Certain more detailed points on the place of affective memory in psychology and art are made in my article "Affective Memory and Art," *Revue Philosophique*, May, 1909.

arts ; and the self-exhibitive serving to render or express feeling and emotion.

I state the antithesis in this way both because it is usually so stated, and also because it must be so stated if the common theory of revival as exclusively cognitive is to be upheld. If feeling as such cannot be revived, then we must hold that art products which do not have intellectual or representative content must have some quite different origin and spring from those that do. We cannot call effects representative which represent nothing at all. The sharp differentiation of the arts into two classes, representative and expressive, would then necessarily follow. If, on the contrary, affective and conative states, feelings and attitudes, not in their nature representative, also have some sort of revival in memory, then the concept of representation can be broadened to include affective revival, and unity be again brought back into the theory of art,—a second case in which we find it possible to rescue ourselves from a certain formal dualism.

It is just this sort of unification and synthesis that the recognition of affective memory enables us to make. Forms of art product whose principle spring, and whose main appeal are 'expressive,' do nevertheless fulfil the laws of revival and representation, although in many cases of this class the revival is primarily affective, and only in a secondary way becomes cognitive through the "addition," as M. Ribot says in the citation made above, of "intellectual elements."

If this be true, the consequences for our theory are evident. It means that there is no sphere of art from which an 'imitative' or 'representative' motive is absent ; and hence that there is always present the sense of 'semblance' or *detachment from the course of actual or serious life*, which the imagination produces. The art that is most expressive,—the pathetic strains of a subtle musical phrase, or the martial rendering of patriotism,—however 'real' the emotion it arouses, never arouses emotion *of or for the real* : it reflects or symbolizes the imaginary, not the actual ; ideas, not things. It is always symbolic, semblant of the real. And we now see that this is as true of 'non-representative' æsthetic experiences as of those produced by the most direct processes of realistic copying.

It follows that in any case of art appreciation, even those seemingly most emotional and least intellectual in their character, there are two leading questions to be asked: first, what representative elements are there in the art-content which may be classed as intellectual or cognitive, and second, what elements are there which while clearly affective or emotional, are nevertheless also in some degree revivals of earlier experience through which they get imaginative and with it artistic meaning. For an emotion is not æsthetic unless it be in some way interpreted or felt as part of a revived or imaginary whole.<sup>1</sup>

When we come to such an art as music with these questions in mind, we find it possible to analyze the æsthetic value of a composition. We find the affective and volitional revival processes so prominent that the question arises whether there is any element that is clearly and unambiguously cognitive. The architectonic unit, the motive or phrase, and even the single note, seem to have a certain emotional suggestiveness, due to sensational qualities of pitch, timbre, and intensity, or to combinations of these in rhythmic or other formal groupings. This latter, as instanced in rhythm, would generally be put down as the criterion of 'music,' as distinguished from merely agreeable tones and combinations of tones. But if the latter also be considered emotionally suggestive, then they too are equally fit to produce the æsthetic effect. Considering then both classes of elements, tonal quality with harmony, and rhythmic or other form, let us enquire whether they are purely 'expressive' or in part also 'representative.'

There are clearly complications of simpler elements in both these effects. In compound notes, in chords and harmonies, both consonances and dissonances, there is a certain complexity which may be made the basis of analysis, and might be considered evidence of a sort of crude cognition. In both cases, however, — the temporal succession of rhythm and the coexistence of ele-

<sup>1</sup> It has been shown by Witasek, Urban, and others (see my article last referred to) that even in so-called simple sensuous effects, such as those of a colored surface, a simple tone, etc., there is a "dynamic constant," a more or less organized motor revival, by which the feeling is generalized in a larger sentiment or mood. It thus becomes representative or symbolic, and is for that reason æsthetic.

ments in harmony, — the suggestiveness for emotion seems to be immediate and not due to the recurrence of these obscure cognitive data. It seems rather to reside in the suggestion of emotions experienced in varied situations that have something in common, or in an immediate effect upon the nervous processes involved in native emotional expression.

If now we admit the fact of affective memory, it all becomes clear. The thrill of musical effect is first of all a nervous or sensuous effect. It is fundamentally emotional in its character in so far as *it is*, racially considered, or *has become*, in the experience of the individual, involved in the expression or physical basis of emotion. The striking of the nervous combination is then at once a setting up in incipient form of the organic processes and dispositions of typical and well-marked emotional moods and sentiments. This is the "dynamic constant" for a variety of specific emotions. The cognitive side is not developed into knowledge, and only later, in the persistence of the emotional mood do appropriate cognitive images come in to support the general tone in this direction or that. These vary with the habits and interests of individuals; and may well have in common those larger indications of meaning which the relational framework of the stimulus allows. A quick lively rhythm becomes a dancing faun, a bounding ball, a babbling brook, etc., all different ideas but all consonant with the mood suggested by the rhythm, and all supporting the particular emotion revived in the hearers' minds. A slow rhythm, on the contrary, means what is heavy, dignified, impressive, mournful. The essential point is that the general mood or emotional tone is not due to ideas, but is a sensuous effect taking form in a specific revived emotion, and the ideas come to give mood and emotion a definite direction and meaning.

This is supported by the theories generally held, — and justified by considerable experimental evidence, — that the variations in effect of rhythm are those of actual organic and muscular processes. A quick rhythm goes with a lively dance and a merry mood; a slow movement with a funeral march, and a state of despondency. There is indeed a direct reflection of the great characteristics of organic and emotional change in the variations

of musical rhythm. How artificial to say that this immediate correlation is not reflected in the recall of a specific emotion when the general tone or disposition excited by the music favors it; but that an adequate 'idea' must intervene to produce the emotion! The emotional revival furnishes the representative factor in the æsthetic effect, and there is no need to 'intellectualize' the music.

The case is made stronger still when we come to consider the suggestive effects attaching to simple tones and to variations of key, pitch, and timbre. Whether these effects are considered æsthetic or not, they certainly enter into the general effects of music, and contribute to its suggestiveness. In these cases there are no clear cognitive elements or relations fit to serve as basis of a cognitive image. Moreover, these effects, — such as the variations between a loud low tone and a soft high one, — do not seem to require repetition, but arise directly from the stimulus itself. The only way to account for their feeling value is to suppose that they stir up processes which enter, to a greater or less degree, into the nervous conditions of larger emotional dispositions or moods. When they are struck there is an incipient stirring up of these latter. In cases of the simplest sort, there is probably a partially instinctive basis for the correlation between sound and mood, the nervous and motor associates, the emotions having been fixed by selection.

It is not necessary to discuss the mechanism of these processes in detail; my intention is only to show that there is a revival, or an original awakening equivalent to revival, of an emotional mood or disposition which does not depend upon the revival of a representative image. The emotional element in the æsthetic meaning of music is due to an immediate and instinctive affective response, or to one that includes elements of earlier experiences of feeling.

In architecture the case is plainer. While the architectural form is not imitative in the sense of representing natural forms, still it does afford a relational scheme which the imagination finds available for the 'semblant' suggestions of completeness and ideal unity. The suggestions both of utility and of special design,

whether they are intellectual, affective, or conative, are utilized by a supplementing imagination which is representative in character. The motive of expression as such is much less prominent than in music. Yet in contemplating the simplest lines of architectural construction and design, one has the sense of personal implication and inner movement, which reveals the motive of self-advancement at work through the operation of the semblant imagination. The feelings of active movement are aroused in the spectator, and by an incipient "inner imitation," in the words of Groos, the life of personal activity is felt to be advanced.

## V.

We are accordingly justified in holding the two impulses mentioned to be the springs of art: 'imitation' and 'self-exhibition,' both operative through the content set up by the constructive or semblant imagination. The work of art is a construction of an imaginative character, embodying, either through explicit revival, or through direct establishment, of emotion or disposition, *an ideal of completeness or worth*; and this is transfused with the *significance of an inner life* common to the work itself and to the spectator.

But these two springs of art do not produce different sorts of art. They are both present in all art. The variations in their relative force are to be accounted for by the limitations found in the material conditions under which the art work is produced. In the graphic or representative arts proper, the motive of imitation has its opportunity in the formal and intellectual models after which the material may be formed; here self-exhibition, the more personal and expressive motive, is less in evidence. In certain forms of decorative art and in music this relative emphasis is reversed. The emotional and personal suggestiveness of the material and the affective mode of revival lend themselves to the direct embodiment of personal striving and individual sentiment. These arts are therefore more expressive and more sentimental; at the same time that they must be more variable, more vague, and less intellectual.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The suggestion that these two springs of art are operative,— and also the manner of their union in the semblant imagination,— has already been briefly made in my

work *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, Chap. IV, § 3 (1st ed., 1897; 4th ed., 1906). The main object of that discussion, however, was to show that 'self-exhibition' introduces a social reference into art which serves to control the judgment and imagination of the artist. It is reflected into the æsthetic judgment,—as into all judgment,—to give it both social competence and self-confidence. The further point made out here is that the impulse of self-exhibition continues operative throughout, showing itself in that essential reading of the object in terms of personal feeling which has had so much attention lately in the literature of *Einfühlung*. While art is 'social' in its 'springs,' and universal in its appeal, æsthetic experience, on the other hand, is individual and immediate. Cf. the references given in the work just cited, especially the citations of the works of Marshall and Hirn; see also Tufts, in *Dict. of Philos.*, art. "Art Theories," and E. K. Adams, *The Æsthetic Experience*, pp. 63-86.

The relation of art to play is treated fully in my more extended text. I do not find play to be one of the 'springs of art,' for the reason that the liberty essential to play shows the imagination running riot in a way that does not submit to the artistic requirements of unity, order, and system. Play does not idealize. In the assumption of the 'semblant' or self-illusional motive in both, together with the immediacy which this carries with it, most of what is common to play and art is comprised.

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## THE PRESENT MEANING OF IDEALISM.<sup>1</sup>

WHEN we make any serious attempt to interpret the philosophical thought of the past, there is one precaution that we are bound to take, if we would attain valid or even significant results. It is not enough to take account of the differences between philosophers or philosophical schools; for, in order to understand even these differences, we must first understand, if possible, what were the underlying assumptions common, or practically common, to all parties concerned. It hardly need be urged that what is thus necessary in order to understand the philosophy of the past is not less important, though more often overlooked, when we attempt to take an objective attitude toward the opposing philosophical schools of the present day.

What, then, may we all fairly take for granted in discussing the present situation in philosophy, no matter how divergent our final conclusions may seem, or may in fact be? In the first place, it seems fair to assume that, for the technical student of philosophy, materialism proper is a thing of the past. And it is important to notice why we are able to say this with a degree of confidence that might seem to the layman little better than dogmatism. When one assumes that materialism, in the strict sense, is a thing of the past, one is not, of course, assuming anything whatever as to the relative importance of the so-called 'internal' and the so-called 'external' factors in experience. That is a perennial problem, which, in very different forms, is likely to occupy philosophy to the end, and dogmatism on that point would be as futile as it would evidently be absurd. Nor need one base one's definitive rejection of materialism upon the very important consideration that it has never been able to offer even a plausible solution of what may be called the ethical problems of philosophy. Arguments of this kind, though they have great cumulative force, are rather dangerous to press in detail; for it is

<sup>1</sup> Read before the American Philosophical Association, at the Baltimore meeting, December 30, 1908.

unquestionably true that our ethical and even our religious conceptions are undergoing a gradual adjustment to the view of the world-order which, — largely, at least, on other grounds, — we find ourselves obliged to adopt. The true reason why dogmatic materialism may thus be summarily ruled out of court is, that it is the classical example of the most dangerous of all tendencies in philosophy, viz., the tendency to explain the relatively known in terms of the unknown, experience itself in terms of something else. The metaphysical conceptions of matter, force, and energy (*i. e.*, these taken in the ontological sense) have very largely dropped out of modern scientific theory, for the simple reason that they do not even help to explain experience, with which alone the scientist is concerned. It is therefore plainly absurd for philosophy to take as an ultimate principle of explanation what science has found, to its cost, does not explain at all.

In the second place, it seems fair to assume that subjective idealism must be rejected as a philosophical theory. As opposed to the materialistic assumption that the reality of external objects must be explained in terms of an unknown and unknowable substratum, viz., material substance, subjective idealism was, of course, triumphantly in the right, when it contended that objective reality must be interpreted in knowable, instead of unknowable, terms. This was simply the protest of all true philosophy that experience must be explained from within and not from without, if it is to be explained at all. But while subjective idealism was bound to be successful in its destructive criticism of material substance, this was due rather to the fatal weakness of that unmeaning conception than to its own inherent strength. Its very formula, 'to be is to be perceived,' though highly useful for polemical purposes, — especially when directed against the weakest of all adversaries, — became disagreeably ambiguous when Berkeley turned from polemics to philosophical construction. Berkeley, the subjective idealist, like Descartes the dualist, began with the conscious experience of the individual, considered as such, and the initial difficulty that each encountered was essentially the same as that of the other. We may smile at Descartes's naïve appeal to 'the necessary truthfulness of God' as a reason for believing

in the external, objective order of things ; but is not Berkeley in at least as bad a case, when he summarily explains the objective order by assuming that God himself is the cause of all our particular perceptions and the ground of their uniformity of occurrence? Mill's suggestion, in comparatively recent times, that matter may be regarded as a 'permanent possibility of sensation,' is rather a dexterous evasion of the fundamental difficulty of subjective idealism than anything that could be seriously accepted as a solution.

In ruling out these extreme theories,—dogmatic materialism, on the one hand, and subjective idealism, on the other,—as no longer relevant in serious philosophical discussion, we are merely simplifying the issues involved, and by no means assuming anything that need prejudice the claims either of realism or of idealism. Modern realism would have nothing to gain and everything to lose by identifying itself with materialism, while idealism must dissociate itself from the implications of subjective idealism, if it would retain its influence in contemporary philosophical thought.

In fact, before we can safely urge the claims of modern idealism, as opposed to those of realism, we must inspect very carefully certain time-honored formulas which did yeoman's service in eighteenth century and even nineteenth century polemics, but which are singularly irrelevant in any serious present discussion of fundamental issues. These may be described as Kantian formulas which have outlived their usefulness, and their persistence in the literature of modern idealism is probably due to historical causes rather than to strictly logical considerations. It will be remembered that the last important philosophical work published by Hegel in his lifetime was the *Philosophy of Right* (1821),<sup>1</sup> and that this was published only forty years later than the first edition of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781). This extremely rapid development and culmination of idealism in Germany during the last two decades of the eighteenth century and the first two or three decades of the nineteenth century could only lead to the very thoroughgoing reaction against Hegelianism which

<sup>1</sup> This, of course, is not taking account of the second and third editions of his *Encyclopædia* (1827 and 1830), or of the second edition of his larger *Logic* (1831).

actually resulted. Later came the 'back to Kant' movement in Germany, properly enough called 'Neo-Kantianism,' and the very different Neo-Hegelian movement in Great Britain, sometimes perversely called by the same name. But, different as these two philosophical movements were, the one inclining toward a self-critical positivism, the other frankly working toward Absolute Idealism, the leaders of both parties professed to go 'back to Kant' and to develop the essential principles of his system. The result in both cases, while more important for philosophy, on the whole, than we of the present day are always ready to admit, was unfortunate in one respect; for the inevitable tendency was to stereotype certain formulas and fundamental conceptions of the Kantian philosophy, which were far from expressing adequately the true logic of the idealistic position.

It would be unprofitable to raise the vexed question as to what was the real problem of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in Kant's own mind. He tells us repeatedly that his problem is, and remains, 'How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?' while many of his commentators, of course, hold that his real problem is the larger one, 'How is experience possible?' If time permitted, it would not be difficult to show that the two problems are inextricably involved with one another in the first *Critique*, and so that the question as to which was the real problem for Kant is less important than it has been regarded. This, however, would not greatly help matters, as both formulations represent what may fairly be called the superannuated form of the general problem of idealism. In Kant's own formula, the emphasis upon *synthetic* judgments *a priori*, as a class by themselves,—granting that there are *a priori* judgments at all,—has ceased to have significance; for practically all recent logicians agree that all real judgments (*i. e.*, all that are not merely tautological) are synthetic, though necessarily involving analysis as well. If, then, we take the formula in its simplified form, it becomes merely, 'How are judgments *a priori* possible?' and this, of course, at once reveals the essentially rationalistic side of Kant's problem. If, on the other hand, we assume that the larger problem, 'How is experience possible?'

was the fundamental one for Kant, we have by no means absolved him of rationalistic intent; for this statement of the problem implies the attempt to explain the organization of experience by reference to something more ultimate than itself. It will perhaps be objected that this is an unsympathetic interpretation of Kant's procedure, since it may be argued that after all he is only concerned to bring to light the logical implications of experience; but this can hardly be admitted as a valid objection, since Kant is never tired of asserting that the understanding lays down the laws of experience, wherever objectivity is to be found.

This raises the whole question of the *a priori*. What does it really mean in Kant's philosophy, or in any idealistic system directly basing upon Kant? Orthodox Kantians constantly remind us that the master is contending for a logical and not a temporal *a priori*. This may be freely admitted, so far, at any rate, as Kant's intentions are concerned; and here he stands exactly with the older rationalists, however different his method may be in other respects. But in at least one other very important respect also Kant's conception of the *a priori* is like that of the older rationalists; for him, as for them, a principle, in order to be *a priori*, must be absolutely free from all contamination of experience, though at the same time it may contribute to any extent to the form and organization of experience. Otherwise expressed, an *a priori* principle may be detected by an analysis of experience in general, never by dealing with experience in the concrete.

Now it may be seriously doubted if progressive idealists of the present day really believe in the existence of such principles any more than do the realists themselves. The only reason why we seem able to analyze experience in general is because we have dealt with it long and patiently in its more special manifestations. The attitude of philosophy in this respect is not essentially different from that of science; the philosopher, like the scientist, is looking, not for principles 'independent of all experience,' but rather for principles that will express adequately, — from the given point of view and for the given purpose, — the various forms of interdependence within experience.

The categories of thought, then, are far from being preëxistent > in the mind or ready-made, but rather are always in the making ; and their evolution, whether in practical life, in science, or in philosophy, is always determined by teleological considerations. Kant was, of course, right in contending that experience must have a certain organization ; but he was clearly wrong in holding that this organization must have been brought about, as from the outside, by definite, permanent, controlling intellectual factors, *i. e.*, the categories of the understanding. Even apart from the abstract rationalism of such a procedure, this is too much like attempting to show how an organic body gets itself organized ; we have to accept the fact of organization, when dealing with experience as a whole, as we do when dealing with the biological organism, and in the one case as much as in the other we must confine ourselves to an analysis of the underlying conditions. The idealist is fond of saying, 'No object without a subject' ; but for the consistent modern epistemologist, whether idealist or not, the reverse formula holds equally true, 'No subject without a world of objects.' It is to the great credit of Kant that he recognized this latter principle as the necessary complement of the former one, though in his actual treatment the emphasis is altogether too much upon the former.

> Since, then, the subjective and the objective side of experience are mutually complementary in the strictest sense, it will not do to speak of anything, — even the 'raw material' or 'blur' of sensation, — as 'merely given.' If it came in this absolutely alien fashion, how could it be received? And if nothing can be 'merely given' as 'raw material,' the 'form' of experience can as little be supplied by the mind. The mind is not an entity, > endowed with creative power, but rather is one side of experience itself, regarded as an organic whole. No, 'matter' and 'form' are meaningless abstractions in this connection ; what is 'given' is nothing less than experience itself, — which is only to say that we must start by presupposing experience, and satisfy ourselves with carefully analyzing its organic structure and logical implications. In short, as we saw before, there can be no independent, but only interdependent, principles in the realm of our experience and knowledge.

It is true that principles may emerge in the development of a special science or discipline which are independent of experience in the sense that they do not result from any mere process of induction, as we ordinarily understand induction. The very conception of the science or discipline in question may seem to demand that we make these rational assumptions; but, none the less, they are discovered, not by analyzing experience in the abstract, but by dealing with it long and carefully in the concrete. In one sense independent of experience, they are as truly the very essence of experience as interpretation of the world-order from a given point of view.

But if this be true of particular so-called *a priori* principles, what shall be said of those tremendous contributions of the mind to experience, according to Kant and traditional idealism, viz., space and time themselves? It is barely conceivable that there might be a highly developed finite experience, very different from our own, in which the spatial aspect of things would either be essentially different or even lacking altogether;<sup>1</sup> but is it conceivable, even by the wildest flight of the philosophical imagination, that the temporal aspect of things, or its equivalent, could also be lacking? Time, at any rate, — time as we know it or its equivalent, — would seem to belong to a finite experience as such. But, it must always be remembered, we are not primarily concerned with what conceivably might be, but with what is; and the plain fact is, that if our concrete experience is one thing more than another, it is space-time experience. And we say 'space-time experience' advisedly; for we have to do not with space-relations *plus* time-relations, but with the two as inextricably involving each other, so far, at least, as our experience of the external world is concerned.

Now, if we rule out things-in-themselves as meaningless, since by hypothesis they are unknowable, and recognize that subject

<sup>1</sup> Even this perhaps necessary concession should not be taken too seriously, since it is evident that a finite intelligence or will could not be simultaneously present and effective in all parts of an indefinitely, if not infinitely, complicated system, such as the world-order must be assumed to be, — and this quite apart from the question as to the terms in which the world-order should be defined. Space, therefore, or its equivalent, would at least seem to be a necessary form of finite experience as such.

and object have no meaning apart from their functional relation to each other,—that the subject presupposes the object as much as the object the subject,—what right have we to assume that space and time belong to appearance, or phenomenal manifestation, as opposed to reality? According to our premises, space and time are forms, not merely of our intuition, but of experience itself; and what have we to deal with except experience, taken in its most comprehensive sense?

Space and time, then, are forms of the only reality we know, the only reality of which we can distinctly conceive. It is true that, in the interest of a particular science or discipline, we may abstract, now from the one and again from the other. For example, in geometrical demonstration we generally abstract from time, except in ideally constructing our figures, just as in arithmetic and algebra we abstract from space; but, in practical applications of these highly abstract sciences, we never forget that it is a space-time world that we are dealing with. Or, to take the cases of psychology and logic, it is evident that, for the purposes of psychology, the time-order is to the last degree important, while we largely abstract from it in many logical investigations; but the psychologist is far from claiming that concrete experience is merely a sequence, that it involves no relations except 'before' and 'after,' while the logician or epistemologist puts himself in a wholly false position when, like T. H. Green, he speaks of a 'timeless act of thought.' Of course every act of thought, being a process, involves time; but it may very well be that the time sequence, for our particular purpose, is not the essential thing.

But how is it when we explicitly deal, or attempt to deal, with ultimate reality? Can we, in truth, view things, as Spinoza expressed it, *sub specie æternitatis*? As already implied, this familiar metaphysical question involves the antithesis of 'appearance' and 'reality,' which, in its extreme form, we deny when we take our stand on experience as the ultimate. But the question itself is by no means free from ambiguity. What do we really mean when we speak of 'transcending' the space-time point of view? That we not only can, but frequently do, *abstract*, now



from space and again from time, in our scientific procedure is evident enough, as we have seen ; but probably no one would use this as an argument for the unreality of space and time. Certainly we do not profess to abolish what we abstract from in our scientific investigations. Why, then, should we make any such claim in philosophy? Here also we remain finite beings, and the principles that we employ are bound to remain instrumental or regulative and not constitutive. In fact, a 'constitutive' principle would be a contradiction in terms, for that would mean a concrete abstraction. In philosophy as in science we must be ready to shift the point of view when necessary,—though always with a full knowledge that we are doing so. The very phrase 'permanent system of relations,' as applicable to the assumptions of science as to those of philosophy, seems in one sense to deny, as in another sense it seems to affirm, the reality of time ; while the conception of immanent rationality,—or, if you please, Divine purpose,—involves the same difficulty. But this difficulty will certainly trouble us less and less in proportion as we become accustomed to regard experience itself, including its ideal development, as the reality, and at the same time recognize that the conflict is only between our own relative and instrumental points of view.

To an ultra-conservative idealist the present argument might seem like a series of damaging concessions to realism. Even if this were true, I should offer no apology, for we are here as seekers after truth and not as partisan supporters of any tradition whatever. But what has been conceded that is essential to idealism as a philosophical method? Does the idealist to whom idealism is not merely a type of philosophical theory but a matter of almost religious faith, wish to retain things-in-themselves, in order that they may play the sinister dual rôle of an unknowable substratum of the objective order and a logical ground for a theory of subjectivism and illusionism as regards actual concrete experience? This, be it observed, would mean a theory of subjectivism and illusionism as regards any finite eternal experience as much as in the case of this present, and doubtless perplexing, temporal one. Certainly idealism proper

has no such interests, if we may speak of interests at all in technical philosophical discussion. And if we really do abandon things-in-themselves and keep to concrete experience, though always regarding it from the point of view of its inner meaning and possible development, we must be prepared for the conclusions that logically result from our revised premises.

In this paper I have attempted to indicate very briefly what seems to me to be the drift of recent idealism in its less dogmatic form. If this analysis be correct, idealism may be said to have lived through its subjective phase, and, to a large extent, through its partisan phase. And just as many idealists, at any rate, are willing to call themselves both empiricists and rationalists, though in a modified sense of those terms, it hardly seems too much to hope that the partisan opposition between idealism and realism may be done away with in the not too distant future, and this on the basis of our increasing recognition of experience itself as the real. No amount of emphasis upon the objective world-order can be excessive, so long as one preserves the teleological standpoint, that of inner meaning or significance, which is the standpoint of philosophy itself. If that, however, be given up, realism is bound to lapse into materialism, not only to its own ruin, but to the great and permanent loss of philosophy.

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## ABSOLUTISM AND TELEOLOGY.<sup>1</sup>

IF in the midst of the present division, not to say confusion, of tongues in the philosophical camp, a general password had to be selected which all could speak "trippingly on the tongue," doubtless that word would be 'purpose.' Absolutist, pragmatist, and realist, idealist and empiricist, intellectualist and voluntarist, all make fervent appeals to purpose; sometimes in reverent capitals; often in frantic italics; otherwise in humble lower case.

So at last it would seem that the philosopher might fairly meet the philistine's challenge to point to anything settled in philosophy by citing the ancient issue between mechanism and teleology. Whatever our differences we are all professed teleologists. *Prima facie* the teleological problem is no longer that of teleology or no teleology. It is a question of the kind of teleology. I say, *prima facie*, for any fond hopes which the reader may harbor, on his first glance at the pages of current discussion, that purpose is to be a beautiful Hegelian synthesis of all philosophical differences, are doomed. He soon discovers that within this camp of professed teleologists the differences are as great as elsewhere; so great, indeed, that at the extremes each party regards the other's teleology as mechanism masquerading as purpose. Like the disputing theologians, each says, 'your God is my devil.' In fact he finds that the issue here is the same as it is elsewhere; namely, the issue between absolute perfectionism, completionism, and developmentalism, — evolutionism. And this, to the writer, is the fundamental theme of the whole pragmatic movement.

It may be said that this statement begs the issue at the outset, since many absolutists are also professed evolutionists. And indeed it has been long since even Mr. Bradley has repeated his famous Eleaticism, "Nothing real can move." Let, then,

<sup>1</sup> Read at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association held at Baltimore, December, 1908.

the statement of the problem be : Can absolute perfectionism be reconciled with the conception of evolution as an essential character of reality ? Can an absolutist be an evolutionist except in a very Pickwickian, not to say Spencerian, sense ?

In metaphysical terms, the problem is : Are there laws or forms of development which themselves do not participate in the development ? In logical terms, it is the question which Hegel put to Kant : Is there a real evolution of categories ? It should be observed, however, that there is some doubt whether, in the end, the evolution of the categories was any more ' real ' for Hegel than their fixity was for Kant. From the biological standpoint it is the problem of the relation of structure and function : Can there be a development of function with no corresponding development in structure or conversely ? Putting it again from the standpoint of permanence and change, and granting the equal claims of each, the question is : can these claims be met in this way ; namely, by dividing up the world into laws and facts, categories and phenomena, structure and function, and assigning all the change to one side and all the permanence to the other ?

In teleological terms the problem is : Whether the ideal in conduct can be absolute, all-inclusive, fixed and given, or must it be constructed in the process in which it functions. So far, the logical and epistemological implications of the question have held the centre of the stage in current discussion. We shall therefore pass to the ethical aspects where the issue is as critical as it is in logic. But the aim of this paper is not so much to develop new criticism, as to state the present situation in the hope that such a statement may help to start the discussion in the ethical direction.

Whatever may be the difficulties which the conception of an all-inclusive fixed purpose encounters in logic, in science, or in a metaphysics based on scientific concepts, it is supposed to come into its own in the field of ethics. If it has no place in science, that only shows, it is said, the abstract character of the ' mechanical ' standpoint of science. "Waiving the formal consideration that if the scientific standpoint be abstract, it must leave that from which it is abstracted equally abstract, let us note," says the anti-absolutist, or evolutionist as we shall call him in this discussion,

“ what is of more interest and effect ; namely, the historical fact that ever since the publication of Darwin’s *Origin of Species*, science has become more and more teleological. The significance of this is that Darwin’s work in science, as Hegel’s in logic, revealed a new type of teleology, — a dynamic, evolutionary teleology, which made it possible to introduce teleological conceptions into science without committing it to the absolute teleology which seemed to it more mechanical than its own ‘ mechanism,’ from which it was all the while trying to escape. The mechanical character of pre-Darwinian science was therefore but the counterpart of the absolute type of teleology of which science was indeed very shy. But as soon as science found that it could talk of ‘ wants ’ and ‘ needs ’ and ‘ purposes,’ without committing itself to the determinism of an all-inclusive and absolutely fixed purpose, it rapidly lost its teleo-phobia. For it found these categories of ‘ want,’ ‘ desire,’ ‘ purpose ’ very serviceable, especially in biology.

“ And it is interesting further to note,” says the evolutionist, “ that the development of this dynamic type of teleology in science since Darwin has encountered its strongest opposition, not from scientists, as might have been expected, but from philosophers who still insist that the method of science must be abstractly mechanical in sharp antithesis to the teleological character of ethics. And the implication of this would seem to be that an absolute teleology in ethics must maintain itself as the correlate of an equally absolute mechanism in science. In what respect this position is beyond that of Kant’s second *Critique*, is difficult to see. Perhaps it doesn’t pretend to be beyond it.”

Before passing to the more directly ethical considerations there is time only to mention one or two general psychological questions which meet us at the threshold. First : How can the absolute purpose be ‘ all-inclusive ’ and still be *selective*, as psychologically a purpose must be. We are assured by Professor Royce<sup>1</sup> that although it is inclusive of all possible purposes, it is still selective. And this assurance certainly is from the very highest authority on the absolute. But there are probably very few psychologists with sufficient reverence for metaphysics not to

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *The World and the Individual*, Vol. I, pp. 460 ff.

ask *how* this can be. Second: This all-inclusive purpose is also, at the same time, its own complete fulfilment. This raises another nice psychological problem into which we cannot go here.

Striking now into the well-known course of the ethical argument, we come at once upon what is most often urged as the crucial support of the absolutist's teleology,—that unless there is an all-inclusive fixed purpose, end, or goal, there is no standard for moral progress. Even if we admit for the moment that consciousness might possibly have a social character without such an absolute, and that there might therefore be a certain *degree* of objectivity in a social purpose, yet how in the case of a community, a national, or even an international ideal, are we to tell whether it spells moral advance or retreat? Without such a fixed and final goal is not the world a huge chartless craft, hailing from no strand, bound for no port,—a vast derelict adrift on a shoreless sea?

But, asks the evolutionist: "After all, how much of the chart does the absolutist's conception furnish? Does it point the direction of the absolute goal? Does it show the rocks and shoals?" "No," admits the absolutist himself, "it contains only the assurance that there *is* such a final goal though its direction is known and can be known to no finite being." "How then," again asks the evolutionist, "shall we tell when we are headed toward or away from it?" Mr. Bradley says frankly, that we cannot, and that therefore moral experience does not belong to reality; it is appearance.

But if the answer be that this poor figure, taken from the world of space and time is utterly inadequate for the conception of the absolute goal, that it is no particular 'where' because it is everywhere; that it is at no particular time, because it is not in time but in eternity; the rejoinder is: What then from *this* standpoint does progress and regress mean? If the harbor is so infinitely extended that no voyage in time is necessary to make it; if, more technically, the absolute purpose is so all-inclusive that it has already determined and included all the means, how can we here talk of advance and retreat? Has not our conception, which was to be the standard of progress and regress, swallowed them both?

And more acute, if possible, grows the issue when we approach the problem of responsibility and freedom. As absolutists we must believe that only in the form of a fixed and all-inclusive purpose can the ideal have that kind and degree of objectivity and categorical authoritativeness which moral experience demands. On the other hand, the evolutionist insists that if our port is already determined and if it is so all-inclusive that no matter in which direction we are headed we are bound to make it, or are always in it, then why be concerned at all? Why do we grow excited and rush into civic federations, labor unions, peace congresses, and suffragette crusades? Why should not our legend be, in the vernacular, 'what's the use?' "Why?" repeats the absolutist, "how utterly vain the question when you come to see that your getting excited and rushing into federations, and unions, and crusades, and refusing to adopt 'what's the use?' as your legend, are all included in the absolute plan."

"But," returns the evolutionist, "What then becomes of *responsibility*?" Waiving at present the problem of the relevancy of an ideal not constructed in the process in which it functions, is not participation in the construction of the plan we are to help carry out the very basis of moral responsibility? How is it possible to feel responsible for the mere executing of a purpose which we have not helped to construct? And is it not strange that a plan which we have helped to form should have any less authority and binding force than one ready-made and given?

"And here," continues the evolutionist, "we touch the heart of the ethical significance of the whole anti-absolute movement. It is the democratic movement in morals; it is the demand for the *full* conditions of moral responsibility. It is the claiming of the moral franchise, — the right to participate in the construction as well as the execution of the ideal. In terms of our familiar figure, it means that if there is to be such a thing as moral experience aboard our craft we must have a real part, not in hoisting sail and washing down the decks only, but in laying the course of the ship. And, as a *moral* experience, 'this laying the course' means more than running for a harbor already built from all eternity. It means nothing less than that our moral craft carries

within her the material and the machinery for the building of *new* shores and ports.<sup>1</sup> And this material is simply the entire world of organized habits and institutions; and the machinery, the method, is thought, — science.”

But long before this the absolutist is impatient to say: “First, all you have said about the necessity of participation in the construction of the ideal, and about the impossibility of the ideal being given to the agent, is entirely beside the mark so far as our position is concerned. For since the days of Plato have we not continually taught that, although all our efforts here on this bank of time do *not* alter by the least jot the absolute purpose, yet what you now seem to be doing for the first time is from the beginning (using ‘beginning’ as a mere figure) an eternal *part* of the all-inclusive plan. The absolute purpose is, therefore, not formed independent of, and given to, the world of individuals in time: it is formed *of* all possible individual purposes. Hence, the thinking or planning of every individual or community is a contribution to the absolute purpose in the sense that it is an eternal part of it. What you are doing here in time is simply finding out what you have already contributed in eternity. Plato’s doctrines of reminiscence and transmigration are, to be sure, awkward expressions of this conception due to his inveterate temporal imagery, which is the bane of all our discussions of the absolute, including the present one.

“Second, when you speak of moral responsibility as involving the capacity for ‘building new shores and ports,’ once more, what is to determine when and where; why in one direction rather than in another; why now rather than then?”

To the statement of the static, timeless, geometric conception of participation in the absolute purpose, the evolutionist’s answer is first of all a direct appeal to moral experience. He complains that he cannot square this account with moral responsibility as directly *experienced*. “I feel,” he says, “as if I were, here and now, ‘in my weak and feeble way,’ helping to create plans and ideals of government, of education, of art, that are *somewhat* new ;

<sup>1</sup> Of course it would be easy for a captious reader to break down this already overloaded metaphor by asking, What about the sea and the ship itself? For it is obvious that they too must be included in the reconstruction?



*somewhat* different from any ever wrought before. And all the experimentation and deliberation through which I make my contribution, — they simply do not feel like, in the language of the radical empiricist, are not ‘*experienced as*’ a mere bringing to the surface of present temporal consciousness pieces of a purpose made in ‘eternity.’ On the contrary, just in so far as this timeless conception fills my mind, in so far do I find myself falling back into the ‘what’s the use’ attitude.” That this attitude does not characterize the absolutist any more than the anti-absolutist in practical life, the latter takes as evidence, — not so much that he has misinterpreted the effect of the conception, as that it is not the one with which the absolutist actually operates, — except in his discussions with evolutionists and pragmatists.

“But,” returns the absolutist, “grant for the moment that you help to work up new *content* for the ideal, yet the *goodness* of it you surely do not even assist in creating. That you can only recognize, even as Plato taught, for it simply *is*.” But the evolutionist is still obdurate or dense. He professes that he cannot strain out or skim off or otherwise separate the goodness as a special essence from the rest of the content and assign it to a world of different dimensions of being. And, moreover, if the goodness simply *is* and has only to be recognized, why is it that we have so much difficulty in the recognition? “No,” confesses the evolutionist, “so far as I can see, goodness is perfectly concrete and is wrought out and *comes into being* along with every reconstruction of the ideal. Thus the goodness of honesty comes into being along with the *ideal* of honesty.”

But this brings us to the absolutist’s second point: that in all this demand for participation in the reconstruction of the ideal, the problem of the *standard* for this construction is again overlooked. In terms of the figure, what is to determine *when* and *where* and *how* you are to construct new shores and ports? This is, of course, only a little more specific form of the problem of progress which we left with only a negative outcome. The evolutionist’s answer to this question is bound to seem to the absolutist very naïve, for he says simply: “First, whenever the old plans, the old shores and ports become inadequate, that is,

unsatisfying ; and second, in the direction and in the manner which in view of all the material and the machinery available, promises the largest satisfaction. This, when sufficiently defined and formulated to become a working plan, is the ideal, is the standard, and is progress. It is the outcome of a genuinely creative process, Fichte's 'fact-act' in its evolutionary form, — with all the relevant results of the past as the material, and thought as the method. "And, after all," continues the evolutionist, "what higher consecration, or what greater claim to our allegiance could it have than that it is a plan for a larger satisfaction which we have helped to create? To ask for a *further* standard for this ideal, which is thus intrinsically worked out *as* the standard, is to go straight into an endless regress, or, to make the ideal again external and given."

To all of which the absolutist again observes: First, that absolutists evidently have not a monopoly of hortatory philosophizing. Further, that in the foregoing, two important points are overlooked: when it is said that the ideal is that which promises relief from dissatisfaction, is not the real situation reversed? Does not the dissatisfaction arise from the condemnation of the present status by the ideal, which therefore must exist in advance of and independent of the dissatisfaction? Again, we must ask, after all, just *whose* dissatisfaction is to be relieved and by *whose* thought are the ideals to be constructed?

First, of the ideal as the basis for, and therefore as independent, and in advance of dissatisfaction, the evolutionist says, interestingly enough, that it was that arch-absolutist Hegel who first called attention to the fact that the dissatisfaction and the ideal are correlative parts of one process; that the idealizing activity arises *with* the dissatisfaction as its positive reconstructive correlate; in logical terms, that the judgment is not a process of applying ready-to-wear predicates, but is one of constructing new predicates out of old ones as material; and that this applies with as much force to the moral as to the scientific judgment. As we have seen, this is just the meaning of responsibility and freedom. "And once more," adds the evolutionist, "if the ideal is there independent and in advance of all dissatis-

faction, and if it is infinite in power and all inclusive in extent, how in the name of the absolute does any dissatisfaction ever arise?"

To the other question, — 'whose dissatisfaction is to be relieved and by whose thought is the ideal to be reconstructed?' the evolutionist's answer again appears unsophisticated. To 'whose dissatisfaction?' he says: "that of everyone." 'By whose thought?' He answers: "that of anyone who can contribute to a plan." "But" objects the absolutist, "there will be conflict in the planning itself." "Then," says the evolutionist, "there will be more planning, more investigation and experimenting, more getting together, until *that* conflict is settled." And, he adds: "Are conflicts, as a matter of fact, ever settled in any other way? However much the absolute settlement is already there, we must make the fight just '*as if*,' in Kant's favorite phrase, the settlement we help work out were a somewhat new under the sun."

All this, of course, ignores the implication of 'subjectivism' in these questions, of which so much was made in the earlier discussions of truth. It assumes that the 'dissatisfaction' and the 'thought' of which we have been speaking are not functions of a particular body or brain or mind *only*, any more than my standing here is a function of my legs *only*. It assumes that 'my' consciousness is a function of a social process in which my body or brain or mind, is only one factor. It presupposes that 'my' thinking and feeling may be as truly a function of 'your' brain or mind as of my own. My thinking of sending for you as a physician to treat my headache is as truly a function of your medically trained brain as of my own aching one. And 'your' thinking as you diagnose my case is no less obviously a function of my head than of your own. You are thinking not merely of or about but *for* me,—in my place. Your thinking literally 'belongs' to me. You are in fact renting me for a few minutes your thinking apparatus, the which if I do not now appreciate I shall when your bill comes in. But the headache,—surely that is *all* 'mine.' And yet do I not in a very true sense 'turn it over' to you? And even before your arrival I experience it as

something *related* to you as truly as to myself. And you regard it and talk of it as 'your' case. At any rate after your arrival it seems clearly to 'belong' to *both* of us. And we both may then regard it quite objectively and speak of what 'we' can do to get rid of 'it.'

With this conception of the '*ganz und gar*' social character of consciousness constantly in mind, is it strange that the evolutionist should find his explanation of the charge of subjectivism in the critic's own subjective conception of consciousness?

"With the limits and nature of the constituents of this social process," says the evolutionist, "the general principle of this discussion is not concerned. It may include infra- and super-human agencies; it may have all the unity consistent with development and all the differences possible with continuity. The principle insists only that the social process be real and that reality be a social process."

"But do you not see," asks the absolutist, "that this appeal to the social process begs the point of my whole contention, which is precisely that the social character of experience is impossible without the absolute. I, too, am a 'socialist,' but even *therefore* am I an absolutist. Without the conception of the absolute I confess I am a subjectivist. With no absolute the social process is to me one of the blind leading the blind."

In vain does the evolutionist insist that it is just *in* this reciprocal leading that the blind *win* (not receive) their sight; for the absolutist exclaims: "Ah, but the light must first be there." And when the evolutionist says: "No, it, too, comes into being in this process of mutual leading," the absolutist will ask: "Leading where?" And with this the discussion has come full circle; for the evolutionist will answer: "In the direction of the ideal worked out in and by the social process in order precisely to give itself a direction,—a 'where.' This implicates, of course, the entire preceding discussion of progress and responsibility.

A. W. MOORE.

## REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

*System der Philosophie.* Von WILHELM WUNDT. 3te Umgearbeitete Auflage. 2 Bände. Leipzig, Wilhelm Engelmann, 1907. — pp. xviii, 436; vi, 302.

In the two volumes before us we have, presumably in its final form, a general view of the results of the philosophical labors of Professor Wundt during his long, active, and successful life. Here we stand, as it were, upon a height, see spread out below us the various fields which he has cultivated, and follow the guiding hand which points out to us their general features and the relations in which they stand to one another.

The figure may almost be taken literally. Wundt's conception of philosophy and of the various disciplines which it is regarded as embracing, his careful cultivation of many sciences, and the encyclopædic knowledge which he always has before him, the conscientious attention to detail which we are not accustomed to regard as characteristic of those who devote themselves to speculative thought and seek a *Weltanschauung*, — these things bring it about that his system presents itself to our eyes rather as a broad domain gained by adding field to field than as a great organism which has unfolded and expanded in virtue of a life-principle which reveals its unity in every part. However, this first impression stands in need of some correction. There are two sides to Wundt, and he must not be judged from an inspection of one alone.

There is little that is new in this third, and, we may assume, final edition of the *System der Philosophie*; so little, indeed, that the changes which have been introduced cannot be regarded as the occasion for a review of the work. Some details have been modified in the parts treating of "The Philosophy of Nature" and "The Philosophy of Mind," and verbal alterations and a few changes in the arrangement of material are scattered through the book, but the system is what it was in the first edition (that of 1889). Wundt himself claims that his doctrine has been substantially the same for forty years (see his prefaces).

Nevertheless, it would be wrong not to make the appearance of this third edition the occasion for drawing attention to a philosophy which is not as well known in America as it should be; a philosophy which

strives to reconcile within itself rival and opposing tendencies, each a living issue in our own day. The book before us is a somewhat formidable one; and, in spite of the mass of valuable material which it contains, there is danger that it may be bought and not read, a dubious compliment to its eminent author.

Wundt tells us that the character of his philosophy is to be explained by the fact that he has approached the subject by the path of natural science and psychology. He regards himself as an empiricist. In his "Introduction" (pp. 1-26) he tells us that the task which philosophy has to accomplish is to unite the general knowledge furnished by the special sciences into a consistent system. The sciences furnish to philosophy the material for all its problems, and, indeed, give the first suggestions for the solution of these problems. As a preliminary to launching upon the exposition of his system, he places before us a classification of the sciences, which runs out into minutest detail. The introduction closes with a brief description of the actual divisions of the work. These are as follows: Part I is logical and treats of the conditions of knowledge and the forms of thought; Part II is an investigation of knowledge in its real significance; Parts III and IV deal with the fundamental problems of metaphysics, which Wundt distinguishes as problems of real and problems of transcendent knowledge; Parts V and VI, composing the second and smaller volume, expound the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Mind, and in them the general principles set forth in the first volume find their application in detail.

Lack of space forbids us to comment upon the interesting classification of the sciences which is laid before us, and which stands as an imposing reminder of the empirical basis of the philosophy which Wundt is to offer us. Nor can I dwell upon Wundt's logic. It is worth while to remind the reader that we have here within a compass of fifty pages what elsewhere fills several bulky volumes, and that he should be grateful to the author for this skilful *résumé*. I can only say that, on the whole, Wundt lays stress upon the empirical character of his doctrine, — he finds, not only the materials of thought, but the stimulus to, and the control of logical construction in what is given in intuition (pp. 34-49). Nevertheless, we seem to come to a parting of the ways. We seem to see even here traces of an aspect of his philosophy which cannot be called empirical. I find these, especially, in his assimilation of induction to deduction (pp. 57-58), and in his treatment of the principle of the ground, or of sufficient reason (pp. 64-72). He denies that logical dependence is to be explained

by a reference to the principle of identity; and declares that the consciousness of inner necessity, which the mind connects with it, is due to "the very nature of thought" (p. 66). Here one may well question whether the author does not fall back upon a principle not in harmony with the general empirical spirit of his doctrine, and not in harmony with the spirit in which he criticises Kant's treatment of forms elsewhere in his book (*e. g.*, p. 107).

With this brief comment, I turn to the next division of the work; and I do not hesitate, on account of its great importance, to give it an amount of attention out of all proportion to the number of pages which it fills.

Part II is the very keystone of the arch of Wundt's system. Here he turns from thought to knowledge, gives an account of the objects of knowledge, and treats of its different orders — of perceptual knowledge, of knowledge on the plane of the understanding, and of knowledge as apprehended by the reason (pp. 76–205). It is from this part of his treatise, chiefly, that Wundt's significance as a systematic philosopher will have to be judged. A careful rereading of this division of the *System der Philosophie* has made it of absorbing interest to me. What shall we call Wundt? Shall we admit that he has a right to be called a realist? or shall we describe him as an idealist in disguise? Shall we claim him as an empiricist? or shall we say that he is essentially a rationalist who is prevented from being an extreme one by the fact that he is an accomplished man of science? It is easy to classify men so long as one remains on the surface and overlooks all subtle distinctions; it is not easy, when one goes deeper. Briefly, too briefly, stated, Wundt's doctrine is as follows:

In experience, or the 'given,' we have a unity of thought and being. What is known is at once known as *object*. By immediate experience we mean experience not worked up by thought; this we contrast with mediate experience. Gradually, as a result of reflection, the knowing comes to be separated from the object, and thinking is recognized as a subjective activity. But, for naïve thought, the 'given' is not something which is at once subjective presentation and also object; it is only an object with such and such characteristics. To distinguish between subjective activity and represented object we must first attain to an apprehension of the subject. This has its basis in the elements of feeling and will (pp. 76–82).

The subject (here, our body), in so far as it is a thing perceived, is an object like others, but it is distinguished from others by its relation to feeling and will. Having apprehended the subject, and grasped

the significance of the subjective (*i. e.*, that which is referred to the subject), we may come back to what presents itself as object, and subject it to criticism. Thinking cannot, of itself, do away with a unity not created by it, but immediately given to it. Nevertheless, it can, in particular instances, deny to a presented content the property of being an object. It is thus that what is merely imagined comes to be distinguished from what is real (pp. 87-92). We begin, then, by accepting what purport to be facts, on their face value. We criticise these, and elaborate our knowledge through the three stages of *perceptual knowledge*, which belongs to common life, *knowledge by means of the understanding*, which is the province of the special sciences, and *knowledge by means of the reason*, which belongs to philosophy (pp. 93-97).

I suppose that the question which will press for an answer in the mind of nearly every acute reader of Wundt at this stage of his exposition will be: What reason have we to believe that the crude, undifferentiated experience referred to in the above would contain any recognition of the real, or know its presentation to be an 'object' in the sense in which an image in the imagination is not an object? Does not the notion of the real come into being when, and only when, the contrast of experiences brings it about that one is taken, — for a purpose, — and the other is left? It was an idealist who first pointed out that the distinction of real and unreal bases itself upon the relations in which our experiences stand in the whole system of our experience. His discovery has been accepted by realists as well as idealists since; Wundt himself falls back upon it in eliminating the unreal. But the impulse which has impelled Wundt to speak as he has done is unmistakable.

Through and through a man of science; convinced that the world of science is objective, and that it is a betrayal of it to call it mental; conscious furthermore of the difficulty of getting out of the charmed circle of images and representations when once imprisoned in it; Wundt lays his hands upon the objective, — not sensation, not idea, but object, — at the very outset. But it seems to go without saying that the word 'object,' as thus used, cannot be synonymous with the word as used in describing elements in our developed and differentiated experience. How much meaning is left to it, when we abstract from all this? Wundt thinks enough is left to make all the difference between realism and idealism.

To continue the argument. The total content of perception is, says Wundt, a complex of "matter" and "form." Sensations are the



matter, and the form is the ordering of this stuff in time and space, and the separation of the ordered whole into single objects (p. 98). We are able to distinguish between the formal and the material elements in perception because they vary independently (p. 104). Space and time are homogeneous, and they are necessary in the sense that no perception can be thought without them. In this sense they are *a priori*; they cannot be deduced any more than red or blue; they are facts in the content of perception (p. 107).

A whole of intuition can only be divided into parts in so far as it has multiplicity. Thus, all correlation of parts, measurement, and ordering of elements, depend upon the distinguishing of form from matter. The science which busies itself with quantitative relations and with the ordering of elements is mathematics. It has to do primarily only with extensive quantities; its application to the intensive is a borrowed function (pp. 108-113). Motion, *i. e.*, change in space and time, gives us our only opportunity to measure time as an extensive quantity, or to compare its parts (p. 113). As the formal measurement of time can only be conceived by the help of space, we may say that all measurement of extensive quantities is spatial (p. 119).

Lack of space forbids my dwelling at length upon Wundt's doctrine of space and time. But I cannot forbear pointing out that he is distinctly Kantian in finding his formal elements in the 'given,' not as a crude 'extensity,' which only by elaboration becomes the space and time of our real world, but, so to speak, ready made. On the other hand, he refuses to regard time as the form of the 'inner sense,' holding that all our presentations are spatio-temporal (p. 115). He keeps close to the actual procedure of science in emphasizing the importance of motion in the ordering of our world; though, in following his discussion, we cannot help asking ourselves whether space is any more directly a measure of time than time is a measure of qualitative change. We undoubtedly measure time by referring to the motions of certain objects in nature; but no measurement of space is in itself a measure of time. The distance traversed has no temporal significance if we abstract from the rapidity of the motion, *i. e.*, if we abstract from time. Our ultimate measure of time is not, then, spatial. Space and time can be ultimately measured only in terms of themselves.

Having gotten, in his doctrine of the 'given,' an external reality in space and time, Wundt turns to an investigation of the dividing up of that reality into individual objects. The independent motion of objects, he tells us, is what distinguishes them from one another (p.

120). Again there is brought to the front the distinction of subject and object, and the question is raised: What, in general, in our presentations, belongs to the object, and what belongs to us, the representing subject (p. 124)?

In his discussion of the subjective and the objective in perception (pp. 121-135) our author appears to be endeavoring to combine into one consistent doctrine views which certainly strike one, at first sight, as incompatible. The argument is of some length, and it deserves the most careful attention; but, at the risk of doing injustice to the author's thought, — a risk which I cannot avoid, — I shall indicate very briefly the difficulty.

On the one hand, Wundt holds tenaciously to the uncompromising realism which regards the whole 'given' as an object from the outset. Both in common thought and in science, we are told, objects are accepted as *beside* the subject (our body), and not as conditioned by it. All natural science rests upon the assumption that objects have an existence independent of the subject (p. 121). Our bodies influence other objects, and other objects influence them. Thus there arises the notion of an interaction of subject and object, the conceptions of action and passion. This we generalize in reflection, and we come to believe that objects must act on the subject in order to be perceived. There results the distinction between objects without, which act upon us, and the perceptions which result from such activities (pp. 123-125). This reasoning, claims Wundt, is psychological, not logical, and it ends in a self-contradictory doctrine. We must not forget that the object of perception is single, not double. The one object which we perceive is given directly (p. 126).

So much for one side of the doctrine under discussion. Every element in the content of perception is originally equally objective, and all perceptual knowledge is from the first equally immediate (p. 127). The mediate object at which reflection arrives is nothing else than the immediate object as it is after certain logical corrections which fix its actuality (p. 127). We attain to this mediate object as follows: The subject, in comparing and connecting its experiences, *is forced by the fact that different perceptions of the same object contradict each other, to take the whole qualitative content of sensation back into the subject.* Such a procedure is not necessary in the case of the constant formal elements of perception. These, then, remain objective, and are contrasted with the subjective (pp. 129-136).

To criticise this interesting doctrine briefly is, as I have indicated, scarcely fair to it. Nevertheless, I must express the conviction that its

two halves, when put together, do not make a quite satisfactory whole. Are we to hold to the doctrine that the whole content of perception, — both matter and form, — are given as object? Or shall we modify it by the statement that the one element is given as object and the other only *seems* to be thus given? If we do this, we seem to reduce the external world which we appeared to hold within our grasp to a mere world of forms, — space and time are objective, and nothing more. Surely this is not the doctrine of science, which demands an independent external world, and not merely independent space and time. If Wundt would admit that the raw material of experience given in intuition is neither objective nor subjective, that such distinctions arise out of its differentiation and elaboration, and that the formal as well as the material element in intuition is, as a matter of fact, subjected to such elaboration in the building up of the concept of a real world, I think the difficulty could be avoided. The problem is: to remain a realist, and yet to recognize the truth that the conceptual world at which science arrives is not a something directly given in intuition. Wundt must be given the credit for recognizing clearly that this is the problem. I think a moderate amount of change in his premises would permit him to keep his conclusions, and yet not be taxed with inconsistency.

The discussion of perceptual knowledge ends with the statement that, through reflection, the object immediately given loses its character as real object, and takes on that of a subjective symbol which refers to an object which can only be determined conceptually (p. 138). The thinking of objects and their relations by means of conceptions is the province of the *understanding*. In the field of natural science, the understanding subjects objects to a conceptual investigation, using *presentations* only as *signs*; in psychology, which has to do with experience in its immediacy, it uses conceptions only to make easier the analysis and synthesis of facts given in intuition (pp. 138–142).

Assuming that all percepts which are related through their time and space form (*i. e.*, are referred to the same time and space) must also be related in their content, we connect them with each other under the conception of a permanent thing with its properties, and reconcile the apparent contradictions among them (pp. 153–156). But we do more than this. We strive to attain to a consistent system of all our experiences, removing contradictions by substituting a wider system for a narrower wherever an apparent exception to the uniformity we seek seems to compel us to such a step. Some uniformities in nature thrust themselves upon our attention, but this in itself would carry us

a very little way. How does it come that, in order to attain to a consistent connection of experiences, we are willing to sublimate the whole living world of sense-perception into mere subjective appearance, and to place over against it as objective reality a purely conceptual construct? The explanation is to be found "in the extraordinary fertility of the original mutual relations of intuition and thought. All the laws of thought have their source in intuition. But no law leaves intuition unchanged, and every law has the power to reach out beyond its original activities, in order to subject to itself everything that can be the object of intuition" (p. 157). The system of our experiences tends to embrace all our experiences, and thus the principle of ground and consequence tends to develop into a principle of the interrelating of all parts of the total content of knowledge, of future, as well as of given experiences (pp. 159-160).

The three fundamental disciplines which, from the standpoint of knowledge on the plane of the understanding, reveal themselves as the three necessary divisions of epistemology, — divisions demanded by the conditions of thought and of experience, — are: (1) The investigation of possible forms of thought; (2) the working up of the 'externally given' into a consistent system of objective, mediate, or conceptual knowledge; (3) the working up of the whole content of outer and inner experience into a consistent system of subjective, immediate, or intuitional knowledge. To these correspond, respectively, mathematics, natural science, and psychology (p. 161).

The need of completing our knowledge of the connected system of our experiences brings us, says Wundt, face to face with three problems: (1) What value for knowledge has a purely ideal system, one which transcends the empirically limited system of perceptions and conceptions of the understanding? (2) Under what conditions is a system embracing the totality of objective and one embracing the totality of subjective knowledge possible and justified? (3) What is the significance of the idea of a unity of both systems of knowledge, and how can this be brought into relation to our actual knowledge of the world (p. 164)? The treatment of these problems does not transcend the limits of all knowledge, but it does transcend knowledge on the plane of the understanding. The understanding aims at a comprehension of the connection of things; the *reason* seeks their *ground*; it aims at a completion of knowledge (p. 165). To mark the distinction, let us call those points of view from which such a completion is attempted, not conceptions, but, following Kant, *ideas* (pp. 165-166). Kant fell into the error of separating the domains

of understanding and reason, giving to one, experience, and to the other, the thing-in-itself. This error is to be avoided (pp. 166-167).

We are concerned only with experience, and its reduction to a system. The reason, resting upon the mental law of ground and consequence, demands an endless progression in the connection of experiences, and at the same time, the completion of this process in the conception of a totality. The idea of an endless progression and the idea of a whole seem contradictory, but both are given in the law of ground and consequence. The two infinities belong together, and neither is possible without the other (pp. 171-173).

In mathematics we have both real and imaginary transcendence. We deal with the infinitely great and the infinitely small, and also with such conceptions as the roots of minus quantities and  $n$ -dimensional space. We may call these two forms of transcendence quantitative and qualitative. In mathematics transcendence has only a formal significance (pp. 173-179).

In philosophy transcendence plays a rôle analogous to that which it plays in mathematics, with the difference that we have here to do with matter as well as form. Thus, in so far as the content of knowledge is conditioned by the form, the universal validity of the former is given by the latter. On this ground we make such mechanical principles as inertia, equivalence of action and reaction, etc., universally valid. Again, wherever a connection of ground and consequence, established by our thought, leads beyond the limits of experience, it embraces both form and content. This establishes our right to apply the causal nexus to both form and content of our knowledge (pp. 184-186). The transcendent problems in philosophy are cosmological, psychological, and ontological (p. 188).

In each case we find a two-fold progression, — in the one direction, toward an absolute totality; in the other, toward an indivisible unity. In dealing with the cosmological idea, we may confine our attention to the formal, to space and time. Thus we may arrive at the idea of an absolutely simple, empirically unattainable, point of space or time. Or we may take into consideration the matter of experience, and conceive such ideas as those of atoms, of the beginnings of our solar system, of a final condition of physical things, etc. Such ideas have not the same real significance as that of the infinite regress. We may call this imaginary transcendence (pp. 189-190). In the field of the psychological and the ontological, we cannot abstract from content.

The psychological idea, like the cosmological, postulates a two-fold progression toward ultimate ideas of unity. The one has reference to

the final and unanalyzable individual unity of spiritual being; the other, to the totality of all that is spiritual, or the universal ground of the whole spiritual world. Some thinkers have laid emphasis upon the one progression; some upon the other. Thus there have arisen *individualistic* and *universalistic* hypotheses, which have been sometimes intellectualistic, sometimes voluntaristic in character (pp. 191-192).

The ontological idea, which binds into a unity nature and spirit, has its origin, partly in the unity of experience, and partly in the cosmological and psychological ideas, which demand such a unification. We may regard the final ground of things as *matter*, as *spirit*, or as neither alone, but *both together*. Thus we have materialism, idealism, and realism, as the three philosophies which, in their various forms, have divided the field among them (pp. 193-194). It need hardly be pointed out that what Wundt here calls realism, many writers have preferred to call monism.

In the foregoing we have the general plan and outline of Wundt's philosophical system as such. It remains for him to give an account of the concepts of the understanding (Part III), of the ideas of the reason (Part IV), and to apply his general principles in detail in the fields of nature and mind (Parts V and VI).

The great influence which the philosophy of Kant has exerted upon Wundt's thought is unmistakably recognizable in the structure of his system. He treats first of intuition and its "forms"; then presents us with a system of the "pure" concepts of the understanding, concepts which serve to order experience, and make of it a connected and organized whole; finally he looks to a completion of our knowledge through certain "ideas" of the reason, which are necessary, but are transcendent, merely regulative, and do not carry with them a guarantee of the existence of an object corresponding to the idea (pp. 434-436).

Here we have the very warp and woof of the Critique of Pure Reason. Nevertheless, Wundt is a Kantian with a difference. He eschews the *a priori*, and seeks his 'forms' in the empirically given. When we examine his pure concepts of the understanding, we are forced to conclude, I think, that they differ from what he calls empirical concepts only in being more abstract (pp. 206-226). These pure concepts do not form a system properly so called. Throughout we are concerned with abstract concepts, which have their place in the sciences, and undoubtedly call for careful analysis, but are not deduced according to a single principle or plan. In this turn given

to the "Kategorienlehre," the empiricist will rejoice, but he may object to the Kantian flavor which the discussion retains, and complain that *apriorism* is not vanquished, but only kept at bay. The pure concepts of the understanding which Wundt selects for especial examination are, the formal concepts of multiplicity, number, and function, and the real concepts of substance, cause, and end.

In the analysis of these concepts our author is at his very best, and his pages are worthy of study by the philosopher of every school. Substance he conceives of as the permanent amid the changes in phenomena, and he traces the history of the concept, bringing us to the atom and the electron. Should the electrons, he tells us, be proved, in course of time, to be composite, recourse will be had, in all probability, to more ultimate changeless elements. It is the whole task of science to explain the changes in the properties of things through changes in their external relations, *i. e.*, by having recourse to the principle of causality (pp. 267-277). Thus, substance and cause are related concepts which explain the changes which take place in the material world.

As the reader of Wundt's psychology well knows, Wundt repudiates the concept of a soul-substance. Psychical occurrences he explains by referring them, under the principle of cause and effect, to other psychical occurrences, or to the impression made upon the individual consciousness by happenings in the world of matter. Thus, the principle of causality obtains in the world of mind as well as in the material world, but it obtains with a difference. In the former, a permanent substance is abandoned, and there can be no talk of the equivalence of cause and effect; on the other hand, the concept of end becomes the leading principle in our judgments of ground and consequence (pp. 299-306).

It is scarcely necessary to comment upon the fact that many who will praise warmly the admirably clear and acute account given of physical causation, will be inclined to marvel that the author is unable to see that, having abandoned soul-substance, he is compelled, in attributing mental occurrences to causality, to use the word causality in a sense quite distinct from that in which he has used it before. Nor will the surprise be lessened in passing on to the latter part of the volume, and discovering that, in the last instance, all causality is to be regarded as mental, that the whole phenomenal world and all changes in it are ultimately attributable to the interaction of wills. How are we to conceive this interaction? The author does not tell us. I do not criticise the doctrine; I merely take this opportunity of recom-

mending it to the earnest consideration of the reader. We are concerned with a living issue, and the study of Wundt can shed light upon it.

In considering the concept of end, Wundt contrasts the mechanical and the teleological views of the system of nature, and casts in his lot with the latter. He finds the true explanation of the adjustment of the organism to its environment in the interaction of the psychical and the physical. In the lowest organisms, he argues, *will* is revealed; movements are due to acts of the will, and function leaves its record in modification of structure. Hence, we may say that the will creates the body of which it appears to be the expression (pp. 306-338).

And now for the Transcendent Ideas (Part IV). I must dismiss this most interesting topic with a word. We are told that, by a necessity of thought, we are compelled to conceive of space and time as infinite totalities, and of the endless series of the subdivisions of spaces and times as a limitless complete series; that, although science has no positive knowledge of an infinite universe of matter, and, in seeking the ultimate elements which will explain phenomena, is forced to stop at the atom, the electron, or something similar, yet we are compelled to think of the progression in either direction as an infinite completed one (pp. 339-358); that we must conceive of the psychological unit, or of the soul, as an absolutely simple activity of apperception, not given in experience at all, and of no significance for empirical psychology, but which implies the existence of other similar transcendent units, which form a totality to be conceived as endless, though we have no empirical knowledge of such (pp. 359-393). Finally, the ontological idea furnishes us with a unification of the cosmological and of the psychological. We have no direct knowledge of any activity except that of our will. That which acts upon us must itself be will. That world of presentations which science regards as independent of us, we must look upon as a product of the interaction of a multiplicity of transcendent wills. Thus, the ontological regress gives us, in the one direction, ultimate individual will-centres; in the other, it arrives at the idea of a World-will, conceived after the analogy of the social will of which we have experience, but transcending every ethical and theological ideal (pp. 393-434).

Of the remainder of Wundt's work I shall not speak. Interesting as it is to follow his thought in its details, the second volume adds nothing to the edifice which has been built up before us. Nor shall I,



for obvious reasons, comment upon these necessary ideas of the reason and their significance. I merely ask the reader to put to himself, in the light of the discussions contained in Part IV, the following questions: Is Wundt a realist? Does he believe in an external world independent of the percipient? Is he an empiricist? Does his philosophical system, as a system, rest upon the foundations furnished by empirical science? Or is it a modified Kantian doctrine, which contains *a priori* elements not clearly recognized to be such?

Philosophy is in a transition stage. The empiricist of to-day is not the crude and unreflective empiricist of an earlier time. The realist is not the uncompromising opponent of every suggestion made by the idealist that he once was. In this flux of theories, it cannot but be of value to consult the work of an eminent scholar, who appears to many to have a foot in either camp, and one whose erudition forbids the supposition that he is writing in ignorance of whatever facts and theories science is in a position to offer us.

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*Voraussetzungen und Ziele des Erkennens. Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Logik.* Von JONAS COHN. Leipzig, Wilhelm Engelmann, 1908. — pp. v, 526.

The work before us offers a noteworthy and very suggestive contribution to the discussion of epistemological and logical problems, if not also a positive advance in theory. The writer, a professor at Freiburg, is a former student of natural science who was drawn into philosophy by the antinomies suggested by the conception of the infinite, and he brings to his task a thorough grasp of recent speculation in mathematics and theory of science as well as of the history of philosophy and modern logic. With the recent English and American studies of logic and value, however, which might be expected to concern him closely, he seems to be wholly unacquainted. He writes very concisely, yet with an ease and fluency of style approaching elegance; and to the constantly attentive reader the present paragraph is always perfectly clear. Not so, however, the larger division of which it forms a part. The structure of the argument recalls somewhat the magazine serial, in which complication is added to complication, and the mystery steadily deepens, until just before the end. It is fair to say that he finally fulfils his promise of giving unity and meaning to his investigations, but in the meantime I think he has rendered a not very easy task needlessly difficult. And the difficulty is increased

somewhat by the introduction of a private terminology, which is elaborated considerably beyond his present needs.

Several motives are interwoven in the texture of the argument. The simplest way of viewing the book as a whole is to regard it as a new Critique of Pure Reason. As with Kant, his problem is the relation of *Begriff* and *Anschauung*, of the forms of thought and the material of thought, of science and reality, and the interpretation of space, time, and the categories. And for him, as for Kant, the contrast of *Begriff* and *Anschauung* (though the distinction is relative) marks an irreducible dualism. Only his work is in no sense a commentary upon Kant, but a positive extension of Kant's analysis along lines of his own, with special reference to the conception of truth as an expression of value. And, unlike Kant, he makes no pretence to offer a system either of epistemology or of logic. His conception of both, and of logic in particular, is based upon the analogy of modern mathematical theory. Contrary to popular ideas upon the subject, mathematics is not a unified system. The prime numbers, for example, for which a serial formula has been vainly sought, are an uncoördinated residuum resulting from the combination of the distinct processes of addition and multiplication. And modern mathematical theory does nothing more than derive its body of statements distributively from the several axioms underlying them, classifying the axioms, indeed, as prior and posterior, but leaving them in the end distinct and underived from any general principle. So of logic. It is a mistake to assume that all logical relations may be derived from the law of contradiction, much less from the law of identity. The processes of inversion and mediate inference, for example, rest upon axioms of their own, axioms which presuppose, indeed, the axiom of contradiction but can only be fully accounted for by reference to the specific aims of knowledge. And so again of the epistemological categories. They presuppose certain fundamental principles, from which, however, they cannot be derived. The author's aim is therefore to present, not a system, but an analysis, which he will make as coherent as possible, of the several postulates, — which are both presuppositions and aims, — of knowing. And in particular he seeks to show the bearing upon the whole problem of certain principles which he regards as especially his own.

The exposition of these principles is given in Part I. They are : (1) the principle of immanence. Here the author gives his interpretation of the proposition, no object without a subject. When we undertake to know an object, what is the peculiarity of our aim? It is not, as commonly defined, to view the object as something inde-

pendent of the knower, for an object thus independent could never be known. It is rather to view the object from the standpoint of the ideal knower; of the knower who has abstracted from all the peculiarities of character and position belonging to his individual self; in other words, from the standpoint of the superindividual ego (*überindividuelles Ich*). This standpoint is not that of the 'normal' or average man. Nor, the author seems to imply, is it a 'social' standpoint. Nor, again, is it ever actual. It is simply the ideal, necessary yet forever unattainable, of the conscious process so far as it seeks simply and purely to know. (2) Next the principle of utraquism (*i. e.*, 'bothism,' and in plain English, dualism. "Utraquism," I suppose, is framed to emphasize the point that the question is of one or both, never of more than two). Utraquism means that in every process of knowing there are two irreducible elements, an element of thought (*Denkform*) and an element foreign to thought (*Denkfremdes*), or a *datum*. Not only, as Kant claimed, are ideas without perceptions empty and perceptions without ideas blind, — there can be no empty ideas and no blind perceptions. The vaguest form of consciousness, *e. g.*, a feeling of pleasure, so far as known, admits of affirmation or denial, and thus involves an element of *Denkform*. On the other hand, the purest conceptions of the superindividual ego must be conceived to contain a foreign *datum*, for otherwise they could not be said to constitute knowledge. The extent to which one element or the other predominates varies, however, with different departments of thought, and the study of these variations is one feature of the author's task. (3) Finally, we come to his theory of the judgment-relation, *i. e.*, of the relation involved in the judgment. The traditional logic recognizes only one form of relation, which is expressed by the copula 'is' in the form A is B, and is commonly interpreted as a relation of subsumption, sometimes erroneously as one of equality or of partial identity. But even 'is' has many meanings, as illustrated by 'this dog is brown,' 'the dog is a mammal,' 'my friend is in Paris.' And as a matter of fact there may be as many relations of terms in the judgment as there are relations of objects conceivable in thought. The analysis of the various relations determined by the axioms of inversion and mediate inference forms one of the interesting episodes of the book, but it cannot be given here even in summary. It may be said that the bearing of this principle upon his subsequent investigations, though not altogether obscure, is not so well made out as that of the other two. But it furnishes a basis for a statement of his main problem: Does the judgment-relation determine the order (*Zusam-*

*menhang*) of objects, or conversely? How far does thought control things? Granting the control of thought where the objects are abstracted qualities, still what shall we say of objects concretely located (*demonstriert*) in space and time?

This brings us to Part II, which is perhaps the most significant portion of the book. Here the author proposes, through the medium of a very intelligible summary and criticism of certain recent developments in mathematical speculation, an epistemological theory of (1) number and (2) space, in which they are interpreted as conditions which must be fulfilled by an object which is to be known. (1) Number is that which is true of an object by virtue of its being merely asserted, or posited. The first demand of knowledge is, let there be something, — not a wholly blind something, which would not be distinguishable from nothing, but a something which may be held fast in thought and treated as self-identical and distinct from other somethings, *i. e.*, let there be a *thing*. As just fulfilling this condition, anything may be substituted for any other, and from this possibility of substitution we have the concept of number. Number is thus the fulfilment in the object of the law of identity, which, according to the author, applies primarily to objects and not to the relations of objects, to the terms of a judgment rather than to their relation. But identity of objects, though nothing more is asserted, implies diversity of content. Otherwise even the equation  $1 = 1$  would be meaningless.<sup>1</sup> And so, even here, in the region of purest construction, thought-form implies a foreign *datum*. In other words, pure mathematics is not pure thought, but only thought with a minimum of foreign matter. This theory of number is contrasted as *utraquistic*, on one side with the (rationalistic) theory of Russell, for whom number is the representative of ultimate logical classes, and on the other side with the (sensualistic) theory of Helmholtz and Kronecker, for whom number is an association of objects with arbitrary signs.

(2) As postulated of reality, space is homogeneous and continuous. Russell and Cantor have endeavored to derive these characters from those of the well-ordered number-series, and so to derive space from number. Their method is to fill up the gaps between the natural numbers with infinite series of rational numbers, each of which series will then be limited by two natural numbers (*e. g.*, the numbers 1 and 2), and thus will constitute an infinite whole. But, according to the

<sup>1</sup> Here and elsewhere, the author emphasizes the point that mere identity, or again purely symmetrical relation, of subject and predicate would leave the thought just where it is and never admit of any further inference.

author, such a series presupposes that all the rational numbers between 1 and 2 can be reduced to fractions of a common denominator; whereas, let your denominator be as great as you please, there will always be rational numbers not covered by it. The series, therefore, while infinite, will never constitute a whole, and it will consequently never finally fill the gap between 1 and 2. An infinite series can never be a whole. For a series can never determine its own limits. A limit implies something which can be transcended, hence something beyond the series limited. The series of rational numbers from 1 to 2 acquires its limits only by being thrust between the two natural numbers, which, however, have been derived from axioms other than those of the series and are thus not properly members of it. Not only, then, is continuity not to be derived from number, but the same is true of the so-called extensions of number, such as fractions and irrational numbers. Their construction presupposes other axioms beyond those of the natural numbers.

Why, then, is space homogeneous and continuous? Because, according to the author's theory, these characters are fundamental conditions of objective identification (*überindividuelle Demonstrierbarkeit*). The possibility of pointing out and identifying an object presupposes an order of objects which is independent of their content. In other words, the object must admit of theoretical construction and control. Objective identification, however, presupposes an order of objects independent of their relations to individual subjects. The fulfilment of these conditions is a continuous and homogeneous space. Here the structure of an object is not dependent upon the point from which it is viewed, the object is not fractured or distorted by being moved from one location to another (which would not be the case if space were a number-series), and its content is independent of its location. As regards the object space is absolutely passive and accommodating. By this argument the author derives space (and also time) from the fundamental postulates of knowledge, and at the same time bridges the difference which Kant left between the forms of intuition and the forms of thought. His argument is not unconvincing, and it suggests various lines of elaboration. Certainly it seems that the demand for clearness and objectivity has a tendency to drive us to spatial modes of distinction. We should ask nothing further if only he could produce an epistemological derivation for our three dimensions. Here, however, he is in difficulty. The postulates of measurement call, indeed, for free movement, and hence for a plurality of dimensions, but with regard to our trinity

he can only claim, plausibly enough, that it must represent some postulate of knowing still to be analyzed.

Part III and the concluding Part IV may conveniently be considered together, as giving his general theory of the relation of science and reality. In Part IV, however, there is a treatment of the more general categories (for Kant the "forms of thought") as distinct from the categories of definite construction and identification dealt with in Part III. The categories specifically defined are those of comparability, substantiality, and causality. I must omit any further reference to them except to note, here again, that, while they all presuppose the general postulates of knowledge, no complete system or list of them is regarded by the author as possible. For example, they are not, as Schopenhauer claims, all to be derived from cause, nor, as the physicists tend to hold, is cause to be derived from the conservation of energy (substance). The conservation-law in itself furnishes no ground for change, and a world governed by it exclusively would consist at best of an unending repetition of the same cycle of events.

There are various conceptions of reality. Scientific reality, however,—the world of scientific construction,—may be contrasted with living reality (*Erlebende Wirklichkeit*), the world of concrete life and experience. The ideal of scientific reality is a closed, articulated system, but the living reality is inexhaustible, though it points to an ideal unity of its own. The relation of scientific to living reality varies, however, with the different sciences. The sciences may be arranged in the following series: mathematics, physics, biology, psychology, the value-sciences, history. Only the first can be satisfied with the principles of pure construction. Each of the others has to introduce "completing principles," of a more or less teleological nature, in order to organize its subject-matter. But, on the other hand, each, so far as it is remote from constructive unity, is nearer to the living reality. And so there is a fundamental antithesis between science and (living) reality. The very peculiarity of knowing,—that of objective construction,—means that thinking, or knowing, must forever face an element foreign to thought. And yet the ideal of knowing is not merely to organize, but to organize all reality. What it all means, then, is that science of itself points to an ideal beyond science, logic to a hyperlogical ideal.

What, then, is the final meaning of knowledge? The answer, so far as given, is to be found in the author's conception of logic as a study of value (*Wertwissenschaft*). This conception dominates the

book as a whole. As a matter of value, truth-value takes its place with moral, æsthetic, and other values, and a given coördination of all these values would constitute a personal *Weltanschauung*, the analysis of which furnishes the task for philosophy in the widest sense. It seems, then, that in last analysis the author's utraquism is also a thorough-going idealism, though his statement of his general point of view leaves many questions unanswered. One point, however, is significant, namely, the bearing of his logical doctrine upon the problem of free will. Free will implies for us the possibility of change, yet the world of science is a determinate and closed system. The solution of the antinomy lies in the conception of the world of science as the expression of an ideal, never, indeed, finally attainable but always to be striven for. In other words, science is not a copy of what once for all exists. It is true that for common thought the completely determinate world is, paradoxically, both a presupposition and a goal of knowledge (*Voraussetzung und Ziel*). But the presupposition becomes simply an ideal when logic is treated critically as a study of value. And this removes the impossibility of change; for in a world to be constructed yet never finally completed there is always room for change.

The book offers a rich field for critical discussion into which I may hardly enter. It should be said that the author's conception of the relation of science and reality is not altogether new. It is prefigured in Royce's distinction of the world of description and the world of appreciation,<sup>1</sup> and I have also made it the basis of an extended analysis of the motives underlying hedonistic and idealistic theories of morality.<sup>2</sup> These details in no wise diminish the fruitfulness and suggestiveness of the conception at the hands of the author. But, considering the nature of his subject, I think he may be held accountable for the extent to which his work suffers from his total neglect, or ignorance, of the literature of value contributed by Royce, James, Dewey, Baldwin, and the English pragmatists. It is significant that the question of the relation of science to social or practical action, of truth-value to social and economic values, is never even raised. His analysis of truth-value ends in the "self-guarantee of truth."

And this suggests a final point. One of the most valuable features of his work is his critical handling of the traditional logic, — which he calls the subsumption logic. To my view the most conspicuous feature of the traditional logic, directly suggested by the relation of subsump-

<sup>1</sup> *The World and the Individual*, Second Series, p. 26 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *An Introductory Study of Ethics*, Chapters XIV, XV, and XVII.

tion, is its rectilinear mode of derivation in one direction only, and its consequent reference of all truth to certain opaque absolutes, either axioms or facts. This feature is accepted by the author without criticism. Indeed, his whole work is a search for such ultimates, of which the "self-guarantee of truth" is an example. And it is worth noting that his criticism of mathematical theory never touches its logical method. Yet just here, I should think, the question ought to arise, especially when, as in modern mathematics, one compares different types of space-systems. The slightest consideration of the axiom of parallels as determining our own type would seem to suggest that any other of its characters would do as well, and that the 'axioms' have therefore no prior validity but are simply members of a democratic system.

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*Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention.*

By EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1908. — pp. ix, 404.

"The system of psychology rests upon a three-fold foundation: the doctrine of sensation and image, the elementary doctrine of feeling, and the doctrine of attention." A sensation in psychology, by way of orientation, is "any sense-process that cannot be further analyzed by introspection," and this must be distinguished from the sensation of psychophysics which is the supposed sense-correlate of an elementary excitatory process posited by a physiological theory. Thus white is psychologically an elementary sensation while, according to the Young-Helmholtz theory, it is psychophysically compounded of three elements. An attribute of sensation, in psychology, is any aspect or moment or dimension which is inseparable, — without which the sensation vanishes: and the attributes of a sensation can ordinarily, but not always, vary independently of one another, — one quality in several intensities, one intensity of several qualities. Attributes are intensive or qualitative. All intensive attribute is changing when a sensation "moves along the shortest path to or from the zero-point"; a qualitative "when it moves in a direction that neither carries it towards nor withdraws it from the zero-point" (Müller). The qualitative attributes are special in the several senses, while the intensive are (with a few exceptions) common; and are, namely, intensity proper, extensity, duration, and clearness. This last "is the attribute which distinguishes the 'focal' from the 'marginal' sensation; it is



the attribute whose variation reflects the 'distribution of attention.''' The qualitative is usually taken as the individualizing attribute of a sensation. We call it one and the same sensation so long as its quality remains, though all its other attributes may have changed; while if the quality alone changes, even very slightly, we call it a different sensation. This usage is inexact but may be allowed to pass.

The second lecture deals with the criteria of affection and the question whether the affections (pleasantness and unpleasantness) are to be classed as sensations or as something generically other. The generic difference, if there be one, must be such as to appear in a comparison of two simple elements,—a single affective element with a single sensation. "As thought differs from emotion, so must the element of thought, the sensation, differ from the element of emotion, the affection." Hereupon the following alleged distinctions are passed in review and dismissed: The 'objectivity' of sensation versus the 'subjectivity' of affection, a distinction which allows of three interpretations, (*a*) that affections tend to fuse as sensations do not (Wundt), (*b*) that the former differ between individual subjects as the latter do not, (*c*) that affections cannot appear without sensations while sensations can stand in consciousness alone; the distinction of localizable versus not localizable, (*a*) in space, (*b*) in consciousness; the distinction of difference versus antagonism, *i. e.*, that sensations merely differ from one another while in affection pleasant is the precise opposite of unpleasant; the distinction of peripherally versus centrally excited; and of persisting versus not persisting, under habituation. All these distinctions are either not empirically discoverable or else not adequate as generic differentiation between affection and feeling. The true distinction, Professor Titchener finds, is connected with the intensive attribute of clearness; it is "that affections lack, what all sensations possess, the attribute of clearness. Attention to a sensation means always that the sensation becomes clear; attention to an affection is impossible." Of the other alleged distinctions, that of the difference between sensations and the antagonism of feelings is the only one that deserves *very* serious consideration, and it is by no means conclusively established. It is also not a difference which would appear from a comparison of two single elements.

The third lecture has for its text Stumpf's paper *Ueber Gefühls-empfindungen*. Stumpf argues that the affections are not a distinct genus of mental elements, but are a species of sensation, and he virtually identifies unpleasantness with the pain sensation, and pleasantness with the sensation called tickle, which is for him akin to itch,

lust, etc. Such a view seems scarcely tenable, since "both itch and pain may be, according to circumstances, pleasant, indifferent, or unpleasant." But furthermore the view seems to exclude artificially from the category of affection the 'higher' feelings which can certainly be pleasant and unpleasant; and Stumpf does consider these apart under the name *Gemütsbewegung*. And another serious difficulty arises "in connection with the affective tone of moderately and weakly intensive sensations of sight and sound, taste and smell." What organs of pain and tickle are concomitantly stimulated with these senses? Thus this effort to make affection a kind of sensation, fails. To the reviewer it seems that, while the two affections are certainly not respectively pain and tickle, they might still be accounted in and for themselves two species of sensation, namely, the sensory qualities of pleasant and unpleasant. But then, again, no very mighty issue depends on this generic identity or difference between sensation and affection, inveterately as the question recurs, until we have a suitable definition of what a *generic* difference in such a case might be. Why, as for Professor Titchener, does the fact that affections lack the intensive attribute of clearness distinguish them generically from sensations, while for some other qualities the lack of the intensive attribute of extension constitutes no such generic distinction? Such may truly be the case, but everything hangs, clearly, on the definition of 'generic.'

The fourth lecture is devoted to Wundt's tridimensional theory of feeling. The genesis of this remarkable chapter of Wundt's psychology is so expounded that the most interesting side-lights are cast on the psychology of its author. The systematic upshot is "that organic sensations are responsible for the dimensions of excitement-depression and tension-relaxation." For, as Hayes and others have found: (a) "Judgments of pleasantness and unpleasantness are direct, easy, and natural;" (b) "judgments of excitement are less direct, and the term is equivocal. . . . Judgments of depression are, in their turn, distinctly less direct than those of excitement, and are often associatively mediated. There is no evidence of a dimension of excitement-depression, still less of a number of exciting and depressing qualities;" (c) "judgments of tension are easy; but tension is described, throughout, in kinæsthetic terms. . . . Nowhere is there evidence, in this third case, either of a new affective dimension or of specific qualities." In conclusion, the author says: "Wundt's tridimensional theory of feelings shows, as it were in typical form, the peculiar features that distinguish his psychology at large. Wundt has, in an eminent degree, the power of generalization, and his generaliza-

tions cover, — as generalizations oftentimes do not! — an encyclopædic range of detailed knowledge. But the exercise of this very power leads him to put a certain stamp of finality upon his theories, as if questions were settled in the act of systematization. You know what I am thinking of: the theory of space perception, the theory of attention, the definition and demarcation of psychology itself. The affective theory which we have been discussing is typical, then, both for good and for bad. It is good, in that it gives rounded and complete expression to a psychological tendency that, in many minds, has been struggling for utterance. It is bad, in that it offers a solution, ready-made, of problems which in actual fact are ripe only for preliminary and tentative discussion.”

Professor Titchener offers (in the eighth lecture) his own theory of affection. The affections appear “as mental processes of the same general kind as sensations, and as mental processes that might, under favorable conditions, have developed into sensations. I hazard the guess that the ‘peripheral organs’ of feeling are the free afferent nerve-endings distributed to the various tissues of the body [excepting those to the periphery]; and I take these free endings to represent a lower level of development than the specialized receptive organ. Hence we have peripheral organs of sense, but no ‘organs,’ in the strict meaning of the term, for affective processes. Had mental development been carried farther, pleasantness and unpleasantness might have become sensations. . . .” This theory explains, “first, the obscurity of feeling, the absence of the attribute of clearness. Affective processes are processes whose development has been arrested; they have not attained, and now they never can attain, to clear consciousness. . . . The theory explains, secondly, the movement of affective processes between opposites, and the relation of this movement to the health and harm, the weal and woe of the organism. For the excitatory processes will report the ‘tone’ of the bodily systems from which they proceed, and the report will vary, and can only vary, between ‘good’ and ‘bad.’ . . . And, lastly, the theory explains the introspective resemblance between affections and organic sensations.”

The fifth lecture, leaving the topic of feeling, deals with attention as sensory clearness. “Popular psychology regards attention, indifferently, as faculty and as manifestation of faculty . . . the influence of the popular conception is still shown in the tendency to treat the attentive consciousness as a whole, to synthesize objective and subjective, incidental and essential, in a single view.” Whereas, “an elementary psychology of attention will deal, not with the facts of

attentional accommodation, but rather with the 'rise' of the single sensation." Pursuant to this aim, five types of attention theory are examined and are found all to recognize that attention involves *clearness* of the content 'attended to': "clearness is, so to say, the first thing that men lay hands on, when they begin to speak about attention." Thus for Professor Titchener the essence of attention lies in the degree of clearness of the content. The remainder of the lecture summarizes the empirical conditions under which a sensation gains maximal clearness in consciousness.

The succeeding two lectures elucidate the psychology of clearness under the headings of seven laws of attention. Among the most interesting of these discussions we mention, that on fluctuations of the attention (the sixth), that on the two levels, *i. e.*, the focal and marginal, of consciousness (the second), that on the relation of clearness to other attributes (the first), and that on prior entry (the fourth). But all are interesting, and all present important issues.

The concluding lecture is devoted to the relation of attention to feeling, active and passive attention, motor theories of attention, etc. As to the first, we can attend and act without feeling, but cannot feel without attending; or (to state this last more exactly) the obscure contents of a two-level consciousness cannot be so strongly 'toned' as the clear contents. The distinction between active and passive attention is retained from considerations that are genetic rather than descriptive. And, lastly, Professor Titchener is adverse to motor theories of attention.

One misunderstanding is to be forestalled. It seems as if in connection with both the topics of this volume, the single element of consciousness is too much emphasized,—affection as a single element, attention as affecting the single element: whereas the attitude theory of feeling, for instance, and volitional and apperceptual theories of attention necessarily relate, not to the single elements, but to the configuration and change of groups of conscious elements. And thus such theories seem to be unduly neglected. But Professor Titchener says, "an elementary psychology of attention will deal, not with the facts of attentional accommodation, but rather with the 'rise' of the single sensation; . . . not with the gross facts of attentional inertia, but rather with the absolute temporal limen and the carrying power of clearness under simple conditions." And again, "an elementary psychology [of attention] will deal with the sensation, under its aspect of clearness." In both cases the emphasis is apparently to be laid on *elementary*, and since the same word occurs in the title of the

volume, one is doubtless to infer that Professor Titchener has intentionally singled out the elementary, or 'clearness,' side of attention, and intentionally neglected other aspects. The same may be true of feeling. Nevertheless, one is bound to be somewhat misled here, since many considerations are touched on which are not, under our present definition, elementary: thus a strictly 'elementary' treatment would surely not even mention motor-theories. And so some views are made unintentionally to look very small indeed,—views for which something can be said.

Such is the main outline of this volume, and yet so to present it is to present a bough stripped of its leaves; whereas the leaves are here numerous and vital. The book gathers in many facts and many opinions and weighs them against one another with all skill, caution, and impartiality; and the argument is everywhere well-articulated and closely-knit. The lectures are called 'elementary' with scant justice, since they are obviously the product of a mature and constructive scholarship and are not, after all, quite elementary even in the aspects treated. The concept of clearness (which others have called 'vividness,' *Eindringlichkeit*, etc., and which has never had all the critical discussion that it requires) is here brought to the fore, and one could only wish that other and not 'elementary' matters, such as motor theories of attention, had been given more space. But this is to wish that Professor Titchener immediately write us another volume—the Advanced Lectures.

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## NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

*Zur Wiedergeburt des Idealismus* : Philosophische Studien. Von FERDINAND JACOB SCHMIDT. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1908.—pp. 325.

The idealistic philosophy of Kant and his successors is the one contribution of transcendent worth made by the German people to human culture ; the application of the principles of this philosophy in the reorganization of human life and society is the great work which Germans are called upon to lead to-day. Such is the earnest conviction of Herr Schmidt, and he makes it the theme of an interesting and inspiring book. The truth of idealism, that the world is the creation of thought or reason, was first apprehended by the Greeks, but only abstractly and in idea, not concretely and as a living force able to renew and transform human life and conduct. The second stage in the development of idealism occurred when the Christian Church attempted to apply its principles in the moral and religious sphere, teaching that God is a Spirit and must be worshipped in spirit and in truth. But the divine Spirit was regarded as an object of faith abstractly removed from the world, — able to save man from the world but not able to transform and spiritualize the world. Thus the idealism of the Church was one-sided and subjective. The third stage in this development falls within the period from 1780 to 1830, when the foundations of a true objective idealism were securely laid by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. That 'spirit' which these philosophers found immanent in the world is an infinite or absolute thought which embraces everything real within itself, reconciling all the oppositions and overcoming all the limitations of finitude. They discovered the method of absolute thought and showed how it is progressively realized in the world. Of this infinite principle every human being is an expression. But the individual learns the truth concerning himself and his relation to the world only in so far as by the exercise of thought he rises above the limitations of sense and embraces within the unity of his consciousness the infinite totality of things, — in this way participating in that absolute experience which is the ground and source of his being. As in the theoretical sphere man thus attains to a knowledge of the truth, so in the practical sphere he gains the freedom of complete self-determination only by negating his desires as a particular individual and devoting himself to the realization of the universal ends of the world-spirit.

The defect of German idealism lies not in the character of its central doctrine, our author believes, but in the fact that this doctrine was fully developed only on the side of theory and its practical applications were

almost entirely neglected. Thus it came to be regarded as an intellectual creation, a speculative achievement without any bearing upon the problems of practical life. Hence, when the need was felt in the middle of the last century for a philosophical principle to serve as a basis of political and social reconstruction, the leaders of reform turned not to idealistic philosophy but to empirical psychology. This psychology disregards the higher organizing activity of thought which unites men in a community of intelligence, and finds the essential part of human nature in the feelings and perceptions, desires and impulses, peculiar to individuals. In close connection with such psychology, therefore, Marx and his followers have developed an economic materialism which is the philosophy underlying the present socialistic propaganda. It starts from the conception of man as a physical individual having certain fundamental bodily needs and natural desires, and would reorganize the entire system of social activities and relationships so that each and all may contribute directly or indirectly to the satisfaction of these needs. The whole socialistic movement is fore-doomed to failure because of the false philosophy on which it is based; for, as natural beings, men are isolated and competing, and it is only through their higher spiritual activities that they are capable of communion and coöperation. The standpoint of modern capitalism is equally false and untenable. It is a natural outcome of the individualistic ethics of Protestantism. As a social theory capitalism has more of the true idealism in it than has socialism. For the aim of its industrial system is not simply the satisfaction of man's physical needs, but the subjugation of nature and the exploitation of its resources in the realization of human purposes. But, in its insistence upon the property-rights of individuals, capitalism tends to increase their isolation and confirm their finitude, ultimately making them slaves to material possessions. The true idealism when revived will exhibit the falsity of these two opposing influences in present-day society, and will point the way to a satisfactory solution of those social and political problems which press in upon us with alarming urgency. Recognizing that all human individuals and all natural objects have their source in the infinite spirit, the aim of this coming movement will be so to reconstruct social and political institutions that all men may experience in the discharge of their functions in society a full development of their own latent spiritual capacities, and in the identification of themselves with the larger life of humanity, a complete realization of their own potential infinitude.

The author makes many other applications of the principles of idealism to special problems, social, religious, and educational. Some of the questions discussed are primarily of interest to Germans, — such as the higher education of women in Germany, — and others have a general importance. But if any one believes that the idealism of Kant and Hegel has no message for the present day or that 'Hegelian absolutism' is incapable of furnishing a program of social and ethical reform, let him read this book, and if not convinced to the contrary, he will at least be given food for thought.

Friends of idealism will welcome this demonstration of its ability to provide a solution for the practical problems of the hour. For they have always believed that while the truth of this philosophy is shown, not by its practical value, but by its inner consistency and comprehensiveness, still by virtue of its truth it possesses greater value as a rule of life and practice than many so-called 'practical' philosophies whose claim to be true rests solely upon the fact that they are useful in solving practical difficulties.

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*Buddhism and Immortality.* By WILLIAM STURGIS BIGELOW. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1908. — pp. 75.

This little book contains the "Ingersoll lecture on the immortality of man" delivered before Harvard University in 1908. Its title is somewhat misleading, for the view of immortality here set forth is not that of Buddha himself, but that of the Tendai and Shingon sects in Japan. These sects, like most Japanese Buddhism, represent the teaching of the 'Greater Vehicle' of the Northern Church, and its peculiar blending of original Buddhism with Sivaistic Hinduism. As this teaching was brought into Japan some thirteen hundred years after Buddha's death, from China, where further modification was possible, it will be seen that the ideas of these two sects are the result of a very long and complex history. As they are to-day, they contain much that Buddha would not have recognized, and something that he or his early followers would probably have condemned as "heretical puppet-show."

The lecture is not, however, concerned with the history of these ideas, but merely with their exposition in modern language. A man consists of states of consciousness, we are told. The question of *individual* persistence is therefore identical with that as to how long these states persist. They may be enumerated as sensory impressions, including pleasures and pains, and habitual reactions to these impressions, including emotions, desires, and 'aptitudes.' The sensations are obviously transitory. The states which persist longest, and which are transmitted by heredity, as biology holds, or by Karma, according to Buddhism, are the most habitual reactions, the sum of which we usually call character. But what is innermost and most essential in consciousness is the will, to which the other forms are objective, while it is never objective to them. In itself it is free and creative; but its connection with a "material personality" or body imposes certain restraints upon it. Furthermore, all consciousness in itself is one. It is only through its dependence, in direct sensory consciousness, upon matter, which is conditioned by space and time, that it takes in any way the form of separation and division. "The difference in beings, therefore, is how much they realize of this universal consciousness. The process of evolution is the process of increase of the amount realized. The only thing that prevents a man from realizing the whole of it is the accumulated habit of



countless generations of thinking in terms of self, that is, of the material self." We can hasten our return to this limitless consciousness, which is also limitless will, by "doing good actions," which are always self-denying, and by "the direct action of the will on the character." This second way is dangerous, however, save for those well grounded in ordinary morality. "The ultimate object of life is to acquire freedom from the limitations of the material world by substituting volitional for sensory consciousness," thus to shake off separate individuality, and to enter into the peace of Nirvana.

