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THE
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF WILLIAM JAMES.

A PHILOSOPHY so complete and so significant as that of William James, touching, as it does, every traditional problem, and expressing through the medium of personal genius the characteristic tendencies of an epoch, cannot be hastily estimated. There is no glory to be won by pressing the attack upon its unguarded defenses; while solemn verdicts, whether of commendation or censure, would surely prove premature and injudicious. But there is perhaps one service to be rendered to James and to philosophy for which this is the most suitable occasion, the service, namely, of brief and proportionate exposition. Every philosophical system suffers from accidental emphasis due to the temporal order of production and to the exigencies of controversy. Toward the close of his life James himself felt the need of assembling his philosophy, of giving it unity and balance. It was truly one philosophy, one system of thought, but its total structure and contour had never been made explicit. That James should not have lived to do this work himself is an absolute loss to mankind, for which no efforts of mine can in the least compensate.¹ But I should like to make a first rude sketch, which may, I hope, despite its flatness and its bad drawing, at least suggest the form of the whole and the proper emphasis of the parts.

If one could read James's writings in a day, and forget the order of their publication, one would, I think, find that they treated of three great topics, the nature of the human mind, the

¹James left an unfinished "Introduction to Philosophy," in which he had made a beginning of a systematic restatement of his philosophy, but owing to its incompleteness it does not, as it stands, afford the reader the total view which was in the author's mind as he composed it.

structure and criteria of knowledge, and the grounds of religious belief. Were one then to take into consideration the writer's development, together with his interests and his aptitudes, one would be brought to see that the first of these topics was original and fundamental. James's philosophy was a study of man, or of life. The biological and medical sciences, psychology, philosophy proper, and religion, were not for him so many independent disciplines, from which he chose now one and now another owing to versatility or caprice, but so many sources of light concerning human nature. So that while one has difficulty in classifying him within a curriculum or hierarchy of the sciences, since he ignored such distinctions and even visited the intellectual under-world when it suited his purpose, his mind was none the less steadily focused on its object. His knowledge was on the one hand as unified, and on the other hand as rich and diversified, as its subject-matter. In the summary which follows I shall first give an account of his general views of the human mind; after which I shall discuss his view of man's great enterprises, knowledge and religion.

THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN MIND.

1. *Mind as interested and selective.*—In his first published article, on "Spencer's Definition of Mind,"¹ James adopts a standpoint which he never leaves. His object is man the organism, saving himself and asserting his interests within the natural environment. These interests, the irreducible 'teleological factor,' must be the centre and point of reference in any account of mind. The defect in Spencer's view of mind as correspondence of 'inner' and 'outer' relations, lies in its failing to recognize that such correspondence is relative to the organism's interests. "So that the Spencerian formula, to mean anything definite at all, must, at least, be re-written as follows: 'Right or intelligent mental action consists in the establishment, corresponding to outward relations, of such inward relations and reactions as will favor the survival of the thinker, or at least, his physical well-being.'"²

¹*The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, Vol. XII, Jan., 1878.

²*Loc. cit.*, p. 5.

The mind is not a 'mirror' which passively reflects what it chances to come upon. It initiates and tries; and its correspondence with the 'outer' world means that its effort successfully meets the environment in behalf of the organic interest from which it sprang. The mind, like an antenna, feels the way for the organism. It gropes about, advances and recoils, making many random efforts and many failures; but is always urged into taking the initiative by the pressure of interest, and doomed to success or failure in some hour of trial when it meets and engages the environment. Such is mind, and such, according to James, are all its operations. These characters, interest, activity, trial, success, and failure, are its generic characters when it is observed concretely; and they are the characters which should take precedence of all others in the description of every special undertaking of mind, such as knowing, truth-getting, and believing.

The action of the mind is not, however, creative. Its ideas are not of its own making, but rather of its own *choosing*. At every stage of its development, on every level of complexity, the mind is essentially a selective agency, "a theatre of simultaneous possibilities."¹ The sense-organs select from among simultaneous stimuli; attention is selective from among sensations; morality is selective from among interests. And above all, thought is selective. The unity and discreteness of 'things' first arises from interest in some special group of qualities, and from among the group the mind then selects some to represent it most truly as its 'essential' characters. Reasoning is not the mere mechanism of association. The garrulous mind, in which the course of ideas is allowed to proceed as it will, is unreason, a symptom of mental decay. To reason is to guide the course of ideas, through discriminating and accentuating those whose associates are to the point. Human sagacity and genius, as well as the whole overwhelming superiority of man to brute, are to be attributed to a capacity for extracting the right characters from the undifferentiated chaos of primeval experience; the right characters being those which are germane to the matter in hand.

¹*Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 288.

or those which enable the mind to pass to similars over a bridge of identities.¹

2. *The relational or functional theory of consciousness.*—Let us now look at mind from a somewhat different angle. If its operations are selective rather than creative, it follows that it derives its content from its environment, and adds nothing to that content save the circumstance of its selection. If the term 'consciousness' be used to designate the mind's content, that manifold which can be held in view and examined by introspection, then consciousness is not a distinct substance, or even a distinct quality, but a grouping, exclusive and inclusive, of characters borrowed from the environment. James first offered this account of the matter in the article entitled "Does Consciousness Exist?" published in 1904. But he then wrote: "For twenty years past I have mistrusted 'consciousness' as an entity; for seven or eight years I have suggested its non-existence to my students."² This theory is therefore both closely related to his other theories, and also of long standing.

In suggesting the 'non-existence' of consciousness, James meant, of course, to prepare the way for an account of its true character. This turn of thought may perhaps be paraphrased as follows. If by a thing's existence you mean its separate existence, its existence as wholly other than, or outside of, other things, as one planet exists outside another, then consciousness does not exist. For consciousness differs from other things as one grouping differs from another grouping of the same terms; as, for example, the Republican Party differs from the American people. But this is its true character, and in this sense it exists. One is led to this conclusion if one resolutely refuses to yield to the spell of words. What do we find when we explore that quarter to which the word 'consciousness' directs us? We find at first glance some particular idea character, such as blue; and at second glance another particular character, such as roundness. Which of these is consciousness? Evidently neither. For there

¹*Op. cit.*, Ch. V, IX, XIII, XIV, XXII. Cf. especially, Vol. I, pp. 284-290; Vol. pp. 329-366.

²*Journal of Phil., Psych., and Sc. Methods*, Vol. I, 1904, p. 477.

is no discoverable difference between these characters thus severally regarded, and certain parts of nature. Furthermore there is no discoverable community of nature among these characters themselves. But continue the investigation as long as you please, and you simply add content to content, without either finding any class of elements that belong exclusively to consciousness, or any conscious "menstruum" in which the elements of content are suspended. The solution of the riddle lies in the fact that one term may be called by several names corresponding to the several relationships into which it enters. It is necessary only to admit that "every smallest bit of experience is a *multum in parvo* plurally related, that each relation is one aspect, character, or function, way of its being taken, or way of its taking something else; and that a bit of reality when actively engaged in one of these relations is not *by that very fact* engaged in all the other relations simultaneously. The relations are not *all* what the French call *solidaires* with one another. Without losing its identity a thing can either take up or drop another thing, like the log . . . which by taking up new carriers and dropping old ones can travel anywhere with a light escort."¹ I have quoted this passage in full because of its far-reaching importance. But we have to do here only with the application to the question of consciousness. The elements or terms which enter into consciousness and become its content may, on these grounds, be the same elements which in so far as otherwise related compose physical nature. The elements themselves, the 'materia prima' or 'stuff of pure experience,' are neither psychical nor physical.² A certain spatial and dynamic system of such elements constitutes physical nature; taken in other relations they constitute 'ideal' systems, such as logic and mathematics; while in still another grouping, and in a specific functional relation, they make up 'the inner history of a person.'³ This functional relation is meaning or knowing, and the discussion of it falls under another heading. The grouping or pattern

¹*Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 322-323. Cf. *Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Sc. Meth.*, Vol. II, 1905, p. 282.

²See below, p. 17.

³*Journal of Phil., Psych., and Sc. Methods*, Vol. I, 1904, p. 483.

which is characteristic of the *individual* consciousness is best described in connection with "the experience of activity."

But before leaving this topic it is important to call attention to a corollary which is capable of a very wide application. The common or 'neutral' elements of pure experience serve not only to connect consciousness with the various objective orders of being, but also to connect different units of consciousness with another. Two or more minds become co-terminous and commutable through containing the same elements. We can thus understand 'how two minds can know one thing.'¹ In precisely the same way the same mind may know the same thing at different times. The different pulses of one consciousness may thus overlap and interpenetrate. And where these pulses are successive, the persistence of these common factors, marginal in one and focal in the next, gives to consciousness its peculiar connectedness and continuity. There is no need, therefore, of a synthesis *ab extra*; there is sameness, and permanence, and universality within the content itself. Finally, just as several individual minds, and the several moments of one individual mind, are 'co-conscious,' so there is no reason why human minds should not be 'confluent in a higher consciousness.'²

3. *The experience of activity*.—A certain grouping of the elements of experience, a grouping in which activity and affectional states are the most marked characteristics, constitutes 'the individualized self.' 'Simon-pure activity,' 'activity *an sich*,' is a fictitious entity. But we are not on that account to banish the word 'activity' from our philosophical vocabulary, since there is a specific experience-complex for which it may be rightly and profitably used. "If the word have any meaning it must denote what there is found. . . . The experiencer of such a situation possesses all that the idea contains. He feels the tendency, the obstacle, the will, the strain, the triumph, or the passive giving up, just as he feels the time, the space, the swiftness or intensity,

¹*Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Sc. Meth.*, Vol. II, 1905, pp. 176 ff.

²*Pluralistic Universe*, p. 290. Cf. Lecture VII, *passim*. For the development of James's view concerning the "compounding of consciousness," cf. *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 160, 161; "The Knowing of Things Together," *Psych. Rev.*, Vol. II, 1895; *Pluralistic Universe*, Lecture V.

the movement, the weight and color, the pain and pleasure, the complexity, or whatever remaining factors the situation may involve."¹ This specific train or pattern of experiences being taken to constitute activity, it will constitute 'my' activity in so far as it is accompanied by certain affectional states, in other words, in so far as it centres in certain experiences of my own body. For affectional states are quasi-bodily. They do not belong exclusively either to the mental or to the physical order. That which is attractive or repugnant stirs the body as well as the mind. 'The interesting aspects of things' rule the consecution of our several conscious streams; but they are "not wholly inert physically, though they be active only in those small corners of physical nature which our bodies occupy."² The individualized self is thus a peculiar assemblage or field of elements, which "comes at all times with our body as its centre, centre of vision, centre of action, centre of interest. . . . The body is the storm centre, the origin of coördinates, the constant place of stress in all that experience-train. Everything circles round it, and is felt from its point of view. The word 'I,' then, is primarily a noun of position, just like 'this' and 'here.' Activities attached to 'this' position have prerogative emphasis. . . . The 'my' of them is the emphasis, the feeling of perspective-interest in which they are dyed."³

And precisely as there is no consciousness *an sich*, and no activity *an sich*, so there is no mental power or 'effectuation' *an sich*. The causality of mind lies in the drama, train, conjunction, or series which is peculiar to the mind-complex. "Sustaining, persevering, striving, paying with effort as we go, hanging on, and finally achieving our intention—this *is* action, this *is* effectuation in the only shape in which, by a pure experience-philosophy, the whereabouts of it anywhere can be discussed. . . . Real effectual causation . . . is just that kind of conjunction which our own activity series reveal."⁴ We meet here with a type of

¹"The Experience of Activity," in *Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 376-380.

²"The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience," *Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Sc. Meth.*, Vol. II, 1905, p. 286, and *passim*.

³*Pluralistic Universe*, p. 380, note.

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 390, 392. For the bearing of this on the question of freedom, see below, pp. 24 ff.

process that is *sui generis*. Whether human action is determined primarily by this process, or by the elementary processes of the nerve-cells, James does not attempt to decide. It is essentially a question between the activities of longer and of shorter span; "naively we believe, and humanly and dramatically we like to believe," that the two are at work in life together.¹

If we assemble these various aspects of mind, we can picture it in its concrete wholeness. The organism operates interestedly and selectively within its natural environment; and the manifold of elements thus selected compose the mind's content. But this content when viewed by itself exhibits certain characteristic groupings, patterns, and conjunctions. Of these the knowledge process is the most striking. But as the body is the original instrument of selection and the source of individual bias, so bodily states and bodily orientation will be the nucleus of each individual field of content.

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

I. *The function of cognition*.—To understand the originality and value of James's contributions to this subject, it is indispensable that one should see his problem. One must respect the difficulty before one can appreciate his solution of it. James's problem can perhaps be formulated as follows: How can idea and object be *two*, and yet one be knowledge *of* the other, and both fall within the same individual conscious field? And this problem James proposes to solve empirically, that is, by an examination of cognition in the concrete. Just what is it that takes place, just what is to be found, when I have an idea of an object?

Although James's discussions of knowledge relate mainly to this dual or mediated type, to knowledge about the thing *b* which I have by virtue of the idea *a*, he does not regard this as the only type or as the standard type. 'Knowledge about' is a derivative of 'direct' knowledge, or 'knowledge of acquaintance,' and is never more than a provisional substitute for it. Representation is cognitive only in so far as it is a virtual presentation. In direct knowledge, or knowledge of acquaintance, "any one and

¹*Ibid.*, p. 387.

the same *that* in experience must figure alternately as a thing known and as a knowledge of the thing, by reason of two divergent kinds of context into which, in the general course of experience, it gets woven."¹ In knowledge of this type, in other words, the thing *itself* is acted on and felt about in the manner characteristic of an individual conscious field. The most notable case of this is sense-perception. In so far as there is here any difference between the knowing and the known, the knowing is simply the context, the company into which the thing known is received. And the individual knower will be that nuclear bodily complex which has already been described. The function of such knowledge is evidently to get things thus directly acted on, or thus directly introduced into life.

But, humanly speaking, if the range of life is not to be narrowly circumscribed, it is necessary that most things should appear in it vicariously, that is, represented by what is known 'about' them. "The towering importance for human life of this kind of knowing lies in the fact that an experience that knows another can figure as its *representative*, not in any quasi-miraculous 'epistemological' sense, but in the definite practical sense of being its *substitute* in various operations."² Thus the function of 'knowledge about' is to provide substitutes for things which it is practically impossible to know directly, so that the original function of knowledge may be widely extended. It is only a special case of that which is characteristic of all organized life, the broadening of its scope by delegation and indirection. And we are thus brought to the consideration of a narrow and definite problem. *When may one item be, for cognitive purposes, substituted for another?* That which may thus be substituted is 'knowledge about,' or 'idea of,' the thing for which it is so substituted, and the thing for which the substitution is made is the object. So that our question is equivalent to the traditional question, "What is the relation between an idea and its object?" But it is important to bear in mind that James's question cannot be answered

¹"Essence of Humanism," in *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 127. Cf. *passim*, and "Function of Cognition," *ibid.*, pp. 10 ff.

²"Relation between Knower and Known," *ibid.*, p. 110.

simply by saying that idea and object are identical. That in many cases they are identical, and that in all cases they are virtually identical, he does not deny. But he asks particularly about *that respect in which they are not identical*; where there is an actual otherness of content, or an actual temporal progression from the one to the other. And it must also be remembered that James does not permit himself to deal with this question on other than empirical grounds; in other words, he assumes that all the terms referred to must be such as can be brought together within one field of consciousness.¹ The older dualism, in which the something 'inside' represents something 'outside' every possible extension of the individual's consciousness, is regarded as obsolete.²

The relation characteristic of an idea and its object can be analyzed into two factors, *intention* and *agreement*.³ In the first place the idea must somehow 'mean' its object, that is, designate which thing is its object. And intention is prior to agreement. It is not sufficient that an idea should simply agree with something; it must agree with *its* object; and until its object has been identified no test of agreement can be applied. "It is not by dint of discovering which reality a feeling 'resembles' that we find out which reality it means. We become first aware of which one it means, and then we suppose that to be the one it resembles."⁴ But intention is essentially a practical matter. What one intends is like one's goal or one's destination, in being what one's actions converge on or towards. And the idea owes its existence as such to an intention or plan of action of which the 'intended' is the terminus. Intention is of course often equivocal; but the intention is revealed, and becomes less and less equivocal, as the plan of action unfolds. It is this which accounts for the superiority of gesture over words. If one can hold up the object, lay one's hand on it, or even point to it, its identity becomes unmistakable.⁵ So we must conclude

¹For the meaning of 'empiricism,' see below, pp. 16ff.

²"Essence of Humanism," *op. cit.*, pp. 126-127.

³"Function of Cognition," *op. cit.*, *passim* and especially pp. 28-32.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁵Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 25, 35; also "Meaning of the Word Truth," *op. cit.*, p. 217.

that where the action on the object is not completed, the object is intended in so far as there is an incipient train of action which if completed would terminate in that thing. I may here and now have an idea of 'the tigers in India,' that is, mean, intend, or refer to them, inasmuch as what is in my mind is so connected circumstantially with the actual India and its tigers, that if I were to follow it up I should be brought face to face with them.¹ In other words, to have an idea of a thing is to have access to it even when it is not present.

But an idea must not only intend its object; it must also in some sense, 'agree' with it. And here again we find that the essential thing is *practical connection*; for identity, or even similarity, is evidently not necessary. "We are universally held both to intend, to speak of, and to reach conclusions about—to know in short—particular realities, without having in our subjective consciousness any mind-stuff that resembles them even in a remote degree. We are instructed about them by language which awakens no consciousness beyond its sound; and we know *which* realities they are by the faintest and most fragmentary glimpse of some remote context that they may have and by no direct imagination of themselves."² Since it is not always necessary that the idea should resemble its object, we must conclude that the minimum agreement which is required of all ideas cannot be resemblance. And we shall understand that minimum agreement best where it is barest, where it is not complicated by the accident of agreement. The best example, then, will be the agreement of words with their objects. Now a word agrees with its object inasmuch as by an established convention it leads to a particular thing, or enables one to find it. And what is true of single words will also be true of combinations of words; they will 'agree' when they are so connected with a combination of things as to enable one to reverse the verbalizing operation and substitute that combination of things for them. But since it is possible that my idea should *not* prepare me for what it intends, it is evident that we are already within the domain of truth and error; agreement being the same thing as truth, and disagreement

¹*Op. cit.*, pp. 43-50.

²"Function of Cognition," *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

the same thing as error. And this is a matter for special and detailed examination.

Before leaving the present topic, however, it is worth while once more to point out that for James all knowledge is virtually direct or presentative. First, the safest and surest of our every-day knowledge is sense-perception. Second, while it is not necessary that the idea should resemble its object, the idea will ordinarily be some fragment of the object, abstracted and made to serve for the whole. And in so far as this is the case the idea and its object are identical. Third, even mediated knowledge is completed only when by means of it the object is brought directly into the mind. So that the best idea would be that which would "lead to an actual merging of ourselves with the object, to an utter mutual confluence and identification."¹ In other words, knowledge, generally speaking, is the entrance of things belonging otherwise to nature or some ideal order into the context of the individual life. Mediated knowledge, in which there is a difference and an extrinsic connection between the idea and its object, is incidental to knowledge thus defined, a means, simply, of extending its scope by the method of substitution.

2. *The pragmatic nature of truth.*—The function of knowledge reveals the *locus* of the problem of truth. Truth is something which happens to ideas owing to their relation to their objects, that is, to the things which they are 'about.' Ideas are true 'of' their objects, it being assumed that the objects are both different from the beliefs and intended by them. The pragmatic theory of truth means nothing except so far as applied to this particular situation. If the specific complexity of the situation be not taken account of, then the theory becomes labored and meaningless. James convicts most of the objectors to pragmatism of overlooking, or over-simplifying, this problem. If one identifies truth with fact, one is simply ignoring James's question as to how one fact can be true *of* another, as is supposed to be the case in all mediated knowledge. If one says that true beliefs are beliefs in true propositions, truth being an indefinable property of some propositions, one is evading the troublesome question as to what

¹"A Word More about Truth," *op. cit.*, p. 156.

is meant by belief *in*, and one is neglecting the fact that in nearly all actual knowledge the content of the believing state, or *what* is believed, differs from that which it is believed *about*. So that James's question will simply reappear as the question how a true belief about a 'true proposition' (in the opponent's sense) differs from a false belief about that same proposition. Or, finally, if one defines truth in terms of a hypothetical omniscience, one transfers the problem to a domain where its empirical examination is impossible, and meanwhile leaves untouched the question of that human truth that can be empirically examined, including the truth of the hypothesis of omniscience.¹

Let us then resort to that corner of the world to which James's question invites attention. We find, on the one hand, something belonging, let us say, to the realm of physical nature. We find, on the other hand, some particular individual's particular belief, idea, or statement with reference to that thing. What, then, do we find to be characteristic of the idea in so far as true of the thing? We are not asking for a recipe for the making of truth; still less for an infallible recipe. We desire only to understand "what the word 'true' means, as applied to a statement," "what truth actually consists of," "the relation to its object that makes an idea true in any given instance."² We shall be faithful to James's meaning if we articulate the situation expressly. Let *b* represent a certain individual thing, assumed to exist; and let *a* represent somebody's idea of *b*, also assumed to exist. *a* may be similar to *b*, or dissimilar; but in any case, it must 'intend' *b*, in the manner already defined. It should also be remarked that *a* and *b* belong to one manifold of experience, in the sense that the same individual mind may proceed from the one to the other. Our question, then, is this: When is *a* true of *b*? The pragmatist answer is as follows:³ *a* owes its existence as an

¹The volume entitled *The Nature of Truth* is devoted almost entirely to the removal of these misapprehensions. Cf. especially the preface, and Nos. VI, VIII, IX, and XIV.

²*Op. cit.*, pp. 221, 234, 235.

³This is not a close paraphrase of any portion of the text, but is arrived at by using the polemical statement in *The Nature of Truth* to give greater precision to the constructive statement in Lect. VI of *Pragmatism*.

idea to some interest; if there were no interested minds at work in the world, then the world would consist only of *b*'s.¹ Ideas, whether they be mere conventional signs for things or selected aspects of things, arise only because of some practical motive. Furthermore the relation of intention which connects an idea with some thing and makes that thing *its* object, is due to the same interest or motive which selected the idea.² Finally, then, *a* is true of *b* when this interest which selected *a* and related it to *b*, is *satisfied*. In short, *a* is true of *b* when it is a successful ideating of *b*.³

We shall gain in clearness and explicitness if we now distinguish the cases of *applied* and *theoretical* truth. We may suppose *a* to arise, first, as a mode of conceiving *b* for some use to which *b* is to be put. Then, when by virtue of the conception *a* I am enabled to handle or control *b*, and reach the desired end by so doing, I have a true idea of *a*, in the applied sense. This kind of truth is much the more common. If we include such knowledge as animals possess, and all of that human competence and skill which is not exactly formulated—all of the art which is not science—it is evident that in bulk it far exceeds the knowledge which is immediately related to the theoretical motive. But pragmatism is not intended as a disparagement of theory. James naturally resents the description of it "as a characteristically American movement, a sort of bobtailed scheme of thought, excellently fitted for the man on the street, who naturally hates theory and wants cash returns immediately."⁴ Indeed, owing to the emphasis given the matter by the turn of controversy, the pragmatist writers have devoted a somewhat disproportionate amount of space to the discussion of theoretical truth. That the theoretical process is itself interested in its own way, that it has its characteristic motive and its characteristic successes and failures, is a fact that no one has ever questioned. And 'theoretical truth,' so-called, is its success. An idea is true theoretically, when it

¹See above, pp. 2ff.

²See above, pp. 10f.

³This success may be actual or potential. What James means by 'potential' is clearly stated in *Meaning of Truth*, p. 93. But in any case truth cannot be defined without reference to the success.

⁴*Meaning of Truth*, p. 185.

works for the theoretical purpose. It remains only to discover what that purpose may be. What, then, is the theoretical motive for the formation of ideas? Or what is the virtue of forming ideas of things, different from the things themselves, when there is no occasion, immediate or remote, for acting on the things? In order, the pragmatist replies, to have a compact and easily stored access to these things; in order to be able to find, should one want them, more things than there are room for within the mind at any one time. It follows, then, that the mark of a good idea, from this point of view, is its enabling one by means of it to come directly at a large number of particular facts, which it means. Verification is thus the trying out, the demonstration, of an idea's capacity to lead to its objects and obtain their direct presentation to mind. Thus *a* is true of *b*, in the theoretical sense, when by virtue of having *a* in mind I can bring *b* into mind, *a* being more compact than *b*. And the adequacy of *a* will depend upon the extent to which it puts me in virtual possession of the full or complete nature of *b*. There is always a sense in which nothing can be so true of *b* as *b* itself, and were it humanly possible to know everything directly and simultaneously, as we know aspects of things in sense-perception, then there would be no occasion for the existence of ideas. But then there would be no truth, in the particular sense in which James uses the term.

It is worth while to observe that when James defines truth in terms of satisfaction, he has in mind a very specific sort of satisfaction, a determined satisfaction, in which the conditions of satisfaction are imposed on the one hand by the environment, and on the other hand by the interest which called the idea forth.¹ This is by no means the same thing as to say that an idea which is satisfactory is therefore true. It must be satisfactory for a particular purpose, and under particular circumstances. An idea has a certain work to do, and it must do that work in order to be commended as true. There is a situation, again a special situation, in which the general usefulness or liveableness of an idea may be allowed to count toward its acceptance. But the case is exceptional, and is not neces-

¹Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 192 ff.

sarily implied in the pragmatic theory. I have thought it on the whole clearer and fairer, therefore, to consider it in another connection.¹

The pragmatic theory of truth is closely connected in the author's mind with 'the pragmatic method.' It emphasizes the particular and presentable consequences of ideas, and is thus opposed to verbalism, to abstractionism, to agnosticism, and to loose and irrelevant speculation. But pragmatism here merges into empiricism, where the issues are wider and more diverse.

3. *Empiricism*.—James was an empiricist in the most general sense, in that he insisted on the testing of an idea by a resort to that particular experience which it means. An idea which does not relate to something which may be brought directly before the same mind that entertains the idea, is not properly an idea at all; and two ideas are different only in so far as the things to which they thus lead differ in some particular respect. "The meaning of any proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence in our future practical experience, whether passive or active . . . the point lying rather in the fact that the experience must be particular than in the fact that it must be active."² Similarly, "the whole originality of pragmatism, the whole point in it, is its use of the concrete way of seeing."³ Empiricism, or pragmatism, in this sense, is essentially an application of James's theory of the function of ideas. Since it is their office to pave the way for direct knowledge, or to be temporarily substituted for it, their efficiency is conditioned by their unobtrusiveness, by the readiness with which they subordinate themselves. The commonest case of an idea in James's sense is the word; and the most notable example of his pragmatic or empirical method is his own scrupulous avoidance of verbalism. He reaches his conclusions while standing in the very presence of the things he is referring to; and so little weight does he attach to the words in which he reports his conclusion that he can be understood only by those who are standing by and looking on. It

¹See below, under The Right to Believe, pp. 21 ff.

²*Meaning of Truth*, p. 210.

³*Op. cit.*, p. 216. For the more popular exposition of this method, and the illustrative application of it, cf. *Pragmatism*, Lectures II, III.

follows that since ideas are in and of themselves of no cognitive value, since they are essentially instrumental, they are always on trial, and "liable to modification in the course of future experience."¹ The method of hypothesis and experiment is thus the method universal, and the canons of parsimony and verifiability apply to philosophy as well as to science.

Empiricism in a narrower sense is the postulate "that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience."² We find experience itself described as "a process in time, whereby innumerable particular terms lapse and are superseded by others."³ This does not mean that experience is to be identified with the manifold of sense-perception, for he refers repeatedly to 'conceptual experience.'⁴ Nor does it mean that experience is to be identified with the *experienced*, that is, with consciousness. Consciousness, like matter, is a part of it. Indeed, "there is no *general* stuff of which experience at large is made." "It is made of *that*, of just what appears, of space, of intensity, of flatness, of brownness, heaviness, or what not. . . . Experience is only a collective name for all these sensible natures, and save for time and space (and, if you like, for 'being') there appears no universal element of which all things are made."⁵ Experience, then, is a colorless name for things in their spatial-temporal conjunctions. Things are experienced when these conjunctions are immediately present in the mind; in other words, when they are directly known *here* and *now*, or when such a here-and-now knowledge is possible. In other words, we are again brought back to a fundamental insistence on direct or presentative knowledge. In respect of this insistence James is a lineal descendent of Berkeley, Hume, and Mill, and a brother of Shadworth Hodgson and Ernst Mach. In all of these writers the insistence on the immanence of the object of knowledge has tended to lead to phenomenalism; and James, like the rest, is a phenomenalist, as opposed to dualism

¹*Will to Believe*, Preface, p. vii.

²*Meaning of Truth*, preface, p. xii.

³*Ibid.*, p. III.

⁴See below, p. 19.

⁵"Does Consciousness Exist?" *Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Sc. Meth.*, Vol. I, 1904, p. 487.

and transcendentalism. But in his later writings at least, he has made it perfectly clear that while things are 'what they are known as,' they need not be known in order to be. Their being known is an accidental relation into which they directly enter as they are.¹ To limit knowledge to experience means only to limit it to what may be immediately apprehended as here and now, to what may be brought directly before the mind in some particular moment of its history.

James's empiricism means, then, first, that ideas are to be tested by direct knowledge, and second, that knowledge is limited to what can be presented. There is, however, a third consideration which is both an application of these, and the means of avoiding a difficulty which is supposed to be fatal to them. This is what James calls 'radical empiricism,' the discovery that "the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves."² "Adjacent minima of experience" are united by the "persistent identity of certain units, or emphases, or points, or objects, or members . . . of the experience continuum."³ Owing to the fact that the connections of things are thus found along with them, it is unnecessary to introduce any substance below experience, or any subject above, to hold things together. In spite of the atomistic sensationalists, relations are found, and in spite of Mr. Bradley, relations relate. And since the same term loses old relations and acquires new ones without forfeiting its identity, there is no reason to suppose the connections of things to be less adventitious and variable than they appear as a matter of fact to be. Thus the idealistic theory, which, in order that there may be *some* connection, conceives of an absolute and trans-experiential connection, is short-circuited.⁴ This handling of the question of relations proves the efficacy of the empirical method, and the futility of 'intellectualism.'

¹Cf. "Does Consciousness Exist?" with "The Knowing of Things Together," *Psych. Rev.*, Vol. II, 1895. Cf. also, below, p. 21.

²*Meaning of Truth*, preface, p. xii. Cf. *Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 279-280.

³*Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 326, 356. Cf. *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 459.

⁴Cf. "The Thing and its Relations," in *Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 347-369, *passim*. Cf. also above, p. 6, and below, p. 26.

4. *Percepts and concepts. The critique of intellectualism.*—The critical application of James's theory of knowledge follows from his notion of conception and its relation to perception. "Abstract concepts . . . are salient aspects of our concrete experiences which we find it useful to single out."¹ He speaks of them elsewhere as things we have learned to "cut out," as "flowers gathered," and "moments dipped out from the stream of time."² Without doubt, then, they are elements of the given and independent world; not invented, but selected—and for some practical or theoretical purpose. To knowledge they owe not their being or their natures, but their isolation or abstraction and the cognitive use to which they are put. This use or function tends to obscure the fact that they are themselves 'objective.' They have, as a matter of fact, their own 'ideal' relations, their own 'lines of order,' which when traced by thought become the systems of logic and mathematics.³

The human importance of concepts and of ideal systems lies in their cognitive function with reference to the manifold of sense perception. Therefore it is necessary to inquire just what kind of a knowledge of the latter they afford. Since they are extracts from the same experience-plenum, they may be, and to a large extent are, similar to their perceptual objects. But it is never the primary function of an idea to picture its object, and in this case, at least, a complete picturing is impossible. Because, in the first place, concepts are single and partial aspects of perceptual things, and never a thing's totality. Although conception exhibits these aspects clearly one by one, sense-perception apprehending the thing all at once, or concretely, will in spite of its inarticulateness always convey something—it may be only the fullness of potential concepts—which conception misses. It would follow, then, that a concept is true of a percept only so

¹*Meaning of Truth*, p. 246.

²*Pluralistic Universe*, p. 235. Cf. *Principles of Psychology*, on "Conception," and "Reasoning," Chapters XII and XXII.

³"Does Consciousness Exist?" *Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Sc. Meth.*, Vol. I, 1904, pp. 482–483. Cf. *Meaning of Truth*, pp. 42, 195, note; *Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 339–340; *Principles of Psychology*, Ch. XXVIII. Here as elsewhere of two apparently conflicting statements I have taken the later.

far as it goes. But those who employ concepts are prone to use them 'privatively,' that is, as though they exhausted their perceptual object and prevented it from being anything more. This "treating of a name as excluding from the fact named what the name's definition fails positively to include," is what James calls 'vicious intellectualism.'¹

But, in the second place, there is a more specific reason why concepts cannot adequately express the existential sense-manifold. Not only are they unequal to it because abstracted from it, but they are necessarily *unlike* it, in that the most characteristic aspects of the sense-manifold cannot be conveyed in conceptual form. This is the chief ground of James's indictment of intellectualism, and is of critical importance to the understanding of his philosophy. It is important once more to note that the cognitive use of ideas does not depend upon their similarity to their objects. They may be abstracted aspects of their objects, or they may be entirely extraneous bits of experience, like words, connected with their objects only through their functional office. Now it is James's contention that the most characteristic aspects of existence can be ideated only in this second way. They cannot be abstracted, they cannot themselves become the immediate objects of thought, although they can, of course, be led up to and functionally represented. Every bit of experience has "its quality, its duration, its extension, its intensity, its urgency, its clearness, and many aspects besides, no one of which can exist in the isolation in which our verbalized logic keeps it."² The error of intellectualism lies in its attempt to make up such aspects as these out of logical terms and relations. The result is either a ridiculous over-simplification of existence, or the multiplication of paradoxes. The continuity of change, the union of related things, the fulness of the existent world, has to be sensed or felt, if its genuine character is to be known, as truly as color has to be seen or music heard. So that, so far as these aspects of existence are concerned, concepts are useful only for 'purposes of practice,'

¹*Pluralistic Universe*, p. 60. Cf. also pp. 218 ff. and *Meaning of Truth*, pp. 248, 249 ff.

²*Pluralistic Universe*, p. 256.

that is, to guide us to the sensible context, and not for 'purposes of insight.'¹

"Direct acquaintance and conceptual knowledge are thus complementary of each other; each remedies the other's defects."² Knowing is always in the last analysis witnessing—having the thing itself within the mind. This is the only way in which the proper nature, the original and intrinsic character of things is revealed. Thought itself is the means of thus directly envisaging some aspects of things. But owing to the peculiar conditions under which the mind operates, it is practically necessary to know most things indirectly. So thought has a second use, namely, to provide substitutes for aspects of things that can be known directly only by sense. The peculiar value of thought lies, then, in its direct grasp of the more universal elements, and in the range and economy of its indirect grasp of those elements which in their native quality can be directly grasped only by sense.

Knowledge in all its varieties and developments arises from practical needs. It takes place within an environment to whose independent nature it must conform. If that environment be regarded as something believed, then it signifies truth already arrived at obediently to the same practical motives. But if it be conceived simply as reality, as it must also be conceived, then it is prior to all knowledge, and in no sense involved in the vicissitudes of knowledge. In short, James's theory is epistemology in the limited sense. It describes knowledge without implying any dependence of things on the knowing of them. Indeed, on the contrary, it is based explicitly on the acceptance of that non-mental world-order which is recognized by common sense, by science, and by philosophical realism.³

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

1. *The right to believe.*—James's contribution to the study of religion is so considerable and so important as to stand by itself, beside his psychology and his philosophy. In the present meagre

¹*Op. cit.*, p. 290. Cf. Lectures V, VI, and VII, *passim*.

²*Op. cit.*, p. 251.

³Cf. *Meaning of Truth*, Preface, and pp. 190-197, 212-216.

summary I shall deal only with what is directly related to the fundamentals of his philosophy, namely, to his theory of mind and his epistemology. Religion, like knowledge, is a reaction of man to his environment. Its motives are practical, and its issues, tests, and successes are practical. Religion is 'a man's total reaction upon life.' It springs from "that curious sense of the whole residual cosmos as an everlasting presence, intimate or alien, terrible or amusing, lovable or odious."¹ The positive or hopeful religion says 'that the best things are the more eternal things,' and 'that we are better off even now' if we believe so,² There is a practical motive leading to some such belief, and there is an additional motive for taking the hopeful rather than the despairing view. Applying the theory of truth already expounded, it follows that that religious belief is true which satisfies the demands which give it birth. So far this might mean simply that it is important for life to have an idea of the ultimate nature of things, and as hopeful an idea as possible; in which case the true religion would be the idea which succeeded in meeting these requirements. It would be the verified hypothesis concerning the maximum of hopefulness which the universe justifies. But the case is not so simple as that. For no idea of the ultimate nature of things *can* be verified, that is, proved by following it into the direct presence of its object. And meanwhile it is practically necessary to adopt *some* such idea. So the question arises as to whether the general acceptability of an idea, including its service to other interests than the theoretical interest, may in this case be allowed to count. To accept an idea, or to believe under such conditions and on such grounds, is an act of faith. What, then, is the justification of faith?

Faith does not mean a defiance of proof but only a second best, a substitute where the evidence is not conclusive. "Faith means belief in something concerning which doubt is still theoretically possible; and as the test of belief is willingness to act, one may say that faith is the readiness to act in a cause the prosperous

¹*Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 35. In the "Varieties" the topic is circumscribed for the sake of convenience. Cf. p. 31.

²*Will to Believe*, pp. 25, 26.

issue of which is not certified to us in advance."¹ If it can be certified in advance, so much the better; but if not, then it may be proper to act confidently none the less. Now such is the case, first, when hesitation or suspension of action is equivalent to *disbelief* in a prosperous issue. Thus, "if I must not believe that the world is divine, I can only express that refusal by declining ever to act distinctively as if it were so, which can only mean acting on certain critical occasions as if it were *not* so, or in an irreligious way."² 'Logical scrupulosity' may thus over-reach itself, and lead one to a virtual denial even in the face of probability. In the second place, there are "cases where faith creates its own verification." Belief in the success of an enterprise in which the believer is himself engaged breeds the confidence which will help to *make* success. And religion is such an enterprise. "Believe, and you shall be right, for you shall save yourself."³

In short, "there is really no scientific or other method by which men can steer safely between the two opposite dangers of believing too little or of believing too much."⁴ We can neither limit belief to proof, for that would be to cut ourselves off from possibilities of truth that have a momentous importance for us; nor exempt our belief altogether from criticism, for that would be to forfeit our principal means to truth. There are genuine 'options' for belief, options that are 'live' in that there is an incentive to choose, and 'forced' in that not to choose is still virtually to choose.⁵ Where such an option exists, hope may be allowed to convert objective or theoretical probability into subjective certainty. And the one momentous case of this is religion.

2. *Reflex action and theism.*—That religious belief which is at once most probable on theoretical grounds, and most rational in the broader sense of making a "direct appeal to all those powers of our nature which we hold in highest esteem,"⁶ is theism.

¹*Op. cit.*, p. 90. Cf. p. 1, and *Meaning of Truth*, p. 256.

²*Will to Believe*, p. 55.

³*Op. cit.*, p. 97.

⁴*Op. cit.*, p. xi. Cf. p. 128.

⁵*Op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁶*Op. cit.*, p. 110. Cf. pp. 115-116.

God is conceived as 'the deepest power in the universe,' and a power not ourselves, 'which not only makes for righteousness, but which means it, and which recognizes us.'¹ "To coöperate with His creation by the best and rightest response seems all He wants of us."² Such an interpretation of the world most completely answers our needs. "At a single stroke, it changes the dead blank *it* of the world into a living *thou*, with whom the whole man may have dealings." "Our volitional nature must, then, until the end of time, exert a constant pressure upon the other departments of the mind to induce them to function to theistic conclusions."³ Here, then, is the possible and the profoundly desirable religious truth. To neglect it is to disbelieve it, which is equally arbitrary, and involves all the practical loss beside. While to accept it is to help make it true, since human efforts may assist in establishing the supremacy of the good. But what evidence may be adduced in its support?

The answer to this question consists partly in the removal of difficulties, such as the dogmatism of science, and the problem of "the compounding of consciousness";⁴ partly in the application to the religious experience of the theory of a 'subconscious self.' "We have in the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come, a positive content of religious experience which, it seems to me, is literally and objectively true as far as it goes."⁵ When we ask 'how far our transmarginal consciousness carries us if we follow it on its remoter side,' 'our over-beliefs begin'; but the evidence afforded by mystical experiences, thus construed by means of an established psychological theory, creates 'a decidedly formidable probability' in favor of the theistic hypothesis.⁶

3. *The dilemma of determinism.*—The belief in freedom, like the belief in God, cannot be proved. Here, again, belief has an option between a rigidly determined world and a world with alternative possibilities in it. Determinism "professes that

¹*Op. cit.*, p. 122.

²*Op. cit.*, p. 141.

³*Op. cit.*, p. 127.

⁴See above, p. 6.

⁵*Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 515. Cf. also "The Energies of Men," *PHIL. REVIEW*, Vol. XVI, 1907, pp. 1 ff.

⁶*Op. cit.*, pp. 513, 524; *Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 309 ff.

those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint and decree what the other parts shall be."¹ Indeterminism, on the other hand, means that several futures are really possible, in the sense of being compatible with the same past. After the fact the one sequel is as reasonable as the other, and the fact itself throws no light on the question whether 'another thing might or might not have happened in its place.'² For this reason the facts themselves can neither establish determinism nor disprove it. And since the facts are not decisive, man is warranted in taking into account the grave practical issues that are at stake. If the hypothesis of freedom be true, it relieves man from what would otherwise be an intolerable situation; and if he fails to accept the hypothesis because his doubts are not entirely dispelled, he virtually chooses the alternative which is worse without being any more probable.

From a moral or religious point of view a determined world is a world in which evil is not only a fact, as it must be on any hypothesis, but a necessity. "Calling a thing bad means, if it mean anything at all, that the thing ought not to be, that something else ought to be in its stead. Determinism, in denying that anything else can be in its stead, virtually defines the universe as a place in which what ought to be is impossible,—in other words, as an organism whose constitution is afflicted with an incurable taint, an irremediable flaw."³ In such a universe there are only two religious alternatives, despair or renunciation—a hopeless complaint that such a world should be, or the cultivation of a subjective willingness that *anything* should be. To adopt the latter alternative, or 'gnosticism,' as the only course that will bring peace of mind, is 'to abandon the judgment of regret,' and substitute an intellectual, sentimental, or sensual condoning of evil for the healthy moral effort to eradicate it.⁴ Indeterminism, on the other hand, is a doctrine of *promise* and *relief*.⁵ It offers me 'a world with a *chance* in it of being altogether good'; an escape from evil "by dropping it out altogether, throwing it

¹"Dilemma of Determinism," in *Will to Believe*, p. 150. Cf. *passim*.

²*Op. cit.*, p. 152. Cf. pp. 146, 156.

⁴*Op. cit.*, pp. 162 ff.

³*Op. cit.*, pp. 161-162.

⁵*Pragmatism*, pp. 119 ff.

overboard and getting beyond it, helping to make a universe that shall forget its very place and name."¹

Although the belief in freedom is in the end an act of faith, there is evidence for its possibility or even probability. Freedom is not incompatible with any uniformity that has been discovered, but only with the dogma that uniformity must be absolute even if it has not been found to be so. If there be any real novelty in the world, any respects in which the future is not merely an unfolding of the past, then that is enough to leaven the whole. In the case of freedom of the will all that is required is 'the character of novelty in activity-situations.' The 'effort' or activity-process is the form of a whole 'field of consciousness,'² and all that is necessary for freedom is that the duration and intensity of this process should not be 'fixed functions of the object.'³ That the experience of activity should contribute something wholly new when it arises, is not only consistent with the facts ascertained by psychology, but is also in keeping with the general principles of radical empiricism. Old terms may enter into new relations; the unity of the world is not over-arching and static but a continuity from next to next, permitting of unlimited change without disconnection and disorder. Indeterminism is thus no more than is to be looked for in a pluralistic universe.

4. *Pluralism and moralism.*—Pluralism is essentially no more than the denial of absolute monism. 'Absolute unity brooks no degrees'; whereas pluralism demands no more than that "you grant *some* separation among things, *some* tremor of independence, some free play of parts on one another, some real novelty or chance, however minute."⁴ And pluralism in this sense follows directly from James's theory of knowledge. In the first place, absolute monism loses its authority the moment its *a priori* necessity is disproved. To account for knowledge otherwise is to render all this elaborate speculative construction un-

¹*Op. cit.*, p. 297; *Will to Believe*, p. 178, and pp. 173 ff.

²*Pluralistic Universe*, p. 391, note. Cf. above, pp. 6 ff.

³*Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 571. Cf. pp. 569-579, *passim*.

⁴*Pragmatism*, p. 160. Cf. Lecture IV, *passim*.

necessary. As a hypothesis it is not wholly out of the question,¹ but it will not bear comparison with pluralism for intellectual economy, and it brings a number of artificial difficulties in its train.² Second, there is positive evidence for the pluralistic hypothesis in the fact of 'external relations.' "It is just because so many of the conjunctions of experience seem so external that a philosophy of pure experience must tend to pluralism in its ontology." Relations may be arranged according to their relatively conjunctive or disjunctive character: 'confluence,' 'conterminousness,' 'contiguousness,' 'likeness,' 'nearness' or 'simultaneousness,' 'in-ness,' 'on-ness,' 'for-ness,' 'with-ness,' and finally mere 'and-ness.' With its parts thus related the universe has still enough unity to serve as a topic of discourse, but it is a unity of 'concatenation,' rather than of 'co-implication.'³

The importance of such a conclusion for religious purposes is apparent. On the one hand, as we have already seen, evil is not necessarily implied by the rest of the universe, so that the universe as a whole is not compromised or irremediably vitiated by it. But on the other hand it must be admitted that the good is in a like position. The supremacy of the good is not guaranteed, but is only made possible, and is thrown into the future as a goal of endeavor. Pluralism 'has no saving message for incurably sick souls.'⁴ It is no philosophy for the 'tender-minded'; it makes life worth living only for those in whom the fighting spirit is alive.⁵ In the introduction to the *Literary Remains* of his father, James distinguished between the religious demand for an ultimate well-being, and that *healthy-minded moralism* in which "the life we then feel tingling through us vouches sufficiently for itself, and nothing tempts us to refer it to a higher source."⁶ It is this note which dominates James's philosophy of life. It accounts for his relatively slight interest in immortality.⁷ He

¹*Will to Believe*, p. vii; *Pluralistic Universe*, p. 292.

²*Meaning of Truth*, pp. 125 sq.

³*Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 321-326, 358-361. Cf. Lecture VIII and Appendix A, *passim*. Cf. also above, p. 18.

⁴*Meaning of Truth*, p. 228.

⁵Cf. *Pragmatism*, Lecture I, and "Is Life Worth Living?" in *Will to Believe*.

⁶Cf. 116-119.

⁷*Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 524; *Human Immortality*, p. 3.

did not feel the necessity of being assured in advance of his own personal safety. With his characteristic tenderness of mind where the interests of others were in question, he sympathized deeply with the more importunate and helpless cravings of the religious spirit. But as for himself, he was "willing to take the universe to be really dangerous and adventurous, without therefore backing out and crying 'no play.'"¹ "The essence of good is simply to satisfy demand." But the tragic fact is, that demands conflict, and exceed the supply. Though God be there as 'one of the claimants,' lending perspective and hopefulness to life, the victory is not yet won. If we have the courage to accept this doubtful and perilous situation as it is, "there is but one unconditioned commandment, which is that we should seek incessantly, with fear and trembling, so to vote and to act as to bring about the very largest total universe of good which we can see."²

These, I believe, are the bare essentials of James's philosophy, and the thread of reasoning by which they are connected. A summary such as this, must altogether miss the pictorial and dramatic quality of his thought. That which is most characteristic of him cannot be restated; for his own style was its inevitable and only adequate expression. But I offer this rude sketch in the hope that it may help those who seek to apprehend this philosophy as a whole. James's field of study, the panoramic view within which all of his special problems fell, was the lot of mankind. On the one hand stands the environment, an unbidden presence, tolerating only what will conform to it, threatening and hampering every interest, and yielding only reluctantly and gradually to moral endeavor. On the other hand stands man, who, once he gets on good terms with this environment, finds it an inexhaustible mine of possibilities. 'By slowly cumulative strokes of choice,' he has extricated out of this, like a sculptor, the world he *lives* in.³ James never confused *the* world with man's world, but he made

¹*Pragmatism*, p. 296.

²"The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life," in *Will to Believe*, pp. 201, 209, 212, and *passim*.

³*Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 289.

man's world, thus progressively achieved, the principal object of his study. Man conquers his world first by knowing it, and thus presenting it for action; second, by acting on it, and thus remoulding it to suit his purposes. But these operations are the inseparable parts of one activity through which a humanized and moralized world is developed out of the aboriginal potentialities. So philosophy becomes the study of man as he works out his salvation. What is his endowment and capacity? How does his knowing take place, and what are the marks of its success? What forms does reality assume as it passes through the medium of the human mind? What are the goods which man seeks? What are the grounds, and what is the justification, of his belief in ultimate success?

The characteristics of James's mind were intimately connected with his conception of the mission of philosophy. He was distinguished by his extraordinary sense for reality. He had a courageous desire to know the worst, to banish illusions, to take life at its word, and accept its challenge. He had an unparalled capacity for apprehending things in their human aspect, as they fill the mind, and are assimilated to life. So indefatigable was his patience in observing these conjunctions and transitions in their rich detail, that few of his critics have had patience enough even to follow his lead. True to his empirical ideals, he abandoned the easier and more high-handed philosophy of abstractions for the more difficult and less conclusive philosophy of concrete particulars. And finally, he had a sure instinct for humanly interesting and humanly important problems. He sought to answer for men the questions the exigencies of life led them to ask. And where no certain answer was to be had, since men must needs live notwithstanding, he offered the prop of faith. Making no pretense of certainty where he found the evidence inconclusive, he felt the common human need of forging ahead even though the light be dim. Thus his philosophy was his way of bringing men to the wisest belief which in their half-darkness they could achieve. He was the frank partizan of mankind, undeceiving them when necessary, but giving them the benefit of every doubt.

RALPH BARTON PERRY.

SOCIETY AND STATE.

IT is a noteworthy fact that most of the serious attempts, during the last century and a half, to reach a comprehensive political principle, have owed their inspiration to Hellenic ideas. This is as true for Rousseau, "citizen of Geneva," whose abstract love of "nature" transmuted itself into a very concrete affection for a city-state, as for certain writers of our own day, and especially Professor Bosanquet, with his ideal of "Christian Hellenism,"¹ itself inspired by the great Hellenic thought of Hegel. This Hellenism has indeed taught us so much that it may seem ungrateful to accuse it of misleading us. Yet the conditions of our modern life are in some respects very different from those of Hellenic society. In particular, within the small circles of the Greek world certain distinctions lay concealed which in the wider reach of the modern community are or should be manifest. An application to modern life of a purely Hellenic theory is on that account dangerous, and seems to the writer to have in fact misled many of those theorists who, from Rousseau onwards, have adopted it,—who have found in Hellenism the key to the modern state.

Within the small circle of the Greek city the distinction of state and society lay concealed. It might be interesting to trace the rise of this distinction in the political consciousness of later ages,² but here it must suffice to say, that the distinction is an essential one and that its validity is shown by the incoherence of the logic which obscures or denies it. In particular, the theory of the general will is, in the hands of most of its interpreters, a virtual denial of this necessary distinction, and I propose before going further to examine briefly the forms of this doctrine held respectively by Rousseau, Hegel, and Professor Bosanquet, and

¹*Essays and Addresses*, p. 48.

²Ritchie (*Principles of State-Interference*, p. 157) quotes an early instance, viz., St. Thomas Aquinas (*De regimine principum*) translates the πολιτικὸν ζῷον of Aristotle by *animal sociale et politicum*.

to show that in every case they are vitiated by a too narrow Hellenism.

1. The General Will, said Rousseau, is the true sovereign and ultimate authority in a state, and, in its obvious sense, this is the accepted doctrine of all democratic states, whose machinery is so constructed that, in one way or another, the ultimate decision lies with the mass of voters, the "people." Politically, then, the "general will" is and must remain sovereign. So far Rousseau is justified. But Rousseau, not content with the necessary political sovereignty of the people, went on to show *not* that such a sovereignty was a moral thing, but that it was *identical* with a moral sovereignty. The general will, Rousseau explained, cannot err. The rightful sovereign *must* act rightfully. Now, that the sovereign "can do no wrong" is a logical and obvious legal position. Legality cannot transcend law; morality can, and it is just the necessary moral righteousness, not the legal rightness, of the sovereign that Rousseau was concerned to uphold. For him the political organization was in no way made distinct from the complex and indeterminate social structure and therefore the bonds of state were just the bonds that keep a society together, the moral sanctions of society. Thence arose the refinements of theory by which Rousseau vainly tries to maintain the identification. First, the general will is distinguished from the "will of all"—not in truth a distinction between two kinds of *political* willing—and then it is asserted that the former always wills the good, though it may be unenlightened. The legal formula asserts the legal rightness of the sovereign's action and leaves its moral rightness open, but the dictum of Rousseau asserts its moral rightness and thus makes the political sovereign an anomalous "person" liable, it may be, to intellectual error but in every other respect infallible,—a "person" absolutely good but somewhat short-sighted. It is the danger of modern Hellenism to confound the actual with the ideal, and in this strange conception of inerrant will united to fallible judgment we have a good instance of that confusion. Here already we find Rousseau losing hold of the political principle, seeking a political sovereign which no state can ever recognize because no state can ever find it.

Rousseau identified the common will with the good will, but without going into the difficult places of psychology we may say that, although it may be to the general interest or good that the general will should be fulfilled, the general will is not therefore the will for the general good. And the practical difficulty is no less than the psychological. A will which cannot be determined by any positive standard can never be a legislative authority or source of positive law. Will is liable to persuasion, and the persuading will is therefore sovereign over the persuaded. So the will of the people may be the will of a single individual, does sometimes mean the will of two or three. To analyze the complex of influences moral and social determining a given act of will, a specific act of legislation, is difficult in the extreme; to isolate among these determinants an original or sovereign will is impossible. For all practical purposes we must find a definitive sovereign, a political sovereign; we must ask not whether it is Pericles persuading the demos or Aspasia persuading Pericles, but what will it is that wills the decree, that actually commands or consents.

The whole attempt to identify the principle of democracy—as any other political principle—with that of morality is doomed to failure, and ends in setting on the political throne a crowned abstraction. For a will that is not realized, that is no man's will, is meaningless. What profit is it that this "general will" does not err—if it does nothing at all? Even if on any occasion the "general will" as understood by Rousseau came into being, it would simply be an interesting social fact, a coincidence; for political purposes it would be identical with a *majority*-will. In every case, therefore, the *majority*-will—which extended far enough becomes the "will of all"—must be the political principle, and to determine political obligation in terms of any other is worse than useless.

It is his consistent attempt to identify the political with the social order that leads Rousseau into the vagaries of his political logic. Why cannot the people be represented or act through deputy? Logically there seems to be no reason why the general will should not will legislation by its representative. But Rousseau is thinking of the whole complex of ideals and interests and

aims animating a society—and that cannot be represented. Why, again, does the *Contrat social*¹ afford us that strangest of all spectacles, the apostle of freedom prescribing “dogmas of civil religion,” declaring that “if anyone, after publicly acknowledging those dogmas, acts like an unbeliever of them, he should be punished with death”? Again the answer is that Rousseau has utterly failed to distinguish the sanctions of all social order from the proper bonds of the political organization.

2. Hegel² finds fault with Rousseau because, while rightly adhering to the principle of will, he “conceived of it only in the determinate form of the individual will and regarded the universal will not as the absolutely reasonable will (*an und für sich Vernünftige des Willens*) but only as the common will that proceeds out of the individual will as conscious.” It is a little like accusing the author of a physiological treatise of not writing a work on psychology when the writer has in fact merely mixed up the two. After all, is there not a common will and is not this common will the basis of any state or institution? Behind the definite institution, the work of conscious will, the philosopher may look for a rationality or universality which that conscious will yet has not for itself. It is at least permissible to search. But no fact is explained away by the greater rationality of another fact, and for the state, for any *institution*, the fact of will is just the fact of “common will, proceeding out of the individual will as conscious.” The will on which state-institutions are based must be a conscious will, the will of the citizens, or they would never come to be. State institutions are not built like the hexagons of a bee-hive, by an instinct of unconscious co-operation. Society in the wider sense is not an “institution” and there it may be permissible to look for a will or a reason that is greater than the will or the reason of the constituents. But though, in the construction of any institution, we may build wiser than we know, the plan of the building and the co-operation of the builders must be consciously resolved upon.

To Hegel as to Rousseau there was ever present the tendency

¹*Contrat social*, Bk. IV, c. 8.

²*Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, § 258.

to interpret the State in terms of Hellenism, and that in spite of his being credited with discovering the distinction of state and society. In reality his account of that distinction is neither clear nor satisfactory. The society which he distinguishes from the state—what he calls *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*—seems to hang strangely between actuality and ideality. It is a community resting on the “particularity” of desires, on economic need, and yet in discussing this economic community which is “different” from the state Hegel treats of law and police, essentially state institutions. On the other hand, the economic system is not the only social grouping, though a primary one, which can be distinguished from the state organization; we might equally distinguish, *e. g.*, the institutions through which arts and sciences develop, the educational system, the church, charitable institutions, *le haut monde*, and so on, names which cover a kaleidoscopic variety of constantly re-forming elements.¹ But the state cannot be regarded as absorbing within itself the free and living interplay of all these social forces; for one thing they are many of them not bounded by the limits of any state; and therefore it is absurd to say, *tout court*, that the *State* is “developed spirit,” “the world the spirit has made for itself,” and so forth.

3. The foregoing argument bears directly on the misconception of the “general will,” and I propose next to consider the more or less Hegelian account of that doctrine set forth in Professor Bosanquet’s book *The Philosophical Theory of the State*. In no modern work are the inconsistencies and contradictions of applied Hellenism more apparent.

Professor Bosanquet’s general position is as follows: Liberty is the condition of our “being ourselves” or willing ourselves, and this liberty is identified with the life of the state. “It is such a ‘real’ or rational will that thinkers after Rousseau have identified with the state. In this theory they are following the principles of Plato and Aristotle, no less than the indications which Rousseau furnished by his theory of the general will in

¹Hegel’s incidental treatment of these parts of the social system is bewildering. What is to be made of such a statement as the following: “Inasmuch as consciousness (*Wissen*) has its seat in the state, science (*Wissenschaft*) too has it there, and not in the church” (§ 270)?

connection with the work of the legislator. The State, when thus regarded, is to the general life of the individual much as we saw the family to be with regard to certain of his impulses. The idea is that in it, or by its help, we find at once discipline and expansion, the transfiguration of partial impulses, and something to do and to care for, such as the nature of a human self demands." He adds two considerations "to make this conception less paradoxical to the English mind." "(a) The State, as thus conceived, is not merely the political fabric. The term state accents indeed the political aspect of the whole, and is opposed to the notion of an anarchical society. But it includes the entire hierarchy of institutions by which life is determined, from the family to the trade, and from the trade to the Church and the University. It includes all of them, not as the mere collection of the growths of the country, but as the structure which gives life and meaning to the political whole, while receiving from it mutual adjustment and therefore expansion and a more liberal air. The State, it might be said, is thus conceived as the operative criticism of all institutions—the modification and adjustment by which they are capable of playing a rational part in the object of human will. . . . (b) The State, as the operative criticism of all institutions, is necessarily force; and in the last resort, it is the only recognized and justified force."¹

The first and greatest confusion into which Professor Bosanquet falls is that he uses the term "state" in two quite different senses. We find him, on the one hand, defining the state as a "working conception of life" (p. 151) or even, after Plato, as "the individual mind writ large" (p. 154)—and it is clear that here he means by state the unity of all the social forces at work in a community of human beings; on the other hand, when he comes to talk of state-action, it is at once obvious that he is now using 'state' in its proper signification of '*political* society,' with its definite form, its definite and limited type of action. Hence we are told that the means of the state are not *in pari materia* with the end (p. 187) and are left with the anomalous conclusion that the "real will," the "rational will," "the will that wills

¹*The Philosophical Theory of the State*, Ed. 1, pp. 149-152.

itself," can never will any positive action whatever, much less "itself," can only "hinder hindrances" (p. 191). Hindrances to what?

The same confusion underlies Professor Bosanquet's distinction of "real" and "actual" will, by means of which he attempts to solve the problem of political obligation. The distinction intended is itself a true and suggestive one, though wrongly expressed. It rests on the primary distinction of "good" and "seeming good." People will what, if they knew the case fully and truly, they would no longer will. They will the seeming good because it seems the good. It is an obvious fact enough, but I may set down as an illustration an instance mentioned by Balzac in the novel *Cousin Pons*. "The mortality in French hospitals," he declares, "caused by women who take food privately to their husbands has been so great that physicians have now resolved to enforce a rigid personal search of the patients on the days when their relatives come to see them." Now Professor Bosanquet's distinction of 'real' and 'actual' rather obscures the psychological relations here involved, and suggests a false antithesis of 'real' and 'actual' will. The opposition is not between two wills, a 'real' and an 'actual,' but within the single act of willing; between the motive and the intention, if we care to use such terms, or between the object intended, the giving of food, and the end it was meant to serve, the restoration to health of the husbands. There is but one object willed, the giving of food. We cannot say even that the health of the husbands was 'willed,' still less the death of those husbands. A motive or end is not an act of will, 'real' or otherwise. Would Professor Bosanquet say that these women 'really' willed the recovery of their husbands, but 'actually' willed the giving of food?¹

It has to be remembered that Professor Bosanquet introduces this distinction of 'real' and 'actual' will in order to answer the question of political obligation. "We have thus far been at-

¹It looks as if Professor Bosanquet's distinction rested on such an opposition as this:—they "really" will the recovery of their husbands, they "actually" *cause* their death—not an opposition in terms of will at all.

tempting to make clear what is meant by the identification of the state with the real will of the Individual in which he wills his own nature as a rational being; in which identification we find the only true account of political obligation" (p. 154). But this in fact does not touch the real problem. It is only too obvious that an 'actual' state is not the 'real' state of Professor Bosanquet, and the question of political obligation is: "On what grounds and how far is a citizen bound to obey the actual laws of the state?" What might be the principle of political obligation in an ideal state—where the question would never arise—is very different from what must be the principle under actual political conditions. The will of an actual state, in respect of any definite act of legislation, is and must be based on a majority-will. It is not because he finds his 'real' will embodied in legislation from which he actually dissents that the citizen is obedient to the law. A thorough-going identity of will is in the nature of the case impossible, and we must look instead for some persistent identity of interest, giving unity to the fundamental will on which the state, like any other institution, must rest, and consent—no longer unanimity—to the secondary acts of will through which the state fulfills its end. We ask too much if we expect an identity of will. In an actual state no individual can have this ideal, this harmony of his will and the state-will, realized all the time. Granting the first unity—the primary will for political life resting on the primary good of political life—we must thereafter be content to rest political obligation on common *good*, and at most only indirectly, through that notion, on common will.

Professor Bosanquet in fact refuses to recognize the necessities of the situation. To avoid Rousseau's difficulty that where a portion of the people must accept the will of another portion there is no freedom, Professor Bosanquet would declare that the general will is the rational will and thus true freedom—a double confusion for, first, the *political* principle must be the majority-will, and second, supposing *per impossibile* that the majority-will were purely rational, yet to identify freedom with enforced subjection to reason or good and to call such subjection self-government is indeed a "paradox." Doubtless a man may be forced

to be free—Rousseau's own dangerous paradox contains a certain truth—but to identify such enforcement with "self-government" is to strain language and meaning to the breaking point. It involves an impossible identification of good and will.

On both sides Professor Bosanquet's account fails to answer the concrete question of political obligation. The conception of an abstract self willing an abstract good will never be an explanation of why and when the actual citizen should loyally identify himself with the positive commands of a very concrete government, enforcing measures whose ultimate conformity to his own "true" nature he may not unreasonably refuse to take for granted.

The basal fallacy of all such views lies, as I have pointed out, in the identification of state and society, in the refusal to draw a clear distinction here. "We have hitherto," says Professor Bosanquet, "spoken of the State and Society as almost convertible terms. And in fact it is part of our argument that the influences of Society differ only in degree from the powers of the State, and that the explanation of both is ultimately the same" (p. 184). This position vitiates the whole of Professor Bosanquet's account of the state, and it may be well, therefore, if we attempt positively to distinguish the meanings of the two terms 'state' and 'society,' to point out so far as may be the relation of the political organization to the whole social order.¹ The difference involved is all-important, a difference of kind and not of degree, in fact almost the whole world of difference between an end and a means.

If the state does not absorb into its own life of organization the other forms of social life, the worlds of art, science, religion, and social intercourse, not to speak of the family life, in what relation does it stand to these? On the one hand, of course, the form of the state depends on the whole character of a society; it is just what it is because of the character and temperament of the people who make the state. But that is not the question. Relations of this character are not reciprocal. No doubt a hun-

¹Logically the Hegelian argument involves a thorough-going socialism, and that is why some socialist writers have rightly claimed Hegel as one of themselves in spite of much in his teaching that seems directly opposed to their doctrine.

dred social forces have determined the present shape of an Englishman's hat, but that work of art does not equally determine those social forces. In fact, determination would lose all meaning if it worked equally in opposite directions. The state, however, does exercise a certain control over the individual and social centres of movement and influence. In the first place, because of what it stands for, because it preserves and upholds through its organization the very existence of society, that being its primary end, it has a certain superiority of control, not merely of influence, over alike the partial organizations and the free life of society,—a control which in no way contradicts the essential claim to spontaneity made by that life. Suppose the state thought a certain religion undermined the security of society, it would interfere with that religion; suppose it thought a certain industrial concern deprived its workers of the opportunity to live as social beings, again it might interfere. It would here be protecting one social grouping against another.

But of course state-action has a much wider area than that just indicated. Individualistic writers like Mill and Spencer limited the state to that type of action, and so gave away their case. The state as the central organization can come forward to organize when such organization is clearly of advantage, and in this way exercise direct control over—though here it would be wrong to admit interference with—the various social activities. For one thing, the various and infinite societies which constantly arise within “society” develop secondary organizations, and these must be inter-organized. For another, the central protective organization can greatly further the partial organizations and thus the life which these support. Take, *e. g.*, the economic life of society. To a certain extent state-organization can develop that life without destroying its spontaneity,—and so we find the state regulating forms of contract, controlling coinage, determining the conditions of limited liability, establishing a bank, even assuming entire control of those industries which, so to speak, bind all other industries together and make their free development possible, the industries of intercommunication. Or again take family life. The family is not simply an element in

the state—after the desiccated conception of socialism—but essentially something more. Yet the state does not merely recognize and protect the family. It claims a certain control. It regards marriage, *e. g.*, as a political institution so far as to insist on certain regulations, registration and so forth, and it defines to some degree the rights and duties of relatives, making them legal and not merely social rights and duties. It might reasonably prohibit the marriage of persons suffering from certain forms of disease, though here, as always, the limit of state-intervention becomes a difficult *practical* problem.

The state is thus determinate, a closed organization of social life; while society is indeterminate, an ever-evolving system spreading beyond and only partially controlled by the definite network of the state. That network of organization, by enclosing within it a portion of society, gives that portion a certain unity and definition, but neither cuts it off from a wider society of which it is essentially part nor within that portion substitutes its own external mode of action, its necessity, for the spontaneity that is the mark of all life, social and other. Such a protective and controlling organization it would be better to think of as an enclosing and interpenetrating network than as, say, a shell, even a living and growing shell,—for it is essentially true that the whole social life of a community is not comprehended within the form of the state.

The question we are considering is in no sense “mere theory”—for political science there is no such thing—and we may finally turn briefly to consider certain important practical applications. I believe the answer to the socialist ideal must rest on the distinction just drawn, but into that larger question I shall not enter here.

1. Hellenistic writers such as Hobhouse¹ and Bosanquet often

¹For the Hellenism of Mr. Hobhouse *cf.* the following passage from *Morals in Evolution*: “Untroubled by any conflict between the secular and the spiritual power the Greeks could readily conceive a political society as an association for all the principal purposes of life that are not covered by the smaller association of the household. On this side their ideal of the state has never since been equalled.” On the contrary it has been the great beneficial result of the conflict between the secular and the spiritual power that more than anything else it has helped to make clear the essential distinction between state and society.

speak as if they were still living in the Aristotelian state four thousand citizens strong—as if a single centre of interests were still possible and the station and duties of the individual could be determined simply in terms of citizenship in a state. Such a view is wholly inadequate, not only because the modern state is too vast to serve such an end, but also because it is too much differentiated. The view in question overlooks the whole development of the political consciousness since Aristotle wrote his *Politics*. The state stands for an area of common good, not for the whole of common good. The life of the individual citizen cannot therefore be lived wholly in the light of the ideal for which the state stands. In modern conditions the ordinary citizen simply cannot live all the time for the state, though he can still die for it on occasion. For certain classes, indeed, for the politician, the civil servant, the soldier, social ends seem more nearly to identify themselves with the political end, but even for these, and in the attempt to serve such an end, there will arise in the very state-organization social groupings with narrower ideals, a political party, *e. g.*, or a military order. For an adequate social life smaller and nearer centres are necessary—the district, the city, the village, and the numerous associations they include. Social life can no longer in practice and should no longer in theory be centralized into state-life. The individual should not be summed up in his citizenship, otherwise the claim of citizenship will itself become a tyranny and its essential moral value be lost. “The modern wilderness of interests” will not be set in order by our pointing simply to the road of citizenship. For the main road of citizenship, which we must make straight as possible, though it intersects a thousand paths of social interest, cannot and should not absorb them.

2. These paths of social interest do not stop at the frontiers of states. The political interest is determinate and has limits, the social has none. Here, therefore, for the proper understanding of international relations, it is most necessary to distinguish state and society. On the assumption of identity we can have no unity of peoples until they are absorbed in some world-state. For each state by its very definition is a determinate and self-

sufficient unit. A man can belong to one alone, can owe allegiance to one alone. Citizenship has hard and fast limits. In respect to the sphere of its sovereignty every state is demarcated absolutely from every other. Consequently if political will were identical with social will, the members of one state would remain totally alien from those of every other state. States would stand to one another as Spinoza and Hobbes imagined them to stand, isolated as the pre-civil individuals of their imagination, totally independent until some contract is agreed upon, even then totally independent because there is no higher will to make agreement binding. But of course it is in international relations that the distinction of state and society is most clearly revealed and that the common interests of universal society most manifestly weave new unities in spite of political separation. A man may perhaps "denationalize" himself (though that is hardly the proper word) by leaving his country, but he cannot "desocialize" himself without leaving the world of men, or at least of civilized men.

Society, therefore, and not the state, is the "world the spirit has made for itself." "The spirit" does not isolate itself in states, as Hegel's argument assumes.¹ On the contrary, the growth of civilization means the growth of ever widening community, the "realization" of social interest beyond the limits of politically independent groups. Society widens and the sense of community grows. In particular, the privileged classes of the different peoples, the authors of most past wars, become more and more allied by social intercourse, by common commercial and intellectual interests. M. Tarde has pointed out how classes of men whose occupation, even if in a competitive way, brings them into constant association with one another develop a friendlier spirit towards one another than classes not subject to this socializing influence. The same holds of peoples. It is not civilization but inter-civilization that develops mutual sym-

¹Hegel is rather confusing on this point. For instance he says (*Gr. der Phil. des Rechts*, § 330) that the state is "not a private person but a completely independent totality" and yet immediately adds that it is related to other states (§ 331) and instances the nations of Europe as "forming a family on account of the universal principles of their legislation, their ethical usages, and their civilisation" (§ 339). How can "completely independent totalities" form a family?

pathy between states. The highly socialized Greek cities, because each held to an ideal of autonomy and self-sufficiency, the ideal of "completely independent totality," were not inter-socialized, and accordingly displayed the intensest hostility to one another. But the aloofness of Greek states is impossible in the modern world, which is pervaded by intersocializing influences of literature and commerce. Common ideas and common trade¹ have formed everywhere social bonds which cut across the line of states, and have made western Europe, looked on as a whole, an effective society. Thus an educated Englishman comes to have more in common with an educated Frenchman than he has, say, with an English agricultural laborer. The alien, shut out from his state, has yet a closer social affinity to him than his fellow citizen.

We should note here that it is just on the sense of community that organization rests. Political organization, the completest and most self-sufficient of all organizations and indeed the most necessary, ultimately requires a definite kind and degree of felt community. But there are other degrees and forms of community. At a certain stage every society, every grouping founded on whatever sense of community, becoming conscious of its unity, strengthens or confirms it by some form of organization, makes for itself as it were an integument of organization, so there are as many types of organization as there are of society. The political society is based on the distinctive organization of law, other societies develop quasi-legal or contract organizations which in turn the political society, as possessing the supremest form of organization, tends to inter-organize. But when the community extends beyond the limits of a state, the single state can no longer of itself ratify the society. So international relations arise, which are no longer strictly legal relations at all, but only approximations to these. There may be many degrees of approximation,

¹For this reason universal Free Trade would be preferable to universal protection. I may quote Hobhouse on this point: "The doctrine of natural liberty, particularly as preached by Cobden and the Free Traders, also told heavily on the side of peace, just as the recrudescence of militarism in our own day has been associated, not in this country alone, with economic protection." *Morals in Evolution*, Vol. I, p. 278.

representing many degrees of international social integration, from alliances and federations down to the minimal organization represented by Berlin treaties and Hague conventions, extradition laws, and so forth. A federation of Europe would, therefore in no sense be a new thing. Europe is already federated.

At the same time we should perhaps further note that those writers are mistaken who assume as a logical development of this principle an ultimate world-empire.¹ The principle is that a felt community between men in course of time produces a contract organization in respect to all definitely recognized common elements, that every society, when it becomes conscious of itself, develops an institutional aspect. But community can be felt only in so far as community exists; and the amount of community necessary for a true political society, is, as experience has shown, a very large one. Community must, perhaps should, always be partial, is rendered partial at the outset by the ultimate fact that men and peoples are marked off from one another not only by their own necessary differences but also by their occupancy of different portions of the earth's soil. It is on this difference that the territorial state is immediately based, making certain boundaries, often not very obvious boundaries, the rigid dividing line where one sovereignty ends and another begins. In such territorial states it is at once obvious that the political line is not a social frontier as well. So far as the territorial principle goes, country is marked off from country just on the principle on which district is separated from district and parish from neighboring parish. Of course between districts, and even between parishes, further differences are found, and so between countries there are differences of national type, temperament, education, and language, sufficient to justify at once the community and the separation involved in political society, the determinations of government which constitutes a state. A world-state would mean that the world had become in certain definite respects an homogeneous society. But as a general rule community and separation, centralization and decentralization, both within and beyond the limits of the state, and just because of the

¹Cf. Tarde, *Les lois de l'imitation*, Ed. 2, Ch. 8, p. 420.

social forces that underlie the state, must go hand in hand, must develop *pari passu*, the two being not antagonistic but complementary principles. Most empires have been failures because they pursued the principles of centralization alone: the Roman empire in particular, when at the last it became a world state and not simply an aggregation of states around one central state, showed how impossible it was for a completely centralized system to meet the needs of peoples of different temperaments and living under very different physical and social conditions. If centralization is necessary for peace and order, decentralization is equally necessary for development and life.

I have tried to point out one or two applications of this vital distinction of state and society. There are many others to be made, and of these the economic application is perhaps the most important. It is only by keeping this distinction in mind that we can hope to understand the difficult relations of political and economic forces. But to touch on this subject here would be unduly to extend the limits of this paper.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF HENRI BERGSON, II.

THAT Bergson is a pragmatist is an assumption that has been generally made both by the pragmatists themselves and by their opponents. Pragmatism is, of course, first and foremost an epistemology, but when the accusation is made that pragmatists have no metaphysics to offer would-be disciples, the reply often takes the form of a reference to Bergson. Here, it is said, is an instance of a pragmatic philosophy which includes both epistemology and metaphysics. A similar exception is sometimes made by anti-pragmatists with respect to the somewhat sweeping condemnation meted out by them to their adversaries. Bergson, they admit, is neither so unsystematic nor so illogical as his fellows; and the form which he has given to pragmatism is one which must be more seriously reckoned with than the English and American versions. Even a cursory examination of Bergson's theories, however, will show that such an assumption as that mentioned is not wholly justified by the facts. While he is undoubtedly in sympathy with the pragmatic attitude toward knowledge and toward rationalistic systems of philosophy, yet many of his views are incompatible with those of pragmatism as usually understood. Indeed, he appears in the anomalous position of protagonist of a philosophical standpoint which he only partially shares.

The very relation between the different divisions of Bergson's system marks a distinction between him and the other pragmatists. The latter, when they achieve a metaphysic at all, as is the case, for instance, with F. C. S. Schiller, do so by the way of epistemology, while Bergson's theories have developed in exactly the opposite direction. His epistemology is the result of his metaphysics, not *vice versa*. For him the problem of knowledge becomes important because of its relation to that of the nature of reality, and he resolves it in the course of his consideration of the latter question. Differences in mode of procedure are, to be sure, of subordinate importance, and how-

ever it may be reached, Bergson's epistemology is strongly pragmatic in its utilitarian view of the intellect. Perception, and the whole construction of the universe founded upon perception, are instruments of action, not mirrors or symbols of a reality revealed to us through their means. The so-called truths of reason are tools and tools alone. The formulæ of common sense as well as the concepts of exact science are modes of making action possible, and their theoretical value consists in their practical significance. Yet besides all this, Bergson recognizes the existence of a truth which, though not accessible to the intellect, is no less a truth; and one moreover to which there corresponds a special knowing faculty. A theory which represents the ultimate nature of reality as known, whether this knowledge comes by means of reason or of instinct, and whether it is the special endowment of men or of insects, can hardly be reckoned as pragmatism. Although what is ordinarily called truth is the formulation of ideas which facilitate action, although the range of common sense and of the discursive reason, of every-day life and of exact science, is determined by the needs of an active being which, just because of its manifold activity, requires various forms of satisfaction, nevertheless the cessation of this activity makes possible an immediate contact with reality. Pragmatism provides an adequate account of superficial life and thought, but does not sound the depths of either.

Probably the reason why people generally ignore the unpragmatic elements in Bergson's philosophy is to be sought in its voluntaristic character. Pragmatism is opposed to every rationalistic system; Bergson's theories are also incompatible with rationalism; and since they are united against a common enemy, it is natural to suppose them more alike than they really are. One might say, perhaps, that they maintain the same attitude toward science but have an entirely different conception of the nature of philosophy. That which for the pragmatist is the end is for Bergson merely the beginning, or even an obstacle which must be overcome before the commencement of any philosophy worthy of the name.

Every attempt at an evaluation of Bergson's system must

recognize its broad compass. It is not confined to one or two divisions of philosophical thought, but embraces, at least schematically, almost its whole range. The initial assumptions of physics, psychology, and biology are all dealt with in turn, and all made to form an integral part of the system. Bergson gives us no ethics, but with this exception there is hardly a single great question of philosophy wholly disregarded. He shows none of that tendency toward specialization, which is so marked a characteristic of scientific philosophers; and though he has not escaped all the dangers that beset the broader view, he at least manifests no desire to substitute some single problem for the riddle of the universe. The difficulties of his system are many and often depend upon details; some are inherent in the nature of the subject, others perhaps could be resolved by their author; but they may all be reduced to three main problems, namely: (1) intelligence and instinct, (2) time and space, and (3) matter and perception. Upon the first depends one's view of Bergson's epistemology, while the other two are more strictly metaphysical questions. All three are related to one another and all are important, but the second, that of the nature of time and space, is the most fundamental and thus provides a basis for the others. Nevertheless, for purposes of convenience, the epistemological question will be treated first.

That the intellect is a tool of action and not a means of knowledge is a view that has been too thoroughly discussed in recent years to require much consideration here. It has the advantages and disadvantages of every pragmatic epistemology. A serious difficulty peculiar to Bergson at once presents itself, however, as soon as we try to determine the status of memory. Reason is apparently regarded from the sensationalistic standpoint, and to understand it one needs only to study perception. Pure perception is an abstraction, the result of analysis, and every concrete experience is made up of perception *plus* memory. "Every perception is an acquired perception." In memory the entire past continues to exist, and such part of it as is useful to the present occasion forces its way into consciousness and makes the perception something different from what it would otherwise be.

The choice of memories depends altogether upon the requirements of the action concerned. So far the instrumental character of intelligence is preserved; but memory itself is described as disinterested and as pressing with its whole weight against the door opened to it by perception, so that irrelevant memories often appear together with those useful to the occasion. They play no part in abstract thought, but furnish the basis for art and philosophy, which are both altogether outside the range of the intellect. The principal difficulty lies in the conception to be formed of the content of memory. A sharp distinction is made between memory proper and habitual motor response to any given stimulus, and the difference between the former and perception is said to be one of kind, not of degree. Memory in the strict sense of the term has only an indirect connection with the brain, in that the latter acts as a selective tool, by means of which useful memories are brought into consciousness through their motor relations. In his general discussion of cerebral localization, Bergson proves, it seems to me, that the facts admit of a different interpretation, but in his criticism of particular theories he is often guilty of misinterpretation. For instance, where he says that the regular progress of auditory aphasia, which affects first proper names, then common nouns, and then verbs, would be incomprehensible if cerebral localization were true, he speaks of words as if they were things laid up in the brain like a box.¹ Moreover, does any psychologist since Hume regard the difference between perception and memory as merely that of greater and less vividness? In insisting upon other differences Bergson is uttering psychological commonplaces. It is true, to be sure, that when he says perception and memory are different in kind, he appears to be thinking especially of characteristics only partially visible to introspection; yet it is difficult to get any clear idea of what these are. Memory becomes conscious only when complicated with perception, yet it exists in its entirety when not so complicated. Of course, everyone must admit that he remembers things of which he is not conscious at any given moment, but it is a question whether

¹*Matière et mémoire*, p. 127.

this means more than a motor tendency; either physical or psychical, and whether the available memories can be said to have meantime an unconscious psychical existence. Bergson maintains that we have no difficulty in conceiving the existence of objects outside of consciousness, and that the unconscious existence of subjects is equally clear.¹ Perhaps that is true, if the terms are used in the same significance, but it is impossible to discover just what Bergson means by the unconscious existence of memory; certainly nothing like a permanent possibility of perception, for memory is not the basis of perception but its reproduction.² Moreover, with the motor conditions as Bergson describes them, how is disinterested memory ever possible? How do we ever approach that state of dreaming which in its purest form constitutes artistic creation? The intrusion of useless memories into consciousness seems to be a wholly gratuitous assumption. Again, since memory is a repetition of experience, even though each moment contains the entire past compressed into itself, its content must be largely the same as perception. Then since perception is constructed with a view to the interests of action, how does memory ever become disinterested? Why should it be so much more real than perception?

It is perfectly possible that these difficulties and other similar ones in connection with Bergson's account of memory are due to misunderstanding, and that they would disappear in a fuller treatment of the subject. The same thing is true with respect to the questions suggested by his treatment of instinct, though the latter are difficulties in the interpretation of facts rather than of theory. I cannot see what there is either in human and animal psychology or in biological history to justify the distinction made between intellect and instinct and the assertion that, whereas the former is a tool for action, the latter is a faculty of knowledge. Everything seems to show that so far as contact with reality is concerned, the two must stand or fall together. They both have the same origin, for both have appeared in the course of the development of animal organisms under essentially the same conditions. So far as we can see, both are useful to

¹*Op. cit.*, p. 154.

²*Op. cit.*, p. 168.

their possessors; and if there is any difference in this respect, instinct would seem to be more utilitarian than intellect. In both man and animal, instinct has to do with activities directly or indirectly necessary to the preservation of the individual or of the race. The form which instinct takes in the animal is, apart from its results, a matter of conjecture, but the study of human instincts yields no trace of a faculty that is without relation to action. Of course, it may be said that although instinct gives us no knowledge about things, yet it nevertheless provides an acquaintance with them, and that the latter is the superior form of knowledge, but I see no evidence that it does even this. Bergson speaks of intuition as if it were a more developed form of instinct, but the difference seems to be in the direction of a more conscious recognition of the purpose of instinct, which would thus bring intuition into closer relation with the intellect..

In short, the whole biological account of intellect and instinct, if regarded as a statement of facts, makes improbable any radical distinction between them. Such a thorough-going separation in function and significance would be much easier to comprehend if they were not both embodiments of the same vital impulse. Moreover, if any appeal at all is to be made to biology, her own view of the relation between instinct and intellect should be at least considered. Intellect and instinct, regarded as knowing faculties, differ from each other in degree and not in kind. Bergson admits that we never get either entirely pure and separate from the other, and he thus provides an explanation for the similarity in the concrete experiences in which either intellect or instinct predominates. He shows his caution also in pointing out the impossibility of making hard and fast statements with regard to the characteristics of either; although such a description in terms of tendencies rather than of the possession of invariable qualities implies differences of degree and not those of kind. For example, intellect is said to be turned toward consciousness and instinct toward unconsciousness. This is doubtless true, but is hardly a confirmation of the theory in question. Another difference, which cannot be so easily ac-

cepted, is that which ascribes to intellect the construction of forms which may be applied to any and every content, while instinct is made conversant with the content itself considered quite apart from form. Even with the limitations mentioned above, it is doubtful whether any such distinction can be made between the form and the content of knowledge. What Bergson apparently means is the difference between 'acquaintance with' and 'knowledge about,' but he overlooks the fact that each not only implies the other but, to a certain extent, at least, is that other. If, for the sake of the argument, the validity of the distinction be assumed, there at once appears the difficulty of reconciling it with another characterization of intellect and instinct through their opposite qualities, in which intellect is declared to be applied to the animate, instinct to the inanimate. Instinct makes use of organic structures and functions; intellect manufactures its own tools out of inorganic substances. Instinct deals with life, intellect with inert matter. Is there then no 'knowledge about' the organic and no 'acquaintance with' the inorganic? And why should attention to living rather than to inanimate existences be a proof of disinterestedness and an evidence that instinct is a knowing faculty?

But difficult as it is to form a clear idea of instinct and of its relation to intellect, the fundamental problem of Bergson's epistemology concerns the nature of knowledge itself. For him no knowledge is possible if subject and object are kept separate; the relation between knowing subject and its object is that of identity. Peter can know Paul only by becoming Paul, and thus having experiences which are not merely like Paul's, but are actually his. There ceases to be any Peter as distinguished from Paul. Reflection upon an event, for instance one's own conscious processes, is not knowledge at all. Such a view is, of course, not new, and many recognized facts of experience, especially those of feeling and emotion, may be cited in its favor. We say that a man may write learnedly of anger and of compassion, of æsthetic appreciation and of religious ecstasy, but that he cannot really know that of which he is speaking until he has experienced in himself the feelings described. In fact, every

elementary conscious process, which is from its very simplicity incapable of definition, is a case in point. There can be no real knowledge prior to experience. Nevertheless this is not equivalent to a refusal to recognize any distinction between knowledge and experience; much less does it mean that the experiencing subject becomes his experience. There is no possible way in which knowledge, in the ordinary sense of the term, can be made to fit this conception; and though Bergson would doubtless reply that he is expressly avoiding the usual significance, he does not substitute for it any comprehensible idea. To deny that it can be defined or described is simply to put it outside all possible discussion, to make it a word and nothing more.

If knowledge is taken in this way as an identification of subject and object, the choice of instinct as the knowing faculty becomes in a certain sense justified. The predominance of feeling, the tendency toward a degree of consciousness not much above the limen, the very lack of clearness, would all be in its favor. If Bergson's view of knowledge is accepted, then his account of the development of instinct to its culminating point in the hymenoptera, which are thus made superior to men in capacity for knowledge, ceases to be improbable and becomes a verifiable hypothesis which may easily prove to be well-founded. Whether such a statement, even if proven, could be regarded as knowledge, would of course be doubtful. Instead, it would appear to be merely a tool for action and thus restricted to the number of the intellect's useful fabrications. True knowledge could hardly contain theories at all, even Bergson's theories. To reply to objections, as he does, with an exhortation to take the risk and thus experience knowledge, is an absurdity. It is as if a man replied to a denial that mathematical properties could be predicated of virtue with a command to be of good courage and compute its square root. The philosophy which will result from taking leave of the intellect will be, of course, a philosophy made up of intuitions with no rational significance. We must have a philosophy which is lived and willed, not one that is thought. If by such a philosophy Bergson meant a theory of the conduct of life which should include its practical application, one could

understand him, though this would be an unfortunate limitation of the term; but apparently the philosophy of his dreams will be equally free from application and from theory, since both are inextricably bound up with the intellect.

The second of the three main problems presented by Bergson's system is that of duration of time and its relation to space. The two notions are so commonly regarded as correlative, it is so universally assumed that what is true of the one will be true of the other, that to separate them and to regard one of them as real while the other is not, seems to be at first sight a wholly arbitrary speculation without any rational basis. Nevertheless, although the theory has aroused much hostile criticism, some of its strangeness is purely a matter of terminology. When we speak of time and space as each implying the other, we mean homogeneous time and homogeneous space, and Bergson would be the last to deny the applicability of the same mode of conception to them both. The trouble is that when Bergson speaks of time without any modifying adjective, he means something altogether different from the abstract and spatialized succession designated as homogeneous time. Time considered as duration is life, movement, activity, an eternal flux in which each moment includes within itself the whole of its past and for which no repetition is possible. Bare succession, on the other hand, abstracted from all notion of content or of rate of movement, must be imaged, if imaged at all, in terms of space. A good deal of what Bergson says concerning homogeneous time and its spatial characteristics may be due to his evident preference for visual imagery. Whatever one may think of his explanation of space itself, the latter is in perfect agreement with his conception of homogeneous time; and the polemic which he addresses against the tendency to translate quality into terms of quantity, and to regard it as thereby explained instead of destroyed, as it must be by such a transformation, is in the highest degree justified.

When Bergson makes duration the fundamental reality, he is not speaking of time in the usual sense of the term. Time proper is not opposed to space as the reality to the appearance, but is its correlative. Duration, on the contrary, means succession in

the sense of change, which may be symbolized by a flowing current, but concerning which one must always remember that nothing is ever lost from the stream. The present includes the past in a heterogeneity where nothing is exterior to anything else, but where multiplicity signifies complexity with no numerical coloring. It is the complexity of a musical composition, not that of a heap of bricks. To prove that duration is the ultimate reality, Bergson appeals to intuition. Anyone who will take the trouble to examine the depths of his own consciousness will find under all the spatialized constructions of the intellect the successive heterogeneity which constitutes duration. The findings of introspection are definite and unambiguous, and no one who makes the attempt will be in doubt as to the nature of the result. The obvious answer to such a mode of argument is that as a matter of fact intuition is extremely ambiguous, and people differ both as to their results and also as to the significance of the latter. It is quite as easy to look upon one's own reality as a permanent ego that abides amid changes as it is to regard it as an eternal flux. The ultimate nature of change is by no means self-evident. Like other ultimate conceptions it is accepted or rejected by something much resembling an act of faith.