Such, in very brief outline, is Dr. Bigelow's argument. He is evidently expounding a view with which he is in thorough sympathy, and does so with much skill. No conventional classification, such as materialism or idealism, as he justly remarks, is entirely adequate for a system of ideas so varied in origin, and so complex in their present connection and dependence. As it is here submitted as a philosophy of life, however, it is pertinent to remark that it seems to involve at least three unfounded assumptions: that, in Dr. Bigelow's own words, "broadly speaking, what is done for one's self is bad; what is done for some one else is good;" that all human individuality is constituted by material limitations only; and that there is such a thing as a will entirely independent of and separable from the other factors in conscious experience.

The evidence for rebirth instead of heredity which is given is interesting in the mouth of a physician, especially the statement that the close resemblance of grandchild to grandparent usually occurs only once in a generation, and when the grandparent has been dead less than ten years. "Heredity by physical transmission," remarks Dr. Bigelow, "offers no explanation of either fact. Whereas, from three to ten years is the ordinary interval for reincarnation, and the single resemblance is the natural result of the rebirth of a single soul." These are certainly to be classed with the things which are interesting if true; but one would like to know the authority for them.

As an attempt to interpret Oriental ideas to western minds, the book deserves high praise. In particular, the exposition of *Karma* is admirable; and the nobler side of Japanese Buddhist doctrine is brought before the reader very effectively.

EDMUND H. HOLLANDS.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

*The Precinct of Religion in the Culture of Humanity.* By CHARLES GRAY SHAW. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Lim.; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1908. — pp. xii, 279.

It is a little difficult to convey an adequate notion of Professor Shaw's book. Not only does the nature of the results not lend itself easily to a summary statement, but the personal equation also is likely to enter a good deal into one's judgment. There are readers to whom it will undoubtedly

appeal as a notably profound and penetrating study, while I can easily conceive that to another type of mind it will seem a rather unintelligible example of a vicious philosophical method. Personally I am a little inclined to feel that there may be some excuse for both judgments. Certainly not much is done to conciliate a possibly hostile critic by telling him in a clear and straightforward way just what the point is. If one were inclined to be ill-tempered, one might complain that the author has at times a preference for saying a thing several ways obscurely, rather than one way clearly. This is specially in evidence in the early part of the book, so that the reader is fortunate if at the end of a hundred pages he begins to get a notion of what it is all about. This may be inherent in the nature of the subject matter, but I hardly think it is. The writer's style is suggestive and cumulative rather than systematic or argumentative. He depends, for conveying his meaning, upon building it up gradually in the reader's mind through a leisurely succession of partial insights, a turning of his subject from side to side with frequent repetitions, intended to let in each a little additional light. The justification for this probably is, that the main outcome is to recommend not so much a set of particular doctrines as the validity of a certain type of experience, whose understanding depends upon the whole spiritual background. But he does not sufficiently remember that while he has himself the clue for interpreting his utterances, the reader is still without this. The result is that what is intended to be illuminating is, through a certain lack of incisiveness, too apt to be, instead, cryptic and a little disheartening, and the real merits of the book are therefore likely to be overlooked by the less persevering.

However when — or if — one gets the meaning that is there, it is well worth considering. Professor Shaw approaches religion from what he calls the cultural, as opposed to the metaphysical and to the psychological or anthropological standpoints. The nature of religion he finds in the condemnation and negation of the natural world, and the effort of the soul to find a home in a supersensible realm in which it shall realize itself and attain to blessedness. The purpose of the book is to demarcate this sphere of religion as a living form of man's spiritual life, limited, therefore, from within rather than from without, and carrying within itself the test of its own objective validity, — a matter not of the perception of utilities in the world of sense, or the deduction of values in the world of concepts, but of the soul's destiny in the spiritual world order. As such a concrete form of human experience, it is nothing if not positive and historical, and therefore is to be interpreted rather in the light of æsthetics and rights, than of logic or ethics. This breaking of the connection between religion and speculative theory is perhaps most definitely the main impression which the book leaves. The finding of the positive content of the spiritual life in the conception of the social consciousness suggests a positive philosophy which is of interest, but it is left in too schematic a form to be easily amenable to criticism.

Whatever the judgment upon its results, the book shows an originality and independence which clearly indicate that it is drawing upon a fund of genuine and first-hand experience. One comes across every now and then a bit of real and even striking insight, emphasized at times by a well-turned and effective sentence. Whether the outcome is satisfactory will of course be judged differently according to one's philosophical prepossessions. My own impression is,—though I confess I am not sure that I have got fully the bearings of Professor Shaw's position,—that our intellectual understanding as shown in ethical or metaphysical theory has been interpreted too abstractly, and separated too sharply from the sphere of religion. That religion has its origin in human nature rather than human reason, that it begins not with a bit of curiosity about the world but with a mighty concern for human life, that the idea of God springs spontaneously from the religious consciousness rather than is the outcome of theistic argumentation, is both true, and eminently important. The doubt that I feel about the attitude of Professor Shaw, and of those who think like him, has to do with the apparent tendency to suppose that when we have shown that religious knowledge is not the same as knowledge about religion, we are thereby at liberty to regard the latter as superfluous. It may be that I do not attain to the religious life primarily through my reason, and that when I am thus reasoning I am not in enjoyment of religious blessedness. But, on the other hand, when I am immersed in the religious satisfaction I am equally not a philosopher. And one may still think that rational processes have a real part to play in dealing with the religious object, not indeed as a form of religion, but in my capacity as an intellectual being. For it is the very essence of reason that it claims to comprehend and evaluate the whole of life. Professor Shaw would seem to me, — again if I do not misinterpret him,—to withdraw the concepts of religion within its own special sphere, and in so doing to ignore certain just claims of the rational will to understand. Religion, for example, may be content simply to negate the natural world ; philosophy, or at least some philosophers, who have a certain intellectual temperament, must continue to demand that this world be given still some positive place in a consistent world scheme. The fault of the book, therefore, seems to me to be that it tends to substitute a description and interpretation of the inner character of the religious experience for a full philosophy of religion, to hold that it is enough for the philosopher to give religion its proper place as a form of life, without needing also to render the concepts which religion uses intellectually consistent with the other forms of human conception. But even from the standpoint of such a criticism one may recognize freely the very considerable value of the interpretative study.

A. K. ROGERS.

*L'Année Philosophique* (1907). Paris, FÉLIX ALCAN, 1908. — pp. 288.

The present number (for the eighteenth year) contains in addition to the valuable bibliography of French philosophical literature for 1907 by the editor, M. F. Pillon, and brief notices *in Memoriam* occasioned by the death of Octave Hamelin and Victor Brochard, also written by the editor, five original contributions by various hands. These articles are the following: (1) The Platonic theory of participation according to the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist*, by M. Victor Brochard; (2) The arguments for immortality in Plato's *Phædo*, by M. G. Rodier; (3) A glance at the non-metric geometries, by M. G. Lachalas; (4) The laws of nature according to M. E. Boutroux, by M. F. Pillon; (5) The "Essay on the Chief Elements of Representation" and the philosophy of M. O. Hamelin, by M. L. Dauriac.

I have dipped into all the above-mentioned articles and have found them highly interesting, the three last-mentioned no less than the first two, though it would require an assumption of knowledge, for the absence of which I trust the readers of the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW will excuse me, for me to pass judgment upon them all. The first two contributions fall more nearly within the sphere of my competency, and to them I will confine my observations in detail.

The editor tells us that the article on Plato's theory of participation was probably the last penned by that singularly lucid and competent scholar, Victor Brochard. Those who have read his admirable book on the Greek Sceptics, and his contributions annually appearing (except 1904) in *L'Année Philosophique* since 1900, will require no words of commendation, for he touched no subject without leaving a lasting mark upon it. In the present article he sets forth the arguments of the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist* with exemplary lucidity and sureness of touch. He devotes especial attention (pp. 23 ff.) to the vexed passage in the *Sophist* 248 E, which has been a veritable crux to Platonic scholars, where motion, life, soul, and intelligence are postulated for τὸ παντελῶς ὄν. This phrase he would have us render not with 'absolute being' nor with 'being in itself,' but with 'being in its totality' (l'être total) or 'being entire' (l'être complet). Regarded as a translation of the phrase, either is, I think, impossible; for it means 'that which completely is.' But M. Brochard is quite right in maintaining, on the basis of the context, that Plato refers neither solely nor primarily to the Ideas, but has in view any 'being' which is postulated as absolute and ultimate. As such, however, we must undoubtedly class the Ideas, and therefore their 'participation' in the ideas of motion, life, soul, and intelligence becomes a problem for Plato, as scholars generally have seen. M. Rodier also (pp. 43 ff.) rightly insists upon this.

The purpose of M. Rodier's article on Plato's arguments for immortality is to show that the third is pivotal, all the others ultimately turning upon it. It will be recalled that (as ordinarily taken) there are four arguments: (1) from the circular process of nature, in accordance with which

(to change the figure) change takes place in both directions : hence, as death follows life, so life must follow death ; (2) from the *a priori* knowledge of the Ideas, which can be interpreted only as recollection (*ἀνάμνησις*) ; (3) from the 'simple,' elementary character of the soul, which, as uncompounded, defies dissolution ; (4) from the fact that 'soul' implies 'life' as its essential character, wherefore it cannot participate in the idea of 'death,' its contrary. Here M. Rodier takes the first two arguments as mutually complementary and as forming a larger unity, but depending for their validity upon the third, which stands or falls with the theory of Ideas ; the fourth is in reality a corollary to the third, a sort of ontological proof finding its warrant only in it.

With this portion of M. Rodier's exposition it is difficult to disagree. But when he proceeds to argue that Plato definitely and consciously equated Idea with Soul and Soul with Idea, it is just as difficult to agree with him. It would be just as true, and more significant, to say that Plato regarded the Soul as an 'element' and that his proofs rest one and all on the conception of the soul as such an elemental 'monad.' It does not seem to have occurred to students of Greek philosophy that Plato's conception and proofs of immortality alike rest upon the Orphic doctrine, which makes of the soul a living atom or monad, and that this holds as much of the first argument or proof as of the rest. The special form assumed by the first proof is probably due to Empedocles rather than to Heraclitus ; for in Empedocles, rather than in Heraclitus, is found the indispensable conception of the 'element' as the analogue of the permanent soul, and in him also there is a consciously drawn parallel between the 'cycle of births' traversed by the elements and the soul. Empedocles doubtless derived this suggestion from the Orphics and Pythagoreans who flourished in Sicily and Magna Græcia in his day and with whom we know he was intimately associated.

W. A. HEIDEL.

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY.

*Die philosophische Lehren in Leibnizens Théodicée.* Von A. THÖNES. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte, herausgegeben von Benno Erdmann. Halle, Max Niemeyer, 1908. — pp. 79.

The purpose of this monograph is to combat the interpretation of the *Théodicée* which Stein and other historians of philosophy have advanced. They hold that the *Théodicée* is neither self-consistent in its parts, nor is it consistent with the more developed form of the system as it is found in the *Monadology*. The explanation which they offer for this is that the separate parts were written at different times, and so represent different periods in the development of Leibniz's thought.

The author, in answer to their position, contends that the aim of Leibniz in writing the *Théodicée* was to counteract the influence which the criticism of Pierre Bayle exerted upon current orthodox religious notions. But as

the criticism was not confined to Bayle, so the polemical part of the *Théodicée* is directed at many others as well ; and this is given as the reason for the lack of unity in the work. The question of its consistency with the rest of Leibniz's system is considered in a lengthy examination of the subject-matter of the essay, and the conclusion reached is, that the chief principles of the Leibnizian philosophy are all contained in, or are at the basis of, the doctrines of the *Théodicée*.

PHILIP H. FOGEL.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

*Materie und Organismus bei Leibniz.* Von H. L. KOCH. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte, herausgegeben von Benno Erdmann. Halle, Max Niemeyer, 1908. — pp. 59.

Herr Koch believes that the connection between the philosophical and scientific thought of Leibniz has not been sufficiently emphasized, and takes the position that the philosophical principles of Leibniz are the direct and consistent outcome of his scientific thought. This notion has been brought out by Cassirer in his book: *Leibniz' System in seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen*. But the criticism has been made that there is too much of Kant in Cassirer's interpretation of Leibniz ; and the present essay aims to avoid that pitfall.

In the first part of the essay an examination of the earlier works such as the *De Arte Combinatoria* (1666), the *Confessio Naturæ* (1668), and the *Hypothesis Physica Nova* (1671), leads to the belief that the development in the thought of Leibniz on the problems of atoms, matter, cohesion, and motion, goes hand in hand with the growth of his scientific knowledge. The second and concluding part of the monograph seeks to show that his later doctrines of the nature of substance, form, organisms, etc., are organically related to the scientific ideas emphasized in the first part.

PHILIP H. FOGEL.

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The following books also have been received :

*Kant's Theory of Knowledge.* By H. A. PRICHARD. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1909. — pp. vi, 324. 6s. 6d.

*The Works of Aristotle.* Vol. VIII: *Metaphysica*. Translated into English under the editorship of J. A. SMITH and W. D. ROSS. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1908. — 7s. 6d.

*My Inner Life.* By JOHN B. CROZIER. A chapter in personal evolution and autobiography. Two volumes. London and New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1908. — pp. xiv, 562. 7s.

*Social Life at Rome in the Age of Cicero.* By W. W. FOWLER. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1909. — pp. xv, 362. \$2.25.

*The Background of the Gospels.* By WM. FAIRWEATHER. The twentieth series of the Cunningham Lectures. Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark, 1908. — pp. xxx, 455. \$3.00.

- What Is Pragmatism?* By J. B. PRATT. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1909. — pp. xiii, 256.
- Sayings of Buddha.* By J. H. MOORE. A Pali work of the Buddhist Canon. New York, The Columbia University Press, 1908. — pp. xiii, 142. \$1.50.
- Introduction to the Genetic Treatment of the Faith-Consciousness in the Individual.* By W. W. COSTIN. Baltimore, Williams and Wilkins Co., 1909. — pp. 45.
- Philosophische Studien.* Von D. MICHALTSCHEW. Mit einem Vorwort von J. REHMKE. Leipzig, Wilhelm Engelmann, 1909. — pp. xv, 573. 9 M.
- Zur Grundlegung der Logik.* Von S. MATIČEVIĆ. Wien und Leipzig, Wilhelm Braumüller, 1909. — pp. 192.
- Le rationalisme comme hypothèse méthodologique.* Par FRANCIS MAUGÉ. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. xii, 611.
- La notion de valeur.* Par GEORGES BERGUER. Genève, Georg & Co., 1908. — pp. 365.
- La morale de l'ironie.* Par FR. PAULHAN. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. 169.
- La théorie idéologique de Galluppi dans ses rapports avec la philosophie de Kant.* Par F. PALHORIÈS. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. xi, 191.
- La sensibilité individualiste.* Par G. PALANTE. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. 140.
- Logique et mathématiques.* Par ARNOLD REYMOND. Essai historique et critique sur le nombre infini. Saint-Blaise, Foyer Solidariste, 1908. — pp. ix, 218.
- Les principes de l'évolution sociale.* Par D. ASLANIAN. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. xxiv, 296.
- Rosmini.* Par F. PALHORIÈS. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1908. — pp. xi, 388. 5 fr.
- Anti-pragmatisme.* Par A. SCHINZ. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. 309. 2 fr. 50.
- Le premier éveil intellectuel de l'enfant.* Par E. CRAMAUSSEL. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. 187. 2 fr. 50.
- Le fondement psychologique de la morale.* Par A. JOUSSAIN. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. viii, 144. 2 fr. 50.
- In memoria di Carlo Cantoni.* Pavia, Tipografico successori Bizzoni, 1908. — pp. xxvii, 710.
- Benedetto Croce.* Per GUISEPPE PREZZOLINI. Napoli, Riccardo Ricciardi, 1909. — pp. 118.

## SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.*: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

### LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

*Zur Kritik des Relativismus.* F. LIFSCHITZ. *Ar. f. sys. Ph.*, XIV, 3, pp. 353-372.

The author criticises severely the philosophy of relativism as it opposes itself to dogmatism, and the so-called "historical conception" as it contrasts itself with *a priorism*. Relativism is allied to skepticism in denying the possibility of absolute knowledge: it teaches that we can determine no universal truths or doctrines but must be guided by circumstances, conditions, etc.; basing itself on experience, it assumes the standpoint of radical empiricism and attacks rationalism and *a priorism*. It boasts of complete triumph over dogmatism with the slogan "all is relative," and contends that one must be indeed ignorant of all history even to think of challenging that statement. But in this very phrase is uttered the most dogmatic statement possible, embracing as it does all things for all time. Just as dogmatic is the sceptical "*Ignorabimus*," for how can we, who know nothing, assert anything of the future? The statement "everything is historically conditioned" implies absolute causality, inasmuch as it sees in an event the resultant of the various conditions and forces of that period of history. When it is asserted, for example, that the political order of the sixteenth century was justifiable because it exactly answered the conditions, it is implied that no other political order would have done as well,—again a judgment which does not rest on an empirical basis but uses the *a priori* method. The article, as merely introductory to a more extended treatment of the subject, confines itself chiefly to a discussion of the economic problems of protection and free trade. The advocates of either of these doctrines would be classed as dogmatists, since relativism would reserve any judgment for particular times, places, conditions, etc. Dogmatism stands for generalization which may be (1) spatial, all countries; (2) tem-



poral, all time, (3) both spatial and temporal, all times and places, or (4) only partial, confining itself to certain countries or certain periods in history. It has been asserted that in practice one must apply relativism, weighing the particular circumstances and determining policies according to local and temporal conditions. Yet the problems are so complicated, the sections of the same country so diverse, interests so varied and enterprises so different, that one cannot proceed without even a great deal of generalization. If it be said that all this is carefully considered and the action suited to the specific individual needs, yet even then strict empiricism is transcended, inasmuch as every measure is prospective and reckons with the future.

The doctrine of absolute free trade is declared dogmatic. But consider the reasons advanced for it. Countries differ in soil, climate, and natural resources, in customs, habits, etc., so that each is peculiarly fitted for the production or manufacture of certain articles. In contending against any interference, or state regulation, the argument is based, therefore, on the very principle of relativism that all economical enterprises depend on certain conditions and will have a proper development according thereto. The supporters of free trade are therefore more consistent and logical relativists than those loudly proclaiming their adherence to the doctrine of state regulation.

EDW. L. SCHAUB.

*Eine Einteilung der philosophischen Wissenschaften nach Aristoteles' Prinzipien.* K. F. WIZE. V. f. w. Ph. u. Soz., XXXII, 3, pp. 305-326.

Aristotle's division of philosophy into theoretical, practical, and poetic,—apparently derived from a psychological standpoint,—has been made, by Riedel, Mendelssohn, and Kant, to correspond to the tripartite division of psychic life into thought, will, and feeling. Sulzer differs from this view in that he refers the æsthetic to sense-perception. The 'French' view regards thought and will as the basis of the theoretical and practical respectively, but takes as the basis of the æsthetic the *sensibilité*, which, owing to French etymology, can be made to refer either to sense-perception, or to sentiment (feeling). Wize examines the views of Kant, Herbart, Natorp, Struve, Lipps, and others, giving Struve's table of classification of psychic phenomena. He objects to the German distinction of thought, feeling, and will, and demands a return to the Aristotelian position. The latter, however, must be improved. The term 'æsthetic,' in the modern sense, should replace the term 'poetic.' The æsthetic sciences are not based on form as such, as there are forms of a non-æsthetic nature. For the same reason they cannot be based on sembling (*Einfühlung*). The æsthetic is the free, conceptless, disinterested activity of the human spirit, a spiritual play. Wize thus divides psychic activity into free, investigating, and striving (*zielzustrebend*). To freedom (not in its ethical sense, as in Kant and Herder, but freedom as an unfettered, playing activity) corre-

sponds æsthetics. Its ideal of perfection is the beautiful. To the investigating, learning activity,—the theoretical, with the true as its ideal. The practical sciences, lastly, correspond to the striving, working activity. Its ideal goal is the good.

R. A. TSANOFF.

*La philosophie des valeurs : d'après un livre récent.* J. SEGOND. Rev. Ph. XXXIII, 11, pp. 477-497.

Hugo Münsterberg gives an analysis of the concept of value from the point of view of critical philosophy. Science tells nothing about the significance of the sense of values and it belongs to critical philosophy alone to justify them. World-affirmation constitutes the fundamental value and from it all values may be determined. There are three classes of values,—logical, æsthetic, and moral,—and three aspects of each class, since we distinguished an external world, a world of being and an internal world. If the affirmation of the world under these three forms is produced spontaneously, we have values of life, if consciously, values of design. Logical values, if spontaneous, concern existence, if conscious, systematization. Under existence we have things, corresponding to the external world, and beings, corresponding to the world of being, and evaluations, corresponding to the internal world. Systematization is the work of science and under it we have in the same order, natural science, historical science, and normative science. Æsthetic evaluations are of two kinds,—unity, a spontaneous value, and beauty, a value of design. Under unity comes harmony, love, and happiness, under beauty, plastic art, poetry, and music. Moral evaluations may be those of development or of action. In the first case we have adaption, progress, and personality, in the second, management, justice and morality. Every phenomenon comes under one of these systems, but each of the values may conflict with the other two. Since each constitutes a supra-personal affirmation of the world, the conflict is irreconcilable and it becomes necessary to have a supreme evaluation. There must be reality outside of and fundamental to experience. We must add metaphysical values to all others. Spontaneous metaphysical values are those of religion, which deal with creation, revelation, and redemption, and those of philosophy, which are fundamental. This ultra-experience is established only by an act of the entire personality. Experience is the realization of design; the ego is the will which realizes itself in experience. In this original unity all conflict is dissolved. The world is no more dead inert matter, but an eternal, living act. To be faithful to oneself through all eternity,—all the values of the world are implied in such an act. Münsterberg distinguishes experimental and voluntaristic psychology; the latter would deal with the will, and the intention and significance of being, and would not be a science.

HARVEY G. TOWNSEND.

*Plato's Vision of the Ideas.* W. TEMPLE. *Mind*, No. 68, pp. 502-517.

In the early dialogues Plato was completely under the influence of Socrates. He strove only to reveal his character and method. In the *Kratylus* he first became directly interested in the problem of knowledge, in objective reality. This problem is solved in the *Symposium* by a prophetess who describes, in terms of rapture and ecstasy, Plato's experience of the vision of Ideal Beauty. The Ideas need no proof since the mind perceives them in the same way the eye perceives light. In the *Republic* Plato realizes a complete teleological system with Good as the highest Idea. Here also appear two considerations which later are to refute his theory. These are the extension of the application of the Ideas to general nouns and the τρίτος άνθρωπος argument. In the *Parmenides*, where these are applied with fatal results to the theory, the vision had faded and reason quickly found the breaks that ecstasy had concealed. It is significant that both the dialogues which picture the vision in the most brilliant terms are panegyrics on Love. Παιδευασία is the means toward the spiritual life. But this love is by no means sensual. The beloved becomes the embodiment of the Ideal Beauty, an object of reverence bordering on worship. The effect of these experiences of Plato on his theory is evident. They give a separate reality to the Ideas. They show that he is not trying to establish a theory apart from experience. For him the Ideas were objects of experience inasmuch as they have been revealed to him in the vision. Furthermore, on strict logical grounds the realm of Ideas should contain perfect evil as well as perfect good. Plato did not so conceive it because the Ideas for him were objects of artistic, almost religious experience. He had seen only the Idea of Beauty but attributed its excellence to the others. To summarize: Plato gradually approaches the problem of knowledge when suddenly the truth is revealed to him in a vision of Ideal Beauty. The vision can be induced by τὸ ὁρθῶς παιδευαστεῖν. This metaphysical Idea is extended to all excellent and thereby implicitly to all objectionable attributes. He finally accepts its extension to general nouns, an admission which prepares ruin for his theory. In the *Parmenides* the vision has faded, argument and proof come to their own and the Ideal Theory is shown to be untenable.

H. E. WEAVER.

*Professor Laurie's Natural Realism.* PROFESSOR BAILLIE. *Mind*, No. 68, pp. 475-492.

Professor Laurie's work is in two parts, the Epistemology and the Ontology, the former dealing with "the analysis of our individual selves as conscious of objects and self-conscious"; the latter, with God, the Absolute, in so far as His nature is revealed through experience. Thus ontology is the more important since it is the aim of knowledge. Epistemology is its preparation and justification. The starting-point of experience is the distinction of subject and object. But underlying all these entities is

the One, embracing the many in a synthetic whole. Thus, depending on the point of view, his theory may be called natural realism, dualism, monism or monistic pluralism. His problem is to harmonize these various view-points, and the means to this end is his conception of "planes of mind." This conception implies three conditions, (1) an ultimate starting-point, (2) an end or standard for determining the planes of mind, and (3) a continuous principle manifested throughout the series. This continuous principle is the subject-object relation given in experience. The end or standard is the ideal state in which the subject perceives its object as an organic, rational whole, continuous and one with the nature of the subject. The ultimate starting-point or lowest level is the lack of distinction between subject and object, the stage of pure feeling. Since the intermediate stages are to a certain extent obscure, the author traces only the more important. The first step is the distinction of particular feelings, the second the "dawn of consciousness in sensation," the beginning of subject and object as independent entities. When this non-subject entity becomes defined, fixed, and grouped into wholes, we have intuition, the highest level of sensation. The grouping is mechanical, synoptic, not synthetic. In the next stage the intuitional subject becomes object, the subject and object being united synthetically. This is the self-conscious stage of will-reason. Will-reason operates in three distinct moments: (1) Perception or judgment; (2) conception, and (3) the notion, revealing the whole as an "inherent necessity of parts." The last is the aim of the will-reason process. The importance of this theory rests on its practical results. By it the seeming opposition of teleology and causality is reconciled, and all contradictions of experience are found to be but different aspects of the one will-reason.

H. E. WEAVER.

*Critical Realism and the Time Problem.* R. W. SELLARS. *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.*, V, 20, pp. 542-548; 22, pp. 597-602.

Absolute idealism explains time through experience-in-general and disregards the evident facts of our experience. Personal idealism is also lacking in its explanation unless supplemented by critical realism. The latter recognizes the things of experience as independent facts. It meets the problem of permanence and change by taking 'process' as the fundamental category of reality. This process is not mere flux but allows permanency through organization of change. All things do not change with equal rapidity. In spite of this process the total capacity for activity in the universe remains the same. Reality is a self-conserving process. Time is change and hence of the same nature as reality, although "there is an 'eternal now' to reality" in that everything must be viewed "as poised in the stress of dynamic relations." For a basis in the understanding of the time problem the author gives briefly the fundamental principles of critical realism in regard to knowledge. Experience is individual, not general; it is a microcosm and must be viewed as incarnated in the body, "an ex-

istence functioning in relation to other existences." Solipsism must be fairly met and conquered by a genetic study of how our knowledge of others is obtained. Change appears in experience as time-perception, conservation as time-construction. The individual seeks to put his experiences into the order in which they occurred, corresponding as closely as possible to the reality process itself. Is time, then, mere appearance? No, it is a part of the experience of the individual who is a part of the larger process of reality.

H. E. WEAVER.

*Anti-pragmatisme. I. Pragmatisme et modernisme.* ALBERT SCHINZ.  
Rev. Ph., XXXIII, 9, pp. 225-255.

This article is an attempt to explain pragmatism as an outgrowth of conditions, especially religious, which in America have forced the hand of philosophy. The relation of philosophy to life has changed in the last century. It used to be written in Latin and read by the learned. Now, general education, liberty of the press, and use of the popular tongue have thrown the doors of knowledge open to all. In Europe tradition tends to control moral action, while philosophy is free to run a more or less independent course. In America the lack of tradition and the changing character of the population give philosophy a great influence, and a thinker who ignores the considerations of practical life is considered dangerous.

The creators of American civilization are not statesmen but capitalists, and they are 'efficiency mad.' America honors whatever produces results. But such a conception of life means to the masses only a contest where force triumphs. Hence social and individual interests clash. A moral check is necessary; and, to be effective, it must have the sanction of religion. "If there were no God it would be necessary to invent one." In order that religion should meet the needs of society certain dogmas, such as immortality and a final judgment, are still necessary. If doctrine and dogma were a dead weight in the church, as some claim, Unitarianism and the Society for Ethical Culture ought to grow at the expense of the other churches. But they do not. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Balzac said, "Religion represses depraved tendencies and is the great element of social order." Later Taine wrote, "The old gospel is yet the best help to social instinct." Present conditions confirm this opinion. Though Professor James insists on recompense for good and courageous acts, and says little about punishment of evil, the one implies the other. The religion which pragmatism recognizes is an efficient moral check.

Pragmatism in England differs somewhat from that in America. Schiller does not speak to a public of converts, and does not, like James, have the air of saying, "Fundamentally you all believe this; the difficulties are only apparent." In England a philosophical doctrine is discussed by philosophers and the verdict rests with them, not with the public. English

pragmatism tries to show that rationality is the supreme postulate of faith. James's conception of the history of philosophy as a series of systems produced by different temperaments applies especially to his own philosophy. He seems to think it will escape the fate of other systems and survive. If the practical continues to be of supreme value, pragmatism will continue to meet the popular need; but this does not furnish logical proof of its truth. The philosophy of the crowd, adapted to the needs of the crowd, is not necessarily true philosophy.

HELEN M. CLARKE.

#### PSYCHOLOGY.

*The Nervous Correlate of Attention.* MAX MEYER. Psych. Rev., XV, 6, pp. 358-372; XVI, 1, pp. 36-47.

This article explains the six fundamental laws of nervous action assumed in a previous article (Psych. Rev., XV, 5, 292-322), and discusses the uniqueness of pain reactions. There is no analogy between nervous processes and the burning of a fuse, for the reason that a fuse burns in both directions and along all its branches and cannot be made permanent, while the opposite is true of a nervous process. The nervous process is analogous to the migration of ions in an electrotype. Both can be caused by the electric current and both are accompanied by electrical phenomena. The assumption of a constant suction at the motor end of the pipe line, in the second law, is merely analogous to the fact that the nervous system, unless exhausted, is always ready to respond to stimulation. In the fifth law, susceptibility is assumed to be greater in the higher neurons, for the reason that the sensory neurons have no susceptibility and that the higher nerve centers suffer more easily from pathological influences. The sixth law is an explanation of the attraction of a weaker process by a stronger on the principle of the jet pump. With respect to the uniqueness of pain reactions it can be said that they differ from other instincts. According to the sixth law, a toothache would attract the other processes and result in a pleasant experience. The explanation is, that the instinctive response to pain is not a repetition of the first reaction, but consists in a different movement each time. The pain process is not one long-continued process, but many processes in succession. Each reaction to pain interferes with other processes by deflecting them, resulting in unpleasantness. With respect to susceptibility of connecting neurons it may be said that positive susceptibility is the property of a neuron which consists in a decrease of resistance in consequence of carrying a current; negative susceptibility consists of an increase of resistance in consequence of lack of function. The assumption of definite ratios between the susceptibility of lower and higher neurons leads to important consequences. A low ratio of positive susceptibility would result in a decrease in the relative resistance of the lower neuron. This is the case of a fixed habit. If the ratios of the positive and negative susceptibility are assumed to be exceedingly different, the result will be a

habit which is merely a strengthened instinct, but which can be more easily modified than the instinct itself.

JOHN B. KENT.

*L'antipathie : étude psychologique.* TH. RIBOT. Rev. Ph., XXXIII, 11, pp. 498-527.

Antipathy, if carefully distinguished from hate, envy, etc., presents a limited field for study, when compared with sympathy which deals with a wide range of human emotion. The feeling of antipathy is made up of three elements : (1) the act of knowing, immediate and spontaneous ; (2) an affective state ; (3) the tendency to movement, inhibitory and defensive. It is an emphasized form of the self-preservation instinct working by anticipation. It may depend upon experience, but is sometimes an immediate repulsion, anterior to all experience, depending solely upon the organization of the individual. It may be divided into four principal states, ranging from the simple to the complex ; organic, instinctive, conscious in the individual form, and conscious in the social form. Organic antipathy means a repulsion of a vital and physiological nature, such as may be seen in the most rudimentary forms of life. Sexual antipathy, which is both important and frequent, comes rightly in this class. Instinctive sympathy is outside of all reflection, antecedent or consequent. It is especially common in animals and in very young children. The antipathy natural to adults may be divided into two classes. The first arrives by an intuition and is distinguished from the purely instinctive repulsion of animals only by a clear knowledge and the possibility of reflection. It is identified by its spontaneity. The second class is deliberative and is produced at least partially by reflection. Though the majority of antipathies are innate, certain ones are acquired. Antipathies of character express individuality in its basic and essential traits, such as those of æsthetic, moral or religious origin. Æsthetic antipathy is the most rare but none the less definite on that account. Among practical moralists antipathy is very common, and in religion it is frequent between believers and non-believers, those of different religions, and those of different sects in the same religion. Collective antipathy presupposes suggestion, imitation, and contagion, and is generally acquired. It tends to take an impersonal form ; that which is disliked is a nationality, a race, or an opinion. It is founded less on instinct than on a definite belief and tends to become rational. There is no notable difference between normal and abnormal antipathy except in the original cause and the intensity of manifestation. The above division into knowledge, feeling, and movement is artificial, and is the product of structural, not functional, psychology. Since it is found in experience antipathy belongs in the category of the instincts. The simplicity and unity found in it are attributable to the homogeneity of its consecutive elements and to their perfect adaptation to a single goal. Certain individuals have many antipathies, just as others are naturally given to sympathy. The condi-

tions which predispose an individual to antipathy may be intellectual, due to lack of plasticity of the mind, or affective, due to a tendency to excitability. Antipathy may be either spontaneous and purely instinctive or it may be reflective and rational. As expressed in life it is found in every degree between these extremes. It is useful as a disposition and necessary to the physiological and psychological organism. The ethical value, whether good or bad, is a question for moralists.

HARVEY G. TOWNSEND.

*Über die Sensibilität der inneren Organe.* ERICH BECHER. Z. f. Psych., XLIX, 5, pp. 341-373.

A study of the sensitivity of the internal organs is of importance : (1) in guarding against a false conception of sensitivity which might be obtained if one studied merely the higher organs of sense ; (2) from the standpoint of its relation to the emotions, especially on the James-Lange theory ; (3) for its function in the estimation of time ; (4) to the study of psychopathology ; and (5) to the practice of medicine. The result of a series of experiments shows that the alimentary canal is sensitive to pressure, heat, cold, and electricity, yet to a much less degree than the skin. Localization seems to be approximately correct. No sensitivity was detected in the stomach, and it would seem that all of the facts which might point to sensitivity of the intestines could be easily explained, if one took into consideration the diffusion of the stimulus to muscles, skin, etc. While the head of the windpipe is sensitive and the large air passages also, though to a lesser degree, it is very questionable in the case of the smaller passages and the lung tissue. The veins seem sensitive to pain, while results confirm the statements of surgeons that the arteries are insensitive. With the exception of only a few internal organs, such as the diaphragm, peritoneum, alimentary canal, and pleura, it would seem probable that the sensations ascribed to internal organs are due to a diffusion of the stimulus to muscles, skin, or other parts of the body which are demonstrated to be sensitive. At any rate, experiments indicate that this diffusion plays a much greater rôle than is generally supposed. Pathological cases tend to show that the emotional life vanishes more or less completely with the cessation of organic sensations such as hunger, thirst, satiety, pains of digestion, etc. So also there results an inability to estimate time, unless by aid of external contrivances. It is these sensations which cause us to 'feel' as persons and not mere machines or automatons. Yet we cannot conclude from this concerning the sensitivity of any special organs. Almost all of the cases reported are of hysterical persons in which it might be difficult to determine whether or not the person had really lost these sensations. Then, again, in such cases there is also a disturbance in the sensitivity of the skin and other organs. There are no authenticated cases on record in which the internal sensitivity suffers while the external is unimpaired. Therefore these do not militate against the results of the



experiments. Nor would the teleological consideration that pain is necessary for the protection of an organ have any bearing, inasmuch as pain is not denied but merely ascribed to other than the internal organs, as the result of a diffusion of the stimulus.

EDW. L. SCHAUB.

*Le fondement biologique de la psychologie.* FR. A. GEMELLI. Rev. Néo-Sc., XV, 2, pp. 250-277; 3, pp. 389-409.

Physiology looks principally for the course of external manifestations of life, for modifications or successive alterations which present the functions of the organism, considered as phenomena of reaction. It abstracts from psychical facts as much as possible. Experimental psychology, on the other hand, attempts to isolate the states of consciousness as much as possible. What is for physiology a disturbing element, represents for psychology an essential element which it ought to determine. Number in psychical measurement is only a schematic representation of psychical facts. It does not serve to quantify psychical phenomena, but simply to individualize a quality determined. Biology and psychology cannot be put on the same level. They have no essential connection. The importance attributed recently to the psychology of 'individual differences,' or the 'types,' or the 'exceptions,' is a natural consequence of empirical psychology. Again, the introspective method recently developed is a further natural consequence of the progress and perfection of this kind of psychology, as opposed to the natural consequences of the development of the earlier materialistic psychology. The author refers here to Külpe's work on experimental æsthetics, Marbe's researches concerning the judgment, Watt and Ach's extension of the same method to the study of higher intellectual processes, and Bühler's study of complete thought process.

TAIZO NAKASHIMA.

*Hedonic Experience and Sensation.* HOWARD C. WARREN. Psych. Bul., V, 10, pp. 317-323.

There are four different views of feeling depending on the different estimates of the relation of feeling and sensation: (1) feeling is coördinate with sensation; (2) it is coördinate with the presentative and conative elements of experience; (3) it is coördinate with intensity and quality; (4) it is coördinate with vision, hearing, and the other particular sensations. This last view has the advantage of simplicity, as it makes experience of one sort at bottom: Of the four arguments usually directed against this view, none are sufficient to overthrow it. Introspection and physiological evidence from the source of experience give no reasons for supposing that feeling is not coördinate with the other sensations. The types of physiological reactions are also the same in both cases. The fact that external experience forms a better basis for knowledge than does our affective experience is not a disproof of their coördination. The capability of producing knowledge rests on clearness, and it is impossible to say whether

any particular experience, when the attention is focused upon it, may not form the basis of some judgment. "The result depends rather on the mental situation than on the nature of the sensation." Thus the distinction between sensation and feeling ceases to be fundamental.

H. E. WEAVER.

#### ETHICS.

*The Dramatic and Ethical Elements of Experience.* J. B. BAILLIE. Int. J. E., XIX, 1, pp. 60-75.

A familiar experience in human life is the thwarting of man's efforts by forces entirely outside the sphere of his moral purposes. In order to understand the larger meaning of his acts, we must interpret their nature in other than moral terms. We pass two kinds of judgments on men and actions: moral judgments of approval or disapproval, from the point of view of the man's own efforts and purposes, and judgments wherein the moral criterion is absent, from the point of view of the thwarting forces. Is there a meeting-ground for these diverse judgments? A reconciliation is required, for they are made about the same objects, namely, the action and life of the individual. First we must determine the range and limits of these judgments. Moral judgments apply to man's efforts, as a purposive, free agent, toward union with others in a social whole. But his moral life has limits and may be invaded by forces beyond his control. Yet the purposes which constitute that life are supremely important to him and inseparable from him. Those judgments, on the other hand, in which we accept events as inevitable, apply to the sphere beyond human control, to natural forces, man's own finite restrictedness, and to all-controlling Destiny which ultimately includes the other two. These factors operate, in general, in two forms which we call accident and necessity, according as we regard events as a discrete series or as connected in a system. The distinctness of moral life from these factors, combined with their inseparable relation, gives rise to the dramatic situation. It is a conflict within the life of a moral personality, between the moral purposes constituting his very being and invading alien agencies. It takes place necessarily because experience as a whole involves the presence of these agencies. Hence an ultimate reconciliation is presupposed by the conflict in order to justify its existence. In comedy the reconciliation is brought about by the course of events; in tragedy it remains a demand. Hence the solution is only to be found by going behind the drama and appealing to a deeper, more comprehensive principle: either to the religious attitude toward experience, or to the conceptual interpretation of experience by speculative reflection.

EDITH H. MORRILL.

*La volonté de conscience comme base philosophique de la morale.* ALFRED FOUILLÉE. Rev. Ph., XXXIII, 8, pp. 113-137.

In accordance with a dominant tendency in recent philosophy, conscious will, *Volonté de conscience*, is made the basis of moral philosophy.

Under this term is included the conservation and development of all the functions of consciousness. Conservation is a recognized law of all life, including the psychical, and is analogous to the law of the conservation of energy. The first law of the will, however, is not conservation, but indefinite development. The three functions of the conscious will are: (1) to complete life by acting; (2) to become conscious of and enjoy itself; (3) to become reflective. The development of psychical activity is not adequately conceived in terms of blind force. Neither function of consciousness is sufficient alone. They are all inseparably connected. Discernment and preference are found in the most rudimentary states. There is no pure reflection. Thought is not simply the mirror of existence. It is active and contributes to the realization of its object; it is dynamic in value; it is consciousness aspiring to a higher degree of consciousness. According to the doctrine of *idées-forces*, on which the principle under discussion is based, consciousness formulates its supreme ideal form within and imposes it on itself, but does not remain individual. It extends beyond itself and realizes the consciousness of others, thus making its ideal universal. The idea of another self becomes the means of realizing the self and allowing it to pass from the subjective to the objective. Thus results the total will of universal consciousness which constitutes the source of morality. In its theory of objective value, the doctrine is superior to positivism, evolution, and the doctrines of perfection. It defines the good, not purely objectively, but through a conscious search for the objective. Sociological doctrines are also insufficient. The true value of life is not found in the crowd as such, nor in individuality proper, but in the individual as conscious of a universal society. The conscious will surpasses all particular representation, knowing or desire, because it imposes a limitation on every motive and action. It is the "persuasive," not a simple sentiment, but a fundamental tendency of consciousness to become universal. This theory of obligation does not rest upon the point of view of the understanding, but takes its start from the roots of voluntary life. It finds morality to be determined, not only by what is, but by what can be, tends to be, or ought to be, by means of our wills and ideas. Doubt can modify that which is to be given. It must be removed by the persuasive force of conscious will. The theory of the persuasive is superior to the doctrine of pure power "*volonté de puissance*." For an idea, such as that of the superhuman, to have a power of realization, requires more than simple power. The positive content of an idea is what gives it value. Pure dynamism in morals makes causality the only good; but the category of good does not apply to cause independent of its effects, which is the end for which the cause exists. In evaluating the virtues of the common people, we should not underestimate the importance of intelligence. Through the concept of the universal by the intelligence man becomes moral. No scheme of manners can take the place of moral belief, which forms the basis of moral and social sentiments.

J. B. KENT.

## NOTES.

During the month of March there passed away in Edinburgh, full of years and honorable labors, two distinguished philosophers whose writings have had an important influence both at home and in this country, — James Hutchison Stirling and Simon Somerville Laurie.

Dr. Stirling was born in 1820, and graduated in Arts and Medicine in Glasgow. In 1851 he retired from the practice of medicine, which had occupied him for about ten years, and after residing for some time on the Continent he settled in Edinburgh in 1857 where he has since that time devoted himself to philosophy and literature. In 1865 his *Secret of Hegel* appeared, a work that may be said to have inaugurated the neo-Hegelian movement in Great Britain. Of his other philosophical works we may mention as of chief importance: *Text-Book to Kant* (1881); *Philosophy and Theology* (a series of Gifford Lectures, 1890); *Darwinianism: Workmen and Work* (1894); and *What is Thought* (1900).

Professor Laurie was born in 1829, and occupied the chair of Education in the University of Edinburgh from 1876 to 1903. In addition to discharging with marked ability the duties of the chair and writing continuously on educational subjects, he devoted much time to philosophy and the elaboration of his philosophical books, *Metaphysica, Nova et Vetusta* (1884), and *Ethica, or The Ethics of Reason* (1885). In 1905-06 he delivered the Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh, which were published under the title *Syntheticæ: Meditations, Epistemological and Ontological*. In the field of education his best-known writings are, *Institutes of Education* (1892), and *Historical Survey of Pre-Christian Education* (1895).

The *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* for January contains forty-seven pages of previously unedited correspondence between Ch. Renouvier and Ch. Secrétan. The letters cover a period of time extending from January, 1842, to January, 1870. During this time the two philosophers were exchanging works with each other and the letters contain friendly criticism and appreciation as well as discussions of philosophical questions.

The following have been advanced to full professorships of philosophy: Professor A. W. Moore, of the University of Chicago, and H. W. Stuart, of Leland Stanford University. At Mount Holyoke College Professor S. P. Hayes has been promoted to the full chair of psychology.

Professor B. H. Bode, of the University of Wisconsin, has accepted a call to a chair of philosophy in the University of Illinois.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophica periodicals :

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, VI, 2 : *A. H. Pierce*, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, Baltimore, December 29-31, 1908 ; *E. F. Buchner*, Proceedings of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Baltimore, December, 1908 ; Psychological Literature ; Books Received ; Notes and News.

VI, 3 : *M. V. O'Shea*, Progress in Child and Educational Psychology ; *W. C. Bagley*, The Psychology of School Practice ; Child and Educational Psychology in Foreign Countries ; Psychological Literature ; Books Received ; Notes and News.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, VI, 3 : *F. C. Doan*, An Outline of Cosmic Humanism ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

VI, 4 : *C. H. Judd*, Motor Processes and Consciousness ; Societies ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

VI, 5 : *R. B. Perry*, The Mind's Familiarity with Itself ; *H. M. Sheffer*, Ineffable Philosophies ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

VI, 6 : *J. E. Creighton*, The Idea of a Philosophical Platform ; *B. C. Ewer*, The Time Paradox in Perception ; Discussion ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

VI, 7 : *R. B. Perry*, The Mind Within and the Mind Without ; *W. T. Bush*, The Existential Universe of Discourse ; Discussion ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE, XV, 1 : *H. Guskar*, Der Utilitarismus bei Mill und Spencer in kritischer Beleuchtung ; *T. Lessing*, Philosophie als Tat ; *L. Gabrilowitsch*, Über zwei wissenschaftliche Begriffe des Denkens ; *G. Wendel*, Metaphysische Ausblicke ; *O. Hilferding*, Die Ehre ; *R. Seligmann*, Zur Philosophie der Individualität ; *Paul von Rechenberg-Linten*, Die Zeit ; *Otto Neurath*, Ernst Schröders Beweis des 12. Theorems : Für die identischen Operationen gilt das "Kommutationsgesetz" ; Jahresbericht.

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, XV, 2 : *O. Gilbert*, Aristoteles' Urteile über die pythagoreische Lehre ; *M. Horten*, Die Entwicklungslinie der Philosophie im Kulturbereiche des Islam ; *A. Seibt*, Ein Entschiedener Verfechter des Indeterminismus (W. King) ; *G. E. Burckhardt*, Herder und Kant, Philosophieren and Philosophie ; *W. Schultz*, Die Kosmologie des Rauchopfers nach Heraklits fr. 67 ; *E. Dupréel*, Aristote et le Traité des Catégories ; *J. Eberz*, Die Tendenzen der Platonischen Dialoge Theaitetos Sophistes Politikos ; Jahresbericht.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, L, 5: *H. Berger*, Über periodische Schwankungen in der Schnelligkeit der Aufeinanderfolge willkürlicher Bewegungen; *M. Lobsien*, Über Schätzung kurzer Zeiträume durch Schulkinder; Literaturbericht.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XXXIII, 2: *J. de Gaultier*, Les deux erreurs de la métaphysique; *E. Durkheim*, Examen critique des systèmes classiques sur les origines de la pensée religieuse (2<sup>e</sup> et dernier article); *E. Tassy*, De la connexion des Idées; Observations et Documents; Revue des périodiques étrangers.

XXXIII, 3: *A. Chiapelli*, Naturalisme, humanisme et philosophie des valeurs; *L. Dugas*, L'antipathie dans ses rapports avec le caractère; *A. Lalande*, L'idée de Dieu et le principe d'assimilation intellectuelle; *G. Richard*, Philosophie du droit; Notices bibliographiques; Revue des périodiques.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE, IX, 2: *D<sup>r</sup> Goix*, Le jeûne mystique; *P. Duhem*, Le mouvement absolu et le mouvement relatif (Appendice); *H. Léard*, Le III<sup>e</sup> Congrès international de philosophie à Heidelberg; Analyses et comptes rendus; Périodiques.

IX, 3: *F. Chovet*, Les principes premiers: leur origine et leur valeur objective; *A. de Gomer*, Ame et matière; *D<sup>r</sup> Goix*, La psychologie der jeûne mystique (fin); *P. Duhem*, Le mouvement absolu et le mouvement relatif (Appendice); Analyses et comptes rendus; Périodiques; L'enseignement philosophique,

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XVII, 1: Correspondance inédite de Ch. Renouvier et de Ch. Secrétan; *F. Rauh*, L'expérience morale; *Ch. Andler*, Le premier système de Nietzsche ou philosophie de l'illusion; *H. Micault*, Sur le récents travaux de philosophie physique d'Abel Rey; *L. Dugas*, Psychologie et pédagogie ou science et art; *J. Delvolvé*, Conditions d'une doctrine morale éducative; Supplément.

REVUE NÉO-SCOLASTIQUE, XVI, 1: *P. Richard*, La Causalité instrumentale, physique, morale, intentionnelle; *P. H. Hoffmans*, La sensibilité et les modes de la connaissance sensible d'après Roger Bacon; *S. Depløige*, Délimitation du conflit entre la morale et la sociologie; Melanges et documents; Comptes-rendus.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA, I, 1: *R. Ardigò*, Infinito e indefinito; *M. Losacco*, Di un' opinione sull' origine della filosofia naturale; *P. R. Trojano*, Ateologia, teleologia ed umanismo nell' etica aristotelica; *A. Falchi*, A proposito di un libro sulle dottrine teocratiche; *B. Varisco*, Fra Kant e Rosmini; *G. Marchesini*, Il concetto empirico e ideale di "Educazione"; *R. Ardigò*, Altre liriche del "Buch der Lieder" di E. Heine; *B. Brugi*, Natura e diritto; Questioni varie; Per l'anima della scuola; Autorelazioni, analisi e cenni.

## THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

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### THE MEANING OF *φύσις* IN THE GREEK PHYSIOLOGERS.

THE pre-Socratic cosmologists from Thales to Archelaus were, as is generally known, called by Plato, Aristotle, and the doxographers, 'physical' philosophers; and the principal writings of many of them, beginning with Anaximander, seem to have been treatises *περὶ φύσεως*, 'concerning Nature.' This expression we may take, then, as indicating the primary and most significant subject of their inquiry; and the beginning of wisdom in the study of Greek philosophy must evidently consist in a correct apprehension of the meaning of *φύσις* in pre-Socratic technical usage. Unfortunately, none of the extant fragments of the physiologists offer any direct definition of the term; indeed, it occurs rather infrequently in them. And the doxographers in describing the pre-Socratic theories commonly substitute for the term *φύσις* the (in its technical sense) purely Aristotelian word *ἀρχή*, 'first principle.' In this absence of decisive direct evidence, two conflicting opinions have recently been held as to the original philosophical meaning of the term. Burnet, who appears to have been the first to insist emphatically upon the importance of a correct understanding of the word as the prime precondition to any sound interpretation of the earliest Greek philosophy and science, regards it as signifying "the primary and permanent substance." "The scientific men of Miletos," he writes, "asked what things really are *now*. The great principle which underlies all the speculation of the early cosmologists, though it is first explicitly laid down by Parmenides, is that nothing comes into being out of nothing, and nothing passes away into nothing. They saw, however, that particular

things were always coming into being and passing away again, and from this it followed that the existence of particular things was no true or stable existence. The only things that were real and eternal were the original matter which passed through all these changes and the motion which gave rise to them."<sup>1</sup> According to this view, *φύσις* was equivalent to *Urstoff*, — but the primal stuff in question was conceived not merely, or chiefly, as chronologically first, but rather as logically fundamental, as that which things always are when you get at their real 'nature.' *Φύσις*, says Burnet, "always means that which is primary, fundamental, and persistent, as opposed to that which is secondary, derivative, and transient; what is 'given' as opposed to what is made or becomes." From this view several recent writers have dissented. Woodbridge<sup>2</sup> has undertaken to show that the pre-Socratics meant by *φύσις* 'becoming' or 'generation' and that their speculation dealt chiefly, not with the material cause or substrate of things, as Aristotle represents, but with the cause and process of the origination, transformation, and decay of things, "the principle to which things owe their birth, growth, and nourishment, and to lack of which they owe their death."

A similar, though not quite identical, view is adopted by the writer of a recent monograph on Empedocles,<sup>3</sup> who contends that the title *περὶ φύσεως* meant "concerning becoming" or "concerning the formation of things," and that it may almost be translated "the world story." Some such interpretation is also implicit in an elaborate study by Heidel of the conception of qualitative change in pre-Socratic philosophy.<sup>4</sup> According to Heidel, the physiologists "never strictly defined the unity and identity of the elemental substance," but were concerned rather to define the cosmic process, — which they conceived to consist in "composition, decomposition, and recomposition" of preëxisting material ingredients, without implying "any assumption as to the ultimate elemental characters" of the constituents of the

<sup>1</sup> *Early Greek Philosophy*, second edition, 1908, pp. 10-11, 13.

<sup>2</sup> *Philosophical Review*, X, 1901, pp. 359-374.

<sup>3</sup> Clara Elizabeth Millerd, *On the Interpretation of Empedocles*, University of Chicago Press, 1908, pp. 18 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 1906, pp. 333-379.



complex. "Any pronounced character," Heidel observes, "even though itself be the product of a previous mixture, will serve" as the raw material for the building up of a new mixture or complex; and the philosophy of the earliest nature-philosophers, at least, went no farther than to propose this notion of rearrangement and mixture as a description of the essential nature of all physical processes. Such a view implies that these philosophers had no definite conception whatever of a primary and elemental substance.

The principal evidence in favor of the view that φύσις means 'becoming,' 'the process of origination,' is alleged to be found in three passages of Empedocles in which the word figures. The first and most important of these is Fr. 8 (Diels):

φύσις οὐδενός ἐστιν ἀπάντων  
θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένου θανάτοιο τελευτή,  
ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξις τε μγέντων  
ἐστί, φύσις δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρωποισιν.

This is commonly rendered: "There is no origination (φύσις) of anything that is mortal, nor any end in baneful death; but only mixture and separation of what has been mixed; but men call it 'origination.'" Such a rendering of φύσις (*Geburt* is Diels's word) is, of course, etymologically possible, and in accord with one of the colloquial meanings of the term. And φύσις is evidently paired here with θανάτοιο τελευτή and the two together contrasted with μίξις and διάλλαξις. This antithesis has been held to make inevitable the translation given. Certainly such a translation is the more natural one; and this one text, as it stands, is possibly more favorable to Woodbridge's view than to Burnet's. Yet even here the evidence is far from clear. It does not appear to have been remarked by anyone that if φύσις in Fr. 8 means 'birth' or 'becoming,' Empedocles in this passage, if he be taken literally, violates the most fundamental distinction of his entire philosophy. For him it is precisely the world of 'mortal things' (θνητά), *i. e.*, compounds, that constitutes the realm of becoming and decay, in contrast with the unborn and undying elements. Elsewhere the word θνητά seems to be consistently used by him to point this con-

trast ; the predicates which are denied of the *ρίζώματα* are regularly affirmed of *θνητά*. Thus he says in Fr. 17, 3 :

δοιή δὲ θνητῶν γένεσις, δοιή δ' ἀπόλειψις,

“Twofold is the birth, twofold the decline, of mortal things ;” their birth, as the next line declares, consists in the *πάντων σύνοδος*. Similar expressions occur at Fr. 17, 9 and Fr. 23, 9. According to the accepted text and the usual interpretation of Fr. 8, therefore, Empedocles there departs widely from his ordinary use of his own quasi-technical terms, and expresses himself in a singularly paradoxical manner : “there is no birth and no perishing of things that perish.” In view of this, one is justified in regarding either the text, or the comon interpretation, of this passage with some dubiety. If the text stands, it is not impossible to interpret the passage in a manner which avoids the paradox, and also corresponds with Empedocles’s common usage of *θνητά* and with what will be shown to be the usual sense of *φύσις* ; namely, by rendering *φύσις* by ‘real’ or ‘permanent nature,’ and by construing *θανάτοιο τελευτή*, not as meaning ‘end *in* death,’ — which is undeniably a common idiomatic sense of the phrase, — but as meaning ‘end *of* death.’ The whole passage would then be rendered : “There is no permanent ‘nature’ in mortal things nor any end of destroying death ; but only mixture and separation of what is mixed. But men [erroneously] speak of a permanent ‘nature’ of such things.” The sense of *φύσις* here would be strictly parallel to that in Theophrastus, *De Sens.* 63 (Dox. 517), which is probably taken directly from Democritus. According to Democritus, says Theophrastus, sensible things as we perceive them “have no permanent ‘nature’ (*οὐδενὸς εἶναι φύσιν*) but are merely affections of our changing sensibility. For there exists no ‘nature’ of the hot and the cold,” etc. Only atoms and the void can be said to possess (or to constitute) *φύσις*. So Empedocles may naturally have said that only the elements — not ‘mortal things’ — possess a real *φύσις*. If the translation proposed is a little less in accord with the meaning that the passage may most naturally and idiomatically bear, it is at all events grammatically possible and far better in accord with Empedocles’s ordinary use of

technical terms and with the meaning of those terms elsewhere in Greek philosophy.

None of those who have cited this fragment as conclusive evidence upon the pre-Socratic meaning of φύσις have examined the two Aristotelian passages in which these lines of Empedocles are quoted. The results of such an examination appear to me unfavorable to the interpretation given the fragment by Woodbridge, Miss Millerd, and others. The more important of the two passages seems to contradict that interpretation fairly unequivocally. In *Met. Δ*, 1015a1, Aristotle quotes the lines in a context which certainly appears incompatible with the supposition that he understood Empedocles to mean by φύσις anything like 'birth' or 'becoming.' The passage runs thus: "Another meaning of φύσις is 'the true Being of natural existences' (ἢ τῶν φύσει ὄντων οὐσία); it is employed in this manner by those who say that the φύσις is the primary composition (σύνθεσις) of things, or as Empedocles says, 'There is no φύσις of any of the things that are [ἐόντων, not θνητῶν], but only mixture and separation of what was mixed, but men speak of a 'φύσις.'"  
Aristotle then proceeds to define φύσις (in the same usage) as equivalent to "that from which things arise," and "the primary matter" and "form" (τὸ εἶδος) and "true Being" (οὐσία). These assuredly are as extreme antitheses to 'birth' or 'becoming' as are to be found in the Aristotelian vocabulary. The fragment is also cited in *De Gen. et Corr.* 1,1,314b7. The context here does not establish the sense of φύσις in line 2 with absolute certainty. The passage reads: "Those who derive all things from one are obliged to say that all generation and corruption are ἀλλοιώσεις. For the substrate (ὑποκείμενον) remains always one and the same. But for those who make the kinds of substance manifold, ἀλλοιώσεις differs from γένεσις. For [according to their view] genesis takes place through coming together and separation; and likewise destruction. Therefore Empedocles says that there is no φύσις of anything, but only mixture and separation of the mixed." The sentence of Empedocles is cited, it is evident, for the sake of its second clause, not of the first. But if the passage implies anything at all about Empedocles's meaning of φύσις, it is

that *φύσις* was, and in his type of system must be, antithetical to what such a system understands by *γένεσις*.<sup>1</sup>

The second passage in Empedocles runs thus (Fr. 110):

αὐτὰ γὰρ αὖξει  
ταῦτ' εἰς ἦθος ἕχαστον, ὅπη φύσις ἐστὶν ἐκάστω.

Here, says Woodbridge,<sup>2</sup> *φύσις* "as birth or origin, is contrasted with the settled *ἦθος* or nature of things; and the translation would read: 'these will cause them to grow, each in its own nature, whatever origin each may have.'" But the text has not the least hint of a contrast between *ἦθος* and *φύσις*; it rather suggests the equivalence of the two terms. Even Diels, who in the other place rendered *φύσις* by *Geburt*, here translates: "Denn es wächst von selbst dieser *Schatz* [die Lehren des Meisters?] in Deinen inneren Kern hinein, wo eines Jeden Eigenart ruht." *I. e.*, *φύσις* is here the inner essence or true character of each individual. In the third Empedoclean passage the word is susceptible of either sense, and the passage is therefore entirely indecisive [Fr. 63].

Woodbridge further cites two passages of Parmenides in which *φύσις* occurs. The first of these reads: "Thou shalt know the æther and its *φύσις*, and all the signs in the æther; and the destructive works of the pure bright touch of the sun, and whence they arose; and thou shalt learn of the wandering works of the round-eyed moon and its *φύσις*." That 'birth' is "the correct meaning of the term in this passage," Woodbridge argues, "is evident from the fact that it is used parallel to *ἐξεγένοντο*, and also from the line immediately following the passage quoted:

εἰδήσεις δὲ καὶ οὐρανὸν ἀμφὶς ἔχοντα,  
ἔνθεν ἔφυ.

'You will know also the surrounding sky, whence it came into

<sup>1</sup> The fragment is quoted also in the so-called *De Xen., Zen. et Gorg.*, 2, 975b7: Empedocles says that of the things that are, some are eternal, as earth, air, etc., but others arise and are born from these. For there is, as he thinks, "no other *γένεσις* of things, but only mixture and separation of what was mixed. But men speak of a '*φύσις*.'" This citation is not quite clear in its import; but, undoubtedly, it looks as if the writer were using *γένεσις* here as synonymous with *φύσις*. But since that writer was pretty certainly not Aristotle, little weight can be attached to the passage.

<sup>2</sup> PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, 1901, p. 367.

being.' Here the term  $\xi\phi\upsilon$  is clearly the key for the translation of φύσις." But there is really no more ground for treating φύσις as parallel to ἐξεγένοντο than for so treating σήματα, 'signs,' or ἔργα, 'works'; the ordinary literary sense of φύσις, 'nature' or 'qualitative character' or 'structure,' is perfectly admissible in this passage. And there is no safe inference from the meaning of φύομαι to that of φύσις, even where they happen to occur near one another in the same writer. The prevailing usage of φύομαι kept relatively close to the literal sense of 'to be born,' 'to be originated'; while by far the most frequent usage of φύσις in all classes of writers of all periods is in the highly developed sense which I have mentioned, — a sense developed out of a secondary meaning of φύομαι, 'to be of such and such a sort by birth,' or 'innately.' It even appears that φύσις (with a short υ) so little reminded the Greek ear of φύομαι (with a long υ) that Aristotle, in pointing out that one of the possible meanings of φύσις is γένεσις, thinks it necessary to add a justification of his etymology: φύσις is ἡ τῶν φυομένων γένεσις, οἷον εἴ τις ἐπεκτείνας λέγει τὸ υ: "it means, in one sense, the genesis of the things that come into being (φύεσθαι), — as if one should pronounce the υ long." So a modern teacher of mathematics might find it necessary to explain to students perfectly familiar with the English language, that the word ratio is akin in origin, and in certain elements of its underlying meaning, to the adjective 'rational,' and the military term 'rations,' — the kinship being obscured to the average user of our speech both by the wide divergence in connotation and in the fields of customary application of the terms, and also by the shortening of the vowel.

The other place in Parmenides where the word occurs (Fr. 16) so little permits the rendering of φύσις by 'birth' or 'becoming,' that Woodbridge himself is constrained to translate it "the composition of the members"; Diels's German version is *die Beschaffenheit seiner Organe*.

It appears, then, as the result of the foregoing examination, that in none of the passages chiefly relied on by those who hold that φύσις in the technical usage of the physiologists signified 'genesis' or 'the process of Becoming,' does the word neces-

sarily bear that meaning; and that in some of those passages any such meaning is absolutely excluded by the requirements of the context. On the other hand, three sorts of considerations, which I shall now mention, seem to me decisive in favor of the view that as a technical term, and especially in the treatises of the cosmologists, *φύσις* meant 'the intrinsic and permanent qualitative constitution of things' or, more colloquially, '*what things really are,*' or, — with a slight modification of Burnet's translation, — 'the essential character of the primary substance.'

I. The first consideration I have already incidentally adverted to: the sense the word most commonly has in ordinary literary use. The possible distinguishable shades of meaning are, indeed, manifold; Liddell and Scott give twelve, without by any means drawing the lines of distinction so fine as they might be drawn. But the dominant and central sense, apparently even so early as Homer, and certainly in fifth century writers, involves the idea of 'qualitative character,' 'make-up,' 'essential nature'; in short, it is very closely parallel to what I take to be the commonest and most familiar colloquial sense of our word 'nature.' In Homer, as is well known, the word occurs only once (K, 303): Hermes gave Odysseus the plant moly, "and showed him its nature; it was black at the root and the flower was like to milk." Herodotus speaks of "the nature of the country," in beginning his description of Egypt (II, 5). In Pindar the word occurs twice: *Isthm.* III, 67: "The nature of Orion," — the reference is specifically to the strength or stature of the giant; *Nem.* VI, 5: "We [men] have in us something like the nature of the immortals." In Æschylus we have the same sense in *Pr.* 489: "What auguries are auspicious by nature, what ill-omened"; there is a like meaning at *Suppl.*, 496. In *Pers.* 441, the reference is to the time of life, *ἀρχαῖοι φύσιν*; in *Ag.* 633, occurs the common periphrasis, "the 'nature' of the sun knows"; so in Soph., *OT*, 333: "thou wouldst enrage the nature of a stone." The word is especially frequent in Sophocles, appearing 36 times, in nearly all of its untechnical senses, but most commonly (24 times) with some connotation of "the distinctive quality" of a thing. Most interesting from a semasiological point of view are such uses as these:

*Philoct.*, 902: "When a man forsakes his own nature, and doth unseemly deeds." Here there is an antithesis between the real character of the man and his acts in aberrant moments. Neoptolemus has been persuaded, much against his natural instinct, to play a despicable trick upon the helpless Philoctetes; at this point in the play remorse comes over him, and he stammeringly confesses to Philoctetes the true state of the case. The speech quoted is a self-interpretation of the character of Neoptolemus, and at the same time a piece of self-justification. "I am," he implies, "not really that kind of person; but I have been led by the wily tongue of Odysseus to belie my real self."

*Electra*, 1023. The passage presents a contrast between φύσις and νοῦς. Chrysothemis says to Electra: "Would thou hadst been so minded [*i. e.*, to kill the murderer, Ægisthus] at the time of our father's death. Then thou mightest have accomplished something." Electra replies to this effect: "Then too I had the disposition (φύσις); but not the discretion (νοῦς) to know what to do." Here again the antithesis is between the intrinsic nature and the accidental circumstances which modify its manifestation. Electra's meaning, too, is: "I had the same nature then as now; but it was prevented by my childish ignorance from expressing itself in effective action."

*Ajax*, 472. Ajax had lost to Odysseus the prize (the weapons of Achilles) that was to have been awarded the best of the Argive warriors. In his wrath, he sets out alone to attack Odysseus and the Atreidæ, to prove that in spite of the award he is the better man; but, rendered mad by Athene, he only falls upon a herd of harmless kine, which he, with much valiant blustering, puts to death. When he comes to himself, what most oppresses him is the thought that he, — "the son of him who bore off valor's prize, the first of all the host," — rests under an imputation of cowardice. He resolves to vindicate his character by some last bold stroke. "Some enterprise," he cries, "must yet be sought to show my aged sire that his son is not, in his real nature (φύσιν), a coward." Here the same antithesis between the appearance and the reality is conveyed by our term; Ajax knows that appearances are against him, but also knows that they entirely misrepresent his true character.

OC, 1194. Antigone is endeavoring to assuage her father's wrath against his son, and says: "Others have sons as bad as thy son, and tempers as keen as thy temper; but when their friends with soothing words advise them, they suffer their natures to yield to the spell" (ἐξεπάδονται φύσιν). There is perhaps a hint here of the same contrast as before. The true nature, — in this case not so much that of the individual, as that of a father as such, — is there to be appealed to, behind the gusts of passion and irritability.

In OC. 446 we find the word in a sense in which its ordinary meaning of 'character,' 'constitution' appears to be just on the brink of transformation into the idea of Nature as a vaguely hypostatized entity: "From these weak maidens, — so far as nature doth allow them (ὄσον φύσις διδώσιν αὐταῖν), — I get my daily bread."

In the relatively less frequent use of φύσις with the the sense of 'birth' or 'origin' (occurring only nine times in Sophocles out of thirty-six), it commonly has still the connotation of 'qualitative character' rather than that of either temporal priority or temporal becoming. Thus *Electra*, 325: "Thy sister, whose parentage (φύσις) and thine are one." In these words of the Chorus to Electra, an Athenian hearer can scarcely have failed to recognize a delicately ironical play upon words; for the two sisters, whose φύσις is said to be one, forthwith proceed to quarrel; and the chief character-interest of the whole play consists in the contrast between the ways in which two such dissimilar temperaments react upon precisely the same experiences and difficulties. Sophocles is here deliberately making use of the antithesis between the strictly etymological and less usual sense of φύσις and its broader and more frequent one. Similarly the term is used with reference to noble or plebeian birth. To a conservative and well-born Greek who shared the orthodox Greek view, — the view that was so constantly opposed to the pretensions of the Sophistic teachers of ethics, — that moral qualities cannot be taught or acquired, a man who was 'noble' by 'birth' was *ipso facto* a man of 'noble nature.'<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf., e. g., Isocrates, *In Soph.*: "Let no one suppose me to say that justice can be taught. For I believe absolutely that there is no sort of art that can implant virtue and justice in one who is evil by nature (or birth)."



From so much of a review (which I regret that limitations of space do not permit me to make more comprehensive) of the literary use of φύσις in a number of typical writers down to the latter part of the fifth century, I think it appears that the predominant and commonest import of the word involved the notion of the 'distinctive qualitative character' of a person or thing; and that already, in passages which show no tincture of technical philosophical influences, the word was (by virtue of the suggestion of 'the innate' contained in it) tending to imply a contrast between the 'intrinsic' or 'real' or 'underlying' character, and the superficial or transitory appearance.

II. The second sort of positive evidence tending to establish the true meaning of φύσις in the pre-Socratic philosophy is found in the express explanations of Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus, — especially of the first, — which seem to me to have been by no means adequately or justly dealt with in some recent discussions of the subject.

There is one text in Plato that must be regarded as absolutely conclusive upon the main point at issue, — the question whether φύσις, for the physiologists, referred to the process of becoming or to the character of the primal substance. This passage (*Laws*, 891C), singularly enough, has been cited neither by Burnet, — whose interpretation it substantiates, — nor by Woodbridge or Miss Millerd, — whose interpretation it renders inadmissible; though Burnet and Miss Millerd quote a far less decisive passage immediately following (892C). Plato says: <sup>1</sup> "One who talks in this fashion conceives fire and water and earth and air to be the first elements of things, and these he calls the 'nature' (τῆν φύσιν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα ἀπτά)." And lest there be any misapprehension of his reference here, Plato goes on to characterize this type of theory (which he objects to because it fails to recognize the primacy and immateriality of the soul) as "the unreasonable opinions of all those who have devoted themselves to inquiries concerning 'nature'" (ὁπόσοι πάποτε τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἐφήψαντο ζητημάτων). This is a perfectly plain and explicit statement that

<sup>1</sup>This reference is not given under φύσις in Ast's *Lexicon Platonicum*, though 892C is mentioned in that concordance. Can this oversight of Ast's be the cause of the general neglect of this important passage?

all the physiologers meant by *φύσις* one or another kind of qualitatively distinct material substance. But on the next page occur words which Miss Millerd seeks to explain, — *contra* Burnet, who refers to them as favoring his view, — as “by no means limiting the theme of the thinkers in question to the primary substance,” but rather as “equally capable of suggesting the story of the genesis of the world, and the process of world-building.” No such explanation, certainly, is possible for the all-important and, apparently, strangely neglected passage just quoted. As for the second passage (892A–C), Plato is arguing that the soul is the true first principle, and that all other things are secondary to and derivative from it; if this be true, he continues, “then thought and reflection and mind and art and law will be prior to ‘the hard’ and ‘the soft’ and ‘the heavy’ and ‘the light’ [these were the qualitative distinctions among the properties of the primary substances which had been constantly referred to by the earlier physiologers], and the great and primary works and actions will be works of art [*i. e.*, of thought]; they will be first, and after them will come nature (*φύσις*) and the works of nature, — though ‘nature’ is not properly the term to use, . . . for by nature is meant *ἡ γένεσις περὶ τὰ πρῶτα*. And if it turns out that the soul is really the first thing, — not fire or air, — then one would be pretty nearly right in saying that it is the soul that in the truest sense exists ‘by nature’ (*φύσει*).” Miss Millerd emphasizes the phrase *ἡ γένεσις περὶ τὰ πρῶτα* as justifying her interpretation. But *γένεσις* may mean simply the ‘origin’ or ‘source’ of anything; and the clear language of the context obviously requires that meaning here. Plato’s point is that the physiologers’ elements are not the source of the existence of the soul, but *vice versa*. The passage as a whole (891, 892), is not an adequate definition of the cosmological meaning of *φύσις*, and it lays a somewhat misleading emphasis upon temporal priority; but it at least ought to prevent anyone from denying that the term referred to a kind of substance, and not to becoming or to a law of the sequence of cosmical changes.

The principal Aristotelian *loci* for the interpretation of *φύσις* are *Met. A*, 4, 1014b16 and *Phys. B*, 192b8–194a21. By Aris-

totle's time the term had taken on, partly through the use of it by the Sophists and partly through his own adoption of it, a variety of further technical shades of meaning; and it would, of course, be entirely unsafe to consider all of his explanations of it as applicable to its earlier use in the physiologists. But in *Phys β*, 193a9 there is set forth a meaning of φύσις that is manifestly referred to the various physiologists and to the Sophist Antiphon.<sup>1</sup>

The text of Aristotle here runs as follows: "By some the φύσις and true Being (οὐσία) of natural things is held to consist in the primary element inhering in each thing, . . . just as wood is the φύσις of a couch and bronze of a statue. And Antiphon says, by way of illustration, that if one should bury a couch and it were possible for the decaying wood to put forth a shoot, it would be wood, and not couch, — the one attribute [of being a couch] belonging to the object in question merely contingently and as a result of its artificial construction and conventional arrangement, but the true Being of the thing consisting in that which continuously abides while undergoing these modifications. And if things are thus subject, each in its own way, to reduction to something else, — as bronze or gold to water, bones and wood to earth, etc., these latter are said to be the φύσις, — the real nature, — and the οὐσία, — the true Being. Wherefore some say that fire, some that earth, some that air, some that water, some that more than one of these, and some that all of them, constitute the φύσις τῶν ὄντων. For what any one of these men conceives to have

<sup>1</sup>This Antiphon, who figures in the *Memorabilia* in a discussion with Socrates about the propriety of receiving pay for teaching science and ethics, seems, — it is worth remarking, — to have been the first European mental healer and practitioner of suggestive therapeutics. We are told concerning him (Plut. in Diels, *Vorsokratiker*, p. 552, l. 26) that "he established a τέχνη ἀλνπίας, an art of being free from pain, showing how there is a cure for diseases without resort to physicians. And building a house in Corinth hard by the agora, he hung out a shingle announcing that he was able to cure those who were in suffering, by words alone; and inquiring into the causes of their complaints, he cheered up the afflicted." Παρεμνθείρο might, it is true, mean either 'cheered up' or 'advised'; but that it is probably mind-cure that is really in question here is shown by a fragment from his treatise 'On Truth,' in which he maintains that "in all men the mind rules [or has the primacy over] the body, with reference to health and disease and all other things" (Diels, p. 553). There are few twentieth-century movements that lacked counterparts in Greece of the fifth and fourth centuries B. C.

the character mentioned, that, he says, is the entire essence of the thing, but the other [qualities] are all merely affections and states and conditions of things. And the former are all eternal (for there is in them no μεταβολή ἐξ αὐτῶν), but the latter are perpetually coming into existence and passing out of it again." This passage gives a meaning for our term that is plainly ascribed to the physical philosophers, and is contrasted with Aristotle's own preferred meaning.

The testimony of Theophrastus is equally unequivocal. In the miscellaneous fragments of the *Physicorum Opiniones* the word occurs ten times, always in the sense either of 'primary substance' or 'primary qualitative nature.' The following passages are typical: "Anaximander declares that none of the so-called elements is the first principle, but a certain infinite φύσις, from which all the heavens, etc., come into being" (*Dox.*, 476). Hippasus and Heraclitus "regard fire as the one φύσις that underlies things" (ὡς ταύτης μᾶς οὐσης φύσεως τῆς ὑποκειμένης, *Dox.*, 475). Diogenes of Apollonia says that air is ἡ τοῦ παντός φύσις (*Dox.*, 477).

In the chapters *De Sensibus*, from which I have quoted earlier in this paper, the word constantly occurs as synonymous with οὐσία and as antithetic to πάθος, — *i. e.*, as signifying 'matter as it really is' in contrast with 'matter as it appears to our senses.'

III. The last-quoted passage from Theophrastus already points to the third, and last, kind of evidence concerning the meaning of φύσις with which this paper is concerned. That evidence consists in a peculiar employment of the term in the dative, with adverbial force, both by the later physiologists and by the Sophistic moralists, to point the contrast between the objectively valid and the subjectively apparent. It appears, for example, that Democritus was accustomed to say (*Simplic. Phys.*, 512, 28) that colors and other secondary qualities of matter do not subsist in things φύσει, but only νόμῳ καὶ θέσει. The same antithesis was applied to the distinction between objectively valid moral principles and merely conventional ones by Archelaus, a pupil of Anaxagoras, described by Diogenes Laertius as the last of the

physiologists. He maintained τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ. A similar usage is, of course, common in the *Gorgias* and in other familiar passages of Plato. In Plato and later writers (though Aristotle has another definition of his own) the word can usually best be translated by 'really,' 'genuinely' or 'objectively.' Now, it is not conceivable that with the later physiologists and the Sophists φύσει should have had a quasi-technical meaning wholly unconnected, and even inconsistent, with the technical meaning of φύσις. The adverbial use of the dative is intelligible only if it be admitted that the essential and distinctive import of φύσις was 'the intrinsic and abiding nature' of anything, — but especially of the primary material substance; whence, by a metonymy too natural to be recognized as such, it came to stand for that primary substance itself.

The purpose of the present inquiry has been to establish decisively a single historical fact, about which there has of late been a conspicuous divergence of learned opinion. Upon the philosophical interest of that fact there is no space left for lengthy discourse. It is evident, however, that, if the foregoing arguments be sound, Greek philosophy was from the first committed to a more or less sharp opposition of reality to appearance; that the chief quest of the physiologists was not, as some recent writers have maintained, for an understanding of the process of becoming, not for a formula of cosmic evolution, but for a consistent conception of reality as it is 'in itself.' And that quest was constantly dominated, vaguely at first, but with increasing clearness as reflection progressed, by two assumptions, both of them latent in the connotation of the term φύσις: (1) that the predicates of any such reality must be permanent and immutable; (2) that they must also be somehow 'inherent,' 'innate,' not dependent upon external circumstances and relations. The interpretation of the meaning, and of the inner dialectic, of the history of Greek philosophy will thus be largely determined by the view taken of the pre-Socratic import of that pregnant term in which the central conception of the reflection at the period seems to have been summed up.

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## KANT'S FIRST ANTINOMY.<sup>1</sup>

PERHAPS no one would take quite seriously, argument by argument, Kant's presentation of the "first antinomy." It may not, that is, have been made out impossible to think of a world infinite in extent, equally impossible to think of one that is finite; forbidden to conceive of a world whose past history has no beginning, no less forbidden to conceive of one whose past history has a first moment.

Yet out of the 'much argument' there may be seen to emerge a puzzle that is not without suggestion. It is this: There is no method by which we may determine the spread of bodies in space, the history of their behavior in time, save that of bare observation. There are, however, the most plausible reasons for asserting that the observations indispensable to this determining form an endless series. If now there is but one method of settling an issue of fact, and if *that* method will not settle it, are we not face to face with the most puzzling of conceptions, *an unknowable fact?*

One naturally thinks first of establishing the reality of the issue. *Is* an infinite series of experiments, one asks, indispensable to the answering of these two questions of extent and duration? Here, many reflections occur to a modern that have received no consideration at the hands of Kant. Those connected with the problem of the space distribution of bodies are certainly the less vital, yet they should be set forth in some manner. Thus, it may occur to one that Kant has made an assumption requiring analysis when he thinks of the method by which we determine the existence of bodies at a certain distance from the earth (say) as involving a consumption of time proportionate to the distance. Certainly if the only method were to send a messenger to such regions, or to await a messenger (say, of light) from them, then, however rapidly the

<sup>1</sup> Read before the Baltimore meeting of the American Philosophical Association, December, 1908.

messenger were to travel, a measurable time would be required for him to arrive and report. And as the journey must be infinite in order to exhaust the infinite reaches of space, the time involved would be infinite no less. But the consideration thrusts itself upon us at this point that not all physical influences are known to be propagated. The gravitational effect of one mass upon another is, so far as experiment can decide, instantaneous. If so, it is conceivable that the presence of masses at all distances from a given finite system would be reflected in the momentary behavior of this system. In order that such a state of affairs may result, however, the law of the force which one body exerts on another must be such that no two distributions should give the same map of lines of force in a given finite region. But so far as gravitation is concerned, there are at least certain 'critical cases' in which more than one, in fact an infinite number of distributions of mass would give exactly the same force-map for a circumscribed region. One such case would be that in which the region in question lay inside of a spherical shell. The intensity in the interior of such a shell being zero, it follows that the presence of the shell would not be revealed by any momentary behavior of systems lying within it. To assure ourselves of its presence or absence, we should require some other method than that of observing the gravitational behavior of a finite system of bodies.<sup>1</sup>

If then no law of the interaction of bodies is empirically known which would enable us in a finite number of experiments to determine the distribution of bodies throughout space by examining

<sup>1</sup>To be sure, the theorem establishing the zero intensity of gravitational force in the interior of a spherical shell depends upon the assumption of the law of the inverse square. To establish the theorem that *no* law of nature can be defined which reflects distribution throughout an infinite region in the behavior of bodies in a finite region requires two steps. First, a law must be conceived that yields no such critical cases as that defined by the law of gravitation. Second, such a law must give a force-function that lies at a finite distance from any given force-function which yields such critical cases. Otherwise viewed, the necessity of a probable error of observation, an infinite number of observations would be required to decide between the function that does and the function that does *not* reflect an infinite distribution in a finite one. I am content to leave so delicate a question of mathematics to future treatments of the problem. The difficulties of the discussion seem to me out of proportion to the importance of the issue.

the behavior of bodies within a finite region, we can have no quarrel with Kant's results. Whether bodies are distributed throughout the infinity of space or are confined to a region of it remains an experimentally unanswerable question.

But when we turn from the problem of distribution in space to that of history in time, the facile analogy by which Kant himself is wont to pass from the one question to the other seems something too unconsidered. For we have undoubtedly the vague suspicion that the history of the past is embodied in the *now* in a much more complete way than the structure of the *yonder* is reflected in the *here*.

I am not inclined to stick on the point that the history of the past is a present document,—is, as Hume would say, a lively idea associated with a present impression. I am rather tempted to put the question whether or not the history, however recorded, of a system is indispensable to a prediction of its future conduct.

When Kant suggests that past history throws its light upon present conditions (a light indispensable to our vision into the future) he is proposing no new idea, nor one likely to offend the commonest of common-sense. Only, the sciences in which retrospect is necessary to prevision are the relatively superficial sciences,—biology, sociology, psychology. The adjective “superficial” is not of course meant to be abusive. It is obvious that certain sciences owe their claim upon our attention to their success in inventing types of explanation that are applicable when the data for applying more thorough-going sciences are wanting. For example, few would be prepared to maintain that the training of an organism left no trace on the intimate anatomy of that organism, although it is true no such trace has been observed. We have not advanced beyond the stage in which the anatomical changes effected by training are referred to in figures borrowed from other sciences; we still confine ourselves to speaking of the well-worn paths of association and the like. Such expressions only give name to a hope and a faith, but they do at least testify to that much,—to a faith, namely, that did we know enough of minute structural differences we should be able to predict a difference in the



reactions of two organisms to the same stimulus when these organisms, as we now view them, are unlike only in training. Not knowing so much in the way of structural detail, we must include among the data indispensable to prediction a knowledge of the past history of the organism, and we introduce among the influences of which account must be taken in explaining behavior 'the force of habit,' 'the direction of memory,' and like expressions which in their very wording mimic the categories of mechanical explanation. To have invented such devices for a ready prediction where the data required by more general, and so deeper, sciences are lacking, is just the contribution of those sciences that I have called superficial. But we must recognize that such sciences are conscious of their superficial, make-shift character, that they have themselves the ambition to dispense with their special devices, and their first step in this sense would be to eliminate if possible an appeal to past history as explanatory.

We cannot say, of course, that any given scientific ideal is bound to be realized by a complacent world of fact. It is perhaps true that biology has made some progress in its effort to trace the structural modifications wrought in an organism by its experience. On the other hand, an increasing knowledge of the inanimate world has revealed, where we least expected to find them, classes of phenomena in which account has to be taken of past history. One which has suggested more frequently than any other that puzzling phrase 'the memory of matter,' is the well-known phenomenon of 'hysteresis.' It would appear, *e. g.*, that two magnets in exactly the same present condition would react differently to the same treatment if they had come into that condition by different ways. In other words, we have to know the past history of a magnet, just as we do of an organism, if we are able to predict its future behavior. Of course if instances of this kind should multiply in the inorganic world, and if in the organic world science should ultimately give up its hope of dispensing with the kind of explanation we have called superficial, the *now* would no more embody the *then* than the *here* reflects the *yonder*, and Kant's transition from the

problem of space distribution to that of past history would be beyond criticism. But as just the opposite is the case, as in the inorganic world the situations in which we have to take into account the path by which a system comes into a given condition are so rare as to excite wonder, and as in the organic world reduction rather than extension is the result of study, it is no mere idle curiosity, but a pressing requirement of sound method to reconsider Kant's treatment of history from the point of view of an image of nature which regards that history as sufficiently recounted if we substitute negative values of time in a formula now observed to hold throughout the known world, and solve for all the dependent variables.

While such an assumption vastly simplifies our conception of natural science, it complicates or rather subtilizes beyond expectation the particular problem with which we are here dealing. Questions not easy to answer begin to crowd upon us. What sort of a formula would mean an infinite past history? What sort a finite? What kind of experiment would be necessary and sufficient to decide between the two formulas? Would this experiment involve a finite or an infinite series of observations?

The first question is not difficult to answer, so little difficult indeed that a formula which means an infinite past and an infinite future history is the one which every scientist carries around with him as the more or less conscious starting-point of his reflections on natural philosophy. Arrhenius, for example, does not hesitate to say that no other world-view is to him conceivable than such as makes past history infinite. All such formulas have at least this in common. They succeed in expressing everything that varies in nature, — whether positions in space, electric charges, magnetic poles, — as functions of a single variable called time; so that for all real values of this independent variable we obtain real values for at least one kind of the dependent variables (*e. g.*, position) and values greater than zero for the time-rate of change of at least one kind of these variables (*e. g.*, velocity). A system of gravitating masses with velocities normal to the lines connecting the masses would be a system with an infinite past, and we might superimpose upon

such a system various phenomena of radiation which would not preclude such infinity.

Neither would the attempt to construct an image of a system with a finite past or future history seem to offer insuperable difficulty. Perhaps it will lie nearer to our experience to think first of a system destined to run down in a finite time. To this end nothing more seems required than to replace the *Wärmemethode*, which Clausius conceived to be the future actually awaiting the system we know. Suppose in a gravitating system we imagine the masses to behave as though moving through a resisting medium. One effect would be constantly to diminish the velocities normal to the radii vectores of the system, velocities now conceived to remain constant. The consequence would be a gradual approach along a spiral path of satellites toward planets, of planets toward suns, of suns toward each other. If the following of such paths resulted in impact with velocities greater than zero, even if we assumed the masses to be perfectly elastic, the conditions would require that the kinetic energy of the masses of the system should gradually diminish, while such gain in potential energy as could be established would not be sufficient to make up the loss; so that the whole system would tend toward a zero of energy, *i. e.*, toward a state of equilibrium. To be sure, so far as experience acquaints us with systems of masses moving through resisting mediums, we look to phenomena of the medium, such as convection currents and radiation effects, to keep the total of energy constant. But nothing assures us so long as there is an error of observation that the sum will be made up, and if it be not, one form of change does not completely replace another; the whole history of the system, which is precisely a record of its changes, tends toward an end.

There remains a point to be considered, or rather two points. A system tending toward equilibrium may not so approach the limit as to attain to it in a finite time. And, in the second place, since we are inspired to these reflections by Kant's treatment of the antinomies, we are without interest in images constructed in terms of laws of force which a finite number of experiments could prove to be untrue to fact. But I am content to treat these two

problems in geometrical form. If we constructed a graph of the energy of a system in which this quantity remained constant, laying off time along the  $x$  axis, and the corresponding energy along the  $y$ , the energy would be represented by a line parallel to the  $x$  axis. The fact that there is always an experimental error makes it, however, impossible to distinguish between this parallel and a second straight line which would intersect the  $x$  axis at a point representing the time when the energy of the system had become zero. As this state of affairs remains unchanged so long as the probable error is greater than zero, and as the very formula by means of which we express the probable error of experimental results implies that nothing short of an infinite series of experiments would enable us to reduce such an error to zero, it follows that no finite series would enable us to include the possibility of a *finite* future history. On the other hand it might be that without going outside of the types of curves which we are accustomed to regard as alone capable of expressing physical laws, we could find none lying within the limits of probable error which did not intersect the axis of  $x$ . We should still not have excluded the possibility of an *infinite* future. For unless the forces we can ascribe to the system are very different from any with which we are acquainted, the energy of the system must increase with the separation of its parts in space. But we have already accepted Kant's result that no finite series of experiments could determine this distribution for us. Consequently, though we were able to establish a law which would require any *finite* system to run down in a finite time, we could not establish the finitude of the system we call the world.

I have presented the problem of a finite future first, in deference to our prejudices. Conceptually, however, there is no greater difficulty in defining the conditions of a finite past. The transition from the one to the other involves nothing more complicated than a change of sign, the substitution of an accelerating medium for a retarding. It is true that experience makes the latter concept less familiar to us, but it can render it no more difficult to define. To go forward to an end and to go backward to a beginning are problems of the same order.

Yet there are certain objections that may well present themselves to the mind of one attempting to follow in imagination this finite history to its beginning or end. To one of these our attention has again and again been called in the history of reflection. Kant himself urges it as conclusive against the hypothesis of a finite past. If, namely, we conceive our system as starting from a condition of equilibrium, what in its previous history of rest decides the moment at which its slumber shall be broken, its balance upset?

The question is a delicate one, and yet I am tempted to maintain that its only answer lies in the ungracious suggestion that it ought not to have been asked. That it is asked is due to our forgetfulness of a simple caution respecting the meaning of time. Our need to deal experimentally with fragmentary bits of nature, systems set up in our laboratories or such as nature has fairly well isolated for us, has left us with the mental habit of looking upon the coördinates of position together with the clock that marks time as furnished for us *from without the system*. When, however, we pass from bits of nature to nature as a whole, we realize that our coördinates of position and our clock are parts of the thing we are dealing with. We can record only distances between masses, between charges, etc., and watch the way in which these distances change with respect to each other. Our clock then becomes a changing coördinate of our system. To take the path of some member of this system as our clock, *defines* those changes to be taking place at a constant rate, whose increments are proportional to the increments of path laid off by the body we have chosen. Now, obviously, the choice of such a clock is quite arbitrary; and this arbitrary element disappears, the issue between a finite and an infinite history for a given system is experimentally settled, only when we have made trial of *every possible clock*. I mean that to think of a system with a finite history, it is necessary to think of each possible clock as having run down in terms of each other, it is not enough to think of the system as having run down in terms of *a* clock. Suppose, namely, that we had arrived at the point of recognizing that only one coördinate of the system is changing, *i. e.*, as we substitute in our

equations successive increments of this coördinate, the rate of change of all others with respect to it is found to be zero, its rate of change with respect to them consequently infinite. Our task of tracing the history of the system in terms of its last possible intrinsic clock is not completed, in a sense that would lead us to pronounce this history finite, until we come to a last substitution such that on trying it we find that all the coördinates of our system become imaginary. For this result we should be forced to interpret to mean that the coördinate in question could not take on the value substituted, that here the last possible clock stops, that the system as a whole has come to rest.

And just at this point, if we imagine our substitutions to have been toward a beginning, our questioner would ask: What happened prior to this? Is there not an infinite history of rest to be added on to a finite history of change? I answer: A part of a system may have a history of rest in terms of a clock found in another part of the system not at rest; but there is no sense in which we can speak of a history of rest in connection with a whole system. If then one asks: What marks the moment when the static system begins to move? Why one moment rather than another? The only answer is: There are no moments for a static system, hence no "one rather than another." We have been faced with one of those "*ungereimte Fragen*" that Kant is sharp to criticise when he detects the "*Ungereimtheit*," but is himself capable of puzzling over when the trick has escaped him.

But there is one other difficulty that suggests itself. If it is maintained that an infinite number of observations is indispensable to the establishing of the fact that the future history of the world is but finite, whence, in this case, is to come the time in which to perform the experiments involved? Would not the experience that we could not perform the series be itself a finite experiment, or less subtly stated, must not the experience which corresponds to the establishing of a last moment, an end of things, lie within finite range in case the facts are such as to confirm the hypothesis of such an end?

One shrinks before the subtlety of the only answer which seems consistent. The end of experience is not the experience

of an end. Should the conditions which make experience possible themselves vanish, I see no sense in which this vanishing would itself be a fact open to observation. Let him who can better interpret the supposed situation 'carry off the friendly palm.'

I have expressed, then, as well as the extreme difficulties of the problem would permit, the opinion that Kant is essentially right, that no possible experiment could decide the issue between a finite distribution of bodies in space and an infinite, between a finite world-history and an infinite. The question remains: What of it?

I need hardly say that no one who deals with such a question is tempted to his task by an interest in a world's destiny. The game is finite enough so far as he is concerned, and his curiosity respecting the fate of the theatre of his brief act must be trifling. The real question that does excite the interest of reflection is that on which Kant focuses our attention. Is not the issue between these two alternative assumptions purely one of fact, and is not the fact involved unknowable? Must there not then be such a thing as an unascertainable fact, one lying beyond the reach of possible experience, in a word a *Ding-an-sich*?

It will be remembered that Kant's own answer to the question: What then? was eminently practical. He saw in the situation nothing but the occasion to point a moral; one which took at his hands the form of a command. In your judgment of what the world is, take into account as much of its distribution in space, as much of its history in time as you can. Our considerations would only modify and that but slightly, the form of the injunction. The omission from our calculation of a spatial presence leads to a constant error. The issue between a finite and an infinite history reduces so far as we can see to a question of the probable error of experiment. Our imperative would then become: Neglect no source of constant error, reduce the probable error of experiment more and more. All of which the 'laboratorius' would be in haste to acclaim, — as a commonplace.

The interest of the problem seems to me to center in the light

its discussion throws upon the question: What is a fact? The answer that Kant returns to this question makes him in his own eyes an idealist; but when that answer is stated in its clearest form, when the idealism implied by it is reduced to its simplest terms, one has the conviction that the Kant of the Dialectic is an idealist of a very different stripe from the Kant of the *Æsthetic* and the *Analytic*; that furthermore it is this Kant if any who can define the meaning of a *Ding-an-sich*, and defend the right of such a concept to a place in an idealistic system.

And Kant's solution of this particular puzzle respecting an unknowable fact would seem to reduce to this: It is the very nature of a fact to be unknowable; but unknowable only in the sense that an *ideal* is unattainable. That which as a '*Gegebenes*' refusing to be found, would be a real puzzle from which the various mysticisms of a '*docta ignorantia*' might spring, becomes, when viewed as an '*Aufgegebenes*,' an ideal of method whose appearance in the discussion has the value of stating briefly the distinction between a less true and a more true experimental result, and of pointing the corollary that for every result that is 'true,' there is always definable and always ascertainable a 'truer.'

If I am right in reinterpreting the "regulative principle" in which Kant's discussion culminates to mean, 'reduce your probable error, eliminate more and more of the inexhaustible sources of constant error,' the ideal fact is the empirical result whose probable error is zero and for which a source of constant error is not definable. The interest of the antinomy we have discussed consists not in the discovery of one question of fact whose decision lies beyond the reach of possible experience, but in the demonstration which it offers that all statements of fact must retain an expression for probable error and must yield a definition of possible sources of constant error. The 'real' fact is an 'ideal' which we can define only in terms of a method that possesses a device for distinguishing between the more and less real.

In Kant's many treatments of the noumenon, there seems to me no statement of the necessity for retaining this concept so clear and so convincing as the passage of the section "Von dem



Grunde der Unterscheidung, etc.": "wo nicht ein beständiger Zirkel heraus kommen soll, das Wort Erscheinung schon eine Beziehung auf etwas anzeigt, dessen unmittelbare Vorstellung zwar sinnlich ist, was aber an sich selbst . . . etwas, d. i. ein von der Sinnlichkeit unabhängiger Gegenstand sein muss." If there is, as Jacobi suggests, a difficulty in becoming a Kantian without retaining enough of a noumenon to make our word phenomenon mean something, it is a difficulty analogous to that which would arise in maintaining that all hands are right hands. If there is a difficulty in remaining a Kantian because of this noumenon, it is owing to the mistaken inference that because a noumenon must be something different from *any* phenomenon, it must be defined without reference to a series of phenomena. Suppose one were to maintain that the method of distinguishing between the 'appearance' and 'that which appears' was one that defined and made attainable a 'real' for every 'appearing,' only that this 'real' was no less an 'appearing' that defined a 'more real' and so on *in infinitum*. There is no longer a circle but a progress, and if one defines the goal of this progress as an 'ideal,' it is none the less true that only a progress can define an 'ideal.' And it is only in the possibility of progress that one can be interested.

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## THE PRACTICAL CHARACTER OF REALITY.

RECENT discussions of the practical character of reality seem very significant when one considers their bearing on the relation between what are probably the two most distinctive doctrines of pragmatism. The first of these doctrines may be called instrumentalism; the second is immediatism. By instrumentalism is meant that element of pragmatism which has grown out of the application of the evolutionary method to logical problems. The evolutionary method in general prescribes that, in order to understand the existing nature of anything, we inquire into its origin and development, and that this development be in every case explained as an adjustment to the specific conditions under which it has taken place. When this method is applied to logic, it means, in the first place, that thought itself has arisen as a mode of organic adjustment to environment, and that its whole development has been, and is, determined with reference to this function. In the second place, and more particularly, instrumentalism means that all distinctions and terms of thought, that is to say, all meanings, are relative to the specific conditions which have called them forth and to the functions which they perform. This carries with it a denial of absolutism in all its historic forms, from the Platonic doctrine of the absolute good to the neo-Hegelian conception of reality as completely organized experience.

It is from the standpoint of instrumentalism that the pragmatist has so effectively sought to discredit the venerable disciplines of ontology and epistemology, whose aim is the investigation of reality as such or knowing as such. As profitably, argues the pragmatist, might we discuss with the pre-Kantian rationalist the nature of man as such, without reference to his biological relations to lower species and the conditions of his development from them. In place of epistemology, that outworn relic of rationalism, he would substitute a genetic investigation of the relation of thinking to other modes of experiencing, together with an inquiry into the specific conditions under which the

various thought-processes arise and subside. The absolutist's condemnation of such procedure as 'merely psychological' he would stigmatize as parallel to the vitalist's contempt for the chemical investigation of organic processes as 'merely mechanical.' The claim, that psychological investigation is essentially and ultimately incapable of throwing light on the nature of meaning, is, he would urge, as unfounded as the claim that vital reactions are in essence not amenable to chemical analysis.

A very similar conclusion regarding the investigation of the nature of reality we might suppose to be the natural expression of the instrumentalist attitude toward ontology. We might suppose, for example, the pragmatist pointing out the dualism in which absolutistic philosophy has generally issued, as a result of the attempt to define reality in existential (as distinct from functional) terms. Such a dualism, he might say, is practically inevitable; for the characterization of one form, or even aspect, of being as real thereby implies the unreality of other forms or aspects, and makes inexplicable the relation between the two divisions. The dualism may, perhaps, be avoided, but only by the expedient of maintaining that all being is real, in which case the term 'real' loses all significance. From the instrumentalist standpoint, the inquiry, *What is reality?* appears as futile as did the question, *What is the cause of the world?* to Kant. And we may imagine the pragmatist to urge of reality, even as Kant did of causality, that it is a conception applicable to the particular objects of experience in relation to each other, but utterly barren if applied to existence as a whole. But the advocate of instrumentalism would go farther than Kant. Something like this, perhaps, is the argument we may conceive him to advance. If one asks the cause of a given event, a complete answer would include the description of the whole preceding state of the universe. On the other hand, the attempt to give a perfectly accurate account of the event itself would equally involve a description of the contemporaneous state of the universe. Completeness of statement in either case means the entire loss of all significance. No event is left and no cause can be adduced. How much, then, of the preceding state of the universe is to be regarded as

the sufficient cause of any event? What degree of completeness does 'truth' demand? The only answer is: So much as is relevant to the purposes of the particular inquiry in hand. In fine, what may be regarded as a true account of the event, and what as an adequate description of its cause, is relative to the purposes of the investigation,—it is a 'practical' matter. The case is similar in regard to reality. What any object or event really is, always depends on the context and occasion in connection with which the object or event is considered. Taken 'at large,'—to use Professor Dewey's phrase,—the inquiry is futile because indeterminate. The 'real,' again, is always such by distinction from the 'unreal,' or the 'apparent,' or even the 'ideal.' The ground for the distinction is always specific, and is to be found in the particular circumstances and exigencies which have given rise to it. The only general theory of reality (as of causality) must be functional; that is, it must be an account of the general service which the distinction 'real-unreal' performs in our actual processes of thought. Such, in brief, is the position which we might suppose the pragmatist to take, and something of this sort we might suppose him to mean when he speaks of the 'practical character of reality.'

Let us turn now to what has been mentioned as the second distinctive doctrine of pragmatism, namely, immediatism. In the following discussion I shall, for purposes of brevity, confine myself to a consideration of immediatism as it appears in Professor Dewey's writings. In this matter he seems to be in substantial agreement with other leading exponents of pragmatism, notably Professor James; and if the thesis which is here to be advanced is valid with reference to Professor Dewey's position, it will, I think, hold respecting that of Professor James.

The doctrine of immediatism is the pragmatist's substitute for ontology. It is briefly expressed in the formula, that reality is, or things really are, what they are experienced as. The formula owes its point to the distinction between things as known and things as otherwise experienced. The fallacy of older theories is supposed to lie precisely in the assumption, that the object of knowledge alone is real; or, otherwise put, that reality sustains

but a single sort of relation to us, namely, that of object to be known. Such an assumption, however, fails signally to do justice either to the nature of reality, or to our relations to it. For reality is practical; and, besides being object of knowledge, it is that with which we hold commerce,— economic, ethical, æsthetic, and the like. Hence it *is* whatever, and all, it is experienced to be. More specifically, the real is what it is *immediately* experienced as, not alone what it is found to be for a later reflection. Thus, in the illustration used by Professor Dewey, the noise heard in the night is *really* fearsome, even though investigation shows it to be only the harmless flapping of a shade in the wind. This is not meant to imply that the object of the subsequent knowledge-experience is unreal (because known as harmless), but merely that the object known has no exclusive title to reality. The knowledge-experience, albeit the issue of a process of mediation, is, as experience, itself immediate, and hence as real, if no more real, than any other kind of experience. Reality, then, is identifiable with experience in its immediate aspect. To the objection that the real object thus becomes the subject of contradictory predicates, the reply of the pragmatist is that the ascription of contradictory predicates becomes a difficulty only when the real object is conceived as a static entity. The solution lies in conceiving the real itself to change. The noise of the illustration is really fearsome and really harmless, just because the reality experienced has changed, and changed, indeed, by virtue of the knowing itself. It is a false account of the occurrence to describe the change as being merely in our attitude and thus subjective. The real thing, that is, the thing as actually experienced, has changed. It is all one, indeed, whether we say that the thing experienced has changed, or that experience has changed. Things are no other than our experience of them; and experience is no other than the things experienced.

But not only do we discover the real nature of such things as particular noises, horses, and chairs, by asking what they are experienced as; but we must apply the same method in our inquiry into the nature of all manner of metaphysical quiddities. As Professor Dewey says: "If you wish to find out what subjec-

tive, objective, physical, mental, cosmic, psychic, cause, substance, purpose, activity, evil, quantity, — any philosophic term, in short, — means, go to experience and see what it is experienced as.”

Suppose, now, we attempt to apply this method to the very subject under discussion, the nature of reality itself. Has Professor Dewey, we may well ask, followed the method of immediate empiricism in his account of reality? Has he asked what reality itself is experienced as? Or has he, since reality is only another name for the different reals of experience, asked what a real thing is experienced as? For surely, although ‘real thing’ may perhaps be conceived as identical with ‘thing experienced,’ it is not immediately experienced *as* such. If a ‘really fearsome noise’ is not experienced as something over and above a ‘fearsome noise,’ the ‘real’ is not experienced at all. As well might the fearsome noise be described as harmless, since investigation shows it to be such. For is it not perfectly manifest, that it is only for subsequent reflection that the ‘fearsome noise’ can become a ‘really fearsome noise,’ just as it is only for subsequent reflection that it could have become a ‘not really fearsome’ but ‘really harmless noise’? The experience ‘*A — B*’ is surely not identical with the experience ‘really *A — B*’; and it would seem that the inquiry to which the immediatist is committed is: What is the nature of this experienced difference?

But what now shall we say of the doctrine, that reality is to be identified with the immediate? Surely if immediatism means that all things are what they are experienced as, then it is not true to say that all things as they are experienced *are* real; for they are not experienced *as* real. The doctrine of immediatism can no more legitimately supply a definition of reality than it can, for example, of causality. All it can with any semblance of consistency claim to offer is a method for discovering either. If as immediatists we would discover the nature of reality, we must, in Professor Dewey’s words, go to experience and see what it is experienced as; and, still imitating his language, one may say that this would be found no short and easy method.

It is not my purpose, however, simply to convict immediatism

of self-contradiction. Let it be admitted for argument's sake that the self-contradiction just pointed out is merely verbal, and that, in Professor Dewey's thought, the term 'reality' is used as synonymous with 'things as immediately experienced'; and let us consider on its own merits the doctrine that things are what they are experienced as. No difficulty may, at first sight, seem to arise, so long as we consider experiences of particular things. The noise which alarms us in the night *is* a fearsome thing; and, when later we find it to be caused by the wind, it *is*, again, a harmless thing. So the horse we use for our afternoon drive is the means of relief from the pressure of the day's cares; although later, when we learn that it grows frantic with fear when it meets a motor-car, it becomes no longer a means of recreation but an unwelcome responsibility. So far we may perhaps follow the immediatist dictum, that things are what they are experienced as. But suppose the case in point be the nature of some universal; say, for instance, the universal 'horse.' What is 'horse' experienced as? How, in general terms, can the immediatist describe the difference between the experience of a universal and that of a particular? The discussions of immediatism by Professor Dewey have given me no material help toward an answer to this question. In regard to one universal, 'reality', the assumption, indeed, seems to be that the experience of the different particular real things is no other than the experience of reality itself. But it is scarcely conceivable that in reply to the question, "What is the nature of the universal 'horse'?" the pragmatist would point to the various experiences of particular horses and say: "That is what 'horse' is experienced as." To such a reply the retort is obvious, — "How is the experience of these numerous and varying objects *as* 'horses' to be described?" No, the only seemingly possible position for the pragmatist to take is the one which we find him actually taking; namely, that the universal is experienced as a tool in the processes of reflective thought, and that, although these are processes of mediation, yet as modes of experiencing they are themselves immediate. Thus we find Professor Dewey saying: "Lest I be charged with intimating that concepts are unreal and

unempirical, I say forthwith that I believe meanings may be and are immediately experienced *as* conceptual.”<sup>1</sup> Suppose we ask, however, just what in such a process of mediation is immediately experienced. Here it is important to recall that the thing experienced and the experience are the same. The thing immediately experienced in the process of mediation, accordingly, is the process of mediation itself. The terms in which the process is carried on, the tools by which the reconstitution is effected, are not themselves immediately experienced. In pragmatist references to universals they usually are described as *Denkmitteln*, instruments of analysis, means by which we are enabled to deal successfully with facts and lead our thinking to successful issue. They are, in short, described in functional terms. Yet one could scarcely state the essence of the immediatist theory of reality better than to characterize it as the belief that the real nature of things is to be found in structure and not in function. Perhaps the difficulty may be better presented in this way. The first principle of immediatism is that things are what they are experienced as. But universals are not described by the pragmatist in terms of what they are experienced *as*, but in terms of the functions they perform. Universals are, it is said, tools in the process of reflection; but surely it cannot be said that they are immediately experienced *as* such. Indeed, it is only for the speculation of the pragmatist that the universal becomes interpreted as a tool, that is to say, as a mediator. Even so, the noise heard in the night may be described as a stimulus to the specific organic reaction which follows; but it is not *as* such a stimulus that it is experienced. Doubtless, universals must, as Professor Dewey says, “somehow enter into experience”; and, doubtless, “all experience is *as existence* immediate”; but, if this last remark is to have any force, it obviously implies that experience *as meaning* is not immediate.

It seems impossible, then, that universals should be immediately experienced. Laying aside the problem, which now emerges regarding the status of universals thus banished from the realm of reality, let us turn to the no less urgent problem of the rela-

<sup>1</sup> *Journal of Ph.*, p. 599, note.



tion of universal to particular. For immediatism, it is evident, is brought face to face with a dualism of particular and universal as radical as that faced by the older empiricism. One finds, indeed, in the writings of pragmatists suggestions as to how this difficulty may be met. Knowing, it is urged, as compared with other modes of experiencing, is not absolutely *sui generis*. It is, indeed, nothing other than the mode in which the conflicting values and meanings of immediate experiences become transformed and adjusted. It is false to assert that any irreconcilable dualism exists between the tools of the knowing-experience and the things which they serve to readjust. For, on the one hand, the very nature of these tools is determined by the specific maladjustments and tensions of the immediate experience which call for the reconstitution; and, on the other hand, the nature of these tools by which the reconstitution is effected determines the nature of the immediate experience in which the process issues. In other words, the relation of universals, which are always mediate terms of thought, to the particular things of immediate experience lies in the uncertainty and doubtfulness existing within the immediate experience itself.

In reply to this argument, I would submit, in the first place, that immediate experience can contain no uncertainty and doubtfulness such as to demand mediation; but that as immediate it is utterly incapable of giving rise to any inquiry whatsoever. Let the point be perfectly clear. An immediate experience may, indeed, be one of vagueness, doubt, uncertainty; but this very uncertainty becomes then the thing experienced, and is not itself uncertain. There can be no possible doubt as to *what is experienced*, since any doubtfulness felt is itself precisely what is experienced. It is only an experience which contains a doubt as to the nature of the thing experienced, that stands in need of, or can possibly evoke, reconstitution. As Professor Dewey himself says in the *Studies*: "It is the uncertainty as to the *what* of the experience, together with the certainty *that* there is such an experience, that evokes the thought-function" (p. 40). But, if the thing experienced is just the experience itself, there is no possible distinction between the *what* and the *that*. The *what* is the

*that*. It is this very confusion of the *that* and the *what* which is, I believe, the source of the dogma of the certainty of immediate experience. "If *any* experience," Professor Dewey writes, "then a *determinate* experience."<sup>1</sup> So also might it be said: "If any existence, then a determinate existence." We see a tree in the yard, and we assume (as indeed we must, if only as a working hypothesis) that as an objective thing the tree is perfectly determinate in every particular. But this is not to assert that any possible description of the tree can adequately express its determinations. On the contrary, we would say that every possible statement about the tree is fundamentally hypothetical, and subject to correction. Just so, we must say that any given experience is, as an objective thing, perfectly determinate; but our statements about the nature of this experience are just as truly hypothetical as are our statements about the nature of the tree,—else why the need of trained introspection? Again, Professor Dewey writes: "It is a situation which is organized or constituted as a whole, and which yet is falling to pieces in its parts,—a situation which is in conflict with itself,—that arouses the search to find what really goes together and a correspondent effort to shut out what only seemingly belongs together" (p. 37). But within the immediate experience there can be no question as to what really, and what only seemingly, goes together. Either things go together or they do not; and in either case it is really, and not seemingly.

Now it is just this failure of immediatism to distinguish the *what* from the *that*, this attempted reduction of meaning to existence, which marks the fatal separation of universal and particular. This will perhaps be evident if we again consider one of Professor Dewey's illustrations, that of the Zöllner lines.<sup>2</sup> One would naturally say of these lines that they are seen as convergent, but are really not convergent but parallel. To such a statement of the case, however, Professor Dewey takes exception. The lines of the experience in which the illusion occurs, he maintains, are *really* convergent, not merely seen as such. But how, we must

<sup>1</sup> *Journal of Philos.*, Vol. II, p. 398.

<sup>2</sup> *Journal of Philos.*, Vol. II, p. 397.

ask, are lines experienced as convergent? What do we *mean* by describing lines as convergent? Convergent lines are commonly defined as those which, when extended, meet in a point. But the lines-of-that-experience cannot possibly be conceived to be extended, without thereby becoming the lines of some other experience. Evidently, then, the lines which are seen to be convergent are not the lines-of-that-experience, in the immediate particularity of the experience; they are not the lines of any *particular* experience at all; they are the *real lines*. That is to say, if the paradox be allowed, the lines-of-that-experience are not real *lines* at all. For what is a real line? Surely something that can be extended and measured and divided; something which (to adapt a phrase of Professor Dewey's) is good for something else in the way of experience. And this, I venture to assert, is just what a 'real thing' means (at least, this is one of the meanings of 'real'),—a thing good for something else in the way of experience. To experience a thing *as* real is to experience it as having reference to that which is not contained in the experience itself. And here we come into open contradiction with immediatism. For this is precisely what the things of immediate experience are not,—good for anything else in the way of experience,—provided that things experienced are, indeed, the experiences themselves.

To put the matter otherwise, the 'real,' I should say, is never immediately experienced at all; it is always ideal. This being so, it turns out that all experiences are not equally good at telling what the nature of a thing really is. If they were, there would be no such thing as illusions at all. In the case of the Zöllner lines, the visual experience is not as good as an experience of measuring for telling whether the lines really are convergent or not. Perhaps the question may arise: If 'convergent' means 'meeting in a point when produced,' what is meant by seeing lines 'as convergent' when they do not actually meet? Simply that a certain visual appearance, now recognized, has come to be a sign or symbol of other experiences. Indeed, the association of these experiences with this visual appearance is so close, that 'convergent' is often used to denote the visual

appearance without explicit reference to the possible extension of the convergent lines to a meeting-point. Thus in the illusion we do, as Professor Dewey says, see real convergence, in the sense that we do actually experience this visual appearance. But let the question arise, whether the lines are really convergent or not; and the reference is no longer to the visual appearance alone, but to the possibility of actually extending the lines until they meet, or of applying some other recognized test of convergence. It is this ambiguity in the meaning of 'convergent' which, it seems to me, makes plausible the contention of Professor Dewey, that the lines of the Zöllner illusion are really convergent. And there is, I believe, a similar ambiguity in the meaning of 'fearsome' as used in the previous illustration. The noise was, indeed, 'really fearsome,' in the sense of actually giving rise to the emotion of fear. But 'fearsome' also means simply *dangerous*; and it is this meaning of the term which we have in mind, when after investigation we say that the noise is not really fearsome but harmless. For there certainly could never arise any question as to whether the noise was really fearsome or really harmless, unless fearsome meant more than actually exciting fear. So the question, what things really are, has meaning only because it refers beyond the particular immediate experience of the things,—not, to be sure, to any reality lying beyond experience, but to other possible experiences of the things. This is true, even if the question be, for example, whether a certain book is really gray. Does the gray I now see belong to the object, or is it merely subjective? The question is not as to the reality of my sensation of grayness, but whether the gray is a part of the nature of the book or not. And the answer to this question involves reference beyond the present experience. For it may be that the apparent grayness is the result of peculiar conditions of the lighting, and that in a better light the book is blue. The experience of a thing *as* anything is always an interpretation, an assumption on which we act in our dealings with it; and the question as to the *real* nature of the thing refers to the verification of the assumption.

What now is to be said of the practical character of reality and of the claim that knowing changes reality? Is it truism, paradox, or significant truth? For evidently the answer given to this question will vary with the interpretation of the term 'reality.' Let us first consider the matter from the standpoint of a consistent immediatism. If real things are things as experienced, and if things as experienced are no other than the experiences themselves, then it would seem the doctrine that knowing changes reality becomes a mere truism, which is better expressed by saying that knowing *is* a change in reality, or that the process of learning is a real change.

Secondly, from another point of view, the doctrine may, I think, be shown to be not a truism but a paradox. As was pointed out earlier in this article, one would suppose the question of primary importance to the immediatist in his investigation of the nature of reality to be: What is the difference between the experience '*A — B*' and the experience '*really A — B*'? In other words, one would expect him to seek to determine empirically when and how a thing is experienced as real. Let us, then, taking the part of immediatists, raise this question. In the first place, it would seem that a thing is experienced as real, only when there has been some question regarding its nature. That is to say, we are led to characterize it as really this kind of a thing, only when its nature has been subject to doubt and inquiry. Now to characterize a thing as this or that means to regard it as promising a specific sort of future experience. The characterization of the thing as *really* this or that means that after investigation we regard this promise as confirmed; not necessarily because we have experienced the actual fulfillment of the promise, but because satisfactory evidence has been adduced that the promise would be fulfilled under certain specified conditions.

(The question may perhaps be raised, whether a runaway horse is not experienced as 'really' dangerous, when we get out of its way. We are surely acting as if it were good for dangerous consequences, even if we do not explicitly frame the judgment, 'That horse is dangerous,' before taking to our heels. True; but my point is that for a consistent immediatism in such

an experience 'reality,' or the 'real,' is not experienced at all. A really dangerous horse is a horse experienced as 'really dangerous.' The horse may for a subsequent experience be 'really dangerous,' but only in so far as my action in getting out of his way has been made the subject of inquiry and judged right.)

If this analysis be correct, and it is only the thing subjected to inquiry that is immediately experienced as real, we have reached a conclusion of great significance for immediatism. For the thing that has undergone the process of inquiry is precisely the thing known. *Thus it is only the object known that is experienced as real.* The paradoxical character of the doctrine that knowing changes reality is now apparent. For if we experience the real only as the outcome of the knowing-experience, it surely cannot be the real that is changed by the process of knowing.

But there is another sense in which the immediatist doctrine shows itself to be paradoxical. As conceived by the immediatist, the object known, the outcome of the knowing-experience, is the earlier experienced reality transformed in a certain specific way. It is emphatically not a different reality. The object known is essentially the same thing that was experienced in the initial stage of the process. The whole purpose of the knowing is just to effect a specific change in the thing experienced. It may, in fact, be described as a specific sort of transformation taking place in things. The significance of describing reality as practical lies in the refusal to regard the real nature of things as something to be distinguished from our personal subjective attitudes toward them. And it is this same refusal which likewise gives point to the assertion, that things are what they are experienced as. For they are experienced as standing in personal, practical relations to us,—as means, ends, obstacles, dangers, delights. In other words, as things are experienced there is no distinction between the merely subjective and the objective itself, between our personal attitude and the thing experienced. In Professor Dewey's words, the thing experienced is just the experience itself. How, then, it seems pertinent to ask, does this distinction of subjective and objective arise? Is it a purposeless device of sheer intellectualism? Or, on the contrary, is it not the very purpose

of the knowing-experience to make just this distinction? Is not knowing evoked for the sake of determining what in the initial experience is to be regarded as objective and what as merely personal and subjective. And does not the outcome of the knowing-experience, the object known, include and preserve just that part of the content of the earlier experience which has been determined as objective? And, contrariwise, is not that part of the earlier experience which is not preserved in the knowledge-experience as characteristic of the object known, regarded as unreal? To say, then, that the object known is essentially the same *thing* as the earlier experience becomes unintelligible. For the earlier experience is not a *thing* in the same sense as is the object known. It is both more and less than a thing; more, by virtue of those subjective factors the discarding of which is necessary in order to make it a thing; and less, because it lacks that supplementation from related experiences through which the thing acquires external and internal consistency. The paradox of immediatism thus becomes acute. For that aspect of the earlier experience which has been determined as real is just that which is regarded as having remained unchanged throughout the process.

There is one sense, however, in which, as it appears to me, reality may well be characterized as practical; but it is a sense almost directly opposed to that in which Professor Dewey has employed the phrase. Whereas reality has been called practical because it is conceived to change with every change of our subjective attitude toward it, may not its practical character be more truly urged on the ground of its stability throughout the changes of our attitudes? Let it be granted that things have been discriminated and are defined in reference to the practical needs of human life. Yet it is equally true, that if a thing bore but a single relation to our needs, it could never be discriminated as a 'thing.' It is just because a thing does stand in such a diversity of relations to us, and because at the same time it maintains a certain experienced identity of character amidst this diversity of relationship, that it becomes a 'thing' at all. Its recognition as a thing marks the distinguishing of this continuity

of character from the changes of relationship it undergoes. Thus the definition of the real nature of a thing as what it is apart from our practical attitudes toward it, is not a piece of intellectualism ; it is a vital necessity for conduct as well as thought.

But in order to appreciate the real significance of the immediatist conception of reality as actual experience, we must recall to mind the ontological theory in opposition to which it has been urged. This is, of course, the theory of reality held by an absolute idealism. According to this theory, reality is, indeed, object of knowledge ; not, however, of knowledge as cumbered with its contingent imperfections, but of knowledge as such, — that is, in so far as it *is* knowledge, or conforms to the eternal ideal of what knowledge should and must be. Or, again, it is the object of absolute knowledge, the content of a single all-embracing experience in which every element is what it is by reason of its relation to and determination by every other element. It is a perfect system, no part of which can be abstractly considered without falsification. Moreover, it embraces not simply relations between contemporary states but between successive events. The processes of the cosmos constitute one evolution, every stage of which is an essential aspect of the system of reality. Just as the human organism may be understood to embrace, not simply the set of tissues and organs belonging to a man at one stage of his development, but the whole life-process itself from the beginning to the end of individual existence ; so reality is understood to be limited to no single cross-section of evolution, — it embraces the universe throughout all its transformations. It is in this sense that it is described as eternal. Change, indeed, is real, but it is not reality which changes ; for reality is precisely that which includes all changes within itself. Accordingly, as applied to any particular thing or event, reality means its nature as an element of the infinite system, and as determined thus by its relation to all other things or events. The real individual is the infinitely determinate individual, — determinate, moreover, not simply for the thought of any particular inquiring consciousness, but for the absolute thought which is the norm to which every rational inquiry submits itself for final judgment.



In criticism of this theory, pragmatism urges that such a conception of reality and truth must remain utterly inoperative as a criterion for evaluating the realities and truths of actual experience. No actual judgment as to the real nature of anything ever was or will be found true or false by comparison with the standard of an absolutely completed knowledge. For the purposes of actual thought, the real nature of any individual never can mean what it is as determined by its relations to all other things in the universe. For so to extend the meaning of 'individual' is to deprive it of all significance; just as the similar extension of the idea of 'cause' deprives it of significance. And if it be urged by the absolute idealist that the realities and truths of human thought must by the philosopher be judged neither real nor unreal, true nor false, but as representing degrees of reality and truth; the reply is that the absolute mind with its reality and truth is separated by an infinite gap from human thought, and that the former can be no measure of degrees in the latter, — just as an infinite straight line can be no measure of the lengths of finite straight lines.

In short, from the standpoint of instrumentalism, reality and truth as defined by absolute idealism are merely *limiting conceptions*; and, like the limiting conceptions of mathematics and mechanics, they must be criticised both as displaying irreconcilable self-contradictions and as failing to represent the concrete facts of actual experience. But this is not to assert that when their limitations are recognized they are not effective instruments of analysis. Take the case of the pulley for example. As a pulley is defined by mechanics, the cord must be perfectly flexible and the wheel on which it runs perfectly frictionless. Only when these conditions are fulfilled have we, from the standpoint of pure science, a real pulley. Suppose a pragmatist mechanic to reply: "Not so. The flexible cords and frictionless wheels of pure mechanics are sheer abstractions. If you would understand what a pulley really is, observe the ropes and wheels that men use in actual life, — these are *real* pulleys." To such a criticism of the definitions of pure mechanics the reply is obvious; for the definitions of mechanics do, indeed, represent the outcome

of a study of the ropes and wheels of common life ; and, if they are abstractions, it is because such abstractions are a practical necessity and owe their justification to their necessity. Moreover, it is only by regarding the actual ropes and wheels *as if they were* perfectly flexible and perfectly frictionless, that the principle of the pulley can be applied to them. It is true that such procedure involves error, for which allowance may be made. But allowance is made only for error that is not negligible ; and it is made, too, in terms that are as ideal and schematic as the perfect pulley itself ; and when all is said and done there ever remains uneliminated error, whose correction would demand an infinite analysis. What the instrumentalist would point to as significant is just this ever-present factor of negligible error. Just what degree of error is negligible in a given case is always determined by the purpose for which the calculation is made. Whether the actual structure of ropes and wheels and weights is a real *pulley* or not depends on whether, for the needs of the existing occasion, the cords and wheels may be regarded *as if* perfectly flexible and perfectly frictionless. In short, the dispute as to whether the pulley of abstract mechanics or the structure of ropes and wheels which draws the bucket of water from the well is the real pulley, is after all a verbal difference. The one is real, just because of its practical usefulness in computations ; the other is a real pulley, because it may, for the purpose in hand, be regarded as conforming to the conditions defined by mechanics.

From the standpoint of instrumentalism, the case is similar as regards reality and truth. It may be admitted that, abstractly considered, we find a pure case of reality only in the completely determined, the object of absolute knowledge. Shall we then say that the things of human experience are merely phenomenal, in that we know them as only partially determined, or even because it is evident that, were they known to us as completely determined, they would thereby become transformed beyond recognition ? Shall we say that all human judgments are essentially untrue, because their correction would involve an infinite process of thought ? Assuredly not. Yet we are not thereby committed to say with the immediatist that reality is just our un-

analyzed immediate experience, and that the real nature of noises and lines and events is no other than what they have been actually experienced as. For the assumption that a given thing really possesses the character we ascribe to it, implies not only that (as we have already pointed out) it has stood the test of inquiry, but also that it may be counted upon similarly to bear the light of any future inquiry, — that is to say, no matter what further investigation might reveal about the thing, what we know now will stand as an integral part of the enlarged knowledge of it. This assumption, as we are ever, upon reflection, ready to admit, is erroneous ; for we are aware that the enlargement of knowledge does not take place by mere addition to the existing stock, but continually involves the modification and even transformation of that which has hitherto been accepted as most assured and most fundamental. In other words, the untruth of the assumption is simply the untruth which attaches to any abstraction whatsoever, — the mistake of supposing that a partial account of anything may be absolutely true so far as it goes. The fact remains, that all our actual knowledge is of this sort, — an everlasting synecdoche in which the abstract poses for the concrete. The very terms in which our most certain judgments are expressed are themselves only relatively determinate. But let us note that even as we demand only that degree of flexibility in the cord of our pulley which will satisfy the requirements of our purpose, so it is only a certain degree of determinateness which is relevant to the ends of either action or thought. A certain degree of indeterminateness is negligible ; and, as in the case of the pulley, just how much is negligible depends upon the specific purpose of the application.

And so we may, as instrumentalists, find a new interpretation for the absolute idealist's definition of reality. It may be legitimately taken as a description of a 'pure case,' or ideal limit, analogous to the fundamental formulæ of the mathematical sciences. It has the same advantage as such formulæ, namely, that of an efficient instrument for the analysis of experience ; and it has likewise the same defects. When it is exalted, however, into a metaphysical first principle, a result follows which is analogous to that which we find proceeding from the similar exaltation of

the primary definitions of mechanics, — that is to say, a dogmatic absolutism quite as sterile when applied to the concrete issues of human life as any materialism could well be. Our actual investigations into the real nature of anything never aim at the description of this nature in its infinite entirety. On the contrary, they are always undertaken from some definite point of view, and are carried on with reference to some specific practical or theoretical interest; and it is this interest which furnishes a criterion for the success of the investigation. But within these limits the investigation may be said to have achieved success, when the description it furnishes of the real nature of the thing may be regarded *as if* completely determinate; when, that is, its indeterminate-ness is negligible with reference to the purpose for which the investigation has been undertaken.

Thus, from the standpoint of instrumentalism, both absolute idealism and immediatism have erred in failing to recognize that a general definition of reality can be given only in functional terms. The claim of immediatism, that reality changes, and changes by virtue of the process of knowing, is indeed valid, if by it be meant that the specific content to which the characteristic 'real' attaches changes from situation to situation, or from stage to stage of scientific progress. But it is nevertheless untrue, that, from the standpoint of any completed inquiry, the concrete reality of that standpoint can be regarded as having been transformed in the process of inquiry just finished; for, as has been pointed out, reality means just that content which is regarded as unchanged by the process.

Let me add a last word in comment upon the claim of immediatism to be regarded simply as a method, using as my text the following declaration of Professor Dewey: "From the postulate of [immediate] empiricism, then (or, what is the same thing, from a general consideration of the concept of experience) nothing can be deduced, not a single philosophical proposition. . . . But the real significance of the principle is that of a method of philosophical analysis."<sup>1</sup> Now, in the first place, if the method has even any *prima facie* claim upon our attention, it must pretend

<sup>1</sup> *Journal of Philos.*, Vol. II, p. 399.

to an appropriateness to the subject-matter to which it is to be applied, and must hence imply something as to the character of that subject-matter. The declaration quoted is parallel to the belief of Descartes that he has doubted all that can be doubted, while he yet has firmly in hand a method for the elaboration of all science. Rather is it true, that a whole philosophy is implicit in the assumption of that method, — if only because the choice of method means the acceptance of an ideal of truth, a standard of that which shall be admitted into the results. It may be said that the immediatist, for his part, is willing to accept *anything* that experience is or contains. But, even so, Descartes is willing to accept *anything* that can be demonstrated from self-evident first principles. The very conception of immediate experience, or of experience as immediate, implies that a body of unequivocal data are given and can be discovered by inspection, — are prior, that is, to all interpretation, and thus form an unquestioned basis for all interpretation. It may well be questioned, however, whether this notion of the 'given' is not simply another *limiting conception*, — like the pulley, again, or 'reality' itself, — never precisely exemplified in any definable content, though admittedly a most useful instrument for the analysis of all manner of experiences.

GRACE A. DE LAGUNA.

BRYN MAWR, PENNA.

## AVERROES ON THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE.

AVERROES lived from 1126 to 1198. He was thus a contemporary of Maimonides (1135-1204), and of Abelard (1079-1142). He lived in Mohammedan Spain, and was the last of the Arabian philosophers in that country. The governing dynasty of the Almohades was not in favor of philosophical studies, as leading to heresy and unbelief, and under this régime a taboo was put on science and philosophy, their advocates and students were proscribed and persecuted, and works dealing with the forbidden subjects were confiscated and burned. As a result, interest in the study, once so great as to influence the rest of Europe and stimulate it to imitation and emulation, rapidly declined. As a second result, the works of the Arabian philosophers in the original Arabic are exceedingly rare, and a large part of them lost, probably forever. Fortunately, translations were made of them in Latin and Hebrew in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and to these, especially the Hebrew, we are indebted for the preservation of many works of the Arabian philosophers, of which the originals are lost. This is especially true of Averroes; for he became, for reasons not quite certain, the favorite of the Jews in Spain, Provence, and Italy, to the exclusion of Aristotle himself, of whom he was considered the commentator *par excellence*; and some of his works are extant in the Arabic language, transcribed in Hebrew characters for the use of the Arabic speaking Jews in Mohammedan countries. To the accident of their transliteration they owe their escape from the Mohammedan inquisitor.

Besides works on medicine, jurisprudence, and astronomy, and a treatment of some philosophical themes, Averroes is known especially as a commentator of Aristotle, and in this department his fame rests especially on his so-called "great" commentaries, which he was the first to compose, and which have won for him a mention in Dante's *Inferno*.

As is well known, Averroes wrote commentaries to all the works of Aristotle, and to some as many as three different kinds, — “great,” “middle,” and “brief.” The “great” commentary contains the text of Aristotle in full, and a detailed discussion of the meaning. The “middle” commentary contains only the first few words of the text of each paragraph, followed by a paraphrase of the content of Aristotle’s thought, closely following the order and method of the original. In the “brief” commentary or resumé, or compendium, Averroes abandons the order of the original, gives an exposition of the subject of the treatise in his own words and by his own method, elucidates the problems under discussion from the Aristotelian treatises bearing on the matter in hand, and settles his account with his Arabian predecessors in the same field, such as Alfarabi and Avicenna, particularly the latter. The short commentary is thus a kind of independent work on the same subject as the Aristotelian treatise of the same name.

As was said before, the works of Averroes in the original Arabic which are extant are very rare, and these form only a small fraction of what he wrote. When Renan wrote his masterly monograph “*Averroës et l’Averroïsme*,” which is still the only complete work on the subject, though there is now new material for elaborating and revising at least one section of that book, all that was known to be extant in the original of the Aristotelian treatises of Averroes were one manuscript in Florence, containing the “middle” commentary on the *Organon*, the *Rhetoric*, and the *Poetics*, and a second manuscript in the Escorial in Madrid containing the commentary on the *Psychology*. Besides these he knew of Arabic manuscripts in Hebrew characters of the compendium of the *Organon*, the “middle” commentary of the treatise *On Generation and Corruption*, on the *Meteorologics*, the *Psychology*, and the compendium of the *Parva Naturalia*. These were in Paris in the national library, and the Bodleian in Oxford contained besides in the same characters the commentaries on the *De Cælo*, the *Generation and Corruption*, and the *Meteorologics*.

Since then a few other manuscripts have turned up, two in Leyden, one containing the “middle” commentary on the *Organon*, *Rhetoric*, and *Poetics*, and the other his “great” commentary on

the *Metaphysics*. In Vol. XVIII of the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 1904-05, Derenbourg described another manuscript of the Escorial library in Madrid containing commentaries on some of the smaller physical treatises of Aristotle, and in Vol. XX (1906-07) of the same periodical, Horten, of Bonn, the translator of Avicenna into German, called attention to the publication in Cairo two or three years ago of the "middle" commentary on the *Metaphysics*, under the editorship of Mustafa Al-Qabbani, without any indication of the manuscript source of the edition. An examination of the work proved to the present writer that it was not the "middle" commentary, but the compendium, and a correspondence elicited from the editor, Al Qabbani, the information that the manuscript from which the edition was taken is in the Khedivial library in Cairo, and contains other works of the same author, and Professor Moritz, the director of the Khedivial library, dates the manuscript about 700 A. H. (= 1322).

This little work, covering 85 closely printed large octavo pages of small type of the Arabic edition, is one of the most important of Averroes's works, giving us as it does the commentator's views on what he regards as the crowning point of philosophy, the study of the separate intelligences, and of God. Renan speaks of the importance of the treatise, and Munk gives a brief statement of its contents, based upon the Latin translation, or perhaps the Hebrew.

If any excuse is needed for presenting this subject to this association<sup>1</sup> now, I may say in the first place that no account of any extent was given of it before, and that none of the writers on Averroes, including the best known, Renan, Munk, and Steinschneider, saw the original Arabic, which became known only about two years ago. It is unfortunate, however, that the Cairo edition is not a good one, teeming with what are either misprints or errors of the manuscript. The result is that while it helps us decidedly to correct the Hebrew and Latin translations, and to separate the numerous interpolations from the genuine text of Averroes in these translations, we can by no means as yet dispense with the latter, as, owing to the defective edition or manu-

<sup>1</sup> This paper was prepared for the American Philosophical Association.



script of the original, they help us in many cases to correct the Arabic. Of the two translations the one that can least be dispensed with is the Hebrew, and for the following reasons :

The Latin translation of Jacob Mantinus was made from the Hebrew in the sixteenth century, and published in the Venice Latin editions of Aristotle with the commentaries of Averroes. If therefore we are sure of the Hebrew text we do not need the Latin. The relation is not quite the same as between the Hebrew and the Arabic. There is only one Arabic manuscript extant, and, if we may judge from the Cairo edition, not an unusually good one. It dates from the fourteenth century, whereas the Hebrew translation was made by Moses Ibn Tibbon in 1258, about sixty years after the death of Averroes. It is therefore based upon an earlier manuscript than the one extant, and as there are ten manuscripts extant of the Hebrew translation, it is of no mean assistance to us in arriving at Averroes's correct text.

Another consideration should not escape us in considering the relative value of a Hebrew and a Latin translation of an Arabic original, apart from the dependence of one upon the other, as in this special case. Arabic, being a Semitic tongue, can be so well rendered literally into Hebrew, — and through many years of translation from the former into the latter has been so rendered, constituting a Hebrew philosophical style closely modelled after the Arabic, — that one who is familiar with the two languages, and with the subject, has no difficulty in reconstituting the Arabic text from the Hebrew translation. That such a relation does not hold between the Arabic and the Latin needs not my saying.

I have dwelt at length on this matter, because it is the fashion in some quarters to belittle the Hebrew translations as worthless, and editors of Arabic philosophical texts are in the habit of ignoring them, when they might be of great value. This applies to men like J. Müller, Schmölders, Mehren, and others. Mehren speaks of them as “*de valeur suspecte*,” and Steinschneider wonders whether the phrase is a cover for his inability to use them. This is, I think, the secret in most cases. Sachau, the Orientalist of the University of Berlin, also thinks, “*man kann mit ihnen gar nicht anfangen*.” Fausto Lasinio, on the other hand,

in his publication of excerpts from Averroes's logic, makes use also of the Hebrew translations; and Munk and Steinschneider, who are really able to judge in this matter, are both of the opinion that the Hebrew translations are of great value, and that a knowledge of mediæval Hebrew is more important in the study of Arabian philosophy than a knowledge of Arabic itself.

The present study is based upon the Arabic text of the Cairo edition above mentioned, upon a copy of the Hebrew translation made by the present writer from seven manuscripts, and upon the Latin translation as found in the Venice edition of Aristotle and Averroes in Latin, 1573.

To judge from the Arabic text there is a number of interpolations in the Hebrew translation, and the Latin always agrees with the Hebrew. But as there is here and there an omission in the Arabic, one is not quite sure that some of the apparent interpolations in the translations are not rather omissions in the Arabic.

Averroes begins his treatise by dividing the sciences and arts into three classes: (1) Theoretical, (2) practical, and (3) auxiliary or logical. The aim of the theoretical is knowledge alone. In the practical, knowledge is for the sake of action. The logical is auxiliary to the other two.

The theoretical sciences are divided into two classes: Universal and Particular. The Universal considers the existent absolutely and its essential attributes (*συμβεβηκότα καθ' αὐτό*). It embraces (1) Dialectic, (2) Sophistic, and (3) Metaphysic. The particular investigates the existent in a particular state. It embraces (1) Physics, which deals with changeable existence, and (2) Mathematics, which deals with quantity abstracted from matter.

The three principal sciences, physics, mathematics and metaphysics, correspond to the three kinds of existences: (1) Existence in matter (physics); (2) things existing in matter, but treated apart from the latter (mathematics); (3) consists of two parts, (a) principles existing absolutely not in matter (separate intelligences, spirits of the spheres), and (b) Universals common to sensibles and intelligibles, such as unity, plurality, actual, potential, etc. The last two constitute the subject of metaphysics.

Of the universals he says in another place that *as universals*

they have no extra-mental existence. They are not figments of the brain ; they are not mere concepts ; they do exist objectively in the concrete, but not as universals. The attribute of universality they do not acquire until they are apprehended by the reason and the reason endows them with it. As objectively existing in the concrete they have a creative or productive power,—man produces man, but not as universals. The mistake of the Platonists, according to Averroes, is that they make the universals efficient causes.

Of the four causes, metaphysics deals especially with the formal and final, and with the efficient also *in a sense, i. e.*, not as preceding its effect in time, the sense in which it is used in physics. He has in mind here God as the combination of the three causes mentioned, formal, final, and efficient, but not preceding the universe in time, since motion is eternal. In physics the material and moving causes alone are considered.

Averroes, it will be seen, divides the efficient cause into two kinds,—the *movens* and the *agens*. The former belongs to physics, the second to metaphysics. The first produces motion only, in its effect, the second gives it form in virtue of which motion takes place.

Metaphysics builds upon foundations laid in physics and mathematics. From the former it accepts the idea of an immaterial mover and shows in what way it moves. From mathematical astronomy it accepts the number of movers, *i. e.*, the number of motions in the heavenly spheres, since each motion has a mover.

Metaphysics is thus divided into three parts. Part one deals with sensibles *qua* existents, and all their genera, *i. e.*, the ten categories, and their *συμβεβηκότα καθ' αὐτό*. Part two considers the principles of *οὐσία*, *i. e.*, the separate intelligences, determines the character of their existence, and relates them to their first principle, who is God. It determines his attributes and actions, the relations of other existences to him, and proves that he is the ultimate perfection, first form and first agent. Part three investigates the subjects of the special sciences and refutes the errors of former thinkers. By special sciences he means logic, physics, and mathematics.

Metaphysics occupies itself with this matter because the special sciences do not verify their own principles. This is the province of a universal science. Dialectics cannot do it, though it too is a universal science, because it employs *acknowledged* but not necessarily *true* propositions in its proofs. These may lead to erroneous conclusions. Metaphysics alone uses *true* premises. The third part, however, is not as essential to the science of metaphysics as the first two. (It will appear from this that Averroes does not agree with Herbert Spencer.)

These three parts of metaphysics Averroes divides into five chapters, devoting the first three chapters to the first part of the subject, the sensible *qua* existent, the fourth chapter to the second part, viz., the separate intelligences and God. The fifth chapter which was to have dealt with the third division of the science, viz., the subjects of the special sciences, he seems never to have written, as it is not found either in the Arabic or in the translations. It is a pity that he did not write it, for under the head of 'refutation of errors of former thinkers' he would have given us important historical material concerning the philosophical and theological sects of his day. On several occasions in this treatise he refers to the views of the Mutakallimun, a school of philosophical theologians of those days, and dismisses them with a brief statement, deferring a more complete discussion of their tenets to the fifth chapter, which he seems not to have written.

The purpose and value of metaphysics is the same as that of the other theoretical sciences, viz., the perfection of the rational soul. Metaphysics is more important in this respect because it is the perfection of the other sciences, leading as it does to a knowledge of existing things through their ultimate causes, and verifying the principles of the other sciences.

In the order of teaching, metaphysics comes after physics, since it makes use of certain principles laid down there, hence called metaphysics. In essence, however, it comes before physics, hence its other name, *first philosophy*.

The proofs in this science are of the kind called "signs" or "indications" (*σημεία* of Aristotle), *i. e.*, where we proceed from what is better known *to us* to what is better known *per se*, or,

which is the same thing, from a consequent to its antecedent. The definition of this kind of proof, known as *dalâla* in Arabic, is given by Averroes in his compendium of logic as that in which the middle term is not the *cause* of the conclusion, but the cause of our inferring it, as for example when we prove that the moon is spherical from the crescent shape of its light. The crescent-shaped light is not the cause of its sphericity, but the *consequence*. It is, however, the cause of our *knowing* that the moon is spherical. It is really a kind of induction, as we should call it.

The rest of the first chapter is devoted to definitions of terms used in the science, closely modeled after the fifth book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

The second chapter investigates the ten categories, the sense in which the term 'existent' is applied to all of them, neither synonymously nor homonymously, but *per prius et posterius*, or as Aristotle calls it, *πρὸς ἕν, ἰ. e.*, by virtue of their greater or lesser participation in *οὐσία*, or reality.

The nine categories of accident are all dependent upon the first. It is independent of them. The definition is found first in *οὐσία*. In the other categories, if it exists at all, it is secondary.

The essences or universal concepts of things are identical with the things themselves, else knowledge would be impossible. The Platonists, who place the concepts outside of the concrete, either make knowledge impossible, or they require another set of concepts to understand the first, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Neither the form nor the matter is generated or destroyed. Hence it follows that the definition is neither generated nor destroyed.

The universals *as universals* exist in the mind only. The universals *as essences* are not the essences of things. Sensible things are composite. This is proved by the fact that we ask the question, Why? This cannot be asked of the simple. We can only ask, Why is *A*? Why is *B*? The answer to the question, 'why,' is any one of the four causes. Though composite, the concrete things do not contain the elements of which they are made *in actu*, or they would be nothing else but the elements, which is not true.

There is in the compound a something outside of the elements which makes it what it is, and that is the *Form*.

In the definition, the genus corresponds to the matter, the difference to the form.

Matter is that which is *in potentia*. Form is actuality. Geometrical figures, too, have a kind of matter, and hence have a definition.

Things have a two-fold existence, — sensible and intelligible. Intelligible existence is sensible existence as known.

If a definition has parts, the compound alone has a definition. Matter, form, and simple things in general have no definition. Multiplicity is due to matter, unity to form. Though a composite of matter and form, and possessed of a definition containing parts, the concrete is a unit, because the combination of matter and form means the realization of the potential.

Chapter III deals with the *συμβεβηκότα καθ' αὐτό* of the ten categories, such as actual and potential, the one and the many, and the "Contraries," and the finiteness of the four causes, and their relations to one another. Time will not allow me to enter into details, and I must proceed to a very brief sketch of the fourth chapter.

All that preceded has led up to this last chapter, in which Averroes proves from the eternity of motion the existence of eternal immaterial movers existing actually, and a single principle, which is God, existing as the cause of the latter and of the universe.

His proofs are based upon the twelfth book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, except that he develops in detail what Aristotle has left in broad outline. I shall therefore assume Aristotle's scheme as known and say a few words about that which is peculiar to Averroes.

In deducing the number of motions and of movers of the celestial sphere (55), Aristotle prefaced his discussion by disclaiming any dogmatism in the matter, saying that the subject is one of probability, not of certainty, and that he was willing to adopt the conclusions of the astronomers of his day, modifying them as he saw fit, and leaving an open door for later revision consequent upon better knowledge. He thus adopts Callippus's

correction of Eudoxus as to the number of the spheres, which he further revises by the addition of the counteracting spheres.

Averroes, who was also somewhat of an astronomer, takes this hint from Aristotle, ignores the schemes of Eudoxus, Callippus, and Aristotle himself, and adopts *provisionally again*, the system of Ptolemy as the best that was known at the time, saying that the whole matter was still uncertain, owing to the difficulty of the subject and the imperfection of the instruments. He thus adopts the view that there are 38 motions, 5 each in the upper three planets, Saturn, Jupiter and Mars, 5 in the moon, 8 in Mercury, 7 in Venus, and one in the sun, on the hypothesis of an eccentric and not of an epicycle, for that would make two. This is the number (38) if we suppose that the mover responsible for the diurnal motion is the same for all. If a different one is required for each of the 7 planets, there will be 45 movers, or separate intelligences, in all.

It is interesting to note here a suggestion of Averroes, that it is possible that instead of Saturn receiving its motion from the sphere of the fixed stars and the others from Saturn in the traditional order, the sun comes next to the fixed stars, then Saturn and the rest in order. This idea commends itself to him from the observation of the dependence of the other planets upon the motions of the sun in speed and proximity. Would it be too much to call this an adumbration of the heliocentric theory? It would seem to have been original with Averroes, as he does not mention any authority for the statement.

Aristotle does not discuss in detail the functions and characters of the movers of the spheres, or their relations to each other and to the *primum movens*, or God. Of the latter he says that he is pure reason contemplating himself eternally, and that the heavenly bodies move eternally, not because he moves them directly, but because they are prompted by a love and a desire for God.

Averroes supplies the deficiency.

The movers of the spheres are pure intellects, the upper being the cause of the lower. The heavenly bodies are endowed with life and reason, and their motions are a result of conception and desire. They conceive the good, which is their perfection, and

desire to become like unto it. Inasmuch as motion is better than rest, since motion is life, they are constantly in motion. The movers not only move the heavenly bodies, but they give them their forms in virtue of which they are what they are, and hence they are thus *agentes*, in a sense. The forms of the heavenly bodies are what they conceive of the movers above them.

As to the movers, or principles, they are pure intellect and their function is knowing, conceiving. They are immaterial and immovable. Judging from our own intellect, which knows itself, we infer that each of the separate intelligences knows itself. To know itself, it must know that upon which it depends, hence it must know its cause, which is its perfection, *i. e.*, the mover next above it, though not in the same way in which the latter knows itself, or they would be identical. The cause, however, does not know its effect, which is inferior to it, hence the last mover, or God, having no cause higher than himself and not knowing the lower movers, knows himself only.

If Averroes stopped here he would be denying all knowledge in God of things below, and hence all Providence. He is not ready to do either. It is absurd, he says, that anything should emanate from a knower *qua* knower without the latter knowing it, and an observation of nature is all that is needed to recognize Providence. He therefore compromises on his previous deductions and argues again from the human mind to prove that the upper intelligences do have a knowledge of the lower. Since our intellect, he says, is nothing more than a conception of the order and method of this world and its parts in reference to its causes, proximate and remote, the essence of the intellect producing ours (one of the movers of the lunar sphere) cannot be different, except that it comprehends the same thing in a superior manner. The same holds true of the intelligence next above this, and so on to the first intelligence, or God. It follows then that God knows the same things as we know, but in a superior manner. These two deductions are both true. God's knowledge of himself is identical with his knowledge of the Universe. But *his* knowledge is not *our* knowledge.

Upon this compromise Averroes bases his theodicy. God is



not responsible for evil, for evil is a concomitant of matter, and *that* God does not know. *Not* to know some things is better than to know them, and argues no defect or imperfection, rather the contrary. To make God know the particular and save him from responsibility for evil by saying that good and evil are only in relation to us, that to God they do not exist, is a dangerous doctrine.

It would seem as if all great men who do epoch-making work require as a stimulus, in addition to the cause of truth, an embodiment of a deviation from it in the shape of a personal opponent against whom they may sharpen their wit, thus rising to greater heights than the smaller men about them. Aristotle had his Plato, Abelard his William of Champeaux, Kant his Wolff, and Averroes his Avicenna. He finds no less than eight occasions in this little book to signify his disagreement with the latter, and in one instance declares that Avicenna can never be relied upon when he goes a-hunting after original views.

The Mutakallimun, or Arabian Scholastics, were another bug-bear to his rigid Aristotelianism, and he does not treat them with great gentleness. "They do not carry on their discussion," he says, "by means of syllogisms composed of two premises, nor do they make use of essential predicates." This condemnation of their unphilosophical, because unlogical, method is only equalled by another in which he says of them: "they do not hold these views (such as the denial of causation and the like) because they are led to them by investigation, but in order to verify by their means opinions about which their minds are made up in advance, and refute principles opposed to them." Maimonides speaks of them almost in the same words. We should have had more information about their system if Averroes had written the fifth chapter which he promises on the subjects of the special sciences.

Though the reputation of Averroes for orthodoxy did not rank high, still he takes the opportunity to quote the Koran in a few instances in confirmation of his philosophical views, such as the unity of God, his knowledge of things in the world, and the importance of knowing the human mind before studying to understand the nature of God.

Many and varied have been the opinions regarding Averroes as a commentator and exponent of Aristotle. He was once glorified by Jews and Christians alike as *the* commentator *par excellence*. He was as much depreciated later in the time of the Renaissance, and hated by a man like Petrarch with almost a passionate hatred. Then he was simply ignored and forgotten. In Solomon Munk he has found a defender who thinks we may still consult him with profit at the present day. It will be near the truth, I think, if we recognize that for his day he *was* the best exponent of Aristotle, better than any of his predecessors; that considering he was twice removed from the original text, the Syriac translations having stood between the Greek and the Arabic, he was as efficient and penetrating a commentator as can be imagined; and while there is no need of consulting Averroes now when we have Aristotle's text and the Greek commentators, and Bonitz's index and the other works of Bonitz, and Trendelenburg, and Waitz, and Zeller, and others, we may study him as one of the sources of mediæval philosophy, who will help us to understand men like Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, William Occam among the scholastics, and Gersonides, Falaquera, and Caspi among the Jewish philosophers of the later middle age.

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## REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

*The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas.* By EDWARD WESTERMARCK. In Two Volumes. Vol. II. Macmillan and Co., Limited, London, 1908. — pp. xv, 852.

The first volume of this work was reviewed in Volume XVI of this journal, pp. 70 ff. In that review attention was devoted mainly to the ethical theory of the author. It might seem strange that such a work as this should be considered from the point of view of theory rather than as presenting the facts of the moral life among 'primitive,' archaic, and modern peoples. It is evident, however, that the author has not intended merely to collect facts. The passage from the preface to the former volume, quoted in the previous review, makes this obvious and the concluding chapter of the present volume confirms this statement if confirmation is necessary: "We have completed our task. Only a few words will be added to emphasise the leading features of our theory of the moral consciousness and to point out some general conclusions which may be drawn as regards its evolution" (II, p. 738). 'The leading features' of this theory have been summarized in the former review, and it is unnecessary to repeat them here. What preëminently differentiates the theory from others is not so much its contents as the method in which the author has presented it. "Any attempt to discover the nature and origin of the moral consciousness must necessarily take into account the moral ideas of mankind at large. And though painfully conscious of the incompleteness of the present treatise, I think I may confidently ask, with reference to its fundamental thesis, whether any other theory of the moral consciousness has ever been subjected to an equally comprehensive test" (II, p. 742). Every candid reader who is acquainted with the literature of the subject can give only one answer to this question. There has never been any attempt to establish a moral theory on facts gathered from such a wide range of time and space as Westermarck's attempt; and the result is that the work deserves to rank among the world's greatest scientific books; in its own branch of science it has no peer, and is not likely to find one for a long time to come.

But even if we had here merely a compilation of facts it would be invaluable. The indefatigable industry and the splendid competence of the author are written on every page. While the author himself

would be the last man to claim that he has examined every nook and cranny of his subject, one is tempted to say that only the nooks and crannies remain unexplored ; and of these surprisingly many have been brought to the light. It was not, however, the purpose of Westermarck to go into the minutiae of moral conduct. He restricts himself "to the more important modes of conduct with which the moral consciousness of mankind is concerned. These modes of conduct may be conveniently divided into six groups. The first group includes such acts, forbearances, and omissions as directly concern the interests of other men, their life or bodily integrity, their freedom, honour, property, and so forth. The second includes such acts, forbearances, and omissions as chiefly concern a man's own welfare, such as suicide, temperance, asceticism. The third group, which partly coincides with, but partly differs from, both the first and the second, refers to the sexual relations of men. The fourth includes their conduct towards the lower animals ; the fifth, their conduct towards dead persons ; the sixth, their conduct towards beings, real or imaginary, that they regard as supernatural. We shall examine each of these groups separately, in the above order. And, not being content with a mere description of facts, we shall try to discover the principle which lies at the bottom of the moral judgment in each particular case" (I, p. 328). This is of course a most comprehensive task ; but it might well be questioned whether it would not have been desirable to include a seventh group, dealing with men's conduct and moral judgments in respect of ideal and impersonal interests, of which art is a conspicuous example. One does not like to find fault with an author who has done so much, just because he did not undertake to do more ; but one can only express regret that he did not crown his task by an account of the facts and the principles involved in this by no means unimportant branch of morality. Westermarck is a writer to whom the reader is willing to increase his obligations.

It will be manifestly impossible to set forth here the author's results even in any one of the divisions of his study. The first group receives naturally the largest attention ; the latter half of the first volume and almost one third of the second are devoted to its consideration. From the point of view of theory the most important chapter in this section is the thirty-fourth, on "The Origin and Development of the Altruistic Sentiment," Vol. II, pp. 186-228. Here he of course first treats of the maternal affection, and propounds a theory which might have been expected from the author of the view that the repugnance to incest is due to an instinct not based on blood relationship but on

social geography. Propinquity during infancy and adolescence, while it blunts the sexual appetite, arouses altruistic affection. The love of offspring is not due to the physiological relationship between mother and child; nor is it due merely to the appeal of the weak and helpless, as such, to the feminine heart. "To account for the maternal sentiment we must therefore assume the existence of some other stimulus besides the signs of helplessness, which produces, or at least strengthens, the instinctive motor response in the mother. This stimulus, so far as I can see, is rooted in the external relationship in which the offspring from the beginning stand to the mother. She is in close proximity to her helpless young from their tenderest age; and she loves them because they are to her a cause of pleasure" (II, p. 189). By the same token, where the father comes into contact with his child he evinces paternal affection. "The stimuli to which the paternal instinct responds are apparently derived from the same circumstances as those which call into activity the maternal instinct, that is, the helplessness and the nearness of the offspring. Wherever this instinct exists, the father is near his young from the beginning, living together with the mother" (II, p. 190). The tie which binds parent and child, like that which binds father and mother, is "developed through natural selection" (II, p. 191), but the "tendency to feel some attachment to a being which has been the cause of pleasure . . . is undoubtedly at the bottom of" both parental and conjugal affection (II, p. 191). In addition to parental, conjugal, filial, and fraternal attachment, Westermarck recognizes also the gregarious instinct in human beings; and this instinct has likewise developed under the influence of natural selection. But man was not originally gregarious; "the kind of food man subsisted upon, together with the large quantities of it which he wanted, formed in olden times a hindrance to a true gregarious manner of living, except perhaps in some unusually rich places" (II, p. 196). The development of tools and the discovery of the art of making fire removed this obstacle. "In short, man gradually found out new ways of earning his living and more and more emancipated himself from direct dependence on surrounding nature. The chief obstacle to a gregarious life was by this means surmounted, and the advantages of such a life were considerable" (II, p. 196). "When gregariousness became an advantage to man, he would feel inclined to remain with those with whom he was living even after the family had fulfilled its object, — the preservation of the helpless offspring. And he would be induced to do so not only from egoistic considerations, but by an instinct which, owing to its usefulness, would

gradually develop, practically within the limits of kinship, — the gregarious instinct" (II, pp. 196-7). Thus clans and hordes arose. While this account is rather guarded, still it appears that Westermarck believes that instincts arise, as well as develop, because they are useful. But here the reviewer is not sure that he understands the author aright. But whatever may be the origin of the instincts involved, there is no question that the author lays as much emphasis on local proximity as on actual kinship in determining the direction of altruism. "Kinship certainly gives rise to special rights and duties, but when unsupported by local proximity it loses much of its social force (II, p. 202). "Nay, even where kinship constitutes a tie between persons belonging to different local groups, its social force is ultimately derived not merely from the idea of a common origin, but from near relatives' habit of living together. Men became gregarious by remaining in the circle where they were born; if, instead of keeping together with their kindred, they had preferred to isolate themselves or to unite with strangers, there would certainly be no blood-bond at all" (p. 203). In fact "the social force in kinship" is of "derivative origin"; this "accounts for its formal character, when personal intercourse is wanting; it may enjoin duties, but hardly inspires much affection. If in modern society much less importance is attached to kinship than at earlier stages of civilisation, this is largely due to the fact that relatives, except the nearest, have little communication with each other. And if, as Aristotle observes, friendship between kinsfolk varies according to the degree of relationship, it does so in the first instance on account of the varying intimacy of their mutual intercourse" (II, p. 204). It will thus appear to the reader, from the few quotations I have given, that Westermarck consistently lays great emphasis on closeness and constancy of social contact as giving direction to the altruistic instinct, as against the centrifugal action of early intimacy in matters of sexual instinct.

The influence of a common religion in adding strength to a community cannot be denied, "but it seems that its national importance has often been over-rated. . . . It sometimes seems as if the national spirit of a people rather influenced its religion than was influenced by it. Patriotism has even succeeded in nationalizing the greatest enemy of nationalities, Christianity, and has well nigh revived the old notion of a national god, whose chief business is to look after his own people and, especially, to fight its battles" (II, p. 226). But in spite of influences making for exclusiveness, there is a gradually widening action of altruism. "People of different nationalities feel that in spite of all

dissimilarities between them there is much that they have in common ; and frequent intercourse makes the differences less marked, or obliterates many of them altogether. There can be no doubt that this process will go on in the future " (II, p. 228).

Rarely does one find a writer on ethical subjects so free from prepossessions as Westermarck is ; but at least in one instance it seems to me that he evinces a strong prejudice which warps his judgment. When he declines to accept the views of Messrs. Spencer, Gillen, Fison and Howitt in regard to the existence of group-marriage among the Australians he seems to show a surprising predilection for theory over fact. It is quite true that we must distinguish " between statements based on direct observation and the observer's interpretation of the stated facts " (II, p. 396) ; but it seems here as if an aversion to the recognition of group-marriage had blinded the author to the significance of the facts stated, especially as they exist among the Arunta tribe. It may be that group-marriage is a " residuary legatee of the old theory of promiscuity " ; but it not seldom happens that false theories leave valid legacies ; such theories may direct attention to facts that otherwise might have long remained unobserved ; and when once the facts are observed, it is not necessary to throw them over just because the theory which led to their recognition has been discarded. It may be wrong " to view the early history of mankind through Australian spectacles " ; and of course " the most ardent advocate of Australian group marriage should remember that the existence of kangurus in Australia does not prove that there were once kangurus in England " (II, p. 396) ; but the opponent of group-marriage should in his turn remember that the non-existence of kangurus in England does not disprove their existence in Australia. Of course they may not exist, but the final authority on the subject is the testimony of those who have seen them, and not of those who have an aversion to them. Westermarck surely does not deserve the appellation of " ethnologist of the study " ; but one cannot but think that if his studies had not made him familiar with the perversity of the theory of promiscuity which builds so much on group-marriage, he would have been more willing to recognize group-marriage as a fact.

Westermarck's treatment of the sixth group of moral facts, those concerning religion, is most admirable. The subject is one in which foregone conclusions are rife ; but here we have a calm and unbiased statement of facts and a most reasonable interpretation of them. That it will be acceptable to all readers is of course not to be expected ; but that in time it will help to clear the atmosphere in

these parts is not too much to hope. Its strictures upon Christianity will of course arouse much antagonism, but what he says is something that Christians may very profitably take to heart, for criticism is something that even religion cannot well dispense with in these days.

Westermarck defines religion as "a belief in and a regardful attitude towards a supernatural being on whom man feels himself dependent and to whose will he makes appeal in his worship. Supernatural mechanical power, on the other hand, is applied in magic. He who performs a purely magical act utilises such power without making any appeal at all to the will of a supernatural being" (II, p. 584). The distinction between the natural and the supernatural is not always clear; but even the savage "certainly sees a difference between events of everyday occurrence or ordinary objects of nature and other events or objects which fill him with mysterious awe" (II, p. 582). "That mystery is the essential characteristic of supernatural beings is proved by innumerable facts" (II, p. 586), linguistic and ethnographical. "Man's belief in supernatural agents, then, is an attempt to explain strange and mysterious phenomena which suggest a volitional cause. The assumed cause is the will of a supernatural being" (II, p. 594). Anthropomorphism arises from the impossibility of imagining a will without a mind or a mind without a body, and from the tendency to attribute personality to the supernatural (II, pp. 594-7). This view of the origin of the belief in the supernatural includes the ghost-and-dream theory of the origin of religion, for ghosts and dreams are uncanny appearances which arouse awe and demand explanation; but it regards ghosts and dreams as only two instances of a large class of awe-inspiring phenomena which provoke the theory of the supernatural. Religion, probably from *religare*, has been commonly assumed to imply that man felt himself tied to his god. "But I venture to believe that the connection between them allows of another and more natural interpretation — that it was not the man who was tied by the god, but the god who was tied by the man" (II, p. 584). Here follow various references to actual practices of literally tying supernatural beings and refusing to unbind them until they give their blessing. Genesis XXXII, 24-32, is omitted from consideration here. Westermarck makes out a strong case in a matter that is at best one of conjecture.

Supernatural beings are not originally regarded as supporters of the moral order, or at least not generally so regarded. "As men are concerned about the conduct of their fellow men toward their gods, so gods are in many cases concerned about men's conduct towards one



another — disapproving of vice and punishing the wicked, approving of virtue and rewarding the good. But this is by no means a universal characteristic of gods. It is a quality attributed to certain deities only and, as it seems, in most instances slowly acquired" (II, p. 663). "I can find no solid foundation for the statements made by recent writers that 'the historical beginning of all morality is to be found in religion,' " etc. (II, p. 696). "We have seen that the gods of uncivilised races are to a very large extent of a malevolent character, that they as a rule take little interest in any kind of human conduct which does not affect their own welfare, and that, if they show any signs of moral feelings, they may be guardians either of tribal customs in general or only of some special branch of morality. Among peoples of a higher culture, again, the gods are on the whole benevolent to mankind, when duly propitiated. They by preference resent offences committed against themselves personally, but they also avenge social wrongs of various kinds, they are superintendents of human justice, and are even represented as the originators and sustainers of the whole moral order of the world. The gods have thus experienced a gradual change for the better; until at last they are described as ideals of moral perfection, even though, when more closely scrutinised, their goodness and notions of justice are found to differ materially from what is deemed good and just in the case of men" (II, p. 728). "The belief in a god who acts as a guardian of worldly morality undoubtedly gives emphasis to its rules" (II, p. 734). "But on the other hand there are also certain circumstances which considerably detract from the influence of the religious sanction when compared with other sanctions of morality" (II, pp. 734-5). "The frequent assumption that the moral law would hardly command obedience without the belief in retribution beyond the grave is contradicted by an overwhelming array of facts" (II, p. 735). "Most religions contain an element which constitutes a real peril to the morality of their votaries. They have introduced a new kind of duties — duties towards gods; — and, as we have noticed above, even where religion has entered into close union with worldly morality, much greater importance has been attached to ceremonies or worship or niceties of belief than to good behaviour towards fellow men. . . . It should also be remembered that the religious sanction of moral rules only too often leads to an external observance of these rules from purely selfish motives. Christianity itself has, essentially, been regarded as a means of gaining a blessed hereafter. As for its influence upon the moral life of its adherents I agree with Professor Hobhouse that its chief strength lies

not in its abstract doctrines but in the simple personal following of Christ. In moral education example plays a more important part than precept. But even in this respect Christianity has unfortunately little reason to boast of its achievements" (II, pp. 736-7).

Westermarck's treatment of his sources in general inspires the utmost confidence of the reader. But in one passage it appears that he has been misled by a trick of speech. I have not been able to verify my impression in this matter by referring to the originals quoted; but the quotations themselves suggest that there has been a misunderstanding of them. "Moreover, on discovering that we have been deceived, we have the humiliating feeling that another person has impertinently made our conduct subject to his will. This is a wound on our pride, a blot on our honour. Francis I. of France laid it down as a principle, 'that the lie was never to be put up with without satisfaction, but by a base-born fellow.' 'The lie,' says Sainte-Palaye, 'has always been considered the most fatal and irreparable affront that a man of honour could receive'" (II, p. 110). Does 'the lie' here referred to mean the lie told to one or the lie imputed to one? Westermarck evidently thinks it means the former.

Seventy-eight pages of bibliography, most carefully compiled, and twenty-eight pages of subject-index complete the work.

I wish I could in this review take up more of the interesting points discussed by the author; but the book is too great a book to review with any satisfaction. I may close by saying that not its least claim to greatness is that the layman can read it with as much interest and profit as the expert finds in it. It should have a wide and enduring circulation. No one after this will have a right to discuss questions of ethical theory who has not made himself acquainted with its contents. Many of us will feel obliged to read it over and over again.

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*The Science and Philosophy of the Organism.* Vol. II. By HANS DRIESCH. London, A. & C. Black, 1908.—pp. xvi, 375.

Professor Driesch, in this volume, concludes the discussions, forming the Gifford lectures, which he entered upon in the summer of 1907. The present volume is made up of the lectures of last summer. The first volume consisted of an outline and an interpretation of "The Chief Results of Analytical Biology." This was reviewed in Vol. XVIII, 1, of this journal. The present volume brings to a close that section and then concludes with a long discussion of the "Phi-

losophy of the Organism." Three other volumes by the same author have been discussed in this REVIEW,<sup>1</sup> and, just as the author in the present volume shows no change of faith, so also the reviewer feels that he must still hold to the validity of his former criticisms. Indeed, to him the attempt to carry through the philosophy of vitalism and of Entelechy seems to reveal a great deal of loose thinking and of bad confusion on the part of Professor Driesch. And yet it must be confessed that the volume is suggestive in parts and, on the whole, worth reading.

The matter first presented makes up part III, of section A, the caption being "Organic Movements." That which the author makes the pivotal point of his argument here is a special case of that point of view which forms the leverage of his whole vitalistic theory,—the view, namely, that there is a 'wholeness' revealed in organisms which cannot be derived additively from the parts, and that this, since it is held that *a differential effect must in every instance have a differential cause*, demands, therefore, a new natural agent, Entelechy.

Now this point of view is characterized, I believe, by both valid and invalid aspects. Thus (1) it is invalid to hold or infer that such a creative synthesis or occurrence of genetic modes is to be found only in the organic realm and can be used to distinguish this from the inorganic; for it can be shown that the impossibility of a non-additive derivation of certain properties of the whole from those of the parts characterizes all cases of synthesis, whether this be real or ideal, successive or coexistent, ontogenetic or phyletic, physical or psychical, and at whatever level the 'whole' be chosen; and (2) it can be shown that Entelechy, as a differential cause, does not really explain anything or solve the problem of the *de novo* appearance which is involved in all creative synthesis, but simply conceals it or repeats it. The valid aspects of the view are, accordingly, to be found in the acceptance of this synthesis and *ex nihilo* appearance of qualities or properties, but they must not be limited to the organic, and must be regarded as, at present at least and perhaps forever, irreducible and unexplainable. Their acceptance in this form means that there is accepted a real ontological discontinuity which, paradoxically, both limits deductive explanation and yet makes it *intelligible* that induction must be the only ultimate method, and which accounts for real progress, advance, and differentiation. Accordingly, if one wishes to interpret this universal creative synthesis as pointing to an Entelechy, or Psychoid, or Spirit in all things, one certainly can arbitrarily do so, but in so doing

<sup>1</sup> "Driesch's Theory of Vitalism," E. G. Spaulding, *Phil. Review*, XV, 5.

there should be the realization (1) that, if there be an Entelechy in the organic, there is also, and for the same reason, one in the inorganic, (2) that to postulate such an entity means, in both cases, to hypostasize possibility into actuality and in neither case to really explain *de novo* appearance. For these reasons, then, it is simpler and better to eliminate the Entelechy hypothesis and to frankly recognize and talk about only the factual creative synthesis and *de novo* appearance, to acknowledge their unintelligibility, and yet appreciate their meaning. This last procedure certainly suffices quite as well as does one based on hypothetical entities, and must, as far as it constitutes the real foundation for Driesch's interpretations, be accepted as the valid aspect of his point of view.

Of course, now, whether we regard the organism as a 'machine' or not depends on whether we identify mechanical theory with this last procedure or not. Most biologists do make this identification, and so are mechanists; but they therewith also accept the position, as do the physicists, that it is impossible for mechanics to explain all the qualitative diversities of existence. To correlate such diversities with motion, with equilibrium, etc., is not the same as to reduce the former to the latter. In thinking along such lines, how easy it is, however, to slip in some such narrow definition of mechanism as that which is something like a steam engine, etc., *i. e.*, something which transforms energy, and then to argue,—fallaciously, of course,—that the organism cannot be a machine in any sense! Yet this error is exactly the one that Driesch commits both in this volume and elsewhere, buttressing (?) his argument by an appeal to inconceivability, etc., instead of making a really thorough-going analysis and then following its results consistently.

According to the view we are advocating, the processes which were discussed in his first volume, namely, metabolism, regeneration, development, heredity, etc., and those which are now considered, namely, reflexes, instincts, and 'profiting by experience,' can be regarded either mechanistically,—in the first sense of the term,—or 'energetically,' or indeed in both ways, and yet at the same time, they, and subordinate processes such as stimulus, reaction, etc., can be admitted to have a 'wholeness' and a specificity which are not derivable additively from constituents chosen at any level. But the author's conclusions from his analyses need not, then, be accepted; indeed not only this, but it may also be charged that in the analysis of action, etc., his thinking is not as exact as it might be. Thus he interprets that experimentally established fact which is called 'profiting

by experience' to mean indefiniteness of reaction to stimulus, *i. e.*, to mean even chance, and chance indeed, in a sense different from that which is implied by *de novo* appearance. *Superficially taken*, behavior does, of course, seem to mean such a variation of means to an end, but only a slightly more penetrative analysis shows that there is not the least difficulty in making all organic events quite regular and uniform within the limits, of course, of the creative synthesis above discussed. Such a univocal determination our author does explicitly accept elsewhere, so that his aberration here justifies the charge of inconsistency.

To base vitalistic theories on such analyses would seem to be to build a house upon the sand, but nevertheless our author does build. He coins interesting phrases, such as the "individuality of correspondence" between stimulus and effect, themselves in turn "individualized," *formulates* what he regards as this, his third, independent proof of the "autonomy of life," and then adds to his galaxy of natural agents by inferring the existence of entelechies and psychoids. Sometimes, indeed, he distinguishes these, and sometimes he identifies them, generally the latter. The psychoid is not the psychological, which with the physical is limited to the self-experience of the ego, but it is part of τὰ φυσικά, its function being, for example, "to use the brain as a piano-player uses the piano." And then there are different kinds of entelechies, of psychoids, for different structures and functions, — complications into which the author is forced, but which make the whole argument almost a *reductio ad absurdum*. Evidently the author could be an interactionist, and yet he does not wish to be, for he likes critical idealism, and, besides, the psychoid is non-spatial!

On such difficulties, however, the discussions of section B, "The Philosophy of the Organism," may throw some light. Here the Entelechy is supposed to be "justified" both "directly" and "indirectly," and here it must be admitted some new and interesting points are made. The results of section A are the establishment of a dynamical teleology, and all purposeful functioning is accepted as the work of Entelechy. Thus, to take one case of 'indirect justification,' the very *possibility* of being influenced by, of profiting by experience implies the existence of an agent, of a "primary knowing and willing," — this in answer to the question, "how is experience possible?" But of course there is now no doubt in the author's mind of the existence of such an agent, indeed of different kinds of entelechies! From now on they are accepted, and are defined and regarded as non-spatial, non-temporal, "intensive manifoldnesses," which, though not energy, *control* the various processes of morphogenesis, acting, etc., discussed in section A.

But how is such a control possible? "How is Entelechy related to those concepts of general ontology which play any part in the science of inorganic nature?" In order to answer these questions the author makes an analysis of certain fundamental concepts of mechanics and energetics, — an analysis which is admissible in its philosophic bearing, but which, ironically, really invalidates the conclusions concerning the function of Entelechy which he subsequently draws. Reviewing 'energetics' he finds that it is the important second principle, that nothing can happen without diversities, *i. e.*, without a difference of potential, with which he is most concerned. Intensities stand in the relation of equilibrium or compensation, or of mutual appearance and disappearance. He admits, too, that in a chemical-aggregative system, such as the organism is also confessed to be, everything is absolutely determined by potential (= intensity) and 'mass' of components. It would seem, then, that everything would be accounted for by the 'energy-factors' which he accepts *plus*, of course, the simple statement of the creative synthesis, the qualitative *de novo* appearance. But not so for Professor Driesch! The Entelechy is held to be able to suspend the "*Ausgleichung*" of intensity-differences, and, of course, in turn to set free such suspensions, its own creations; thus it regulates the "*Ausgleichung*," directing it now one way, now another. Accordingly the Entelechy plays a part analogous in some respects to the rôle of the energy-intensities, yet differing from this in that it is supposed to introduce the possibility of variation in using means to an end. However, a difficulty is encountered in the first respect in that the Entelechy is explicitly asserted not to be energy, and in the second case in that the author accepts, explicitly also, a universal determination. In fact, to the reviewer, the attempt to carry through the doctrine of Entelechy seems to lead to a piling up of inconsistencies and even absurdities. Nor is this conviction weakened when the author is found asserting that "any single spatial occurrence induced or modified by Entelechy has its *single* correlate in a *certain single feature* of Entelechy so far as it is an intensive manifoldness," so that the consequence must be accepted that nothing really new happens, that all is *evolutio* in the strict sense of the term. Thus is possibility hypostasized into actuality!

But, if the Entelechy be not energy, may it not be substance in the most general philosophical sense of the term? The answer is No, for Entelechy is neither divisible nor localized; it acts not in space, but into space, and no one chemical substance nor any constellation of chemical substances is its basis. Of course, here the question always

is: Could not a constellation *plus* the creative synthesis do all that Entelechy is supposed to do, and is it not simply another way of describing the same facts, though a misleading one, to introduce an Entelechy and *evolutio*?

But all the above is regarded only as an indirect justification, *per exclusionem*, of Entelechy. We now come to the "direct justification," through epistemology, making up Part II. The core of the argument here is a peculiar hybridization of subjective and objective idealism. Thus, first, it is admitted that phenomena are simply *my* phenomena, and later it is held that a metaphysical, independent absoluteness is implied: (1) by morality, — for this demands a 'thou'; (2) by the unity of experience, — for this demands the existence of an unconscious or supraconscious basis of the conscious ego; (3) by 'Givenness' being independent of my will.

However, by the "introspective analysis of complete Givenness" the ego is held to reveal itself to be a vitalistic agent, a real link in the universally determined series of phenomena, — this, for instance, in the purely psychical series which is between physiological stimulus and reaction. Consequently, every form of traditional Parallelism is given up, and a new form is substituted, that, namely, in which a parallelism between the psychical, given alone to introspection, and the Psychoid, the new element of nature, is asserted. Thus the mystifying complexities of Professor Driesch's system grow in number!

Categories, — yes, our author deals in categories also, and here he has something of interest and value. Thus he asks: Was not Kant's critique, in which he used categories to describe the doctrine of categories as the presupposition of experience, itself experience? And here one may also ask: Was such a system self-critical and consistent, or did it refute itself? Again Driesch finds that "my thinking necessity is not necessary, but only is." Past thinking, your thinking, is necessary, but is my thinking? Freedom escapes analysis, since to analyze is to subject to necessity.

Are there, now, any categories by which Vitalism and Entelechy can be understood? Yes, individuality is such a concept; the organic realm is distinguished by the construction of an individualized wholeness, and that which brings about this individualization, namely, Entelechy, is not itself individual, but is supra-individual; so, also, it is not cause, although it implies causality.

Has now individuality a wider range, so that there is a universal teleology? In answer to this question the author discusses many phases of the problem, but not with much system, nor with very satisfactory results. It would seem, perhaps, that, as has been shown pre-

vously, the fact of creative synthesis, of *de novo* appearance, in the inorganic realm as well as in the organic, could itself be identified with an immanent progress or teleology in things. And so it could be if our author were consistent. But he has found, blindly, wholeness, individuality, etc., only in the organic realm. So, now, he does not find much teleology in the inorganic. In fact he finally asserts, after discussing much without definite results, that, in the "question as to universal teleology," morality, the "ought" becomes the standard, that this relates, however, only to human individuals, so that teleology is limited. And yet in concluding his volume the author asks: Does not the stational harmony between certain domains of nature point to an original, primary Entelechy that made it, just as the artist makes an object of art? He answers that the mind is forced, at least allowed, to assume such an Entelechy-God, and that this is the eternal object of science.

In conclusion, now, of this, the third review of the writings of Professor Driesch in which he has argued for, and explained, and developed his entelechistic and vitalistic philosophy, it must be said that to the reviewer he does not seem to have established his case; in this opinion, too, the great majority of the biologists seem to agree. Yet it must be admitted that there is something in the position which Professor Driesch takes, something in the phenomena which he emphasizes, that is both significant and important. This 'something' which he has very persistently argued for and expounded in one form or another in all his writings is the *de novo* appearance of new qualities or properties in all cases of the creative synthesis of organic wholes out of parts. The significance of this is that it means the necessary limitation of mechanics as a means of explanation; of mechanics it must be admitted that it cannot account rationally or deductively for such *de novo* appearances, but must wait upon these, in order to study them inductively. But such a limitation applies as well to the inorganic realm as it does to the organic, and for the same reason. Professor Driesch's central error consists, I believe, in his not seeing this. Accordingly, if there is an Entelechy in the organic realm there is also in the inorganic; conversely, if there is not in the latter, then not in the former. This converse case has the advantage, since the introduction of the Entelechy hypothesis *explains* nothing. Therefore I hold that it is not established. Of significance alone, then is the protest against a dogmatic universal mechanical explanation upon which such an hypothesis is based; this protest alone is the element of real importance in Driesch's system.

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*Geschichte des deutschen Idealismus.* Von M. KRONENBERG.  
Erster Band, *Die idealistische Ideen-Entwicklung von ihren Anfängen bis Kant.* München, Oskar Beck, 1909. — pp. xii, 438.

This work is to comprise two volumes, the second of which has not yet appeared. Its purpose, as announced in the *Preface* to Volume I, is (1) to give an exposition of German idealism in its classical period, the period from Kant to Hegel, and (2) to help, by means of this historical survey, to establish that *Neu-Idealismus*, "whose beginnings can everywhere be plainly seen in the spiritual life of the present" (p. iii). The first volume is, in the main, simply preparatory to the fulfilment of this purpose; for it merely brings us to the beginning of the classical period. Because of the manifold relations in which German idealism stands to earlier modes of thought, the author deems it best to start with the beginnings of philosophy among the Greeks and to trace the development of the idealistic tendency down to its culmination in Hegel.

The method of treatment is not that of the typical history of philosophy. Dr. Kronenberg's purpose, he tells us, is to trace the history of ideas and of tendencies of thought, rather than to furnish information about individual thinkers or their works. Hence, we have no detailed analysis of any system of philosophy, no extended criticism, and no biographical detail. The method of exposition is popular, but popular in the very best sense. It emphasizes the fundamental aspects which appeal to all intelligent readers, rather than the minute details, which are essential for the scholar; and it lays stress upon the intimate relations of philosophy to life. The style is admirable for its clearness, force, and attractiveness. Dr. Kronenberg adds another honorable name to the all too short list of those who are showing us that philosophical thinking is not incompatible with the possession of a good prose style.

The present volume is divided into three parts. The first, entitled "*Die geschichtlichen Vorstufen*," brings us down to the time of Descartes. After an introductory chapter on "The Nature and Fundamental Types of Philosophical Idealism," we have a brief survey of Greek idealism, a chapter on Christian idealism, and a discussion of the philosophy of nature of the sixteenth century. The history of culture is the record of that mightiest of all conflicts, the conflict between subject and object. It includes three stages: (1) the mythological period, in which subject and object are as yet undifferentiated; (2) the period of the philosophy of nature, in which the spirit has in some degree come to its own, but in which it bends its gaze upon the

external world, rather than upon itself; (3) the idealistic period, in which the spirit reflects upon itself. Occidental thought has twice passed through this conflict; the struggle which constitutes the history of Greek thought is repeated in the history of modern philosophy. Greek cosmology corresponds to the sixteenth century philosophy of nature; the Sophists, to the German Enlightenment; Socrates, to Kant. Through the influence of the Sophists and Socrates, the *Naturphilosophie* of the Greek cosmologists and the absorption of the Eleatics in "the absolute object" give place to the idealism of Plato and Aristotle. From this time until the birth of modern philosophy, human thought is characterized by the emphasis upon the subject. But at the beginning of the modern period we have the return to the object. The world of objective phenomena, in all its concrete fulness, absorbs the attention of the Italian philosophy of the sixteenth century.

Part II deals with "The Transition from Philosophy of Nature to Idealism." Descartes and Spinoza are discussed as representatives of that mechanical view of the universe which is the culmination of the objective tendency. Descartes completed and systematized the mechanical philosophy of the Italians, chiefly by means of his conception of substance; but he derived this conception from the realm of pure subjectivity. Thus we see in him a constant struggle between the two rival tendencies of subjectivity and objectivity. Spinoza, much more consistent than Descartes, is completely absorbed in the absolute object, as were the Eleatics before him. Leibniz swings to the other extreme of pure subjectivity and is thus the herald of German idealism. But, to some extent, he still remains in the bonds of the mechanical conception; he states his problem wholly in the spirit of *Naturphilosophie*.

The chapter on Leibniz is followed by a suggestive discussion of the German Enlightenment, which brings Part II to a close. The distinguishing characteristic of the German Enlightenment, as compared with the Enlightenment in France and England, is not, as is commonly supposed, its rationalistic tendency. For the empiricism of France and England contains many rationalistic elements, while in the German Enlightenment "the empirical tendency was, at certain times, so strong as to be almost the sole determinant" (p. 196). In particular, the author thinks, it is a mistake to describe Wolff as an out-and-out rationalist. What most sharply distinguishes the German Enlightenment from the French and the English is its preëminently individualistic tendency. For the Enlightenment, the central conception was man; in Germany, it was man, not as a social and political being, but as an individual.

Part III discusses "The Idealistic Revolution in Thought" and contains chapters on "German Mysticism," "The Renaissance of Christian Idealism" in Hamann and Jacobi, "The Renaissance of Greek Idealism" in Winckelmann and Lessing, "The Overthrow of *Naturphilosophie*" in Kant's pre-critical writings, "Idealistic Universalism" in Herder, and "Storm and Stress." The chapter on German mysticism describes briefly the doctrine of Meister Eckhart, "the greatest mystic of all times" (p. 248), and touches rather lightly upon the relations between mysticism and religion, and mysticism and art. The next chapter contains a most interesting and sympathetic discussion of Hamann, whose importance, Dr. Kronenberg thinks, has been greatly underestimated. It was Hamann, he believes, who, more than any one else, prepared the way for the development of German mysticism into philosophy. More original and possessed of wider knowledge than Jacobi, he was less consistent and systematic in his thinking. The fundamental problem is the same for both, How can mysticism become a principle of knowledge? Neither succeeded in solving it; but Jacobi holds the higher place in the history of philosophy because he made a definite attempt to embody the fundamental thought of mysticism in clear conceptions. He spoke "the language of the understanding," though the understanding was as unlovely in his eyes as in those of Hamann. Above all, he made clear, for the first time, the opposition between the two great types of *Weltanschauung*,—idealism and philosophy of nature,—between the spirit of mysticism and the spirit of the Enlightenment (p. 289).

The chapter on Winckelmann and Lessing is followed by a brief discussion of Kant's pre-critical writings. Starting in sympathy with the philosophy of nature of his time, Kant soon begins to question its rationalistic presuppositions. His distrust of rationalism next leads him into empiricism; and this, says the author,—agreeing, in this respect, with Windelband,—was the "dogmatic slumber" from which he was aroused by Hume. The net result of his pre-critical period was a state of resignation, arising from his conviction of the impossibility of knowledge. Something of the Socratic irony is manifest in Kant at this time; the only true wisdom he holds to be the consciousness of the depths of our ignorance. Dr. Kronenberg lays much stress upon the parallel that he draws between the Kant of this period and Socrates. One may feel, perhaps, that he over-emphasizes the likeness, but the comparison is suggestive. The chapters on Herder and the Storm and Stress Period bring the volume to a close.

## NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

*Anti-pragmatisme.* Examen des droits respectifs de l'aristocratie intellectuelle et de la démocratie sociale. Par ALBERT SCHINZ. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. 309.

In addition to an appendix of two reprinted articles, this volume of about three hundred pages consists of three parts. The first part, entitled Pragmatism and Intellectualism, begins with a chapter on "The Principles of Pragmatism," which sets forth the three arguments upon which pragmatism is based and then 'refutes' them. The three fundamental principles are that (1) all purely intellectualistic systems have failed to satisfy us; (2) all systems (whether we are aware of the fact or not) are inspired by personal and practical motives and envisage practical ends; and, (3) pragmatism reconciles all philosophic speculations because it enables us to recognize as true whatever is useful in any of them, while they are compelled to deny one another *in toto*.

That Professor Schinz is a consistent Anti-Empiricist, a thorough-going conceptualist, is obvious enough in the above summary, which sets forth, not the arguments upon which any pragmatist has ever rested his case, but the type of formal, rationalistic reasons that would appeal to an intellectualist of a somewhat unusually abstract sort.

That his 'refutations' follow the lines of a highly formal logic might therefore be expected. (1) Even if all the intellectualist philosophies were false, this would not add one iota of proof to the truth of pragmatism; (2) if it be admitted that all philosophies have been inspired by subjective and personal preferences, this, by pragmatism's own argument, confers upon them exactly the same advantages pragmatism claims for itself, thus negating its claim to superiority; (3) the sciences when they employ the useful as a criterion of selection and coördination of rival hypotheses always mean the useful to *intelligence*, while pragmatism means the *socially* useful, — a characteristically "Anglo-Saxon" standard. Subjectivism is an established principle of all modern philosophy, made such by Hume and Kant, but there is all the difference in the world between a philosophy which holds that phenomena have to be adapted to certain fixed predetermined faculties of our intelligence, and that which holds that they are influenced by factors of desire and volition. The unusually abstract flavor of the intellectualism of these refutations is probably apparent without express indication. The average man, probably even among the 'anti-pragmatists,' is sufficiently empirical so that if the idea occurred to him that all other philosophies are on the same level with pragmatism because pragmatism insists that all alike are influenced by personal and practical considerations, it would also occur

to him to ask whether the fact that pragmatism *recognizes* this influence while other philosophies deny and ignore it does not make a considerable difference. And, similarly, when Professor Schinz sets up the dilemma (the dilemma is his habitual mode of thought) that either the pragmatist accepts the principle of contradiction and so admits intellectualism, or else denies it, and so subverts itself as well as other philosophies, the ordinary intellectualist (at least if an Anglo-Saxon) would stop to consider that possibly the pragmatist would have a pragmatic interpretation of the principle of contradiction.

The second chapter being entitled "Le Cas Dewey," a becoming modesty forbids my dealing with it. I was somewhat surprised,—some Anti-pragmatists will probably share my surprise,—however, to learn that my chief interest was to base morals upon transcendental metaphysics, and that the traces of a naturalistic reliance upon psychology and sociology in my writing are evidences of "hesitation" and "self-contradiction" on my part! But as Professor Schinz says of himself in another portion of his work (p. 138), "Without doubt it is necessary for us to interpret pragmatism and *to read between the lines*," — a passage which might well serve as its motto.

In the second part, "Pragmatism and Modernism," we have Professor Schinz in the very act, as it were, of reading between the lines: Industrial democracy, the insistence of America upon sheer activity for its own sake, upon success, upon the battle for victory,—that, and Pragmatism as a hearty concession to the views of the populace in which such ideas are current, are the vision. Democracies, especially those in which the spirit of industrialism is dominant,—as in the United States,—are hostile to freedom of thought and science, for they are interested only in results.

"*La philosophie de Wm. James reflète exactement cette façon de voir ; . . . il cherche à la justifier.*" There is, however, a second trait of our American life reflected in pragmatism. The furore of competitive energy leads to excessive egoism,—the war of all against all. Some check, some restraint, is needed,—hence America is great on religion, not to say religions. Accordingly when Professor James speaks most as a pragmatist, the utilitarian aspects of religion are the feature most emphasized.

One fears that Professor Schinz does not always get the full force of his own humor, as for example in a passage he uses to exemplify the doctrine of the prevalent recognition in America of the financial value of religion. "There is in Wall Street a broker's office at the head of which is a woman, Mrs. Gailord. She began each day's work with prayers in the office. Early in 1907 she wanted to do even more ; she arranged with a clergyman to come every Wednesday and asked the great financiers who were her neighbors,—the Rockefellers, the Pierpont Morgans, the Schiffs (!),—of whose religious tendencies she was aware, to coöperate." In a foot-note he adds that he does not know whether the undertaking went through or not,— "but after all, that matters little ; the interesting fact is that it was

proposed!" The American reader's appreciation of the humor of the entire chapter (think what a boon to the French literary writer is this one Wall Street passage!) is saddened at times by reflection upon the nostalgia with which Professor Schinz must suffer from living in a country such as he depicts.

The next chapter is entitled "Medieval Pragmatism and Modern Scholasticism." Medieval philosophy was distinctly pragmatic; it supported theology which sustained the church in its social task. The rationalistic method of Descartes in enfranchising philosophy made necessary a new pragmatism, for a complete disintegration of religious beliefs was too dangerous for society. This the contemporary pragmatic philosophy supplies; it is a new scholasticism. Pascal, Rousseau, and Kant are its great fore-runners, utilitarian ethics not being sufficiently religious to fill the bill.

The first chapter of Part III, "Pragmatism and Truth," is called the Triumph of Pragmatism. Pragmatism will triumph; democracy is invading the whole world. America to-day is what we (Europe) will be to-morrow. In America the members of the intellectual class do not have children; immigrants coming from lower classes increase more and more. Strict scientific truths would be dangerous for such a people; it could not use them. And as if to prove that his volume is not mere non-pragmatism, but is genuine anti-pragmatism, Professor Schinz adds: "What is this stupid prejudice that truth has anything to do with the practice of life? It was necessary for our epoch of crude democracy to arrive before such enormities could be seriously affirmed." "Truth has nothing to do with life," — and for this reason, pragmatism, an acceptance of popular life as a philosophy, is so thoroughly false that it will surely triumph.

In the next chapter, however, Professor Schinz recovers a little from this gloom. "Salvation is possible, but not possible," for the Latin civilizations have kept intact the principle at least of intellectual inequality. If only "the social organization conceived before the Revolution had been continued, and existed in our own day, even supposing that free thought had arrived (as it has) at the notion of determinism in nature, then just because this principle is dangerous for the masses, society would not have to yield itself to the acrobatic feats of pragmatism; it would have accepted the consequences of determinism and would, from the point of view of practical life, have formulated *a rule of conduct adapted to the masses*, a rule which would have satisfied the masses, and which would not have sacrificed the dignity of thought." If it is still not too late to establish the organization of society on this basis of castes (the word is our author's own), pragmatism may still be defeated, — a pragmatic suggestion to anti-pragmatists in America to get busy in politics if they wish really to down pragmatism.