It is difficult to decide to what extent Bergson intends duration to be regarded as conscious. I must admit that I do not understand what is meant by psychical existence which is unconscious, unless the term is taken to imply the permanent or shifting conditions of consciousness, which are not represented by Bergson as in any way incompatible with matter and so could hardly be called psychical. The duration which constitutes the reality of each experiencing individual is a part of the larger duration which is described in *L'évolution créatrice* as the vital impulse and which is said to be analogous to consciousness. On the one hand, duration and memory are identified and both said to be unconscious; on the other, consciousness is declared to be activity rather than existence, and so could not fail to be merged in duration. The whole difficulty, however, is one of those that might be solved by fuller explanations from Bergson and is not necessarily inherent in the subject.

The main problem is, of course, that which was the point at issue between Heracleitus and the Eleatics, namely, the relative value of permanence and of change. Every voluntaristic philosophy seems bound to decide for the latter, to resolve things into processes, and substance into flux. Why, Bergson asks, should we find it so much easier to posit logical existence than physical or psychical? Why should we suppose that anything continues or that there is anything to continue? *Πάντα ῥεῖ*,—even those figments of the reason by which we strive to give permanence to the changing, fixity to the free play of vital impulse, and substance to activity. Again the appeal is not to intellect but to faith.

With regard to the third question, it has been pointed out more than once that Bergson's view of matter is confused and contradictory and that he does not really determine its status. He says, to be sure, that materialism and idealism are equally false and that both may be avoided by the recognition that the material world really is exactly what it appears to be; but he fails to see that people have always been at issue concerning the nature of the appearance, no less than with regard to that of the underlying reality. To say that objects are there where we see them, and that perception belongs to the object rather than to the subject, sounds satisfactory, but in reality provides no suggestion as to what it means to be an object and what is signified by its existence. When Bergson develops his own theories instead of arguing against those of other thinkers, he gives two descriptions of matter which hardly seem compatible with each other. Matter is defined as the sum of images and also as a movement interrupting that of the vital impulse and proceeding in the opposite direction. Matter as the sum of images is to be especially distinguished from perception, which is made up of selected images. The difference is one of degree, not of kind, for those images which are useful to action are thus marked off from the larger sum of which they form a part. Matter is the world of phenomena, and the images composing it enter into perception to just the extent that they are related to certain images having peculiar properties, namely, images of the body. But such an account

is not intended so much to suggest an idealistic interpretation of matter, as to relegate perception to its proper place as a mere tool. The nature of matter itself is not thereby determined, except that it is evidently neither substrate nor cause. It is not a *Ding an sich* but the phenomenon itself. Such a view, however, hardly seems consistent with the definition of matter as inverse movement. If the individual checks within himself the flow of duration which is his deepest reality, the tension relaxes and what has been quality becomes quantity. The same thing happens with the universal stream which is the vital impulse, and with the cessation of its movement, its elements spread out, become spatial, and thus constitute the material world. But such a material world has no necessary relation to consciousness; and if it thus ceases to be an object, how is it to be conceived? It is said to be as real and as original as the duration which it interrupts; and at the same time it has the unreality pertaining to everything spatial. It affords a genuine opposition to the vital impulse, yet is merely the slackening of its tension. Matter and intellect are adjusted to each other so that they correspond, yet neither is dependent on the other. Again, matter is the potentiality of action, almost in the Aristotelian sense of the term, and, viewed by itself, it has no existence worthy of the name. If intellect alone is conversant with it, there can be no knowledge of it, for intellect affords none. Whether instinct is cognizant of it, is not made clear; but matter so far as it is inert, could hardly be referred to instinct. Altogether the ontological and cognitive status of matter is veiled in obscurity, and a clear idea of it can be formed only by ignoring some of Bergson's statements and by giving an arbitrary interpretation to others. It may easily be, as in the case of duration, that the contradictions are merely apparent and that the confusion would disappear with fuller explanations.

With regard to the system as a whole, it seems to me that a sharp line should be drawn between the epistemology and the metaphysics, in that the difficulties in the former are inherent in the theory itself, while in the latter they are less radical and seem often due to ambiguities rather than to positive contra-

dictions. The fundamental doctrines of the epistemology, on the contrary, are made perfectly clear. They are all based upon the demand that knowledge should be, not know, its object, and such a demand implies a *contradictio in adjecto*. Consequently, what begins with an attempt to satisfy the reason, ends with a denial of the latter's validity, almost of its existence. The reason is employed against the reason, and the result is mysticism. Of course the contention that such a demand and such a procedure are logically vicious, will be of no avail where logic has already been intentionally discarded. Arguments for the position or against it are equally worthless. A direct appeal must be made to the feelings of the philosophical votary, and his acceptance or rejection will be an act of free choice, in which his intellect will have no part.

There is a close affinity between mysticism and a voluntarist metaphysics, for both are based upon a denial of the claims of reason; and therefore their union in Bergson is by no means a matter of chance. With respect to the particular form of his voluntarism, he has doubtless been influenced by many thinkers, but his likeness to Heracleitus can hardly escape notice. Both viewed the nature of ultimate reality in the same way. Next to Heracleitus, Bergson is most akin to Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, although the differences are here so great as sometimes to conceal the fundamental similarity. But wherever he is classified, Bergson must be recognized as a great and original thinker. With an epistemology that ends in mysticism and a metaphysics that shows the limitations threatening every purely voluntaristic system, he is nevertheless a genius in both; and as such, he is likely to have followers and opponents rather than critics. By all of them the appearance of his next book will be awaited with the keenest interest, for it can hardly fail to be of the greatest importance for the philosophical thought of the present and the immediate future.

G. N. DOLSON.

DISCUSSIONS.

THE NATURE OF TRUTH: A REPLY.

It is a pleasure to discuss a problem with a colleague so fair-minded and so lucid as Dr. Tsanoff.¹ Perhaps the most fruitful thing I can do is to restate first of all the fundamental presuppositions of thought as I understand them. By the law of consistency, I understand that our experience of reality, whether we regard it from the point of view of meanings or of the objects intended, must possess such identities that we can take contents over again and so conceptualize our world, whether taken as individuals or as groups of individuals. Thus we can prepare for the future. It follows, of course, that if we must thus take experience, we cannot take it otherwise in the same respect and also that we must be thorough in our sorting, if we would have accurate prediction, *i. e.*, our contents must be disjunctively arranged. By the law of totality, I mean that these concepts or attributes, these part definitions of our world, must be seen to hang together. The parts of reality must make such differences to each other, directly or indirectly, as to constitute a dynamic whole. Atomism and parallelism, with their hydra-headed forms, make the ideal of knowledge impossible at the very outset. Our thoughts must belong with things and things with each other in a dynamic context in order for science to be worth while.

By the subject-object law, or the law of reference, I mean that thought presupposes the unique relation of an active or volitional referent, a prospective system of meanings, on the one hand, and a specific object, the referatum, which is selected by this cognitive purpose, on the other. The subject-object relation is distinct from other functional relations of referent and referatum through the volitional character of the referent. It is alive, it glows with interest. All other systems of relations, whatever their specific meaning may be, must be referred to this living subject in order to have systematic value. By thought being 'representative,' I mean only that the object, for purposes of truth, must be taken over into this systematic context of active experience. This is what happens in the process of judgment, the simplest form of which is symbolized in the proposition. The complete truth would be a systematic, personal expe-

¹ "Professor Boodin on the Nature of Truth," *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, Vol. XIX, No. 6 (November, 1910), pp. 632 ff.

rience—the fulfilment of our living formal demands. Such an ideal is Hegel's absolute, which must be held valid as an epistemological ideal, whatever may be its claim to ontological existence. These claims I do not think it is the province of epistemology to settle.

By the law of finitude, I understand that an object, in order to be known, must be capable of being described or identified by a finite number of marks or rules. This is true even of the concept of the infinite, which I agree is hypothetically possible. The infinite series is defined, however, not by an enumeration of its instances, which is impossible, but by a finite rule or law. In truth, as in our other ideals, we demand realization or completeness; and this is possible only if the object, however infinite in its instances, submits to a finite law. If the universe itself is an infinite process with creative novelty, then truth is only in part realizable. That the universe is such is not a case for dogmatic assumption, but to be proven as other hypotheses are proven. As a universe of absolute chance would make truth impossible, the attempt to *prove* the existence of such a universe would be contradictory.

The law of finitude does not contradict the ideal of the completeness of truth. If the absolute should prove to be a valid metaphysical hypothesis, we must suppose that the canons which hold of our search for truth hold likewise for the absolute experience, including the law of finitude. For suppose that the absolute, instead of generalizing from finite relations, sees truth in terms of infinite relations, then our truth would bear no ratio to the absolute. With all our efforts at generalization, we should never approximate any nearer. Our research would be futile and irrelevant, and we should land in the dismal abyss of agnosticism as to even the problematic nature of truth, which of course must involve the existence and character of the absolute itself. In other words, truth would have entered upon the self-contradictory task of attempting to define the (by hypothesis) undefinable. In so far as we think of an absolute truth, we must think it as the completion of our demands, not as a violation of them.

I suppose the main difficulty as between my idealistic colleague and myself is that I cannot accept the ontological absolute, as a postulate, but insist on proof. I admit that my incredulity here is due to my metaphysical leanings; but I do not see any good reason, in any case, why we should assume a metaphysical theory as a condition of our search for truth. Ought not our method to be neutral enough so as not to prejudice the results of the search? Is it not better to start with the common consciousness, with its dualism of thought and things, and to follow the dialectic of the thought process, as it attempts to master its more or less stubborn

world? This would seem to be Hegel's own procedure. If the necessities of the truth process should lead in the direction of an idealistic absolute, I hope I shall be honest enough to accept the implications without abandoning the truth. That I cannot do so now is due to no lack of respect for my idealistic colleagues, among whom I number my friend and teacher, Josiah Royce. Idealism certainly has made the only thorough-going attempt up to date to give a systematic account of experience. Its critics seem to have lived mostly on the weaknesses of idealism.

I insist, however, that the hypothesis of the universe as an absolute experience cannot be settled *a priori*. It must come as a result of our success in applying our logical ideals. Certainly the universe is in part a rational experience, for human thinking is an intrinsic part of the universe. In part, too, we have been successful in applying logical categories to the infra-human world. And in so far it cannot be regarded as irrational, whether it is non-rational or not. We find it convenient in any case to distinguish, for purposes of conduct, between the thinking and the non-thinking world and to treat the latter as means to the former as end. I have faith in a higher consciousness than the human as the fulfilment of our fragmentary insight and "the final cause" of the evolutionary process. But I do not see any leading toward this mind in the infra-human world—the world of the stone and the amœba. I must rather seek it in the supra-human reaches as the goal of our ideal striving. While mystical and æsthetic intuition may seem to furnish some of us a very intimate acquaintance with such a world, I cannot see that such a faith exempts reason from dealing with it as an hypothesis and from testing it as any hypothesis is tested, through its success in simplifying and guiding experience. I do not deny the possibility of the idealistic absolute. There is certainly nothing contradictory in the conception of such a complete, systematic experience. On the contrary, it must always figure as an epistemological ideal, even if not an ontological assumption.

And now a word as regards the relation of the will to thought. For finite purposes it is convenient to regard the will as a larger genus than thought. While thought is the systematic activity of the will in its higher development, not all will is systematic and in this sense is non-rational. Its rationality at any rate is prospective, not actual. In our finite sphere there seems to be error, due to false assent or failure to assent to a supposed truth. Such must seem to the absolute idealist my failure to subscribe to his assumption that reality is an organic experience. If the logic is truly coercive, my failure to assent must be a certain blindness on the part of the will. It is the old question whether virtue can be reduced to mere knowledge, or whether we must not also assume a certain willingness

to accept the ideal, whether theoretical or practical. With Fichte I would agree that the will must furnish the goal and motive of thought. Else thought would move in a vacuum. If the will, however, chooses to think, it must do so in accordance with certain rules. It is this deliberation according to certain rules, whether the aim be merely formal agreement or also perceptual termination, which constitutes the difference between thinking and volition in general. To the fully organized will, such thinking has become the normal activity. The will, too, may divest itself of its practical, biological interest and pursue science as a sport—a game furnishing its own logical and æsthetic satisfaction apart from its survival value.

I do not assume, as my colleague seems to think, that the universe is irrational. Thought is as normal an expression of the universe at a certain stage of its development as the sex instinct. The very existence of the postulates of thought and the success thought has had in their application shows that the universe in part lends itself to thought's formulation. That it does so altogether is obviously a faith. Whether such a faith turns out to be absolutely true or not, we shall still hold to thought for its convenience in dealing with our world, for its part-truth, its prospective value. There are constancies which we can seize upon in the stream of experience and thus regulate our conduct. Nature not only favors thought as regards capacity and demand, but it puts a premium upon thought as regards survival. What reality must be taken as in the last analysis, must be the outcome of the truth experiment.

I cannot agree with my colleague that thought is the only final way of evaluating life. It is the only way we can attain the truth of life. But, "there is not only one way to the realm of the Gods," to quote an old Viking poem. Æsthetic appreciation furnishes another evaluation of life which cannot be reduced to terms of thought, and some who have grown weary of the arduous path of truth have decided to pitch their tents in the restful oasis of beauty. Others again have found in our sense of duty, in the urging of conscience, the key which unlocks reality. Temperament no doubt has a great deal to do with our preference here. But what must not be lost sight of is that there are different ways of reaching the final significance of life and if we are not able to drive the triple team of values abreast, we must at least appreciate that our preference does not annul distinctions—does not make æsthetic appreciation truth. The failure to distinguish these types of evaluation, or using thought loosely to stand for each and all indifferently, has been a serious weakness of Hegelianism. They may all be harmonious and complementary in human nature as realized. Identical they cannot be.

If this discussion makes the problem any clearer, the reader owes it to my colleague, Dr. Tsanoff, for his lucid and gracious criticism.

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REJOINDER.

PROFESSOR BOODIN'S restatement of the laws of consistency and of totality leads me only to repeat my appreciation of his plea for epistemological unity and coherence. His present formulation of the 'subject-object law' and of the law of finitude makes his position somewhat clearer. Professor Boodin correctly points out the necessity of recognizing what he calls the volitional character of the thought-referent,—that is, I take it, the dynamic solidarity of thought and will in concrete experience. He explicitly declares that such a "systematic, personal experience" must be held valid as an epistemological ideal. In his restatement, again, of the law of finitude, Professor Boodin plainly admits that the attempt to prove the existence of a universe of absolute chance would be self-contradictory; that is, that, if our study of the philosophical universe is to be fruitful epistemologically, we must proceed throughout upon the basis that experience is an immanently coherent system. The higher truth must be the completion, not the denial and violation of the lower truth.

The 'universe' for the epistemologist is the systematic, organic, dynamic experience, which we can profitably study from the point of view of the mutually implicative relations which obtain in it. In so far, then, Professor Boodin and myself seem to be in substantial agreement. Indeed, so long as problems frankly epistemological are under consideration, I can follow him quite closely. But, if one reads again his exposition of the four epistemological laws, one finds everywhere a string attached. Professor Boodin is always careful to add that, while this law and that are valid for epistemology, they need not necessarily hold for metaphysics. There is no need of quoting any passages here: Professor Boodin's Reply is before the reader's eyes. My main criticism of his position was and is precisely concerning this very point. What Professor Boodin calls "absolute truth" is, by his own statement, to be regarded "as the completion of our [epistemological] demands, not as a violation of them." Nevertheless, because I maintain the position implied in this and similar statements of his own epistemological principles; that is, because I insist that philosophy must be of one piece, that epistemology cannot be one thing, and metaphysics another; because I insist that the 'laws of metaphysics' must be the completion, not the violation, of the laws of episte-

mology,—Professor Boodin characterizes me as an “absolute idealist,” who merely “accepts the ontological absolute as a postulate.”

I must protest emphatically against the ontological absolutism with which Professor Boodin burdens my position. It is hard to see how any part of my Discussion could have been so utterly misunderstood. It is precisely against ontological absolutism of any sort,—rationalistic or irrationalistic,—that I was and am contending. I distinctly protested against any “ontologizing excursions,” insisting that “metaphysical priority avails nothing unless warranted by epistemological considerations.”² Indeed, the term ‘Absolute’ is not to be found in my Discussion.

Whether what Professor Boodin himself calls “the hypothesis of the universe as an absolute experience” can or cannot “be settled *a priori*,” I am unable to answer until I know what Professor Boodin himself means by ‘absolute.’ ‘Absolutism,’ unfortunately, may thrive on any philosophical soil,—logical or alogical. Idealism has no monopoly of absolutism; idealism is by no means necessarily absolutistic. Indeed, the discussion of any abstract ‘Absolute’ becomes meaningless, once the philosophical position for which I was contending is fully grasped. As I said, “The prime demand of philosophy is that experience should be studied in the light of its systematic unity and concrete organization.”³ To insist, as I did, that the ‘Reality’ of philosophy must be intelligible, dynamic experience, if the philosophical problem is to have any real meaning at all, by no means involves the out-and-out assumption of a metaphysical creed. Far from “assuming a metaphysical theory as a condition of our search for truth,” as Professor Boodin suggests that I do, I would insist that ‘metaphysics’ *means nothing* apart from epistemology. It is precisely for this reason that, agreeing as I do in the main with Professor Boodin’s epistemological presuppositions, I insist that they are *ipso facto* metaphysical presuppositions. And if Professor Boodin does not see his way clear to follow the logic of his professedly unitary epistemology, and demands a new philosophical compass when he embarks upon the sea metaphysical, it would then seem that it is he, and not I, who harbors an ontological absolute in his system. How *can* Professor Boodin demand any “proof” of his metaphysical principles, if he lacks confidence in the only method of philosophical procedure which, on his own statement, has proved fruitful in our study of experience?

Absolutism, in any form, is the result of separating experience from reality. We may regard thought as appearance and will as the Real, or *vice versa*: in either case we are sure to land in a dualism which robs

¹PHIL. REV., Vol. XIX, p. 637.

²*Ibid.*, p. 638.

³*Ibid.*, p. 637.

our theory of experience of all ultimate meaning. The 'Absolute,' whatever it is, can and must justify its title only before the bar of epistemology. The philosophy of concrete experience is not threatened with absolutism, precisely because it does not enter upon what Professor Boodin himself calls "the self-contradictory task of attempting to define the (by hypothesis) undefinable."

This is my attitude towards Professor Boodin's account of The Nature of Truth. I contend mainly against the unwarrantable and fatal separation of metaphysics from epistemology. All that is demanded is "the recognition of the standpoint of rational intelligibility and organic unity as the criteria of philosophical 'reality.'"¹ The battle of idealism is not a battle over a philosophical trademark. If the voluntarist, accepting the concrete intelligibility of experience as a philosophical *sine qua non*, can endow the term 'will' with a connotation broad enough to embrace not only the dynamic character of experience but also its coherent rationality, if his 'will' can mean to him what 'thought' means to me, namely, "dynamic, rational, intelligible experience," I would have no objections to using his terminology, provided we understand what we mean. The idealist not only does not deny the volitional element in experience, but he insists on its being recognized. The cognitive, the volitional, and the æsthetic, however, are one and all abstractions. No one of them is The Real. To be sure, we must abstract, if we are to study experience at all. Our philosophical problems demand the emphasizing, now of the cognitive, now of the volitional, now of the æsthetic. But we must keep in mind throughout the fact that we *are* abstracting; we must remember that our basis is concrete experience, and that the goal of philosophy is the progressive organization and concrete growing-into-each-other of the various aspects of experience which we isolate for special study and abstract formulation.

The main difficulty between Professor Boodin and myself, therefore, seems to be, not that I would assume my ontological absolute,—far from it. It is rather that, insisting as I do on the organic unity of all epistemology and 'ontology,' *i. e.*, of experience and reality, I am unable to regard thought as a game that the pilgrim indulges in who travels to the land of Will and Faith. The sciences confirm the old Viking wisdom that "there is not only one way to the realm of the Gods"; but we must not turn epistemological apostates and demand a new guide-book when we reach the gates of Valhalla. To insist that concrete experience is the real basis of all scientific and philosophical abstractions, is not to "annul distinctions." Professor Boodin himself has stated the fundamental pre-

¹*Loc. cit.*, p. 638.

suppositions of our study of experience, and in the main they hold. In so far as a method proves adequate in my philosophical study of experience, I find no motive for changing it when I come to the study of Reality; for the simple reason that 'Reality' means nothing to me outside of concrete, intelligible, dynamic experience.

Professor Boodin's frank discussion of his position and of my criticism is a model of philosophical courtesy which I appreciate and wish here to acknowledge.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

The Psychology of Reasoning. By W. B. PILLSBURY. New York and London, D. Appleton and Company, 1910.—pp. viii, 306.

The purpose of this interesting and valuable book is "to give a brief statement of the place of the logical processes, particularly judgment and inference, in the concrete individual consciousness" (p. vii). In the process of reasoning there are four factors: the purpose of the moment; the circumstances of the moment, as appreciated and interpreted by the individual; the suggestion of the solution; and the testing of this suggested solution. Reasoning has two main forms: it may be either an action or a mental operation. In the first case the solution is a movement, and the testing is the success of the movement; in the second case the solution is an idea, and the test is the belief, disbelief, or doubt with regard to it. We have belief "when any statement or interpretation harmonizes with experience as a whole" (p. 40). "Doubt is due to the alternating dominance of systems of experience that have not been altogether co-ordinated" (p. 42). There is no third state of disbelief; disbelief in anything is really belief in something else. Finally, belief, disbelief, or doubt attaches to every content of consciousness. "In opposition to Brentano," the author maintains "that there is no moment when any perception," or any statement, "stands in consciousness as a mere given that is neither believed nor disbelieved. . . . A statement may be first believed, then disbelieved . . . ; but never, so far as my experience goes, does it stand without evaluation as to its truth" (pp. 31 f.).

The examination of belief is followed by a valuable discussion of *meaning and the concept*. Its main thesis is that the empirical consciousness, the 'mind' with which psychology deals, is not an aggregate of sensations and their combinations, as Mill would have us believe, but resembles closely what is commonly called 'the world of meanings.' The author starts with the question, How can a single mental state stand for a number of particulars? Clearly, its "representative function . . . depends upon its associations" (p. 64). Because of its connections, the image which represents *could* be replaced by any one of a host of particulars. But the same mental image may represent, at different times, different sets of particulars; *e. g.*, the visual image of a right triangle may at one time represent triangles, and at another time, right triangles. What, now, is to prevent our using this image wrongly—*e. g.*, our asserting something of triangles which is true only of right triangles? There must be "some-

thing in consciousness" that prevents it, and this something is "the purpose or momentary mental set that controls the course of association at any moment" (p. 69).

How is this representative image—the concept—related to 'meaning,' in the sense in which Bradley and Bosanquet use the term? Meanings are types. Now a careful study of consciousness shows that all our thinking is in types. Even perception is in terms of them; I see the top of my table as a rectangle even when the image of my retina is that of a trapezoid. The contents of the real mind are not concrete impressions, but types; and these types are all interrelated. In these two respects the world of actual individual consciousness is like the Neo-Hegelian world of universals; it differs from the latter only in the fact that its types are not preformed, but are developed in and through the experience of the individual.

Modern logic usually defines judgment as 'the ascription of meaning to the given.' This may be accepted, with one important modification: there is never in consciousness a mere 'given,' devoid of meaning. Consciousness is wholly composed of interrelated meanings, and entrance into consciousness is identical with the acquisition of meaning. "Before it takes on meaning the process can at most be nothing other than the physiological or the physical" (p. 104). The essence of judgment, then, is "the arousal of the type on the occasion of the stimulus, and the selection of some type in harmony with the momentary set of consciousness" (p. 110).

The great difference between our treatment of judgment and the treatment adopted by formal logic is that we are interested in the actual mental operation, while logic is concerned with its result as expressed in language and as taken apart from its context. The logician asks, not what the speaker meant by a certain statement in its context, but what this statement *might* mean apart from its context. Logicians offer us various theories of the nature of judgment: it is a relation (of equality or similarity) between subject and predicate; it is subsumption; it is analysis; it is synthesis. But this variety of opinion is largely due to the fact that formal logic has made the mistake of considering the judgment apart from its setting. When we study it in the right way, we see that each of these definitions represents one particular form of judgment and that most, if not all, of these forms can be brought under our psychological definition of judgment "as the ascription of meaning to the presented, or as the reception of the entering impression into the organized consciousness" (p. 136). As thus conceived, judgment represents a single mental operation; in all the simpler forms, careful introspection shows that only one meaning is involved, although the linguistic expression of

the judgment may produce the appearance of two. Judgments in which there are really two meanings are more closely related, Professor Pillsbury thinks, to what we commonly call 'inference,' and he therefore suggests that the range of the term 'judgment' be narrowed and that of the term 'inference' widened. Under judgment, in his sense of the word, are included "all judgments of relation, and of spatial attributes, all impersonal and interjectional judgments, most demonstrative judgments and a fair proportion of the simple judgments of perception" (p. 162). The other judgments of perception—those which contain two interpretations of the given—may be called either inference or a succession of judgments. But inference conceived as the succession of two appreciations is very different from inference as described by formal logic. According to formal logic we have, in the typical inference, the assertion of a general truth, its application to the particular circumstances, and the statement of a new truth, and the conclusion. But "careful examination of the procedure in a case of concrete reasoning will, I believe, convince any one that he is actually aware of nothing but the conclusion" (pp. 185 f.). The premises are logical constructions rather than psychological realities. The logician lays stress upon them because his real interest is not in the origin of the conclusion, but in its proof. "The syllogism arose through confusing inference and proof. . . . It is adequate to proof of one kind but has only remote relation to the derivation of the conclusion. . . . Conclusions all come through suggestion, and the laws of suggestion here are the laws of association" (pp. 187 f.).

The study of proof brings us back to our old problem of the nature of belief. To prove a conclusion is to produce a conviction of its truth. Deductive proof has two main forms—the syllogism and the argument from analogy; inductive proof has also two—observation and experiment. In the syllogism the "general truth" expressed in the major premise seems to give "additional warrant to the conclusion" (p. 211). But how can it do this? Certainly its formulation gives us no new knowledge. We might even prove "that one could not know the general statement unless all the particular instances under it, and hence the conclusion, were also already known" (p. 212). How it is that the major premise serves to strengthen our belief in the conclusion has never, Professor Pillsbury thinks, been fully explained. His own suggestion is "that the general statement represents the type and that the actually remembered framework of our knowledge is forged out of typical statements." The framework gives satisfaction because "the general has hundreds or thousands of connections where the individual has but one" (pp. 217 f.).

The relation of the syllogism to argument from analogy, and the

nature of the two forms of inductive proof are treated in a fresh and suggestive way. But we cannot pause to comment upon them nor upon the discussion of modality and probability. The concluding chapter, however, must receive some notice. It is chiefly an exposition of the doctrine, found earlier in the book, that "the beginning" and "the end of all reasoning" is "the establishment of a system of things and of explanations that corresponds on the empirical level to the world of universals of Bradley and Bosanquet" (p. 276). All the elements of the system are products of experience. But they are not particular experiences: they are types, which have been developed largely by the method of trial and error. My perception of a certain desk, *e. g.*, is "like no single impression" that has "ever fallen upon the retina. . . . From the images and from thought modifications of the images" I choose the one "which best fits into experience" and accept it as real (pp. 278 f.). And a scientific conception develops in much the same way: it is tested by the extent to which it helps us coördinate our experiences. This system of things and conceptions is "the external world as it is appreciated. Whether there is an external world that is not appreciated" is a question which by reason of the "very manner of its asking cannot be answered" (p. 294). Since knowledge is continually growing, we shall always think of the outside world "as the source from which knowledge comes. . . . But all that we know is the fact" of growth (p. 295). Besides the external world there is another system—the human mind—which has developed around a somewhat different center. The two systems have not yet been perfectly united. A thing may be either an object in the external world or a mental state, according as it is taken up into the one system or the other.

There is no question that this book will make a place for itself as a genuine contribution to our understanding of the process of reasoning. The problems which it discusses are treated with much freshness and originality, and the book is interesting from cover to cover. The author succeeds admirably in his effort to keep close to concrete experience: not infrequently he substantiates his position by reference to some results of experimental psychology. At the same time he has evidently made a careful study of the logician's point of view and, in particular, has been much influenced by some of the contributions of modern logic. Most of the positions which he takes seem to me sound, though occasionally I feel impelled to dissent. In general, I think that he tends to exaggerate the difference between concrete reasoning and the processes described by formal logic. I doubt whether logic, after all, is quite so far removed from our actual mental processes as he would have us believe. When,

e. g., he tells us that the syllogism never represents the actual procedure of thought, and that "the conclusion always precedes the premises" if these "are present at all" (p. 188), he is going rather too far. If some one gives me an unknown botanical or zoölogical specimen to identify, the process by which I solve my problem may not infrequently correspond exactly to the syllogism, with the trifling exception that the minor premise precedes the major in my thought. It is true, of course, as Professor Pillsbury asserts, that this particular set of premises is, usually at least, not the only one by means of which this particular conclusion could be proved. But there is no reason in the nature of things why I may not, in my effort to convince another, use the very ideas which in the first place led me to the conclusion. And on the basis of my own introspection I should say that this is what one often does. That the effort to prove—either to ourselves or to others—leads us to formulate what before was vague and inchoate in our thinking is true; but one may grant this and still take a position less extreme than Professor Pillsbury's. The similarity between some of our ordinary reasoning processes and the syllogistic form is well shown by James in his *Psychology*, though he too points out that usually the conclusion "overshadows the process from the start." But when this is the case, does not the conclusion often present itself simply as an interrogation, '*S—P?*' which becomes for us an affirmation only when we have hit upon some *M* or other? To this, Professor Pillsbury would apparently say, No. From his criticism of Brentano's theory of belief I should suppose that he would deny that '*S—P*' is ever, even for a moment, simply a question in the mind. According to him, introspection reveals no such thing as genuine suspense of judgment. He admits doubt, to be sure; but doubt is described as the alternation of opposed judgments. With regard to the actuality of suspense of judgment I can only say that my introspection does not agree with his. It is doubtless true that all perception involves judgment and that thus you may say, No perception can be in consciousness without our believing *something* about it. But it does not follow that there is no such thing as suspended judgment. If you call my attention to a tree near by and ask me to estimate its height, I may suspend judgment until I have run my eye up the trunk. In the interval the tree is for me an actual tree; I accept it as an object among other objects: and this, if you like, implies judgment on my part. But with regard to the question asked, I have not yet judged.

Another criticism which may be made has to do with a fault in exposition. In reading the book I found some difficulty with the doctrine that entrance into consciousness is identical with acquirement of meaning.

My trouble would probably not have existed if Professor Pillsbury had told us in an early chapter what he means by 'entrance into consciousness.' When we reach the eighth chapter it appears that his intention probably is to distinguish between 'experience' (in the broadest sense, as including the lowest forms of mental process) and 'consciousness,' and to use the latter term to designate a more or less organized experience (pp. 251 ff.; cf. p. 292). This should have been brought out earlier in the book. But when this has been made clear, it is still difficult to see why one should say that "before it takes on meaning the process can at most be nothing other than the physiological or the physical" (p. 104). Probably this is a slip.

One other criticism which I feel constrained to make is concerned with the author's use of English. When one is reviewing a book so admirable as this, one feels that it is ungracious to call attention to faulty modes of speech. It seems to me, however, that there is a growing tendency among American men of science toward carelessness in the use of their mother-tongue and that it is time for some one to raise the voice of protest. The author's very sparing use of commas sometimes makes it necessary to read a sentence twice in order to grasp its meaning. (See, e. g., the last sentence in p. 127 or the last in p. 213.) More commonly the errors in the book do not interfere with our understanding the thought; but to the reader who cares for good English they mean irritation and consequent loss of time. And in some cases, though we know what the author means, it is obvious that he has not said it. (See the last sentence but two in p. 40 or the last one in p. 137.) The more sincerely one admires Professor Pillsbury's book, the more one dislikes to find in it things like these.

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Aristote et l'idéalisme Platonicien. Par CHARLES WERNER. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1910.—pp. xii, 370.

This work is a study of the fundamental principles of Aristotle's philosophy, with especial regard to its relations to Plato's theory of Ideas. The work is well written and is based on a very extensive and thorough acquaintance with the text of Aristotle. Professor Werner, throughout his book, gives an abundance of citations and references in support of his interpretations. In several respects these interpretations differ very materially from the view of Aristotle's doctrines made current by Zeller and others.

The exposition of Aristotle's Philosophy is arranged under four heads, "Reality," "Mind," "The Good," and "God."

The most noteworthy features of Professor Werner's discussion of Aristotle's general conceptions of reality are: (1) Aristotle, notwithstanding his criticism of Plato's theory of Ideas, is himself an intellectual realist, the chief point of difference between Plato and him being that he is an immanent realist, whereas Plato is a transcendent realist. The Aristotelian 'Form' is the Platonic Idea brought down from its heavenly isolation and made to dwell and energize in the 'matter' of concrete reality. (2) Aristotle does not, as Zeller maintains, contradict himself in regarding individuals as alone real, whereas science deals solely with universals. Aristotle is, in fact, a conceptual realist, for whom the species is more real than its individual examples. Matter is simply the principle of particularization, which in part obstructs the formative actuality. (3) In consequence, the fundamental contradiction in Aristotle's theory of reality consists in his attempt to find in sensible reality a principle which has been established precisely in opposition to this reality, namely, the Platonic Idea. 'Matter' is a blind power, independent of, and partially balking the formative work of, the final causes. As such, matter is the source of the 'contingent' or 'irrational' in nature, in other words, of the 'unnatural.'

In the exposition of "Mind" the points which I regard as noteworthy are: (1) The view that Aristotle reduces the activity of thought to a minimum and, in general, regards the soul as passive. I cannot admit the truth of this interpretation or see how it squares with the theory that Aristotle regards God, the Unmoved Mover, as the soul of the cosmos. This conception of the Aristotelian theory of mind Professor Werner regards as established by Aristotle's doctrine that thought is form realized in matter. (2) Aristotle's treatment of mind is dominated by the Platonic idealism, which really misconceives the true nature of mind. Mind or 'Spirit,' says Professor Werner, is spontaneous self-activity. (3) Aristotle, in his theory of desire, admits a non-intellectual element in the soul, but here again desire is determined by the object and is not shown by Aristotle to be a unique spontaneity. (4) Aristotle reduces all moving causes to consciousness, and confounds the motor and affective elements of the soul.

In his treatment of "The Good," Professor Werner maintains that Aristotle's theory of virtue is really quite as intellectualistic as that of Socrates. That virtue is always a mean is a doctrine which reveals the intellectualistic prejudice, and Aristotle reduces vice to error. Here again I cannot follow Professor Werner.

Pleasure is held to be the supreme principle of valuation in Aristotle's system, and the fact of human appraisal in terms of pleasures is said to be made by Aristotle the basis for the conception of a realm or world of

values distinct from the world of reality. In short, Professor Werner makes Aristotle out to be a hedonist in ethics. This is certainly a strange conclusion, and one that is not at all in harmony with the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Although he cites the discussions in which Aristotle makes pleasure the natural accompaniment of normal functioning and the value of pleasure to be determined by the value of the function, in his anxiety to find in Aristotle a sharp distinction between the world of factual reality and the world of values, Professor Werner overlooks the bearing of these discussions and roundly says that Aristotle identifies happiness with pleasure. Professor Werner maintains that, in admitting that pleasure determines action and confers worth upon it, Aristotle recognized the presence of an irrational element in the soul—a principle of mysterious spontaneity or freedom. In this respect Aristotle departs from the intellectual determinism of the Platonic idealism. The intelligible is the antithesis of liberty. Plato recognizes no freedom of spontaneity in action. Aristotle, in his moral empiricism, abandons the rationalism of Plato. Of course, the pleasures which determine human action are the pleasures of a thinking being. Professor Werner's conception of freedom appears to be that of Professor Bergson. Freedom is the irrational element in the soul.

In Part IV, "God," it is argued that the God of Aristotle is the indwelling soul, the immanent moving cause of the first heaven, and therefore, since all movement depends on the movement of the first heaven, which embraces all reality, God is the indwelling world soul—self-active and unmoved. All motion is derived from him. For this interpretation Professor Werner argues as follows: God is the unmoved mover; but a mover cannot be separated from that which it moves. Now God is himself motionless, eternal, unchangeable, self-contained. All these attributes are ascribed also to the first heaven. Therefore God must be the indwelling cause of the motion which is internal to the first heaven. The motion of the latter is eternal. It is a motion which returns upon itself. Such a motion is circular. Moreover, the heaven of the stars is called divine, immortal, unchangeable, etc. In short, it is given the same attributes as God. And Aristotle argues from the analogy of the soul as mover of the body to the conception of God as mover of the world. God, therefore, is the motionless, self-existent soul from which proceeds the movements of the universe which is his body. This conclusion Professor Werner reaches by way of deduction from Aristotle's expressed teachings. He does not cite any passages in which the theory is explicitly stated. The contradiction between the theory that God is the World-Soul and Aristotle's statements that God is pure form, free from any

admixture of matter, is only apparent, says Professor Werner. For the matter which constitutes the first heaven, or body of the Divine being, is not the blind contingent matter of things sublunary. It is simply the *subject of form*. It is perfect actuality, not inert and imperfect potentiality, and the circular world movement is pure *ἐνέργεια*.

Finally, the pure form or God is the equivalent of the Platonic Idea. Aristotle's God is the supreme term in the hierarchy of forms. The great difference between Plato and Aristotle in this regard is that, whereas Plato assumes a plurality of Ideas or forms, Aristotle assumes only one perfect form, which he identifies with the Idea of Good. The form of the cosmos is harmonious since it is God. God thinks the whole universe of beings, not in their isolated material complexity, but in their formal unity. This world-thought in God is love. In him love and desire are one, and he responds to the confused aspirations which come from all parts of the universe by an eternal act of comprehension and love. Man can, in rare moments, identify himself with this divine thought, and enjoy this intellectual love of God. In so doing man becomes identical with God.

Professor Werner's book will prove of interest and value to all students of Aristotle. It is a contribution to the understanding of the great Stagirite which is worthy of serious consideration. I find myself unable to regard as convincing Professor Werner's interpretation of Aristotle as an out and out intellectualist in his doctrine of mind, and as holding that God is the Soul of the World. Notwithstanding his apparently complete command of the text of the Master, I think that Professor Werner's exegesis has been somewhat warped by Bergsonian anti-intellectualism.

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Race Questions and other American Problems. By JOSIAH ROYCE. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1908.—pp. xiii, 287.

It is a familiar charge against Idealism that it is anything but a practical creed, that it is an

"Abstract intellectual scheme of life
Quite irrespective of life's plainest laws."

It is not therefore without significance when an idealist philosopher seeks to answer it by a practical application of his doctrines to the problems of modern life, a life which, as he fully admits,

"Is Rome or London not Fools' Paradise."

This is what Professor Royce undertakes to do in the present volume.

The book consists of five essays: "Race Questions and Prejudices";

"Provincialism"; "On Certain Limitations of the Thoughtful Public in America"; "The Pacific Coast, a Psychological Study of the Relations of Climate and Civilisation"; "Some Relations of Physical Training to the Present Problem of Moral Education in America." Each of these, as the author says in his preface, "states opinions which from my own point of view, make it a part of an effort to apply, to some of our American problems, that general doctrine about life which I have recently summed up in my book entitled *The Philosophy of Loyalty*." A portion of the concluding essay is devoted to a brief resumé of that doctrine. The "theory is that the whole moral law is implicitly bound up in the one precept: *Be loyal*" (p. 245). "This loyal attitude makes a man give himself to the active service of a cause" (p. 235). But "you cannot devote yourself unless you are aware of yourself" and hence "loyalty is never mere self-forgetfulness; it is self-devotion" (p. 236). The cause regarded as a larger and supra-personal unity stands over against the loyal man as something which by contrast emphasizes the consciousness of self, but "despite the contrast he becomes one with it through his every loyal deed" (p. 238). Only in so far as he becomes the willing instrument of his cause, and thus gives active expression to his loyalty, does he acquire a genuine self, "an office, a function, a place, a status, a right, in the world" (p. 247). Loyalty, then, must be intelligent and it must be practical; "it is complete only in motor terms, never in merely sentimental terms" (p. 239).

But individual causes, individual loyalties, may conflict, often do, with disastrous results. "Must there not then be some higher moral principle than that of loyalty, some principle in terms of which we can find out who is right when two forms of loyalty contradict each other's claims, while each pretends to be the only true loyalty" (p. 243)? The solution is to be found not by the introduction of some principle other than that of loyalty, but by the discovery of "the internal meaning, the true sense of the principle itself" (p. 245). The spirit of loyalty, no matter what may be the particular forms in which it embodies itself, is a common good of mankind. It alone enables a man to find a cause which he may serve and a self with which he may serve it. But, "if this be so, loyalty, taken in its universal meaning, is just as much a true good when my neighbour possesses it as when I possess it. If once I am wide awake enough to grasp this fact, I shall value my neighbour's loyalty just as highly as I do my own. He indeed will be loyal to his cause, I to mine. Our causes may be very diverse, but our spirit will be one. And so the very essence of *my* spirit of loyalty will demand that I state my principle thus: Be loyal, and be in such wise loyal that, whatever your own cause,

you remain loyal to loyalty" (p. 248). "Let your loyalty be such loyalty as helps your neighbour to be loyal" (p. 249).

Such is, in outline, the doctrine to the illustration of which the rest of the volume is devoted. The breadth and importance of the topics discussed permit us to see in a comprehensive way its genuine significance. The first essay, as its title indicates, deals with that group of problems which the contact of various races is making daily more prominent. It is notoriously a dangerous as well as a thankless task to attempt to undermine a claim to superiority of race by calling it a prejudice, especially when the aggrieved can always fall back on the latest results of anthropology or race psychology to support him. But the author faces the undertaking, encouraged by a certain scepticism about those results. He believes that our studies upon the physical varieties of mankind are not yet sufficiently advanced to shed light upon the more important questions of moral and intellectual development. He claims further that if the investigations of anthropologists have shown anything it is that, taken at an early stage of development and viewed apart from the influences of culture, most races exhibit the same poverty in morals, intellect, and imagination. To claim a privileged position, therefore, for any one race is simply to fail to distinguish between the accidental effects of environment and culture and the essential capacity for progress. "Our so-called race problems are merely the problems caused by our antipathies" (p. 47). The solution of them lies, not in fostering those antipathies, in "training a man first to give names to his antipathies and then to regard the antipathies thus named as sacred merely because they have a name" (p. 48), but rather in realizing that the problem is essentially one of administration. The surest way to win adherents to the cause of order and good government is to exhibit that cause in operation. "Sympathy with the law grows with responsibility for its administration" (p. 28). The author cites in illustration the case of Jamaica, where the negro has been admitted to a share in the administration and "superiority" has asserted itself in deeds rather than in boasts. To this he attributes the comparative absence of friction.

The essay on "Provincialism" deals with another aspect of the same problem—the problem of the creation of a civic consciousness. In the ideal of provincialism Professor Royce sees the means for obtaining the desired end. This seems, at first sight, paradoxical enough, for the word frequently connotes those tendencies to narrow-mindedness and exclusiveness which are opposed to genuine progress. For instance, 'The Southern attitude to the negro is simply provincialism,' is a remark which the present writer has often heard. But Professor Royce gives his own

meaning to the term. "For me, then, a province shall mean any part of a national domain, which is . . . sufficiently unified to have a true consciousness of its own unity, to feel a pride in its own ideals and customs, and to possess a sense of its own distinction from other parts of the country" (p. 61). The province, in this sense, is the digestive organ of the body politic, and the provincial atmosphere of local pride and relative local independence is that in which the new-comer may most easily become acclimatized. With the growth of this provincial spirit will go other gains. For it is the source of individuality, of independence, of initiative, of all those tendencies towards wholesome variation which the levelling influences of modern civilization are threatening to obliterate. Again, in the development and organization of those smaller groups for which the life of the provincial community affords opportunity rests the hope of avoiding the dangers of mob-rule. Upon these Professor Royce dwells at some length. "Our modern life," he says, "with its vast unions of people, with its high development of popular sentiments, with its passive and sympathetic love for knowing and feeling what other men know and feel, is subject to the disorders of larger crowds, of more dangerous mobs, than have ever before been brought into sympathetic union" (p. 86). But the efficacy of a group depends upon the variety and not upon the uniformity of its members, upon the individual's preservation of his critical judgment, upon the prevalence of a normal spirit of opposition within the group. And so, "Keep the province awake that the nation may be saved from the disastrous hypnotic slumber so characteristic of excited masses of mankind" (p. 96). This wakefulness, however, is not that of self-satisfaction and self-centeredness, but that of a community striving after an ideal and so ready to offer a hospitable spirit to new influences and to express its seriousness of purpose in the beautifying and dignifying of its own life.

The principle stated in *The Philosophy of Loyalty*: "Have a cause; choose your cause; be decisive" (p. 187), might be taken as the text of the third essay, "On Certain Limitations of the Thoughtful Public in America." Professor Royce, as against many foreign critics, lays more stress on the idealistic than on the materialistic tendencies in the national life. "Yet this same American is unable to give his idealism any adequate expression in his social life" (p. 131). His idealism is for the most part ineffective because it lacks focus and intelligent direction. There is energy, there is a generously receptive attitude, but the energy is diffused, the curiosity expresses itself in an eagerness to accept the new as necessarily the good; the mental attitude shows too little discrimination. The causes of the evil are too much thought, on the one hand, and too little,

on the other; too much thought for reforming all the world and too little for improving a small part of it; too much interest in setting traps for the millennium and not enough in the problem of the moment. The individual thinks for the world instead of thinking for himself. "What then is the happy medium? Shall I cease to think? No, not so. Be thoughtful, reason out some of your ideals for yourself. Know something, and know that something well. . . . In that region be indeed the creature of hard-won insight, of clear consciousness, of definite thinking about what it is yours to know. There the formula is in order. . . . But remember life is vast and your little clearing is very small. In the rest of life cultivate naïveté, accept authority, dread fads, follow as faithfully as your instinct permits other lovers of the ideal who are here wiser than you, and be sure that though your head splits you will never think out all your problems or formulate all your ideals so long as you are in this life" (p. 159).

The essay which follows—"The Pacific Coast, a Psychological Study of the Relations of Climate and Civilisation"—stands somewhat detached from the rest of the volume. It is an estimate of the influence of topographical and climatic conditions in producing "the spirit of California,—that tension between individualism and loyalty, between shrewd conservatism and bold radicalism, which marks this community" (p. 225).

The concluding essay, which discusses "Some Relations of Physical Training to the Present Problems of Moral Education in America," emphasizes the value of such training as a propædæutic to the expression of loyalty in the wider social activities. In the first place, "skillful and serious physical exercise involves true devotion," and secondly, "in so far as it is a part of the life of a social group" it "can more directly aid the individual to learn to be loyal to his group" (p. 272). But its most valuable results are to be found in the spirit of fair play and the intelligent self-control which, under wise direction, it may promote. For this spirit is nothing but "the spirit of loyalty to loyalty . . . that honors and respects one's very enemies for their devotion to the very causes that one assails" (p. 268), while cool-headed self-possession is an essential condition of loyal service. As the author constantly insists, "One must be in control of one's powers, or one has no self to give to one's cause. One must get a personality in order be to able to surrender this personality" (p. 255). Loyalty in any sphere must be expressed "not in confused sentiments but through clearly conscious deeds" (p. 287).

Enough has been said to indicate the way in which an Idealist ethics may approach some modern issues. Many of these are concerned with the creation of what Mr. H. G. Wells has called the state-consciousness,

and it is interesting to observe how a philosopher approaching the subject from a stand-point very different from that of many modern students of social tendencies reaches a conception of the goal not so very remote from theirs. The difference lies in the means. For Professor Royce the end is to be obtained not by coercion but through the development of public opinion in its best sense, not through mechanical devices but through a process of spiritual assimilation.

The doctrine of loyalty as here set forth neither invites nor demands criticism on the formal or metaphysical side. Here is a theory of the moral life: The question is, Is it a mere flapping of metaphysical wings, or can it endure the ordeal of a practical application? It is impossible to read this volume without admiration for the way in which the test has been withstood.

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Die Ethik Kants. Entwurf zu einem Neubau auf Grund einer Kritik des Kantischen Moralprinzips. Von WILHELM KOPPELMANN. Berlin, Reuther und Reichard, 1907.—pp. viii, 92.

Within the last decade or so interest in ethics has steadily grown in Germany, and this has naturally led to a renewed study of Kant's moral philosophy. To the number of able treatises written by Hegler, Schmidt, Hagerström, Vorländer, Förster, Menzer, Adickes, and Messer, we can now add that of Koppelman, the author of *Kritik des sittlichen Bewusstseins*. Owing to the significance of Kant's ethics for his world-view and the fact that many of the younger German scholars have been attracted by the ethical teachings of the great criticist, investigations such as these possess more than a historical value to students of philosophy. The present work, for example, attempts not merely to offer an interpretation and criticism of the Kantian theory, but also to develop the basal moral laws from the *a priori* conditions of a spiritual kingdom—the kingdom of ends, as Kant would say—which are held to be the same in all rational beings and can therefore be known with absolute certainty. In this respect Koppelman agrees with Kant in his endeavor to deduce the moral principles from the notion of a rational being as such, or, better, from the notion of a kingdom of rational beings. He accepts as correct both Kant's method and his premises, but tries to show that Kant reaches a perfectly barren formula by exaggerating the principle of autonomy.

As the most fruitful teaching in Kant's ethics our author regards the idea—not clearly and directly expressed—that action in accordance with the principle of 'fitness for universal legislation' will result in the highest good, in the preservation of a society in which the highest is to be

realized. With this opinion I entirely agree: the thought in the background of Kant's consciousness was the notion of an ideal society, a society of rational beings; and it was the tacit assumption of this idea that made his fundamental principle in any way acceptable as a criterion. But it is the silent introduction of this standard, which after all, makes the system teleological, a thing Kant tried so hard to avoid. And he thinks he can avoid it, just as Koppelman proposes to avoid it, by holding fast to the absoluteness of the categorical imperative. This theory is not social eudæmonism, Koppelman holds, for the welfare ethics declares that the act is moral if directed toward the realization of the ideal state, a view that would inevitably lead us to the principle that the end justifies the means. This criticism, however, is based on a misunderstanding of the welfare theory. It does not necessarily teach that man either does or ought to think always of the highest good; social eudæmonism is not identical with what Sidgwick calls empirical utilitarianism. The social eudæmonist could accept the Kantian definition of duty and still assert the social good to be the final test of morality. He could also, as has been pointed out often enough, make friends with the intuitionist. That he ordinarily refuses to regard the blind acceptance of a categorical imperative as a higher moral motive than the conscious adoption of a social end, is by no means to his discredit. However that may be, in so far as the categorical imperative aims at the establishment of a society of rational beings, and in so far as this ideal is the ultimate, though tacit, criterion of right and wrong, Kant's ethical theory belongs to the very school of thought which he so bitterly attacked.

The most fatal error, however, in Kant's teaching, according to Koppelman, is his conception of autonomy, the view that the autonomous will forms the moral rules. The moral rules do not necessarily spring from the will: they may, like theoretical truths, have their seat in reason. Koppelman therefore eliminates this notion of autonomy, retaining the other elements of the doctrine, and develops what he believes to be the logical consequences of the Kantian principles as follows: The moral rules are valid for all rational beings, absolutely valid in the sense of being independent of private inclinations and purposes. They are, further, laws which regulate the mutual relations of rational beings; they have social character, as Kant himself intimates. All the moral rules can be comprehended in one: Have respect for the autonomy of reason, that is, be truthful. Kant believed that no moral laws were given *a priori*, but that there was only *one* principle of guidance for practical laws. The result of this teaching was that, in order to derive his moral laws, he was compelled to have recourse to empirical ends, for even his highest

good takes on an empirical character. Koppelman, on the other hand, regards his own laws as laws which we actually apply as moral standards, as *a priori* laws, which are rooted in our own innermost essence.

That the teachings of the modern teleological school of ethics have not been without influence upon our author is also apparent from his answer to the question concerning the sanction of the categorical imperative. *Sollen* is really a *Wollen*, though not exactly in the way in which Kant had understood it. As rational beings we desire complete spiritual community and, consequently, also the reign of the laws of the spiritual community. We desire them all the more because the dignity of mankind and our own personal worth and dignity depend upon them. It is therefore not necessary to have recourse to a noumenal world in order to explain the consciousness of obligation: we really desire what the categorical imperative aims at. This conception enables Koppelman to solve a problem which had given Kant a great deal of trouble, the question of the relation of morality and happiness. How can the desire for happiness, which forms an inextinguishable factor in the human soul, be reconciled with morality? Man desires the spiritual kingdom and his happiness depends on the realization of that kingdom; his desire for happiness therefore is identical with his desire for the kingdom. But since his moral aspirations are also directed towards that kingdom, there is a harmony between the desire for the universal reign of the moral law and the desire for happiness. If Kant had seen this, it would not have been necessary for him to bring in the idea of God merely to make possible the realization of happiness in proportion to virtue. At the same time, according to Koppelman, man must believe in the realization of the highest good, and faith in the highest good necessarily leads to religion, or rather, to ethical monotheism; indeed, the consistent development of faith in the highest good necessarily points to a supersensible realization of the same. As with Kant, metaphysical conceptions are here regarded as inseparable from the ethical conceptions.

The theory developed by Koppelman shows a tendency common in our day to make peace between the different schools of ethics. It seeks to reconcile the principles of rationalistic intuitionism, as taught by Kant, with the so-called teleological theory, both in the hedonistic and energistic forms of the latter. The emphasis, however, is laid on the rigoristic element: though 'universal legislation' aims at the highest good, we must not consciously aim at this, but must do our duty for duty's sake. The free will problem is also settled in a manner agreeable to most modern moralists. Koppelman refuses to accept Kant's doctrine of freedom in the form in which Kant offers it, and assumes a causality of reason:

a man is free when he can resist his inclinations through reason; a man governed by his reason, by moral principles, is free. Why some men are lacking in moral principle, others not, the author does not undertake to explain; he accepts it as an inexplicable fact. And it is wiser to make this confession than to assume with Kant that the good will is a will chosen by a timeless, intelligible character.

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The Duty of Altruism. By RAY MADDING McCONNELL. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1910.—pp. vi, 266.

The problem which Dr. McConnell has set before himself in *The Duty of Altruism* is whether it is "possible to prove to the selfish man that altruism is right and rational." Right he defines in terms of what we should do well to call the idealistic theory, even though, in order to do so, we may have to alter our terminology at one or two other points. The application to conduct of the adjectives right and wrong is due to the presence of an ideal; the right is a form of the good, and the good means that which is adopted as an end by the will. That this position, with proper definitions, is identical with the view that moral judgments have their source in the emotions of approbation and disapprobation, is explicitly recognized. The rational is defined—in accordance with a common, but by no means universal, form of idealism—as being merely that mode of conduct leading to the end that appeals to desire. From these accounts of the fundamental terms Dr. McConnell believes it follows immediately that moral distinctions are absolutely subjective; so that it is sheer nonsense to say to another person, "You ought." For either he is actually pursuing the end in question, so that your "ought" is unnecessary; or else it does not appeal to him, in which case the "ought" is mere nonsense. The attempt to avoid this conclusion by asserting that the interests of the broadest egoism—which the author seems to assume is a universal characteristic of human nature—and of altruism are identical, is declared to be inadmissible, because such identity is in fact not complete.

The conclusion derived from the above definition of right is fortified by a critique of the various theories that claim universal validity for the moral judgment. This critique occupies the greater part of the book. By implication, all egoistic theories, hedonistic or otherwise, are rejected, though they are not subjected to a special examination. Theological theories, the first to be studied, are condemned on grounds familiar to every one and now almost universally accepted. The chapter on metaphysical theories criticises the system of Kant, Schopenhauer's doctrine

of the disappearance of the illusion of individuality through sympathy, and the Hegelian doctrine of morality as obedience to the universal will. Its contents also represent nothing new, but, so far as Kant and Schopenhauer are concerned, will be of use to the beginner in the history of ethics. The attempt to show that law or custom is the source of the distinction between right and wrong is met by the assertion that "when we shape our acts with reference to law and custom, we regard these as representing our own will, as representing what we should decide were we to take the trouble to investigate the matter in question." The principles of logic are declared to be equally impotent to give us a moral code which we should ever dream of acknowledging where it required anything not demanded by desire. As against Sidgwick, Fouillée, and G. E. Moore, it is urged that identity, equality, and contradiction are categories that get meaning only as applied to some content. But moral judgments get their contents from standards which have their source in desire or approbation. Again, psychological theories which claim to show—whether without or with the aid of the theory of evolution—how altruism has arisen in some men can do nothing towards showing that it is obligatory for all men. The same is true of any theory of evolutionary ethics whatever, no matter how successful it may be in proving that the cosmic process is working towards the ultimate extinction of the purely egoistic members of the race.

The majority of the author's criticisms seem to be, in the end, valid, though they too often fail to get the precise point of view of the writer criticised. Two matters, however, should not escape without mention. Dr. McConnell frequently uses the argument that a certain position must be false because it is incompatible with the fundamental principle of what I have called the idealistic theory. But the only serious argument offered in behalf of idealism is that all alternative systems break down at some point. Hence his argument runs in a circle. Even more objectionable is the attitude which the author persistently takes towards metaphysical theories. "The metaphysical way of leading an egoist to become an altruist," he writes "denies the efficacy of a method entirely scientific and positive, that is, resting solely on the facts of experience." Again he writes: "We must refuse to draw upon the resources of an invisible, transcendental, metempirical world. A justifiable obligation for man must be grounded in the actual nature of man, in his actual constitution, in his actual goods and purposes, that is to say, in his actual human will." Such crude statements are not calculated to advance the cause of empirical ethics among thoughtful students. The two ablest representatives of metaphysical ethics in this generation are T. H. Green and Martineau—

neither of whom, by the way, is ever mentioned. What were the methods of these men but the analysis of experience, the outcome of which, they held, proved that there is much more in experience than empiricists have ever dreamed of? Indeed it was precisely because he believed that he alone had been willing to stand by experience to the very end that Martineau called his own theory, in distinction from all others, idiosyncrasy. At bottom the same is true, with some limitations, of the Kantian system. The attack upon metaphysical systems of ethics must be based upon something better than the combination of misunderstanding and *a priori* reasoning here offered.

But if, in the end, all non-idealistic theories will have to succumb to criticism, does it follow that I must not presume to say what ought to be the ideal for you or for the world because "one ideal is no 'higher' or 'better' or 'nobler' or more 'obligatory' than another, except for the person who has it"? Is it true that "I can recognize no 'obligation' either to form ideals or to conform to them, [because] if my ideal is simply what I will there is no sense in saying that my will *ought* to pursue it"? This follows only if by right we mean nothing more than the approbation of the present moment. But, though the author ignores the fact, this is not the interpretation put upon it by the great leaders of idealism. It is not the view of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, the modern founders of this theory. It is not the view of great contemporary representatives like Westermarck. Hume showed that, for common sense, right means that which is approved when all relations of the act to the judge's personal interests have been abstracted from,—the approbations of the "impartial spectator." Hutcheson pointed out that he who uses moral terms claims to have taken into consideration the interests of all parties affected. By a passing reference, undoubtedly an echo of very definite statements of Cumberland, Shaftesbury shows that he recognizes that moral epithets claim to be the outcome of a consistent ideal. If these positions are correct, *you ought* has at the lowest a very extensive range of application. And he who is thus addressed can be led to acknowledge it, a classical instance being King David's response to Nathan's parable. How far this range extends becomes, therefore, a matter for a systematic investigation, of which the author has not attempted to make a beginning. When he does so, he will find, I believe, that even the complete egoist—if there be such a person—can be convicted of inconsistency in so far as he disapproves of making the same sacrifice for another person that he is willing to make for his own future. He will find, I believe, that the representatives of rationalistic or logical ethics, with all their fumbling, were really on the track of the significance of consistency and its place

in the moral judgment, though none of them seem to have clearly apprehended the exact relation between the inconsistent and the contradictory. In any event it is certain that he will discover that the facts are far more complex than he has hitherto imagined, and that there is a long road to travel between the position that the moral judgment has its ultimate source in desire and any conclusions whatever about the range of its validity..

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

L'évolution de la mémoire. By HENRI PIÉRON. Paris, Flammarion, 1910.
—pp. 360.

Henri Piéron and Georges Bohn are the most productive French investigators in the field of 'animal behavior' at the present time. It is to be regretted that a quarrel seems to have arisen between them, for which the differences in their scientific views would appear to furnish insufficient explanation and which wears a rather personal aspect. Bohn last year published an account of his theoretical convictions on comparative psychology in a volume entitled *La naissance de l'intelligence*, and Piéron now follows with a work of generally similar scope. The chief divergence in the points of view of the two men is that while Bohn regards the phylogeny of mind as made-up of sharply defined stages, new factors having been introduced by the development of the eye, the cerebral hemispheres, and the human cortex, Piéron lays emphasis on the continuity of the process, and maintains "l'étroite parenté des phénomènes mentaux de l'homme et des animaux."

In accordance with this position the method of the book consists in discussing the various types of phenomena to which the term memory may be applied, and attempting to show that there is no essential difference between them. The result of such a proceeding, despite the author's thorough acquaintance with the facts, to some classes of which he has been an important contributor, is to produce a certain impression of superficiality. The ideal work on the evolution of memory would endeavor not only to show a connection between the various forms of memory, but to explain the differences between them, and to offer suggestions as to how these differences have been developed. It is particularly the psychologist who finds any minimizing of these differences unwelcome, for while to the observer of the objective aspect of animal behavior all cases where the effects of former stimulation are evident may be, to a certain extent, considered under one heading, to one who is interested in their subjective aspect such phenomena as acquired organic rhythms, the slow learning of a labyrinth path, and inferential imitation pointing to the revival of a memory image, are interesting even more through their unlikenesses than through their common elements: they certainly must 'feel' very different to the animal manifesting them. It is therefore in harmony with the general purpose of the book that the author repudiates the subjective point of view, maintaining that introspection can add nothing whatever to our knowledge of the evolution of memory.

In the introduction, the continuity of memory phenomena is carried down even into the inorganic world. By 'inorganic memory' the author designates the various manifestations of inertia: solid bodies retain the effects of past stimulation, a magnetized bar of iron loses its magnetic character at a rate

which lags behind the diminution of the inducing current, and so on. As for organic or biological memory, it is held to differ from inorganic memory only in complexity: the fact that memory in living beings usually displays adaptation to their needs does not constitute an essential difference, for on the one hand the influence of past stimulation is not always favorable to welfare, as when repeated exposure to toxins produces diminished rather than increased resistance to disease ('anaphylaxis'); and on the other hand there are phenomena in the inorganic world which bear an adaptive aspect, as for instance the fact that chloride of silver resists the decomposing action of light by turning red in red light and green in green light. Under the head of psychological memory, the author disposes of the question as to whether associative memory, or the revival of the effects of a stimulus through the medium of another stimulus formerly experienced at the same time, introduces a new factor, by merely pointing out that it is found considerably lower in the scale of animal life than Loeb supposes; and the claims of the memory image to be a new order of phenomenon in the evolutionary process are dismissed with a general denial that the subjective aspect of memory processes is worth investigating. Considerable stress is laid in this section on the fact, pointed out by a pupil of Loeb, Brailsford Robertson, that the curve obtained in Ebbinghaus's experiments on the effectiveness of repetition in memorizing, which shows that such effectiveness increases with the number of repetitions at first slowly, then more rapidly, and then slowly again, is coincident with the curve obtained in chemical processes of 'autocatalysis in monomolecular reactions,' that is, where one of the products of the reaction has an accelerative influence upon the reaction itself. This coincidence is held to indicate that the process of memorizing is a chemical process of the type in question. It is needless to say that Piéron is an emphatic opponent of vitalism.

The three principal divisions of the book deal respectively with rhythmic persistences, with animal memory, and with human memory. The first of these topics is the one to which Piéron's own investigations have contributed most. As an example of rhythmic persistence we may take the fact that sea-anemones, which open in a rising tide and close in a falling tide, continue to open and close at the proper times for a few days when the animals are placed in an aquarium. That this persistence is individually acquired and thus a true memory phenomenon, rather than the expression of an innate rhythmic tendency, is shown by the possibility of varying the rhythm artificially. Book II, treating of animal memory, gives a good account of the results of experimental investigation in this field. In writing of imitation the author seems to ignore the existence of purely instinctive imitation, and repeatedly says that when an animal imitates another it is thereby proved to have a memory image. He also asserts that when an animal rapidly associates a percept and an action, it is shown to recognize the causal relation between them. These two bits of interpretation illustrate amusingly the fact that a writer who makes things easy for himself by saying that he will ignore the

psychic aspect of behavior altogether is usually betrayed into drawing inferences regarding it of a distinctly unguarded character.

The discussion of human memory, finally, contains chapters on the modalities of memory, where the identity of the laws governing human and animal memory is maintained, for instance the law that forgetting is at first rapid and later much slower, and the law that a given number of repetitions is more effective if distributed over a considerable interval than if massed; on the variations of memory, ethnic, individual, ontogenetic, and pathological; and on the utilization of memory, in connection with which the author maintains that intellectual progress consists in a gradual freeing of intelligence from subjection to memory, by various devices, such as scientific laws and mathematical formulæ, which enable experience of the past to be conveniently synthesized.

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An Outline of Logic. By B. H. BODE. New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1910.—pp. 324.

"The aim of this volume is, among other things, to give a concrete discussion of ambiguity, to simplify the study of causal connections, and to treat with greater detail than is usually done the type of inference called circumstantial evidence, the nature of proof, and the postulates of reasoning. The place assigned to the syllogism is relatively small, the subject being presented with a minimum of detail. In the distribution of emphasis, the function of logic as a guide in reasoning has been constantly borne in mind. It is partly for this reason that the illustrations are, as a rule, taken from other sources than the physical sciences because I incline to think that in the past these latter have been relied upon more than is desirable. Finally I have added a chapter on sense perception, in the hope that it will aid in making logic a propædæutic to philosophy" (p. v).

After the introductory chapter we find chapters on "Classification and Class Names," "Ambiguity and Definition," "Some Special Forms of Ambiguity," "The Nature and Interpretation of Propositions," "The Categorical Syllogism," "Hypothetical and Disjunctive Syllogisms," "False Assumption or Begging of the Question," "The Proof of Universal Connections," "The Proof of Causal Connections," "Probability," "Circumstantial Evidence and the Test of Truth," "Observation and Memory," "The Nature of Reasoning," "The Authority and Test of Truth," and "The Problem of Sense Perception."

The discussion first points out that the consciousness of likeness and of difference are the central thought functions in reasoning. Where likeness predominates, classification and class names result. But these change in meaning and are often vague, and ambiguity, one of the two most prevalent errors in reasoning, is the consequence. "An ambiguous argument correctly assumes some resemblance among the members of the class, but it mistakes the nature of the resemblance, and this is the reason why a statement which is

supposed to be true of all is true only of some" (p. 27). The test whereby ambiguity is exposed, "is to substitute other terms for those to which a suspicion of ambiguity attaches itself" (p. 27).

The question is then raised as to "what the relation of classes must be to each other in order to make correct inferences possible." This leads to the statement that "a judgment is a mental assertion of something as true or untrue, while a proposition is the expression of the judgment in words" (p. 52). But a proposition is only one of the ways in which a judgment may be expressed and so there is a discussion of various transformations of propositions which are free from ambiguity. Here, for the purposes of underclass teaching, one might perhaps prefer a fuller exposition.

The treatment of the categorical syllogism, like those by Jevons and Creighton—except for the omission of their second rule—gives seven rules of the syllogism and illustrates with circles. The errors of denial of the antecedent and affirmation of the consequent are reduced to cases of false obversion. After the formal fallacies follows the discussion of what are usually called the material fallacies. These are ambiguity and false assumption. In fact, "it will appear that the fallacies of ambiguity and imperfect disjunction may also, if we see fit, be viewed as cases of false assumption" (p. 95). "False assumption consists in making an assumption which an opponent would not grant if its real character were understood" (p. 95). Here, it will be observed, the author has practically followed Creighton in naming the two classes of fallacies, only that Creighton uses the conventional names in pointing out the fallacies included under these heads, whereas the author, *e. g.*, gives only two special forms of false assumption: reasoning in a circle and irrelevancy or ignoring the question. The latter has a subordinate form, the *Argumentum ad Hominem* or the *Argumentum ad Populum* (p. 105). There is no doubt that some simplification of the sub-classes of fallacies would be very desirable, but the question arises whether this particular simplification compensates for the loss of the definiteness which the pupil finds in Creighton's presentation.

In the chapters concerned with the inductive side of logic, a distinction is made between the proof of universal connections and the proof of causal connections. If "we wish to prove a universal connection, we must select our cases so as to vary the circumstances as much as possible. The process is a process of elimination. We rid ourselves of those circumstances in which our cases differ, in order to isolate the circumstances in which they all agree. If we find that all circumstances can be varied except one, we are entitled to conclude that this circumstance in which all the cases agree is an unfailing sign of the attribute in question; and the method by which this conclusion is established may, therefore, be called the Method of Agreement" (p. 110). This method, however, cannot prove a causal connection, for causation is not a matter of universal propositions, but of the elements involved in universal connections. We can say that, other things being equal, certain constituents produce the effects; in other words, we can get general propositions but not universals. Furthermore, universal propositions, as just quoted, result from

the emphasis of resemblances, whereas the reverse procedure obtains in proving causal relations. "We can discover causes only by noticing the difference between those cases in which the cause is present and those in which it is not" (p. 125). Consequently the Method of Difference is the characteristic method here, the Joint Method and Concomitant Variations being merely variations of Difference.

The test of analogical inference is motivated doubt which is defined as "a doubt that can point to some fact which seems to establish an analogy or a general rule as a basis for the doubt" (p. 166). If different analogies are combined to support a conclusion, we have circumstantial evidence. The test of this form of reasoning is again motivated doubt, also the harmony of the present experience with the large body of previous experience.

A chapter on the Nature of Reasoning is followed by two chapters on the Authority of the Test of Truth and the Problem of Sense Perception which give the student an excellent introduction to further problems of philosophy and which, together with a good collection of exercises, bring the book to a close.

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Die menschliche Geistestätigkeit in der Weltentwicklung. Eine kritisch-philosophische Betrachtung des menschlichen Geistes, mit Anwendung der Prinzipien auf die Entwicklung der menschlichen Gesellschaft. Von AUGUST J. GISS. Band I. Leipzig, A. Deichert, 1910.—pp. xvii, 278.

This work, as the author tells us in the preface, "resulted from the attempt to comprehend the content of the Kantian doctrine, particularly the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In this connection I have proceeded upon the following assumption: There are in the world's history world-ordering, spiritual activities (*weltordnende geistige Tätigkeiten*), which have exerted a determining influence upon the development of the world. The Kantian *Critique* constitutes such a world-ordering, spiritual activity. It has exerted a determining influence upon the spiritual development of the world. But it also constitutes a human, spiritual activity. How is it possible that a human, spiritual activity should constitute a world-ordering, spiritual activity? This is the fundamental problem. From the standpoint of this assumption, I could consider the problem solved only when I succeeded in understanding the Kantian *Critique* as the product of a human, spiritual activity."

The meaning of this rather enigmatical *Problemstellung* appears gradually as the work proceeds. The author states that his attempts to attain an intimate appreciation of the fundamental problems of Kant's critical labors were unsuccessful at the outset, that Kant's achievements constantly appeared to him as something superhuman, something beyond purely human possibility. That Kant's work was the product of human endeavor did not become fully intelligible, until it was interpreted in the light of the hypothesis that it really embodies two distinct systems of thought.

These two systems of thought are the critical and the idealistic. With

the latter Kant's apriorism establishes an entangling alliance from which he struggles in vain to disengage himself. Hence the fundamental motivation of Kant's thinking does not find full expression. This motivation springs from a world-ordering, spiritual activity, which strives after an order internally complete, *i. e.*, a closed system. That all possible experience necessarily involves a subjective element is Kant's imperishable contribution. And while he is not successful in the attempt to evaluate this subjective element, he nevertheless furnishes the key to the solution of the problem. Thus space and time are not *a priori* conditions in Kant's sense, but are ideal standards of measurement, brought into being through the creative activity of the thinking subject, which employs these ideal standards to the end that it may introduce order, when the need arises, into the relatively undifferentiated experience of the preceding stage. A similar explanation applies to the whole of Kant's *a priori* machinery, as the author shows by a detailed examination of the *Critique*. Sense and thought are not different sources, but different levels of the ordering activity. The relation of faith and knowing is to be interpreted, not in Kant's sense, but in the sense that the belief in a fixed order is at the basis of all human knowing.

The second part of the book consists of an application of this general standpoint to the social and religious development of man. The ordering activity, it appears, is, on the side of content, the expression of personality. It inevitably takes the form of social activity, and so human history may be viewed as the progressive achievement of a higher world-order. The creative spirit in man brings into being, as the need arises, a higher type of morality and religion, just as the categories are brought into being in order to accomplish the ends of speculative activity. This view is exemplified by a survey of portions of Greek and Jewish history.

According to the author, every fact is to be viewed in the light, and as an expression, of a world-ordering activity. But he nowhere attempts a serious discussion or justification of this "world-ordering activity," which is asserted to be fundamental to all that is. The reader finds in the book no point of contact with the discussions of the past decade concerning the matters which are brought up for consideration. With regard to this world-ordering activity, he is left in the dark as to its nature, its concrete content, and its necessary existence. Why it is necessary to appeal to a world-ordering activity in order to account for the reconstruction of human experience is by no means apparent. The author frankly assumes this at the outset, and thus saves himself the trouble of reflecting on the facts of struggle and adjustment. Hence the gratuitous hypothesis of a self-dependent, world-ordering activity, which constitutes, when rightly viewed, a closed system, within which all facts derive their being through the internal differentiations of a single principle. The style of the book is commendably clear, but its type of thinking,—assuming as it does the transcendentalist position in advance of all argument,—is of the kind described by Professor James as 'thin,' a kind which, in its more pronounced forms, is now happily becoming obsolete. B. H. BODE.

Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy. By ÉMILE BOUTROUX.
Translated from the French by JONATHAN NIELD. London, Duckworth
and Co., 1909.—pp. xi, 400.

This book, which, by the way, is beautifully printed in large type on light paper, is an elaborate treatment of an interesting subject. The programme presented by the analytic table of contents is most inviting, but the text itself is very difficult to follow on account of its entire lack of concreteness. The whole treatment is highly abstract and metaphysical.

In the introductory chapter the author sketches the changing relations of religion and science from Greek antiquity to the 19th century. Science and philosophy together sprang in part from religion, but they have gradually grown apart until science, at least, is radically separated from religion, the two presenting a complete dualism. They can no longer be said to present two sets of truths between which it is possible to demonstrate an agreement. They exist rather "one beside the other like two impenetrable atoms, placed side by side in space. They have come to an understanding, explicitly or tacitly, in order to abstain from scrutinizing one another's principles." It is the relation of religion to science in the thought of this nineteenth century period that forms the problem of the book. The author finds in contemporary thought a naturalistic and a spiritualistic tendency. The philosophy of Comte is the first type of the naturalistic tendency. Positivism, or the religion of humanity, has certain significant aspects but also serious limitations. It occupies a "position of unstable equilibrium. It knows only the real and the useful. But in the real and the useful are necessarily implied other higher notions."

After Comte, the author discusses Spencer's doctrine of the unknowable as an attempt to relate religion and science. It is the recognition of this "something other and higher" that characterizes the thought of Spencer. The religion of the unknowable, however, is merely a residuum of science and does not in any real sense afford an adjustment between religion and science. "How," he says at the conclusion of his long discussion, "can we refrain from seeking the means of converting this possibility into reality?"

The monism of Haeckel is next examined. Haeckel raised "science to the rank of philosophy in such a manner as to find in it the means of overthrowing religions; and he has afterwards brought his philosophy to the level of these same religions in such a manner as to render it capable of replacing them. And the end, as a heterogeneous principle, has created the means." The so-called ethics of solidarity, a variant of monism, covers up, the author avers, a persistent dualism between man and things. Science in all these attempts to adjust religion to itself really eliminates religion. "She herself would be our supreme requirement, our absolute, our ideal."

The claims of the psychologist and the sociologist are next taken up. Each offers a professedly adequate account of religious phenomena. The psychologist attempts to trace the evolution of the religious sentiment and to offer a naturalistic account of religious phenomena in terms of the psychical or-

ganism. Certain deficiencies in the psychological account are supplied by the sociologist. Thus, in the explanation of duty or obligation, the sociologist is able to escape from postulating a transcendental basis by showing that the same effect is secured through the action of society upon its members. The explanations of the psychologist and of the sociologist are not, however, feally scientific. The human ego and human society are not resolvable into mechanical causes. Psychology is powerless to explain the feeling of religious obligation, and sociology must supplement its account by postulating not only a real society but also an ideal or divine social order.

In Ritschlianism, the first aspect of the spiritualistic tendency in this period, the author finds a recognition of a specifically religious element, namely, feeling of faith. This, however, is narrow because it is anti-intellectualistic, and, as developed by Ritschl, becomes a subjectivity without content. "How can we see in faith, thus separated from all intellectual content, anything else than an abstraction, an empty form, a word, a nonentity?"

After discussing in great detail the limits of science with respect to religion, the author turns to the philosophy of action. The outcome of his long and subtle argument may be expressed by his question at the close. "Action, existing solely for and through action; pure practice producing, may be, concepts, but not depending itself upon any concept, does such an abstract pragmatic notion still deserve the name of religion?" The doctrine of Professor James is not taken up in this connection but is reserved for a chapter of its own. We find here set forth, not James's general philosophy of pragmatism but rather what is embodied in the *Varieties of Religious Experience*. The author seems to think that here, again, we are confronted with pure subjectivism. "Does not religion have objective value?", he asks. "If feeling is the soul of religion, beliefs and institutions are its body; and there is only life in this world for souls united with bodies."

The above paragraphs are not even a brief synopsis of the long and subtle analyses and arguments of this volume. The author seems to have a genius for rendering simple things obscure and for multiplying purely verbal distinctions. To one of slightly pragmatic tendencies, the whole book seems to be a fine illustration of the futility of the abstract conceptual mode of treatment. Even when one grasps the meaning of the sentences, he feels that it is after all mere words. The hope that we may get some light upon what it is all about again emerges as we come to the "Conclusion," which sketches the author's conception of the difference between the religious and the scientific spirits, and last of all his conception of religion as such. This conclusion occupies 22 pages and it is impossible for the reviewer to summarize it, nor is he able to discover in what respect the conception presents any advantages over those which are criticised in the preceding chapters. The final word of the book is that religion and science are essentially distinct and that they have each been developed through their mutual conflicts. Conflict has served to render the value and indestructibility of each more and more evident. "Strife tempers them both alike."

IRVING KING.

Schillers philosophische Schriften und Gedichte (Auswahl). Zur Einführung in seine Weltanschauung. Mit ausführlicher Einleitung herausgegeben von EUGEN KÜHNEMANN. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchandlung, 1910. —pp. 438.

The first edition of Professor Kühnemann's book of selections from Schiller's philosophical writings was published in 1902, and was discussed in the *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW* for November, 1904. The present second edition will accordingly require little comment. The first edition met with a more cordial reception from the general audience of Schiller lovers than from the schools, for which it was originally intended. The present book has accordingly been expanded by including selections which will prove useful to a general audience of cultivated readers. The extensive Introduction of 90 pages is reprinted without change, but to the original list of selections are added the essay, *Von den notwendigen Grenzen des Schönen*, and the entire collection of the *Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen*, instead of the original collection of nine. The number of the *Volviptafeln* has also been almost doubled. The reader interested in the development of Schiller's reflective thought would probably have welcomed some selections from the early medical essays, which are interesting both for themselves and for the anticipations there of a number of Schiller's later and most characteristic ideas. The volume is supplied with a useful index of names and topics.

EMIL C. WILM.

WASHBURN COLLEGE.

Form und Materie des Erkennens in der transzendentalen Ästhetik. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung. Von FELIX GROSS. Leipzig, Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1910.—pp. 100.

This is an attempt to show, by a rather circumstantial examination of Kant's theory of space and time, as contained in the *Dissertation*, the first *Critique*, and the *Prolegomena*, that the Kantian doctrine of space and time, as pure intuitions, is untenable, and that its untenability is due to the backward state of psychology in Kant's day, which did not recognize specific space and time sensations. Space and time experiences through the special senses do indeed presuppose space and time, as Kant held; but this does not argue that space and time have an extra-experiential origin. They arise in connection with organic, especially muscular, sensations, and are therefore original endowment only in the sense that they are bound to arise as soon as the infant can experience organic sensations. We do not dispose sensations *in* previously existing space and time; we have experiences *of* space and time. The theory of specific space and time sensations enables us to explain sundry phenomena inexplicable on the Kantian theory, such as the applicability of the category of space to external objects only, the tri-dimensional character of space, and symmetry.

There are occasional errors, typographical and other, such as p. 10, l. 14; p. 12, l. 35; p. 16, l. 31; p. 61, l. 11. A good index of names and subjects concludes the volume.

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The following books also have been received:

- The Phenomenology of Mind.* By G. W. F. HEGEL. Translated, with an introduction and notes, by J. B. BAILLIE. 2 vols. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York, The Macmillan Company, 1910.—pp. xlv, 427; viii, 428–823. 21/.
- The Psychology of Religious Experience.* By EDWARD SCRIBNER AMES. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1910.—pp. xi, 428. \$2.50.
- The Philosophical Theory of the State.* By BERNARD BOSANQUET. Second edition. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1910. \$3.25.
- Manual of Mental and Physical Tests.* By GUY MONTROSE WHIPPLE. Baltimore, Warwick & York, 1910.—pp. xix, 534.
- A Text-Book of Psychology.* By EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1910.—pp. xx, 565. \$2.
- Dogmatism and Evolution.* By THEODORE DE LAGUNA and GRACE ANDRUS DE LAGUNA. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1910.—pp. iv, 259. \$1.75.
- History of Ethics within Organized Christianity.* By THOMAS CUMING HALL. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910.—pp. xi, 605. \$3.
- The Basis of Musical Pleasure.* By ALBERT GEHRING. New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1910.—pp. vii, 196.
- Three Philosophical Poets.* By GEORGE SANTAYANA. Cambridge, Harvard University, 1910.—pp. vii, 215.
- The Evolution of Mind.* By JOSEPH MCCABE. London, Adam & Charles Black, 1910.—pp. xvii, 287. \$2.
- Pragmatism and its Critics.* By ADDISON WEBSTER MOORE. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1910.—pp. ix, 283.
- Christianity and Social Questions.* By G. W. CUNNINGHAM. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910.—pp. xv, 232. \$75.
- Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.* New Series, Vol. X. London, Williams and Norgate, 1910.—pp. 300. 10/6.
- Education in the United States.* A Series of Monographs edited by NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago, American Book Company, 1910.—pp. xxiv, 1068. \$2.50.
- Thought and Reality in Hegel's System.* By GUSTAVUS WATTS CUNNINGHAM. Cornell Studies in Philosophy, No. 8. New York, Longmans, Green, and Company, 1910.—pp. v, 151.
- Principles of Secondary Education.* By CHARLES DE GARMO. Vol. III: Ethical Training. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1910.—pp. x, 213. \$1.00.
- Principles of Education.* By FREDERICK ELMER BOLTON. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910.—pp. xii, 790.

- The Presentation of Reality.* By HELEN WODEHOUSE. Cambridge, University Press, 1910.—pp. x, 163.
- The Fundamental Problems of Metaphysics.* By JAMES LINDSAY. Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood & Sons, 1910.—pp. xii, 135.
- The Unexplored Self.* By GEORGE R. MONTGOMERY. New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1910.—pp. vii, 249. \$1.25.
- Radium and Materialism or Physical Monism.* By JAMES BROWN.—pp. 54.
- The Concept Standard.* By ANNE M. NICHOLSON. New York, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1910.—pp. 138.
- The Qualities of Men.* By JOSEPH JASTROW. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1910.—pp. xv, 183. \$1.
- The Mystical Element in Hegel's Early Theological Writings.* By GEORGE PLIMPTON ADAMS. University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. 2, No. 4. Berkeley, The University Press, 1910.—pp. 67-102.
- The Judgment of Difference with special Reference to the Doctrine of the Threshold in the Case of Lifted Weights.* By WARNER BROWN. University of California Publications in Psychology, Vol. 1, No. 1. Berkeley, The University Press, 1910.—pp. 1-71.
- A Study in the Psychology of Ritualism.* By FREDERICK GOODRICH HENKE. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1910.—pp. vii, 96. \$1.05.
- An Inconsistent Preliminary Objection against Positivism.* By ROBERT ARDIGÒ. Translated from the Italian by EMILIO GAVIRATI. Cambridge, England: W. Heffer & Sons, 1910.—pp. 52. 1/.
- Das Problem der Theodicee in der Philosophie und Literatur des 18. Jahrhunderts bis auf Kant und Schiller.* Von OTTO LEMPP. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1910.—pp. vi, 432. M. 9.
- Die Stetigkeit im Kulturwandel: Eine soziologische Studie.* Von ALFRED VIERKANDT. Leipzig, Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1908.—pp. xiv, 209. M. 5.
- Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff: Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik.* Von ERNST CASSIRER. Berlin, Verlag von Bruno Cassirer, 1910.—pp. xv, 459.
- Encyklopädie der Philosophie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Erkenntnistheorie und Kategorienlehre.* Von A. DORNER. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1910.—pp. vii, 334. M. 6.
- Der Sinn des Lebens und die Wissenschaft: Grundlinie einer Volksphilosophie.* Von F. MÜLLER-LYER. München, J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1910.—pp. iv, 290. M. 4.
- Erkenntnistheorie und Naturwissenschaft.* Von OSWALD KÜLPE. Leipzig, Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1910.—pp. 47. M. 1.25.
- Rudolf Rocholls Philosophie der Geschichte.* Von WERNER ELERT. Leipzig, Verlag von Quelle & Meyer, 1910.—pp. 138. M. 4.40.

- Die Philosophie des Bewussten.* Von M. B. KUPPERBERG. Bern, Buchdruckerei Scheitlin, Spring & Cie, 1909.—pp. 72.
- Die Prinzipien der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung: Eine logische Untersuchung des disjunktiven Urteils.* Von SAMUEL LOURIÉ. Tübingen, Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1910.—pp. 221. M. 5.80.
- Ethik.* Von BARUCH DE SPINOZA. Übersetzt und mit einer Einleitung und einem Register versehen von OTTO BAENSCH. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1910.—pp. xxix, 315. M. 3.40.
- Wolffsche Begriffsbestimmungen: Ein Hilfsbüchlein beim Studium Kants.* Zusammengestellt von JULIUS BAUMANN. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1910.—pp. iv, 54. M. 1.
- Wilhelm von Humboldts ausgewählte philosophische Schriften.* Herausgegeben von JOHANNES SCHUBERT. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1910.—pp. xxxix, 322. M. 3.40.
- Fichte, Schleiermacher, Steffens über das Wesen der Universität.* Mit einer Einleitung herausgegeben von EDUARD SPRANGER. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1910.—pp. xliii, 291. M. 4.
- La crise de la psychologie expérimentale.* Par N. KOSTYLEFF. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. 176.
- Épicure.* Par E. JOYAU. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1910.—pp. 223.
- Émile Boutroux.* Choix de textes avec une étude sur l'œuvre par PAUL ARCHAMBAULT. Paris, Louis Michaud.—pp. 290.
- Cabanis.* Choix de textes et introduction par GEORGES POYER. Paris, Louis Michaud.—pp. 222.
- La psychologie animale de Charles Bonnet.* Par ED. CLAPARÈDE. Genève et Bale, Georg & Co, 1909.—pp. 95.
- La curiosité: Étude de psychologie appliquée.* Par FRÉDÉRIC QUEYRAT. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. vii, 141.
- Le concept du hasard dans la philosophie de Cournot.* Étude critique par A. DARBON. Paris, Félix Alcan.—pp. 60.
- Siger de Brabant et l'Averroïsme Latin au XIII^{me} siècle.* I^{re} partie: Étude critique; II^{me} partie: Textes inédits. Par PIERRE MANDONNET. Louvain, Institut supérieur de philosophie de l'université, 1908, 1911.—pp. xvi, 328; xxx, 194.
- Verità e realtà.* Per ALESSANDRO BONUCCI. Modena, A. F. Formigini, 1911.—pp. viii, 518. L. 7.50.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mèt.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*, *I. Abtl.*: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

The Prediction of Human Conduct: A Study in Bergson. B. BOSANQUET.
Int. J. E., XXI, 1, pp. 1-15.

Three basal facts are enumerated and explained by the writer in connection with the views of Bergson. (1) There is a distinct difference between mathematical time and conscious duration of time. The former is thought of as a succession of *point positions*, while the latter is conceived as a succession of *intervals* of experience. When revived from the past, these intervals are never exactly as they were in the past, but are linked with the experience of the present. Bergson complains of the fact that in connection with philosophy, language, and common sense the spatial, point-position conception of time is much confused with the conception of duration. Experience is pictured as a cinematograph picture. (2) The spatial conception of mathematics also vitiates the views of determinism and indeterminism. Alternatives of willed action are imagined as analogous to the forking of a road on a map. Such decisions are influenced not by the alternative possibility of action, like the possibility of taking the other road, but by tendencies characteristic of the actor. (3) Free action then is dependent on the whole self, not only as expressed at the moment of action or by the 'crust' of education and tradition, but by the total group of sentiments and characteristics formed long before action takes place and actively present at the instant of action. In considering Bergson's views of prediction of human conduct a distinction is made between prediction of *natural* events, when causes and conditions are known and mathematical time *units* are reckoned, and the prediction of human events, in which case the time *interval* of experience may alone be the cause. The second instance admits of two methods of attack: that of knowing the total facts, not as brute facts, but as living portions of the life of the person whose conduct is to be predicted; and that of subjectively experiencing all the mental factors, and, by actually living them, personally perform the deed

which was to be predicted. But because we can never get at all of the factors operating in the mind of any individual, both of these methods fail. Bergson, then—and in a broader sense Bradley also—states that prediction of conduct means a performance by proxy of the act to be prophesied. Bergson is pessimistic as to the feasibility of this method, but the writer, assuming the idealist's attitude, believes that this method is practical in view of the fact that the universe is one, and specifically, because similar ideas are commonly of simultaneous occurrence. Moreover, if the general conditions and elements of character are known in any individual case, one ought to be able to predict the drift of action under definite circumstances.

C. A. RUCKMICH.

La philosophie scientifique comme système de valeurs. FRANCIS MAUGÉ. Rev. Ph., XXXV, 10, pp. 387-408.

A scientific philosophy has a task beyond the mere recording and classifying of data furnished by the special sciences. It must frame and hand over to the sciences for further investigation certain general questions or hypotheses, suggested by universal, practical demands or values, and thus affect somewhat the course of scientific procedure. To accomplish this end philosophy requires methods and criteria by which to single out the significant facts; it must have facts, and not abstract notions, as its principles, and must offer suggestions as to the utilization of these facts. The method suggested is that of material abstraction in contrast to mere ideal abstraction. To get at the individuals composing a system, elements which are actualities, and not mere conceptual devices, must be separated from each other. For this work, the logical method of difference must be supplemented by such auxiliary scientific methods as segregation, neutralization, differentiation, etc. Since the elements are thus independent and individual, the construction of the system consists in an identification of these elements. Intuitions, that is, the universally accepted facts of experience, must be used as principles rather than conceptions, both because of the demand of induction for the individual, or particular fact, and of deduction for a progression from the known to the unknown. Systematization, then, consists in the identification of intuitive elements of representation. Granted that this is a good theory, can science take it and use it? The fact of sensorial symbolism makes this possible. Every sense organ has a system of symbolisms, its own particular set of representations for describing the world. Are there any of these symbolic systems which can be substituted for others? The kinæsthetic and affective systems can be thus substituted, and they are the most useful because they alone are susceptible of quantitative expression. The intuitive element of the first system is the material point, the least conceivable center of strain or movement, with its two simple functions, those of gravity and of electricity. The intuitive elements of the second system are the elementary tendencies to fuse and to discriminate. These elements can be substituted for the conventionally understood elements of the various sciences. For instance, in biology, the cell can be expressed as a unit

with the functions of gravity and electricity. Similarly in psycho-physiology gravity can be substituted for affection and electricity for representation. These hypotheses of a scientific philosophy are to be distinguished from the creations of an uncontrolled imagination in that they are tried out in science, and in that they are no more arbitrary than the facts warrant.

KATHERINE EVERETT.

Le problème morale et la sociologie. F. PALHORIÈS. Rev. Néo-Sc., XVII 3, pp. 352-375.

The spread of positivism seems to involve the giving up of the traditional ethical conceptions of duty, the good, obligation, and moral sanction. Current sociological ethics is essentially descriptive. The task of the moralist, according to this school, is not to make men better, in any absolute sense, but to point out to them certain types of action, which are nothing more than generalizations of human experience. The old ethics was prescriptive and based upon an essentially rational order with God as its final cause. This ethics was individual, deductive, and normative. Reasoning from the true nature of man, it addressed itself to the individual conscience. The new ethics, expressly rejecting all metaphysical and religious considerations, is primarily inductive. Occupying itself exclusively with the generalization and systematization of customs and usages, it must, in the nature of the case, dispense with real duties. It then becomes sociology rather than ethics. For this inductive, empirical ethics, the distinction between good and evil resides in the idea, not in the facts. Obligation becomes merely the recognition of the utility of conforming to a mean type. The objections against the older ethics may be best met by giving of it a definition as precise, philosophical, and scientific as possible. From the point of view of the older ethics, reality is too rich to be confined within the set formulæ of positive science. Aside from *relations of existences*, there are *relations of value*. Over and above the dialectic of science is a dialectic of art, morals, and religion. Reason attains a knowledge of this order of values through a spontaneous intuition of the qualitative connections of things. This intuition or perception being of a very general character, our particular evaluations are often erroneous. Variations in moral practice do not argue against an absolute and universal ethics, but merely indicate that it is only gradually that man learns to judge of values with precision. However dependent on experience, the determination of particular values belongs peculiarly to reason. Inductive procedure here becomes nonsense. To explain the moral order we must refer back to God, the source of both existence and value. The progressive recognition of the qualitative relations which exist in the divine order constitutes all ethical evaluation and puts our intelligence into accord with that of the Creator. The ethics which comports with human nature is respect for order rendered moral by the action of a free will. To this specifically ethical conception, religion adds that of a divine commandment to be executed. All the great ideas of ethics follow logically from the recognition of the value of things.

Moral obligation is the recognition of the necessity of respecting the essentially reasonable order of things. But this intellectual conviction must be supplemented by the love of a free will for this order. This rational, free, and generous love for the order of beings is the essence of the *virtuous act*. *Compensation* is to be found in the state of happiness, which, according to the nature of things, infallibly accompanies the practice of the moral law.

J. R. TUTTLE.

Politik als Wissenschaft und Philosophie. KURT PESCHKE. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XVI, 3, pp. 332-348.

Every science must have some definite end in view: it must not content itself with an orderly array of facts alone, but must assimilate and digest them for the accomplishment of a set purpose. Politics, in the sense of a science of state-government in its widest application, also seeks fundamental concepts to be built up into an organized whole. But the following questions naturally arise in this connection: does political science, in the search for these concepts, make only *a priori* assumptions; and of what nature are they? On what basis should the state act? Need it trouble itself about moral standards? A review of historical or economic facts cannot reveal normative standards. The teachings of ethics make it apparent that purposes are relative to some ultimate end; and that moral evaluations are subjective, not objective. Even philosophy and its special department of metaphysics cannot be of service in this respect. The principle of "highest good" cannot be found in any theory of the purposive existence of the universe, because such a theory is itself biased by a subjective point of view of moral ends.

But, although philosophy can be of no assistance in the establishment of premises, an investigation of the methods of statecraft can possibly reveal them. An organized science of so general a nature, which forces its decrees indiscriminately upon mankind, must evidently possess some sanction, because it seems to be so successful in its task. The science of politics appears to derive its authority from the fact that it assumes as its own 'highest good,' the standards which the individual citizens hold collectively. The most common ideal of mankind is self-preservation. Since society and the state in a measure realize this ideal and do so economically, they are advantageous institutions to the individual. Statecraft, then, is based on the standards of the people of the state, rationally applied to problems of government. The ethical value, the intrinsic metaphysical purpose of the principles, is not a problem for political science. Its problem is: with these moral standards acknowledged by the people, how can they be best governed?

C. A. RUCKMICH.

Is Christianity a Moral Code or a Religion? L. HENRY SCHWAB. Harvard Theol. Rev., III, 3, pp. 269-293.

There is a tendency at the present time to interpret Christianity as an ethical system rather than as a religion. This is due to the enthusiasm for social

welfare which seeks the sanction of the ideals of Christianity's founder for its own ideal. The question as to the correctness of the interpretation is one of fact. Which has the support of the records? In the first place it is to be noted that nowhere in the writings of Christ's followers do we find presented the conception of Christianity as a moral code. If this conception be nevertheless the true one, the inference is that those who were taught uniformly missed this point of the teaching. In studying the problem, two questions must be considered. 1. Is Christ's own teaching merely a system of moral precepts? His entire ethical instruction is confined to a few short passages, the beatitudes, the golden rule, and a few other epigrammatic statements. It is on the great religious concept of the spirituality of life that Christ concentrates his attention. His habit of mind, as displayed in the parables, is to understand events and objects in this world as mere types of the truths of the spiritual world. The standard of righteousness, he asserts, is set for us by God in Heaven, and is not a construction of human minds. Faith, prayer, and repentance, essentially religious conceptions, are his theme, again and again. 2. What is the teaching in the Acts and Epistles regarding the nature of Christianity? A careful examination of these writings reveals an emphasis on metaphysical truth rather than on moral conduct. Paul glories in the facts of salvation and redemption; his mind is set on another world, one different in kind from ours. John and Peter have practically the same point of view. It was not until the time of the early church that men began to ignore the spirituality, the otherworldliness, of Christianity, and to lay stress on conformity to ethical standards. This distorted view has been more or less common in the church ever since, though held from different motives at different periods. It is important to realize that, however ideal the ethical code, it will be barren unless the spring of action is found in religion.

KATHERINE EVERETT.

The Passing of the Supernatural. ALFRED H. LLOYD. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., VII, 20, pp. 533-553.

In some sense at least the supernatural is passing, Yet in the death of the supernatural do we not have a liberation of the spirit? When we think of the spirit as set free by the death of the body, or of an ideal meaning as set free by the passing of a civilization, we mean in either case that whatever dies or passes is particular, relative, or partial, and that whatever is liberated is universal and whole. In the relation of whole and part which here appears, can the whole be said to tyrannize over or to annihilate the part? A negative answer to this question may be based, first, on the relation between the spirit and the letter, second, upon that between the soul and the body, and finally upon that between the ever-living God and the dying God, that is, between the supernatural *in toto* and the supernatural *in parte*. That the letter or form passes, is a common observation in moral ideas, art, science, philosophy, etc. The means are discarded, but the end remains and this end is the spirit. Anarchy has destroyed governments, but never government; license morals,

but never morality; doubt doctrines, but never truth; heresy and profanity religions, but never religion. Assertion of the spirit brings extreme license, but the spirit only becomes universal in achievement or in reality when it changes its license into a substantial freedom and makes of the neglected part a new instrument. In its recall and use, the partial past, although transfigured, loses none of its original individuality. Turning to the relation of body and soul, we note that the body lives for a short time and is apparently lost more hopelessly than the letter or institution. Yet here again we must hold that the soul is only realized by a restoration of the body in some sense, as a vital and primary whole or personality. As to the third relation, we may identify the supernatural *in parte* with the possible as an object of positive belief, and the supernatural *in toto* with the purely possible, the region of the whole. In this view, the dying or secularization of a Church, a soul, or an anthropomorphic God, means only a realization of the supernatural in the sense of the wide and free, its rebirth in terms of the human and natural. Furthermore, the passing of the supernatural as other-worldism means the rise of a more dynamical view, an immediate realism and naturalism, an identification of reality with experience, an exaltation of action above form, an era of will.

J. R. TUTTLE.

L'induction en mathématiques. G. H. LUQUET. Rev. Ph., XXXV, 9, pp. 262-269.

The methodology of any science, and especially of mathematics, the author says, must be difficult, because it requires an acquaintance with both logic and the subject matter. There are two types of induction in mathematics—the one like that used in the concrete sciences, the other, reasoning by recurrence. The latter consists in proving a theorem for a value n , and proving that if it holds good for n , it will hold good for $n+1$. In the former case, we reason on principles which we already know to be general; in the latter, we reason on the principles of a particular case. The method of recurrence is that of concordance; the ordinary method, that of difference. Mathematics is the study of the necessary; science, that of the constantly recurrent. The method of difference and the *reductio ad absurdum* are alike indirect proofs.

N. WIENER.

Deduction et syllogisme. E. GOBLOT. Rev. de Mét., XVIII, 4, pp. 478-490.

The place of the syllogism in mathematics is disputed, one school denying it any function in the formation of general propositions, the other asserting the use either of the syllogism proper, or of that more general method, the logic of relation. Extension and comprehension are mutually reciprocal. From either comprehension or extension we can deduce two rules: (1) the extension of a term in the conclusion should be no greater than in the premises; (2) the middle term should be taken universally at least once. Scholastic logic, when it defines its figures by the nature of the middle term, neglects the essential character of its data and deals with chance resemblances. All

sylogisms can be classified on a basis of subject, quality, and mode. Rodier, a comprehensivist, calls a syllogism the immanence of the matter in the form. According to him, a concept is not a group of objects, but a system of qualities. The natural syllogism, he says, should consist solely of relations of comprehension, for these alone are not tautological. But in fact these are tautological. Rodier calls analysis syllogistic. But extension and comprehension play no part in any mathematical proposition that needs proof, for subject and attribute are heterogeneous. Finally, modal propositions are not categorical, but hypothetical; mathematical syllogism too is hypothetical.

N. WIENER.

Personality and a Metaphysics of Value. J. A. LEIGHTON. Int. J. E., XXI, 1, pp. 23-36.

Fundamental problems of modern philosophy center in questions of evaluation; but a system of values involves a systematic study of personality—values are human in origin. There are three kinds of valuing attitudes: (I) theoretical or truth attitudes; (II) practical or overt action attitudes; (III) immediate emotional or feeling attitudes. The first applied to the three types of experience, viz., nature, fellow man, and god, establishes their reality. The second, referred to the same three types, produces (1) technology of natural experiences, (2) instrumentalities of social order and well-being, (3) methods for entering into right relationship with God. The third attitude governs the other two and can likewise be referred to the three types of experience. They are (1) feelings of natural beauty, (2) feelings of friendship, (3) feelings of worship and of personal relation to God. *Æsthetic* values are not classified because they are not a single unified type. The outcome of activities represented by practical and emotional attitudes are dependent upon the orders of existence indicated by truth attitudes. The principle of this classification is based purely on personality, on the harmonious enrichment of universal experience.

C. A. RUCKMICH.

A Unit-Concept of Consciousness. EDWARD M. WEYER. Psych. Rev., XVII, 5, pp. 301-318.

Psychology lacks a serviceable unit-concept of mind, a cautious reduction of consciousness to the lowest terms compatible with the limitations of science. The required concept should set bounds for comparative psychology by indicating how far downward in the scale of organic beings its surveys properly extend, and should embody in itself the demonstrable antecedents from which the human mind has evolved. That psychical units are possible as well as physical units is attested by the psychosis and the mental elements in descriptive psychology, the term in logic, the voluntary act in ethics, the family in sociology, and the like-minded group in the science of history. The sole qualification of every such unit is that it embody an auxiliary concept rendering a particular subject-matter more congruous and systematic. Three

assumptions are necessary for this unit-concept of mind, namely: consciousness, sensation, and feelings. As to consciousness, a small amount of complexity, differentiated in clearness as distinguished from sensory intensity, is assumed as a necessary trait of any mind capable of manifesting its presence and thus existing as an object for science. Sensations may be either tactual or muscular, the latter referring to sensations attending movement centrally initiated. All sensations may be regarded as formal and abstract, their concreteness being due to their affective accompaniments. The feelings assumed are strain-relaxation and excitement-depression. In conceiving the autonomy of this mind, we must treat any single incoming sensation as an isolated fact. The sensation enters the two-dimensional system and the prevailing state of feeling depends on its position. If it contributes somewhat to the amount of change going on in the sensory content, it will either augment or produce a feeling of excitement; if it contributes to the quantity of the sensory content, this will make a displacement of the point in the direction of the feelings of strain, etc. The function of autonomous consciousness in respect of behavior seems to be the introduction of greater variety into the series of possible responses to stimuli than would arise through mechanical causes acting alone. Consciousness has for its purpose the dislocating in time of the reactions from sensations. Whether all consciously-directed movements are the successors of simpler reflexes, or whether reflex acts may be regarded as the consequents of conscious acts, we cannot prove. But a serviceable hypothesis relating to the mind at the stage when consciousness did enter is the goal toward which by our unit-concept we should endeavor to approach.

AUSTIN S. EDWARDS.

Beiträge zur Psychologie des Übersetzens. GABRIELE GRÄFIN VON WARTENSLEBEN. Z. f. Psych., LXVII, 1 and 2, pp. 89-115.

The investigation has for its problem the systematic introspection of consciousness during the translation of Latin words and sentences into German. The method is that of Marbe. The observers were instructed to translate a given word or sentence, visually exposed, and then give an introspection of the experience they had from the translation. The sentences, though more difficult than the words, could be easily understood by one who had an average knowledge of Latin. The time between looking at a word or sentence and giving the translation was kept with a stop watch to one fifth of a second. Fifty words and 50 sentences were used. All of these were exposed to two observers; 35 words and 35 sentences were exposed to a third; 30 words and 30 sentences to a fourth observer.

The results of the investigation are as follows: In the translation of Latin words, there were present, besides the perception of the words to be translated and the announcement of the translation, ideas, feelings, and different conscious attitudes. Of special note were the attitudes of meaning and familiarity. The German equivalent came before its verbal expression, or at the same time with it. Auditory images or motor reactions occurred with all observers, while visual images were almost completely absent in five out of six observers. The

conscious attitude of meaning occurred during any stage from the first reading of the Latin to the rendering of the translation, also in combination with the other conscious contents, or as independent content. The same holds true with the attitude of familiarity. The attitude had to be differentiated into meaning of isolated words, syntactical meaning, and meaning of the interconnection of the words. The existence of the former did not presuppose the latter. Besides the delayed translation, in which there appeared accompanying or interpolated conscious processes between the perception of the Latin and the translation, there was an immediate translation. In immediate translation no kind of conscious processes were present between the perception of the Latin words and the translation. With the increasing ease of associative connections between Latin and German words, the number of ideas coming up during the translation decreased, while meaning and familiarity increased. With the greater ease of associative connections the number of the accompanying and interpolated processes became smaller. The translation approached the immediate translation. The "Einstellung" of the observers for the translation had no influence on the kind of mental processes reported.

AUSTIN S. EDWARDS.

Do Kittens Instinctively Kill Mice? ROBERT M. YERKES AND DANIEL BLOOMSFIELD. Psych. Bul., VII, 8, pp. 253-263.

The article is a report of a series of experiments in the Harvard Psychological Laboratory with two litters of kittens born in the mouse-proof animal room. The experiments were performed in fifteen minute periods, at irregular intervals. During the first week, each kitten was allowed to smell a live mouse twice but no reaction occurred. By the end of the second and third months all the kittens were killing and eating mice. Results were as follows: Kittens possess the instinct to kill mice, though the same reaction may not differ from the one toward any small animal. It differs radically, however, from that toward a lifeless object moved before the kitten. The instinct appears suddenly, at times before the end of the first month, but more commonly during the second. The reaction is fairly definite in character, complex, and highly adaptive, involving the bodily states of attention, and being aroused by the movement and odor of the mouse—the latter factor being important after the first reaction. Opportunity neither for imitation nor experience is necessary for the efficient execution of the killing reaction, but is of assistance in the awakening of the killing instinct. In the first kill, the kittens seize the mouse so that they cannot be bitten by it, and though at first they kill it immediately, they soon learn to treat it in the habitual, playful way. Probably the instinct to kill is more highly developed in the female than in the male.

CORRINNE STEPHENSON.

The Puzzle of Color Vocabularies. R. S. WOODWORTH. Psych. Bul., VII, 10, pp. 325-334.

Gladstone was the first to point out the vagueness of color names among

the early Greeks; and he inferred that it was due to an underlying sensory defect. Geiger extended the study to various ancient literatures, and came to the same results. In these literary remains, he found a word for red and reddish-yellow, but none for blue; and, in the oldest literature, none for green or yellow. He concluded that where there was no color name, there was an absence of sensitivity to that color. Magnus then took up the problem. His results led him to abandon the view of a close correspondence between color sensitivity and color vocabulary. The Gladstone-Geiger theory gained support later by the investigations of Rivers, who measured the color sensitivity of different peoples. The low sensitivity to blue among primitive people, he regarded as caused either by their primitiveness or their pigmentation. The writer maintains that the late appearance of names for green and blue cannot be explained by racial differences. Abstract color names are developed late in a language from names of colored objects. That color name would be the first to develop which was the mark of an object of special importance to a race.

M. E. GOUDGE.

An Experimental Study of Imagination. CHEVES WEST PERKY. Am. J. Ps., XXI, 3, pp. 422-452.

The following extracts are from the author's summary appended to the article: (1) We find that, under suitable experimental conditions, a distinctly supraliminal visual perception may be mistaken for and incorporated into an image of imagination, without the least suspicion on the observer's part that any external stimulus is present to the eye. It follows that the image of imagination must have much in common with the perception of everyday life. (2) For preliminary purposes, images of memory may be distinguished from images of imagination as having particularity and personal reference. (3) We find that, in the great majority of cases, memory images of sight, sound, and smell involve gross movements of eyes, larynx, and nostrils, while the corresponding imaginations involve no such movements. (4) A detailed comparison of visual images of memory and of imagination brings out the following differences: memory involves eye-movement and general kinæsthesia, imagination involves steady fixation and lack of general kinæsthesia; memory images are scrappy, filmy, and give no after-images; while images of imagination are substantial, complete, and sometimes give after-images. We thus reach the general conclusion that the materials of imagination are closely akin to those of perception. Popular psychology looks upon memory as a photographic record of past experience, and regards imagination as working with kaleidoscopic, instable, undependable materials. Precisely the reverse appears to be true. The image of memory is stable and fixed in meaning, in reference; but it is exceedingly instable as conscious content. The image of imagination is the photographic record, a stable formation that stands still to be looked at. These results, positive as they are, can at present be said to hold only for the conditions under which they were obtained and for the observers upon whose introspections they rest.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

NOTES.

Professor Harry Allen Overstreet, of the University of California, has been appointed head of the department of Philosophy in the College of the City of New York. Professor Overstreet will take charge of his new work in January, 1911.

Professor S. W. Dyde, of Queens University, has been appointed Principal of a new school of theology in the University of Alberta, at Strathcona, Alberta. Professor Dyde will assume his new duties in October, 1911.

We have received an early number of a new periodical entitled *Logos: Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur*. The new journal will be directed by an international board of editors, divided into several national groups, and will be printed simultaneously in several languages. Already a German and a Russian edition are published and it is intended that in the future French, Italian, and American editions shall be issued. The editors for America are Professors Hugo Münsterberg and Josiah Royce. Communications to the German edition should be addressed to Dr. Georg Mehlis, Zasiussstrasse, 68, Freiburg i.B.

Dr. Kurd Lasswitz, Professor Emeritus of Mathematics in the Gymnasium Ernestinum at Gotha, died on October 17, 1910, aged sixty-two years. Dr. Lasswitz is known to students of philosophy as the author of *Geschichte der Atomistik vom Mittelalter bis Newton*, 1890; the life of Gustav Theodor Fechner in the Frohmann Klassiker der Philosophie; and *Wirklichkeiten: Beiträge zum Weltverständnis*, 1900.

Professor Wilhelm Schuppe, of the University of Greifswald, has retired from active service.

A complete and correct edition of Schopenhauer's Works in ten volumes, including hitherto unpublished letters and papers, is announced by the Verlag von R. Piper & Company in Munich. Professor Paul Deussen, of Kiel, is the editor.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals:

MIND, No. 76: *H. W. B. Joseph*, The Development of the Perception of External Objects (II); *C. M. Gillespie*, The Truth of Protagoras; *A. A. Bowman*, Difference as Ultimate and Dimensional; *Helen Wodehouse*, The Apprehension of Feeling; Discussions: *F. C. S. Schiller*, Absolutism in extremis; *H. A. Prichard*, Philosophic Pre-Copernicanism; *H. W. B. Joseph*, The Enumerative Universal Proposition; *John E. Russell*, The Humanist Theory of Value; Critical Notices; New Books; Philosophical Periodicals; Notes.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XVIII, 6: *T. V. Moore*, The Influence of Temperature and the Electric Current on the Sensibility of the Skin; *W. F.*

Book, On the Genesis and Development of Conscious Attitudes (Bewusstseinslagen); *Knight Dunlap*, Reactions to Rhythmic Stimuli, with attempt to Synchronize.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, VII, 10: *R. S. Woodworth*, The Puzzle of Color Vocabularies; Psychological Literature; Books Received; Notes and News.

VII, 11: General Reviews and Summaries; Special Reviews; Discussions: *Raymond Dodge*, The 'Pendular Whiplash Illusion'; *Knight Dunlap*, A Correction; Books Received; Notes and News.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XXI, 4: *E. C. Rowe*, Voluntary Movement; *T. Okabe*, An Experimental Study of Belief; *L. R. Geissler*, A Preliminary Introspective Study of the Association-Reaction Consciousness; *E. B. Titchener* and *L. R. Geissler*, A Bibliography of the Scientific Writings of Wilhelm Wundt; Commemorative Note—William James.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, VII, 19: *John Dewey*, William James; *J. E. Boodin*, Truth and its Object; *H. Heath Bawden*, Art and Nature; *William Brown*, Note on a Quantitative Analysis of Mathematical Intelligence; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VII, 20: *Alfred H. Lloyd*, The Passing of the Supernatural; Discussion: *John Dewey*, The Short-cut to Realism; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VII, 21: *Edgar L. Hinman*, The Aims of an Introductory Course in Philosophy; *Jay William Hudson*, An Introduction to Philosophy through the Philosophy in History; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VII, 22: *H. M. Kallen*, The Lyric Philosopher; *DeWitt H. Parker*, Knowledge and Volition; *H. Heath Bawden*, Art and Science; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VII, 23: *A. W. Moore*, How Ideas Work; Discussions: *Ralph Barton Perry*, A Reply to Dr. Brown; *Harold Chapman Brown*, A Note Concerning "The Program and First Platform of Six Realists"; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, III, 3: *Charles S. Myers*, Instinct and Intelligence; *C. Lloyd Morgan*, Instinct and Intelligence; *H. Wildon Carr*, Instinct and Intelligence; *G. F. Stout*, Instinct and Intelligence; *William McDougall*, Instinct and Intelligence; *Charles S. Myers*, Instinct and Intelligence. A Reply; *C. Spearman*, Correlation Calculated from Faulty Data; *William Brown*, Some Experimental Results in the Correlation of Mental Abilities; *Henry J. Watt*, Some Problems of Sensory Integration.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE, I. Abtl., LVII, 1 u. 2: *L. v. Karpinska*, Experimentelle Beiträge zur Analyse der Tiefenwahrnehmung; *Gabriele Gräfin von Wartensleben*, Beiträge zur Psychologie des Übersetzens; Literaturbericht.

LVII, 3: *Richard Müller-Freienfels*, Zur Psychologie der Erregungs- und Rauschzustände; Literaturbericht.

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, XXIV, 1: *Emanuel Loew*, Die Zweiteilung in der Terminologie Heraklits; *Leo Ehlen*, Die Entwicklung der Geschichtsphilosophie W. von Humboldts; *Stan. von Dunin-Borkowski*, Nachlese zur ältesten Geschichte des Spinozismus; *Emil Raff*, Die Monadenlehre in ihrer wissenschaftlichen Vervollkommnung; Rezensionen; Die neuesten Erscheinungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte der Philosophie; Zeitschriftenschau.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE, XXXIV, 3: *Richard Müller-Freienfels*, Zur Begriffsbestimmung des Ästhetischen und der Kunst; *Eduard Stamm*, Das Prinzip der Identität und der Kausalität; *M. Horten*, Indische Gedanken in der islamischen Philosophie; *Paul Barth*, Die Geschichte der Erziehung in soziologischer Beleuchtung, XIV; Besprechungen; Philosophische und soziologische Zeitschriften; Notiz.

LOGOS, I, 2: *Ernst Troeltsch*, Die Zukunftsmöglichkeiten des Christentums; *Wilhelm Windelband*, Kulturphilosophie und transzendentaler Idealismus; *Bernardino Varisco*, Das Subjekt und die Wirklichkeit; *Georg Simmel*, Michelangelo. Ein Kapitel zur Metaphysik der Kultur; *Jonas Cohn*, Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre, ihr Sinn und ihre Bedeutung für die Gegenwart; *Karl Joël*, Gefahren modernen Denkens; *Friedrich Steppuhn*, Friedrich Schlegel, als Beitrag zu einer Philosophie des Lebens; Notizen.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XXXV, 10: *F. Le Dantec*, Les mathématiciens et la probabilité; *Th. Ribot*, Le moindre effort en psychologie; *F. Maugé*, La philosophie scientifique comme système de valeurs; *H. Piéron*, Contribution à l'étude des sentiments intellectuels; Analyses et comptes rendus; Revue des périodiques étrangers; Nécrologie—W. James.

XXXV, 11: *L. Dugas et F. Moutier*, Dépersonnalisation et émotion; *L. Dauriac*, Psychologie générale et psychologie musicale; *N. Kostyleff*, Les travaux de l'école de psychologie russe: étude objective de la pensée; Revue critique: *F. Paulhan*, L'oubli, d'après le récent livre de Renda; Analyses et comptes rendus; Revue des périodiques étrangers.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XVIII, 5: *G. Sorel*, Vues sur les problèmes de la philosophie; *C. Bouglé*, Proudhon sociologue; Correspondance inédite de Ch. Renouvier et de Ch. Secrétan; Études critiques: *Walter Kinkel*, La logique de la connaissance pure; *A. Lévi*, Directions des études éthiques dans l'Italie contemporaine; Questions pratiques: *Guy-Grand*, Le procès de la démocratie; Supplément: Nécrologie; La philosophie dans les universités; Livres nouveaux; Revues et périodiques; Correspondance.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE, X, 9-10: *A. Gemelli*, Darwinisme et vitalisme; *A. Briot*, Le problème de l'origine de la vie; *C. Torrend*, Le transformisme dans les derniers échelons du règne végétal; *E. Wasmann*, La vie psychique des animaux; *H. Colin*, La mutation; *R. de Sinéty*, Mimétisme et Darwinisme;

M. Kollman, Les facteurs de l'évolution. La sélection et l'influence du milieu; *R. D.*, La loi biogénétique fondamentale; *J. Gérard*, Évolution, Darwinisme, vitalisme. État de la controverse en Angleterre; *J. Maritan*, Le néo-vitalisme en Allemagne et le Darwinisme.

X, 11: *C. Lucas de Pesloüan*, Histoire des idées et des recherches touchant la nature du diamant; *R. Van der Elst*, La suggestion; *S. Belmond*, La connaissance de Dieu d'après Duns Scot; *Th. L.*, Positivisme et pragmatisme; Les cours de philosophie dans les universités des pays de langue française pendant l'année 1910-1911; Les cours de la Revue de Philosophie. 2^e année; Analyses et comptes rendus; Recension des revues; Nécrologie.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA, II, 4: *Roberto Ardigò*, Il positivismo nelle scienze esatte e nelle sperimentali; *Pasquale D'Ercole*, La reintegrazione della facoltà teologica; *Salvatore Minocchi*, Religione e filosofia; *E. Juvalta*, Postulati etici e postulati metafisici; *Giovanni Calò*, Le ragioni dello spiritualismo; *E. Troilo*, Bernardino Telesio; Libertà di scienza e di coscienza; *Luigi Luzzatti*, I martiri nella storia del pensiero; *B. Varisco*, Realtà e cognizione; *Alessandro Levi*, Bibliografia filosofica Italiana (1908-1909); Recensioni e cenni; Rivista delle riviste; Atti della società filosofica Italiana.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENCE.¹

IN the year that has passed we have lost in the death of a former president of this Association one who in the eyes of the world had come to stand for American Philosophy. Professor James was the most widely known, and at the same time the most universally beloved American philosopher. There was none who did not come under the spell of his personality, none who did not look forward eagerly to a work from his pen. There was such a sense of reality and life in all that he wrote that reading his works had, in a peculiar sense, the charm of personal intercourse. It was meeting the man himself and sharing in his life and outlook. He was not one of those who content themselves with reporting what some one else has said about what some one else has experienced and taken for reality. With marvelous skill he portrayed the situation as he himself confronted it, and in doing so enabled his reader the better to discover the facts of his own inner life.

I am reminded that when we met a year ago we had to mourn the loss of another distinguished American philosopher. No two men could be temperamentally more unlike than William T. Harris and William James. The one lived serenely secure, on the heights, contemplating in the sweep of his vision all time and all existence, holding in his hand the golden key, the solvent formula, of all of life's problems; the other dwelt ever in the valleys, in the market place, in the bustle of finite things, seeking ever new experiences, his interest centered in the unique, the dramatic, the elusive, distrustful of all comprehensive formulas

¹Delivered as the presidential address before the American Philosophical Association at Princeton University, December 27, 1910.

whether of science or of philosophy. Their very features marked the contrast, the marble-like placidity of the one, the eager, restless, mobile face of the other,—the ascetic saint and the intensely human being. The ideal of one was peace, contemplation, the theoretic vision of truth absolute, or as he himself put it, “speculative vision”; of the other, active efficiency in a world of finite facts and definite problems. The one could say “a whole I planned”; the other, the parts are more or less recalcitrant, they will not fit perfectly together,—possibly they do not belong together. Each may be said to have possessed the defects of his virtues. If the one could not see the forest for the trees, the other at times could not see the trees for the forest. If the formulas of the one had at times a far-away echo, the other occasionally let his interest in the individual and unique, and his distrust of formulism, go so far as to make the whole problem of reason seem futile.

Doctor Harris deserves a conspicuous place in the annals of American Philosophy, not only because of his success in arousing interest in the subject throughout the country at a time when men, more absorbed even than at present in the struggle with the material environment, and in the more narrowly utilitarian view of life which that struggle suggests, were little given to reflection on the larger problems of the inner world, where ideals are the forces to be reckoned with; not only because of his success in applying philosophy to practical problems in the introduction of some semblance of order and rationality into our general educational situation; not only because of his services in interpreting to the English-speaking world the philosophical system of the greatest of the German philosophers; but also for the notable contributions which he himself made to that philosophy. And yet I think the fact remains, and can be frankly admitted without any disparagement, that he stands rather at the close of a chapter, if not of an era, in philosophical development, and that it may properly be said that, for us at least, Professor James opens another. There can in any case be no doubt that Professor James succeeded in putting new life into the issues of philosophy, and that he better represents the spirit of our own age.

When a philosophy is once enthroned and endowed with authority, thought crystallizes into formulas; that system then has had its day, though it may not have ceased to be. Later German idealism had achieved this somewhat unenviable position. *Philosophus dixit* began to be heard once more, the *philosophus* being now either Hegel or one of his tribe. Now, a *philosophie autoritaire* and formulism go hand in hand. Professor James represents the protest against the complacent substitution of the parched formula for the living truth. There are times when in philosophy, as in politics, insurgency seems necessary for progress, and when the conservative is apt to be regarded as an old fossil who, clinging to the wisdom of the fathers, overlooks the needs of altered times. It is only human nature that one should exaggerate the novelty of the so-called new views, and lose sight of the virtues of the older philosophies. A glance at the history of philosophy should, however, dispel our illusions. Turn to Descartes and Locke and Kant and read how they despaired of previous philosophies and expected by their own efforts, by the adoption of a new method and its consistent application, to avoid the snares and pit-falls of their predecessors. In the perspective of time we discover that their break with the philosophy which had gone before was by no means so complete as they supposed, their new methods neither so novel nor so perfect as they fondly believed. I have no doubt that every significant philosopher, every philosopher who has been a voice and not a mere echo, however scholastic and formal his reasoning may appear to us, set out from facts of experience, even as we all aim to do; that his interpretations emerged from the facts and were not simply foisted upon them; that his distinctions were significant. And yet they frequently are not the facts and distinctions that seem to us most important and interesting. They have grown cold and stale. The spirit of our times makes other problems pressing. Our eyes are not directed to some far off divine event but to the definite tasks tumbling about at our feet. We are not primarily concerned with the heaven above where saints immortal reign, but with the now and the here-below, where the diabolic is painfully in evidence, and the

next best is always the best we can do, and not perfection but progress is the watchword.

The present reactionary tendency in philosophy is part of the same spirit which finds expression also in modern social, ethical, and religious life. This protest is directed chiefly against the older idealism, or what the older idealism is supposed to be. That philosophy is charged with doing a wholesale, not a retail business; its advocates are said to be lost in verbalities; they have become mere artificers of soothing phrases. The wife of a distinguished Scottish philosopher once remarked that when she heard her husband expounding his philosophy she felt as if she were sitting up on a cloud with nothing on, with a Lucifer match in her hand, but no earthly way of striking it. A good deal of current criticism represents a similar estimate, only perhaps there would be more reluctance in admitting the presence of the Lucifer match. That older idealism is supposed to give us generalities which may inspire as well as glitter, but which lose themselves in the end in the limbo of the vague. And there is a demand made from many different quarters for a reformulation of philosophy's problems.

I.

There are in contemporary philosophical discussions three things constantly being insisted upon:

1. Philosophy must show more respect for the facts of ordinary finite experience than the older idealism did. No explanation which results in a substitution of something else, by whatever name, for the facts as experienced, will suffice. Now it is one of the first discoveries of reflection that appearances are deceptive, and that it is necessary to distinguish what *is* from what *seems*. From the recognition of this necessity, from which there is indeed no escape either for science or philosophy, it was an easy and natural step for the naïvely uncritical philosopher to assume a complete separation between the real and the apparent, and then to discredit the apparent as the unreal. The first great idealist, or realist—for he was surely something of both—Parmenides, falls into this trap, and speaks with contempt of the opinions of mortals who trust the deliverances of experience rather than

reason,—“deaf and dumb and blind and stupid unreasoning cattle.” The wise man, however, knows that things of sense are mere names which we mortals assign to the underlying and unchangeable reality. And the first great materialist, or realist, commits the same blunder, for Democritus makes the sense qualities of things unreal in calling them mere conventions. So Plato, in one of his moods (but only one), when Orphic tendencies are uppermost, follows the same path in teaching that philosophy is “a study of death and dying,”—dying to sense in order to live in the eternal world of ideas.

It is, I think, a significant fact that this blunder is made by idealists, realists, and materialists alike. The utter futility of such a position is, now-a-days at least, obvious to all of us. Even Plato freed himself from it. For we certainly do not explain experience by the persistent endeavor to turn our backs upon it, and no philosopher of any school who lands in this separation of the real from the apparent, has ever been able to show how any connection of any kind could ever be established between such disparate things. And the new realist and modern idealist are surely at one in their insistence that in the order of reality, whatever interpretation may be given to that phrase, the things experienced, with all their experiential qualities, have their definite place and value. How the idealist and realist respectively would accomplish this is indeed a long story, and fortunately does not concern us here. I would only suggest that the facile fashion of bringing the charge against idealism that it ignores this truth should give place to a serious attempt on the part of the critic to show how he himself avoids the snare.

2. Closely connected with the former, and indeed its corollary, is the insistence that the temporalistic character of experience is finally valid, and that, in fact, no meaning can be put into reality except in so far as it lives in a temporal process.

3. The third characteristic is the one with which I am in this paper chiefly concerned, and it lies in my judgment at the basis of the other two which have been mentioned. I refer to the pluralistic leanings of modern philosophy; the distrust of any view which attempts to round up all facts of experience as belong-

ing to one systematic whole which is so closely interlocked that every item of experience is once for all fixed in precisely the place which the unity of the whole order demanded. This may properly be described as an insistence upon the recognition of the transcendent. If there are many reals, then from the point of view of any one the others are transcendent. If the time process is real, then from the point of view of the present the future is transcendent; it is not somehow locked up in the present so that the future is merely its unfolding. I use the word transcendent rather than a term which might seem to limit this view to some particular sect of philosophers, for the open or tacit recognition of a transcendent is found in philosophies most diverse, in pampsychism, with its insistence on the thing-in-itself, in every view that insists on the recognition of an alogical factor in reality, in realism, pragmatism, and certainly in some forms of idealism.¹

The reasons which incline men to a pluralistic view are many and diverse, and I suppose that the most influential are due to what might perhaps be called external reflection. There is in the first place the horror of the alternative view. This seems to have been particularly potent with Professor James, as is manifest in almost every essay in the *Will to Believe* series. The individual is lost in any monistic scheme, and whether vortex or Logos would devour us, the

¹In this connection I should like to enter a protest against the tendency, which has recently been growing pronounced, to make invidious classifications, to divide ourselves into groups with separate labels, so that we come to speak as partisans of realism, or partisans of idealism. There was a time when in the science of medicine physicians divided themselves into groups and spoke as homeopathists or allopathists. But this procedure only marked the backward condition of that science. And so, in philosophy, if a man under stress of circumstances reluctantly gives himself a label in order to mark in a general way certain broad characteristics of his position, he himself always makes many saving mental reservations. If he gives a label to another, it generally stands for something much more rigorously definite, and there is usually something invidious in the characterization. I wish we might have less of the polemical method. The object of attack, particularly when he is assailed under cover of some ambiguous blanket term like idealism, realism, etc., never feels that he has been fairly represented, and the discussion misses fire. After all, the value of work in philosophy, as elsewhere, is found not in its negations but in its affirmations. Whatever one may call one's self, what the rest of us desire to know is not what he thinks about something that he may call by another name, but rather what he regards as philosophy's problem, what are his methods of attack, and what solutions he proposes.

process is not one to which we propose to submit. Again, if the monism take an idealistic turn, then, in the face of all the reckless waste and actual misery which the world presents, the problem of evil is appalling; one is in the sad dilemma of affirming either that the hand of the potter was palsied and the clay that he made and used most unfitted to his purpose, or else that his purposes were far from being benign or even coherent. It is with a sense of relief that we discover that experience does not warrant the inference to such monistic conclusions. If we lean on experience for authority we can say with James, "Ever not quite."

Again, certain things seem clearly to be within our own power; others as clearly not. Feeling our own independence in the former case, we ascribe equal independence in the latter to things.

Finally, all social and moral valuations lose their significance unless we assume that in spite of their social interdependence each of the units entering into such relations possesses a unique inner life, and expresses a will and purpose all his own. If each is merely a phase or a partial manifestation of a larger inclusive life, these relations certainly seem to lose the precise meaning which they possess for you and for me.

I am well aware that such reflections are not the discovery of recent thought, but there is a widespread, and I think a well grounded conviction, and that in all schools of contemporary thought, that in the traditional absolutistic idealism, these things, upon which after all the significance of our daily life depends, have been in the end explained away.

Transcendent, then, of my experience would seem to be: (1) Those facts which collectively taken I call the world, and (2) the individual lives of my fellows.

The reasons so far adduced for inclining to a pluralistic view are no doubt not thought-compelling, in spite of the fact that common sense lends its support at every turn. And all reasons are lightly pushed aside by Bradley, who has a short and easy way of banishing any pluralism. If the reals are many, he tells us, then obviously the many must be either in relation to one another or not. If they are not, then it helps us not at all to

assume the existence of a many; if they are, then the relation limits and makes the terms relatively unreal. This attempt to force one by an inner dialectic to a monistic view does not carry conviction, however, for it begs the whole question at issue. It is by no means obvious that limitation spells unreality. If so, nothing but the indefinite would be real. Moreover, it is by no means self-evident that in all cases relation means limitation. If one can ever say, "Blest be the tie that binds," it is because of a very genuine experience that a certain kind of binding sets free, makes more real and not less so. And, on the other hand, if by accepting the Bradleyan position one is driven in the end to the conception of an absolute which can be characterized as "a gigantic automatic bankrupt bank," it would seem as if we had in such a concept the very quintessence of unreality, or to put it more accurately, as if that philosophy had been brought to ruin by its own immanent dialectic.

To one who would catch the pluralist in the dialectic net, the only effective reply consists in showing that the alternative or monistic view can be shown up by the same method. The difficulty of putting positive content into the notion of the absolute has often been recognized, and by none more clearly than by some of those philosophers who feel in the end driven to such a monism. But the root difficulty appears when one reflects that a being who is supposed to be one and all-inclusive could have no real relations of any kind, since there is by hypothesis no other to whom he, or it, could be related. Or, to put it in other words, he would be confined to relations with fragments of himself and would certainly be limited by that necessity. Whatever limitations attach to the finite would seem to cling to the absolute. If, on the other hand, one attempt to escape this conclusion by holding that in the life of the absolute all finite facts appear, but that the absolute sees them in their totality, then it would follow that he simply does not see them at all as they are for us. To say as some absolutists do that God suffers in the suffering of the finite, is a meaningless position if one take this back in the next breath by asserting that he not only suffers but triumphs, for to him all things are present, for him there is no before and

after. The absolute at any rate could have no sense of humor, for there could be no real surprises in his world. An American was walking down the street one day with an Indian Swami when they were suddenly confronted by a ludicrous situation; the American commented on the funny character of the incident, whereupon the solemn wise man at his side remarked: "There is nothing funny in this universe,"—quite as the walking edition of an absolute should.

II.

There is, however, very clearly a problem of transcendence. The very term suggests inaccessibility, a mere beyond to one's experience. Can the term be given any positive significance, and if so, how?

No doubt many of our perplexities in philosophy, as in life generally, are of our own making. We state a problem in terms which make the problem insoluble. Our most baffling perplexities come from the acceptance of certain distinctions which arise naturally enough in the course of experience as if they were equivalent to a segregation of objects. Thus mind is distinguished from body. But it by no means follows from the pertinency of this distinction that mind could have being, or even a meaning, apart from the experiences grouped as bodily, or the latter have a being and meaning apart from mind. Once make a separation of realities corresponding to this distinction, and then try to establish relations between the realities we have thus put asunder, and we run either into the absurdities of interactionism, or the fantastic doctrine of parallelism, or the futilities of epiphenomenalism. And similarly, if the problem of transcendence is stated as the problem how the mind can know things, how the ego can escape itself to reach the object, or, as seems with some the fashion, how the knowing relation can be eliminated and intelligible objects remain, one has stated the problem so as to make it forever insoluble.

I am ready to premise that the whole business of philosophy is to make things intelligible, and that if we humans have other functions besides the function of making things intelligible (eating, drinking, loving—in short living), these things must be parts

of that order of experience which we seek to make intelligible. So far at least I see no escape from the inclusiveness of the knowledge standpoint.

If, however, it be urged that thinking never reaches reality, that it can only classify, and always misses the unique value of the fact it seeks to explain, and can consequently never be a substitute for life, I reply that thinking never seeks to be a substitute for life, or for any fact thereof, but merely its interpretation. And if its business were merely to classify, to enumerate universal traits, we should be led in the end to the curious position that thought's whole business consisted in classifying, and that it had nothing to classify but other classifications. No, the interpretation must in every case emerge from the fact, and the fact with all its unique values must persist in the interpretation, or it were best not to try to think at all. Surely the vicious abstractionism is here on the side of him who would divorce life from its interpretation.

Waiving the consideration of temporalism, transcendence is commonly supposed to refer either to physical objects or to other selves. Now it is generally assumed that so far as other selves are concerned the matter is simple enough. Experiences more or less like my own are supposed to be possessed by the other person. Our experiences exist in duplicate, so to speak; these feelings, sensations, ideas, etc., have their counterpart elsewhere. And our several groups of experiences then may or may not be supposed to represent in consciousness a third something, namely, an order which these inner experiences more or less imperfectly copy. But while it may be useful enough for certain purposes so to view the matter, it is obviously a highly abstract and artificial construction. This comes out the moment we try to appropriate any object of experience. Two boys may be struggling for the possession of a cherry. Each, by this view, possesses in his own unassailable inner world the cherry experience, the color, appearance, fragrance; but only one gets possession of the cherry and enjoys its flavor. Yet the flavor is bound up with the other qualities which are supposed to be privately owned by each of the contestants. In other words, the qualities

and the thing cannot be separated, and the thing with its qualities does not repeat itself. My feelings, sensations, etc., do not hang in the air; they cluster about and inhere in the object which is supposed, as all our social life presupposes, to be not an experience of such and such a kind of which there might be many replicas, but a single, unique object, the identical and simultaneous possession of both experiencers. And similarly if the physical objects are supposed to be transcendent, and if this is merely taken to mean that they have an independent being, that they exist whether or no any one experiences them, and unaffected by the fact of experiencing, we are then confronted by the double difficulty (1) of giving any positive content to the object when thus regarded, and (2) of giving any reality to the experience which is superadded. In short, this interpretation of the independence of the object makes the knower and his experience once more a sort of ghostly double of reality.¹

To understand how the belief in transcendent reality arises, and what meaning we as a matter of fact do ascribe to such being, it is necessary to get behind those ready-made distinctions between mind and body, knower and known object, and turn directly to experience itself. What is it in experience which suggests the belief in the existence of mind as possessed of its own private inner life, and of physical objects and other selves as possessed of transcendent being; and what do we then mean by inner life and transcendent being?

We must, of course, begin each one of us with his own experience. That is, in the appeal to experience one is asking each person to observe for himself what he finds in the region of his own experience. This obvious and inevitable reflection is usually, however, given a quite misleading interpretation. For it by no means follows that one begins with observing anything merely private, subjective, a supposed "world within," of sensations, feelings, as these are found in an isolated consciousness. No, this is precisely what, in attempting to solve any problem whether in science or in philosophy, we never are concerned with. The initial attitude is

¹It is, I suppose, considerations of this sort which have led our new realist (if I understand him) to break with the old representational realism, and which have led Professor Royce to his form of concrete and objective idealism.

wholly object-minded. The distinction between subject and object is one that supervenes upon this primitive attitude. One may reflect that he is having these experiences, and that all that he can say about them is couched in terms of his own feelings, sensations, etc.,—yes all but the unique existential value which this experience and no other possesses, which leads him to regard it as belonging to an order of experience which is also there for the other fellow. But in order to make this distinction, one has already introduced the concept of the transcendent.

III.

This primitive experience of the unreflective but object-minded experiencer, at first undifferentiated into subject and object, becomes thus differentiated through the consciousness of the thwarted will. If one could conceive of a being whose every desire met with prompt and full satisfaction, without any planning, without any striving, there would seem to be nothing that could introduce into the life of such a being the distinction between subject and object. Life would be one placid dream, and the dreamer and his dream undistinguished; there would be no transcendent being,—nothing to contend against, nothing to rely upon; no other to oppose or to support. For us, however, consciousness of our own desires and of their frustration breaks experience into a world of cross-purposes. My purposes are crossed by the physical order and its regularity. My purposes are also crossed by certain irregularities manifest in the same order. And as I ascribe the collision in the latter case to another will, so in the former I ascribe it to a transcendent being which is at first conceived after the analogy of the will, as a sort of purposive agent, and later as a sort of super-personal and invariable will. Further experience shows that it is precisely the invariability of nature's workings that makes possible the fulfillment of any of my plans; and that furthermore it is the same impartial uniformity of nature that makes possible my relations with other finite wills. Then the notion of a will behind nature gives place to the conception of an order which is indifferent to purpose but bound by necessary laws. The natural order is then

still regarded as transcendent, but now no longer because it expresses the purpose of another will than my own, but rather because it is supremely indifferent. Or better, because, as far as it goes, it expresses at least the basic purpose of us all,—the purpose, namely, to make our purposes definite, and to coöperate with our fellows in the pursuit of common aims.

To get at the real significance of these notions of the transcendent and see how far they are justified, one must look a little more closely into experience itself. Every one must have had the experience of being utterly absorbed in some object of contemplation so that all consciousness of self has vanished even from the background of one's thinking. One is, so to speak, all there where the object is, his identity is merged in the object of his contemplation. And then all of a sudden this experience, which seemed so objective, flashes forth, because of its very intensity, as something highly subjective. It is just as when gazing steadily at an intaglio it may suddenly jump forth into relief. This phenomenon of alternating reference has not been given sufficient consideration. It is, I think, because of this that the term experience possesses its peculiar kind of ambiguity, now meaning something private, individual, subjective, all my own; and anon the objective common world of facts,—yet all the while remaining the same in content, save for the single difference of reference. But however this may be, when one finds one's self in this condition one must run for the other fellow and borrow his vision to assure one's self that one has not been dreaming. Or else one must collect one's self, as the saying goes. This always means getting the immediate experience, however wide its spread, in its larger experiential context. But the immediate experience loses nothing in being thus interpreted. It merely gains standing in a more abiding order of experience. Now, as a matter of fact, one never for a moment supposes that when he has accomplished this result the object has merely been put in its place in relation to other private experiences of his own. His attitude is still wholly object-minded. He supposes that he has found its place in an order of experience which includes the experiences of other men, and also all that no one

has experienced, but that might have been experienced, granting the principle of uniformity, if certain preliminary conditions had been fulfilled. And one also further supposes that if the fact has once been established in such an order it must henceforth be reckoned with. No matter what your private purposes, they cannot budge this now known fact. One thus comes to view that order of experience as transcendent of one's own inner life because one's own plans, one's likes and dislikes, must all submit to its domination. And the transcendency remains, and will continue, until this collision disappears.

At first it may be physical facts that seem thus transcendently objective, but it does not require much reflection to see that mathematical and logical objects are in the same case; and that moreover it is thought alone which succeeds in holding the physical fact tight in its moorings. In any case one reaches the conception of an order of experience, where all one's own experiences belong, which is transcendent of one's purely personal aims and strivings.

But the curious thing is that one has not escaped from one's own experience, but has merely interpreted it, and in such wise that it now seems to belong to an order that moves independently of one. Looking at the matter more closely, it is as if one were all the while referring his experience to an impartial spectator who stands ever in the shadow, observing all and assessing all values. Of course such an impartial assessor is a fiction, or better, he is my own other. I never think he is an impartial spectator unless I can make his judgments mine. Yet candor compels me to admit that I have private prejudices. The impartial spectator is then simply myself trying my level best to be intellectually honest. But in this tacit reference to an impartial spectator in the interpretation of my own experience, I am also tacitly assuming that he is assessing values for other minds as well. The point is that in trying to reach objectivity, to introduce order and coherence into my own experience, I am always assuming that my own thinking is typical,—what any intelligent observer would in like situation affirm.

What really dominates my thinking is thus my belief in other

intelligent beings, and in my ability to think for them as well as for myself, whenever I succeed in actually thinking for myself; to interpret their experience just in so far as I succeed in interpreting my own. And so I never rest content until my impartial spectator has been adopted by my fellow worker in the spontaneity of his own inner self. Thus the only real transcendent being is the free inner life of my fellow men, and the impartial spectator is our go-between. He is, if you please, our social self. But such a self clearly has no independent being. It gets its reality solely through its free adoption by the independent beings who accept its authority. Is it not plain, however, that the acceptance of such an authority implies the possession on the part of those who accept it at once of an identical fund of experience and of common purposes or ideals? Or, putting it the other way round, failure to possess a common fund of experience and common ideals would make agreement (a common order of experience with its impartial observer, or social interpreter) an impossibility.

IV.

In the first instance, our common fund of facts is just our physical experiences as natural science has taught us to interpret them, running quality into quantity, and fixing facts once for all in a rigidly mechanical order which is one and the same for all experiencers. And, again in the first instance, the common ideal is found in those organizing principles of the understanding, such as space, time, and causality, which serve us as the fixing solutions of fleeting experiences.

Yet such an order is painfully unlike our rich and varied and growing qualitative world, and such an ideal woefully inadequate to express the purpose of beings with a future. And progress, in knowledge as in culture, is marked by the inclusion in the common order of facts of ever more and more qualitative distinctions; and by the adoption of ever larger and more comprehensive and more dynamic ideals. Sympathy broadens. One's individual life becomes more and more one with that of one's fellows as one's purposes widen. The absolute, if you

choose to use the expression, is not the *ens realissimum* but simply the impartial spectator, the social self, who is progressively being brought to realization through the free activity of finite, purposive, progressive beings.

Stated in this condensed form, I fear that what I have said may appear more remote and recondite than it actually is. I am after all but reporting the plainest fact of every-day experience. The truth is, we live most of the time behind, or above, the distinction of subject and object, mind and things; or, if you prefer, we are ourselves on the object side as well as the subject side of the subject-object relation, and in proportion to our interest and absorption in the matter in hand does the distinction between subject and object vanish. Nevertheless, in all of our activities (and thinking is an activity) we are trying to work over and remould experience in accordance with a more or less definite plan, which is in turn determined by our interests and desires, so that even the objective order is, in so far, made what it is by our interests and desires. Now whenever this reflection arises, forthwith the interpreter of experience draws into his shell and pulls the world of experience in after him. It is again the case of the phenomenon of alternating reference to which I have referred above. But no one long remains a Protagorean dreamer. Each task, if it be only the task of making his own desires definite and effective, sends him forth into the common objective order of experience. This, as we have seen, is equivalent to a reference to the social interpreter, that is, to the independent spontaneity of other individual egos, and the transcendent remains in the purposive lives of other selves.

But, as we have seen, the existence of a common world of experience implies the possession on the part of each interpreter of this order of an identical fund of experience, and common ideals or purposes. Now if there are any common elements, either of content or form, such that their very denial involves their affirmation, we must at least presuppose their objective validity.

Idealism, as I understand it, simply means that the thing (anything you please) always is what one is forced to think it as, and

this means that necessities of thought, in determining what the thing must be thought as, determine in so far at the same time what the thing must be thought to be. There are, however, and in the nature of the case can be, no necessities of thought that come merely as empirical data, since such data could at best do no more than justify particular judgments.

Now no one, however radical his empiricism, does, as a matter of fact, confine himself in the statement of his own view to particular judgments. We have surely a right to expect that a philosophy which proposes to be purely empirical should state its case without violating that principle. However, even if one should attempt to state his case wholly in the form of particular judgments, he could not in so doing deal with a single concrete individual object. He would be confined to the passing experience in its pure and ineffable immediacy, for to identify this experience, and give it its setting in an objective order, means not merely comparing it with other present experiences, but also recognizing these as memories, that is, as pointing to actual occurrences in a past that is no more but once was real. It may be objected that the test in such a case is always pragmatic. Whether true or not this is irrelevant, for whatever the test, the conclusion is, if the test holds good, that what is verified is an actual past experience with its place in that order of experience, where all experiences are supposed somehow to find their resting place, but which, in its entirety, no man has ever directly experienced.

In other words, the world is for any one objective precisely in so far as he is one with himself, in so far as the unity of his self-consciousness is preserved, and the identity of the functioning of that consciousness presupposed.

I shall no doubt be reminded that this is simply a case of getting one's self into what Professor Perry has called the "ego-centric predicament." Well, one cannot live without breathing, but this constitutes no predicament save for him who attempts to get along without air. And so the fact that our human ways of thinking will haunt us to the end in all our attempts to make experience intelligible is only a predicament for him who kicks against the pricks of the inevitable.

The above propositions, in spite of their condensed forms, will be readily recognized as familiar. I name no names to avoid entangling alliances. I am, moreover, well aware that they have frequently been challenged in recent discussions. While I think the challenge can be met, this is not the place to undertake a defense of idealism. For what I am here primarily concerned with is to show that, granting its main contentions, idealism has too readily passed from the inevitable recognition of the unity of self-consciousness as it is manifest in our own lives to the unity of a single all-inclusive and over-individual self-consciousness. The reason for this is apparent enough. Objects must be grasped not only in the unity of my experience, but in the unity of a single experience, one and the same for all. It is precisely at this point, as it seems to me, that idealism has been over-hasty in its conclusions. The unity of experience, and the parallel unity of self-consciousness, is in the first instance the unity of my experience and of my self-consciousness. But as this seems to be insufficient to account for an objective world, I am led to posit the continuity of my self-consciousness with a universal self-consciousness. In doing this I am launched on the way to an absolute where all terms lose their meaning, except in so far as I bring them back and interpret them in terms of my own experience.

I submit that in the first instance what I mean by the objective world is nothing more and nothing less than my own experience locked fast in the principle of identity, and therein, and thereby; being recognized as literally one with the experience of any other conscious being that can plan and strive, or even define its own aims. It is simply the unitary world of science. It is nature run down to mathematics, dealt with quantitatively, and stated in terms of permanence and identity. The philosopher accepts the results of the work of the scientists with as much docility as any layman. There is no collision between science and philosophy. But I insist that the world when thus viewed has been deprived of certain characters, which are none the less real and of which philosophy must take account. If it be said that the unitary world of science is a construct of human intelligence, and that

it presents the objective world not in its full concrete reality, and that consequently it is in so far abstract, this is not in any wise to condemn the scientist. On the contrary, it is to commend him for sticking to his last, for doing precisely what he set out to do. For every scientist begins his work by the adoption of certain points of view toward that region of experience with which he is concerned and the elimination of others which are none the less present, though they do not concern him.

V.

I confess to being very much perplexed when I hear a critic solemnly refuting what he calls idealism by arguing that physical objects retain all their qualities *as physical objects* whether or no the knowing relation is established between those objects and any individual knower. Was there ever an idealist reached by this criticism? Must I as an idealist suppose that, for example, when I entered this hall this evening and experienced the presence of this desk, this desk suddenly gave a quiver, gained or lost in weight, changed, or acquired its color or shape? To be sure the desk acquired this added character, that henceforth it has a definite place in my knowledge of the physical order, which it did not have before, and its fate may be determined by that fact. But surely it has been clear to every idealist since the days of Kant that physical objects have their place and their definite character in a single unitary world of experience.

But, none the less, if, when regarding any experience as objective, I ask what it is that confirms me in that conviction, what it is that I regard as its common or universal character, I at once see that it is not simply the immediate impression that one gets, as we say, in the presence of that object. That simple and immediate impression taken just at its face value turns out to be what is most subjective and private. It is thus perhaps that physical objects might appear to the placid and doubt-free mind of the ruminating cow. In truth, experience is public and common only in so far as it is significant, and it becomes such by reference to other experience, by being fixed in a context, conceived in a network of thought relations. When

we refer physical occurrences to a common order of experience, the common or public character of these occurrences is wanting when they are taken apart from their ideal significance. When we try to take the object out of its thought context, and to regard it simply as an immediate or direct datum of sense, we can never be sure that any two of us are having precisely the same experience. We are then as near as we can get to the region of sheer subjectivity. But when by means of scientific investigation we have got the particular experience in its larger experiential context and fixed its meaning there, we can no longer regard the now significant object as belonging merely to private experience. We fully count upon and demand the agreement of our fellow workers with our own clearly established results.

And thus it would seem that what is truly common in the realm of experience is just its real ideal significance,—that experience as transfused with thought. Does this mean that the reality of the common objective world is wholly exhausted in its ideal or universal meaning? Certainly not, if form be divorced from content, for this ideal meaning is ever the ideal meaning of precisely those facts of immediate and direct experience which we have found to be our nearest approach to the purely subjective.

Natural science, by eliminating so far as possible the personal and purposive, locks each fact in a fixed order. When our common world of experience is conceived in these terms, its order is fixed in such wise that the whole is given at a stroke in the full definition of any one of its parts. The Laplacean calculator has here taken the place of the impartial spectator. And yet it is clear that in viewing experience in this fashion one is conceiving it in static terms. There could be no genuine progress in a world thus conceived. Past and future alike are locked in the present. This is, however, our common world precisely in so far as we need or choose to describe it in terms of the primary qualities and of these exclusively.

One may endeavor to escape from the common, and therefore conceptualized, order of experience by plunging into the current of life, drifting with the tide of feeling. He may call this life,

rich and real, in comparison with the days of his bondage to the cold demands of imperious reason. And yet he cannot define his own interests and reach his own ends, nor even mark the contrast between such living and that state of bondage, without returning to that common order of experience and fixing his purposes and his meanings there. The trouble with the conceptualized experience is not that it is conceptualized, but that the concepts one has been using are inadequate. Now although it be necessary to conceive our common world of experience as a mechanical order if we are to depend upon it and accomplish any definite task, it seems none the less equally obvious that we do as a matter of fact, and all of us, break away from the all-inclusiveness of this standpoint, wherever other purposive beings are in evidence, or wherever we view our own experience as aiming at ends not realized. When, however, we do thus break away from the interpretation of the common order of experience, we are driven to construct a new and more inclusive unitary world of our common experience, and this we succeed in doing in so far as we are able to read the meaning of our experience in terms of categories at once personal and purposive, and thus genuinely dynamic.

VI.

Now it is not necessary to introduce at this juncture the conception of an absolute consciousness to whom all facts of experience are simultaneously present and whose interest in them gives them their reality. Such a conception seems useless. It merely doubles the facts to be explained. Neither is it necessary, on the other hand, to conceive of happenings in remote times as merely "possible experiences," any more than it is necessary so to conceive facts that at the present time no one is actually experiencing. If I think of the center of the earth, or of the other side of the moon, as real at the present time, I do not mean that some absolute consciousness is having certain experiences which I might have if I succeeded in digging down into the bowels of the earth, or in flying round the moon; nor yet do I conceive of these as merely possible experiences. They get their present actuality because they are locked with certain facts of

present experience as being necessary to complete *their* meaning. Those remote or inaccessible experiences, therefore, have their being in the reality of any experience which calls for them in order that it may itself find its place in a single order of experience.

The view which I am suggesting is, then, that there are many centers of conscious experience, egos if you will, each leading its own life, determined by its own ideals, yet making itself effective in a common order of experience and doing this by building up jointly with other intelligent agents a common world of ever increasing richness and complexity. On the background is a fixed and unalterable framework of experience, which in baldest terms is mathematical and quantitative. Yet each of these centers of consciousness possesses its private appreciations and is directed by private purposes. Growth in intelligence, as in civilization and culture, is marked by the extent to which each individual is able to enter into the experience of others precisely as it is for them in their own inner lives. Thus the root of ignorance, as well as of evil, is selfishness; the basis of wisdom as well as of virtue, sympathy.

There is at the present time a curious aversion to the term ego. First the term soul ceased to be a respectable term in philosophical discussions and gave place to the more inoffensive ego. This in turn was banished in favor of consciousness, and now some are making the effort to banish consciousness also. And yet the ego, or soul, is the one ontological concept that should survive all others, for it is the one to which all others are in the last analysis referred. It is, moreover, the one by means of which we escape the static interpretation of experience and at the same time keep our hold upon reality, for it is the one by means of which we succeed in grasping not only variety in unity, but also change in identity. Moreover, it seems to be unescapable. If you throw it out by the window it creeps in again by the door. I have never found any writer who has repudiated the notion who has not forthwith brought it in again by some other name, and who has not continually referred to himself and his reader in terms that imply that they at least are exceptions to his rule. The reason the concept is not in good odor

is because one will insist upon erecting distinctions into separations, separating the knower from the world that he is supposed to know, the ego from its experience. And then, of course, either the ego vanishes, as a sort of ghost or supernumerary, or else the world,—for truth to tell, the whole is found on either side.

This may, if you please, be called a sort of monadology; I care not for the name. At any rate these are not windowless monads mirroring a common world. They are rather monads whose lives are interpenetrating to such an extent that they all possess in their several experiences an identical world. But possessing also private appreciations, private purposes, and private ideals; collision between them is inevitable in so far as they try to realize their several purposes in this common identical world, and in so far as at the same time these purposes do not reckon with the purposes of other independent monads. There is therefore no "pre-established harmony," but only so much harmony as there actually is at any given time. Complete harmony remains an ideal which may or may not ever be realized, but which never can be realized except in so far as each monad freely wills that it shall be.

If it be asked, must there not be one ego-world in which all find their place, the answer must undoubtedly be in the negative, if one conceive of such an order in any wise after the analogy of the physical order with its conceptual fixity. The only meaning that can be put into unity where persons are in question is precisely the sort of unity which is even now discoverable in our human relations. We work at cross purposes except in so far as we are brought into unity by the free adoption of a common ideal. But again it should be observed that the only kind of unity in social relationships which is either held to be desirable, or found to be enduring, is one in which the affirmation of the common ideal goes hand in hand with the possession of a unique individuality on the part of those who thus unite. Each must have his own independent contribution which no other could give.

Thus what I have to propose is little more than a tentative program for an idealism which would reckon with present-day interests. What is needed is, if there be any foundation for

such a personal interpretation of life and experience as I have suggested, that one should accept frankly the principle of the primacy of the practical reason and should deduce the categories of social life therefrom, and ultimately in terms of these categories ground the principles of interpretation which lie at the basis of theoretical reason as well, including even the so-called laws of logic. Or, reversing the process and starting with the mechanical interpretation of experience as itself the expression, the embodiment, of the practical reason in its barest immediacy, and therefore with the maximum of abstraction, proceed to show how this interpretation of our common world develops with the progress of civilization by the successive employment of categories ever more and more adequate to express the social life of independent and free individuals with a task and a future.

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THE 'FRINGE' OF WILLIAM JAMES'S PSYCHOLOGY THE BASIS OF LOGIC.¹

SINCE our last meeting the cause of philosophy, not only in America but also in the whole civilized world, has lost the services of one of its most distinguished champions, and it is fitting that on this occasion we do ourselves the honor of paying in part our common debt to William James, by dwelling upon the significance of one of his contributions to psychology and to philosophy. His achievements in his chosen fields of work were too varied and too great to make it possible within this hour to do justice to them as a whole; and even if there were one among us who had the sweep of view, the breadth of sympathy, the tact of selection, and the gift of expression, that might enable him to summarize for us the accomplishments of James's genius, such a one would still lack the prescience that in a worthy appreciation would now have to take the place of the lacking historical perspective. Instead, therefore, of seeking to estimate the value of his total work and to predict the place that this work will win for him in the ranks of the world's great thinkers, I will invite you this evening to join with me in a much less ambitious tribute. Let us attempt to make our own one of the insights he won, and in doing this let us not confine ourselves to what this insight meant for him; rather let us ask ourselves what it may mean for us. Let us accord to the great pragmatist the highest honor that we can render him, by appropriating one of his thoughts and setting it to *work* in the solution of one of the fundamental problems that confronted him and that still confront us.

The problem to which I refer is the problem of the nature of truth, and the insight that I wish to appropriate is the insight into the fact which he expressed by saying: "If we then consider the *cognitive* function of different states of mind, we may feel

¹Read as the presidential address at the eleventh annual meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, at Minneapolis, December 28, 1910.

assured that the difference between those that are mere 'acquaintance,' and those that are 'knowledges-about' is reducible almost entirely to the absence or presence of psychic fringes or overtones."¹ To understand clearly what James meant by psychic fringes or overtones it is necessary to recall briefly his doctrine of the feelings of relation. "If there be such things as feelings at all," said he, "then so surely as relations between objects exist *in rerum naturâ*, so surely, and more surely, do feelings exist to which these relations are known. There is not a conjunction or a preposition, and hardly an adverbial phrase, syntactic form, or inflection of voice, in human speech, that does not express some shading or other of relation which we at some moment actually feel to exist between the larger objects of our thought. If we speak objectively, it is the real relations that appear revealed; if we speak subjectively, it is the stream of consciousness that matches each of them by an inward coloring of its own. In either case the relations are numberless, and no existing language is capable of doing justice to all their shades."²

Now, if we speak objectively, in some cases where a relation appears revealed, all the terms of the relation also appear revealed. In such cases, if we now speak subjectively, the consciousness of that relational complex may be distinguished, according to James, into successive 'states,' and if the relation in question has only two terms, we have first a 'state of consciousness' to which the first term of the relation is revealed, then following upon that a second 'state' to which the relation is manifested, and last of all comes a third 'state' that cognizes the other term of the relation. The second and intervening 'state' he calls a 'transitive state.' This 'state' is but a cross-section of one continuous consciousness, which as an undivided whole has as its object the relational complex in its totality of terms and relation. In such a continuous consciousness of a relational complex there are two tones and their interval, but that is all: there are no harmonics.

"So much," said James, "for the transitive states. But there

¹ *The Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 258-9.

² *Op. cit.*, I, p. 245. I have romanized some words italicized in the text.

are other unnamed states or qualities of states that are just as important and just as cognitive as they, and just as much unrecognized by the traditional sensationalist and intellectualist philosophies of mind. The first fails to find them at all, the second finds their *cognitive function*, but denies that anything in the way of *feeling* has a share in bringing it about. Examples will make clear what these inarticulate psychoses, due to waxing and waning excitements of the brain, are like.

"Suppose three successive persons say to us: 'Wait!' 'Hark!' 'Look!' Our consciousness is thrown into three quite different attitudes of expectancy, although no definite object is before it in any one of the three cases. Leaving out different actual bodily attitudes, and leaving out the reverberating images of the three words, which are of course diverse, probably no one will deny the existence of a residual conscious affection, a sense of the direction from which an impression is about to come, although no positive impression is yet there. Meanwhile we have no names for the psychoses in question but the names hark, look, and wait.

"Suppose we try to recall a forgotten name. The state of our consciousness is peculiar. There is a gap therein; but no mere gap. It is a gap that is intensely active. A sort of wraith of the name is in it, beckoning us in a given direction, making us at moments tingle with the sense of our closeness, and then letting us sink back without the longed-for term. If wrong names are proposed to us, this singularly definite gap acts immediately so as to negate them. They do not fit into its mould. And the gap of one word does not feel like the gap of another, all empty of content as both might seem necessarily to be when described as gaps. . . . There are innumerable consciousnesses of emptiness, no one of which taken in itself has a name, but all different from each other. The ordinary way is to assume that they are all emptinesses of consciousness, and so the same state. But the feeling of an absence is *toto cælo* other than the absence of a feeling. It is an intense feeling. The rhythm of a lost word may be there without a sound to clothe it; or the evanescent sense of something which is the initial vowel or consonant may

mock us fitfully, without growing more distinct. Every one must know the tantalizing effect of the blank rhythm of some forgotten verse, restlessly dancing in one's mind, striving to be filled out with words."

"The truth is that large tracts of human speech are nothing but *signs of direction* in thought, of which direction we nevertheless have an acutely discriminative sense, though no definite sensorial image plays any part in it whatsoever."

"What must be admitted is that the definite images of traditional psychology form but the very smallest part of our minds as they actually live. The traditional psychology talks like one who should say a river consists of nothing but pailsful, spoonsful, quartsful, barrelsful, and other moulded forms of water. Even were the pails and the pots all actually standing in the stream, still between them the free water would continue to flow. It is just this free water of consciousness that psychologists resolutely overlook. Every definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water that flows round it. With it goes the sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo of whence it came to us, the dawning sense of whither it is to lead. The significance, the value, of the image is all in this halo or penumbra that surrounds and escorts it,—or rather that is fused into one with it and has become bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh. . . ."¹

Now, to speak objectively, the difference that distinguishes the fringe from other felt relations is that it is a relation which does not terminate in an experienced object and thus give a complete relational complex within experience. The fringe terminates in a gap which defines the nature of the missing term in the sense that whatever definite term may rise in consciousness in our effort to fill the gap is immediately felt as either being or not being the appropriate complement of the incomplete relation. So long as the appropriate object does not appear in consciousness, the relational complex is felt to be defective. When any object appears in consciousness and does not fit the gap, that object itself "swims in a felt fringe of relations of which the

¹ *Op. cit.*, I, pp. 249-255, with the omission of many illustrations and comments.

aforesaid gap is the term,"¹ and we may say, changing this figure of speech, that the two incomplete relational complexes thus present do not weld into one complete whole. The fringe is thus for James not only, subjectively, the cross-section of *consciousness* which cognizes the relation in which some object experienced stands to some object not experienced at the time: it is also, objectively, the *cognized relation*, which is thus, so far as the experience of that time goes, without its full complement of terms; "the fringe, as I use the word," said he, "is part of the *object cognized*,—substantive *qualities* and *things* appearing to the mind in a *fringe of relations*."²

So far, however, the fringes that have been mentioned are fringes that point toward the future, and their "function is to lead from one set of images to another. As they pass, we feel both the waxing and the waning images in a way altogether peculiar and a way quite different from the way of their full

¹*Op. cit.*, I, p. 259.

²*Op. cit.*, I, p. 258, second footnote. The reader of the *Psychology* should always bear in mind that James used the term fringe indifferently of such experientially incomplete *relations*, and of the '*states of consciousness*' which cognize such relations. The context must decide which of these two things he had in mind in any particular sentence. To be perfectly fair with my hearers, it is necessary to say here that I do not remember any passage in the larger *Psychology* in which James committed himself to any official definition of the fringe which explicitly stated that the gap in which the fringe terminates is void of content. He says negatively that there is no *definite* object therein, and positively that in the fringe the mind is "aware of relations and objects but dimly perceived" (*ibid.*, italics mine). The use he makes, however, of the fringe, in ways that will appear presently, leads me to believe that he recognized 'gaps' with no felt objects therein. It may be significant that in his later and briefer *Psychology* his definition of fringe omits any reference to 'objects dimly perceived.' "Let us call," said he, "*the consciousness of this halo of relations around the image by the name of 'psychic overtone' or 'fringe'*" (p. 166). But I do not care to press this point. I find as a matter of fact that in my experience there are fringes without objects dimly perceived; and this discovery I owe to James; and I take it for granted that he found the same thing from the fact that in other parts of his larger work he refers to fringes in such a way as to imply that there is no object at all in the gap in many cases. In my definition above, I have therefore narrowed the term to apply only to such cases, inasmuch as James already had the terms 'transitive state' and 'felt relation' to apply to cases where the object is perceived but in a way different from the way of full presence. James himself intended to distinguish fringes from 'transitive states' in general, as is evident from the way in which he began his treatment of fringes, especially in his briefer work. "There are other unnamed modifications of consciousness just as important as the transitive states" (p. 163).

presence.”¹ But there are many other kinds of fringes mentioned in the *Psychology* specifically as fringes, or spoken of in such a way as to leave no doubt that James regarded them as fringes. “The date of a thing is a mere relation of *before* or *after* the present thing or some past or future thing.”² What is this date but a fringe of pastness or futurity attaching to some present content, whether image or word? “So in space we think of England as simply to the eastward, of Charleston as lying south.”² What is this but to have the words or images in question fringed with spatial direction? Both abstract ideas and universals are explained as consisting of words or images fringed with pointing relations. “The ‘fringe,’ which lets us believe in the one, lets us believe in the other too.”³ “When I use the word *man* in two different sentences, I may have both times exactly the same sound upon my lips and the same picture in my mental eye, but I may mean, and at the very moment of uttering the word and imagining the picture, know that I mean, two entirely different things. . . . This added consciousness is an absolutely positive sort of feeling, transforming what would otherwise be mere noise or vision into something *understood*; and determining the sequel of my thinking, the later words and images, in a perfectly definite way.”⁴

I could multiply quotations, but I think that enough have been accumulated to show how central a position the doctrine of the fringe occupies in the great *Psychology*. The last passage cited is especially appropriate to pause upon, as it brings out the point which I wish to emphasize this evening. The word *man* may mean on occasion Smith or Jones or Napoleon Bonaparte or all of them and all other men besides, but what the word with its specific meaning does in any sentence is to lead to later words. The fringe which makes the word mean Napoleon points to Napoleon, but the word does not lead to Napoleon—it leads to other significant words. The thing to which that fringe points—the Napoleon of history—does not appear in present experience, and yet we know just what the pointing is to;

¹*Op. cit.*, I, p. 253.

²*Op. cit.*, I, p. 631.

³*Op. cit.*, I, p. 473. The dozen pages beginning with page 468 should be read in this connection.

⁴*Op. cit.*, I, p. 472.

we understand the word's meaning. The word with the fringe so 'fused with it as to become bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh' is the idea of Napoleon; this idea means Napoleon; but the Napoleon meant, though the object of the idea, is not present in the experience in which the idea is present.

Now it is true that this word *man*, when used at the beginning of a sentence, has another meaning. It means the other words which are to follow, and "as the words that replace it arrive, it welcomes them successively and calls them right if they agree with it, it rejects them and calls them wrong if they do not."¹ But this is to say that the word in this case has two fringes, one pointing backward toward the long-dead Corsican, and the other pointing forward toward the intended continuation and completion of the sentence. Of the latter fringe James says: "One may admit that a good third of our psychic life consists in these rapid premonitory perspective views of schemes of thought not yet articulate."² Now if any one needs to be convinced that, in saying "That man was banished to St. Helena," the word "man" meant something more than the words that are to follow, or even the images that may accompany the words, let him compare his experience when he repeats this sentence meaningly, with his experience when he begins to say "All mimsy." In the latter case, "All mimsy" means "were the borogroves, and the mome raths outrabe," and as these latter words come on, "All mimsy" welcomes them successively and calls them right. They fulfil the meaning which "All mimsy" had, and when "outrabe" brings up the triumphant conclusion, we thrill—more or less—with the satisfaction which comes of achievement. Everything we meant at the beginning of the sentence is all there, nothing is lacking, the pulse of thought has accomplished its full beat, and this important organ may enjoy its well-earned right to pause before taking up another

¹ *Op. cit.*, I, p. 253. Here the word 'fringe' so far as it relates to words already in the fore-end of the specious present conforms to James's formal definitions of the term, and not to mine. So far as it relates to words that are not already appearing in the specious present, it conforms to my definition and not to his. After this paragraph, I shall use the term only in accordance with my definition.

² *Ibid.*

diastole. Think what would have happened, though, if impertinent 'brillig' had turned up at the finish to spoil it all! Now my reason for emphasizing the difference between meaning to talk nonsense and meaning to say something that has a meaning ulterior to the meaning to say it, is that I am interested in pointing out that in James's *Psychology* there is full recognition of ideas which do not lead up to all they mean. In such ideas there are, as constituent elements, fringes that point to what they cannot help us to experience. James did not commit the fatal blunder of asserting that ideas mean *only* what is to follow as our thought moves on. In other words, James's doctrine of the fringe lays a foundation whose ample dimensions afford room for the construction of a logic that, while including the pragmatic logic as a part of its structure, is spacious enough to house many a truth which the tender mercies of some pragmatisms would leave to perish in the outer cold and darkness.

In my judgment this doctrine of the fringe, so convincingly worked out by James, is his most brilliant and substantial contribution to logic, and I cannot but feel that when later he came to develop the logic involved in his *Psychology* he failed to realize the full logical significance of his own previous psychological achievement. As a psychologist he has supplied us with the materials for a comprehensive logical edifice; as a logician he has used only a portion of this material. He was a leader who not only succeeded in bringing his followers in sight of the promised land; he also led them into possession. But the settlements he established need to be extended till the Amorites and the Jebusites be altogether driven out of the land.

But before we proceed to take a glimpse at the whole logic which his psychology makes possible, it will be necessary to define some terms that we shall have to use in describing what we shall find. In giving these definitions I do not wish to be understood as implying that the words to be defined should not be used in other senses. I merely purpose to state the meanings in which I shall use them, and I shall ask that what I shall later say be interpreted in the light of these definitions. First, let me define *idea* as an experienced complex which is constituted by an ex-

perienced content and an experienced fringe attaching thereto. The content may be what the current psychology would call sensational or it may be imaginal; it may be a word or some other thing; in short it may be anything whatever that may be present in any experience, with the exception of the fringe attaching to it. Such a content, as distinguished from the fringe, I call the *nucleus* of the idea; the idea is composed of the content *plus* the fringe. The fringe which attaches to such a content I call the *meaning* or *significance*¹ of the idea. This fringe may be an experienced relation of any sort whatever, provided only the relation be not experienced as terminating in some then experienced content other than the nucleus of the idea—it must terminate in a definitely discriminated ‘gap.’ This fringe may itself be complex in that there may be several different relations experienced together as pointing, each in its own way, to the same gap, to the same missing term or object. To take an instance, in memory I may have an ‘image’—which is the nucleus of the idea—fringed with pastness, with familiarity, with similarity, with westwardness, all the flags convergingly floating toward something which they conjointly mean to indicate. In non-technical language I should say in such a case that I remember having seen Professor James in California some years ago and I know now just how he looked then. It will thus be seen that I restrict the word ‘meaning’ to what Professor Royce calls the internal meaning of an idea. By the *object* of an idea I mean the missing something to which the meaning points. Because the word idea has been defined as a relational complex which, so far as it is in experience, is in default of one of the terms which would make it a complete relational complex, the object of the idea, as object has just been defined, *corresponds to* the idea in the sense that the idea and the object, if the object is existent outside of the experience in which the idea exists, together make the complex complete. If, on the contrary, the object does not exist outside of that experience, the object, though non-existent,

¹ Ideas are not the only things that have meaning. Words and other symbols have meaning when used or understood in the same experience in which the things they mean are present. This meaning is a relation of representativeness, which cannot be discussed here.

is still defined by the idea as that which is *missing* from experience and whose absence prevents the complex from being complete. The question of the existence or non-existence of the object is one we shall have to take up later. But whether the object exist or not, its character, as the character of something missing, is determined by what is experienced as lacking it, namely, by the idea as an experiencedly incomplete relational complex. If the nucleus of the idea be fringed, for instance, with an incomplete relation of resemblance, then the object of the idea is defined by the idea as something like the nucleus in respect of the quality which is fringed with resemblance. If, on the contrary, the nucleus of the idea be a word which is not experienced as onomatopoeitic, but yet as meaning something, the object of the idea is not defined as resembling the nucleus but as that something which the word is experienced as meaning. This is of course vague so far as statement goes; but James's doctrine of the fringe is a deliberate "re-instatement of the vague to its proper place in our mental life,"¹ and the question is not whether this definition of the character of the object is vague, but whether there are not ideas of objects that are vague for purposes of verbal definition otherwise than by giving the name of the object meant, and yet which, for the experience which has the ideas, identify the character of what is meant. James's reply to the objection that he cannot designate the difference between what I have defined as ideas, cannot be bettered: "Designate, truly enough. We can only designate the difference by borrowing the names of objects not yet in the mind. Which is to say that our psychological vocabulary is wholly inadequate to name the differences that exist, even such strong differences as these. But namelessness is compatible with existence."² The vagueness is vagueness to the ear of the listener who should demand that he be enabled to find out what is meant by attending exclusively to the sounds heard rather than by trying the experiment of thinking what is meant. By the *objective reference* of an idea I mean that the idea is experienced as an *incomplete* relational complex, and *as assuming the existence* of an object which completes

¹*Op. cit.*, I, p. 254.

²*Op. cit.*, I, p. 251.

the complex.¹ As this object does not exist in the experience in which the idea exists—does not exist in that experience at the time at which the idea exists—the assumption of the existence of the object is the assumption of the existence of the object *outside* of that experience. This assumption of the existence of its object beyond the limits of the experience within which the idea exists is the objective reference of the idea. As James put it in his last work: "Objective reference is an incident of the fact that so much of our experience comes as an insufficient."² It is to be observed that every one of these definitions with one exception is a definition of something that is experienced at the time any idea is experienced,—that is, provided James's doctrine of the fringe be true. The object is not experienced: it is assumed. It is not, however, the logician who, in reflecting upon the idea, makes this assumption; it is the idea itself that makes it. The idea may be logically very naughty in making this assumption, but this is the idea's fault; the logician is *particeps criminis* only so far as he may be willing to be regarded as an accessory after the fact.

We should now be ready to take up the problem of the meaning of truth, but inasmuch as what I shall say will perhaps be compared with what some of the pragmatists say, and as the question may arise how my account differs from that of these pragmatists, I think that it is desirable to make one quotation from the leading pragmatist of to-day, in order to show how radically the logic I am trying to indicate differs from that which he has worked out. The difference is at bottom not one of theory but one of fact, although it develops into one of theory. *If* there be ideas such as are described above, then what is said in the following quotation is not true, provided, of course, that I understand what is said. If I do misunderstand it, I shall have to crave Professor Dewey's pardon for repeating an offense to which I seem to be as prone as sparks are to fly upward. The passage to be quoted refers to a certain "situation in which a smell is experienced to mean a certain fulfilment through an operation."

¹ Whether we may not have ideas which do not make this assumption is a question we need not discuss here. All naïve ideas, at least, do make it.

² *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 117.

The smell has, as I understand it, already been identified as the smell of a rose, and the fulfilment which this smell means is the handling and enjoying of the rose, a consummation still to be attained. For our purposes the operation may be left out of account, although of course for Professor Dewey's purposes it is essential. Before the consummation, the smell is called 'the thing meaning'; the handling and enjoyment of the rose is 'the thing meant.' Now for the quotation. "Both the thing meaning and the thing meant are elements in the same situation. Both are present, but both are not present in the same way. In fact, one is present as *not-present-in-the-same-way-in-which-the-other-is*. It is present as something to be rendered present in the same way through the intervention of an operation. We must not balk at a purely verbal difficulty. It suggests a verbal inconsistency to speak of a thing present-as-absent. But all ideal contents, all aims (that is things aimed at) are present in just such fashion. Things can be presented as absent, just as they can be presented as hard or soft, black or white, six inches or fifty rods away from the body. The assumption that an ideal content must be either totally absent, or else present *in just the same fashion* as it will be when it is realised, is not only dogmatic, but self-contradictory. The only way in which an ideal content can be experienced at all is to be presented as *not-present-in-the-same-way* in which something else is present, the latter kind of presence affording the standard or type of *satisfactory* presence. When present in the same way it ceases to be an ideal content. Not a contrast of bare existence over against non-existence, or of present consciousness over against reality out of present consciousness, but of a satisfactory with an unsatisfactory mode of presence makes the difference between the 'really' and the 'ideally' present. In terms of our illustration, handling and enjoying the rose is presented, but it is not present in the same way that the smell is present. It is presented as *going* to be there in the same way, through an operation which the smell stands sponsor for. The situation is inherently an uneasy one—one in which everything hangs upon the performance of the operation indicated; the adequacy of movement as a

connecting link, or real adjustment of the thing meaning and the thing meant."¹

Of course we must not balk at purely verbal difficulties; after what I have said above, I, least of all, could afford to do this. The best-chosen words are at times very clumsy implements. What I do balk at is the statement that "all ideal contents, all aims (that is things aimed at) *are present* in just such fashion" that they "are present as-not-present" in the satisfactory way in which the thing meaning is present. This passage seems to be a most unambiguous allegation of fact. The alleged fact is that the object of any and every idea is always present in the experience in which the idea is present, and is always present at the time the idea is present, if the idea is experienced as an idea. It is not indeed present in a satisfactory way; it is however present, though the fashion of its presence be unsatisfactory. Now what I maintain is that 'things meaning' are often present when the 'things meant' are *not present in any fashion* in the experience in which the 'things meaning' are present and at the time at which the latter are present; and that in spite of the absence of the 'things meant' the 'things meaning' are present *as* 'things meaning.' In short, I contend for things meant which are realities "out of present consciousness." The question at issue, then, between Professor Dewey and me, is not *how* 'things meant' can be experienced: if we were to agree that they *must be experienced* when we experience things meaning them, then this question might come up. The question at issue is the prior question, whether things meant are always experienced when the things meaning them are experienced *as* meaning them. To this question, if I understand Professor Dewey aright, he answered "Yes." With the same reservation, I find that Professor James answered "No." It is not, however, a matter to be settled by appeal to authority; each one must decide for himself whether he ever means things which he does not, at the time of meaning them, experience in any fashion whatsoever. I find that I do, and not rarely; in fact if all my ideas which

¹ "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge," in *Mind*, N. S., Vol. XV (1906), pp. 300-1.

mean what I do not experience when I have these ideas were to be cut out of my experience, anybody would be welcome to what should be left of my *thinking* experience; I should not know how to set about piecing together the fragments that remained. Any logic that ignores such ideas as would be cut out may be a logic adequate to some other sort of thinking experience than mine, but it would not be adequate to mine, as I find it constituted. If my experience in this respect be peculiar, then of course my logic is idiosyncratic; and others would be justified from their point of view in calling it wrong. If, however, my experience is in any fashion typical, then my logic will perhaps apply to such as happen to belong to the same class of thinking beings as myself. I have some hopes that the latter supposition is true; for this logic is not anything brand-new. It looks like the kind of logic people have been using all along; and the reason why I present it here is that 'in certain influential quarters' it has been repeatedly asserted that people do not think in this way. Absolutism and pragmatism agree that the old-fashioned logic cannot stand—absolutism, because finite thinking must be guaranteed by infinite intuition; and pragmatism, because finite experience taken in the long run is sufficient unto itself. As against absolutism and pragmatism, the realistic logic finds that, on the one hand, infinite intuition is of no service to a finite experience which does not share such intuition, and, on the other hand, that finite experience, considered apart from a real world in large measure lying outside of such finite experiences as our finite experiences know about, is finite experience *taken out of the setting which our thinking finite experience assumes for itself*. Let us now look at this assumption.