The final chapter is entitled "Is William James a Pragmatist?" Professor Schinz here concludes that Mr. James's main object is, after all, to oppose to the stupid popular pragmatism he finds all about him an enlightened pragmatism, — one which recognizes that practice is so different

from theory, life so different from philosophy and science, that the latter may and should have its own rights in its own sphere without any dictation from practical life. (*Query*: Had Professor Schinz got hold by mistake of a book by one of Professor James's colleagues?) These second thoughts regarding Professor James may be compared with the earlier chapter in which it is shown that Professor James "exactly reflects" the popular tendencies about him. It would be interesting to see Professor Schinz apply his favorite disjunctive dilemma to his own case.

If the reader wonders why so much space has been devoted to a book of which the foregoing is a synopsis as exact as limits of space permit, I may remind him that the book appears in Alcan's "Library of Contemporary Philosophy"; and, coming from a teacher in a representative American college, can hardly fail in France at least of a certain prestige and authority, as presumably diagnostic of American life and thought.

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*Essays on Evolution: 1889-1907.* By EDWARD BAGNALL POULTON. Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1908. — pp. xlvi, 479.

This volume is made up of ten papers and addresses, of various date and occasion; but all, as Professor Poulton remarks, "are the expression of a continuous line of thought," and all have been revised, so that their "arguments and conclusions . . . represent" his "views at the present moment."

An introduction, entitled "Mutation, Mendelism, and Natural Selection," subjects the manners of the English 'Batesonians,' as well as their theories, to a severe but not unjustified criticism. Mendel's discovery, says Professor Poulton, is "a fascinating and interesting addition to knowledge." But as yet the extent of its application is doubtful; and it is in any case probable that its part in evolution "is limited to the prevention in certain cases of the supposed 'swamping effect of intercrossing.'" Professor Bateson and his school have greatly exaggerated its importance; and their contemptuous depreciation of investigations in the geographical distribution of species, in embryology, and in the various questions connected with adaptation, if it prevailed, would have a most baleful effect upon biological studies in general.

In the first of the ten essays, "A Naturalist's Contribution to the Discussion upon the Age of the Earth," the principal methods of calculation proposed by the physicists are briefly stated, and criticised as involving an excessive simplification of the actual conditions. The mean result of the geologists' calculations, about 450,000,000 years, is accepted as the period required for the formation of the stratified rocks. The naturalist's contribution consists in establishing, by a brief review of the paleontological record, and its comparison with living forms, that only a brief portion of the development of even the great higher phyla took place within this period. All the evi-

dence goes to show that the earlier forms in any series are developed and modified much more slowly than the more advanced. The general conclusion is therefore that for the history of these phyla the 450,000,000 years must be multiplied several times; and for the development of the original ancestral forms "the period thus obtained requires to be again increased and perhaps doubled." The general reader will find this essay especially useful, as it summarizes compactly a heated discussion of long standing, and a mass of evidence both old and new.

The second essay deals with the question, "What is a Species?" Professor Poulton defends the interesting conclusion that unlike all the other divisions employed in biological classification, species, like individuals, have objective reality. They are, he holds, groups characterized by the two marks of free interbreeding and common descent, for which the terms *syngamy* and *synepigony* are proposed. Common characters are but the consequences of these two causes; and so also is interspecific sterility "an incidental consequence of asyngamy." It is also suggested that "the injurious effects of self-fertilisation" are "the consequence and not the cause of the adaptations for cross-fertilisation," since these result in partial or complete asyngamy, and consequently in a partial sterility.

The following three essays, "Theories of Evolution," "Theories of Heredity," and "The Bearing of the Study of Insects upon the Question 'Are Acquired Characters Hereditary?'" are devoted to the presentation of the case for Neo-Darwinism against Lamarckism. The details of the discussion must be passed over. Professor Poulton is an able advocate, and, as might be expected, the evidence he draws from entomology is especially fresh and interesting. Elsewhere he is perhaps more effective in criticism than in defence; but this is probably true of the champions of both parties. It is interesting to notice that the two brief paragraphs at page 108, replying to the objection that a variation must have life-and-death value before it can be 'selected,' have apparently remained unamplified and unaltered since their original delivery in 1894. The gist of their answer is that "organs are not formed anew in an animal, but they are formed by the modification of pre-existing organs." How far this is from answering the question as to the origin of such modifications and their cumulation to the selective level is obvious; but this is the only passage in which Professor Poulton discusses this cardinal difficulty in the Neo-Darwinian theory. Nor is there any mention, either here or elsewhere, of Weismann's attempt to meet this difficulty by his theory of Germinal Selection. It may be remarked in passing that the statement that "Lamarck believed in an innate tendency toward perfection in animals" is truer to Darwin's idea of Lamarck than to Lamarck himself.

"A Remarkable Anticipation of Modern Views on Evolution" is narrated in the sixth essay. It is that of James Cowles Prichard, famous for his work in anthropology. He is shown to have stated very clearly, as early as 1826, the precise distinction between congenital and acquired characters,



and to have held that only the former were hereditary. He also had a vague idea of Natural Selection, and a very clear one of Artificial Selection. But, like Buffon, he wavered later, and gave up his original insights.

The first part of the seventh essay discusses the attitude of Huxley towards the theory of Natural Selection. Its second part, and the three remaining essays of the book, are devoted to an extended discussion of mimicry and Müllerian resemblance in all their aspects, for the most part, naturally, as found in insects, where the phenomena in question are most conspicuous. The tenth essay, in spite of the limitation of its title ("The Place of Mimicry in a Scheme of Defensive Coloration"), is really a brief monograph on all the various modifications, for the purposes of defence or offence, of form, color, movement, and attitude, and sums up the results of a great deal of the recent work in this field. A classified list of examples of mimicry is appended.

Although this is the most technical portion of the book, it is not the least interesting. Professor Poulton is here especially concerned to establish two conclusions: that Natural Selection is the only adequate explanation for the phenomena of mimicry in its wide sense; and that 'true' or 'Batesian' mimicry is very rare, while Müller's theory of "common warning colors" seems to explain the larger number of such cases of resemblance. Judgment as to the success of the argument for the second position must be left to the specialist. To the casual reader it seems very probably correct, but needing further experimental verification, especially in the matter of the relative unpalatability of various species of insects to their bird enemies. For the first conclusion Professor Poulton makes out a very strong case, which no adherent of the rival explanations can neglect. He points out that no other of the causes assigned,—direct effect of environment, internal laws of development, or Sexual Selection,—can account for *all* the cases of resemblance of animals to one another and to inanimate objects, without great improbability; Natural Selection can. The various cases of mimicry between animals are quite independent of affinity, and the resemblance is in all cases superficial save where more essential similarity assists in its production. Indeed, the methods of producing resemblance to the same model sometimes differ in the most surprising way, thus excluding both external and internal causes; while its appearance in immature individuals excludes Sexual Selection. Resemblance to inanimate objects can in no way be explained by internal causes; while any explanation by external causes presupposes the inheritance of acquired characters. Professor Poulton, however, obviously implies, in urging this last argument, that external causes can in no way affect the germ, and thus, as has already been mentioned, seems to adhere to a position which Weismann has now abandoned. The wealth of interesting examples with which the argument is illustrated, and the incidental references to topics, such as the education of birds, which have an independent interest of their own, can be merely mentioned here.

Professor Poulton's book is one that may be commended to the general reader as well as to his colleagues. His exposition is lucid, and his method truly philosophical, for everywhere he tries to see the part in the light of the whole. "There are always two questions," *why* and *how*, "to be answered with reference to any natural phenomenon," he remarks, "and both must be answered if the facts are to be fully understood." So the general discussions with which he begins are verified and illustrated by examples chosen from his especial field of research, and the detailed special investigations summed up in the concluding essays are all made to bear upon and be illuminated by his chosen principle of explanation. As long as Natural Selection has defenders of this quality, it may safely be prophesied that no mere 'school of facts,' Mutationist or other, will oust it from control. That can be accomplished only by a more adequate *theory*.

The book is beautifully printed, in a large bold open type, which is a delight to eyes wearied by attenuated stereotype. Its analytical index, eighty-four pages in length, deserves especial praise for its completeness and usability. May it serve as a model to other authors and publishers,—especially French and German! No topical table of contents, however full, can take the place of a good index. Still, had Professor Poulton prefixed such a table, his book might be regarded as mechanically perfect.

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*The Psychological Phenomena of Christianity.* By GEORGE BARTON CUTTEN. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908. — pp. xviii, 497.

In this recent book Dr. Cutten makes a notable contribution to the modern clergyman's library. There can be no doubt that "the psychological standpoint is not only important but indispensable for the religious worker, whether preacher or teacher," and it is certainly time that some competent person should work through the great mass of material which has been accumulating in recent years, and "essay a summation of the conclusions" reached by various workers in different parts of the field called "The Psychology of Religion." In the main Dr. Cutten has done this work thoroughly and well. His bibliography is extensive and comprehensive; his attitude is independent and fearless, and generally scholarly and scientific, though occasionally one feels that he allows the preacher to slip into the place of the scientist, that he has turned from an impartial statement of the facts to exhort the faithful and reassure the timid by brief declarations of his personal beliefs. However, this may be no objection to the book, in the minds of those for whom it is intended, — "the general reader, as well as the psychological and theological student."

In his first two chapters, Dr. Cutten gives a general introduction to his work: in the first chapter emphasizing the importance of the study of religion from the psychological point of view, since in the treatment of souls, diagnosis should precede and determine the remedies to be tried; and in

his second chapter outlining his general view of religion and his attitude toward it. In the latter chapter he announces two fundamental beliefs to which he constantly refers throughout the book : (1) Religion is not concerned with a part of man's mind (his intellect, feeling, or will alone), but involves man's whole nature ; and (2) " If God works directly in man, He must work through the subconscious."

Next come sixteen chapters in which the author treats a long list of topics which have figured largely in the discussions of religious people in all ages. His method is first to set before us the material for discussion, generally arranging it in chronological order, and then to explain it in terms of the laws which modern psychology has discovered through the study of the workings of the human mind. The appeal to the supernatural is, in most of these chapters, rigorously excluded, but true to his position as pastor, the author frequently takes occasion to explain that this study is not an undermining of religious belief, but rather a disentangling of the essential from the accidental and abnormal. The subconscious occupies a prominent place in the chapters on Mysticism, Ecstasy, Visions, Dreams, and Conversion. In the chapters upon Stigmatization, Faith Cure, Christian Science, and Miracles, the facts discovered in the modern study of hypnotism and the psychology of suggestion are used to good advantage. In the chapters on Witchcraft, Religious Epidemics, Contagious Phenomena, and Revivals, the spread of ideas through suggestion and the heightened suggestibility of crowds serve as explanatory conceptions. In the chapter on Monasticism and Asceticism the author shows that those practices were resorted to which were found to help in the attainment of the particular type of religious experience most desired at the time ; Glossolalia is viewed as an ecstatic phenomenon resulting from " the dominance of the lower brain centers under great excitement," which shows itself as a " lack of self-control " ; Demoniacal Possession is explained as " the disaggregation of consciousness, or a split in personality, with an insistent idea in the secondary consciousness."

With Chapter XIX we pass completely out of the domain of the abnormal into that of the normal. This chapter on Age, and the next on Sex, sketch the differences in religious experience which should be expected with the differences in individuals. The chapter on Age includes a forceful plea for the adaptation of religious teaching to the mental development of the individual, while the chapter on Sex deplors the feminine tendency of Christianity and counsels a greater emphasis on masculine religion, — a type of religion which was perfectly exemplified in the Founder of Christianity but neglected by the religious leaders that followed him.

In the next six chapters, the main purpose seems to be to trace the importance of the various mental functions in different types of religious experience, and to emphasize the author's theory that religion involves the whole man, and cannot be explained in terms of any part, no matter how prominent that part may seem to be. In this section, then, we find chap-

ters entitled Intellect, Knowledge, Imagination, Will, and Emotions. In Chapter XXIV, on Inspiration, the subconscious is regarded as the medium through which God acts upon man.

In the final chapters of the book, the author makes some practical applications of psychology to familiar topics. In Chapter XXVII, the reasons for Worship and its varied forms are studied; the next chapter is devoted to Prayer, issuing in a discussion of the question whether the benefit derived from prayer is due merely to the activity of the subconsciousness itself or to the acquisition of some sort of energy from the Deity, assumed to be received through the subconscious; after this comes a chapter in which the author discusses with sanity and frankness the "historical, pathological, and psychological" evidences of a close relation between sexuality and religion; Denominationalism is explained by the fact that "men are psychologically constituted so that different things appeal to different persons"; Immortality, which suffered at the hands of physiological psychology, receives a new infusion of life from psychical research, for "if the evidence is true, and there is no reason to doubt it, the spiritistic hypothesis seems to present the best case up to the present time"; and in the final chapter upon Preaching, approved methods of holding and influencing an audience are based upon the modern psychological study of attention, rhythm, suggestion, and emotional expression.

From psychologists the chief criticism of this otherwise admirable book must be that the author has accepted and used as a fundamental principle of explanation a theory which many of the best psychologists to-day are very far from accepting,—the concept of a subconscious mind. To be sure, Dr. Cutten has considerable psychological authority for using the concept as he does, and if there were such a thing as 'the subconsciousness' many hard things would find an easy explanation in terms of it. But realizing the perils of its use, as he seems to do, it is surprising that he should so easily fall a prey to its seductiveness, and thus vitiate an otherwise highly commendable piece of work, a volume which might perhaps have become a standard reference book. With the book as it is, it will certainly be necessary for every scholarly teacher to refer students to the controversy over the subconscious while reading this book, and if the students have not already a considerable background of psychological knowledge, even this precaution may not restore the balance.

Psychologists will, with equal heat, inveigh against Dr. Cutten's attempts to provide for the passage of influence or energy of some kind from God to man, as the author does in his chapters upon Dreams, Conversion, Inspiration, and Prayer, and against his readiness to accept spiritism as a support for his belief in immortality. To be sure, these ideas do not permeate the whole book, as does the concept of the subconscious, but scientists will certainly accuse the author of accepting, without sufficient proof, hypotheses which happen to favor his personal beliefs.

SAMUEL P. HAYES.

*Berkeley and Spiritual Realism.* By ALEXANDER CAMPBELL FRASER, Professor (Emeritus) of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. London, Archibald Constable & Co., Ltd., 1908.—pp. xi, 86.

This volume belongs to the interesting and useful series of monographs, "Philosophies Ancient and Modern," but it deserves more attention than its appearance in such a series might naturally suggest. The author himself says that "perhaps this was a presumptuous undertaking for one in his ninetieth year"; and while it is unlikely that any reader will agree in this modest estimate of the importance of the little book, it does add appreciably to its significance that it is the ripest fruit of a life devoted with remarkable persistence and enthusiasm to the consideration of the ultimate problems of the world and man and God. It ought to be welcomed by all younger students as giving in small compass and with many fresh touches the main points in Professor Campbell Fraser's philosophy, and the venerable author, who has taught so many to think for themselves, and therefore, in many cases, to think differently from himself, is to be warmly congratulated on the intellectual power and literary finish of the book.

As suggested above and in the title of the volume, the philosophy of Berkeley is interpreted as "a serious endeavour to vindicate the ultimate spirituality of the universe, and the moral or supernatural agency constantly at work in nature" (vi). "Berkeley's Realism belongs to one of the two forms, which philosophy has been apt to assume from the beginning:—the shallower, which stops short amidst the visible and tangible phenomena of the material world and their laws; and the deeper, which is dissatisfied till it reaches the spiritual world, on which physical phenomena depend, and from which they derive their scientific significance" (viii). "To think of the material world as itself impotent, and necessarily dependent for its real existence and its natural order upon omniscient and omnipotent World-Mind, is at least a step to a more definite religious conception of the spirituality, intelligibility, and morality that underlies the universe" (p. 39). "The theism of Berkeley is large enough to comprehend all who see the immanence of Active Reason in the material and the human world" (p. 64). "Only in a spiritually constituted universe *can* we even ask, what the *moral character* of the Supreme Power is, and what the spiritual relations of the Universal Spirit are to the struggling, striving, and sorrowing spirits of men. In a finally material reality there is no room for this question. Purpose,—good, evil, and indifferent,—is all excluded. Under spiritual realism we can at least ask whether the universal purpose is optimist, or pessimist, or indifferent" (p. 61).

The ultimate question raised by Spiritual Realism is, according to the author, whether we are living in "an ethically constituted universe," and this question he identifies with that of "its ultimately theistic constitution." It is a question neither considered nor answered by Berkeley himself. "Perfect *goodness* of the Universal Spirit is not necessarily the consequence of the final spirituality of the Real" (p. 71). "Answers to the questions

thus raised are hardly found in Berkeley. His exposition of Spiritual Realism adds little to our resources for meeting them" (p. 72). "Spiritual Existence and Omnipotence do not carry us far, unless the spiritual Reality is morally perfect. Berkeley does not help us much at this critical stage" (p. 83). Professor Fraser, in short, takes up the ultimate metaphysical question at the point where Berkeley left it. The Berkeleyan philosophy itself is used simply as a point of departure; it is developed in the first chapter, in close connection with the life, and then in three chapters suggestively entitled respectively, "The Material World and its Natural Order," "The Human World and Moral Disorder," "God, or the Universal Mind, and Theistic Optimism," the real philosophical argument of the book is independently elaborated.

We may close by calling attention to the two central positions in that argument, to which the author recurs at various stages of it. The one is that the existence of moral disorder is itself the great evidence of moral order at the heart of the universe. "May it not be that the moral disorder now found on this planet signifies, not that we are living in an immorally-constituted universe, but rather that the *present* life of the moral agents who inhabit it is purgatorial; not perfect, but on the way to perfection; through struggle and suffering, and frequent relapse, — consequences of the moral freedom which implies power of moral agents to make themselves bad? . . . The Divine Ideal may be a universe, in this slow way of moral trial and struggle, becoming gradually more and more valuable morally" (pp. 57-9). The other is succinctly stated in the closing sentences of the book. "If Nature is practically trustworthy, and fit to be scientifically reasoned about, the Omnipotent Spirit immanent in it must be perfectly good and design the goodness of all. This is final faith" (p. 84). Both positions will be recognized by readers of the *Philosophy of Theism* as characteristic; in this volume, as in the larger work, we are made to feel the reality of the argument for its author.

JAMES SETH.

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.

*Die Reproduktion und Assoziation von Vorstellungen.* Teil I. By ARTHUR WRESCHNER. Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1907. — pp. 328.

Some twenty-five years ago Ebbinghaus succeeded in bringing the study of memory under experimental control. Since that time the subject has undergone a profound change. General description has given way to the concrete investigation of a number of lesser problems directed upon the individual factors and conditions of the memorial and associative functions. In this manner there has grown up a technical knowledge of impression, retention, reproduction, recognition, learning by heart, and forgetting, — a large amount of material, now at hand and capable of being used in several different ways. For example, the data now accessible might first of all be gathered together, rearranged and interpreted, and then absorbed into

current systems of psychology. Professor Ebbinghaus himself has incorporated much of the later work in his unfinished *Grundzüge der Psychologie*; and Meumann, in the recent *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die experimentelle Pädagogik, etc.*, has performed a like service for education. In the second place, the material suggests a technical treatment in the form of a *Methodik*; or, again, it might well be made to serve as a guide in a broad investigation which should attempt to cover the general field in a manner quite impossible fifteen or twenty years ago. It is the last of these three ways that Dr. Wreschner has adopted, though he has put his emphasis upon the aspect of reproduction. Certainly the undertaking called for a stout heart. It meant, not a mere repetition of earlier experiments, but a first-hand attack which should combine all the ingenuity and wisdom of fifty men and of a half-score of methods. It meant, if it were to be successful, that every predecessor should be studied and appreciated, and then relegated to foot-notes. Wreschner starts in at the beginning with a Hipp clock, a *Schalltrichter*, and twenty-two observers, — men, women, and children, educated as well as illiterate (besides some 200 persons in his *Massenversuche*), — and he proceeds to take twenty thousand word-reactions. In the investigations reported in Part I, association was unrestricted or 'free,' and the stimulus-word was given but once. The reaction-times are treated by themselves (Quantitative Analysis), and afterward the introspective protocols (Qualitative Analysis). Thus far the author's attention is directed to the associative nexus and its conditions. The stimulus, the reaction-word, and the 'bond' (the relation between the reproducing processes and the reproduced) are considered in their order. The temptation and the danger arising from the use of words, — the tendency, I mean, to fall into logic and into syntax, — Wreschner recognizes; and although he does not entirely escape, his classification of associative forms, that pitfall of the descriptive psychologist, is probably the most nearly adequate that we possess. Like many of his predecessors in the analysis of association, Wreschner lays too much stress on the *Beziehung*, or the associative bond between the releasing word and the word reproduced, — as if a grammatical or logical relation (*e. g.*, attributive or judgmental) were *prima facie* evidence of a ligating process in consciousness. It is true, the author partly saves himself by leaving the bond to introspective control. At the same time, it may well be questioned whether the observer's report that the "cause of the reproduction" (as Wreschner defines association) was, let us say, alliteration ("Zwang-Zwiebach") or synonymy ("Sitte-Gewohnheit") or antithesis ("schnell-langsam"), was a true introspection or a mere reflection lying quite outside the bounds of the associative experience. As the author himself admits, the place for studying incentives to reproduction is the memory-experiment, where associations are made, — not the reproduction-experiment, where they are renewed. The most important classificatory distinction of the monograph is that drawn between *Kombinationen*, in which stimulus and reaction belong to

two successive formations, as "black-white," and *Konnexionen*, a single formation, as "black-cloth." The distinction sets the difference between simultaneous and successive associations in a new light. The author throws out a hint that the two classes may arise from different *Aufgaben* or *Ab-sichten*. And this hint leads the reviewer to observe that *Aufgabe* and *Tendenz* ought as certainly to be taken into account for motives and causes of reproduction as are the overt processes of the associating mind. But Wreschner worked, — it must be noted, — before or beside Ach and Watt and Messer.

Wreschner's reaction-times show the most astonishing uniformities and the most constant and suggestive differences both as regards age, sex, and education, and as regards the nature of the stimulus and of the reaction-word. His liberal use of the arithmetical mean as a representative value is in part offset by frequent rearrangement of data. The monograph abounds in careful analysis and ingenious, though at times suspiciously acute, interpretation. Its completion will be awaited with interest.

MADISON BENTLEY.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

*The Stoic Creed.* By WILLIAM L. DAVIDSON. Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark, 1907. — pp. xxiii, 247.

Professor Davidson has written this work mainly to explain the significance of the Stoic philosophy for the problems of religion and morality. To the Stoics and to the people of their time, the problems of conduct and religion had come to be the chief concern of philosophical speculation. An introductory sketch of the work of Socrates, and of his relation to the Sophists and to the Stoa forms a serviceable preface. Then follows a brief chapter on the historical representatives of the Stoic doctrines in Greece and Rome. In the second and third sections of the work, the whole of the Stoic Philosophy, including Epistemology, Physics, Ethics, and Theology, is discussed.

The discussions show a considerable departure from the traditional mode of treating the history of philosophy. In the first place, the book is written in popular style for a general audience, but at the same time it is on a high plane of scholarship. It is strikingly lucid and every page shows that the writer has diligently pursued and investigated the sources with which the subject deals. Illustrative matter is drawn from a wide range of contemporary literature, and the illustrations enliven and illumine these theories of a remote past. Particularly interesting is the way in which the author first states the content of the Stoic doctrine, and then subjects it to criticism from a purely modern standpoint, thus bringing into clear relief its salient features, sometimes by contrasting it with the Epicurean system, again with the Christian religion, or again with ideas drawn from contemporary philosophical literature. This has the effect of giving vitality and distinctness to the notions discussed. Histories of philosophy are generally content to



record theories as facts. Davidson's services in the volume before us consist to a large extent in an evaluation of the facts.

Because the Stoics emphasized the practical side of philosophy, its relation to conduct and human activities, the author has added to his treatment of Stoicism, a supplementary chapter on Pragmatism and Humanism, — a discussion of voluntarism *vs.* intellectualism. The discussion is so good that the reader will be glad to forgive its somewhat doubtful relevancy to the main business of the volume.

WM. A. HAMMOND.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

The following books also have been received :

*God, Man and Human Welfare.* By SPINOZA. Translated into English by L. G. ROBINSON. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1909. — pp. xi, 178. \$1.25.

*Psychotherapy.* By HUGO MÜNSTERBERG. New York, Moffat, Yard and Co., 1909. — pp. xi, 401. \$2.00.

*The Eternal Values.* By HUGO MÜNSTERBERG. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909. — pp. xv, 436. \$2.50.

*Fifty Years of Darwinism.* Centennial addresses in honor of Charles Darwin before the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Baltimore, Jan. 1, 1909. New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1909. — pp. 274. \$2.00.

*Modern Thought and the Crisis in Belief.* By R. M. WENLEY. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1909. — pp. xvii, 364.

*The Revival of Scholastic Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century.* By J. L. PERRIER. New York, The Columbia University Press, 1909. — pp. viii, 344. \$1.75.

*Studies in Mystical Religion.* By RUFUS M. JONES. London and New York, The Macmillan Co., 1909. — pp. xxxviii, 518. \$3.50.

*Is Immortality Desirable?* By G. L. DICKINSON. The Ingersoll Lecture, 1908. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909. — pp. 63. \$0.75.

*Gründe und Abgründe. Präludien zu einer Philosophie des Lebens.* Von OSCAR EWALD. Zwei Bände. Berlin, Ernst Hoffmann & Co., 1909. — pp. xvii, 551 ; v, 331.

*Elemente der Philosophie.* Von A. RAUSCH. Halle a. d. S., Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1909. — pp. xii, 376. M. 4.60.

*Das Problem des Lebens in kritischer Bearbeitung.* Von B. KERN. Berlin, August Hirschwald, 1909. — pp. viii, 592.

*Über die Erkennbarkeit der Gegenstände.* Von H. PICHLER. Wien und Leipzig, Wilhelm Braumüller, 1909. — pp. 105.

- Vom Messias. Kulturphilosophische Essays.* Von R. KRONER, N. v. BUBNOFF, G. MEHLIS, S. HESSEN, F. STEPPUHN. Leipzig, Wilhelm Engelmann, 1909. — pp. v, 77. M. 0.80.
- Les éléments Cartésiens de la doctrine Spinoziste sur les rapports de la pensée et de son objet.* Par A. LÉON. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1907. — pp. 294.
- Le problème de l'éducation.* Par L. DUGAS. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. iii, 344. 5 fr.
- Essai sur la psychologie de la main.* Par N. VASCHIDE. Paris, Marcel Rivière, 1909. — pp. v, 501.
- L'année philosophique.* Par F. PILLON. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. 280. 5 fr.
- Principii di scienza etica.* Per FRANCESCO DE SARLO e GIOVANNI CALÒ. Milano, Remo Sandron. — pp. 316.
- La patologia mentale in rapporto all'etica e al diritto.* Per F. DE SARLO e G. CALÒ. Milano, Remo Sandron. — pp. 194.

## SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.*: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

### LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

*Das Problem der Geschichte.* LUDWIG STEIN. *Ar. f. sys. Ph.*, XIV, 3, pp. 289–317.

From a scientific standpoint, future events may be forecast with either astronomical certainty based on exact computations, or hypothetical certainty based on an interpretation of conditions and a weighing of probabilities. A law of history demands definite, specific results depending on physical causes and logical grounds. Historic prophecy must assume uniformity in the course of history, — whatever has acted in a certain way in the past must repeat itself, under the same conditions, in the future. Since however, it bases itself, not on bare facts, but on symptoms, on an interpretation and evaluation of a complex of facts, like the science of medicine or meteorology, it cannot give other than 'problematic' judgments. But, although the best statesmen have erred, historical prophecy is not scientifically worthless. We should not confine ourselves to that only which has apodictical certainty. Truths may be: (1) Those of mathematics, whose contrary is logically inconceivable; (2) those of science, whose contrary is logically possible, but which all past experience has verified; (3) those of social science, *e. g.*, demography, moral statistics, and social psychology, in which there is individual deviation from the action of the group, yet essential constancy and consistency. In history we can speak only of probability and tendency, for, besides logical necessity and natural law, there is the important factor of human purpose. The fact of uniformity and conformity of actions and activities as shown in demography and statistics is no longer questioned, although there is disagreement regarding its cause. The idealist finds it in the Idea, *i. e.*, nature and history are progressive steps in the development or unfolding of the absolute world-ground; naturalism in

certain interests, either those of self-preservation (Mandeville, Helvetius, Ratzenhofer), or of the preservation of species (Spencer); history is nature carried to a higher plane (Herder), or merely a special aspect or exemplification of the universal natural law (Gumplowicz). But either causality or teleology may be used as a principle to reduce the apparently contingent and accidental in nature to general conceptions or logical necessity. The former, with its quantitative notion of cause and effect, gives us a "mathematics of nature" and finds a universe of absolute lawfulness. The latter, with its causal notion of purpose and means, gives a "logic of history," a world of values and of tendencies rather than laws. The former is concerned with a 'must,' an external compulsion, the latter with a 'should,' an inner stress of motive. The former gives us a definite order in the world of being, a causal series with 100 per cent correct prophecy; the latter a provisional order in the world of human activity, a teleological series which indicates the relatively permanent purposes and values of mankind. Even though each act of will be the result of the strongest motive, each individual is sovereign over that which shall determine for him that strongest motive. So also in the varying characters and temperaments of individuals there is ground for a departure of the individual from the general mode or standard of action. Therefore Buckle, Taine, Breysig, and Lamprecht are not justified in maintaining absolute laws for history. When a natural law is once established, the personality of the individual plays no rôle, whereas this is an all-important factor in the interpretation and evaluation of the facts of history. Here, no less than in art, it requires genius to detect the universal in the particular and to foresee coming events. Its method is intuitive, not discursive, as in natural science. A true statesman must be able to foresee truly the results of political policies and measures. He must base this on an accurate knowledge of the past; statistics, demography, folk psychology, history and sociology are his instruments and criterion. But this will be of little avail without that creative imagination which alone can develop from these the proper policies for the future, — policies which must be determined from a correct interpretation and appreciation of present conditions.

EDW. L. SCHAUB.

*Anti-pragmatisme*, II. *Pragmatisme et Vérité*. A. SCHINZ. Rev. Ph., XXXIII, 10, pp. 390-409.

This article on Anti-pragmatism is an attempt to show the place of pragmatism in the evolution of modern philosophy. It has its roots in scholasticism, which was philosophy taken into the service of the church. Descartes restored the natural method in science and philosophy and tended to undermine the dogmas upon which the social order rested. Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Leibniz, Newton, and even Descartes himself made concessions to religious beliefs. This our author calls negative pragmatism, — a return to the principle of *credo etsi absurdum*. With the work of Descartes

and Comte the divergence between moral and intellectual truth increased and it became necessary to choose or mediate between them. Pascal led the reaction and was the first in modern times to formulate the pragmatic paradox. Since Pascal, a pragmatic reaction has corresponded to every scientific advance. As Pascal followed Descartes, so Rousseau followed the Sensationalists, and Kant followed Hume. Rousseau's philosophy, like that of James, grew out of existing circumstances. The social order of France was threatened with ruin. Rousseau's criterion was: Judge an idea by its social and moral consequences. Through civilization man has lost his native morality, hence the return to nature. The "Profession of Faith of a Savoyard" will remain the profession of pragmatic faith for all time. Leibniz and Wolff did in Germany what Rousseau had done in France. Hume's keen criticisms of Wolff led Kant to take up the problem. After vindicating reason in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he went back to the thesis of pragmatism in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. The oscillations between pragmatism and philosophy have been similar in the nineteenth century. The advance of science has been great; but some like Darwin, Wallace, and James himself, who have done much to further science, have later thrown the weight of their influence against the scientific spirit. In spite of attempts at conciliation, science still menaces old beliefs. Then it is that there are many conversions to Catholicism and even great names become connected with psychic research and occultism. Then also pragmatism steps in and proposes to judge the truth of a principle by its consequences. Pragmatism having played this part in the logic of events, the reason of its success is not far to seek. We agree with Professor James that it is likely to outlast many other systems. If a pragmatic philosophy was needed in England and Germany, it is needed still more in America. The social center of gravity has shifted to the masses, and hence there must be a philosophy for the masses. Our population is being kept up by immigration from some of the least desirable nations of Europe. These people see life as a struggle and value everything in the light of its practical consequences. There is ground for James's assertion that there never were so many people with empiristic tendencies as now. The irreligion and immorality in our society are alarming. There is need for the strengthening of moral and religious authority, but this should not be called philosophy. It might be pleasanter to believe that life and truth go hand in hand, but if this is not the case it is not man's fault, as the pragmatists seem to suppose. As a system of morals for the masses, pragmatism has been useful, and James and his followers have done us a service; but in confusing it with philosophy they have sacrificed truth and compromised pragmatism.

HELEN M. CLARKE.

*La science et le réalisme naïf.* E. MEYERSON. Rev. de Mét., XVI, 6, pp. 845-856.

The term 'positive science,' as usually defined, begs the question by excluding all metaphysics. The purpose of this article is to show that this

is impossible. Science takes as its point of departure the view of naïve realism. Although profoundly modifying this view by resolving objects into phenomena, science still affirms the existence of real objects of some kind, independent of sensation ; it assures us of the permanence of invisible things, constituted after the models formed by naïve realism ; it attributes even greater reality to certain concepts, such as mass and energy, than common sense supposes in its objects, in that the action of time does not affect them. It is only by postulating material objects independent of sensations that science arrives at the concept of quantity. The progress of science is away from common sense, but its modifications are always the substitution of objects for sensations. The point of departure of a science, free from ontological presuppositions, can only be that of pure sensation. A purely qualitative science is possible, but of little value, for the reason that it would afford us no principle of connection by which we could deal with things. The sterility of such a science is shown in the old Aristotelian conception of heat. At no point in its evolution does science abandon the supposition of a real substance external to sensation. On the contrary, it intensifies it. A truly positive science never has existed ; doubtless it never will exist.

JOHN B. KENT.

*Martineau and the Humanists.* LESLIE J. WALKER. *Mind*, No. 67, pp. 305-320.

There is a striking resemblance between the philosophical standpoint of Martineau's ethics and the pragmatic theory of knowledge. Adopting the psychological method, both oppose Absolutism by a return to the human point of view. Martineau's "springs of action," essentially conative tendencies expressive of our human needs and purposes, constitute for the Humanist the forms which we seek to impose on the plasticity of matter. Protesting against the Absolutist identification of our nature with thought, Martineau and the Humanists tend to subordinate thought to volition. As freedom to choose between conflicting springs of action conditions morality, so selective action is fundamental to knowledge. No spring has intrinsic moral value ; its moral worth depends upon the conflicting spring. Truth, for the Humanist, depends on its power to satisfy human needs. But, on such a theory, moral-values and truth-values must be relative, not only to one another but to the Ego that strives to realize its needs. Thus subjectivism is involved and a consequent denial of the objective validity of truth and morality. There are two ways out of the difficulty, a return to Absolutism or a return to Aristotle. Absolutism, however, secures objectivity at the cost of personality and freedom. An Aristotelian philosophy gives to both a full significance, and, while recognizing the determining power of springs of action and human needs in the spheres of morality and truth, assigns its proper place to the object. For the object is a determinant of morality and a determinant of thought. Martineau confuses the dynamic sources of action with the determinants of morality ; the Humanist

confuses the dynamic sources of cognition with the determinants of truth in psychological analysis ; both are at fault in losing sight of the functions of the intellect. The protest against Intellectualism was needed ; but for a permanent philosophical position we need a *via media* which shall give to subject and object alike their due value in knowledge and morality.

EDITH H. MORRILL.

*Some Thoughts on the Concept.* FRANK N. SPINDLER. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., V, 25, pp. 684-689.

The method in teaching what a concept is depends upon one's philosophical and psychological views. Various definitions have been given, none of which are satisfactory. Some have held that the concept is a fixed general idea or image corresponding to the general term ; others, that it is nothing at all, that the general term is all that there is. The concept is, however, a general notion with a name, arising from experience, and is constantly changing. The student should be taught this individualistic nature of the concept by appeals to experience showing that concepts are not the same in different people. This form of instruction may confuse the pupil temporarily, but in the end he will have a real feeling for what the concept is, that it is more than a purely abstract ideal, that it has an active functional side, an adaptability to life.

H. E. WEAVER.

*A New Scientific Argument for Immortality.* H. HEATH BAWDEN. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., V, 20, 533-542.

Along with the relatively late consciousness of individuality comes the consciousness of a deep social relation with one's fellows. In this social relation lies the immortality of the self. I am immortal through the very fact that I have identified myself with the lives of others. Biology throws light on this problem. Birth and death are not facts, but processes, death a pre-condition of life, life a process of death. Birth is the climax and life is a gradual loss of vitality. The only immortality is an immortality of function. I may lose all my somatic cells, yet perpetuate my life and individuality into other modes of being. Death "is merely the negative phase of a rebirth into a higher and different sphere." From the physical side, immortality involves the questions of origin and of conservation. Mere conservation of quantity is impossible ; there must be conservation of form. "A mode of activity once come into being cannot perish." Of course there must be transformation, but that cannot destroy. The redistribution in death may just as conceivably lead to a higher as to a lower level. In fact, man as the most complex organism, the least dependent on any single factor, has the best chance for continued existence. The fact that in death we lose sight of individuality is no reason for denying that the functional activity of the individual is continuing on a different level.

H. E. WEAVER.

*Judgment and Apprehension.* HELEN WODEHOUSE. Mind, No. 67, pp. 359-367.

In support of the thesis that judgment and apprehension are identical, the writer argues, not that the lowest step in knowledge must be classed as a judgment, but that judgment itself is no more than apprehension. To the objection that judgment is apprehension plus belief in the reality of the thing apprehended, it is answered that apprehension without belief is inconceivable; whether the belief concerns one kind of reality or another, the cognitive process is essentially the same. The discrimination of the different kinds of reality, a process which may have a claim to the special name of judgment, seems to the writer, however, similar to other kinds of discrimination, and hence identical with apprehension. The author then proceeds to a detailed analysis and refutation of Dr. Stout's arguments for the division of judgment and apprehension. The advantage of giving up the traditional division is that so many traditional logical difficulties disappear with it.

EDITH H. MORRILL.

*Les principes de la raison sont-ils réductibles à l'unité ?* F. CHOVET. Rev. de Ph., VIII, 9, pp. 269-274.

A. M. Bouyssonie declares that the laws of reason are not reducible to a unity. Moreover, the law of identity presupposes that the mind simultaneously observes unity and diversity in a given thing. The only explanation for this must be in the law of sufficient reason. The writer claims that this law of sufficient reason is a mere derivation from the laws of identity and contradiction. The law of contradiction becomes void only when we suppose the mind able to take two different points of view simultaneously. The law of identity fully accounts for the appearance of many in one. It includes the law of causality, not, however, in the sense that the cause equals the effect, but in that there is in the cause at least all of the effect. This is why the meaning of the little word 'is' comprehends all things in its very conception. It is the logic of the statement, 'I am that I am.'

HARVEY TOWNSEND.

*The Unreality of Time.* J. ELLIS MCTAGGART. Mind, No. 68, pp. 457-474.

Positions in time are distinguished either as earlier and later (the B series) or as past, present, and future (the A series). Although the former is more permanent, the latter is more fundamental. Upon this fact the author bases his arguments for the unreality of time. Are both these series alike essential for time? The essential nature of time is change. In a B series alone there could be no change, since by hypothesis the position of any event in it is permanent. The only characteristic of an event that can change without affecting the real nature of the event is its presentness, pastness, or



futurity. Therefore the A series must be essential to time, since without it there can be no change. Furthermore, the B series is by nature temporal, and since the A series has been proved essential to time, there can be no B series where there is no A. The B series, then, is not ultimate. The A series, when combined with another ultimate series (C) of permanent timeless relations of terms, forms the two series we meet in experience. The author then considers two objections to his position. It is said the adventures of Don Quixote, for instance, form a B series but not an A. However, the adventures do not really exist, and in so far as they do exist, they are in the A series. The second objection is based on the possibility of a number of independently real time-series, each with its A and B series. Then there would be a number of presents with no time relation at all, an impossibility which would seem to prove that different time-series could exist without the distinction of past, present, and future. This is not a valid objection, since each A series would be as real as its own time-series. Now, the terms of A series must be either relations or qualities of events. If we consider the terms as relations, we are either involved in the contradiction that they are incompatible and yet united in the same object, or else we argue in a circle or an infinite series, since we assume time in order to explain time. The same argument holds good if the terms are regarded as qualities. Another disproof of the reality of the A series is the consideration of the origin of that idea. Direct perception is different from memory or anticipation, and hence we attribute to it presentness. This idea of presentness, involves us in contradictions unless we consider it a mere point, a view that has no basis in experience. The final results of the discussion show that neither time nor the A or B series are real. The C series may be. That, together with the questions to which it gives rise, must be problems for future discussion.

H. E. WEAVER.

*A New Type of Naturalism.*—*Montgomery.* WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER. Int. J. E., XIX, 1, pp. 90-107.

The writer's purpose is to outline Dr. Montgomery's philosophical view as expressed in several articles and books, especially in his latest book, *Philosophical Problems in the Light of Vital Organization*. Dr. Montgomery's intellectual standpoint differs both from classical idealism and ordinary realism; nor is he in harmony with prevailing views in physical science. His experience as a physician and lecturer on physiology led him to the view that living substance is a unity, not an aggregate; its characteristic phenomena are not mechanically explicable. Life is the functional play of the organism with the surrounding medium at their surface of contact. All that we call material is idealistic in nature; but Montgomery, too clear-sighted to suppose that conscious experience is self-contained or self-explicable, was led to assert an extra-conscious reality, both without and within man. Parting company equally with empiricism and current

idealism, he bases his view on an original interpretation of biological facts. In the first place, the movement of the world comes from inner springs; causes are coöperating conditions. Secondly, the unity of the living organism remains fundamental to all development of thought and feeling and organic structure. This conception becomes also the basis for the moral autonomy of the conscious person, for the action of the organism is the action of a whole, not a resultant of independent and possibly conflicting forces. In this connection the doctrine of substance is rehabilitated, not material or mental substance, but the identity of the living organism. It is dynamic, — an ever freshly created identity. Its nature can only be in hidden depths of our being, that are more constant and continuous than either our material or our spiritual side. Montgomery is not altogether clear as to the ultimate elements in the creative process. There is something, he thinks, more elemental and originative than thought and morality in the world. He repudiates theism, pantheism, and Spencer's unknowable; yet the meaning of the 'creative stress' remains a mystery. But Montgomery holds that the order of the cosmos, in its development of organic beings, is teleological. Man is the last product; through him can be done what cannot be done through unconscious things. Hence ethics. It has an objective and naturalistic foundation. Our conscious intentions and volitions afford the occasion for what is done. This practical response, the human obeying what is more than human, constitutes both morality and religion.

EDITH H. MORRILL.

#### PSYCHOLOGY.

*Über die experimentelle Untersuchung der Denkvorgänge.* E. DÜRR.  
Z. f. Psych., XLIX, 5, pp. 313-340.

The writer discusses the work of Bühler, for whom he acted as observer. So much work has been done, in late years, in the experimental investigation of thought processes, that the question no longer concerns its possibility but the proper method. From the very first, the method was used of directing questions to the observer, who was required to report his experiences when he directed his thoughts along the line thus suggested. The various records were considered a basis for determining the nature of thought. But there is the difficulty that an observer would know the 'what' rather than the 'how.' Therefore the subjects selected for thought were the simplest possible, since it was thought more difficult to obtain a grasp of the psychical processes involved in the more complex ones. Bühler pointed out that abstract thought, with its dearth of content, presents little psychical material for the attention of the observer. He therefore chose subjects neither too easy nor too familiar, yet interesting. He also allowed absolute freedom of expression, instead of an adherence to stereotyped psychological terms. His conclusion was that thought is characterized by a certain clearness, vividness, and degree of positiveness

with which it binds the attention, yet is entirely different from sensation, and has neither quality nor intensity. Nor is it an image of any kind, nor any construction from images by the imagination, nor the representation of an image not actually present yet capable of being called out. Thought is *sui generis*; it is unitary, having no separate independent parts and yet it has attributes or phases, which one might abstract, of which he emphasizes especially "Intention" and "Wasbestimmung." Dürr contends that, if this be the case, one of these might vary while the other remained constant. But, if "Intention" varies, we evidently have not the same "Wasbestimmtheit." To say that one might describe an equilateral triangle either as a figure with three equal sides or with three equal angles, and thus have the same "Intention" with varied "Wasbestimmtheit" is confusing the metaphysical and psychological standpoints. Therefore these are not attributes of thought but separable elements. In pure, imageless thought there is only "Intention" and never "Wasbestimmtheit." We must also reject Bühler's conclusion that 'thought-type' is an abstraction or mere attribute of thought; likewise the consciousness that a particular thought comes under some law (*Regelbewusstsein*); also the consciousness of relation (*Beziehungsbewusstsein*). No doubt these are all to be found and we think by means of conceptions, judgments, and conclusions; yet the psychologist's problem is to determine the character of thought, not in reference to its content, but to its particular nature or essence. The analysis of Bühler logically results in separate thoughts instead of attributes or abstract phases of thought. A more fruitful method would be a comparison of the thought processes with other psychical experiences. The peculiar nature of abstract thought seems similar to the relational elements (*Beziehungsbewusstsein*) such as we have in our consciousness of time, space, similarity, identity, etc. With special reference to this, the questions asked the observer should be selected, and he should be asked to observe carefully the presence of such elements. The question method, as a whole, is defended and the arguments directed against it by Wundt discussed in some detail. The latter advocates an investigation of thought processes by a study of language and philology, combined with pure introspection. But why go back to the expression of thought as crystalized in a language, when one can study directly the process of thought itself?

EDW. L. SCHAUB.

*The Nervous Correlate of Attention: II.* MAX MEYER. Psych. Rev., XVI, 1, pp. 36-47.

Automatic action is an habitual activity accompanied by little or no consciousness. Neurology shows it to be like instinctive action in that it is independent of the higher nerve centres. This fact appears to contradict our theory of habit formation, which asserts that habits are formed from instincts by the connection of sensory with motor centres through higher neurons. Automatic action may be explained by the hypothesis of the for-

mation of a short circuit by a tension aroused between two neighboring points of the path, thus resulting in the development of a new connecting neuron. The shortening of the path would make the action quicker and more direct. It would also be accompanied by less intense consciousness. The intensity of the nervous process is the correlate of both the intensity and vividness of sensation. It depends upon the following conditions: (*a*) intensity of stimulus; (*b*) resistance of the neural path; (*c*) presence of other weaker nervous processes; (*d*) deflecting processes; and (*e*) directness of the path. Psychologists speak of intensity of sensation in so far only as the degree of consciousness is determined by (*a*), while vividness is dependent on any one of the five conditions. The only justification for distinguishing the intensity and vividness of mental states is to be found in accessory conditions. Attention, thought of as a faculty, unifies the mental states. The correlate of attention is the law that a stronger nervous current attracts a weaker if the nervous connections and their resistances make this possible. According to this law two independent conscious processes are impossible. From the point of view of our theory, attention may have many levels or but two; the exact number has no scientific significance. This theory accounts for the disappearance of feeling when attended to; attention is correlated with quantity of flux, feeling with change of quantity of flux.

J. B. KENT.

*Les problèmes actuels de l'instinct.* H. PIÉRON. Rev. Ph., XXXIII, 10, pp. 329-369.

The term 'instinct' has usually been used to denote a tendency to certain acts in living beings, but the usage of the word is not constant. The actions of living beings may be attributed to instinct, to reflexes, or to the action of physico-chemical laws. The main contention has been over two questions, — the intervention of the nervous system and the intervention of mentality. In spite of the variety of opinions there is practical agreement that an instinct is an act useful to the organism, but performed without knowledge of ends or of the relation of means to ends. A reflex is partial, rigid, and limited by response to specific stimuli. Instinct is changeable, plastic, coördinated, and adaptable. But experiment shows that reflexes can be complex and coördinated, and that instincts do not always show adaptation, so that the distinction between them almost disappears. Instinct is not something fixed and unchangeable for all time; it passes through all degrees of transition from mere reflex to instinct proper. Science no longer holds to the dogma of immutability of instinct any more than of species. Different species of the same genus often give us all the transitions between crude and perfect instinct. This evolution has been explained by the same two theories as that of species, — the Darwinian and the Lamarckian, selection of fortuitous variations and the transmission of acquired characteristics. One theory seems to fit the facts about as well as the other,

and both causes may have been operative. One instinct may, by adaptation or mutation, change into another, or even disappear entirely before intelligence. Instincts, like species, show both development and reversion. Some have tried to interpret all change in instinct to be observed at the present time as atavism or return of past forms. This is wrong. Development of the new goes on now as it did in the past, and we are not justified in calling all past change development and all present change reversion.

HELEN M. CLARKE.

#### ETHICS.

*La formation de l'idéal.* MAURICE MILHOUD. Rev. Ph., XXXIII, 8, pp. 138-159.

A personal morality can be evolved by an analysis of essential elements, its material and end. Its material is our mentality. Its end is to be found, not in nature, but in the general law of psychical life and the goal of individual morality, which is the organization of personality. The formation of an ideal is one of the modes of organizing personality. As an example of an ideal, Heracles embodies both rudeness and grandeur. In him many different traits, concrete enough to hold and fix the imagination, unite, take form, and become the idol of a group of followers. All the cases considered show three characteristics: (1) The elaboration of an image; (2) the externalization of that image; (3) the effect which it produces on the individual. In the cases of Heracles and St. Francis, the image is concrete, external to its subjects, and an object of devotion which exercises a dominating influence. The ideal is seldom free, but confused and not separated from the individual. The great artist incarnates his ideal in his work, but the ideal is not separated from the work. He does not reproduce an image presented to his mind, so much as discover it in his work. The work of metaphysics is a search for unity, since the metaphysician produces an image of the universe. The foregoing description shows the characteristics common to both the collective and individual ideal. There are also some differences. The collective ideal is more external, more impelling, and more independent of its votaries. The individual ideal is not emancipated from the person in which it takes form. It may take form in some production and exert an influence on the person in return, and it sometimes becomes a strange impelling force, but these are exceptional cases with individual ideals. When once formed, the natural tendency of an ideal is to lead to an image, formula, or symbol, which frees itself and radiates its influence over individuals. The formation of an ideal is thus a process of evolution comprised between the two extremes: an actual emotion and the externalizing of an image. The externalizing of an ideal is similar to the problem of perception. Unsatisfied tendencies become conscious and take the form of an idea. That idea becomes objectified because it acts upon us. Plato's ideal of beauty is an object acting from without. It is verified by the same

argument as the existence of an object, except that it is more distant. The ideal acts upon the individual by recalling tendencies of exceptional intensity, some of which are very tenacious. It serves as a regulating force in moral life. As the ideal becomes organized, the play of emotions is not so marked, but consciousness does not thereby lose in depth or volume. Its force becomes less apparent, but more efficient.

J. B. KENT.

*The Modern Conception of Justice.* F. MELIAN STAWELL. Int. J. E., XIX, 1, pp. 44-60.

There are two conceptions involved in the idea of justice: the justice of retribution and the justice of distribution. The second may best be attacked after an attempt to handle the first. The old view that punishment should be exactly apportioned to deserts gives way before the conception of punishment as remedial, based on the belief that man is free to govern his own actions. Experience destroys the belief that consequences must always recoil on the head of the doer, and leads to the idea of vicarious suffering. The recognition of the fact that the innocent do suffer for the guilty has a more salutary effect than any notion of legal justice. Hence two new ideas arise: That suffering by the innocent is not unjust, when willingly borne, and necessary; and that the reward the good man seeks is not merely personal, but the good of many. Instead of desert appear the ideas of love and redemption; punishment and reward in the old sense remain only as possibly serviceable tools. Thus there emerges the vision of Kant's Kingdom of Ends, in which everyone attains proper good and no one is a means. The practical working out of this ideal depends largely on whether we follow it up by the conviction of immortality. For in the progress of attaining the good life, some individuals must be sacrificed. It may be claimed that the man who willingly sacrifices himself for the sake of others realizes, at the same time, his own highest good. But the man from whom unwilling sacrifice is exacted is, contrary to our modern conception of justice, treated as a means. None of the reasons given for the present distrust of the belief in immortality is sufficiently well presented to weigh against the necessity of postulating a future life in order to justify the exaction of unwilling sacrifice.

EDITH H. MORRILL.

*Ethical Value.* JAMES H. TUFTS. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., V, 19, pp. 517-522.

Ethical value is the value belonging to objects in the ethical consciousness; its object is conduct. It is rational and social value, and has intellectual, as well as affective and instinctive, elements. An examination of its volitional side discloses four aspects: (1) The ethical consciousness is a choosing consciousness, implying at least a formal person as active in the process. (2) It chooses with reference to a system of ends, a single stand-

ard, differing in this respect from economic value, which has no single comprehensive end. (3) It is further specified by a characterization of the *kinds* of choice, as 'higher' and 'lower,' social and unsocial. (4) Such a consciousness is one in which values are 'objective,' that is, imply a social and rational moral order. In regard to the emotional quality in ethical value, three attitudes are indicated: (1) The hedonist calls it mere affective tone. (2) The moral sentiment school insists on the emotional 'tang'—sympathy, resentment, reverence, the 'feeling of ought,' etc. (3) A third view ignores the emotional element, as unessential. The author regards both moral sentiments and emotional color as essential to moral value; but the ethical must get its quality as a relation between the psychological and the biological or sociological, and this cannot be experienced in purely emotional terms. Genetically, ethical value develops along four lines: (1) From the needs of the life-process, through rationalizing and socializing of the objects, and of the self. (2) From group or class valuation, reinforced frequently by emotional reaction. (3) The conceptions of 'honor' and 'Kalokagathia' combine the group basis with the emotional and utilitarian. (4) The individual emotional and instinctive aversion to certain acts is another factor, which has been specially emphasized by Shaftesbury.

R. A. TSANOFF.

*Du rôle des idées dans l'évolution des sociétés.* S. JANKELEVITCH. Rev. Ph., XXXIII, 9, pp. 256-280.

Civilization has two factors,—the material and the ideal. Writers differ as to their relative importance. The object of this paper is to show the importance of the ideal. The sociologist who studies primitive man works in the dark and is in danger of putting too much of the subjective into his interpretations. Civilized nations leave records which show how they themselves conceived of the events of their history, and this enables the historian to abstract from his own personality. Primitive are distinguished from civilized peoples by an almost passive obedience to organic reflexes and instincts. Primitive man has one aim,—personal survival; he reflects little, reasons and criticises less, and cannot foresee the effects of his acts. For some schools civilization depends upon the perfection of such physical conditions as climate, water supply, and shape of coast line. Civilization really springs from man's efforts applied to these physical conditions. It begins when man ceases to react passively to nature and starts to reflect. Primitive life is as invariable as organic reflexes; civilized life is in perpetual change. Civilization is a constant effort by which humanity tends to pass the purely organic stage of life and affirm its autonomy in regard to the world. It is a social fact and shows itself in collective life. Ideas and sentiments determine its general form; institutions are only means by which ideas express themselves. Those who try to discover the general laws of historical evolution based on observation of facts recoil

before the difficulty. The facts seem to be a chaotic collection. The same fact reappears from different causes, and reforms often lead to results just opposed to those intended. The consequences of human acts cannot be predicted with the exactness of astronomical phenomena. Yet we must not conclude that there is no order in historical events. In order that a hypothesis may be satisfactory, it is not enough for it merely to embrace all the facts. Among all the hypotheses fulfilling that condition, one gives the preference usually to that which accords best with the spirit of the time. Materialism, spiritualism, idealism, not only accord with facts at different times, but express the needs and aspirations of different epochs. If we are to study the general tendencies of civilization, we must consider societies having historical life long enough to show gradual changes. Ancient civilization is to be studied in its influence on ours, and ours as an outgrowth of it. But this reduces historical evolution to that of a certain number of ideas and principles. The evolution of a principle consists in the extension by which it becomes applicable to an increasing number of cases. This is true only in the abstract. If external conditions always went parallel with ideas, the idea would realize itself immediately according to a logical plan. But institutions resist change. What distinguishes one social group from another is not so much the way in which it realizes eternal principles, as the degree to which it realizes them. Even in civilized society there are many savages. The masses play a passive part,—their power is inertia. Progress is assured by the great personalities working for the continuity of evolution along ideal lines.

HELEN M. CLARKE.



## NOTES.

Professor H. H. Horne, of the department of Philosophy of Dartmouth College, has been called to a chair of the History of Education in the University of New York.

Mr. Asa Gifford, instructor at Bryn Mawr College, has been called as Acting Professor of Philosophy to the University of Vermont.

Dr. W. K. Wright, of the University of Chicago, has been appointed Instructor in Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals :

MIND, No. 70 : *F. C. S. Schiller*, Solipsism ; *J. B. Baillie*, Professor Laurie's Natural Realism, II ; *T. Loveday*, On Certain Objections to Psychology ; *R. A. C. Macmillan*, Reflective Judgment ; Discussions ; Critical Notices ; New Books ; Philosophical Periodicals ; Notes.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XIX, 3 : *Norman Wilde*, The Meaning of Evolution in Ethics ; *D. H. MacGregor*, Some Aspects of Industrialism ; *R. C. Brooks*, Attempted Apologies for Political Corruption ; *Frank Granger*, The Meaning of Experience for Science and Religion ; *E. B. Bax*, A Socialist's Interpretation of Ethical Evolution ; *W. R. Hughes*, An Experiment in Social and Religious Education ; Book Reviews.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XX, 2 : *T. Nakashima*, Contributions to the Affective Processes ; *F. Kuhlmann*, On the Analysis of Auditory Memory Processes ; *C. W. Waddle*, Miracles of Healing ; *M. W. Calkins*, The Abandonment of Sensationalism in Psychology ; *M. Bentley*, *E. B. Titchener*, and *G. M. Whipple*, Some New Apparatus ; *M. McMein* and *M. F. Washburn*, Minor Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of Vassar College ; Psychological Literature ; Notes.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XVI, 3 : *A. T. Hadley*, The Influence of Charles Darwin upon Historical and Political Thought ; *J. R. Angell*, The Influence of Darwin on Psychology ; *J. E. Creighton*, Darwin and Logic ; *C. A. Ellwood*, The Influence of Darwin on Sociology ; *J. H. Tufts*, Darwin and Evolutionary Ethics ; *J. M. Baldwin*, The Influence of Darwin on Theory of Knowledge and Philosophy.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, VI, 4 : *L. Witmer*, The Study and Treatment of Retardation ; *E. J. Swift*, Juvenile Delinquency and Juvenile Control ; *E. Jones*, An Attempt to Define the Terms Used in Connection with Right-handedness ; Psychological Literature ; Discussion ; Books Received ; Notes and News.

THE MONIST, XIX, 2: *R. von Garbe*, Akbar, Emperor of India; *J. L. Heiberg*, A Newly Discovered Treatise of Archimedes; *D. E. Smith*, A Commentary on the Heiberg Manuscript of Archimedes; *H. Poincaré*, The Choice of Facts; *C. H. Cornill*, Music in the Old Testament; *Percy Hughes*, Some Current Beliefs in the Light of Heracleitus's Doctrine; *A. Thomsen*, David Hume's Natural History of Religion; *F. C. Russell*, A Modern Zeno; Criticisms and Discussions; Book Reviews and Notes.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, VI, 9: *E. B. McGilvary*, Experience and its Inner Duplicity; *W. P. Montague*, The True, the Good, and the Beautiful, from a Pragmatic Standpoint; *E. L. Thorndyke*, A Note on the Specialization of Mental Functions with Varying Content; Discussion; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE, XXXII, 4: *R. Müller-Freienfels*, Die Bedeutung des Ästhetischen für die Ethik; *K. Mittenzwey*, Die III. internationale Philosophenkongress; *Paul Barth*, Die Geschichte der Erziehung in soziologischer Beleuchtung; Besprechungen; Philosophische und soziologische Zeitschriften; Bibliographie.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, LI, 1 u. 2: *G. Heymans u. E. Wiersma*, Beiträge zur speziellen Psychologie auf Grund einer Massenuntersuchung; *V. Benussi*, Über "Aufmerksamkeitsrichtung" beim Raum- und Zeitvergleich; *Karl Bühler*, Zur Kritik der Denkeperimente; Literaturbericht.

LI, 3 u. 4: *H. Haenel*, Die Gestalt des Himmels und Vergrößerung der Gestirne am Horizonte; *R. F. Pozdëna*, Eine Methode zur experimentellen und konstruktiven Bestimmung der Form des Firmamentes; *K. Groos*, Untersuchungen über den Aufbau der Systeme; *Ph. Kohnstamm*, Parallelismus und Wechselwirkung vom Standpunkte der mathematischen Physik; Besprechung; Literaturbericht.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XXXIV, 5: *J. M. Baldwin*, La mémoire affective et l'art; *A. Rey*, Vers le positivisme absolu; *Ch. Lalo*, Beauté naturelle et beauté artificielle; Observations et Discussions; Analyses et comptes rendus.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE, IX, 4: *A. Farges*, L'union du sujet et de l'objet dans la perception des sens externes; *A. Briot*, Les origines de la vie au point de vue scientifique; *G. Dumesnil*, C. C. Charaux; *P. Duhem*, La mouvement absolu et le mouvement relatif; Analyses et comptes rendus; Periodiques; L'enseignement philosophique.

IX, 5: *P. Duhem*, Le mouvement absolu et le mouvement relatif; *M. Gossard*, De la réalité divine à la formule humaine; *A. Farges*, L'union du sujet et de l'objet dans la perception des sens externes; *M. Baelen*, Le mécanisme moniste de Taine; Analyses et comptes rendus; Periodiques; L'enseignement philosophique.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XVII, 2 : *J. Tannery*, Pour la science livresque ; *M. Calderoni*, Formes et critères de responsabilité ; *L. Weber*, La morale d'Épictète et les besoins présents de l'enseignement moral ; *A. Reymond*, Note sur le théorème d'existence des nombres entiers et sur la définition logistique du zéro ; Études critiques ; Questions pratiques.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA, I, 1 : *R. Ardigo*, Infinito e indefinito ; *M. Losacco*, Di un' opinione sull' origine della filosofia naturale ; *P. R. Trojano*, Ateologia, teleologia umanismo nell'etica aristotelica ; *A. Falchi*, A proposito di un libro sulle dottrine teocratiche ; *B. Varisco*, Tra Kant e Rosmini ; *G. Marchesini*, Il concetto empirico e ideale di "Educazione" ; *R. Ardigo*, Altre liriche del "Buch der Lieder" di E. Heine ; *B. Brugi*, Natura e diritto ; Questioni varie ; Per l'anima della scuola ; Autorelazioni, analisi e cenni.



THE  
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

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THE OBSOLESCENCE OF THE ETERNAL.<sup>1</sup>

NO contingent aspect of reality, doubtless, is likely to seem less deserving of recognition from philosophers than an anniversary. The habit of contemplating the universe under its eternal aspect is scarcely compatible with much respect for the accidents of the Gregorian calendar. Yet, since this discourse is chiefly to argue for the practice of viewing things *sub specie temporis*, some deference to chronological considerations may for the nonce appear not altogether incongruous. Our association, at all events, actuated by human and by pedagogic, if not by philosophic, motives has chosen to devote a large part of the present meeting to commemorating an anniversary and to taking an account of half a century's progress. The association assembles to-day for the first time in the city in which Kant, Fichte, and Hegel were first fully naturalized in America; in which began the movement to which the revivification of philosophical study and teaching in our colleges and universities must in great measure be traced back; in which was published, I suppose, the first American magazine devoted to technical philosophy; where were associated for a time a remarkable group of men, of high gifts and high enthusiasms, who later came to be, in widely scattered places and in very diverse ways, the influential missionaries of views of life and ideals of culture that were all based in common upon an idealistic metaphysics. St. Louis, perhaps, more than Boston or Concord, is the native home of speculative philosophy, in the strict sense, in America; and the history of the movement that began here exhibits a decided tendency of what are called

<sup>1</sup> Address of the President at the Ninth Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, St. Louis, April 9, 1909; printed with some revision and abridgment.

'abstract speculative ideas' to influence life and affairs, to contribute to the moulding of a civilization. The transition from the ideas to their application was often, I cannot but think, an alogical, if not an illogical, one; but it was, at all events, actual:—in one way or another, the abstruse conceptions of the Kantian epistemology and the Hegelian dialectic bore fruit upon American soil and gave evidence of 'pragmatic' vitality. It would be most unfitting that this organization of teachers and students of philosophy should convene in St. Louis without recalling all this, and without commemorating the services of two men,—Henry C. Brockmeyer and William T. Harris,—to whom, first and foremost, the movement owed its beginning, a little more than fifty years ago.

Reminiscence, however, is not the chief use of anniversaries; their more important office is to remind us how far we have come, and to make us examine with a fuller historical self-consciousness whither we are tending. In reflecting with such purposes upon the past half-century's development of neo-Kantian and Hegelian idealism in America, it is impossible to forget that all the world is this year celebrating a still greater anniversary, and engaged in similar reflections upon the present outcome of another notable movement of thought, covering the same half-century. There is, it is true, an illusion of perspective involved in much that is said and written *à propos* of the semi-centenary of the *Origin of Species*. The theory of organic evolution, even as a substantially demonstrated doctrine, is much more than fifty years old; and the evolutionary way of thinking about natural phenomena was no discovery of the biologists. The doctrine of the mutability of species is only one application of a general presupposition in scientific method, and in the conception of the temporal order, which has a range far wider than the natural history sciences. The biologists were, in fact, curiously late in utilizing the notion; it had established itself in geology a good deal earlier, in astronomy and cosmical physics earlier still. It was, perhaps, as Professor Wenley has lately been reminding the non-philosophical public,<sup>1</sup> German philosophical or semi-philosophical writers of 1780—

<sup>1</sup> *Popular Science Monthly*, April, 1909.

1800, and the succession of post-Kantian idealists culminating with Hegel, who did most to elaborate and to diffuse a general evolutionist way of thinking, especially with relation to man and human society. But though this is true, the fact remains that our contemporaries are just now much occupied with discussions about the history, the meaning, and the value, not simply of the hypothesis of natural selection, but of the idea of evolution.

It has seemed worth while to let the conjunction of these two anniversaries dictate the theme of the present discourse. For the evolutionist conception of the world, — usually incongruously joined with a mechanistic conception, — and post-Kantian idealism not only have been the two greatest intellectual forces playing upon the mind of the past fifty years; they also are forces which, in spite of a superficial harmony, are bound to come into final opposition, — an opposition which may be capable of, but which at least assuredly calls for, rational adjustment. For the evolutionist in natural science, in the social sciences, in ethics, is concerned with the temporal genesis and growth of things, with a process of Becoming by which items of reality emerge into existence and the total content of reality is modified or augmented. But the philosophy of both Kant and Hegel implies that the temporal aspect of things is a superficial and in some sense unreal one, that even moral and intellectual progress belong to the world of appearance rather than that of genuine reality, and that, in spite of the utility of genetic or evolutionary ways of thinking in the abstract realms of the special sciences, they have no pertinency to the ultimate problems, which must be solved by the use of conceptions of quite another type. Hegel's language, for example, — in the words of one of the most authoritative of his English commentators, — “is clearly incompatible with the theory that the dialectic is gradually evolved in time. It is true that, in the *Philosophy of Religion*, the *Philosophy of History*, and the *History of Philosophy*, he explains various successions of events in time as manifestations of the dialectic. But this proves nothing as to the fundamental nature of the connection of time with the universe. The dialectic is the key to all reality, and, therefore, when we do view

reality under the aspect of time, the different categories will appear as manifesting themselves as a process in time. But this has no bearing on the question whether they first came into being in time, or have a timeless and eternally complete existence."<sup>1</sup> And to such a question most of the thinkers of the neo-Kantian and Hegelian succession have returned the same answer,—they have adopted the conclusion at which Mr. McTaggart arrives, "that there is something which renders our conception of time unfit, in metaphysics, for the ultimate explanation of the universe, however suited it may be to the finite thought of everyday life." Against the evolutional, in short, neo-Kantian idealist metaphysics has usually set the eternal; and it has declared that, although doubtless in some manner both evolution and eternity subsist, the latter is the overriding, ultimate, and truly explanatory notion. Though the masters of idealistic philosophy in the nineteenth century were great promoters of evolutional ways of thinking, evolution was never the last word with them; and it is a question deserving of consideration whether the sort of evolutionism that they professed could be superimposed upon their more fundamental eternalism without inconsistency.

It is chiefly with this question that the present inquiry is to be concerned. We are to seek to determine whether a belief in the eternal character of 'ultimate' reality, or of any reality at all, is reconcilable with a belief in the actuality of evolution, in the most general sense. Before proceeding to the inquiry, some definitions ought to be given. By evolution, as used here, I mean a process of real temporal Becoming; and by real Becoming I desire to imply not only change, but also the emergence into existence, at diverse moments, of new items of reality which did not previously exist and which, therefore, by their appearance bring an actual augmentation of the total content of the universe. And by eternity, of course, I mean neither everlastingness nor mere permanence through time, but timeless existence,—being that is without change in itself or in any of its relations, and therefore without date,—entity to which the lapse of time cannot lend

<sup>1</sup> McTaggart, *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, 1896, p. 170.



even an increment of age. In a preliminary stage of the argument, I shall have something to say about a sort of temporal shadow or terrestrial counterpart of eternity, namely, the quantitative and qualitative constancy of the universe, which physical science has been supposed to affirm; we shall find it worth while to inquire whether even this be compatible with the ascription of any sort of reality to evolution. But our main business will be with the strictly supra-temporal realities of the eternalistic idealists. These philosophers have, in the nineteenth century, usually not intended to fall back into the Oriental doctrine of illusion, by boldly consigning all Becoming to the realm of simple nonentity; they have, as has been intimated, rather wished to supplement Becoming by one or many eternals, or to include time in eternity. They have, as a rule, supposed it possible to find some, though not a coördinate, place in one universe for each of these modes of being, and even to derive from the alleged existence of the one inferences bearing upon the other, — to find in the consideration of the timeless either theoretical explanations or practical guidance, consolation, or incitement, relevant to the life in time. It is the truth of this supposition that I wish on this occasion to examine. It will be contributory to the purpose to begin with a rough genetic natural history of the conceptions of immutability and eternity.

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Our business in this inquiry, however, is not with the epistemological question about the meaning and the supposed 'eternity' of truth as truth. That issue I hope I may, for the present occasion, be permitted to avoid. Our problem is not that of determining whether 'truth' is a concept which includes eternalness as a part of its connotation. We are only to consider whether real evolution and real eternity can be congruous in the realm of concrete existences. The 'eternity of truth' (if truth be anything *but* the concrete existence of specific entities) would not, of itself, settle the question of the possibility of conceiving any concrete existence, — a state of consciousness, for example, — as eternal.

<sup>1</sup> Several pages of the MS. of the address as delivered have been here omitted through necessary limitations of space.

For, as we have seen, the eternity of the trueness of a proposition nowise implies the eternity of the objects that the proposition is about ; nor does it directly imply the eternity of the mind that affirms the proposition as true. Our concern, moreover, is not even with the criticism of the idealistic inference from eternal truths to an eternal mind or noumenal Ego. It is, however, with one of the results of that inference ; and our hasty sketch of the natural history of ancient and modern, — of realistic and idealistic, — Platonism, has therefore been of use, in that it now enables us to grasp more understandingly the second of our two problems. When, namely, you give up the mere abstraction of eternal truths, and begin to speak of an eternal consciousness which possesses those truths, you are obliged in two ways to define the relation of that consciousness to temporal existences. The eternal consciousness, namely, must, among other things, be *about* temporal, changing, and imperfect objects ; and it must also, according to the view of all modern idealists, include or ground or generate other consciousnesses that are not eternal but successive. And our second main problem arises just at this point. The direct argument for the existence of this idealistic eternal we shall not challenge ; we shall only inquire whether that eternal can conceivably be correlated in any logically consistent or practically pertinent way with the empirically undeniable existence of the temporal and the evolving.

Our two problems are now adequately defined. We may proceed to take them up in turn. The discussion of them will be not quite so voluminous as the length of the preamble might make it natural to fear.

#### I. THE CONSTANT OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE.

It was the great initiator in whose hands the problems of philosophy took on their typical modern form who first joined the conception of the quantitative and qualitative constancy of the material universe with the conception of that universe as the scene of a progressive evolution. In his suppressed *Traité du Monde*, written about 1632, Descartes, as he tells us in the Fifth Part of the *Discours*, undertook to show how, even though one sup-

posed the world to have once been "a chaos more confused than ever poet feigned," there must gradually have developed out of this chaos, as the simple consequence of the redistribution, through a fixed quantum of matter, of a fixed quantum of motion in accordance with fixed laws, a world in which all "things purely material would in course of time have become such as we observe them at present." From the nature of matter and the principles of mechanics, the necessary evolution of planetary systems, of "mountains, seas, fountains and rivers, the metals produced in the mines, the plants that grow in the fields," and the bodies of animals and men, was to be deduced. The same enterprise has been many times repeated since. Spencer's system is the best-known latter-day manifestation of it. That 'evolution' follows as a natural implication from the mechanistic conception of the physical world, seems to be assumed by many as an obvious common-place. But it is not difficult to show that in reality the notion of evolution and the notion of a closed mechanical system are inherently incompatible; that where there is evolution, there can be no quantitative constancy of the universe, and that where there is quantitative constancy there can be no evolution. This would, indeed, be so nearly self-evident as scarcely to need argument, were it not that many minds have forgotten the meaning of the verb 'to be.' The device of Democritus, renewed and modified by Descartes, whereby, in the interest of the quantitative constancy of the material universe, all qualitative change and diversity are taken away from it, is apparently supposed to have either abolished secondary qualities out of existence altogether, or at any rate, to have made it legitimate to treat the physical correlate of a given quality as if it actually *were* that quality. A wave-motion of a given length in the inherently colorless ether, — or, perhaps, that motion *plus* a vibration of particles which it ultimately sets up in the cortex, — is oddly imagined to *be* that wholly different, qualitative thing, the color red, as presented in sensation; the energy-equivalent of a toothache is identified with toothache as such, though what I have before my mind when I am thinking of the one entirely excludes the predicates which I have before my mind when I am thinking of the other.

The error is, of course, due to the fact that where you have an invariable correlation between a given measure of motion in a part of a qualitatively and quantitatively constant material system on the one hand, and a given kind of quality in sensation, on the other hand, you are, for purposes of the practical manipulation of things, concerned only with the former. The physical correlate is a perfectly adequate substitute for the quality in experience with which it *is* correlated, so long as the production of the one may be confidently expected to be accompanied by the experience of the other. But there are, after all, two items of reality to be counted here, and not one. For, — as all might have learned from another part of the philosophy of Descartes, — to say that A and B are the same thing, when A and B are at the same time conceived by you as having distinct and mutually exclusive attributes, — is to say what is meaningless and absurd. This truism, — which is, none the less, often forgotten, even by subtle metaphysicians, — is all that any one needs to bear in mind, to see the incompatibility between the occurrence of evolution in the universe and the quantitative constancy of the universe.

In order, however, to make the application of this truism clear, let us imagine a definite situation. Suppose that in the course of the redistribution of matter and energy, sentient organisms have already appeared; suppose that in one of these organisms there is about to occur the first rudimentary experience of color-vision; and suppose that there hovers above the scene, at the moment, Laplace's perfect physical calculator, a being fully acquainted with the quantity of matter and energy present in the universal system and with the unchanging laws of their distribution, but destitute of any experience or idea of any of the secondary qualities of matter. Our calculator, at the moment in question, will have before him nothing but a world of energy-possessing particles thus-and-so distributed. He will know that in the moment to ensue that world will continue to contain exactly the same number of particles and the same sum of energy; but that the distribution will be, in a determinate manner, different from the present distribution. He will also know, as a detail of this distribution, that there will occur just that arrangement of

moving parts in the ether and in what we now call the rudimentary eye of the organism, which *we* know to be the invariable correlate of the sensation of red. But *he* will not know anything of the sort, nor have the least ground, in his perfect acquaintance with the laws of his qualitatively uniform system, for suspecting that anything so strange is about to happen as the sudden appearance of sensible redness in the universe. All that he could predict would be that the particles at that next moment were going to be arranged in a certain spatial order, just as at the preceding moment they had been arranged in a certain other spatial order. But that, when the new arrangement eventuates, there will therewith pop into existence something, *other than that arrangement merely defined as such*, which was not in the universe at all at the preceding moment, — this would be a thing not dreamed of in his physical philosophy. And, even if assured that the something more had actually supervened upon his world, he would, of course, be unable to form any representation of *what* it was, unless there came to him, as well as to the developing organism at that moment, a direct experience of color-sensation. Still, even if denied this acquaintance with the concrete *quale* of the new element, he would remain a perfect calculator; and a perfect calculator should be able to add. He would, therefore, certainly conclude that if, upon the occurrence of a given disposition of the units of a qualitatively and quantitatively constant physical order, there emerges a new sensible quality, not identical with the invariable primary qualities of those units, then the total sum of the universe at that instant is greater than at the preceding instant. The constancy of his physical order, within its own limits, need not be affected by the appearance of a new reality lying, by definition, outside those limits. But since the reality is there, it must be counted as one, when you are footing up the account of the entire system of realities; and since, also, the reality is a newly introduced item, the total of your addition must be greater than it was when the sum was last cast up.

Thus if evolution, — in the sense of the emergence, upon the occasion of certain physical combinations, of new and increasingly diverse sensible or other qualities, — if evolution takes place at

all, the sum total of the universe cannot remain constant, but must be subject to augmentation. Constancy can be maintained only in that conceived part of the general system of things from which all the diversity and change of quality characteristic of the concrete world of experience have been artificially abstracted. You may, if you will, — so far as the present argument goes, — suppose the invariable physical order to have existed for ages, all by itself, innocent of sensibility or other mode of consciousness. During all those ages your physical order would have been all the universe there was; and that universe would truly have been constant in quality and quantity, and in all save the shifting positions and relations of its contained parts. But when the first dim spark of consciousness started up, the days of the invariableness of the cosmic content came to an end, the evolution of qualitative diversity had begun. It will be observed also that rudimentary sentiency or rudimentary color-vision or any other newly-appearing item in the qualitative make-up of the evolving world must have appeared quite literally out of nothing. To the observant Laplacean cosmic calculator, it would have been simply a case of 'now you don't see it and now you do.' Nothing in the antecedents pointed to the result; that that kind of physical arrangement is a uniform correlate of the given quality, — a kind of being wholly disparate and incommensurable with the first, — could be ascertained only *post factum*. Give a physicist the original cosmic formula, and permit him to assume the conservation of energy and (if he still cares for matter) the indestructibility of matter, and his inferences as to the position of any portions of matter in space, at any given moment, will be purely deductive and necessary. But his knowledge as to the secondary qualities arising in sensible experience at the same moment must be empirical to the end. From the primary qualities (however you may enumerate them) to the secondary there is no argument or any intelligible mediated transition; nor is there any in the contrary direction. Consequently, physical science, using the Democritic device, may reduce the world of primary and unchanging qualities to never so clear and certain and deductive scientific form, without making the world we really live in much the less

contingent and opaque and baldly factual ; and without making its evolution any the less a process of absolute, unpredictable, inexplicable creation of new realities out of nothing. If the nexus between primary and secondary qualities,—for the sake of simplification I say nothing of the nexus of cortical processes and their sensational correlates,—is incomprehensible, incomprehensibility would seem to lurk at the crucial point in our universe. Something like this was a favorite remark of Locke's ; I scarcely think that it has been sufficiently reflected upon by the mechanistic cosmogonists.

The conclusion reached, upon our first problem, then, is simply this : that a world in which qualitative evolution is supposed to take place is one in which, as a total, quantitative constancy cannot be said to subsist. It may be added that a world in which any kind of qualitative change takes place, even though not evolutionary, is one in which quantitative constancy cannot in any verifiable sense be maintained ; for qualities, though they unquestionably constitute enumerable items in the sum of reality, are not quantitatively commensurable.

## II. THE ETERNAL OF NEO-KANTIAN IDEALISM.

We turn from the constant of physical science, at best but a weak imitation of an eternal being, to the strictly supra-temporal realities of most post-Kantian idealism. Upon the conception of an eternal Self, whether in its monistic or its pluralistic form, the criticisms that might reasonably be made are numerous and diverse ; but I am compelled to limit myself to two simple arguments. The first seems to me so simple and of so evident cogency that the general principle of it can be stated in a paragraph.

The eternal, it will scarcely be denied, is a discovery of philosophers who live in time,—of transitory creatures who were born and will die, to whom tomorrow has a far different interest and import from yesterday, in whom the content of the future, by virtue of its futurity no less essentially than by virtue of its character, awakens emotions of hope, or curiosity, or incertitude, or terror, or resolute determination. And it was through time,

and because of exigencies arising in this concrete temporal life of theirs, that the most other-worldly of these philosophers were led to set up their graven image of an eternal. In all cases eternity was designed by them to serve some temporal use, to solve some temporal problem, or to illuminate some temporal situation; even in the most nihilistic of ontologies the eternal is meant to be functional, not to be merely the blank and irrelevant negation of temporality. It is, therefore, a pertinent, and a fatal objection to the doctrine of the eternal nature of ultimate reality, that an eternal being can be shown to be incapable of logical relevancy to any temporal fact. Time and eternity are, indeed, by the very definition of the latter, incommensurable in an absolute sense; *non sunt mensuræ unius generis*, in the words of the Angelic Doctor.<sup>1</sup> For the eternal to enter into relations with aught that becomes or changes is *ipso facto* to lose its eternity. For the change in the temporal term in the relation makes the relation one of change; and, since the proposition that a thing may change its relations while remaining absolutely unaffected by change, is a plain contradiction, the change must necessarily infect the other term of the relation also. If this is not sound logic, certainly none of the dialectic of our absolute idealists can make any pretensions to validity; it is a sort of reasoning that should make a peculiar appeal to that school of dialecticians. And for them, at least, it should suffice to make evident the hopeless sterility of the eternal. Yet, since this way of putting it is abstract and formal, it may be worth while to illustrate the difficulty by recalling specific instances of its occurrence in eternalistic philosophies of the past and present.

The difficulty was, of course, a peculiarly troublesome one for the Christian theology of the Middle Ages. For that system was committed to the affirmation of a causal relation between God and the world in time. The universe was created on a certain morning of a certain year B. C.; but it was created by a Deity *omnino immutabilis*, who was not in time at all. This required that God should do something at a moment in time in which, *as* a moment in time, he, by definition, did not exist.

<sup>1</sup> *Summa*, I, I, q. Xa 4, ad I.



Such a being was, therefore, really useless and unintelligible as a causal explanation of the beginning of the temporal order, or of any subsequent happening in it. Equally useless is the conception of the eternity of the Absolute when considered in relation to final causality,—to the purposes and plans of action of human beings. For the illustration of this we may jump from Aquinas to Hegel. The latter philosopher, as Mr. McTaggart has pointed out, is frequently inclined to infer from the eternity of the scheme of relations constituting the dialectic, that “all dissatisfaction with the existing state of the universe, and all efforts to reform it, are futile and vain,—since reason is already and always the sole reality.” “Das absolute Gute vollbringt sich ewig in der Welt, und das Resultat ist, dass es schon an und für sich vollbracht ist, und nicht erst auf uns zu warten braucht.”<sup>1</sup> As thus interpreted by Hegel, the notion of the eternal perfection or rationality of reality is, in its practical implications, equivalent to fatalism. If you try to bring your confidence in the supra-temporal completeness of the self-fulfilling *Idee* to bear upon your life in time at all, you can only conclude that nothing whatever can be, or need be, done by you in time. Mr. McTaggart has, it is true, acutely argued that Hegel here draws from his own doctrine of eternity an unwarranted inference. If, Mr. McTaggart insists, we are thinking about the world as perfect, we must *then* also think it as timeless and changeless, and so no question of action, — which is a mode of change, — can arise. But if we are, on the other hand, thinking of time and change, then “whatever reality is to be allowed” to them, “imperfection and progress may be allowed to share; and no conclusion can be drawn, such as Hegel seems at times to suggest, against attempting to make the future an improvement on the past. Neither future and past, nor better and worse, can be really adequate judgments of a timeless and perfect universe, but *in the sense in which there is a future* it may be an improvement on the past.”<sup>2</sup> The logic by which Mr. McTaggart thus defends Hegel against himself may be admitted to be better than Hegel’s own; but its result is not to improve the situation for

<sup>1</sup> McTaggart, *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, pp. 170–171.

<sup>2</sup> McTaggart, *loc. cit.* Italics are the present writer’s.

the Hegelian eternal. For it saves the conception of that eternal from the fatalistic implications indicated by Hegel, only at the cost of the virtual admission that the conception has no practical implications of any sort. Mr. McTaggart simply tells you that if you wish to plan or to act, to think about past and future, or better and worse, you must, for the time being, shut a door in your mind, and rigorously forget all about the perfect and the eternal.

Similar objections hold against the attempt of many neo-Kantians, both monistic and pluralistic, to represent their 'Eternal Self' as standing behind, possessing, and making possible, man's empirical existence in time. In the metaphysics of T. H. Green, for example, you have the painful spectacle of an earnest and resolute intellect engaged in the manifestly hopeless effort to bestride the great gulf that is fixed between the evolving and the eternal. Green, being fundamentally a moralist, was chiefly interested in the evolving, in the self-development of the individual and the cumulative historic tasks of humanity. It was merely with a view to giving to these interests a higher dignity and a deeper sanction that they were declared to be simply the phenomenal expression of an eternally complete thinking consciousness, a 'spiritual principle' behind all natural Becoming. With this consciousness man's "true being" was declared to be identical. But if the Divine Mind is eternal and complete, how can it be said to 'manifest itself' in what, confessedly, is as different from it in all its predicates as anything can conceivably be? And how can it become any more complete or any more adequately manifested by virtue of any moral endeavor on man's part? Sidgwick seems to me to have concisely but definitively exhibited, not only what he characterizes as "the barrenness of Green's metaphysical convictions for his ethical purposes," but also the internal discrepancies of those convictions.<sup>1</sup> "An eternal intellect out of time," as Sidgwick says, being (even by Green's own reasoning) "equally implied in the conception of *any* succession," does not "carry with it the conception of any progress toward an end in the series of motions or changes of which the process of the world in time consists. The series might be altogether purposeless, — a

<sup>1</sup>Sidgwick, *Lectures on the Ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau*, 1902, Chapter I.

meaningless round of change, — and still the ‘unification’ which appears to be the sole function of Green’s eternal mind would be none the less completely performed.” And, this form of the difficulty aside, the addition to the temporal self of man of an Eternal Self simply ends in an unmediated and unintelligible duality. “What,” Sidgwick asks, “becomes of the unity of the individual’s consciousness when it is thus split up into an eternally complete consciousness out of time, and a function of an animal organism which this eternal mind, somehow limiting itself, makes its vehicle?” To this question no satisfactory answer appears to me to be forthcoming. Green’s, however, was the most determined and impressive effort of the British mind, with its intense ethical seriousness, to extract edification out of the eternal. If, as I believe, the effort was a total failure, — and has been shown to be such by another British moralist of not inferior ethical seriousness but of much greater logical acumen, — the outcome is an historical fact from which some profitable reflections may arise.

In a somewhat different setting the same objection presents itself, when we turn from the neo-Kantianism of the great Oxford teacher to the much more lucidly and vigorously excogitated form of the same philosophy put forward by a great American teacher formerly associated with the St. Louis group, — I mean the pluralistic or ‘personal’ idealism of Professor Howison. This system, to which I owe much instruction, seems to me to be chiefly subject to difficulty at just those points where the working of the old leaven of eternalism and perfectionism becomes noticeable in it. Eternity appears at two points in this doctrine. First, each individual self has two “aspects”; it is, primarily and essentially, eternal, and, in so far as it is viewed only under this aspect, perfect; but it “defines itself” as different from other equally eternal selves by virtue of its association with a unique, individuated life in time, which, just because it is in time, involves some measure of imperfection. In the second place, since it is assumed that the total society of selves must contain all possible grades of being from lowest to highest, there is a Supreme Self, which differs from all the others in that it has no temporal side to

it and no imperfection. This supra-temporal *ens perfectissimum* is the final,—not the efficient,—cause of the temporal striving of all the other selves. The ideal of timeless self-sufficiency and of impassible aloofness from sin and struggle and becoming, which is realized in God, is the chosen (but the unattainable) goal of each developing consciousness.

In this scheme of things, it is evident that both my eternity as a noumenal Ego, and the eternity of God, are meant by the philosopher to have some pertinent bearings upon both the intellectual and the moral life in time. But here again it may be shown that neither of these eternals can, without self-contradiction, be said to have any logical relation to, or practical significance for, any piece of temporal business whatever. Consider, for example, the Aristotelian kind of deity which Professor Howison proposes to revive. How can the thought of such a being's perfection serve as an inciting ideal for me, when the mode of existence in which its perfection is realized is generically different from any possible to me,—and by the most radical of all conceivable generic differences? By no imaginable strivings in time can I ever become in the least like such a God in his one truly distinguishing peculiarity,—supra-temporality.<sup>1</sup> Nor can his supposed character

<sup>1</sup> In recent issues of the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW (XVII, 18 ff. ; XVIII, 1 ff.) Professor Overstreet has apparently sought to relieve this and kindred difficulties by proposing some refinements upon the notion of time, and by devising a sort of *tertium quid* combining the charms of both time and eternity. I am unable to see that the relief desired is secured. The 'defect' of time, we are told, is not its successive-ness, but its fragmentariness, its dividedness ; it prevents the whole of our life from being present at once, since the past of us is always gone and the future not yet. Yet this defect may belong only to the time of our experience. There might be a succession in which our whole self would "in each phase" be totally present. "With such a wholeness, time, as a past, present, and future, would disappear ;" but "pure succession" would not. In this latter sense time may be conceived "as of fundamental reality," and such succession may be predicable even of "perfect being." — On these ingenious distinctions I venture the following comments : (1) "A succession without past, present, or future," is to me a phrase wholly destitute of meaning. (2) If the "pure succession" which it is proposed to ascribe to perfect being contains the past-and-future contrast in any sense whatever, the "whole self" (if that is meant to include all the content of the successive temporal phases of the self) cannot conceivably be present "in each phase" of the succession. (3) Some 'essential' or 'fundamental' (*i. e.*, partial) self might, indeed, persist unchanged through the succession ; but precisely in so far as this essential self is declared to be unmodifiable and unaugmentable through change, just so far is it removed from relevancy to temporal experience.

reasonably awaken in me any interest or respect; my feeling for an entity so otiose, so completely ignorant of, and unaffected by, all the moving turmoil of our world, could resemble only the feeling which Stevenson, in 'Our Lady of the Snows,' expresses for the monks of the Grande Chartreuse. As little, again, shall I be profited, either in speculation or action, by considering the alleged eternity and (in its eternal aspect) perfection of my own private Self. If it is perfect, *it* will not be made any more so by the endeavors of the empirical Ego with which, in some unintelligible manner, it is unequally yoked together. If it requires those endeavors, on the other hand, for its own fulfilment or development, it is not perfect and it is not out of time. How, moreover, can an eternal self be said to "define itself in its eternal difference from all other selves" in terms of a mode of existence which can only be described by attributes which the self in question is in the same breath declared not to possess? Every proposition that is made about my noumenal Ego as related to my empirical life brings the former down into temporal relations. It can retain its proper character only by having nothing whatever to do with the empirical; it belongs apart, in a completely 'separated,' Platonic sort of world, and it cannot remain what it purports to be save by everlastingly keeping there.

These difficulties are veiled in philosophical systems of this type chiefly by the use of the term 'aspect.' Now this word may, I suppose, mean any of these four things: (*a*) a line of direction in space; (*b*) the way in which something appears, not in itself, but to an external observer, and as modified by the means of apprehension employed by the observer; (*c*) a real but temporary quality or relation of a thing; (*d*) an actual part or element in a complex, conceived as abstracted from the rest of the complex. None of these meanings, however, seems fitted to render intelligible the conjunction of eternity with temporal process in a single human person or a single Absolute Mind. It is apparently in some approximation to the second sense that the term 'aspect' is usually employed. But, in any case, an aspect is either a genuine part of the entity of which it is predicated, or else it is a more or less false appearance. Both alternatives are

unsatisfactory to the eternalist.<sup>1</sup> To say that the temporal and the eternal are two distinct parts or constituents of the self seems to destroy its unity, and to preclude the desired identification of the one with the other. To say that the temporal aspect is a mere appearance means, if it means anything, a resort to the lame artifice of the Oriental metaphysician. That artifice is, in point of fact, the eternalist's only ultimate way of escape from palpable self-contradiction. His doctrine, if stripped of equivocal metaphors, amounts in the last analysis to calling the temporal *Māyā*, — unexplained, meaningless, negligible, absolute illusion. For those who do not wish to go to this length, the sole alternative is the abandonment of the eternal.

The difficulties which I have tried to set forth thus far all illustrate the common principle, that the assertion of a real relation between an eternal and a temporal reduces the eternal to the temporal. There is a second principle, distinct from, though akin to this, which seems to me to have been too little heeded by metaphysicians. It appears to me to be impossible for us to conceive any concrete thing save as either *now* existing or not now existing, — as other than past or present or future. There is, I think, a temporal form of the law of excluded middle. Not only must anything either be or not be, but it also must either be now or not now. It has been commonly assumed by eternalistic ontologists, and too readily admitted by philosophers generally, that you can avoid this alternative by saying that some things are not in time at all, and therefore cannot be said either not to be or to be at any given moment *in* time. But this seems to me to be a mere evasion. I personally find it as easy to conceive that *a* is *non-a* or that twice two is seven, as to conceive (assuming that 'existence' means anything at all) any possibility beyond the present existence and the present non-existence of a given potential entity, — between the assertion that the entity is or isn't contemporaneous with any specified duration in my experience. The time form, with its categories of antecedence and

<sup>1</sup>Since this address was written, substantially the same criticism of the use of the term 'aspect' has appeared, with a far more effective expression, in Professor James's *A Pluralistic Universe*, 201 ff.

simultaneity and futurity, infects, I believe, all the thinking of us temporal creatures, — it conditions not merely possible objects of perception but also possible objects of thought. You may refrain from thinking of ‘now’ or ‘then’ at all; but, as soon as those ideas enter your mind, as soon as you raise this question with respect to any determinate moment or period in time, you find all your universe of discourse falling into two reciprocally exclusive and jointly exhaustive classes. Now an eternal being, of course, cannot be said either now to be, — for then it is brought within the range of application of the calendar and the time-table; nor yet can it be said now not to be, — for an eternal surely cannot at any time be supposed to be non-existent. I conclude, therefore, that the idea of eternity is an idea which cannot be positively thought, under the conditions involved in all our thinking as beings in time. It is a self-contradictory, and therefore wholly empty notion.

For a final exemplification of the truth of the principal thesis of this discourse, I turn to a recent paper of Mr. McTaggart’s on “The Relation of Time to Eternity.”<sup>1</sup> Mr. McTaggart is a Hegelian who has the rare merit of grappling seriously with the difficulties which the time-process offers the Hegelian sort of metaphysics. His solution of those difficulties is that we should agree to speak of eternity in the future tense. “When, taking Time as real, as we must do in every-day life, we are endeavoring to estimate the relation of Time to Eternity, we may legitimately say that Eternity is future.” This is at least, “much truer than to say that it is present or past.” “We must conceive the Eternal as the final stage in the time-process. We must conceive it as being in the future, and as being the end of the future. Time runs up to eternity and ceases in Eternity.” Mr. McTaggart’s reasons for this surprising conclusion proceed from a primary assumption which he asks us to make, but for which he thus far has offered no real argument: namely, that “the states of the time-series” are arranged in such an order that each successive state “is a more adequate representation of the time-

<sup>1</sup> Delivered before the Philosophical Union of the University of California 1907. — Berkeley, The University Press, 1908.

less reality" than its predecessor. Then that timeless reality would be the limit which the temporal states progressively approximate; and a future moment might, as a representation of the eternal reality, "be only infinitesimally inadequate." It would then imply as the next state in the series, "the timeless reality, in its own completeness."

Now the motives which seem to have led Mr. McTaggart to this view admirably illustrate once more our first principle of the irrelevancy of the eternal. They may be described as a dissatisfaction with the eternalistic solution of the problem of evil, and a craving for an evolutionary meliorism as a substitute therefor, — which evolutionary conception, however, Mr. McTaggart, as a Hegelian, finds himself obliged to state in eternalistic terms. Hegel, as Mr. McTaggart says, "reared the most magnificent optimism that philosophy has ever seen." But that optimism rests upon the unreality of time. "Only the Eternal reality exists and the Eternal is perfectly good. All the evil which we suppose to be in existence is part of the time-element which we wrongly suppose to be in existence. And so there is no evil at all." But this sort of optimism Mr. McTaggart finds quite unconsoling; and the reason that it is so, is that it does not deny or diminish the temporal reality of temporal evil. "To tell us that evil is unreal does not make what we think to be evil in the least less unpleasant to suffer or in the least less depressing to expect. And even if it had that effect on the people who know the truth, how about the people who do not know it?" Mr. McTaggart in this matter seems to me to be reasoning more justly than Professor Royce, who has repeatedly put forward the doctrine of the eternal perfection of the Absolute Experience as the ground of a theodicy and a means of religious consolation. That the Absolute somehow finds that experience rational and satisfactory, when viewed from an absolute point of view, which I cannot share, and seen in its eternal completeness and simultaneity, which I cannot see, nowise alters the character of the imperfect fragment of reality which I do see, from the temporal point of view to which I am limited. It is, then, because he feels the force of these considerations that Mr. McTaggart gives up



the attempt to extract comfort and religious profit for beings in the time-process from the notion of the (present) perfection of a being out of the time-process. Such comfort and profit as are to be had he finds only in a faith in the cumulative and ameliorative character of the general evolution of things. But, being under the Hegelian spell, Mr. McTaggart can represent this only as an evolution towards a time when time and evolution shall be no more.