We have seen that a naïve idea assumes the existence of its object, although that object is not existent in the experience in which the idea exists, not existent, namely, at the time at which the idea exists.¹ Now what is meant by the statement that

¹To avoid constant repetition of clumsy circumlocutions, I shall hereafter in this paper use the terms 'intra-experiential' and 'extra-experiential' always with reference of some particular experience (yours or mine) at some particular moment, the moment being the specious present of the experience in question at the time in question; the time referred to will be determined by the context. What at this

every idea assumes the existence of its object? I do not undertake to decide how the term existence should be used by others. I use it here in the sense of temporal relatedness and spatial relatedness, either one or both as the case may be. The existence of an intra-experiential thing is its intra-experiential temporal relatedness or spatial relatedness, or both relatednesses, to some other intra-experiential thing,—not relatedness at large to nothing specific, but temporal or spatial relatedness to some definite thing. To exist means in the first instance to form a part of the temporal or spatial continuum, or temporal and spatial continua, experienced by any one at any particular time. Now an idea, in assuming the extra-experiential existence of its object, assumes an extra-experiential extension of either intra-experiential time or intra-experiential space or of both; and the assumed extra-experiential existence of the object is its assumedly having a position in this assumed extra-experiential time or space or in both. Its assumed position therein gives it an assumed temporal and spatial relation to the nucleus of the idea, and this assumed relation is the assumed existence of the object. Thus, if I have an idea of an object as going to exist, the assumption that it is going to exist is the assumption that it is going to have a place in the assumed prolongation of intra-experiential time. Time and space thus form the *framework* of things as existent, and the center of this framework for any particular experience is found in intra-experiential space and time.

Now if we call the total complex consisting of the various things present at any time in any particular experience an *intra-experiential world*, every intra-experiential world that includes an idea as a factor in it, assumes, in virtue of that idea, a world larger than itself, larger by the fact that the object of the idea exists in that larger world, whereas it does not exist in the intra-experiential world. Of this larger world the intra-experiential

particular time so determined is in the particular group or togetherness of things that form my present experience is intra-experiential in respect of my experience at this time. Everything else is extra-experiential in respect of my experience at this time. Where ideas are in question, the terms will be employed with reference to the particular experience in which the idea is a factor and to that experience at the time when the idea is a factor of that experience.

world is a part, because the idea, in assuming the existence of the object, assumes that it exists in an extra-experiential *extension* of the time or space which is in the intra-experiential world. Now as the intra-experiential world of one moment gives way to that of the next, there is a transition of such sort that certain things of the former world continue into the succeeding world, although certain other things have dropped out. There is no break or interruption; and where there is a temporal gap, the identity of content, experienced as identical and as 'warm and intimate,' constitutes a very definite continuity. Let us call this continuous series of intra-experiential worlds an *experience-continuum*. Any such continuum, in virtue of the ideas that exist in it from time to time, assumes itself to be part of a larger universe in which there assumedly exist the various objects of these ideas, each object situated temporally or spatially with more or less definiteness according to the greater or less definiteness of the ideas that assume them. The continuity of the experience-continuum is the basis of the continuity of those parts of this universe which are not in the experience-continuum. Because of this latter continuity this universe is called a universe. Let us identify such a universe by calling it the *universe of a naïve experience*,—of naïve experience, because so far as this universe has been described in terms of ideas and their objects, these ideas assume these objects naïvely. The *naïvete*, however, is not experienced as such. It is we who have attained to the conception of another kind of universe, to be described presently, who judge these ideas to be naïve. When we call this universe one of experience, we do not mean to imply that *every* part of it is ever present in the experience-continuum. The 'of' is an 'of' of continuity and not of inclusion. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that the experience-continuum is an integral part of this universe. Part of this universe is included and part is not included in the experience-continuum.

Let us now see how there arises in this universe of a naïve experience a criticism of itself. Because some of the ideas in an experience-continuum refer to objects that are assumed to be going to exist in a prolongation futureward of the time in experience,

they point in the direction in which the continuum is itself advancing. Thus it comes about that what was previously an assumed extra-experiential extension of intra-experiential time later becomes intra-experiential, and when ultimately that position in this formerly assumed time is experientially reached, in which the object of the former idea was assumed to exist, it sometimes happens that the object is not found where it had been assumed that it would be. The experienced non-conformity between what the former idea assumed and the present experience contains is what, in this case, is meant by the experience of falsity. Such an experience of falsity is itself an ideal experience or at least it usually is, in that the former idea is now past and gone, and what is present is fringed with the relation of non-conformity to that past idea; that is, what is now experienced is an idea, its nucleus fringed with non-correspondence, pointing to the past idea.

Until falsity has been experienced, there is no experience of truth *as truth*.¹ It may be that before falsity has been experienced, objects of ideas pointing futureward had been thereafter experienced, but as the ideas in question have been naïve, the later intra-experiential presence of their objects does not confirm such ideas: such ideas, being naïve and confident of the existence of their objects, did not need confirmation. What was expected happens, but so far, remember, only the expected happens—when it happens it is taken as a matter of course. There may have been dissatisfaction before it happened; that is, there may have been desire that what was assumed to be going to happen should hurry up and come on. But the uneasiness of the desire is not, under the conditions assumed, due to the doubtfulness but to the absence of the object. All of us even now probably still have many expectations which are not experienced as doubtful. Without questioning that the event longed-for will occur, we yet 'cannot wait' till it comes. When at last it does occur, it may not be experienced as confirming our former expectations but as satisfying our former longing. Now, in view of the fact that we

¹ The insistence on this truth seems to me to be the most valuable of Mr. Schiller's contributions to the theory of truth.

who are sophisticated about the uncertainties of life still have such experiences, I think that we are justified in distinguishing between the satisfaction of a desire and the confirmation of an idea. An idea is not experienced as confirmed until the idea can be regarded as liable to be falsified; and an idea is not so regarded until some ideas have been actually falsified; that is, till there has been an experience of falsity. The experience of an object as confirming an idea is what I shall call an experience of verification. It is to be observed that the experience of verification is, at least generally, an ideal experience in the same way in which the experience of falsification is an ideal experience. That is to say, the object experienced as verifying an idea is experienced as fringed with a relation of correspondence pointing back to a previous expectation; it is fringed with a relation of identity with what the idea meant, and the object-as-thus-fringed is further fringed with a relation of contrast to previous experiences of falsity. The object thus fringed and re-fringed is an idea, the idea that the former idea has been verified. The nucleus of the present idea may also be experienced as satisfying; but this happens only if we formerly desired to experience verification, or if the object proves to be for some reason pleasing. Satisfaction is neither verification nor a test of verification. It is either pleasure in the attainment of a desired verification or, independently of verification, pleasure in an object which happens also to verify.

When there is an experience of verification such as above described, the idea verified is thought of as *having been* true. That is, the object which is experienced as verifying, points *back* to the previous idea, in the way indicated a moment ago. Such an idea may, when it was experienced, not have been experienced as true, but it is now looked back upon as having been true, because the object it assumed to be going to exist is now, at the time designated by the idea, existent, and in this respect different from the objects of false ideas. Surely there should be no more difficulty in saying that an idea was true although its object did not exist when the idea did, than in saying that the idea is now true when *it* no longer exists. Those who maintain that an

idea cannot become true till its object exists will please tell us whether now in the year 1910 this year 1910 *is* before the year 1911, or whether it will not be so *until* the year 1911 has arrived and the year 1910 has passed. Or perhaps we should say that in the year 1911 the year 1910 *becomes* before 1911! The fact is that where the date of the object and the date of the idea of that object are different, the particular relation that constitutes the truth of the idea transcends the date of either term of the relation, and the question as to the time of this relation cannot be answered without taking into account both the dates involved. But if the adjective true is to be applied to the idea as *one* of the terms of this relation, the tense of the copula which applies it naturally conforms to the date of the term to which it is applied. A father, speaking of his son's resemblance to the grandfather who died before the son was born, would naturally say, "You *are* like your grandfather" or "Your grandfather *was* like you." If the value of pragmatism were limited to the discovery that the grandfather was not like the grandson, but becomes like him after his own decease, it would have to be set down as a perverse bit of philological pedantry rather than a profound logic. My poor excuse for having dwelt so long upon this matter of grammar is that others with whom we all must reckon have dwelt upon it longer. But let us pass to something more important.

We have followed the development of an experience-continuum up to the point where some ideas have come to be regarded as true and others as false. It is now necessary to observe and emphasize the fact that even in the case of an idea subsequently proved false the very proving of it false is made possible by the fact that the former assumption of an extra-experiential prolongation of intra-experiential time has been realized. The assumption the idea made that intra-experiential time is only a part of a larger time-continuum is thus experienced as realized, even though the assumption the idea made, that at a later date in this time-continuum the idea's object would have its place, is falsified. The same is of course true of space. The error of the idea that there is a house around the corner cannot be experientially detected unless the space around the corner, in which space the

idea assumed that its object exists, actually is. In other words, what I have called the framework of existent things survives the epoch which ushers in the experience of truth and falsity. The convicted falsity of an idea is not a total falsity; the assumption the idea made that there is a larger universe of which the then intra-experiential world is a part is subsequently verified in the very falsification of the idea's assumption that this universe contains the object of the idea in the place designated by the idea. Let us call this larger universe, the assumption of whose existence is verified in the falsification of any and every idea proved false, *the real universe of experience*. This universe differs from the universe of a naïve experience not in its general spatial and temporal structure¹ but in the objects it contains. What exists in this real universe of experience determines the truth or falsity of any idea. If, now, at a later period in the history of any experience-continuum, there be raised the question as to the truth or falsity of any idea then existent, this doubt, *if motivated by what has been ascertained in previous experiences of truth and falsity*, is not a doubt as to whether there is a real universe of experience, but as to whether such a universe contains the object of the idea at issue in the way in which the idea assumes that it does. In other words, the question of the truth of a present idea is not a question as to the correspondence between the idea and its object—by the terms of our definition every idea corresponds to its object—but it is a question as to the existence of its object in the real universe of experience. If now we call *real* anything which exists in this real universe of experience, we may say that an idea is true if its object is real; it is false if its object is unreal;² it is partly true and partly false if its object is partly real and partly unreal. False ideas have

¹ I say *general* structure, because it is necessary here to reserve judgment as to the relation between 'perceptual' and 'conceptual' space, and between the 'apparent' and the 'real' length of any interval of time.

² The various 'is's' have different time-values to be determined by the dates of the respective subjects of which the predication is made. There are difficulties in this view of truth which I cannot here attempt to clear up; *e. g.*, the nature of the truth of the *proposition* that centaurs are half horse and half man. My account of truth in this paper deals with the truth of ideas that assume the existence of their objects.

non-existent objects, as wise old Thomas Reid said in effect long ago. That is to say, the objects which are missing from the experience in which these ideas exist, and whose absence makes ideas out of what is experienced, are also lacking from the real universe. True ideas, on the contrary, have existent objects. The truth of an idea is its correspondence with reality—not with reality at large, if anybody ever thought that it was that, but with that specific reality which is situated in that part of the frame-work of existence identified by the specific pointing of the specific fringe which is a factor of the specific idea in question.

The real universe of experience, like the universe of naïve experience, contains everything that has existence in the experience-continuum; but, unlike the latter universe, it does not contain everything which all the ideas in the experience-continuum assume to exist; it contains only some of the objects of the ideas in that continuum, namely, the objects of the true ideas. On the other hand, it is thought of as containing an indefinite number and variety of things which are not severally the objects of any ideas in the continuum, but collectively the object of the general idea of the real universe of experience. Such a general idea of reality at large is no more of a mystery or an impossibility than other general ideas, so admirably described by James in his chapter on "Conception." Any one who does not happen to have such a general idea of reality at large of course does not have it; but this is no reason why he should deny such a possession to others, and is a very good reason why he is not competent to decide whether such ideas have any value. The real universe of experience, thus described, *so far as it transcends* the experience-continuum, nay, so far as it transcends the intra-experiential world in which there is an idea of what thus transcends, is still assumed—it is not experienced. The assumption of it, however, is one that is never falsified; on the contrary it is partially confirmed by the confirmation or the falsification of every specific idea. Its truth stands or falls with the truth of general ideas in general, none of which are ever in subsequent experience proved true in their *whole* extension or denotation. If any one accepts the truth of any general idea other than this general idea of the real

universe of experience and refuses to accept the truth of this general idea, that is his business. But if he denies to others, on logical grounds, the right to accept the truth of this general idea while granting the right to accept other general ideas, he should show justification for this apparent inconsistency. The acceptance of the truth of the idea of a real universe of experience, provided this acceptance be not accompanied with the reservation that every part of this real universe is in *some* experience, or is itself *an* experience, or that the whole of it is in *one* all-comprehensive experience,—such an unreserved acceptance of this truth is realism.

If time permitted, this would be a fitting place to take up the question of doubt, but our time is getting short. All that is possible now is to point out that doubt assumes the existence of such a real universe of experience as much as does the truth or falsity of a present idea. What makes an idea doubtful is not that there is any incompatibility in what is *present* in the experience in which doubt arises. In doubt there are what we call conflicting assumptions, but in fact the assumptions, so far as what is experienced in them goes, are not incompatible. The best proof that they are not is that they coexist intra-experientially. What constitutes the incompatibility is that the *things assumed* but not experienced should be assumed *to exist together in the real universe of experience*. Let me illustrate. When Solomon found himself confronted with two women each of whom claimed to be the mother of the same child, he was, or should have been, enough of a connoisseur of oriental woman-kind to know that the existence of rival claims was not a fact that in itself was necessarily fraught with any danger to the integrity of his experience; he must have already outlived several such experiences. Nor, let me add, was what presented the specific problem he so successfully grappled with, the fact that his royal peace was disturbed by brawling in his presence. If this were all, he could easily have ordered the racket-makers out of court. He probably would have done this had he not been interested in an event that he was not then experiencing and could not have reasonably expected to experience. The child before him had

presumably been born of one mother into the real universe. Except with reference to this previous event that had evidently not occurred in the Solomonic continuum of experience, the clamor the king heard would have been mere clatter. It was that one event in its incompatible relation to both the experienced claims, that made the claims incompatible. If there is incompatibility in a situation, the whole situation is *not* experienced; the incompatibility is in the unexperienced object of an idea, in its relation to the idea as making two or more different assumptions. The assumptions, so far as what is actually experienced is concerned, are merely different—so far as what is not experienced but is meant is concerned, they are incompatible.

So far, with the exception of the last case touched upon, we have been considering ideas that point futureward in such wise that their truth or falsity could be subsequently detected. But we have other ideas that point backward or forward in time or outward in space to dates or regions which we cannot reach. The truth or falsity of these ideas should be conceived in the same way in which the truth or falsity of directly verifiable or falsifiable ideas is conceived. These ideas are true, namely, if their objects are real, false if their objects are not real. Some of these ideas may be verified indirectly in a way which we cannot consider now. But whether verified or not, they are true if the real universe, which we assume when these ideas are experienced, contains the objects of these ideas in the place and at the date designated by the ideas. Otherwise the ideas are false. An idea that points to the past must be taken at its face value as to what it means, and where and when it assumes its object to have existed. The relation of truth or falsity in which this idea stands to its object spans the time interval that lies between the idea and the assumed past date of the object. For this reason nothing that can happen subsequently to the idea can affect this relation. A later event may indicate that the idea was false when it was assumed to be true, but it cannot make an idea to have been false if it was not already false when it was experienced, any more than what can happen to the grandson in our recent illustration can undo the fact that he resembled his defunct

grandfather. Among the changes that the future may have in store for that lad there may be changes that affect the points of resemblance, and he may therefore become unlike his ancestor. But however much he may diverge from his present similarity to the latter, the fact that he now resembles him will have become a past fact, immutable and irrevocable, if it be a present fact now. Among these changes may be the discovery of an old daguerrotype which may convince the father that he was mistaken in saying what he did. But even such a discovery will not retroact so as to remove the fringe of resemblance which attached to the son's features as they appeared to the father at the time of his saying what he said. These features, as they later appear, may be fringed with a relation of dissimilarity, the fringe of that date pointing to the same object to which the fringe of the earlier date pointed, but the latter fringe will have become a past fringe, irremovable from its place in the real universe, world without end. The past idea and the present idea are incompatible with each other in that the same real object cannot have completed the two incomplete relational complexes, namely, the two ideas. Either the past idea will *have been* false, or the present idea *will be* true, when it is present.

Now, when I said earlier in the evening, that James did not make full use of his doctrine of the fringe when he came to work out his logic, I did not mean to imply that he ever ignored the fringes that point in other directions than toward the future. The ideas of his psychology had been comets, sometimes with beards floating in front of them, and sometimes with tails streaming behind. These tails his comets never dropped. But when James *defined truth* as an affair of leading, he wove this definition out of the beards alone. The fault of this definition is not that it does not fit the facts to which it is meant to apply, nor even that it completely changes the meaning of the word truth, which has been current from time immemorial. Its fault is that it changes this meaning unnecessarily. Sometimes it is of course necessary to change the meaning of a word if it is to continue in scientific use and if what it had meant before was something of which science cannot take cognizance. Thus the mathe-

matician still speaks of chance, but he has redefined chance because the chance of vulgar currency, chance as an incalculable and mysterious agency that disturbs the order of nature, is something with which the science of calculation cannot deal. Now if truth, as correspondence between idea and real object in other than a pragmatistic sense, be something that logic cannot deal with, then by all means let us discard this definition, and redefine the term in such fashion that logic may still deal with truth. The reason why James did just this thing was that he saw no way out of it. It was not sheer arbitrariness that made him propound the definition of truth which has since been identified with pragmatism. His challenge to his opponents to produce some other than the pragmatic definition, to bring forward a definition that should make truth 'consist in something assignable and describable, and not remain a pure mystery,' was not issued in the spirit of a controversialist who sought to take advantage of his foes. His promise: If Professor Pratt "can assign any determination of it whatever which I cannot successfully refer to some specification of what in this article I have called the empirical *fundamentum*, I will confess my stupidity cheerfully, and will agree never to publish a line upon this subject of truth again"¹—this promise, while unnecessarily drastic, indicated his willingness to abide by the facts and let his definition go if the facts required the sacrifice. Now I have tried to show that there is a non-pragmatistic correspondence between ideas and realities, a correspondence sometimes experienced and sometimes assumed, and that this correspondence can be assigned and described in terms which can be understood by any one whose thinking experience has such ideas as I have been dealing with, following upon James's treatment of these ideas. If there be such correspondence, then it is, to say the least, poor economy to insist that we change the meaning which 'truth' has always had, and leave the relation which this term has always meant, without a distinctive name for itself. This may be pragmatic, but it is not practical. It is like insisting that henceforth we shall call horses cows, and let the now anonymous cows look about for

¹ *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 168.

a suitable pseudonym. The analogy between the two insistences is the more apt because we already have a term which has been generally applied to what James wished to have us call by the name of truth. I mean the term *useful*.

The proposed conservatism in terminology would not prejudice the efficiency of truth as an affair of leading. Truth is practical in that it serves to lead us forward; but an idea of the past can lead us forward only if it be more than an idea of the past, just as the North Star can serve to guide the south-bound mariner only if there be other directions before him than that in which the North Star lies. Now of course an idea of the past *may be* something more than an idea of the past. My idea of Cæsar may be an idea not only of what Cæsar was or did, but also of the bearing of Cæsar's character or actions upon what I am interested in doing. For instance, if I am engaged in the task of Latin prose composition, I may have an idea that Cæsar wrote this passage of the Commentaries lying before me and that Cæsar's Latin is a very good model for my efforts at Latinity. But surely the fact that this idea can and does lead to a satisfactory result, does not prove that Cæsar wrote this passage, however much it may prove that I was right in making it my pattern. It might have served my purpose as well if it had been written by Cicero or by any one else who happened to command the style which my teacher exacts of me. James was justified in asking what any idea is good for; but in doing so, he was asking whether the idea, if it did not refer to something he was interested in doing, could not be incorporated as an element in a larger and more comprehensive idea which should refer to a means of obtaining an end he desired.

The value of a true idea does not differ essentially from the value of anything else. The value of anything is the fact that it satisfies our desires or advances our interests; value is thus a certain specific relation between the valuable thing and our desires and interests. But this relation is different from the specific correspondence-relation, which is truth. There is as much difference between these two relations as there is between priority and similarity; the disparateness of the two, however, is not an incompatibility.

I have pointed out one reason which determined James to reject the notion that truth is something else than an affair of leading. But there was another motive that indisposed him toward the ordinary view of truth. If your idea of any future event is true now and if truth means the correspondence of this idea with that event in the manner above described, does not this commit you to the doctrine that the future is determined by the fact that the idea *is* true? This is too large a question to take up here; I will merely say that I agree with Thomas Reid in being unable to see any more reason why the truth of any idea I may have of the future should determine the future to the preclusion of the efficiency of such efforts as may intervene, than why the truth of any idea I now have of the past determines that past to the preclusion of the efficiency of the antecedents of the event thought about. But whatever may be the merits of this question, Professor James had convinced himself that to admit an idea to be true now when its object lies in the future is to admit that the future is cut and dried and all worked out. No wonder that such a view was repulsive to him, and especially to *him*. His aversion to what he so graphically called a block universe was a passion. "As far as the past facts go, indeed there is no difference. These facts are in, are bagged, are captured; and the good that's in them is gained." But the future is a different matter. That is the region of deeds to be done, fights to be fought, and victories to be won. Undetermined events were there awaiting him and were inviting the coöperation of his efforts. No logic that ends in a block universe, offering rigid resistance to a man's every desire and hope and aspiration and resolve to do something that but for his doing it would not be done, can ever claim the full allegiance of any one who is more than a logical monomaniac. Professor James would have been the last of men to divide his allegiance between logic and life. For this we cannot but honor him. Any but the pragmatic logic was in his eyes the logic of the Lotus Eaters for youth and middle age, the logic of Tithonus for the old. James himself was a Tennysonian Ulysses. The thunder and the sunshine, the lights that twinkle from the rocks, the long day waning, the

slow moon climbing, the moaning deep with many voices—no man in our generation has felt more keenly the shock or the caress of every stimulus, but his invariable response was: "Come, my friends, 'tis not too late to seek a newer world; for my purpose holds to sail beyond the sunset, and the paths of all the western stars, until I die." Compare this spirit, confidently setting out westward with the drift of things, and resolutely rowing past the mere drift of things, with the plaintive melancholy of Tithonus, sitting with his wrinkled feet upon the glimmering thresholds of the East. The thoughts of Tithonus were of the past, of far-off Troy, remembered as the scene of sweet delirious dalliances. The future had for him but happy barrows of the happy dead. Ulysses, standing upon the shore of his kingdom and his isle and ready to embark upon his venturous quest, likewise had his thoughts of far-off Troy, which lay eastward behind his back, the Troy upon whose windy plains he had drunk delight of battle with his peers. But it was the untravelled West that called him, and to the call he answered in temper of heroic heart, strong in will to strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

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FAITH.

THE object of these pages is to enquire as to the meaning of faith. They will be concerned, not merely with religious faith, but with faith in general. I will endeavor first to fix loosely and within limits the sense of the term, and will go on next to state and to explain a narrower view which has much to recommend it. I shall have, however, to point out, thirdly, that this view is not in accordance with all the facts. Unless, that is, we take it as a definition more or less arbitrary, it requires modification. From this I shall proceed to adduce by way of illustration a number of instances, and will finally ask how philosophy and faith are connected. I may, however, add that for myself the enquiry as to the meaning of our term possesses no great importance. As long, that is, as some definite sense is attached to the word, I do not for myself much care how it is defined.

I. It is obvious that faith is in some way opposed to knowledge proper, but it is obvious also that faith implies some kind of believing and knowing. If you descend, that is, below a certain intellectual level, the word faith becomes inapplicable. It is therefore not knowledge but knowledge of a certain kind which is excluded by faith, or which, to speak more accurately, falls outside of that which constitutes faith's essence. Mere feeling (I do not ask here if this is to be called knowledge) is certainly not faith. I do not deny that a man may have faith in that which he feels, but in any case his faith must go beyond mere feeling. And the same thing must be said once more of sensible perception. You cannot have faith in what you see, so long as you have nothing but seeing. And again everything that can be called intellectual perception must, as such, be external to faith. The mere apprehension of a principle or of a logical sequence is certainly not that which, taken by itself, we should call faith. And we may go on generally in the same sense to

exclude all knowledge so far as that is grounded in ideas or is verified in facts.

On the one side, the object of faith must be ideal. To believe in a person, for instance, is, however vaguely, to believe something about him. In order to have faith I must, that is, entertain an idea. On the other side, not every such entertainment is faith. For faith is limited to that ideal region where, apart from faith, doubt is possible. Its positive essence lies in the overcoming or prevention of doubt, actual or possible, as to an idea. And the doubt further, as we have seen, must be excluded in a way which cannot in the ordinary sense be called logical. The non-logical overcoming from within of doubt as to an idea, or the similar prevention of such doubt, appears, so far as we have seen, to be the general essence of faith.

II. I will now proceed to state a meaning in which faith may be more narrowly understood. We have here a view which, except as an arbitrary definition, will not cover all the facts, but which nevertheless is instructive and in great part tenable. There are two questions which are naturally asked as to the nature of faith. How in particular is faith able to prevent or to overcome doubt, and what is the result of faith's presence? I have spoken of these two questions as two, because in the end, as I think, they must be divided. But for the view which I am about to state briefly, no such division exists.

Faith according to this view will exist so far as an idea is a principle of action, whether theoretical or practical.¹ The doubt is not first removed or prevented before we act, but by and in the process of our acting. And our state in thus acting remains faith so long as and so far as the idea is not verified. Thus in theory an attempt to reconstruct the world ideally might, and, we may even add, must begin in faith, but the process ceases to depend on faith so far as it visibly succeeds. And, if our theory ever became intelligible throughout, faith would have

¹ The distinction between theory and practice has been discussed by me elsewhere. The reader is not to identify the view given in the text with what is called Pragmatism. Pragmatism, as I understand it, is merely a one-sided perversion of the more complete view. Its essence consists in the attempt to subordinate every aspect of mind to what it calls practice, the meaning of practice not having been first ascertained.

ceased wholly to exist in it, since no further doubt as to that theory's beginning or end would be possible. On the other hand, apart from such complete verification, faith must always remain, since your doubt, actual or possible, is removed only because, and so far as, you resolve to act in a certain manner. What overcomes your doubt, therefore, is in the end action and not vision. And on the practical side the same account holds good. For practical success tends to banish doubt as to those ideas on which we act, and therefore, so far as it goes, tends to remove the condition of faith. But because neither in theory nor in practice is a complete success attainable throughout and in detail, we are left, so far as this aspect goes, still dependent on faith.

Even on this view, the reader will have noticed, faith is not essentially practical, if, that is, practice is taken in its more ordinary sense. On the other hand, all faith both in its origin and its result will (upon this view) be active. Doubt, that is, will be overcome always by that which I may be said to do, to do, if not in practice, at least theoretically. My contemplation even may be called active, and must everywhere, so far as doubt is removed by action, imply faith. But this view, however much truth it contains, cannot in my opinion be defended. It does not throughout answer to the facts. Even in the widest sense of practice I cannot find that faith is always practical in its origin or even always in its issue.

(a) The origin of faith, it seems to me clear, may be what we call emotional, or, even perhaps apart from emotion, faith can arise through what may be termed a non-active suggestion. The reason why I have come to believe in an idea must in some cases be said to be æsthetic, or in others again sympathetic and social; or it may be found in the magnetic force of a commanding personality. To maintain that in every one of such cases I believe because of something that I do, and that faith arises through action, would surely be contrary to fact. And the objection that in such cases there is no possibility of doubt, and that there is therefore no faith, seems once more untenable. To me it seems clear that I may believe in ideas the opposite of which I am able to conceive, and that my possible doubt is

overcome by an influence which is not properly intellectual, and yet which certainly does not consist in action. And I do not see how to deny that such a process is faith. If and so far as I go on to act, the action, I agree, will and must affect the source from which it arises. But we have here a subsequent reaction, and to conclude from this to the nature of the first origin seems illogical.

(b) Hence, even in the widest sense of the term, the origin of faith is certainly not in all cases practical. And it may be doubted whether even the result can in all cases be called action. I may believe that to-night it will rain because some one in whose opinion I trust tells me so. And this belief may, so far as I see, in no way influence what I call my conduct. And to urge that under other conditions that influence *would be* there, and that therefore it *is* there, to myself seems not permissible. Hence neither in its origin nor even in its issue can all faith be called practical, if at least the term practical is to keep its ordinary meaning.

And even if we extend that meaning so as to embrace every kind of mental action, a difficulty may still remain. If I believe upon faith that to-night it will rain, my conduct, we saw, may remain uninfluenced. A difference of some kind will, however, have been made in what in the widest sense I may call my mental furniture. And, since I always in some way am acting theoretically, the difference made by any belief, however seemingly irrelevant, in my mental furniture, must affect every subsequent theoretical action, and therefore may be said to consist in activity. So far as I really and actually believe that to-night it will rain, so far any judgment of mine with regard to anything in the universe will be affected, and the result of my faith will thus be action. To this extreme contention I may naturally object that, whether I believe that it will or will not rain, may make apparently no visible difference. Still I may be asked, in reply, why and how the idea of rain is kept before me at all unless it is connected with some subsequent mental action? We should thus be brought to the question, whether, and if so in what sense, I have faith so long as I do not exercise it, and so long as

there is no actual idea before my mind. I do not wish to discuss this here, but must insist on the conclusion that the first origin of my belief must in some cases be passive. Again, as to the result, it is questionable how far in some cases we can speak of any actual result at all. We may infer a result on general grounds but there may be nothing that we can verify in detail. And, further, an action resulting from faith need not be practical. We must therefore conclude that certainly faith does not in all cases arise from action, and that, whether it issues necessarily in act, even a theoretical act, seems highly doubtful.

If we pass from faith in general to religious faith, this conclusion must be altered. Religious faith consists, I should say, in the identification of my will with a certain object. It essentially is practical and must necessarily be exercised in conduct. I do not contend that in its origin all religious faith must be practical. On the contrary, it may be generated, I believe, in a variety of manners. But, except so far as the accepted idea is carried out practically, the belief (we should perhaps most of us agree) is not properly religious. And of course the practical exercise of a belief must react on its origin. But, unless we wish to lay down a definition which is more or less arbitrary, I do not see that we are justified in arguing from the nature of religious faith to that of faith in general. For reasons that have been given I could not agree that everywhere faith involves the identification of my will with an idea.

III. It may perhaps help the reader to judge as to the truth of the doctrine laid down above, if I go on to offer some applications in detail. And a certain amount of repetition may perhaps be excused. It is not, for instance, faith where I draw deductions from a principle accepted on faith. So far as the sequence is visible, faith so far is absent. Further, an unverifiable assumption as to detail—an assumption made because a principle demands it—seems hardly to be faith, unless so far as the principle itself is taken on faith. Wherever a principle is seen and grasped apart from faith, my confident acting on this principle should not be called faith. And from the other side, where through weakness of will I fail to act on my knowledge, we must not

everywhere identify this defect with want of faith. In the first place, the knowledge itself may or may not rest on faith, and again, the knowledge itself may still be faith even if it apparently is followed by no action. It is only, we saw, in the case of religious faith that this must be denied. The apparent fact of my failure to act upon knowledge will always, I presume, create difficulty, since the detail in each instance may vary and is hard to observe correctly. In some cases my failure may have its origin in doubt, in doubt, that is, not with regard to the principle but as to the detail of its application here and now. And, so far as the right ideas would be secured and the contrary ideas banished by knowledge or faith, my want of action may be attributed to a defect in faith or knowledge. But there are other cases where such an account of the matter seems not to answer to the facts. To pass to another point, when we hear that "The infant, who has found the way to the mother's breast for food, and to her side for warmth, has made progress in the power of faith,"¹ we are at once struck by the inappropriateness of the phrase. The action in such a case need not arise from any kind of belief and idea. And in the second place, where there is an idea from which the action proceeds, the conditions may exclude the possibility of faith. Where an idea, suggested by perception or otherwise, cannot be doubted, faith is obviously inapplicable. Faith, in the proper sense, cannot begin until the child is capable of entertaining a contrary idea.

At the risk of wearying the reader I will add some further illustration. When serving on a jury a man may come to a decision in various ways. If he accepts and rejects testimony, and in the end judges according to probability and by what he knows of the world, the process so far is not faith. If he is influenced by another man simply because he infers that the other man knows better, faith once more is absent. If he is influenced by the other man otherwise, let us say morally and emotionally, and in consequence follows the other man with belief, this is certainly faith. But we cannot call the same thing faith where, and so far as, the belief is absent. The influence of another person on my conduct tends, we may say, normally

¹ Bain, *Emotions*, Ed. III, p. 506.

to influence my belief, but this consequence may be absent, and, if so, we cannot speak of faith proper. Finally, if our jurymen cannot decide rationally, and if he says, "Since I must decide in some way, I will take the plaintiff as being in the right," that again certainly is not faith. The man's doubt here is not overcome, nor is there any principle, rational or otherwise, which he accepts as the ground of his particular decision.

IV. I will end by asking whether and, if so, in what sense faith is implied in philosophy. The question how far in philosophy we can be said to go to work with our whole nature, and not merely with our intellect, need not here be discussed. But, to pass this by, philosophy, I should say, in a sense must depend upon faith. For we do not rest simply on a datum, on a given fact or a given axiom. On the contrary, we may be said to depend on a principle of action. We seek, that is, a certain kind of satisfaction, and we proceed accordingly. In and for philosophy (I do not ask if this holds also in the separate sciences) truth in the end is true because I have a certain want and because I act in a certain manner. The criterion may be said in the last resort to involve my act and choice. And thus in the end truth is not true because it is simply seen or follows logically from what is seen. Further, philosophy in my judgment cannot verify its principle in detail and throughout. If it could do this, faith would be removed, and, so far as it does this, faith ceases. But, so far as philosophy is condemned to act on an unverified principle, it continues to rest upon faith.

You may indeed object that here there can be no faith since here doubts are impossible, but this objection, I think, will hardly stand. The doubts may be said to be impossible only because of our principle of action. And, if it were not for our faith, we have perhaps a right to say that the other ideas, now meaningless, might at least in some irrational sense be entertained. But how we are to decide on this point, and whether we are to assert or to deny that philosophy in the end rests on faith, is to my mind of no consequence.

F. H. BRADLEY.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL
ASSOCIATION: THE TENTH ANNUAL MEETING,
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, DECEMBER 27-29,

1910.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-TREASURER.

THE tenth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association was held at Princeton University, Princeton, N. J., on December 27, 28, and 29, 1910. The Treasurer's report for the year ending December 31, 1910, was read and accepted after being audited by a committee appointed by the President and consisting of Professors Riley and de Laguna:

FRANK THILLY, SECRETARY AND TREASURER, IN ACCOUNT WITH THE
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION.

Receipts.

Balance on hand December 31, 1909.....	\$449.84
Interest (July to January).....	8.35
	<u>458.19</u>

Expenses.

Committee on Early American Philosophers.....	34.71
Fichte Memorial (Gabriel Campbell).....	24.24
New Haven Smoker.....	31.81
	<u>90.76</u>

Balance on hand February 1, 1910.....	367.43
Total.....	<u>\$458.19</u>

EDWARD G. SPAULDING, SECRETARY AND TREASURER, IN ACCOUNT WITH
THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION.

Receipts.

Balance from Frank Thilly, February 1, 1910.....	\$367.43
Dues and sale of Proceedings.....	155.85
Interest to January 1, 1911.....	8.68
	<u>531.96</u>

Expenses.

Printing (Proceedings, circulars, programs, etc.)....	34.00
Stationery.....	10.83
Travelling Expenses.....	5.00
Telegrams and Telephone.....	1.70
Clerical Assistance and Stenographer.....	17.20
Postage, all purposes.....	24.06
Express.....	.45
	<hr/>
	93.24

Balance on hand December 31, 1910.....	438.72
	<hr/>
	\$531.96

The following officers were elected for the ensuing year: *President*, Professor Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, of Columbia University; *Vice-President*, Professor Walter T. Marvin, of Rutgers College; *Secretary-Treasurer*, Professor Edward G. Spaulding, of Princeton University; *Members of the Executive Committee* (for two years), Professor Dickinson S. Miller, of Columbia University, and Professor Theodore de Laguna, of Bryn Mawr College.

Upon recommendation of the Executive Committee seven new members were elected: Miss Savilla A. Elkus, of New York City; Dr. W. D. Furry, of Johns Hopkins University; Dr. Horace Kallen, of Harvard University; Professor Edward L. Moore, of Harvard University; Professor W. J. Newlin, of Amherst College; Professor H. A. Overstreet, of the College of the City of New York; Mr. John M. Warbeke, of Williams College.

The invitation of Harvard University to hold the eleventh annual meeting at Cambridge was accepted subject to reconsideration by the Executive Committee to whom the matter was referred with power.

The report of the Committee on Early American Philosophers was read by Professor Riley and accepted, and the Committee was continued. The report is given in full below. The question of the advisability of printing in the Proceedings the abstracts of papers read at the meetings was referred to the Executive Committee with power.

The report of the committee chosen to prepare a memorial on the death of Dr. William Torrey Harris was read by the President, and was adopted by a rising vote. The report is given in full below.

A committee consisting of Professors Dewey, Ormond, and Perry, previously selected by the Executive Committee, was requested to present at the next annual meeting a memorial on the death of Professor William James.

The Secretary was instructed to extend the greetings of the Association to The International Philosophical Congress to be held at Bologna in April, and the President was instructed to appoint one representative or more to attend this Congress.

It was voted to give the Executive Committee power to appoint a committee of five to prepare, after the selection of the subject for discussion at the next meeting, definitions of terms pertaining to that subject, for the use of those participating in the discussion.

It was voted to extend the thanks of the Association to Princeton University for its hospitality in entertaining the Association.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON EARLY AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS.

The Committee reports progress. The Columbia University Press will issue this year a reprint of President Samuel Johnson's *Elements of Philosophy*, under the editorship of Prof. F. J. E. Woodbridge. Next, the Princeton University Press will issue also this year a uniform reprint of President John Witherspoon's *Lectures on Moral Philosophy*, under the editorship of Prof. V. L. Collins. Finally, the Publication Committee of the University of Pennsylvania has approved the reprinting of Dr. Benjamin Rush's *Diseases of the Mind*. The three other books on our list remain to be arranged for, viz., at Harvard, *The Dudleian Lectures*; at Yale, *Selections from Jonathan Edwards*; at the University of Virginia, *Selections from Thomas Jefferson*.

The card catalogue now numbers twelve hundred titles; for this and for circulars there has been spent \$48.50 out of the appropriation of \$75.00.

I. WOODBRIDGE RILEY,
Acting Chairman.

WILLIAM TORREY HARRIS.

A Minute Prepared for the American Philosophical Association.

By the death of William Torrey Harris, in 1909, the American Philosophical Association lost a member distinguished especially by reason of two features of his career. These were, first, his importance as an initiator and in many ways, for years, a guide and counsellor of a notable philosophical movement in this country; and secondly, his success in applying philosophy to life and in becoming thereby a notable organizer of educational enterprises and, as United States Commissioner of Education, a public servant of wide and lasting beneficence and of national significance. In him we honor the philosopher whose work is known by its fruits.

Dr. Harris was born in Connecticut in 1835 and died in 1909. In 1857 he began his career as a school teacher. From 1867 to 1880 he was Superintendent of Public Schools in St. Louis. In 1867 he began the publication of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. After his retirement from the St. Louis superintendency, he settled for several years in Concord, Massachusetts, where he took a prominent part in the conduct of the Concord Summer School of Philosophy. In 1889 he was appointed United States Commissioner of Education, and held that office with distinguished success until, in the very last years of his life, age compelled him to lay down the duties of office. His essays, his addresses, his editorial labors, and his contributions to encyclopedic and to official publications were very numerous; and in this sense his literary productiveness was great. His published philosophical books were few,—his best known works being his exposition of Hegel's Logic, published in 1890, and his *Psychological Foundations of Education*, in 1898. In the meetings of this Association he was, for some years, a welcome and kindly presence, until failing health forced him to be absent.

As a man, Dr. Harris joined very decided personal convictions and very systematic philosophical opinions with a wide range of intellectual hospitality, and with an extraordinary power to

coöperate with men whose views he opposed, to bear with men whose temper was less tolerant than his own, to be profoundly patient in debate as well as in investigation, and above all to welcome and encourage the efforts of young men, and of all who seriously sought for light. Profoundly as his whole nature, his training, and his philosophical ideas and ideals contrasted with those of our beloved William James, the two men had in common one very notable and beneficent trait,—their willingness to encourage the lovers of philosophy to devote themselves to the great questions of life freely and courageously, to assert their individuality, to seek insight in their own way, and thus to win confidence in themselves. Like James, Harris was, throughout his career, ready to give a hearing and to offer literary opportunities not only to scholars of recognized power but also to a wide variety of earnest and sometimes of more or less eccentric and unpopular seekers after light. The *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* was founded in the interest of studies, and in great part of opinions which were dear to Dr. Harris himself; and it welcomed and printed many notable contributions to scholarship. But the volumes of that journal, especially in its early years, also contain contributions from many who were indeed far enough in opinion and in philosophical ideals from the school which Dr. Harris represented and who were men of highly individual temperament. The Concord School, and in still later years the school which Mr. Thomas Davidson conducted at Glenmore, and in which Dr. Harris also often coöperated, were places where very great varieties of opinion were encouraged and expressed; and few indeed were the earnest and ambitious souls, interested in philosophy, that could not win from Dr. Harris, when he met them either at such places or elsewhere, in any walk of life, a gentle and tolerant hearing, and an encouragement,—often a most welcome and needed encouragement,—to continue their search and to be true to their ideals. Young authors, and unknown authors of any age, constantly appealed to him for aid in gaining recognition for their manuscripts or for their printed books. He often answered their appeals in accordance with their wishes; and neither any sectarian narrowness of opinion,

nor any love of his own personal popularity, set limit to Dr. Harris's willingness to help in such cases, whenever he was assured of the sincerity and of the promise,—perhaps often of the still latent promise,—of those who consulted him.

But Dr. Harris was not merely, in such ways, a stimulator of philosophical efforts. His work as editor of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, and the direct and indirect influence of the St. Louis group of philosophers of which he was so prominent and effective a member, had a transforming influence upon the study and teaching of philosophy in this country, both in respect to the academic and in respect to the non-academic forms and interests of such study and teaching. This Association must freely recognize that, whatever our present opinions, tendencies, or ideals are, our opportunities as philosophical teachers and students, the public interests to which we appeal, the educational situation which we face, and our hopes for the future, are all of them deeply affected by social movements for whose rise and early successes we are deeply indebted to Dr. Harris. Laboring modestly and patiently, seeking no popular notoriety, proclaiming no messages such as appealed to the passions of the day or to the curiosity of the multitude, Dr. Harris still did, in the course of his life's work, a great deed for the cause of philosophical study in this country. He helped to win serious recognition for philosophy, and to free it from its bondage to some of the more deadening of its older associations in our American life. Since he was so successful an organizer of certain educational movements, he also helped to associate, in the minds of our people, philosophical ideas and practical interests. We all work to-day the better and the more effectively because of what he did to make our own life-work possible.

In his philosophical opinions, Dr. Harris may be described as an Hegelian of the Right. With his early friend Brockmeyer, and with certain of the German Liberals of the type that flourished in the home land before 1848, and that represented for the following generation in this country what that generation most prized in German thought as it became known in our land, Dr. Harris shared the belief that it was the destiny of philosophy

to guide and, in its own way and time, to transform all human life, educational, political, social, religious. In conceiving of this coming transformation, Dr. Harris was at once a conservative and an idealist. He heartily believed in the world as an evolution. But this evolution, for him, had its definable ideal goal; and philosophy, to his mind, had the right and the power to know this goal. Hegel seemed to him to have stated the definition most completely; but Harris's form of Hegelianism was, within its own limits, plastic and progressive. Had he not devoted himself so long, so earnestly, and so effectively, to doing good as a public servant, he would have had more to tell us regarding those amendments, reconstructions, and supplements which he proposed, and only in part expounded, when he set forth his relations to Hegel. It is a matter for regret that he never completely stated his own mature philosophy.

In him we have lost a noble and devoted man, a faithful servant of the nation, of philosophy, and of the Truth.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

CHARLES M. BAKEWELL.

The following are abstracts of papers read at sessions of the Association:

The Problem of Transcendence. CHARLES M. BAKEWELL.

[The President's Address, which appears in this number (March, 1911) of the *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*.]

An Examination of Four Realistic Theories of Perception.

DICKINSON S. MILLER.

This paper is a statement and analysis of four theories of perception, with an indication of their relation to each other and the logical progress of realistic thought, driven by difficulties, from the first of the theories to the last.

1. The first theory is that which has been most widely held by realists. It holds that any perception we have amongst the contents of our consciousness is what may be called a picture of the object. The flaw in this theory is that it doubles the given object, whereas if we examine our perceptive consciousness,

we find no such duplication. Hence the theory has been restated to hold that we have the content, but do not view or class it as a content. But, if we do not distinguish between consciousness and object, no testimony in favor of realism can be extracted from natural perception.

2. This has driven some realists to a new conception. There is no duplication of representation and object. There is merely the physical object, with its own quality, and of this we are "aware," awareness being an ultimate kind of fact. It is the ultimate and irreducible nature of consciousness to reveal qualities of independent things. The flaw in this theory (that of Mr. G. E. Moore and others) is (a) that it does not adequately provide for the case of illusion, and (b) it cuts away the ground for saying that the awareness of perception exists at all.

3. The third theory holds that the very object *is*, so long as perceived, a content of the mind; but so soon as the attention is turned elsewhere that object continues to exist, though now no longer a content of the mind. Thus, the presentation we call grief, or any other subjective presentation, enters every time we perceive it, into a peculiar relation of *conjunction* with an object which thus becomes also a presentation. Among the flaws in this theory is its total disregard of the machinery of perception. In point of fact, the object which sends vibrations to my organism might, in some cases, have ceased to exist, before I have the presentation.

4. The fourth theory bases itself on those facts as to the machinery of perception which the third theory ignored. The object sends forth through space not merely vibrations unlike itself, but also its true nature. This theory is a return to the copy-theory and, like this, it does not enable us to extract from the experience of perception any proof of realism. This theory is alien to natural realism; it is without proof and it asserts the existence and passage in space of facts to which we cannot ascribe location with any meaning.

The Belief in Sensations. F. J. E. WOODBRIDGE.

As an introduction to an examination of the belief in sensations, certain ambiguities and confusions in current psychological termi-

nology and theory, and also a marked contrast between psychological theory and practice, were pointed out. Explanation of the ambiguity was sought in the belief that there exist, over and above the factors involved in any definition of the situation in which an organism reacts to a stimulus, other factors, mental in character, which may be regarded as first things in the way of consciousness, or the elementary constituents of mind.

The evidence for belief in such existence was examined. (1) The so-called relativity of sensation: It was pointed out that the relativity in question is an indication only of the general relativity of things to one another, but not a proof that there are such things as sensations in the sense defined. (2) Dreams and illusions: It was pointed out that these are indications of the cessation or interruption of the ordinary mechanism of perception and cannot exist when that mechanism is in normal running order. It appears difficult, therefore, to find in them any proof that the content of perception is made up of the so-called sensations. (3) Pain and similar experiences: It was pointed out that the inaccessibility of pain and other similar experiences to "external observation" is not an indication of the "subjectivity" of these experiences, but only that in their case the perceptive machinery is limited to the organism. (4) Introspection: It was claimed that introspection is very far from revealing the existence of sensations. It reveals, rather, that things which have been called sensations are stimuli to thought and behavior, but not the constitutive elements of mind. Since introspection as matter of fact reveals no 'sensations' in the subject or in the person doing the introspecting, there appears to be no reason why 'sensations' should be 'ejected' into the subjects of psychological experimentation.

The paper concluded, therefore, that there is no good evidence for the belief in sensations. It suggested, however, that this conviction does not entail the obligation to put something else in the place of sensations. The indications are rather in the direction of the two problems: (1) What, as matter of fact, are the objects with which we are consciously familiar? and (2) what are the causes of the appearance of consciousness? Both these

problems appear to be problems of positive science but not of epistemology.

DISCUSSION: The Platform of Six Realists. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, Vol. VII, No. 5. Leaders: JOHN DEWEY and WALTER B. PITKIN. In the absence of Professor Pitkin, Professor RALPH BARTON PERRY was appointed to fill his place in the Discussion.
(No abstracts furnished.)

Contemporary Criticism of Idealism. MARY W. CALKINS.

The following are the most important of the contemporary criticisms of idealism: (a) Its arguments disprove, at best, only the existence of the immediately perceived, common-sense thing. Reply: This is admitted with regard to three of the traditional idealistic arguments: (1) the argument from the variableness of sensible objects; (2) the argument from the pleasurable or the painfulness of sensations; and (3) the argument from the essential likeness of secondary and primary qualities. But idealism does not rest its case on these arguments. (b) The distinction actually made by idealists as well as by others between subjective and objective, that is, between perceived and imagined, is possible only on the supposition of an external order. Reply: The distinction between perception and imagination is as readily conceived as the contrast between the private and the shared experience. Against this theory, presupposing the existence of many selves, realists, however, urge that (c) idealism must be solipsism, since from the basal certainty of myself it is at least as difficult to argue to the existence of other selves as to the existence of a non-ideal reality. Reply: This objection holds only against pluralistic idealism. The monistic idealist claims that other-than-me is directly known, and then validly inferred to be of the nature of self. (d) Idealism is based on the assumption that known reality is, by virtue of being known, mental. Reply: The so-called assumption is in truth a discovery.

The neo-realists have so far been concerned mainly with criticism. Among them, they offer, however, the following conceptions of non-ideal reality. But, unless the validity of the

criticisms outlined above be admitted, these positive conceptions turn out to be idealistic in implication. (*a*) The extra-mental reality is conceived as unknowable but existent, in which case the extra-mental reality is, to say the least, negligible. Or (*b*) it is conceived in tactual terms or as organism. But tactual quality is sensible and hence ideal, and the organism cannot be treated as extra-mental without assuming the point at issue. Or (*c*) it is conceived as energy. But energy is either a form of motion, and therefore sensible and ideal, or a cause; in the latter case is it sensible and ideal, or unknowable and ideal.

(This paper will appear in full in *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*.)

The New Realism and the Old. W. P. MONTAGUE.

The issue between the new realists and their opponents is limited to the question whether or not the known exists independently of the fact that it is known. As such it is to be carefully distinguished (1) from the ontological question as to the mental or physical nature of the known objects themselves, which is the point at issue between materialists and spiritualists, and (2) from the methodological question of the origin of knowledge and the best method of attaining and testing it, which is the point at issue between empiricists and rationalists.

There are three types of theory offered for the solution of the problem of the relation of knower to known. These are: (1) Natural realism, according to which the physical world is (*a*) directly known in perceptual experience, but (*b*) capable of existing independently of such knowledge; (2) hypothetical realism or epistemological dualism, according to which the physical world is (*a*) capable of existing independently of a knower, but (*b*) capable of being known only inferentially as the hypothetical cause of mental states, which alone are the objects of the knower's experience; (3) subjectivism or epistemological idealism (not to be confused with either the ontological or with the methodological idealism mentioned above) according to which (*a*) there exists no physical world independent of the knower, and (*b*) the only objects are the mental states or experiences of the knower which

as such depend for their existence upon the fact that they are known.

Natural realism is unable to reconcile the independent externality of perceived objects with the fact of illusions and with our knowledge of the mechanism of perception. It leads naturally to hypothetical realism which explains illusions but is unable to reconcile the belief in a world beyond all experience with our inability to speak intelligibly except of what is in some sense experienced. This in its turn leads naturally to subjectivism, which, however, is unable to face the problem of how a mind can know (1) other finite minds, (2) the experience of an absolute mind, without being confronted by the dilemma of going on to a self-refuting solipsism or going back to the already discredited dualism of the second theory.

The New Realism is in America a systematic and coöperative movement for the restoration of natural realism in a form free from the objections that led to its original abandonment. So far, the attempt to meet the difficulty of illusions consists in invoking a new form of the principle of relativity according to which the so-called non-existent characters of what we experience are treated as real characters which, however, only pertain to objects in their relation to the organism of the knower.

The Externality of Relations. THEODORE DE LAGUNA.

I. The question of the externality of relations dates from the first recognition of a distinction between the essence of a substance (whether an individual, a class, or an ideal type) and its accidents, the latter comprising both non-essential qualities and relations. 'External' means here external *to the essence, i. e.*, to the attributes which are comprised in the concept of the substance in question and serve to define it. From this point of view the question of the externality of relations is closely involved with that of the externality of qualities; and both lead back to the question whether the distinction between essence and accidents is valid, and how far valid; *i. e.*, whether, and within what limits, adequate definition is possible. It is only within the field of mathematics that the possibility of adequate definition can be seriously

maintained, and even there it is open to question. But granting that mathematical definitions are or may be adequate, it is precisely in this case that the doctrine of the externality of relations is most clearly unsound. For, first, the meaning of the fundamental conceptions (the indefinables) can be expressed or conveyed only by means of sets of axioms in which they occur. Their relations to each other, as set forth in these axioms, are thus their whole meaning so far as the science is concerned. Secondly, it is, to an extent unknown to us, indifferent which concepts are chosen as indefinables. Thirdly, some of the indefinables must be relations. Analogous considerations may be urged in other than mathematical fields.

The question remains, whether, while some relations are essential, others may not be unessential. Wherever the distinction between essential and unessential is admitted as having any validity at all, this question must clearly be answered in the affirmative. Generally speaking, the progress of knowledge implies a deepening of conceptions, by which qualities and relations which have formerly been regarded as external become excluded in the essence; and there are no definitely assignable limits to this process. Even *temporary* qualities and relations may be regarded as essential if they belong to one stage in a typical order of development. Moreover, the capacity for entering into temporary relations or of exhibiting (under the proper conditions) temporary qualities, may be clearly essential.

II. Sometimes the externality of relations means externality *to qualities*, whether essential or not. Can a thing enter into a new relation without changing any of its qualities? The question hardly admits of a precise answer, because the distinction between a quality and a relation is not precise. It is safe to answer in the negative, while adding that the more superficial the new relation, the more superficial the qualitative change. If it be asked whether a new relation involves a change in *all* the qualities of a thing, there is no ground for an affirmative answer.

III. In recent discussion the question of the externality of relations appears to have taken on a new meaning: viz., whether relations are or may be external *to each other*, i. e., independently

variable. A similar question arises with respect to qualities. It has been held that simple qualities are all equally compatible with each other. But what is a simple quality? It seems clear that some qualities vary independently of some others, while some are more or less definitely interconnected. That all the qualities of a concrete object are analyzable into elementary 'forms,' each of which may vary independently of all the rest, no one in our day would seriously suggest. But the interdependence of qualities is (as Locke said) only slightly known to us. Much the same may be said as to relations. Some are clearly independent of some others, and some are clearly interdependent. That a change in one relation (or definable class of relations) in which a concrete object stands might take place without affecting *any* of its other relations, is an assumption which we have no motive for making.

The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Mathematics.

MORRIS R. COHEN.

The progress of mathematics in the nineteenth century seems to have established the fact that mathematics is both deductive (*contra* Mill) and productive of genuine knowledge (*contra* Schopenhauer). This suggests as a problem, fundamental to a philosophy of pure mathematics, the question: How can a small number of purely logical principles produce the extensive and indefinitely progressive body of mathematical knowledge? Three answers are considered, viz., empiricism, Kantianism, and the answer of Poincaré. (1) The empiricist solution involves difficulties as to the nature of the axioms of mathematics and their relation to the body of propositions that follow from them. (2) The Kantian answer, that mathematical judgments are synthetic *a priori*, based on the intuitions of time and space, can no longer be accepted. The rise of non-Euclidean geometry makes an entire reconstruction of his doctrine of axioms imperative, while the movement known as "the arithmetization of mathematics" renders untenable any view that holds mathematical demonstration to be peculiarly dependent on any intuition of time and space. (3) Poincaré's suggestion, that the fruitfulness of mathe-

mathematical reasoning is due to mathematical induction, is met by the contention that the principle of mathematical induction is simply a definition of finite integers. But even if it is, as Poincaré contends, a special axiom, reasoning from it is purely deductive, and different from inductive reasoning in physics.

The assumptions common to the above three views are: (1) that all deductive reasoning is syllogistic and can produce only a series of tautologies, and (2) that reasoning cannot extend our knowledge. The observation that both of these assumptions are false suggests the answer that logical implications are a species of fact and that demonstrative reasoning consists of a series of intellectual intuitions or apprehensions of such facts. This enables us to answer the fundamental problem of applied mathematics: Why does nature obey the results of mathematical deduction? The relations of formal implication which are the objects of mathematics are just as objective as the physical terms among which they hold. The laws of convergent series are just as much laws of nature as the laws of moving bodies, though differently apprehended. The view that numbers or mathematical relations are 'mental' is due (1) to the current confusion between logic and psychology and (2) to the ancient prejudice that only particular (spatial) terms can have real existence. The metaphysics, therefore, suggested by the recent Neo-Leibnizian movement in mathematics is a Platonic realism (as opposed to sensationalism and nominalism).

The Asymmetry of the Imagination. C. J. KEYSER.

Let x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n and u_1, u_2, \dots, u_n be two sets of real variables. The expression, $u_1x_1 + u_2x_2 + \dots + u_nx_n + 1$, is said to be symmetric with respect to the two sets of variables because the x 's and the u 's enter it on the same footing, it being indifferent so far as the value of the expression is concerned, owing to the law of commutation, whether a u comes before its x or *vice versa*. Denote the expression by E_n . The equation, $E_n = 0$, admits, in thought, of two spatial interpretations according as the u 's are held fast and the x 's are allowed to vary or the x 's are held fast and the u 's are allowed to vary. Denote these inter-

pretations-in-thought by $T_n(u)$ and $T_n(x)$ respectively. If n be less than 4, the equation, $E_n=0$, admits of two interpretations in imagination. Denote them by $I_n(u)$ and $I_n(x)$. $I_n(u)$ is the mental picture or image of the concept or thought $T_n(u)$, and $I_n(x)$ is similarly related to $T_n(x)$. Thus, if $n=2$, $T_n(u)$ and $I_n(u)$ are respectively the concept and the image of a range of points, whilst $T_n(x)$ and $I_n(x)$ are respectively the concept and the image of a (plane) pencil of lines. But if n be greater than 3, then, whilst the thought-interpretations $T_n(u)$ and $T_n(x)$ remain as such perfect and whole for all finite values of n , the imagination-interpretations do not so remain but fail more and more as n increases, thus exemplifying strikingly the unlimited transcendence of thought compared with imagination. This, however, is not the point. The point is that, for n greater than 3, $I_n(u)$ and $I_n(x)$, whilst both of them fail more and more as n increases, are not equally imperfect at any stage in the growth of n , the imperfection of $I_n(x)$ being far greater than that of $I_n(u)$. By virtue of this inequality, I say that the imagination is asymmetric whilst thought is not. Into the higher spaces imagination enters like a binocular being with unequally damaged eyes and in these spaces it moves as a bird with unequally failing wings, whilst thought is adequately visioned and winged for spaces of every order of dimensionality. By use of systems of equations like $E=0$ and yet higher symmetric equations, the thesis in question may be copiously illustrated and endlessly confirmed.

DISCUSSION: The Value for Philosophy of Mathematical Methods and Ideals.

JOHN GRIER HIBBEN.

Mathematics is a phase of logic. Given certain postulates, they in turn compel certain conclusions by necessary implication. (1) In what sense can a mathematical system serve to represent the world of our observation? It represents the world of experience in the following particulars: (a) through the function of compendious definition; (b) through systematic arrangement of material; (c) through economic manipulation by its various processes and devices; (d) through the possibility of extending

knowledge beyond the frontiers of observation. The last is the most important and significant aid which mathematics gives to our powers of observation. The value of its predictions will depend, however, upon the manner in which the mathematical system articulates with our real experience. The point of articulation is the original postulate. If truly stated, the processes depending upon it will reach results which are available for the prediction of relations subsequently verifiable. Thus, results in one system may be translated into forecasts of phenomena logically inevitable in the other, which are not necessarily foreseen, or even suspected.

(2) Can we deduce a system of philosophy, *geometrico more*, from a set of universally comprehensive postulates? The answer is, No. The limits of mathematics are the limits of its postulates. Whenever we can command by thought the elementary conditions at the basis of any system, we can employ the processes of the system with precision and certainty, as a method of interpretation and elaboration of knowledge. However, the elementary data of philosophy are too complex for any such expression in a few simple and fundamental postulates. On the other hand, the conquests of mathematics suggest an underlying unity of the sciences, and an underlying unity in the world of nature suggests the possibility, at least, that ultimately we may be able to discover a fundamental unity underlying a general *Weltanschauung*.

HAROLD C. BROWN.

The contributions of mathematics to philosophy are not greater than those of any other science. Its clearness and surety are offset by the obscurity of its connections with external reality and the consequent danger of being construed as a justification of a pernicious form of rationalism.

This danger really springs from a misconception of mathematics, for although its entities, whether arithmetical or geometrical, do not copy reality, they are symbols that function in getting us into working relations with reality and so must be sanctioned by it. The apparent exception of the non-Euclidean

geometries is not real, for all the facts expressed by Euclid can be expressed in terms of them and *vice versa*. Our choice of geometries (*cf.* H. Poincaré, *The Value of Science*) is based not upon truth but upon convenience.

The apparent novelties attained through mathematical deduction, or any deduction, are nothing but more serviceable forms of the same knowledge that is implicit in the original postulates.

Whether or no the form of a mathematical system is fruitful in philosophy, either for construction or for critical reconstruction, is an empirical question that can only be decided by experimentation. Historically, it does not seem to have been fruitful in either sense. Constructively, it is unsuitable because philosophy grows by the assimilation of new facts from outside the system, whereas a system of mathematics grows by the development of the implications within the system. As a form of critical reconstruction, the value of mathematical form depends on the number of fundamental concepts and the number of postulates necessary to summarize a philosophy and it is a question whether or no this number is small enough to present a convenient "set," *i. e.*, a collection of postulates such that any new one must either be derivable from those already accepted or introduce new concepts not found in them.

Ideals of Philosophical Thought. W. H. SHELDON.

The main differences in philosophic opinion are due to the presence in men's minds of either one of two ideals. One ideal demands that reality be subject to certain logical rules; the other that it is the here-and-now verifiable. These cannot be demonstrated, but are due to their owners' immediate insights. Each seems to exclude the other, yet one of them must be adopted by every philosopher; no third alternative is open. Hence on the great problems (rationalism *vs.* empiricism, realism *vs.* idealism) we find a deadlock upon which argument has no effect. The only solution would be to show that the ideals do not really conflict.

(This paper will be printed in full in an early number of the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.)

Idealism, Realism, and the Theory of Value. WILBUR M. URBAN.

The perennial conflict of idealism and realism is a matter of evaluation. This is shown as clearly by the unexpressed presuppositions of the recent attacks of realism, as by the more self-expressive attitude of recent idealism. Absolute idealism, by recognizing the fundamental problem of philosophy as *value*, has been able to express itself more vividly and clearly than heretofore. Let realism do the same.

The problem has no meaning except as one of evaluation. In working out the connections of science, *i. e.*, its internal values, the idealistic or realistic reading makes no difference. A Pearson can prosecute his researches in science as well as the most naïve realist. For the realist to say that '*he* takes science at its face value' is either meaningless or a contradiction. For either he takes the internal connections of science as they are given, which the idealist also does; or else he ascribes to them a value as the ground and presupposition of all other values, which is then no longer the face value of science. A realistic philosophy is an evaluation no less than an idealistic. For both, a judgment of existence is also a judgment of value. Both reckon, not with existence and truth, but with existence- and truth-*values*. The idealist protests against what he considers an over-valuation of existence-values. The realist contends for a certain valuation of them.

A realism, thus conscious of itself, is both possible and significant. Its chief point of attack would be the 'transcendental deduction' of values, including existence and truth, from a 'value-axiom.' For the realistically minded, value remains other than idea, and absolutism transmutes values into relations of identity. For such a realist existence is a value, but only in the sense that it is presupposed in all other values. The predicate of existence is not created by a 'judgment of conservation,' but is an interpretation of values already given. Truth also is a value, but only in the sense that it is implied in all constructions of value.

A realism such as this, strictly within the precincts of a philosophy that conceives value and reality as ultimately identical,

the paper championed, being for the most part concerned to show the consequences following from the two alternatives.

The Logical Value of the Genetic Explanation. H. H. BRITAN.

The problem proposed is one of evaluation. There are two methods by which the mind evaluates the elements of its experience, distinguished by the character of the standard of value employed. In the first case the standard is usually some sensuous unit,—finite and fixed; in the other it is an ideal,—abstract, problematic, the sum of certain specific attributes. The ideal or perfect explanation is of this latter type. It serves as the standard by which to measure the value of any given form of explanation, the only real explanation though never realized.

The forms of explanation may be classified under three heads, viz., the recognitory, the scientific, and the metaphysical types. The first is psychological rather than logical in character and consists of the mere recognition of familiar elements in a new or present experience. This form serves well the purposes of the practical life but has little logical significance. Much scientific explanation reduces to this type. The scientific ideal is an explanation through an explication of the causes involved in the production of the present phenomenon. Its logical weakness is that it has no definite starting point. The metaphysical explanation seeks to overcome this difficulty by carrying the sequence back to an all-comprehending, unitary First Cause.

The genetic explanation is obviously of the second type and seeks to show how by the uniform modes of action in nature some elemental factor or form has developed into the present form or attribute. As an explanation it is deficient, first, because it ignores all the metaphysical implications which are indissolubly bound up in the experience; second, because it fails to complete the series of changes which science admits and does not offer any principle of limitation according to which the datum can be chosen; third, because the 'natural laws' relied upon to explain the sequence of changes have no causal efficiency but are merely observed uniformities of change in nature. This being true, the whole causal explanation lies in the datum with which the genetic

explanation begins. But to accept in this way by assumption that which contains implicitly the fact to be explained is to commit the fallacy of *petitio principii*. The genetic explanation, which is properly a scientific theory, can be made to do service as a philosophical doctrine only by an illegitimate expansion of its jurisdiction and by doing violence to the fundamental principles of rational thought.

The Existential Proposition. WALTER T. MARVIN.

We should define the term 'existence' with the minimum of ontological assumption. This can be done if we can define it in terms only of formal logic. In other words, is the 'existential proposition' a term of formal logic? To answer this question, it is shown that some specific uses of the word existence in recent philosophy can be brought under a generic definition which employs only logical notions. The ontologies themselves are in no wise called in question.

(1) What is meant when pure mathematics is called a non-existential science? If Russell's account be taken, its propositions are all of the form, ' p implies q ,' where the truth of neither p nor q is known. This seems to indicate that an existential science would be one in which the propositions are of the form ' p implies q ' and where either p or q is true or asserted. Here there are two generic types. First, we can assert p and then q follows. Applied mathematics is of this type. Secondly, we can assert q and because p implies q we then assert p . Most non-mathematical existential sciences and most popular knowledge is of this type. In this type we have, or seem to have, a further but non-logical postulate; viz., as q becomes more and more extensive and complex there can be only one system p that can imply it. In short, it is assumed that there is but one true existential system, reality. But this is quite beside the issue. Thus an existential system is one that is of the form ' p implies q ' and all of whose propositions are asserted.

(2) Are the following meanings of the word 'to exist' species of this genus? Viz., (a) "to exist is to have a position in the time series, or in the spatio-temporal system"; (b) "to exist is

to be perceivable" (Pearson); (c) "only particulars can exist" (nominalism). Examination shows that each is such a species.

(3) But each of these three has the logical difficulty that they are in part ontological. (a) The first assumes that the real world is temporal or involves the circle "time exists and to exist is to be in time." (b) The second assumes that all the real can be perceived. (c) The last (asserting that only particulars exist) has to admit that some particulars do not exist and therefore must seek a further differentiating criterion (one of the foregoing). Moreover, it is ontological for it shuts out Platonic realism by definition.

Mind as an Observable Object. EDGAR A. SINGER, JR.

The "analogy argument" for the existence of other minds is unsatisfactory at every point. It starts with the assumption that I know my own mind before I know other minds. It then calls its procedure an inference; but no inference from a single case is possible. As a result of this inference it sets up the hypothesis of other minds, admitting the while that no experience can confirm or refute such an hypothesis. But an hypothesis that can neither be confirmed nor refuted is meaningless.

As an alternative one may assume that mind, my own as well as others, is not an eject inferred from observed behavior, but is a term used in describing that behavior itself. Without attempting to establish which aspect of behavior defines it as "conscious," the paper considered other objections that would strike at the very idea of identifying mind with an aspect of behavior.

The analogy argument springs most naturally from the ground of English sensualism. To one who follows this school, regarding himself as possessed of certain data of consciousness from which he builds up a world in space and time, including among its objects his own body and other bodies behaving like his own, it is impossible that if he accords to those other bodies minds like his own, these minds should not start out with data of consciousness as independent of his as his data are independent of theirs. But, if we deny the existence of such immediate data,

regarding sensualism as a philosophy that has stopped thinking before it has finished its task, we may admit that there is no state of our own mind so simple but that to recognize it *as* any thing implies that we class it with states of minds of other conscious beings, known to us as well as our own.

More primitive than sensualism is a certain instinctive procedure, explaining the complex by the simple. It is the instinct-to-add. Just as a hot body was once composed of a body *plus* heat-stuff (*e. g.*, caloric), a living body of a carcass *plus* life-stuff (*e. g.*, psyche), so a conscious living body has been regarded as an animal *plus* mind-stuff. In the history of each case the thing added became more and more vague until it disappeared and was replaced by the concept of behavior. A hot body is a body behaving in a certain way; a living body is a body whose behavior leads us to calculate that it will attain certain ends. Are we not prepared to find that mind, too, is not an eject, but a trait of behavior, as open to experimental determination as is the presence of heat or the possession of life?

The Nature of a Philosophical Platform. KARL SCHMIDT.

The generating problem of this paper is to examine the criteria by which the truth of a philosophical platform may be determined. It assumes that the tenets of a platform are of the nature of axioms in that they are fundamental propositions, not proved, and that they form the basis of the proofs of other propositions. The possible criteria of truth are divided into two classes: those of the first class attempt to determine the truth of a proposition *in isolation*; those of the second as part of a system, *i. e.*, in relation to others. The main object of this paper is to show that criteria of the first class are to be discarded.

In dealing with these criteria I distinguish between logical and psychological criteria. To do so effectively, I speak of a "realm of logical entities,"—characterized negatively by the property of being independent of a mind, positively by its generating problem,—and of a "realm of subject relations." This distinction amounts fundamentally to a distinction between two generating problems which are often confused in philosophical

discussion. The realm of subject relations belongs to the generating problem of psychology. The usual principle of self-evidence (inconceivability of the contradictory) lies in this realm. And it does not grow into a *logical* principle by extending the number of subjects even so as to include "all rational beings."

The least that can be expected of the criteria of the first class, whether they are psychological or logical, is that they determine which of two contradictory propositions is true. But this presupposes that one and only one of the two is true, and I deny that this can be asserted of any proposition in isolation. In all these cases the proposition and its contradictory may both be assumed as true. Which one we choose to call true depends upon considerations that lie outside the proposition itself, in particular, upon the generating problem of which the proposition is, in part at least, the solution. The criteria, psychological or logical, to determine the truth of a proposition in isolation, must fail, because the truth of a proposition in its isolation does not exist.

Some Problems Confronting the Intellectualist. CHARLES GRAY SHAW.

The introduction of the term *activus* and the contrast between the activistic and intellectualistic were due to Seneca and Quintilian. At the close of Scholasticism, as also at the conclusion of the Enlightenment, Duns Scotus and Kant respectively transposed intellect and will so as to subordinate the intellectual to the voluntaristic. The activism of to-day is likely to influence the intellectualist in framing the problem of reality, as also in formulating the doctrine of truth.

I. The intellectualistic view of reality as something conceptual was occasionally defied by certain stubborn facts, as may be observed in the philosophies of Plato, Leibniz, and Kant, while to-day this opposition is presented by what seems to be an independent order of activity. To meet this difficulty, the intellectualist must revise his notion of reality in such a way as to include activity as well as appearance, and thus meet the contention, *nihil est in intellectu quod non ante fuerit in sensu et in actu*.

2. The intellectualistic criterion of truth is rivalled by the activistic standard according to which not ideas only, but interests also, seem to afford a new basis of belief. This activistic, or eudæmonistic, view of truth is found in Vedanta, in Plato's erotic, in Aristotle's *eudæmonia*, in the *ἀγάπη* of St. John, and the *voluntas* of Scotus. Where such activistic eudæmonism was repulsed by Spinoza's rationalism, it was restored by Kant's moralism. Modern activists formulate the doctrine egoistically (Stirner), naturalistically (Bergson), spiritualistically (Eucken).

3. The explanation and criticism of activism shows: (1) that activism is a normal tendency in man, who is descended from an energistic world and endowed with an active mind; (2) that the activistic inclination seems to lead to a frank egoism, and it is by means of the active ego that the yoke of conceptualism may be cast off, though the activist has usually shunned this implication; (3) that where activism depends for truth upon the interest of the will, rather than the principles of the intellect, it is likely to lead to illusion and superstition; (4) that activism is the natural foe of culture and intellectual life, since it provides substitutes for knowledge and stupefies where it cannot satisfy the soul.

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(Members are requested to notify the Secretary of any correction to be made in the above list.)

REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

S. Thomas d'Aquin. Par A. D. SERTILLANGES. 2 vols. Paris, F. Alcan, 1910.—pp. vii, 334; 348.

In this latest contribution to the *Grands philosophes* series, the Professor of Philosophy at the Catholic Institute of Paris presents two imposing volumes on the philosophy of St. Thomas of Aquin, which are worthy of a place beside the *Socrate*, the *Platon*, and the *Aristote* contributed by the editor of the series, M. Clodius Piat. Father Sertillanges gives in his Introduction a brief account of the life and works of St. Thomas and traces the origin of the Thomistic philosophy. The contents of the remainder of the work he arranges as follows: Book I, "Being," including, Chapter I, "Metaphysics, the Science of Being," Chapter II, "Divisions of Being," Chapter III, "The Categories"; Book II, "The Sources of Being," including, Chapter I, "Prolegomena to the Proof of the Existence of God," Chapter II, "The Five Ways [quinque viae] by which the Existence of God is Proved," Chapter III, "The Nature of God"; Book III, "The Emanation of Being," including, Chapter I, "Creation," Chapter II, "Multiplicity and Distinction of Things"; Book IV, "Nature," including, Chapter I, "Principles of Nature" (matter, form, time, etc.), Chapter II, "Quantity and the Infinite," Chapter III, "Contingency"; Book V, "Life and Thought," including, Chapter I, "Life in General," Chapter II, "Consciousness," Chapter III, "Sense Knowledge," Chapter IV, "Intellectual Thought"; Book VI, "Volition and Action," including, Chapter I, "Appetite in General," Chapter II, "Will," Chapter III, "Free Will," Chapter IV, "Human Action." The volume ends with a short Chapter on "The Future of Thomism."

From this summary of the contents of the work, it is evident that the author intends to explain the Thomistic system in its entirety. The only portion of St. Thomas's philosophy to which he accords treatment which seems less than adequate is the ethical and political, which is expounded too summarily, we think, under the title "Human Action." It may be, however, that this very important part of the Thomistic system is reserved for a separate treatise.

Father Sertillanges is actuated by a twofold purpose in writing these volumes. He intends, in the first place, to enlighten the "convinced Thomists" on the true meaning of St. Thomas, for whom their admiration, he says, is too often a matter more of sentiment than of scholarly appreciation. In the second place, he hopes to conciliate in favor of Thomism

those who come without prepossession to the study of philosophy, but who are capable of appreciating a system in which unswerving common sense has summoned to its aid one of the most profound minds which the world has ever seen (Avant-propos, p. vii). The author's expectation, expressed, it must be said, with becoming modesty, will not, we think, be altogether disappointed. The two volumes before us should, indeed, be found helpful by the Thomist who is already convinced, as well as by the student who belongs to no school in particular, and who has not given his assent to the principles of scholastic philosophy. They contain no trace of the apologetic, much less of the polemical. In clear, calm, readable style, they expound the doctrines of St. Thomas with a comprehensiveness that stops short of the point where erudition begins to have the air of pedantry. The illustrations are always apt, and sometimes singularly happy, as when, for instance, the *Supplement* in which Henry of Gorcum completed the *Summa Theologica* is compared to those hurriedly built belfries which surmount the magnificent Gothic towers in some of the monuments of the Middle Ages (p. 4).

One of the accusations most frequently made against the Thomistic system of philosophy is its excessive intellectualism. The indictment is brought forward not only by the positivist and the empiricist whose point of view is not in any way determined by theological prepossessions, but also by the Catholic apologist of the immanentist school, who sees in the intellectualism of St. Thomas a menace to religion in the fullest sense of the word, leading as it does, in the estimation of these critics, to a purely formal conception of Catholic dogma and Catholic practice of piety. The author of the volumes before us frankly admits that St. Thomas was an intellectualist. He does not attempt to deny that the doctrine of universals, the theory of ideas, and in general the outlook on the problems of philosophy which we find in the *Summa Theologica* and the other works of Aquinas imply the supremacy of intellect over will. He sees clearly that dialectic is dominant in scholasticism of the Thomistic type, that there is there a tendency to exalt the categories of logic into adequate expressions of reality, and that there is in Thomism an inclination to regard the formal definitions of logic as more than schematic representations of the truth of things. Nevertheless, our author will not admit that the intellectualism of the Angelic Doctor is excessive. He will not even admit that it is exclusive. He says very truly, "In our definitions by means of the genus and difference we seek, it is true, to express the reality of things, and we believe that to some extent [*partiellement*] they are an expression of the real. But we are aware at the same time that the *quest* of definitions (*venare quod quid est*) is the picturesque scholastic

phrase) does not always result in complete success. Besides, the differences which enter into the definition, or better still, the fundamental difference from which the others proceed, is often inaccessible to us. *Multæ differentiæ rerum sunt nobis ignotæ*, St. Thomas is fond of repeating. He remarks over and over again that in our ignorance of the fundamental nature of things we are often obliged to class them and name them according to their accidental qualities, which amounts to admitting that in his estimation our schemas have only a relative value. Even if we *knew* the fundamental difference of a thing, we should not, perhaps, be able to *penetrate* it so as to arrive at the core, so to speak, of the reality of the thing. It would be absurd to believe that the idea of a 'rational animal' expresses all the reality of man. Our definition of man should be 'animal rationale bipes, etc.,' the 'etc.' standing for other differences besides the two mentioned, and indicating, therefore, that part of the nature of man which the definition does not and cannot express" (I, pp. 47, 48). This would seem to be the realization of Father Sertillanges's hope that he may at once enlighten the Thomists whose admiration for St. Thomas is more ardent than critical, and at the same time conciliate the anti-Thomists whose zeal sometimes exceeds their knowledge of what they are criticising. For, strange as it may seem, there are formalists who apparently believe that in the definition, 'rational animal,' they have expressed the whole nature of man, and against them should be directed the indignation of the voluntarists who rightly contend that in man there is something more than the power of syllogizing within the rigid forms of Barbara or Celarent. The intellectualism of St. Thomas is neither so narrow as the formalists represent it to be, nor so puerile as the immanentist, actionist, vitalist, or pragmatist believes it to be. His intellectualist schema of reality, like the artist's first carbon sketch of his subject, requires to be filled in with detail, expression, and, above all, color, which have primarily an emotional, volitional, or vital value, before the picture is fit to be exhibited as a representation of the real.

Another point of controversy which, like the foregoing, possesses interest for the student of contemporary philosophy is that of Plato's influence on St. Thomas. Since the publication of M. Picavet's *Equisse d'une histoire comparée des philosophies médiévales* in 1907, the idea has prevailed in some quarters that scholasticism owes more to Plato than to Aristotle, that, in fact, the scholastic point of view was determined more by the Neo-Platonic literature which came to the schoolmen from the Arabians than by the writings of Aristotle which came to them at first from the same source. Father Sertillanges, far from admitting the conclusions of M. Picavet, holds that St. Thomas is fundamentally and es-

entially an Aristotelian. At the same time, he shows that St. Thomas made use of Platonism. He alludes to the declared intention of the Angelic Doctor to write a commentary on the *Timæus*, as appears from a letter written by the Faculty of Arts at Paris to the Chapter of the Dominicans at Lyons in 1274. Besides, he shows how the influence of Plato reached St. Thomas through St. Augustine, Proclus, Boethius, the Arabians, and even Aristotle. He might also have mentioned the strong tradition of Platonism in the Christian schools, which was quite vigorous in Paris in the first decades of the thirteenth century, and which, we have good reason to believe, had not been entirely dislodged when St. Thomas began his career there as a teacher. Indeed, there must have been some even in his own order, who, in his day, as is evident from the remarks of his teacher Albert the Great, still clung to the earlier tradition and attacked the new Aristotelianism, "*tamquam bruta animalia blasphemantes in iis quæ ignorant*" (Albert, *In Ep. VIII B. Dionysii Areopag.*, n. 2.).

St. Thomas's relation to Aristotle is treated in detail in the various subdivisions of the work. There is, however, a general resumé of the subject in the introductory chapter. The author maintains that the relation of the greatest of the scholastics to the master whom all the later schoolmen acknowledged is not always understood. The reason, he thinks, is that many of the critics come under one or another of the two heads: (1) Those who know their Aristotle, but do not know their St. Thomas; (2) Those who know their St. Thomas but know their Aristotle only through him. The point seems to be well taken. There is room for a critical study of the question by one who has a thorough acquaintance with the text of both, and who is capable of appreciating the spirit of both. Father Sertillanges admits that St. Thomas sometimes "baptizes" the master, telling us what Aristotle ought to teach and not what he actually does teach; but, he adds, the fault, while it would be unpardonable in an historian, is excusable in the case of a disciple, who is not strictly bound by fidelity to facts but is free to interpret in the light of the spirit truths which the teacher saw in part or expressed in an imperfect manner.

The portion of Father Sertillanges's work which will be read with the greatest interest by the present-day student is that which treats of St. Thomas's theory of knowledge. The question of the day is a question of epistemology. For the time being, pragmatism, idealism, absolutism, and realism have thrown into the shade problems which a generation ago occupied the limelight of attention. The scholastics, as is well known, hold a realistic view of knowledge. They give a definition of truth which is now considered *naïf*, and adopt a solution of the problem of knowledge

which is often characterized as childish. Their claim that they have common sense on their side and that their solutions leave undisturbed the conclusions of science is hardly considered worth while. Their contention that the whole question hinges on psychology, and that their psychology rests on the facts of experience, is seldom taken seriously. In the pages before us this contention is made the point of departure of the author's exposition of St. Thomas's epistemology. It is shown that, if we are to understand the act of knowing, we must realize at the outset the truth that there is in the object something of the subject and in the subject something of the object; that, in fact, Fichte was right in contending for the formula, "No subject without object; no object without subject." In the act of knowing, subject and object are united, the act being a perfection of the subject. From this general view we pass to the more particular consideration that in the act of perception there is no psychological intermediary between object and subject. The "feeling of externality," or more properly, the "consciousness of other-than-self," is given immediately in the act of knowing. What the subject first becomes aware of is not a sensation of whiteness or a sensation of sweetness, but a white something-other-than-self, or a sweet something-other-than-self. Externality, or otherness, is not, therefore, a matter of interpretation, though it may become that, later, by reflection. The other-than-self is *given* originally in consciousness. Consequently, the external world, the thing-in-itself, or whatever one wishes to designate it, is not a product of the activity of the theoretical mind, as the absolutist and idealist contend; neither is it a product of the practical reason, as the voluntarist and the practicalist maintain; it is independent of the action of the mind, and scholastic realism returns to the position of *naïf* realism, holding that things are not thoughts, that there is an external world, and that existence is not "the being perceived." At the same time, scholastic realism is not so *naïf* as to believe in a perfect correspondence between things and thoughts. It leaves room for "interpretation," and acknowledges that while we do not make the external world, we modify it in thought, without, however, going so far as to transfigure it.

The claims which Father Sertillanges makes in his concluding chapter, "*L'avenir du thomisme*" (II, pp. 327 ff.) will be admitted in different degrees according to the extent of one's devotion to the cause of scholasticism. No one, however, will refuse to share his hope that we are "*à cette heure même à la veille d'un grand siècle de philosophie.*" If this expectation is realized, the volumes before us will be sure to be appreciated as the best introduction to the study of St. Thomas's philosophy in the original text.

WILLIAM TURNER.

The Metaphysics of Nature. By CARVETH READ. 2nd edition. London, Adam and Charles Black, 1908.—pp. xiii, 372.

This is a reprint of the original edition, published three years earlier, without change save for the addition of a preface and several appendices. In the appendices, which deal with "Truth," "Consciousness," "Being," and "The Soul and Freedom," the author undertakes to restate in more compact form some of his fundamental positions, and at the same time to answer sundry objections of his critics.

That a book on so forbidding a subject as the Nature of Being should so soon reach a second edition is in part no doubt a tribute to the excellent qualities which the book possesses—to the weight of the argument, and to the author's pleasing manner of presenting it—but also in part, I think, to the timeliness of the discussion. If there is one characteristic of recent philosophical discussions more striking than another it is the general reaction against idealism, the tendency to regard that philosophy as inevitably leading to subjectivism or nihilism, and as being fundamentally inconsistent with the recognized methods and the accredited results of science. From many sides we hear the cry that the great desideratum is a new view which shall do justice alike to the demands of philosophical reflection and to the results of scientific investigation. In so far as the book before us would satisfy this end, it makes common cause with our modern realisms and anti-intellectualisms, or at least anti-absolutisms, but our author pays more respect to the historic tradition than most reactionary philosophers of the present day. He speaks with more respect of Berkeley, and feels himself called upon to answer Berkeley's question as to "how it is possible to predicate anything of that which is other than consciousness."

Since the publication of the first edition Professor Read has discovered that others, notably Professors Strong and Paulsen, had independently reached a similar view, that indeed his view had been in the world long enough to have been christened pampsychism,—a misfortune, he adds, that could not have been foreseen and must be endured, though, we are assured, the view is not so bad as the abuses of its name might imply.

Having reviewed the first edition at some length in this journal (Vol. XV, p. 324), I shall take the liberty of referring to that review for a completer account of the plan and contents of the book, and shall here confine myself to a consideration of its central doctrine in the light of the further discussions contained in the appendices. Professor Read holds that all philosophers are driven to a belief, tacit or confessed, in the thing-in-itself, although many philosophers endeavor to blind themselves

to this fact. Now the thing-in-itself is necessarily transcendent, *i. e.*, it is not given in empirical reality, which is always phenomenal, *i. e.*, is in consciousness. Empirical reality, however, is not on the same level with consciousness. In the latter, we directly know ultimate reality, but not the whole of reality. Again, while our bodies and the external world constitute a system of phenomena constructed in consciousness, we are none the less bound to refer them to a reality other than the consciousness in which they appear, and to suppose that they somehow represent that inaccessible reality, 'manifest' that reality in the consciousness in which they appear. From this position it might seem that the issue would be either agnosticism or an attempt to construct an objective, or absolute idealism. But Professor Read does not follow either of these paths. He argues for the hypothesis that consciousness is universally present in nature, or, as he also puts it, that reality is universally conscious. In reaching this view one is after all, he holds, but trying to build up a conceptual system of consciousness which will connect and complete the fragmentary contents of introspection, and is following the analogy of science as it constructs its conceptual world from the perceptual data of experience. At the same time, although reality is by this hypothesis universally conscious, its being cannot be fully expressed by consciousness, and as to the remainder of its being it is transcendent. Now the difficulty at once presents itself as to how any meaning whatever can be given to being *in so far as it is transcendent*. Professor Read frankly acknowledges the difficulty but thinks that we can transfer to this shadowy concept certain characteristics which are universally found in consciousness, and also, though with less certainty, certain universal relations of empirical reality. When, however, he undertook to put positive meaning into the concept of transcendent being in this way, it had seemed to the present reviewer that he was unwarrantably carrying over terms which acquire their whole significance in consciousness and in phenomena, and that it was not shown that, when the conditions of consciousness and of phenomena were left behind, these borrowed terms had any meaning.¹ In an appendix, in discussing this question, Professor Read, if I have caught his meaning, explains that transcendent being is not so transcendent as many of his phrases seem to imply. Consciousness, we discover, is not something that accompanies or is correlated with the changes in transcendent being, but is rather, and simply, the activity of that being itself. Transcendent

¹ And if, and in so far as, the conditions of consciousness and of phenomena are supposed to hold of transcendent being, it would seem to lose its transcendent character.

being, however, is supposed to express its activity in two ways, directly in consciousness and indirectly by manifesting itself as phenomena. Consciousness, then, is supposed to be correlative with the activity of being that represents itself in consciousness as phenomena. I must confess that this is a tangle from which I can hardly extricate myself.

The view bears on the surface a resemblance to that of Spinoza, except that for Spinoza's substance we have substituted the more colorless word being, or transcendent being, and for the two attributes we have the two activities of transcendent being, consciousness and phenomena. Being acts and is thereby consciousness; being at the same time acts and thereby manifests itself to other consciousness, as well as to itself, as phenomena. Is not the meaning of being exhausted in this double activity? Why then call it transcendent? Is not the meaning of any reality exhausted in the account of its behavior, and do we add anything when we say that it is *that which* behaves in such and such ways? The answer would seem to turn on the obvious reflection that the consciousness which is mine, or which I am, contains as part of its own contents phenomena which I am constrained (in order to fill up the gaps in empirical reality) to refer to activities other than my own consciousness. Although from one point of view the world is my oyster, I cannot make it intelligible without supposing that there are other oyster-worlds inaccessible to me, but whose owners have the power of irrupting into mine by proxy, so to speak, and indicating their presence in the realm of being and their right to recognition, I, of course, also having the same privilege so far as they are concerned. One might suppose that the being which thus transcends my consciousness is simply other consciousness, and so indeed it is, but Professor Read thinks it must be more than this since "no one steadily regards consciousness as self-existent: attempts to do so end in verbal jugglery" (p. 366). This transcendent being is a name for the condition, ground, or cause, alike of the various consciousnesses and of their correlative manifestations as empirical reality to one another. But inasmuch as the category of cause gets its meaning for us, according to our author, wholly within empirical reality, being "exclusively a physical category," what right have we to carry it over to transcendent being? Confronted with this difficulty, Professor Read replies that "'something equivalent to causation' may perhaps be predicated of Being considered as a condition of phenomena. If we assume a transcendent condition of phenomena, we may regard it on the same grounds as the condition of changes in phenomena, and of what are called the 'forces of Nature.'" This seems to me no answer, but rather an evasion of the difficulty. Nor is much light thrown by the further comment which Professor Read adds by

way of illustration: "Similarly, phenomena in space imply, on the same hypothesis, transcendent conditions equivalent to space" (p. 368).

In fairness to Professor Read, he should be allowed to describe transcendent being in his own words, since any attempt to restate a view so puzzling is pretty sure to be misleading. Transcendent being, then, is a conscious thing "having also other characters" (p. 172). It is "some condition of a phenomenon which needs, for the actuality of that phenomenon, that the conditions of a perceptual consciousness should also be present" (p. 365). This notion is by itself necessarily empty; "it cannot be genuinely thought, because thought is a conscious process establishing relations between terms in consciousness." "Being is the condition of the world in abstraction from consciousness: consciousness is the condition of the World's being known or actualized, and of all Reality so far as knowable." Personal consciousness is "a function or activity, or (as it might be best to say) the actuality of that Being of which the body is the phenomenon. Again, as we have seen that consciousness is a continuum without beginning, and that it may be supposed to accompany in some degree all phenomena, I propose to attribute it to the Being of those phenomena. By that means we are able to think of the World as existing independently of us and before we existed, inasmuch as its consciousness can be thought of by its resemblance to our own. Consciousness is an everlasting continuum; it is an activity of something; it accompanies all phenomena, but cannot be dependent on them; so let us suppose that it is the activity of that which phenomena express. In the higher animals and ourselves we find phenomena organized in such a way that the accompanying consciousness, correlatively organized, supplies the condition necessary to actualize Being in a World of experience" (pp. 366-7).