The way in which I have just put the conception at which Mr. McTaggart arrives is not a caricature. It simply brings out sharply that peculiarity of the conception in which the truth of our second principle concerning the relation of eternal and temporal is exemplified. A future eternity would obviously be an eternity in time,—an eternity that could be put down in the calendar, if you were informed in advance of the scheduled running-time of the universe. It would duly arrive and be entered upon just so many million weeks or months or years from April ninth of the year of our Lord 1909. You would, when making temporal distinctions of before and after, be obliged to say of it, 'It is not now, but it is going to be.' Now we have had eternities that have been declared to include time,—which, it is not difficult to show, is an absurd conception; and we have had eternities which have been declared somehow to stand apart from time altogether; which, it is not difficult to show, is a profitless and a logically impossible conception. But a future eternal would neither include time nor stand apart from it; and it would assuredly, therefore, not be open to the complaint of either inconceivability or irrelevancy. But it would escape this only by giving up all pretensions to be eternal, in the ordinary sense of 'supra-temporal.' Mr. McTaggart has brought his eternal into relation with time with a vengeance,—namely, by making it nothing more or less than one among the other moments of the time-series. This is the result of the latest effort, by one of the most learned and accomplished of contemporary Hegelians, to give to the eternal some intelligible meaning and some real use.

It is true that Mr. McTaggart's kind of eternity is defined as the *last* moment in time, and as one of a certain qualitative su-

periority over all others, — as might be some perfected mind's moment of complete, instantaneous insight *into* all the other moments, and into all the content and all the constitutive relations, of the whole system of reality. But the last moment and best moment is just as much a part of time as any other. Moreover, if it *were* the last, — if there were no change, no development, no duration, after it, — then to speak of the arrival of eternity would be a euphemistic way of referring to an absolute end of the world and a general disappearance of reality. For when the moment of "adequate representation," of complete insight came, its 'eternity' would mean merely the instantaneous, the simultaneous, all-inclusiveness of that insight; it would, by definition, have no possibility or need of continuance or augmentation. Thus, the picture which Mr. McTaggart's ingenious metaphysical imagination presents to us, is really a picture of the universe, at some future date, going gloriously to smash. The world, we are assured, will have its great moment before it dies; but it will purchase that moment at the price of total and immediate extinction. Drowning people have been popularly imagined to experience, just before they sink for the last time, an instant of complete remembrance and understanding of all their past lives. It is some such prospect that Mr. McTaggart holds out to the universe; and to this border-land vision of a drowning cosmos he gives the odd name of eternity.

He is not, of course, blind to all this; he realizes that, in order to bring his eternal to terms with our temporal mode of thinking he has really made it an episode in time. But his manner of forestalling this objection is also instructive, and illustrates one of the contentions already made. "The answer," he says, "to these objections, I think, is as follows: Of course, on this view, Eternity is not really future, and does not really begin. For time is unreal, and therefore nothing can be future and nothing can begin." But "Eternity is as future as anything can be. It is as truly future as tomorrow or next year." Now this sort of thing, I submit, is merely playing fast and loose with logic. Time is taken as real so long as the argument serves; and when inevitable self-contradictions arise, the contradictions are

conveniently annulled by the denial of the reality of time and all that it contains. In short, the final refuge of the eternalist is and must be, as I have already maintained, sheer illusionism, the doctrine of *Māyā*,—a doctrine which I take to be but vanity and a striving after wind, a thing to which no sober occidental mind is likely to give heed. But if one is to be an illusionist, it is at least well to know it and be plain about it. And that the Vedāntist is. There are, I incline to think, only two types of philosophy that quite thoroughly know what they are about,—Oriental illusionism and thorough-going temporalism,—Shankara and, if you please, Bergson. And between these alternatives I do not find it possible to hesitate.

The eternal is, then, I think, the characteristic but not necessarily incorrigible distemper of adolescent metaphysics. So long as the belief in it has prevailed, it has produced in philosophy logical irresponsibility, an unwholesome sort of other-worldliness, and an intellectual priggishness based upon the idea that the philosopher was dealing with a finer, higher, more elegant class of realities than those with which the common man or the scientist were concerned. When metaphysicians generally begin to abandon their eternal and immutable, and set themselves whole-heartedly to understand the world temporally and evolutionally,—*sub specie generationis*, in Professor Dewey's phrase,—philosophy may undergo a revolution not less notable than that which took place in 'natural history' when the biologists generally began to abandon their immutable species and set themselves to understand the world of organisms evolutionally. Certainly, philosophy will not have learned the primary lesson of modern reflection until, in all its departments, it begins,—as it has until lately scarcely ever done,—to take the time-process seriously. But the genuine evolutionary view of the world is not to be reached upon the path followed by such transitional system-makers as Spencer, who naïvely conceive it possible to apprehend real Becoming in terms of a change of distribution of parts in a qualitatively and quantitatively constant system. That kind of evolutionism is as impossible as eternalism. A thoroughly temporalistic way of thinking has its

technical categories for the most part still to forge; it means a profound and difficult reconstruction of our epistemological and ontological presuppositions. There is plenty of hard dialectical work for it to do, though the work is now happily begun in several quarters, — a part of the work being that of setting precise limits to the reach of dialectic. It is a kind of philosophy which is naturally ready to recognize its own results as provisional, and to leave much to the future. But of its main principle I think we have by this time a right to be confident; if I may conclude with a sentence borrowed from Mr. Schiller, “it is only in the direction of an abandonment of the prejudice against the reality of time that I can descry a future for hope, a future for philosophy, and a philosophy for the future.”

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## IDEALISM AND REALISM.<sup>1</sup>

IN one of his dialogues Plato, when he is about to enter upon a searching criticism of the *esse-percipi* theory of Protagoras, prefaces his discussion with these words: "A wise man is not likely to talk nonsense. Let us try to understand him." Plato may possibly have been over-benevolent in this remark about the wise man; and certainly I am very far from wishing to imply that the terms 'idealist' and 'wise man' are interchangeable. But I do think it not unreasonable to expect that the adversary of the idealist, when he pays him the compliment of discussing his doctrine, should take it for granted that his opponent also is clothed and in his right mind. I am led to make this remark by the fact that in current discussions views are being continually fastened upon the idealist which it is scarcely exaggerating to characterize as sheer insanities. I am going to consider a few of these misrepresentations at the outset, in the hope that I may thereby do something to clear the atmosphere, and help to focus attention on the real matter in dispute.

1. We are told that the idealist seeks to make out his case against realism, or to establish his own idealism, by an appeal to the physiological argument. That argument is briefly as follows: We know physical objects only in so far as they affect our senses. The resulting perceptions are merely 'in us,' — sensations, impressions, states of consciousness. Moreover, they are what they are because our particular sense instrument has certain characteristics, a certain structure, and is in a certain condition. They therefore do not give us the real qualities of real objects in space; they are merely states of our individual consciousness. And yet we have no other way of getting at things, so 'things' must mean to us just these inner states. Now this physiological argument clearly proves a great deal too much. It is plain as day that it hasn't a leg to stand on. It cannot even be stated

<sup>1</sup>A paper read in the discussion of "Idealism and Realism," at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association held in Baltimore, December, 1908.

unless we assume to begin with that we do in some way know things as distinct from our impressions. The idealist who would rest his case on this argument is consequently in a strange quandary. His doctrine is proved by the physiological argument; but, if that doctrine be true, the physiological argument is meaningless. In other words, his doctrine is the conclusion drawn from premises which that very conclusion makes absurd. Undoubtedly the facts of sense physiology present their own peculiar problems when one attempts to integrate those facts with other facts of experience in the construction of one's philosophy, and any philosophy to be successful must solve those problems. But we can all, idealists and realists alike, join in the laugh at the expense of any one who would think to get his philosophy so cheaply as in the pretended argument given above.

So much for the madness of the method which the idealist is supposed to employ. And now for the madness of the results which he is supposed to hold.

2. The idealist it is said resolves physical phenomena into mental phenomena. He holds that those trees which you see are not real trees out there in space, but bundles of feelings, groups of sensations, states of consciousness, — that and nothing more. In consistency with his view he ought to say, for example, that when you walked around here this morning it was not a real objective physical sidewalk that you walked on; though you may not have observed the fact, the truth of the matter rather is that you were treading on your feelings all the way. The idealist in short is represented as if he performed some wonderful feat of legerdemain with the facts of experience, dragging the outer world within, and there consuming its outwardness utterly. It is as if a serpent should get his tail in his mouth and begin to swallow his own body, and should continue the process until he had succeeded in swallowing it all, and nothing but a disembodied mouth remained. The idealist is represented as if, having reduced physical phenomena to mental phenomena, he ought to feel some uneasiness every time he walks out of his library and closes the door, lest the room and all its contents, as they pass out of his conscious experience, should drop out of existence altogether,

and as only able to free himself from this anxiety by smuggling back some eye, — apparently any eye will do, that of fly, archangel, or absolute, — to keep watch over his possessions in his absence.

3. Again, the idealist is represented as logically forced to believe that the actual processes of nature are identical with his experience and knowledge of those processes ; that thinking, his actual finite human thinking, makes the objects that it knows come into being.

4. And, finally, all these things are summed up in the charge that idealism entirely obliterates the distinction between subjective and objective. By objects, we are told, the ‘plain man’ means, — and by the way it is interesting to observe how often the plain man is made the court of appeal in current discussions, as if he were the unconscious oracle of profound wisdom, — things in space, things he can touch. These he opposes to, and sharply contrasts with, mental phenomena, to which the idealist in his folly would reduce everything.

Now all of these things are so obviously absurd that the idealist, if he really holds such views, should simply be regarded as unbalanced, — though no less so than his adversaries who undertake seriously to discuss these views with him. And yet, absurd as these things are, they may most of them be extracted from a certain interpretation of the *esse-percipi* theory. That was an unfortunate phrase, — *esse-percipi*. Had the word experience been in those days as much an idol of the forum as it has since become, Berkeley would no doubt have used it ; it would have served his purpose, saved him from some of his perplexities, and from many misunderstandings. No doubt, in the exuberance of youth, and intoxicated by his discovery of the way in which seeing and inferring have coalesced in experience, the way in which we read into one sensation its habitual sense companions, Berkeley may have said extravagant things which lead in the direction of the absurdities mentioned above ; and the older and maturer Berkeley is rarely allowed the opportunity to correct the impression. But the chief object of Berkeley’s work was to demolish the matter fetich of his predecessors, the matter substance of

earlier hypothetical realism, which was vaguely thought of as a something wholly inaccessible to experience, its underlying ground, unknown and unknowable except in so far as one through faith or instinct might bring himself to believe that his experiences more or less accurately copied or represented those inaccessible realities. In short, if we were to speak in terms of the subjectivism which the idealist is supposed to be guilty of, we should have to say, for example, that when you drank your coffee this morning it was not a real object existing in space that you drank, you simply swallowed your sensations, or you had or were the sensation of swallowing other sensations. But, on the other hand, if we were to describe that same occurrence in terms of this realism, we should have to say that what you drank was not the coffee of experience; you swallowed a mysterious something, you know not what, which produced those sensations in you. This statement is no less ridiculous than the other. Coffee that could only be characterized in this fashion would be, in Berkeley's phrase, a manifest repugnancy. If the idealist would not accept the former statement as required by his view, it is equally true that the modern realist would repudiate the latter statement.

It is surely a significant fact that the first searching criticism of the *esse-percipi* theory was made by the first great idealist, and that some of the criticisms he makes are the same as those which our contemporary realist makes, when he thinks he is attacking the idealist, but is in reality opposing the common enemy, subjectivism. And it is not less significant that the first great realist, Democritus, is the man who more than any one else is responsible for the *esse-percipi* theory of his fellow townsman, Protagoras.<sup>1</sup> And the inference which these facts at once

<sup>1</sup> "There are two forms of knowledge," writes Democritus, "one genuine, one obscure. To the obscure belong all of the following: sight, hearing, smell, taste, feeling. The other form is the genuine, and is quite distinct from this." And then distinguishing the genuine from the obscure he continues: "Whenever the obscure (way of knowing) has reached the *minimum sensibile* of hearing, smell, taste, and touch, and when the investigation must be carried farther into that which is still finer, then arises the genuine way of knowing, which has a finer organ of thought." (Bakewell, *Source Book in Ancient Philosophy*, p. 59.) And according to Sextus Empiricus it was Democritus who said: "By convention sweet is sweet,



suggest is, I think, amply justified in the history of philosophy, viz. : that a realism which makes the reals lie outside of experience in an inaccessible beyond has subjectivism for its twin error ; and that idealism from its first appearance in the Western world has been a conscious repudiation of subjectivism. Whatever other failings are to be ascribed to it, subjectivism at least is not one of them.

Now the idealist certainly intends to keep the distinction between subjective and objective, and to view spatial experiences as the experiences of real objects in space, and not as feelings or sensations having their being in some mysterious way out of space altogether and in the mind. And he thinks he can make these phrases less abstract and more luminous than his adversary. He furthermore holds that nature's laws and ways and processes are what they are, and not what we in our ignorance may fancy them to be, that nature is not created anew with every revolutionary discovery in science, that we must obey nature to conquer her, must patiently interpret and not impatiently anticipate her. Yes, he even undertakes to show that if and in so far as, the material world is viewed as unreal the mental order becomes itself unreal. One can only fix one's meanings, and distinguish thinking from dreaming, by tying up to the physical order. The old Hindu thinker, who had persuaded himself of the unreality of the world of physical phenomena drew the only proper inference when he proceeded to deny the reality of the mental as well, and to teach the "four-fold nothingness" in the words : "I am nowhere anything for anybody, nor is anybody anywhere anything for me."

And, on the other hand, the modern realist has abandoned this earlier form of hypothetical realism which cut the reals off from experience. He believes that we have a direct knowledge, a direct experience of the real objects, which, however, he still supposes to have in some way or other, independent existence. And when he proceeds to tell us what these real objects are he

by convention bitter is bitter, by convention hot is hot, by convention cold is cold, by convention color is color. But in reality there are atoms and the void. That is, the objects of sense are supposed to be real and it is customary to regard them as such, but in truth they are not. Only the atoms and the void are real." *Ib.*, p. 60.

uses language that is, as far as it goes, hardly distinguishable from that of the idealists. One of them, who carries along with his realism an 'epistemological idealism,' writes: "The reality we know and the reality we predicate with any intelligibility or significance is reality for us as predicators. Even when we think of this kind of reality as being possible in another universe unradiated by a single gleam of intelligence or sense-experience, we still *are thinking* of it; we cannot think ourselves and everything else out of such a universe without being in this universe to do the thinking away. No thinker, no thought object."<sup>1</sup> Another tells us that we know the reals directly in experience, and in no other way, and that we distinguish real objects from sensations and feelings of our own solely by the setting which we are forced to give the particular experience.<sup>2</sup> And still another defines his realism in this way. "We may lay it down that the real must be known through our purposive attitudes or conceptual construction. Real objects are never constituted by mere sense perception. They are not compounds of sensation. They presuppose creative purpose. They can only become objects for a self-realizing will. The real is the *intelligible or noumenal*, not the mere immediate."<sup>3</sup> (Italics mine.) I do not mean to imply that these statements agree with each other, or that the rest of our 'new' realists would accept any one of them; but they are typical of the sort of thing one runs across continually in current expositions of realism, and agree in showing how unlike this new realism is to what we have been accustomed to call by that name, and how suspiciously like idealism it is after all. Why should thinkers who can use such language wish to repudiate idealism, and revive the old word realism with this new and highly idealistic coloring? It would seem as if idealists, believing as firmly as any one can in the reality of the natural order, and realists, teaching that the real is the experienceable and the intelligible, ought easily to be able to get together. They must after all be twin brothers under the skin. The answer is various. One apparently holds aloof from

<sup>1</sup> Professor McGilvary, in the *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, XVI, p. 274.

<sup>2</sup> Professor Fullerton, in his *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 186, Chs. IV, V, and XIII and *passim*.

<sup>3</sup> Boodin, in *Journal of Philosophy*, IV, p. 538.

idealism because he wants to have some "residual reality uncatalogued after the inventory of all experience is taken."<sup>1</sup> Another because he has identified idealism with immediatism. A third because he proposes to stand fast by the rigid distinction between mental phenomena and physical phenomena and to put ideas in the group of mental phenomena ; and if this be done, it is obvious that physical phenomena cannot be brought into the group mental without losing the distinctive character that they had in the contrast with the mental.

In so far as realism is merely a protest against subjectivism we can all be realists. If it means to affirm the existence of independent reals outside the realm of experience, and therefore wholly independent of consciousness, it is the old hypothetical realism whose absurdities have so often been shown up in the history of philosophy. If it means to affirm the existence of independent reals which are none the less wholly accessible to experience, directly experienced or known, it is hard to see how this doctrine differs from idealism, except that the idealist would be constrained to point out that the word independent is not strictly taken in such usage.

No criticism of idealism has any value which starts out with the assumption that we have, to begin with, two separate orders, called mental phenomena and physical phenomena, or a 'world without' and a 'world within,' and then proceeds to put ideas into the class mental phenomena, the so-called world within, and then to rule idealism out because it has taken the half of reality for the whole. It has no value because it simply begs the question at issue ; for idealism is one continued protest against the finality of any such divisions of realities. If one *could* make any such division of experience into two mutually exclusive orders of existence, it is plain that ideas could not be confined to either group, for the simple reason that ideas live, move, and have their being in the facts of experience, and in the facts of both orders. Of course, we can and must distinguish physical phenomena from mental phenomena ; and the growth of the natural sciences and the science of psychology clearly attest both the possibility and

<sup>1</sup> Professor McGilvary, *Journal of Philosophy*, V, p. 594.

the utility of the distinction. These sciences, however, keep in > their separate provinces not by dividing actual concrete objects of experience into separate groups, but by adopting and maintaining distinct points of view with regard to all possible objects of experience. The objects themselves may overlap, and furnish material for several sciences, and all objects may serve as material for the psychologist. The separate sciences seek to unify > experience, so far as this is possible, from the standpoint of certain deliberately chosen aspects of experience. They deal, not with reality in all the fullness that it has in actual experience, but with abstractions, or, if this term is odious, with reality in so far as it may be conceived or unified by means of certain selected, and selective, principles and categories.

When this dualism has been called in question by those who view it as simply an instance of the survival of early crudities of thought, in which even primitive animism has had its share, it will not suffice to bring in the 'plain man' to settle the question, or even to invoke the imposing name of science, since it is an issue that falls outside the province of the scientist as such. Every one must test the question for himself by turning to his own experience and asking what it is that he there finds. When one > thus turns to one's own experience, one simply does not find any such dualism. Subject and object turn out to be always correlative terms, mutually implied and organically related in all data of experience that have any significance whatsoever.

But, in the attempt to master and control experience, and to comprehend it, a new meaning of subject and object appears. Subject comes to stand for the transient, private, idiosyncratic; object for the permanent, the common, the universal. The physical experiences are then isolated and assumed to be objects in the strict sense of the word, because, at first sight, they seem to possess these characteristics, and to give us something to tie to; whereas sensations, feelings, volitions, and perhaps ideas, which, again at first sight, appear to lack these characteristics, are referred to the subject. But it takes very little reflection to see that this simple-minded distinction cannot be carried out. Objects, > cut off from those subjective factors, lose all the significance which

they possess in concrete experience ; and the subject, regarded as independent of these objective factors, loses all definiteness. Moreover, when we take the object to be the immediate impression, the thing-as-immediately-apprehended, it turns out to be tantalizingly subjective. Objectivity proves to be not something handed over as a gift in the direct impression, but rather a characteristic which the impression *acquires* in being *thought*.

We hear a great deal nowadays about 'data,' the 'actual,' the 'factual,' about being 'objective,' 'taking things as they really are,' etc. These are popular but question-begging-phrases, — usually little more than benevolent characterizations of our own views. Of course we all, of whatever philosophical stripe, intend to found our edifice on the solid rock of fact. The idealist contention merely is that the solid rock of fact dissolves into the shifting sands of sense in so far as ideas are extruded.

But if it is impossible to regard this naïve classification as final, none-the-less the motive that led to its adoption is the motive that underlies the efforts alike of science and philosophy : the desire, namely, in and through individual experience to reach universal experience. The history of ontology is the record of the attempt to do this starting from the object side of the dual relation characteristic of all experience ; and one of the pathways to idealism follows this route. The effort is in the first instance to discover in experience a permanent ground or cause, something which will hold over from one moment of experience to another. Unless I can do this, the momentary experiences, being of all things most slippery and uncertain, could leave behind a mere chaos of impressions. Moreover, I always assume in this undertaking that, if I am able to read off the meaning of my shifting experiences in such a way as to give them their place in an orderly and dependable world, I am getting reality not only as it is for me but also for every other intelligent being. One at first tries to conceive this real as 'matter-substance' underlying experiences and causing them, only to be continually baffled by finding such matter slip off into a world by itself and lose all meaning, and so fail to help in the interpretation of the actual world of experience. Various shifts are tried. 'Law' may appear as the one perma-

nent thing. Things one and all change, but the law of their changing remains the same. But this is too abstract. Or, again, it is the 'Logos' that remains as the common possession of all; the story that experience is unfolding has its coherency; and, > finally, the real comes to be viewed as 'idea.' As compared with the immediacy of sense-experience ideas are stable, stubborn, dependable, and shareable. The real is, meaning fulfilled, unfolded in experience; and experience as fulfilling meaning.

> Of course idea, as here used, is not an image, not an impression, not a state of consciousness. It is not even form as contrasted with content. Form and content here cannot be sundered. Just as a story cannot be a story independently of the characters and incidents in which the story is unfolded, and just as the incidents do not become a story by mere accretion, but only through the unity of plan that makes the parts relevant to each other, so it is here with the idea. It is literally a one in > many and many in one. Universal experience is one and continuous with individual experience. It is simply individual experience fully understood, and that means, viewed as constituting a realm of experience in which there are no 'stray facts which have not found their setting in relation to all the rest.

A good deal of unnecessary trouble is sometimes stirred up by asking such questions as this: What, on such a theory, must we say of happenings in the remote geological past? Did they actually occur, if the ideal is the real, and there was as yet no mind to report the fact? There is no more difficulty about such occurrences than about occurrences that happened last year or yesterday, say, in the bowels of the earth. One believes such things to be real because he finds present evidence in the facts before him; that is, he can only find the intelligible setting for the facts he observes by putting it into relation with certain other facts, and a relation which determines their position and date unalterably. Of course they happened, as the story of nature requires. But this is only a difficulty for idealism provided one has made the mistake of confusing ideas with mental phenomena, and of putting the mind in the body, or in some other fashion imprisoning it in a 'world within.' The mind goes wherever thought

carries it, may be busy exploring the heart of nature, or the distant ages of the past, and is not to be viewed as a thing bound to its definite date and place.

The criticism is sometimes made that one has no right to use the word 'idea' in the sense which I have given it. The 'plain man' doesn't do it. Well, I think as a matter of fact this is one of the commonest meanings of that word. When I speak of a person as 'a man of ideas,' what do I mean by the phrase? That he is a big bundle of impressions, that he is full of images? Do I not always mean that he has a genius for getting facts of experience put in their appropriate setting, and in this way bringing order out of chaos. Again, when one speaks of 'catching an idea' what does one mean? Getting an image, getting a mental state, getting the form apart from content? I think not. One means grasping the manifold in the unity of thought, catching the thread of meaning that guides one through a labyrinth of detail. But the thread is meaningless apart from the detail.

There is another pathway that leads to idealism. But I have not time to do more than mention it. It is the epistemological road, and it starts from the subject side in the subject-object relation of individual experience. It discovers through analysis the part played by the activity of thought in giving experience the character that it has for us, and discovers, by the method of dialectic, the structure which this activity must have if experience is to be intelligible at all; and finally it seeks to show the way in which the subject of individual experience finds its own true being in the subject of universal experience, which in turn finds *itself* in the object of universal experience. But whichever pathway one follows, the result is certainly not subjectivism.

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## GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN 1908.<sup>1</sup>

IN characterizing the philosophical literature of the past year in Germany, I would say, by way of preface, that it follows the lines suggested by the previous status of the problems of philosophy. German philosophy in the last ten years shows a continuous and clear line of development. The analysis of the intellectual situation and prognosis of its future development given in my last two articles have, on the whole, been justified. I took the ground there that contemporary German philosophy presents a revival of idealistic speculation, and I showed this in detail. What I said then is equally true of present conditions; philosophy is still taking its bearings from idealism. A gradual clarification continues, fantastic and mystical exaggeration diminishes, the force of tradition lessens, and the tendency to independence grows more evident. In this connection one cherishes the hope that German philosophy, strengthened and enriched by intimate contact with the great past, undisturbed by foreign factors, will again travel its own way.

Perhaps this development may be stimulated by the *international* character of modern investigation, which prevents isolation and one-sidedness by the constant exchange of intellectual views. This international character of inquiry finds expression not only in the increased intercourse promoted by philosophical journals, but in still higher degree in the facilities for personal discussion.

\*The Third International Congress of Philosophy met in Heidelberg August 31 to September 5, 1908. Windelband, in his address of welcome, correctly emphasized the immense external development of all the forces of civilization, the gigantic progress of technical factors, and the fact that these demanded supplementary deepening of the inner aims and grounds of being, if the whole expenditure of energy is not to assume the character of senseless, haphazard guess work. Philosophical coöperation, he went on to say, confines itself to the shaping and adjustment of

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the German by Wm. A. Hammond.



ideas, through which culture-ideals are expressed in a unitary view of life and the world. For this reason, interest in modern philosophy centers in epistemology, which does not, however, sever the connection between knowledge and reality. "One does not think of the relation of consciousness to reality, without thinking of the problem of reality itself; and in this sense there is no epistemology which does not imply a metaphysic. The investigation of this relation, therefore, in the form of a revision of our conception of truth, is everywhere noticeable in the current philosophical program, and we welcome renewed opportunities of exchanging views on the subject." In this way Windelband pointed out that the opportunity for personal exchange of opinions is of great value to the philosopher, because every philosophy is, in addition to its being conditioned by facts, an expression of individuality. "We do not desire a synod or council to determine dogmatically any doctrines. We come together to weigh principles with one another; we desire to learn through personal exchange of ideas how to be just to all views; we believe that in their being set in opposition they will be fortified and polished, and that in this personal reciprocity every one will take a step forward on the path, whose goal is in the limitless." In Windelband's address the principal point is his reference to the organic connection between epistemology and metaphysics. He has correctly characterized the situation in contemporary philosophy, and the program of the Congress corresponds with this. Here we have renewed confirmation of the fact that interest in the problems of metaphysics is strengthened, rather than diminished, by epistemology.<sup>1</sup>

Windelband expressed the foregoing view again in his important address, "On the Concept of Law." The emancipation of the concept of law from anthropomorphism and its transcendental establishment by Kant cannot be made to furnish aid to subjectivism. The introduction of order into our perceptions and their elevation into experience by means of this concept, would be unthinkable unless order were ultimately given in the nature of things.

<sup>1</sup> Attention was called to this fact in my report for the year of 1907.

Windelband's interpretation of the concept of law leans unmistakably towards realism. To the discussion of the concept he adds a brief review of the notion of phenomenon. Hitherto one has been disposed to regard this notion *qualitatively*, and has, therefore, made a fundamental distinction between phenomenon and thing-in-itself. The tendency of modern epistemology, on the contrary, is to convert the relation into *quantitative* terms; the phenomenal world is a part of the real world. As every perception presents a choice of the possibilities of sensation, as every notion presents a choice of the possibilities of perception, so every theory, under a determinate epistemological aim, presents a choice of the given. This interesting view, which in a certain sense is a synthesis of Kant's and Fechner's ideas, will, no doubt, be completely developed in Windelband's forthcoming monograph on the Concept of Law. Windelband's theory of truth thus approximates that point of view, which I said in my last annual report was characteristic of the present philosophical tendency, to which other philosophers, especially Simmel, incline. The absolute opposition between knowing and being is surrendered in favor of a view, which sees in knowledge, together with morality and art, only *one* aspect of the world. These ideas are suggestive of an inexhaustibly rich and many-sided view of reality. Undoubtedly this conception has something in common with the position of Nietzsche, which differs from the traditional scepticism, by denying, not the possibility of knowledge in general, but the possibility of a homogenous (unitary) knowledge.

The importance of the problem of truth, in its mediatory position between epistemology and metaphysics, is indicated by the fact that it was the focus of discussion in the Congress. The immediate stimulus to the discussion was furnished by Professor Royce's address on Pragmatism in the first general session. The subject of the address was "*The Problem of Truth in the Light of Recent Research.*" The distinguished savant characterized in a few words three conceptions of truth: the instrumental, the individualistic, and the absolutistic. The first regards truth as a product of biological adaptations, the second as the arbitrary product of the individual will, the third as an eternal, over-indi-

vidual coherence in the essence of the logical spirit, to which the principles of logic and mathematics bear witness. Royce attempted to bring about a synthesis of these three views, by interpreting the absolutistic conception, not intellectualistically, but voluntaristically, as the form and norm of will. In this way he aims to convert transcendentalism into terms of Pragmatism, to reconcile epistemology with the claims of will. It is clear that Royce's position is intimately related to Neo-Fichteanism, which is at present influential in Germany. Common to both is the acknowledgment of the claims of pure logic to create absolute, eternal values, which include the autonomous and sovereign totality of the logical, viewed as the expression of an over-individual will.

In this form, Pragmatism would not have challenged the opposition of the exponents of logic; but inasmuch as the other advocates formulated Pragmatism in terms of the instrumental or biological concept of truth, the opposition of the aprioristic school was challenged, and all the groups of Neo-Kantians and Neo-Fichteans combined in combating the theory, which threatened to resolve the fundamental principles of knowledge into subjective relativity. The discussion of this topic was the climax of the Congress, and the issue was unquestionably favorable to the aprioristic position, which was supported by Royce.

The congress was divided into seven sections:

(1) History of philosophy; (2) general philosophy, metaphysics, and philosophy of nature; (3) psychology; (4) logic and epistemology; (5) ethics and sociology; (6) æsthetics; (7) philosophy of religion. In the second general session an ingenious and valuable dialectic exposition of æsthetics was presented in Benedetto Croce's address on *L'intuizione pura e il carattere lirico dell' arte*.

In the third general session Boutroux characterized concisely the general trend of philosophy in France since 1867.

Heinrich Maier gave an interesting and instructive address on David Friedrich Strauss, more particularly in his relation to materialism. The shorter papers in the special sections also brought valuable material to light.

It is deserving of special mention that the celebrated Indologist, Professor Deussen, presented to the second general session of the Congress his *History of Indian Philosophy*, just completed, with an appendix on China and Japan, and in a few expressive words pointed out the significance of the history of philosophy in general, and more especially of Brahmanic and Buddhistic philosophy.

This Congress, which brought together a body of the most eminent savants of the civilized world in the famous university city of Heidelberg, thus awakened the desire that philosophers might continue by the method of mutual contact to strengthen and enlarge the culture of the spirit. The international character of the Congress was again strikingly evident. That the evolution of civilization should not be determined by any particular national interest, that it should have unlimited cosmopolitan coöperation, was one of the chief notes struck in the Congress, and approved by loud applause. This feeling is a moral success of the Congress, in no way inferior to its theoretical success. The task of the Congress was not to convince its members of the validity of any particular view, but to present the possibility of mutual agreement on fundamental problems, within which the varying theories might be better worked out and so become more clearly differentiated from each other. Opposing theories in philosophy always constitute a stimulus to fruitful development. But the points within a given material where we must have clearness, are the selection of problems and the conception of ultimate aims and presuppositions.

The Congress showed the power of Neo-Kantianism, in the use made of it to repulse external attacks. Also from within it has lost none of its influence. During the past year the *Kantstudien* has published a series of interesting and valuable articles, which concern us here mainly in so far as they touch upon the fundamental problems of methodology and epistemology. In a thorough analysis of Heinrich Gomperz's philosophy, Professor August Messer opposes Gomperz's attempt to introduce a new method, the "pathempirical." He points out that this method, with its derivation of pure epistemological values from the feel-

ings, ends in psychologism. Messer's criticism, expressed in very subtle and precise argumentation, that Gomperz distinguishes too little between the subjective comprehension of values, substance, relation, identity, and their objective meaning, will scarcely apply in strictness to the second volume of Gomperz's *Noologie*, of which I shall have to speak later. *Kant in the Light of Ultramontane and Liberal Catholicism*, is the title of an article by Bauch, which deals with two representatives of these two religious tendencies. Bauch rejects the ultramontane standpoint emphatically. He characterizes the liberal standpoint as a half-way place, in so far as it ignores the confessional, on the one hand, and on the other, recognizes the absolute, and not merely the historical, significance of dogma.

Hönigswald treats epistemological problems in a notable article: *Zum Begriff der kritischen Erkenntnistheorie*, which takes issue with Uphues's work on *Kant und seine Vorgänger*. He discusses primarily the relation between epistemology and metaphysics, and rejects the metaphysical interpretation of the categories in favor of an immanent theory of experience.

Supplementary numbers of the *Kantstudien* appeared last year. I mention here *Kant's Lehre vom innern Sinn in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft* by Franz Rademaker, and *Kant's Stil in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft* by Ernst Fischer.

Riehl's comprehensive work, *Der philosophische Kritizismus*, the first volume of which in the second revised edition has come from the press of Engelmann, Leipzig, takes the reader back to the sources of Neo-Kantianism. Only about a third of the first edition reappears in the second; but the essential features of the work, the realistic interpretation of Kant, the insistence on the dependence of all experience on external things, receive even greater emphasis in the new edition. Riehl regards Locke as the first critical philosopher, and includes Descartes amongst the dogmatists. In this he differs entirely from the Marburg School, which classifies these two philosophers in the opposite way, as may be seen in Cassirer's lately published book *Das Erkenntnisproblem*. He regards Hume as the founder of modern positivism rather than as an exponent of scepticism. Both English philos-

ophers are subjected to a searching analysis. The history of the development and completion of the critical philosophy forms the climax and conclusion of the book. At this point Riehl directs his criticism particularly against two interpretations of the transcendental methodology, the psychologistic and idealistic. Psychology, he says, covers merely a part, the inner part of experience; consequently the whole system of experience cannot be based upon it. The idealistic position is equally untenable. In distinction from Berkeley, Kant never doubted the existence of external things; on the contrary, he made them the fundament of his philosophy, for the notion of phenomenon disappears with the notion of the thing-in-itself. Transcendental idealism asserts merely the ideality of pure space and pure time. He claims that these forms of perception represent merely the reaction of consciousness to the stimulus of external things. In this stimulus the reality of external things is clearly presupposed. For both of these theses, Riehl finds numerous historical confirmations in lately discovered sources. With Hume's principle of not extending the use of reason beyond the field of experience, Kant combined the principle, which Hume did not grasp, of interpreting the field of experience as not coincident with the vision of reason. The general tendency of the critical philosophy is finally characterized by Riehl in the sentence: The *Critique of Pure Reason* affirms the metaphysical, but rejects metaphysics.

Riehl is an avowed Neo-Kantian. He preserves carefully the balance between the subjective and objective, and rejects emphatically the one-sidedness, which has been the error of the great followers of Kant. Consequently, he opposes Fichte and Neo-Fichteanism.

The Neo-Fichteanism, which goes back to Rickert and Windelband, has found an interesting supporter in Münsterberg. His psychological writings had already pointed in this direction, but his *Philosophie der Werte*, published last year,<sup>1</sup> a book of extensive proportions, aims avowedly to revive the fundamental position of Fichte. The work is divided into two parts, the first of which presents a theory of values, and the second part a system

<sup>1</sup> Leipzig, Ambrosius Barth, pp. viii, 486.

of values. The first division handles the problem of principles with great clearness. The boundary line between value and reality is nicely drawn, one of the best discussions of this difficult problem that has been published. It is particularly significant that Münsterberg extends the concept of nature, reality, to include psychical phenomena, the inner world. Psychology suffers from a peculiar vacillation in the interpretation of its problems. The meaning of inner purpose and aim in the psychical life, its characteristic of intention, does not fall within psychology. The confusion of the two realms of causal and voluntaristic psychology obscures the relation between value and reality. For causal psychology, which analyzes inner experience, similarly to the analysis of external bodies, into its elements, there is nothing to which one can immediately ascribe value, not even to the feeling of value; for in the objective system of nature, this phenomenon is quite as independent of value as is a feeling to which no value attaches. The world, conceived as psycho-physical nature, is fundamentally independent of value, whether in molecular movement human organisms are destroyed or preserved, whether in human organization joy or pain, feelings of value or valuelessness, pass through the soul. This is the final word in the world of physics and psychology. But neither physics nor psychology exhaust the whole of reality. Rather the mere fact that we have physics and psychology is proof of the existence of an independent realm of values. For both of these denote an arbitrary transformation of immediate reality from an evaluating standpoint. While the content of physical and psychological reality is conceived as neutral, thinking itself acquires the character of intellectual evaluation. We may say in apparent paradox: the absence of value proves value.<sup>1</sup> Münsterberg goes on to show that in the concept of value there is implied an unconditioned, absolute value, which proves the relativistic, evolutionary, and pragmatic theories of value to be untenable. By these theories the world is dissolved in a dream. For every effort to attain

<sup>1</sup> [“The objects of the scientific judgments are without value, but the scientific judgments themselves are affirmations of value.” Münsterberg, *The Eternal Values*, p. 23 — Translator.]

logical, ethical, religious, and æsthetic values rises above the personal sphere into a transcendental, although not a metaphysical, world. It is neither a must nor ought that binds the human will to value. All values are derived from a pure will, which has no reference to the individual, but uses the individual merely as a means for the furtherance of the eternal reality. The will to value is an absolute, unequivocal, and pure will, independent of pleasure and pain. Münsterberg takes the case of a criminal to prove that ultimately the will even of a bad man aims at the good. A psychological analysis of an act of will shows that it is not at all determined by pleasure as an aim; the satisfaction of the will is not dependent upon pleasure or displeasure. There is a fundamental act of will of an over-personal kind: the will that demands a world, *i. e.*, that there be a persistent and coherent reality. We demand that there be a world, that the content of our experience be more than just passing experience, more than dream or chaos. "That experience is not merely individual life but a valid over-personal world; this is neither a truth, nor duty, nor beauty, nor a sacred good; for all truths, beauties, duties, and holinesses of the world are themselves necessarily dependent on the demand that there be a world."

The following are the several fundamental directions of evaluation: the value of conservation, the value of agreement, the value of realization, and the value of completion. Within these four directions we differentiate the immediate values of life and the purposive values of civilization. Further, in all these groups our experience may refer to three different fields, *viz.*, to the outer world, our inner world, or our fellow-world. The system of logical, æsthetic, ethical, and metaphysical values is discussed in the second part of the volume, in the theory of basic values, the cosmos, humanity, and the over-self, the aim of which is to formulate a philosophy of "eternal absolute deed of the over-self," an energistic optimism. Münsterberg is a follower and reviver of Fichte, not merely in his system of values and in the derivation of ethics, but especially in the epistemological basis of his concept of value. The doctrine of pure will, of will that demands that there be a world, in spite of the independent way in which Müns-



terberg carries it out, goes back to Fichte. The same advance beyond Kantianism is marked by it as characterized Fichte's philosophy. Reality in its complete fullness was for Kant an eternally foreign element, which the human spirit could master only in the form of intellectual statement. It could come no nearer to the inner essence of reality than that, and Kant's ethics and doctrine of freedom culminate in the idea of a complete isolation of the intellectual subject, his complete severance from the alien element of nature. Fichte, on the contrary, aimed from the standpoint of the ego to comprehend the non-ego, which for Kant was an impassable boundary. He (Fichte) regarded the non-ego as a necessary function of the ego, as its creation. He thereby overcame the dualistic opposition between two worlds. If one eliminates the metaphysical factor from this view, one discovers its real essence in the doctrine of the will that demands a world-identity.

Jonas Cohn's interesting work<sup>1</sup> is also influenced by the spirit of Fichte. But Fichte's influence here is felt less in ethics than in the general field of logic. This is true of the doctrine of the knowing ego, which Jonas Cohn, like Rickert, regards as an over-individual ego. In knowing, the individual ego strives to attain the standpoint of the over-individual ego. The over-individual ego, however, is neither a metaphysical reality nor a mere relation, but the totality of the constitutive forms of knowledge. The emancipation from the component parts of the individual ego is the problem of knowledge. In so far as man solves this problem, he approaches the over-individual ego. In a very comprehensive analysis of judgment, which also discusses the nature of inquiry and other intellectual functions, the author bases thereon his proof that all knowing is judging. With this is connected an investigation of the nature and kinds of relation. Then follows a long section on mathematical matters, occupied with the concepts of number, space, and the geometrical axioms. This is succeeded by a very remarkable chapter on continuity and the antinomies of the limitless, in which the author furnishes interesting discussions of space and time, and devotes himself to

<sup>1</sup> *Voraussetzungen und Ziele des Erkennens*, Leipzig, 1908, pp. v, 526.

the exposition of the difficulties involved in these concepts, amongst which the most important is the idea of a completed infinity. These antinomies are rooted in the tendency to think the world as a whole. The further discussions are occupied with the concepts of existence and reality, and with the foundations of the doctrine of the categories. The author also devotes attention to the reciprocal limits of psychology and logic. In logic the crucial value of truth has to be investigated. Psychology, on the contrary, is the constructive presentation of connected experience with reference to the individual subject, and with the aim of making it knowable from an over-individual standpoint. The transition to a system of values forms the conclusion of the work. Here Jonas Cohn shows a freer critical attitude towards Neo-Fichteanism and Neo-Hegelianism. He does not subordinate logic to ethics nor ethics to logic. He rejects entirely the blind scheme of subsumption. The relation between these two fields of values is rather one of mutual supplementation. Similar conditions hold good of religion and æsthetics. The factor of immediate experience that characterizes the system, points from the philosopher to the artist. Consequently, it is Goethe's name that determines the direction of such a great system.

The same motive that led Fichte beyond Kant, points from Fichte to Schelling. The material world of external nature is no longer to be regarded as a mere boundary idea, as an eternal foreign element, incomprehensible to the human spirit. Fichte made a beginning by interpreting it as the creation of the ego. But this was only a beginning. It is true, nature was no longer regarded as an impassable boundary, as Kant had regarded it. But it still retained for Fichte the character of a barrier that the absolute ego posits in order to overcome it. The whole of nature continued to be referred to the subject in a one-sided fashion, and so this system was a great anthropomorphic philosophy, which was unable to attain the ideal of pure knowing. Nature in its inwardness, in the fullness of its individual phenomenal forms, could not be mastered in this way. It was reserved for Schelling to emancipate philosophy from these anthropomorphic bonds, by interpreting subject and object as co-equal ema-

nations of the absolute, thus grasping the structure of being in its immanent logical character and necessity. The notion of emanation from the absolute, from the life of the pure idea is common to Schelling and Hegel. The point of divergence between them is not so much in the formulation of the problem as in the methodological manner of its treatment. Schelling grounded his philosophy ultimately on intuition, Hegel on the logical movement of dialectic.

Amongst the later philosophic movements, as I have repeatedly pointed out, Hartmann's school is most closely related to Schelling's views. Here also we have as the basic factor an absolute world-principle, the Unconscious, which includes nature and spirit. Arthur Drews, whose recent writings were referred to in my last report, has emphasized this historical connection. In the second volume of a collection of monographs edited by Drews and entitled *Der Monismus*,<sup>1</sup> the first volume of which was mentioned in my last article, this connection is again discussed. The second volume deals with historical matters, and contains essays by Liebert, Marie Joachimi, Otto Weiss, Max Wentscher, Wilhelm von Schnehen, Otto Braun, and an essay of especial interest by Alma von Hartmann entitled *Eduard von Hartmann's Konkreter Monismus*, in which the relation between the monism of the Unconscious and the philosophy of identity is made plain. This connection is also clear from Otto Braun's Schelling studies, *Hinauf zum Idealismus*,<sup>2</sup> in which the attempt is made to present Schelling's personality and doctrine in their relation to the intellectual movements of the romantic period and the present.

The difference between Schelling's philosophy of identity and von Hartmann's philosophy of the Unconscious, as shown by the above-mentioned writings, consists chiefly in the fact that for Schelling's aprioristic intuition, or dialectic method, von Hartmann substitutes an inductive and empirical method. In this, one recognizes an approximation to Fries, which however is formal, for induction in Hartmann's case is employed in the service of metaphysics, while in the Fries school it is employed in building up an epistemological psychology and phenomenology.

<sup>1</sup> Jena, Diederichs, pp. 201.

<sup>2</sup> Leipzig, Eckardt, 1908, pp. 154.

The clearest proofs of the foregoing are found, as one might expect, in Hartmann's own works, especially in his *System der Philosophie im Grundriss*, now being published by Haacke (Sachsa im Harz), of which the third, fourth, and fifth volumes, containing *Grundriss der Psychologie*, *Grundriss der Metaphysik*, *Grundriss der Axiologie*, appeared in 1908. Hegel's influence is at present less apparent. That the development of modern philosophy must ultimately take him into account, I have said repeatedly. Above all it is the purely logical, anti-psychological character of modern philosophical thought, the demand, if I may so say, of the theoretical spirit for a movement in terms of itself, that will naturally necessitate a return to Hegel. While this tendency in foreign countries, England, Italy, and Holland, has brought about a renaissance of Hegelianism, it has also found representatives in Germany, amongst whom I may name Medikus and especially Ferdinand Jacob Schmidt. Meanwhile, it is precisely its extreme radicalism that makes it impossible to keep this movement in the ascendant. It is all the while evident that dialectic is powerless to create new knowledge; it can only so interpret the old knowledge, gained by way of experience, that it may be called a genial exposition of the world-process, but incapable of becoming a substitute for real investigation. And so in this year we have in the German language only Bolland's new edition of Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*.<sup>1</sup> However, new editions of other works of Hegel are announced in Germany.

Although the influence of the dialectic has suffered constant diminution, owing to the growth of empiricism, it should be kept in mind that Hegel's influence on our time is not confined to this methodological point. On the contrary, his doctrine of the concrete spirit, which manifests itself in a manifold and yet unitary way in every sphere of civilization, has sunk much deeper into the consciousness of his successors. What is most characteristic of Hegel is his struggle to get beyond the stadium of the natural, to transcend the narrow limits of the subjective spirit. A higher spiritual being, richer in relations, which cannot be conceived

<sup>1</sup> Amsterdam, Müller, 1908.

from a naturalistic standpoint, envelops as a totality the individual. For its laws are fulfilled, not in the individual's existence, but only in the communal life, as it expresses itself in society and history. This view, which Hegel developed much more clearly than Schelling on its philosophical-historical side, is revived amongst contemporary thinkers, especially by Eucken. The notion of the life of the spirit, which Eucken is constantly striving to explain in its significance for humanity, is approximately the same idea as Hegel's notion of the objective and absolute spirit. This holds good also of the fact that both are concerned, not merely with a logical point of view, but with a metaphysical reality. The life of the spirit is not shut to humanity, neither is it a ready-made possession. Otherwise there would be no world-history, the very meaning of which is the gradual evolution and realization of eternal values in temporal existence. What more than anything else reveals the kinship between Eucken's fundamental postulates and those of Schelling, is the fact that Eucken does not oppose the inner world as the totality of values to external nature, but regards both, subject and object, as two aspects of nature, which can acquire absolute value only by being lifted to the independent and absolute life of the spirit. This standpoint has been stated in Eucken's recent writings: *Einführung in die Philosophie des Geisteslebens*, and *Der Sinn und Wert des Lebens*.<sup>1</sup> Only by faith in such an universal, spiritual world, including in itself man and nature, and transformed into historical reality by its unceasing movement, can one, in Eucken's opinion, escape pessimism and nihilism.

In another sense, George Simmel approximates the spirit of Hegel. His *Soziologie*, a comprehensive analysis of the forms of human association, belongs here both by reason of its method and its matter. The fascinating peculiarity of Simmel's philosophy is that its form, by its own power, seeks and posits an adequate content. And so it is that the logical mode in which Simmel handles the social problem, gives to his subject-matter a philosophical significance. As a general characteristic, one must

<sup>1</sup>Leipzig, Quelle und Meyer.

say that Simmel's sociology is not at all an ætiological, but rather a strictly phenomenological presentation. He does not inquire into the ultimate moving causes and stimuli of social life, but rather into its inner structure and configuration, into the fullness of its characteristic relations. He gives greater prominence to mathematical than to dynamic factors. In the first chapter, important for epistemology, entitled *Das Problem der Soziologie*, which is stated in the Kantian fashion, How is Society Possible?, the fundamental preliminary questions are examined. It is not the subject-matter of the inquiry, but purely and simply the formal mode of looking at the problems, that determines the direction and nature of sociology. It is the doctrine of reciprocal human relations; its territory is an inter-individual territory. "We are here concerned with the microscopic-molecular processes within human society, which constitute, however, the real events, that are bound together into macroscopic, fixed unities and systems. That men look upon one another and are jealous of one another, that they write letters to one another and share their midday meal, that apart from all tangible interests they are moved to sympathy or antipathy, that gratitude for an altruistic act furnishes irresistible stimulus to further acts, that one inquires the way of another, that men dress and adorn themselves, all these thousand relations, momentary or lasting, conscious or unconscious, trivial or important, thus cited at random, bind us unceasingly together." An extraordinary sense for relations, that characterizes Simmel, enables him to state and solve his problem from this standpoint. Little as Simmel is a dialectician, there is nevertheless an element in the rhythm of his thought, that challenges comparison with Hegel. By stripping concrete objects of their relations and forms, by turning exclusively to their logical character, form as such acquires the character of a creative world-power, that dominates the structure of all matter, but is not enthralled by matter. The doctrine of form becomes the doctrine of the cosmos itself; limitless thought discovers its stuff and its goal within itself; it hovers sovereignly over all individual being, as its only meaning and value. Simmel's works also form in a certain sense a *Phenomenologie des Geistes*, to be sure with the great difference that Sim-

mel is no rationalist, that the world for him is not resolved into abstraction, that his forms are psychical rather than notional, and that consequently for him the irrational and plural character of being persists. This circumstance brings him into near relation with that group of psychologists and phenomenologists, to which we have now to turn our attention. It also makes him akin to Friedrich Nietzsche.

As I explained in my former report, Kant's influence is not exhausted by the line of development from Fichte to Hegel. While these thinkers aim to deduce the system of pure knowledge *a priori*, by way of pure logic, an aim adopted also by the Neo-Kantians, Fries turns from the objective proof to the subjective, phenomenological derivation of the categories. Amongst his modern followers one may name as preëminent Leonard Nelson, the founder of the new Fries School. The fundamental principles which he takes over from his master, were discussed in such detail in my report of 1908, that a mention will suffice here. Nelson has formulated his ideas in a book, *Ueber das sogenannte Erkenntnisproblem*,<sup>1</sup> which presents his theory on a broader basis, but nothing essentially new is added. He attempts again to prove the impossibility of epistemology, or, more properly speaking, of epistemological criticism. His chief purpose is to show that the critique of reason can be understood only in a psychological sense, which differs from psychologism in that the categories are not derived from inner experience, but only exhibited in it.

I have repeatedly called attention to the connection between the new Fries School, on the one hand, and the phenomenological inquiries and theory of objects (*Gegenstandstheorie*) of such pure logicians as Husserl, Stumpf, and Meinong, on the other. The ideality of logical activity is acknowledged, but the method of its discovery is inner experience. In this connection I should like to mention Heinrich Gomperz's *Noologie*, the second volume of his *Weltanschauungslehre*, the first half of which, *Einleitung und Semasiologie*, appeared last year.<sup>2</sup> Gomperz distinguishes here

<sup>1</sup>Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.

<sup>2</sup>Jena, Diederichs, pp. 297.

more sharply than in his *Methodologie* between the logical and psychological treatment of thought.

The purpose of the *Noologie* is to overcome the contradictions that arise from this two-fold objective and subjective mode of treatment. Its field is, therefore, limited. In the first place, uniformity in the temporal process of the psychical is eliminated, because this has no immediate points of content with logic. "And so one may say in general," Gomperz writes, "that Noölogy has to do with the static view of thinking consciousness, the phenomenological description of the intellectual psychical life, or in short, with classificatory investigation into the psychology of thought; for differences in objective thought correspond merely with the several kinds of thinking consciousness, without regard to the temporal aspects or conditions of their concrete realization." One sees that this field coincides, at least partially, with what Husserl calls phenomenology. Along with this classification of thoughts into subjective and objective, one may examine them with reference to their meaning and validity. The *Semasiologie* contains the theory of meaning. Within the problem of meaning, there arise on the boundary between logic and psychology, four main questions, which Gomperz answers in terms of his "pathempirical" method. Also an exhaustive historical development of the meaning-problem in Nominalism, Realism, and Rationalism is presented by the author, and he attempts in his explanation to reconcile the opposition in these extreme points of view.

The work of the well-known thinker, Eugen Heinrich Schmitt, entitled *Kritik der Philosophie*,<sup>1</sup> falls apparently outside the range of our discussion up to this point, for, as the title indicates, it goes back to the presuppositions of philosophy in general, and aims to uproot them. One would, however, be quite mistaken, if one were to suppose that this were due to sceptical or positivistic motives, as in the case of Avenarius or Mach. It is rather mystical or gnostic points of view that determine Schmitt, the author of a work in two volumes, *Die Gnosis*. The fundamental error of philosophy, in Schmitt's opinion, lies in the fact that it has attempted from the start to explain knowledge in a one-sided

<sup>1</sup> Leipzig, Eckardt, pp. 507.



way, as conditioned by the knowledge of nature, the knowledge of the outer world, and so has regarded it as an imitation, a copy of external reality. It is, therefore, closed to an understanding of the most valuable realm, the inner world, by regarding this as a copy of another reality and not as immediate reality. But here the distinction between phenomenon and reality is destroyed; the knowledge of the inner world is intuitive knowledge. There is, therefore, no opposition between illusion and truth. The infinite that appears in man's inner self, is the most immediate and assured notion of which he can be conscious. Schmitt does not put this idea forth in an aphoristic way; he attempts to establish it by a careful analysis of human consciousness. He sketches a picture of its structure, of its rising to constantly higher dimensional altitudes from punctual sensation to three dimensional images and the endless forms of conceptual thought. Schmitt's mode of treatment is also psychological and phenomenological, an empirical mode. What distinguishes him from the Fries direction is that he revives Schelling's doctrine of intellectual intuition, and believes that in inner experience itself one grasps immediately the absolute and infinite. At this point, the gnostic and romantic element in his thought comes to light. Again we see how the several movements of thought appear to pass over into each other, and there is need of constant analysis to keep clearly in mind the ultimate conditions of knowledge, in their interconnections and distinctions.

The philosophical movement in Germany grows in ever widening circles. The Heideiburg Congress has again proved that interest in philosophy is not confined to the academic world. It has shown that in the most varied disciplines, especially in the investigation of nature, there is need of philosophical elucidation, and that wider strata of population are seeking deeper explanations of the ultimate principles of existence. The practical, ethical desire for the redemptive power of a great philosophy is stronger than the theoretical stimulus. And so it happens that a thinker like Nietzsche, by the greatness and impressiveness of his personality, has exerted a deep influence, although his creations fall for the most part outside the realm of general discussion.

This affective impulse, this spiritual longing, is incalculably important for the renaissance of philosophy, because the most inward stimulus to a comprehensive system is never merely theoretical.

One of the most significant signs of the increasing influence of philosophical ideas is the large number of new editions of the works of great thinkers prepared for the public. In the first rank stands the publishing house of Dürr in Leipzig, whose *Philosophische Bibliothek* represents a substantial collection of old and new works. Amongst them may be named Rene Descartes's *Meditationen* (vol. 27), translated by Buchanau, and accompanied by a commentary; David Hume, *Eine Untersuchung über den menschlichen Verstand*, edited by Raoul Richter (vol. 35); Immanuel Kant, *Kleinere Schriften zur Logik und Metaphysik*, edited with an introduction by Vorländer (vol. 46); Spinoza, *Theologisch-Politischer Traktat, Abhandlung über die Verbesserung des Verstandes, Abhandlung vom Staate*, translated with an introduction by Gebhardt (vols. 93, 95); Schleiermacher, *Weinachtsfeier*, with introduction and register by Mulert (vol. 117). All of the volumes are sold at low prices, and are admirably edited. In addition to the foregoing, the following are also published in this collection: Vorländer's instructive and extraordinary *Geschichte der Philosophie* in two volumes, Witasek's *Grundlinien der Psychologie*, which, after an introduction on general preliminary problems, is divided into a psychology of intellect and psychology of feeling; Kirchner's *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Grundbegriffe*, revised by Michaelis.

Further, the collection of historical monographs on philosophical concepts, planned by Winter in Heidelberg under the title of *Synthesis*, is a response to the growing interest in the principles of philosophical thought and their historical development. Of the collection, one monograph has been published, Julius Baumann's *Der Wissensbegriff* (pp. vi, 229), and others are in preparation by Windelband, Rehmke, Ziegler, Joël, Stöhr, Menzer, Külpe, Drews, Vossler, Bäumker, Bauch, Kabitz, Hönigswald, and Ewald.

To the Göschen series a new volume has been added, viz., Bruno Bauch's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, covering more particu-

larly modern philosophy to Kant. The work combines the great advantages of a popular exposition, with rigid exactitude and the complete mastery of the present state of historical criticism and sources. Its arrangement of the subject-matter is at once clear and exhaustive. The five divisions are as follows: The period of the philosophy of morality and religion; the speculative-dogmatic philosophy of nature; philosophy dominated by rationalism; philosophy dominated by empiricism; the philosophy of nature based on exact investigation. The brief exposition would serve admirably as an introduction to the philosophical problems of our time.

The most tangible expression of the current struggle for philosophical insight continues to be found in neo-romanticism. Its centre is the publishing house of Diederichs in Jena, whose activity was described in detail in my last report. Lately the Leipzig publisher, Eckardt, has issued works of importance to neo-romanticism. His selections from Schelling, mentioned last year, deserve the highest praise. Similar selections from the writings of Fichte and Hegel are in preparation.

A series of interesting books is published by Diederichs, which in part go beyond romanticism back to classical antiquity. *Die Vorsokratiker*, published in selections by Nestle, and Preisendanz's translations of Plato's *Gorgias* and *Menon* belong here. To the field of romanticism belong Steffen's "*Lebenserinnerungen aus dem Kreise der Romantik*," published in selections by Gundelfinger; Schelling's *Schöpferisches Handeln*, edited with an introduction by Emil Fuchs; Rousseau's *Kulturideale* collected by Spranger. The two books, last named, present an epitome of the chief doctrines of Schelling and Rousseau.

Last year, writings occasioned by Darwin's centennial offered proof, even in this field, of the growth of idealism. Biological naturalism has lost ground both in epistemology and ethics. This comes clearly to view in Max Stirner's work, *Die Lehre Darwins in ihren letzten Folgen*,<sup>1</sup> a second edition of which was quickly called for. The work is to be recommended to the attention of everyone interested in philosophical and moral prob-

<sup>1</sup>Berlin, Hofmann and Co., pp. vi, 244.

lems, especially to persons vacillating between naturalism and idealism. It offers a rigid demonstration that a genuinely human ethics cannot be based on the postulates of the theory of selection, and that the principle of the struggle for existence can establish only the brute morality of might. Stirner shows with logical care that wherever ethical ideas are developed from naturalistic postulates, contradictions and arbitrariness are involved. And so one may regard this book as an indirect support of idealism.

The essence of neo-romanticism, viewed in this connection, appears to me to be in a transitional stage. It is characteristic of romanticism, that it represents a starting point rather than a conclusion. Whenever a new field of spiritual life is disclosed, or hidden possibilities are revealed to the astonished gaze, they are at first experienced as strange and alien, characteristics which the fancy readily converts into the notion of the romantic. The business of philosophers and artists, however, is not to stop here, or indeed to heighten artificially the charm of the unknown, but to translate the unconscious into terms of consciousness, and to clarify the obscure. Therefore, real romanticism leads of itself to that synthesis of idealism and realism, which is the essential mark of classical art and philosophy. We must, consequently, expect that neo-romanticism will become crystallized into more complete and noble forms, will not sink into formless pseudo-mysticism, but on the contrary, survive in the transformation and clarification of the mysterious and uncomprehended. Joël writes in his dialogical work, *Der freie Wille*:<sup>1</sup> "I see in classicism merely romanticism formed and comprehended, reduced to determinations and thereby transcended. For romanticism lives in the undetermined, in the endless overstepping of boundaries, in the endless overcoming of the fixed, in endless flux, mutation, and variation." These sentences are found in a book, which one may regard, to a great extent, as an attempt to adopt the full import of romanticism, and by that very fact inwardly to overcome it. It is a book, rich in matter, impressive, almost passionate, which the distinguished thinker of Basle wrote, not so much as an abstract formulation of a system of philosophy,

<sup>1</sup> München, Bruckmann, pp. xvii, 724.

as a personal expression of his own inner life. The mechanism of nature is to be understood in its mere relativity, which, far from enslaving organic and conscious life, is dominated by it. Freedom rises above mechanical necessity, but freedom is not the highest word in the romantic vocabulary; on the contrary, it is subordinate to a still higher ethical and ideal necessity. Schelling, the philosopher of romanticism, attempted a reconciliation between freedom and necessity. Goethe, the artist, who completed the transition from romanticism to classicism, realized this reconciliation in his work and life. We may, therefore, expect that neo-romanticism will break away from its one-sided subjectivism and recognize freedom as the efflux of conformity to a higher law; that it will surmount its arbitrariness in seeing and fashioning, and will rise above the vacillating sport of idealizing fancy to a new all-comprehending reality.

OSCAR EWALD.

VIENNA.

## REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

*A Pluralistic Universe: Hibbert Lectures at Manchester College on the Present Situation in Philosophy.* By WILLIAM JAMES. New York and London, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909.—pp. vi, 405.

In the Preface to *The Will to Believe* (dated December, 1896) Professor James remarked that the validity of the "radical empiricist" attitude "admits of being argued in as technical a shape as any one can desire, and possibly I may be spared to do later a share of that work. Meanwhile these essays seem to light up with a certain dramatic reality the attitude itself." At the close of his Gifford lectures (1902) he held out the same hope of a statement of the metaphysical argument which was there crowded out by the wealth of the psychological material. But his later volumes have rather continued the line of treatment exemplified in *The Will to Believe*, the sub-title of which was "Essays in Popular Philosophy." The volume on *Pragmatism* is similarly entitled "Popular Lectures on Philosophy," and the present series of lectures, though delivered to an academic audience, is also deliberately popular in style and method. "It is one thing to delve into subtleties by one's self with pen in hand, or to study out abstruse points in books, but quite another thing to make a popular lecture out of them" (p. 184). Professor James seems to have a growing and almost morbid dread of the "academic," the "pedantic," the "professorial," in style. Now that he has ceased to be an active professor, he seems to have conceived a supreme contempt for the professorial tribe as such. Professors, he tells us, are great in technique, but "few professorial philosophers have any vision." More and more it becomes clear that our author has found his own true *métier* in the rôle of the popular essayist in philosophy, that his writing is dominated by the essayist's desire to interest and surprise, by the essayist's concern for picturesque effect, by the essayist's *art de bien dire*. The result is a brilliant literary effort rather than a substantial contribution to philosophical discussion. I have spoken of Professor James's dread of the pedantic as almost morbid; for surely the use of technical terms is no less necessary, and no more pedantic, in philosophy than in science. Pedantry is the unnecessary and affected use of technical or learned terms and phrases; and we all do well to be on our guard against this. But to be always on the watch for the popular effective-

ness of our arguments in a philosophical discussion is a habit no less vicious. On its literary side, the present volume is comparatively free from the defects which marked the lectures on *Pragmatism*. The consciousness that he was addressing an Oxford audience seems to have restrained the author from the use of the colloquialisms and slang American phrases which disfigured that work, though he still allows himself to speak of "Hume, Kant & Co." (p. 250), and occasionally relapses into his former habit of interjecting a German phrase or term into the midst of an English sentence, to the confusion of the "popular" audience to which the volume (if not the lectures), is addressed, and in any case to the sad detriment of the English style. Nor can I leave unmentioned the peculiarly irritating eccentricity of printing adjectives like "English," "Hegelian," after the French and German fashion, without capitals. Is not this mannerism just a little "pedantic"?

In the Preface to *Pragmatism* Professor James tells us that "there is no logical connection between pragmatism, as I understand it, and . . . 'radical empiricism.' The latter stands on its own feet." In the present volume the argument for pluralism, which is identified with radical empiricism, is conducted, in the main, without reference to pragmatism, though the affinity between these two views is occasionally emphasized. We may, therefore, keep the question of pragmatism out of the discussion of the nature and merits of the argument here offered in support of pluralism or radical empiricism.

The question primarily discussed in this volume is rather one of method than one of doctrine, though, of course, the adoption of one or other of the alternative methods leads to the acceptance of the corresponding theory or doctrine of reality. The alternative methods are "vision" and technical argumentation, and Professor James's preference is distinctly for the former method or attitude. "A man's vision is the great fact about him. Who cares for Carlyle's reasons, or Schopenhauer's, or Spencer's? A philosophy is the expression of a man's intimate character, and all definitions of the universe are but the deliberately adopted reactions of human characters upon it" (p. 20). "Philosophy is more a matter of passionate vision than of logic, . . . logic only finding reasons for the vision afterwards" (p. 176). The true method, therefore, is that of direct and immediate experience, of intuition, of sympathetic self-identification with the object, of analogy, of life, and especially of the religious life. "For my own part, I have finally found myself compelled to *give up the logic*, fairly, squarely, and irrevocably. It has an imperishable use in human life,

but that use is not to make us theoretically acquainted with the essential nature of reality. . . . Reality, life, experience, concreteness, immediacy, use what word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows and surrounds it. . . . So I prefer bluntly to call reality if not irrational then at least non-rational in its constitution, — and by reality here I mean reality where things *happen*, all temporal reality without exception. I myself find no good warrant for even suspecting the existence of any reality of a higher denomination than that distributed and strung-along and flowing sort of reality which we finite beings swim in. That is the sort of reality given us, and that is the sort with which logic is so incommensurable” (pp. 212, 213). Our philosophy runs “thick” or “thin” according as we adopt the method of direct vision or that of logic and discursive thought. “All the thickness, concreteness, and individuality of experience exists in the immediate and relatively unnamed stages of it, to the richness of which, and to the standing inadequacy of our conceptions to match it, Professor Bergson so emphatically calls our attention” (p. 280). We must “go behind the conceptual function altogether,” and “look to the more primitive flux of the sensational life for reality’s true shape” (p. 282). For the discovery of this method Professor James acknowledges without reservation his indebtedness to Bergson. “I have now to confess . . . that I should not now be emancipated, not now subordinate logic with so very light a heart, or throw it out of the deeper regions of philosophy to take its rightful and respectable place in the world of simple human practice, if I had not been influenced by a comparatively young and very original french writer, Professor Henri Bergson. Reading his works is what has made me bold. . . . For our present purpose, then, the essential contribution of Bergson to philosophy is his criticism of intellectualism. In my opinion he has killed intellectualism definitively and without hope of recovery” (pp. 214, 215). “When I read recent transcendentalist literature, — I must partly except my colleague Royce! — I get nothing but a sort of marking of time, champing of jaws, pawing of the ground, and resettling into the same attitude, like a weary horse in a stall with an empty manger. It is but turning over the same few threadbare categories, bringing the same objections, and urging the same answers and solutions, with never a new fact or a new horizon coming into sight. But open Bergson, and new horizons loom on every page you read. It is like the breath of the morning and the song of birds. It tells of reality itself, instead of merely reiterating what dusty-minded professors have written about what other previous professors have thought. Nothing in Bergson is shop-worn or at



second hand" (p. 265). This is also the secret of the attraction which Professor James finds in Fechner, "whose thickness is a refreshing contrast to the thin, abstract, indigent, and threadbare appearance, the starving, schoolroom aspect, which the speculations of most of our absolutist philosophers present" (p. 144).

Such a disparaging comparison between the philosophic theory of Reality or experience and Reality or experience itself is, of course, by no means novel. The novelty of Professor James's position lies in the demand that Philosophy shall match the concreteness and livingness of life or experience, shall reproduce reality in all its concrete "thickness." Such a demand seems to me to be the result of a confusion of the functions of philosophy and poetry or religion. Of the poet or the seer we demand insight, but not the reasons or grounds of this insight; of the philosopher, as of the man of science, we demand not mere "vision," but theory or reasoned explanation. The continuity of the effort of the scientific and the philosophic mind to understand or think out the content of reality or experience is implied in the very conception of philosophy. But Professor James would assimilate philosophy rather to the intuitional and emotional apprehension of poetry and religion than to the conceptual apprehension of science. "Philosophy should seek this kind of living understanding of the movement of reality, not follow science in vainly patching together fragments of its dead results" (p. 264). It is in this connection that he really assumes the validity of the "pragmatic" interpretation of the function of science, and the "pragmatic" limitation of the significance of scientific explanation. Apart from this, mainly implicit, basis there is no argument in the present work for the proposed differentiation of philosophy from science, and its assimilation to the unscientific or immediate modes of apprehension which are represented as so much more adequate. That the author does not realize the full implications of his condemnation of "logic" and of "intellectualism" becomes clear when he actually asks us "to think in non-conceptualized terms" (p. 290); when he says that "religious experience, peculiarly so called, needs, in my opinion, to be carefully considered and interpreted by every one who aspires to reason out a more complete philosophy" (p. 307), and that while "the clay matrix and the noble gem," whether of religion or of anything else, "must first come into being unsifted," yet "once extricated, the gem can be examined separately, conceptualized, defined, and insulated"<sup>1</sup> (p. 316). The truth seems to be that what, taken in its full and literal meaning, would be a condemnation of

<sup>1</sup> Italics mine.

philosophy or the "thinking view" of reality, as such, is only intended by the author as an indirect attack upon a certain system in philosophy, the system, namely, of "intellectualism" or absolute idealism. What he is anxious to proclaim, in this as in previous volumes of essays and lectures, is not the bankruptcy of philosophy, but the bankruptcy of this particular type of philosophical theory.

It is unnecessary here to point out that the alternatives considered in these lectures, namely, monism (= intellectualism or absolute idealism) and pluralism (= radical empiricism), are not exhaustive. The monadism of Leibnitz is a pluralistic theory, but Leibnitz could hardly be called a radical empiricist, and there is a materialistic as well as an idealistic form of the monistic theory. What we are concerned with is the question of the justice or injustice of Professor James's criticism of the idealistic form of the monistic theory, and this raises the previous question whether the theory criticised in these lectures is the theory of absolute idealism as held by any of its recognized expositors or, like the theory criticised in the lectures on *Pragmatism*, a fiction of Professor James's own imagination. His representation of the idealistic view seems to me to be vitiated by two fundamental misconceptions. In the first place he represents the absolute as standing to the finite individual knower in the relation of subject to object. "For monism the world is no collection, but one great all-inclusive fact outside of which is nothing—nothing is its only alternative. When the monism is idealistic, this all-enveloping fact is represented as an absolute mind that makes the partial facts by thinking them, just as we make objects in a dream by dreaming them, or personages in a story by imagining them. To *be*, on this scheme, is, on the part of a finite thing, to be an object for the absolute; and on the part of the absolute it is to be the thinker of that assemblage of objects. . . . The absolute is nothing but the knowledge of those objects; the objects are nothing but what the absolute knows" (pp. 36, 37). "The notion that the absolute is made of constituents on which its being depends is the rankest empiricism. The absolute as such has *objects*, not constituents, and if the objects develop selfhoods upon their own several accounts, those selfhoods must be set down as facts additional to the absolute consciousness, and not as elements implicated in its definition" (p. 123). "Since (if we are idealists) nothing, whether part or whole, exists except for a witness, we proceed to the conclusion that the unmitigated absolute as witness of the whole is the one sole ground of being of every partial fact, the fact of our own existence included." It follows that "we are constituent

parts of the absolute's eternal field of consciousness." But "it is impossible to reconcile the peculiarities of our experience with our being only the absolute's mental objects. . . . Objects of thought are not things *per se*. They are there only *for* their thinker, and only *as* he thinks them. How, then, can they become severally alive on their own accounts and think themselves quite otherwise than as he thinks them? It is as if the characters in a novel were to get up from the pages, and walk away and transact business of their own outside of the author's story" (pp. 192-194). Professor James gives no citations in support of this interpretation of absolute idealism, though the entire force of his criticism depends upon the accuracy of his statement of the theory. It would be impossible to find support for such an interpretation in the text of Hegel or of any of the more recent idealists, such as Mr. Bradley and Professor Royce or the late Master of Balliol and T. H. Green.

A second, and no less fatal misunderstanding of the idealistic view is Professor James's failure to distinguish the higher logic of the theory from the "logic of identity," and the resulting interpretation of idealistic monism as simply the opposite of pluralism, the one being the "all-form" and the other the "each-form" of philosophy, the one the collective and the other the distributive view of reality; while the very essence of the theory is the effort to unify the manifold, and the whole which it attempts to reach is far from being the mere collective unity of the parts. While the contention that the manifold of sensation is already a network of relations may have some relevancy against Green's version of the idealistic theory, such an interpretation of reality is demanded by the Hegelian or Bradleyan statement of idealism. In many passages accordingly we find Professor James adopting, in spite of himself, the idealist's fashion of speech. "Look where you will, you gather only examples of the same amid the different, and of different relations existing as it were in solution in the same thing" (p. 270). "The absolute is said to perform its feats by taking its other into itself. But that is exactly what is done when every individual morsel of the sensational stream takes up the adjacent morsels by coalescing with them. This is just what we mean by the stream's sensible continuity. No element *there* cuts itself off from any other element, as concepts cut themselves off from concepts. No part *there* is so small as not to be a place of conflux. No part there is not really *next* its neighbors; which means that . . . no part absolutely excludes another, but that they compenetrates and are cohesive; . . . that whatever is real is telescoped and diffused into

other reals ; that, in short, every minutest thing is already its hegelian 'own other,' in the fullest sense of the term" (pp. 271, 272). Yet he objects to Monism that it "insists that when you come down to reality as such, to the reality of realities, everything is present to *everything* else in one vast instantaneous co-implicated completeness — nothing can in *any* sense, functional or substantial, be really absent from anything else, all things interpenetrate and telescope together in the great total conflux" (p. 322). On the other hand, he contends that "if the each-form be the eternal form of reality no less than it is the form of temporal appearance, we still have a coherent world, and not an incarnate incoherence, as is charged by so many absolutists. Our 'multiverse' still makes a 'universe'; for every part, though it may not be in actual or immediate connection, is nevertheless in some possible or mediated connection with every other part however remote, through the fact that each part hangs together with its very next neighbors in inextricable interfusion" (p. 325). Professor James tries to differentiate this theory from that of "the rationalistic block-universe, entire, unmitigated, and complete" by the fact that, while each term in the series is "one with its next neighbors," "yet the total 'oneness' never gets absolutely complete" (p. 327). Similarly he urges, in reply to Professor Taylor's charge of self-contradiction, that "what pluralists say is that a universe really connected loosely, after the pattern of our daily experience, is possible, and that for certain reasons it is the hypothesis to be preferred" (p. 76). Finally we find him admitting, in spite of all that he says about radical empiricism and the non-rationality of reality, that "the alternative of an universe absolutely rational or absolutely irrational is forced and strained, and that a *via media* exists which . . . is to be preferred. *Some* rationality certainly does characterize our universe ; and, weighing one kind with another, we may deem that the incomplete kinds that appear are on the whole as acceptable as the through-and-through sort of rationality on which the monistic systematizers insist" (p. 81). It would be a difficult task to reconcile these various statements, and to extricate from them either a clear and coherent view of idealism or a clear and coherent statement of pluralism.

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*Völkerpsychologie: Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythos und Sitte.* VON WILHELM WUNDT. Zweiter Band, Mythos und Religion. Dritter Teil. 1909. — pp. xii, 792. Dritter Band, Die Kunst. Zweite, neu bearbeitete Auflage. 1908. — pp. x, 564. Leipzig, Wilhelm Engelmann.

What is here announced as the third volume, second edition, of Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie* consists in a revised, enlarged, and redistributed form of chapters one and two of the original second volume, the third, concluding part of which, appearing at about the same time, is dated a year later. The explanation which Wundt gives of this anomaly is as follows. Originally planned for three volumes, the work grew inordinately in the process of composition. The first volume, treating of language, became two, called 'parts,' and the second, treating of myths and religion, three. In particular, the discussion of imagination, and specifically of imagination in art, in the first part of volume two was much too long to serve merely as an introduction to the genetic psychology of myths and religion. Wundt, therefore, without waiting for the completion of the work, decided to publish the questionable material separately, calling it a second edition of volume three with reference to a possible future edition of the other volumes, in which parts one and two of the first would appear as volumes one and two, and parts two and three of the second, — doubtless introduced by chapter three of the present part one, a chapter on the myth-making imagination, — as volumes four and five. The method of publication is amazing, but we have to take from Wundt what we get. It will not pass unnoticed that with the change of plan the three main divisions of *Völkerpsychologie*, on which some stress was placed at the outset, should now become four and should so appear in the sub-title of the work.

Three new sections are added in the revision: one on the object of a genetic psychological study of art, namely, to determine the motives and aims of artistic production; one on the elementary phenomena of creative imagination, Wundt now assuming, in addition to the processes of *Einfühlung* previously recognized, as a peculiar resultant of the general mental functions involved, a creative shaping of the material, and that not alone by the producing artist, but also by the æsthetically appreciating spectator; and the third, a final section on the unity of the musical and the plastic arts, the two groups into which, on Wundt's scheme, all the arts are divided. The important conclusion of the whole survey is that man's art, like his philosophy, is an expression of his *Weltanschauung*, and that therefore those the-

ories are false which find its essence in some abstract idea, such as the production of beauty, the feeling of æsthetic satisfaction, or the awakening of a contemplative mood. One result of the appearance of these valuable discussions under an appropriate title in a separate volume may be confidently expected, — they will no longer escape the attention of serious students of psychological æsthetics, as they well might under the cover of an introduction to mythology and religion.

The discussion of these latter topics is continued and completed in the other volume before us in two long chapters, the fifth and sixth, entitled respectively "Nature-myths" and the "Origin of Religion." A noteworthy feature of the treatment is the amount of space given to the study of the *märchen*. This topic fills over two hundred and sixty pages, being nearly half of the fifth chapter and a third of the volume. The reasons assigned for this distribution of the material are the comparative neglect of the *märchen* by mythologists, the tendency being to treat it as a pendant to the heroic saga, and Wundt's view of its importance as containing the most primitive form of myth; on the other hand, the special forms of religion are so dependent on historical and cultural conditions, while the motives to its development are in general so uniform, that the treatment here could be comparatively brief. Characteristically throughout, at various points in the discussion, Wundt takes occasion to combat those mythological interpretations which start from some higher level or from an artificial system. Thus he rejects the view which, first assuming an original nature-significance of some hero, god or myth, proceeds thence to picture the particular features contained in the mythological tradition, and even more emphatically does he reject the now commoner view which finds the origin of all or most myths in one or more of the heavenly phenomena (sun-, moon- and astral-theories). And although admitting degeneration in details, he has, of course, no sympathy with a general degeneration-hypothesis. Systems of myths grew naturally, — and he seeks to show how, — out of combinations of separate myths and the lower forms preceded the higher. The earliest were simple fairy-tales, a species of narrative fiction as primitive as the song and the dance, and their content was not celestial, but the fortunes of human life. The simplest *märchen* are pure tales of adventure.

Along with the *märchen* Wundt reckons as forms of the development the saga and the legend, distinguished as follows. The *märchen* is characterized by the absence of any definite relations to time and place and by a purely imaginary connection of events determined by the emotions. Its casuality is magical. The saga is of events related

to place and time and, on occasion, to historical personalities; its phenomena are those of real life, though for the most part wonderful, and the hero himself possesses only the common human qualities, though in a degree surpassing the natural limits of human capacity. The legend is a sub-species of the saga. Originally applied to the stories of the Christian martyrs, the name is extended to that important class of sagas in which the hero is the object of a cultus, either as an ancestor or as a whilom benefactor. The comic legend is an easily explicable parallel to the burlesque pantomime in savage dances, to the satyr plays of the Greek drama, or to the humorous episodes in the mediæval passion plays. A peculiar position is occupied in this scheme by the sagas of the gods. They cease to be real sagas so far as they return to the magical notions of the *märchen* and to an elevation beyond space and time. This is especially the case when they lose connection with the sagas of heroes. Hence the view that theological myths form a class by themselves. Wundt's own view is that they are either *märchen* or sagas or a mixture of both. There is no single myth, he holds, which does not belong to one or the other of the forms mentioned. From them arise first mixed forms and then deliberate poetic fictions.

The *märchen* begins by containing as its principal part matter that is believed, but ends as free poetic fiction. All manner of combinations intervene. This suggests the difficult problem of distinguishing the element of accredited myth from that of conscious poetry. The problem cannot be solved by examining the fusion of the two in the developed mythologies, but only by comparison of many products of related origin exhibiting similar motives, now in simpler form and now in the modified combination. Wundt finds the distinguishing mark of poetic creation in the unity of the thought; the mythical elements, arising from the general conditions of a community, are the particular ideas of the myth-making imagination which furnish its substrate. But this affords no criterion of belief, for the very stability of form given by the poetic elaboration may often fit the tale for general acceptance. The peculiar mixed forms produced in the transition from the pure *märchen*-myth to the pure *märchen*-fiction bring more specific marks of distinction. Wundt names the *lie-märchen*, where the story is a regular 'whopper,' pushing the adventures and the magical element to the point of the grotesque, the allied *jest-märchen* with its drollery and humor, and the biological *märchen* which, in giving an account, however absurd, of the origin of animal shapes and characters, is the earliest form of explanatory *märchen*-fiction. These

forms all contain manifest traces of arbitrary invention. But the boundaries are fluent, and the same tale may be believed by one class in the community and treated as fiction by another. The genuine märchen-myth is, in Wundt's view, the immediately believed reality. The sun setting or in eclipse is really seen as devoured by a dark monster; the Indian boy really made a treaty with the buffaloes providing for their capture; etc. Such tales are not an interpretation of reality, but the accredited reality itself. On the other hand, the great cosmogonic myths show the influence of reflection and are the beginnings of a philosophy of nature.

It is no part of the purpose of this review to follow Wundt beyond these general indications of principles into the details of his elaborately divided and subdivided exposition. We note in that the same masterly command of an astounding mass of encyclopædic information, the same power of vigorous and subtle analysis, the same balance, confidence, and maturity of judgment that we have observed in the previous volumes, and a still greater fulness of concrete illustration. This last we owe, no doubt, in part at least, to his daughter, his "treue Gefährtin im Urwald der Mythen und Märchen," to whom the volume is dedicated. Only an expert mythologist, and he only if possessing something of Wundt's psychological equipment, can properly estimate the value of the explanations advanced in particular cases. A remark, however, may be permitted a layman regarding the general arrangement. Wundt apparently distinguishes between mythical ideas and myths proper, the narratives in which the ideas are embodied. The distinction is a practical one so far as other than mythical elements may enter into a mythically colored content, though, psychologically, it is doubtful if definite ideas exist apart from judgments which are the elements of the tale. But Wundt seems to regard all myths, as distinct from elements, as nature-myths. Thus apart from the introduction, which treats in three chapters of the imagination, and from the final chapter, which treats of the origin of religion, we have in the entire work but two chapters, one of which is entitled "*Die Seelenvorstellungen*," the other "*Der Naturmythus*," and it is in the latter that we find the division of all myths into märchen, sagas, and legends. We might be tempted in spite of this to suppose a more general division into soul-myths and nature-myths, but the difference in Wundt's designation is significant. Moreover, when we come to the chapter on nature-myths, we find that it treats, not only of what we are ordinarily accustomed to call nature-myths, but also of culture-myths, heroic sagas, etc., the origin of which from a mythical apper-



ception of the objects of external nature Wundt himself repudiates. Indeed, the very earliest form of the *märchen*, on his theory, is the *Glücksmärchen*, the central interest in which lies not in 'nature,' but in the fortunes of men. This too is the central interest in the conceptions of the future life, treated in the last division of this chapter. It is difficult, therefore, to understand precisely what Wundt means by a nature-myth. The term as he uses it seems either too broad to be definite, or too narrow to embrace all that he has included under it.

We pass to a brief account of his theory of religion. The central fact for a correct judgment here, he holds, is the cultus. The cultus is defined in general as consisting in acts directed to the attaining of any sort of goods by the help of superhuman agencies. In this broad sense it need not be religious. Three further motives enter into the development of the religious cultus: it involves a narrower or wider bond of social union, it comprehends in its object the most general needs aroused by beginning civilization, and it refers its acts to a supersensible world. The answer to the question whether religion is a phenomenon to be met with in all stages of human life depends on the interpretation of the term 'religion.' If the presence of a cultus is sufficient, then there is no tribe without a religion; but if more than magical rites and the worship of demons is required, if the above three conditions are to be met in any high sense, then the dissemination of religion must be regarded as limited both in time and in place. The germs are present everywhere, developed religions are found only under the conditions of a higher material and spiritual civilization. The most important transition is made in the development of the vegetation-cults, assimilating new objects of cultural interest and advancing from the cult of demons to the worship of the gods. Psychologically religion is defined by Wundt, who considers feelings of dependence, of happiness, etc., as only partial motives of the religious attitude, as "the feeling of the attachment (*Zugehörigkeit*) of man and of the world about him to a supersensible world in which he conceives as realized the ideals that appear to him as the highest ends of human striving." As the original sensuous ideals are transformed into ethical ideals, the latter shape themselves into ethical norms of life. Morality thus, though having its independent roots in the sensible affections which move will and action, is a product of religion, and religion, though having its roots in the metaphysical soil of a gradually developing idea of the supersensible, is no less a product of morality. It is essentially a metaphysical-ethical creation. Wundt, however, never allows us to lose sight of its mythical origin or of the continued

presence of its lower motives in its higher and highest forms. Myth forms an indispensable requisite in all actual religions. Christianity is no exception. In the recorded life of Jesus, as distinct from the sayings, there is very little that is not mythical, nothing, Wundt says, but a few episodes of the passion, and the 'legend of Jesus' is paralleled here with that of Mithras and Buddha. Nor is historical Christianity a form of pure monotheism; that, Wundt holds, no historical religion has attained, but only philosophy. So far as the great masses of the people are concerned, religion goes no farther than to distinguish one God as *primus inter pares*, or as over against a series of lower, subordinate divinities called angels, demons, and the like. Either view is for him a form of polytheism. It seems to be a peculiarity of Christianity to exhibit in a remarkable degree the motives and process of the whole development of religion. In the variety of its forms it is less a single religion than an encyclopædia of all religions. Nor is it likely that there will ever be one, uniform religion; this ideal seems forbidden by the increasing manifoldness of the goods of civilization and the increasing differentiation of human personality. So far Wundt reports what he finds as a clear-headed observer, and there may be some difference of opinion as to whether he fully and accurately reports the facts. In the final paragraph he undertakes to point the goal to Protestant Christianity, the goal of a free church bound by no creed. And here, whatever one may think of his views in other respects, he strikes a note to which every conscientious man will respond when he says that "an untruth can least of all transform itself into truth by investing its expression with a certain solemnity."

There is some reason to complain of the length of this work, which is not wanting in repetitions, although the present volume certainly is replete with matter and interest. A certain massiveness of impression is given by the bulk, but physically the handling of a volume of this size is painful. Wundt's sentences are usually pretty long, but they are also, as a rule, clear. But when he invites the reader to follow him through paragraphs of three and four unbroken pages, which is not uncommon, and in one case (pp. 277-283) of five and a half pages, he makes a demand on the attention which only the most resolute can meet and which no one ought to be expected to meet. The work might have been condensed: we record this conviction; but we more gladly record also our appreciation of it as probably the most splendid and not the least valuable of the many contributions made by its distinguished author to the science and thought of our time.

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*A Handbook of Christian Ethics.* By J. CLARK MURRAY, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, McGill University. Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1908. Imported by Scribner's Sons. — pp. xiv, 328.

By Christian ethics the author means a science "starting from the ethical ideal embodied in Christ and working out from that a code of morality for the practical guidance of Christian life" (p. 7). It differs from moral philosophy in general by taking that ideal as something granted to begin with, whereas moral philosophy must discover the ideal by the ordinary methods of philosophical inquiry. But Christian ethics tends to an assimilation with moral philosophy. We have no authoritative exposition of the Christian ideal in such a form as science demands. Christ did not teach a scientific theory, his method is not that of the scientific expositor. Hence his conception of the general principle has to be gathered from a collation of a variety of statements, and gathered by the same methods of research that are employed in moral philosophy (p. 10). Moral philosophy also tends to an assimilation with Christian ethics, that is, there is a remarkable general tendency towards a solution of the problem of ethics which is in essential harmony with the Christian ideal (p. 11). Moreover, the application of the supreme ethical principle to practical life must be conducted on the same method in every region of inquiry, and here the method of Christian ethics must be substantially identical with that of moral philosophy. This method is the rational method, the method imposed upon all work of reason by the essential nature of reason itself. This, of course, includes the use of the historical method. The Christian moralist may often find guidance in solving the ethical problems of his own day by studying the moral history of the past from which these problems have been evolved (p. 15). There is also a relation between Christian ethics and dogmatics. An absolutely creedless morality would imply that there might be an activity of mind which was volitional or emotional without being intellectual at all; it is sheer intellectual confusion to talk of a creedless morality. Every moral action is an intelligent action, it flows from the intelligent assent of the agent to some principle he believes to be good. It implies therefore faith in that principle, and the grandeur of moral action must in general be in direct proportion to the intensity of faith in the articles of the creed (p. 17). The dogmas of Christian faith, like the theories of other sciences, find their vindication in practical tests. If a genuine Christian life can be shown to be impossible except by faith in certain dogmas, the fact should be taken as a more triumphant vindication of these than could be achieved by the most ingenious specu-

lative dialectic (p. 20). Any theory therefore which is beyond the reach of such tests, which does not admit of being verified by experiment or observation, may continue to furnish gratification to idle curiosity but does not become part of the scientific faith of the world (p. 21).

Professor Murray divides his book into four parts. Part I is taken up with an inquiry into the general principle or ideal of Christian morality, discussing the Christian ideal in the abstract, the evolution of the Christian ideal from the Greek and Hebrew ideal, and the moral ideal revealed in the New Testament (pp. 23-114). Part II views this ideal in its subjective aspect, as personal culture, *i. e.*, as a spiritual influence evolving the various virtues which together constitute the Christian character (pp. 115-226). It studies the natural state of man in regard to morality (original sin, etc.), the beginnings of the Christian life (sin, repentance or conversion, atonement), and the Christian character. Part III treats of this ideal in its objective or social aspect, that is, as an external standard from which may be deduced the rules of conduct which together form a code of Christian duty (pp. 227-289). It discusses the essential forms of society, the family, the state, and the church, their functions and the duties of the individual with respect to them. Part IV deals with the methods of moral culture, that is, the ways of forming virtuous habits (pp. 290-320).

The principle of Christian morality is found in love. "Christian morality consists in loving our fellow-men as we love ourselves, such love being a rational habit of life, which is revealed in Christ as the realization of God's will with regard to man, and therefore of man's love to God" (p. 27). As Professor Murray well sets forth, this is not to be interpreted in a one-sided social sense; in reality virtue is neither exclusively social nor exclusively personal. It is personal in one aspect, social in another. The will to do any real good to another can never come into irreconcilable conflict with the will to do real good to oneself (pp. 29-31). The evolution of moral life through the history of man has been all along a movement towards this principle, as is shown in a special chapter (pp. 40-89). Professor Murray's general conclusions on this point are in agreement with the modern investigations of the evolution of morals. There is, however, a tendency to read too much of the developed Christian spirit, as we conceive it now, into Hebrew life, that is, to interpret the Old Testament injunction, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," too broadly. It is not to be denied that humanitarian impulses were at

work and grew stronger among the Jews, and it is true too that the prophets developed a purer conception than the people at large, but after all the Hebrew ideal was less universalistic in spirit than even the primitive Christian ideal. The passages quoted by Professor Murray himself (pp. 96 ff.) show that hatred of enemies "was sometimes represented even by the prophets as if it were an obligation imposed by the God of Israel"; and many more could be given to show the intense nationalism of the Jews. This nationalism also expressed itself in their conception of God, and although the notion was purified and extended in the course of history, it did not emphasize the universalistic and sympathetic element which characterizes the teaching of Jesus.

There will also be difference of opinion as to the teachings of Jesus himself as presented in Chapter III. It is not easy to comprehend into a unified philosophical system the various sayings of Jesus, as Professor Murray himself is fully aware; and different interpretations can be and have been offered. According to some, the founder of Christianity preached asceticism and world-denial, according to others, he was not opposed to the proper enjoyment of the good things of this world. According to some, his mission was limited to the lost sheep of the house of Israel, according to others, he commissioned his apostles to go and make disciples in all the nations. Passages may be quoted in favor of any one of these views. Professor Murray seeks to bring harmony into the seemingly inconsistent statements by reading them in the light of the fundamental principle, a method of procedure which cannot fail to appeal to the philosophic mind, but which is not without its dangers. In this way the attitude of Jesus towards the so-called intellectual and practical virtues, towards wisdom, courage, temperance, justice, wealth, marriage, and the state, is conceived not after the manner of primitive Christianity, but in agreement with modern Christian ideals. And in this way too the teachings of modern Christianity are brought into harmony with the teachings of modern ethics. Thus, for example, Christian ethics is neither an exclusive egoism nor an exclusive altruism. Christ's conception recognizes the real worth of the individual, hence the supreme end of existence sometimes takes an intensely egoistic form: it is the single moral life, the individual soul, that is of supreme worth in the universe. The worth of other things is trivial compared with the worth of an intelligent soul (pp. 115 ff.). But in the light of the infinite worth of the soul egoism is transformed, it comes to be identical with altruism, the egoistic end can be found only in

the altruistic. The saving of the soul is achieved only by its emancipation from the corrupting effects of sin, by cultivating all the virtues, altruistic and egoistic alike (pp. 130 ff.).

Modern ethical theory may use somewhat different language from this but its meaning will be much the same. If the principle underlying Christian morality harmonizes with the principle underlying morality in general, there can be no essential difference between the results of Christian ethics and those of secular ethics. And there is no reason why the ideal expressed in the moral teachings of Christianity should be something absolutely unique, if Christian morality is one of the stages in the evolution of morality, as Professor Murray properly conceives it. The book is a sensible presentation of the subject. It is well written and well arranged, and will be of great service to the student and general reader desiring an introduction to the study of Christian ethics.

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*The Philosophy of Gassendi.* By G. S. BRETT, London, Macmillan and Co., 1908. — pp. xiv, 310.

To most students of philosophy Gassendi's name stands for little more than opposition to Descartes and advocacy of a materialism of the Epicurean type. According to Professor Brett this involves at once a lack of proper appreciation of Gassendi's value and a misinterpretation of his system. *The Philosophy of Gassendi* is intended to rectify both these errors, and since both alike have their source in ignorance of Gassendi's teachings, the greater part of the book is devoted to a summary of the latter. After an introduction containing a history of the line of philosophic thought which terminates in Gassendi, the exposition proper begins with an account of Gassendi's Logic. Here the general standpoint is found to be atomistic, inasmuch as truth and knowledge are regarded as made up of indivisible parts. Gassendi follows Epicurus as to his main outline, but by no means slavishly, and with the addition of elements essentially Aristotelian. He shows here as elsewhere his characteristic breadth of view, boundless learning, and the healthy common sense which refuses to sacrifice facts in the interests of a theoretical unity, no matter how desirable in itself the latter may be; but his most important doctrines are to be sought under the heading of Physics.

A preliminary distinction is that between Nature and God. Nature has both a passive and an active aspect, but the latter is no less dis-

tinct from God than the former. Space and time are defined as quantitative realities independent of matter. The discussion of them as such is described as most "subtle and involved," and its inconsistencies are traced to a confusion between space and time as they are in themselves and as they are in experience. Gassendi constantly shows a rationalistic tendency and just as constantly refuses to follow where it would lead him. His account of his materialistic principle is more consistent. Since the ultimate matter must be really ultimate and also capable of explaining the solidity of bodies, it must have unity and divisibility on the one hand and physical reality on the other. Gassendi cleverly traces the history of human thought in such a manner as to make atomism appear as the simplest and best solution of a problem, the earlier answers to which were less satisfactory and more complex. In his description of the properties of the atom he follows Epicurus, but he denies that it is eternal or unproduced. By making it dependent upon God for its creation, but preserving its independence in action, he safeguards the interests of both science and theology. A crucial point in the system is the explanation of qualities as due to various combinations of atoms that differ only in magnitude, figure, and weight, and in the order and position of their arrangement. Somehow or other the qualitative distinctions known through the senses are correlated with these simple properties, but no attempt is made to reduce the one to terms of the other.

In his treatment of animate nature, Gassendi, true to philosophical tradition, distinguishes between the *Anima* and the *Animus*, and assigns the different aspects of consciousness to one or the other, as if they were entirely different entities. Sensation and perception belong to the *Anima*, and are treated from the mechanical standpoint. Imagination or phantasy is a function of the *Animus*, and is dependent upon the condition of the brain, which has been modified by preceding sensations. "The direct material of thought is purely symbolic of the external reality; only the disposition of the brain itself remains to testify to the action of an object on the senses, and all the substantial nature of things is reduced to a mode of motion of the brain-substance, out of which we may build again an unsubstantial pageant of reflection" (pp. 133-134). Wax as a simile is expressly rejected, and the whole treatment is a remarkable anticipation of later work in psychology.

The mind or intellect cannot be explained in the same manner as phantasy. It must be viewed as a distinct entity, requiring a new creation to account for its origin, otherwise its immortality could not

be established. Yet it is united with the body; and, as Gassendi is acute enough to see, the very fact of their union proves the two elements to be not wholly antagonistic. He insists that they must be regarded as adapted to each other; yet since the terms used represent absolute differences, mind and body are continually appearing under the guise of distinct realities.

The task of discovering Gassendi's views on ethics is described as one of considerable difficulty, not only on account of the enormous mass of quotations and the frequent repetitions, but also because of the obscurity caused by the double purpose of defending and modifying the doctrines of Epicurus. Gassendi pronounces the end of life to be pleasure, yet the pleasure must be that which would seem preferable to the good man, something that can be called moral apart from its pleasure-giving qualities. Brett considers this description of the *summum bonum* as a good apology for Epicurus but as a weakness on the part of Gassendi. "Mere transference of an ideal from one age to another must necessarily be weak and shallow: it implies an abstract attitude of mind refusing to face the new conditions and new problems that time unfolds" (p. 194). The principle is undoubtedly sound, though there might be a difference of opinion as to whether Gassendi's procedure may properly be called the "mere transference of an ideal from one age to another"; but however this may be, if the criticism is applicable to his ethics, is it not equally so to his physics? Is not his method the same in both cases? It is true that the results reached are not of like value, but the advantages of his physical doctrines are chiefly due to his master, while his own modifications, apparently introduced with a view to reconciling atomism with Christianity, are less consistent with the original body of teachings than are the changes made in the Epicurean ethics.

The treatment of the virtues offers nothing especially distinctive, but seems to be equally prolix and edifying. Brett argues at some length against the contention of Thomas (*La Philosophie de Gassendi*) that Gassendi arrives at an idea of universal law comparable to that of Kant, and succeeds in showing that Gassendi's universality is of the strictly legal type, and that his ethics never oversteps the bounds of the ideal set by prudence. With regard to the nature and attributes of God he is in direct opposition to Epicurus. He treats the question as one of causality and regards God as the first cause, as the creator of the atoms. The metaphysical presuppositions of his system justify him in doing so, and the assumption of the existence of God is not to be considered as a mere arbitrary appendage to his



philosophy, added for the sake of conformity to Church doctrines, but as an integral part of the system.

In spite of the closeness with which Brett holds himself to the matter in hand in his summary, and his evident intention to separate, so far as may be, exposition from evaluation, the reader comes to the last part of the book with his mind pretty well made up as to his author's opinion of Gassendi. The final discussion serves, however, to clarify and systematize these general impressions, and also supplies us with a comparison between this and other modern forms of atomism. In the revival of ancient, especially pre-Aristotelian systems that marked the beginning of modern philosophy, Gassendi was the first to attempt a systematic reconstruction of atomism. He did so, however, at a time when subjectivism was rapidly gaining ground, and thus the very objectivity of his thinking was a cause of the neglect accorded to him, a neglect which was increased by the opprobrium attached to the name of Epicurus. Yet his writings are not so alien to us to-day as we might expect to find them, and Gassendi may with justice be compared to Herbert Spencer. Each tried to write the synthetic philosophy of his age; and their likenesses and their differences show how much has been done since Gassendi's time and also how many problems remain the same. To call the system produced by Gassendi materialism, as Ueberweg and Lange do, is to overlook some of its essential characteristics, or else to use the term materialism in another than the accepted sense. Since Gassendi does not make mind a function of matter, he cannot properly be designated a materialist. Neither is he an idealist, either of the Cartesian or of the transcendental type. His combination of the atomistic theory of the world with a non-materialistic view of the mind may best be termed an empirical realism, which means that "our ground is experience, and our world is real in the anti-idealistic sense that it is not made by mind" (p. 256).

The principle employed in the working out of this philosophy is that of an ascending series of complexities. "The unit is the atom; things are complexes of atoms; and each degree of complexity has its own peculiar attributes" (*loc. cit.*). Besides the atomic scale we have, as irreducible realities, time and space, the mind and God. In a certain sense this is a pluralism, yet the collection of irreducibles must be regarded as a unity, just because it holds together and as a matter of fact is one, as soon as the philosopher ceases to meddle with it. That such a position is crude is apparent, that it is not merely so becomes clear from the treatment accorded by Gassendi to motion, the categories, and the relation of quality to quantity. In passing

upward in the scale of being we find constant breaks, which must be recognized; and the disparity between matter and mind is only an extreme case of differences everywhere present. Gassendi does not attempt to compromise between mind and matter; and, while emphasizing the value of the mechanical view, he sees its limitations, and recognizes the existence of quality as well as quantity. Yet his philosophy cannot escape the vices attached to its good points, and the very fact that mind and matter remain equally objective makes a final unity impossible.

The concluding chapter is largely concerned with a comparison of Gassendi with Leibniz and Lotze, and does not contribute much to an understanding of Gassendi himself. In fact I think the book would be improved by omitting the final chapter, which weakens the impression left by the preceding ones. With this exception it would be difficult to find fault with the book. It is a well-written account of a philosophy of which we have hitherto known but little, and displays an admirable union of enthusiastic interest and temperate judgment. When the author differs from other critics of Gassendi, he in most cases succeeds in proving his side of the question at issue. He is disposed perhaps to credit Gassendi with rather more originality than is his due, and possibly to overestimate his importance as an independent thinker. Lange's view of him as a materialist who out of regard for theology admitted inconsistent elements into his system, is not altogether without foundation, though I think Brett has succeeded in disproving this in Lange's extreme form. Perhaps we shall not be far wrong if we regard the term materialism as less applicable to Gassendi's philosophy than Lange supposed but as a more adequate description of it than Brett is inclined to admit.

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## NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

*Der Skeptizismus in der Philosophie und seine Überwindung.* Zweiter Band. Von RAOUL RICHTER. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1908. — pp. 584.

The first volume of this very valuable work was devoted to the examination and criticism of the ancient schools of scepticism ; that now before us continues such examination and criticism up to the close of the nineteenth century. While we have to thank Professor Richter for an extremely thoughtful, acute, and thorough exposition of sceptical philosophy from Pyrrho to Nietzsche, our debt is materially increased by the fact that he has not confined himself to explanation and criticism, but has, incidentally yet with considerable fullness, contributed to the foundations of a sound epistemological theory. The breadth, sanity, and vigor of the author's thought make the constructive parts of his book a valuable addition to current philosophical discussion, and fully justify his use of Schiller's words as the motto of his treatise :

“Für dem Ernst, den keine Mühe bleichet,  
Rauscht der Wahrheit tief versteckter Born.”

According to the classification here adopted, scepticism may have three forms according as it is, or is not, “total,” and is, or is not, “radical.” Total scepticism denies the possibility of absolute knowledge of either sensible or supersensible objects ; radical scepticism does not recognize any degree of knowledge. Hence scepticism which is both “total” and “radical” denies the existence of knowledge of any degree of validity in any sphere ; that which is “total” but not “radical” recognizes only relative or imperfect knowledge in any sphere ; while scepticism which is “radical” but not “total” is of two kinds as it denies the possibility of any knowledge to the supersensible or to the sensible world. Although the volume before us is by no means short, it is with regret that we find at its close only a brief chapter given to the scepticism which is not “total,” in place of the fuller treatment which the author originally planned, his discussion of Kant and of Pascal, who are taken as types of the scepticism of the supersensible and of the sensible worlds respectively, being too brief to be satisfactory, while other partial sceptics deserved, and would have repaid, an analysis of their views.

It is impossible in a limited space to do more than draw attention to those parts of Professor Richter's treatise which seem to the present writer the most interesting and noteworthy. Of considerable value is his account of Montaigne's place in the development of sceptical thought. Montaigne's philosophy indeed cannot be rigorously systematized ; in form

and spirit it is defiant of such a process, but it can be analyzed and valued, and this is here done with subtlety and good sense. Especially keen is the criticism of Montaigne's rejection of the validity of ethical judgments. And yet it might be questioned, by one who should lay stress less on the language of the *Essays* than on the personality which they reveal, whether Montaigne can rightly be classified at all as a "total" sceptic. His enjoyment of his own doubts is so obvious that one may be pardoned for the suspicion that he voluntarily extended the circle of his professed unbelief.

There is nothing better in the volume before us than the chapters devoted to the exposition and criticism of David Hume's scepticism. The commentary on the great Scotsman's epistemology will be most helpful to the student, being both clear and thorough. The criticism is more profound, and at the same time more fair-minded, than that of Green; there is throughout an adequate appreciation of the essential soundness of much of Hume's thought, and of the great worth of his contribution to the progress of modern philosophy. Incidentally, Professor Richter has much to say in this connection in regard to the questions underlying the present-day controversies of pragmatists and antipragmatists which will repay the reader. If, however, the discussion of Hume's sceptical position is the most intrinsically valuable part of the work, that dealing with Nietzsche is perhaps of most timely interest. Though a considerable mass of explanatory and critical literature has now gathered around this latest of the sceptics, there is still a good deal of vagueness in the mind of the intelligent public in regard to the elements of real worth in his thinking. The dazzling brilliance of his gospel of revolt, and the fragmentary form of its presentation, render his philosophy almost impervious to the kind of assault usually directed against philosophical systems. The criticism here is none the less clear-sighted that it is tempered by a sympathetic recognition of the originality and power of Nietzsche's genius. The author rightly refuses to lay much stress upon the incidental contradictions and inconsistencies that can so easily be exposed by any student of his works; it is not by isolated expressions, but by the general tenor of his thought at its more advanced stage, that he must be judged. It is, however, requisite to lay bare that which is essentially irrational in the method, and self-contradictory in the content of his nihilistic epistemology; and this is here done with considerable force. When Nietzsche's scepticism reaches the point of attempting to prove the worthlessness of all reasoning processes, the critical summing up of Professor Richter seems inevitable and unanswerable. "Mit untauglichen Mitteln die Untauglichkeit der Mittel tauglich zu beweisen, — das ist ein unhaltbares Verfahren, eine contradictio in adjecto und petitio principii, ein Vorgehen im Zirkel, aus dem es schlechterdings keinen Ausweg gibt." In his concluding section Professor Richter touches briefly on the relation between scepticism and dogmatism, regarding both as being but partial and temporary stages in the progress of thought, which a profounder insight into thought itself will absorb and harmonize.

E. RITCHIE.

*Lectures on Humanism*, with Special Reference to its Bearings on Sociology.

By J. S. MACKENZIE. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Lim.; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1907. — pp. 243.

This book, which is the outcome of the lectures delivered by the author at Manchester College in 1906, as the Dunklin lecturer of Sociology, is a popular presentation of the fundamental principles of teleological idealism in their bearings on important spheres of human thought and action. Professor Mackenzie does not hope to be able to accomplish more in this series of lectures than to awaken reflection and suggest directions in which further light may be sought. I think that this hope is fully realized, and that the little volume performs even more than it modestly promises. It will prove of service to the general student seeking to acquire a general philosophic insight into things, and it cannot fail to give the specialist who may read it a wider outlook upon his field. The writer's sane and impartial judgment, his clearness of thought and expression, his broad scholarship, and his fine ethical spirit particularly qualify him for the task he has set himself, and make him a fit interpreter to the larger public of the significance of philosophy for life.

By humanism Professor Mackenzie understands, not the recent theories that have been put forth under that name in England, but "the attitude which seeks the key to the world in the life of man, or, at any rate, the key to man's life within himself" (p. 14). It is the attitude which tries to interpret man in his own light and the universe in the light of man, and is used in antithesis to naturalism, which seeks to interpret the material universe in its own light and man in the light of the material universe. Humanism emphasizes such conceptions as thought, purpose, quality, and value in studying the higher aspects of life; naturalism attempts to understand the world by reference to matter and motion and other cognate conceptions. After making clear the humanistic position and showing its significance in human thought (Lecture I), Professor Mackenzie traces its development through the history of philosophy (Lecture II), and then points out its philosophical implications (Lecture III). In Lectures IV, V, VI, and VII, the sociological bearings of the humanistic attitude are brought out, that is, its fundamental conceptions are applied in the field of politics, economics, education, and religion. Lecture VIII is devoted to a critical examination of the limitations of humanism. In a concluding lecture, the ultimate implications of the position are more fully set forth and some of its difficulties removed. Fundamental concepts like quality, teleology, causation, time, good and evil, are discussed briefly, but sufficiently at least to give the reader an idea of the author's metaphysical point of view. The universe is conceived by him as an ethical unity, in which the most excellent forms of life are developed through a continuous process. This reality has to be thought of as a many in one, having as its material basis a finite material system bound together by unity of system and persistence of motion throughout the whole of its incessant

changes. "Within this material system various qualitative differences emerge. There grows up, in particular, by gradual development, the vast series of living forms, with man at their head, in whom first the universe comes to consciousness of itself; and it is in the more and more perfect working out of this life, so far as we can see, that the ultimate meaning of the universe is displayed" (pp. 229f.). We cannot explain the spiritual life of man by any of the lower and less comprehensive facts around it, it must be explained from within. Our universe must somehow be an intelligible system, and some form of humanism is the only way of making it intelligible to ourselves. And though our philosophical system will probably always be of a somewhat tentative character, yet we need not despair of seeing it sufficiently completed to become a guide, a power, and an inspiration in our lives.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

FRANK THILLY.

*Religion, critique et philosophie positive chez Pierre Bayle.* Par JEAN DELVOLVE. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1906. — pp. 446.

We have here the most comprehensive and thorough study of the work of Pierre Bayle that has thus far appeared. In the opinion of Dr. Delvolve, Bayle was one of the most celebrated, and yet least understood, of the philosophers of the seventeenth century. Not one of his contemporaries penetrated the depth of his thought or appreciated the true significance of his writings. He did not take the place in the history of human thought which he deserved because his ideas were so original, were not presented in systematic form, and were scattered through a great mass of writings. For the same reasons his influence made itself felt but slowly and imperfectly; he exercised what Dr. Delvolve calls an "anonymous" influence upon the development of thinking. The French philosophers of the eighteenth century seldom mention Bayle's name, but they draw copiously from his *Dictionary*. He influenced, among others, the Encyclopedists, Voltaire, and Holbach, but only one of the eighteenth century thinkers understood and employed his method, and that was Montesquieu.

And it is in his method that Bayle's originality and the interest attaching to his work lies. He alone of his age held that the critical knowledge of *facts* is the touchstone of *all* truth, in the field of history and morals as well as in physics, and that such knowledge is capable of supplying positive equivalents for theological systems of the universe and of morals. The application of this method to religious problems results in a destructive criticism of religion, regarded both as a revelation and as the sum-total of philosophical reasonings. Bayle criticises the dogmas partly by opposing to them facts that contradict them, partly by pointing out the natural and historical contradictions of reason. Religious apologetics is thus reduced to revelation, which must itself submit to the critical examination of the historical facts upon which it is based. Nothing essential, Dr. Delvolve

declares, has been added to this general frame-work of religious criticism since the days of the great French critic.

The same method also furnishes Bayle with the principles of positive knowledge concerning the questions from which it has eliminated religious authority and apriori reasoning. For the theological and metaphysical dogmas on the nature and the origin of the universe he substitutes simple hypotheses, whose merit consists in their agreement with observable laws of phenomena. It is for this reason that he inclines to the acceptance of the hypothesis of the animated atom as according best with the totality of natural laws. He is particularly interested in moral problems, for which he seeks naturalistic and sociological solutions as sufficing for human practice, and rejects as explanations the entire theological-metaphysical system of the providential government of the world, divine commandments, free will, grace, immortality, and eternal sanctions. It is his method and the theories resulting from its application that make Bayle an interesting and valuable object of study to the present age, and justify the publication of a work like that of Dr. Delvolve.

FRANK THILLY.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

*A Study of the Influence of Custom on Moral Judgment.* By FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP. [Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, 236.] Madison, 1908. — pp. 144.

This monograph is a study, conducted by the method of the questionnaire, of the moral judgments of certain groups of students in the University of Wisconsin. The students whose opinions were sought were not confined to the College of Letters and Science, but included a considerable number of relatively untrained students pursuing the Short Course in Agriculture. The answers of this latter group served as a valuable check on the results obtained from those who were pursuing a course of liberal study, and who for this reason might be supposed to represent less accurately the point of view of the popular moral consciousness.

Whatever may be the reader's prejudice against the questionnaire, he must acknowledge, I think, that Professor Sharp has been aware, throughout his investigation, of the limitations and dangers of the method, and has striven to guard his accepted data from error. There seems to be no reason to doubt that he has obtained by the written and oral answers to his questions a fair expression of the ideas of middle-class American youth of both sexes concerning some difficult moral problems. I am also inclined to believe with Professor Sharp that the results would be substantially the same if the examination could be so widened in its scope as to include very large numbers of Americans and Europeans of the younger generation.

The aim of the study is primarily to test the theory, so widely current, that custom is the great force in determining the morality of each successive

generation. Both custom and authority are included under what is designated as the "foreign pressure" theory of the origin of moral standards. The immediacy of moral judgments is also subjected to careful examination.

Without calling in question the trustworthiness or significance of the data presented, one may still not see how the theories of custom held by ethical writers of repute are shown to be untenable. Does anyone hold the "foreign pressure" theory in a form which is disproved by the evidence submitted? Professor Paulsen is quoted in a way which would suggest that he is an exponent of such a theory. But his statement of the place of custom in morality, taken as a whole, seems hardly to warrant this interpretation. Much of what he says obviously applies to the earlier stages of moral development both in the individual and in the race. He also emphasizes the "*conscious activity*" of the community in the process of education, as well as the growing individualization of conscience with advancing civilization.

Another difficulty emerges in the statement of the theory of "autonomy" which is opposed to the "foreign pressure" theory. This view is said to assume that the individual starts "with at least some moral conceptions of his own resulting from the native structure of the mind." But when one really becomes aware of "moral conceptions of his own" he has already for a long time been to school to custom. These very "conceptions" are social in a thoroughgoing way; they belong, indeed, to the individual, but not to the individual uninfluenced by custom. Even the "native structure of the mind" is nothing absolutely individual.

But the chief difficulty of the argument concerning the influence of custom seems to lie in the type of questions asked. These questions in casuistry, admirably fitted to elicit certain moral judgments, seem to be those that have the least to offer concerning the influence of custom. For most of them deal with unusual and rare situations to which no clear canons of custom apply. How determine the influence of custom by appeal to the non-customary? To answer the questions proposed the student must leave the well-worn paths of custom and strike out for himself. Would not a series of questions that asked for the attitude of the student towards matters about which customs differ in different groups and circles of society, tend better to show the degree to which each has been moulded by custom, and also the extent to which individual conviction has led each to transcend or oppose custom? Thus questions about the moral character of various amusements and recreations, of the observance of Sunday, of the claims of benevolence, of economy, etc., might perhaps more fully test both the moulding power of custom and the force of individual conviction.

In frankly expressing these difficulties I am dealing only with the application of the data to the problem of custom. The significance and value of the results in other directions remain untouched. As regards the immediacy of moral judgments they seem decisive; they offer a striking refutation of intuitionism in most of its historical forms, and they show that



considerations of general welfare are the ground of judgment in most cases of perplexity. They are highly instructive, too, as regards the slow modification of moral sentiment that is taking place in various directions. To mention but one point, they show that the moral right of a person to shorten life under certain special conditions is recognized far more widely than it was a generation or two ago.

The results are also significant, as Professor Sharp indicates, for moral education, revealing points at which moral training ought to be greatly strengthened. Every teacher of ethics who comes to close quarters with the practical attitudes of his students must recognize, along with some exhibitions of an unreasoning rigorism, far more painful expressions of laxity, especially in respect to the importance of truthfulness, and of regard for financial obligations, for pledges and contracts of every kind.

Such a study as has been here undertaken may render good service both to ethical theory and to ethical practice. Any increase in definite and detailed knowledge of moral conditions is a *desideratum*. Might not special investigations be profitably extended to other classes of society, and to other kinds of problems? Our indebtedness to Professor Sharp will be redoubled if the experience and skill won in this study are still further used in the same direction.

WALTER GOODNOW EVERETT.

BROWN UNIVERSITY.

*Pragmatisme et modernisme.* Par J. BOURDEAU. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. vii, 238.

"*A bas la logique, vive la psychologie! Telle est la devise du pragmatisme.*" A single sentence sometimes expresses an entire standpoint, and the words quoted above (pp. 74, 75) leave no doubt as to the attitude of the writer towards pragmatism and its implications. They at once characterize and condemn the point of view under consideration, and if the book as a whole is devoted to the task of characterization, the condemnation is not on that account the less evident. *Pragmatisme et modernisme* is made up of papers written at different times and already published in the *Journal des Débats*. Their connection with one another is somewhat slight, and they are avowedly intended for the intelligent amateur rather than for the professional philosopher. The result is a lack of technical terms and few assumptions of a knowledge of philosophical writings on the part of the reader, while these advantages are not offset by superficiality or by any want of accuracy. The lightness of touch so often found in the French *feuilleton* is united with a critical appreciation and keenness that render the book as valuable as it is interesting.

After four introductory chapters, grouped under the title of Agnosticism, comes the first main division of the subject-matter. The principal tenets of pragmatism are described, together with their close relationship to the teachings of the English empiricists from Locke to Spencer. Pragmatism

is essentially a racial philosophy, Anglo-Saxon through and through, with all the Anglo-Saxon's fondness for practical details, with all his impatience of idle speculation and his confidence in facts and in experience. Moreover, it is no mere chance that pragmatism first made its appearance in America. It is a typically Yankee production. Who but a Yankee would have found the meaning of truth to lie in its practical results? The writings of James and Schiller are regarded as the most characteristic manifestations of pragmatism, while Bergson is a more profound representative of a similar tendency. The Italian pragmatists led by Papini have, on the other hand, developed pragmatism into a sort of Machiavellian opportunism, which gives the world over to the caprices of individual fantasy and volition, and justifies every enterprise by its success. However much they may differ from one another in detail, all pragmatists are subject to the same illusion, in that they regard reality as something unstable, created by the thinker who experiences beneficial results from his beliefs. The theory is of some value, because it calls attention to concrete facts and so provides a warning against an over-abstract rationalism, but, on the other hand, it utterly ignores the results reached by such thinkers as Leibniz and Kant. For the pragmatist they are as if they had never existed.

Modernism is the application of the pragmatic method to a special field. It finds the truth of religion to be entirely of a practical and moral sort. The efficacy of belief in dogmas is the most convincing proof of their truth, in fact, to a certain extent, their efficacy is their truth. The reality of transubstantiation, for instance, is to be found in the faith of the worshipper who kneels before the host, as if in the presence of the Christ. No other reality is necessary to make the doctrine true. The treatment given to the whole subject of the religious crisis in France, and to the present religious unrest to be found everywhere, is clear and eminently suggestive, but for the most part it concerns matters not to be counted, strictly speaking, as philosophy.

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*The Will to Believe as a Basis for the Defense of Religious Faith, a Critical Study.* By ETTIE STETTHEIMER. New York, The Science Press, 1907.  
— pp. vi, 97.

Miss Stettheimer here undertakes an epistemological examination of Professor James's famous doctrine, an examination partly comparative, relating it to other volitional philosophy, and partly critical, "for the purpose of exhibiting its utter inherent inconsistency" (p. v). Though appreciative of the fact that "as a sermon, owing to its fullness of suggestion and of wisdom, it is of irresistible charm" (p. 97), she finds that from the standpoint of a desire for truth it is wholly unacceptable to the intellect. The foundation of the doctrine she succinctly states as the theories that "belief is the kernel of all judgment whatsoever; secondly, that it is the same psychical

attitude as will ; thirdly, that both will and belief resolve themselves into voluntary attention ; and fourthly, that voluntary attention may be assumed to be indeterminate or free" (p. 28). The two principal accusations brought against it are, first, that "the dualism of intellect and will is neither obviated nor surmounted" ; and second, that it is "based on a standpoint of absolute subjectivism" (p. 32). Thus on both counts the doctrine destroys knowledge.

The fundamental inconsistency which Miss Stettheimer finds infecting the doctrine is the following. Freedom, according to James, "means that attention is indeterminate in quality and direction," and manifests itself only in conscious and deliberate choice. "But obviously such attention with effort must not only be motivated, but, moreover, wherever it is involved and the will consciously chooses an idea to make it prevail, there a definite principle of choice is involved, and the will is not and cannot logically be conceived to be indeterminate in any direction" (pp. 50, 51). In consequence we are forced back in search of cognitive grounds of choice, or else we are left with a belief-function which from its very lack of assurance deprives 'knowledge' of all meaning. The author expounds the implied subjectivism in detail, and concludes by maintaining that James is guilty of a circular argument in that "freedom of will and of belief can . . . be assumed or believed only if one can freely choose to believe : the very point in question" (p. 89).

Miss Stettheimer's standpoint of criticism is that of Neo-Fichteanism. Knowledge is universally necessary and valid because teleologically based on the practical will. Science is a transformation of reality, and determinism is so implicated methodically as to exclude free belief from any theoretic standing.

In the opinion of the reviewer the inconsistencies which Miss Stettheimer discovers in James's views are really (1) inconsistencies with her own epistemological premises, (2) artificial inconsistencies produced by exaggerated interpretation of some of James's statements, and (3) mere suggestions of inconsistency, which might be removed by careful statement. The first is illustrated by her central point of attack (see quotation from page 51 above), where one of the inconsistent propositions is her own assertion that in a struggle between antagonistic ideas, attention with effort "obviously" involves deterministic motivation, an assertion which the indeterminist does not admit and which he regards as a clear case of *petitio*. The second kind of inconsistency appears on page 62 (note), where the author interprets James's acknowledgment of the "immense pressure of objective control" exercised by "funded truths," as implying that at this point "the will to believe or free belief has no place in the pragmatic account of belief and knowledge," and so produces an artificial self-contradiction. The third difficulty is exemplified by the total paradox which she finds (p. 76) in the statement that belief in the religious world-order is justified in that it is a necessary factor to the reality of that order, while, nevertheless, we cannot

abruptly believe at will, but can produce belief by acting as if we believed. Accordingly, if by 'inconsistency' we understand that definite logical structure consisting of affirmation and denial of the same character in the same subject, it does not seem to the reviewer that she reveals such genuine defects in James's doctrine.

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The following books also have been received :

- Studies in European Philosophy.* By JAMES LINDSAY. Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood and Sons, 1909. — pp. xxi, 370. 10s. 6d.
- Idealism as a Practical Creed.* By HENRY JONES. Lectures on philosophy and modern life delivered before the University of Sidney. Glasgow, James Maclehose and Sons, 1909. — pp. ix, 299. \$2.00.
- A Text-Book of Psychology.* Part I. By E. B. TITCHENER, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1909. — pp. xvi, 311. \$1.30.
- Letters and Addresses of Charles Edward Garman.* By ELIZA M. GARMAN. A memorial volume prepared with the coöperation of the class of 1884, Amherst College. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909. — pp. xiii, 616. \$3.00.
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- Leibniz Historien.* Par LOUIS DAVILLÉ. Essai sur l'activité et la méthode historiques de Leibniz. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. xii, 798. 12 fr.
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- Le problème de l'action, la pratique morale.* Par G. RODRIGUES. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. iv, 203. 3 fr. 75.
- Le doute.* Par PAUL SOLLIER. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. viii, 407. 7 fr. 50.

- Le lien social.* Par SULLY PRUDHOMME. Avec une préface et une introduction par C. HÉMON. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. xix, 230. 3 fr. 75.
- Le pluralisme.* Par J.-H. BOEX-BOREL. Essai sur la discontinuité et l'hétérogénéité des phénomènes. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. 272. 5 fr.
- Le socialisme et la sociologie réformiste.* Par A. FOUILLÉE. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. viii, 419. 7 fr. 50.
- Métaphysique et esthétique.* Par ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER. Première traduction française avec préface et notes par A. DIETRICH. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. 192. 2 fr. 50.
- La psiche sociale.* Per ENRICO RUTA. Milano, Palermo, Remo Sandron. — pp. 381.
- Logica.* Per BENEDETTO CROCE. Seconda edizione interamente rifatta. Bari, Gius. Laterza & Figli, 1909. — pp. xxiii, 429.
- Los supuestos filosóficos de la noción del Derecho.* Por JORGE DEL VECCHIO. Madrid, Hijos de Reus, 1908. — pp. 210.

## SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.*: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

### LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

*Naturalisme, humanisme, et philosophie des valeurs.* A. CHIAPPELLI.  
*Rev. Ph.*, XXXIV, 3, pp. 225-255.

The negative tendencies of positive science make necessary a reconsideration of the more general and higher interests of life. Philosophy, situated beyond the limits of positive and experimental science, and on the borderland of religion, attempts to satisfy these needs. As a critique of knowledge, philosophy comes upon limiting concepts just as does science; but when it tries to reconstruct the totality of reality it is forced to go beyond these limiting antitheses and reconcile them in an "integral interpretation of reality." This is necessary for moral and religious interests if not for thought. Hegelianism insists on an absolute difference between philosophy and science. It derives its interpretations of the world from consciousness and takes its material from the history of humanity. Yet Hegel recognized a rational element in nature, and made the philosophy of nature an integral part of synthetic philosophy. Recent scientific discoveries tend to show that the mechanical theory is not final, even for science, and point to a closer union of science and philosophy. The downfall of the atomic theory since the discovery of radio-activity permits us to regard the ultimate elements of matter as centers of energy, and to recognize that they are at bottom immaterial. In a similar way the revival of neo-vitalism tends more and more to supplant the mechanical view of life, and to affirm a belief in the self-regulated activity of the organism. The rôle of future philosophy will be to harmonize positivism and humanism in a superior synthesis, though their difference now seems to be unrecconcilable. The one searches for universal, necessary, and simple laws, the abstract relations of phenomena. The other has for its object indi-

vidual values in their social relations. In spite of the efforts towards union by means of evolution, the difference between the two is still so thoroughgoing as to justify a double conception of reality. According to naturalism, man no longer appears to be the master of nature. He is not only regarded as a very small part of an infinite universe, but as a cog in an immense mechanism. The result is materialism, practical utilitarianism, and moral decadence. The glory of the firmament and the exaltation of the ancient psalmist no longer exist for such a mechanical world. While naturalism is dogmatic and uncritical, humanism inclines on the one hand towards agnosticism and subjectivism, and on the other towards objective idealism. One seeks the practical aspect of truth, and places sentiment above reason, while the other glorifies the absolute sovereignty of reason. It is the task of a new philosophy to make us see in man both a part of nature and a product of history; for the philosophy which places man outside of nature is lacking in foundation because its relations to the world are not established. Such a philosophy must become an ideal interpretation of nature which completes the mechanical and dynamical explanations of science.

Philosophy as a science of value consists of a series of judgments of valuation and an appreciation of the most general values. It is concerned with ends rather than with elements of knowledge. Its difficulty lies in treating the problem of being as a question of universal value; for the science of nature does not admit of the concept of value. We can, however, recognize in nature the equivalent of mental forms which renders things intelligible. Knowledge would not be possible without an affinity with nature, but it is not necessary to identify being with thought. Between identity and duality is the middle ground of conformity. The internal life would thus become the fixed point in the interpretation of reality. In this way knowledge and being coincide. Herein is revealed the rational character of the world which appears in the unity and regularity of nature. The causal interpretation becomes purposive. It is expressive of a system of real values known in nature. The process of evolution presupposes an end towards which it tends. Since the innermost end discovered in nature by the reason is the category of will, it makes possible ethical investigation and justifies religion. That end no longer has simply the value of a method of research, but becomes the expression of a constitutive principle. The philosophy of natural values associates voluntarism and rationalism, and thus comprehends in a superior synthesis the two fundamentals in which the new idealism fixates the antithesis between the sciences of nature and mind.

JOHN B. KENT.

*Les principes premiers : leur origine et leur valeur objective.* F. CHOVET.  
Rev. de Ph., IX, iii, pp. 249-262.

The laws of our intelligence bear their own justification. Intelligence is the faculty of comprehending relations, of which there are two classes :

(1) identity, including contradiction and the excluded middle ; (2) dependence, including substance and causality. Some hold that the first law is purely formal, but if it does not apply to the real thinking being it certainly can have no formal value. The laws of the second class are derived from experience but presuppose the law of contradiction. The idea of the substantial ego is the result of experience. Take away permanence and my thought vanishes ; take away thought and my being no longer knows itself. To comprehend the union of the permanent and the changing is to employ the law of substance. To observe the relation between movement and intention is to make use of the law of causality. The absence of a causal antecedent is contradictory to being. In order to avoid this contradiction we must identify the law of causality with the law of contradiction itself. To suppose that things have reality in thought only, is to declare that my thought alone exists. This thought is either finite or infinite. If finite, it must explain all things by the idea of cause. If we conceive it as infinite, the concept is absurd. Causes, then, exist and have a reality beyond the thought which conceives them. The being of the cause is permanent, its action only is changeable. Thus the law of substance has an objective value, and in turn objectifies the laws of identity and contradiction. All the principles of reason form a unity through the law of identity.

HARVEY G. TOWNSEND.

*L'idée de dieu et le principe d'assimilation intellectuelle.* ANDRÉ LALANDE.

Rev. Ph., XXXIV, 3, pp. 276-284.

Religious ideas are a product of a fusion between elements diverse in nature and polygenetic in origin. In the development of the Egyptian religion, there was a gradual identification of innumerable popular gods until they were all transformed into Râ the god of light. In the Greek religion, we find a great variety of incoherent elements which were gradually fused together, and later the Greek gods fused with the Roman gods in popular belief. The Roman and Jewish religions show the same fusion of elements internal and external. At first moral ideas are separate from religious ideas in both Greece and Egypt. We see manifest in this tendency of religion a general law of the mind. Reflection leads first to the recognition of differences, then to a synthesis, and finally to the elimination of differences. This law applies to the sciences and to social progress. "Community" is a necessary characteristic of every affirmation of judgment, of moral good, or of artistic work. It is because of this law of unification that we can recognize in the synthesis of religious ideas something more than an accidental conglomeration.

JOHN B. KENT.

*Le premier système de Nietzsche ou philosophie de l'illusion.* CH. RUDLER.

Rev. de Mét., XVII, 1, pp. 52-86.

If Nietzsche had finished his first system he would have sketched for us a psychology of the need of truth based on Schopenhauerianism and



Taine's formula : "The law of selection is applicable to mental events." Intelligence is an obscure and fleeting phenomenon in a great universe. Its original function was defensive. Man found it useful to deceive as did the animal to change its color. But man had to make a truce with antagonistic forces and thus arose the social need for truth. Certain forms of deception were condemned and the distinction between truth and falsehood arose. Later he came to apply to his relations with the universe notions applied at first only to his relations with men. All words are metonymies or metaphors for images and the nervous excitations that cause them. Our perception is a sort of compromise between things and the activity of the organism. Nietzsche came to see will in all experience. Every image bears its stamp of joy or sorrow. They conflict, and a choice is forced. To the hero of truth the predominant image gives such joy that he goes into the conflict for truth without hope of victory. Society imposes upon us the duty of finding truth and hastens the selection of those who devote themselves to it. At first each will seeks his own good. These goods conflict. Their final agreement is based on conquest and the oppressive institution called the state, which, though barbarous in its origin, is necessary. Acts, at first enforced by law, become habits, and thus practical restraint persists as duty, even when coercion is removed. The will to live is at the basis of morals and there is egoism in all our acts. The state is a patron of intelligent as opposed to unintelligent egoism. But there is a higher morality which results from our putting ourselves in our neighbor's place. To be good is to be a good logician, — to see more likeness than difference between our lives and the lives of others. In the lives of others we find despair and suffering and we have to pity. Christ knew men so well that he loved them from pity and creates love in them. This is sanctity and is the property of artist-souls. It is not, however, a blind belief in the goodness of the universe. The saint is so much the greater when he realizes that the universe is enigmatical and may not reward his sacrifice. Nietzsche distinguishes two deep tendencies of thought, imagination and abstraction, which must be in eternal conflict. Philosophy always attacks mythology, and it is necessary that it should do so, because it arises when the illusions that have satisfied one age are disappearing from contact with reality. Nevertheless, life is not content with negation and creates for itself new illusions. Myth can never be uprooted, and philosophy can never say its last word and cease to be. Only that mythology is vital which is still growing. Christianity has become fixed, and Nietzsche thinks that we are now ready for the new mythology of the Superman. Art is no closer to reality than science, but it does not deceive us, for it does not pretend to be real. Even plants and animals seem to premeditate beauty, and its expression is the unique end of human life. We foster a higher form of humanity when we realize works of art or attain sanctity. The crowd is the mother from which the genius springs and his appearance is made possible by the labor and suffering of the obscure. Nietzsche enlarges the

Socratic idea of maieutic, — Socrates would deliver the clear idea from the confused state of mind, Nietzsche, the genius from the masses.

HELEN M. CLARKE.

*Truth and Agreement.* J. E. BOODIN. Psych. Rev., XVI, 1, pp. 55-66.

Realists and idealists both affirm that truth is agreement with reality, but fail to state the nature of the agreement. Agreement has a two-fold meaning, an instrumental and a sharing aspect. Thought is instrumental in so far as it controls its objects in accordance with its own purposes without reference to the inner meaning of the object. On the other hand, some objects have a meaning of their own which we must acknowledge or share. They are not to be made over but to be appreciated as we find them. Social and ideal objects are of this type. The difference of the two attitudes is metaphysical, consisting in the ultimate intention of the knowing process. Knowledge is valid only when it reproduces its object, but this does not mean that knowledge is a duplication of independent characters of the object. Sensations are not copies, but definite energetic relations of our psycho-physical organism to the objective world. Images are relatively persistent processes of experience. They function representatively by suggesting the context of another experience with its dynamic coefficient and time value. Copying in the case of meanings can only arise when we have in mind the sharing of such meaning by several subjects. The momentary meaning has a transsubjective reference which we may explain by regarding the universe as consisting of energetic related centers some of which, at least, are capable of inner meaning. Idealists make meaning agree with the objective constitution of truth, but this implies that the universe as a whole is truth, which they have not shown. The instrumental theory regards each moment of experience as an instrument to another moment, without any significance of its own.

J. B. KENT.

*La causalité instrumentale : physique — morale — intentionnelle.* P. RICHARD. Rev. Neo-Sc., VI, 1, pp. 5-31.

Being and activity are the two worlds which philosophy seeks to know. Activity may be considered alone or in a system of coördinated causes. The two causes which constitute the fundamental relations of the dynamic order of nature are either cause as principle or instrumental cause. The author is concerned with the latter only. The strictly instrumental cause does not determine what the effect shall be but only that it shall be what the principle has determined. Duration and permanence of the appropriation furnish no essential difference between the two causes. The instrument must have native power, which, since it is not sufficient for the production of the final effect, must be utilized by the cause as principle. Some say that the influence of the cause as principle upon the instrument is a mere physical pre-motion; others that there is an intrinsic physical

elevation of the instrument to the superior order of the chief cause. If the artistic effect differs absolutely from the native power of the instrument, the last hypothesis may be true. The melody requires no special elevated power added to the intrinsic physical energies of the instrument, for there is nothing new except the actuation. If there were no cases where the effect differed absolutely from the native power of the instrument, the latter hypothesis would be useless and meaningless. But such a case might exist either if the instrument, in exercising its native function, really served for the production of the effect, which, to be sure, is contradictory; or if the effect, although superior, be at least in the same order as the natural power of the instrument. The old division of causes into perfective and dispositive must be retained because it explains many facts. There are three kinds of instrumentality: physical, moral, and intentional. The first works for the production of a physical reality in distinction from that which is known as free choice, rights, and duties. The second concerns the order of free agents and their responsible decisions. It exists every time there is an action tending by its operative influence, — not by its attractive goodness, — to produce a free choice. There is a special class of instruments purely intentional. For example, the words on a printed page stimulate the retina and also convey a meaning; they are causes operating as principles for the first effect, but as instruments for the second. The value of the word is based on a purely intentional conventionality, and is certainly an instance of the third class. Signs may be speculative, if employed to communicate thought, or practical, if used to communicate rights, obligations, etc. In both cases, it is necessary to use sensible signs. The practical signs may cause a physical effect, not, to be sure, in immediate production, but by producing the exigency. To deserve the title 'just' is to cause a physical effect, for every social function gives a right to participate in social wealth. The thaumaturgist may bring about the physical effect by intentional instrumentality taken not as a perfective but as a dispositive causality.

HARVEY G. TOWNSEND.

*The Will to Make-Believe.* WILBUR M. URBAN. Int. J. of Eth., XIX, 2, pp. 212-233.

A too gross appetite for beliefs and a morbid taste for skepticism are both abnormalities leading to excesses, which in turn bring about their own cure. Common sense, however, finds the 'half belief' attitudes of suspended judgment intolerable, and seeks to free itself from them by developing the instinct and will to make-believe. For practical purposes, belief and whole-souled make-believe are identical. The universal prevalence of the make-believe tendency is shown, by analyzing Newman's applied logic of belief-making regarding miracles, and comparing it with our own new set of make-believes, which substitute the *vox populi* of social miracles of regeneration, for the old-time *vox Dei* of religious wonderworkings. There is no

absolute distinction between belief and make-believe. The thesis defended is: Our passional nature, with its instinct to make-believe, not only lawfully may, but really must do so, when the make-believe is genuine or whole-souled; that is, when it is, in turn, the necessary condition or resultant of some other belief, the only alternative of which is disbelief and skepticism. The author examines the meaning of "to thine ownself be true" and, as a result, modifies it to read "to thine own selves be true." For we have the two alternatives, of an abstract point which is simple, but useless, and a concrete self, which is plural and fallible, but workable. In pure science, the rule is not to pretend at all, there being, by hypothesis, no concrete self to be affected by the make-believe. In the realm of pure imagination, on the contrary, the make-believe is so complete that the assumption of seriousness becomes absurd. But in everyday life reality and ideality, facts and values, are strangely mixed. There we find it practically indispensable to assume and make-believe certain things, and that not in mere play, but with at least an appearance of reality. This is especially true in the relations of persons to each other. When the realization of an end, itself useful or good, depends upon the reflex effect upon ourselves and others of the assumption, even pretense, that we already have it, then make-believe, pretense, is certainly a lawful and probably an indispensable thing. And, if we once reach the conclusion that the religious interpretation of the world is the humanistic, our relation to the religious principle can be no other than personal and human, and therefore characterized by the same indispensable make-believe tendency. Absolute truth is abstract; in concrete life "there is a game going on between you and the nature of things, but it is a beautiful game, in which both mean the good and the true *on the whole*."

R. A. TSANOFF.

#### PSYCHOLOGY.

*The Abandonment of Sensationalism in Psychology.* MARY WHITON CALKINS. Am. J. Ps., XX, 2, pp. 269-277.

"The basal purpose of this paper," to quote the author, "is to call attention to the advance made by present-day psychology on the sensationalism which persisted into the writings of the last decade." In the early nineties feelings were still considered attributes of sensation; now it is generally conceded that they form an independent class of elements. The reaction against sensationalism has appeared especially in two directions. First, Wundt enlarged the feeling class by the addition of two more feeling dimensions, — tension-relaxation and excitement-quiescence. This theory has been contested on the ground that these so-called feeling elements are further analyzable. In the opinion of the writer of this article, neither side has proved its point. She offers the following theory. Tension is merely attention and, as such, an element of consciousness. Relaxation is the absence of strain and, if positive, is a mere complex of organic sensations. Excitation and quiescence are not elements, but complex ex-

periences made up of organic sensations, and more especially of a "vivid consciousness of doubtful future or of irrevocable past." The second advance consists in the recognition of the relational element in consciousness. This view is maintained by the Würzburg school, by the school of Meinong, and by Stout, Woodworth, and James.

HELEN M. CLARKE.

*Psychical Process.* HAROLD H. JOACHIM. *Mind*, No. 69, pp. 65-83.

After stating the common distinction between 'logical content' as universal and objective, and 'psychical process' as unique and singular and peculiar to the individual mind, the writer criticises certain conceptions based on this distinction. Though one may justifiably make this distinction between two ways of regarding a total experience, confusion results when a division is made within the total experience, *i. e.*, when *within my knowing X*, the *X known* is severed from my *knowing*. 'Psychical process,' in terms of this distinction, is either nothing at all, or nothing which we can study; for whatever the processes of apprehending may be, the mind is not aware of those processes as mediating its apprehension of *X*, or as a part of *X*. Further, if I reflect on what I take to be the process of my judging, I find a new real,—a judgment to which again may be applied the distinction between meaning and psychical fact, and so on *in indefinitum*. But, it may be objected, this contradiction is merely illusory; the phenomena indicated by the distinction are real. Judgment in its universal aspect is the subject-matter of Logic. The apprehending and affirming of the meaning, however, is something singular and unique, a process inseparable from the individual mind, and yet a process exhibiting a certain general character and conforming to certain conditions and laws; this is the subject-matter of Psychology. But, the author asks, in what sense are these processes singular and unique? This is the crux of the argument. All phenomena are unique in that they occupy determinate positions in a complex system. But this character of the facts of science does not interfere with scientific investigation, since it is not in that aspect that science endeavors to know them. The 'unique singularity' of the 'facts of mind,' however, consists in a privacy of 'being-for-self,' which, from the nature of the case, cannot be given or apprehended as data for science. 'Psychical facts,' as so interpreted, are a contradiction in terms. On the basis of the contrast between 'perceptible things' and a 'mind' as essentially itself a process, the author suggests that the 'psychical process' of judging *is* the mind *qua* judging. But here the distinction between process of apprehending and object apprehended vanishes altogether, or, if it is still maintained, the whole subject-matter of study falls on the side of content. And in place of two sciences, we have one,—a more concrete science of Logic. Finally the appeal to common sense, that "we *do* think in ideas," is shown to fail in supporting the conception of 'psychical process' attacked in the preceding arguments. In conclu-

sion, the writer suggests that Psychology, avoiding the danger of 'psychologism,' begin, as it were, at the other end, studying the nature and functions of mind as revealed in Art, Morality, and Religion. "Such a Psychology would be essentially a part of Metaphysics. For its subject-matter would be the most developed and most significant manifestations of the real: — mind incarnate in the universe at the level and in the forms of its self-conscious expression."

EDITH H. MORRILL.

*Comment fonctionne mon cerveau: essai de psychologie introspective.* H. BEAUNIS. Rev. Ph., XXXIV, 1, pp. 29, 40.

Many of the acts performed in the course of a day are mechanical, automatic, or habitual. It is the same with sensations. There is no reflection before movements, and there is also no reflection after sensations. The experience of such non-reflective process may fall under two categories. In the first place, there are impressions of which we are scarcely conscious; for instance, cutaneous impressions that are produced by the clothes we wear. In the second place, there are impressions which we are conscious of, but which may pass almost unperceived, and without arousing any thought. Corresponding to these two categories, there are (1) movements mechanical and unconscious, (2) mechanical movements of which we may be very vaguely conscious. For the most part of a day, the author found that he did not think at all. He reserves the term *pensée* for a group of phenomena in which mental activity is operating, *i. e.*, the cases in which are found active perception, comparison, judgment, etc. The author excludes from the term *pensée* the following acts and phenomena: raw sensations, raw perceptions (form, size, distance, etc.) which have become mechanical through habituation, instinctive phenomena, mechanical and automatic acts, impulsive and mimic movements, and appetites (hunger, thirst, etc.).

TAIZO NAKASHIMA.

*Contributions to the Study of the Affective Processes.* TAIZO NAKASHIMA. Am. J. Ps., XX, 2, pp. 157-193.

The main question to be investigated in these experiments is: "What goes on in consciousness when I judge 'pleasant,' 'indifferent,' 'unpleasant,' or 'more (less) pleasant,' 'more (less) unpleasant'?" According to three different hypotheses, affection is an attribute of sensation, is itself a sensation, or is an independent element. The first is dismissed as unworthy of consideration. The other two are in dispute. In the first series of experiments the stimuli were tones of the three octaves  $c-c$ ,  $c^1-c^2$  and  $c^3-c^4$ , combined in all possible ways giving two hundred seventy-six combinations. The introspections of the first observer indicated the following factors in his affective judgments; reflection on different attributes of the tones, general condition or mood, associations, bias or prejudice, breathing and pulse. In spite of these, however, the larger number of judgments were made on

the basis of the stimuli only. The judgments of the second observer fell into two classes, the associative and the direct. This observer showed a strong tendency to organic sensations, and attempts to explain the judgments by these. The conclusion is that the factors named above are disturbing factors to be eliminated by the form of instruction and tend to disappear as the experiments progress. On the whole the judgments were immediate. In the second series of experiments, twenty-six Milton-Bradley colors were used combined into pairs in all possible ways. The judgments were 'pleasant' or 'unpleasant.' After every five comparisons the observers wrote their introspections. The general conclusion from these two series is that affective judgments may be and usually are as immediate as the sensory judgments of psycho-physics. In the next series there were used twelve cutaneous and twelve olfactory stimuli. The object was to secure introspections on the nature of the affective process and its difference from sensation. The results were not satisfactory in that they showed the peculiarities of the individual observers rather than any general tendencies. The only positive result was the fact that the affective process either was simultaneous with sensation or followed it in consciousness. This is in direct contradiction to Wundt's statement that the affective process may enter consciousness alone or precede sensation. Only one observer found qualitative differences within the classes pleasant and unpleasant, and only one observer, — the same one, — found both feelings in consciousness at the same time. There were a few cases of affective localization, and the introspections throw interesting light upon individual differences in affective reaction to colors. The last series of experiments gave reaction times for sensation and affection. The touch stimuli were so placed as to rest partly on one release key of a vernier chronoscope, so that, when the finger was applied to the stimulus, the pendulum was released. The other pendulum was released by discriminative reaction to paired judgments of hard-soft, rough-smooth, wet-dry, hot-cold, sharp-blunt, and pleasant-unpleasant. The results show that the affective discrimination times are regularly longer for all the observers than the sensible discrimination times. In regard to the relative time required for sensory and affective reaction, two opinions are possible. Since feeling is expressed in movement, this movement might occur as quickly as that recording sensory processes; or since affection lacks clearness, the movement might be expected to be slower than in sensory reaction. The results of the experiments favor the latter hypothesis. The method of reaction has thus been proved applicable to affective processes and affective discrimination times have been shown to be times of the same general order and the same sort of variability as sensible discrimination times.

HELEN M. CLARKE.

*The Psychological Origin of Religion.* JAMES H. LEUBA. *The Monist*, XIX, 1, pp. 27-35.

"It is the power with which man thinks himself in relation, and through

whom he endeavors to secure the gratification of his desires, which alone is distinctive of religious life. And so the origin of the idea of gods, though not identical with the origin of religion, is at any rate its central problem.' It is variously asserted as arising from the belief in ghosts, the personification of nature, or the necessity of a creator. The chronological order, in which ghosts, nature beings, and creators appeared, may conceivably vary among different peoples. But what is 'the lineage of the first god or gods, *i. e.*, of the first unseen, personal agents with whom men entered into relations definite and influential enough to deserve the name religion'? Since there is required incomparable greatness, creative power, and benevolence, the 'idea of a creator probably takes precedence . . . ; for a World-Creator possesses from the first the greatness necessary to the object of a cult, and the creature who recognizes a creator can hardly fail to feel his relationship to him. A Maker cannot be an enemy to those who issue from him, but must appear as the Great Ancestor, benevolently inclined towards his offspring.' The original emotional form of religion is generally held to be fear, because (1) 'evil spirits are the first to attain a certain degree of definiteness; (2) man enters into definite relations first with these evil spirits.' This theory, then, may be admitted if 'it be understood (1) that fear represents only one of the three constituents of religion, (2) that it is not in virtue of a particular quality or property that fear is the primitive emotional form of religion, and (3) that this admission is not intended to imply the impossibility of religion having ever anywhere begun with aggressive or tender emotions.' The importance of the rôle which fear plays is due to the fact that it was necessarily one of the first of the well-organized emotional reactions. However a small but weighty minority agree with Robertson Smith that religion as such really begins with 'a loving reverence for known gods who are knit to their worshipers by strong bonds of kinship.' Smith denied that the propitiation of dreaded evil spirits is religion. Yet, since this also is an anthropopathic relation to a personal being, it stands opposed to magical behavior, and may well be included as religion, especially since the 'striking development of religious life is the gradual substitution of love for fear in worship.'

EDWARD L. SCHAUB.

*Die Bedeutung des Ästhetischen für die Ethik.* RICH. MÜLLER-FREIENFELS. V. f. w. Ph., XXXII, IV, pp. 435-466.

The question, whether the æsthetic has any importance for Ethics, is variously answered. Some regard Ethics as wholly foreign to art; for others, morality is opposed to the æsthetic; still others view art as furthering and serving the cause of morality. For Freienfels the first of these positions is untenable and due to a misconception; the concept of *Amoralität* is a psychological non-entity. The other two views recognize the mutual influence of the ethical and the æsthetic on each other. The author proposes to discuss the chief ways in which art affects the emotional



life. One tends to distinguish here influences of form and of content. Of course, this is no sharp line of division, for the work of art is really an organism, without shell or kernel. The distinction is made for practical purposes. In music, the effects of form are uppermost, the content side being negligible. [In this sense, music is the ideal of an "*l'art pour l'art*" theory. This triumph of form in instrumental music is to correspond to color-harmony in painting, and to "*la musique avant toute chose*" in some schools of poetry.] The formal effects of poetry are primarily rhythmical and secondarily harmonic-melodic. And rhythm is no mere acoustic matter, but is largely motor. In stimulating the emotions, rhythm directly affects the organism; the kind of feelings aroused depends greatly upon the character of the person affected. This power of touching one's emotional life indicates the moral importance of music. It prevents the general *Logisierung* of our life. Music, affecting the feelings directly through rhythm, is also aided by harmony and melody, which are products of art, requiring generations of tradition and training for their proper appreciation. Asiatic harmony may be European discord, and *vice versa*. Harmony and melody give coloring and individuality to the emotional state aroused by rhythm. Allied to these are manifold associative influences, through which qualitative elements enter into the emotional excitation. A Rondo by Mozart affects us differently from a Beethoven Adagio. In vocal music, where the definiteness of the effect produced is largely due to the verbal factor, the formal influence is not the predominant one. The growing importance of orchestral effects in modern operas indicates the taste of modern audiences for the musical as against the 'dramatic' part of opera. In poetry, the content-factor predominates. In the *Augen-künste*, form and content contend for ascendancy. Poetry, like every other art, is a union of form and content. The latter, however, produces here the chief moral effect, and, of course, moral effect means æsthetic effect also. For great poetry is not didactic; open insistence on the moral problem involved, and elaboration of concepts parading in æsthetic garb are things displeasing to the artistic temperament. But in literature ethics and æsthetics are inseparable. Poetry is a portrayal of life: it cannot avoid morality, one of life's most essential phases. Naturalism, endeavoring to present 'truth,' real life, and aiming to be non-moral, often ends in being immoral. 'Art for art's sake' is an impossible position. In the arts of Architecture, Sculpture, and Painting, content often tends to hold the uppermost. Formally, painting is a 'music for the eye.' Art thus affects morality in several ways: It produces a purely dynamical 'loosening' of the entire emotional life and brings into play specific emotions, the latter representing the so-called selective influence of art. The first is effective mainly by means of formal factors, the latter mainly by means of content. A third effect of art is its elevating, liberating influence. Through art man rises to freedom and to higher spiritual planes. Hence the importance of art for ethics and religion.

## NOTES.

The Sixth International Congress of Psychology met at Geneva during the first week of August. It is announced that the Seventh International Congress will be held in Boston, with Professor William James as honorary president, Professor J. Mark Baldwin as president, and Professors J. McK. Cattell and E. B. Titchener as vice-presidents.

Professor J. Mark Baldwin has resigned his work of teaching Philosophy in Johns Hopkins University. He will reside abroad for sometime.

At the University of California Professor George H. Howison has been made Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Mr. George P. Adams has been promoted from Instructor to Assistant Professor of Philosophy, and Dr. DeWitt H. Parker has been appointed Instructor in Philosophy.

Dr. E. H. Hollands, formerly Instructor of Philosophy at Cornell University, has been made Acting Professor of Philosophy at Hamilton College.

Professor W. H. Sheldon, formerly Preceptor in Philosophy at Princeton University, has been called to a chair of Philosophy in Dartmouth College.

Dr. Philip H. Fogel and Dr. G. W. T. Whitney, formerly Instructors in the Department of Philosophy at Princeton, have been promoted to the Preceptorships made vacant by the resignations of Professors Adam Leroy Jones and W. H. Sheldon.

Dr. Oswald Külpe, Ordinary Professor at the University of Würzburg, has been called to the University of Bonn as successor to Professor Benno Erdmann.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals :

MIND, No. 71 : *F. H. Bradley*, On Truth and Coherence ; *J. E. McTaggart*, The Relation of Time and Eternity ; *A. R. Whately*, The Higher Immediacy ; *D. L. Murray*, Pragmatic Realism ; *Helen Wodehouse*, Knowledge as Presentation ; Discussions ; Critical Notices ; New Books ; Philosophical Periodicals ; Notes.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XIX, 4 : *J. S. Mackenzie*, Moral Education : The Task of the Teacher ; *Mrs. Millicent Mackenzie*, Moral Education : The Training of the Teacher ; *H. L. Stewart*, Some Criticisms of the Nietzsche Revival ; *Anna G. Spencer*, Problems of Marriage and Divorce ; *Mary G. Husband*, Women as Citizens ; *F. S. Hoffman*, The Right to Property ; *Bradley Gilman*, The Ethical Element in Wit and Humor ; Book Reviews.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XVI, 4 : *H. A. Carr*, Visual Illusions of Depth ; *June E. Downey*, Muscle Reading : A Method of Investigating Involuntary Movements and Mental Types.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, VI, 6: *G. A. Coe*, Psychological Aspects of Religious Education; *W. C. Bagley*, Recent Studies on Periodicity in Mental Development; Psychological Literature; Discussions and Reports; Notes and News.

VI, 7: *Carl E. Seashore*, Homogeneous Content in the Measurement of Continuous Memory Processes; *S. S. Colvin*, Methods of Determining Ideational Types; *A. H. Munsell*, On the Relation of the Intensity of Chromatic Stimulus (Physical Saturation) to Chromatic Sensation; Psychological Literature; Books Received; Notes and News.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, VI, 11: *Karl Schmidt*, Critique of Cognition and its Principles; *H. R. Marshall*, Clearness, Intensity, and Attention; Discussion; Societies; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VI, 12: *F. C. Doan*, The Cosmic Character; *Donald Fisher*, Common Sense and Attitudes; *R. W. Sellars*, Causality; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VI, 13: *G. R. Dodson*, An Interpretation of the St. Louis Philosophical Movement; *J. W. Hudson*, Hegel's Conception of an Introduction to Philosophy; *Eleanor H. Rowland*, A Case of Visual Sensations during Sleep; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VI, 14: *Ernest Davies*, Education and Philosophy; Discussions; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VI, 15: *W. T. Bush*, Knowledge and Perception; *Grace M. Fernald*, The Phenomena of Peripheral Vision as Affected by Chromatic and Achromatic Adaptation, with Special Reference to the After-Image; Societies; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, XV, 3: *Anna Tumarkin*, Kant's Lehre vom Ding an sich; *Julius Fischer*, Die Hegelsche Logik und der Goethesche Faust, eine vergleichende Studie; *Oscar Janzen*, Schopenhauers Auffassung des Verhältnisses der mathematischen Begründung zur logischen; *A. Richter*, Worin weicht Thomas bei der Darstellung und Beurteilung Spinozas von Herbart ab? *C. Baeumker*, Primäre und sekundäre Qualitäten; Jahresbericht.

XV, 4: *A. Goedeckemeyer*, Die Reihenfolge der Platonischen Schriften; *J. Eberz*, Die Tendenzen der Platonischen Dialoge Theaitetos Sophistes Politikos; *P. Bokownew*, Der νόος παθητικός bei Aristoteles; *H. Romundt*, Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft und die Geschichte der Philosophie; *C. Güttler-Preisaufrage*, Drittes Preisaufschreiben der "Kantgesellschaft"; *P. Eusebietti*, Il problema metafisico secondo Aristotele e l'interpretazione d'un passo della metafisica; Jahresbericht.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE, XXXIII, 2 : *Paul Barth*, Alois Riehls Darstellung des philosophischen Kritizismus ; *G. v. Glasenapp*, Zur Psychologie des Unendlichkeitsbegriffs ; *E. Cassirer*, 'Persönliche' und 'sachliche' Polemic ; *Cay v. Brockdorff*, Synthetische Urteile als Einheit von Abhängigen ; *A. Wagner*, Die Auffassung des Organischen im Darwinismus und Lamarckismus ; *Paul Barth*, Die Geschichte der Erziehung in soziologischer Beleuchtung ; Besprechungen ; Notizen.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, LI, 5 und 6 : *K. L. Schaefer*, Bibliographie der psycho-physiologischen Literatur des Jahres 1907 ; Namenverzeichnis der Bibliographie ; Namenregister.

LII, 1 und 2 : *K. Koffka*, Experimental-Untersuchungen zur Lehre vom Rhythmus ; *A. J. Schulz*, Untersuchungen über die Wirkung gleicher Reize auf die Auffassung bei momentaner Exposition ; Literaturbericht.

LII, 3 und 4 : *P. Stein*, Tatbestandsdiagnostische Versuche bei Untersuchungsgefangenen ; *A. J. Schulz*, Untersuchungen über die Wirkung gleicher Reize auf die Auffassung bei momentaner Exposition (Schluss) ; Literaturbericht.

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THE  
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

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FRENCH WORKS ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY DURING 1907-08.<sup>1</sup>

THE subject of this article will be the works upon history of philosophy which have appeared in France during recent years, more especially during 1907 and 1908; these works will be considered less for the purpose of giving an account and an appreciation of them individually, — a task already accomplished by the REVIEW for several among them, — than with the view of indicating toward what objects they have more or less converged, and what results concerning these objects they have more or less succeeded in attaining.

The works which have been devoted to the history of ancient philosophy during this period are not very numerous; but almost all are of great interest and some are of high value. Let us mention at the beginning those which are due to two masters, both prematurely dead, Victor Brochard and Octave Hamelin, who by their teaching as well as by their works had already guided, and could have continued to guide, disciples toward the study of ancient philosophy. Victor Brochard, the learned author of the *Sceptiques grecs*, had been for a long time prevented by the most painful and heroically borne illness from thinking of productions of great length; but he contributed regularly to a periodical collection, *L'année philosophique*, published under the direction of M. Fr. Pillon, solid articles bearing principally upon Greek philosophy. It would be sufficient to bring together these articles to obtain, upon Platonism in particular, a collection of very sound and coherent views, equally removed from the interpretation in which Zeller remained obstinately fixed, and the very

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French by Dr. Grace Neal Dolson.

hazardous conjectures to which the recent Platonic exegesis has more than once abandoned itself. The last study which Brochard contributed to these matters and in this spirit related to the Platonic doctrine of participation; and it explained with as much ingenuity as demonstrative force how the apparently sophistic subtleties of the *Parmenides* are a mode of proposing a problem of which the *Sophist*, with its doctrine of the existence of not-being and of the communion of kinds, brings the solution.<sup>1</sup> . . . If among the ancient philosophers Plato was the one to whom Brochard was always returning, it was upon Aristotle that Hamelin preferred to concentrate his efforts. Of these efforts his pupils alone have been able to measure the whole extent and power, and the testimonies that remain of them for the public are unhappily extremely rare. Permit me to recall, though it may be of a date already somewhat antiquated, the study upon *L'opposition des concepts d'après Aristote*,<sup>2</sup> which is, among the several articles which Hamelin has contributed to *L'année philosophique*, the only one devoted, strictly speaking, to Aristotelianism. The interest of this study is not merely in the elucidation of a singularly obscure point in Aristotle's thought, but lies also in the fact that it shows how reflection upon Aristotelianism could contribute to form Hamelin's personal philosophy, which he has set forth in his *Essai sur les éléments principaux de la représentation*. Concerning Aristotle Hamelin has left us, besides this study, a French translation, with commentary, of Book II of the *Physics*,<sup>3</sup> a translation at once remarkably faithful and intelligent, which reproduces wonderfully well the connection of ideas; a commentary abundant and precise, which, if it is not encumbered with the detail of contemporary erudition, makes use with rare penetration of the teachings of Themistius, of Simplicius, and of Philoponus. Certain notes, — I will cite by way of example that which relates to the theory of chance, — furnish the most profound and the most exact interpretation of Aristotle's thought. The author intended to continue under the same form the edi-

<sup>1</sup> *L'année philosophique*, 18th yr., Paris, Alcan, 1908.

<sup>2</sup> *L'année philosophique*, 16th yr., Paris, Alcan, 1906.

<sup>3</sup> O. Hamelin, *Physique d'Aristote, II, Traduction et commentaire*, Paris, Alcan, 1907, pp. 172, 8vo.

tion of the whole of the *Physics*; a tragic death came to destroy this plan together with all the works that a mind as rich in original conceptions as in exact knowledge could promise to itself and to us.

It would be fitting to recall after such studies the most recent of the articles which M. Rodier has also published in *L'année philosophique*: the one discloses to us the 'pragmatism' of Antisthenes;<sup>1</sup> the other shows us the direct relation between the theory of Ideas and the belief in personal immortality in the reasoning of the *Phædo*.<sup>2</sup> — But we are dealing here with works of greater extent; and we have in the first place two books by M. Robin concerning Plato. The first<sup>3</sup> attempts to show how the Platonic theory of love is completed or transformed between the *Lysis* and the *Symposium* and between the *Symposium* and the *Phædrus*; how, according to Platonism, love, demon as well as soul, has a synthetic nature which permits it to play a mediating rôle between the sensible world and the intelligible world. The work recommends itself by the detailed study of the texts, by the skillful use and often very keen criticism of the resources and the methods which may be employed to fix the chronological order of the dialogues in question, and also by the force and coherence of the interpretation. Doubtless the author risks exciting more than one suspicion when he affirms the posteriority of the *Phædrus* in relation to the *Timæus*, or when, through reaction against a too strictly rationalistic idea of Platonism, he pushes it in the direction of the Alexandrian Neo-Platonism. But that he had the habit of making a decision only after the most loyal and minute investigation, no one could doubt for an instant, especially after reading his other book.<sup>4</sup> The design of the latter seems to be to take up a wager: to set forth Platonism as we should be able to know it, if we did not have the Dialogues and if we were obliged

<sup>1</sup> *Conjecture sur le sens de la morale d'Antisthène, L'année philosophique, 17th yr., Paris, Alcan, 1907.*

<sup>2</sup> *Les Preuves de l'immortalité d'après le Phédon, L'année philosophique, 18th yr., Paris, Alcan, 1908.*

<sup>3</sup> L. Robin, *Théorie platonicienne de l'amour, Paris, Alcan, 1908.*

<sup>4</sup> Léon Robin, *La théorie platonicienne des idées et des nombres d'après Aristote. Étude historique et critique, Paris, Alcan, 1908, pp. xviii, 702, 8vo.*

to reconstruct it from the sole testimony of Aristotle,— the surest means, according to the author, of escaping the subjectivity of modern interpretations. But is this really certain? And is not the information furnished by Aristotle itself open to subjective interpretation? None the less the book of M. Robin is a work of great and sound learning, and constitutes the most varied and substantial commentary upon the passages of Aristotle relating to Plato. One could hardly believe what a crowd of questions the author is in this way led to treat. Concerning the central question, after having rejected the hypothesis which puts the Number-Ideas on the same plane as the Ideas, as well as that which relates them to the Ideas as to anterior and superior models, he admits the hypothesis which regards them as first in relation to the Ideas. In representing to ourselves the generation of ideas after the simpler model which the generation of numbers offers us, we understand what the Idea is, why there is a plurality of Ideas, and how this plurality forms a hierarchy. The mathematical speculations of the later Pythagoreans furnished Plato with a new means of passing beyond both the philosophy of Heraclitus and that of the Eleatics, and made it possible for him to reconcile the multiplicity and mobility of Being with its unity and immobility.

The two works of Robin therefore contribute in a high degree to enrich the knowledge of Platonism and Aristotelianism which we owe in France to the lectures or to the studies of Brochard, of Hamelin, and of Rodier. We desire soon to possess larger and more complete works than we have at present upon the Post-Aristotelian schools. It is especially to be regretted that Stoicism has been studied among us only in a rather incidental and fragmentary fashion, that it has been so little followed in the complexity and evolution of its constitutive ideas. It is only to a limited problem that M. Brehier devotes himself in a monograph<sup>1</sup> in which he shows how the tendency of the Stoics to eliminate incorporeals from Being, by creating a division between knowledge of the real and dialectical knowledge, led Greek philosophy into

<sup>1</sup> Brehier, *La théorie des incorporels dans l'ancien Stoïcisme*, Paris, Picard, 1907, pp. 63, 8vo.



a road opposed to that which had been traced for it by the conceptual doctrines of a Plato and an Aristotle. The author seems well prepared and thoroughly qualified to enlarge the field of his investigation upon Stoicism.

Meanwhile he has given us, at the same time with his monograph upon Stoicism, a finished book upon the philosophical and religious ideas of Philo the Jew.<sup>1</sup> The treatise, which is preceded by a very extensive bibliography, attempts to represent the multiple aspects of Philo's work. If the author does not always sufficiently dominate the confusion of his subject-matter, he marks everywhere with satisfactory clearness how, in appropriating Greek doctrines, the Judaism of Philo imposes upon them a new significance. Thus Philo replaces the logical relation of beings to God by a more nearly moral relation, and makes of the knowledge or realization of this relationship through revelation or spiritual adoration the supreme end. Upon the problem of Philo's relation to Christianity the author maintains a great reserve; he nevertheless applies himself to disengage from Philo's writings a moral doctrine which was, he asserts, the first ethics of conscience. In a work which appeared a little earlier,<sup>2</sup> and which is especially valuable on account of the ease and clearness of its exposition, M. l'abbé Martin had, on the contrary, more freely emphasized the differences which separate Christianity from Philoism.

Concerning the knowledge of the propagation of Greek ideas, and in particular of Alexandrian ideas, in the thought of the middle ages up to the time of modern philosophy, our French literature has immense gaps; and the scarcity of works relating to this subject prevents us from hoping that these gaps can soon be filled. One could doubtless point out here and there studies or articles which are devoted to emphasizing such and such doctrines of mediæval philosophy; but almost always their inspiration is dogmatic and apologetic rather than historic and critical. We nevertheless must recognize in the work of M. l'abbé Rousselot upon the intellectualism of St. Thomas a freer

<sup>1</sup> Bréhier, *Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie*, Paris, Picard, 1907, pp. 336, 8vo.

<sup>2</sup> L'abbé Jules Martin, *Philon*, Paris, Alcan, 1907, pp. 303, 8vo.

effort at reconstruction.<sup>1</sup> The author maintains that the intellectualism of St. Thomas does not fall under the criticisms of our day addressed against intellectualism in general, because St. Thomas does not admit the priority of the conceptual and discursive reason, but makes the supreme intellection consist in the living coincidence of the mind and of things. But since this intellection could not belong to man in the present life, and since the human discursive understanding is inadequate to reality, the intellectualism, strictly speaking, of St. Thomas appears finally to vanish, doubtless much more than its author would have wished, either in the perfection of God or in the imperfection of man. However that may be, attempts of this sort are more useful in reviving the thought of the middle ages than all those works which try to adapt it to modern thought by fair means or foul.

It is rather, as I said, the diffusion or the transformation of the ideas of antiquity and of the middle ages into modern ideas, which merit consideration. To the accomplishment of this task the remarkable studies of the history of science which are due to M. Pierre Duhem, have more or less directly contributed. We have the right to claim these studies; for since there has been brought about among us a reconciliation between philosophy and science, which had been too long separated and ignorant of each other, the history of philosophy ought herself to have been occupied with the long neglected relations which have in so many philosophers bound together strictly philosophical speculations with scientific theories. M. Pierre Duhem, who, with his great competence as a scholar and his rare penetration of mind, has contributed more than any one to renew the philosophy and criticism of the sciences, has particularly devoted himself in recent times to the discovery of the origins, often more remote than had been supposed, of modern science. It is from this standpoint that he had previously written his important and novel work upon the history of statics.<sup>2</sup> Between the admirable labors of an Archimedes and the classical doctrines of a Galileo,

<sup>1</sup> Rousselot, *L'intellectualisme de St. Thomas*, Paris, Alcan, 1908, pp. xxv, 256, 8vo.

<sup>2</sup> P. Duhem, *Les sources des théories physiques. Les origines de la statique*, Paris, Hermann, 1905-1906, 2 vols., 8vo.

of a Descartes, of a Roberval, and of a Torricelli, the teachings of the expiring Hellenic science and then of the science of the middle ages and of the Renaissance exhibit uninterrupted connections. Duhem has discovered two principal ways through which statics has thus progressed: the method of potential work, which from the thirteenth century was employed by Jordanus de Nemore and the *Auctores de ponderibus*; and the theory of the centre of gravity, developed at Paris in the fourteenth century by Albert de Saxe. In thus studying the origins of statics Duhem has come upon Leonardo da Vinci, who has been the occasion of a series of excellent studies, also destined to show the continuity of scientific progress.<sup>1</sup> On the one side, the thoughts of Leonardo da Vinci were very often inspired by the writings of the middle ages; on the other side, the authors of the sixteenth century seem many times to have been acquainted with his ideas and to have drawn upon them for their own works. In statics, in dynamics, in geology, Leonardo made himself the disciple of what were called in his time the Parisian doctrines. He enriched them by his own reflections; he contributed to their diffusion in Italy. Now the triumph of the Parisian doctrines over the routine Averröism of Bologna and Padua played an essential rôle in the Italian renaissance of the sciences. It is also for the purpose of making evident the continuity that presides over evolutions of scientific thought, that Duhem has followed the notion of physical theory from Plato to Galileo.<sup>2</sup> Greek thought appears to have anticipated the diverse opinions of physical theory which are still debated in our day. Among the Greek philosophers, some see in astronomical theory a collection of corollaries, the principles of which are justified by a metaphysical doctrine upon the nature of the stars; others demand of astronomical theory only the means of constructing models suitable for figuring out celestial movements; others finally see there *hypotheses* capable of "saving the phenomena" and of rendering them calculable. In the Mohammedan and Christian middle ages and at the time

<sup>1</sup> P. Duhem, *Études sur Léonard de Vinci*, Paris, Hermann, 1906-1909, 2 vols., 8vo.

<sup>2</sup> P. Duhem, *Σώζειν τὰ φαινόμενα, Essai sur la notion de théorie physique de Platon à Galilée*. Paris, Hermann, 1908, 1 vol., 8vo.

of the Renaissance we find continually these different points of view; each of which is familiar with many vicissitudes of repute and of disfavor.

These works of Duhem are like castings of the lead thrown with incomparable skill into the depths where scientific theories are preserved and are slowly transformed in passing from one age to another. The studies of M. Milhaud,<sup>1</sup> — who has also come from science to philosophy and the history of science, — have to do more particularly with the relations of philosophic and of scientific thought among the great philosophers. Directed by preference to disengaging the forces of spiritual activity which have established such relations and occupied with sufficiently diverse subjects, *Platon géomètre et Platon métaphysicien*, *Aristote et les mathématiques*, *le hasard chez Aristote et chez Cournot*, *les préoccupations scientifiques chez Kant*, etc. . . . , they tend to defend the autonomy and the value of Greek science, to show the creative part which enters into every scientific discovery, and to make clear the variety and the wealth of standpoints and steps by means of which the mind has proceeded to knowledge. There is pleasure as well as profit in allowing oneself to be guided by a writer so clear, so quick, and so well informed. The example which men like Duhem and Milhaud have given in passing from science to philosophy and the history of science, has fortunately been followed in the opposite direction by philosophers who have sought in a more or less extended scientific culture a solid foundation for their works upon philosophy or history of philosophy. One of them, the author of the profound *Essai sur l'hypothèse des atomes*, Arthur Hannequin, died prematurely, taking with him the idea of works, which, if they could have been executed, would have done great honor to French philosophy. Very appropriately a collection has been made of different studies in the history of the sciences and in the history of philosophy, which he had published in the Reviews or had left among his papers.<sup>2</sup> These studies are all dominated by the

<sup>1</sup> G. Milhaud, *Études sur la pensée scientifique chez les grecs et les modernes*. Paris, Société française d'imprimerie et de librairie, 1906, pp. 273, 16mo.

<sup>2</sup> A. Hannequin, *Études d'histoire des sciences et d'histoire de la philosophie*, with a preface by R. Thamin and an introduction by J. Grosjean, Paris, Alcan, 1908, 2 vols., pp. ci, 264 and 326, 8vo.

idea that the royal road of philosophic thought is that which has been so vigorously traced by Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant, in uniting their geometrical conception of nature to the notion of the superior and, so to speak, overflowing value of the mind, which gives to the former its foundation. In the method of Descartes he perceives, through reaction against the unfruitful analytical logic of the schools, a synthetic procedure of concatenation. In the new lectures, which unfortunately remained incomplete, he energetically protests against the theses of Russell and of Couturat, who have professed to make the metaphysics of Leibniz proceed exclusively from his logic; and he is thus led to confirm the views that he had uttered elsewhere in a Latin dissertation, translated into French in the present work, and according to which the formation of the philosophy of Leibniz had been essentially conditioned by his mechanics. A more profound truth, which, according to him, is to be found in a hidden form in Cartesianism, as well as in the philosophy of Leibniz, is the idea, which Kantism made explicit, of the agreement between the synthetic function *a priori* of the mind and the conditions of the exact knowledge of nature. In fact, in an article devoted to the Kantian doctrine of the principles of the pure understanding, he not only vigorously reconstructs this doctrine, but he also claims to justify it through the meaning and progress of the science of the present time. Around these central studies will be found arranged various others upon Hobbes, upon Spinoza, upon the history of French mathematicians and physicians of the first half of the nineteenth century, — all equally in conformity with the wonderfully firm and penetrating ideas which the author explains at intervals, upon the relations of science and philosophy, of history and speculation.

If one is curious about the development of scientific discoveries and theories in their contact with the philosophic and religious spirit, one should not fail to consult the volumes that M. Fortunat Strowski has published upon Pascal.<sup>1</sup> A very exact learning, which is ignorant of none of the events and

<sup>1</sup> Fortunat Strowski, *Pascal et son temps*, Paris, Plon, 1907-1908, 3 vols., pp. iv, 286; iii, 405 and 419, 16mo.

motives of the spiritual life of Pascal or of the environment where that life was formed and where it burst forth, a remarkable power of concentration in the exposition of facts and of ideas, a nervous and luminous style: here are the incontestable qualities of this work, to which our French Academy has just awarded the highest recompense in its power. Now the guiding idea of the book in question is that the scientific spirit is the ruling form of Pascal's genius. Whether Pascal studies the vacuum, writes the *Provinciales*, or meditates an *Apologia de la Religion Chrétienne*, he always works in the same manner, with equal care and according to constant rules. What was the nature of the scientific spirit of Pascal; how he is naturally opposed to Scholastic methods; but how he also differs from the scientific spirit of Descartes by the more discreet, one would gladly say more critical, use which he makes of mathematical deduction, by the more profound respect which he expresses for experimentation and the facts, and by the more positive notion that he has of the compass and of the verification of hypotheses, — all of this Strowski explains in terms as clear as they are precise. He devotes some very instructive chapters to the experiments of Pascal, in particular to the great experiment upon the equilibrium of liquids. He interposes with new arguments in the re-echoing controversy, which has been aroused among us by the accusations of M. Mathieu, and to which M. Lalande has introduced the readers of the REVIEW.<sup>1</sup> He accordingly restores to Pascal his originality as a scholar at the same time that he analyzes and makes comprehensible the proceedings of his mind. On the other hand, let us congratulate ourselves that besides a work which represents with such strength the history of Pascal's thought, we have the instrument of study and control that completes it: I mean the edition of Pascal undertaken by M. Brunschvicg. M. Brunschvicg had already edited the *Pensées*; he has just given us in three new volumes,<sup>2</sup> with the collaboration of M. Pierre Boutroux, all the writings of Pascal in chronological order up to the memorial of Nov. 23, 1654, that is to

<sup>1</sup> See A. Lalande, *Philosophy in France*, Vol. XVI, July, 1907.

<sup>2</sup> Paris, Hachette, 1908, pp. 1xv, 406, 574 and 600, 8vo.

say, up to his definite conversion. He has had the very happy idea of accompanying these writings not only with divers biographical notes coming from the family, but also with a great number of fragments, scattered until now, which are indispensable for following the development and the direction of Pascal's thought. This edition, executed with an extreme care, will be particularly precious in establishing the contribution of Pascal to the science of his time.

Pascal the scholar, as well as Pascal the man of faith, is to a large extent outside the movement of the Cartesian ideas. In an important book upon the philosophy of Newton,<sup>1</sup> M. Bloch shows us Newtonianism drawn up against this movement. According to Bloch, Newton created the positive spirit in reaction against the metaphysical tendencies of Cartesianism. The notion of continuity, upon which rests the infinitesimal calculus, the notions of mass, of force, of motion, by which rational mechanics was certainly constituted, were, in spite of appearances, not laid down as first definitions before imposing them upon facts. They are at bottom of an experimental character. In the Newtonian physics the geometrical and deductive form is not essential; if it brings precision, it does not add certainty, and especially it does not cause natural laws to be conceived *sub specie æternitatis*. Without doubt the physics of Newton accepts mechanism because the latter is a part of science; but, positive before everything else, it employs general methods independent of every mechanical hypothesis; it is a system, not of explanation, but of description. Such is the general meaning of this book, which furnishes, besides, ample information upon all of Newton's work. But is not such a reconstruction of Newton equivalent to modernizing him? Newton occasionally appears as if he had had exactly the notion of the character and import of science that is held to-day, for example, by M. Poincaré! There is an evident exaggeration here, due to a certain defect of the historical spirit in the author. The opposition of Newton's philosophy to Cartesianism is in like manner too much emphasized, and the intermediaries that made

<sup>1</sup> León Bloch, *La Philosophie de Newton*. Paris, Alcan, 1908, pp. 642, 8vo. See upon Newton's work a popular monograph, *Newton*, by Carra de Vaux. Paris, Blond, pp. 59, 12mo.

possible the substitution of the one for the other are too much neglected.

From Pascal and Newton to pass to Cournot, — continuing with the series of historical works devoted to doctrines in which are joined the philosophic spirit and the scientific spirit, — such a juxtaposition as this would be unjust to Cournot, if the union aroused the idea of a comparison between him and the others. Nevertheless in his *Exposition de la théorie des chances et des probabilités*, as well as in his *Traité élémentaire de la théorie des fonctions et du calcul infinitésimal*, Cournot has not failed to add some originality to his understanding of the work of his two glorious predecessors. But it is not, to be exact, through his learned discoveries that Cournot was of value; and his real worth may be estimated as consisting especially in the combination of the gift of elucidating the essential notions of the very diverse sciences to which he applied himself, with the faculty of pointing out their rational significance and connection without ever reading his own views into the system. Gratitude is due to M. Mentré for having given, in the large book that he has just published,<sup>1</sup> so conscientious an abstract of the varied work of Cournot, — a work which embraces economic and historic questions and religious problems as well as subjects of scientific criticism. Even if one regards the book, which is somewhat compact and heavy, as too prodigal of literal exposition and of citations, this defect should not be too much insisted upon; for it compensates in some measure for the difficulty which one finds at the present time in procuring for oneself the works of Cournot. However, most of those who have read Cournot, and who have reflected upon the *Essai sur les fondements de nos connaissances*, or the *Traité de l'enchaînement des idées fondamentales*, have almost unanimously attested to the extreme profit they have derived from it. Cournot's doctrine, which allies to so firm a conception of the order of things so energetic an appreciation of the limits within which we can reach that order, which marks so rigorously the place of chance, of the contingent, of the historic, and, on

<sup>1</sup> Mentré, *Cournot et la Renaissance du problème au XIXe siècle*. Paris, Rivière, 1908, pp. viii, 649, 8vo. — By the same author, a popular monograph, *A. Cournot*, Paris, Blond, 1907, pp. 71, 12mo.



the side of law, of the necessary and the rational, this doctrine has something sober, measured, and so to speak, extremely judicious about it,—qualities which perhaps do not much excite the speculative imagination, but which deserve to hold the sound and cool reflection. The book of M. Mentré is well adapted to facilitate initiation into this doctrine.

Studies upon different questions of the history or philosophy of the sciences are also found in a work<sup>1</sup> in which M. René Berthelot has brought together articles and lectures from different sources, as well as reports of discussions provoked by certain of his theses for the *Société Française de Philosophie*. I will point out especially the observations upon the distinctive characteristics of the idea of evolution according to Darwin,<sup>2</sup> all the more since they have called forth interesting remarks from such scholars as Giard and Houssay ; I will mention also the instructive and keen study upon the origins of the philosophy of Spencer. Beside these studies are to be found others,—all interesting, but sometimes artificially systematic,—which are devoted to purely speculative conceptions or doctrines ; such as the study upon the *Loi du Ternaire chez Proclus* or that upon the *Sens de la philosophie de Hegel*. The last two subjects give us an occasion for returning to works bearing upon those modern theories which are more strictly philosophical, or, if one prefers, to works falling more exactly under the ordinary categories of modern philosophy.

An admirable essay upon atomism and occasionalism in the Cartesian philosophy has come out to fill various gaps present in our ordinary knowledge of Cartesianism.<sup>3</sup> The author, M. Joseph Prost, has conscientiously studied those minor Cartesians, who, by modifying the doctrines of the master or by developing it in a certain direction, have prepared for the appearance of such doctrines as those of Malebranche and Leibniz, by whom the

<sup>1</sup> René Berthelot, *Evolutionisme et Platonisme*, Paris, Alcan, 1908, pp. iv, 326, 8vo.

<sup>2</sup> I mention in this connection a widely known popular monograph, *Ch. Darwin*, by Emile Thouverez. Paris, Blond, 1907, pp. 124, 12mo; in the same collection of monographs Thouverez has given equally good expositions of Stuart Mill and of Spencer.

<sup>3</sup> Joseph Prost, *Essai sur l'atomisme et l'occasionalisme dans la philosophie cartésienne*, Paris, Paulin, 1907, pp. 271, 8vo.

modest originality of their own ideas was quickly eclipsed. He shows how De la Forge shares with Cordemoy the merit of having perceived what was later called the synthetic character of causality, and of having clearly formulated occasionalism; and how in addition Cordemoy introduced into the Cartesian physics the atomism which Descartes expressly rejected, without succeeding perhaps in suppressing every trace of it in his system.

Spinoza has continued to be the subject of useful works, and certainly among such one of the most useful consists in translating him anew into our language. This is the task which M. Appuhn has undertaken, and which for one part he has already brought to a successful issue.<sup>1</sup> Not only through his translation does he often happily fix the more or less uncertain meaning of some passage, but he has also added, in the form of a commentary, a certain number of substantial notes, the content of which is supplied by the most recent books of Spinozistic exegesis. On his own account he tries to make apparent the character of the system as being both individualistic and religious.<sup>2</sup> However justifiable such a view may be, it is not in this way that the system struck contemporaries; and those who welcomed it at first sought in it something entirely different. Among them was Boulainvilliers, who under the deceptive title of "Refutation" wrote an apology for Spinozism. Now a French translation has just been published, the first to a certainty that was made of the *Ethics*, from a manuscript which was found in our day in the Municipal Library of Lyons; and the editor of this translation, M. Colonna d'Istria, has shown, in as convincing a manner as possible, that it was due to Boulainvilliers.<sup>3</sup> He is, moreover, not content to have it printed as it is; he has accom-

<sup>1</sup> *Œuvres de Spinoza*, translated and annotated by Appuhn, Paris, Garnier, 1907, pp. 566, 12mo. — *Éthique*, Revised Latin text and new translation by Appuhn. Paris, Garnier, 1908, pp. 710, 12mo.

<sup>2</sup> In a posthumous article published by the *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, under the title "La Dieu de Spinoza" (November, 1908), Victor Brochard, by uniting more closely than had been done before the doctrine of the *Ethics* and of the *Theologico-Politicus*, has vigorously maintained the personality of the Spinozistic God.

<sup>3</sup> Spinoza, *Ethique*. Unedited translation of Count Henri de Boulainvilliers, published with an introduction and notes by F. Colonna d'Istria, Paris, Colin, 1907, pp. 374, 8vo.

panied it with notes that correct its inaccuracies, and with an introduction, in which he shows how adherence to Spinozism was for Boulainvilliers a method of combat against orthodoxy, and also the satisfaction of a very free curiosity and a thoroughly irreligious mind. This study throws light upon a point of the history, still obscure and not well understood, of the spread of Spinozism in France, while at the same time it discloses one of the currents of thought which passed from the seventeenth century to the eighteenth, to be considerably widened in the latter.

Among those who fed this current Pierre Bayle figures in the first rank. The French philosophers of the eighteenth century, if they do not mention him very frequently, nevertheless do not hesitate to borrow freely from his *Dictionnaire*. But what was he himself? M. Delvolvé has tried to disengage the essential traits of his physiognomy from the extreme variety of the circumstances in which he lived, from the vivacity of the controversies in which he was engaged, and from the often prolix abundance of his work.<sup>1</sup> I would not affirm that through reaction against the scepticism ordinarily attributed to Bayle, he has not exaggerated the positive and affirmative character of his ideas. But, by the very fact that it is even too systematic, the book has the advantage of saving us from the minutiae of detail. It shows how, through all his disputes and his learned investigations, Bayle is more and more led to free himself from every alliance with confessional beliefs, whatever they might be, and to lay down rules of practical activity independent of those beliefs. His criticism of dogmas consists in opposing to them the facts that contradict them, and also in bringing to light, through the analysis and comparison of different metaphysical systems, the contradictions of the reason with itself, as soon as it passes beyond experience. According to the author Bayle is not a sceptic, he is a critic in the modern sense of the term. However different he may be from Kant in the general form of his mind, he prepares the way for him, or anticipates him through his manner of looking at the general relations of experience, of metaphysics and of practice.

<sup>1</sup> Delvolvé, *Religion, critique et philosophie positive chez Pierre Bayle*, Paris, 1906, Alcan, pp. 445, 8vo.

Such an interpretation is perhaps a generous ascription to Bayle of a decidedly moral spiritualism. Certainly, even if it can be admitted that Bayle does not go in the direction of the sensualistic and utilitarian naturalism of the eighteenth century, such as M. Keim, in an instructive but involved book, has been pleased to glorify in the person of Helvetius,<sup>1</sup> it is undoubtedly to force analogies to make him so direct a precursor of the Kantian criticism. He lacks too many of the essential conditions of criticism! It is not through having affirmed that there are limits to knowledge and that morality is independent of speculation, that Kantism has been what it is; its significance lies in the discovery of a rational foundation and a precise import for those theses, which, as they were, had only an undetermined significance. Moreover, Kant never denied at bottom the education which he had received from the previous metaphysics; and no one could fully understand him without seeking to know to what degree he shared in the philosophy of Leibniz and of Wolff. In this search two works of M. Van Biéma may be of use. One is a monograph devoted to the master of Kant, to Martin Knutzen,<sup>2</sup> and is intended to explain why, having started out from the Leibnizian theory of preëstablished harmony, Knutzen substituted for it his theory of physical influx. M. Van Biéma does not emphasize sufficiently the part which Newtonism had in this substitution; but he makes clear the influence of pietistic beliefs, and he gives us on the whole a scrupulous analysis of the *Systema causarum efficientium*. His other work,<sup>3</sup> which is without question of keener interest and greater merit, has as its object the establishment of the relations between the Leibnizian and the Kantian theories of space and time. Before showing what these relations really are, he indicates how Kant has represented them. He relies upon a very conscientious and sometimes even minute study of the texts, and utilizes in particular the writing of Kant against Eberhard. Perhaps in the *Critique of Pure Reason* he

<sup>1</sup> Keim, *Helvétius, sa vie et son œuvre*, Paris, 1907, Alcan, pp. viii, 716, 8vo.

<sup>2</sup> Van Biéma, *Martin Knutzen, La critique de l'harmonie préétablie*, Paris, Alcan, 1908, pp. ii, 125, 8vo.

<sup>3</sup> Van Biéma, *L'espace et le temps chez Leibniz et chez Kant*, Paris, 1908, Alcan, pp. 336, 8vo.

draws too exclusively from the texts of the *Aesthetic* and the *Analytic*, without considering sufficiently those of the *Dialectic*, which latter might have led him to occupy himself more with the historical formation of Kant's theory. The thought occurs also that his discussion of psychological interpretation and of the innateness of the *a priori* does not keep sufficiently close to the terms of the problem. But taken as a whole the book is sound, and in more than one place it does not lack keenness. It will be appreciated by whoever thinks that apart from all adherence to doctrines, the knowledge of Kant remains an essential element of philosophic education. May I be permitted to point out that in accordance with this conviction, I have myself recently published a new translation, with introduction and commentary, of the *Foundations of the metaphysic of morals*?<sup>1</sup>

In spite of their unequal value the works that we have just mentioned are almost all conceived in a sufficient spirit of objectivity and according to the rules of a good historic method. Some of the most important, we have seen, treat of the history of philosophy in connection with the history of the sciences, and it is desirable that this procedure should become a tradition. Since, on the other hand, among us as elsewhere, studies in religious psychology and philosophy are at the present time in favor, may it not be hoped that the history of philosophy will receive a corresponding enlargement, and that it will take greater account in the future than it has done in the past, of the numerous links between philosophical doctrines and the diverse manifestations of the religious spirit?<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Kant, *Fondements de la Métaphysique des mœurs*. New translation with introduction and notes by Victor Delbos, Paris, 1907, Delagrave, pp. 210, 12mo.

<sup>2</sup> The work of Strowski which we have mentioned in the course of this article naturally includes a profound study of the religious thought of Pascal. Writings such as *Science et Religion*, by Emile Boutroux (Paris, Flammarion, 1908, pp. 400, 12mo), or the *Études d'histoire et de psychologie du mysticisme* by Henri Delacroix (Paris, Alcan, 1908, pp. xix, 470, 8vo), contain, mixed with the doctrinal discussion or the psychological analysis, very valuable fragments of the history of religious conceptions and theories.

## INDIVIDUALITY AND FREEDOM.

IN the present paper I wish to discuss the relation between the problem of freedom and the conception of human individuality. It is often asserted that if we deny the existence of real alternatives in the choices of men, we rob 'personality' of all its significance, that unless the will is 'free,' in the sense of there being real alternatives, we have no true individuality. It is the correctness of this assertion that I wish to consider.

Our first task is to try to make clear to ourselves what we mean by individuality. An exhaustive study of the concept would lead us beyond the limits of this paper, but we can, I think, give an account that will be sufficient for the purposes of our discussion.<sup>1</sup> The ordinary conception of an 'individual' seems to include three chief factors, — unity, uniqueness, and completeness or self-sufficiency. We shall consider each of these briefly.

That individuality always involves some sort of unity will hardly be denied. That which is in no sense one is in no sense an individual; and the more truly a thing can be called one, the more truly can it be called an individual. We must distinguish, however, between two aspects of unity, — the quantitative aspect or numerical unity, and the qualitative aspect or inner coherence. Both quantitative and qualitative unity are essential to any high degree of individuality, but the qualitative is the more important of the two. The lowest phase of unity is exemplified in the mere aggregate, — for instance, in a heap of stones. Here there is numerical unity of a sort, but inner coherence is almost or wholly lacking. The heap of stones is, in a sense, one, and as

<sup>1</sup> The purpose of this paper limits us to the ordinary notion of individuality. Such an analysis as Professor Royce, *e. g.*, attempts in his Supplementary Essay to *The Conception of God* (pp. 135 ff.) is not called for. I wish simply to show that human individuality, in the sense in which we ordinarily take it, is not in any way endangered by the denial of real alternatives in men's choices. This limitation of the problem seems justifiable because the protests against such denial are commonly made from the point of view of the ordinary conception.

one it may also be called an individual thing. But unless it is more than an aggregate, unless as a heap it fulfills a certain purpose, — *e. g.*, the marking of a goal, — its unity, and hence its individuality, is of the lowest grade. A single stone is more truly one; its numerical unity is more obvious, and it has a certain small degree of inner coherence, — the mechanical coherence of its particles. A plant, in turn, has more unity, more inner coherence, than a stone; a highly organized plant, more than one of the lower forms of the vegetable kingdom. And with the progress in unity, there is a corresponding progress in individuality: the single stone has more individuality than the heap of stones; the plant, more than the stone; the highly organized plant, more than the less highly organized one.