These quotations will perhaps awaken in the reader the suspicion, which I think the work as a whole would confirm, that the concept of transcendent being is about as otiose as the Kantian thing-in-itself. It is invoked because consciousness cannot be regarded as self-existent. But since, by hypothesis, whatever other activities being may have, consciousness will always be one, Professor Read thinks that certain universal characteristics of consciousness may be ascribed to it. This would, however, not be true in so far as it is transcendent. As transcendent it remains a mere 'that which.' We might as well call it x and be done with it.

But waiving this difficulty, is it true that by attributing consciousness to the being of phenomena we are able to think of the world as existing independently of us and before we existed, because we are then able to think of its consciousness by its resemblance to our own? By what right

do we infer that the consciousness supposed to be correlative with the manifestation of being in inorganic matter resembles our own? Why may not all the characteristics of our consciousness be due to the higher organization of the activities of being which accompany the higher organization of the correlative phenomena? Moreover, 'I suspect that the hard-headed scientist will think that this view chimes as ill with his method and results as the much-criticised idealism. For note what it means. Phenomena constitute for our author a world in consciousness, and this world "develops at the same rate that consciousness develops in the world. If there was no consciousness above that of an amoeba there could be no phenomenal world above an amoeba's comprehension" (p. 364). And why stop with the amoeba? Before any organic life existed there would be no world above the comprehension of inorganic matter—whatever that might mean. But when the scientist talks of those remote times he is talking of *our* phenomenal world, and at the same time telling us what happened *then* in the phenomenal world.

I admit that the view has a certain fascination,—to trace consciousness back to *petites perceptions*, and even to more elementary and primitive activities, and to view it as evolving *pari passu* with the evolution of phenomena,—but I must confess that I find myself unable to carry it through. And although our author tells us that consciousness is not "on the same level" with phenomena, or empirical reality, I cannot but think that in this whole way of envisaging the development of consciousness he is putting them on the same level more than he is aware of. One source of difficulty seems to me to lie in the conception of consciousness as self-contained, so that to reach other consciousness one must do so *via* the transcendent. True, I cannot feel another's feelings, or be conscious of another's consciousness in the same way that I am of my own; but sometimes (although perhaps not in the present instance) I can think another's thoughts. Consciousness, in other words, in being itself is already beyond itself, the so-called transcendent is, here at least, the other pulse of the consciousness transcended. And this mutual implication of consciousness in other consciousness would seem to be assumed in the view of phenomena held by the plain or unsophisticated man (to whom Professor Read does not hesitate on occasion to appeal) and in so far to carry the weight of "social assent." For he surely takes it for granted that the phenomenal world is a common world; and if Professor Read should then tell him that phenomena are in consciousness, and that consciousness is individual, and that empirical reality is a common world only in the sense that it has for all a common ground in a condition of transcendent being, would he not properly reply that we make dates,

keep appointments, get together, not in this transcendent being, but in an identical phenomenal world; and that if this world is in consciousness, the various consciousnesses must somehow, in spite of their seeming exclusiveness, interpenetrate, or overlap, even if they do not unite in a higher and common consciousness? But I fear this would lead in the direction of the much-condemned idealism. I am not sure that, had Professor Read made more of the concept of "generic consciousness," an idea thrown out but not developed, a way might have been found out of some of the difficulties which the theory seems to present, although I think again that this would lead toward a more idealistic view.

A word about freedom. Professor Read's view admits of freedom in the Spinozistic sense but in no other. He tells us that we have more power over our character than over circumstances and yet, since by his own theory a man's body expresses his character, he can clearly have no more power over his character than he has over his body. Now it is one of Professor Read's fundamental tenets that consciousness, not having mass and energy, cannot effect changes in empirical reality. So when he tells us that the decision in any deliberate action depends upon a man's character and shows what kind of a man he is, he might quite as well have said that it depends upon his body and shows what kind of a body he has. The only answer that Professor Read can give is, that our desires, volitions, etc., are expressed in the body, but this only links the desires and volitions the more securely in the same chain of necessity that controls the body. I am, of course, well aware of the difficulties that beset any attempt to make freedom intelligible; and indeterminism is clearly not what the common man means by freedom. But I do not think that Professor Read is justified in assuming that the alternative is either indeterminism or the view which he presents. Here again I think the root difficulty lies in an inadequate conception of consciousness and of the ego, and in the sharp antithesis between consciousness and empirical reality, which cannot be consistently maintained. But this is a large question which we cannot discuss here.

Professor Read's book is in my judgment the most consistent and thorough-going presentation which has yet been made of the pampsychist view, and I am well aware that the difficulties which I find in the doctrine may in a considerable measure be due to my misunderstanding of it. "Profound, O Vaccha, is the doctrine, recondite, and not to be easily comprehended by the simple-minded."

CHARLES M. BAKEWELL.

A Beginner's History of Philosophy. By HERBERT ERNEST CUSHMAN. Vol. I: Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910.—pp. xx, 406.

The pedagogy of college teaching is notoriously still very far from making even a respectable showing. Philosophical teaching is perhaps no worse than the average; it may even be a little better. But the application to it of sound psychological principles, determined by the peculiar conditions to be found in American colleges, has certainly not received the general attention that it should, though there is evidence just now of an awakening of interest among philosophy teachers that ought to bring results. Philosophy has, as its devotees are well aware, special difficulties of its own as an academic subject. Its aloofness from the surface interests of the ordinary student; the fluidity and—from the student's standpoint—vagueness of its results, at least until a comprehensive survey has been made which requires a discouraging draft upon time and patience when it does not presuppose a compass of mind practically not attainable; the peculiar demands it makes upon the student's own active powers of thought, and the entire worthlessness of the memorizing habits which do such valiant service in college work, and which in other fields may bring a certain harvest, if not the most abundant one; the extreme difficulty of knowing just where some apparently simple and elementary distinction—elementary to us because we forget the toil and sweat through which we first came laboriously to realize its significance—will prove an entire bar to our being intelligible, and the consequent very strict limitation of the value of the lecture method—all these are things to vex the flesh of the conscientious teacher of philosophy, and make him wonder at times if he has not missed his calling. The strong temptation, under such conditions, is to throw off our responsibilities as elementary teachers, and take our stand as pillars of the scientific ideal, distributing our wisdom to all and sundry, and leaving our hearers to pick up such crumbs as they may find it possible to digest—an attitude usually going along with pronounced opinions about the poverty of the intellectual life among college students, and a rigorous appeal to natural selection.

In certain situations this last attitude is no doubt possible and advisable. But it will hardly answer for the typical American college of to-day. Whatever the theory of the college as an existing institution, its main function is certainly not to produce leaders of scientific thought; and if that is to be the great aim of our higher education, the only conclusion is that the college is bound to disappear. As a matter of fact, I think it should be possible to defend the place in a democracy of such an institu-

tion, in a way to justify the serious claims upon our attention of the student of only average ability and of non-technical interests. But in any case, as a condition and not a theory, such students have at present to be taken into account, and the question how the philosophy teacher in particular is to do this without reducing his subject matter to milk and water is a constant problem. I am inclined to think that the majority of our text books err on the side of a too academic quality. The writer has too much in view the fear of his colleagues, he is afraid of the epithets "unscientific" and "popularizer"; and in consequence he tends to move in the region of problems and considerations unnecessarily remote from a natural human interest. To strike the happy medium, and appeal intelligibly to such a fairly general interest without becoming innocuous, is relatively so rare as to deserve a special welcome.

Professor Cushman's new *Beginner's History of Philosophy*, of which the first volume is now ready, is such an attempt, and, as it seems to me, a rather exceptionally successful one. The book disclaims anything more than a pedagogical originality, and it is to the pedagogical side that I wish chiefly to call attention, although it may be said that its own claims are unnecessarily modest, and that it is much too solid a production not to be found very useful by others than the tyro in philosophy. Probably its most striking feature is the richness of the material of geography, history, and biography, which together take up not very far from half the volume. Whether such an emphasis will enlighten the student, or merely swamp him, will of course depend very much upon how it is handled; and Professor Cushman seems to me to have been remarkably successful. The intellectual tendencies stand out clearly from a concrete historical background, with the generalizations judiciously emphasized and backed by enough of detail to give them content. I hardly know where there is to be found a summary of ancient civilization on its intellectual side which will convey to the general reader so adequate a notion of its essentials in their continuity. The author believes, rightly, I think, that this historical, literary, and geographical material constitutes a highly important means for getting the attention of the average student. Not only does it represent the only previous knowledge which it is at all safe to presuppose, but it serves to make him feel that he is anchored to some sort of solid reality, and helps in a measure to avoid the sense of instability and arbitrariness that is pretty sure to come to him when first introduced to the subtleties of metaphysical reasoning. This in my own experience constitutes a large advantage which the history of philosophy has over a more logical and systematic presentation of the subject as an Introduction course; practically the same content can be brought in, but brought

in as a part of human history rather than as an excursus into the realms of pure reason, where to the beginner anything whatever is possible, and he is likely to emerge with little more than a sense of futility and bewilderment.

Another feature which deserves notice is the very careful summaries and tables by which the attempt is made to render precise and drive home the points of main importance, and overcome the tendency to rest content with vague general impressions. In theory I should rather prefer to utilize the situation to a somewhat greater extent to give the student a chance to do a little organizing for himself, without having it set out too plainly in cold type before him; but experience, I grant, would seem to show that Professor Cushman's method will save disappointment.

Of the actual statements of doctrine which constitute the final end of the book, it is perhaps enough to say that they are in the great majority of instances models of terse, clear, accurate exposition. I should be inclined to mention, in particular, the account of Aristotle, and that of the early Cosmologists, both difficult tasks, and both extremely well done. What on the whole has chiefly impressed me is the great skill shown in bringing out the interrelationships of doctrines—a feature well exemplified in the treatment of the Cosmologists. The careful reader will come away with a feeling for the evolution of ideas, and the dependence of the philosopher on his predecessors and contemporaries for his own intellectual atmosphere and the formulation of his problems, which he would find it hard to get elsewhere in so clear, interesting, and relatively untechnical a way.

Any criticisms I should have to make are so slight as to be negligible. I have not happened to notice any actual inaccuracies. Of course there are bound to be differences of opinion in places, but a text-book is probably not the place for exploiting these, and it is to be assumed that they are entirely familiar to the author. Not every one of course would agree with any possible interpretation of Plato; and whether the evidence justifies so sharp a contrast between Socrates and Protagoras, from either side, is still an open question perhaps. I am not quite convinced that Scepticism has all the significance for the Hellenic and Roman periods assigned to it, or that the interpretation of Scepticism is entirely fair to the possibility that a less negative and more modern and positivistic element is to be found in it. At any rate, there is a little risk in giving the student an impression that Scepticism is the only alternative to "metaphysical or absolutely complete knowledge." The need for condensation which increases toward the latter part of the book makes the expository sections sometimes less satisfying here than in the earlier portions; I suspect,

for example, that the account of Augustine's debt to Neo-Platonism—assuming the point to be in all respects well taken—would be found rather blind by most readers. But the general judgment upon the book will, I feel sure, be altogether favorable, not only as a brilliant example of good text-book writing, but as a solid piece of workmanship which is a credit to American scholarship.

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La morale du bonheur. Par CLODIUS PIAT. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1910.—pp. vii, 263.

Despite the fact that the happiness principle has played all conceivable rôles in philosophical systems, one does not open a book with the above title in the expectation of finding a defense of theological ethics. Yet such the present work is, made with much fairness against existing tendencies, which have, in the author's opinion, brought "our epoch of hypercriticism" to a condition of well-nigh universal doubt regarding moral values and distinctions. Nearly all the more important phases of modern philosophical speculation come in for a share of criticism—naturalism, leading directly to pessimism, evolutionism, talking of progress but unable to furnish evidence thereof, rationalism, which makes inconceivable an objective source of morality, science and empiricism, which break down established distinctions and divest life of its higher meaning. The disintegrating effects of these tendencies can be escaped only by a return to religion and the idea of God, at present banished from philosophy and education. This and the dependent idea of happiness are pivotal concepts in the author's attempt to provide ethics with a group of irrefragable principles.

The six chapters of the work treat in succession the value of life, moral obligation, the precepts, the motive for morality, and the sanctions, the last being devoted to an appreciation of results which issue from the present "moral crisis." A summary of the first two chapters may suffice for the point of view.

Happiness, and by this one does not mean pleasure, but rather a harmonious synthesis of pleasures, involving the development of the entire personality, gives to life whatever value it has; to this test all systems ultimately appeal. There is no question of our general agreement; doubt arises only when we approach the empirical facts, and find in nature and in human life the suffering which apparently gives the lie to the principle. 'Progress' should furnish a clue, but this occurs sporadically; the ancients surpass us in many things, and no central upward tendency can be observed in human life. Even if science could yield

happiness, man is a thinking being and ever unsatisfied. Metaphysics will illumine with no ray of light our dark existence except it abandon its determinism and too common belief in a blind cause and adopt the concept of a Creator, who "in all his works proceeds with wisdom," and implant in us the unquenchable thirst for happiness, who has appointed to every creature its place, its rôle, and its destiny in the work of creation." One always admires the boldness which does not hesitate to place such a conception in juxtaposition to a critique of determinism, and solve the contradiction by recourse to "a profound mystery."

Chapter II, on the whole the most important and interesting in the book, criticizes the empirical view of moral obligation, and here, as elsewhere, the influence of Kant is apparent. Fear is not the source of obligation, otherwise it would increase and not be replaced by the sentiment of obedience. But obligation implies more than obedience; it involves respect for the law. Nor is it a mere "vital tendency to action" (Guyau) or a species of attraction, a wish or desire directed to the good of society (Belot). Empiricism extends too greatly the range of the moral law, admitting within its scope even the lower orders of life by reducing obligation to a mere need for action. Moreover, duty either is or is not; there are no degrees of intensity. The moral law is absolute, and in the enjoyment we experience from obedience to the law is found that which gives to life its value, constituting it an object of realization through the moral law. Hence arises the necessity by which we are bound to respect the essential conditions of happiness.

Here, says the author, we have the answer to Kant's question regarding the origin of duty. "We have a right to happiness; otherwise our existence would be deprived of meaning. Consequently we have a right to life; it is equally true that we ought to respect the conditions without which life would be impossible, and even, to a certain extent, those which conduce to its harmonious development" (p. 58). But what gives meaning to life, and, therefore, to us the right to happiness, can only be found in a philosophy of ends and in recourse to a Free Will which created the world and governs it with a view to the realization of the best. "Admit that God exists; that this God has instituted a rational order of things, that he has done so because he is good and that happiness may be the outcome. All is then clear at a stroke; but nothing is explicable except in this way" (p. 64)—that is, by a supernatural imperative. If, on the other hand, we relegate God to the unknowable or identify the law with ourselves or find its source in the ideal essence of man (Janet), the transition is easy to the position of Guyau, for whom there is no natural imperative, or to that of Bayet and a social conception in which moral ideas play no part whatever.

Thus, by converting Kant's ideal of reason into an existent Being whose will thereby becomes the ultimate foundation of duty, by introducing the empirical principle of happiness, and by subordinating respect to the conditions conducive to happiness, we have the chief elements in Kant's system subservient to the author's theological view. Doubtless these elements are capable of many permutations and combinations, but in the present case the author avoids Kant's formalistic conception of duty by a sheer assumption that the obligation imposed on us to realize the idea of the best has inevitably the wished for result, happiness.

Now since happiness gives value to life, the principle is deserving of respect wherever it may be found in operation. From this point of view precepts are discussed in the third chapter. The life, health, and honor of the individual should be respected, and since society must exist, political right with attendant precepts follows, and law, which is "only the official expression of what is best for all." But higher than all is divine right, the right of that God "who created moral values" and who requires of us respect for these values. In the following discussion the thesis that it is the matter and not the form of obligation which changes is urged against those who assert the complete relativity and infinite variability of moral ideas. At the close of the chapter, a section on "The Place of Science in Morality" acknowledges the formative power of inductive science in the moral life, as well as the practical benefits it has conferred, though its exclusive hegemony at the present day is deprecated, in view of its tendency to positivism and an ill-proportioned emphasis of the factual side of existence. The greater portion of the chapter on the "Motive of Morality" is devoted to Kant, who has revealed to us the absolute value of the moral law. But duty is not the whole of the moral life. Respect is, after all, a sentiment and much exaggerated in his system. The categorical imperative is too narrow, for there is the large domain of the permitted, and here, and in the realm of duty also, the love of the good should dominate. In excluding sympathy and in suppressing sensibility Kant banishes Christianity from the sphere of duty.

The theological trend of the discussion becomes more apparent in the remaining chapters. The idea of a sanction is a corollary of the conception of justice; the natural sanction acquires, however, its complete justification only as it is coupled with the thought of a Divine Providence. Modern conceptions combine with traditional ideas in the author's notion of punishment. Personality must be respected even in the criminal, and society, while providing for its own existence, must inflict the least possible harm upon the individual. But the administration of justice, begun here below is finished beyond the tomb, and the dogma of a hell

is justifiable, for the necessity of a punishment which has no termination will always remain a humanly acceptable conception. To conclude, the task of the Christian, his sole business in life, is to save his own soul.

M. Piat's book is obviously dependent, as the author states in his preface, upon its predecessors, *Insuffisance des philosophies de l'intuition* and *De la croyance en Dieu*, particularly the latter, for in the absence of other support than is furnished by the work under consideration its central conception, the idea of God, appears somewhat dogmatically stated. The dominant influences seem to be Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* and the speculative system of the Church, to which may be added an evident desire to incorporate in the resulting view whatever empirical elements may appropriately find lodgment there. But if the book leans here and there upon the conceptions and definitions of the Church, which in turn it supports, it teaches dogma without being itself dogmatic in tone. It is clear in statement, and the range of its citation and argument leave no doubt that the adverse currents of modern thought, criticized by the author, have been given whatever evaluation may be possible in the absence of that total reconstruction of thought which alone can establish in their proper perspective the formulas of the past.

But it is difficult to estimate properly a work whose centralizing conceptions are derived in large part from a system between which and the leading tendencies of philosophical speculation to-day such profound differences exist that slight basis is afforded for comparison or criticism. Doubtless there is much in the past that will receive ultimate justification, given time and a better knowledge of the present. But to the past we cannot return. All that M. Piat says either in criticism of empirical tendencies or in witness of the dynamic value of certain dogmas may be true, but only by entering completely into the spirit of present empiricism, and by interpreting it in its relation to the past, shall we be able to mend its faults or reinstate, if need be, the hitherto regnant conceptions which M. Piat defends.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy. And Other Essays in Contemporary Thought. By JOHN DEWEY. New York, Henry Holt & Company, 1910. —pp. vii, 309.

In this volume Professor Dewey has brought together a number of essays and addresses belonging to recent years. All of the papers except one, "A Short Catechism Concerning Truth," have been previously published, although in some of them certain minor changes have been made. The hitherto unpublished paper, which has the form of a dialogue between a teacher and pupil, is a defense of pragmatism against certain popular criticisms and misunderstandings. The other essays have the following titles: "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy"; "Nature and Good: A Conversation"; "Intelligence and Morals"; "The Experimental Theory of Morals"; "The Intellectualist Criterion for Truth"; "Beliefs and Existences"; "Experience and Objective Idealism"; "The Postulates of Immediate Empiricism"; "Consciousness and Experience"; "The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge."

The fundamental idea underlying all of these essays is the necessity of a new formulation of philosophical problems and a radical transformation of philosophical ideas in the light of the new methods and problems that are now dominant in other fields of human inquiry. "Classic philosophies have to be revised because they must be squared up with the many social and intellectual tendencies that have revealed themselves since those philosophies matured. The conquest of the sciences by the experimental method of inquiry; the injection of evolutionary ideas into the study of life and society; the application of the historic method to religions and morals as well as to institutions; the creation of the sciences of 'origins' and of the cultural development of mankind—how can such intellectual changes occur and leave philosophy what it was and where it was? Nor can philosophy remain an indifferent spectator of the rise of what may be termed the new individualism in art and letters, with its naturalistic method applied in a religious, almost mystic spirit to what is primitive, obscure, varied, inchoate and growing in nature and human character" (p. v). The full realization of the changed intellectual conditions, Professor Dewey believes, will lead to the abandonment on the part of philosophy of the old metaphysical and epistemological problems,—the inquiries regarding the nature of the universe as a whole or of the universal conditions of experience,—and to the acceptance of the less pretentious, but more responsible, task of discovering the meaning of concrete situations as they arise in social and political life, and the practical methods of transforming them. "Philosophy forswears inquiry after absolute origins and absolute finalities in order to explore specific values and the specific conditions that generate them" (p. 13). "But if insight into specific conditions of value and into specific consequences of ideas is pos-

sible, philosophy must in time become a method of locating and interpreting the more serious of the conflicts that occur in life, and a method of projecting ways for dealing with them: a method of moral and political diagnosis and prognosis" (p. 17).

It is this final dismissal of all the general problems, about the world and man's relation to it in order that philosophy may afford guidance and direction in the practical affairs of life, that is the most striking feature of Professor Dewey's program. Several of the papers, indeed, set forth in detail and with much vigor and persuasiveness the pragmatic view of truth; but pragmatism itself seems to be subordinate and in a sense incidental to the tremendous reconstruction that is taking place or has taken place. At any rate, the pragmatic theory of knowledge has already received so much attention that it seems unnecessary to attempt to summarize Professor Dewey's arguments, or to bring up once more the difficulties which so many have found in that theory. Instead of doing so, I should like to raise the question whether the injunction against metaphysics and epistemology is really binding. Have the new methods of inquiry and changed intellectual conditions really rendered it superfluous to search for some consistent conception of reality as a whole?

There can be no question that the progress and vitality of philosophy depend upon its ability to substitute genuine problems for those that have become merely abstract and formal. Nor can anyone doubt that at the present day important reconstructions of traditional philosophical conceptions are taking place and that the movement must go on. The question at issue is only whether it is necessary to abandon as unmeaning the ultimate problems that have always occupied philosophy since its first beginnings, or whether it can be shown that the old formulas are capable of transformation without any such radical breach of continuity. Genuine problems, of course, grow out of life and are not manufactured in the schools. But human life is reflective as well as practical—in fact, if it were merely practical it could have no problems at all. Professor Dewey holds that all genuine problems refer to particular situations in experience because only the analysis of such situations can have any bearing on practice. But in what sense are we to understand the over-worked term 'practice'? Some pragmatists, at least, include under it logical activity, so that the 'practical consequences' necessary to make a problem 'genuine' might well be logical in character. But leaving out of account this ambiguity in the use of the word 'practical' (which really seems to be essential to pragmatism as a distinct theory), is it anything more than dogmatism to assert that theories about the world and the general nature of experience are futile and unmeaning? "Were it a thousand times dialectically demonstrated that life as a whole is regulated by a transcendent principle to a final inclusive goal, none the less truth and error, health and disease, good and evil, hope and fear in the concrete, would remain just what and where they are now" (p. 17). I am not certain what Professor Dewey means by a "transcendent" principle; but I cannot admit that metaphysical theories do not affect our concrete experiences. I should say that if such a demonstration were made,

truth and error and all the rest would not remain what they are now, or rather that they would not be what they are to one who held to a different theory of the course of events.

It would not be difficult to show that a metaphysics is implied in Professor Dewey's own doctrines, and that his failure to develop this side of his theory has been one of the chief sources of the misunderstandings of which he complains. Some theory of the conditions and general nature of experience and of the origin and function of consciousness is involved, for example, in his claim that his own view is 'naturalistic' as opposed to all forms of transcendentalism. In all references to the relation of the individual to the objective situation and to other individuals in society, a theory of knowledge and of reality is necessary in order to render the account completely intelligible: the specific problem is part of a larger problem which is always more or less explicitly involved in its formulation. We all are trying in our own way to be naturalistic in our thinking,—to get rid of ultimate dualisms and transcendent principles and to find explanations within experience itself. This, however, does not mean the abandonment of the old problems, but their restatement. The progress of philosophy requires that the meaning of specific problems be revised and modified in the light of general theories of experience, just as the latter are transformed and reconstructed through the analysis of particular situations.

It would not be right to close this review, in which I have emphasized points of difference, without speaking of the stimulating quality of these essays, which is perhaps the best evidence that they are, what their author intended them to be, a 'contribution to the revision of our stock notions.' Especially interesting are the historical summaries and interpretations which many of the papers contain. Even when one cannot admit that the generalizations do full justice to the historical facts, one never fails to find the treatment suggestive and instructive.

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Theology and Human Problems. A Comparative Study of Absolute Idealism and Pragmatism as Interpreters of Religion. By EUGENE WILLIAM LYMAN. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910.—pp. ix, 232.

In this volume Dr. Lyman has published the Nathaniel William Taylor lectures which he delivered before the Divinity School of Yale University in December, 1909. Both style and thought are characterized by clearness and precision. Definiteness, however, is often secured by way of contrasts rather than by accurate characterization. As a result, certain doctrines hardly receive their just due, and the criticisms, therefore, fail to carry conviction.

Two methods, the author points out in the preface, are open to workers in the field of theology: the 'cloistral,' which aims to defend religion, seeking support for existing religious truth in philosophy, in tradition, or in the church; and the 'clinical,' which strives to develop religion, to deepen the significance

of religious truth, and to stimulate a healthier and stronger spiritual life. Since the former often attempts to make practical use of the results gained, and the latter often withdraws from practical activity to derive inspiration from the religious life of the past, their fundamental difference tends to be overlooked and the fact is obscured that only in the latter case is serviceableness to life the principle for the discovery of truth. The author aims to set these methods in sharp contrast, to determine their relative merits, and then to apply the one adopted to certain great themes of religion (p. ix). Unfortunately, his distinctions are not always clear or consistent. We are told, for example, that ethical monotheism is an "independent metaphysical point of view" (p. 186) and yet this is described somewhat later as "concerned not so much with the 'interpretation' of evil as with its elimination" (p. 193). Similarly it is said that "the function of theology, when it is needed, is to work out reflective interpretations of religion, which shall strengthen and guide the life of faith, and if possible enlarge the boundaries of truth" (p. 90), while yet it is maintained that the limit of its endeavors should be to introduce men "to the great laboratories of spirit, make them familiar with the resources there, place in their hands the apparatus devised by the original souls of the past, and help them to undertake their own experiments with as much wisdom and skill as possible" (p. 60). At this point one might raise the question whether the above two methods really can or ought to be separated. Is not religion developed as well as defended when it is brought into vital relation to other aspects of truth? On the other hand, can the religious life be successfully quickened, or can it receive a healthy growth, apart from an understanding of its true nature and of its wider and deeper implications? The interpretation of experience and the search for meanings are most decidedly practical activities, and are most potent factors in increasing the real significance of life, yet, since they aim at truth rather than at edification, they cannot be prejudiced by any shortsighted desire to inspire, but must seek to attain to a view of the eternal.

In Chapter I, "Highways of Thought," Dr. Lyman discusses the doctrines of absolute idealism as represented by Professor Royce, of critical philosophy as entertained by the Ritschlians, and of pragmatism, with a view of determining in how far these avenues of thought are serviceable to theology; in the three succeeding chapters, more specific problems are dealt with: how we may have an experience of the eternal, how we may find reinforcement to the belief in the reality of a moral purpose in the world, and how we are to deal with the problem of moral evil. The objections to absolute idealism are based throughout on the thesis that it conceives the Absolute as timeless and static, and cannot, therefore, consistently hold that God is immanent in history or a vital factor in human progress, that there is one increasing purpose in the world, or that moral evil and moral victory are genuinely real. The criticisms urged against such an interpretation of reality are not new, but they are presented in a clear and an original manner. It is doubtful, however, whether Dr. Lyman has fairly interpreted Professor Royce, and even

if so, whether those systems of idealism should not also have been discussed which insist that the question of time cannot be settled on the basis of 'either-or,' but that there is a unity pervading and animating the world order as we know it, an ideal which *qua* ideal does not develop, yet does develop in the real through which it manifests itself. Such a view allows full value to the immanence of God and yet does not render meaningless the conception of transcendence. When the author complains that in the view of absolute idealism God cannot be "an actor whose deeds count *in addition to* our deeds" (p. 20), he seems dangerously near the conception of God as simply one more and therefore as finite,—a conception which is as barren for philosophy as it is unsatisfactory to the religious consciousness. The ultimate source of the difficulty of absolute idealism is found to be its intellectualistic method, for "in gaining the deepest truths of the universe one cannot rely on the intellect alone, but must have recourse to moral and religious experience as well, and in fact must allow this type of experience to play the decisive role" (p. 23). Ritschlianism is to be commended for recognizing this fact, yet it leaves such a dualism between the realms of knowledge and of faith that it cannot support the testimony of religious consciousness by appeals to science or even to history, for even this is a theoretical discipline concerned with causal relationships and can, therefore, neither deny nor affirm the deliverances of practical reason. It is to pragmatism, then, that the author would have us turn as the 'highway' for theology, the method for solving our fundamental human problems. Pragmatism has all of the advantages of the idealistic and Ritschlian doctrines while yet avoiding their difficulties. It accepts without reserve the reality of time and thus makes possible the belief in the immanence of God in history, as well as a genuinely historical point of view; it maintains that moral and religious attitudes are genuine factors in the process of obtaining objective knowledge, and at the same time does away with the dualism which prevents giving full value to the knowledge gained by faith, showing, indeed, that faith enters into all knowledge. The author makes no attempt, however, to vindicate pragmatism as a theory of knowledge nor does he take into account its antimetaphysical tendency—curiously enough, since he recognizes that Ritschlianism, "in ruling out metaphysics, . . . has curtailed the power of theology to serve religion" (p. 90).

In discussing the apparent aimlessness of the world, in his chapter entitled "One Increasing Purpose," Dr. Lyman rightly points out the inadequacy of the mechanical conception of law in our interpretation of concrete reality, and opposes to it the 'evolutionary conception' (p. 125), 'the principle of continuity' which makes no reference whatever to an equivalence of quantity that persists through change, and which therefore "enables us to recognize and deal with that which is new" (p. 127). The author does not seem, however, to rise to a genuinely teleological point of view, but describes a tendency which "consists of an inward spontaneous pressure along the line in which the process is moving, which actively resists the environment so far as it stands in the way" (p. 129). Moreover, while it is true that the 'principle

of continuity' rationalizes far wider ranges of experience than that of mechanism, it cannot be said that "its superior rationality is evident" (p. 130), or that "we are passing from a mechanical to an evolutionary conception of law" (p. 125), if we mean by this that the mechanical categories are not perfectly valid in their sphere and must be relegated to the museum of scientific antiquities. In concluding the chapter, the author states that its purpose has been merely to remove obstacles from the way of faith and to defend its rights, inasmuch as the ultimate solution of the problem "in the last analysis belongs now as ever to religious faith" (p. 161). Does not this in itself suggest serious limitations in method and in point of view? It is regrettable that Dr. Lyman had summarily ruled absolute idealism out of court in this chapter, on the plea that it regards the universe as timeless and therefore as static, for light might have been thrown on his problem by the consideration of the philosophy of the one who taught that the world is the expression and the progressive realization of absolute reason, and that the rationality and goodness of reality are presuppositions of thought which receive their verification in the progress and in the conclusions of philosophical speculation.

Whatever the defects of the book may be from a philosophical point of view, its discussions are throughout very suggestive and are characterized by sincerity and moral earnestness.

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Les sentiments esthétiques. Par CHARLES LALO. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1910. —pp. 278.

The book opens with a statement of its problem: to make objective and explicit, æsthetic phenomena and laws. Æsthetics is the last science to become exact, because it depends on all the others—the physics of color and sound, the physiology of emotional states, the psychology of appreciation and of creation, as well as the history of art-forms, and the special forces that have given them opportunity to exist.

Since emotion is usually cited as the main characteristic of the art-attitude, we must analyze the emotional processes and here two theories present themselves: the James-Lange, or physiological explanation, and the psychological explanation which denies the importance of organic reactions. The author discusses these theories and finds the former clearer and more scientific. But the fact on which both agree, namely, that feeling and emotion radiate through all consciousness and are not separate faculties, makes emotion useless as a scientific explanation. Since emotion is the affective side of a tendency which it accompanies, it must necessarily be confused; it can have no clear limits, and it can give no valid solution of the problem. This misconception of the value of emotion as an explanatory term, and the attempt to put into a scientific formula what is by its nature too diffuse and unanalyzable, makes the substance of his criticism of various theories in the new æsthetic '*sentimentalisme*.' He first subjects to this critique the '*Einfühlung*'

theory of which Lipps and Volkelt are the main exponents. The substance of this theory is the objectification of æsthetic emotion, in that we objectify, or feel ourselves into, the beautiful object, and wholly identify ourselves with it. As it were, we soar with the arch, bend with the sculptured athlete, and live the musical rhythm. M. Lalo brings three objections against this theory. First, the æsthetic objection, that in proportion as one is a cultured lover of beauty he does *not* move, dance, and laugh before an exciting art stimulus, but is less rather than more unconsciously one with it. Moreover, he asks how it is possible to 'feel into' the opposed characters of a drama, for men to identify themselves with female figures in art, and *vice versa*, and he raises the further difficulty that this sympathetic emotion is felt as keenly before real objects that are not beautiful as before those that are, and hence it cannot be the distinguishing mark of the æsthetic state. When the emotionalists protest that this objectified union of self with the object of beauty is above differences of structure such as those of sex, and is a new individuality, this brings a psychological objection. What is this self, this 'I know not what,' which exists ungoverned by the usual mental laws? The third objection is the philosophical query, whether such a standpoint, a self which is not myself, does not necessitate mysticism and resign itself unreservedly to an unanalyzable experience.

That this trend toward mysticism is inevitable from such a starting point he goes on to show by the example of the vitalistic school in France, represented mainly by Guyau and Seailles. For them, "Art is concentrated life." Wherever there is life there is beauty; the genius is the normal man, and he is universal. Here again the vitalistic theorist refuses to analyze his concept. He uses as a term of explanation 'life,' which is the most difficult of all terms to define, and which includes so much that he can read any meaning he chooses into it. Moreover, to find beauty universal and coincident with life, is once again to blur the problem. If beauty is everything, we have destroyed but not solved the problem. This standpoint is æsthetic mysticism *par excellence*, in which the author sees the influence of Bergson. The practical result of such a theory is, curiously enough, to destroy the very art which it exalts. Beauty becomes an ineffable experience to be stimulated by every living thing. Particular art forms, with their material and technical expression, are minimized (compare Tolstoi's ruthless contempt for any complicated art object) and we find ourselves excluding art from beauty and being swayed by vital experiences, among which we refuse to discriminate!

With this critique M. Lalo ends the first part of the book and begins the constructive portion. He finds three large divisions of emotions in the æsthetic consciousness. Some are effects, some accompaniments, and some causes of the æsthetic attitude. Admiration, the feeling of superiority founded on value; sympathy, the contagion of the author's suggestion and that of the appreciation of the rest of the audience; and vitality, the increase of personal energy, he finds are all effects and not causes (as is so often maintained) of the æsthetic attitude. They are not in any sense peculiar to it, and to give them

as causes is to misunderstand their sequence. Individual associations, affective sympathy, and a feeling that a general conception of life is embodied in the stimulating object, are always accompaniments of the æsthetic attitude, but these again are not causes. They are disproportionate and arbitrary, and also not peculiar to the appreciation of beauty. They are 'anæsthetic.' The æsthetic feelings proper can scarcely be called feelings, but are rather ways of thinking and habitual processes. They are feelings of æsthetic play, of technical superiority, and of harmony. The author emphasizes the fact that play is a luxury, a discipline, and an illusion; and the same is true of art. It can only flourish where there is a margin of time amidst the struggle for life, a luxurious surplus. It lays down its own rules, as does play, and is concerned with the appearance, and not with the practical reality. Moreover, any æsthetic theory which ignores the facts of technique, the art development, the schools, the fashions of painting and composing by which we judge a Giotto or a Gregorius, destroys its own value. Harmony also is essential to æsthetic enjoyment and includes the harmony of the technique with the idea and with itself.

The author recognizes that our consciousness is a unity, but denies that moral and æsthetic ideals coincide. Both have disciplines of their own, but art, based as it is on luxury, bound up in its own technique, dealing with appearances, a refuge from practical reality, has its own conscience, and it is needless confusion to affirm that goodness and beauty are identical. Art cannot run too much counter to morals, for our personalities are unitary; and art objects cannot be as universal as moral acts, for life cannot have such a balance of luxury. Art has its own domain, and to more accurately define it is the task of future æsthetics.

M. Lalo has stated his subject well, and kept to his main problem with admirable method. The critical portion is very forcefully put, and the great value of the latter portion lies in emphasizing the need for a scientific æsthetics, based upon a careful study of actual beauty, and in pointing out the weakness of theorists who destroy their own field by merging it with ethics, who are not willing to analyze critically the objects of which they speak, and who therefore confuse rather than elucidate their subject.

There is a slight difficulty to English readers in the fact that the French *sentiment* and *sentimentalisme* have no fixed equivalents in English. Feeling and emotion, already somewhat loosely used in English, may both be included under the term *sentiment*, and an occasional ambiguity results. With this exception, the book is lucidly clear, and its object and method admirable.

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Eracito, testimonianze e frammenti. Di EMILIO BODRERO. Torino, Fratelli Bocca, 1910.—pp. xxxii, 212.

The scholastic literature of Italy is admittedly deficient in works on the early Greek philosophers (la bibliografia italiana della filosofia chiamata

presocratica è . . . scarsa, . . . p. 80), and the little book before us is an attempt to supply partially this want. Accordingly it is not meant for the interlingual specialist or the historian of Greek philosophy *von Fach*. The latter finds after all, and will continue to find for some time to come, the best part of his material in German. Our author has a humbler aim, if we judge from the heights of the German specialist, namely, to present the work of Heraclitus—as much as is extant of and about Heraclitus—in Italian garb for Italian readers. But as the heights of the German specialist are not the only heights from which to contemplate ancient philosophy, even that part of it which has come down in fragments; as, in fact, some would not think them heights at all, our author does not regard his aim or his task as humble in any sense.

He has very positive tendencies in philosophy, or rather very positive views on the function of philosophy, which color whatever philological or historical work he may do. Accordingly we have a rather lengthy dedicatory epistle to Doctor Erminio Troilo, teacher of theoretical philosophy in the University of Rome, breathing the spirit of the *Schöngeist*, and deploring the impersonal and non-spiritual, the purely critical and analytical, character of modern philosophy (p. v). He is of the opinion that the *ego* must subject the *non-ego*, and not the contrary. He maintains without blushing (*e non ne arrossisco*) that philosophy must remain in a certain sense poetry, and reveal and unfold every virtue, instead of being limited to method and being forced to pick up the crumbs from the table of the sciences (pp. vi f.). He even goes so far as to say that he is one of those who prefers an agreeable lie to a sad truth, and if removing the veil which conceals all the pain of nothing (*del nulla*), should cost him the loss of the most insignificant of his illusions, he would choose to remain as he is with his ignorance, but at the same time with all the purity of his fallacious ideal, which at least he, and he alone, has constructed for himself (p. xxi).

He imagines he sees in Heraclitus a kindred spirit, and nothing daunted by the possible charge of being a "lodator del tempo passato," he does not hesitate to seek repose in the phantasies, so profound and so incomparably beautiful, of the progenitors of philosophy, in order through them to try to increase as well as he can whatever value his own personality may represent (p. xxii).

There follows then a bibliography of Heraclitus complete to 1908, which is really a valuable thing for the student. Then comes a long introduction of eighty-two pages entitled "The Presocratic Philosophy and Heraclitus of Ephesus," in which all sorts of questions about the development of Greek philosophy before Socrates and its relation to Oriental thought are discussed, and various phases of Heraclitus's personality and teaching are touched upon. The only comment the present reviewer wishes in all humility to make on the introduction is that in the matter of conciseness, directness, definiteness, and precision it leaves a great deal to be desired. Such diffuse, warm, and romantic introductions are suitable to a great many minds; but not, I think, to him who wishes to get away with a clear and definite idea succinctly expressed. But

perhaps this is exactly the critical and impersonally and unfeelingly analytical character of modern philosophy which the author deplures so much.

The rest of the book is devoted to the Italian translation of Heraclitean texts. This is divided into four parts. The first three are taken from Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, and consist of (1) Testimonies on the life and teaching of Heraclitus; (2) Fragments of Heraclitus Concerning Nature; (3) Imitations, containing for the most part a quotation from Pseudo-Hippocrates, *De victu*. The fourth part is based on Bywater, *Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiæ*, Appendix V, and contains the Pseudo-Heraclitean epistles. The text of the fragments is that of Diels and the translation for the most part is also based upon Diels. The author even takes over Diels's notes and translates them. The reader of Diels has therefore nothing to learn from Bodrero. In fact, there are instances where Bodrero, in taking liberties with Diels's note and truncating it, has left it meaningless. Thus Fragment 45 reads in Diels's text, ψυχῇ πείρατα ὧν οὐκ ἂν ἐξέυροιο. . . . In his note he says "πείραταιον BF: πειρατέον P. πείρατα durch Tertullians (*de an.* 2) Übersetzung terminos gegeben; ὧν bessert' ich: . . ." This is all very clear. The MSS. have πειραταιον or πειρατέον, which do not make sense. Diels finds the word *terminos* in Tertullian, which suggests to him πείρατα as the reading (so already Bywater), and he explains πειραταιον of BF as representing an original πείρατα ὧν. Bodrero's note taken from Diels reads as follows: "Secondo la traduzione di Tertulliano (*de an.* 2) πείρατα = terminos. Il Diels ha corretto ὧν. . . ." Bodrero has not the Greek text in his edition, only the Italian translation, and as in the note he leaves out the MS. reading, it makes no sense. That Tertullian in his translation renders πείρατα by *terminos* is of no earthly interest to anybody, and is not what Diels's note means to say.

A few other oversights may be noted here.

Fragment 10, ἰσως δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων, κ. τ. λ., ἰσως is rendered inaccurately *parimenti* (p. 115). It means *probably*, not *equally* or *similarly*. Fragment 65, χρησμοσύνη δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ διακόσμησις κατ' αὐτόν, is incorrectly rendered "la mancanza è l'ordinarsi del mondo secondo il fuoco" (p. 135). Κατ' αὐτόν cannot refer to πῦρ, which is neuter. Diels translates correctly *nach ihm*. Fragment 109, note, Bodrero renders Diels's "spielerisch," which means 'playfully', by the word "ironica," which is not the same thing.

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I massimi problemi. Di BERNARDINO VARISCO. Milano, Libreria Editrice Milanese, 1910.—pp. xii, 331.

There is much in this work of Signor Varisco which will well repay the reader. It is a serious and careful presentation of the philosophic faith of an earnest and capable thinker,—a convinced idealist who believes that the loftiest and most abstruse problems, which for many centuries have formed the subject of human speculation, are susceptible of a permanent and satisfactory solution. Adverse criticism of a work undertaken in this spirit does not necessarily

imply any doubt as to ability of the author, or any disparagement of the manner in which he has carried out his self-imposed task. It may rather be directed against the task itself. If the "Greatest Problems" of philosophy are not fairly to be likened to those riddles which puzzled Alice in Wonderland, of which the peculiarity was that they had no answers, it must surely be admitted by every student of the history of speculative thought that the answers reached never set the questions finally at rest, but are only, in Hegelian language, "moments" in the onward march of speculation itself; new problems, or the old ones in more adequate and rationalized forms, are ever emerging from the solutions that have been accepted. Nor can these "Greatest Problems" be quite satisfactorily exposed and discussed in a single volume by an individual thinker, however well informed and well equipped for his task, since inevitably under such conditions it is not possible to take account, on the one hand, of the widely differing points of view from which readers will regard the subject-matter under discussion, and, on the other, of the possible solutions, at variance with those of the author, to the questions in dispute. In this instance, a preliminary conviction as to the legitimacy of the doctrine of pragmatism as a method, and of idealism as an end, would seem to the present writer needful if the main arguments here adduced are to be sufficient for the author's purpose. Do 'values' "depend upon their 'truth,' or do 'truths' depend upon their value"? Interesting as it is, the work before us does not logically settle these questions, and unless the reader is prepared to answer them in the sense of the pragmatist, no sound foundation is laid for the edifice of idealism which the author proceeds to rear. Moreover, when there is no examination into the structure of other systems of thought—and for this, of course, a single volume offers no opportunities—the student is left in doubt as to whether the conclusions reached are the only ones worthy of consideration. None the less, Signor Varisco's reasoning is often weighty, while his language is always clear and free from unnecessary technicalities; the chapter on "I Valori" in particular is an extremely able presentation of his views on this subject and will prove profitable reading even for those who dissent from his argument. The whole book is significant as showing that idealism with a strongly religious coloring still possesses vitality and vigor.

E. RITCHIE.

HALIFAX, N. S.

La morale de l'ironie. Par FR. PAULHAN. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909.—pp. 169.

Those readers who are familiar with Paulhan's brilliant and exasperating essays will require but little inducement to take up the present little volume. It is as characteristic a piece of worldly wisdom as one could wish to find. The outline is very simple. Man is by nature social to a very slight degree. Necessity has imposed upon him a very complex social life, to which he is far from being adapted; and the result is an unreconcilable inner conflict. The function of morality is to repress this conflict by persuading the individual that he has no antisocial interests, and that the sacrifices which society re-

quires of him are really for his own highest good. An extensive 'mythology' is thus developed, which has been fostered by both religion and philosophy. The choicest product is the metaphysical conception of duty—a universal obligation voicing itself as an autocratic command, though the obligation is without motive and the authority is without force.

But the task of morality is really incapable of fulfillment. The conflict will not down. The consequence is that morality is a mass of shifting contradictions. It is at all times full of outright immoralities—exaggerations which are directly prejudicial to social welfare. Every 'virtue' is such an exaggeration, not to be logically distinguished from a vice. On the other hand, all manner of vices are essential to the very existence of society. Morality pretends to be eternal. It lags behind the march of events. When human needs have finally succeeded in modifying its standards, newer needs have already become urgent.

What, then, should be the attitude of the educated man toward moral questions? One of irony—that is to say, of sophisticated detachment. He should know too much to be a partisan or to share a partisan's enthusiasm. "He will play the game while admitting that his adversary may win it, and that that will doubtless not overthrow the order of the world. He will play his best and strive for the victory; but he will perhaps also be on his guard against presumptive joys and bitter disillusionments" (p. 163).

THEODORE DE LAGUNA.

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La critique du darwinisme social. Par J. NOVICOW. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1910. —pp. 407.

This volume, written to advance the cause of universal peace, is not without interest to the mere theorist. It discusses an important phase of the confusion between organic and social evolution which was so characteristic of the sociology of the generation that followed Darwin, and which is widely prevalent to-day.

The term 'social Darwinism' is used to denote the theory that social evolution is due to the struggle for existence between social groups, known as war; or, as the author epigrammatically defines it in the opening sentence, "the doctrine which considers collective homicide to be the cause of the progress of mankind." He finds that it is shared by the vast majority of educated men, and is especially popular among men of political influence; and the whole of the volume is devoted to its systematic demolition.

The work as a whole is admirably done. The mass of fallacies contained in the pseudo-Darwinistic view are untangled and laid bare with rare thoroughness and skill. The style is, if anything, too simple—for controversial success, I mean. The errors criticised are made to seem so obviously foolish, that the reader is often led to wonder whether the opponents are fairly treated; and indeed I think that in several instances they might have a good deal to say for themselves. But controversial fairness aside, Novicow's treatment of

the facts is impressive in the breadth of knowledge and balance of judgment which it displays.

The book is divided into three parts. The first treats of some biological errors of the 'Darwinians.' (A chapter devoted to Darwin's theory of the origin of species may be skipped without loss.) They think only of the struggle for existence between members of the same species, and forget the importance of the constant struggle with the whole environment—the struggle for light, warmth, air, and nourishment. They "ignore the existence of the universe." Even the one phase of the universal struggle of which they take account is wrongly interpreted as a literal fight to the death. Besides, they commit the gross error of treating social facts as if they were biological phenomena. All social processes are essentially psychological. Institutions are shaped by ideas; and ideas are 'selected' not by butcheries but by suggestion, argument, and persuasion.

Parts II and III have to do with errors of a sociological character. The former (in my opinion the least convincing part of the work) discusses the significance of association, which the 'Darwinians' are accused of ignoring. All evolution is increase in the breadth and complexity of association; and this for society means the increase of travel, commerce, and the interchange of ideas. War is intrinsically a form of dissociation, and hence cannot without paradox be said to be a cause of evolution. Civil wars are confessedly a curse; and national boundaries do not change the curse into a blessing. If it be urged that conquest, by enlarging national boundaries, results in increased association, the reply is that it may or may not so result; and that when the increased association does follow, it is properly due not to the war itself but to wise government.

Part III deals with a variety of topics, but is in the main devoted to showing the preponderant part which peaceful industries have in all times played in the formation and development of states. The 'Darwinian' sociology is in a position analogous to that of geology before Lyell: it explains the origins of society by catastrophies, instead of by slow, imperceptible changes. The primitive state is not a product of war, but necessarily precedes it. No considerable part of any people could ever be for any considerable time engaged in war. Every society is first and foremost an industrial society. Its energies are of necessity far less occupied by struggles with other societies than by the unceasing struggle with the natural environment; and it is to this latter that social evolution is in the main ultimately due.

These are but a few salient features of the argument, which give no hint of its richness in suggestive observations.

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The following books also have been received:

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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mêt.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Nto-Sc.* = *Revue Nto-Scholastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*, *I. Abtl.*: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

Truth and Its Object. J. E. BOODIN. *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.*, VII, 19, pp. 508-21.

We must distinguish reality as the object of our knowledge from reality as our object-construct. By the first is meant the world to which we must adjust ourselves; by the second, the conceptual tools with which we work, such as formulæ and equations. The question whether we can know has a threefold meaning: (1) Can the individual recognize or know an object or event that has occurred once before in his mental history; (2) Can *two* individuals know the same object or meaning; (3) Can physical objects be known? In the first place, we must hold that our belief that we know again our own past states as the same or nearly the same is correct, for without this all knowledge would be impossible. Moreover, empirically speaking, we must admit that two or more individuals are able to know the same object, for only upon this supposition is science possible. As regards nature we can say that it, as we know it, is our social construct; still we must recognize that physical processes are not mere phenomena but have a place in their own context of physical interaction. Though the three contexts—the individual, the social, and the physical—are all related to each other, still Bradley's contention that the object of truth is always reality is a clumsy way of putting the matter, for the object becomes meaningful precisely by being singled out from the rest of reality and being made the center of attention. Our knowledge can never do justice to reality, for reality is a world of process which thought attempts to fix—an impossible task. Still, while there is a conventional element in truth due to the fact that it has to express itself in descriptive symbols, it *means* to be eternal. Knowledge is phenomenal, not because facts are vitiated by being known, nor because we are unable to know the real thing, but because in the process of selection we must omit so much of reality. Still the desire to discover the whole truth of reality remains, and the attempt to accomplish this we call metaphysics.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

Huxley's Epiphenomenalism: A Criticism and an Appreciation. EVANDER BRADLEY MCGILVARY. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., VII, 17, pp. 449-460.

Huxley's epiphenomenalism, while indefensible as it stands, is capable of development into a view that is both self-consistent and consistent with the facts. Huxley started by assuming the law of the conservation of energy, that the total energy of any body or system of bodies is a quantity which can neither be increased nor diminished by any mutual action of such bodies. He also postulated the law of causality, by which he meant an invariable order of succession. Now if the conservation of energy applies to physical events alone, then psychical events can follow physical events without violating this law; a brain process may have two effects, one physical, preserving equivalence of energy with its cause, the other psychical, having no energetic relation to its cause. The absence in the latter case of the energetic relation does not necessarily imply the absence of antecedence and consequence in which alone the causal relation consists. In so far Huxley was right, but he was wrong in denying that psychic events can in turn be the cause of brain changes. For example, if we have brain processes *A*, *B*, *C*, with psychical processes α and γ always correspondingly to *B* and *C* respectively, then since *A* always precedes *B* and α , it is the cause of both *B* and α . Huxley, however, should have gone farther and shown that since both *B* and α precede *C*, both together are the cause of *C*, and that for the same reason both *B* and α are the cause of γ . Should it be objected that *C* would happen if preceded by *B* without α , the reply is that this violates the assumption that *C* is never so preceded. Huxley's theory, as thus developed, would violate neither the law of the conservation of energy nor the law of causality and would at the same time be consistent with itself. It should be said that Huxley himself did not adhere strictly to his view that psychic events cannot be the causes of subsequent physical processes.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

Die Entwicklung der Geschichtsphilosophie W. von Humboldts. LEO EHLEN. Ar. f. G. Ph., XXIV, 1, pp. 22-60.

History is superficially characterized as having for its subject-matter that which is psychical and as dealing exclusively with past occurrences. A philosophy of history involves, on the other hand, a plexus of logic, epistemology, and metaphysics. The development of modern philosophy of history began with the ethical tendencies of the 18th century, which harmonized all conflicting theories of knowledge and metaphysics. Herder attempted this unification by subordinating the mechanical factors to the meaning of history, while Kant caused the factors to assume a teleological aspect. Kant failed to make his conception fruitful because he did not utilize Herder's idea of a superior ordination of events. The most important progress of the 18th century was made when events of history were viewed as a surface revelation of a developing metaphysical undercurrent. In the post-Kantian treatment,

e. g., with Fichte and Hegel, the purely mechanical features were transcended and the regulative principle of historical events became constitutive. Nevertheless, the purely mechanical factors were recognized clearly by Hegel, and also by Schiller and Humboldt, as constituting a methodological, instead of a metaphysical problem. With Humboldt, however, came the first attempt to unite the methodological basis of Herder's individualism and Kant's mechanism on an empirical ground, and to use the metaphysical superstructure in a merely speculative manner. Schelling stimulated, but did not contribute directly to the philosophy of history, in that he indicated the possibility of a mechanical conception of history on an epistemological basis, and the usefulness of an empirical and instrumental though not truly historical combination of individualism and teleology. A peculiarity of Humboldt's conception of history is his interest in events as expressions of the human mind, in the variety of this expression, and in the subordination of these to a higher developing ideal. The personal ideals of individuals are subordinated to the ideal of the human race. A second peculiarity lies in the unification of mechanism and teleology in the conception of a world history. He realized that the individual is a superempirically determined organism but limited as a historical phenomenon. But in his conception of man as the expression of an absolute idea, this idea assumes a psychological form, so that that which determines man permits man to determine his acts within the scope of that higher determination. *Der Mensch ist nur ein Mittelglied*. Besides recording events, the historian must classify them under appropriate categories, and here personal character plays its rôle. Instead of Kant's two-fold division of metaphysic, Substance and Causality, we have in Humboldt a three-fold division, Matter, Causality, and the Idea (Substance). The idea gives direction to matter, *e. g.*, determines human action, but this causal relation or direction is a necessity which lies in the nature of matter so that it contributes *per se* to the causal direction. For this reason the individual assumes a double rôle in its ontological essence: it is the originator of no historical event; and yet it is for itself its own absolute. This raises the question whether, after all, history reflects solely the individual and what influence the higher ideal has upon individual action.

CHRISTIAN A. RUCKMICH.

Vues sur les problèmes de la philosophie. G. SOREL. Rev. de Mét., XVIII, 5, pp. 581-613.

The most fatal misconception of modern times is the idea that philosophy is a sort of empirical science. Physical science and philosophy were identified only so long as both dealt with natural phenomena. From Egypt came the first stimulus toward a supernatural philosophy. The peculiarity of the Greek philosophy was its moral tendency. The Christian philosophy subjected natural philosophy to theology. Soon, however, the discoveries of church hypocrisy in the Reformation led the thoughtful element to resurrect the ancient monuments and to seek in the Stoic philosophers the

material for a new morality which was to be more agreeable to kings and peasants. With Descartes, Galileo, and Newton, natural phenomena were not only scientifically investigated and explained, but again also deified as of old. While the anti-scholastic movement was, on the whole, not of philosophical, but of political moment, the successful development of great religious movements and the growth of religious authority turned philosophical minds toward spiritualistic tendencies. The beginning of the 19th century produced an extraordinary return to Christianity, but it was soon found that the newer studies of religion could persevere in their lesser details without seriously interfering with the more essential progress of philosophy: the spiritualistic element was supernumerary. Time and again philosophers have believed that it was their concern to discover the rules for attaining the truth. John Stuart Mill thought he could deduce the methods of experimental reasoning. If philosophy is unable to furnish a code of thought to be used as a basis for scientific research, it is unable to verify the foundations of science. Furthermore, it is clear that the deductions of geometry, for instance, form the groundwork of the fine arts. Philosophy cannot share in the actual work of either science or fine art but it can create an atmosphere eminently favorable to scientific research and artistic production. The success of the Peripatetic Philosophy for so long a time was due to the fact that Aristotle well interpreted and expressed the life of the people. His causal categories were in agreement with enlightened Hellenic and pre-medieval thought. The later weakness of that philosophy consisted in regarding the method of geometry as applicable only to the physical sciences. Christianity had taken the Aristotelian idea of prime mover, converted it into an idea of a Providence, and thus wedded the Platonic immortality to the Aristotelian final cause. With Galileo, the school of geometers emancipated science from this Peripatetic tendency of causal classification, and developed a new theory of cosmogony. It was more difficult, however, to reform the schools of theology and persuade them to adopt modern conceptions, because they deemed philosophy all too ephemeral. The Cartesian philosophy can be briefly criticised in that it fails to credit empirical evidence and relies purely on logical reasoning. On the other hand, the mechanical explanation of the universe, proposed by Newton, failed because it relied almost entirely on evidence of the senses. With Kant a new movement was inaugurated which outlined, to some extent, the part that reason could play as against the rôle of empirical evidence.

C. A. RUCKMICH.

How Ideas Work. A. W. MOORE. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., VII, 23, pp. 617-626.

The idea is a proposed connection of things for a specific end, and is true when it works in the way proposed. It is objected that the idea does not make the connection between the toothache and a tooth, but it simply discovers an existing connection. Here the absolute idealist inconsistently joins the

realist against the pragmatist. The latter admits a connection between the ache and the tooth before there is an idea, but he holds that the idea does more than merely symbolize this connection. The tooth takes on a new relation to the ache as soon as the dentist gets hold of it, and the dentist gets hold of it because the tooth acts as a guide to patient and dentist the moment the pain is ideated as the pain of a tooth. The realist thinks that knowledge of the past is the crucial difficulty of the pragmatist. The latter finds it difficult to see how pastness can be a special case of knowledge, since it is involved in every act of thinking, which is a process in which things produced in the past recombine or interact to produce other things. Caesar's example in crossing the Rubicon may influence a man of affairs, and Caesar's act never will be finished so long as it continues, through acts of knowledge, to produce new results. The pragmatist insists that, in becoming known, a past act takes on additional functions and consequences, and he holds that no fixed distinction can be made between an act and its effects. He agrees with the realist that experience does not consist of a system of ideas, and that, at any given time, a fact of experience may be independent of knowledge in the sense that it is not at that time known. But the pragmatist and the realist part company when the unknown experience passes into knowledge. Pragmatism and idealism agree in the conception of the constitutive character of thinking, if idealism does not confine this to *absolute* thinking. In teaching the efficiency of *our* thinking, pragmatism is saving idealism from its own unbelief.

J. REESE LIN.

The Psychology of Belief. JAMES LINDSAY. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XVI, 3, pp. 292-309.

After giving a summary of the teachings of various philosophers with a brief comment on each, the writer states his own theory. Belief is best taken as the assertion of a reflective judgment or determination. It is the psychological side of what, on the logical side, we call judgment. Its consent is compelled. But such belief involves voluntary adaptation to the uncontrollable. Nevertheless voluntary control is bound up with our belief, in respect of thought reality, because only by the aid of such voluntary control can ideal ends be attained. The purity and earnestness of the whole thought and life must affect it. Indeed, the foundations of our psychic life rest on belief. While belief is an aspect of judgment, the willing function is present in all cases of belief. Belief is the driving power of knowledge, guiding it, using it, and working out its implications. It is both a fruit of life, and an essential of its development. For belief pours vigor into the affections, no less than it re-inforces will; in its higher forms it is a movement of our being so central and fundamental that its issue is life. There is no ideal without belief. Belief is the grand propulsive power of man's complex nature and activity.

J. REESE LIN.

Some Implications of Anti-Intellectualism. JOHN DEWEY. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., VII, 18, 477-481.

Intellectualism, once the antithesis to the sensational theory of knowledge, is now often used in contrast with voluntarism. Anti-intellectualism (pragmatism) has two forms. One form holds that things are what they are known to be, but upholds the supremacy of non-rational factors in our knowledge, and denies an underlying, noumenal reality. The other form attaches more value to logical functions than the first does, and holds that concepts are the only means of making things *intelligible*. But it holds that making things intelligible is a function operating in the interests of behavior, and that intellectualism wrongly isolates the knowledge standpoint from its functional place. The data in such a theory of pragmatism are primary functions, both biological and social. Philosophy is held to be a mode of knowing, which arises out of typical perplexities and conflicts of behavior for the purpose of their solution and adjustment. It holds that the origin, structure, and purpose of knowing are such as to render nugatory any wholesale inquiries into the nature of Being. It avoids the "egocentric predicament," into which intellectualism falls, by holding that, in every knowledge event, the ego is seen to be simply the agent that undertakes and is responsible for the cognitive event; its relation is not that of one of the two terms of knowledge to the other term.

J. REESE LIN.

An Experimental Study of Belief. T. OKABE. Am. J. Ps., XXI, 4, pp. 563-596.

According to Hume, belief or assent is the vivacity, force, and liveliness of the perceptions presented by memory and the senses. It results from the customary conjunction of a lively idea with a present impression. James Mill makes belief an inseparable association, while J. S. Mill adds that there is an ultimate difference between thinking of a reality and representing to ourselves an imaginary object. Bain holds that belief is an innate credulity which is tempered by checks and influenced by intellectual, emotional, and active factors. In his account, the two most important elements are the emphasis upon the instinctive tendency to accept and the stating of a theory of belief in motor terms. Herbert Spencer, following James Mill, reduces belief to an inseparable association, while Brentano accepts and recasts the doctrine of J. S. Mill. James holds that belief is an emotional reaction of the entire man on an object, a reaction which resists further analysis. He agrees with Bain that the opposite of belief is not disbelief but doubt and inquiry and, like him, emphasizes the primitive impulse to affirm and the motor activity connected with belief. Sully makes belief a compound of intellectual representation, feeling, and active impulse. Baldwin holds that it is a feeling of confirmation and security over and above the feeling of simple reality. It is *sui generis* and attaches to the representation faculty primarily. Stout, who also regards belief as fundamentally distinct from simple apprehension, uses the term belief

in a wide sense as interchangeable with judgment. This brief historical review shows that the status of the experience of belief is still very uncertain. Titchener gives belief a place among the intellectual sentiments and suggests a method of investigation. The object of the present study is to describe, in analytical terms, the experience of belief as it appeared under experimental conditions. A method of single exposures was first used, followed by one of paired comparisons. The first method was applied in three forms. In the first series of experiments, the observers were instructed to give an introspective account of the consciousness of belief and disbelief aroused by the exposure of simple type-written sentences. Another series dealt with the consciousness of certainty or uncertainty accompanying the mental solving of simple arithmetical and algebraical problems presented on slips of paper. In the third series of experiments, sentences or mathematical expressions were read aloud to the observers. Two variations of the method of paired comparisons were used. In the first, sentences, and in the second, mathematical expressions, were presented to the vision. A series of experiments with tones was carried out with one observer. At the conclusion of the whole investigation, the experimenter read to each observer a summary statement of his introspections and in each case the analysis was accepted. The following are the chief results of the experiments. The belief-disbelief consciousness, as something more than a quasi-mechanical acceptance or rejection, is not of common occurrence in ordinary life, yet it may appear fairly regularly under experimental conditions. While not regularly emotional in character, this consciousness may be markedly affective. This consciousness may be given in terms of a general kinæsthetic attitude, or of internal speech and localized kinæsthesia, or of the mutual relations of visual images, in which case the contents come to the observer as being, specifically, belief. If bound up with a particular consciousness, verbal or visual, the contents of the experience do not come to the observer as being, specifically, belief, but as the vehicle of belief, which itself finds conscious representation only in the mode of occurrence of the contents. Belief and disbelief are consciousnesses of the same kind. The certainty-uncertainty consciousness is, in general, more strongly affective than that of belief-disbelief. Certainty is pleasant, doubt, unpleasant.

J. R. TUTTLE.

La fonction de la philosophie dans la science positive. F. MAUGÉ. Rev. Ph., XXXV, 8, pp. 113-142.

In a union of science and philosophy having as its end the explanation and systematization of experience, what is the distinct rôle philosophy would play? Comte would make its speciality that of generalities. Cl. Bernard objects that this is both anti-philosophic and anti-scientific. M. Rey fears the vulgarization of science. Such a systematization would be but a classification of scientific theories only serving to show the conflict of ideas. Scientists would hold that experience by its very nature gives us a synthesis. But have scientists admitted that the various results of experimentation are sufficient

by themselves or that such results merely control the determination of theories which in turn influence the direction of further experimentation? Poincaré holds that the truth of a theory must have general utility; Duhem, that any experiment has demonstrative value only if it integrates itself into a preconceived, theoretical unity. Cl. Bernard and Newton decided that, in addition to a mere recognition of facts, a method founded on reason, superior to experimentation is necessary, and Newton's inductive method is but a rationalization of experience. Results can be obtained only through the use of preconceived ideas since the principles can never be applied to all facts, though their applicability gives them their value. For Aristotle, who sees in induction the condensation in general rules of many experiments and for whom the principles of science consist in such rules, these principles seem to arise from experience itself; for Descartes they result from reason alone. Newton derives the principles of science from both reason and experience. They are selected facts and as such are the products of experiments, but as scientific values they pass beyond the range of experimentation. Likewise among modern scientists, principles are both empirical and *a priori*. They imply an analysis of the real but must be orientated according to a determined meaning. The principles of positive sciences imply most frequently preconceived ideas, which have their root in experience and are justifiable by it, but whose germ is found in a presentiment of their fertility. If science can progress only by aid of such preconceived conceptions, philosophy is to coördinate these ideas and establish a system of rational presuppositions. In the work of scientists who seem best to embody the scientific spirit, one finds a distinction between what results from experimentation and what fulfills a methodological requirement. Science can put the questions to nature; philosophy can coördinate them in a system according to their necessary relation to one ideal and form a basis of a broad interrogatory of which all the parts are harmonious and for which experimentation can furnish the answers.

CORINNE STEPHENSON.

Das Subjekt und die Wirklichkeit. BERNARDINO VARISCO. Logos, I, 2, pp. 197-206.

A subject is the unity of its thoughts. A judgment is always made by a single subject, though not dependent on any particular subject. I am, in so far as I think, and my thought is real or nothing is real. Indeed, my thought creates reality. Solipsism is avoided by the recognition of other subjects and of a material or outer world. This outer world, however, has less reality for a particular subject than its own inner world, since to the latter belong all mental activities, and its kernel is self-consciousness. The ability to differentiate an ego and a non-ego denotes that these realities are but parts of a greater unity, which, to have reality, must have all these parts organically related in itself. Every unity of consciousness is a center of reality, though not of reality as a whole, for that is polycentric and any focus of reciprocal action is one of these centers. Reality is neither outside the subject nor a part of any

individual subject, since it includes more subjects in itself. Neither is a subject part of reality in the same sense that a leaf is part of a book. Between the individual and the whole, even as between different individuals, there must be an organic relation.

CORRINNE STEPHENSON.

Zur Psychologie der Erregungs- und Rauschzustände. RICHARD MÜLLER-FREIENFELS. *Z. f. Psych.*, LVII, 3, pp. 161-194.

The study is an attempt to analyze the peculiar supra-normal states of consciousness characterized by excessive feelings, irregular ideational processes, hypersensitivity, extraordinary transitoriness, a peculiar shift of temporal relations, and a change of attention from clear to obscure. These states are studied from the points of view of affection, intellection, and æsthetic appreciation. The shifts in the affective life are especially frequent in the case of feelings of pleasantness. One of the most frequent shifts is in the long duration of affection which we call mood. A mood, though sometimes unpleasant, is generally a pleasant feeling which in small intensity lasts a long time. If intensity is increased it becomes an emotion. If the emotion last a long time, the conscious state is then not a unitary one, but is subject to all fluctuations of intensity and quality. A strong feeling is an emotion, which, if it lasts long, loses its unitary aspect, and approaches now more toward the impulsive, now more toward ideational complexes. The states of excitation may occur without any definite connection with definite ideas and are aroused by the most trivial things. Under these conditions the function of reasoning is inhibited in a way similar to that brought about by certain toxins. Music has at times a like effect, as in the arresting of self-control. Organic changes, increased vasomotor activity, glowing cheeks, etc., are artificially induced by certain movements, as in religious observances. Thus the Egyptians in repeating the word "Allah," make unceasing movements of the head and body and the Dervishes likewise make continuous movement in prayer. The result is a kind of intoxication followed by a peculiar insensibility. On the other hand, absolute immovability or voluntary control of the breathing and circulation induces a kind of hypnotic condition as in the case of the Yogi of India. This result may also be brought about by certain monotonous noises, such as the singing of certain sentences and the recitation of magic words or by certain chemicals such as alcohol and tobacco. Opium produces visions with the most pleasant of feelings. In certain intoxications, for example, ecstasy, the ideational life is almost minimal. In connection with these affective states there is a change in the consciousness of self, even an entire forgetting of the normal state, and a feeling of unity with the Godhead. Such cases are found among the mystics. Intellectual activity does not always accompany increased affective life. Sometimes a complete insensibility towards the strongest external stimuli occurs, in other cases a stupid thoughtlessness ensues. In some moments, however, there is a clearness of ideas amounting almost to hallucination. The cause is assumed to be hyperemia of the cortex such as is produced

by toxic substances. Controlling judgments and apperception are excluded. The most essential difference between the abnormal and the normal states is the speed of ideational trains. In the former states, images and thought chase each other without diminution of clearness. In these abnormal states the field is to be compared with the visual field of the microscope in which first one part then another comes into focus. The flight of ideas differs, however, from that of the maniac. Memory seems at times to be greatly extended. On the æsthetic side we find that rhythm is used to arouse these states both in music and poetry. The rhythm of poetry produces an easily sliding, pleasant dance of passing imagination. The physical effects of the fine arts is less clear. Colors have a marked livening effect, which, however, is never rhythmical because their impressions are necessarily simultaneous. Not only artistic enjoyment but creation produce these effects.

AUSTIN S. EDWARDS.

Knowledge and Volition. DE WITT H. PARKER. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., VII, 22, pp. 594-602.

The problem of the relation of knowledge and volition is important in modern epistemology. Rickert in Germany, Royce and Münsterberg in America, are the most prominent of those who have offered a solution. They all argue—with differences of detail—that knowledge is affirmation of ideas, and this affirmation is an act of will. For Rickert, assertion, although voluntary, is not capricious, but is determined by an intellectual "ought," which manifests itself in the feeling of certainty. Royce accepts in general Rickert's analysis. For him the intellectual ought is valid if it expresses the will, but this will is ultimately the will of the absolute, with which we feel ourselves identical, whenever we experience the certainty belonging to all true ideas. Rickert wrongly separates the element of assertion from the idea, in which it is really inherent. He also regards the assertion as determined by a preceding feeling of certainty, whereas the certainty does not precede, but accompanies it. Further, it is impossible, as Royce maintains, to identify the meaning of an idea with the will of an idea. If ideas could not assert an object apart from the will, there would never be a choice of possible courses of action. An idea is true so far as it can be filled out in perception, and the truth-character of an idea is determinative of the feeling of certainty which accompanies it as its value.

M. E. GOUDGE.

Reactions to Rhythmic Stimuli, with Attempt to Synchronize. KNIGHT DUNLAP. Psych. Rev., XVII, 6, pp. 399-416.

These experiments are the beginning of a work on rhythmic reactions which was suggested by the results obtained in the so-called 'complication experiment,' where the phenomena of the experiment depended on an indirect attempt of the subject to synchronize the reaction with the stimulus. The apparatus consisted of a reaction-key, a Schumann chronograph with motor

attachment, and the stimulus, which was either the snap of an electric spark, or the illumination of a white screen by a flash from a helium tube. The stimulus rates varied from one-third to two and one-fourth seconds. The subject's room was darkened, and no noise from the apparatus in the experimenter's room reached it. Nearly 7000 reactions were taken with five subjects. The series taken show that there was no relation between the average error and the rate of the stimulus, and that the reaction was not different in those cases where there was alternate change of attention to the stimulus and the reaction. The results are, in general, similar to those of the complication experiment.

M. E. GOUDGE.

The Play Impulse and Attitude in Religion. C. E. SEASHORE. Am. J. Th., XIV, 4, pp. 505-520.

Play is that which we do for the pleasure of doing it. In this sense play is coextensive with activity, and manifests itself in all genuine art and in much scientific research. With development it becomes purposive. It then develops mind and body more than work does. Both religion and play supply an ultra-rational basis for conduct. Play is a preparation for religious life and has a large share in its realizations. The best of religion is spontaneous; that is, playful. The two agree in demanding a sense of freedom; in involving the feelings of fascination, of the extension of personality; and in arousing the sense of fellowship. Both are fundamentally serious. Both are anthropomorphic in the interpretation of their objects. These analogies, each of small import, are collectively of the greatest significance. Some may consider that this position is a trifling with religion, but in reality it sets forth an important point of view. However, all of religion is not play.

NORBERT WIENER.

NOTES.

Robert Flint, Emeritus-Professor of Divinity in Edinburgh University, died at his home in Edinburgh on November 25, 1910, in the seventy-third year of his age. Professor Flint was the author of *The Philosophy of History in France and Germany*, 1874; *Theism*, 1877; *Anti-Theistic Theories*, 1879; *Vico*, 1884, in the Blackwood Philosophical Classics; *Agnosticism*, 1902; and of several volumes on theological subjects. Professor Flint was Baird Lecturer, 1876-77; Stone Lecturer at Princeton University, 1880; and the Croall Lecturer at Edinburgh, 1887-88.

Sir Francis Galton died on January 17, aged eighty-eight years. He was the author of *Hereditary Genius*, 1869; *English Men of Science, their Nature and Nurture*, 1874; and *Human Faculty*, 1883; besides numerous works on travel and exploration.

The Western Philosophical Association held its meeting in conjunction with the American Psychological Association at Minneapolis during the Christmas recess. The following officers were elected for the ensuing year: *President*, Professor Addison W. Moore, of the University of Chicago; *Vice-president*, Professor Boyd H. Bode, of the University of Illinois; *Secretary*, Professor Bernard C. Ewer, of Northwestern University; *Members of the Council*, Professor D. F. Swenson, of the University of Minnesota, and Professor James H. Tufts, of the University of Chicago. The next meeting of the Association will be held in March, 1912. The address of the retiring President appears in this number of the REVIEW.

The sixth annual meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology was held at Chattanooga, Tenn., December 27 and 28, 1910. The following officers were elected for the coming year: *President*, Dr. Shepherd Ivory Franz, of the Government Hospital for the Insane; *Vice-president*, Professor A. Caswell Ellis, of the University of Texas; *Secretary-Treasurer*, Professor R. M. Ogden, of the University of Tennessee.

At the meeting of the American Psychological Association last December in Minneapolis, Professor C. E. Seashore, of the University of Iowa, was elected President for the coming year. Professor W. V. D. Bingham, of Dartmouth College, was elected Secretary-Treasurer.

Professor Josiah Royce, of Harvard University, will deliver the next course of Bross Lectures at Lake Forest College in November, 1911. The subject of the lectures will be "The Sources of Religious Insight."

Professor John Dewey, of Columbia University, is giving a course of six lectures at Smith College on "The Psychology and Ethics of the Self."

Professor James R. Angell, of the University of Chicago, will deliver a course of eight lectures at Union College on "Modern Psychology."

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals:

MIND, No. 77: *G. F. Stout*, Reply to Mr. Joseph; *J. Solomon*, The Philosophy of Bergson; *E. E. C. Jones*, A New 'Law of Thought' and its Implications; *J. L. Stocks*, Motive; Discussions: *J. A. J. Drewitt*, On the Distinction between Waking and Dreaming; *F. H. Bradley*, Reply to Mr. Russell's Explanations; Critical Notices; New Books; Philosophical Periodicals; Notes.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XXI, 2: *Arthur O. Lovejoy*, William James as Philosopher; *B. Bosanquet*, The Place of Leisure in Life; *Thomas Jones*, Charity Organization; *F. Melian Stawell*, Goethe's Influence on Carlyle, I; *J. W. Scott*, Idealism and the Conception of Forgiveness; *W. F. Cooley*, Confessions of an Indeterminist; Book Reviews.

HIBBERT JOURNAL, IX, 2: *C. F. D'Arcy*, Theology and the Subconscious; *H. C. Goddard*, Language and the New Philosophy; *G. Lowes Dickinson*, Ideals and Facts; *G. W. Mullins*, Woman Suffrage: A New Synthesis; *J. E. Mercer*, The Theology of Laughter; *Giovanni Luzzi*, The Roman Catholic Church in Italy at the Present Hour; *A. O. Lovejoy*, Christian Ethics and Economic Competition; *K. C. Anderson*, Whitherward?—A Question for the Higher Criticism; *William Danks*, The Clergy, Conscience, and Free Inquiry; *J. M. Lloyd Thomas*, What is Schism; *Charles Stewart*, Prayer; *Donald Macmillan*, The Ecclesiastical Situation in Scotland; *Francis Bickley*, The Agenda Club; Discussions; Reviews; Recent Books and Articles.

THE MONIST, XXI, 1: *William Mackintire Salter*, Schopenhauer's Type of Idealism; *Editor*, Professor Mach and his Work; *Bernard Pick*, Early Attacks on Christianity and its Defenders; *John E. Boodin*, From Protagoras to William James; *Charles Alva Lane*, The Self and Personality. Poems of Herder translated into English; Criticisms and Discussions.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XVIII, 1: *F. L. Wells*, Some Properties of the Free Association Time; *Edmund Jacobson*, Experiments on the Inhibition of Sensations; *Herbert Woodrow*, The Rôle of Pitch in Rhythm; *James R. Angell*, Editorial: William James.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, VII, 12: *G. H. Mead*, Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning; Psychological Literature; Books Received; Notes and News; Indexes.

VIII, 1: General Reviews and Summaries; Special Reviews; Notes and News.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, VII, 24: *D. S. Miller*, Some of the Tendencies of Professor James's Work; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VII, 25: *Shepherd Ivory Franz*, On the Association Function of the Cerebrum; *Arthur O. Lovejoy*, The Place of the Time Problem in Contemporary Philosophy; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VII, 26: *John E. Russell*, Realism a Defensible Doctrine; *H. L. Hollingworth*, The Oblivescence of the Disagreeable; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News; Index.

VIII, 1: *H. B. Alexander*, The Goodness and Beauty of Truth, I; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VIII, 2: *H. B. Alexander*, The Goodness and Beauty of Truth, II; Discussions: *H. S. Shelton*, Cause and Ground. A Reply; *Bernard Bosanquet*, Cause and Ground. A Rejoinder; *H. S. Shelton*, Postscript; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, III, 4: *Robert R. Rusk*, Experiments on Mental Association in Children; *W. H. Winch*, The Transfer of Improvement in Memory in School-Children, II; *Edward Bullough*, The 'Perceptive Problem' in the Aesthetic Appreciation of Simple Colour-Combinations; Proceedings of the British Psychological Society.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE MORAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF LABOUR.

THE problem of labour may be said to be as old as civilisation: Labour is coeval with the existence of society; for labour as a form of the activity of human beings is an essential condition of the life of every social group. It is one way in which a society is constituted and maintained. For many persons it makes up, if not the whole, at any rate the chief part of their existence as members of a social organism. To them membership in a society means primarily (as they put it) toiling "for" society. To be social and to labour are for them almost equivalent terms.

No doubt its prominence as a determining factor in social life has varied from time to time in the history of mankind. Thus, *e. g.*, labour has not the same significance in a militant society as it has in a commercial state. The incidence of human interest is in the former case concentrated on the defensive and offensive operations required for the maintenance of one social unity against another which threatens its very existence as a unit amongst the nations. In a commercial society, on the other hand, labour is all-important for the advancement and growth of the society, and interest in its problems outweighs in importance all other considerations. But in either case the difference is only one of emphasis. For the maintenance of labour is as much a necessity in the former as the maintenance of an armed defence is a necessity for the latter. We might distinguish the two types of society by saying that in the militant type, aggressive or offensive warfare is the predominant characteristic to which the resources of labour are made to minister as sub-

ordinate operations; in the commercial type, the cultivation of the arts of peace, which is part of the function of labour, is the predominant feature, and for this only defensive military operations are required, and to this they are made to minister.

But while the position of labour in a society thus varies with the type and tendency of society, at all times it presents a special problem to the political or moral guide of the destinies of a state. At no time has this been more true than the present. In some of the societies of Western Europe at the present moment, the problem of labour has become the prime factor to be reckoned with in determining the conditions of social equilibrium. All the more important is it therefore that we should try to understand the nature of labour and the place it holds in the social order.

It must be borne in mind that while labour has always existed as a fact in human society, the fact has not always been interpreted in the same way. Its significance has varied from time to time. It is the conception by which we interpret the place of labour in society that guides explicitly or implicitly all considerations of its worth or importance in the plan of social life. This conception, unlike the fact of labour, has not always been the same. Different conceptions of its nature have been formed by different societies, and each, as we shall see, throws some light on its real meaning.

But first it is necessary, in order to clear the ground for discussion, to state the limits within which we wish here to confine the use of the term labour. There is clearly no specific problem regarding labour if we take this term to apply to all forms and kinds of activity, still less to all forms and kinds of work. In a social whole, everyone is active in the production of social ends in some way or other; the child at school or even at play, the student, the sculptor, the saint, the statesman, the salesman, the sweep, the ship-builder. Some of these activities we would call 'work'; but certainly not in the ordinary usage of language would many of them be called 'labour.' All 'work' involves efficient action with a view to realising the ends which constitute the permanent good of man in society, of a man living with his

fellow-men. In this sense, certainly, the artist or the scientist 'works,' the one to attain an ideal in the medium of sense-experience, the other in the medium of thought. But such 'work' is not 'labour.' The distinguishing feature of labour seems to be that it is the purely physical activity of man's body directed upon such physical objects of nature as can be manipulated for man's economic purposes in society. Thus, *e. g.*, the planning and drawing of a monument is the work of an artist, the understanding of the laws of the stability of the monument is the work of the scientist, but the exerting of physical energy to fashion and transfer the physical material of the monument (stone, mortar, etc.) from one part of the earth to another and set one stone on another in the building of the monument is a form of labour. Again, certain forms of activity are exercised for their own sake, and others for further ends. Labour belongs to the second class, the work of the scientist and the artist to the first. Thus the laws of equilibrium of the spatial bodies that compose the monument may be studied and arranged simply for the sake of finding out the laws, and without any reference to the building of the monument or to any other end. Truth for truth's sake is the end of the scientist. But a labourer labours for some end beyond his actual physical toil, whether the end be the satisfaction of the end of the artist or the attainment of the means of comfort and subsistence for other members of society. Labour, then, in what we have to say, will be primarily treated in this sense. It is obvious that the claims of a "labour party" and a labour theory of society are soon dissipated in confusion if the term labour is taken to mean work in general. And very often the opponents of socialistic theories of a "labour state" have made easy capital out of a mere play of words.

We find different conceptions offered of the significance of labour in the life of man according as one or other of its elements is emphasised. Thus if we lay exclusive stress on the strenuousness of toil, the hardships to which it subjects the individual, the effort it involves, and the pain which often results from it, we get such a conception as that formed among the Hebrews—that labour was necessitated for man as the result of his fall from

a primitive state of blessedness where nature did everything for his physical wants, and that labour therefore is a necessary evil, a kind of punishment. 'In the sweat of his brow' man has to earn his bread. This conception takes account of certain inevitable incidents of labour and regards these as its essential significance in the economy of human life. Such a view ignores altogether the positive contribution labour makes to man's well-being, first of all by the intimate association of man with his fellows which it makes possible and establishes, and secondly by the expression and development of the individual life which it brings about, through conflict with and control over the resources of nature. Even from the Hebrew point of view these results more than make up for the loss of the somewhat animal ease of a primitive state of nature, in which man doubtless may obtain without trouble the satisfaction of ordinary physical needs, but in which he must also acquiesce helplessly in the unpredictable events of nature. Still the fact of arduous struggle with its consequent diminution of vitality is undoubtedly an element in labour, even though such effort cannot be used as a principle for interpreting labour completely. This element is in part the source of the social subordination which labour entails, and of the desire which impels man to lift himself out of it either by adopting another and a higher kind of work, or by introducing machinery to perform the labour for him. The importance of this element must therefore be carefully borne in mind.

Another view lays stress exclusively on this fact of the subordination of labour and thereupon builds its conception of a labour status. Labour we saw was an activity directed towards an end which in general lies outside the actual labour itself. A man breaks up the earth's crust or builds houses or ships, not for the sake of merely doing so, but for the sake of some further end, such as food, comfort, commerce. Strictly speaking, a man never labours for the sake of labouring; if he did so, his work would pass from the sphere of toil into that of art. The end of labour thus lies outside labour; labour is a means and hence subordinate. Those who engage exclusively in labour are therefore looked upon as themselves means to some end be-

yond themselves. When this aspect is exclusively emphasised, we get at once the view of labour as slavery. Because labour is a means, those who are solely labourers are means to the ends of those who are not. Labourers are not ends in themselves. But the life of man in society is the life of beings who are ends in themselves; the citizen is a freeman living with his fellows in freedom. Only those who can and do live this life and can exercise all its privileges are citizens, only those can form a state. Those human beings, therefore, who are merely means are not citizens; they are instruments for securing ends for the human beings who are. They are slaves. Hence, *e. g.*, in the Greek view of the state, the mere labourer was a slave, and slaves had no share in the life of the state. They were property, not persons. Here again we have a very one-sided view of the nature of labour. Such a theory fails to notice that the dependence is really mutual; the citizens proper are as much dependent on the slaves as the slaves on the citizens; the service is just as real, though different in kind, in each case. Moreover, it is a false view of freedom. No one is an end in himself in the sense of not being in some way a means to the ends of others. Detachment from toil is only possible in a social whole which includes the toilers; and occupation with toil does not detach the individual from his fellows but unites him to them by their dependence upon him. His toil is just his way of making himself necessary to the whole society and society necessary to himself. This principle was really admitted, since through the very fact of his toil the slave was permitted to purchase his freedom, *i. e.*, to enter into full citizenship. Again, while we may admit that man is higher than physical nature, and that therefore those who are occupied with the resources of physical nature (the labourers) are in a sense on a lower plane than those who are not, yet it is mere confusion of principle to look upon a lower class of society as no class at all, and still greater confusion to identify those who are occupied with physical nature with physical nature itself. For to transform nature, which the labourer does, is *ipso facto* to rise above it, and so to justify a claim to share the higher life of man which he has in society.

This last is the point of view of what we may roughly call the modern theory of labour. Labour is a way by which man controls the resources of nature for human ends. These ends are all summed up in the life and order of society, which is a specific whole of human beings existing for the promotion and maintenance of man's well-being in all its forms. Hence to toil for this consciously is by that very fact to aim at securing human well-being. There is no other reason or justification for labour except that in the long run it secures this end; and this one end is coincident with the very existence of society. To toil is thus to share in and promote the good of the social whole, and be a constituent part of it. This at once establishes the place and worth of labour to the social organism. Society is constituted by the combined efforts of individuals after a common good, at once connecting them together and furthering and sustaining the individual good of each. To aim at this end is the business of a moral life; to accomplish this end in any degree is to establish and maintain a society. The life of society and the life of morality, therefore, are coincident. They are to one another as the words of a sentence to the meaning of the sentence. Now labour is a function directed by and towards this end. For labour at once connects a man with his fellows, and further sustains his own individual well-being. These are the ultimate elements constituting the meaning, nature, and end of labour. Labour connects a man with his fellows, for it is an activity exercised for others, for those who direct the labour and pay the labourer, for those who want the labour done, for those dependent on the labourer. It connects a man with his fellows also in virtue of the fact, so prominent and necessary in modern industry, of co-operation and division of labour; for if we divide the labour required to secure a certain result, say, building a house, we must also have co-operation amongst the men who perform each his specific part in the whole. Again, labour furthers the individual well-being of the labourer for it is the expression of his individual will, the sphere in which he manifests his character and abilities, the sphere of opportunity for exhibiting honesty and sincerity of purpose; it gives him a claim on society, *e. g.*, in his right to

have a reward or wage for his labour; it procures him the means of subsistence, compels society to take care of his health and training; in short, it is the source of the good which he seeks as an individual member of society.

In view of all this, therefore, we can see at once not only that labour gives a man a place in a social whole of moral beings, not only that labour has a moral significance, but that labour is a form of the moral life itself. To labour is really and strictly to be moral. It is only part of the truth to say that a man's work is the sphere where he shows or can show his moral qualities, for this seems to imply that morality is one thing and his work another. Properly understood a man's labour *is* his moral life in one of the forms in which his moral life is lived. It is as much morality as the fulfilment of his obligations to his family, or the payment of his debts, or the telling of the truth; for in all of these alike we have primarily the same factors involved which make morality what it is,—the system of conditions connecting a man with his fellows for the common good of all, including himself.

Having thus indicated the moral meaning of labour, we may proceed to indicate its legal aspect, perhaps the more familiar aspect of the two. But before doing this we may bring out the significance of the above argument by a contrast and by some consequences. There is a form of activity dealing with objects of physical nature by physical means which has also an end in view, and yet this form of activity is not labour. I refer to 'play' or a 'game' or 'sport,' or however it be termed. The man who kicks an inflated elastic vessel about a field and assists or opposes some one who is also doing so, is not said to labour but to 'play a game'; yet he is using physical force over a physical body for an end. A man who makes a hole in the ground and propels a small ball in the direction of the hole, is also exerting physical activity, but is again, we say, 'playing,' not 'working.' What is the difference, then, between labour and play? The difference throws an instructive light on the above argument. That difference lies in the character of the end. The characteristics of a game are that its end is determined in a purely arbitrary manner, that the attainment of the end is essentially

incalculable and uncertain, that the result achieved in each case stands quite by itself, that the end has no significance beyond the moment, is fulfilled literally for its own sake.¹ In every one of these respects it differs from the end of labour. Reflection will show that all these elements are necessary, if the game is really a game; for they are all derived from the essential fact that a game is a deal with chance or contingency. With chance we can do as we please, by the very nature of chance; hence the arbitrary character of a game. We can make a game with any elements involving chance, an inflated vessel at football, three upright rods and a ball at cricket, and so on. If we are quite certain of accomplishing the end we set before us, if we can count on it being done with all the probability which is the guide of practical life, we say it is not a game at all; if the result practically always comes off there is none of the contrast between intention and expectation in which the very interest of a game lies. When again we are done with a given game, we are no better off for the next game than we were before, except so far as the skill in pursuing the game is concerned. But this skill never reaches the point of helping us to prophesy the result with certainty, otherwise we cease to care for the game. And the man who has something to gain by the game, whose life is perturbed by the result, or whose status in society is at all affected by it, is not a player; we call him a professional, a man whose business it is to play, who plays for a reward and not for the sake of the game itself, who has a serious end beyond the game. But in labour the ends are set by the very conditions of human existence and are determined by the ends of living and of living well, ends which are in the control or arbitrary choice of no one. The attainment of these ends must be certain, calculable, and reliable, otherwise we cannot pursue them continuously and stake our very lives upon their attainment. The result of each day's work or of each bit of work does not stand by itself; it is bound up with the whole plan and structure of a man's purposes in life; it forms a part, and a necessary part, of a wider whole with which his life and the lives of others are bound up.

¹ In this respect a game resembles an art.

And the end of labour is not an end in itself but subordinate to, conditioning and conditioned by, the other ends of society, because it forms part of the general well-being of a community and ministers thereto. Hence it is that in labour we have the seriousness which characterizes devotion to a lasting purpose; in play the delight and amusement in transitory ends. In labour the conditions of acting are *laws* which are imposed on individuals as *obligations* and *duties*, to which we can even assign an eternal significance; while in a game the conditions are *rules*, arbitrarily laid down and binding on none but those who choose to play. In labour as in morality there are no amateurs, and no professionals; but all are more or less unsuccessful strugglers towards a better life.

As regards the consequences of this view of labour: it follows from the conception of labour here put forward that it is impossible to separate the labour element in society from the general social life or from the general well-being of the community, and, on the other hand, it is equally impossible to separate the labourer from his task. Labour is, on the one hand, social service for the common good; on the other, it is the sphere of individual effort, responsibility, and, if possible, development. From the point of view of the social whole there is no difference in kind between the workman who builds houses, the capitalist who contracts for the work, the lawyer who draws up contracts, or those who make the law and see the contract carried out. For all these are forms of social service, all are ways of realizing the one end and the common good of all. The difference lies in the way the service is rendered, and the extent of well-being accomplished by each. If they differ in degree of worth or value for the whole, as they do, we must not confuse this with a denial of any worth at all to the lower, because it is not on the same level as the higher. Each has a moral value of its own, is a certain form of moral activity, the attainment of part of the common good. From this we see (1) that there is no moral *separation* of one section from another in a community (however great the *distinction* between class and class may be), because the good of a community is one in nature, though manifold in form. Dis-

tinctions between classes there are, but separation there cannot be, because all aim at securing the common good; and this makes each class what it is in the social whole. The common good at which each separately aims is also what holds all together. (2) The interests of social order, of morality, and the interests of labour are bound up together. The interests of labour are not merely the interests of its own class or of other classes, they are the interests of the moral life, the moral order of the *whole* of society. To further and secure the well-being of labour is therefore to further the well-being of society as a whole. And the only way to treat the problems of labour adequately is to treat them from the point of view of their true ethical significance. In short, labour problems are in the long run strictly moral problems, and the furtherance of the well-being of labour and labourers is essential to the attainment of the well-being of a community.

Again, we said that the labour a man does is an expression of his own individual will and has a value for himself. We cannot separate what a man does from the spirit in which he does it. Not merely does a man's work react on the man,—as is so often said in connection with the effect of machinery on the labourer,—it is equally true that a man's character, mind, and will determine the character of his labour, no matter what the labour be, whether it be sweeping the streets, or sailing the seas. Carlyle once said of a bad workman engaged on a job in Carlyle's house, that he broke the whole decalogue with every stroke of his hammer. And the remark goes to the root of the meaning of labour, so far as the labourer is concerned. We cannot separate the way a man does a task from the task which he does. The result will inevitably vary with what the man is and the way he does it. No doubt we may, and for practical purposes do, neglect the differences between men or the differences between their work: but only when it is practically convenient for us to neglect them, or when the differences do not count. Thus we might say that a number of men are doing the same work when each is breaking stones, or building a wall. But each is really, when you come to analyse the situation, building the wall in a different way from another, according to the man each is; and

the difference will appear either in amount done, or the quality of the work. Such differences in many cases *do* count and are reckoned with; hence the difference in the rate of pay on the one hand (a very serious way of indicating the difference between individual workmen), and the introduction of piece-work labour on the other, which is also a way of taking advantage of and bringing out the individual differences between workmen. It is questionable if under any circumstances it is even theoretically possible for two workmen to do exactly the same bit of work without some characteristic difference appearing either in the time, quality, or quantity of the work. But whether this speculative question can be settled or not, practice shows that the individual and his labour vary together. The man in performing his task is realizing an end of his own, irrespective of the kind of material he is working with, be it iron, wood, or coal, or anything we please; and in realizing an end of his own, he is to that extent realizing his life in a specific way.

From this we see (1) that in all labour individuality counts, and has to be reckoned with; (2) that since a man is a moral being, is never merely a means for others, but in part at least an end in himself, a labourer can never in fact, and should never even in intention, toil merely for wages, but in order to do his work well, and to do it as a way of fulfilling his life. If he toil for anything else, *e. g.*, for wages, he is making *himself* a means for others who pay him, and in that sense *enslaving himself* (a position which so many workmen very readily forget). (3) We see too that it is the business of the labourer not merely to compel *others* to recognise the ethical importance of himself and his work for society, but to recognize for *himself* the individual responsibilities under which he is placed in performing his task. Far too often we find that labour questions are discussed by labourers altogether from the first point of view. Labourers tend to ignore altogether the second, which is indeed so important that until and unless the labourer is aware of the moral responsibility under which he rests for the performance of his own task, it is worse than useless, it is sheer impertinence, to ask society to further his interests. (4) It follows, again, that since in the performance of his task in-

telligence counts, for intelligence is a part of his mental equipment for his work, there are bound to arise in the history of labour differences of excellence both in the performance of the work and the nature of the work to be performed. Hence the difference which has arisen and must arise between skilled and unskilled labour: hence the absolute necessity for training, and, as a consequence, of schools of instruction or technical education. And finally (5) we see that if a stage in the development of a given kind of labour arises where a labourer can perform his work without bringing out to any extent his individual interest in his work, the sooner that work is undertaken by another agency the better for the workman and the better for the work. Now it is just at this stage that such an agency does appear in the form of machinery. When labourers do work in which individual ends and individual needs cannot be expressed, it can be and should be done by some lower agency which can produce the same result. The conditions required for such an agency are that the movements necessary to produce the work should be uniform in character, should be continuous, should not vary in the course of repetition, and should be more or less coherent. A machine is precisely an instrument or agency which can carry through movements with those characteristics. Monotony, which is the extremity or limit of efficient labour for the individual, is the opportunity for the machine. And when such monotony in production is obtained, it is time to hand it over to machinery. It is only a question of time and intellectual ingenuity before the man will appear who can invent the machine to do the work. Such an instrument, therefore, is not merely a 'labour-saving' apparatus; it saves the labourer himself, preserves him from monotony in his work, sets his mind free for other things. So far from being the enemy of the workman, it is the friend of the workman, and so far from destroying individuality, it is the only way of saving individuality from destruction. A true insight, therefore, will lead the workman to welcome the construction and the utmost use of machinery. And the history of machinery in industry bears this out completely. For while it has been the cause of temporary discomfort when those en-

gaged in the industry have had their part taken over by machinery, it has been merely a question of time for those so engaged to find more humanising tasks and for the industrial world itself to be immensely enriched as a whole by the introduction of the machine.

Now to come to the legal aspect; and with this we can deal more shortly. The legal aspect arises from the fact that labour is a function exercised in the interests of the well-being of the community, and can make claims upon the community for the security and maintenance of that function, claims which the community as such must acknowledge and sustain, not merely for the sake of labour itself, but for its own sake. These claims are what we call rights, and the business of determining, asserting, and maintaining rights is undertaken by the state. The form in which those rights are prescribed by the state and recognized by the members of a state is what we call Law. A law is a regulation or universal condition laid down by the state in order to fix the relation between persons in the state in their pursuit of what all persons and powers in a society aim at—the well-being of the whole. Thus labour, having a position in society, in virtue of its effort to attain the common good, has necessarily rights on the one hand and legal conditions of existence on the other. These rights it must seek to find out and make good before the whole community, and these rights the state must, in the interests of the whole community, fix in definite shape and see carried out. Here, then, we have at once the justification for any and every attempt on the part of labour and labour associations to make their case and their position in the community understood. If this has to be done by means of opposition to other powers and interests, that must be accepted as a condition of the struggle. Opposition will be and must be offered, because finding our rights means in a sense finding our limitations with reference to others in the state; and we cannot find our limitations without rubbing against other people and other things. In the long run labour is bound to succeed in its effort to have its rights recognized and established by law; for failure to admit its claims is a standing peril to the harmony of the community, and prevents the

realisation of the very well-being of the community. This struggle to get rights admitted may lead, as it has recently in Great Britain, to the necessity of labour representation in parliament, a result which is at once an indication of the size of the labour class in the community, and of their power to see their case fully stated—a result, too, which every wise member of society will welcome. The struggle may and does involve organisation of ways and means, for organisation is a source of strength and compels attention by the sheer weight of its massed opinion. Hence the origin of, and, we may say, the necessity for, Trade-Unions of every kind, which are more and more assuming a political as well as an economic significance, and are being endowed by the state with powers of their own of even a sinister kind, as in the case of the recent Trades Disputes Act.

The rights to which labour may lay claim are primarily of two kinds, the right of property and the right of contract, and of the two the latter is the more prominent. Labour is, as we saw, the performance of a function for some end in which the community is concerned. The end lies, in the case of labour, beyond the workman. It is a subordinate end; as we say the labour is done for his master or for some end determined by another, an end which is not the workman's and not found in the work itself, and is compensated in the form of payment or wages. In the very nature of labour, therefore, we have implied a relation between persons, the labourer on the one hand and the master on the other. To maintain that relation securely, both as to the doing of the work and the reward to be obtained, it is required that the two parties concerned have a hold on the actions of each other, and have the power to anticipate what each in the future (so long as the relation lasts) will do. The expression of this mutual reliance may be implicit in the form of mutual trust, or it may be explicit. It can always be made explicit, and when this is done it appears in the form of what is called Contract. The right of contract, therefore, is inherent in the very nature of labour. Moreover, a man cannot make a contract with another unless he has something to contract

with, and has the power to claim the result of the contract. What he possesses are his capacities on the one hand and the use of his tools, etc., on the other; and what he earns as the result of the contract is his reward or wages. The right of contract carries with it, therefore, the right of property, and *vice versa*. It is within these conditions that the rights of labour are asserted. And both can be determined and carried out to any extent consistent with the position of the labourer in the state.

The only question regarding these rights is the limits within which they can be asserted. Now these limits are determined simply by reference to (1) the well-being of the whole community, and (2) the share of the individual workman in the general good. It is not in the interests of the community to sanction contracts for labour which are made under any compulsion, for the essence of a contract implies freedom of personality in the forming of the contract. Compelled labour is slave labour in all but the name; and such forms of labour stand condemned by the very purposes of the community. It is again not in the interests of a community to sanction contracts for labour which is carried on under conditions which imperil the life and safety of those engaged in the labour, for that is subordinating the person to the contract instead of the contract to the person. Hence, *e. g.*, 'sweated' labour, which is carried on at the expense of the well-being of the toiler, must be suppressed in the interests of the community. The same is true of labour under dangerous conditions; hence the origin of protective legislation for labour. Further, the well-being of a community can only be secured by the fullest and freest development of the power of the labouring individuals composing the community. An absolutely essential condition for this is an efficient provision of the very means of subsistence. There can be no good life without life itself. To be unable to secure this absolute minimum for subsistence is therefore hostile to the very well-being of the community. From this it follows as a direct corollary that a minimum living wage ought to be fixed and recognized by the State as resolutely as it is insisted on by labourers themselves. Once more, since free-

dom is of the essence of contract, and the end of contract is the furtherance of the good of the community, any attempt to check or suppress the free exercise of this right is hostile not merely to the interests of the workman but to the community as well. For that reason there seems no justification for the action of Trade-Unions in frustrating contracts made by non-unionists on the one hand, or for preventing the operation of piece-work contract on the other. Their attempt to control the output of work and their hostility to machinery stand condemned by what has already been said of the ethical meaning of labour, and the significance of machinery.

I am aware that all this is a general statement of principles and not a concrete statement of details, but perhaps the former may be more useful at the present time than the latter. For a grasp of principle is often more important for the student of social problems than a mass of detail.

In conclusion, labour, we have said, is a form of social activity in the interests of the common good; and all its questions are ultimately not economic but moral, and must find ethical solutions. But labour is no more than a form of man's general activity in the community. To regard it as the whole, or as the primary form, is to distort the position of labour itself. It is never an end in itself; and that is in a large measure the source of the irksomeness and wearisomeness of labour. But man as a whole is an end in himself, and must therefore have other ends than those of labour to make up the complete sum of human good. If, therefore, opposition of classes in a community is hostile to the general good and unjustifiable for the reason shown, the attempt to erect the labour class into the whole state is not merely foolishness, it is a degradation of mankind. And if that be true, all attempts to establish a labour-state, all forms of socialism on a purely labour basis, are seen to be the dreams of extravagant enthusiasts, and the outcome of a very one-sided conception of human good.

J. B. BAILLIE.

REALISTIC CONCEPTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.¹

TO attempt a definition of consciousness is to plunge at once into the midst of current philosophic controversy. Such an attempt may be foolhardy for one not blessed with overmuch confidence in his powers of discrimination, but it has the merit of approaching present-day issues from an angle which promises most in the way of clear-cut differentiation and demarcation. Moreover, our quest for a definition of consciousness may disclaim in advance all pretense of originality. Its purpose is primarily to use the concept of consciousness as a standard of reference in the comparison of contemporary theories, in the belief that the concept thus used will furnish a convenient and suggestive means of orientation.

Our consideration of current theories will concern itself chiefly with the movement which at present passes under the name of realism, and which has shown such surprising vitality. To some minds, indeed, this movement, while it has undoubtedly stimulated inquiry into the nature of consciousness, is merely a transient disturbance, an outbreak of insurgent tendencies, such as are constantly recurrent in the course of speculative thinking, but which, in the present instance, at least, argue nothing but a lack of proper historical perspective. It is a well-known fact, however, that even those who occupy exalted positions may guess wrong on insurgency. Present-day realism is not only a widespread and determined movement, but the "Program and First Platform of Six Realists," published not long ago,² is evidence that we are dealing with organized revolt, which is undeniably a phenomenon of peculiar interest in philosophy. There seems to be no reliable evidence at present that the realistic movement is on the decline.

In this movement there is undoubtedly much that may well enlist our sympathies and win our assent. But unfortunately

¹ Read before the joint session of the Western Philosophical Association and the American Psychological Association, Minneapolis, December 29, 1910.

² *Journal of Phil., Psych., and Sci. Methods*, Vol. VII, pp. 393 ff.

the point is soon reached where we are embarrassed by the question of interpretation. It is often not so much what is said as what is left unsaid that causes hesitation and suspicion. After all, it cannot be denied that realism was formerly in evil repute, and so there is a natural wish for further assurance regarding its tendencies and implications. Our sympathies are hence likely to place us in the perplexing position of the voter whose representative in Congress is under suspicion of serving the powers of darkness at Washington, but who is decorously insurgent at home. Contemporary realism has about it the air of a propaganda; as one of its adherents remarks, it is something between a tendency and a school. Inquiry soon shows that realism is a term covering attitudes which in some cases are ill-defined, not to say ambiguous, and in other cases are widely divergent from each other.

In view of these facts, it is not a matter for surprise that realism should offer a variety of definitions of consciousness. Among those which have attracted attention of late may be mentioned the doctrines that consciousness is awareness or apprehension, that it is a name for a certain context or setting in which experiences occur, and that it is identical with the function of representation or meaning. Of these views the first can claim to stand nearest to historical realism. In its conception of objectivity it occupies exactly the same ground as its predecessor. Its aim, accordingly, is to interpret consciousness in such a way that it may give a true report of things, and, in particular, that it may avoid the error of copyism. Hence Professor McGilvary identifies consciousness with plain awareness, while Mr. G. E. Moore speaks of a 'diaphanous element,' and Mr. Hobhouse has recourse to 'simple apprehension.' While these writers exhibit different degrees of thoroughness and detail in the elaboration of their respective views, they seem to agree that consciousness is merely an abstract element in the total experience, an element which is variously indicated as awareness, diaphaneity, or apprehension, but which is not further analyzable or definable. These statements regarding consciousness are meant to guard against the notion that the object

presented to consciousness is itself constituted by consciousness; and they show how radical the revision of consciousness must be if the error of the earlier realism is to be avoided. Consciousness is stripped of all content and reduced to a simple, unanalyzable element, because this is the only effective guarantee that it will not obtrude itself improperly and thus interfere with the business of knowing.

This theory of consciousness does not, of course, intend to confer upon all facts of which there is awareness the same objective status. In pains, illusions, and dreams, and in all errors of judgment, the awareness has to do with objects which, according to the best available evidence, have existence only during the time of awareness. These objects, then, differ from other objects in that the reaction of the experiencing organism serves not only to make them known, but to bring them into being. Hence this form of realism is forced to maintain that the response of the organism which is involved in the fact of consciousness may be of two kinds: it may be a response which has no further bearing or function than to present to consciousness a pre-existent object, or it may be a response which is an indispensable condition, not merely of the awareness, but of the existence or being of the object thus presented. ✕

It seems, then, that we are obliged to postulate a definite, specifiable difference in the responses of the organism, if the doctrine of 'independent objects' is to be kept on its feet. This assumption, of course, is not based upon observed differences in the behavior of organisms, but upon the implications of realistic theory. If the sole purpose of the response, in the case of independent objects, is to present these objects to consciousness, this response must not be complicated with any factors which would make the thing known bear an indispensable reference to the organism. Reflections of this kind lead us at once into the psychology of perception and raise the question of the relation of associative processes and motor response to perception. If it is true, as there is excellent authority for believing, that perceptions of all kinds are acts involving motor responses of a complex kind, if perception is, in short, an act of

adaptation and hence determined, as to its character, by the constitution and previous history of the organism, then the independent objects are, indeed, in a bad way. The distinction between the kinds of objects is then no longer determined by reference to the organism, since they all have this reference, but by reference to function or behavior. In other words, our conception and criterion of objectivity undergoes a change which abandons all that is distinctive in the theory.

We approach the same matter from a different angle if we inquire how the distinction between the two kinds of objects gets itself made. To all appearances, the test is rather simple. We ascertain what is objective in the realistic sense and what is not by a test which Berkeley calls 'coherence,' and which others describe as context or relationship.¹ The futility of trying to jump out of our own skins in the way demanded by the copy theory is conceded on all hands. A given experience, therefore, is objective if it is bound up with other experiences in a certain way, while a different kind of relationship gives to it the status of subjectivity. The book before me is an objective fact if others can share the experience and if certain tests can be applied to it; otherwise it is subjective.

The realist who sets up this test ordinarily seems to assume that the context or relationship is added to the presented fact *ab extra* and *ex post facto*. Hence we are invited to concentrate our attention upon the immediately given fact, and we are admonished to note that the fact as here and now experienced is at all events an assured possession, whatever we may consider appropriate to infer about it afterwards. The colored outline before me is what it is; if subsequently I discover that it is objective or subjective, this discovery is in the nature of an addendum.

This interpretation, however, involves an artificial simplification of the facts. It is true that a subsequent experience sometimes causes us to change our classification, as is evidenced by illusions and dreams. But it is not true that all context falls

¹ Cf. McGilvary, "Realism and the Physical World," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. IV, p. 688; and Hobhouse, *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 35, note.

entirely outside the presented fact, *i. e.*, that the fact is given independently of all context. The character of the experience itself is determined by the context in which it is found to occur. To see a tree, for example, is not merely to experience a colored outline. It means that we somehow experience, here and now, the context upon which its status as object depends. In psychological language, the visual impression is modified by tactual and other impressions. The experience, in short, does not offer merely a lump sum of sensuous fact, but it presents a tree. It has the character of objectivity by virtue of the immediately experienced claim to possess validity. This claim may of course turn out to be unfounded, but that is quite another matter.

The point that I wish to urge is that experience does not give us fact and meaning or validity apart from each other, but that the character of validity is experienced as immediately as anything else. The validity may indeed be tested in a subsequent experience, but such testing merely confirms or refutes what is already presented. The meaning does not fall outside of the fact. The facts given in experience are meaningful facts. If, therefore, we attribute to any such facts the status of 'independent objects,' the meaning must share in this independence. If meanings can exist independently, however, then any kind of object can exist independently, and the distinction between *kinds* of objects disappears. On the other hand, if meaning depends upon the individual, we must attempt to differentiate within the given experience between fact and meaning. That is to say, the fact apart from meaning cannot be found simply by reference to any actual experience, but only through an elaborate process of abstraction. The facts are not independent facts at all, but what the idealist loves to call 'moments' within concrete or actual experience.

All this is merely another way of saying that the appeal to coherence or relationship involves a serious ambiguity. This appeal is intended to mark a contrast or opposition between the presented fact and its setting, context, or meaning. This opposition between the fact and its meaning is necessary, since otherwise the theory cannot get under way. The fact is there in its

wholeness, but its status or quality as subjective or objective is yet to be determined. In other words, the contrast lies between the fact and its validity. If, however, the presented fact already possesses meaning or claims validity, the contrast is not a contrast of fact and validity, but of valid fact and subsequent validating experience. And since all our experiences normally possess meaning, we are obliged to conclude that facts which are objective in the accepted realistic sense are meaningful facts; which is equivalent to saying that meanings can exist objectively in precisely the same fashion as any other character pertaining to objects. The transcendentalist plainly has no monopoly of the cherished privilege of hypostasizing meanings.¹

The statement that our experiences somehow include a context does not mean that we invariably or even usually classify our experiences as objective or subjective. It aims rather to emphasize the 'organic unity' of fact and meaning. Our visual perception of the tree is not a color and an outline *plus* a reference to further qualities; in the experience as it actually occurs the qualities and reference are not given either separately or as a collection. We call the experience a tree because the separateness of fact and meaning does not exist. The peculiarity of the situation lies in the fact that while certain qualities, such as the tactual, are not present in the way that others are, they nevertheless are present in their own way and play a part. This peculiar presence in absence is reflected in the being of what is immediately present and endows it with the character of validity. The validity is not only experienced in the same immediate way as the color, it may even be said, with a little license, that the validity is the color. The assertion, then, that validity or membership in a certain context or setting is immediately experienced is intended primarily as a protest against the opposition between fact and meaning upon which this realism is based. If this opposition is unwarranted, the realism fails, since it would hardly be permissible to transfer this validity to 'objective' fact.

Essentially the same difficulty confronts us if we turn to the

¹Cf. McGilvary, *Loc. cit.*, especially pp. 686 and 687, and Hobhouse, pp. 17 and 35.

form of realism advocated by Professor Fullerton. This realism differs from the foregoing in the fact that it surrenders the notion of objectivity in the Lockean sense and confines itself to experiences which are admittedly dependent, as to their character, upon the bodily senses. There is, consequently, no need of postulating an awareness or apprehension. Consciousness is identified with facts belonging to the subjective order, and the distinction between the subjective and the objective is determined, as in the former case, by context or setting. The context, however, is not merely a means of determining what is really subjective and objective, but it *constitutes* subjectivity and objectivity. Hence the criterion is applied differently. All experiences are determined by relation to organism, and thus, from this standpoint, they are all subjective. But they also have a place in the course of events or system of facts which is described as the objective order, and so, from this point of view, they are objective. The status of an experience, therefore, depends, as Professor James puts it, upon these respective 'takings.' Apart from these contexts it is neither subjective nor objective, but just 'pure experience.'¹

It was argued a moment ago that our experiences are not so independent of context or 'detachable' from it as realism seems to assume. Experiences present themselves with the character of validity, *i. e.*, they are invested with the function of a symbol. And we find in Professor Fullerton's presentation, that, as a matter of fact, the character of the given experience as subjective or objective is determined, not primarily by an external relation of the experience to other experiences, but by its inherent character as a symbol. The experience is subjective or objective according to the manner in which this symbolic character is present. If we recognize the experience explicitly as a symbol, it is classed as an appearance and is hence subjective. Thus we say that the tree on the horizon appears as a faint blue, but is 'really' a bright green. On the other hand, if the symbol manages to conceal its character as a symbol, it is called an object. Visual experiences functioning as signs of tactual experiences furnish flagrant

¹*System of Metaphysics*, Chapters VI and VII.

examples. They constantly present to us "the world in which I rest when I insist that I *see* the real desk before me as it is and reject the suggestion that I am deluded by an empty appearance. I confound sign and thing signified, it is true; but this particular sign gives me the thing so satisfactorily that I rest in the thing without being forced to the recognition that I am grasping it, so to speak, at one remove."¹

On certain other occasions, however, the context manages to get within the given experience, not merely factitiously, through the sleight-of-hand whereby we "confound sign and thing signified," but in actual bodily presence. An imaginary line, we are told, "is conceived as vaguely localized in space. It is out beyond us, looked at from a more or less definite point of view, and we measure it by moving an imaginary finger to it and along it. It is visual sensation as interpreted, not visual sensation pure and simple. The sign upon which we have elected to gaze has dragged in with it the thing signified. We are dealing with a *real* line, not with a merely visual experience."²

These results would seem to warrant the conclusion that the differentiation of consciousness and object may occur in at least four different ways. The given experience may acquire a context through a process of reflection instituted subsequently to the occurrence of the experience. Or it may function explicitly as a symbol, which involves some sort of conscious reference to the organism. Or, again, the symbolism may be implicit only, so that the experience appears rather as object than as consciousness. Or, lastly, the experience functioning as a symbol may be so completely transformed and assimilated to the other qualities constituting the object as to lose its separateness and identity.

To construe all these experiences in terms of context seems to be a pointless proceeding, unless we assume sensations which possess an identity of their own, apart from meanings. In the visual experience of the line, for example, the visual sensation must be regarded as the fact and the rest as context. But if the

¹ *Op.cit.*, p. 154.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 151-2.

visual sensation is the fact which here appears in an objective context, we are forced to conclude that the object is not experienced at all. If we insist, on the other hand, that the line is the object, the character of objectivity is made to fall within the experience, and the relation to other experiences does not constitute objectivity, but is merely a test of objectivity. Similar remarks apply, of course, to the explanation which is given of consciousness. We have here the same confusion of the opposition between fact and validity with the opposition between valid fact and validating experience; and to this confusion we are indebted for the curious spectacle of a realistic philosophy rendered wholly in terms of a sensationalistic psychology. The hands are Esau's hands, but the voice is the voice of Jacob. The statement that an experience is consciousness if it is assigned to a place in the 'subjective order' is not an explanation, but a surrender to the hypnotizing influence of a phrase.

The foregoing discussion suggests two divergent roads of advance. On the one hand, we may attempt an analysis of the experiences which determine the differentiation of consciousness and object, in the hope that the genesis of these latter will give us a clue to their nature. Or, on the other hand, we may take as our point of departure those experiences in which the distinction of consciousness and object, or of symbol and symbolized, is an experienced content. The latter alternative is the one adopted by Professor Woodbridge, who also calls himself a realist. The experiences which function explicitly as a symbol are polarized, so to speak, and show an objective and a subjective end. They possess certain qualities and they also fulfil the function of representation. The sense-qualities, considered apart from the function of meaning, are adequately accounted for by the relation of interaction between organism and environment. Professor Woodbridge agrees, apparently, that we must start with sense-experiences which are conditioned by our sense-organs.¹ Consciousness supervenes when meaning is added, *i. e.*, when objects take on the function of representation. In the conscious situation, therefore, we find it possible to distinguish between the

¹ *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. VI, p. 449.

relation of meaning and the other relations or qualities pertaining to things. Moreover, these relations of meaning are the differentia of the conscious situation, as conscious; hence consciousness is identifiable with meaning.¹

This definition brings us back once more to the distinction between objects which exist only when they are objects of consciousness and objects which are independent of consciousness. Pleasures and pains are as much objects of consciousness as desks and books. This distinction, however, between kinds of objects cannot be referred to differences of context, in the sense that the objects are first given as facts and subsequently acquire meanings. To be facts for us at all they must already possess meanings. The facts appear in contexts merely in the sense that the valid or meaningful fact points to a further validating experience. The validity is immediately experienced, but it is an experience which Professor Woodbridge seems to regard as not further analyzable. The tale is told when the statement is made that objects possess the function of meaning or representation.

This point marks the divergence between the view of Professor Woodbridge and that of Professor Dewey. According to the latter, the nature of meaning or validity may be ascertained more in detail if we analyze the situation in which this function has its origin. The strategic point of attack, therefore, lies in what he calls the doubt-inquiry-answer situation. Such a situation is at odds with itself, because it incites mutually incompatible modes of adjustment. In other words, the doubt and hesitation arise from the fact that the stimulus is more or less indeterminate. In order to dispel the doubt and resolve the conflict, it is necessary to reconstitute the stimulus. To take the classic illustration of the child and the candle, the struggle is ended when the bright somewhat of the earlier moment is finally seen as a candle. Until this point is reached, it constitutes the center of tension, it is a 'candidate for reform.' Doubt, therefore, means a lack of adjustment; while, conversely, the experience of validity is a felt

¹ *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 119; also *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*, chapter on "The Problem of Consciousness."

or experienced adjustment with reference to further conduct or behavior.¹

On this ground it obviously becomes necessary to revise the view that the nature of sense-material—or the nature of physical qualities—is sufficiently explained by reference to the interaction between organism and environment. This view implies the same false opposition between sense-content and meaning; and it is only on the assumption of such an opposition that the identification of consciousness with meaning is significant. According to instrumentalism, the opposition between sense-impression and meaning is strictly relative to the situation in which the opposition arises. We distinguish between the two, not because the sense-element is experienced apart from the meaning, but because it is experienced as doubtful or uncertain. When alternative meanings present themselves, the distinction between the 'that' and the 'what' becomes inevitable, particularly since the character of the sense-impression is normally uncertain merely in some one respect, but not in others. Thus the candle may be localized and its outline and size definitely determined; what is uncertain is whether it will burn the fingers. Hence the contrast and opposition between fact and idea, between datum and ideatum. Even when the situation is too vague for definite alternatives, the sense-impression retains its meaning as a problem, as a matter for investigation. To abstract this meaning and assign to the sense-content a status antecedent to all meaning is to destroy its character entirely. Incidentally, also, we introduce an opposition between thought and sense which can never be overcome. The endeavor to ascertain the meaning of the stimulus is not an attempt to introduce meanings from without, but to effect the right change in the quality of what is presented, *i. e.*, to ascertain what attitude or response is appropriate to the situation.

This process of transformation brings an experienced contrast into the situation, and it is in this contrast that we find our clue to the differentiation of the subjective and the objective. The

¹Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*; also "The Reflex Arc Concept," *Psychological Review*, Vol. III, p. 358.

transformation or struggle as a process is set over against the final result, as appearance is set over against reality. From the standpoint of appearance, or doubt, it is classed as subjective. Some form of crisis or conflict or instability is present wherever attention is present; hence all experiences have a subjective aspect. On the other hand, the final product or result of the process is what gives us a 'permanent or stable object of reference,' and is hence classed as object. To possess meaning, to control adjustment, and to be an object are synonymous expressions. To be experienced as an object is to be experienced in terms of an adjustment in which the previous conflict is harmonized and resolved. When the candle is finally seen as a candle, it is seen with the finger-tips as well as with the retina. That is to say, the experienced character of an object is determined by the response which it evokes.

This contrast between the subjective and the objective also introduces a distinction between what we experience and the process of experiencing. In the course of experience certain appearances are discredited, certain meanings are cast aside, while others are accredited and confirmed. Hence arises the question as to the laws which govern the process or course of experiencing. This question determines the task and province of psychology. According to Professor Dewey, the differentia of psychology is not a special subject-matter or kind of existence called consciousness, but rather its problem, "the problem of the *course* of the acts that constitute experiencing."¹

In addressing himself to this task, the psychologist first analyses the experience with which he happens to be concerned into its elements. His mode of approach is illustrated in the quotation from Professor Fullerton, according to which the visual perception of a line is "visual sensation as interpreted, not visual sensation pure and simple. The sign upon which we have elected to gaze has dragged in with it the thing signified." In other words, the psychologist regards the perception as consisting, in the first instance, of a visual sensation, which is 'the sign upon which we elect to gaze.' By following this procedure

¹Dewey, *Influence of Darwin*, etc., chapter on "'Consciousness' and Experience."

he wins the privilege of looking on while the 'thing signified' is being dragged in and placed on exhibition. Stated less dramatically, it means that by breaking up the concrete experience into sense-elements, he is enabled to discover the laws, such as apperception, association, or habit, according to which the experience takes place. These laws are valid for experience, even though the 'sensations' or 'states of consciousness' are entities or objects which the psychologist himself creates in the furtherance of his purposes.

On the basis of the foregoing, the definition of consciousness can be given only in terms of these constructs whereby the psychologist accomplishes the end which he has in view. 'Consciousness' is a name for the 'sensations,' 'states of consciousness,' or 'psychic events' which emerge as the results or products of the psychological investigation. They have no proper status or existence elsewhere. The endless complications of epistemology have been due almost entirely to the fact that these products are supposed to have an antecedent existence. If we start with states of consciousness, it is always found necessary to go forth and with violent hands drag in the objects, since they will not listen to the voice of reason, charm it never so wisely.

Limitations of time do not permit more than this hasty outline of the standpoint to which Professor Dewey has given the name of instrumentalism or immediate empiricism. Whether it is a tenable theory is a question which had perhaps better be postponed until further criticism and reflection furnishes a larger perspective. The theory, however, enables us to make a tentative evaluation of the realistic movement. The chief significance of the latter doubtless lies in the fact that it constitutes a protest against subjectivism and transcendentalism, and that it compels a reconsideration of first principles. The insistence that knowing involves an 'external' relation between consciousness and object means, in the first instance, that knowing is a natural event, without transcendental implications, and that what is known is something other than a state of consciousness. The realistic movement as a whole, however, lacks the coherence to establish itself as a rival doctrine, because, after all, it perpetuates the

fundamental fallacy of the subjectivism and transcendentalism which it seeks to displace. In each case the 'external' relation of consciousness and object is so interpreted as to introduce an irreconcilable opposition between sense-data and meaning. The distinction between datum and ideatum, which is valid only within certain situations, is converted into an absolute distinction, and the sense-data are made logically and perhaps temporally prior to the meanings. This is characteristic of all subjectivism, and it furnishes the starting-point, historically, for transcendentalism. In thus separating fact and meaning, we lose the key to the situation. Hence, subjectivism, vainly attempting to avoid solipsism and inconsistency, has been obliged to resort either to the shuffling or compounding of the sense-data or 'mental states,' or to the introduction of an additional element in the form of concept or meaning. Transcendentalism, on its part, has sought to regain the objective world in a manner peculiarly its own. It postulates a transcendental or universal element which exists in the particular facts in such a way that they lose their particularity. The valid experience and the validating experience somehow possess an ontological identity. By virtue of this element, thought is both logical and ontological, and the distinction between consciousness and object is both maintained and overcome. But the need of all this machinery is not made apparent, and the reconciliation and harmonizing of the particular and the universal has hitherto remained unaccomplished.

How this opposition between sense-datum and meaning is carried over into present-day realism, I have attempted to make clear in the preceding discussion. The doctrine of awareness or apprehension postulates sense-data which give us 'absolute' fact, in the traditional realistic sense, apart from interpretation. In so doing it not only involves itself in the difficulties that are raised by the facts relating to the relativity of sense-perception, but it finds itself compelled to substitute tacitly a different object, an object to which it can show no legitimate title. Professor Fullerton escapes the difficulties of sense-relativity, but has no further advantage over the other theory. Nor does the theory of Professor Woodbridge account for the relation of

sensation and meaning. It starts from the point of achieved adjustment, and this fact constitutes its essential limitation and defect. It omits from consideration the experiences of struggle and transformation, and so it fails to appreciate the function which meanings fulfill. These experiences reveal to us most clearly the relation in which ideas stand to fact; and it is at this point accordingly that, in the language of Professor Royce, we attack the world-knot in the way that promises most for the untying of its meshes; whereas, if we begin with the world of fact, we are sunk deep in an ocean of mysteries. To abstract the relation of meaning from its antecedents is to reduce it to the status of an unanalyzable datum and to convert our objects into a hard and fast given. The relation of consciousness to its objects becomes as inscrutable as that of concepts to the ready-made material of sense-impressions to which they are superadded. Hence this abstraction of meaning from the situation which gives it birth compels the return to an ideal of knowledge to which history has meted out a full measure of condemnation. To know things is not to eliminate struggle and to secure adjustment, but to reduce them progressively to universals or concepts, in the manner with which idealistic literature of a certain kind has made us sufficiently familiar.

By way of summary, then, we may say that the realistic movement is more significant in what it denies than in what it affirms. As a protest against subjectivism and transcendentalism it may be allowed to stand. As a rival doctrine it shows the same inherent weakness as the standpoints from which it dissents, save perhaps in the case of the realism which has not yet ventured beyond the hazy and ambiguous assertion that the relation of consciousness to its objects is an 'external' relation. As a distinct creed or school there seems to be no place for realism, but as a tendency or attitude in philosophy it is to be welcomed, since it brings back the spirit of independent inquiry and fastens attention upon problems which contain the promise of rich and permanent contributions to positive doctrine.

B. H. BODE.

IDEALS OF PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT.

THE argument of this paper is as follows. Philosophic thinking is dominated by either one of two ideals. These are in most discussions latent rather than explicit; they appeal to apparently opposed intellectual tempers, and when laid bare seem to contradict each other. They are beyond proof or refutation, yet are no mere subjective wishes, but, to those who possess them, necessities of thought. Yet one of them *must* be chosen by every philosopher, for they belong to the very essence of philosophic, as distinguished from common and from scientific thought. Hence on the great problems such as Rationalism, Idealism, and the like, a deadlock results; we find hostile schools, neither of which can argue down the other. The only way out of this deadlock—a way not travelled in the present paper—would be to show that these two ideals, when clearly conceived, do not conflict.

To unearth the ideals, let us first consider some recent utterances upon the question: Are relations internal or external to their terms? As we are not trying to settle the question, it will not be necessary to define the words "external" or "internal"; the presuppositions of the rival schools will be clear enough from their statements. For convenience we may call the two views "externalism" and "internalism" respectively.

We begin with the latter view. Professor Taylor says that if externalism be true "it becomes a standing miracle how or why any terms should enter into relations to which they are all the time absolutely indifferent."¹ Mr. Joachim says "a purely external relation is in the end meaningless and impossible."² "Why *this* atom should be related to *that*, or indeed any atom to any other, is a question which cannot be answered. It cannot be answered, for there is no rational ground for the relation."³ Their position thus seems to be, that a term cannot have a relation without something in its own character to account

¹*Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 148.

²*Nature of Truth*, p. 11.

³*Ibid.*, p. 44.

therefor, and thus the relation is logically implied inside the term. This rests in turn, I think, on a general presupposition that, for philosophical thought at least, nothing can be without a ground. Thus Mr. Joachim says, speaking of the reality of the given, "the bare fact that an apprehension is 'immediate' does not, to my mind, create a presumption in favor of its truth: on the contrary, it rouses suspicion. For an 'immediate apprehension' is one, the grounds of which are not stated; and . . . perhaps even there are no grounds."¹ Finally, he seems to admit that this assumption of a ground, though necessary, cannot be verified by observation and therefore is hardly a question of fact, for he says, "the truth which our sketch described is—from the point of view of human intelligence—an Ideal."² This presupposition now, that everything must have a ground (the principle of sufficient reason), constitutes one factor in what I shall call the ideal of rationality. Another factor will soon appear; together they make up the first of the two ideals mentioned at the outset.

This first factor is again brought to light if we consider one or two attempts at refutation of the intellectualism that seems implied in internalism, and see why they fail to refute. Professor MacLennan, in a paper devoted to Mr. Bradley's dialectic, accuses him of a false psychology of thought, *i. e.*, of making thought do what common thought does not naturally do.³ In the same vein, Mr. Schiller would forbid Mr. Bradley's method with the words "We have always to find out how men actually do feel and think before we can safely generalize or systematize as to what they *ought* to feel and think."⁴ But the intellectualist could reply to both critics that ideals of thought do not draw their validity from generalizations based upon common thought, but are authoritative in themselves. The worth of an ideal is not destroyed by showing that it is not fulfilled in common life. And the same answer could be made to Professor James's reply to the internalists when they accuse their opponents of irrationality. He says, "If 'irrational' here means simply

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 55. ² *Op. cit.*, p. 79.

³ *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. I, pp. 403ff.

⁴ *Humanism*, p. 228, note.

non-rational, or non-deducible from the essence of either term simply, it is no reproach."¹ Precisely so, if you do not feel the force of the postulate that everything must have a ground; but if you do, it is a reproach.

The presence of the second factor in our first ideal is revealed in a similar manner. We find that alleged refutations of Mr. Bradley's dialectic fail through not doing justice to another presupposition of the intellectualists. This one comes to light as follows. Professor James ascribed the contradictions to "the treating of a name as excluding from the fact named what the name's definition fails positively to include";² that is, to taking terms *in abstracto* as themselves and naught else. Another critic, Professor Boodin, likewise traces the fault to "taking thoughts as abstractions mutually exclusive, and then attempting to bring them together."³ So too Dr. Stout: "The whole argument seems to be vitiated by a confusion between ignoring and denying—between abstraction and hypostatizing the abstract object."⁴ And Mr. S. Hodgson speaks in the same way: "Mr. Bradley's argument rests on isolating and practically hypostatizing these terms, and then showing that so to hypostatize them is to make them self-contradictory."⁵ What these thinkers seem to me to overlook is that the hypostasis is no arbitrary matter, to be set up or stopped at pleasure. The rationalistic ideal commands us (and this is its second part) to take each term and each relation as just itself and nothing else (the law of identity), and it is this command which gives rise to the hypostasis. One may refuse to obey this order, but he does not thereby refute the validity of the rationalistic postulate, and has, so far, no right to blame those who accept it; he simply gives up the ideal. Professor Taylor, replying to Dr. Stout's assertions above quoted, shows that the latter escapes the contradictions of relation only by refusing to go on thinking, and by stopping with the words "continuity" and "relatedness." He

¹ *A Pluralistic Universe*, Appendix A, p. 363.

² *Ibid.*, p. 60.

³ *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, Vol. XIX, p. 309.

⁴ "Alleged Contradictions in the Concept of Relation," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1901-2, p. 13.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

says, "I cannot understand how mere insistence on the concrete unity of the fact makes the conjunction of its aspects more intelligible."¹ The root of the quarrel thus seems to be that Professor Taylor's party hold the ideal of rationality to be ultimate for thought: their opponents do not.

For just the same reason Mr. Hobhouse's criticism of the dialectic, careful and thorough as it is, seems to me inadequate. He lays his finger upon the law-of-identity motive in the ideal, but instead of refuting it, turns his back upon it. In treating the contradictions of the judgment 'A is B' he says, "You take 'is' as = 'is completely identical with' . . . then you get a contradiction. But if 'is' means 'is in one respect' = has an element, the contradiction vanishes."² "We should not come to the examination of the question with a ready-made theory of what any of the terms used, for example the copula, must mean."² But "if we take the conception from the facts as given, the contradiction ceases."³ That, however, is just what the intellectualist cannot do. The appeal to *fact* cannot satisfy the thinker who follows an *ideal*. His terms, copula, etc., must be interpreted according to that ideal. Professor Taylor's reply, quoted above, is still in point.

This ascription of internalism and intellectualism to an ideal is confirmed by the confession of Mr. Bradley himself. He has said in a recent paper, "The criterion of truth, I should say, as of everything else, is in the end the satisfaction of a want of our nature."⁴ And he had already said, "The way of philosophy . . . is not the way of life or of common knowledge, and to commit oneself to such a principle may be said to depend on choice."⁵ His opponent Mr. Russell has seen this too, for he says, speaking of the internalist view, "This opinion seems to rest upon some law of sufficient reason, some desire to show that every truth is 'necessary.'"⁶ I find no utterances which go

¹ *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 156.

² *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 166; p. 164.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 180 f.

⁴ *Mind*, Vol. XVIII, 1909, p. 490.

⁵ *Appearance and Reality*, 1st edition, p. 501.

⁶ *Mind*, Vol. XIX, 1910, p. 374.

nearer to the issue than these. The internalists make the choice of Mr. Bradley; they choose to regard the ideal of rationality as an end in itself, valid, like the categorical imperative of Kant, in spite of the needs of common thought or the pains of contradiction. Accordingly the appeal of their opponents to fact, practical needs, the actual constitution of every-day thinking, are as refutations misdirected because they overlook the appeal of the rationalist's ideal.

But we must now expose the second of our two ideals. For the externalists as well as the internalists are swayed by a need of thought. Improbable though it may sound, it seems fair to say that they obey a thoroughly "absolutist" demand, viz., the demand for absolute certainty here and now. That is, notwithstanding their disdain of their opponents' 'absolutism,' they themselves worship an 'absolute,' albeit of a somewhat different kind. The clearest and briefest statement of externalism seems to be that of Mr. B. Russell.¹ He says, in effect, that if A and B are related, while the relation is to any extent within the terms, or in any way modifies the terms, it is not A and B that are related, but A and B modified, *i. e.*, C and D. And the same must hold of C and D, and so on forever. So that in the end we should be able to make no statement not subject to revision. It is the penalty of not getting any finally true propositions that gives force to this argument. And what makes this penalty a penalty but the desire for unrevisable, that is, absolutely final, knowledge? Moreover, this accusation of absolutism that I make is confirmed by the fact that Mr. Russell advocates absolute position in time and space, and the "principle of abstraction." An opponent might reply to him, "I do not see why we finite thinkers must be able to make absolutely final statements; neither practical life nor pure science need any more than truth relative to their own spheres." But if Mr. Russell and other externalists believe that we must have such absolute certainty in our finite thinking, I do not see how they can be refuted, unless the validity of the rationalist's ideal, which ruins all propositions, is already begged.

¹*Principles of Mathematics*, Vol. I, p. 448.

Based upon the same ideal as Mr. Russell's are the arguments of Professor Spaulding.¹ The internalist, he says in effect, finds externalism contradictory because implying an infinite regress of relations; but in so doing the internalist really contradicts himself in turn. For the infinite regress is filled out by means of *extensional* logic, but its necessity is discovered by analyzing the *intension* of the concepts "term" and "relation"; and each method taken exclusively is the contradictory of the other. Now this accusation is damning to one who believes that our finite thought *must* not be contradictory. But to one who believes that we should follow the ideal of rationality wherever it leads, it is not enough to say that it leads him to contradiction. The internalist might reply that all discursive thinking leads to contradiction, but that "to think is no less a necessity." Mr. Spaulding, on the other hand, believes, if I understand him, that one can drop out the infinite number of successive relations between relations and terms, if to use them brings contradiction. And he would, I think, point to the case, in mathematics, where we sum an infinite series and do not delay upon the infinity of terms within the series. It is simply that he does not feel bound by the demand for ultimate rationality, but is content to stop with the actually reached result, as science and practice do. This refutation of Mr. Bradley's contradictions and of internalism is like the old answer to Zeno's denial of motion—*refutatur ambulando*—and is after all only the general empirical answer of Mr. Hobhouse, Mr. Schiller, and others. But because in science we disregard, for the purposes in hand, many logical implications, and because in daily experience we do so too, we do not thereby make science or fact any more ultimately intelligible. Once give up that ideal, however, and adopt in its place the ideal of actually getting final truth here and now, and you can be content to do as science does and as common thinking does.

There is, however, a special form in which the externalist urges his refutation of the enemy, which looks at first more serious than the above. If, he says, every relation modifies its

¹ PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. XIX, pp. 278 ff.

terms, then the position we have taken must be modified by our taking it, and so cannot be true as stated. Hence internalism kills itself and the ideal of rationality on which it is based is self-refuting. Now note, first, that this objection, like the other above, derives its force from the claim that there must be un-revisable truth attainable by human beings. If one did not make that claim, he might here join issue and adopt scepticism, retaining the ideal. But, second, the objection misconceives the situation. If the internalist, viewing the nature of philosophic thought, entertains his own view as a result, he is not in relation to something external to his own thought. He is thinking about thought. Psychologically indeed his momentary thinking is distinct from the other instances of thinking about which he reflects; and in consequence his particular statement and interpretation of internalism will differ at different times and from other men's. But logically valid thought about thought is not, conceptually, related to something external to itself, but to itself alone, and by the relation of identity. Now the relation of identity, from the purely logical point of view, can be internal to its terms without modifying them. Accordingly, internalism, as a logical system, is a view which applies to itself; to use Professor Spaulding's term, it is self-critical. Thus the ideal of rationality on which it is based is not a self-defeating ideal, in the sense that it leads to scepticism.

There is, however, another way of criticising internalism which appears at first to rest on no ideals: I mean from the platform of empiricism. Messrs. Hobhouse, Schiller, James, MacLennan, and others claim, we have seen, that we should not set up any ideal to which facts must conform in order to be real. I presume these thinkers would say that we cannot decide the question of internalism on *a priori* grounds, but must examine each relation in its actual situation to see whether or not it is internal or external. Meanwhile the most consistently empirical form of this view seems to be that called "radical empiricism," or "immediatism." If I understand this, it claims that the abstractions of logic, principles of reasoning, and such like, originally lie and move in the matrix of common experience, and are currents, so

to speak, leading in characteristic ways to further experience. Their value and hence their validity consist in the success with which they lead us to the continuation and enrichment of our experience. They are not to be torn from their matrix and set up as idols, or ideals, in themselves. This appears to be a protest against the exaltation of the intellect's norms above those of other departments of our nature. Professor Dewey has said, "To assume . . . that . . . metaphysically, absolutely, without qualification, everything in its reality . . . is what a knower would find it to be, is, from the immediatist's standpoint, if not the root of all philosophic evil, at least one of its main roots."¹ And again, "No final or ultimate validity attaches to those *a priori* arrangements [of the intellect] . . . their value is teleological and experimental, not fixedly ontological."² Not what conforms to intellect's ideals is the sole possessor of reality, but everything in experience whatsoever. "Things—anything, everything, in the ordinary or non-technical use of the term 'thing'—are what they are experienced as."³ Reason, the high priest of philosophy, is here unfrocked and reality thrown open to every kind of experience. This is a thoroughly democratic view, corresponding to the coöperative democracy of Mr. Dewey's ethics.⁴

But I think it is quite as idealising, after its own manner, as is intellectualism. It appears to pursue no ideal because it contents itself with what is directly at hand; but it has an ideal because it does this, not uncritically as science and practice do, but after much reflection and for what seem to it good and sufficient reasons. What then are the reasons? Let us take, as far as we can, the testimony of a radical empiricist himself. According to Professor James,⁵ the empiricist Professor Bergson, seeing the contradictions into which the rationalistic ideal brings us, rejects intellectualism, choosing the empirically immediate stream of experience. Now if he really felt the force of that ideal, he

¹ *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. II, pp. 394f.

² *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, Vol. XV, p. 473.

³ *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. II, p. 393.

⁴ Cf. Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 304.

⁵ *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. VII, pp. 29-33.

would, like Mr. Bradley, plough *through* the contradictions to the logically demanded transcendental solution. This way of escape is open to him; but he does not believe strongly enough in the potency of logical demands. *That* kind of reality is not satisfactory to him; he prefers a certainty actually and concretely present here and now. Hence he turns to immediate experience. For our immediate experiences seem to stand on their own feet and to need no ground or excuse for being. They are on this side of doubt, absolutely certain in themselves. Accordingly, I think we have here the same ideal as that of Mr. Russell above: there must be absolute certainty here and now for us finite beings. But it is perhaps more convincingly put by the avowed empiricist, because the appeal is openly made to that which to some degree undoubtedly is; while it may be slightly more misleading, inasmuch as it rests its case less obviously on a demand for final assurance than on a claim to the actual possession thereof.

Let us restate our result so far. The rationalist puts logical principles higher than other modes of experience. Now logical entities have this property: they are not as such concrete, but of a transcendental character.¹ But the transcendental, in contrast with the concrete, is just that which is beyond direct experience in the sense of being somehow higher. On the other hand, it is this very 'beyondness,' this aloofness from common experience, at which empiricists revolt. Witness how most of their criticisms of the idealistic absolute insist on its ineffectiveness to us here and now, and its impotence to make any concrete differences. So we see that the one party takes as its criterion of reality, something beyond and higher than the rest, while the other takes as its criterion, that which is direct, present, and (to use slang) "on the level." This latter reveres the common experience, the former desires something above the common. The difference is closely akin to that of democracy and aristocracy; an opposition as old as the human race.

Such are the two ideals of philosophic thought. But further,

¹ This transcendental character, as the differentia of idealism, has been pointed out by Professor Bode, *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, Vol. XIX, pp. 597 ff.

we cannot escape the choice between them. To philosophise is to seek the ultimately real. This cannot be done unless we have some standard by which to test that real. The standard is our ideal; and it must be either something abstracted from and elevated above our experience, or something in no sense above and beyond, viz., what is directly experienced as such. Besides these two, the beyond and the present, I can conceive no third possibility. If, however, it is urged that we should set up no standard at all, but just follow the facts and reduce philosophy to science, the obvious answer is, that that is only the second of these ideals once more. And it is quite possible to choose it, if you do not happen to see the intrinsic worth of the first ideal; otherwise not. But at any rate some choice must be made.

As to the proof or refutation of either ideal, I do not see how it is even thinkable. In present-day discussions either is criticised by a covert appeal to the other, which of course is no refutation. A resort to fact cannot refute either of them, for one ideal assumes a standard transcending fact, while the other denies that standard. And what other evidence can be brought in? Thus it is not a kind of inevitable ignorance that rules out demonstration here. It is not that we do not know whether reality is aristocratic or democratic, and wish or hope one or the other. These ideals are not wishes, but, for their owners, axiomatic; philosophic thought is impossible without at least one of them. Each side claims, and must claim, objective validity for its own ideal. The aristocratic thinker simply cannot understand why his opponent does not revere the ideal of rationality. The democratic thinker is perfectly certain that actual presence here and now is the one thing the lover of reality craves. He cannot comprehend the aristocrat's need of something higher and beyond. And so both ideals are to their possessors necessities of philosophic thought. Do you say, "Well, then, it is only a matter of individual psychology after all; let us trace the origin of these attitudes and see which are the natural and which the perverted ones"? Then you are appealing once more to the democratic ideal. You are assuming that the facts about common thinking can decide what ideal thinking must be. This however is just what the aristocrat denies and will always deny.

The deadlock which results from this situation is to my mind one of the main reasons, if not *the* main reason, of some of philosophy's perennial quarrels. The disagreement about Objective Idealism, the issue of Rationalism with Empiricism and Pragmatism, seem to turn largely upon this pivot. Philosophy has indeed made great progress in elaborating each side of the conflict; but we seem hardly nearer agreement upon these large problems than in the early days. From an impersonal point of view there seems no reason for preferring one of these ideals to the other. Each represents a belief necessary to the human mind; each has as good a claim as the other; yet each persists in denying the other. I do not see how the situation can be regarded as anything but intolerable. But if both have equal claims, the only way to solve the deadlock is to show that each ideal, clearly conceived, does not really conflict with the other. But that I must defer to another paper.

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THE UNKNOWABLE OF HERBERT SPENCER.

IT would seem that Spencer's philosophical doctrines have been shown contradictory often and thoroughly enough; but they have still an influence which, while it cannot be denied, should be restricted to its proper sphere. Science still likes to appeal to Spencer,¹ and to other writers of the same type, for the justification of its special views, ignoring the fact that these special views either have no relation to, or contradict, the fundamental principles upon which they are supposed to depend. Either, then, the special views are without justification, or the fundamental principles are false, or the relation between the fundamental principles and the particular views is not one of dependence. It is the purpose of this paper to examine one of the fundamental conceptions of Spencer to find, first, whether it has necessary relations to certain particular doctrines, and second, whether it is logically worthy of acceptance.

The conception supposed by Spencer to lie at the bottom of his system is that of the Unknowable. What he means by the Unknowable can be fairly clearly seen from the following citations, after making allowance for certain indefiniteness of expression. The conclusion reached in Part I of the *First Principles* is stated in the proposition, All Knowledge is relative; and this statement is followed by the assertion that that which religion and science usually regard as the ultimate truth concerning the nature of things is in reality unknowable. The ultimate nature of things "remains forever inscrutable." As to the special characters of the concept of the Unknowable, it is, first, not a purely negative concept.² It does not represent a state of consciousness which is devoid of all content, nor does it suggest the absence of all consciousness; for either of these conditions precludes the possibility of there being a concept at all. It is not the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible. For to

¹See the article by H. S. Shelton, *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, Vol. XIX, p. 3.

²*First Principles*, §26.

regard the Unknowable as a pure negation would involve the affirmation that we cannot arrive at the concept by reason, and it is just by this means that the existence of the Unknowable is established. That is to say, Spencer thinks himself driven to the postulation of the Unknowable by an analysis of thought.¹ This analysis begins with the proposition, All knowledge is relative.² The same reasoning that establishes the proof of this proposition also furnishes the proof of the existence of the Non-relative. The condition of knowledge is the existence of relations among the states of consciousness.³ No single state could become an element of knowledge, for "that a thing be positively thought of, it must be thought of as such or such—as of this or that kind."⁴ From the conclusion that "relation is the universal form of thought,"⁵ we may show the positive nature of the concept of the Unknowable. In the very assertion that all knowledge is relative, there is involved the assumption that there is a non-relative, for neither could be thought of except in relation to the other. This would follow from the definition of thought as the establishment of cohesions among manifestations.⁶ And if the relative has any reality, the non-relative must have the same reality, for no relation could be conceived between terms one of which is nothing. Further, unless there be conceived an Absolute as over against which the relative is conceived, the relative itself would become an Absolute, and that would involve us in contradiction. Thus the necessity of thinking in relations compels us to believe in the existence of the Absolute. "And in contemplating the process of thought, we have equally seen how impossible it is to rid ourselves of the consciousness of an actuality lying behind appearance; and how, from this impossibility, results our indestructible belief in that actuality."⁷

After this attempt to describe the Unknowable, Spencer concludes that, while we are compelled to believe in its existence, we can give to the concept of it no quantitative or qualitative expression whatever. Some attributes must express its relations

¹ *First Principles*, §24.

² *Ibid.*, §26.

³ *Principles of Psychology*, §471.

⁴ *First Principles*, §67.

⁵ *Ibid.*, §47.

⁶ *Ibid.*, §50. *Principles of Psychology*, §471.

⁷ *First Principles*, §26.

to the other elements of consciousness; yet these attributes can tell us nothing of its real nature, but simply assure to us its existence as over against that to which we can apply positive attributes. The fact that we cannot tell what it is does not remove the necessity of believing in its existence. Our ignorance of its nature does not make it non-existent, does not make it "the less certain that it remains with us as a positive and indestructible element of thought."¹ Even when we say we cannot know the Absolute, we tacitly affirm that there is an Absolute. For unless it exists we could not even express our ignorance of it. Merely to make the assumption proves that the Absolute has been present to our minds, not as a nothing, but as a something.² Our consciousness of it is "positive though indefinite,"³ yet it "persists in consciousness."⁴ For the problem as to the form of our consciousness of the Absolute, Spencer appeals to our conception of the relative. "We are conscious of the relative under conditions and limits. It is impossible that these conditions and limits can be thought of apart from something to which they give the form. The abstraction of these conditions and limits is, by the hypothesis, the abstraction of them *only*; consequently there must be a residuary consciousness of something which filled up their outlines, and this indefinite something constitutes our consciousness of the Non-relative, or Absolute."⁵

Spencer's argument, in brief, seems something like this: Ultimate reality is unknown and unknowable to us. But since no knowledge is possible except upon its assumption,⁶ it must be said that there exists an unconditioned something, and that this unconditioned something is in some way manifested to us.⁷ Our concept of the Unknowable is not purely negative. It could not be a nothing, for in that case it could have no relation to our experience; and that which "remains forever inscrutable" makes experience possible by underlying it.⁸ Our knowledge of a thing comes to us through the relations which obtain among its parts. But the Unknowable, as a vague and indefinite something, though

¹ *Ibid.*, §26.

² *Ibid.*, §47.

³ *Ibid.*, §26.

⁴ *Ibid.*, §26. *Principles of Psychology*, §56.

⁵ *First Principles*, §26.

⁶ *Ibid.*, §191.

⁷ *Ibid.*, §194.

⁸ *Ibid.*, §62.

it is assured to us as positively "there," is not in any known way related to our experience. Yet we must think of it as the condition of experience. Since its relations to our knowledge are not such as can be known to us, we cannot think of it as "such or such—as of this or that kind."¹ It is therefore unclassifiable; and, for Spencer, what cannot be grouped or aggregated cannot be known, since knowing implies grouping.² The Unknowable persists in consciousness, and is the ultimate in the sense of that which persists absolutely.

There are, as it seems to me, two aspects of Spencer's argument, although he does not clearly distinguish them. And it is just this failure to distinguish the various lines of his interest which accounts for the confusion often mentioned in connection with Spencer's writings. There is, first, the psychological phase of the argument, in which the Unknowable as an ontological reality is assured existence by what is found in consciousness. Second, there is the logical phase, in which an attempt is made to establish the Unknowable as a condition of knowledge, through an analysis of the structure of knowledge. Both these lines of argument are, as it seems to me, defective, and I shall attempt to show in what respects they are insufficient. I shall show that the first does not apply at all to the problem, and that the second defeats itself when carried far enough to satisfy logical demands.

The psychological argument may be stated thus: When the conditions and limits of anything which is known are abstracted from, there is left a residuary consciousness,—a blank, sheer awareness, which is the manifestation of an unknown something underlying experience. It is there and cannot be got rid of; hence it is an Unknowable and an Absolute as if by pure obstinacy. This is not the place to object to the residuary consciousness as a result of abstraction, nor to the notion of abstraction as a process which results in a residuary consciousness and then vanishes. Attention is here directed to the residuary consciousness with a view to finding what sort of reality it may be. According to Spencer's list of qualities (so long as he remains

¹ *Ibid.*, §67.

² *Ibid.*, §42.

true to the psychical origin of his Unknowable), the Unknowable is described as positive, though indefinite, and persistent. So far as the question concerns what is psychologically there, it is difficult to understand what difference it would make whether the Unknowable were positive or otherwise. So long as the fact of its presence constitutes its essential nature, nothing can be said further toward its description, since it has no qualities to enumerate nor any relations to be pointed out or explained. All the scientist could do would be to bow down in wonder before its everlasting presence, and chant a lonely "It is." And its persistence may be treated in a similar way. Let it persist to doomsday, and it will still have to be regarded as a negligible quantity, if nothing further can be found within the rest of the system of reality as a reason why it persists. If its character as persistent or its act of persistence has no other business than to reinforce its presence to the degree that it cannot be got rid of, the Unknowable must be regarded as an intruder in the domain of human knowledge, and if there were no possibility of neglecting it, we would have to devise some scheme whereby we could acknowledge it, and still disregard it,—all of which means that so long as anything is 'there' at all, it cannot be properly and satisfactorily accounted for by the use of such indefinite adjectives as positive, persistent, and indefinite. It is clear from what has just been said about the ultimate as positive and persistent that the character of indefiniteness fares just as ill. In fact, it appears that the expression indefinite ultimate is a contradiction in terms. If what is ultimate were indefinite in the sense of vague and confused, it is not easy to see how there could be a basis of any kind for the structure of human knowledge. Or if we speak of knowledge as a process, we would have to regard the process as blind in the degree to which its ultimate were indefinite. The fact is, that an Unknowable or an Absolute cannot be built out of such empty terms. What is ultimate for human knowledge and experience must have more definite characters, characters which connect with all possible human interests and endeavors, instead of withdrawing from all contact with human purposes. And it is clear that Spencer recognizes this

fact when he passes from his psychical Absolute to one which he can describe as a Power, a Cause, and an external Reality. This latter Absolute is, however, a logical matter, and does not require consideration here.

The Unknowable as residuary in consciousness has a slightly more serious aspect as the 'given.' According to this conception a content is present to consciousness directly and immediately, its presence there necessitating no previous knowledge or mental act as its antecedent condition. It is ultimate in that with it all knowledge begins, and further, in that it is the point of reference to which all other forms of knowledge are referred to establish their validity. It is, therefore, genetically previous to, and logically prior to, all other forms of knowledge. The present content, used thus as ultimate datum, is one of which most use is made by sensationalists, the content being sense impression. It is clear that Spencer, in one phase of his doctrine at least, thinks of the ultimate reality as given directly in sense impression.¹

It is true that of late the ultimate datum has not been insisted upon with so much vigor as formerly, since the criticisms of the adherents of the relational view of thought tend to modify the bold sensationalistic statements. The datum is still defended as a sacred relic, but it is acknowledged that the pure sensuous consciousness is never the whole of any given experience. The datum is found by the analysis of a given complex experience situation, and it is not, as such, a separate or separable mental activity.² Not even is it generally argued, when a particular state of consciousness is being described, that there is a temporal antecedence of the relational forms by the sense experience, nor that there is a logical dependence of the one upon the other. The whole compound is psychologically there, and the situation is described as one of great complexity. All that is required to find the pure datum is the analytic purpose of science, which isolates it from the complex experience.

It is strange that those who insist on the ultimateness of the sense datum never question the methods by which the datum is

¹*First Principles*, §47.

²Hobhouse, *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 36.

found; they do not hesitate to ascribe necessity to their results, forgetting that the fate of results hangs on the fallibility or infallibility of the methods by which results are obtained. As it seems to me, the ultimateness of the datum involves two assumptions: first, it is assumed that the ultimate must be simple, even while the matter to which it refers is regarded as very complex; and second, it is assumed that, in this case at least, the method of analysis cannot fail, and that the purpose of analysis is accomplished when the elements of the matter under consideration are set apart from one another and are shown in their disparateness.

That Spencer is looking for an ultimate in the sense of absolute simplicity is clear from what he says positively about it,—namely, that it is positive, though indefinite, and persistent,—as well as from what he denies of it, namely, that we can give to the concept of it no quantitative or qualitative expression whatever. What there could be of reality in a thing described in such vacuous terms is not easily made out, nor are we helped in understanding it when he speaks later of it as an Inscrutable Power and an Unknown Cause. The simple facts in the case are that the result of the search for an ultimately simple datum is a bloodless abstraction. We can put it in Spencer's own words when we say with him that the "consciousness of the unconditioned" becomes "the unconditioned consciousness, or raw material of thought to which in thinking we give definite forms." And this amounts to a mere insistence that there is an unqualified datum, with no explanation as to how the raw material ever loses its rawness. At the same time, the adherents of the datum-doctrine continue to harp upon the complexity of experience. Thus, upon their own statement, if the datum is to be found, it is not an experience, but can result only from the dismemberment of experience by analysis. The living process of experience must suffer on the wheel in order that the sacred law of analysis be not perverted. If experience is complex as it occurs in its 'natural state,' why not leave it so, and proceed to exhaust our powers of description to do it justice when at its best, instead of attempting to improve scientifically upon it by tearing it asunder? The predatory

instinct is not lost from the race of psychological logicians. That they have started right, there is no question; consciousness is complex. But the departure from this point is just where the trouble begins. It seems to be forgotten that experience (the point where all philosophical description begins), *when* complex, is quite another and a different thing from the aggregate of its dismembered parts. Or, if not, it remains to be shown what the process of aggregation adds to the parts as such, which restores to the initial experience its original character as living. What I insist is, that a datum can no more be an experience than a leaf can be a tree. And if not an experience, the datum has no place in philosophical discussions. A leaf is not a leaf even, when detached from the tree. And when attached, no amount of description *of the leaf* can do justice to the living organism. The datum does not exist outside of the analyst's purpose.¹ Apart from the whole experience, the datum is nothing, and the complete experience is as 'ultimate' and 'simple' as there can be any reasonable demand for.

It can be agreed that analysis is final, but it is worth while to reflect what analysis means. Those who depend most upon this means of investigation confuse the act of analysis with the results of the act. Besides, there are results which the analyst does not usually recognize; those which he finds are those which he takes from the whole complex of results, and it is this whole which it is the business of logic to examine. The results chosen for description are thus selected out of the whole complex according to the purpose which the scientist has in performing the analysis. That within the whole there are others which the present interest does not consider, is evidenced by the fact that the object of analysis shows different characters when the purpose of the scientist changes. The stone is a different object for the physicist from what it is for the chemist, and neither has the right to maintain that the stone is such only as his particular interest determines it to be. The physical description may modify the chemical, and *vice versa*. Just so, the psychologist has a perfect right to describe a fact of experience, and his description, in so

¹Cf. Bosanquet, *Essentials of Logic*, p. 28.

far as it is not contradictory to the accounts of the fact given by other interests, must be respected by all others who examine the same fact; but this does not argue that others with special and non-psychological interests may not give attention to characters which do not excite the interest of the psychologist. Analysis, then, has no right to determine *a priori* what characters it will find in a given object, nor to decide upon the primacy of one set of characters over another. It remains the prerogative of the selective purpose to determine upon the characters which shall be in consilience with that purpose, but that prerogative does not extend to the determination of the characters which shall satisfy all purposes. Purpose, with respect to objects, is individual; and, as such, must recognize individuality. It is thus the act that decides to analyze, and not the instrument of analysis, which has to do with results; the same instrument is made use of in connection with all results; but the character and significance of results depends upon the active purpose.¹ It is neglect of the active purpose in connection with analysis that accounts for the brick-yard appearance of experience after it has passed through the hands of the 'datum' logician.

Whatever may be the character of psychological analysis, or of its results, it does not determine or 'find' objects. The object as such has no dependence upon analysis, whatever may be its relation to the purpose to analyse. So far as analysis is concerned, the object is 'there,' 'given.' The purpose and the object meet face to face, and significance accrues to analysis as the instrument by which the purpose works itself out in its relations to the object. As an instrument, it has nothing to do with what is to be found in consciousness except at the beck and call of attention. So the subjective Unknowable,² for which Spencer manifests so much psychological concern, has nothing to justify it from this quarter. Whether the Unknowable is justified as a logical matter, and what part analysis plays with it as such, will receive consideration in connection with the examination of Spencer's doctrine of relativity.

¹ Cf. Professor Adamson, *Kant*, p. 7.

² Cf. Sidgwick, *Philosophy of Kant and Other Lectures*, pp. 285 ff.

Two other difficulties ought to be mentioned in connection with the subjective or internal Unknowable. As justified by what is found in consciousness, the Unknowable would seem to have no more command over our theoretical respect than the fixed idea of the insane, or the emotional vacuity that occupies the mind of the devotee of art, or the monstrosity which possesses the mind of the mystic. In either case something is 'there' with such a vengeance as to vitiate any attempts that may be made toward rational description. And the Unknowable is just such a psychological zero as, when recognized at all, negates the whole system of human knowledge, and hands the world over to chaos. We cease thinking when we contemplate it. Again, if it have any logical force at all, Spencer's argument for the Unknowable is an imperfect form of the Cartesian 'ontological proof,' consideration of which has certainly been made forever unnecessary by the criticism of Kant.

There seems little reason or justification for the ultimate which just doggedly persists in consciousness, and there is also no conceivable function which such a cumberground could perform in experience. The internal ultimate of Spencer is neither an Unknowable nor an Absolute—not an Unknowable, because the result of the process by which it is supposed to be found could only be a fact of the same order as any of the facts with which the psychological analysis begins, and therefore known as well as any of those facts; and not an Absolute, because, first, as a particular fact in experience it has no more universal value than any other fact of experience, and hence does not constitute but only suggests universal connection; and second, as a mere psychic fact it has no points of connection with the objective system of things, and consequently does not transcend the private consciousness of the individual. The psychological argument does not apply at all to the question of the Absolute. The Absolute which Spencer describes as a Power and a Cause and which therefore has attributed to it characters that negate his internal or psychic Unknowable, and by means of which he attempts to find lodgment for the Unknowable within the system of things, is decidedly another matter.¹ As such, the Unknowable-

¹ See Fullerton, *System of Metaphysics*, pp. 422-428.

Absolute has been criticized thoroughly enough; reference here to the objective or logical aspect of the question will be made only so far as is necessary to carry out the intention to examine the method by which the Absolute is supposed to be reached. This method involves Spencer's doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, which we proceed to examine.

The relativity of knowledge comes down to Spencer from Kant by the precarious way of Hamilton and Mansel, and in Spencer's hands it ends in confusion. There are two meanings (at least) of the doctrine interfused in Spencer's presentation, neither of which is worked out in any conclusive fashion. Corresponding to these two meanings there are what I may designate as the negative and the positive, or constructive, method, the latter containing some promise when pursued to a logical issue. The negative may be stated thus: When abstraction from the conditions and limits of thought is carried as far as human capacity can reach, there yet remains a condition of thought and things which stoutly refuses to budge and is testified to by a residuary consciousness. Consideration to this testator as the psychic symbol of the ultimate has been given above, and it was found that practically all that can be said of it is that it is residuary. This ultimate condition is left after abstraction is complete, or is found through the instrumentality of abstraction to underlie all thought. The negative aspect of the doctrine of relativity presupposes the independent existence of the Absolute, and argues for the complete absence of any relation between the Absolute and the relative. To be sure, the relative would not exist but for the Absolute, and the Absolute would disappear if the relative were taken away. The relative is known, the Absolute unknown; yet the Absolute exists in order that the relative may be known. In order that that which is known may be known, an unknown is postulated; thus a contradiction is introduced into the doctrine of knowledge in order to save the principle that correlatives imply one another. One wonders what becomes of this principle when the doctrine of knowledge itself makes knowledge impossible. And upon following the method by which Spencer seeks to establish his Absolute, it will plainly

appear that the nearer he approaches the Absolute, the farther away from the relative his argument leads; and in leading away from the relative, it loses, upon his own principle, the conclusiveness which he is seeking for it. For knowledge of the Absolute, even, is not knowledge except it is relative; so if it were established that the Absolute exists, the knowledge which establishes it with sufficient firmness that we may say it exists, is also relative knowledge, and the Absolute is swamped in relativity. Thus the independent Absolute becomes relative and dependent in the very process of establishing its independence; and this ought to be a hint that the conditions of knowledge cannot lie outside knowledge—at least cannot lie outside the knowable—if those conditions are in any way to help in understanding the process or the product of knowledge. The Unknowable—how nonsensical the whole matter is when the term is substituted for the Absolute, as Spencer would permit us to do—cannot be sifted out from the knowable by any process of separation. Spencer can harbor the Unknowable in his own mind only by deliberately neglecting every possible positive aspect of experience, and it is just our purpose to show that this method of neglect of the ordinary facts of experience leads and can lead to no positive results. Spencer's method is the method of abstract analysis, and his abstraction is literally a process of drawing away from everything that is concrete and real in experience.

In opposition to this negative method I should propose that abstract analysis does not *find things* as the ground rock of reality, but that it does *disclose an act* which is of the distinctive character of the reality which underlies thinking and the world, but does the latter only when it allies itself with synthesis or becomes constructive of the concrete. Abstraction seems to be for Spencer a principle which runs the gauntlet of all possible correlative terms, putting them to oblivion on either side, and finally meets its peer in an ultimate which defies its disintegrating stroke. What becomes of the correlatives after they are set aside, or what new relations they may have assumed in being set aside, or whether any terms heretofore non-existent may have appeared on the scene as due to the act of setting aside, do not

seem to be questions worthy of the slightest consideration. The whole universe is neglected in the interest of finding a final term which is to have no relation whatever, either actual or possible, to any of the host of terms which gave their lives toward its discovery. So smothered is the ultimate reality under the rubbish of the relative, that the whole of 'relative reality' must be annihilated in order that we may have a glimpse of its eternal thereness; and when we get the vision we are the wiser only in that we know we have burned the bridges behind us, and return to the work-a-day relative world is cut off. The Unknowable, as a presupposed necessary condition of thought, when regarded as independent of the concrete activities of thought, and discovered by the method of abstract analysis, is shown impossible by the very process which attempts to justify its assumption. From abstraction only abstractions can come. If we can abstract from the conditions of knowledge, we can say that no knowledge remains, but we certainly cannot say that an unknowable something remains. If anything remains we cannot call it an Unknowable. Mere want of knowledge does not constitute the Unknowable. For if the thing has no relations to knowledge, if it lies outside the conditions of knowledge, it cannot be defined in terms of knowledge, not even negatively; the term, or any term which has even a hint of connection with a knowing subject, represents something which is *in so far* known.

That the Unknowable described by Spencer is from the start a presupposition is proved by the fact that he employs analysis to establish it. For, if the Unknowable were self-evident in thought, his laborious argument for it would be unnecessary. If it is not self-evident, but yet justifiable by characters to be found in valid thinking, the argument would take the form of a development through concepts generally recognized as valid. That is, the argument would be constructive *upon* certain commonly recognized conceptions, and not destructive and neglectful *of* characters found as concrete in experience. The Unknowable is not found in or by means of the concrete in experience, but is proved to be behind, or to underlie, experience as an unknown cause. What is found beneath or behind experience cannot be

justified by what is in or of experience, that is, what is external to experience is a baseless presupposition, made use of in this case to force the concrete facts into forms which are the creatures of a narrow purpose. Reality could not be successive and disparate impressions of force if the Absolute were a principle active in experience; physics could not be the basis of all knowledge if the Absolute were an intelligible principle within the world instead of a mechanical principle beneath and outside the world; consciousness could not be an aggregate of sensations if there were evidences of constructive purpose; *ergo*, the Absolute is an Unknown Cause and an Inscrutable Power. As was suggested above, analysis pure and simple can apply only to a concept held as a presupposition; the analytic purpose cannot be employed in the development of a valid concept. Analysis may prepare the way for the construction of a principle by the enumeration of concrete characters, but it cannot choose among them, cannot decide that such and such characters by nature belong together. It cannot compare. It is the principle or instrument of the sciences because its application is mathematical. Analysis enumerates the particular contents of a concept; it finds the many and sets them apart so that their fitness together may be examined, but it does not perform the examination. It attends to the terms, but not to their interrelations, hence can provide for no more significant combination than the quantitative. Until thought goes beyond the enumerative interest it has no right to claim validity for its concepts, but must take their significance and application for granted, since to determine the limits of the application of concepts is critically to judge of their development and construction. And the latter is not an analytic process, but constructive, since its concern is with relations, and to be concerned with relations is to create relations whose activity is systematizing with respect to the relations attended to. To analyze a concept is to brand that concept a presupposition; to justify a concept is a formative act, going from the given content and by means of it to a connection which transcends that content and provides for the validity of the concept by establishing its fitness within the system of experience.

The positive aspect of Spencer's doctrine of relativity is significant and fruitful, but it is strange that his own attempt at development of it is its perversion. And it is just as strange that some of his critics¹ have not seen that in this form the doctrine contains suggestions of great logical importance. Spencer's attempt fails because he is unwilling to follow or incapable of following to their logical issue the suggestions contained in the generalizations which he hands down as conclusions from the analysis of thought. The difficulty is probably due to lack of thoroughness in the analysis (which, if thorough, surpasses itself), and this prevented the analyst from seeing that the whole performance is based on a presupposition. This assumption, as mentioned above, is that of the independent cause and the possibility of explaining experience by the discovery of that cause, without showing how the cause is operative. Spencer seems to forget that certain of his doctrines commit him to a view fundamentally identical with that which defines cause as invariability of succession, which, if established, would unconditionally negate the possibility of a cause independent of the phenomena among which the succession occurs. There may be, on this view, absolute causation, which would be defined as universality of connection among phenomena, but the first necessary corollary of such a law would be the denial of a cause underlying or behind experience. In any case the relativity of knowledge, taken in the sense in which Spencer employs it even, that is, in the sense of the incompleteness of knowledge with the further assertion that knowledge can never be complete, does not prove the existence of anything beyond the limits of knowledge. To assert the independent cause here is equivalent to drawing a positive conclusion from negative premises. We can assert nothing as the real on the strength of premises which express only our ignorance. Reference is here made to the independent cause only for the purpose of showing that the relativity of knowledge has nothing to do with that cause. It is,

¹For instance, Professor Fullerton, who is singularly fortunate in his destruction of the internal Unknowable, might have been delivered from his sensationalism if he had taken the suggestion contained in the doctrine of relativity.

then, necessary to find significance for that doctrine in another direction.

Taking Spencer's conclusions and agreeing perfectly that such conclusions follow from examination of the facts of experience, it can be shown that their significance points in precisely the opposite direction to that in which they lead Spencer; that they point to an Absolute, which, however, is by no means unknowable nor independent of human experience. This positive absolute makes no claim to objective reality, if objective means external to knowledge, but has its reality as the distinctive character of human experience as such. The general conclusion, All knowledge is relative, is based on the further propositions, Relation is the universal form of thought and Thinking is relationing.¹ So far as these propositions are valid, they assume relativity to mean no more and no less than interrelatedness of all forms of conscious experience. And this provides for the significance of the principle that correlatives imply one another, and destroys the psychological doctrine that there can be a consciousness which is 'residuary' and known only by the fact that it is 'there.' The analysis of thought (when complete, that is, when it passes over into construction) shows that there is no determination of thought which is not dependent upon some other determination, in the sense that each form has a reference to some other form, which reference between terms is nothing less than the act of knowing. That the references or relations are the characteristic acts of knowing is well stated by Spencer in the assertion that thinking is 'relationing,' and this conception of thought as a synthetic activity ought to have shown Spencer that the adequate description is a constructive performance, and not one which picks and pries its object into assumed elements. But this notion of relatedness destroys itself when conceived as a series to which there must be a definable final term. Such a demand abandons the relational conception altogether, since it tries to think a term which is independent of the relations that determined it as a term of the series. After declaring the terms to be nothing apart from their relations, it is attempted to construct a term

¹ Spencer's *Essays*, Vol. III, p. 293.

which explains the series without reference to the relations which determine the terms and at the same time give continuity to the series. Such building of toy houses only to knock them down again is characteristic of Spencer's whole discussion; instead of a conception which would provide for permanence and solidity, he sets up an Unknowable which makes the whole structure fall apart. There is no more potency in a final term as a criterion of explanation for such a connected series than there is in any other term of the series. Any term by itself has already been declared impossible for thought. The key to the explicableness of the world does not lie in the vacuum left after that which constitutes knowledge is stripped away, but is found in the principle of the construction of knowledge, which was well stated in the proposition that thinking is relationing.

It is strange that the investigation which leads to the conception of the knowledge process as one of the formation of relations does not realize that it is connectedness which is characteristic of that process and that the facts of knowledge are intelligible only as they are conceived as hanging together. It is generally admitted that facts of experience are found in complexes representing various degrees of interdependence, but the question is at this point whether these facts are to be accounted for or described. Those who attempt to account for the facts begin by separating them into their component elements, and seek by this method to discover through their relations other facts antecedent to them, which may be looked upon as causes. Their curiosity is satisfied when an experience is referred to a previous experience, as if the whole were completely formed and static, and there were nothing to do in any case but thus to trace references backward to a world assumed as complete. Such an attitude is certainly indicative of a dualism of thought and things which is contradicted by the principle of relation proposed as the guiding notion, and avowedly held by Spencer as the key to the intelligibility of experience. It is difficult to see how Spencer would make philosophy the capstone of the sciences, since the method followed by him is certainly not recognized nor followed by scientists. The latter do not feel themselves

obliged to explain the facts with which they deal by referring them to an ultimate outside the order to which those facts belong. In fact, the scientist is not looking for ultimates at all, even though he may leave evidence that a universal is readily found. Physics is not seeking the ultimate nature of body, force, etc., but is striving to give the most comprehensive description possible of the significance of those conceptions for experience, and is certainly not attempting to brand them as utterly unintelligible by thrusting them out of the world. On the contrary, it is the method of science to describe what it finds and as it finds it, and to correlate its results with results already obtained. There is no attempt to mutilate the facts in the hope of finding an undetermined substratum which produces them; for such a 'cause' when found only enshrouds the situation in darkness. And the philosophy which progresses profits by the example of science; it takes its material as it occurs 'in nature,' and attempts to give the description which is most satisfying, and at the same time offers most promise as an instrument for dealing with material which is as yet only possible. This subject-matter is experience in its concrete aspects, and the purpose of philosophy is to find the laws within it which render its constitution intelligible.

Spencer's conception of knowing as relating denies to analysis the right to recognition as a means of investigation, since such a conception can be reached by no other than a constructive process. Abstraction, it may be argued, is never used with such rigor as is here described, and this may be admitted; but when the results reached are in point of abstractness so far removed from the concrete as the Unknowable of Spencer, it is necessary to show that the method is no legitimate one. This has already been shown by the criticism of his results. Analysis pure and simple is impossible as an act of thought, if knowing is relating. And the conclusion which follows is that whenever analysis is at work there goes hand in hand with it a process of synthesis which not only guarantees the results but at the same time justifies the method by the results. It is often forgotten that, whenever in thought things are set apart, there are at the same time and by

the same act relations established between the things put asunder. Everything abstracted from gets by the act of abstraction a determination applied to it, so that differentiation even is a tie that binds. The fact that different aspects of an experience are distinguishable, is an evidence that they by nature belong together, and it is the fact of their occurrence together which provides the possibility of their being distinguished; further, there could be no purpose in making the distinction if there were not a conceived positive relation present as the reason which suggests the distinction. When I deny one relation, I assert another; in fact, my denial is a positive relation seen to exist within the present experience situation. It is, then, evident that the act of thinking is not so much one of making distinctions as of going forward in a constructive fashion upon the basis of the suggestion afforded by observed differences. It is, thus, a synthetic activity, and one which provides for unity and intelligibility in the whole of experience, in so far, at least, as our concern with experience is theoretical.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

The Phenomenology of Mind. By G. W. F. HEGEL. Translated with an Introduction and Notes by J. B. BAILLIE. 2 vols. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1910.—pp. xlv, 823.

One cannot but congratulate Professor Baillie on the industrious and happy care with which he has accomplished what is clearly to him a labor of love. The translation of Hegel into English is far from an easy task, and of all the volumes by which the thought of Hegel is known to us the *Phänomenologie* perhaps presents the worst difficulties to the translator. In the courses of lectures which form the main bulk of what we know as Hegel's "works," the *Zusätze* between the directly dictated paragraphs, with their racy colloquialisms and happy illustrations, are like so many oases in the desert of systematic formalism, and even in the longer *Logic* these welcome breaks in the exposition afford some relief to the wearied reader. But in the *Phänomenologie* there are no breaks in an exposition which is doubly hard to follow, both because of the employment of a technical symbolism whose real meaning in many places only becomes clear on a second or third reading of the whole work, and because of Hegel's stylistically bad trick of describing concrete institutions and episodes of human history (such as the Stoicism of the early Roman Empire or the French Revolution) in an allusive fashion most tormenting to the reader who happens not to hit on the key to the riddle. At the same time, if a man wants a single work in which he will find the pith and substance of Hegel's criticism of life as a whole, the *Phänomenologie* is the only book which will give him what he is looking for. And there is perhaps a further reason for attaching special importance to the book. It has been complained (as the present writer thinks, with justice) that the Hegelian method, as practiced by Hegel, insidiously falsifies the understanding of human development by a tacit initial postulate. I mean the postulate that human development falls into several distinct lines, in each of which the later stages can be understood by reference exclusively to earlier stages in the same line. Thus the attempt to exhibit the "dialectic process" in the succession of philosophies seems to go on the assumption that the displacement of one reigning system of thought by another is regularly to be accounted for by the purely "dialectical" tendency of intellectual one-sidedness in any direction to lead to a reaction in the opposite direction; the historical succession of religions is treated as if it

were determined solely by their adequacy as expressions of the religious element in human life. It is this tendency, perhaps, which is what is really resented by those who accuse Hegel of an inhuman *Panlogismus*. So far as it really exists in Hegel's philosophy, it must, of course, be pronounced a source of grave misconception. There is really no such thing as isolated development in science or art or religion; there is only the development of beings who are at once interested in all three. And hence the causes which lead to the supersession of, *e. g.*, one religion by another (*e. g.*, of Christianity by Islam in Syria and Asia Minor) may have nothing to do with the superiority of one over the other as a religion. They may be military, or economic, or ethnological, or may have even to be sought in purely geographical and climatic conditions. For example, it is no proof of the superiority of a form of art or religion that it has been adopted by a conquered people from their conquerors. The conquered are likely enough to copy the conquerors, even when the copying means retrogression. But, if Hegel cannot be wholly acquitted of this misunderstanding, it is common fairness to remember that the extent to which it vitiates his understanding of human life should not be estimated by its apparent prominence in most of his so-called "works." The mere circumstance that these "works" are, for the most part, lecture-courses on specific aspects of the historical world-process was of itself bound to stamp them with a certain appearance of one-sidedness. Hence it is fortunate that he should have left us in the *Phänomenologie* one work in which he is avowedly dealing with the development of humanity as a whole, and it is only just that this work, and not the lectures on Art, Law, Religion, or the History of Philosophy, should be taken as the measure of the extent to which he has failed in fidelity to his own principle of looking to the whole.