It is obvious that qualitative unity involves multiplicity and complexity. From the quantitative point of view, the fresh-water hydra is just as truly one as the human body is; but from the qualitative point of view the latter has a much greater degree of unity. If a fresh-water hydra be cut into halves, each portion, under ordinary conditions, will regenerate its missing parts and will then perform all the necessary functions of life; but if the human body be cut into halves, both portions will die. We have the highest unity in a whole composed of many different, but firmly coherent, parts.

Qualitative unity, as involving multiplicity and complexity, leads us naturally to uniqueness, the second element in individuality. That is unique which is unlike all other things, which is, in greater or less degree, different from everything else. Uniqueness, like unity, has two aspects, a quantitative and a qualitative. In the lowest sense of the term, anything is unique, just as, in the lowest sense, anything may be called a unity. Uniqueness of the lowest kind is conferred by temporal and spatial position. Whatever occupies a given space at a given time is, in this respect at least, unique, different from everything else. Position in time and space serves to distinguish one grain of sand from a second grain, which, in all other respects, is exactly like it. And in the degree in which each of these grains of sand is unique, it is also individual; as Schopenhauer has said, space and time are principles

of individuation. But, obviously, we have here a low form of individuality ; uniqueness which is merely quantitative cannot bestow upon its possessor individuality of a high order. For this, qualitative uniqueness is essential.<sup>1</sup> And, within limits, the degree of individuality increases with the qualitative uniqueness ; the more complex the organism is, — the more qualitative differences there are which distinguish it from all other organisms, — the more individual it is. The human being represents a higher type of individuality than the most highly organized plant or brute, because the play of his mental life gives to him a greater degree of qualitative difference from the other members of his kind than is possessed by any brute or plant. Similarly, men themselves differ greatly in the degree of their individuality ; and, speaking generally, a man is more individual, the more clearly his inner life and his mental characteristics are differentiated from those of his fellows. But, as has already been hinted, this is true only within certain limits. The uniqueness which constitutes the truest individuality rests upon a broad basis of likeness. All normal human beings share in a certain common nature ; and the most individual man is not he who violates this common nature. There is a point beyond which unlikeness ceases to be valued by us ; individuality has passed over into *bizarrierie*. It is not that, beyond a certain limit, individuality does not appeal to us as desirable ; it is rather that we feel that that which is bizarre is less truly individual than that in which the uniqueness recognizes certain bounds. We do not regard the crank as having more originality than the genius, but as having less. The genius is always, indeed, a highly differentiated being ; but at the same time, unless a man can make us feel that he speaks the common language of humanity, that he sounds the deep note of universal passion, that he gives expression, — in his own way, — to the experience of us all, we refuse him the name of genius ; we refuse to recognize in him individuality of the highest order.

<sup>1</sup> It is true, of course, that 'quantitative' and 'qualitative' are not wholly unrelated terms. As Hegel has shown, differences in degree often pass over, by almost imperceptible stages, into qualitative differences. But the general distinction between qualitative and quantitative uniqueness is clear, and of this distinction my statement holds.



Apparently, then, the uniqueness which is a factor in individuality must rest upon a basis of similarity. This is true, at least, in the case of an individual which is, at the same time, part of a larger whole. Reality taken in its entirety is unique in a somewhat different sense; and if we say that the whole of reality is an individual, it is obvious that we must modify our conception of individuality. Into this question, however, we need not enter; for our concern is to determine the nature of *human* individuality, and the human being, certainly, is an individual which is part of a larger whole.<sup>1</sup>

We pass on to the third factor in individuality. We have spoken of it as completeness or self-sufficiency; but in its higher degrees it may also be called self-direction. That some measure of independence is essential to our notion of individuality will hardly be questioned. The hand is less truly an individual than the body, because it is in much smaller degree sufficient unto itself. And, in general, the more power any organism has of directing its own life, the more truly individual it is. Hence, we regard the animal as having more individuality than the plant of equally complex structure. And in the animal kingdom itself, the higher we rise in the scale, the greater becomes the self-sufficiency or power of self-direction, and the greater the individuality. With the development of the rational faculty in man, this power is enormously increased; and for this reason, among others, we have in man a higher type of individuality than we find in any brute. Similarly, within the human race the degree of individuality varies with the power of self-direction. A man who has no opinions of his own, who borrows from others his theory of life and his code of morals, whose choices seem to be decided by the play of circumstances, is said to lack individuality.

In our consideration of uniqueness, we saw that, beyond certain limits, it does not conduce to what we ordinarily mean by individuality. The case of self-sufficiency is somewhat different. It is clear that the human being, since he is part of a whole, can

<sup>1</sup> That the human being is, in some sense, part of a whole every one except the mythological solipsist will, I suppose, admit. The most thorough-going pluralist will hardly carry his doctrine of the independence of the individual to the point of denying this.

never attain to complete self-sufficiency. But whereas, we think that a man is more truly individual who does not depart too far from the rest of his kind, we do not feel that power of self-direction can exist in such degree as to destroy the individuality. We recognize the fact that no human being has complete power of self-direction, but we regard this as a limitation of his individuality. Here, at any rate, the individuality of the part seems to point to a higher individuality, which could be possessed, if at all, only by the whole of reality.<sup>1</sup>

What we must say, then, seems to be this. The individuality of the part implies unity, uniqueness, and some degree of self-sufficiency. In its higher forms, the unity involves great inner complexity, while the uniqueness rests upon a broad basis of similarity. Finally, while, in general, individuality increases with the degree of self-sufficiency, yet, by its very nature, the part cannot be completely self-sufficient. Other things being equal, that part will be most truly individual which has the highest degree of independence that is compatible with its fulfilling its function in the whole. More than this, it seems, we cannot say; but this is all that we need for our present purposes.

What, now, is the bearing of this conception of individuality upon the problem of freedom? The question actually at issue to-day, the *live* question in the discussion, is that of 'real alternatives.' Confronted with the necessity of deciding between two opposed courses of action, *a* and *b*, I choose, let us say, *a*. The question in dispute, as I understand it, is: Was it really possible for me to choose *b* instead of *a*, possible, *i. e.*, in the sense that I could have chosen *b* without anything, either in myself or in the attendant circumstances, being different from what it was? To answer this question in the affirmative is to accept, and to answer it in the negative is to reject, the doctrine of real alternatives.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I say 'if at all' because, while it seems clear that the whole of reality has self-sufficiency and a certain kind of uniqueness, its possession of any high degree of unity is often questioned.

<sup>2</sup> Though some who call themselves 'indeterminists' might dissent, I think that we are justified in saying that this is the vital point in the present-day discussion of 'freedom'. And at least three prominent champions of 'freedom' seem so to regard it. Cf. James, "The Will to Believe and other Essays" (1897), pp. 150 ff.; Schiller, "Studies in Humanism" (1907), pp. 392 ff.; Perry, "Freedom as Practical Postulate," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XIII, pp. 42, 46, 51.

It is unfortunate that we have no words to indicate the respective opponents and champions of this doctrine. I should be inclined to use the words 'determinism' and 'indeterminism' to mark the distinction but for the fact that some who reject the theory of real alternatives are unwilling to be labeled as 'determinists.' And it must be admitted that 'determinism' has a certain connotation that is not involved in the mere denial of real alternatives. It seems better, therefore, to discuss the question without employing these labels.<sup>1</sup>

A word of explanation is necessary before we enter upon the discussion. I am not primarily concerned with attacking the doctrine of real alternatives. My purpose is defensive, — namely, to show that there is nothing in the denial of real alternatives which should, in itself, prevent our conceiving of the human being as having the three requisites of individuality which were brought out in our analysis.

Let us begin with unity. That the human self is a complete unity no one would be so bold as to assert. The lack of consistency in our opinions, the variability of our feelings and our purposes, the sense of inner discord, all this shows indubitably that we fall far short of that complete inner coherence which forms part of our ideal of individuality. But the fact remains that, other things being equal, the more harmonious and coherent a personality is, the more individuality we ascribe to it. Granting, then, that the human being only partially fulfills this requirement, our question is, what unity has to do with the doctrine of real alternatives in human choice. So far as I can see, it touches the doctrine at only one point. The denial of real alternatives implies the insistence upon the continuity of the moral life. When we say that the man who has made a certain choice could not have decided otherwise unless he had been, in some respect, a different sort of man, we assert the vital connection

<sup>1</sup> 'Freedom,' of course, is still more misleading. Professor James, with his humorous reference to "the word-grabbing game" (*op. cit.*, pp. 149, 179), has called attention to the fact that determinists and indeterminists alike have an ardent affection for the term and are equally anxious to be known as believers in 'freedom.' The reason for this is not far to seek. The word has so many associations with what we hold highest and dearest, — with political liberty, with intellectual and social opportunity, — that the desire is by no means unnatural.

between what one is and what one does. It is because we regard the man's act, not as something externally connected with him, but as, in deepest truth, his very self that we say, *He* could not have chosen otherwise. The denial of real alternatives, then, instead of being in any way hostile to our conception of the self as unitary, is fully in harmony with it,<sup>1</sup> and seems, indeed, in closer harmony than the assertion of the doctrine is.

I think we may say, then, that so far as the element of unity is concerned, individuality does not suffer from the denial of real alternatives. Indeed, all the objections which men most commonly feel to this denial seem to be connected with the other two factors. We shall, therefore, devote the rest of our discussion to them. It will be convenient to begin with the last one, with self-sufficiency. We have already said that this characteristic cannot belong to the human being in the highest measure. We are "members one of another," and we must pay the costs, as well as reap the advantages, of this fact. The tremendous force of heredity, the subtle influences of other personalities upon ours, these we can no more escape than we can avoid taking air into our lungs. But when all the considerations of this sort have been urged, it remains true that we have a certain measure of self-dependence. And we must now inquire whether the denial of real alternatives is consistent with the affirmation that the human being has a moderate degree of independence.

The believer in real alternatives will make haste to tell us that it is not. The theory which we are defending, he declares, leaves

<sup>1</sup> To this, the believer in real alternatives might raise the objection that it asserts a greater unity in human nature than actually exists. A character that is completely self-consistent and coherent, he might urge, could act, under given circumstances, in only one way. But for any being that lacks this perfect coherence there may be, in many cases, real alternatives. (Cf. Schiller, *op. cit.*, pp. 399 ff.) My reply to this would run somewhat as follows. There is, of course, a sense in which one might say that two quite different acts are possible for the ordinary man. His personality is not perfectly harmonious; there are in him opposed tendencies, conflicting desires. Hence, you may say that, taking the man as a whole,—a whole of many selves,—each of the opposed courses of action appeals to something in him and is possible for him. But in the moment of decision, the self which chooses is fairly coherent. It is not many selves; for so, there could be no choice. One of the many selves chooses. And if there is any bond of union between the self and its acts, this choosing self could not find its expression in *either one* of two directly opposed courses, but only in one.

no room for the independence of the individual. If you say that the choice which I have just made could not have been other than it is unless something, either in myself or in the circumstances, had been different, you are virtually admitting that this choice of mine was determined long ago,—at my birth, nay, ages before my birth. And if this be true, it is mere mockery to suggest that I have any power of self-direction. Let us at least be honest with ourselves and face the bitter fact that we are mere puppets, controlled by some external force, that all our deep-rooted conviction of our responsibility, all our quivering sense of the importance of our choices, is illusory. There is no middle ground between the two positions: either real alternatives or complete lack of the power of self-direction.

I am far from wishing to deny that these considerations have weight. There are few of us, I think, however strongly we may be convinced of the untenability of the doctrine of real alternatives, who do not, in certain moments, feel the force of an appeal like this. None the less, it seems to me to involve more than one misconception. In the first place, as I look at the matter, it is the *assertion* of real alternatives that is actually fatal to the belief in man's power of self-direction. If, for the self of a given moment, two opposed courses of action are equally possible, how can we say that either one of them is really representative of that self, is *its* choice? My self, in the moment of choice, is not anything and everything, but something particular. And how we can say that from this particular self either one of two utterly different actions can issue, I cannot see. If both actions are equally possible, this can only be because the choice does *not* proceed from the self. If I really have the power of self-direction, my act must be one with me; and two utterly unlike acts could not be equally one with the me of a given moment.

I suspect, however, that it is of little use to dwell upon this point. To those of us who accept it, it seems hardly conceivable that any one can believe the opposite, and our opponents have, doubtless, as great difficulty in understanding how we can accept it. We may pass on, therefore, to another consideration. We have said that in certain moments the appeal for real alternatives

strikes a sympathetic chord in the hearts of most of us. And it may be useful to inquire how this feeling of sympathy is to be accounted for. If we reject the doctrine of real alternatives and yet are conscious of sometimes having the feeling,—as I, for one, am,—it is incumbent upon us to try to analyze it. Before we are through with this analysis, it will have carried us over from the conception of self-direction to that of uniqueness.

What, then, is the reason for our shrinking from the thought that in the case of a choice which we have made, we could not, being just what we were, have decided differently? It seems to me that there are four chief reasons. The first of these is a real misunderstanding, a misunderstanding which is continually reappearing after it has been corrected. Very frequently, when we are told, 'You could not have chosen otherwise,' there is, implicit in our thought, the idea that we might have desired to choose differently and have been unable. The thought which the words suggest to us is of something that can thwart our will. We know, perhaps, that this is not what is meant; we are told, at any rate, that,—physical compulsion excepted,—there is nothing save ourselves that can prevent our acting in a certain way. But in spite of this, we smuggle in, almost unconsciously, the idea which alters the whole situation. The consequence is that we think of ourselves *as not being able to choose that which we really desire*. In the dim background of our consciousness, there lurks the thought of a thwarted self, a self compelled by some mysterious power,—the force of hereditary tendency, the influence of environment, the fatal power of its past choices,—to do that which it *would* not do.

Closely connected with this is another consideration that will help to explain further the feeling of which we are speaking. It is sometimes said that whereas, in the case of human choice, we shrink from the thought that there are no real alternatives, most of us are quite ready to believe this in regard to the divine mind; we do not hesitate to say that God, being what he is, can act only in the way in which he does act. This has suggested to me the thought that our so-called 'yearning for freedom' is, in part, a yearning for complete self-sufficiency. It does not dis-

press us to think that an 'infinite' being could not act in another way than that in which he does act, because we see clearly, in this case, that the 'could not' has no reference to any power other than his own. If, then, we were but infinite we should not shrink from the thought that our choices could not be other than they are. It is because we realize our limitations, because we recognize the fact that we are only a part of reality, that we shrink. For to say of us that we can act only in a certain way seems to put the ultimate source of the 'can' in something not ourselves. Our 'yearning for freedom,' then, is an expression of our sense of our own limitation, is the longing of the spirit for greater independence and self-sufficiency than it is conscious of possessing. But this, I think, cannot be held to constitute a valid objection to the denial of real alternatives. All that it amounts to is that we should like to be more nearly self-sufficient than we actually are.

The third reason why many persons are unwilling to think that there are no real alternatives expresses itself in a protest against the doctrine with which we are all familiar. If there are no real alternatives, it is urged, the choice that I am to make to-morrow is *already* determined, was determined ages ago. But if this be true, it robs human action of its significance, takes from life all its vivid sense of real happenings, of momentous things to be decided, of great issues depending upon us. We still live on and go through our daily round of work and play. But the deep sense of the meaning of life, the consciousness that *we* are contributing to reality, that we are helping to determine the fate of ourselves and others, — all this is gone, and with it all zest and passion die out. So, human life, which might have been great and glorious if only the philosophers had left us our vivid sense of 'freedom,' becomes 'aimless, helpless, hopeless.'

It will be convenient to postpone the answer to this objection until we have considered the last of our four reasons. This has quite as much to do with uniqueness as with self-sufficiency, and will thus lead us on to the remaining element in our conception of individuality. This last reason has its source in the belief that unless there are real alternatives in human choice, any one

who knew a certain man through and through could tell in advance precisely how he would act under given circumstances; that, to quote the words of John Stuart Mill, "given the motives which are present to an individual's mind, and given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which he will act may be unerringly inferred; that if we knew the person thoroughly, and knew all the inducements which are acting upon him, we could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can predict any physical event."<sup>1</sup>

Mill himself, it will be remembered, maintains that there is no good reason why any one should object to this supposed consequence of the denial of real alternatives. Unfortunately, however, the ordinary man does object to it seriously. While, in many cases, it does not distress him to learn that a certain choice which he has made was predicted, he cannot bear the thought that some one, knowing him completely at his birth and foreseeing all the external circumstances of his life, could confidently foretell how he would act under every one of these circumstances. The reason for his objection is, I think, twofold. In the first place, if all my choices can be thus resolved into the tendencies which I inherited from my forebears and the external influences to which I have been subjected, what is there, in this whole life of mine, that *I* have done? What has become of that power of self-direction which is one of the essential factors in individuality? And what has become, in the second place, of that other factor which we call uniqueness? For the supposition that any one could thus predict all the details of my thought and feeling and conduct seems to involve the assumption that in my essential nature I am like every one else. He who could thus foretell my life would have changed me into an abstract formula, which he could deal with as he could with a formula of mathematics. And against such transformation of our palpitating life, with its vivid sense of its uniqueness, its individual worth, our spirit rises in passionate protest.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "Logic," Bk. VI, Chap. II, § 2.

<sup>2</sup> No one has better voiced this feeling than Mr. Bradley, in his essay on "The Vulgar Notion of Responsibility" (*Ethical Studies*, Essay I). See particularly pp. 16, 18 f.



And well it may. If this is what the denial of real alternatives means, it is no wonder that men hesitate to make it. I hope to show, however, that this is not the inevitable consequence of such a denial.<sup>1</sup> The first thing to be said, it seems to me is this: if the denial of real alternatives has for its consequence the theoretical possibility of infallible prediction,<sup>2</sup> it is certainly hostile to the conceptions of uniqueness and self-direction; but that it has this logical consequence is, so far as I can see, pure assumption. If there were no real alternatives and *if a man were not in a very true sense unique*, it would follow logically that one who had knowledge of a certain kind could foretell all his actions. But without this second hypothesis it does not logically follow. For if the man is unique, we have not, and cannot conceivably have, sufficient *data* for predicting how he will act in all cases.

My own conviction is, on the one hand, that the doctrine of real alternatives is fatal to the conception of 'choice,' and on the other hand, that every element of reality is, in some sense or other, unique.<sup>3</sup> This uniqueness is found in unusual degree in the human being. Every human life, and every choice in that life, is something unique. Now if this be true, it follows that such prediction as we were objecting to above is, not only practically, but also theoretically, impossible. For that which is unique cannot by any possibility be infallibly predicted.<sup>4</sup> Even if you knew everything about me; if my whole past and all the past of my ancestors for countless generations were open to your gaze; if,—to suppose the impossible,—you had penetrated the

<sup>1</sup> Many determinists, indeed, have assumed that it is. And this is one reason why I have not used the word 'determinism,' in the present paper, to designate the position which I am defending.

<sup>2</sup> I say 'theoretical' because we all admit that our *actual* predictions of conduct are, at best, only highly probable.

<sup>3</sup> 'Every element of reality,' I have said. But of course all that is needed for the purposes of the argument is what immediately follows, that every human being and every real choice is unique.

<sup>4</sup> Humanly speaking, *i. e.* What a divine intelligence could or could not do, I hardly feel qualified to suggest. It seems safe to say, however, that no mind could exactly foretell my future save one,—if such a one be possible,—to whose gaze the future is open just as the present is to ours. And of such an intelligence it would hardly be accurate to say that it *foretells*.

inmost recesses of my thought and feeling,—even so, you could not infallibly predict how I would act at a certain future moment of great temptation. For we can predict only on the basis of likeness to the past, and we can predict infallibly only where the likeness is complete. Now this requirement of complete resemblance is never met in the case of any real choice on the part of a moral agent. In any real choice we have a complex set of conditions which has never, in all the history of the past, been precisely duplicated; infallible prediction is, therefore, a sheer impossibility. It is true that those who know us well are often able to foretell our conduct and our mental attitudes with a large measure of assurance. They can tell, *i. e.*, how we are likely to feel and act under circumstances which are very similar to others in which they have known us to be placed in the past. But there are two factors which tend to make the prediction more or less uncertain. The circumstances are never precisely the same again, and we ourselves are never precisely the same. Thus the prediction can never rightfully claim to be more than highly probable.

But can we, then, predict anything infallibly,—any event in the outside world even? Here, too, in the physical world,—if my theory of the nature of reality be correct,—everything that happens is in some measure unique. Strictly speaking, therefore, no event, in its concrete fulness, can be infallibly predicted. This concrete fulness natural science tries to express in abstract formulæ; and in so far as the event can be reduced to a set of such formulæ, in so far it can be foretold. But what science foretells is always, after all, only a certain aspect of the total event. The abstract formulæ are correct, perhaps, from their limited point of view. But they are never adequate to the fulness of reality.

The matter may be put briefly in this fashion: In so far as an event is not unique, in so far,—granting certain conditions of knowledge on our part,—it can be predicted. Now, in the case of physical happenings, it may be possible so to limit ourselves to a particular aspect of reality that we can foretell with complete assurance. That is, we can say, Given ordinary air of a certain temperature and humidity, a definite fall in its temperature, without change in any other of its conditions, will be followed by a

precipitation of moisture. We can predict here, because we have arbitrarily so limited our view of reality that what we are dealing with is precisely similar to something which we have experienced before. But try to do this with a human being, and what is the result? In order so to limit your view of him that infallible prediction would be, even theoretically, possible, you would have to disregard everything in him that is unique; and that in him which is unique — is the very essence of him.

It seems to me that we have removed the supposed difficulty with regard to the possibility of prediction. We may now turn back to our other objection, namely, that if there are no real alternatives in human choice, all our sense of real happenings, of actual contributions which we make to reality, of the vital importance of our decisions, becomes illusory. Here, again, my purpose is simply to show that this is not a necessary consequence of the denial of real alternatives, taken in itself. A theory which maintains that time and change have no part in the fundamental nature of reality is, to say the least, difficult to reconcile with a belief in the vital significance of human choice; for 'choice' seems to have no meaning left if time and happenings are not real. If, however, one maintains that time and change are of the very essence of the real, the case is different.

It is no part of my purpose to prove that reality is essentially temporal. Neither do I care to inquire here whether it is possible to unite the two aspects of timelessness and temporality in such a way as fully to preserve the rights of the latter. I wish simply to consider what are the consequences for human individuality if we assert the fundamental reality of time and yet deny that there are alternatives in human choice.

If we say that time is real and if we add to this the assertion, which we have already made, that every element of reality is unique, there is no good reason why the denial of real alternatives should destroy our sense of the vividness of life.<sup>1</sup> For what have we, on these conditions? We have a universe which is constantly changing, continually bringing forth the new. In particular, each human life, and each human choice, is something

<sup>1</sup> Those philosophers who say that it *must*, might well be asked to try to discover whether, in point of fact, it *does*.

that has never been before and will never be again. This world is not something fixed and once for all there; it is a world in which new things are continually coming to be. And every human choice, since it is itself unique and helps to create a unique set of conditions, plays its part in the making of reality. How then should we say that life lacks zest or significance?

But what one is to do to-morrow, you tell me, is already determined. I can reply only by pointing out that this is the old error which has been exposed again and again, the error of assuming that my *past* self can determine my action, but that my *present* self cannot. What I am to do to-morrow is determined only in the moment when I choose it, and is determined only by me who choose. What I who choose am, is, indeed, not something utterly disconnected with what I have been, — and if we saw clearly, we could not wish that it should be. But it still remains true that I, — the ‘I’ of the moment of choosing, — decide. Our objection, it seems to me, is a case of the confusion of which we have already spoken, the thought of a present self, desiring to act in a certain way and prevented from realizing its purposes by the clutch upon it of the dead hand of the past.

And here we must leave the matter. Real happenings in which we ourselves play a part, momentous decisions which we ourselves have to make, the power of determining, in no inconsiderable measure, our own future and the future of others, — all these we assert. And yet we must remember that we are not gods, but men. We are not entirely self-sufficient, not strictly independent centers of power and action; we are part of a great whole. The same life-blood is in us which flows in the veins of these other men, our brothers. By all the subtle ties of heredity and of personal influence, our lives and our destinies are interwoven with those of countless other human beings. Such complete independence as we sometimes long for is seen, when we consider it aright, to be quite impossible. And yet, in spite of all, there is given to each of us some degree of unity, of self-direction, of uniqueness, some measure of that priceless possession which men call individuality.

ELLEN BLISS TALBOT.

## THE POSTULATES OF A SELF-CRITICAL EPISTEMOLOGY.<sup>1</sup>

THE purpose of this paper is to present a set of principles or postulates from which a self-critical theory of knowledge can be derived. Its completion would demand the demonstration that this end is really thereby attained, but the satisfaction of doing this must at present be foregone because of lack of space. The first step will consist in the illustration and determination of the meaning of self-criticism. A characteristic example of the recognition of the demand that a theory of knowledge must be self-critical is found in a typical criticism which the absolutist makes of pragmatism.<sup>2</sup> The crux of this criticism is, that pragmatism, as the epistemology derived from the theory of evolution, presupposes that this theory is true absolutely, and, therefore, in a sense different from that definition of truth which is explicitly developed by pragmatism itself. The same criticism is brought against the pragmatic theory of knowledge taken as a whole and as the corollary of evolution.<sup>3</sup>

This attack employs and discloses one of the constituents or 'dimensions' of self-criticism, namely, the demand for self-consistency, yet this can be further differentiated. Thus the criticism consists partly in the claim that pragmatism is inconsistent in that it is, seemingly, compelled to use a term, to characterize itself, in a sense different from its own definition of it. *Consistent use of terms is, then, one 'dimension' of self-criticism.*

But further analysis of the criticism shows that still two other 'dimensions' may be differentiated. The purpose of the attack is to demonstrate the absolute truth of the absolutistic position.

<sup>1</sup> This paper was read before the American Philosophical Association at its meeting in Baltimore, December 28-31, 1908; in preparing it for publication some expansions and rearrangements have been introduced.

<sup>2</sup> Josiah Royce, "The Eternal and the Practical," presidential address, 1903, *PHILOS. REVIEW*, Vol. XIII, pp. 113 ff.

<sup>3</sup> To decide whether this criticism is valid or not is unnecessary at this point; subsequently it will be shown not to be so.

This end is thought to be attained by basing the attack itself on a principle, which, though it is itself accepted without proof and, therefore, really only assumed or postulated, is nevertheless to be regarded, by its own implication, as a *criterion of absolute truth*. This principle is that 'that is absolutely true which is implied<sup>1</sup> by its own denial,' and this is applied in the attack as follows: Pragmatism, as a theory making explicit denial of absolute truth, is held (1) to presuppose, in order that this denial may be well grounded, that both it itself as a whole and evolution are absolutely true, accordingly, (2) to refute itself, and so (3) indirectly to demand and confirm the absolutistic position. *The second meaning of self-consistency and second 'dimension' of self-criticism is, then, freedom from contradiction either of part by part, or of part by whole, or conversely.*

However, this application is not the most significant feature concerning this assumed criterion of absolute truth; this consists, rather, in the fact that, *as a criterion of truth, it itself presupposes that it should apply to itself and in this sense both presuppose and imply itself,*<sup>2</sup> of course, without contradiction. This demand of self-application is implied; for, if the principle be a criterion of truth, it is implied by itself that it should be a true criterion. The same demand is implied by a number of other criteria, among them those of so-called self-evidence;<sup>3</sup> each of these as a criterion of truth should apply to itself as supposedly true, but whether such an application results successfully either with them or with the above 'indirect' criterion may at present be left undetermined; for the significant feature at this point is the fact that by all of these criteria still another principle is presupposed, namely, that that which is true<sup>4</sup> should apply to itself, or, as this may be put briefly, that '*that is true which presupposes itself.*'

*Thus there is disclosed a third characteristic necessary to a theory*

<sup>1</sup> 'Presuppose' would be a better term, as will be shown presently.

<sup>2</sup> Presuppose can be defined in terms of implication as follows: If '*p* implies *q*' implies that '*q* implies *p*,' then *p* is the presupposition of *q*. Subsequently, then, 'presuppose' will be used to designate the logical antecedence, not priority, of one or more propositions (premises) to others, and 'imply' the converse relation of logical consequence. Cf. Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, Part I, Chaps. II and III.

<sup>3</sup> See the analysis of this, pp. 619-24.

<sup>4</sup> In what sense is yet to be determined.

*of knowledge in order that it may be self-critical, — a third 'dimension'; it must apply to itself, i. e., presuppose and imply itself.*

The justification and bearing of this self-implied demand are made clear by even a slight inspection of the purpose and pretensions of a theory of knowledge. Such a theory is the result of the endeavor to ascertain, let us say, the character of the origin, the purpose, the validity, and the extent of knowledge; but this knowledge *a fortiori* includes the theory; therefore the theory must apply to itself, and without contradiction, if it be true.

The connection of this with the logic of the proper infinite<sup>1</sup> is important. A partial definition of the proper infinite, and one demanded by a self-critical epistemology, is that it is a whole or class which cannot be reached by mathematical induction, and that it is a whole such that it is similar to any one of its proper parts and that, while part and whole imply each other, the former is logically prior to (presupposes) the latter. Quite analogously in a logical sense, a theory of knowledge, as a conceptual statement referring to existents and subsistents,<sup>2</sup> but concerning all knowledge, is a statement concerning itself as a part; presupposed by all knowledge, including itself, it again presupposes itself, or will do this if it is really self-critical, and so on, in an infinite regress.<sup>3</sup> *Logically, i. e., as a subsistent, it is a special case of the proper infinite.*

Now the bearing of this self-implied demand of self-application is two-fold. In the first place, supposing such an epistemology as presupposes itself to have been attained, there is, then, no principle which is presupposed by it which is not included in the list of propositions that make up its foundation. Conversely, if there are principles which an epistemology actually though tacitly presupposes, but which are not included in some way in

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Russell in various places (see his index) but especially Chaps. XVII, XVIII, XLII, XLIII, and pages 260, and 356-360.

<sup>2</sup> Subsistence = Being; and Being may be defined with Russell (*Principles*, p. 449) as "that which belongs to . . . every possible object of thought, — to all propositions" true or false.

<sup>3</sup> This feature of self-criticism and its bearing will be recurred to later.

its own list, then, either such an epistemology is not ultimate, and is conditioned externally, and is perhaps self-refuting, or it must be so extended as to finally include such principles in such a way that, together with others, they will give a self-critical set or system. *For a theory of knowledge must be based on presuppositions, and these must be either such as presuppose other propositions or such a set as presupposes only itself.*

In the second place, then, there is the practical question as to what method shall be pursued for the discovery of those propositions which form the foundation of a self-critical system. Is the above statement that a theory of knowledge must be based on presuppositions, defined as principles assumed and not proved, although possibly provable, incorrect, and can a method which eliminates this necessity be employed? In deciding these questions a distinction must be made between the general necessity of making assumptions, and that specific necessity as it concerns an epistemology. In the latter case, the assertion concerns the endeavor to attain a body of knowledge stated in propositional form. Whether or not such knowledge is necessary is a different question, although only specifically so, from that as to the general necessity of making assumptions, but yet one to be answered only affirmatively. For knowledge in general is necessitated, for human beings, as a means of adaptation, as a condition for survival in the struggle for existence, and so, consequently, are those inter-individual, social means furnished by formulated knowledge, including epistemology and its presuppositions, as specific kinds of knowledge. For these general reasons, then, there must be presuppositions, and, in the case of an epistemology, both for these and for specific reasons, unless some method of avoiding them is discoverable there is the same necessity.

As concerns this possibility, the position has been taken<sup>1</sup> that a presuppositionless epistemology is possible; but it is clear that this position is itself not without presuppositions, but, rather, requires these for its own establishment. It is thus a position which presupposes its own contradictory. *Taking this contradictory in the form 'that there must be presuppositions,' a principle*

<sup>1</sup> Ladd, *Philosophy of Knowledge*, p. 268.



is given which is presupposed both by itself and by its own denial,<sup>1</sup> and which, grounded in this way by itself, makes clear the logical justification, in the case of every proposition or propositionally formulated body of knowledge, of demanding proof or establishment.

What ways are open, then, for meeting this demand, and do any of them confirm or refute the above principle? Four traditional means of establishment are at our disposal and require examination; these are deduction, induction, self-evidence, and hypothesis and confirmation. To ground an epistemology purely deductively is, now, impossible; for the *consistent* use of this method demands an infinite regress of premises which cannot be completed. Therefore at some point propositions are accepted hypothetically, *i. e.*, are postulated, and our principle is confirmed. A similar result is given by the examination of induction in the strict sense of the term. For, on the one hand, this method is itself, as is well known, based on the assumption of the regularity of nature or of unique functional correlation; on the other, an examination of the inductive sciences shows that there is frequently the opportunity and necessity for an optional interpretation, by different assumptions, of the same data.<sup>2</sup> Such an interpretation is necessitated both because of the grossness of nature and of the coarseness of our senses and of even their instrumental aids, and is determined in one direction or another by the emotional make-up of the thinker himself. Thus induction also demands certain assumptions, neither proved, nor, seemingly, provable by experiment, etc., and our principle is once more confirmed.

Can it, however, now be invalidated by the use of a method by which, as it has been held, the absolute truth of certain principles can be discovered, so that these can be employed deductively and with a stop put to the infinite regress, and as unequivocal principles of interpretation? That there is such a method, namely, that of self-evidence, is, of course, frequently held, for it

<sup>1</sup> These are found subsequently to be logical criteria of self-evidence.

<sup>2</sup> The inability of experimental methods to decide between two or more possible interpretations is recognized in many cases, as, for example, in the various geometries, and in the *actio in distans* versus medium controversy. Cf. Campbell, *Modern Electrical Theory*, 1907, in various places.

has been often used. Now, as preliminary to the discussion of this third possible method of grounding, for the sake of clarity a distinction may now be made,—for it is justified later,—between psychological and logical self-evidence. Investigation shows that the motive underlying the acceptance of all psychological criteria of self-evidence is the (absolutistic) conviction that, in order to have truth at all, an absolute truth must be started with, and that such self-evidence is a guarantee of this truth.<sup>1</sup> Further, it shows that all the seemingly different criteria permit of a reduction to three, whereby their real character is revealed: The so-called self-evident (psychological) is really either (1) that whose opposite is inconceivable, or (2) that which is believed in as unconditionally true, or (3) that which has not yet been questioned or is no longer so, giving blind dogmatism or authoritative. Now an interesting and, for this paper, important characteristic of these, as well as of the specific criteria which reduce to them, is the fact that each implies that it should apply to itself.<sup>2</sup> This becomes clear by considering one typical case, say the norm 'that that is true whose opposite is inconceivable.' Clearly nothing can be true by this criterion unless the criterion be true; and if it be true, then, as a true criterion of truth it should be true by itself, for its supposed function is its use at just that point where deduction and induction are impotent. Submitted to this test, however, it fails and refutes itself; for it is not inconceivable that 'that is true whose opposite is inconceivable,' should be false. Personally, I can conceive that the inconceivable should be true, and the history of thought confirms the conceivability of my position. The same result is obtained by submitting the other criteria, general and specific, to this, in every case, self-implied test of self-application; all fail to meet it, even boldly asserted self-evidence itself; *they refute themselves and are demonstrated to be in every case only specific instances of a mere claim, of a subjective-holding-to-be-true, and, logically, of an identification, as a tacit postulate, of this conviction with the fact*

<sup>1</sup> This is opposed, of course, to the position that practice and action are possible without absolute truth, or without the knowledge of what is absolute truth. Cf. Postulates VIII and XI.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the previous discussion, pp. 616, 617.

*of truth. Thus we emerge with a criterion, that of self-application, for distinguishing between psychological and logical criteria of self-evidence; the former do not apply to themselves; the latter, if there are such, do or must.*

This analysis shows, then, on the one hand, that psychological self-evidence does not do away with the necessity of grounding an epistemology on principles assumed and not proved, and in this sense on presuppositions or postulates; but, on the other, it has disclosed again an important principle or criterion, namely, *that that is true which presupposes or implies itself.* Leaving undecided for the present in what sense 'true' shall here be taken, inspection further reveals that, just as this principle is itself presupposed by each psychological criterion and by the absolutistic test,<sup>1</sup> *so also does it imply that it must stand its own test; it must apply to itself.* The result, now, of complying with this demand, is the confirmation of the principle — by itself. Thus, applying the principle to itself, we get: that 'that which applies to (presupposes and implies) itself is true,' is true if it applies to itself. Now it does apply to itself; for the demand for proof, for its presuppositions, can be made on it, with the result that it is found to presuppose just this 'that there must be presuppositions'; but this has been found<sup>2</sup> to presuppose our principle; therefore *it* presupposes itself. Q. E. D. But it also implies itself: for it is a proposition, and all propositions, whether true or false materially, imply themselves<sup>3</sup> as subsistents. Q. E. D.

Taken by itself the principle states a formal implication; it is applied by substituting for the variable "that" some constant, *i. e.*, some proposition, and making the application. Thus, to illustrate this, we have: that 'that which is self-evident is true,' is true if it is self-evident (which it is not). Propositions so tested are found, then, to be either such as, presupposing themselves, apply to themselves or such as do not. But it is just such an application giving a material implication, that is made in the paragraph above with no contradictory results. *The principle does,*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the previous discussion, pp. 615, 616.

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 618, 619.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Russell, *Principles*, Chap. II.

then, presuppose itself materially (Q. E. D.), and now takes the form that 'that which presupposes itself materially is true.'<sup>1</sup>

Taken, now, in its original form, *i. e.*, as stating a formal implication, the principle cannot be denied universally; for submit it to this test, *i. e.*, assert its falsity; then this assertion is either true or false; if it is false, then we have our original principle (Q. E. D.); but, if it be true, then the assertion is either proved, or not proved or provable; if proved, then, in the regress of premises we either get finally to a proposition which presupposes no other than itself materially (Q. E. D.) or to those which presuppose different ones at each step; in the first case we have, then, our original principle presupposed, *though by its own denial*; but likewise in the second case *also*; for, since the infinite regress cannot be completed, *if* there is to be a true conclusion (namely, this assertion of the falsity of the original formally universal principle) *somewhere an assumption must be made which is true although not proved; but there is thus presupposed another and new principle, namely, that truth is independent of proof*; now this is a principle which is found (1) to apply to itself, *i. e.*, is itself independent of proof, and thus (2) to presuppose itself, and (3) to be implied by its own denial; in this way, therefore, — indirectly, — *our original principle is again presupposed by its own denial* (Q. E. D.). It cannot, then, be denied universally (Q. E. D.). If it is denied, this can be done only particularly, giving 'some that presupposes itself is not true' (materially), with, of course, the subcontrary true, that 'some that presupposes itself is true (materially).' But this is to be distinguished from '*that which presupposes itself materially is true*' (materially),<sup>2</sup> which is a principle presupposed materially both by itself and by its denial both universal and particular.

This analysis, and that which preceded it, discloses, then, three interesting and important principles, namely:

<sup>1</sup> Clear examples of propositions which presuppose themselves materially are: 'There must be postulates,' and 'Knowledge must not modify its object,' — our first and third postulates; but every other postulate of the fifteen subsequently submitted does the same.

<sup>2</sup> Subsequently, for brevity's sake, this principle will be formulated without the use of the adverb, but is to be understood as if the adverb were expressed.

- I. *That which presupposes itself is true.*
- II. *That which is presupposed by its own denial is true.*
- III. *Truth is independent of proof.*

In each the presupposition must be taken to be 'material,' and the question now is, in what sense 'true' shall be understood. This is illustrated and determined by considering the principle, similar to II, and previously discussed,<sup>1</sup> that '*that is absolutely true which is implied by its own denial.*' This demands, too, that, as supposedly a criterion of absolute truth, it should apply to itself as a true criterion; but the attempt to fulfill this demand shows that *as so formulated* the principle refutes itself, but that the substitution of 'conditionally' for 'absolutely,' meaning by this (1) conditioned by other propositions, *i. e.*, implied,<sup>2</sup> and (2) tentatively, *i. e.*, admitting the possibility of error, gives a principle which does apply to itself. *It is this definition of 'true,' then, that must be accepted<sup>3</sup> in principles I and II, and also in III, although this cannot be demonstrated here.<sup>4</sup>*

An interesting and significant characteristic of each of these three principles is that each is presupposed by the other two and that each is true both by the self-implied test of itself and of each of the others.<sup>5</sup> For these reasons the first two are to be regarded as logical criteria of self-evidence in accordance with

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 615, 616.

<sup>2</sup> But since the implication can be only discovered, *i. e.*, since it is a felt implication, there is in this process also a liability to error, a tentativeness, a 'conditionedness'; yet on the other hand knowledge of the implication may be quite true, since truth is independent of truth. (Cf. Postulates VIII and XI.)

<sup>3</sup> That this interpretation is practically necessitated and confirmed by experience is shown by the previously discussed criticism of pragmatism. The actual attitude taken toward the theory of evolution is that it, like other theories and laws, is only tentative, although it has a high degree of probability. Pragmatism, as derived from it, neither presupposes its absolute truth nor the absolute truth of itself; rather, *the truth of pragmatism is conditioned in that (1) it shares the tentative character of evolutionary theory, and (2) is implied by it.*

<sup>4</sup> A typical illustration, and in this sense demonstration, is given by non-Euclidean and Euclidean geometry. The truth of the propositions of these systems is conditioned (1) in that they are implied by the original postulates (not proved), and (2) in that experiment cannot decide between them. Each is, therefore, tentative in its ontological reference, but either may be true as revealing reality as it really is, although which is true in this sense cannot be shown.

<sup>5</sup> These characteristics are important because of their bearing on the postulates of a self-critical system.

that term's connotation of internally contained evidence. Thus the previous assertion of a distinction between psychological and logical self-evidence is now justified. The criterion for that distinction now appears as itself a logically self-evident principle standing that test, its own, which psychological principles imply they should stand, but fail to, and also that test (II), which, by conforming to I, stands its own test.

Returning now to the main line of discussion, the result up to the present point is the confirmation of our supposition that an epistemology must be based on presuppositions, *i. e.*, on principles assumed and not proved, briefly, on postulates, with these awaiting confirmation. But this is our fourth method.<sup>1</sup> The further result is, that, while the confirmation must be of the kind that the postulates set up give a self-critical system, there are two criteria of logical self-evidence, in lieu of the failure of the psychological criteria, by which the postulates can be tested for their individual self-criticism. Finally, there is a principle which guarantees, since it submits to these two criteria, that the postulates may be true although not proved. As regards the system, then, while each postulate will thus be grounded by itself, nevertheless, each, as a proposition of a system self-critical as a whole, will be implied by each of the others and by the system as a whole; conversely, each will be applicable to each and so, collectively, to the system as a whole, and the system as a whole both to itself and to each. *These demands form the fourth characteristic of a system which is self-critical*, and must be stated, although a satisfactory and complete demonstration that they are fulfilled by the postulates subsequently submitted is impossible within the limits of this paper. Their fact and justification is discovered by simple inspection of the general demand that an epistemology, by its very purpose, must be such as will apply to itself. Accordingly, it must *incorporate in itself its own presuppositions, and yet derive them from itself*, for then, and then only, will it presuppose only itself. The endeavor to comply with this demand introduces some new considerations and leads to the discovery of further 'dimensions' of self-criticism. The method for

<sup>1</sup> See p. 619.

doing this is simply the experiential one of withdrawing, by analysis and inspection, certain presuppositions from the field of the tacit to that of the explicit.

The point has already been made clear that, if there is to be an epistemology, it must be stated in propositional form, and this has been both distinguished from and yet connected with that general necessity of postulating which results from certain evolutionary considerations.<sup>1</sup> This specific necessity has, now, important implications. Viewed from the standpoint of the psychology of reasoning there are in the propositional formulation of a body of knowledge four aspects involved: (1) words or symbols, which are perceivable, conceivable, etc., but which formulate (2) the meanings or subsistents; (3) existents, known and denoted, and (4) conscious events, which may take place in some knowing individual, and have as their content the symbols, the meaning, or the existents, any or all. Of the many and complex relationships herein involved only those which are germane to the main purpose of the paper need be discussed. By virtue, now, of (2), the meaning or subsistents, there is, on the one hand, a certain logic used in presenting the knowledge propositionally, but, on the other, in a theory of knowledge, there is a certain logic presented and defended. Accordingly, firstly, *it is a demand both self-imposed and to be met by the theory, in order that it may be self-critical, that the logic defended and accepted be such as will allow of a (its own) formulated propositional statement (1).*<sup>2</sup> But further there is a psychological side (4) and also an ontological, (3) and (4), to an epistemology; for conscious events are existents, and it is the purpose of an epistemology to state in propositional form, (1) and (2), the relation of knowledge, as an existent, to its object, whether this be physical, subsistent, or psychical, *i. e.*, knowledge in general, including epistemology. Therefore, secondly, *the logic defended and accepted must be such as will allow*

<sup>1</sup> See p. 618.

<sup>2</sup> Analogously, if with Professor Dewey we argue logically the purpose of logic, then the logic thus derived must be such as will give the logic of the argument and of the purpose. Logic must thus account for logic, at least indirectly, and might as well directly. Compare also Professor James's attack on conceptualization, etc., by conceptual methods in his *Pluralistic Universe*, 1909.

of these relations themselves as well as of their propositional statement. Thirdly, error must be accounted for; for error is a fact ontologically and psychologically, and involves certain logical relations. Therefore, in the final logic of the system the logic of error must logically find a place, and the admission must be made, in agreement with experience, and really to make the system further self-critical, that, while it may be true (cf. Postulate XI), also, by this very logic of error, the system itself may be in error and only tentative.<sup>1</sup> In summary, it may be concluded that the logic accepted must, then, be such as will account logically for logic, for ontology, and for psychology (truth and error in knowledge), and through these indirectly again for logic, and a similar statement, 'by symmetry,' can be made of ontology and psychology. Thus it is important to recognize that, since knowing (or knowledge), whether formulated or not, in error or not, aware of its own logic or not, reflective or not, is itself an ontological process, such an ontology is presupposed by a theory of knowledge as will account, when stated logically in propositional form, ontologically for ontology, for psychology, for logic and propositional formulation, and finally again for ontology. However, since the final and only expedient method of deriving and of presenting such a theory is that of propositional statement, which demands, of course, a certain logic, there must be such a logic, derived on an ontological basis, etc., and finally accepted, as will allow not only of this derivation and presentation, but also of these three aspects in their various relations.

Although, now, this logic in all its ramifications is too complex to be presented here, there are *three logical doctrines* included in it which must be briefly expounded. Previous discussions have already led up to two of them. *The first of these concerns the infinite*; both its implication and the possibility of dealing with it in a manner free from contradiction must be accepted.<sup>2</sup> The implication of the infinite regress appears in a number of places in connection with a self-critical system, but most notably in that such a system as a whole presupposes itself repeatedly.

<sup>1</sup> Compare the definition of 'true,' p. 623.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Russell, *Principles*, Chaps. IV, IX, XI, XVII, XLII, especially p. 349.



Two methods of dealing with an implied regress are conceivable, those, namely, of enumeration and of 'intension,' with the latter alone possible for obvious (psychological) reasons. To deal with the infinite regress by 'intension' means that the very law or principle in accordance with which a specific regress is implied or generated is known and stated in conceptual terms; there is, then, no necessity of dealing with it by enumeration. Indeed the discovery of the implication of the regress and the attempted demonstration that it somehow involves contradictions presupposes this 'intensional' method: *it* is presupposed by its own denial (as well as by itself). Now the discovery of an epistemology which presupposes itself is identical with the 'intensional' treatment, through a set of principles, for this special field.

*The second doctrine to be accepted is that of the 'externality' of relations to their terms, briefly, the 'external view.'*<sup>1</sup> This is, of course, opposed to the view that relations are 'internal,' which is made to mean a number of things, such as penetration of the term by the relation, with a resulting generation of an internal state, and so with what is variously regarded as modification, or the making or demanding of dependence, or likeness, or contradiction. Now of these two views it can be shown that the second presupposes its contradictory, the first, and the 'intensional' method: conversely the first is presupposed both by itself and its denial.<sup>2</sup> Thus, to illustrate, if it is held that the relation modifies its terms, then it is presupposed, both in order to state this view and to work it out, that the terms *to be modified* are first unmodified, and this must be storable in order to show the modification.<sup>3</sup> But to do this is to use the method of 'intension,' and means that a relation can be stated correctly without considering the implied subordinate relations and without there being internal states. But this is identical with the view that relations are external to their terms, which means that a term is what it is, although related to other terms, and exists or subsists, even as a

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Russell, *Principles*, Chaps. XXVI, XLII, LI.

<sup>2</sup> An illustration of the applicability of the two logical criteria of self-evidence.

<sup>3</sup> With modification insisted on, there is always, in the attempt to state it, its contradictory presupposed: for it is tacitly assumed that the statement, which is, of course, related to the modification to be stated, does not modify the modification.

related term, as if it were not related, and can pass in and out of relation to another term without being altered.

Now that this 'external view' is necessitated by a theory of knowledge in order that it should be self-critical is shown as follows: *First, every such theory presupposes that to know = to relate, in some sense.* Indeed, this is a principle which is presupposed both by itself and by its denial; for whether it is taken to mean that in knowledge relations, objects, etc., are discovered as they really are, or that objects unrelated objectively are by knowing related subjectively, etc., in every case there is stated the relation of knowledge to its object. But if now, secondly, it is made the purpose of an inquiry (an epistemology) to determine which one of these views expresses the real relation of knowledge to its object, a new clue is given by the discovery that *it is presupposed as a condition for the validity or success of the outcome of this inquiry that the knowledge so won is related to its object (all knowledge) without modifying it.* But this is a special case of the view that relations are 'external.' Q. E. D. Thus two demands come together; that to know = to relate is presupposed in any case; that 'to relate' must be interpreted in accordance with the 'external' view is presupposed by an epistemology; therefore it can be made a postulate for all (genuine) knowledge; in no case does knowledge modify its object, whether this consists of existents, psychical or physical, or of subsistents.

But further it is found, that, since other theories of knowledge must accept this same general definition of knowledge as = to relate or be related, but interpret this in accordance with the 'internal view' whereby to know is made = to modify, or to make dependent, or like, or contradictory, a fulcrum is furnished by which a system, itself rendered self-critical by embodying the 'external view,' not only can contradict, but can refute these opposed systems. Indeed they are already self-refuting as based on a self-refuting doctrine of relations. There is disclosed, then, another, a fifth, 'dimension' of the self-critical character of a system; *by its own postulates and the definitions derived from them it must anticipate and refute all external criticism.* This it will do if it is really self-critical.

The third logical doctrine which is presupposed by and must be incorporated in a system in order that it may be self-critical is that of discontinuity.<sup>1</sup> As a logical doctrine discontinuity, like infinity and relations, *a fortiori* concerns primarily subsistents, to which existents may or may not correspond. Thus an epistemology which presupposes itself does not mean an infinite series of psychical existents, but only of subsistents, and such a series is known conceptually, *i. e.*, by 'intension.' But relations are existent as well as subsistent; and that there are ontological and so subsistent discontinuities is shown by the experientially attained fact that, for example, theories, even the one herein presented, appear out of non-existence both in the phyletic and the ontogenetic psychical series. Accordingly, to be self-critical by way of accounting for its own origin, an epistemology must incorporate in its postulates such a logical principle, as, stated and defended logically, will account logically for *de novo* appearances at certain critical points in the ontological series, psychical, physical, phyletic, and ontogenetic.<sup>2</sup> To this doctrine of a real ontological discontinuity the objection may be raised that the fact that in the present state of knowledge discontinuities are treated of as due to our ignorance, and that in due time they will all be eliminated, as they have been in so many instances already. But in regard to this elimination there is much opportunity for confusion; for the inspection of certain typical cases of so-called elimination shows that it is identical with the introduction of hypothetical, ideal continuous processes, involving the variables time and space and motion, with which really discontinuous and irreducible qualities (of wholes) are correlated. This is the method of mechanics and of atomistic theories in general, and the elimination is only apparent, not real. The question is also one as to what induction shall be made from the history of scientific

<sup>1</sup> The term is employed here with that exact meaning which it has in pure and applied mathematics; *e. g.*, a function is discontinuous if the differential coefficient has two distinct values determined by the slope of the tangent to each curve where the discontinuity occurs. Cf. Russell, *Principles*, in various discussions of continuity.

<sup>2</sup> The same demand is made on the theory of evolution; it must be so formulated as to account for the evolution of the theory (cf. Baldwin, *Development and Evolution*, Chap. XVIII), and a self-critical epistemology proves to be simply an evolutionary theory so extended as to include and account for knowledge.

thought and from its present status, — universal continuity or some discontinuity. The latter position is herewith accepted, to be incorporated in a theory of knowledge, for the reason that it is presupposed in order to render that system self-critical in the following respects: (1) it enables a theory to account for its own origin, and gives an ontological basis, (2) for the fact of error, (3) for the inductively ascertained fact that success is the final criterion of knowledge, and (4) for the very necessity of induction itself, *i. e.*, of a merely 'finding out,' as the basal method of all knowledge.

The recognition, now, that these three logical doctrines are really presupposed by any theory of knowledge in order that it may accomplish its purpose, will go far toward making it possible to state the fundamental principles of a self-critical theory; for only through them can a theory, as it is given its necessary propositional statement and defence, logically include those three aspects, logical, ontological, and psychological, which it must include in order to have meaning and agree with experienced facts. Thus, to illustrate, the two doctrines of 'external relations' and of the infinite as presented above, make it logically possible; (1) that the set of propositions, which form an epistemology must take, should be symbolized; (2) that the symbols should be related to and refer to (*a*) ideas, (*b*) subsistents, *i. e.*, the real propositions, etc., and (*c*) the existents, corresponding to these last; (3) that the ideas should be related and refer to both subsistents and existents, *in each case without modification either way*; and finally (4), that the 'set' itself, as consisting of real propositions (not merely of symbols), should be a conceptual treatment of that which logically or subsistently is an instance of the proper infinite.<sup>1</sup> Again, discontinuity, subsistent and ontological, and, of course, as formulated under the above conditions, makes it logically possible: (1) that an epistemology as a series of conscious events should arise *de novo*; (2), and very important, that, as belonging to the 'mode' reasoning, it should 'take place' in accordance with certain 'laws of thought' peculiar to it, whether these are formulated or not; and yet (3), by 'external rela-

<sup>1</sup> See previous discussion, pp. 617, and 626, 627.

tions,' be a knowledge of that which does not follow these laws.<sup>1</sup> Further implications of these doctrines will be developed in presenting the bearing of the postulates which incorporate them. Preceding analysis has disclosed other principles which must be incorporated in a system in order that it shall be self-critical, and yet *it is a further aspect of the self-implied demand for self-criticism that these logical doctrines and these principles can only be postulated,*<sup>2</sup> *i. e.*, set up experimentally with the question as to whether they actually do give a self-critical system or not to be tested subsequently; *this position is demanded not only by the very logic which is incorporated by postulation in the system, but is confirmed by the history of epistemological systems in general.*

In accordance, then, with this point of view and guided by this introductory analysis, the following postulates are submitted as together forming the foundation for an epistemological system which will fulfill the requirements which have been expounded. *Psychologically self-evident these postulates need not be, but logically self-evident they are; each applies to itself, i. e., presupposes itself materially, and each is implied by its own denial, and, although at first merely postulated, each may be true although not proved.*

*Postulate I. There must be postulates.*<sup>3</sup>

Comment: To postulate is necessary both for evolutionary reasons and because of the character of grounding, as previously shown. Further, if there were only knowledge and no error, there would be no necessity of postulating in the sense of experimenting. The fact of error necessitates, then, the attempt to

<sup>1</sup> The possible criticism, that by this scheme something is made intelligible only by using that which is itself unintelligible, presupposes that the so-called 'laws of thought' are the only norms of rationality and that that which does not follow them is unintelligible or even contradictory. But this begs the question at issue, and really presupposes the opposite view: for, to demonstrate unintelligibility is to make the unintelligible intelligible and rational.

<sup>2</sup> Freedom to postulate is given by consciousness of method: necessity of postulating is ultimately evolutionary, but is conditioned also by inherent trial and error method and by ontological discontinuity; purpose is to serve as means to an end, ultimately vital; method, = (a) experience suggests, (b) held experimentally; result, = makes experience more congruous. Cf. Schiller, "Axioms as Postulates," in *Personal Idealism* ed. by H. Sturt.

<sup>3</sup> For a definition of the term see pp. 618, 619, and 631 above.

discover the nature and norms of substantiation, etc., = epistemology, and yet this can be done only experimentally, — by postulating.

*Postulate II. An epistemology must be self-critical.*

Comment: The major 'dimensions' of self-criticism have already been expounded; certain minor ones, derivatives, are shown in developing the implication of these postulates. Self-criticism is a demand self-imposed by an epistemology on itself, and yet, by that very logic which a system postulates in order to be self-critical, this presupposition can be made only a postulate.

*Postulate III. A theory of knowledge, which is by self-implication a knowledge of knowing, including itself, must not modify its object, viz., the knowledge (and its conditions, relations, etc.) known.<sup>1</sup>*

Comment: This is the condition for its success, *i. e.*, that it should be that real knowledge which it is its self-implicit purpose and claim to be. This postulate is a special case of the 'external view' of relations. Generalized, it means that real knowledge in no case modifies the object, whatever this may be, which is related to the ontological knowing process; it therefore means realism, discovery, objects known as if they were not known,<sup>2</sup> and their free coming and going into relation with knowledge.

*Postulate IV. Qualitatively new existents appear (de novo) at certain critical points both in the inorganic realm and in the phyletic and ontogenetic series, physiological and psychological, of the organic realm, and in all synthesis, real and ideal, of wholes out of parts or elements.*

Comment: This is the postulate of an irreducible ontological discontinuity. It makes recognition of that condition which is presupposed for there being a real ontological advance and progress and increasing richness of diversity in 'things' and means freedom and teleology in just this sense. While it recognizes the actuality of a qualitative *ex nihilo* appearance, it is compatible with certain quantitative identities such as that of the conservation

<sup>1</sup> Hobhouse, *Theory of Knowledge*, accepts this postulate, p. 175.

<sup>2</sup> Here and elsewhere there are a number of points of agreement between my position and that outlined by Professor Woodbridge in his paper, "The Field of Logic," *Science*, Vol. XX, No. 514, Nov. 4, 1904.

of energy, but it means that these are not all; their meaning is limited by the fact of a real genesis. It accounts for error, and for the necessity of induction, of success as a criterion, of postulating.

The postulate refers only to discontinuities as the limits of continuous functions, and not to an absolute *ex nihilo* appearance; something precedes each new appearance. Thus, whether a monadistic<sup>1</sup> or some other view<sup>2</sup> of causation be taken, there is, in some practicable sense, a causal determination or functional connection to be granted. Thus we have,

*Postulate V. In all de novo appearance, as well as in all continuous ontological change, there is an agent existing antecedent to, independent of, and yet determinative of the appearance of subsequent existents, whatever their character.*

Comment: The view that relations are external to their terms is again made use of and is herewith applied to the causal relation.

*Postulate VI. The existents between two critical points or discontinuities are in certain respects sui generis, and, a fortiori, with their appearance, new objective laws of their behavior spring into existence; by definition each such continuous discontinuously-limited range of existents in any realm is a 'genetic mode.'*<sup>3</sup>

Comment: This postulate, together with the two preceding ones, implies that reality can be known as if it were not known.<sup>4</sup> This is presupposed for an epistemology, and therefore for all knowledge, as the condition for the fulfillment of the purpose of an epistemology. The idealist objects to this with the claim that, since without knowledge there is no knowing, we can never know what reality would be like before knowledge had arisen and therefore without it.<sup>4</sup> But this very claim, if it itself be knowledge, as it pretends to be, presupposes its contradictory, the very view, namely, that it criticises, and refutes itself; its

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Russell, *Principles*, Chaps. XLII and LV.

<sup>2</sup> An optional interpretation is possible, illustrating the point made on page 619.

<sup>3</sup> I use this term in much the same sense as does Baldwin in his *Development and Evolution* (see Chap. XIX) and *Genetic Logic*, but develop its implications quite differently.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Woodbridge, *op. cit.*, reprint, p. 29 and p. 26 respectively.

contradictory, on the other hand, presupposes itself and is implied by its own denial.

Accordingly this postulate means that at some point in the progressing phyletic series (and, of course, in ontogenetic development), under certain definite conditions, cognition in its various modes arises, and that this is the case whether known subsequently or not; that, further, when rationalistic modes have arisen, following their own laws, of course, whether these be known or not, there can be known rationally, and as if not known, other modes, including the conditions for the appearance of knowledge, with each following its own laws. Thus there are recognized both the fact of, and some of the conditions for the solution of the epistemological problem.

Epitomizing, now, some knowledge of this kind which has been already obtained inductively, but which is now to be used deductively, we have,

*Postulate VII. In the organic series, both phyletic and ontogenetic, there appear, under fairly definitely ascertainable conditions, new existents, both physiological and psychological, which, though they do not arise, nevertheless persist and develop because of their direct or indirect (by correlation) usefulness and efficacy.*<sup>1</sup>

Comment: This postulate together with VI means that with the appearance of the psychic modes new factors of adjustment, etc., such as organic selection, imitation, social heredity, etc., become operative; but inherent and operative in all of these 'modes of behavior' are the objective laws of trial and error and of selection through use and efficacy.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, when reality makes itself known by bringing about the appearance of

<sup>1</sup>In accordance with this and other postulates, notably III and IV, it is implied that existents are to be taken at their 'face value' and cannot be done away with by any so-called reduction, but that this is only a functional correlation with other existents, real or imaginary. The position is, then, one of naive realism, though it is also quite compatible with the *discovery* of new existents by the penetrating methods of scientific investigation. The result is, then, that the conscious or psychical modes are to be accepted as essentially just what they are revealed to be by introspection. Thus our self-critical epistemology escapes in its ontology such doctrines as universal dualism, pan-psychism, subjective and objective idealism, and materialism, positions for which the unproved premises are disclosed by a slight analysis.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Jennings, *Study of the Behavior of Lower Organisms*, published by the Carnegie Institution, 1904, and other books and articles by the same author.



these conscious modes, since with each mode the objective laws of that mode are operative, the method of discovery, of coming to know, both for other modes and finally for the knowing mode itself, is *a fortiori* the tentative one of trial and error and of selection through efficacy. This necessitation of tentativeness is supplemented by that which is conditioned by the ontological discontinuity in the existents known. This leads to,

*Postulate VIII.* All knowledge of the objective laws of any mode, physical or psychical, and of its relations to other modes, etc., *i. e.*, all the concepts of 'funded knowledge,' all the principles of proof, all the criteria of selection, even all the ideals and valuations as to the character of truth, arise and develop only in the tentative knowing process itself and must bear its character.<sup>1</sup>

Comment: This postulate means that epistemology, and indeed philosophy in any branch, is not different in kind from other ratiocinative knowledge; that all knowledge is tentative in some degree and in some respects, though in what can be known, not with absolute certainty, but again only tentatively; that none is known to be absolute, not even the ideal of absolute knowledge nor any content which may be given to it;<sup>2</sup> and finally, that absolute truth is not requisite to action, but that action demands only the attempt to know,—trial and error,—postulates.

It may be said, then, that, while truth always concerns knowing and so action, directly or indirectly, this does not constitute the whole of truth; for knowledge is itself an ontological process, psychical at least in part, related to something known, either existents, physical or psychical, or subsistents, in such a way as not to 'modify' them. This leads to,

*Postulate IX.* It is of the very nature of consciousness in its cog-

<sup>1</sup> This is the fundamental principle of pragmatism, but its acceptance does not carry with it the acceptance of the whole list of pragmatic developments. However, it furnishes the pragmatist with an anticipatory refutation of absolutism at every turn. Compare the previous discussions, pp. 615, 616, and 623 with note. An analogous principle holds good of all æsthetic and ethical values.

<sup>2</sup> This postulate is, therefore, quite compatible with subsequent postulates and with the principle applying to all of them that 'truth is independent of proof'; *i. e.*, knowledge, any particular knowledge, may be (absolutely) true although not known to be; but knowledge or assertion that this is the case, in any specific instance, even in this assertion, can be only tentative.

*nitive modes to transcend itself, and in some cases to know (be related to) that which is very different from itself in nature.*

Comment: Transcendence is presupposed by every ontology and every epistemology, even by solipsism; for every epistemology presupposes some other object of knowledge than simply itself, although this 'object' must ultimately include the epistemology. Reference of consciousness beyond itself to something different in kind is not done away with by merely nominating all things a psychism, a self, etc.; for then these are made *constants* which accordingly can be eliminated with the original differences between physical things and individual consciousness, etc., still remaining.

As the complement of IX we have,

*Postulate X. There is a real transcendent ontological process which 'works' and progresses independently of that knowledge of it which it itself produces and which is itself ontological.*

Comment: This is again a realistic postulate incorporating 'discontinuity' and the 'external view' both in the causal and in the knowing relation. It is an extension to all knowledge of the presupposition recognized by III. It recognizes that at a certain point in both the phyletic and the ontogenetic series psychical modes arise (by discontinuity) while physical ones remain. Neither the object known nor the knowing itself is altered by being related each to the other; or, if alteration be insisted on, the *equivalent statement* can be made that the object is altered by becoming known as if it were not known, and that the knowing is altered by being a definite knowing event with a specific content and not some other.<sup>1</sup> As a further extension of the presupposition stated by III, and stating a further condition for the success of an epistemology we have,

*Postulate XI. There is a simple, direct (real) knowledge of the transcendent prior to the reflective knowledge that this is so and prior to that reflective knowledge which, as = science and philosophy, extends our knowledge of transcendent processes, even of the knowing process itself.*

<sup>1</sup> Again the doctrine of 'external relations' is used. A consistent (?) and real modification theory is always based on the 'internal view,' and so presupposes this, its contradictory, based on the 'external view.'

Comment: This means that we can know in some cases without knowing that we know. That there should be (correct) knowledge in some respects in the earlier stages is presupposed in order that there may be genuine knowledge in the later and derived stages; and where distinctions are not yet made, there distinctions may nevertheless exist, to be subsequently discovered.<sup>1</sup> Just as, if error were non-existent, there would be no necessity for substantiation, but since, with error a fact, substantiation and the discovery of its norms are necessitated, so, without original truth, there would be no possibility of substantiation, even of the hypothesis that there is no truth. Tentativeness characterizes both the reflective knowledge (opinion) about other knowledge, and this 'other knowledge,' but both may be true (in certain details), since 'truth is independent of proof.'

Once again, then, the principle of the 'externality of relations' is recognized as the condition for there being real knowledge, both original and derived. Ontological discontinuity accounts in part for error and demands success as the criterion of truth; but now, conversely, the transcendent's independence is demanded as the condition for success, *i. e.*, as the condition for real knowledge. Accordingly we have,

*Postulate XII. The transcendent ontological process, which, in its progressive unfolding, is the ground for the appearance of knowledge, is, through its independence of that knowledge, the ground of its validity = success.*<sup>2</sup>

Comment: That this is the case is especially clear in the instance of a prediction awaiting verification. It results from this postulate, that, while success is the criterion, it does not constitute the nature of truth. Success or satisfaction is of two kinds, individual and 'over-individual' or social. In the former case success may, in some instances, verify itself in that a satisfaction is derived from an assumption, tacit or explicit, that an 'idea' is satisfactory, *i. e.*, is true; this = belief;<sup>3</sup> but even this demands

<sup>1</sup> The contradictory of this last principle is the basal postulate of Radical Empiricism and of positions like Ernst Mach's.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. my four articles on "The Ground of the Validity of Knowledge," *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. III, pp. 197-208, 257-266, 309-317, 371-380.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. the previous discussion of psychological self-evidence.

*independence*, namely, of other assumptions by other individuals. For a universal 'over-individual' success,<sup>1</sup> then, a universal independence is presupposed, and this is stated in the postulate of a transcendent. This postulate applies to itself; for it implies that the postulated independence of knowledge includes independence of the postulation, or of the belief in the existence of that which is postulated. Not only is the object not modified by the knowledge of it, but, conversely, this independence makes it impossible that that success which is of the type either of the immediate contact with reality given in perception or of processes which lead to such contact should be anything more than the criterion of truth. *Truth exists when an object is known as if it were not known*; then there is real and genuine knowledge. If all existents, including knowledge itself, and all subsistents were known in detail, in their relations, etc., in this way, although by conceptual methods, then would knowledge be perfect, *i. e.*, complete and accurate. Accordingly we have,

*Postulate XIII. The development and increase of knowledge in extension and in accuracy is identical with the approximation to and implication of an ideal limit of perfect knowledge.*

Comment: Thus the ideal is implied, but it is subject to a two-fold tentativeness; for (1) the ideal itself and its definition, and (2) any content thereby denoted, arise and develop only in the tentative knowing process itself<sup>2</sup> (cf. VIII). And yet any part of all this knowledge, ideal, definition, or content may be absolutely true<sup>3</sup> although not known absolutely to be so, for 'truth is independent of proof.'

Such an ideal necessitates the endeavor to work out a theory of knowledge, and this theory must account for error and for tentativeness; but it must accordingly grant that these may apply

<sup>1</sup> The psychological modes both demand and make possible that there should be one consistent 'over-individual' system of truth as the most useful and efficient means of survival in that inter-individual, social working which they also make possible and actual.

<sup>2</sup> It is always impossible for the absolutist in working with the concept of absolute truth to do other than either make the ideal, its definition, and its content tentatively tentative or make a tautologous and *useless* definition. Cf. the self-refuting criterion of absolute truth, pp. 616 and 623.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. the definition, just above.

to itself, even to that ideal of a perfect knowledge which it must formulate, and of whose content it forms a (tentative) part. Quite analogously it must discover and account for its own method and determine whether this is different from that of other knowledge or not. The result, given by induction from the various theories of knowledge, is that the latter is the case, with the difference that epistemology can use logical criteria of self-evidence where other bodies of knowledge need not. All knowledge, including epistemology, must be based on induction in the broad sense of the term as a finding-out, supplemented by a guessing, a postulating. But epistemology can justify this, by

*Postulate XIV. The inductive procedure is necessitated by the ontological discontinuity of the progressing transcendent process.*

Comment : Deduction is accordingly limited ; it must always follow or await on induction and tacit or explicit postulation and stand ever ready to find that its results fail of confirmation, — because of discontinuities. These may of course be subsequently bridged over by induction, and the results then used deductively.

The question then arises as to what is the relation of the known laws of each mode to those of the others, or, objectively, of each mode to the others, and this becomes especially important when it concerns the knowing of other modes by the rational mode, reason. The presupposition in any case<sup>1</sup> is that by reason, which as an ontological process follows its own laws whether these are known or not, modes following other laws can be known. This is really the postulate of rationality, which, of course, conditions the possibility of any epistemology, even this one. It means that it is presupposed by an epistemology that the rational as well as the irrational and non-rational and their relation to each other can be known rationally.<sup>2</sup> The result is, on the one hand, that both the limitations and character and yet

<sup>1</sup> For this is presupposed in the attempt to deny it, in the position, namely, that causation, relations, etc., are contradictory and so only appearances, since it is thereby tacitly assumed that that which is contradictory from the standpoint of the laws of reason can nevertheless be known in a manner free from contradiction by reason using those laws.

<sup>2</sup> See Höffding, *Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 114, 131, and other places.

extended applicability of the 'laws of thought' must be recognized,<sup>1</sup> and, on the other, that the meaning of rational must also be made wider so as to include other logical principles than these 'laws.' Thus we shall finally have in a propositional statement (an epistemology) logic accounting logically for logic. Now in order that there should be this knowledge of all the modes (including the rational mode) and of their relations to each other, and of the principles underlying these relations, the logical doctrines of infinity, of discontinuity, and of 'external relations,' especially the last two, are presupposed. In its most general form as involving both this logic and the 'laws of thought' this presupposition may be stated as

*Postulate XV. As concerns formulæ and laws and their relation, and, therefore, supposedly, the relation of different modes, certain laws are peculiar to certain modes, those for the 'higher' having no application in some cases to the lower modes, and conversely, but those for the 'lower' are not invalidated by those for the higher, while those for the higher are not constructed by analogy to those for the lower, although in some cases certain formulæ or laws are common to a number of modes.*<sup>2</sup>

Comment: Thus it is possible for a theory of knowledge, by the very logic which it presents and defends rationally in a propositional statement using the 'laws of thought,' both logically to have this propositional form and yet logically to have an ontological reference, logically to be in error, and logically to know<sup>3</sup> the doctrines that made all this logically possible. By this postulate, itself a postulate of the system, the system as a whole is to be interpreted; and since the logic which it involves demands postulates, it both recurs to and meets the demand of Postulate I, and so 'closes' the system.

This, then, completes the set of postulates which are necessary and which suffice to constitute the foundation of a self-critical theory of knowledge. Although explicit attention has not been

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Sidgwick, "Applied Axioms," *Mind*, N. S., Vol. XIV, pp. 42-57.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Baldwin's "Axioms of Genetic Science," p. 323, in *Development and Evolution*; also my own article, "The Physical Basis of Conduct," *Psych. Bull.*, IV, 9.

<sup>3</sup> Thus all the introductory discussion finds a place in the system.

given to ethical and æsthetic considerations, the set as it stands is capable of bringing into itself these valuations along with those others which it does take account of. The system as it stands is a propositional statement of an ontology as well as of an epistemology, and this it must be, since cognition and valuation are ontological processes. But that it is an ontology derived through and from epistemological considerations is perhaps its chief value rather than otherwise. Both as an ontology and an epistemology, and without losing the characteristic of self-criticism, the system can be presented descriptively as an Evolutionary Realism and Empiricism.<sup>1</sup> *Paradoxically, perhaps, it means that Realism is the most rational of all systems.*

In conclusion it can only be asserted,<sup>2</sup> because of the limitations of space, that the system is self-critical in the various ways which it itself implies it must be; it does apply to itself in whole and part, and is able to refute external criticism,<sup>3</sup> and yet, while, by its own logic, it can claim to be only tentative, on the same grounds it may possibly be more, since 'truth is independent of proof.'<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. the generally similar position taken by Woodbridge, *Science*, N. S., XX, and by Höffding, *Problems of Philosophy*, Chap. II, especially p. 94.

<sup>2</sup> It is my purpose to submit the demonstration in a subsequent paper or papers.

<sup>3</sup> This means, as it may be *modestly* asserted in accordance with the logic of the system, that, just as each postulate is presupposed (materially) both by itself and its own denial, and likewise the 'logical doctrines,' so also is the system as a whole presupposed both by itself and its own denial (in other systems); it is thus logically self-evident in whole and part.

<sup>4</sup> See Postulate XI and Comment.

## REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

*Die Philosophie des jungen Leibniz. Untersuchungen zur Entwicklungsgeschichte seines Systems.* Von WILLY KABITZ, Privatdozent an der Universität Breslau. Heidelberg, Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung. 1909. — pp. viii, 159.

Since the beginning of the publication of Leibniz's posthumous writings, interest in the Leibnizian philosophy has steadily increased. Within the last few years a number of important books have been written by scholars of different nations, offering new interpretations of the system in the light of the later material. Each new student has tended to exaggerate some phase of the teaching, and has sought to explain the other phases from the standpoint of what seemed to him the key-note of the whole. Russell and Couturat have pushed Leibniz's logic into the center of the system, and have tried to show that his metaphysical doctrines follow necessarily from the premises of his logic; while Cassierer treats the great monadologist as a kind of connecting link between Descartes and Kant, finding in him, or rather reading into him, the germs of the later criticism. Dr. Kabitz, the author of the book before us, though frankly acknowledging the great merits of these contributions, does not believe that a proper understanding of the system can be reached in that way alone. His own method is a much more satisfactory one, one much more likely to give us a true insight into the philosophy as a whole, than the one-sided treatment already spoken of. He approaches his task from the historical side; his ideal is to trace the evolution of the system through the published and unpublished material at hand, in short, to describe the birth and growth of the system. This is not an easy thing to do, and the author thoroughly appreciates the difficulties of the undertaking, being well aware that it can be accomplished only gradually. The source-material at our disposal is still incomplete and not always trustworthy. The dates of many important manuscripts have not been definitely fixed or even determined at all. The present book therefore confines itself to the examination of the writings of Leibniz's youth, of the 'first phase' of his thought, down to his sojourn in Paris. The discovery of the infinitesimal calculus brings about a significant advance over Leibniz's earlier position, while a profounder study of Descartes and contact with thinkers like Huygens, Malebranche, and Spinoza, form contributing causes of development. At



the same time, Dr. Kabitz finds, the leading principles of the later system, the basal conceptions and the main lines of growth, are already established in the first period; during the later stage Leibniz simply acquired new means for solving his problems in a more complete manner.

The beginning made by Dr. Kabitz is a good beginning; his work gives evidence of careful scholarship and inspires one with confidence in its results. In the five chapters, discussing Metaphysic, Mathematics, and Logic as the Foundation of the System of Sciences (pp. 4-48), Natural Philosophy (pp. 49-80), Mental Philosophy (pp. 81-94), Practical Philosophy (pp. 95-109), and Theology (pp. 110-126), he examines the writings of Leibniz down to 1672, using many hitherto unpublished manuscripts, as well as some of the sources from which the philosopher drew. In the very first metaphysical work, *De principio individui* (1663), a principle of the later system already appears: the Aristotelian-nominalistic proposition that only individual substances exist; it is the traditional metaphysical standpoint of the Protestant schoolmen, which was handed down to Leibniz by his teachers. He was an individualist or pluralist from the start, and never gave up the theory of individual substances. A decisive change takes place in his views in the years 1664-1666, and is expressed in the *Ars combinatoria*. He becomes acquainted with Pythagorean-Platonic and natural-scientific conceptions, and these bring conflicts into his thinking which it takes him a long time to overcome. His teacher, Weigel, convinced him of what became and remained a basal notion of his system, that the universe is a harmonious, mathematical-logical, unified whole; that metaphysics and mathematics are the fundamental sciences, and the deductive method the true method of knowledge. Leibniz also becomes aware of the importance of the principle of sufficient reason, and makes it the basis of his physics, ethics, and theology. From the very beginning it had not only a logical but metaphysical-cosmological meaning for him. It is not true, therefore, as Couturat asserts, that Leibniz's metaphysics rests solely upon the principles of his logic and grows out of these. The history of his development shows the reverse: Leibniz's logic rests upon metaphysical presuppositions and is shot through with metaphysics.

Alongside of the rationalistic tendencies which we have noticed in the foregoing, we also find in Leibniz a marked empiricism that follows from his nominalism. Indeed, all through the writings of his earlier period we discover an irreconcilable antagonism between his rational-

ism and his sensationalism, — a proof that he did not at that time grasp the full meaning of the epistemological problems. It was not until the influence of Descartes had made itself more deeply felt that he studied the question more thoroughly and brought the different parts of his theory of knowledge into harmony with each other.

In his earliest published work Leibniz accepted the traditional scholastic view of nature which had been taught him at the university. A few years later, however, we find him greatly interested in the newer atomistic-mechanical conceptions. But down to 1669 we note no progress in his views; he wavers between the different standpoints, frequently shifts his ground, and is inclined to compromise. The mechanical theory appeals to him, and yet he is not willing to conceive mind as a mere accident of matter. In an unpublished fragment of 1670 we mark a decisive change; the notions of extension, space, time, body, motion, and figure are brought under the arithmetical notion of quantity (the notion of a whole composed of parts): extension being conceived as quantity whose parts are assumed as existing, number as quantity whose parts are not assumed as existing. Leibniz here already possesses the notions of *conatus*, *punctum*, and *instans*, which he places at the head of his *Theoria motus* (1671). These concepts he takes over from Hobbes, who had defined *conatus* as motion occurring in the smallest possible space and in the shortest possible time; but he modifies them in accordance with his metaphysical conception of reality. For him they are inextended and indivisible elements, real parts in the continuum, — real infinite parts. This new conception is not merely an epistemological notion, but a metaphysical solution of the problem of the continuum. *Conatus*, *punctum*, and *instans* are metaphysical realities, *conatus* being tacitly conceived as a kind of will-impulse. Here we are on the road to the later teaching of Leibniz. From here there is only a step to the larger letter to Arnauld (1671), in which the essence of the body is conceived as motion. If this is so, and the principle of motion is extended, then the body is in principle inextended. Body as such therefore is not a substance but an accident. Leibniz has here reached a wholly kinetic theory of matter.

As the chief merit of his new theory of motion Leibniz regarded the fact that it compelled the assumption of mental beings, and that it furnished proofs of almost geometrical certainty of the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. The most important question for him had always been the substantiality of the soul. He reaches the conclusion that psychical realities are the basal elements of the body and

of motion. Mathematics with metaphysics and logic now form the basis of the sciences, and theology the apex; whereas down to 1669 the order had been: metaphysics or theology, moral philosophy, mathematics, physics. We see here the influence of Hobbes. Leibniz now plans (1671) a system of mental sciences with mathematics and natural science as its basis. In the writings of 1671 the mind is localized in an inextended point in space. The *conatus* is the basal element of consciousness; the operations of consciousness consist in tendencies, as those of the body consist in movements. Just as there is no absolute rest in bodies, there is no rest in the mind; consciousness is in a state of constant activity. Corresponding to the manifold movements of the body we have manifold tendencies in the mind. The mind or consciousness is a harmony of tendencies, and pleasure a feeling of harmony. The substantiality of the soul consists solely in the unity of its functions, and from consciousness as such follows its individual character.

As Dr. Kabitz points out in a concluding section of his book, Leibniz's earlier world-view contains a number of characteristic basal ideas, which are as yet, in many respects, loose, disjointed, and undeveloped, and which he develops, elaborates, and systematizes in his later period. His originality largely consists in the way in which he accomplishes this task. A central thought is the idea of the complete rationality of the universe, the logical law of ground and the law of causality being combined into a cosmological law. This notion determines the thinker's general problem as well as his method; it also settles the question of the relation of logic and metaphysics in the system from the very start. The two sciences develop in interdependence; the threads run back and forth between them; for which reason it is impracticable to treat them in complete separation from each other. To make the matter still more complicated, mathematics also exercises an influence upon the development of logic and metaphysics.

Another basal notion of the system is that of the independent value of the individual in the universe, a view which Leibniz took over from his scholastic days and never surrendered. It constitutes an argument for the existence of God: only a teleological or rational cause can explain the presence of individual objects in the world; indeed those must already be contained in the rational world-ground as the idea or motive or goal of his creative will. A later thought grows out of this: owing to its origin in the divine mind, every individual carries within itself its own destiny and law. Leibniz's conception of the value and reality of the individual and particular affects his logic and theory of

knowledge even in the period of his youth, bringing it into conflict with his rationalistic presuppositions.

Closely connected with the individualistic conception is the notion of the perfect harmony of all things, a harmony which is grounded in the divine reason itself. It is the absolute standard for the divine will in its choice among possible worlds; it is the principle by which the value of the individual is measured; it is the principle of all purposes, or the end in itself, of the world reason. It is the conception which appears in the later system as the principle of preëstablished harmony.

Another thought is the thought of the quantitative and qualitative infinity of the universe. The mechanical hypothesis is also a fundamental and permanent factor in the world-view of Leibniz; but it is limited to the corporeal world and subordinated to the principle of purpose and harmony.

The book is a valuable contribution to the literature of Leibniz, and a good example of the historical-critical method. The only safe way to discover how Leibniz came to develop his particular system is to study the documents in which he expressed his thoughts. It is easier to make guesses and to formulate all kinds of theories about it than to work it out patiently from the original sources; and we are indebted to Dr. Kabitz for having chosen the more fruitful, though more difficult, path.

The appendix contains a number of hitherto unpublished manuscripts.

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*The Philosophy of Kant Explained.* By JOHN WATSON. Glasgow, James Maclehose & Sons, 1908. — pp. xi, 515.

Professor Watson has already earned the gratitude of all English students of Kant by his translations from the three "Critiques." More accurate and readable renderings cannot well be demanded of Kant's cumbersome German. They are invariably a quite masterly statement of his intended meaning. If Dr. Watson could be prevailed upon to undertake complete translations of Kant's chief works, they would be assured of a most eager welcome.

The purpose of this present volume may best be stated in the author's own words. "This book is the result of a not unsuccessful experiment in the art of teaching continued over many years, the main object of which was to provide a method by which the tendency of the student to lean upon the authority of his teacher could be counteracted. Nothing can well be more fatal to any real progress in philos-

ophy than the habit of listening to lectures without a corresponding reaction of one's own mind. Various plans have been suggested for the avoidance of this fatal defect. The plan which I was led to adopt with more advanced students a good many years ago was to introduce them to the direct study of the critical philosophy through the medium of the translated passages, published under the title of "The Philosophy of Kant in Extracts from his own Writings," which I had made expressly for that purpose. In this way I was able to count upon the coöperation of the class, while the method seemed to me to have the additional advantage of recognizing that the mind can only be aroused to powerful reaction when the matter upon which it is exercised is of the first rank. The main disadvantage in this method of slow and elaborate study is the amount of time it consumes, and I have therefore thought it advisable to publish the oral explanations that I have been led to give on the successive paragraphs of my translations from Kant. As these explanations were actually given in class with direct reference to the difficulties found in the text of my translations, it may be hoped that they will be found instructive to others as well."

As in the case of the "Selections," considerably more than half of the volume is devoted to the *Critique of Pure Reason*; but a translation is given of additional extracts from the *Critique of Judgment*, with corresponding commentary.

The expository notes open with an "Historical Retrospect"; and only in this introduction does Dr. Watson allow himself anything like criticism. The commentary strictly limits itself throughout to explanatory exposition. In other ways, however, this "Retrospect" seems hardly to fit in with the main purpose of the volume. Little objection need be made to the positions taken up; but, as an historical introduction to the problems of the critical philosophy, it seems somewhat inadequate. Spinoza is treated at much greater length than either Locke or Hume. Also the epistemological problems which bulk so largely in the first *Critique* are unduly ignored, in favor of those wider metaphysical and theological issues which play the more prominent part in the philosophies of Spinoza and Leibniz. As a result, there is no quite adequate explanation, either here or in the opening notes, of Kant's alternative modes of stating his fundamental problem,—how an idea in us can refer to an object, and how *a priori* synthetic judgments are possible. Indeed, throughout the whole volume the problems of perception seem hardly to receive their proper share of attention. Probably, however, such criticisms are unfair. This in-

roduction is obviously designed for students who have been studying Spinoza, and as such it may be justified by pedagogical reasons.

As regards the main commentary, the same criticisms may, of course, be made as hold against Dr. Watson's previous volume of "Selections." It is executed from the thoroughgoing idealist point of view, and it is based upon the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Those of us who prefer the first edition and who incline to a realist interpretation of the critical philosophy cannot, therefore, recognize Dr. Watson's selections and exposition as affording an adequate account of what is most fundamental in the three 'Critiques.' We are bound to miss many of the passages which most interest us, and upon which in teaching we would lay much stress. Not only is the second edition account of the Paralogisms followed throughout, but even that is quite scantily treated. Kant's distinction between the indispensable notion of things in themselves and the problematic conception of noumena is practically ignored, with consequent confusion, as it seems to me, in the exposition of the chapter on phenomena and noumena. No emphasis is laid upon the important distinction between the pure forms of understanding and the categories. The categories arise through union of the pure forms with time and space, and are therefore identical with the schemata. Kant's criticism of the teleological argument in the "Ideal" and in the *Critique of Judgment* also seem to be all too briefly dealt with, and there is no reference to the dominant influence, in this connection, of Hume's *Dialogues*. Also, there are no selections from the "Methodology." And, lastly, there is complete omission from the *Critique of Judgment* of Kant's central doctrine of the nature of genius, and of all discussion of the relation of artistic to natural beauty, — matters which have a very important bearing upon Kant's view of the relation holding between appearance and ultimate reality.

It is easy, however, to criticise a brief commentary, covering the three 'Critiques,' for imputed sins of omission. Dr. Watson's readers, whatever be their personal attitudes towards the Kantian philosophy, must feel indebted for the clearness and thoroughness of his expositions, and for the added value which this commentary confers upon his previous "Selections." Together they undoubtedly constitute, — Caird's monumental work alone excepted, — the best and most serviceable introduction existing in English to the critical philosophy.

Dr. Watson promises that should this present work "meet with a fair share of approval" he will publish a sequel, containing discussions of Hegel's criticisms of Kant. This should not be long delayed.

This work will have prepared for it a very wide circle of appreciative readers.

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*La morale rationnelle dans ses relations avec la philosophie générale.*

Par ALBERT LECLÈRE. Paris, Felix Alcan, 1908. — pp. 543.

The present book contains the substance of a course of lectures given at the University of Berne in the years 1904-05 and 1905-06. The author proposes to justify the metaphysical method in ethics, and by means of it to establish the orthodox morality upon a secure "rational" basis. This requires that the moral ideal shall be shown to be a metaphysical reality rather than a "fiction"; and that morality shall be deduced *a priori*. The latter requirement means that morality shall be a sort of "accord de la pensée avec elle-même." "Aussi tout notre effort sera-t-il d'exposer la *Morale la plus immédiatement conforme aux nécessités essentielles de la raison, de la pensée pure normale*" (p. 17). This is not an auspicious beginning; and, as we shall see, this subjectivistic version of the *a priori* is typical of the scholastic epistemology in which the book abounds.

Part I comprises, in addition to these preliminary statements, first, a definition of ethics as distinguished from religion, science, and philosophy, and second, a historical retrospect.

As a theoretical discipline, ethics is first classed with science and philosophy, and opposed to religion. The latter expresses a natural instinct to center the universe in oneself, while the intellect, on the other hand, regards the individual only as a part in the whole. In order to relate ethics to science and philosophy, Professor Leclère undertakes a systematic classification of all theoretical disciplines. This classification (for which the author acknowledges his large indebtedness to Goblot and Tarde) is based on two fundamental distinctions: that between the "given" (donné) and the "non-given," which separates the positive and the philosophical sciences; and that between subject and object, which is central in the arrangement of the positive sciences. With the aid of the latter distinction the author attempts to reduce the Comtean list of sciences to two: mathematics (or algebra) and psychology. Mathematics, in this more comprehensive sense, embraces all science dealing with the variety and unity of phenomenal objects; psychology, all science making use of the intuition of consciousness. So fundamental a matter cannot here be argued on its merits. We can only enter a

protest against so easy an acceptance of the conventional notion of consciousness. A more general objection may be raised against the whole classification. It is the avowed intention of the author to accomplish this without committing himself to any philosophical doctrine, but the result is only to demonstrate anew that a systematic classification of human knowledge is itself a philosophical task which cannot be accomplished without the acceptance and use of philosophical propositions.

Thus the other than nominal existence of certain subdivisions, such as the philosophical science termed "Critique" (with its "Deduction métaphysique" and its "Deduction transcendentale"), depends wholly on an antecedent interpretation of experience. The fundamental distinction between the "given" and the "non-given" involves a volume of epistemology. As it stands it is hopelessly obscure. It seems to involve both *subjectivism* (the distinction being a psychological one, and implying that experience as a whole is psychical), and *dualism* (between phenomenon and noumenon); but without justifying either by means of a clear and valid analysis.

When the fundamental sciences, Mathematics, Psychology, Logic, Critique and Metaphysics, are defined, it appears that ethics is "*moins une science qu'un faisceau de parties de sciences*" (p. 81). The ethical point of departure is the psychology of the moral consciousness, with its characteristic concepts and sentiments. This "pure géographie et pure histoire de la mentalité morale" (p. 86) is the positive ethics, the verifiable nucleus of ethical truth. Together with sociological and biological data of the same kind, it constitutes "l'ethologie inductive." The problem of the *a priori* or *a posteriori* character of moral judgments is a branch of "Critique" (Ethocritique), while the transcendental speculation necessary to a scientific ethics forms a branch of metaphysics (Métamorale). The "Ethologie déductive" formulates the results of theoretical ethics and prepares for "La Morale rationnelle pratique."

The performance of this programme is deferred until the author shall have justified himself historically. He begins with nothing less than a demonstration of the inevitable alternatives (Logique de l'Hésitation initiale), aberrations (Logique de Variations), and final homecoming (Logique de la Préférence normale) of the speculative mind. This is intended not as a "Psychologie pathologique de *l'homo philosophans*" but as the proof of the necessary journey of "un esprit attentif à la voix de la Pensée pure," from empiricism and dogmatism, *via* criticism, to the haven of idealism. The thesis is not original, nor



would be any criticism of it that might here be offered. The history of ethics is divided similarly into empirical theories (Hedonism and Sentimentalism), metaphysical or dogmatic theories, and critical theories. Hedonism receives a thorough analysis, interesting mainly on account of its division into sub-types: psychological, materialistic, vitalistic, sociological, cosmological, — with two added varieties, “*pragmatique*” and “*scientific intégral*,” to accommodate MM. Rauh and Guyau. Empiricism is criticised adversely, dogmatism and criticism, on the whole, favorably. “*De toutes ces considérations, l’on peut brièvement conclure que le plus stable des points de vue est une Synthèse où le Criticisme fournit exclusivement la méthode, et donc la Métaphysique spiritualiste est l’élément principal*” (p. 177).

The author next enters into a long history of moral opinion, beginning with antiquity, and coming down to the present day. For an American reader no little interest attaches to the summary of contemporary French and German ethics. The whole survey proves “*l’irrésistible attraction de la Morale rationnelle sur l’esprit humain*” (p. 302), and the intimate union with “*la Morale rationnelle*” of disinterestedness and individualism.

Part II, comprising theoretical and practical ethics systematically treated, begins with the “*Ethologie inductive*,” a study of the moral consciousness, individual and social. It would be difficult to invent a method more futile and confusing. It soon appears that we are not dealing with *moral data*, but with a ready made *ethical opinion*, imputed by the author to “*la conscience commune*.” Sanction, merit, responsibility, virtue, duty, right and good, — each is an idea belonging to “*notre conscience*,” and expounded by the author with great assurance. Since they are all equivocal (common sense invariably is, when cross-examined) they lend themselves readily to the interpretation the author chooses to put on them. In the discussion of the good, the formalistic-idealistic trend of the whole is manifested. Duty is the right of the good to be (“*le droit du bien à être*,” p. 326), and the good is the rational; while the rational is that which is fitted to be, or that the idea of which justifies the reality of its essence (p. 339)! A more barren and tautological treatment of the matter could not well be imagined.

The “*Ethocritique*” is the positive sequel to the “*Ethologie inductive*.” The latter demonstrates the *non-a posteriori* character of morality; the former discovers its *a priori* character. This means its deducibility from ultimate categories, the categories of that “*pensée en soi*” which is presupposed as the norm in all given thought.

'Thought' is under the necessity of individuating itself to save itself from inanity. "Conscience = pensée individualisée" (p. 388), and the good is the category of consciousness. Why thought unactualized should be thought at all; or why, if the good is the category only of *actualized* thought it should be regarded as universal, does not appear.

The *Métamoraie* supplies the general philosophical basis which the author believes ethics to require. God, freedom, and immortality are discursively affirmed (one cannot say proved, — "la raison se passe de preuves!") in a manner more reminiscent of pre-Kantian dogmatism than of Kant. The immediate and absolute reality of consciousness, the ontological primacy of personality, the absolute as the real-ideal, — these and other idealistic doctrines appear in a somewhat conventional and uncritical form.

The "Éthologie déductive" is an attempt to mediate between the metaphysical ethics thus far outlined, and a practical ethics. The fundamental thesis of metaphysical ethics is the synthetic proposition: "le Bien, c'est l'Être." To make this practically significant it is necessary to add that "l'Être est action," and to interpret action in what are virtually teleological terms. It is then possible to deduce the imperative, "Sois-toi même," with the coördinate imperative to further the being of others. How far one shall assert one's own individuality against the environment, and how far one shall sacrifice one's own interests to those of others, — these questions receive only an ambiguous answer, consistent with the barrenness of the first principle.

The "Morale rationnelle pratique" occupies the last hundred pages of the book, and contains much that is of interest, especially its declaration in favor of "la libre association" as opposed to action by the state (p. 522).

But to the present reviewer it seems less important to refer to these minor merits than to condemn the book as a whole. There are two defects so general, and so typical, as to be deserving of special criticism. In the first place, this is not a book *of* ethics, but a book *about* ethics. It does not proceed from conduct, but from traditional technicalities. In place of a direct and open analysis of the moral complex, the author offers classifications and criticisms of ethical opinion. The actual field of moral living is so crossed with pedantic ditching and fencing that its proper contour is almost wholly obliterated. Ethics is properly not a study of 'ologies' and 'isms,' nor even of concepts, but of acts and propensities to act. In the second place, largely in consequence of its pedantry, the book is

scholastic in terminology. It is almost wholly lacking in first-hand analysis, depending largely upon the traditional and doubtful meaning of such words as "consciousness," "thought," "reason," "a priori," "given," "absolute," "freedom," and "God." It happens that idealism is especially liable to this pre-Baconian idolatry. But the present book is almost wholly unaffected by that neo-criticism which even idealists themselves are proclaiming, and which all in all is the most hopeful sign of the times.

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*Kant's Theory of Knowledge.* By H. A. PRICHARD, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1909. — pp. iv, 324.