Of the merits of Professor Baillie's translation as a translation it is superfluous to speak. His previous work on Hegel of itself warranted the expectation, which he has not disappointed, that his rendering would be a sound and scholarly one and, so far as a translation can ever really replace its original, an adequate substitute for the original German to the student who is compelled to make his acquaintance with Hegel in English. Further, the commendably brief and few explanatory notes which he has seen fit to append to the text will probably be sufficient to remove for an intelligent reader the difficulties created by that trick of allusiveness to which reference has already been made. It is much to be hoped that the promise of a further work of criticism and exposition will be fulfilled in the near future. All students of modern philosophy are bound to feel an interest in knowing how far so devoted a disciple as Professor Baillie holds his master's interpretation of the course of human

development to retain its significance after the lapse of a century during which our knowledge of the facts has been so enormously advanced. That Hegel's judgment on all the great critical stages of the development should maintain their value unimpaired is not of course to be expected, even by the most fervent of Hegelians. To see the whole life of humanity steadily and to see it whole is a thing not vouchsafed to mortal man. In some cases the movements which were bound to loom largest in the perspective of Hegel's generation were too near in time, and the actual facts about them not yet accessible to critical scrutiny. This is particularly the case with the phenomenon which, in its practical effects, was the most significant fact of human history for the man of the end of the eighteenth century, the French Revolution. It was something which every man of that age "experienced but did not know," an actual living and present myth behind which it has been reserved for the historians of a later age to penetrate. In other cases, as for instance in the matter of the true conception of Greek philosophy and its development, the true facts were, a hundred years ago, largely concealed by untrustworthy late tradition, and every judgment based upon the materials accessible to Hegel requires now to be revised in the light of an added century of critical scholarship. It will be a most interesting thing to see how far Professor Baillie will find it necessary to modify the actual letter of Hegel's judgments in cases like this on the strength of our superior knowledge of the past. There is one point in particular upon which one would like to see him explain himself. In the *Introduction* to the present work he tends to write as though the Hegelian philosophy were the one and only legitimate continuation of the Kantian Criticism. Hardly any notice is taken of developments like the thought of Herbart, or Fries, or Schopenhauer, in which the work begun by Kant is followed out on very different lines and to very different conclusions. Even Fichte and Schelling, who stand in the direct line of succession between Kant and Hegel, are treated as though their speculation had done little but devise extravagances which it was the first task of the true "successor" of Kant to clear out of the way. It may, of course, be said that a translator's Introduction could hardly have dealt with developments like Herbartianism which belong almost wholly to the years immediately subsequent to the ascendancy of Hegelianism. And as to the treatment of Fichte and Schelling it can be urged that the view of them as interlopers is that which Hegel himself takes, and that Professor Baillie is only acting as a translator should in presenting the case for his client as his client himself saw it. Yet it is of some importance to know how far the Kantian influence is really dominant in the "absolute" philosophy, and how far its presence may be regarded as an historical

accident. It would seem possible to hold that Aristotle and Neo-Platonism really played a much more important part than Kant in giving Hegelianism its peculiar character, and, at any rate, no answer can be given to the question I have suggested without a serious examination of the claims of Herbart, Fries, and Schopenhauer to be equally legitimate heirs to the throne of Königsberg. And with regard to Hegel's more direct predecessor, I find it hard to acquit him of decided unfairness to Fichte, who was, after all, the creator of the notion of the "dialectical movement," as well as of something like personal ingratitude to Schelling.

If one may add an observation of a more general kind, I would say that I should be glad to hear Professor Baillie's view as to the reason why so many of our best thinkers, with all the respect and good will in the world, somehow find themselves obliged to stop short of actual acceptance of even the main principles of the "absolute" Philosophy. They are "almost persuaded" to declare themselves Hegelians, but there is always one step more which, somehow, they cannot bring themselves to take. I have myself a suspicion that the real obstacle is not so much purely intellectual as moral. At heart, I fancy, what many of us feel is that the Hegelian philosophy suffers from an insufficient sense of the hatefulness of sin and the supreme moment of personal righteousness, as any philosophy must which identifies the kingdom of God with a Prussian bureaucracy. What we miss from first to last in the seventeen volumes of the "works" is some breath of the spirit of the *Gorgias* and *Phaedo*. And some of us, at least, cannot help feeling that the defect reveals itself in Hegel's personal character as delineated by his own friends and disciples. It is commonplace, and even, perhaps, as enemies like Schopenhauer insisted, at bottom a little sordid. Kant and Fichte impress us, even when we find ourselves unable to accept their most characteristic speculative tenets, by their personal moral nobility, but we look in vain in the record of Hegel's life, as we look in vain in his philosophical utterances, for any uplifting inspiration to noble living. No *sursum corda* comes to us from that quarter. It may be that these are the utterances of prejudice and misapprehension begotten of imperfect sympathy. At any rate, I, for one, shall welcome Professor Baillie's exposition all the more warmly if it takes account of feelings like these and does something to dispel them.

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ST. ANDREWS.

L'espace et le temps chez Leibniz et chez Kant. Par ÉMILE VAN BIÉMA.
Paris, F. Alcan, 1908.—pp. v, 337.

This clearly and interestingly written book, a dissertation for the French doctorate by a writer whose excellent conceptions of the method

in which to treat the history of philosophy have been inspired by M. Boutroux, falls essentially into four parts. The first examines the numerous and singularly discordant attempts of Kant to tell what the philosophical positions, especially with regard to space and time, of Leibniz and of Wolff were, and to define the relation of their positions to his own. The second part analyzes independently, and seeks to unify and systematize, the actual utterances of Leibniz about space and time; the third does the same for Kant; and the fourth expounds what the author conceives, in the light of these analyses, to be the true relations of agreement and opposition between the two doctrines.

M. van Biéma's undertaking, it will be seen, requires him to attempt the elucidation of what is very nearly the most involved, delicate, and difficult exegetical problem in the whole history of modern philosophy—the Leibnitian theory concerning the nature of space and time, their relation to the monads and to bodies, and their consequent ontological status, and the character and source of our knowledge concerning them. The exposition is manifestly based upon a careful collation of texts; in the analysis of these it shows not a little penetration and logical ingenuity; and upon several points it is decidedly illuminating. Yet upon the main question, which is the metaphysical question concerning the objective reality, for Leibniz, of space and time, I hardly think the author has done justice to all the complexities of the Leibnitian position; he has given to the argument an appearance of clarity and coherency which do not in fact belong to it. It is to be regretted that in dealing with this subject M. van Biéma did not profit by a reading of Mr. Bertrand Russell's book; it is a rather surprising piece of provincialism in scholarship that no reference should be made to, and no apparent use should have been made of, so important an English discussion of precisely the same question. For Mr. Russell has made certain things very clear which M. van Biéma appears to overlook. The latter defines the Leibnitian view with respect, for example, to extension thus: Extension is "partially subjective," but it also "incontestably contains somewhat of reality and objectivity," it is "*véritablement un rapport entre des réalités absolues.*" It is objective, namely, inasmuch as for each monad's representation there objectively exist many other monads related to one another and to itself, which relations are represented under the form of extension. On the other hand, extension is subjective (in the sense of being relative to the *individual* perceptions of each subject) inasmuch as each monad "represents the relations of the other monads from its own special point of view." And in this M. van Biéma appears to see no obscurity and no incongruity. It is, however, not to interpret but to falsify Leibniz's ideas, to reduce

their characteristic rich confusion to so neat and balanced a form; while the neatness itself is rather verbal than logical. The sense in which, by the author, Leibniz is said to regard extension as subjective—viz., relative to individual points of view—would be compatible with the doctrine that there exists a really objective system of spatial relations which, though always seen somewhat out of perspective by the individual, can yet be known to be independent of thinking as such. But, now, could Leibniz consistently hold such a doctrine? Obviously not. Extension is for him, it is true, a way of representing the relations of real monads which, with respect to one another, are objective and independent. But it is not a way of representing the *real relations* of monads. For the monads are not extended. Leibniz does, of course, at times say that they are *in* extension though they have none, *i. e.*, that they have position. But this means nothing unless it means that the monads are truly localized at geometrical points in space. This latter view Leibniz actually took in his early writings; but—as Russell and Cassirer have noted and van Biéma has failed to note—he found himself (for obvious reasons) compelled to abandon it. He thereafter wavered between several diversely unsatisfactory ways of ascribing some sort of *ubiquity* or ‘whereness’ to the monads, inclining chiefly, perhaps, to the formula that they are in bodies dynamically through their control of the bodies, the bodies as such having, of course, both extensive magnitudes and relative positions. But then the bodies consist exclusively of monads, which have, *in themselves*, neither extensive magnitude nor relative (spatial) position, but merely the power of representing one another under those mysteriously falsified disguises. Thus in all this vicious circle objective extension forever escapes us; though space may be a mode of representing something objective—the real plurality of the monads—all that is actually *spatial* in that representation proves to be purely phenomenal. And even this objective something behind it is in conflict with another highly characteristic Leibnitian principle, that of the phenomenality of all plurality: “whatever things are aggregates of many are not one except for the mind.” On the other hand, one might, by beginning at another point in the system, equally well prove that it implies the objectivity, not only of spatial relations, but even of the one universal space, “strewn with points,” of ordinary intuition. And just this conjunction of contradictory principles is of the essence of the Leibnitian doctrine.

M. van Biéma's exposition of Leibniz, then, cannot be considered wholly satisfactory. For a similar examination of his exposition of Kant, and of his final comparison of the two theories, space is lacking. The comparison seems to me also somewhat over-simplified, through a disregard

of the diversity and incongruency of Kant's positions. If more account had been taken of his ethical writings and of the *Kr. d. U.*, the contrast with Leibniz, upon the metaphysical question, would hardly have appeared so clear and sharp. The plurality of noumenal Egos which Kant fetches in by the door of the practical reason do not lack a certain family likeness to the monads; they are no more alien to space than, in their true nature, are the monads; and each of them, like a monad, is somehow connected with its own individual system of representations under the form of space and time. Only, Kant does not follow Leibniz in trying to explain why, given such supersensible entities, they are, and in what sense they can be, connected with a world of phenomena having just those forms.

In the opening division of his book (pp. I-110) M. van Biéma has done a useful and interesting piece of work in tracing the fluctuations of Kant's account of the relation of Critical Philosophy to Leibniz. In the first *Kritik* Kant holds Leibniz himself responsible for confusing the object of the sensibility with the object of the understanding, condemns him roundly as a dogmatist, and charges him with the grossest possible error in elementary logic. In the *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, 1786, Kant declares that the real doctrine of both Leibniz and Wolff with respect to space and time was identical with his own, but that it had been distorted by their disciples. This, with some qualification, is also maintained in the "Reply to Eberhard," where, as the author shows, Kant gives a grotesquely false interpretation of Leibniz. In 1790 Kant returns to his original version of the matter. These changes, it is made pretty clear, are to be explained rather by the exigencies of the controversies in which Kant was engaged, than by any actual study of Leibniz on his part. The author justly remarks that "ce grand philosophe était l'homme le moins apte à reconstituer historiquement un système." The author does well also to insist upon the importance of the controversy between Reinhold and Kant on the one hand and Eberhard on the other; it constituted, as M. van Biéma points out, a veritable crisis in the propaganda of the Critical Philosophy. That, in their zeal to crush their opponent, both Reinhold and Kant were capable of the utmost bad faith as controversialists is plainly shown. But M. van Biéma has not dealt quite so objectively with the logical as he has with the moral merits of the controversy. The truth is that (as the present reviewer has elsewhere undertaken to demonstrate) Eberhard had the better of the second half of the issue (that concerning synthetic judgments *a priori*) as surely as Kant had the better of the first half. M. van Biéma has failed, as many others have failed, to observe three facts. (1) It is

entirely true, as Eberhard maintained, that the Leibnitians had definitely distinguished synthetic from analytic *a priori* judgments, though in other terms. (2) Kant's formulations of this distinction did not clarify but profoundly obscured it; for they involved a neglect of the difference between the psychological and the logical sense of 'synthetic,' and were ambiguous with respect to the fundamental question whether anything more than tautological propositions can be justified by the "principle of contradiction." (3) Kant's question, "How are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?" was a logical absurdity in so far as it meant "How can their validity be established?" The only conceivable evidence of the validity of an *a priori* judgment is its self-evidence, its necessity, or its deducibility from some immediately necessary judgment. Necessity, once granted, may prove the judgment's apriority; but apriority cannot be antecedently established as a proof of necessity. Kant himself betrays this simple truth in the notorious piece of circular reasoning wherein he infers from the necessity of mathematical judgments that apriority of the pure concepts which is to ground the legitimacy of the mathematical judgments. When, therefore, Eberhard remarked that what is known to be true does not stand in need of a prior inquiry into its possibility, he plunged a pointed truism to the very heart of Kant's pretension to have discovered a radically new method in philosophy, unknown to his "dogmatic" predecessors.

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History of Ethics within Organized Christianity. By THOMAS CUMING HALL. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910.—pp. xi, 605.

"Strangely enough," says Dr. Hall in his Introduction, "the history of Christian ethics has had no adequate treatment by an English-writing student." The use of the term "adequate" suggests at once two conceptions of the task of a history of Christian ethics. If the historian conceives his duty to be that of stating as clearly and accurately as may be the ethical conceptions and doctrines of the various writers who have been most closely associated with organized Christianity, it is possible to speak with some propriety of an "adequate treatment." But if one attempts rather to single out what is most distinctive in Christian ethics, to compare this with other ethical systems, and then to explain the same, it is obvious why there has been no adequate treatment hitherto, and also that no treatment in the immediate future, is likely to maintain long any claim to adequacy. "Christian" ethics is, among other things (1) the ethics of an organized community, (2) the ethics of a religion, (3) the ethics of a religion which at its beginning stood in peculiar relations to

certain existing religions and civilizations, (4) the ethics of a religious and political body which transmitted the order and values of an older civilization to peoples possessing great vitality but only a slightly developed system of conceptions either for comprehending nature or for controlling and valuing life, (5) the ethics of a religious community recruited at various periods from different social and economic classes, the poor, the powerful, the middle class. Now the conceptual apparatus, as well as the concrete facts, for explaining most of these aspects of Christian ethics has only begun to be available. Social psychology, comparative religion, anthropology, folk-psychology, have come in to supplement the older methods of logical analysis, and various writers will apply these with varying emphasis to the historical task.

The present work is to a considerable degree devoted to a statement of the positions of the various writers treated. To some it may seem that there is too little, to others it may seem that there is too much space, relatively, allotted to this general aim, or in particular, to this or that author. It might be questioned whether an allotment of twenty-eight pages to Luther, as against eighteen to Paul and eight to Augustine, was objectively justifiable, however one's sympathies might lie. But it would be unprofitable to discuss this. Suffice it to say on this side of Dr. Hall's work that it shows patient and sympathetic effort to gain from the sources the most significant doctrines and to make these accessible. In some cases the statement gives a somewhat scrappy effect, but this was perhaps inevitable unless the size of the work were to be unduly increased, or many less familiar authors omitted entirely.

The most valuable feature of the book is its consideration of the whole history of Christian ethics as this is affected by the rise and fall of authority in the Christian community. Although the author makes no effort to conceal his conviction as to the evil effects upon an ethical system of such a principle, and shows clearly his sympathy with the struggles against it, he does not treat it simply as a 'corruption' or 'perversion' of the simpler ethical teaching of Jesus. He exhibits the growth of the church organization as affected by the necessity of maintaining itself and defining its position as over against hostile groups or forces of disintegration. The social psychology of all group-life under such conditions is effectively introduced to explain the ethics of the early church. It found itself in a situation analogous to that of a modern trade union when fighting for existence. Private judgment, inner authority, is stamped as the attitude of a heretic or a scab. "The needs of an organization, whether in China or Japan, in England or Germany, will produce rules of conduct and habits of mind exactly resembling each other so far as the needs of the organiza-

tion happen to be the same." "The little Christian church meant to gather from the whole world a 'holy community' to prepare for the coming Utopia and to receive the master when he came." It had a practical program. It was looking forward with hope and longing to the era of social justice "when the possessionless working class would enter upon its rights, joys, and rewards." "The ethics of ecclesiasticism becomes a law to be imposed on others, rather than, as in the beginning, an autonomous regulation of each life by a common loving enthusiasm." "The compacting force of hostile attacks compelled it [the church] to adopt a special ethics and to consolidate its life and traditions."

In the successive chapters—Ethics of the Early Church, the old Catholic or Bishop's Church, The Militant Papacy, Scholasticism, The English Reformation, The Continental Reformation, and The Merging of Churchly with Philosophical Ethics—the central theme is the rise and decline of authority and the relation of this to the ethics of the periods thus defined. With the scholastic period another aspect of authority comes into greater prominence—the authority not only of the hierarchy but of the dogmas and traditions of the Fathers and the councils. Elements of the system were indeed derived from a great variety of sources—it was 'one vast convenient compromise.' The high religious and ethical ideals of Judaism, the fine and subtle intellectual and artistic exactitudes of Greece, the metaphysical systems of the Orient, with their pessimism and passivity—none of them could be taken over in its original purity. The hierarchy took what she needed for her purpose and gave it all the stamp of her divine authority. This, no doubt, served a useful pedagogical purpose. But "ethics on the basis of authority becomes a mere legal casuistry. Ethics was handed over to the confessional, and was dealt with in the distressing books of penitence, where the practical purpose of church discipline, of reformation of the sinner, and the preservation of the peace mingle with other and lower motives, as the exaltation of the clergy, the protection of property and class privileges, and the maintenance of a humble frame of mind among those whom the church governed."

The ethics of the Reformation likewise show the influences of authority under new forms. The contest between church and state was important in England. On the Continent Luther and Calvin show the conflicting forces of the old and the new but with a difference: "In the last analysis for Luther the soul must stand alone for truth, and trust that it will not be forsaken. In the last analysis for Calvin the soul finds out which church has the sacrament and the word and submits wholly to it. The difference is world-wide. For true ethical development there is no more room in logical Calvinism than in logical Romanism."

Dr. Hall has performed a highly important service in bringing out so clearly the influence of the conception of authority in Christian ethics, and it would be ungracious to complain that he has not at the same time given as much attention to several of the other possible lines of consideration suggested in the first paragraph of this notice as one might desire. One does not, for example, have a very definite impression as to whether there is anything which may fairly be called the Christian ethical ideal and, if there is one, how this differs from other ideals. Nor have comparative religion and anthropology been utilized to their full extent to throw light on some of the important motives and conceptions. For example, Christian ethics has conceived life largely under the imagery of sin and redemption, of sacramental grace and new birth. What is the real content of these conceptions? How far is their import affected by the medium of magic in which they arose? What have they meant at various periods to the people who expressed through them their ethical ideals? These and many other similar questions will demand an answer of the future writer who aims to understand the conceptions which still affect Christendom, even though the ethics of the present takes little account of them in its formal systems. It is to be hoped that Dr. Hall and others whom this excellent piece of work may stimulate will attempt further analyses with the improved methods now becoming available.

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The Philosophy and Psychology of Pietro Pomponazzi. By ANDREW HALLIDAY DOUGLAS. Edited by Charles Douglas and R. P. Hardie. Cambridge, University Press, 1910.—pp. x, 318.

Pietro Pomponazzi (Pomponatius), a name unfamiliar to the average student, has been sadly neglected even by scholars, although called the "most influential professor of philosophy of his age." The standard histories of philosophy treat of him perfunctorily. We learn from them that he was the leader of the Alexandrists against the Averroists, that he attacked the doctrine of St. Thomas regarding the soul as a substantial form independent of the body, that he denied the immortality of the individual soul, that he rationalized in various ways the popular notions of the supernatural, and that he reconciled all this with theological orthodoxy by the subterfuge of a "double truth," one for reason and one for faith. And all this, no doubt, is substantially correct as far as it goes. But so far we have had no complete account of his teachings in English based on a first-hand study of his works and exhibiting them in their proper historical setting. The Italians have given him some attention. Ferri, for example, has competently treated of his psychology; Renan,

among the French, has recognized the importance of his relation to Averroes; the Germans, strange to say, have done little to elucidate and estimate him, his name appearing but once in the many volumes of the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* and that in a review by an Italian of an Italian work; while in English, till now, the fullest account of him appears to be some fifty-seven pages in John Owen's *Skeptics of the Italian Renaissance*. The present volume, therefore, supplies an obvious deficiency.

And on the whole the deficiency is well supplied. The first three chapters give the historical background in an account of Aristotle in the early Middle Ages, of the divergent interpretations of him by the Averroists and St. Thomas, and of the general position taken by Pomponazzi as an Aristotelian. These chapters are based on material derived from standard authorities. The more original part of the work is contained in the remaining eight chapters which develop in detail from a study of his writings Pomponazzi's views on the soul, knowledge, virtue, natural law, and religion. One fact brought into clear light by this study is that Pomponazzi, although living in the age of the Renaissance—he was born at Mantua in 1462 and died at Bologna in 1524—remained in all his thinking essentially a scholastic, comparatively uninfluenced by the more significant spiritual movements of his time. His empirical temper he derived from Aristotle. This is the most vital thing about him. His writings are in large measure a prolonged polemic against the views of the Arabians, on the one hand, and the Dominicans, on the other, concerning the constitution of the human soul. His significance, however, lies not in the fact of his opposition, but in the fact that his criticism is based on the demand for empirical analysis, as over against mere metaphysical speculation.

The controversy turns on the question of the nature and relations of the active and the passive intelligence. This distinction, which Aristotle had perhaps regarded as merely logical, Alexander had interpreted in a metaphysical sense, referring the active intellect to God, who was thus conceived as the energy which brought the capacity of intelligence in man into exercise. Alexander's successors regarded the potential intellect as a real entity, like the active. Averroes carried the original doctrine of Alexander a step further, denying that intelligence can be attributed in any real sense to the human soul at all. Over against these commentators St. Thomas holds that the *intellectus agens* is a genuine part of the human soul, which thus, *qua intellectiva*, manifests itself as a separable substantial entity and no longer as a mere form of the body. Other parties to the controversy sought to interpret the mind of Averroes in

support of the doctrine of individual immortality. The position taken by Pomponazzi was as follows. He rejected, from an empirical point of view, the dualism of soul and intelligence set up by Averroes, but accepted to the full the Averroist doctrine that all operative thought in man is the work of universal reason. He agreed with Thomas that active intellect is part of the human soul, but contended that as the soul is a unity, the whole soul, and therefore the soul *qua intellectiva*, is the form of the body, and cannot be separated from the body. He admitted that in one sense intellect is not in body; it is not in it in a quantitative and corporeal way. It can have itself for its object, can reason and have universal conceptions, which faculties that use material organs and are extended cannot do. The subject of thought is not body, but thought; it is, therefore, immaterial *tanquam de subjecto*. Nevertheless, since it is conjoined with sense and cannot operate without images, it cannot altogether be separated from matter and quantity; it is, therefore, *tanquam de objecto*, material and mortal. Of the soul, accordingly, taken as a whole, it can be said that it 'participates' in immateriality and in that which is immortal, but that it is *simpliciter materialis, immaterialis secundum quid*.

Pomponazzi appeals for this doctrine both to Aristotle and to facts. The empirical evidence is, of course, as far as it goes, manifest. It is not, however, in the opinion of the present writer, as clear as the author of the book would have us believe, that this is essentially the original doctrine of Aristotle. No decisive appeal surely can be made to the ambiguous statements concerning the relations of active and passive reason in the third book of the *De Anima*. What is plain in the doctrine is that the passive, or potential, reason, which does not think except as stimulated to activity by a causative principle which is related to it as art to its material (430 a 12), is perishable (430 a 25), while the true nature of the latter is only realized in separation and it alone is immortal and eternal (430 a 23). Nor is it doubtful that the distinction indicated is "in the soul" (430 a 13); the metaphysical dualism of Averroes is excluded. But it is doubtful if Aristotle here regards the immortal reason in the individual soul as an individual substance; its immortality, therefore, might be interpreted as merely generic.

The same doubt attaches to the passage 413 b 24, where it is said that intellect, which seems to be a distinct species of soul, is alone capable of separation from the body as that which is eternal from that which is perishable, an assertion which has somehow to be squared with the statement, 414 a 19, that the soul is neither without body nor itself a kind of body. But that there was no logical contradiction in Aristotle's mind between the assertion of the soul's nature and existence as entelechy and

form of the body and the conception of its possible separation from the body seems plain from what he says at the end of the first chapter of the second book of the *De Anima* in direct connection with, and as a qualification of, the sense in which we are to understand his exposition of the doctrine of the soul as the body's form. This doctrine, he says, does not imply that there may not be parts of the soul which are capable of being separated from the body, nay, further, it is not clear that the soul may not be the actuality of the body *as the sailor is of the ship*. It is true that Aristotle does not dogmatically commit himself to this view, but it is futile to minimize his words and explain them away, as Alexander does by interpreting 'sailor' to mean the art of navigation and 'it is not clear . . . may not' to mean precisely the opposite, namely, 'it is not possible' that it should. How the two conceptions of the soul as form and entelechy of the body and as individually separable might be harmonized was shown by Leibniz's hypothesis of the relation of the 'ruling' monad to the other monads in an organism. But this is a good way beyond Aristotle.

A certain academic interest attaches to the posthumous publication of this learned work. It was originally written, the editors tell us, as a thesis for the degree of bachelor of arts in the University of Cambridge. That the B.A. may mean all sorts of things, we in this country are well aware; it does seem, however, a little anomalous that in one and the same University it should mean things so different as the qualifications of a passman and those of the writer of a book superior in extent and content to the ordinary doctor's dissertation and only comparable to the better products of candidates for the doctorate in France.

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L'intellectualisme de Saint Thomas. Par PIERRE ROUSSELOT. Paris, F. Alcan, 1908.—pp. xxv, 256.

This work is a notable contribution to the literature on Thomas Aquinas. Characterized especially by fine reconstructive power, critical acumen, and originality of view, it also reveals an intimate acquaintance with Thomas, and good historical knowledge. Throughout is apparent the artistic finish so prized by the French writer. Its presentation to the Sorbonne at nearly the same time as the publication of an historical study (*Pour l'histoire du problème de l'amour au moyen âge*) in the Baeumker-v. Hertling series, sufficiently marks the ability of the author. It is one of several recent works which suggest forcibly the inadequacy of our understanding of a thinker whom Charles Jourdain described as "one of the noblest geniuses who have honored the human race," and the great profit which we may yet seek in a philosophy too often considered antiquated.

Especially those present day thinkers who are surcharged with the voluntaristic habit of thought will find much in Thomas as restated by M. Rousselot to make them pause. While he seeks, and most commendably, not "to attenuate Thomism for the sake of making it acceptable to contemporary thought" (p. xxiii), yet his language throughout presupposes the post-Kantian point of view. And, indeed, the modern spirit is really never lost sight of (*e. g.*, pp. xi, xvii, 7, 27, 32, 48, 63, 66, 98, 113, 125, 131, 153, 163, 168, 197, 235). The author has elsewhere made plain that he can think Thomas in modern terms (see *Revue Néo-scholastique*, Vol. XVII, 1910, pp. 476-509, "Métaphysique thomiste et critique de la connaissance"). His own standpoint is Aristotelian in Thomistic form.

The book is not a mere treatment of the primacy of intellect over will; that follows only as a necessary consequence (pp. 43ff, 214ff, 237ff), and the author has shown good sense of proportion here. It is rather an exposition, in a well sustained atmosphere of distinctly metaphysical enquiry, of the supreme place of intellect in the universe as a whole. From this standpoint are treated theodicy, epistemology, criteriology, æsthetics, ethics, politics. Undue emphasis upon criteriology, as in the dogmatic scholastics of the nineteenth century, the author believes (p. 254), may give a false perspective to what is essentially an intellectualistic metaphysics. And whereas usually the worship of abstraction and excessive dogmatism are taken as dominant traits of Thomas's philosophy, M. Rousselot finds the central principle in his theory of the primacy of contemplation (pp. x, xi). The result is a very happy one; he has really found a new language for the exposition of Thomas. The reader is presented with a true apotheosis of the Spirit. "Spirit comes first, and all being is for spirit . . . the material world is only an appendage to the world of spirits" (p. 23, cf. p. 33); and "spirit is *Θεός πῶς* before being *πάντα πῶς*" (p. 65; see also pp. 26, 56, 126, 228, 236). This is vital. Equally important is the finely tempered affirmation of the inadequacy of mere rationalism. The intellectualism of Thomas, says the author (p. ix, cf. pp. 20, 21), "is the very opposite of a system which conceives the life of the spirit after the fashion of human reason"; the true rôle of intelligence is "to capture being, not to frame concepts or arrange judgments" (p. xviii, cf. pp. 54, 229; see also pp. 23, 26, 138, 140). But at the same time the Platonic, or Augustinian, "mentalisme à outrance" is avoided (p. 80, cf. p. 67). There is one neat formulation of the "Platonic" element in Thomas (p. 25), and a full score of references to this influence; but nowhere is there an attempt to measure it exactly. Unfortunately the work is essentially analytic, not historical, and it really suffers thereby.

By intellectualism is meant "a doctrine which reduces the whole of life, in its full intensity, and the essence of the good (identical with being) to the act of intelligence; all the rest can be good only by participation" (pp. ix). To be able to be is to be able first to be thought by God (p. 65 cf. p. 71 n.). Intelligence is life *par excellence*; and not a mere 'epiphenomenon' on the surface of life (pp. 3, 7). Man's intelligence is the lowest, and God's is the highest; between the two lies that of the Angels. The last represent a combination of the orthodox personal Angel with the separated Idea attributed to Plato, and are for Thomas "the models of perfect intellection, the perpetual terms of comparison, ever present to his thought" (pp. 24, 25). Thus the universe is rational, and it is eminently spiritual, but above all it is divine. "Intelligence is essentially the sense of the real because it is the sense of the divine." This is the conception of Thomas's doctrine which M. Rousselot seeks to make clear (p. xi). The work falls into three main divisions, dealing respectively with the supreme value of the intellect as such (pp. 3-54), the value of human speculation in its efforts to remedy its lack of perfect intellection (pp. 55-209), and the value of the intellect for human action (pp. 211-234). In a concluding chapter (pp. 235-242) the unity of philosophy and theology is briefly treated. And in an Appendix (pp. 243-252) the principles are applied to "intelligence in society." The author has chosen the *a priori* method of exposition, the better thereby to remain faithful to Thomas (p. xxiv). And while it suffers the twofold disadvantage of compromising results and creating confusion, one finds it difficult to see how the reverse procedure could have been followed successfully. In his method, however, of interpreting Thomas by a body (vaguely defined) of Thomistic principles, he assumes too much for the general reader, I think, and will frequently appear arbitrary to the student of Thomas (p. xxiii, cf. pp. 97, 109, 129, 130, 132, 152, 155; for principles see, e. g., pp. 12, 46, 63, 69, 80, 110, 122, 143, 157, 192, 197, 234, 239). His characterization of the mind of Thomas is of real significance for his interpretation (p. 112, cf. pp. xxii, 81, 123, 131, 144, 148, 159, 173, 175, 199, 242). The appearance of reading into Thomas is of course only the price of his charming originality. It should be added that a more thoroughgoing citation of passages would have made the whole less fluid. His extraordinary familiarity with Thomas (as evidenced by the scope of actual citations, and the omission of even excellent texts) makes this the more regrettable.

The central theme is the supreme value of intelligence for the "conquest of being" (p. xxiii), and the pages devoted to this are among the most suggestive in the work. In intellection is found a necessary distinction of subject and object (pp. 6, 16), while it also combines subjective inten-

sity with objective extension in the highest degree (p. 7). For action is the more perfect the more it "reaches the *other* as such" (p. 12); to knowledge alone is it granted to "remain the same and at the same time be also the other"—thus, the cow with its hoof may crush a daisy or two, but it sees with its eye all the daisies in the field (p. 13. cf. p. 487). So immanence and grasp of the other go hand in hand; to possess the other is to possess one's self (p. 16). The more completely, then, intelligence embodies the universe, the more it is itself; in the perfect Consciousness alone occurs perfect unity of immanence and all-inclusiveness (p. 19, cf. p. 65). And the decreasing perfections of intuition, concept, judgment, and discourse are measured by their respective degrees of removal from God's unique simplicity (pp. 59ff, cf. p. 241). By the law of continuity (Neo-Platonic) the lower participates in the higher (p. 58); and man participates in the life of the Angels in intuition, the beatific vision furnishing a common ground for all capacities of Spirit (p. 40). This vision is the final end, and thus the world is a vast assemblage of means to intellection (p. 34).

A few words of warning are necessary at this point. First, as to intellection. The very wealth of material employed to make this clear only leaves in the end the exact nature of the "grasp" confused. Thus, intelligence is the faculty of being (p. 7, cf. pp. 16, 40, 71n., 80, 113); of the "other" (p. 7, cf. pp. 12, 16, 48, 68, 128, 129, 187, 219, 229); of the divine (pp. xi, xvii, cf. pp. 64, 65, 240); of infinite Being (p. 40); of the absolute (p. 80); of the 'capture' and possession of being (pp. xviii, xxiv, cf. pp. 21, 34, 41, 44, 55, 64, 138, 140, 150, 211, 212, 219, 233, 239); of "total intussusception" (p. 20, cf. pp. 58, 128, 219). It is analogous to prehensile organs (p. 25); and knowledge is "symmetrical with being" (p. 108, cf. p. 69). But intelligence "can somehow become all things" (pp. 20, 32, 48); and the grasp of the truth is less the adequation of things to the spirit than the union of spirit with things (pp. 21, 22 n., 41). It is a monad which multiplies the world by reflecting it (pp. 32, 48, 197). This rich variety of description really represents a twofold point of view, which permits the too ready passage from subject-object, as opposed, to their identification. The term, he says (p. 38), is unimportant; that the faculty which makes reasoning possible is identical with that which makes us capable of the beatific vision, is alone important. And the motive for this is sufficiently clear; for only so can reason 'imitate' intellect (e. g. pp. 138, 150, 179). But the term ought to make a great difference if the dualistic viewpoint (taken as so essential in Thomas) is to be maintained against the monistic. The necessary dualism in human thought, from which after all the analysis of intellection as such is made, must claim

recognition in this inference to an intuition characterized by utter unity. It is a point, I think, where the Aristotelian and the "Platonic" elements in Thomas are clearly in conflict; and this M. Rousselot seems to recognize (p. 61), but for the rest passes over. His readers will no doubt feel that interpretation which thus fails to attend duly to the historical side can hardly be final for a proper understanding of the great mediæval thinker.

A second point is the beatific vision. This is treated in two different connections; intellection as such (pp. 34-42), and the value of human speculation (pp. 197-209). The first should be read only in connection with the second. All things 'represent' God, whose perfection demands multiplicity of self-expression (pp. 28, 29). This representation is assimilation (all creatures) or vision (intelligent beings) (p. 30). The best resemblance to God is the beatific vision (p. 34), in which "God in his naked self, and just as he sees himself, is acquired" (p. 41), because he *becomes* our idea (p. 36). The author is not sufficiently explicit here, and really misleads (*e. g.*, pp. xxiv, 28, 34, 36, 38). The true vision of grace comes only in the life hereafter. Only late in the work (p. 207 n.) are passages cited affirming the possibility of the mystic vision; in his theory of contemplation Thomas lays stress upon that which man can attain by his own efforts and ordinary grace, and he rarely alludes to 'infused' contemplation. Thus, as a matter of fact, much of what is gained in the first treatment is lost in the second. A hasty reading may prevent this defect from being noted; and the order of exposition conduces to this.

To continue. This present life is poorly adapted to pure intellection as such (p. 27, cf. pp. 55ff). Hence there follows a critique of the human understanding; a pre-Kantian critique which clearly outdoes Locke and, in effect, even Kant. Human intelligence in the presence of truth is like a bat before the sun (Aristotle); "out of this fundamental idea is developed Thomas's entire noetic" (*sic*) (pp. 55, 56, cf. p. 180). All human error springs from our two-fold multiplicity of sense-knowledge (space) and discursive reason (time) (pp. 56ff, cf. p. 76). We are *forced* to reason because we have senses; for discourse presupposes concepts, which are formed only in spirits having bodies (p. 62). Reason, therefore, represents a defect of the intellect, which at the same time furnishes its certainty (pp. 60ff). Hence the reason can at best imitate intellect, and seek to make up for the perfection which it lacks, by recourse to such substitutes as the concept, 'science,' system and symbol (pp. 82ff, cf. p. 63). And because our knowledge is necessarily 'analogic' (pp. 83ff, 109), spiritual substance (Angel and soul, pp. 87ff), and God (pp. 90ff), and even things in their individuality (pp. 95ff) are in reality all inaccessible to it.

Many will find in this part of the work its greatest significance. But for M. Rousselot this is necessarily not the fact, and there are certain points in this connection which deserve especial attention. In spite of the severe critique, briefly outlined above, the robust faith of Thomas in reason remains undisturbed (pp. xix ff, cf. pp. 39, 63ff, 81, 139, 144, 235). And a critique which in the end thus confines man to conceptual knowledge could naturally leave confidence in nothing save reason. Little wonder then that Thomas concedes on occasion the identity of reason and intelligence (p. 128), in spite of the distinction between the two, "whose importance cannot be exaggerated in the Thomistic philosophy" (p. 58, cf. p. 138). But, as the sequel shows, it is really faith in something higher than reason, and not in reason itself. This 'critique méprisante' of human knowledge is an essential part of the philosophy of Thomas because "a low estimate of *our* intellectual powers must be combined with the absolute needs of the spirit" (p. 236, cf. p. 241). And the very triumph of intellectualism, as he elsewhere says (p. 38), lies in the fact that while at the extreme remove from rationalism it yet makes the rational creature 'capax Dei' (Augustine). The entire value of our judgments comes from the fact that intelligence is the faculty of the divine (p. 65, cf. p. 240). Even the significance of the senses, for speculative certainty, comes wholly from their relation to the intellect (pp. 67ff); and the intuitive vision is postulated by the very nature of intellect (pp. 190, 197). Thus, sense and reason and intuition derive all certitude from the intellect, while intellection as such (the 'vision' notwithstanding, p. 207) remains forever denied the human mind, because of its inevitable multiplicity of thought. Only after the present life will the 'logical artifice cease' and 'fabrication' give place to vision (p. 54, cf. p. 229). The author is not blind to the difficulty, and frequently returns to it; only, however, to deny any real inconsistency. But, even assuming always the "profound unity of the spiritual life" (p. 235), it by no means appears how the certitude implicit in the higher process should guarantee the functioning of the lower. Moreover, in the oyster, that "most scattered of souls," no guarantee seems to be necessary; for its knowledge, even though "in a perpetual twilight" and with "no part in contemplation," is completely infallible (p. 14, cf. p. 69). This arbitrary drawing of lines seems to me to represent, again, the conflict of Aristotelian and "Platonic" elements; and I think the author obscures rather than clarifies by insisting that there is no confusion here.

But more vitally important is his analysis of 'analogic' (negative) knowledge (pp. 83ff), by which we "condemn on rational reflection an attitude of mind which was a necessary condition for the original apprehension" (p. 85). It is thus "a process of purification by condemnation,

which comes very near positive falsification" (p. 86). However, the very multiplicity of our nature condemns us to it (p. 87). The analysis is extraordinarily acute and refined; but the implications are more serious than the author seems to fully recognize. To be sure, one may "think (with image) a being to whom is denied all that implies image" (p. 85); but the thought can in no proper sense represent the being. Deny as many attributes as you will to X, the result must remain forever ignorance and not knowledge of X. One may not, of course, dismiss offhand so difficult a conception as that of negative knowledge; but the author should have been more at pains to fortify a position so vital. If to know spirit by body and God by the creature is really like knowing an ox by the idea of an ass or of a stone—not, as he points out, by the idea of "animal" or of "body" (p. 84)—then it would seem that analogic knowledge can have just absolutely no representative value; and resort to 'system and symbol' must be only vain and end in a "melange de deduction et de poesie" (cf. pp. 173, 174, 168, 159). If on the basis of analogic knowledge so defined it is found that Angel and soul and God and the individual reality as such are strictly inaccessible to human knowledge, then they must, *ipso facto*, fall without the range of even speculative interest; because speculation can have no warrant for conceiving them true rather than false. But these are precisely the objects which are of interest to Thomas. Moreover, if M. Rousselot's interpretation is correct, and the reason in analogic knowledge really makes a critique of the intellect as it is in man (p. 84), and yet its necessity arises from a defect of this same intellect (p. 60), it must naturally stultify itself, and Thomas's robust faith in it must suffer.

There remains a third point of importance. The author finds Thomas inconsistent with his own principles in maintaining that knowledge of the individual as such is possible (pp. 101ff). I think the point proved, if his severe formulation of analogic knowledge be admitted. But he oddly enough fails to find here a serious contradiction (pp. 110ff), while admitting (pp. 113, 128) that Thomas assigns exclusive reality to the individual. Surely the contradiction must remain for Thomas as for Aristotle (pp. 96, 97, 100). To perceive with 'indistinction' (*i. e.*, never the 'this' or 'that') must in the very nature of the case leave the individual detail as such forever lost to knowledge; and this he points out (pp. 118, 120, 121, 127, 129, 138). But to say that "for Thomas our ideas of material things are *concepts* and not *percepts*" (p. 98)—the Thomas for whom the individual is known by the sense, the universal by the intelligence (p. 96, cf. p. 118)—is a very different matter from saying this for a post-Kantian thinker. It is not only that Thomas's *chef d'oeuvre*, his theory of the

individual (p. 115), is thereby affected. It is to assail the very basis of conceptual knowledge, in the theory of abstraction. And it would then be difficult to understand how "this metaphysical intellectualism guarantees the value of the idols (concept, judgment, dogma) of the ordinary intellectualism" (p. xix). I think, too, that the vague description of the 'savoureuse' perception of the individual in art and history (pp. 113ff) suffers from just this unwillingness to take the contradiction more seriously. He seems to me to find meaning for what he will say only by confusing unity and individuality (*e. g.*, pp. 128, 133).

To conclude. Inasmuch as human values are moral rather than directly intellectual (awaiting Heaven for this), the value of the intellect for action must be considered (p. xxiv). In the conquest of the body by the spirit is gathered Thomas's entire theory of morals (p. 212). Because man's highest good is to gain God, love is the only norm for action on earth (pp. 213ff, cf. pp. 50ff). The conflict of subjectivity and objectivity is solved in the conception of love, which destroys individuality while intellection multiplies beings (p. 51, cf. p. 239). Since the efficacy of the practical idea increases with its subjectivity (individuality, cf. p. 7), the practical reason is in perpetual opposition to the speculative intelligence (p. 233). But there is an intellectual operation of infinite efficacy, namely, God; and herein is found the essence of Thomas's ontological and moral intellectualism (p. 236). Man's practical reason is only provisional; God, attained by the speculative reason, is his final end. And so philosophy and theology unite (pp. xxv, 239). There is a profound unity of the spiritual life; mysticism crowns intellectualism, whose fruit it is (p. 235, cf. p. 206). God as transcendent Reality, the absolutely speculative Idea, is the true object of endeavor (pp. 236ff). And by the various substitutes for our imperfection of spirit we may here approach this absolute Life, through practical and speculative reason, awaiting the intuition of the perfect Spirit in the life to come (p. 241, cf. pp. 237ff). This Christian crowning of the Aristotelian theory of contemplation, for all its ethereal vagueness, is formulated with compelling force by M. Rousset; and in it is to be found the real significance of the intellectualism of Thomas. The reader should consult pp. 43 to 54 in connection with pp. 211 to 234; and, if he will, the treatise in the Baeumker-v. Hertling series (VI, 6, pp. 7ff) referred to above. It should be added that the author interprets 'natural knowledge' in morals in intellectualistic terms (p. 74, cf. p. 225). This will hardly be welcomed by the Neo-Scholastics, I think; and his texts are certainly not conclusive.

In a work of so vast a sweep, one must feel the inadequacy of mere criticism by the foot-rule. And as one reflects upon the excessive diffi-

culty of the subject, he must admit that it is remarkably free from less important defects (*e. g.*, cf. pp. xx, 12, 14; xxiv, 180; 16, 25, 87ff; 25, 34, 61, 241; 26, 40; 34, 88; 71, 98, 116; 71, 241; 144, 147, 162, 158ff). Being so clearly a labor of love it could hardly be otherwise. What seem to me its essential short-comings I have sought to point out; but after all with some misgiving. For one knows that it is a poor rule for profit, in reading the history of thought, to follow only where thoughts interplay with the precision of billiard balls; appropriate exactness should be sought in different fields, as Aristotle has said more than once. But it seemed best to warn where the need appeared. The numerous points of excellence will be plain enough to the reader, who must be grateful indeed for this new view of Thomas, thus carried further on his own principles. M. Roussetot has well illustrated the truth of Kant's saying, that the critical examination of a writer may lead to a better understanding of him than he had of himself. And we may hope that this original and stimulating work will do much to place the study of Thomas on the same basis with the study of other philosophers.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Die Stetigkeit im Kulturwandel: eine soziologische Studie. Von ALFRED VIERKANDT. Leipzig, Duncker und Humblot, 1908.—pp. xiv, 209.

Vierkandt's thesis can be put into a few words. Culture is an inheritance with its roots deep in the past; it tends to continue itself unchanged; change is difficult and a sharp advancement is hampered by a thousand influences; creators and innovators rarely produce any startling novelty—their most significant achievements are merely somewhat new combinations of old elements; progress is by blind reachings out in all directions and the actual movement in any direction may be more due to accident than to intelligent and purposive effort or leadership. In the development and demonstration of these ideas the author makes a penetrating analysis and brings together a mass of examples and illustrations from all times, places, and culture stages.

His discussion falls into three parts: Historical, Psychological (the Historical Structure of Consciousness), and Sociological (the Mechanism of Culture-movement). In his historical part, Vierkandt brings together facts from daily life, from customs, language, and political life, from religion and mythology, from art and from science—where, if anywhere, one might expect to find free and independent thought, original discovery, and invention—to demonstrate his claims. Even our boasted present-day civilization is not a purposive, intentional, well-directed, progressive movement; it is a blind struggle between the old past and a new present in which progressive ideas and tendencies have a great probability of being strangled or suppressed. New propositions and ideas are based upon and built up from old ones and are but slight variations or improvements; short cuts are rare and the new thought is forced to follow all the windings and twists and turns of the old, which may have been directed to quite different ends. Saint Paul appreciated all this as clearly as Vierkandt and expressed it quite as well. In the psychological part of his discussion, Vierkandt investigates the historical structure of consciousness. Conservatism and progress are existent psychological tendencies; the mental life of the individual shows the significance of repetition, of training; what is difficult the first time it is done, becomes easy, mechanical indeed, by repeated performance; every new mental operation must be fitted to and connected with what has gone before; adjustments and interrelations once established make change in the mass extraordinarily difficult; mental processes, the emotional life, the formation of value standards, conduct, all illustrate and exemplify these facts. In this part of his work Vierkandt investigates the creative faculty and indicates the characteristics and qualifications of an inventor, creator, or leader. In the third and principal part of his treatise—the sociological—our author studies the mechanism of Culture-movement or Culture-change. Left to

itself any local culture persists indefinitely, with extremely slow change. When different cultures come into contact, changes are most rapid and notable; even then they are subject to all the limitations already indicated. Different types of changes may be recognized,—accultural and indigenous, stable and unstable, essential and unessential, conscious and unconscious. At the very beginning of his discussion Vierkandt indicates three conditions of culture change: there must be a pervading social preparedness or ripeness, a need, and an originating individual or individuals. Here each of these is discussed in detail. His study of the qualities of leadership and of the irrational character of culture are among the most suggestive and interesting passages in the whole work.

The author concludes by a brief chapter in which he applies his study to existing conditions. His treatment here is at once pessimistic and optimistic. He emphasizes the importance of the trivial and the fact that great things are but combinations of small ones. Notwithstanding his demonstration of the force of conservatism and the irrationality of culture, the author plainly hopes for a future in which purposive action will lead to definite progress. Vierkandt's discussion is new and thorough-going, yet at its conclusion we feel that we knew it all before. Perhaps the facts have been less clearly defined and they have not been brought into consistent combination but they have long been felt and known. It would be almost possible to bring together a series of folk proverbs and religious maxims which would outline his whole argument.

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Le droit et la sociologie. Par RAOUL BRUGEILLES. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1910. —pp. 162.

The fairest criticism of M. Bruguilles's monograph would, it seems to the reviewer, begin with the conclusion, which occupies the last six pages of the one hundred and sixty-two the book contains. In these pages the author sketches, in the briefest way, a proposal for a radical reconstruction of existing legal systems.

Dissatisfaction with existing law is perennial, and proposals for reform or reconstruction of it are almost numberless. But these proposals may generally be classified in one or the other of two groups: proposals to collate and formulate in some brief and clear fashion the present body of law—the law as it already exists in a less accessible or less intelligible form—such a work, for example, as was done by Sir Frederick Pollock for the partnership law of England; or, on the other hand, proposals to improve the existing law, to devise new legal rules more in conformity with the principles of justice than those obtaining at present—such a codification as Bentham advocated, and to the principles of which the great work of David Dudley Field, in some degree at least, conformed. M. Bruguilles is a more radical Bentham. Dismissing as hopeless any reform of present legal systems by legislative patchwork or jurisconsult commentary, he announces as the only final solution of the problems presented by the chaotic mass of rules now constituting law,

even under so careful a compilation as the French Code, "l'élaboration complète de l'ensemble du Droit sur des bases vraiment scientifiques." Such bases he believes are to be found in the results of a sound sociology.

But a sound sociology must be based on a sound metaphysic, and accordingly M. Bruegilles sets himself the task of elaborating a metaphysical basis for sociology—and not only this, but a sufficient sketch of sociology itself, its object, methods, subject-matter, and divisions, to show that in it the possibility of a scientific Law is implied. All this in one hundred and fifty pages.

The author's metaphysical creed is briefly summed up thus: "Pour nous l'individu n'est qu'une transition, un passage d'une individualité élémentaire à une individualité supérieure: l'individu passé, c'était l'élément, plus infime que l'atome; l'individu futur c'est l'Univers. Tous les autres ne sont que des *essais* pour unifier les premiers et les acheminer vers le second."

In this process the end of the individual man is subordinated to the social end. Society M. Bruegilles conceives as an entity, "l'être social," distinct from and superior to the individuals composing it. Social phenomena he classifies on the basis of their contribution toward the achieving of the social end. Religion, philosophy, art, and science enable the individual to conceive of society and the social end; language, mathematics, and to some extent art, provide for the communication of these conceptions between man and man; morals, politics, and religion impose conformity to the social end upon the individual; and the technical arts make it possible for him to realize this end.

M. Bruegilles finds no difficulty in assuming the position that the end of society is superior to any individual end whatever (p. 112). Law expresses the conditions which society deems necessary at a given moment for its maintenance and advancement. It coördinates individual ends in so far as they are not contrary to the social end, and subordinates them to the latter (p. 146).

Law at bottom is the social logic. The juridical phenomenon is in itself purely formal—its content is economic, moral, or political. It expresses the laws according to which the social phenomena evolve and become apparent to us (pp. 154-155). These laws are laws in the scientific sense, and once discovered and formulated with scientific precision they would constitute a body of law which would require for all but the abnormal man no exterior sanction.

Interesting and often suggestive as all this is, the legal reader, at least, is likely to feel that there is an intolerable deal of "la sociologie" for the six concluding pages of "le droit." In his preface the author admits that the elaboration of "toute une sociologie" in the space of one hundred and fifty pages can have only the value of a sketch. Such a sketch is necessarily too abstract to serve the purpose of showing that the basis for a scientific Law may be found in sociology; and aside from this, the treatment of debatable points is too slight to carry conviction. Yet the number of topics discussed is such that the author has not left himself space to develop the methods by which the data to be furnished by sociology can be utilized in that work of legal reconstruction for which the book is designed to be a plea.

La psychologie sociale de Gabriel Tarde. Par AMÉDÉE MATAGRIN. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1910.—pp. 352.

A disdain of system,—or at least a modest refusal to create even the impression of the monumental,—is no less characteristic of Tarde than of other French thinkers. Of his social philosophy as a whole we have from his own hand merely the sketch in his little book, the *Lois sociales*, an abridgment of *Les lois de l'imitation*, and its chief complements, *La logique sociale* and *L'opposition universelle*. When it is recognized that, even more than these works, it is his many scattered writings in which he applies his theories to economic, political, juristic, and criminological questions that give significance to Tarde's social philosophy, the usefulness of such an résumé as this, especially when the work is so well done, is beyond question. The difficulty of doing justice to one whose chief attraction is to be found in the multitude and suggestiveness of his examples, is fully realized by the author, but he meets the difficulty much more than half-way.

One of the features for which the reader of Tarde will probably be most grateful is the reconstruction of the historical background of his thought, especially his connection with the critical philosophy of Cournot. But M. Matagrín also brings out the real originality of his point of view. It was at a time when the science of sociology was in danger of losing itself in other sciences that Tarde came with his great work of synthesis, with his emphasis upon the one question: What is the specific and elementary social fact? His "social logic," with its four principles of the social cosmology (variation, imitation, opposition, adaptation), implies, one easily perceives, the rejection of previous sociological doctrines. Tarde admits neither the law of unilinear evolution from confused homogeneity to coördinated heterogeneity, nor the organic theory in its materialistic form. In the *Lois de l'imitation* he insists that, while society as a living being organizes itself, organization is but a means; propagation is its essential end. He believes that the pretended Spencerian law, the instability of the homogeneous, explains nothing. The sole way to explain the exuberant diversities at the surface of reality is "to admit at the basis of things a crowd of tumultuous elements, individually characterized." From the point of view of this monadology, he will remind the sciences of the purely symbolic value of the laws they establish.

Though emphasizing the originality of Tarde's psychomorphism, he also points out its dangers, especially the "psychology saturated with metaphysics" that resulted. The essential and durable part of his work is the discovery of a social "inter-psychology"; his principal claim to a place in science is his profound study of social opinion and public life.

According to Tarde, the sole communicable elements (of this inter-psychology) are the two essential forces, variable in their degree but not in their essential nature, desire and belief. The sensation, taken as the basis of modern psychology, is really subjective and relative to the individual. Explanation of fundamental human similarities by the intelligence is insufficient. Intelligence is merely a necessary condition. It is rather suggestion or imitation,

in its normal and objective aspect, that alone makes possible a comprehensive conception of sociology, and one not merely a servant of biology. If Matagrín believes, as he does, that Tarde has justified the conception of a social psychology, relatively independent of both individual psychology and biology, it is not because he accepts either his metaphysics or his characterization of the essential social fact. His criticism of Tarde's philosophy of desire and belief, as well as of his view that these are the subject-matter of statistics, is most searching. As for the theory of imitation, he does not hesitate to speak of it as a "parasitic principle" that spoils the whole of Tarde's sociological work. He points out, rather keenly I think, that association is more fundamental than imitation. If Tarde replies that association is perhaps the more fundamental metaphysical conception, of which imitation is the specific social expression; Matagrín raises the counter-objection that this holds only if it be pretended that a universal sociomorphism is demonstrated analytically. But it fails absolutely if, on the other hand, it be shown that imitation is not primary but secondary and teleological. Most imitations, Matagrín holds, are teleological. There are two fundamental objections to Tarde's conceptions that he has never really met: that man does not invent for the pleasure of inventing, but in response to needs; that he does not imitate for the pleasure of imitating, but adopts merely those forms that seem to him useful and true. Is imitation the sole cause of association or its end? Is it *by* imitating or *in order* to imitate that men associate? The first is not true; the second involves a paradox. Repetition has no interest in itself; it concerns itself with secondary differences rather than with fundamental similarities. The one consideration that Tarde continually neglects is the fact one often notes, that sympathy and prestige are more fragile and variable than interest.

But while having us recognize all this, Matagrín would also insist upon the value of the contributions to social science of a mind in a sense greater than his theories. The presentation as well as evaluation of Tarde's contributions to practical sociology, especially penology, no less than of his suggestive speculations in the spheres of ethical, economic, and religious conceptions, is admirable. It is true, the fact that the phenomena of societies and groups are for Tarde but material for the interpretations of the social psychologist, means that these interpretations will be affected by the "parasitic principle" of imitation. His explanation of the notions of value and sovereignty by his theory of desire and belief, his explanation of the law of supply and demand not by the interest of the individual but by the imitation of desires, carried him too far. His theory of value, while criticising not without reason the too simple and mechanical law of supply and demand, substitutes too absolutely for it a logical and teleological explanation that leaves little reality to political economy as a positive science. His systematization of the material of economics under his captions of repetitions, oppositions, and adaptations, so energetically repulsed by the specialists, must be recognized as having largely suggestive value. All this, however, does not in the least diminish the significance of his penetrative insight into the phenomena of the life of modern

societies, nor the value of an attempt at synthesis, which, if not the most comprehensive, is at least one of the most interesting in the field of social science.

To those who have followed at all closely the criticism of Tarde's works during the last fifteen years, the book will appear to be the mature judgment of one who has known most intimately the drift of sociological opinion in that time. To those who are familiar with Tarde himself, that judgment will appear sound and just which finds in him "a vast and original mind, but one too systematized by the need of certitude," and which sees in his subordination of teleology to logic, and his complete separation of the social phenomena from their biological basis, the chief sources of weakness in his work.

WILBUR M. URBAN.

TRINITY COLLEGE.

Le doute. Par PAUL SOLLIER. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909.—pp. 404.

The doubt of which this book treats is a mental process which is sometimes normal, sometimes pathological. The normal doubter is the person whose doubts are occasional, who has, that is, some reason or objective ground for his feeling of uncertainty. The morbid doubter, on the contrary, makes his occasions, and his uncertainties have a subjective basis. But pathological differs from normal doubt, says the author, only in the exaggeration and persistence of its manifestations.

The characteristics of doubt are as follows. It is primarily an oscillation between two or more representations, beliefs, or courses of action, a hesitation to commit oneself to either or any side. And the oscillation is always unpleasant—often agonizing. These two points Sollier considers the essentials of doubt. This opposition of tendencies is really also a division or conflict within the self. Doubt of the external world engenders doubt of self. The doubter is self-conscious, and this is particularly annoying when he is trying to perform acts which are usually automatic. Acute self-consciousness is inhibitive and the author says that it is rare for the morbid doubter to lose self-consciousness completely. The strong affective tone, and the fact that the oscillations are involuntary and unsought for, distinguish this experience from impersonal or philosophic doubt, which the writer does not include in his field. A tendency to obsessions is general in cases of pathological doubt. It is not essential, since the doubter may sometimes suspend his state of hesitancy and attend to other things, but obsession is a fairly constant manifestation of doubt. If, for example, an habitual doubter is not sure whether he has washed his hands perfectly clean from some contamination, he may wash them again and again indefinitely, or some certain number of times which he has fixed for himself "in order to be sure." This mania for repeating the operation is his obsession and it is the natural result of the doubt, *i. e.*, is his means of assuaging that doubt.

Certain sensory and motor accompaniments of morbid doubt are noted. There are sensations of tingling, pricking, burning, and numbness, and even sometimes a diminution of sensitivity, chiefly in the region of the head.

There are feelings of fatigue, both cerebral and general. The pulse becomes small and hard. The throat tightens. A state of muscular fatigue is often entailed by a siege of doubt, and is probably due to the fact that there is a large expenditure of neuro-muscular energy as the doubter vacillates between different lines of action and is inhibited from all of them. The intellectual accompaniments of morbid doubt are a lessened power of attention, and consequently a lessened power of reasoning. The doubter's thought lacks continuity and organization. Memory is impaired. A predominance of association by contrast is characteristic. However, the author asserts that the habitual doubter is sometimes endowed with great imaginative power and critical acumen. Doubt is analytic, dissociative, inhibitive. It is the character of the doubter to be unstable, emotional, and impulsive.

Practically any circumstance or possibility may become the object of doubt. But the author says that of two possibilities which present themselves the more improbable is the one which the doubter fixes upon. This is noted particularly with the phobias which form a very important class of doubts. Not only does the "phobic" fear the evil which is less likely to happen, but he usually fears possible rather than actual conditions. The sufferer often fears that he will do certain acts, and these acts are almost invariably such as the person's established habits and character would render impossible. The religious person fears that he will commit some sacrilege, the honest man that he will commit a theft, etc. These specific fears do not mean that the sufferer is universally timid. The "phobic" is not necessarily a coward, and in circumstances unconnected with his doubts and fears he may display signal firmness of mind and even heroism.

The cause of morbid doubt, or the general condition which leads to it, is described as a feebleness of cerebral action, which is marked by incapacity for sustained effort and by *émotivité*. This general affectivity accounts for the rapidity with which the doubter oscillates from one mental representation to another, and also for the facility with which an excruciating doubt may appear and disappear.

A comparison between what the author calls doubt and what Pierre Janet has called "psychasthenia" convinces Sollier that the two phenomena are equivalent. The symptoms and stigmata of psychasthenia which Janet describes are but the characteristics of doubt as Sollier understands it. Instead of Janet's conception of lower mental levels as the basis of the phenomena, Sollier employs his conception of cerebral instability and of affectivity.

In discussing the treatment of pathological doubt, the author insists continually that the patient cannot be argued or reasoned out of his doubt. The arguments used become in their turn the objects of doubt and the patient finds himself worse confounded. What he needs is dogmatic assurances from some person in whom he has confidence. Doubt, being fundamentally an emotional state, is less amenable to reason than it is to something which is able to inspire a blind faith. Sollier says that doubters will beg for personal affirmations and assurances rather than for proofs. Doubt will sometimes

disappear under the stress of excitement of various kinds. The author has little faith in an appeal to the will power of such subjects as a means of cure. He believes rather that the most important means of helping to remove pathological doubt is to promote the physical well-being of the subject. Plenty of sleep, nourishing food, and the absence of distracting or harrowing circumstances will do much towards establishing greater cerebral stability and hence towards diminishing affectivity.

The book is clearly written and is pleasant and temperate in tone. It contains valuable and interesting material but it is too long. There is a good deal of repetition and an amount of unnecessary material.

KATE GORDON.

MONTROSE, COLORADO.

L'art et le geste. Par JEAN D'UDINE. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1910.—pp. xvii, 284.

This interesting book offers an explanation in mechanical terms of the facts and processes of art. In the preface M. d'Udine acknowledges his indebtedness on the one hand to M. E. Jaques-Dalcroze, on the other to M. Félix Le Dantec. It is from the methods of artistic instruction devised and practised by the former and from the biological theories expounded by the latter in numerous well-known works, that M. d'Udine has developed his own conception of the way in which works of art come into existence and of the ultimate origin of the artistic impulse. Stated in his own words (p. 63), his central thesis is as follows: "Je voudrais établir, en effet, parce que je crois cela profondément vrai, qu'à chaque émotion, de quelque ordre que ce soit, correspond une attitude, un mouvement corporel, et un seul, et que c'est par l'intermédiaire de ce mouvement que s'opère la traduction synesthésique extrêmement complexe dont s'accompagne toute création artistique."

The first part of the book, entitled "L'imitation des rythmes naturels," is devoted to the proof of this thesis. Chapter I considers the emotion experienced by the artist, the desire to produce, and the phenomenon called inspiration. The essential feature of life is motion, and underlying all our feelings and states of mind are physiological rhythms. What the artist does is to create for a given series of such rhythms a set of symbols that will have the power of giving rise to a closely similar series in those to whom the work of art is addressed. No act of magic, however, is involved in the process, and what we call inspiration is in no sense a cause, but a result, a state of mental exaltation accompanying the successful and rapid accomplishment of the artist's task, in short, a mere epiphenomenon.

The writer passes in Chapter II to a discussion of various preliminary topics, e. g., the nature of imitation and the stages of artistic evolution, and at the end of the chapter enters more directly upon his principal subject, namely, the nature and function of synæsthesias in art. The remaining chapters of Part I are occupied with a study of synæsthesias as fundamental to the various arts, poetry, dancing, music, painting, architecture. In poetry, language effects a fusion of specific sensory images into generic images. Contemporary literature (Hüysmans) "présente les associations sensorielles synesthésiques

sous une forme analytique," but literature has always made use of such synæsthesias, and the language of the people contains numerous traces of them. "C'est ainsi que les carriers de Fontainebleau appellent le grès très dur grès *pif*, le grès dur grès *paf*, at le grès très tendre grès *pouf*, du bruit que fait leur pic en s'y attaquant. (Leur pic, quel mot évocateur, imitateur!)." The synæsthetic arts in particular are the dance (the word is taken in the broad sense to include gesture and attitude), and music of a pictorial or emotional quality. In Chapter IV M. d'Udine studies the history of the dance and of its relations with music, and takes up the question as to whether the dance, in addition to its power of representing or translating musical rhythm, may also translate into its own language melody, harmony, and the like. Naturally he answers the question affirmatively, since he believes that to each emotion and sensation there corresponds a certain attitude or movement, the product of a synæsthetic equivalence. Passing on to music, he declares that all music is synæsthetic in character, more especially that which is pictorial or emotional (program music?). "The musical expression of any emotion is the translation into sound rhythms of the physiological rhythms we experience while dominated by the emotion in question." M. d'Udine's attitude toward 'program' music, and indeed toward all artistic experimentation, is nevertheless conservative enough, and he does not at all underestimate the importance of the practical test. A new form must, whatever be its basis in theory, actually in practice force its acceptance by the public, or at least a sufficient portion of the public. Wagner met such a test successfully. The outcome of the trial now being undergone by Strauss and Debussy, *e. g.*, is problematical. Granting, what indeed M. d'Udine's study of synæsthesias does not at all compel him to grant, and what I do not think M. d'Udine believes, namely, that it is possible for a number of persons to obtain through music alone the same conception of a scene or an event, he would still insist that such music must be accepted as good art by the musical public. In other words, the question as to how far music may, as a matter of psychologic fact, fulfill the descriptive or narrative functions of language is totally different from the question as to what constitutes good music. What M. d'Udine clearly does believe, however, is that the study of synæsthesias has greatly weakened the conventional argument that program music is an attempt to do with musical sounds what these sounds in the very nature of things cannot do.

There are two kinds of synæsthesias, double and single. The double synæsthesias have already been considered under dancing and emotional music. The arts that make use of single synæsthesias are 'pure' music and decorative art. In regard to pure music, we must distinguish two kinds of pleasure derived from it, that, namely, which is properly artistic and is of motor origin, and that which is intellectual in character and proceeds from an educated ability to recognize and analyze musical forms. The two are quite distinct in kind, though usually confused in æsthetic discussion.

In Chapter VII, which has chiefly to do with architecture, M. d'Udine finds the ultimate origin of all artistic emotion in the muscular sense of weight.

At this point his reasoning seems less clear than usual, and this chapter is without question the least satisfactory from the point of view of æsthetic theory.

Part II, "Le mécanisme des signes imitateurs," has to do with so many different matters that even a brief summary cannot be attempted. The most interesting portion is that (Chapter XII) dealing with the system of musical education pursued by M. Jaques-Dalcroze. "La Gymnastique Rythmique est donc l'art de représenter les durées musicales et leurs combinaisons par des mouvements et des combinaisons de mouvements corporels (musculaires et respiratoires), d'associer à chaque valeur sonore une attitude, un geste corrélatif." In the preface M. d'Udine, drawing upon his own experience, assures us that this system has justified itself in practice.

It is regrettable that in this country we should not possess professional critics of art sufficiently well-versed in the psychological and in the historical study of æsthetics to make real contributions to æsthetic theory. From any point of view, M. d'Udine appears to have done as much as this.

WILLIAM DINSMORE BRIGGS.

LELAND STANFORD JR. UNIVERSITY.

Principles of Secondary Education: Volume III, Ethical Training. By CHARLES DEGARMO. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1910.—213 pp.

In this volume Professor DeGarmo has given us the ripened fruit of his long study of the problems of education. In his half dozen earlier volumes he has clearly given evidence that his supreme interest lay in the ethical ends and means of education. He has reserved for this volume, however, his complete expression upon this phase. The book is specifically stated to be a text-book, and presumably is for graduate students and advanced undergraduates. Because of its organization as a text-book, the general reader finds that he is frequently stopped in the midst of an intensely interesting expository discussion and confronted by a set of questions growing out of the text. The questions are decidedly interesting and reveal the wide application which Dr. DeGarmo evidently makes in his own class-room.

The first two chapters deal with "regulative principles," including (1) "The Teleology of Conduct," and (2) "The Psychology of Conduct." He has designed, as stated in the preface, "to make clear the great existing differences in ideals and conditions between the ancient static and socialistic organizations under an economy of deficit and pain, with their resultants of struggle and sacrifice, and the modern democratic order under an economy of surplus and satisfaction, with their resultants of personal independence, and co-operative well-being." He maintains that the ethical doctrines of the Greeks, the Mediæval philosophers, and of Kant, are clearly too individualistic and inadequate for modern social conditions. Dewey, Tufts, Hobhouse, Paulsen, and Baldwin, have furnished, according to De Garmo, much more desirable regulative ethical principles, because fully in accord with the fundamental ideas of evolution.

Chapter 4, "Moral Habits, New and Old," and Chapter 5 on "Some Cardinal Moral Ideals, Old and New" consider genetically several of the specific ideas

growing out of the fundamental regulative principles, earlier discussed. Among the cardinal ideals treated are justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom as virtue. Present day ethical teachings do not deal with ideas of right in the abstract, but with concrete every-day human experience. Greek ideals of conduct do not completely satisfy the minds of moderns because they are essentially æsthetic rather than moral. "But Kantian moral philosophy, reinforced by evolutionary study of man and his institutions, and the general sense of social solidarity, which modern science and its diffusion have made possible, have enabled the masses to apprehend a theory of morals which, while involving many ancient conceptions up to a certain point, rises distinctly above them in moral worth."

In his chapter on "The Adolescent in Modern Society," Dr. DeGarmo is chiefly concerned with considering the best means for getting the youth to develop ethical habits. He advocates an appeal to the utility which such a procedure may have for the youth, that is, get the youth to believe that a desirable course may promote his survival. "Such prudential notions, or those of enlightened self-interest, are not perhaps the highest that may be appealed to, but they are at least to be respected, and they have the advantage of being always appropriate to urge."

Chapters 7 and 8 deal with "The Ethical Value of the High-School Studies," and Chapter 9 with "Some Moral Aspects of Physical Training." The high-school studies considered are the natural sciences, industrial subjects, history, the arts, and literature. Here is to be found the most satisfying discussion of the relation of the curriculum to moral training that has come to the present reviewer's attention. The limits of space preclude any adequate mention. The various academic specialists who have partisan views concerning the special merits of their own subjects would be immensely benefited by a perusal of this impartial analysis of the underlying principles which give a study an ethical value. According to DeGarmo, "Whether knowledge shall have ethical import or not, depends upon the attitude, capacity, and insight of the knower. It becomes a moral instrument when consciously used for moral ends; but when these are absent because unseen or disregarded, then knowledge may be purely intellectual or æsthetic, or may even become the instrument of evil. In itself considered, knowledge, even of the most sacred things, may be wholly non-moral." His criterion of the moral worth of any study is summarized in the expression: "Studies are moralized by being socialized, and they are socialized by daily application to constructive effort." By this he means that, whenever the principles of any subject are developed out of a consideration of their concrete applications, and in turn the principles are made to render meaningful every-day, concrete, human experiences, they come to have moral significance. In short, the applied aspects of every study, whether science, literature, history, or the arts, are those fullest of ethical significance.

FREDERICK E. BOLTON.

Philosophie de l'éducation. Essai de pédagogie générale. Par EDOUARD ROEHRICK. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1910.—pp. 288.

For M. Roehrick the end of education is the development of moral character, but not moral character *in abstracto*; it is rather a character that results from the individual's striving to realize *in himself* the fullest expression of himself. It is natural, therefore, that for him the process of education consists in the cultivation of the will and in the establishment of ideals for moral culture. In brief, education is a progress in the direction of freedom. It seeks to establish conduct upon the appreciation of the value of a certain kind of act rather than upon subjugating authority or fear. The starting-point in this process is individuality, and educators may take one of three alternative courses: (1) They may try to destroy individuality through enforced uniformity and subjection to authority; (2) they may give absolute freedom to the development of individuality; (3) they may take individuality as they find it and cultivate it by the pedagogical means most likely to form moral character. The second and third parts of the book deal with the third alternative.

Part II deals with the indirect training of the will, that is, by educative instruction, and Part III considers the direct training of the will through the agency of the teacher. The beginnings of will-training take their rise in the desires in men, which are born of sentiments of pleasure or pain, sympathy or antipathy, and which are the first direct movements of human activity. Right mental attitudes and materials of instruction are means of accomplishing the training aimed at. The author emphasizes the importance of interest and attention. He criticizes the special or professional school as not being educative because of the difference in kind of the interest manifested in such schools as compared with public schools. To the reviewer, however, it seems that the difference is of degree rather than of kind, and that M. Roehrick has made the distinction too sharp. May not even special and professional schools contribute to the end set up by our author? In fact, it is a serious mistake to distinguish too sharply between what is useful and what is cultural, as if they were opposed to each other. In any well ordered scheme of education they are but opposite sides of the same thing. As materials of instruction, which are the means for the indirect education of will, the author mentions the four main divisions: (1) knowledge of human nature and culture, (2) of exterior nature, (3) of signs and symbols, and (4) of forms. These, he holds, must be studied simultaneously. He would use the analytic-synthetic method in their presentation.

In Part III, as already stated, M. Roehrick discusses the direct education of moral character. This is accomplished through discipline in physical education, through an interaction of the pupil's objective character with his subjective character. The term objective character refers to what the individual is by conduct; subjective character refers to what he is with respect to his judgments on conduct. We may add that progress in development of will comes only through this interaction, for in order to know what moral character is, one must feel the impulse to realize it. It is appreciated first through striv-

ing, which is enriched by intellectual processes. The notion of the teacher's direct influence upon the development of will is discussed adequately. There is one phase of moral education, however, which is not given the attention it deserves. This is the effect of a crisis in producing moral character. The appreciation of duty cannot come to an individual with greater keenness than in a crisis, where possibility of choice presents itself clearly and where the individual is responsible for the result. In other words, responsibility is a key to moral development and the school must be organized in such a way that real crises exist for the pupil. The book is wholesome and suggestive,—a philosophy of education that grows out of actual problems and situations.

ROLLAND M. STEWART.

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Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie. Von WILHELM WUNDT. 6. Aufl., II. Band. W. Engelmann, Leipzig, 1910.—pp. viii, 782.

It is eight years since the corresponding instalment of the last (fifth) edition of the *Grundzüge* came out. This new second volume contains fewer important changes than the first (1908), which was noticed in this REVIEW last March (Vol. XIX, 1910, p. 217). The text is expanded by about fifty pages. The new material is supplied almost entirely by recent Leipzig researches and from Wundt's *Psychologische Studien*. The temporal course of sensation and the process of assimilation are the topics responsible for most of the changes in exposition. For pressure a new section is added (p. 9) on the stimulus-gradient and on *Anstieg*. Wundt refers local differences of pressure to variations in the gradient; but he makes no important use of the gradient when he comes later to his theory of tactual space (pp. 519 ff). A revision of auditory sensation and of tactual perception of space lays additional weight upon the factor of assimilation. A recent study from the Leipzig laboratory furnishes new facts bearing upon the temporal course of visual sensation. The sections on feeling have suffered but little change in the new edition, except that Wundt pays his respects to Stumpf's *Gefühlsempfindungen* and to the critics of his own tridimensional theory. His doctrine of the affective elements stands as it stood eight years ago. An extension of the paragraphs devoted to the stroboscope recalls the recent violent discussion that arose out of Linke's work. Wundt naturally takes sides with Linke against Marbe and makes assimilation, not the after-image, the primary factor in stroboscopic vision. The indexes, which were published in separate covers for the fifth edition, have been put back into the several volumes.

MADISON BENTLEY.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

Elemente der Philosophie: ein Lehrbuch auf Grund der Schulwissenschaften. Von ALFRED RAUSCH. Halle a. d. S., Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1909.—pp. xii, 376.

This volume, written especially as a text or reference book for students who may never take up the higher philosophical branches in detail, aims to place

at their disposal the working concepts of science and philosophy. There is no attempt at systematic formulation of principles, no proffer of a short-cut to metaphysical truth. The purpose is rather to open up the problems, and reveal the legitimate function of philosophy. Under the four divisions, "Stellung der Mensch zur Welt," "Natur," "Kultur," and "Bildung," such topics as the relation of body and mind, the naturalistic interpretation of human life and destiny, freedom *vs.* determinism, organic evolution, the religious consciousness and primitive religious concepts, the categories of science, the nature of the beautiful, are presented in their simplest terms and in their historical and philosophical setting.

Throughout the book the style is lucid and fluent. There are copious illustrative references to the literature and history of the Greeks and Germans. If the author lapses now and then into banality and verbosity, if his didactic bent becomes at times uncomfortably obvious, there is yet much that is fresh and suggestive. The book serves more than tolerably its double function—to open up vistas, to whet inquiry, and at the same time furnish beginners with a compendium of terms and concepts for ready reference. The reviewer knows of no equivalent in English,—a readable work by means of which the layman and isolated student is encouraged to orientate himself among the problems and methods of philosophy.

Much of value in the volume is traceable to the influence of Kant, to whom, along with Wundt, the author acknowledges his heavy debt. An over-emphasis on the positivistic element of the Kantian doctrines here and there discernible is, however, to be deprecated. So also are numerous gaps in the author's survey of the field of culture, notably the absence of reference to some of the recent social applications of psychology. A brief but well constructed index adds materially to the usefulness of the volume.

ELSIE MURRAY.

WILSON COLLEGE.

Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. By HENRI BERGSON. Authorized Translation by F. L. POGSON. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1910.—pp. xxiii, 252.

In *Time and Free Will* (*Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*), which was published in 1889, Bergson deals with the intensity and multiplicity of conscious states, which he regards as qualitative, not quantitative. This ever-changing conscious multiplicity he identifies with duration, which is for him the fundamental reality, and as such is to be distinguished from the homogeneous and abstract time of science and of common sense. Like most other philosophical difficulties, the problem of the freedom of the will is rooted in the neglect of this distinction and is readily solved as soon as its true nature is recognized. Since such appreciation is possible only for the immediate experience of duration and never for conceptual thought, reality may be lived but not defined.

In this earliest of Bergson's books we are evidently already in possession of his most characteristic theories, which are here presented more convincingly

than in his later writings, where the greater complexity of subject-matter renders clearness of exposition more difficult. For this reason an English translation was eminently desirable, and the work has been well done by Mr. Pogson, whose version is an accurate rendition of the original into idiomatic English. He has added a brief introduction, a bibliography of Bergson's writings and of the principal criticisms upon them, marginal summaries, and an index, all of which contribute much to the value of the book as a basis for the study of Bergson's theories. The bibliography will be especially welcomed, because so much of what is written about Bergson has appeared in the various periodicals and is correspondingly hard to trace.

WELLS COLLEGE.

G. N. DOLSON.

Friedrich Nietzsche, sein Leben und sein Werk. Von RAOUL RICHTER. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1909.—pp. vii, 356.

Of the never-failing supply of monographs upon the various aspects of Nietzsche's life and writings, by far the greater number serve their purpose well or ill for a year or two and then disappear altogether from public notice. Herr Richter's *Friedrich Nietzsche, sein Leben und sein Werk* has fared better than its fellows, for the first edition, which was published in 1903, is now followed by the second. In its new form the book presents the same excellences of style and treatment that characterized its first appearance, and in addition gives a more systematic study of Nietzsche's metaphysics and epistemology and a completer account of his relation to the Darwinian theory. This unfortunately necessitates the addition of about seventy-five pages to a book which was long enough in its original form; but it still remains one of the best untechnical discussions of Nietzsche's philosophy. Based upon lectures delivered at the University of Leipzig, it presupposes in the reader sufficient familiarity with philosophy to enable him to follow the exposition and criticism of philosophical theories, but assumes no acquaintance with the teachings of even the greatest philosophers.

G. N. DOLSON.

WELLS COLLEGE.

The following books also have been received:

The Individual and Society. By JAMES MARK BALDWIN. Boston, Richard G. Badger, 1911.—pp. 210.

Thoughts on Ultimate Problems. By F.W. FRANKLAND. London, David Nutt, 1911.—pp. vii, 101.

Protestant Thought Before Kant. By ARTHUR CUSHMAN MCGIFFERT. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911.—pp. 261.

English Philosophy: A Study of its Method and General Development. By THOMAS M. FORSYTH. London, Adam and Charles Black. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1910.—pp. xii, 231. \$1.75.

The Value and Dignity of Human Life. By CHARLES GRAY SHAW. Boston, Richard G. Badger, 1911.—pp. 403. \$2.50.

Hegelianism and Human Personality. By HIRALAL HALDAR. Calcutta, Calcutta University Press, 1910.—pp. v, 61.

- Text-Book in the Principles of Education.* By ERNEST NORTON HENDERSON. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1910.—pp. xiv, 593. \$1.75.
- Truth on Trial.* By PAUL CARUS. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Company, 1911.—pp. v, 138.
- Some of God's Ministries.* By WILLIAM MALCOLM MACGREGOR. Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1910. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons.—pp. x, 297. \$1.75.
- The Christ Myth.* By ARTHUR DREWS. Translated from the third edition (revised and enlarged) by C. DELISLE BURNS. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Company.—pp. 304.
- Philosophie als Grundwissenschaft.* Von JOHANNES REHMKE. Leipzig, Frankfurt a. M., Kesselringsche Hofbuchhandlung, 1910.—pp. v, 706.
- Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit.* Von ERNST CASSIRER. Erster Band. Zweite durchgesehene Auflage. Berlin, Verlag Bruno Cassirer, 1911.—pp. xviii, 601.
- Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre.* Von EMIL LASK. Tübingen, Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1911.—pp. vii, 276.
- Einführung in die Metaphysik.* Von G. HEYMANS. Leipzig, Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1911.—pp. viii, 363.
- Zur Lehre vom Gemüt.* Von J. REHMKE. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1911.—pp. viii, 115. M. 3.
- Platons Dialog Theätet.* Übersetzt und erläutert von OTTO APELT. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1911.—pp. iv, 192.
- Analyse et critique des principes de la psychologie de W. James.* Par A. MÉNARD. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. 466. 7.50 fr.
- Nouvelles études sur l'histoire de la pensée scientifique.* Par G. MILHAUD. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. 235.
- Essai sur la sincérité.* Par GABRIEL DROMARD. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. iv, 242. 5 fr.
- La genèse des espèces animales.* Par L. CUÉNOT. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. iii, 496.
- La prière. Essai de psychologie religieuse.* Par J. SEGOND. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. 364. 7.50 fr.
- Philosophie de la religion.* Par J. J. GOURD. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. xix, 331. 5 fr.
- Essai sur l'histoire de l'idée de progrès jusqu'à la fin du XVIII^e siècle.* Par JULES DELVAILLE. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1910.—pp. xii, 761. 12 fr.
- La poétique de Schiller.* Par VICTOR BASCH. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. xxiv, 352. 7.50 fr.
- La chalogais éducateur.* Par JULES DELVAILLE. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. xi, 225. 5 fr.
- Le problème pédagogique.* Par JULES DUBOIS. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. vii, 533. 7.50 fr.
- La morale de l'honneur.* Par L. JEUDON. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. 246. 5 fr.
- L'évolution du droit et la conscience sociale.* Par L. TANON. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. 204. 2.50 fr.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scholastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*, I. Abtl.: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

La morale et la sociologie. F. PALHORIÈS. *Rev. Néo-Sc.*, No. 68, pp. 510-542.

In a former article (August, 1910) it was pointed out that sociological ethics endeavors to discredit the traditional systems and set up in their place a rational art free from all *a priori* metaphysics. It may be admitted that metaphysics is not reducible to a science in the positivist sense, but positivist science does not embrace within its categories all aspects of the real. The principles of traditional ethics are not fantastic and unjustifiable, nor are they *a priori* in an abstract sense. The idea of the good is not an abstract conception, but finds concrete character in human nature, in the facts of consciousness, in human aspirations, in the tendency toward happiness. Assuredly, we must start from experience, but we may pass from the fact of a desire for individual satisfaction and perfection to the conception of an absolute, universal, and obligatory order. The traditional ethics is reproached with confusing the theoretical and practical points of view. While a clear separation is difficult, it may be said to be a theoretical science in so far as it establishes the end of life, the right employment of man's faculties, his relations with his fellows and other orders of beings, and a practical art in its applications of these principles. Ethics is at once theoretical and concrete. It is charged with drawing copiously upon other fields for its subject-matter, but all sciences do the same. Again, ethical theory is accused of being merely an imitation or copy of moral practices, but even primitive speculations, theogonies, and poetry, prove the contrary. To the objection that science has no right to establish a scale of judgments of value, we may say that while such judgments are not facts in the positive sense, nevertheless these observations on man, his ends and duties, find a rational place in the categories of human knowledge. The traditional ethics is said to build upon an abstract conception of a uniform human nature which fails to take account of the actual development of the moral consciousness in various ages and peoples. Such a development is granted, but variations in moral theory and practice are held

to be, on the whole, accidental, leaving intact the conceptions of obligation and of the good. While the moral ideal and the rational order of values are, in truth, fixed, this does not mean the negation of moral progress. There is an internal as well as an external progress, in that both the individual and society strive toward the ideal and endeavor to realize the inherent capacities of human nature. Reversing the accusations, the new ethics may be charged with being anti-scientific, anti-moral, and anti-philosophic. It is anti-scientific in that it does not recognize the existence of moral reality with its characters of obligation, absolute good, and judgments of value; in that it bids us follow the customs of society without telling us explicitly what society to follow; and in studying morality as a phenomenon of physical nature existing outside of individual consciences. It is anti-moral in that it contradicts in every way the conception which humanity has always had of duty and the good, overlooking the fact that social duties are only duties with regard to an individual subject. It is anti-philosophical in denying autonomy to the moral agent and making him conform to the mediocrity of the group.

J. R. TUTTLE.

Morale thomiste et science des mœurs. S. DEPLOIGE. Rev. Néo-Sc., No. 68, pp. 445-475.

M. Lévy-Brühl and M. Durkheim do not admit that the ethical theory of the past had a scientific character. According to M. Lévy-Brühl, there is no normative science. Moral and juridical rules are imposed by the *milieu* and the task of the ethical theorist is primarily one of historical research. Now, Saint Thomas maintains, as firmly as Auguste Comte, that the moral world contains a regularity which renders it subject to scientific observations. He avoids the error of the eighteenth century writers on natural right, who held that the unaided human reason could deduce moral rules, as well as the extreme position of the modern sociological ethicists, who examine facts alone and profess to exclude the normative element. M. Durkheim holds that Rousseau and the moralists following him are in reality revolutionary in that they attach ethics to pure postulates of individual sensibility, which discourage some while they drive others on too rapidly. Ethical facts are determined by necessary laws. We should look simply for efficient causality and functions and not for final causes. But M. Durkheim himself introduces ends in that he postulates an ideal of individual good and social perfection, deduces precepts from this ideal, and tests existing institutions by it as their norm. His criterion of degree of 'generality' does not exclude the normative element, as this generality is brought to the test of utility to the organism. Saint Thomas says that a decision to act requires a judgment, not of fact, but of value. We affirm certain ends to be desirable or obligatory. There are certain indemonstrable principles in the moral order which spring from a consciousness of the most profound human needs and may be said to be innate. The first principle is that it is necessary to will and do the good. This ceases to be an empty formula when other less general principles are connected with it. The

office of reason is to relate human tendencies to their first principle. These tendencies are not only those which man has in common with the animals, but the social instinct and the desire for knowledge. Thus moral rules do not spring from imagination or fancy but from the nature of man. Moral philosophy does not invent them but discovers them as a presented reality. It is impossible to escape the teleological problem by a simple profession of determinism. The deterministic sociology of Comte, a reaction against the eighteenth century theory that human action is indefinitely modifiable, did not imply a fatalistic resignation to the outcome of events. Institutions are natural but natural does not necessarily mean legitimate. The sociologists are forced to recognize that man is not simply compelled to submit to that which exists, but called to realize that which he ought to be; that a science of moral customs should be linked to a philosophy of action. But while other sociologists look for ends in feeling, instinct, or tendency to persist, M. Durkheim, though himself unsuccessful in determining by science the ends of action, holds that we are really giving up science by going to the unconscious for ends. In reality, the sociologists, to a greater or less degree, are coming to feel that, while human society is part of a natural and orderly world, man has distinctive laws of his own development which may be discovered by reason. In other words, they feel the need of a theory like that of Saint Thomas.

J. R. TUTTLE.

La connaissance de Dieu d'après Duns Scot. S. BELMOND. Rev. de Ph. X, II, pp. 496-514.

In a series of six formulae, Duns Scotus maintains that the real existence of God is an object of knowledge. Firstly, it is impossible, by our natural means, to have a direct, objective knowledge of God. In our abstract knowledge of God, secondly, all our ideas are necessarily complex. Thirdly, we may in this way conceive God to the exclusion of created things. Again, these complex ideas, through which we conceive God apart from creatures, express attributes really inherent in God's nature. Fifthly, we only know of God that which he is not. Lastly, all our concepts concerning God are engendered by the understanding, but occasioned by created things. Duns Scotus defends his position against those who base the unknowability of the Infinite Being upon the unknowability of the indefinite, upon the fact that knowledge is limited to sense perception, or upon the very fact of the infinite and overpowering splendor of God. We must not, Scotus holds, demand an absolute knowledge or direct intuition of what God is and how He operates. We must be content with an indirect and abstract knowledge of God as a real postulate demanded by logic and metaphysics which rise from sense particulars through species and genera. Scotus departs from ontologism in holding that all our ideas are not derived from the divine concept and that God is not to be considered as anterior to all in reality and in knowledge. On the contrary, the first object of knowledge in the temporal order, in so far as we are concerned with an actual but confused idea, is found in the singular image. Again, the

concept of univocal being, while it is the first idea distinctly formed, is by no means the first principle of knowledge nor a sort of luminary of reason. Much less is this concept identical with God, whose existence is only revealed to us by *a posteriori* proofs. Thus Duns Scotus keeps to the right mean between over-cautious agnosticism and presumptuous ontologism.

J. R. TUTTLE.

Kulturphilosophie und transzendentaler Idealismus. WILHELM WINDELBAND.

Logos, I, 2, pp. 186-196.

The philosophy of culture can be considered either as supplying an ideal for future civilization or as being limited by and as building upon civilizations of the past. The problem is to discover how a present condition of society gives rise to ideals higher than its present status and how these ideals can be realized. A theory similar to Kant's transcendental idealism can furnish the solution. Empirical data are given; ideals can be conceived and realized only by a synthesis of these data in consciousness. Through the application and limitations of the categories to the manifold given in experience, one can comprehend theoretically the fundamental form of civilization. Carrying out methodically the principle of the transcendental philosophy shows the relation between it and the philosophy of culture, if by culture we mean the totality of what the human consciousness, by virtue of its rational determination, works out of the given. As civilization progresses, the activity of the synthetic reason is apparent in the practical and æsthetic realms no less than in science. The world is worked out anew by the laws of mind. Herein lies the real unity of the transcendental idealism and the philosophy of culture. The enjoyment of the beautiful, all works of art, and all religious systems show some choice of view-point. So vastly differentiated have the forms of modern civilization become at present, indeed, that it is impossible for any one individual to know them all. Their final value lies in their union in a common system, a unity which must be conceived as the world view of a self-conscious, rational being. This ultimate value is never the subjective creation of any finite individual.

CORINNE STEPHENSON.

Das Prinzip der Identität und der Kausalität. EDUARD STAMM. V. f. w. Ph., XXXIV, 3, 292-309.

The principle of identity may profitably be discussed from the standpoint of its relation to the principle of causality. Absolute identity is both a logical contradiction and an ontological impossibility and hence cannot come into consideration. Every object has within it some means of distinguishing it from all others; and the principle of identity is itself a differentiating principle. Science can have meaning only as it is progressing toward practical goals and it uses what are called true judgments, not as unalterable facts, but as measuring tools in the progress. Prediction has its place, though it must, of course, be founded on something permanent in the science and not be mere random speculation. Man must build on the basis of invariants. These invariants are the result of classification; knowing an object means bringing

it into relation to a known invariant on the basis of which prediction can be made. The method of prophecy in science is, then, the inductive, and only those things and relations are of value in which invariants can be found. The principle of identity is significant in science for separating out the valueless moments. If the individuals of a class contain many universal moments and their invariant is significant, prediction is relatively sure, but the fewer universal moments the class contains the more does it belong to the accidental. Prediction also involves a temporal sequence,—if A is, then B is also,—and this invariant of sequence is the nature of causality. The principle of causality can be stated as a relation in a regular time sequence between two classes of objects, the original and the developing. Teleology is the subversion of causality. From a logical standpoint it is but a preliminary step, giving a possible relation of an object to an end, when the specific cause is unattainable. Though the cause can often not be found, and even if found may seem to be merely accidental and to tell us nothing, the principle of causality is not false. It has the same character as the principle of identity; it is of value for progress in science. But the two are not the same. The principle of causality completes the principle of identity with reference to the temporal sequence. We are unable to account for regularity, though we recognize its presence. To remove it into the ego is no solution, though some regularities do have their origin there.