"This book is an attempt to think out the nature and tenability of Kant's Transcendental Idealism, an attempt animated by the conviction that even the elucidation of Kant's meaning, apart from any criticism, is impossible without a discussion on their own merits of the main issues which he raises." The outcome of this critical examination is destructive. Apart from those issues in which Kant is, in spite of himself, of one mind with Bishop Berkeley, his idealism is shown to be, when freed from its obscure and inconsistent formulation, realism pure and simple. His 'phenomena' are 'the things in themselves.' That is, to be consistent Kant should have chosen between the subjective idealism of Berkeley and realism; and had he seen this, he would have chosen realism. The bias of the author is frankly toward realism and toward the conviction that all idealism is subjective and fallacious. In fact the book may almost be said to be a missionary tract for the spread of realism.

Mr. Prichard owes much, as he tells us in his preface and footnotes, to Professor Cook Wilson, "to have been whose pupil I count the greatest of philosophical good fortunes." The author ignores almost entirely the work and results of other students of Kant. He does not consider the source and growth of Kant's doctrine, nor the manner and order in which the various portions of the *Critique* were written. All of this he may do, for his book is devoted almost entirely to a keen and brilliant analysis and criticism of important passages in the *Æsthetic* and *Analytic* as they stand, and especially of the psychology of cognition therein contained. Many of these obscure and difficult passages he clears up admirably.

In the formulation of the problem of the *Critique*, "the parallel of mathematics which suggests the 'Copernican' revolution does not really

lead to the results which Kant supposes. Advance in mathematics is due to the adoption, not of any conscious assumption, but of a certain procedure." "Kant, however, makes the condition of advance in metaphysics consist in the adoption, not of a method of procedure, but of an assumption, viz., that objects conform to the mind. And it is impossible to see how this assumption can assist what, on Kant's theory, it ought to have assisted, viz., the study of God, freedom, and immortality, or indeed the study of anything" (p. 13). Then again the 'Copernican' revolution is not strictly what Kant supposes it to be; for it is not the precise reverse of the ordinary view that the mind has to conform to objects, for in the ordinary view object means the thing in itself, whereas in Kant's doctrine it is only a phenomenon.

Moreover, this criticism affects not only Kant's statement of his problem, but also his solution. His doctrine is that both empirical and *a priori* judgments are valid only of phenomena and not of things in themselves, and therefore the problem how objects conform to our judgments cannot be confined to *a priori* judgments. Kant's problem should not relate specially to *a priori* judgments, but should be, "what renders possible, or is presupposed by, the conformity of individual things to certain laws of connexion?" (laws of mathematics).

There is a further difficulty in the formulation of Kant's problem in the two Prefaces and the Introduction. That problem arises from the unquestioned existence of *a priori* judgments in both mathematics and physics and from the doubtful existence of such judgments in metaphysics; whereas in the body of the work, a fundamental distinction is implied between *a priori* knowledge in mathematics and in physics. In short, Kant in no way sought to prove the truth of mathematics, but he did the principles underlying physics, which did not seem to him self-evident. All of which adds to our difficulty in understanding what Kant means positively by *a priori*.

The author finds a number of difficulties in Kant's distinction between the sensibility and the understanding. If 'by the sensibility objects are given to us,' and 'by the understanding they are thought'; then it follows that the data of sense are things of the external world. But, according to Kant, they are not, they are merely sensations caused by things. What are these things which cause them? Of course the normal form of Kant's theory is that they are unknowable, but certain verbal usage, and the fact that this problem occupies Kant's attention in the *Æsthetic* and is a problem at all only so long as the cause of sensation is thought of as a physical body, indicate that Kant often

thought of the causes of sensation as the things of the spatio-temporal world. But, again, how does the old distinction between the sensibility and the understanding help us to solve the problem, 'How are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?' Evidently it is Kant's aim to relate the judgments of mathematics to the former faculty and those of physics to the latter, hence the distinction between the *Æsthetic* and the *Analytic*. But this last distinction is not compatible with Kant's own doctrine when he is not thinking of any theory to be based upon it; for here "the sensibility and the understanding are represented as inseparable faculties involved in *all* knowledge" (p. 35).

In endeavoring to prove that space is an *a priori* form of perception, Kant confuses the actual perception of empty space, which perception he implies is possible, with a potentiality, *i. e.*, the power of perceiving that which is spatial. The really valid argument adduced by Kant for the *a priori* character of our apprehension of space, based on the universality of geometry, he ignores.

Turning to Kant's arguments for the *perceptive* character of our apprehension of space, we find that these also fail. "There appears to be no way of distinguishing perception and conception as the apprehension of different realities except as the apprehension of the individual and of the universal respectively." "The distinction, then, between perception and conception can be drawn with respect to any characteristics of objects, and does not serve to distinguish one from another" (p. 44).

In his fourth chapter, entitled "Phenomena and Things in Themselves," Mr. Prichard makes the following main accusation against Kant's distinction between the two. "Kant is compelled to end with a different distinction from that with which he begins. He begins with the distinction between things as they are in themselves and things as they appear to us, the distinction relating to one and the same reality regarded from two different points of view. He ends with the distinction between two different realities, things-in-themselves, external to, in the sense of independent of, the mind, and phenomena or appearances within it" (p. 75). The remainder of the chapter is devoted mostly to an analysis of the distinction between reality and appearance, especially in its bearing on the reality of space. The author reaches the conclusion that space cannot be a property of appearances.

In the next chapter, entitled "Time and the Inner Sense," Kant's doctrine is put as follows: Just as we do not know things, but only appearances, so we do not know ourselves, but only appearances of

ourselves. But how are we to determine in the case of any given affection whether it be from the external thing or from the self? We could not determine, but should ascribe all to the things without. In short, we must know ourselves or we have no inner sense. How does Kant come to hold such a view? The answer is, "that, inconsistently with his general view, he continues to think of the facts as they really are" (p. 109).

In his examination of the metaphysical deduction of the categories, Mr. Prichard shows that Kant should have recognized from his own account of judgment (the act of bringing individuals or species under their corresponding concept or universal), "that judgment involves the reality, not of any special universals or, — in Kant's language, — conceptions, but of universality or conception as such" (p. 152). Further, he argues that there is no connection between Kant's account of judgment and the list of activities of thought in judgment borrowed from formal logic, and finally, that these forms of logic do not in turn involve the categories.

The following two chapters are a keen and admirable analysis, elucidation, and criticism of the transcendental deduction of the categories.

The difficulties found in Kant's deduction are of two kinds: (1) those "involved in the working out of the theory, even if its main principles are not questioned"; and (2) those "involved in accepting its main principles at all." Of the former kind, the first difficulty has to do with the possibility of performing the synthesis that is said to be the work of the understanding. We are told by Kant that the mind has several ways of combining the manifold, viz., the categories. What, however, we should expect is that the mind has only one way of doing this; for the character of the manifold to be combined cannot determine how the mind shall combine; and if that rests solely with the mind, we should expect only one form of combination. The second difficulty is that, if there is but one single principle of synthesis, this cannot contain in itself the ground for the different ways of its application. Finally, it is impossible to relate terms unless these terms correspond to the general nature of the relation, *e. g.*, a term must be a sound to be more or less loud, or be spatial to be at right or left. Again, "the special nature of the relation to be effected presupposes a special nature on the part of the terms to be related. If one sound is to be related to another by way of the octave, that other must be its octave" (p. 219). Indeed, the fundamental mistake of Kant's view is that, misled by his theory of perception, he holds terms to have their source in the things in themselves through their action on

our sensibility, and relations to be entirely the product of the understanding, whereas both are equally given. In thus treating what is given by the sensibility as terms, and what is contributed by the understanding as relations, he is really "confusing the distinction between a relation and its terms with that between universal and individual" (p. 228).

The second type of difficulty, namely, that involved in accepting Kant's main principles at all, is considered next. Kant explains knowledge as a synthesis, a sort of manufacture of objects, a process by which the physical world is constructed out of elements given in perception: but knowing is not making, for it presupposes the object to be known.

In examining the mathematical principles, and, in particular, 'the axiom of perception,' Mr. Prichard draws our attention to the following difficulties: first, no justification is given by Kant for the use of the word axiom; secondly, instead of basing his argument upon the doctrine of the categories, Kant does not really appeal to it but only to the character of space and time as forms of perception; thirdly, there is no need to appeal to space and time as forms of perception but only to them as ways in which objects are related. In short, *the axiom need not appeal to Kant's theory of knowledge.*

Two serious inconsistencies are to be found in the first analogy of experience. How can Kant legitimately speak of a permanent substratum of change at all? Phenomena, or appearances, cannot imply or be such a substratum; at the most they could be said to imply the permanent subject whose successive mental states they are. This substratum cannot be matter; for our sensations, the phenomena produced by the things in themselves acting upon us, cannot be the states of bodies in space. Then, again, Kant's proof of the analogy, instead of being transcendental, is really dogmatic, and that too in spite of his own protest; for his argument is based (as, by the way, it should be) on the nature of change and not on the possibility of our perceiving change. The author gives the second analogy a longer and excellent study. In this he finds that Kant's vindication of causality "is no argument at all."

The conclusion of the book is a note of five pages on Kant's 'Refutation of Idealism.' An examination of Kant's argument "forces us to allow that Kant, without realizing what he is doing, really abandons the view that objects in space are phenomena, and uses an argument the very nature of which implies that these objects are things in themselves" (p. 321).

Throughout the book the author's analysis and his criticism seem to

me almost always correct, excellent, and helpful. Yet, though some of the chapters certainly should have been published as articles, I cannot help asking, why they all were published as a book? It is hardly the book for a student beginning Kant. Then again, now that the higher critics of Kant's writings have shown the hasty and exceedingly artificial way in which the Critique was finally put together, it is evident that the book should not and cannot be interpreted precisely as it stands. To get at Kant's real views is a far harder task, and, after all, it is only a criticism of these that we care about. Of course much of Mr. Prichard's book escapes this animadversion, but much does not. Finally, as an attack on idealism and as a defense of realism, the book loses much of its force by keeping so closely to the letter of Kant's critique instead of dealing with his main problems apart from their artificial setting.

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## NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

*Entwicklungswerttheorie, Entwicklungsökonomie, Menschenökonomie.* Von  
RUDOLF GOLDSCHIED. Dr. Werner Klinkhardt, Leipzig, 1908. — pp.  
xxvi, 218.

This *Programmschrift*, as it is called by its author, is offered as a fragment of a larger work which is to appear under the title of "*Höherentwicklung und Menschenökonomie.*" In short, incisive chapters, centering about dogmatic and often highly epigrammatic pronouncements, a range of ideas is opened up remarkable for the same large independence and passionate conviction which such critics as Jodl and Ostwald discovered in his earlier work, *Zur Ethik des Gesamtwillens*. As it stands, it is a book of passionate challenge, a tract for the times; but if the heart is much in evidence, it rarely parts with the head, and the discerning reader cannot fail to realize the hard thinking which precipitated the dogmas and polished the epigrams, — thinking, which, if it does not get itself fully expressed in the present fragmentary form, doubtless will in the larger work from which the fragment is taken.

Primarily, and certainly on the surface, Goldscheid's challenge is directed against the crude competition and the 'monstrous' exploitation of human energy which characterize the industrial development of the time, and above all against those loose and false interpretations of Darwinism with which it has been the fashion to support the system. He is indeed concerned to show the entire falsity of the assumption that human progress is dependent upon competition. He denies that it is necessary, either within or between groups. The good effects attained are not proportionate to the expenditure of energy necessary. Competition does not eliminate the conquered, but more often degrades the conqueror. But his attack is really deeper. He is a scientific socialist in that he seeks a transvaluation of values in the sense of disclosing the complete untenability of the very concepts of utility which dominate the present time.

The intellectual nerve and sinew of the book is to be found, therefore, in his attack on current conceptions of utility and economy. The present economy is a matter of sale and exchange, not of value. A theory of value is yet to be found. The economists who have speculated upon marginal utility have given us merely a theory of price. And as for Marx, that which he had in mind was to show that social evolution would end in the expropriation of the owning class. He sought to understand the development of a certain type of economy, not to establish an economy of development. An *economy of development* which shall be frankly teleological can alone be a real theory of value. It is indeed, as Goldscheid recognizes, the veriest commonplace to say that it is only when we make

clear to ourselves the end toward which our economy is directed that we shall know how to form and direct that economy. "But," as he further wisely remarks, "we are always overlooking the fact that the rigorous logical deductions from a commonplace need not themselves necessarily be commonplace." Commonplace they certainly are not among the economists of the present. Anti-teleological scepticism was, he admits, useful in its time, as a cure for human prejudices, but it has now become a destructive hindrance. All the talk of a *wertfrei* economics is for Goldscheid the veriest nonsense. It is worse than nonsense for it is the intellectual support of that "economy of things" rather than "economy of men" which he attacks.

All this is certainly not new. From Ruskin on, such ideas have called forth enthusiasm or laughter according to the temper of the mind upon which they have fallen. Nevertheless much has happened, in the worlds of thought and things alike, since the days of triumphant positivism. And again, the type of mind represented by Goldscheid is a different thing from that of a Ruskin. Not that the teleological theory of value, with which he would again make economics "the science of right means," is either completely or convincingly worked out. When he says that the end is to obtain the greatest possible sum of utilities with the least possible work, and consequently to create surplus values, or when he says that a good economic organization will assure the satisfaction of social needs, and will be preoccupied with the future rather than the present, with *Entwicklungswerte* rather than with exchange values, he is dealing in generalities. But if they are generalities, they have come to have a meaning which already threatens to become quite particular. If, moreover, he can hardly be said to have completely established the equivalence of *Arbeitswert* and *Entwicklungswert*, on which so much of his theory rests, he has at least helped to bring to clearer consciousness this necessary presupposition of all rational economic effort. It is just at this point, — the working out of the necessary presuppositions of social development, — that he is most original and suggestive. Thus, for illustration, the place he accords to individual rights in his socialistic and developmental scheme. "It was an entirely false method, he tells us, when it was formerly sought to found the rights of the individual individualistically. It is not because the individual has a right to existence, health, and the development of his capacities that society concerns itself with social and political regulations; but it is rather because the acknowledgment of all these rights of the individual constitutes the scientifically demonstrable necessary presupposition of the higher development of society, that such acknowledgment is an ethical postulate."

Consideration of this book has necessarily been confined to the most general outlines. In fact its more strictly economic doctrines rather elude criticism in their present form, if indeed such criticism, necessarily technical, were here in place. An adequate notice should, however, not omit reference to the philosophical background of the book. Epistemological

reflections, — concerning the presuppositions and postulates of value judgments, — constantly obtrude themselves; but it is rather the vistas opened up that will prove enticing to the philosopher. The necessity, and as the author believes, the actual gradual realization of the teleological character of the economic and social sciences, is for him but a part of a larger *activistic* or dynamic turn which is being given to the entire scientific activity of the time. His chapters on "Deskriptive und normative Wissenschaft," and on "Die aktivistische Wendung des gesamten Wissenschaftsbetriebs" (Chapters X and XIII), epitomize in somewhat noteworthy fashion those newer concepts of the function of knowledge which have gradually emerged from the heart-searchings of a period dominated by practical and voluntaristic tendencies.

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*Spinoza's Short Treatise on God, Man and Human Welfare.* Translated from the Dutch by LYDIA G. ROBINSON. Chicago, The Open Court Publ. Co., 1909. — pp. xxiv, 178.

The translator's preface states that "This *Short Treatise on God, Man and Human Welfare* (commonly referred to with abbreviated title, "Short Treatise") was Spinoza's first philosophical work. The exact date of its authorship is not known, but it is probable that he wrote it between the ages of 25 and 30. He was early surrounded by a coterie of friends who looked to him for their guidance in philosophical matters, and when in 1660, at the age of 28, he left Amsterdam for the vicinity of Leyden, it is thought that he either left this treatise behind him to be circulated among his friends, or sent it back to them soon after his departure. It was originally written in Latin, but was soon translated into Dutch by one of his friends. Both Latin and Dutch versions were lost sight of until the middle of the nineteenth century when Dutch manuscripts were discovered, but no Latin original has ever been found."

From a literary point of view the *Treatise* is a long distance behind the *Ethics*; but it seems evident that the earlier production contains in general, though more or less crude, outline the point of view presented more fully and systematically in the later. To offer a detailed comparison of the two writings is not within the province or the ability of the present reviewer. It is of interest, however, to note that even in this early work the conception of substance as unitary and all-inclusive stands forth prominently; and that the principle, *Omnis determinatio est negatio*, while not explicitly formulated, is the controlling idea, which leads, even in this early production, to the characteristic doctrine of the infinite attributes bodied forth in the infinite diversification of the modes. This fact gives considerable support to the inference of Avenarius that this peculiar conception of substance represents the labor of earlier thinkers, which Spinoza has acquired through inheritance and not primarily through independent reflection.

As regards the character of knowledge, Spinoza takes his stand unequivocally upon the doctrine of immediate apprehension or *Anschauung*. He illustrates his conception of knowledge by reference to the Rule of Three. This rule may be followed blindly like a rule of thumb, in which case we are on the plane of opinion. A slightly less critical stage is occupied by the person who tests the rule by some particular instance, and then permits the correctness of the particular instance to convince him of the reliability of the generalization. Next comes the man "who is not satisfied with hearsay because it might deceive, nor with some particular experience because it cannot be a rule, investigates, with the aid of true reason, which never deceives when rightly employed. This tells him that by virtue of the property of proportion in these numbers the result must be thus and not otherwise. But a fourth man with the clearest perception of all, has need neither of hearsay, nor experience, nor logical thought, because by his penetration he sees proportion directly in all his calculations" (p. 62).

Clear cognition, according to Spinoza, is "that which is not convinced by reasoning but by a feeling and enjoyment of the thing itself" (p. 63). "This kind of cognition is not a consequence of something else but comes by means of a direct manifestation to the understanding of the object itself. And if the object is excellent and good the soul is necessarily united with it as we have said of our body. Whence it follows incontestably that it is this kind of cognition which causes love, so that when we come to know God in this way we must necessarily become one with him, for he must manifest himself and be known to us only as the most excellent and best. In this alone, as we have said before, consists our supreme happiness" (p. 133).

This last quotation may serve to indicate the relation, on the side of practical philosophy, of the *Treatise* to the *Ethics*. As regards the English version of the *Treatise*, the text from which the translation is made is the edition of Van Vloten and Land. This edition, as the preface says, "gives the most authentic manuscript entire with occasional pertinent variations in brackets and footnotes. . . . Where a variant manuscript reading has there been indicated, that alternative which seemed the simplest and most natural has been adopted [in the translation] without explanation or apology" (p. vii).

Whether this plan on the part of the translator is commendable, is perhaps not easy to decide. There is no doubt, of course, that the procedure tends to give a more readable version of the book, which, in the case of a work as cumbersome and disjointed as the one under consideration, is a matter of consequence. But, on the other hand, the book is of interest chiefly to those who are inclined to make a serious study of Spinoza; and to such it would probably seem more desirable to be informed which passages represent the second of the two Dutch originals, rather than the first. While Sigwart, for example, grants that Mss. A is

the older and that Mss. B is in some way dependent upon it, he also insists that the character of Mss. B is such as to point to some additional source besides Mss. A. It may be suggested, further, that if there were no such additional source, the divergences of Mss. B from Mss. A necessarily represent some interpretation; and while the translator has faithfully endeavored to keep translation distinct from interpretation, the interpolation of 'pertinent variants' would in this case be merely interpretation at second hand. Nor is it possible to escape the responsibility of deciding which variants are pertinent and which are not. Thus in Part II, chapter 17 (p. 109), the translator (following A) has incorporated the clause, "that is, when we see in another the inclination to something that is evil," which clause does not occur in B, and which, according to Sigwart, raises a doubt both as to doctrine and as to authenticity, while the rendering in B apparently does not. Another difference of opinion between the translator and Sigwart as to which is the pertinent variation, occurs in Part II, chapter 16 (p. 105), in the paragraph beginning, "I do not say this in regard to will in general," etc. It would surely have been worth while to indicate variations of this kind.

This matter aside, the translation is helpful if taken in conjunction with the text. Certain inaccuracies, however, dispose us to caution. To illustrate, we find, on p. 36, that "do not agree with us" is given instead of "do not differ from us," as is required both by the context and by the original (*met ons niet verschillen*). Perhaps 'disagree' is the word that was intended. Again, in the long note on pp. 103-4, the words, "But it might be said," which are placed at the beginning of a sentence, seems to be an inaccurate rendering for, "But it *must* be said" (*maar men moet zeggen*). The context also shows that the phrase is intended to introduce a direct inference from the preceding passage, and should, therefore, form part of the same sentence. It may be added that in the first sentence of the second paragraph of this note the pronoun 'it' is twice employed instead of 'them,' in a way that is somewhat confusing. Considerably more serious is the confusion of the important words, 'essence' and 'existence' (cf. p. 17, note, and p. 143). As regards the general character of the translation, the "style has been retained with all its ambiguities and even crudities where they occur, so that the reader will have as faithful a reproduction of Spinoza's Short Treatise as is possible with the material at hand, and is therefore at liberty to form his own opinion with regard to its merits and intent."

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*Studies in Mystical Religion.* By RUFUS M. JONES. London, Macmillan and Company, 1909. — pp. xxxviii, 518.

This volume is part of a larger plan. It is intended, Dr. Jones tells us (p. xxxviii), to be an introduction to a series of historical volumes, by himself and others, "devoted to the development and spiritual environment

of a particular branch of modern Christianity — The Society of Friends — a religious body which has made a serious attempt to unite inward, mystical religion with active, social endeavours, and to maintain a religious fellowship without a rigid ecclesiastical system, and with large scope for personal initiative, immediate revelation and individual responsibility." As introductory to such a series, this volume traces the history of inward religion (almost entirely within Christianity) from the days of the primitive church to the seventeenth century,— the time of George Fox, with whom a further volume is to deal. Jacob Boehme is left aside, as Dr. Jones proposes later to issue a volume treating of him.

In the Introduction, which studies the "nature and value of first-hand experience in religion," the distinction is drawn (pp. xiii, xiv) between two great tendencies manifest in the whole course of religious history. There is, first, the tendency "to regard religion as something permanent and unchanging"; permanent and unchanging in the deeper sense, because it "reveals permanent and time-transcending Realities"; permanent and unchanging in order and outer form, as, through habit and custom and system, a "storage of the gains of the race." This tendency has in it at once a great value and a great danger. As a conserving spirit, it "binds the ages together and makes possible *one humanity*." But it may go to the extreme of closing up "the east window of divine surprise," and then religion, settling down into a mechanism of custom and system, "though it may still have a disciplinary function in society, is no longer religion in the primary sense." But, secondly, there is "the equally fundamental tendency to revivify and reshape religion through fresh and spontaneous experiences." This is the living inner power of religion; without it, the organized system of institution and dogma is scarcely religion at all. And when the outer has prevailed over the inner, the institution over the ever-new personal experience of eternal realities, this creative tendency in religion becomes in the nature of the case revolutionary. It is with this second tendency, with religion as vitally and immediately spiritual, controlling life and society by the power of spontaneous and creative inner experience, that the author is concerned. To it he gives the name mysticism, and defines that word (p. xv; cf. p. 5, *note 1*) as expressing the "*type of religion which puts the emphasis on immediate awareness of relation with God, on direct and intimate consciousness of the Divine Presence. It is religion in its most acute, intense, and living stage.*"

In the body of the book, mysticism, as thus defined, is taken up in a series of historical studies. First the author deals with the mystical element in primitive Christianity; with the ministry and organization of the early church; with Montanism, a reaction in the name of first-hand experience against the Catholic transformation of Christianity; with the mysticism of the Church Fathers,— Augustine taking greatest place. Here, too, is the one chapter which goes outside the history of Christianity,— that on "The Roots of Mysticism in Classical Literature" (the statement, in the note to

page 66, that Plotinus is Plato's greatest interpreter, is scarcely a right reading of Platonism). Then, by way of the Areopagite, we pass to mediæval mysticism. Of the chapters dealing with this period, that on the Friends of God, and that on the Brethren of the Common Life, are specially admirable. The purely historical student will be particularly interested in Dr. Jones's view of the *crux* as to the *Gottesfreund vom Oberlande* and the treatises associated with him and with Rulman Merswin: Denifle's theory is rejected; Jundt's is not easily substantiated; Rieder's, with an important modification, is accepted. Rather strangely, Bernard, the psychological mystics of St. Victor, and that later man who gathers so many mediæval tendencies into himself,—Nicolaus Cusanus,—are passed over. Next, after a chapter on Wyclif and the Lollards, we come to the Reformation. Sects (like the Anabaptists) touched with mysticism are studied; then the group of individual mystics of whom the greatest is George Fox. He, however, is to be dealt with in another volume, and this volume closes with a study of John Saltmarsh, William Dell, Gerrard Winstanley.

The one criticism which I could wish to urge does not seriously affect either the structure or the workmanship of the book. Dr. Jones's interest is in that inwardly spiritual religion which is always new, always creative, sometimes revolutionary, because of its sense of immediate relationship with God; and such religion (with ample historical precedent for the usage) he calls mystical. But does not the term mysticism lose in usefulness by being applied so widely? Within the religion which is primarily inward, and therefore stands in antithesis to religion as priestly, sacramentarian, institutional, there is still a deep distinction of types. First, there is the type for which God is absolutely transcendent, and therefore incommunicable to us under the ordinary forms of our life,—communicable to us only in an ecstasy which, as transcending all ordinary experience, must be called mystical. Secondly, there is the type for which God is a self-communicating spirit, at once transcendent and immanent, who in all the ways of our life and labor, through all true fulfilment of our capabilities and energies, communicates Himself to us, and by the communication reconciles and unites us with Himself,—the God of the *λογιον* of Jesus, which Dr. Jones so aptly quotes (p. 6, *note 1*): "Wherever there are (two), they are not without God, and wherever there is one alone, I say, I am with him. Raise the stone, and there thou shalt find Me; cleave the wood, and there am I." The religion in which Dr. Jones is interested, with its depth and freshness of personal devotion, its control of life and regeneration of society through a sense in individuals of immediate relationship with God, belongs as much to the second of those two types as to the first; while the term mysticism seems properly and conveniently to be applicable only to the first. Some such distinction as this might, I think, have helped in drawing the lines more firmly in the immense field with which this book deals.

The book is written with clearness and quiet dignity. It is animated

throughout by breadth of fine and kindly sympathies, and by a sense of the character of religion as a light and a power that from within control all the social fulfilments of our nature. — For the promised further volumes, Dr. Jones may be assured of a warm welcome. The book on Boehme will meet a real need. The English-speaking peoples can scarcely be proud of their work in the historical exposition of the great philosophers; and Boehme has been specially neglected. In dealing with Boehme, moreover, Dr. Jones will have the advantage of a more strictly defined field than in the present volume, and hence of greater concentration and unity of treatment. The volumes on the life and history of the Society of Friends will be still more welcome. The Friends have long been silent amongst us; or have had a literature of their own which the great world has not read. It will be a benefit to the whole of society if, in books that command the general interest by literary power as well as by the intrinsic interest of the story, their brave and admirable history becomes more widely known.

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*Faith in Man.* The Religion of the Twentieth Century. By GUSTAV SPILLER. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1908. — pp. vi, 190.

Mr. Gustav Spiller is the secretary of the "International Union of Ethical Societies," and he has written this book in the interests of that movement, — "to give a systematized and clear exposition of the new ethics, — of the ethical movement outside the ethical societies and within them." "Its chief purpose is to assist in the establishment of the new ethics as the new religion." Religion, art, ethics, science, social reform, philosophy and education are briefly interpreted in the light of "the new faith," — which is summarized in part as follows: "We are to trust to social, civic and democratic effort for the purpose of ensuring human salvation; no powers outside nature need either be dreaded or appealed to; nature itself is passive, if not friendly, towards our endeavors and is to man, armed with scientific insight, as the clay to the potter. . . . Human solidarity in motive and end is the goal of the new faith."

It is difficult to pronounce judgment on such a book without obscuring its merits. For it is wholly lacking in *good reasons*. It contains scarcely a generalization or critical observation that is not crude and open to easy refutation. Its optimism is shallow, its tone is lacking in mellowness, as though its author had not sufficiently meditated on ancient truths. The style serves to accentuate these defects, — many pages reading like a newspaper advertisement of the accomplishments of mankind. And there is a tedious bragging about all things modern, that is like to evoke more aversion than applause. And yet in the main the book is both sound and wholesome. It is a faithful though unreasoned representation of the better aspirations of the present-day secular consciousness.



The key to the new faith lies in the statement that society is "a democracy working out its own salvation." It follows that "the new ethics must encourage individuality; it must insist on a high-purposed private, family, professional and civic life; it must emphasize respect and love for one's neighbor and for man; it must laud a character that stands square to the winds of temptation and misfortune,—all these qualities it is bound to reverence; but the supreme object of care must be the improving and the perfecting of the political and social fabric." All this is right-minded, and the hopefulness that lies behind it makes it tonic.

From a philosophical point of view one must complain of the cavalier way in which religion is dismissed,—for "the establishment of the new ethics as the new religion" amounts virtually to a denial of what is traditionally, popularly, and reflectively supposed to be religion. "Men are turning from theology to science." It is scarcely necessary to point out that such generalizations entirely miss the import of great contemporary movements; and that they involve the ancient and perennial folly of overlooking man's dependence on a larger environment than that which is sounded and controlled by the laws of physics.

RALPH BARTON PERRY.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

*Modern Thought and the Crisis in Belief.* By R. M. WENLEY. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1909. — Pp. xviii, 364.

Professor Wenley's volume consists of lectures given at the University of Michigan on the Baldwin foundation, — a lectureship instituted there by the Protestant Episcopal Church "for the Establishment and Defence of Christian Truth." The author surveys with highly commendable frankness the difficulties and problems which beset religious thought by reason of the drift of modern scientific belief; and the assistance which he is able to bring turns upon his applying to the situation in some detail the orthodox philosophical idealism regnant in our universities. The result is the production of a book of marked interest and integrity of thought, which must prove of great service both to the clergy and to the educated general public.

The first four lectures, — half the book, — are taken up by the introductory statement of the problem, and by a summary of the intellectual achievements of the past century that are responsible for most of our present unrest in religion. The data and inferences which now dominate conviction in the fields of natural science, of history and historical criticism, are here so marshalled as to form a tremendous indictment of traditional religious interpretation and dogma. But facts are facts, and I know of no more commendable brief summary of the present cultural situation than these chapters afford.

It would be a mistake to infer, however, that the entire book is but another of the destructive and negative discussions so abundant in these times, in which criticism outruns construction. In the last lectures the

author essays the substantial "establishment of Christian truth" by appeal to the constitution and active career of human self-consciousness; and now the familiar metaphysics of the idealistic philosopher comes strongly into play. Professor Wenley points out the unsoundness of naturalistic systems. He emphasizes the vitality and reality of the higher values in experience, and the part which the Christian conception has to play in revealing and fostering those values. He dwells upon the fact of the normative presence of the divine nature implicit in every man, which he regards as the key thought of the Christian teaching.

The book is one which may be commended to thoughtful people generally, but especially to students who have been instructed in the general principles of philosophical idealism, and are wrestling with the problem of reconstructing their religious creed. While it is strong food, it is precisely what is needed for the health of many men.

EDGAR L. HINMAN.

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA.

*Studies in European Philosophy.* By JAMES LINDSAY. Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood and Sons, 1909. — pp. xxi, 370.

One can hardly fail to be impressed by the wide reading which is in evidence in Dr. Lindsay's latest volume, ranging as it does from the Oriental philosophies to the, — in some instances relatively obscure, — men and movements of modern France, Italy, and Spain. In fact the book almost constitutes a history of philosophy along certain rather narrow lines, and without much effort at connecting links. The titles of the more historical chapters are as follows: Oriental Philosophy, Plato and Aristotle on Substance, Greek Philosophy of Religion, Ethical Philosophy of Marcus Aurelius, Doctrine of the Logos, Gnosticism as a Philosophy of Religion, Augustine's Philosophy of History, Origen, Plotinus, Scholastic and Medieval Philosophy, Aquinas, Wyclif, Spinoza, Lessing's and Kant's Philosophy of Religion, and the chapters on modern Continental philosophy already mentioned. The selection of topics will indicate that for the most part it is the concepts which connect themselves closely with religion and theology in which the author has a particular interest. His own philosophy is constantly in the background as a critical standard, and in several somewhat more general and constructive chapters is given fuller expression, — chapters XX, XXI, XXII, and, especially, XVI, which is called a Constructive Essay in Idealism. Dr. Lindsay is concerned to recommend perhaps two things in particular: the rights of reason, of the speculative instinct as opposed for example to a too exclusive insistence on practical or moral interests, and, secondly, the claims of personality and of freedom, particularly the former, in the interpretation of the universe, alike in God and man. This philosophy of his own, which he calls Theistic Idealism, has frankly a theological bias, and is essentially the historically familiar form of British Theism, interpreted and enriched through an acquaintance with mod-

ern critical tendencies, — a universe conceived in terms of a God alike transcendent and immanent, a world of matter really existent but created, and the human soul, also existing for itself, but with the life of God immanent within it. The conclusions are for the most part set forth rather than systematically argued, — set forth most persuasively where the ethical and spiritual implications are concerned. On the more purely metaphysical side there is left the impression at times of a certain lack of rigor, though perhaps this is only due to the mode of treatment. Dr. Lindsay's rationalism is of the modest type familiar in recent times, and is, quite justifiably I should say, ready to admit the limitations of actual human knowledge; in his own words, it is part of human wisdom to be willing to be ignorant of some things with equanimity. Philosophical difficulties are not necessarily fatal; to quote again, there are elements that belong to the larger logic of life against which verbal quibblings do not avail. Nevertheless, I am a little inclined to think that Dr. Lindsay settles back on the limitations of knowledge rather too easily when he comes to the obscure places in his own theory, for example in the concepts of the material world and of creation. On the whole, however, he represents an attitude which, though doubtless it is much less imposing and up-to-date in appearance than some of the popular tendencies, seems to me to be deserving of a renewed and careful consideration.

The historical chapters cover too much ground to be easily dealt with except in general terms. They differ naturally in value. In some cases the ground is rather too familiar to appeal much to the philosophical reader (though the less instructed will find it useful), and occasionally the treatment is too sketchy to be satisfactory, — this would be my judgment of the chapter on French philosophy. But there is left much which will be found interesting and instructive, and as a contribution in particular to a history of the philosophy of religion, it brings together in a painstaking way a large amount of valuable material. The historical and critical value of the chapters would appear to me in general to increase the more definitely the subject matter approaches to the theological. In a few instances the author has done service in bringing to light matters which lie outside the customary field of philosophical treatment, as in the chapter on Wyclif.

A. K. ROGERS.

BUTLER COLLEGE.

*Sociologie de l'action.* EUGENE DE ROBERTY. Paris, F. Alcan, 1908. — pp. xi, 355.

The publishers' announcement refers to the author of this volume as "the celebrated founder of the new school of neo-positivism." In the text this soft impeachment is acknowledged. So far as I can learn, however, the author is not so well known among philosophers or sociologists in this country.

Neo-positivism, as all other 'neos,' has discovered certain limits in the

Master's system, which it attempts to transcend. The first of these limitations the author finds in the failure of Comte to recognize any genuine distinction between philosophy and science, in his definition of philosophy as "a unification of the sciences." At this the philosophical reader takes hope in these days of scientific scoffers at philosophy. But when he discovers that the substance of this hope consists mainly in the statement that philosophy is 'synthetic,' while science is 'analytic' he loses heart again.

This recognition of the 'synthetic' character of philosophy as opposed to the 'analytic' character of science reveals a second limit of the earlier positivism; namely, its pluralism, which despite the positivist's renunciation and denunciation of metaphysics was as metaphysical as the monism which it opposed. As a substitute for both pluralism and metaphysical monism the author proposes a 'functional' or 'logical' monism (p. 216). Imposing as this sounds, it turns out to mean nothing more than continuity between the stages of development to be mentioned below. Why a process which is described in terms of 'differentiation' and 'coördination' should be set down as 'a functional monism' rather than a functional pluralism, when it is so insistently both, will doubtless puzzle some simple-minded readers.

This volume forms the last of a series of studies on "ethics as elementary sociology." There are two general divisions of the essay under the headings: "The Social Origin of Reason," and "The Rational Origin of Action." Of Part I, the chapter headings are: The Essential Aspects of Mental Interaction; Consciousness and Knowledge; The Social Character of the Idea; the Civilizing Function of Abstraction; Sociology, the Fundamental Science of Mind; Replies to some Objections. The subdivisions of Part II are: Analytic Thought and Action; The Scientific Postulates of Action; Synthetic Thought and Action; The Philosophical Postulates of Conduct; Symbolic Thought and Action; Psycho-Physical Postulates and Art; Fine Art and Technical Art.

This is an interesting programme, but the promises of the index are scarcely fulfilled in the context. In general, the failure is due to the fact that the author, as so many writers of the positivistic school, is too much interested in formal, architectonic systematization. Instead of detailed analyses of concrete materials which one anticipates from the chapter headings, the pages are consumed with repetitious discussions of classes and terms. The result is that often the positivist falls into the very snare he is striving to avoid, namely, metaphysical hypostatizations. What at the beginning are logical divisions soon begin to figure as ontological 'laws' and 'forces.'

If the author's multiplication of divisions and terms is symptomatic, it would seem to indicate that sociology is still in the Linnæan stage. 'Bio' and 'psycho' are especially hard-worked as prefixes. Notwithstanding a facetious reference (p. 254) to "the pompous terminology of modern sociologists," one soon acquires from the author's own pages a remarkable set of terms: bio-individual, bio-social, bio-concrete, bio-abstract, bio-

chemical, bio-physical, psycho-individual, and psycho-social, not to mention *syncritique* and *inorganoleptique*.

The author's world is divided into: I, the inorganic, or physico-chemical; II, the organic, or bio-chemical, which is also bio-individual, bio-concrete, and psycho-physical, being psychical to the extent of immediate feelings of pleasure and pain, and "simple images or representations"; III, The *surorganique*, which is "bio-psychical," "bio-social," and "bio-abstract," and in which abstract ideas, language, judgment proper, philosophy, art and practical thought, arise.

The transition from the second to the third general stage is marked by the distinction between *Conscience* and *Connaissance*, the insistence upon which the author regards as one of his principal contributions. *Conscience*, that is, pleasure-pain, and mere representative images, is a function of the 'bio-individual' organism or brain. But conceptual, judgmental consciousness, — *Connaissance*, — is a function of the interaction of the individual 'consciences,' of the 'inter-consciential' and constitutes the *surorganique* stage of development.

While this conception of the superorganic and much of the exposition of the essentially social character of thought is very suggestive, and moves in the general direction of the social psychology and logic of Tarde, Baldwin, Royce, and others, yet some of the psychological and logical crudities of the older positivism still survive. For instance: "Psychical interaction . . . has for its immediate effect the formation within the brains which it involves of notions more or less general and abstract," etc. (p. 18). Again, "It (Collective experience), deposits in the brain the germ of ideas more and more general," p. 20. The serial character also of the author's conception of psychological and logical development, as shown in his view of the relation of immediate to reflective consciousness, and in his accounts of induction and deduction and of the concrete and abstract, seems out of date. In neo-positivism induction always *precedes* deduction, and thought always moves *from* the concrete *to* the abstract.

In the treatment of the relation between science, philosophy, art, and practical experience, the author finds that there has been much confusion, due to the failure to distinguish between the 'causal' and the 'teleological' series. In the teleological series, the enterprises of practical social life, as ends, come first. But to say with pragmatism, that the 'causal' source or origin of science, philosophy, and art, is in practical life, is to confound the teleological with the causal series. In the causal series, science, the analytic mode, leads to philosophy, the synthetic mode, both of which, however, being abstract, cannot become common property and pass into practical life until their results are 'syncreted' by art. This simply 'happens,' occurs, 'causally,' positivistically. Of course, when through reflection these *de facto* results become 'ends,' we have the 'teleological series' which is the reverse of the 'causal.' And in this series pragmatism holds. But this is only a 'practical,' not an 'explanatory' series.

But if difficulties have arisen from the *confusion* of the causal and the teleological series, many will wonder whether they are reduced either in number or seriousness by this method of separation. Even if they are distinguished they surely must be connected in some way. The author admits this and says he just "couples" them. Aside from the fact that in the super-organic stage the causal process *is* reflective the reader will note that elsewhere the author clearly points out that Spencer's theory of survival holds only for the organic, — the non-reflective stage, not for the super-organic, the reflective stage. This would seem to imply that reflection makes a *real* difference in the 'causal' series.

The author's anti-pragmatism, which is confined mainly to the discussion of the origin and function of art, is based upon a connotation of pragmatism, which makes it impossible to identify his position with what most American readers would recognize as anti-pragmatism. His point is that the art of to-day cannot be regarded as the *direct* descendant of the merely 'useful' acts of primitive times, but is based upon the science and philosophy which have intervened. All of which of course is beside the mark until the function of this intervening science and philosophy is stated. And in the author's system the goal of science, philosophy, and art appears to be in practical social thought (*pensée pratique*) which probably is 'pragmatic' enough for most cis-Atlantic pragmatists.

In the author's account of the origin of language he insists that "utility is an effect not a cause of language"; that the "true cause" of language is found in the fact that "abstract ideas formed by collective experience, *spontaneously express themselves in words*"! This scarcely calls for comment.

In their general intent the leading ideas of the volume, — namely, the social character of reflective consciousness, the conception of the super-organic, the rejection of the individualistic theory of evolution, the social function of art, — are valuable and timely, but they are supported by an inadequate psychology and logic.

ADDISON WEBSTER MOORE.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

*Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung.* By GEORG SIMMEL. Leipzig, Duncker und Humblot, 1908. — pp. 775.

Owing to the fact that the Germans did not build their political economy on the hypothesis of an imaginary 'economic man,' or found their political science on the maxim of *laissez-faire*, sociology has never been called on in Germany to render the service that it has performed in France and in the United States. Wherever a narrow and abstract political economy has had sway, it has been the mission of sociology to reveal the variety of interests and the wealth of motives present in men's groupings and institutions. In Germany, the sociologists play a slighter rôle and have been pressed to find a scientific justification and an academic place for their product.

Professor Simmel of the University of Berlin has succeeded by drawing a fruitful distinction between the content or purposes of human groupings and their 'form.' Each of the types of interest that men's groupings promote is already treated by a special social science, *e. g.*, economics, politics, jurisprudence, ethics, comparative religion, etc. There is left, however, the modes of relation and modes of interaction involved in the associations of men for the advancing of their various interests. Simmel sees here his opportunity and carves out his sociology by cutting right across the other social sciences. Thus, taking secrecy as a 'form' or incident of association, Simmel shows how secrecy naturally begets ritual and graduated initiation, whether the group be a Greek-letter fraternity or a band of conspirators. Again, studying the implications of conflict, he shows that, whatever be the purpose of a group, conflict, if it does not break up the group, centralizes and toughens it, gives it a sharper boundary, and a larger authority over its individual members.

The 'forms of socialization' examined by Simmel are size of group, conflict, secrecy, superiority and subordination, interlacing with other groups, the self-maintenance of the group, relations of society to space, and the enlargement of the group with consequent development of individuality. In both structure and matter the work is highly original. The line of interpretation is throughout psychological, and much of the analysis is ingenious and illuminating. The author's conclusions are based, not on an *a priori* philosophy, but on primary observation, reinforced by wide researches into the history of particular associations. Political groupings figure largely in the book, and Simmel's fresh and penetrating analysis will surely be found to be one of the indispensable foundations of political science.

Although the style is prolix and the book would not have suffered if it had been made half its present size, Simmel's work is a great piece of construction and will have to be reckoned with in many quarters.

EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

The following books also have been received :

*The Problem of Human Life.* By RUDOLF EUCKEN. Translated by W. S. Hough and W. R. Boyce Gibson. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909.—pp. xxv, 582. \$3.00.

*The Philosophy of Change.* By D. P. RHODES. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1909.—pp. xxvii, 389. \$2.00.

*In the Abstract.* By NORMAN ALLISTON. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Lim., 1909.—pp. 156.

*The Fundamental Problems Involved in Dr. Caird's Philosophy of Religion.* By W. O. LEWIS. Leipzig, Quelle & Meyer, 1909.—pp. 62.

*Thoughts on Natural Philosophy and the Origin of Life.* By A. BIDDLE-COMBE. Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, R. Ward and Sons, 1909.—pp. 68.

- On the Law of History.* By W. E. HOCKING. University of California Publications, Berkeley, The University Press, 1909.—pp. 20.
- Kulturwissenschaftliche Weltanschauung.* Von REINHOLD BIESE. Halle a. S., Max Niemeyer, 1909.—pp. v, 344.
- Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart.* Von RUDOLF EUCKEN. Dritte, verbesserte und erweiterte Auflage. Berlin, Reuther & Reichard, 1909.—pp. viii, 172.
- Beiträge zur Hegel-Forschung.* Von GEORG LASSON. Berlin, Trowitzsch & Sohn, 1909.—pp. 70.
- Der Pragmatismus.* Von GÜNTHER JACOBY. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürrschen Buchhandlung, 1909.—pp. 57.
- Studi sui tipi rappresentativi.* Per RODOLFO MONDOLFO. Bologna, A. F. Formiggini, 1909.—pp. 57.
- Tra il diritto di natura e il comunismo.* Per RODOLFO MONDOLFO. Mantova, Prem. Tip. degli Operai, 1909.—pp. 70.
- La filosofia del Feuerbach e le critiche del Marx.* Per RODOLFO MONDOLFO. Prato, Tipografia Carlo Collini, 1909.—pp. 56.



## SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*, I. Abl.: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*.—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

### LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

*Das Wesen und die Voraussetzungen der Induction.* NICOLAI VON BUBNOFF. *Kant-Studien*, XIII, 4, pp. 357-408.

Mankind has always drawn conclusions regarding the unknown from the basis of the known. Not until modern times, however, has logic seriously investigated the ground of validity of such reasoning. Bacon did not free himself from the traditional conceptualistic philosophy of scholasticism; Hume only cleared the way for the distinction between induction as a psychological fact in the associative processes and induction as a logical method; J. S. Mill attempted to justify induction on the basis of the axiom of the uniformity of nature, but was involved in circular reasoning, inasmuch as he derived this axiom by inductive procedure from the observed uniformity. No sum of facts can ever give us necessity. The method of induction consists in conceiving a single fact of experience as exemplifying a universal law, and its problem consists in discovering and so determining this law that all of the consequences which may be drawn therefrom will harmonize with the rest of experience. It thus establishes the premises from which the individual fact must follow. Sigwart attempts to show that the universal reached by induction may be either numerical or general. The former, however, falls out of the sphere of logic, — in the case of absolute sameness there is no necessity for inductive reasoning. Besides, we can never know whether those things which appear the same are not in reality different. There is implicit in every induction a universalizing process. He is right, however, in maintaining that induction and deduction cannot be radically different, because every induction itself rests on a general presupposition. Erdmann's difficulties arise chiefly because he fails to recognize this relation. He maintains that

induction is an expression of actuality which is not yet present, and, as it includes that which is not given but is uncertain, it cannot be assertorial but expresses mere expectation. To differentiate it from mere guesswork one must find, in the given facts, conditions which make logically necessary certain assertions regarding what is not given. This involves the presupposition that the same given causes bring about the same effects which, in turn, contains the assertions, (1) that the same causes will be given, and (2) that like causes produce like effects. The latter, manifestly the causal law, is rather inconsistently based by Erdmann on psychological necessity. Inasmuch as the presupposition itself cannot be deduced from the causal law, nor be grounded in the formal laws of thought, he thinks it must be derived from experience. But this makes the law of induction a product of itself, and merely states that we reason inductively because we reason inductively. Erdmann does not consider any problematic conclusion, drawn from a single given phenomenon, as inductive. In all cases of induction there must be numerous instances and, the greater the number, the more certain is the conclusion. But how can mere summation give rise to increased certainty? Induction is concerned with the necessary connection of phenomena, with the interdependence within experience. Mere repetition has no value except, by reason of variation of method of an experiment, to control the conditions, to eliminate errors of observation, or to insure that there is not mere accidental succession but real connection. The demand that one have a large number of instances merely postpones indefinitely the process of induction, and makes the task of detecting a uniformity of connections the more difficult as the number of specific instances to be dealt with are increased. Induction presupposes a universal and regular connection within experience. But on this depends also all possibility of valid thought concerning our world of experience. Uniformity or conformity to law (*Gesetzmässigkeit*) is a constitutive principle of reality. The conception that the various sciences consider reality from a definite abstract point of view in the light of certain ends has been most valuable for methodology. But the prejudice to which it has given rise against any universal method or principle is not without serious consequences for a theory of knowledge. Rickert insists that any constitutive principle must be taken account of in every scientific method. But there is no reason why we may not have a variety of scientific methods according to their various points of view, even if we accept '*Gesetzmässigkeit*' as constitutive. At first sight it might appear as if this would make a science of history impossible, since it deals only with single events. Because of this character of its subject matter Rickert regards history as much more concrete than any of the natural sciences. However, history deals with values, and its elements are conceived only in reference to a unitary value of the whole. The historian singles out the facts which are of importance for him, but he must also show their connection in the whole series of events. In order to ascertain the facts there must be a

critical sifting of the material, just as in science there is required a careful analysis of phenomena by means of observation and experiment. In both cases analysis must precede synthesis. But, whereas science requires careful and detailed analysis of the conditions nearest in time and space, and a reduction of the most simple elements, history is concerned rather with the more remote causes. Thus the conception of causality varies in the different disciplines according to the intellectual interest which prevails or the character of the unit to be obtained. Unless 'Gesetzmässigkeit' were a constitutive principle we could not have natural science or even nature, — neither would the knowledge of every separate individual fact have any value. With this principle induction as a logical method must stand or fall. But to ascertain the actual empirical causal laws we need a less general presupposition. An effect is never the result of a single cause but of several, which operate differently under different circumstances. Thus a serious problem presents itself when we attempt to reason from effect to cause. 'If A is, B is,' does not necessarily mean, 'only if A is, is B.' This can only be asserted with a greater or less degree of probability according to (1) the scope of experience (since, in a series of special laws, we can the more positively conclude the cause from the result, the longer the series), and (2) the specialization of the effect (since the more complex or specialized the effect the more improbable that it will result from any other than the given known cause). Rickert rightly maintains against Hickson that causal connections are not quantitatively equivalent combinations of changes. When a result follows from a certain cause and measurement is possible, we can only say that there are certain quantitative relations which must be determined by experimental methods. Causality means uniformity.

EDW. L. SCHAUB.

*On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience.* F. H. BRADLEY. *Mind*, No. 69, pp. 40-64.

The experienced will not all fall under the head of an object for a subject. There is an immediate experience in which no distinction is made between my awareness and that of which it is aware. One of the questions which arises is: How can immediate experience itself become an object? If it becomes an object it is transcended; and there is doubt as to how such transcendence is possible. Yet we seem to be certain that immediate experience is transcended, for we speak about it, it must therefore have become for us an object. But we are thus led to the dilemma that, so far as I know of immediate experience, it does not exist, and that, whether it exists or not, I could in neither case know of it. The solution of the difficulty, the writer anticipates, is in general supplied by considering the fact that immediate experience, however much transcended, remains and is active. It remains throughout as fundamental; it contains within itself every development which in a sense transcends it, and moreover, acts as

judge of these developments. The demand for an object which is complete is only satisfied by the idea of an object including immediate experience.

After an analysis of the problems of Attention and Introspection, which shows that their puzzles are insoluble unless that which is felt, and which is not an object before me, is present and active, the author explains what is meant by immediate experience. It is that which is comprised wholly within a single state of undivided awareness or feeling. By feeling is meant an awareness which, though non-relational, may comprise in itself an indefinite amount of difference. At every moment my state is a whole of which I am immediately aware. Analysis of relations cannot exhaust my actual experience. Everything which is analyzed out implies the felt background; and the whole experience of both feeling and object is a non-relational, immediate, felt unity. Immediate experience, then, is the basis and the vital element of all analysis, while, and so far as, and however much, that analysis transcends immediacy. Thus in all experience we still have feeling which is not an object, and all that comes to us, however much distinguished and relational, is felt as comprised within a unity which itself is not relational.

How immediate experience can even serve as a criterion of truth is explained by the fact that the sense of disagreement or harmony which I feel in regard to an object tends to become a qualification of the object itself. The object is accepted or rejected because it expresses or fails to express the felt demand of immediate experience. How immediate experience is able to know itself and become for us an object, when *ex hypothesis* it essentially is no object, is outlined as follows: That such knowledge exists in fact seems to the writer incontestable. Immediate experience certainly cannot make an object of itself throughout, but we can set it before us in its main general character. Our actual object fails to satisfy us, is incomplete; we attempt to complete it by relational addition from without and by relational distinction from within. The result in each case is defective, felt to be less than what we actually experience. Then we try the idea of a positive, non-distinguished, non-relational whole, which contains more than the object and in the end contains all that we experience. This appears to be the one ground on which satisfaction is possible.

The writer concludes by suggesting the larger application of the idea of immediate experience as a higher form of unity which combines the two essential aspects of our world, involved in the fact that feeling, while it remains as a constant basis, nevertheless contains a world which in a sense goes beyond itself.

EDITH H. MORRILL.

*Zum Begriff der kritischen Erkenntnislehre.* RICHARD HÖNIGSWALD.  
Kant-Studien, XIII, 4, pp. 409-456.

This paper has special reference to Professor Goswin Uphues's *Kant und seine Vorgänger*. The positive theoretical bearing of the critical

philosophy lies in the principle that the existence of the object of experience must underlie the general conditions of its knowledge,—a principle precluding all relativism and ‘psychologism.’ The recognition of the problem of experience as fundamental in the theory of the object characterizes the critical epistemology. A decided opponent of all psychologism, Uphues maintains that with the equation of the conceptions of an universal validity with that of a validity embracing experience, the limits between science and metaphysics must needs vanish. The objects of metaphysics are the presuppositions of all knowledge; all knowledge and science are thus surely grounded in metaphysics. Such a metaphysical epistemology, maintaining the metaphysical significance of all knowledge, is evidently opposed to Kant and to philosophical criticism. There is no separation of sense-knowledge from knowledge of the understanding. Uphues argues for the objective validity of all judgment. With every judgment for which we claim any knowledge-value, we enter into the world of things in themselves, of things existing independently of us, into a world of eternity. But how is this “eternal world” of truth to be connected with the temporal-psychic process which is the subject-matter of judgment? Unless this is really possible, the metaphysical question, attaching to the subject-matter of judgment, as to the essence of truth, remains distinct from the epistemological question, attaching to the judgmental *form* as to the universal validity of the judgment. Two possibilities follow from a definition of judgment which, like that of Uphues, seeks the grounds of its claim to the universal validity of the *Vorstellungsverknüpfung*, advanced in the judgment, beyond the form of the latter. Either this universal validity is guaranteed through its relation to an essentially metaphysical factor; or else it is based upon the relation of the judgment to a somehow ‘given’ reality, of which judgment would then be a copy. A discussion of these possibilities shows that the claim of judgment to objective validity is based not upon the peculiar character of its content; rather is it a function of its form, an expression of the objective unity of apperception which constitutes the latter. Reality and universal validity are thus not the subject, but, in the strict epistemological sense, the predicate of the judgment. The copula *is* forms the concrete expression of this predicate. Uphues regards absolute space (and the case holds good for absolute time) as a conceptual law-principle, transforming sensations into intuitions. No mark of space can be derived from intuition, for the space first makes intuition possible. We are not here concerned with a concept of intuited space, but with space that is itself a concept. For Euclidean geometry, however, space is not a concept but an intuition. Demonstration, from its standpoint, is nothing else than construction. The Euclidean geometry is epistemologically characterized, not by the fact that its propositions are valid independently of the existence of the corresponding objects, but rather by the fact that the validity of geometrical propositions for objects is independent of the existence of the latter. The scientific conceivability of non-Euclidean

space proves Kant's point that the axioms of Euclidean geometry are not analytic; they have nothing to do with the problems of the critical epistemology. Again, the actuality of Euclidean space, its 'Gegebenheit,' has far-reaching importance for epistemology; it guarantees the relative self-dependence of 'sensibility' over against 'understanding.' In this connection Kant's distinction between sensibility and understanding is discussed. To return to Uphues's conceptual space and time: these do not arise from, and do not pass away with, the empirical consciousness. They are the system of conditions of the unity in which the form of consciousness consists. This consciousness in general, or transcendental apperception, which is beyond the reach of psychology, is the sum total of the formal conditions of the objects of experience. And these objects are not things-in-themselves, but the phenomena synthesized in the conceptual unity. The consciousness in general is not a thinking being, but the synthesis and connection inherent in the very conception of thought. Kant explains the identity of the self as the formal condition of my thoughts and their coherency. Uphues regards it as a persisting something which lies at the basis of our conscious processes. But the simple conclusion from the phenomenon to an essence manifesting itself in it is analytical, and proves nothing regarding the real existence of things-in-themselves. This latter depends not upon the mere conception of the phenomenon, but upon the proof of the validity of such a conception. The metaphysical interest of Criticism is concentrated on the methodic concept of "Gegebenheit." There is no science of the conditions of the 'given' as such; as Riehl says: "the Critique of Pure Reason affirms the metaphysical, but denies metaphysic." The specific problem of the critical epistemology is to establish the criterion of the truth of those propositions which are valid for the objects of experience not upon the *basis* of experience, which, *i. e.*, are necessarily valid, but which none the less lay claim to validity not from mere conceptions. Truth can be predicated only of judgments, not of categories; for categories are materially not determined logical forms of judgments. The validity of the latter depends upon their application. For Kant the problem of metaphysic is the problem of science. To Uphues metaphysic is science, for science is ultimately metaphysic.

R. A. TSANOFF.

*The Logical Foundations of Mathematics.* R. B. HALDANE. *Mind*, No. 69, pp. 1-39.

The article begins with a criticism of the views of Bertrand Russell as presented in his book on the *Principles of Mathematics*. Russell's work has two objects: (1) To prove that all pure mathematics deals exclusively with concepts definable in turns of a very small number of fundamental logical concepts; (2) to explain these fundamental concepts. On the fundamental questions of philosophy, he accepts the following positions from G. E. Moore: (1) The non-existential nature of propositions. (2) A

pluralism which regards the world as composed of an infinite number of independent entities. In mathematics he adopts the new view of quantity introduced by Dedekind and Cantor. The objection of the writer is that the new method does not require such a foundation as Russell assigns to it in symbolic logic. The method is only the outcome of a general view of quantity insisted on by Idealists ever since Kant. His symbolic logic makes all pure mathematics an absolutely deductive process. Pure mathematics is concerned with what, following Peano, he calls implications. The new method may be valuable both in logic and mathematics, but it has some awkward limitations. It must show how its deductions can ever carry us beyond its premises. Modern logic holds that the judgment always refers to reality. Russell rejects the existential view of judgment and the Aristotelian view of logical forms. Does his new method require such a logical basis as he gives it? The writer holds that pure mathematics is not a mere process of deduction from general principles. Even the barest process of counting is arrived at by abstraction from our consciousness of a succession in our acts of judgment. There is nothing in his method upon which modern logicians are not substantially agreed. Symbolic logic may be of real value to mathematics, but if its adaptation to mathematics necessitates a total departure from the form of the judgment and inference as we find them in experience, then the new system can hardly be more than a makeshift. Idealism asserts broadly that what we mean when, in everyday life, we speak of reality, depends upon distinctions which fall within knowledge and not without it. This principle separates Idealism from Russell's doctrine. Unless Idealism is to be set aside we cannot assume lightly that a category such as quantity ought to be discussed after order or eliminated altogether. Russell's mathematical writings do not depend to any material extent on his philosophy. The work of the new school to which he belongs does not appear to rest on any particular philosophical principles, and its reasoning is wholly consistent with Kant's views as ordinarily interpreted. The mathematics of the school mark a real advance in scientific generalization. The method was originally devised to get rid of the standard of a spatial continuum by substituting the standard of an arithmetic continuum. The revolution is purely mathematical. It is concerned with no particular theory of inference or of the relation of judgment to reality. The following views are comprised in the writer's interpretation of the doctrines of the school: The judgment of quantity is presupposed as the foundation of all mathematical method. In the judgment of quantity what is in point of quality like is judged as unlike, but only in respect of differences which do not affect the quality. The category which makes this possible is no mere derivative from experience, or even from order or number, categories which themselves come later because they imply the predication of the quantitative character as the condition of any meaning being put into them. The simplest recognition of order in series, the barest act of counting, involves the judgment of an identity exhibited in

differences and affirmed of reality. When the elements of the series present themselves in the shape of distinct units within a continuous nature we have reached number. The concept of number thus defined is from its very nature both continuous and discrete, and every logical concept which depends upon quantity as its foundation has this double aspect. It is through the derivative categories of order and number, which bring into further determinateness the characteristics implicit in quantity, that we get to such fundamental concepts as order, series, unity, aggregate and correspondence. Abstraction only enables us to arrive at these from the study of experience because they are already presupposed in experience. As the concept of quantity elaborates itself into these and other complex forms, the principles which it embodies progressively give rise to qualitative differences, and the character of a mere sequence is replaced by a synthesis of differences in an individual system. This is the outcome of principles presupposed in all knowledge. They make possible the methods of the new mathematics in regard to limit and infinity. In judgments about reality lies the beginning of all knowledge, mathematical and otherwise. The source of the new arithmetic continuum must be sought for in experience, from which it has been evolved by abstraction. Its origin is no mere deduction from exclusively logical principles.

JOHN B. KENT.

#### PSYCHOLOGY.

*La conscience affective.* TH. RIBOT. *Rev. Ph.*, XXXIV, 4, pp. 374-399.

Instead of the three dimensions of the Wundtian theory of feeling, the author is inclined to believe in two dimensions, pleasantness-unpleasantness and excitement-depression. He further maintains that the latter dimension is the principal one and more stable, the former being somewhat superficial. The bases for this view are essentially biological and pathological. Sensibility and mobility are both invariably present in the primitive irritability of living matter; and protoplasmic combinations show an equivalent of the act of choice by approaching assimilable and repelling non-assimilable matter. Irritability is the property of living matter to respond to excitations; and the state of apathy seems due to the failure of production or of transformation of the energy in an organism.

To show affective independence, the author calls attention to the cases of insensibility to bodily pleasure and of the total loss of sensibility of higher order, such as joy, sadness, hatred, tenderness, etc. In such cases the individual affected is indifferent to all emotions, while intelligence is still intact.

TAIZO NAKASHIMA.

*Time-relations of the Affective Processes.* TAIZO NAKASHIMA. *Psych. Rev.*, XVI, 5, pp. 303-339.

The twofold problem of this investigation is the "determination of the time necessary for the arousal of an affection," and the "dependence of



‘affective intensity upon the duration of stimulus.’ Herring’s modification of Ludwig’s kymograph was used in the first set of experiments, the apparatus being so arranged that thirty-two selected color combinations should pass in series across a small window. The series were arranged in ascending and descending order. Judgments, given in seven steps from P to U, were made on the basis of affection aroused during the exposure of the stimulus. The results of eight observers revealed the fact that “affective intensity decreases with decrease of time of exposure,” and also that “the shortest time necessary for an affection to arise varies from 0.84 to 0.98 seconds. The above was then changed by substituting geometrical figures for the color combinations with substantially the same results, save that the shortest time necessary for an affection varied in this case from 0.72 to 1.08 seconds. The writer believes this method is preferable to that of the ordinary chronometric reaction, since it avoids mere impulsive response, which never corresponds to a real mental time. Since it also saves the need of an objective device for registering reaction times, he concludes that the “direct reaction method is feasible and reliable and has important advantages.” In another set of experiments using the same method, a single stimulus was introduced instead of a serial presentation with a number of stimuli. Three parallel vertical screens were so arranged that a drop of the first revealed the primary stimulus on the second and a drop of the second revealed a second stimulus on the third screen, “designed to check or destroy the affective process possibly remaining as an after-effect of the first stimulus.” The observations seem to indicate that affection or feeling is identical in temporal definiteness with sensory experience, although the affective times are more or less longer than the cognitive reaction times. The experiment was further supplemented by a test with six simple color impressions used upon the Vernier chronoscope, model II, and the Wundt tachistoscope. The resulting tables show that the times of affective reaction are decidedly longer than those of cognitive reaction, and that the relative variability of affective reaction-times follows the same rule as that of the cognitive reaction-times. In a third division, the experimenter seeks to determine whether or not in the field of affective reaction the times differ with the different sense departments. He continued the same study in the field of tones using the graphic method. The apparatus in the main consisted of a chronometric interrupter, a Stoelting kymograph and an ordinary piano. The results obtained were essentially the same as those previously noted. The general conclusions are: (1) “that affective judgments may be and usually are as direct and immediate as the sensory judgments of psycho-physics; (2) that the formation of an affective consciousness requires a longer time than that of a sensory consciousness; (3) that affective times and their variability are either absolutely or relatively of the same order as sensory times and their variability; (4) that the method of reaction, when applied to the affective processes, pleasantness and unpleasantness, has a like scope and validity as for sensory processes.”

The time relation of affective to sensory processes varies with the different sensory fields, being most immediate in the case of cutaneous impressions and most remote in color impressions. There are two possible 'a priori' opinions, *i. e.*: (1) that pleasantness and unpleasantness are the results of a sensation-complex or of an apperceptive combination; and (2) that lack of clearness is the principal criterion of affection. Of these the experiments seem to support the second. However the lack of clearness in affection may be only relative, not absolute, although this must be a matter of doubt for the present. The author believes to have shown "that affection is different from sensation in its need of a longer time of arousal," but "akin to sensation in so far as affective judgments are direct and immediate, and affective times and their variability are of the same order as those of their sensory correlates."

HARVEY G. TOWNSEND.

*Examen critique des systèmes classiques sur les origines de la pensée religieuse.*

E. DURKHEIM. *Rev. Ph.*, XXXIV, 1, pp. 1-28; 2, pp. 142-162.

Worship is addressed either to the things of nature or to spiritual beings. Some consider one the primitive form, some, the other. The question is, which extreme to adopt or how to combine the two. Tylor and Spencer have stated the position of animism. Their task is to show how the idea of the soul is formed, how the soul becomes the object of reverence, and how the worship of nature is derived. The savage dreams of visiting another tribe, but on awaking discovers his body still in its accustomed place. This suggests to him the idea of his dual nature which in turn he reads into his fellows. This 'double' has the power, under certain conditions, to quit the organism. He calls it his soul, but it is not yet an object of worship. Once separated from the body by death, it is looked upon as a good or evil divinity having the power to aid or plague men. Hence the primitive ancestor worship. For Tylor the worship of nature is due to a mental peculiarity of primitive man to interpret all phenomena in terms of his own animate nature. For Spencer it is due to a literal interpretation of metaphorical words. An ancestor who is called a 'tiger' finally becomes a real tiger to the mind of the savage. This theory is entirely inadequate to explain the facts and is being universally abandoned. Every tradition and all the personal relics left by the ancestor would be opposed to this confusion, to say nothing of the direct contradiction of the laws of generation. These theoreticians rightly considered the soul as an extremely complex product of history and mythology, but the notion is much more complex than the theory supposes. Why should not the sleeper have imagined that during sleep he was capable of seeing at a distance? How could he believe that he had experienced while asleep events which he knows to have transpired during the day? It is much more natural that he should see in the images a renewal of the experiences of the day although with a different intensity. Why need he consider all his

sensations objective? Intellectual laziness is necessarily at its height in the savage. Of the two experiences, the daily and nightly, the first is all important. Is it not strange that the second should have captivated his attention and formed a basis for such a complicated system of ideas? This objection is the more weighty, if it is true that men least civilized dream least. Furthermore, he doubtless considers a majority of his dreams as simple illusions. The hypothesis of the 'double' may have been applied to the phenomena of dreams without being derived therefrom. Considering the wide separation of the sacred from the profane it is strange that the soul becomes an object of worship by a simple detachment from the body. The separation might reinforce its sacred character if the soul already possessed one but it could not change the profane into the sacred. Moreover, ancestral worship is a comparatively late development. If the idea of God was not derived from the idea of soul, might it not have been just the reverse? If the Gods were really constructed in the image of the human soul they should bear the marks of their origin, but this is not the case. Anthropomorphism is a relatively advanced idea and the original sacred beings are always in animal or vegetable form. Shall we admit that religious beliefs are mere hallucinatory representations? Under this conception the term 'science of religion' cannot be employed without impropriety. What sort of a science would it be whose principal discovery consists in denying the object of its research?

Naturism is concerned in pointing out a remarkable similarity between the various mythologies. The names referring to the Deity generally designate the principal phenomena of nature. The immense unknown set over against the known gives the first impulse to religion. According to Max Müller, (1) the roots of cognate words express types of extreme generality, (2) they are types of action. On this account they may be applied easily to all sorts of things. The notion of the soul is invented to explain the word. This doctrine rests upon a certain number of linguistic postulates which have been and are disputed. One contests the coördinances, another the interpretation and a third asks whether the coördinances are as ancient as Müller supposes. He assigns to religion a point of departure in the real but leaves it immediately. He tries to distinguish mythology from religion by placing the former outside the latter, but such a distinction is purely arbitrary. If we extract the myth from religion, we must also abandon the rite, which is only the expression of the myth. Surprise and wonder are emotions of a relatively advanced civilization. The primitive does not believe that the cosmic forces are superior to his own; and religion itself gives him this assurance. If it confers a certain power over nature it certainly does not have its source in a feeling of impotence. Moreover, if things of nature became divine because of their imposing form or power, how does it happen that the first beings to be worshipped are humble vegetables and animals? Each system attempts to construct the notion of the divine from the sensations which certain

phenomena awake within us. They suppose a veritable creation '*ex nihilo*.' The man as he appears to himself in his dreams is still only man. Natural forces which the senses perceive are only natural forces whatever be their intensity. Each substitutes pure phantasmagoria for reality, which forces the conclusion that beyond naturism and animism there is a worship more fundamental and primitive of which they are only the derived forms or particular aspects.

HARVEY G. TOWNSEND.

*L'analogie scientifique.* J. SAGERET. Rev. Ph., XXXIV, 1, pp. 41-54.

One of the principal operations of the human mind is the act of comparison. Now comparison will be made either from the quantitative or the qualitative standpoint. In the first case, it leads to measure; in the second, to analogy. Analogy consists in recognizing general characteristics. Adjectives were introduced into languages by this operation of analogy. It cannot be denied that the use of adjectives presupposes an implicit unification among a large number of objects. The fact of having recognized among many bodies an analogy, contained in itself the germ of Galileo's experiments. Every generalization implies analogy. There can be no scientific fact without generalization. Scientific fact has, however, a variable value that is measured by the number or the extent of analogies co-existing with it. Thus the fact of falling of liquids and solid bodies was already a scientific fact. In eliminating the resistance of the air, Galileo made this fact more scientific, since the analogy was carried over, not only to the falling, but to the rapidity of falling. A new advance was thus rendered possible, an advance made by Newton when he extended the analogy from the terrestrial to the celestial domain. But that is not all: Galileo's experiments helped to develop dynamics. From thence, all mechanical phenomena came under an analogy which included hitherto only the phenomena of gravitation. Thus the progress of science in its synthetic way is blended with the extension of the domain of analogy, whereas its analytical progress consists in increasing approximation (laws are always approximate). It is principally a matter of measure, of experimental technique, where the end pursued is the establishment of a quantitative relation. In short, the conquests of science are the conquests of analogy. Scientific certitude depends upon the weight of analogies. It varies from heavyweight, certainty, to lightweight, hypothesis. The author preferred the term analogy to the term 'resemblance' or 'similitude,' because the first is more accurately applied to morphological order, and the record would seem to limit science to grouping things and phenomena which are strictly alike.

TAIZO NAKASHIMA.

## ETHICS.

*Der Utilitarismus bei Mill und Spencer in kritischer Beleuchtung.* H. GUSKAR. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XV, 1, pp. 1-22.

The various systems of ethics may be classed under one of two groups: the metaphysical-rational, whose method is speculative, or the psychological-genetic, which proceeds empirically. Both are legitimate and necessary for a complete solution of ethical problems,—either goes wrong when it undertakes to cover the entire field. The former, of which Kant is typical, investigates the true essence of morality and seeks a positive *a priori* criterion of moral action. The latter proceeds by psychological analysis to determine the relation of the feeling of obligation to the simpler mental processes, to trace its genetic development from primary instincts and impulses, and to view the evolution of morality from the standpoint of history. The systems of J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer belong to this second group. Mill's system is inconsistent in introducing qualitative distinctions of pleasures. Finding external sanctions insufficient to explain the fact of conscience, he is compelled to have recourse to internal sanctions, which really are inborn feelings of obligation. Thus utility is only a secondary criterion. Spencer departs from utilitarianism in making the preservation of life the criterion of good and bad acts, and in assuming that differentiation and heterogeneity represent the 'higher,' and not merely the later stages of life. He points out Mill's failure to derive moral obligation, and insists that this can be done only by passing beyond morality to conduct 'as exhibited by all living creatures,' and by treating ethical action as part of action in general. He elaborates a physical, a biological, a psychological, and a sociological view. The two former, although offering interesting analogies, are abstract and fanciful and fail to throw any light on ethical problems. The psychological view shows how our moral sentiments have come to be what they are but does not explain the unique character of the 'ought.' It presupposes an agent who wills and merely describes the course of development by which certain will acts, which are in harmony with the environment, are accompanied by feelings of pleasure and pain. The sociological view represents morality as the result of coöperation which is brought about by the utility arising from a differentiation of activity or division of labor. But this is not possible without a confidence which already implies morality. Mill says, "a test of right and wrong must be the means, one would think, of ascertaining what is right or wrong, and not a consequence of having already ascertained it." In another passage he points out that the principle of Utility "is a mere form of words without rational signification, unless one person's happiness . . . is counted for exactly as much as another's." The system is based on 'intuitionistic utility.' Spencer insists that we cannot calculate pleasures and that they lead to contradictions if made the principle of action, so that happiness cannot be made the direct end of action. What that principle should be,

he is unable to say. He can merely point out the ultimate goal and the general line of conduct leading thereto. Real morality is possible only in a society of perfect people. Thus the system has no practical value, in failing to establish any criteria of action. The method is deductive; the basis is 'metaphysical utility.' Both Mill and Spencer have failed inasmuch as they have attempted more than is possible by the method used. This can be fruitful only when it assumes the essence of morality as grounded in the will, in the rational self-determination to action based on concepts. Moral obligation rests on ultimate purposes, on will acts. Everything which contradicts personality, which, by limiting or negating the self, reduces the consciousness of worth, which is the result of blind impulse and so not in accord with one's true will, is immoral.

EDW. L. SCHAUB.

*Philosophie als Tat.* THEODOR LESSING. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XV, 1, pp. 23-39.

Although, with the writings of Kant, philosophical thought was diverted to epistemology, yet at bottom the interests and implications remained metaphysical. The nineteenth century has, however, witnessed a radical change. Ethical problems have come to the forefront. Philosophy has become concerned with concrete life, with purposes and values, and with the realization of ideals in the here and now. It is this alone which, at the present time, can justify its place among the sciences and disciplines, — a 'Wissenschaft' which is at the same time a 'Willenschaft.' This may be regarded as meaning the final expulsion of metaphysics from philosophical thought, or as representing metaphysics at its most complete development, inasmuch as it involves an ultimate attitude toward reality. The older a nation and its culture, the more is it characterized by serious work, by industry and order, the more its activity is directed by the principle of the greatest results with the least expenditure of energy. The same holds true of philosophy. Myths and imaginative symbolic interpretations of the world order represent its infancy; the age of metaphysical problems is a necessary step in development, and only gradually are all of these, which can be dispensed with, sifted out, not because they are solved but because they are declared irrelevant or naïve and meaningless questions. As little as the speculations of the subtle scholastics interest us, will those of the present age interest future generations. It is encouraging that we ourselves are beginning to lay them aside, and are seeking a psychological interpretation of the fact of their existence, rather than a solution of the transcendent questions of religion and philosophy. Although it may signal the decline or death of philosophy, yet the prevailing interest in ethical problems is but the natural course of development and represents the ripest fruits of human thought. As a biological necessity, it should not be lamented but calmly accepted. If philosophy wishes to maintain itself in the future, it must become 'Aktivismus,' a philosophy of action. This does

not imply the adoption of the superficial principles of pragmatism which base truth on beneficent results or cash value. Nor does it mean an alliance with positivism, which, though limiting the problems and the sphere of knowledge to the so-called real world, yet has a dogma and an epistemology of its own. 'Aktivismus' is not concerned with a theory of knowledge nor does it limit itself to any single sphere of reality. It has reference only to ultimate values, and endeavors to focus all philosophical thought on will acts which furnish the immanent teleological principles of the various special disciplines. The fundamental demand of ethics is that we make the most of present opportunities and not neglect present needs for future possibilities. Duty commands that we make our life one of service, and actualize in ourselves and others the highest ideals. Too much energy is wasted in striving for impossible ideals and in speculating on useless, irrelevant problems. Philosophy is an interpretation of life based on a reflection on its actual, concrete experiences. It is the expression of the deepest needs and conflicts of the human mind, the desire to give life meaning and value, and the attempt to solve its essential and ultimate problems. Too often it is made a mere mental discipline, a matter of theoretical speculation involving the same 'contemplative' attitude as the mathematical sciences. A healthy reaction from such a tendency is found in Fichte, Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, Stirner, and Nietzsche.

EDW. L. SCHAUB.

## NOTES.

### THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PSYCHOLOGY.

The Sixth International Congress of Psychology met in the University building at Geneva, August 3-7. Professor Flournoy was the able president of the Congress, Professor Claparède its active and efficient secretary. Careful preparations had been made in anticipation of the meeting, and with so wise discretion that, in spite of the unexpectedly large attendance, the programme was carried through with remarkable smoothness and success. The social side of the Congress added to its usefulness as to its charm. In the modest phrase of the circular the members were promised a simple but cordial hospitality. Instead, we found not only a hearty welcome, but handsome provision for our entertainment supplied by private munificence as well by the Genevan authorities. It cannot be doubted that the more intimate associations formed in these social gatherings contributed to the furtherance of the scientific interests for the promotion of which we had in the first instance come together. Our retrospect is saddened only by the thought of the heavy bereavement which soon after the close of the Congress fell on the president, and through him on the whole circle at Geneva.

The membership of the Congress amounted to almost six hundred, quite surpassing the estimates which had been formed beforehand. As was to be expected, the considerable majority of the members came from the Romanic countries. Germany was more sparsely represented. The British delegation was notably small. From the United States and Canada a good-sized group of psychologists was in attendance, and, as will appear below, our representatives were favored with important positions on the programme. Several interesting experiments were tried in the conduct of the meetings. Because of the mass of individual communications which had almost swamped the preceding congress, it was decided by the Committee at Geneva to return to the earlier plan of reports by invited scholars, although special papers, when offered, were not excluded altogether. Of these reports extended, often very extended, printed statements had been circulated beforehand. Thus the members came to the sessions acquainted with the positions that were to be brought before them. A few of the 'reporters' read their communications *in extenso*, in one or two instances taking as much as fifty minutes for the exercise. Others gave selections. A third class presented briefer and more popular statements of their printed conclusions. While one or two, and these not the least successful, contented themselves with a few sentences of exposition, inviting discussion chiefly on the basis of the printed reports. The plan approved itself to the members of the Genevan Congress, who by a decisive vote recommended it for



adoption to the Committee in charge of the Seventh Congress. Among its advantages may be mentioned its tendency to promote the more informal discussion of the subjects considered, as well as its usefulness in limiting these to a few central and important fields. At the same time, the plan needs to be administered with care. "Individual communications," as the Congress also voted, "cannot be entirely eliminated without a loss of spontaneity and interest." The choice of subjects for the principal discussions is a responsible one. The length of the reports, in print and in delivery, their relation to the oral exposition of the reporters, the impossibility of making all the meetings general sessions, are further questions which will require attention in connection with the planning of future congresses.

For the Geneva meeting a group of topics had been selected of present interest and permanent importance. The psychology of religion, subconsciousness, comparative psychology, educational psychology, psychological terminology, were brought most prominently forward. Experimental psychology, on the other hand, was less considered, and cerebral physiology only in incidental connection with other topics. Social psychology was also notably omitted, except in so far as several of the principal subjects included a distinctly social phase. As has already been suggested, a marked feature of the Congress was the earnest discussion of the reports presented on the principal themes. In some instances, the psychology of religion, for example, and tropisms, such discussions were adjourned to one, two, or even more special sessions organized under the provision made for such meetings in the rules of the Congress. It need scarcely be added that these proved among the most valuable, as well as the most animated of all the meetings. A characteristic trend of the discussions, as of the reports, was the tendency to deal with the problems of psychological method. Was it altogether by design that methodology was so often brought into the foreground, or because of the undeveloped state of our science, or also in part because the form selected for the papers favored arguments of a more general, rather than of a more special kind? In any case, the tendency gave a noteworthy coloring to the work which the Congress undertook. Under the psychology of religion, Höffding and Leuba debated definitions and postulates rather than the results of concrete inquiry; in the discussion of tropisms, emphasis was rightly laid on the methodological aspect of Loeb's discoveries; the report on pedagogical psychology had for its principal object to consider the methods of investigation in the field.

The programme comprised the following principal *thèmes de discussion* (the reporters whose names are given in brackets were prevented from attending): (1) The Feelings, Külpe, Würzburg, Sollier, Paris; (2) The Subconscious, Dessoir, Berlin [Janet, Paris], Morton Prince, Boston; (3) The Measure of Attention [Patrizi, Modena, Ziehen, Berlin]; (4) The Psychology of Religion, Höffding, Copenhagen, Leuba, Bryn Mawr; (5) *Principles of his*  
 principle

Psycho-pedagogical Classification of Backward Pupils, Decroly, Brussels, Ferrari, Bologna [Heller, Vienna, Witmer, Philadelphia]; (6) The Methodology of Pedagogical Psychology, Ioteyko, Brussels; (7) The Perception of Position and Movement, Bourdon, Rennes; (8) Tropisms, Bohn, Paris, [F. Darwin, Cambridge, Jennings, Baltimore], Loeb, Berkeley; (9) Distant Orientation, Thauziès, Périgueux; (10) *Les Phénomènes psycho-physiologiques dits de Médiurnité Physique*, Alrutz, Upsala.

The first session of the Congress began with the addresses of welcome, in particular that of the president, Professor Flournoy. The principal topic of the morning was the psychology of religion, with Professors Höffding and Leuba as reporters. Höffding defined religion as moving in the sphere of values, but as not identical with any special form of worth. Rather it is concerned with the conservation of value (*le sort des valeurs*). The methodology of the subject includes both psychological and historical factors. Religion manifests itself by external facts and in historical forms; but it is nevertheless a matter of the inner life, and history does most when it throws light on this. In the study of religion a distinction must be drawn between the classical and the critical periods in its history. It is only in the latter, when religion has itself become a problem, that the psychology of religion becomes possible. Conversely, the psychologist must take note of the periodicity of the religion which he investigates. The report of Professor Leuba was divided into two parts. The first, "Religion Conceived as a Biological Function," defended an analysis markedly different from that of Höffding. According to Leuba, religion consists essentially in reliance on "certain real or imaginary psychical powers, conceived as greater than man, and ordinarily, but not necessarily, as personal and invisible." The second part, "Religious Experience, and its Relations to Science and to Philosophy," dealt with methods and postulates. Religion, as life, and science, as organized knowledge, are disparate. The phenomena of religion require investigation by scientific methods. This psychology of religion is to have the same authority as science in any other field, — precisely as much and no more. With regard to religious metaphysics, "although psychology, like every other science, accepts the principle of the exclusion of the transcendent, it nevertheless bears upon metaphysical religious beliefs." For it brings back to the domain of the natural "facts of experience which have been, and are still used as arguments for the existence of transcendent religious objects." These reports gave rise to a spirited debate, which, as already noted, extended itself over several special meetings. Some speakers demanded that the psychology of religion should be pursued in a religious spirit (Lutoslawski and others). A few extreme radicals found in the psychology of religion a destructive solvent of dogma, and so of religion itself. The considerably more numerous 'centre,' including members of different religious faiths and men of no faith, approved the strictly scientific attitude in the study of religious phenomena, several vigorously urging that the scientific posi-

tion excludes any argument whatever to transcendent facts (Höfdding, Flournoy, and others).

At the second general session the problem of subconsciousness was attacked. Professor Dessoir, Berlin, opened the discussion with one of the most lucid addresses of the Congress. Premising the proved reality of subconscious phenomena, he sought an explanation by working out from the recognized principles of normal consciousness. Thus the clue may be found in the facts and laws of the marginal region (*die Randzone*), and its relations to the central field. The value of this explanation is shown by observation of conditions in dreams, hypnosis, and cases of alternating personality. Dr. Morton Prince followed, expounding the outcome of his own brilliant investigations. Founding on these, he favored, as was to be expected, a bolder view of the problem. To describe dissociated or split-off ideas, he advocated the use of the terms co-conscious and co-consciousness in substitution for subconscious and subconsciousness. And he reached, as a general conclusion, the principle that any perception or experience, conserved in unconsciousness and which has not been synthesized into the personal consciousness, may become part of a co-conscious synthesis of which the subject is unaware, if the subject's condition of dissociation is sufficient. The third reporter, Professor Janet, was unfortunately absent, but his position was sympathetically presented in the general discussion, as it was also at hand in his printed memoir. It is questionable whether the limitation of subconsciousness to certain pathological conditions, favored by Janet and his school, would have gained the acceptance of the members of the Congress; but many, it is safe to say, sympathized with the tendency to pass by the vaguer theories which in recent years have sprung up about the subject.

Professor Loeb, heartily seconded by Dr. Bohn, Paris, led the discussion of tropisms, Professor Jennings, Baltimore, as a representative of moderate, if still positive views, being to the regret of all prevented from attendance. Loeb dwelt in his remarks on the general statement of the theory and its relations to psychology and to philosophy, Bohn on its development and defence against objections, in particular against the criticism based upon the variability of tropic movements. For Loeb the problem is one of chemistry pure and simple. Even the question of adaptation must be dismissed in the study of animal movements, in favor of the doctrine of purely nervous (chemical) reactions: *die Tropismen sind weder schädlich noch nützlich, sie sind blos Reactionen* (so in answer to Claparède's incisive questions). Thus considered, the phenomema of tropism gain extensive significance in the explanation of psychical life. The protracted general discussion turned, first, on the nature and extent of tropisms in themselves, second, on their meaning for psychology, third, on the philosophical implications of the doctrine. Several speakers emphasized the methodological value of Loeb's inquiries, even apart from the complete accuracy of his position. In relation to the more ultimate problems involved the principle

of parallelism was invoked,—by Claparède, by Höfding (as an indispensable working hypothesis, *hypothèse de travail*), by Fullerton (as a philosophical position and in authorized interpretation of Loeb).

Among other papers of general interest may be mentioned Professor Külpe's comprehensive report on the Feelings,—definition, methods of investigation, results of inquiry to the present time,—Dr. Sollier's discussion of the *Sentiment Cénesthésique*, and Mlle. Ioteyko's elaborate memoir on the Methodology of Pedagogical Psychology. In addition to these *thèmes de discussion* certain more formal matters were on the programme. The subject of psychological terminology was presented by Baldwin, Claparède, and R. de Saussure, and psychological symbolism by Courtier. Esperanto was recognized as one of the languages of the Congress and the aid of the Esperantists in the formation of a more precise and scientific terminology welcomed, although formal representation was not accorded them on the committee appointed to report progress at the next Congress (Baldwin, English; Claparède, French; Lipmann, German; Ferrari, Italian). Attention was further given to the question of standard colors and an international committee appointed (Nagel, Asher, Thiéry, Yerkes, Larguier, and a chemist to be selected). A third commission, on psychological pedagogics, was left for appointment to the committee in charge of the seventh Congress. Moreover, notwithstanding the general plan of the meeting, more than fifty *communications individuelles* had been offered by scholars from some dozen different countries. In part, therefore, the sectional arrangement had to be resumed, and these briefer papers grouped for discussion under various rubrics (by subjects, languages, etc.). In a number of instances the fresh results of special investigations, thus summarily presented, proved of genuine importance. And in this division of the programme also our representatives did their part: Mrs. Ladd-Franklin, *The Theory of Color Theories*; Leuba, *La Perception Kinesthésique de l'Espace par les Mouvements du Bras*; M. Meyer (Missouri), *Ergebnisse von Versuchen betreffend den Gehörsinn der Fische*; Ogden, *Die Beziehungen des ästhetischen Verhaltens zum Gefühlsleben*; Riley, *Mental Healing in America*.

At the business session Professors Fullerton, Leuba, Morton Prince, and Sanford were added from America to the general International Committee. In response to an invitation unanimously signed by the American members of the Congress, it was cordially voted to hold the next, seventh, Congress, 1913, in the United States, the determination of the exact place being left to the committee in charge. The following were chosen as officers: Honorary President, James; President, Baldwin; Vice-Presidents, Titchener, Cattell; General Secretary, Watson (vice Sanford, resigned).

A. C. ARMSTRONG.

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY.

On September 17, 1909, Professor Max Heinze, the well-known historian and philosopher, died at Leipzig. Professor Heinze was born in 1835 at

Priessnitz. He studied philosophy and theology at various universities and finally became a pupil of Trendelenburg at Berlin. The influence of Trendelenburg was plainly discernible in the character of Heinze's later work. After leaving the University, he was for some years instructor of the Princes of Oldenburg, and then became Privat-dozent at the University of Leipzig. In 1874, he was called to a Professorship of Philosophy at Basel. In the following year, he accepted a call to the University of Königsberg, and, after a brief residence there, went to Leipzig as Professor of Philosophy. For over thirty years, Professor Heinze was the chief historian of philosophy at Leipzig, and the bulk of the training of students, who during that period made their doctorates in the history of philosophy, was carried on by him. He was an unusually popular and stimulating teacher. He wrote on Descartes, Spinoza, Anaxagoras, the Stoics, the doctrine of Logos in Greek philosophy, Eudæmonism, prepared Kant's lectures on metaphysics covering three semesters, and issued the various editions of Ueberweg's History of Philosophy that appeared subsequent to the year 1875. He made constant additions to this history, prepared a large part of the fourth volume on Contemporary Philosophy, and through his exhaustive bibliography made this work an invaluable part of philosophical apparatus.

The Open Court Co. have in press an edition of Arthur Collier's *Clavis Universalis*, edited with Introduction and Notes, by Ethel Bowman, M.A., Wellesley College. The book has long been inaccessible except to those with access to the large libraries.

Professor Benno Erdmann has been called to Berlin as successor to Professor Paulsen.

Dr. Horace C. Longwell has been appointed Instructor of Philosophy at Northwestern University.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals :

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XX, 1 : *Ernest Albee*, Meaning of Literature for Philosophy ; *Charles M. Bakewell*, The Unique Case of Socrates ; *J. E. Creighton*, Knowledge and Practice ; *Edward S. Ames*, Religion and the Psychical Life ; *John W. Buckham*, The Organization of Truth ; *R. M. MacIver*, Ethics and Politics ; *Henry W. Wright*, Religion and Morality ; Discussion ; Book Reviews.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XVI, 5 : *Taizo Nakashima*, Time-relations of the Affective Processes ; *E. L. Thorndike*, A Note on the Accuracy of Discrimination of Weights and Lengths ; *G. M. Whipple*, A Range of Information Test : *J. V. Breitweiser*, Resistance of Keys as a Factor in Reaction Times.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, VI, 16 : *T. H. Bolton*, On the Efficacy of Consciousness ; *John Dewey*, The Dilemma of the Intellectualist Theory of Truth ; Discussion ; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature ; Journals and New Books ; Notes and News.

VI, 17: *F. J. E. Woodbridge*, Consciousness, the Sense Organs, and the Nervous System; *Elsie R. Clapp*, Dependence upon Imagination of the Subject-Object Distinction; *W. P. Montague*, May a Realist Be a Pragmatist? Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VI, 18: *W. H. Winch*, Conation and Mental Activity, I; *W. P. Montague*, May a Realist Be a Pragmatist? II; Discussion; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VI, 19: *W. H. Winch*, Conation and Mental Activity, II; *Harold C. Brown*, The Problem of the Infinite in Space and Time; Discussion; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VI, 20: *H. S. Sheldon*, On the Methods of Applied Mathematics; *W. P. Montague*, May a Realist Be a Pragmatist? III; Discussion; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, VI, 8: *R. M. Yerkes* and *Sergius Morgulis*, The Method of Pawlow in Animal Psychology; Psychological Literature; Books Received; Notes and News.

VI, 9: *R. M. Ogden*, A Contribution to the Theory of Tonal Consonance; Psychological Literature; Reports; Books Received; Notes and News.

THE MONIST, XIX, 3: *B. C. H. Harvey*, The Nature of Vital Processes according to Rignano; *L. M. Billia*, Has the Psychological Laboratory Proved Helpful?; *T. B. Robertson*, A Biochemical Conception of the Phenomena of Memory and Sensation; *The Editor*, Psychology a Domain of its Own; Criticisms and Discussions; Book Reviews and Notes.

ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE, XV, 3: *G. Seliber*, Der Pragmatismus und seine Gegner auf dem III. Internationalen Kongress für Philosophie; *R. Müller-Freienfels*, Das Urteil in der Kunst; *M. Meyer*, Wahrheit; *Otto Neurath*, Eindeutigkeit und Kommutativität des logischen Produktes *ab*; *Olga Hahn*, Zur Axiomatik des logischen Gebietkalküls; *Otto Braun*, Rudolf Euckens Methode; *P. C. Franze*, Eine entwicklungstheoretische Betrachtung über das Verhältnis von Wissen und Glauben; *B. Lemcke*, De Potentia; *K. Geissler*, Wer darf in philosophischen Fragen urteilen?; *H. Aschkenasy*, Zur Kritik des Relativismus in der Erkenntnistheorie; *G. Wendel*, Das Problem der Kausalität und der Freiheit; Die neuesten Erscheinungen auf dem Gebiete der systematischen Philosophie; Systematische Abhandlungen in den Zeitschriften; Eingegangene Bücher.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, LIII, 1: *L. J. Martin*, Über ästhetische Synästhesie; *S. Witasek*, Lokalisationsdifferenz und latente Gleichgewichtsstörung; Literaturbericht.

LIII, 2 u. 3: *H. S. Langfeld*, Über die heterochrome Helligkeitsvergleichung; *M. Levy-Suhl*, Die Hypnotische Beeinflussung der Farben-

wahrnehmung und die Helmholtz'sche Theorie vom Simultankontrast ; *S. Meyer*, Zum Traumproblem ; Literaturbericht.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XXXIV, 8 : *J. Philippe*, Pour et contre la psychophysique ; *R. Brugeilles*, L'idéalisme social ; *Th. Ribot*, Sur la nature du plaisir ; Notes et discussions ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Revue des périodiques étrangers.

XXXIV, 9 : *Kozlowski*, L'explication scientifique et la causalité ; *Lalo*, L'esthétique scientifique ; *Georgesco*, Des vicissitudes de la lutte pour la vie ; Notes et Discussions ; Analyses et comptes rendus.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XVII, 4 : *H. Poincaré*, La logique de l'infini ; *L. Dauriac*, Les sources néocriticistes de la dialectique synthétique ; Correspondance inédite de Ch. Renouvier et de Ch. Secrétan ; Études critiques ; discussions ; Questions pratiques.

IX, 9 : *P. Gény*, Le problème critique et la perception extérieure ; *A. Véronnet*, L'atome nécessaire ; *M. Baelen*, Le mecanisme moniste de Taine ; *G. Michelet*, Revue critique de morale ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Périodiques.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE, IX, 8 : *N. Vaschide* et *R. Meunier*, Les théories de l'attention ; *R. Saleilles*, L'origine du droit et du devoir ; *P. Duhem*, Du temps où la scolastique latinea connu la Physique d'Aristotle ; *J. Louis*, La détermination des concepts de matière, d'entendement et de raison dans la philosophie de Schopenhauer ; Analyses et comptes rendus ; Périodiques.

REVUE NÉO-SCOLASTIQUE, XVI, 3 : *C. Piat*, Les sanctions ; *P. H. Hoffmans*, Roger Bacon, L'intuition mystique et la science ; *C. Alibert*, Pour lire en psychologue la vie des saints ; Melanges et Documents ; Comptes rendus.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA, I, 2 : *R. Ardigò*, Infinito e indefinito ; *L. M. Billia*, La percezione intellettiva ; *E. d'Ors*, Religio est libertas ; *R. Mondolfo*, Studi sui tipi rappresentativi ; *A. Faggi*, Lo Schelling e la filosofia dell'arte ; Per l'anima della scuola ; Autorelazioni, analisi e cenni.

I, 3 : *A. Ravà*, Introduzione allo studio della filosofia di Fichte ; *E. Troilo*, La formula kantiana della conoscenza nelle relazioni tra la filosofia e la scienza ; *A. Levi*, Il fenomenismo empiristico e la concezione fenomenistica della scienza ; *L. Limentani*, La supremazia del criterio morale nella valutazione degli atti ; Per l'anima della scuola ; Autorelazioni, analisi e cenni.

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[N. B.—(a) stands for original articles, (b) for book notices, (d) for discussions, (n) for notes, (r) for reviews of books, and (s) for summaries.]

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