CORRINNE STEPHENSON.

L'expérience mystique et l'activité subconsciente. JULES PACHEU. Rev. de Ph., XI, 1, pp. 10-46.

The word 'mystic' is here applied in the broad sense to the union of the individual and the universal principles through the emotions, and in the restricted sense to those extraordinary facts of experience which we term hallucination, trance, communion with the divine. It is in connection with this sort of experience that the subconscious is to be explained. The word 'subconscious' has assumed a variety of meanings: under-conscious, subliminal, unconscious, co-conscious. It is often termed an intelligent but not intelligible activity, something that enters into consciousness and then unaccountably escapes; responsible for automatic writings, revelations, and general mediumship; a dissociated mind, as it were, with a peculiar attribute of otherness and foreignness to the individual self. The degrees of mystic experience traceable to the subconscious may be classified as follows: (1) perfect contemplation of the divine, characterized by complete suspension of the volitional element of control, and graded into (a) simple union, (b) ecstatic union, and (c) transformed union with the divine, all of which occur in solitary prayer attitudes from the simple devotional state to that of transfiguration; and (2) imperfect contemplation of the divine, characterized by partial absorption of the mind with normal consciousness in peripheral attention. The subconscious element involved in all phenomena of this sort presents, in general, three problems: (1) To discover the nature of the force, regarded as passive, to which, however, acceptance and submission is granted; (2) to investigate its psychological mech-

anism, whether is it an affection or perception, how much of it is morbid and how much normal; (3) to indicate the value of its cultivation as an ethical and religious principle. The point of view taken must be that of the psychologist who considers the significance and rôle of the subconscious in every-day life. Binet and others are wrong in treating the principle from a metaphysical basis; Delacroix, in explaining it in terms of a sentiment of passivity and externality—the vague intuition, vision, or communion of an external divine being; Hügel, in holding to a supernatural and spiritualistic interpretation, to which also James has a tendency when he interprets the mystic state as giving access to experience available in no other form. The only possible explanation seems to be that it is an active force not separate from the conscious state but reducible to it in terms of the normal activities and processes of the mind.

C. A. RUCKMICH.

On the Genesis and Development of Conscious Attitudes (Bewusstseinslagen).

W. F. BOOK. Psych. Rev., XVII, 6, pp. 381-398.

The results of recent psychological investigations of the thought processes have led to a greater recognition of non-sensory elements in conscious experience. Such elements are recognized by Stout, Bühler, Ach and several other psychologists, who variously regard them as forms of feeling, as a new conscious element, as imaginal processes of a high stage of development. They have also been accounted for on purely physiological grounds, and as a difference of individual mental constitution. Experiments carried out in the Clark laboratory five years ago throw some light on the nature of these conscious attitudes. A number of subjects were given the task of learning to use the typewriter. They used both the sight and the touch method. The main problem was to determine the rate of learning, and to obtain a cross-section analysis of consciousness at the different stages of learning. The subjects practised a certain amount every day at a fixed time. They were allowed to stop during the practice whenever fatigued, as well as to make and record observations. In the analyses, all conscious processes which preceded or accompanied the writing were carefully noted. The results of the experiment showed that, in the early stages of the learning, the writing movements were directed by images; and that, in a later stage, these developed into "sets of mind,"—conscious attitudes. These conscious attitudes were of the same general nature as those described by Bühler, Ach, and others. All observed the same group of phenomena, but at different levels of development, which accounts for the difference in their descriptions of these attitudes. Conscious attitudes, then, seem to be a stage of development which begins with images and passes downward to instinctive control.

M. E. GOUDGE.

The Transfer of Improvement in Memory in School-Children. W. H. WINCH.
Br. J. Ps., III, 4, pp. 386-405.

These three series of experiments, carried out in different municipal schools, were an attempt to find out whether improvement by practice in rote memory

produces improvement in substance memory. In the first series of experiments, the class was composed of children whose ages averaged ten years. Tests in both substance and rote memory were given on a certain day in the week for three successive weeks. In the fourth week, the class was divided into two equal groups on the basis of tests in substance memory. For the next three weeks, one of the groups was practised in rote memory for meaningless things, while the other group drew geometrical designs. At the end of the practice period, the two groups were tested again for substance memory. For a substance memory test, a short story was read aloud to the class three times. They had to write out afterwards all they could remember, either in the words used or in their own words. The tests were marked by a system of mnemonic units adapted to the mental stage of the class. Single consonants formed the material for the test of rote memory. In marking the papers, each consonant correctly reproduced and placed counted three points; if it was out one place, two points; and if two places, one point. The general method used in the second and third series of experiments was similar to that of the first series. In the second series, however, a visual method was substituted for the auditory, while in the third series the practice in rote memory was given for things with meaning. The results show that improvement in substance memory for stories follows practice in rote memory; they would also seem to indicate a positive correlation of substance memory with rote memory in the same mind.

M. E. GOUDGE.

Christian Ethics and Economic Competition. A. O. LOVEJOY. *Hibbert Journal*, IX, 2, pp. 324-344.

Christian ethics condemns the modern distribution of wealth chiefly on the ground that it is competitive. Economic competition is a compulsory war between man and man and is incompatible with the Christian ideal of social fraternity, for by it men endeavor to get or keep either marketable goods or modes of employment to the exclusion of others or in greater measure than they. Usually the word is applied to men working at the same sort of employment, but this competition need not necessarily promote a feeling of hostility as long as all are competing with similar opportunities. There is, however, a competition between buyer and seller, employer and employee, and this struggle is the one which has the greater moral significance. It is a more brutal pitting of interest against interest and there is more apt to be a feeling on the part of the laborer that the capitalist has not attained his superiority because of superior abilities. But even in this case, if everyone could feel that he had had an equal chance to gain the upper hand, Christian ethics could still object that competition is anti-social. One man grows rich at the expense of another. There is, however, a beneficent side to which even Christian ethics cannot object, and this is due to the fact that there is competition in classes as well as between them. Such competition has a real social service to perform; it lowers prices and raises standards of products and of wages. At present, too, the struggle is not so much between individuals as between

organized economic groups. Competition cannot be expelled from economic life but it can be regulated. If the machinery of production and distribution were in the hands of the state, incomes would have the form of salaries and their amounts would be determined by the judgment of the community expressing itself through legislation. The inequalities which existed would express the opinion of the majority formed after discussion and deliberation. The Christian socialist is right when he deems it morally desirable that distribution should be left to the general reason instead of to the blind antagonism of individual desire.

CORRINNE STEPHENSON.

Über ästhetische Grundtypen. KASIMIR FILIP WIZE. V. f. w. Ph., XXXIV, 4, pp. 369-385.

In spite of Volkelt's recently published *System der Ästhetik*, it is necessary to formulate some classification of the fundamental æsthetical forms. As 'the good' is teleological, 'the true' epistemological, so 'the beautiful' arises from a relation of these through a 'free play' of the intellect. From this 'freedom' and 'intellectuality,' taken as view points, must be derived the fundamental forms of 'the beautiful.' 'Free play,' or æsthetic freedom, is subdivisible into categories of the fanciful, the probable, and fiction and non-fiction. Derivable play must have balance, the result of multiplicity, unity, and unity through multiplicity. The intellectual view-point assigns values to these categories and is itself composed of the tri-part divisions of the understanding, feeling, and willing. The first of these contains (I) the fundamental category of relation, consisting of the new or that which is to be distinguished, the known or the similar, and the arranged or that which has been distinguished; (II) the category of perception, which is subdivided into that of (1) quality, which may be peculiar, normal, or characteristic, (2) quantity, which may be of prominence, neatness, or adequacy, (3) space, which may disagree with, transcend, or fit in with the environment, (4) time, either recent, temporary, or eternal, (5) movement, in action, passively observable or, owing to the interaction of the observable and the active, resting, and (6) substance, subjectively valuable, objectively valuable, and ideal, symbolic of creative harmony; (III) modality, consisting of (1) simple judgments of the beautiful, the ugly, and the indifferent, (2) conjunctional judgments of contrast, harmony, and reconciliation, and (3) conclusions of surprise, consistency, and impartiality. Under feeling are classed (I) pleasure and displeasure, either joy, gloom, or refined emotion; (II) momentary moods of exaltation, oppression, and tranquility; and (III) dispositions, optimistic, pessimistic, and heroic. Under willing are classed agreements of inspiration, regret, and refinement of volitional impulses. Besides these are the categories arising from æsthetic sympathy, which may be (1) sympathy with general appearances, including sympathy with the new, sumptuous, the light, ingratiatingly familiar, and the changeable sympathy of kind, and (2) sympathy with the allotted share, inducing pensiveness, simplicity, and clarity.

CHRISTIAN A. RUCKMICH.

Darwinisme et vitalisme. A. GEMELLI. Rev. de Ph., X, 9-10, pp. 215-249.

Though the mechanistic theory of life has often claimed that it has forever displaced vitalism, facts do not sustain its claims. It is the fruit of Darwinism, being connected with it both intrinsically, since both depend on the protoplasm theory, and extrinsically, since both are the outgrowth of the scientific discoveries that date from 1845 to 1870. For a long time the mechanists believed that they had reached a final solution of the problem of life, but scientists such as Hertwig and Ostwald soon rebelled against their dogmatism, and gave birth to the neo-vitalistic school. Since Wohler synthesized urea, organic chemistry has made vast strides, and the synthesis of the albumens is already in sight. However, the plant accomplishes with apparently simple means what the chemist brings about only with the most violent reagents. The chemist has come to study the reactions that occur in the living organism, but he is far from understanding them completely. Even when he shall have done so, he will not have explained life away. Ciamician recently admitted the existence of a specific vital energy. One proof of its existence lies in the enormous number of similar compounds, such as the sero-albumens, that exist in the bodies of various animals,—far too many to be explained on the hypothesis of isomerism. Often morphological and anatomical explanations must be called in to supplement the chemical ones, as in the case of such vital functions as assimilation, respiration, etc., and especially in the case of heredity and adaptation. The lowest living organisms do not shade off gradually into inorganic matter, as Uexküll points out. A mechanism, unlike an organism, cannot adapt itself to meet the conditions of a new environment. In the golden age of Darwinism, life and structure were considered as synonymous. Life, however, is a form, not a substance. The chromosome phenomena of egg and sperm maturation give evidence of a teleological element in heredity; and heredity has always been admitted to contain such an element, both by Weismannians and Lamarckians. But teleology is the antithesis of mechanism. Embryology has played us false with her promises to reveal the laws of heredity and evolution; for these we must turn to experimental methods of observing and interpreting the laws of growth and inheritance. Hertwig and others have pointed out a strong teleological directive force in the development of the embryo. From these facts we can see the strong scientific basis upon which modern vitalism rests. We find a causal, ontogenetic harmony in the necessity of a given reaction following a given stimulus; an ontogenetic harmony of composition in the correlation of the development of the parts of an embryo; and an ontogenetic harmony of formation in the development of the organism towards a definite end. This is the vital force, which is really an entelechy. Vitalism is not anti-philosophic. The decadence of Darwinism is nowhere more evident than in its mode of dealing with this problem.

NORBERT WIENER.

Difference as Ultimate and Dimensional. ARCHIBALD A. BOWMAN. *Mind*, 76, pp. 493-522.

Difference is an ultimate character of the real. The judgment S is not P, or better, S is other than P, is not resolvable into the judgment S is at one with P. The two judgments imply each other but can never be substituted for each other. For instance, in the judgment S is other than P, the real nature of S may be unknown, so that the corresponding affirmative judgment as to what is P, would be impossible. Yet there would be perfectly definite meaning in the denial that S is P. It is true enough that in every significant judgment of difference the terms have positive content and certain qualities in common, but that does not alter the fact that the real assertion, the genuine object of thought in the case, is negation. What is the nature of this difference which is declared ultimate? Difference is a matter of degree or dimension. Dimension cannot be defined except in terms of itself, for it too is ultimate, an ultimate form of difference. A dimension is a perfectly unique mode in which some specific function (whether of consciousness or the object of consciousness) keeps developing itself according to a uniform principle. It is absolutely continuous and yet manifests itself in experience as discrete particulars. It is itself schematic and general; its content is specific and individual. Instances of dimensions are: in sensation, the pitch and loudness of sound, the brightness and hues of color; in ideal processes, truth, beauty, and goodness. The application of the dimensional idea to sensation and to experience as a concrete whole is difficult, but illuminating. In the case of sensation is it difficult because dimension must be conceived of as an absolute continuum and therefore infinite in both directions, and yet in particular sensation-series we come to absolute breaks and ends. For instance, sound may be so softened as not to be heard at all. This difficulty is somewhat obviated by remembering that dimensions, although of the very constitution of the world, are yet mental constructs or ways of interpreting experience, and thus, although actual finite experience knows only limited ranges of sensation, those ranges can and must be conceived of as infinitely extended. In the case of concrete wholes of experience, the difficulty is this: we never seem to get continuums, but only cut-off particulars. Here it is necessary to realize that in all dimensions, as in the case of space, the dimension expresses itself through individuals. Each broken bit of a dimension tells the whole story, if adequately understood. It is of the very nature of dimension to be expressed in a determinate material along some specific line. In any given object many different dimensions meet, *e. g.*, the combination might be beauty, size, hue, brightness, etc. This account of dimensions does not pretend to be thoroughly worked out, but the point made is this: although difference is relative both to other difference and to unity, it is as genuine a fact, which can be found in the nature of things.

KATHERINE EVERETT.

The Place of the Time Problem in Contemporary Philosophy. ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., VII, 25, pp. 683-693.

Against the idealistic, neo-Kantian types of systematic philosophy, whose influence is waning, we now find arrayed anti-intellectualism, pragmatic nominalism, or radical empiricism, realism, and temporalism in metaphysics and epistemology. All unite in opposing the epistemological and metaphysical eternalism of idealism. The eternalism and the this-worldliness of idealism are essentially incongruous. Most people think of the truth of a proposition as being independent of time. If a judgment be true, it would seem to those so minded to have been true before any temporal mind bethought itself of its trueness, and it will be true when all such minds have forgotten it. Eternalistic idealism is idealism as well as eternalism. Truth as a mere abstraction, it holds, cannot be true all by itself, because it cannot, as an abstraction, be said to be at all. As the predicate of a judgment it must be said to subsist in a conscious mind. An eternal truth implies an eternal mind, and the timeless experience of this mind must include our temporal experience. This is the Platonic argument of Royce. The Kantian argument implies both eternalism and idealism. It holds that the experience of succession cannot be identified with mere succession. In order that succession may be known, the several successive moments must be present at once in consciousness, *i. e.*, non-successively, though with due recognition of their one-directional, serial relation. Thus experience both contains succession and transcends it. The empirical reality of all time is conceivable only if one posits a universal, supra-temporal ego, which makes time possible by transcending it. The pragmatist holds that a judgment is a phenomenon arising in the temporal existence of a being whose primary business is not to know, but to live by adjusting inner relations to outer relations. Since judgments are merely plans for action in dealing with novel situations, truth cannot consist in a mere correspondence of the judgment with a system of timeless validities which get none of their meaning from the given situation. Moreover, an abstract term is only an abridged name for some concrete particulars in the experience of an actual finite mind. Hence trueness is realized only when there occurs in experience a certain conscious pointing in one moment of time at the experience of another moment of time. The Kantian proof of the eternity of true reality shows a confusion of *thinking about* a transition with the transition itself. We can think a succession only in so far as the elements of that succession are simultaneously present to thought. To experience succession is, in part, to think succession, but it is also to live through a succession. The several moments of succession may require to be thought together at once, but they cannot be lived through all at once. There are in our temporal experience two distinct things—a perception of succession and a succession of perceptions, which latter cannot be contained in any *totum simul* of consciousness, whether of a finite or an absolute knower.

J. REESE LIN.

Is Belief Essential in Religion? HORACE M. KALLEN. Int. J. E., XXI, 1, pp. 51-67.

All writers agree as to the cardinal importance of religion in life, but few agree as to what its essence is. Yet, to evaluate it for future use, we must consider what is essential in it. In current usage we find belief identified with religion, and, in comment on Eliot's religion of the future, we find that many think a Godless religion as truly a religion as if it had a personal God and a hierarchy. Still, tradition, orthodoxy, and instinctive sense insist that the essence of religion consists in the *object* believed in, not merely in the belief and it also insists that the object be supernatural. All historical religions have four elements—a cosmology, an ethics, an art, and a belief. Of these the belief is the underlying human attitude without which the other elements cannot be. Belief is a complex having at least two elements, the object of belief and the attitude of belief. The object may be only subjective, but it does exist and evokes the believing attitude. Belief of some kind is inevitable, and the most important beliefs assert the existence of their objects. Life is a flux of beliefs, and the object, not the attitude, determines their character. A religious belief must contain a supernatural personality, a God. Popular speech distinguishes knowledge as fit belief, and belief as knowledge with its fitness yet to prove. Religion is called belief because its object has not yet found a place in the efficacious world. Unless God is manifested materially, common-sense is inclined to think, He does not much matter. Some souls find this manifestation in the order of the universe, but most find it in the interruption of this order. Much of the authority of religion depends on mystical religious experience. Thus the material element of religious experience may be merely psychological. The presence of God is thus uncertain to an observer. When the attitude rather than the object of belief is emphasized, insincerity is made inevitable. The believer knows that he calls that God which is not God. The religion of common sense calls itself belief because it clings to God, and the religion of rationalism calls itself belief because it abandons God. The emphasis of the attitude-aspect may be due to the fact that science abandons an object on almost any distinct challenge; religion, however, clings to its object in spite of challenge. The former accords with the spirit of the time, but the latter accords with human nature. Religion is not distinguished by belief, but by belief's object, an actual, personal God, supernatural and prepotent for the excellent outcome of personal destiny.

J. REESE LIN.

Is Faith a Form of Feeling? A. C. ARMSTRONG. Harv. Theol. Rev., IV, 1, pp. 71-79.

There are various motives which may induce one to hold an emotionalistic view of faith. This, however, is as one-sided as the intellectualistic view. Religious feeling is emotional in character; however, it is motived emotion. The progress of our knowledge may not, and often does not, bring on immediate alterations in the character of our religious emotions, but these must and do change in the end, and ought to change, if intellectual honesty is morally valuable.

N. WIENER.

NOTES.

The Senatus Academicus of the University of St. Andrews has appointed Mr. J. G. Frazer, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and Professor of Social Anthropology, Liverpool, to be Gifford Lecturer for the years 1911-12 and 1912-13.

The Fourth International Congress of Philosophy met at Bologna, April 6-11. The REVIEW hopes to publish later a somewhat detailed account of the sessions of the Congress.

Professor Gabriel Campbell has been appointed Stone Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy Emeritus at Dartmouth.

Professor Paul Shorey, of the University of Chicago, has completed a course of six lectures on the Platonic Traditions in Philosophy and Literature at Columbia University.

Professor L. T. Hobhouse, of the University of London, is delivering a course of ten lectures on Social Evolution and Political Theory at Columbia University.

Professor Henri Bergson, of the University of Paris, will deliver the Huxley Lecture at Birmingham University.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals:

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XVIII, 2: *W. B. Pillsbury*, The Place of Movement in Consciousness; *J. E. Wallace Wallin*, Experimental Studies of Rhythm and Time; *H. L. Hollingworth*, Experimental Studies in Judgment: Judgments of the Comic; A List of the Published Writings of William James; Editorial Announcement.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, VIII, 2: Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, Minneapolis, December 28-30, 1910; Proceedings of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Chattanooga, December 27-28, 1910; Books Received; Notes and News.

VIII, 3: General Reviews and Summaries; Discussion: *Helen D. Cook*, The James-Lange Theory of the Emotions and the Sensationalistic Analysis of Thinking; A Correction; Special Reviews; Books Received; Notes and News.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, VIII, 3: *G. Santayana*, Russell's Philosophical Essays, I; Discussions: *Edward Gleason Spaulding*, Realism: A Reply to Professor Dewey and an Exposition; *John Dewey*, Rejoinder to Dr. Spaulding; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VIII, 4: *Harold Chapman Brown*, The Logic of Mr. Russell; Societies: *Karl Schmidt*, The Tenth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Associa-

tion; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VIII, 5: *G. Santayana*, Russell's Philosophical Essays, II; Societies: *R. S. Woodworth*, New York Branch of the American Psychological Association; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VIII, 6: *James Harvey Robinson*, The Relation of History to the Newer Sciences of Man; *B. Russell*, The Basis of Realism; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VIII, 7: *Wendell T. Bush*, The Emancipation of Intelligence; *Edgar A. Singer, Jr.*, Mind as an Observable Object; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE, I. Abt., LVIII, 3 u. 4: *Albert Feuchtwanger*, Versuche über Vorstellungstypen; *Walther Peppelreuter*, Beiträge zur Raumpsychologie; *Narziss Ach*, Willensakt und Temperament; Besprechung; Literaturbericht.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE, XXXV, 1: *F. M. Urban*, Über den Begriff der mathematischen Wahrscheinlichkeit; *Paul Barth*, Die Geschichte der Erziehung in soziologischer Beleuchtung, XV; Besprechungen; Philosophische und soziologische Zeitschriften; Bibliographie.

ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE, II. Abt., XVII, 1: *Albert Sichler*, Über falsche Interpretation des kritischen Realismus und Voluntarismus Wundts; *Paul Schwartzkopff*, Für und wider den Monismus; *Victor Schlegel*, Grundgedanken einer Sittlichkeit; *Georg Müller*, Versuch einer Zeittheorie; *Walther Wagner*, Die Produktionsform als geschichtlicher Faktor; *Wilh. M. Frankl*, Einteilung der möglichen Folgerungen; Rezensionen; Die neuesten Erscheinungen auf dem Gebiete der systematischen Philosophie; Zeitschriften-schau; Zur Besprechung eingegangene Werke.

LOGOS, I, 3: *Edmund Husserl*, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft; *Peter von Struve*, Über einige grundlegende Motive im nationalökonomischen Denken; *Hans Cornelius*, Die Erkenntnis der Dinge an sich; *Leopold Ziegler*, Wagner. Die Tyrannis des Gesamtkunstwerks; *Herman Graf Keyserling*, Zur Psychologie der Systeme; Notizen.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XXXVI, 2: *A. Naville*, La matière du devoir; *A. Leclère*, La mécanisme de la psychothérapie; Notes et discussions: *L. Dupuis*, Le moindre effort en psychologie; Revue critique: *J. Segond*, La renaissance idéaliste et néo-Kantienne du droit; Analyses et comptes rendus; Revue des périodiques étrangers.

XXXVI, 3: *G. Dumas*, La contagion mentale; *H. Pieron*, L'illusion de Müller-Lyer et son double mécanisme; *Revaull d'Allonnes*, Recherches sur l'attention; Analyses et comptes rendus.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE, XI, 3: *J. B. Sauze*, L'école de Wurtzbourg et la méthode d'introspection expérimentale; *A. Gemelli*, La notion d'espèce et

les théories évolutionnistes; *G. Jeanjean*, Revue critique de pédagogie; *P. Le Guichaoua*, Responsabilité et sanction; *J. Louis*, Soutenance de thèses en Sorbonne. M. J. Second: 1. Cournot et la psychologie vitaliste; 2. La prière; Notice biographique: *A. Farges*, Le Comte Domet de Vorges; Analyses et comptes rendus; Recension des revues et chronique.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XIX, 1: *F. Rauh*, Fragments de philosophie morale; *G. Vacca*, Sur le principe d'induction mathématique; *L. Weber*, Notes sur la croissance et la différenciation; *G. Sorel*, Vues sur les problèmes de la philosophie; Etudes critiques: *E. Meyerson*, L'histoire du problème de la connaissance de M. E. Cassirer; Questions pratiques: *H. Bourgin*, Réflexions sur la notion et sur quelques fonctions de l'état; Supplément.

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE, 38-39: *A. Michotte* et *E. Prüm*, Étude expérimentale sur le choix volontaire et ses antécédents immédiats.

REVUE NÉO-SCOLASTIQUE DE PHILOSOPHIE, XVIII, 69: *Joseph Lottin*, Le concept de loi dans les régularités statistiques; *L. Noël*, William James; *H. Lebrun*, La crise du transformisme; *Fr. A. Gardeil*, O. P., Faculté du Divin ou Faculté de l'Être; *N. Balhasar*, Deux guides dans l'étude du thomisme; *L. Noël*, Le mouvement néo-scolastique; *M. Defourny*, Bulletin de philosophie sociale; Comptes rendus; Chronique philosophique; Ouvrages envoyés à la rédaction.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA, III, 1: *C. Ranzoli*, Il caso; *Giorgio Del Vecchio*, Sulla positività come carattere del diritto; *Corradino Mineo*, Logica e matematica; *Michele Losacco*, La filosofia naturale dello Schelling e le nuove correnti del pensiero; *P. Carabellese*, Intuito e sintesi primitiva in A. Rosmini; *C. Tommaso Aragona*, Del fatto educativo; *G. Mazzalorso*, Le guerra, la pace e la filosofia; *Raffaele Giacomelli*, Un teologo e apologeta riformatore della fisica e dell' astronomia; Recensioni e cenni; Rivista della riviste; Notizie; Atti della Società Filosofica Italiana.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF PSYCHOLOGY¹

THERE is little doubt that in the minds of those specially skilled in the handling of psychological mysteries, as well as those who look at such subjects from the more remote and popular points of view, one or more of the following three questions will arise at the mere announcement of the theme I am proposing briefly to discuss. The first of these questions may take the form of a more or less scornful objection to the whole subject of ontology. Are there any real human interests, whether scientific or ethical, that can be served by the further consideration of ontological problems? Is not all metaphysics, in the narrower meaning of ontological speculation, a worn-out and hopelessly unfruitful affair, and thus devoid of claim upon the resources of the human mind, which, indeed, shows itself as not unlikely soon to be unable to keep pace with the demands made upon it by the most imperative so-called 'practical affairs'?

The second of these three questions, while not denying all value to ontological speculation, and even making the languid concession which I once heard of as made to the sermonettes of a certain preacher—"Such things sometimes do some good"—deprecates the admission of metaphysics within the sacred precincts of a scientific psychology. Now I trust I have in the past made myself sufficiently clear on this point. It is, in my judgment, possible and profitable for the attempt at a science of psychology to take the same attitude toward ontological problems as that assumed, in general, by the physico-chemical

¹ This paper was one of a series of addresses on "The Problems of Psychology," delivered last spring in Columbia University.

sciences. This attitude is a naïve and uncritical assumption of certain human faiths, ideas, and conclusions, as somehow undoubtedly valid for the world of objects, and as imparting to them what, for lack of a better term, we may venture to call "*extra-mental reality*." But as a matter of fact—a fact of great interest and importance—the progress of the physico-chemical sciences, and indeed of all the sciences, is marked by, and is notably dependent on, the success they have in clarifying, purifying, elevating, and justifying these same ontological faiths, ideas, and conclusions. In a word, the testing of the value of its categories is an indispensable part of the work of a truly progressive science. I do not see how psychology can reasonably or profitably resist the demand that it, too, should make an honest and persistent effort to do this for its special branch of metaphysics.

The third of the questions to which reference was made above is, of course, the following: Supposing that we try, can anything worth while be accomplished by way of answering the ontological problem of psychology? Has anything, in fact, been accomplished through all the past centuries of observing, experimenting, and theorizing in the field of mental science, toward providing for it even the beginnings of a satisfactory answer?

In taking up these three questions, I shall dwell at what may seem an inordinate length on the first of the three; and I shall try to throw some light on the present condition and future prospects of the ontological problem of psychology by calling attention to the present condition and future prospects of the corresponding problem in the other class of sciences. I take this course for these reasons chiefly. The discussion of the metaphysics of physics and chemistry, instead of being infected with the languid and *blasé* air which distinguishes us psychologists at the mere mention of such a theme, is just now of the most lively and even intense character. It may be conducted by men who have never been trained in psychology or metaphysics, and who have no very wide acquaintance with the history of philosophy in the past; they, therefore, in not a few instances, do not seem fully to recognize the source or the significance of

many of the conceptions which they find themselves compelled to accept. In general, they do not intend to "ontologize,"—if permission may be accorded for using so barbarous a word. They do not conciously purpose to become metaphysicians. Many of them have scanty respect for what they consider to be the task of metaphysics. But the best of them are most admirable metaphysicians. For they propose, from the start and all the way through to the end, or even if there be no end, to submit their speculations to the test of accepted facts of experience, and facts of which others and all may, if they will, have a consenting experience. They show a respectful but unslavish deference toward their own great names in the past and in the present; they are usually ready to make their assertory and confident judgments wait upon the arrival of satisfactory evidence before they incorporate them into a theory of reality, and they have confidence—whether they recognize the full significance of this confidence or not, and in many cases they evidently do not recognize it—in the real unity and ultimate rationality of the world of things with which, as men of science, they are constantly dealing.

Approaching our problem, then, from the point of view of the speculations now rife in the physical sciences, it is impossible not to notice that never before in the history of those sciences was such discussion at once so complicated and puzzling, and at the same time so fascinating and imperative, as at the present. The more nature reveals itself to the human mind,—and the recent revelations have been, in fact, far more startling than the wildest dreams of the mediæval alchemists,—the more difficult becomes the construction of a satisfactory theory of physical reality. This increasing difficulty, however, instead of quenching endeavor to know the ultimate mystery, only stimulates it the more. And a sorry, yes, a fatal day will it be for the science of things, and even yet more fatal for the science of souls, when men become convinced that questions which deal solely with the practical, so-called, are the only problems that should absorb the devotion of the human mind. But there is not the slightest ground for fear that this day will ever arrive.

The history of metaphysics in the physical sciences shows that the same categories, with varying emphasis placed upon each of them, and with varying degrees in the manner and the measure of their interpretation, have characterized their discussions from the beginning down to the present time. Of such categories, or permanent and universally obligatory conceptions, as binding upon all speculation in the realm of the physical sciences, it is enough for my present purpose to mention the following four. History shows that Space, Time, Force, and Substance are assumed if not expounded, and when expounded, however unclearly, always in such a way that the "virtuality" of each one of these categories is essentially conserved. Over and over again the effort has been made, in the interest either of simplifying the fundamental conceptions of physics, or by way of concession to the claims of subjective idealism or to the theory of the relativity and so the uncertainty of all human knowledge, to dispense with one or more of these so-called categories. But whether politely bowed out of the front door, or kicked out of the back door, the supposedly banished category has inevitably, either in a sneaking way or with a tremendous flourish of trumpets, succeeded in getting back in again. Indeed, I am firmly of the opinion that a thorough search of the premises would at any moment of the interval have discovered the unfortunate victim of scepticism lurking in some dark corner of the ontological den.

Of these four categories the most unclear, and yet in many of its aspects the most indispensable, is the conception which—for lack of a better—has been covered by the word 'Substance.' The principles of geometry of the Euclidian sort, when applied to the percepts or conceptions derived by abstraction from our experience with extended things, carry us through to conclusions and predictions which are so steadfastly confirmed by further experience that comparatively little occasion arises in the mind of the scientific observer for questioning his naïve impression of being face to face with the reality of space. It is chiefly when he considers such problems as the relation between apparent and actual motions in space, and whether the real space is to be

conceived of as limited or unlimited, as filled with some kind of a substantial *continuum* or as a perfect vacuity, that doubt as to the ontological validity of this side of his science arises in the mind of the physicist. So, too, in the measurement of natural forces, the truth in reality of an order of transactions which corresponds to the ordering of our sensations and, in a larger and more important way, to the order in which the modern doctrine of evolution has placed the times and seasons of physical and biological events, is an assumption so obviously necessary that to void it of its essential content effects the destruction of all human science, and, as well, of the most ordinary common-sense pretence of knowledge. Somewhat the same, and even more unanswerable, is the claim of the conception of force to courteous treatment by metaphysics. Especially since the theory of the conservation of energy was introduced in order that some entity-constant might be devised which should bear, the better, the weight of our advancing experience with the systematic and orderly behavior of things, a new aspect of this category has come into use as a modification of the earlier and more vague and general conception which metaphysics had christened with the name, "Force."

Now it does not seem that the doctrine of the relativity of all human knowledge, even as applied by the newer mathematical and physical speculation to all things with reference to the Whole in which they "live and move and have their being," has weakened the claim of any of these three categories to rule in the realm of physical realities. I am well aware that this last sentence states the present situation of speculation among the men of science in a very crude fashion. But it is enough for my present purpose if it expresses my contention that, reduce or expand the extension and duration and energies of things as we may, and alter their relations to one another and to the Whole as we will, the essential nature of Space, Time, and Force, and the imperative demand which these conceptions make upon the human mind that it should give to them some kind of ontological validity, are not impaired in the slightest degree. Let the world of things be shrunk so that its energies may operate and be conserved,

under law, in a space no larger than we conceive the head of a pin really to be, and with a rapidity of its actual events which equals that with which we now conceive the waves of light to follow each other, and still space, time, and energy, in order that we may interpret and explain that world to our minds, must retain the same control over the conceptions of physical science. That is to say, however metaphysicians may think it wise to regard them, they cannot be accepted by physicists and chemists as laws of the subject only, of the human mind; they must, the rather, be taken as forms of the behavior of things, and so ultimately independent of the human mind for their existence and action in the realm of physical Reality.

But what, meantime, about the fourth of the categories of physical science? What about the category of Substance so-called? Surely we can no longer conceive of it as apart from the concrete thing, or as the hidden core of the existence of the concrete thing. Hidden enough it certainly is, but not as a secret core at which we may come by a physical analysis. Indeed, the most subtle mental criticism has always had, and still has, an almost incomparable difficulty in its attempts at an analysis of the abstract conception of substance. Even attempts at description lead to a sort of sensuous pantomime which quickly becomes ridiculous in the eyes of the metaphysics of criticism, whether such criticism maintains the dominantly realistic or the essentially idealistic point of view. But, on the other hand, psychology and metaphysics are as hard put to it as are the physical sciences, if the attempt is seriously made entirely to get rid of the claims of this so-called category to represent, in however figurative fashion, some aspect or side of the reality which we have to ascribe to that system of things which we call the physical universe. I take it that few psychologists to-day would be satisfied with the conclusions of subjective idealism, whether as adopted by the older school of sensationalists, or as left by the earlier writings of Berkeley, or as elaborated by the Associationalists, especially by John Stuart Mill. But it is not necessary to our present purpose to do more than record this impression. What we are just now interested in is the modern

position of the leading authorities in the physical sciences with regard to the ontological problem as involved in the criticism of these four categories, and especially, among them all, the category of substance.

It is difficult for one not especially expert in the handling of the data of modern physics and chemistry, and indeed not trained to the comprehension of the mathematical formulas employed, or of the significance of the facts observed, or of the alleged facts conjectured in these sciences, to frame in his own mind any satisfactory answer to the question which has just been raised. This question, bluntly put, is as follows: "What are our brethren in the physical sciences, who, like ourselves, earnestly wish to conform their theory of reality to the facts of experience, in order that theory may interpret if it does not explain experience, —what are these authorities coming to hold as to the ontological validity and the real nature of the four categories enumerated above, but especially of the conception of material substance?"

In the very brief and confessedly imperfect answer which I shall attempt to this question, I shall appeal to two lines of observation. The first of these is along the line of a personal experience, which always proved interesting to those who had part in it, and which perhaps has some claim to seem worthy of note by others. Repeatedly, during the years when I was teaching a considerable number of well-advanced students in philosophy, I required them to make a somewhat careful investigation into the conception of 'Matter' as held by the leading authorities in physics. This investigation disclosed an almost universal 'shyness' on the part of these authorities even to attempt the definition of matter. Indeed, on the first approach to the problem, it was customary to say: "We do not know what matter *is*; we only know what *it* does, or what are some of *its* qualities or properties." But, inasmuch as to stick fast in this position would seem to bring about a very embarrassing inability to move forward at all without the almost constant use of an agnostic parenthesis, in numerous instances a way of escape was found by employing for the subject of so many wondrous performances the compound of mere words, 'that-which.' And then we were told through

hundreds of intensely interesting pages, more precisely than the unscientific know, or ever can hope to know, in detail and in mathematical terms, what "that-which" is in the habit of doing. But for the life of me, I was never able to conjecture, not to say discover, any way of telling what anything really and truly *is*, except by telling what that same thing actually and truly is in the habit of *doing*. Yet one is forced to sympathize with the need to which this mysterious compound of mere words ministers, so much as a sort of mental soothing-syrup. Nor does the need seem to be of an infantile sort, and best satisfied by an opiate which will send the mind off to the land of dreams, or to a meta-physical Utopia. On the contrary, it remains a very rational and pressing need; no less rational and pressing than the need of some *subject* to which we may attribute the properties and the performances; and this involves also the more superficial but scarcely less suggestive need of nouns for all our adjectives and verbs.

Everything, therefore, which is considered or treated as a real Thing, must be honored with a title to participation in its own style, so to say, of a 'that-which.' But nothing is known to us, or can ever, under the essentially unchangeable laws of human knowledge, be known as an isolated 'that-which,' having escaped all obligation to pay respect to others of its own kind. Indeed, as modern science advances, it brings every single thing into closer, more numerous, and more inescapable relations with every other thing. Hence the need of a big and all-comprehending 'That-which,' capable of serving as the Subject of all the changing motions and distributing energies of a world really existent in space and time. We are now to see how the more recent speculations of the physical sciences seem disposed to deal with the conception of energy, and with the vehicle which has hitherto been deemed necessary to conserve and distribute the various types and degrees of energy in the one world that is made known to us by our experience with things.

The discoveries of Galilei, Kepler, and Newton were followed by a marvellous development of the mechanical theory of the universe. The forces at work upon material things as we may sub-

ject them to sensuous observation and to experiment, and the laws obeyed by them under the influence of these forces, were rapidly and confidently extended to the bodies of the solar system and to the most distant stars. Further observation and experiment increased the confidence and accelerated the rapidity with which a purely mechanical theory was made to cover the entire domain of the physical sciences. When the doctrine of the conservation of energy, helped out by the distinction between stored, or static, and kinetic energy prevailed, and the atomistic theory of chemistry furnished so many brilliant and satisfactory solutions of the problems of chemistry, it really seemed as though we were on the eve of explaining all our experience with things in terms of a consistent and unitary conception. The sum-total of energies remained constant; their vehicle, the 'that-which,' called *matter* by name, had essentially the same constitution throughout; and although its metaphysical essence might remain forever unknown, its manner of working could be satisfactorily imagined, or credibly conjectured, by the trained physicist, after the type of an immensely complicated machine.

But there were always difficulties and, as time went on, there were increasing difficulties with this comparatively simple conception of the real world on which our experience depends. The conception of an energy that gave no expression of itself in any form or degree of motion seemed obscure and mysterious. The astonishing velocity of the light-waves plainly demanded some vehicle of a character, in certain essential respects, incompatible with the most important and indispensable of the properties of so-called matter. A new substance, or at least a quite new conception of the one substance that serves as the vehicle of energy, became imperative. The demand was met by the theory of light as movement in ether. And ether is no ordinary matter, but a most extraordinary kind of substance. I suppose that when Clerk-Maxwell worked out the electro-magnetic theory of light, he had no thought that his conclusions would disturb, much less upset, the conceptions and conclusions necessarily involved in a strictly mechanical theory of the physical universe. On the contrary, he believed himself to be extending that theory into

regions which it had hitherto been unable completely to conquer and to possess. I am not prepared to say that the future will not prove that he actually did what he believed himself to be doing. But we are interested in looking after the fate of the categories, and especially of the category designated by the term 'that-which.'

At first, the category of substance seems particularly well-provided for by the introduction of ether into the world of physical reality. But the economy of physics does not wish two so essentially different substances; it would much prefer to do the entire business of explanation with one substance. At once, the physico-chemical sciences began to hope that the properties of matter, and the behavior of things as constituted of matter, might have their more nearly ultimate explanation in the nature of the all-embracing all-performing Ether. And, indeed, the almost miraculous phenomena of the Roentgen rays, and of bodies possessed of radio-active properties, apparently demand a vehicle no less subtile and sensuously incomprehensible than is the light-bearing ether.

But now again, the very most recent discoveries of experimental physics are vigorously attacking the claims of ether itself to have any hold, so to say, upon the world of reality. For the most delicate, careful, and prolonged experimentation fails to detect any motion of the ether as a whole, or of any portion of the ether, or anything in the ether that either opposes or assists motion of other bodies in the ether, in any direction or with any speed whatsoever. To sum up the conclusion: "Free ether" = a total vacuum; and movement of the light-waves in the ether, if there is any such movement, is movement *in vacuo*.

The confusion into which all this has thrown the mechanical theory of the physical universe, at least in any of its previously existing forms, can easily be imagined. On this point I need only quote a single sentence from one of the leading authorities on theoretical physics in Germany. "For the theoretical physicists," says Professor Planck, of Berlin University, "no physical proposition is at present secure from doubts; all and each physical truth is open to discussion."

But what about the categories which were said to be indispensable to the statement, not to say the solution, of the metaphysical problem of the physical sciences. Have they, like ordinary matter, after being etherialized, then, like the ether, been tossed over from the field of reality into the death-kingdom of abstractions or dream-like ideas? Peering into the darkness of the ontological den, we have little difficulty in recognizing the somewhat shrunken shapes of two of the four. These are space and time. Even the barest phenomenalism must have some *théâtre* for the phenomena. And to talk of movements that are comparable and measurable, without assuming some kind of ontological validity for space and time, is a plain absurdity. For unless it may occupy itself, at the very least, in the comparison and measurement of the extent and direction of movements, physical science has no call to existence, whether that call come from purely practical motives, in the most restricted significance of the word 'practical,' or from the more ambitious motives of a desire to know the truth about reality. We seem also to get a glimpse of the conception of force, in a form which, although somewhat mutilated and not a little changed, must serve still to do the actual work of the physical conception of energy. The most negative conclusions of our physical theory of the ether are forced upon us by the behavior of things, *as though* they were always acting, in their ceaselessly changing relations with one another, under compulsion from influences that are measurable and transferable, and that reside partly within the individual thing and partly in other things. All the rich and varied store of facts, and of legitimate conclusions from the facts, to which the doctrine of the conservation of energy has been conformed, remains the same as before.

A still more diligent search seems necessary in order to find any trace left, in some of the most recent physical theories, of the category of substance. Certainly, on its way to annihilation this category has passed through a number of most surprising changes in the recent history of the physical sciences. The conception of material substance failed to explain all experience in terms of an imaginable mechanical theory. The kinetic and

atomistic theory of modern chemistry could not explain all in terms of its more refined theory of the mechanism of the constituent elements of matter. The successes of the theory of material substance as a system of so-called "mass-points" had only a partial and temporary control of scientific opinion. The theory of the light-bearing ether as the universal substance had its brief period of great triumph and of promise of greater triumphs in the near future. But just now it, too, appears to have suffered greatly from an extreme of that very facility which made possible its earlier successes. I refer to the prominence which it gave to the use of highly abstract mathematical conceptions. As a result, the vehicle of that particular kind of energy which light was formerly supposed to be, and if ether is the all-pervading substance, the vehicle for all the correlated forms of energy, is now itself reduced to a system of mathematical abstractions, to a collection of formulas which have a motionless and immovable vacuum as their theatre and ground. Even so, however, we do not seem to have dispensed with the category of substance. We have only reduced it to *a system of active ideas* which determine each others' mode of behavior in an empty shell of space and time; and about which the most significant thing is that they compel us to believe that we are thinking them as they actually are, and as they verily perform, but in a complete independence and indifference to our thought. All of which as a solution of the ontological problem of the material universe reminds me more than any other form of metaphysics in modern times, so far as its essential features are concerned, of Malebranche's celebrated philosophy of "seeing all things in God." It certainly is a theory of reality which may fitly call forth in the thoughtful mind the most profound and admiring attitude of veneration toward the mysterious Being of the World.

But our theme was the ontological problem of *psychology*; and thus far the special problem of psychology has been referred to only indirectly. The time, however, has not been lost or misimproved. For with certain relatively unimportant changes, the conclusions from this survey of the experience of the physical sciences may be transferred to the field of the metaphysics, naïve or critical, of the science of mental life.

One important conclusion which we may venture to carry over from physics to psychology would seem to be this: In considering any ontological problem, our thoughts and arguments seem compelled to move round and round in a circle from which there is no escape. All our knowledge of things is of them as existent under the conditions of space and time. Idealize these categories as we may; recognize so much of truth as there may be in the Kantian criticism which reduces space and time to the pure or *a priori* forms of our sensuous experience, or look upon them as only the highest order of empirical generalizations; that these categories have some kind of ontological validity is not only the instinctive assumption but the critical conclusion of all science as well as of the most ordinary knowledge. But everything which is in any way known to us as existent in space and time is known only in terms of the way it behaves when acting or suffering in relation to other things. What the thing *really is* we can know only by knowing how the thing *acts and suffers* in the system of things. That the thing really is, it compels us to know by maintaining a certain independence in its way of acting and suffering. Its reality is not exhausted, or even known, by our putting together in imagination all we have known about its ways of acting and suffering. The kind of its reality appears; but its reality is not mere appearance to us. The very essential characteristic of its reality is a certain invincible independence of the mere fact of appearance,—to us or to any other mind. But when we ask for a description, or a guaranty, of this characteristic, we get it only in the form of appearances. And so we go round and round in this circle, wondering at its mysterious character and widening it perhaps, but never escaping by so much as a hand's breadth from the circle itself. Round and round we go in this treadmill of metaphysical speculation; but to increase the rapidity and length of our stride results simply in bringing us the speedier to the same point in the same circle again.

"There was the Door to which I found no Key;
There was the Veil through which I could not see."

But if we cannot escape from this circular puzzle afforded by

the ontological problem, as this problem appears not only in the physico-chemical sciences but in all forms of human knowledge, it is possible that we may come to understand its essential significance. We may, perhaps, interpret it wisely and profitably for our own peace of mind and for the more confident advance of the positive sciences. Now there are at least two quite radically different ways of interpretation, which have striven for the mastery of the human mind from the beginning of metaphysical speculation down to the present time. The first takes toward the ontological problem, whenever proposed and in whatever form, the sceptical attitude of subjective idealism. This attitude almost inevitably tends toward one of three results. These are: an indifference, which is altogether likely to be feigned; or an agnosticism, which is likely to become disputatious and dogmatic without much profit to the cause of positive science; or an absolute idealism, which is brought about by the need of finding some tenable ground for reality in experience. And then follows the back-swing to realism again.

But why not interpret the circle in good faith, and cease attempting to escape from it? We may then say that to be both the active subject and the suffering object of characteristic forms of energy, under the conditions of time and space,—this is to be really existent. And our valid knowledge of reality grows only as we learn, in good faith, more and more of these characteristic ways of acting and suffering.

I cannot answer for the physicist, whether this trustful manner of taking his dose of metaphysics, in its present mixture, will contribute toward his increased peace of mind and promise of health in the future of his science. But I am disposed to address him in somewhat the following way. My brother in a common doubt and confusion of thought, your science has done much in the past, and in the more recent past it has done an enormous amount, toward the solution of its own ontological problem. We know far more than ever before, not only how things appear under changing relations to the human senses, but what the invisible, intangible qualities and performances of things really are. If matter will not meet the demands made by the category

of substance, as constructed in terms to satisfy experience, then the conception of matter must be changed; or a larger and more competent subject must be found, if under another name. And so with ether, as well. But let us not kick against the categories; for they cannot be got rid of in this way. And the being which somehow corresponds to these categories, unless we accept the cheerless and irrational conclusion that they are mere forms of illusion, abides in independence of our discoveries, and will—so to say—reveal itself only on terms satisfactory to itself.

However such exhortations as the foregoing may impress the student of physics, and whether they make upon him any impression at all, it seems to me that they may be used so as to bring a great peace into the mind of the psychologist. For whatever advantages the student of the physical sciences may have, as compared with the student of mental life, in respect to the certainty of his control over methods of research, and the definiteness and verifiability of his empirical conclusions, the latter has several notable advantages when it comes to the discussion of the ontological problem. This problem is no less definite and apprehensible, as a problem, than the demand for a progressively complete and accurate knowledge of that Self, to which we are compelled to refer as subject all the different forms of acting and suffering of which it has experience in consciousness. We must have a subject for these characteristic forms of acting and suffering. And here there can be no separating distinction between *subject* and *reality*. Indeed, the very conception of subject, and so in a secondary way the entity which we try to cover with the word 'substance,' is derived from the experience of the Self with itself. All the gain, therefore, which we can make in knowledge of the nature of this subject is so much progress in the solution of the ontological problem of psychology. Again, the experiences of acting and of suffering are immediate and beyond all doubt as data for the science of psychology. It is from these experiences that our conceptions of being the subject of force, and of being the object of forces which have another subject, have their origin. Without these experiences there would be no problem connected with the origin, conservation, or distribution

of so-called energy. And were it not for the active intellect of the Self operating upon the data of sense-perception, there would be no science of things as existent and measurable, and comparable under an infinite system of relations to one another in a world of space and time.

And now I am prepared to make a claim in behalf of the superior immediacy and certainty of the data available for the progress of the metaphysics of psychology, which many psychologists will perhaps consider extravagant. But, in my judgment, the claim is invincible. We do not need to search for a new door because the one we should like to open has no key; we do not need to try to tear asunder the veil which hangs before our eyes, because of its essentially impenetrable character. Every advance in the verifiable and true discoveries and consistent and tenable theory of psychological science opens the door a little more widely, draws the veil a little more to one side. The grandeur and beauty of this science are enhanced by the indisputable conviction that the door will never be open to its full extent; that the veil will never be drawn wholly aside. But what aspiring soul would wish to remain so small as completely to know itself? What ambitious psychologist would wish the end of the development of his science to come, although he should have succeeded in gathering its finished wisdom to himself, with a view to have his name go down in the history of scientific development as the last of his kind?

But to take the claim out of its figurative and poetic form and present it in the more intelligible language of prose. However necessary the students of the physical sciences may find it to make such a distinction between appearance and reality, or—to use the consecrated language of Kant—between phenomena and noumena, as to compel them to identify appearance with illusion, and reality with the unknown and the forever unknowable, psychologists do not need, and positively must not admit, the validity of any such distinction. To the Self, all its appearances, including the most patent illusions and the most persistent hallucinations, are expressions of its reality. To know them as they are, and in their causes, concomitants, and con-

sequences,—this is to add something to the solution of the ontological problem of psychology. For this sort of knowledge does not have to attach the appearances to the reality whose appearances they are by a doubtful argument from analogy or a system of remote inferences. In so far as it has its sources in sense-perception and self-consciousness,—and from these sources all the empirical data of psychology are derived,—the appearances are known only as the characteristic modes of the reality who is their subject. Reaching the involved ontological problem, therefore, no longer consists in trying to get to the other side by leaping or bridging over a chasm, known to be bottomless and perhaps assumed to be infinitely wide; the would-be observer is already on the side of the chasm on which lies the admittedly limitless field which he is desirous of exploring.

But one may ask, “If this cheerful view of the superior immediacy and certainty of psychology is correct, why has there been in the past, and why is there still, so much controversy, often ending in disgust with the whole subject, over its own ontological problem?” My answer is that the reasons are chiefly two; but that neither of them is essential to the discussion of the problem, or forms any valid hindrance to its progressive solution. The first of these two reasons is that the question is so frequently approached under the overpowering influence of prejudice from a sceptical theory of knowledge. He who takes the position that, because the knowledge of the human mind is limited, not only as to the present and the prospective field of its operations, but also and chiefly by the dependence of those operations upon the essential nature of the mind itself, therefore all human knowledge is illusory, cannot fail to have little taste for the consideration of metaphysical questions in any of their various forms. Having gone round and round in the circle of the categories, and having, as a matter of course, failed to escape, he is so tired that he would rather lie down and die than keep up this profitless treadmill kind of work. But he would not willingly suffer such a death alone; that would be too distinctly ignoble. He wishes, quite naturally, that all men should also confess their failure, and die to metaphysics at the same time with him.

The other chief reason for the prevailing discontent with the ontological problem of psychology has been even more influential. All through the history of speculation on the subject, there has been a tendency to let the theory run riot in independence of concrete and verifiable experience. This tendency has led, on the one hand, to representing the real soul after the analogy of material substance, often under the impression that in this way we should the better guarantee its claims to permanence, if not to immortality, in the realm of reality. But any attempt to get at the reality by removing the successive layers of appearances is particularly unsuccessful in the solution of the ontological problem as this problem is given to psychology. On the other hand, the attempt has been made to establish a superlatively attractive doctrine of what the soul of man really is by speculating on what it is destined to become, when, being delivered from all the most essential conditions of its present existence, as we are obliged to recognize these conditions, it shall really be something very different from what it is now. However fruitful these speculations may prove as ministers to cheer and hope, they are not science, unless they can be placed on a basis laid in the experience of the Self with itself, as determining what the Self can do and suffer, and so what the Self knows itself really to be.

If, then, we will accept the ontological problem of psychology as it in fact presents itself, we may cherish a hopeful view as to its progressive, but always only partial, solution. The distinction between the "phenomenal ego" and the real mind, if by the former term we mean the one subject to which we attribute all the characteristics of doing and suffering that make themselves known in consciousness, is a scientifically useless and metaphysically invalid and mischievous distinction. This is one of the several bad, among the many good distinctions, which we owe chiefly to the Kantian Criticism. This subject of states *is* the reality. And to call it 'phenomenal,' in any such meaning of the word as to call in question its reality, is to deny that it is a true subject at all. With such denial, all the phenomena with which psychology assumes to deal vanish as data for a scientific psychology.

A satisfactory theory of knowledge assures us that the so-called categories are not inescapable forms of cognition that render the active intellect phenomenal in the sense of being the perpetual and inevitable source of illusion. On the contrary, such a theory of knowledge assures us that these categories are the natural—or, shall we not say, divinely-given?—laws that condition the appointed task of the mind of man as, with faltering steps and by a zigzag path, he climbs higher to a wider and wider prospect over the realm of reality. Or, to use again in a modified way a figure of speech which has already been employed: This circular wheel which supports the vehicle of human science is not made like the tire of an automobile which, if it has the good luck to escape puncture and the consequent emission of the air that has been forced into it, is surely destined before long to be worn out by the very performance of the journey. The rather are the wheels on which the car of our science goes forward so constructed, if we will only recognize the fact, that the more they are used, the more strong and dependable they become, for all further progress in the journey. Indeed, this is the characteristic of the relation between all the sciences and the different phases and forms of the reality with which they assume to deal; for Nature always remains true to the terms of her agreement, if we only understand what those terms are, and always fulfills her promises for the future, if only we have correctly heard and properly interpreted those promises.

But how, in accordance with the facts of history, shall we answer the third and last of the questions which were proposed at the beginning? Has there ever been any real progress made, and more especially, has there of late been any considerable progress made, in the metaphysics of psychology? To this question I do not hesitate to give an affirmative answer. We know much more than was known two thousand years ago what the mind or soul of man *really is*. This is not to say that we are men of bigger or more acute minds than was Plato; or that the average graduate student of physiology surpasses in intellectual power the peerless Aristotle, who although he considered the human brain to be chiefly useful as a source of lu-

bricating fluid, tells more truth about the real soul in his *De anima* than is told in not a few modern text-books on psychology. Yes we know more than Kant knew about the correct solution of the ontological problem of psychology; although it was Kant who, like the very Copernicus he claimed to be, started the whole modern movement for a more modest but vastly improved solution of this problem. Especially may the advances of the last twenty-five years, or somewhat more, be claimed to have shown something like the same notable advances in the science of psychology as those which have certainly been shown by the physico-chemical sciences. If we accept the views which I have tried to defend as to the essential nature of the philosophy of mind, the so-called metaphysics of psychology, we are warranted in holding that all these scientific advances necessarily contribute something toward the improved solution of the ontological problem of psychology.

In closing I will try to specify what in particular are some of these more notable gains in the metaphysics of psychology. In the first place, there is one most obvious kind of gain which is the indispensable condition of securing all the other gains; this is knowledge of scientific method as applied to psychology. But this term 'scientific method' must not be understood in a too narrow signification; for I do not intend it to refer *solely* to the use of experiment in psychology; although, of course, it includes and places in a somewhat special place of honor all the facts and laws established by the experimental method. More than two thousand years ago, however, it was made clear by Aristotle that the scientific method differs in its characteristics according to the different characteristics of the science whose method it is. And there are many of the most interesting problems of psychology to which the methods of experimental physics or physiology cannot be easily, or at all, applied. By scientific method in this connection, then, may be understood every particular form of inquiry which aims directly at the ascertainment of the facts, and which proposes to test all theory by the success, in respect of clearness and comprehensiveness, with which it interprets all the facts. But when we include among the

facts those which have to do with the rational, the moral, artistic, and religious nature of man, if we take the view which has been advocated of the problem to determine the real nature of the subject of all these manifold facts, as known in its experience, then our continued and improved use of the scientific method in psychology is the sure guaranty of our progress in the metaphysics of psychology.

To specify one most important advance which has been made of late years in the solution, by the use of the improved scientific method, of the ontological problem of psychology, we may refer to the success in applying the conception of development to the subject whose doings and sufferings reveal its character and position in the world of reality. . The soul of man really is a development. This we know more surely than ever before. And we know much more accurately and comprehensively than was ever known before just what kind of a development the soul really is. This development is the actual history, under the conditions of time and space, of a real being in a real world. The modern study of genetic psychology has already made, and promises to make more abundantly in the future, notable contributions toward the solution of its ontological problem. But by genetic psychology we are not to understand any separate branch or treatment of psychical subjects. All study of man's mental life must use, and all such study always has used, the genetic method. Nor do we lessen one whit the mystery of our metaphysics, if we make the growing bodily organism the subject to which the development in reality belongs. How an impregnated ovum can hold the *potentiality* of which the adult human brain is the development is to my mind even more mysterious than how the earliest dawn of sentient life in the unborn infant can hold the potentiality of the mind which frames such an hypothesis. I repeat: The gains we have recently made in the knowledge of the evolution of mind in the individual and in the race are gains in the solution of the ontological problem.

Just as every other reality is known only as it actually is in its relations to other things, and in its relations of dependence upon them, so is it with all our knowledge of the reality we call

soul or mind. What the subject of mental states and processes actually is, we know the better as we learn more about the way it reacts to its physical environment, and in dependence upon its bodily organism. Hence all the established discoveries of modern experimental psychology for an improved theory of sense-perception, and all the recent advances of physiological psychology, in the more definite meaning of the latter term, are contributions toward the solution of the ontological problem of psychology. Here again, we find the true but imperfect and yet progressive answer to the question, What the substance *really is*, in our growing knowledge of what states of doing and suffering the subject *actually experiences*; and for this sort of an answer the very nature of psychological investigation is especially favorable.

I will illustrate my contention by only one further example. This is an example, however, which at the present time is especially interesting and especially adapted to test the contention severely. I refer to all the phenomena which are being investigated and classed—rather inaptly, as it seems to me—under such terms as ‘double personality,’ ‘triple personality,’ etc. However this may be, the case is plainly one in which we may well wait for a much larger collection of valid facts and for a much more searching and careful criticism of the alleged facts, than are at present available. It is indeed conceivable that we may be compelled to go back to the position of uncultured and savage man, who, in order to account for all the mysterious wealth of his experience, deems it necessary to posit two, three, or even more souls (I believe that seven is the largest number hitherto reached) as really belonging to every individual human being. But notice: it is one *individual* man that is in reality the fortunate possessor of all these souls. Or what is more likely, in my judgment, we may reach the conclusion that one soul is enough for any individual human being, if only it is enough of a soul.

The same line of reflections may be extended over all the alleged phenomena of telepathy, table-tipping, and other physical effects of materially unmediated mental states. However the particular problems offered by these phenomena may be

solved, they will not affect essentially the solution of the ultimate ontological problem. The psychologist may be compelled to change his conception of the nature of the real subject of mental states somewhat as did the physicists when they substituted the conception of ether for that of ordinary matter. But the necessities of his science can scarcely lead him to identify the subject of these states with a perfect vacuum, as long as he is satisfied to win more testimony from consciousness by the guarded and improved use of scientific method, and is loyal to the theory of reality founded in the faith of reason, upon that testimony.

GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD.

KNOWING THINGS.

I.

IN dealing with things *as known*, we place ourselves at once at the pragmatic point of view—things as they must be *taken* in our systematic experience. In other words, we try to unlock the reality of things by means of their qualities. This pragmatic way of taking things has at least the advantage of convenience. It is the only *approach*, whether it is the whole truth or not.¹ And by qualities we mean the constant and describable ways in which we must take nature in its concrete contexts. They are differentiated and made significant through the specific conduct which we must adopt in varying situations, sensory, chemical, or electrical. They are diverse or homogeneous just in so far as we must take them as such.

We must distinguish the relation of a thing to its qualities from other forms of diversity and unity. We must not confuse qualities with logical consequences, which exist only as part of a cognitive context; nor must we confuse qualities with the species of a genus, for the qualities cannot be regarded as existing individually apart from their complex. We cannot regard the qualities as effects of the thing, because the thing apart from the qualities is a mere abstraction. We cannot regard the qualities as external parts of a whole, because the qualities only exist as interpenetrating in the one space-unity. The thing is not the sum of our abstractions, such as independent qualities would have to be. Nor are the qualities, as sometimes stated, the behavior of the thing; they must include how the thing *can* behave under definite conditions as well as its actual behavior. They are not the behavior in the abstract, but what a thing must be taken as, or acknowledged, in its specific behavior. Qualities are not inert ideas, as Berkeley supposes, but energies that can

¹For a fuller discussion of the pragmatic method, see the author's *Truth and Reality* (Macmillan, 1911), Chapters IX and X. This paper is part of a volume, entitled *A Realistic Universe*, soon to appear.

be tapped under definite conditions. Qualities, moreover, are not merely the actual, but also the potential energies of things, their possible differences to other contexts. When we see the diamond, we expect it also to cut glass, though the visual qualities do not cut glass.

The theory that consciousness is perspicuous, and does not alter the qualities intuited, is true enough, if you mean by consciousness the bare character of awareness. But this does not mean that qualities are static entities, to be intuited in the abstract, as the old realism, which has had a recent revival, supposes. To regard qualities as abstract intuitions is equivalent to holding that energies can be intuited as at work, when they are not at work. While we can abstract our awareness from the energetic continuities, sensory or extra-organic, that does not save us the trouble of taking account of these specific continuities and giving a definite description of them. This is precisely the task of science. And while all qualities are not dependent for their existence upon our sense continuities, as we shall show later, we have no way of intuiting the qualities of things, except by our awareness of such sense continuities. Things by themselves have no properties. They cannot even be conceived as having existence, as this is a dynamic relation—the difference which a fact makes to a context, including in the case of perception the context of our sense energies. And qualities without contexts are a pragmatic contradiction. They are differences which make no difference—non-entities. All that realism can insist upon is that our taking account of the qualities—their figuring in our cognitive context—does not constitute them. And with this probably no one now disagrees.

As a thing may exist in several contexts at the same time, we come to conceive it as having simultaneous as well as successive diversity of qualities. Thus a bit of honey may exist in a number of sensory contexts at once. We see it, touch it, taste it, smell it at the same time. The honey in the meantime is undergoing certain physical and chemical changes independent of the sensory contexts. And so long as this diversity can be attended to at once—fulfils one interest—we do not regard it as fatal to the unity of the thing.

Is the thing its qualities? In the first place, if we strip the thing of its qualities, of its possible reactions, what is left is zero—position without content. To try to conceive a surd or core as remaining becomes self-contradictory. When we try to make clear to ourselves what we mean by such a core, we find that it is a certain group of qualities, the conditions for the appearance of which are more constant in our experience than those of the rest. Thus the conditions for the touch-motor qualities are simpler and more often repeated than those for the visual qualities. The conditions for such physical qualities as gravity and heat conduction must be conceived as still more universal. Owing to the law of habit, the qualities whose conditions are more constant become the standard of reference for those whose conditions are more intermittent. They come to constitute for us the substance of the thing. No other intelligible meaning can be given to the conception of substrate, if qualities are the ways a thing must be taken in its conduct. There can be nothing in the thing not capable, theoretically at least, of being shown in its conduct. That it is *one* thing, and not a mere sum of discrete qualities, is itself one of the ways in which we must take a thing. It is because qualities can be taken as interpenetrating in one space, as fulfilling one purpose, that we speak of one thing. This, however, does not preclude us from being interested, in other connections, in the diversity of ways in which a thing can be taken. No mere mystical coalescence on the part of our states of consciousness would destroy the diversity of functions on the part of a thing.

If you identify a thing with its qualities, in the second place, you must be careful to include all the possible ways of taking a thing. The ways in which things can be taken not only connect them with our sensory contexts, but also with other contexts, independent of our perception. Their relation to these contexts may, for some purposes, be more important than the relation to sense. We must learn to take the thing at its face value, as the various ways in which it *proves* itself in its variety of contexts, without inventing hidden essences, on the one hand, or making abstract entities of our ways of taking things, on the other.

Does human nature create the qualities? It is true that some qualities, involving a high degree of organic organization, are only present in man and the higher animals, as in the case of color. Our perceptual qualities in general do involve a relation to the organism. But this condition is just as real and objective, so far as our cognitive meaning is concerned, as any context can be. The perceptual qualities are just as independent of the cognitive context as the chemical. It is true, further, that we have perceptual illusions. But this is due to no "faking" of qualities, but to the fact that qualities can only be *known* through the machinery of complication and association. As some qualities may occur in different contexts, it is possible that the wrong system of associates may be called up at any one time, either as the result of habit, or from the momentary set of attention, which further experience shows do not co-exist in the particular thing. But this is a problem in our *knowing* of the qualities and does not concern their reality or objective co-existence.

That we do not know all the properties of things, owing to our finite instruments—our senses and our artificial instruments—and owing to the indefinite number of possible situations, must be admitted. This means relative agnosticism; and to this, all honest science must subscribe. Yet we may still maintain that our knowledge is of the real, so far as it goes; that it approximates reality in our systematic effort for truth, and does not lie in another dimension from the object which we attempt to know. The unknown is more of the same sort of thing as the known; and however far we may be from knowing all the properties of things in their possible contexts, yet the thing can be taken as having the properties we do know. Human nature does not create qualities, though it is an indispensable condition for their significance.

Absolute agnosticism, on the other hand, has always maintained that, even though our research were complete as regards the seeming nature of things, yet we would be as far from knowing the real things as ever. The thing is something besides its apparent qualities, were they all known. It is difficult to understand the mental attitude implied in this position. If it means conceiving

a thing apart from its properties, then what is left is zero, and there is nothing mysterious or unknowable about zero. If, on the other hand, it means that the thing-in-itself does have properties, but that these are different from those which we perceive; that human nature has created the qualities as we have them, and that the true qualities could only be perceived by a consciousness entirely different from our own, which seems to be Kant's position—if such is the assumption, all we can say is that it is entirely gratuitous and has no pragmatic value. In any case, the only fruitful method of procedure is to assume that qualities are such as we must take them in relation to our systematic conduct. The agnosticism of the unconditioned, in the sense of a reality outside the matrix of concrete relations, is a fiction of the faculty of abstraction. We must hold, on the contrary, that reality is known in its concrete determinations. And we are ever striving to increase our knowledge of things by trying them out in new determinate situations. It is by such experiment and observation that we find the melting point and freezing point, the resistance, the complexity, the decomposability, and the coherence of the world as we have it.

Whether the persistence of certain ultimate units, such as atoms or electrons, turns out to be more than fiction or not, the reality and persistence of qualities is a *sine qua non* of science. Not only can we predict that a certain set of qualities shall make its appearance, with the Aladdin change of conditions, but what to me is still more striking, we can predict that certain identical qualities shall *persist*, as a set, through the protean transmutation of things, with their characteristic energies.

Such is the case in chemistry with salts in the wider sense, including acids and bases. To quote from Ostwald: "Salts are, therefore, characterized by the fact that in solution their components give individual reactions which are in each case independent of the other component present in the salt. And this relation is a reciprocal one; the second component also shows its own reactions independent of the first. These components of the salts which react independently of one another are called *ions*."¹

¹ Ostwald, *Principles of Inorganic Chemistry* (1902), English translation, p. 189.

This persistence of qualities as seemingly individual energies is shown even more strongly in the case of biological heredity. The chromosome-characters of the germ cell, which are now believed to constitute the most important part of the factors in the transmission of characteristics including sex, have been shown by Boveri to constitute a qualitative constellation; and the combination of characters in the generated individual has been shown to depend upon a particular combination of chromosomes. These continue to act qualitatively so as to build out the diversity of organs and functions in the new organism, and can be traced, throughout the development of the organism, by microscopic examination of the cell. Conversely, the elimination of certain characters has been proven to cause the lack of the corresponding organs and functions. Mendel's law formulates in general how the "unit characters" appear in the reproduction of individuals. In crossing the white and black race, the offspring would tend to be two mulattoes, one white, and one black. In crossing the mulattoes there would be three mulattoes, one white, and one black, etc.¹ Thus in part of the individuals the original characters, so far as color is concerned, tend to reappear intact. And so in regard to the other characteristics in which they differ. Moreover, in the long run, the tendency will be, except, perhaps, in a few cases where the blend may stick, for the original characters to assert themselves, and the race to run pure. This is quickly accomplished in the case of the mule owing to sterility.

The characters or qualities thus constitute the pragmatic significance of the thing. And if science can abstract the characters or qualities so as to predict the behavior of nature in its stages of change and complexity, things are of secondary importance. Or rather, the identity of characters *is* for science the substance. Even the chemical elements have fallen into a natural series on the basis of identical characters. Whether these elements prove ultimate or not, the qualities and the predictions based upon them remain as of prime importance in conceptual description. We must start with qualities and hold the individuals, as far as we can, in the net of our identities. Concrete

¹ In the first instances this would amount only to a variation in shades. . .

individuals, on the other hand, seem to come and go. They probably never quite repeat themselves. What is predictable are the recurrent qualities—the *karma* as the Hindus called it, in the case of moral qualities.

While this abstract view of qualities, however, is convenient in our ignorance in unlocking the secrets of nature, we cannot regard it as metaphysically final. In reality there are not "unit characters," as Mendel calls recurrent qualities, but dynamic *situations* hanging together by means of certain overlapping identities. Thus it has been shown by Professor E. B. Wilson that chromosome-characters are not sufficient by themselves to determine heredity, but we must take account as well of the potentials of the protoplasmic context in which they exist, though of course this would not prevent our having predictability by taking account of the chromosome-characters alone, the protoplasmic conditions remaining the same. The whole concreteness of the situation is not necessary for prediction. If it were, we could not have science. For ethical and æsthetic purposes, again, the individuals, whether transient or permanent, may have final and eternal significance.

II.

Having now defined in general the nature of qualities, I wish to say a word about the problem of their *relative importance*. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is an ancient one. There have been several reasons for making some qualities more important than others. One reason offered in the past is the mode of intuition. The primary qualities are supposed to be immediately intuited, according to such writers as Thomas Reid,¹ while the secondary qualities are supposed to be due to our sense reactions. According to this theory the primary qualities would be not only copies but identical with reality, while secondary qualities are only ways in which the primary qualities affect our sensibilities. Thomas Brown, however, al-

¹ To use Reid's own language, "Our senses give us a direct and distinct notion of the primary qualities, and inform us what they are in themselves: but of the secondary qualities, our senses give us only a relative and obscure notion. They inform us only that they are qualities which affect us in a certain manner." *On the Intellectual Powers*, Essay II, § 17.

already recognized that there is no essential difference between qualities so far as the mode of perception goes.¹ They are all alike in being reactions of our organism upon the selected stimuli. Nor is there anything inherently mean about sense that would make qualities subjective or unreal, just because they are sensed. Again, qualities that are perceived by means of a number of senses have been thought to have a superior reality to those perceived only through one sense. Thus, form, size, position and motion are perceived by sight and touch alike. But solidity, which has figured as one of the most important of the primary qualities, can only be had by means of the sense of active touch. So perception by a number of senses cannot be all-important.

It has been argued again that the more generic sense qualities are more real than the more specific ones. Because the generic sense qualities lend themselves best to mathematical description, it has been supposed that they come nearest to giving us the reality of nature. Secondary qualities on the whole are due to greater specialization of our sense organs and have seemed to be more subjective. But, on the one hand, some of the generic qualities do not seem to figure high in the scale of information. Thus pain and temperature are among the most generic of our qualities, but they have not been recognized as belonging to the primary list. Because the condition for the manifestation of the qualities are complex, it does not follow that the qualities are less real. The conditions for the manifestation of electrical properties are exceedingly complex, but we do not on that account doubt the reality of electricity.

Again, qualities have been deemed subjective or objective according to their clearness or distinctness to the attention. The primary qualities, according to Descartes, are clear and distinct, while the secondary qualities are held to be confused. But according to this, color and tone rank at the head of the list, because here we can distinguish more qualities and arrange them in a serial order with greater success than we can in the other senses.

¹ *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, 1828, pp. 253 f. "I cannot discover anything in the sensations themselves, corresponding with the primary and secondary qualities, which is direct, as Dr. Reid says, in *one* case and *relative* in the other. All are *relative* in his sense."

This is especially true of color, where the largest range of qualitative discrimination and arrangement is possible; but neither color nor tone were included in the old list of primary qualities, though they permit of the greatest analysis.

More convincing is the argument based on their value for prediction. The primary qualities, according to Locke, are constant and inseparable while the secondary qualities vary. While this is true, to a certain extent, shape, mass, and weight cannot be regarded as invariably present in the physical objects with which we must deal. We cannot speak of electricity, for example, as having either shape, mass, or weight. These qualities, therefore, cannot be regarded as universal, as Locke would have us think. On the other hand, the qualities just mentioned are only constant when conditions are the same. In this respect, therefore, they have no particular advantage over the so-called secondary qualities. Mass varies with temperature and with pressure, and it has been shown recently to vary with velocity. Velocity approaching that of light has been found to increase the apparent mass. But that qualities differ under different conditions certainly does not indicate any subjectivity. If so, we would have to conclude with Berkeley that all qualities are subjective. Constancy for science always means repetition under determinate conditions.

One reason for the distinction between primary and secondary qualities has doubtless been the confusion between qualities and values. The so-called secondary qualities have been rejected in part, no doubt, because of their affective tone. This affective tone is especially prominent in connection with such qualities as those of taste or smell. But Aristotle, long ago, pointed out that touch may be the most sensuous of the senses, and therefore carry the most violent organic tone. We would, therefore, have to reject touch as well as taste. In fact, we would have to reject most of our sense qualities.

Evidently, one difficulty in making up the classical primary list, which for the most part remains approved, was the lack of scientific knowledge. Thus the old list fails to include weight, which has since come to be regarded as one of the most important

of the descriptive qualities. The old theory of primary qualities, moreover, presupposes the impact theory of physical changes, and so emphasizes mass as fundamental and universal. This will have to be revised in the light of our more recent knowledge of electricity and radio-activity. Such energies have brought to light a whole list of descriptive properties which were unthought of in the old catalogue. Certainly, impact would be far too gross a method of describing these reactions.

Whatever basis we can find for distinction, as to the importance of qualities, it is clear that any such basis must be relative, not absolute. It is relative to the purpose in question. What is primary for one purpose may be quite secondary for another purpose. Thus the importance of the mechanical qualities is quite secondary for æsthetic purposes, while color and tone become of very great importance. *Qualities must be taken as objective, if they enable us to identify and predict the things with which we must deal.* And in this the so-called secondary qualities may be fully as important as the so-called primary. Locke himself, in giving us the description of gold, does not fail to mention its yellowness. In the identification of a gas, the odor may be of the greatest importance. In identifying a solution, as a saline solution, the sense of taste may be worth all the rest. Qualities are objective just in so far as we must take them as objective. If they do not help us to identify an object they can no longer be called qualities. They must be reckoned on the side of value.

Some qualities can be taken as existing independently of the reaction of the human organism, though of course they must make a difference to the context of perception, too, in order to be known. This, however, is secondary in importance to their reactions in other contexts. Thus, we have more confidence in weight as determined by the mechanical scales than when indicated by our sensory quality of strain. For the purpose of science we must determine our conduct with reference to weight as fixed by scales. In determining temperature we place more reliance on the thermometer than on the sensory differences of hot and cold. And so in regard to size, we have more confidence

in size as determined by certain standard measures which are kept under artificial conditions than we have when we depend on sensory qualities. We must take such qualities as existing in contexts of their own, independent of the organism. This fact is doubtless what has given rise to the conception of primary qualities, and what makes Locke speak of these as archetypes which we copy, though even from this point of view there is not complete consistency, as can be seen in the case of heat and weight, which do not occur in Locke's primary list. The relation, however, is not that of copying. In fact, cognitively, the sensory differences would necessarily come first. The relation is rather that we can take the qualities which are sensed as identical with the qualities in other contexts, for example, that of the scales.

Such qualities as color or taste, on the other hand, must be taken as requiring specialized organic conditions. While the light-waves have qualities in other contexts, such as the camera film and various pigments, these are not the qualities of the sensible context of color. It does not at all follow, however, that because some qualities can only exist in the specialized context of certain sense organs that they are therefore subjective. Because we can only get water under the condition of H_2O , it does not follow that water is subjective. The context of our retina, with its rods and cones, in connection with light rays, is just as real a context and just as independent of our will as that of any other chemical or physical reactions.

There is only one meaning, so far as I can see, in which we could speak of subjective qualities. And that is, if we speak of *having* qualities as itself a quality. Thus some would say that the sky has the quality of having the quality, blue. In this case we can easily suppose an infinite series, because the quality of having qualities can be repeated on itself any number of times that imagination chooses to conjure. Obviously this is a purely subjective process—a creation of intellectual abstraction. It does not add anything to the existence of qualities.

Any quality may be treated as a sign or secondary to other qualities for the specific purpose in question. Thus visual qualities may be treated as secondary to tactual and these again to

chemical, when the purpose is the satisfaction of hunger. But for the purpose of enjoying a painting or reading a book, the tactual qualities become signs or secondary, for the normal person, to the visual. In space-perception, touch may serve to call up a sight map and this in turn to suggest motor sensations.

In any case, when we are dealing with qualities we are not concerned with the relation of a thing to consciousness, but with its relation to a determinate energetic context, whether that be physiological or physical. Qualities are certain permanent expectancies which we can have with reference to things under definite conditions. The purpose in question, whether mechanical or economic or æsthetic, must decide the importance of the qualities so far as that particular context is concerned. All qualities, in so far as they are qualities, must be taken as real. Their acknowledgment is a forced acknowledgment.

III.

There has been a tendency ever since Berkeley to confuse *sensations* and sense *qualities*, and on account of this confusion to insist upon the subjective character of the sense qualities and all qualities. Now, it is quite true that, in order to become significant, qualities must become a part of the context of our cognitive experience; but this does not prove that qualities have no other status than that of experience. Berkeley, we all admit, is wrong in supposing that, in knowing the qualities, the observer, whether human or superhuman, creates them. Qualities, we have seen, have their own energetic contexts, whether in relation to our organism or independent of it. We must take account of the changes of nature, its growth and decay, quite irrespective of whether we are conscious of it or not. Berkeley, on the other hand, truly states the relation of qualities to our cognitive attitudes. "To explain the phenomena is all one as to show why, upon such and such occasions, we are affected with such and such ideas."¹ But he is not warranted on that account in saying that the qualities are nothing but ideas. This is confusing the *causa cognoscendi*, or the reason for our knowing, with the *causa essendi*, or the reason for existence.

¹ *Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 50.

Taking a content as a quality, moreover, and taking it as a pure sensation are two entirely different attitudes. Taking it as a sensation means the bare awareness, for a subjective interest, without relation to an objective context, while taking it as a quality means taking it as a part of a specific context, fulfilling a purpose. Taking yellow as a sensation or having a yellow consciousness is a different attitude from yellow as a quality, as in recognizing gold as yellow. Whether there ever exists in experience a pure sensation, we will not argue here, but the logical distinction is none the less clear. The reference or attitude is quite different in the two cases. We can never say, therefore, that our sensations constitute the thing. Calling them sensations already indicates that they are taken in the context of a subjective interest, apart from the context of things. What is objective is the sensible qualities—the qualities as perceived and as they must be taken again under similar conditions. A sense quality is not a pure sensation, but the qualification of an interest of the will which implies the externality of the thing. Things are never merely sensed. Qualities are qualifications of a certain interest in the world *as sensed*. Thus we qualify our interest in the thing, chair, by the way it appears to the touch and the way it appears to sight, and to various other senses. We never make the mistake of eating, or clothing ourselves with sensations, but we deal with things as sensed. Part, at least, of Berkeley's convincingness lies in his playing between things as perceptions and things as perceived.

Furthermore, sensations persist even after the sensible continuities, which make us attribute them to things, no longer exist. This can be seen in complication—the sensory revival, which gives us the concrete perceptual object, on the reestablishing of sensible continuity; in illusion, where the wrong sensory complex is stimulated; or in hallucination, where the sensory context is intra-organically re-excited. In all these cases of the revival of sensory elements, we must distinguish between their existence as subjective states and their being taken as qualities of things. Sensations can be taken as qualities only as they are actually, or signify, sensible continuities.

Some sensations cannot be taken as sense qualities. Some sensations inform us, not of qualities, but of relations. Thus, the joint sensations, though they contribute a great deal to our consciousness of space relations, do not inform us about any new qualities of the thing taken account of. Other sensations, again, like the organic sensations in the more specific sense, such as hunger, thirst, nausea, do not inform us about the objects, but about the way in which the objects affect the welfare of our organism. They, therefore, come to enter as a part of our sense of value, instead of being taken as qualities of the thing. It seems, however, that the organic sensations do contribute a certain coefficient of existence, in the sense of presence, which may be regarded as qualifying the object. In such sensations as those of taste or smell, the accompanying affective tone seems the more important part of the situation.

Again, it is indifferent to some qualities that they may be sensed. Of these, the sense qualities may be regarded as signs. The reality of such qualities we take to be their emphasis in the extra-organic context. Our consciousness or perception of the explosion does not make the explosion occur, though it indicates the connection of the explosion with our sensible experience and so makes it significant to us. The knife in the drawer grows rusty and loses its sharpness, though we have not perceived it in the meantime. The chemical changes in such cases must be interpolated by ourselves, when we establish sensible continuity with the thing. Our physical instruments are often far more sensitive to certain changes than our gross senses. Where the senses, even equipped with telescopes fail to see stars, the more sensitive film of the camera still records them and makes it possible for us to count them. A large part of the qualities of nature we must take account of in this *a posteriori* fashion. Our taking account of the co-existence of qualities does not make either the co-existence or the qualities. The intellect, while a coupling agency, fulfils its function, not when it couples arbitrarily, as Kant would have us believe, for then we have illusions, but when it couples in such a way that our conjunctions tally with the conjunctions of qualities as ascertained through experience.

IV.

Sometimes *qualities* and *relations* have been identified. This does not seem the best way of dealing with the problem. We might, with more truth, identify qualities with one set of relations, namely, the energetic relations. A thing has been defined as the intersection point of its dynamic relations. But the qualities cannot be taken as merely the actual energetic relations; they must include what the thing can be in all possible energetic relations. That being the case, we cannot speak of the relations as constituting the thing. The thing is what it must be taken as, what it proves itself, in its determinate contexts. It is not a sum of abstract relations any more than of abstract qualities.

Some relations do not as such make a difference to qualities. Spatial or temporal or logical relations do not as such affect qualities. The quality, red, taken here or in China, 2000 A.D. or B.C., other conditions being the same, is the same red. It can be taken over and over again, in various logical contexts, and yet remain identical. If it appears different, this is due to the concrete situation, whether that of physical change or psychological association.

In discussing relations we must distinguish between internal relations and those that are external to the thing. We know little or nothing about the relation of qualities to each other within the thing. We can only say that the qualities, as a matter of fact, do interpenetrate in such ways or exist in such conjunctions and that, given similar conditions, we can anticipate their conjunctions. Some qualities, indeed, seem to imply each other. Thus color implies extension and form. Weight implies mass. But most of the co-existences we must ascertain experimentally, as they are found in actual experience. We cannot predict *a priori* the particular conjunctions. We can no longer even say that such qualities as extension and weight must invariably be present, since science has discovered energies such as electricity, where such qualities seem to be irrelevant.

If, again, we take up the external relations into which things may enter, these make up a large number. We have, on the one hand, those groups of relations which exist independently of our

cognitive experience, such as space, time, and the causal relations. Things exist in certain space clusters, in certain time sequences, and in certain reciprocal relations of causality to other things. We cannot regard these relations as qualities of things, though the reactions of things may vary with the relations. They vary with the distance, with the acceleration, and with the causal situation.

On the other hand, we have the significant relationships into which things may enter. Things can be taken over into our cognitive, æsthetic, and volitional contexts. These contexts do not directly alter the qualities of the things, but their significance depends upon their relations to these contexts. These relations may be systematic, as in the case of the working out of our logical, æsthetic, and economic purposes, or they may be merely additive. Any fact can be joined subjectively with any other fact by such particles as *and*, or *with*, or *plus*, or *minus*, and other relations of external interest.

We must remember, however, that these relations, whether additive (due to contiguous interest) or systematic (due to the internal development of purpose) do not affect the existential nature of the thing. They have to do with our attitude to the thing, its value for experience. Things can enter into or drop out of the context of our interest, but that is not in any case a condition of the existence of the thing. Thus things can have a double location. They exist in their own existential contexts and they also may exist in our contexts of significance. With reference to the learning process, this becomes a triple location, because the individual must ascertain and locate in his experience the results of social experience, in the form of science and institutions, which in turn depend upon the existential context of nature. Differences and likenesses are not properties of things; they are the relation of things to our cognitive context, the basis for our sorting of things into our ideal series, for taking them over into our systematic construction. Our qualitative and quantitative series, our units of measurement, exist merely for our convenience. They are only of use as they enable us to fixate certain co-existences. Our *taking* a quality in various contexts does not

on its own account alter the quality. We must be able to take the quality *a* in *axy* as the same character as *a* in *abc*. If not, science is impossible. Moreover, while qualities always exist in concrete contexts, our understanding can single out a quality for a certain purpose and substitute it for the whole for the sake of prediction and control. Thus to simplify our world is the task of science.

V.

We must distinguish finally between the *quality* and the *value* of things. They have too often been confused in past discussions. While qualities depend upon the will for their *significance*, values depend upon the will for their *existence*. Values are the functions which objects have in relation to the satisfaction of the will and may have to do with the intellectual satisfaction, the economic satisfaction, or the æsthetic satisfaction of the will. Ethical satisfaction there could not be in the case of things, for this presupposes inter-subjective relations, unless things first be socialized, as in the case of property. The values may be transient or permanent. An object may affect the organism in different ways at different times. Thus, music may be agreeable when we are at leisure or set ourselves to attend to music. It may be disagreeable when we try to concentrate our attention upon an examination. But the æsthetic value of music remains the same in either case, because this depends not upon the temporary organic equilibrium, but upon more permanent presuppositions of our mental constitution. Even while the music upsets us, we may recognize its beauty. It is not true that values are subjective in the sense of private and evanescent. Values are socially predictable as well as qualities, and so we have our cookery, our science of economics, and our art, which would be impossible if values were of a merely unique, private, and irreversible character. While values, however, vary with the will, qualities vary independently of the will. Our will cannot directly alter the color or the size of the thing. We cannot, by taking thought, add a cubit to our stature. Again, while the values of things vary with certain social conditions, such as supply and demand, as affecting the desirability of the thing, their qualities are not

altered through supply or demand. The qualities of gold have not been affected by the tremendous increase in the supply of gold and the consequent fluctuation of values.

Qualities vary in their own energetic contexts, whether sense contexts or extra-organic contexts, but they do not vary directly with the attitude of the will. While values, however, vary with the will, they may have a high degree of uniformity, as in the case of our biological values; even our æsthetic and ethical values show a large degree of constancy in the development of the race. Greek art is still beautiful to us, and the ethical ideals of the Hebrew prophets are still standard for us. On the other hand, some of the elements like radium would seem to be undergoing a radical change as regards their qualities.

We cannot attribute value or meaning to things on their own account as we can to selves. Agnosticism is quite right in maintaining that we cannot know the inwardness of things, but this is because nature has no inwardness. Things have no halo of value on their own account. The values of things exist, as Hegel would say, *an sich* and not *für sich*; that is, they exist for the spectator, and not for the things themselves. Things, so far as we know, have no purpose of their own in terms of which values can be measured. Man, and conscious wills like his, are the measure of things.

The epistemological idealist, who regards value as the fundamental category of existence, can only attribute reality to selves. In this, T. H. Green is quite logical. For having assumed that the reality of things is constituted by reflective experience, and finding that nature cannot itself be regarded as such an experience, he can only give it a locus in our own and the absolute experience. But this is confusing values and qualities. Things have qualities and relations of their own which we must acknowledge, even though they can only be treated as having value from the point of view of conscious wills. We gladly admit that values are real, but we cannot admit that the world of existence can altogether be stated in terms of value. Values seem to exist only in spots, while we must recognize qualities wherever nature requires adjustment on our part.

Even if we regard reality as fundamentally the valuable, we could not say with some philosophers that only the relative and fleeting is real, any more than we could say *a priori* that only the eternal is real. At least some of the values can be described, or taken twice, and so we have sciences of value. There are, no doubt, the fleeting values which escape our observation and description. But they lie outside the purpose of truth and must in the nature of things be ignored, so far as our cognitive interest is concerned. They must be appreciated to be owned at all. We can only point out the conditions under which they can be had.

Values may mediately condition the survival of things. This happens when the will selects on the basis of ideals. Things, when taken over into the context of our purposes, may survive or perish according as they succeed or do not succeed in expressing those purposes. Form, rather than the qualities of things, may determine the survival. Whether a statue shall survive as a statue depends upon its formal fitness rather than the properties of its material, which may be Parian marble. Whether a grove or a hill survives may again depend upon its relation to human purposes. If there is a conscious power in the large universe that exercises cosmic selection, then survival in the whole of existence, as well as in the world of human control, may depend in the last instance on formal fitness—fitness to an ideal constitution.

Natural beauty, as it seems to us, is an accidental framing of the existential contiguities of our environment. We limit nature arbitrarily by our interest and within those limits find an æsthetic purpose fulfilled, as in a mountain, or a lake, or a woodland scene. In the case of artificial beauty, on the other hand, the will has created its own conditions. Here the will has the advantage of being able to eliminate a great deal of detail, and thus produce a greater clearness and distinctness than the natural object usually has. Both artificial and natural beauty alike must suggest life and energy in harmonious interplay and equilibrium in order to fulfil the demands of the æsthetic instinct.

JOHN E. BOODIN.

PROFESSOR PRINGLE-PATTISON'S EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM.

IN the light of present discussions of realism, it is interesting to recall a somewhat different realistic interpretation of experience which is found in the series of lectures delivered by Professor A. S. Pringle-Pattison, then Professor Andrew Seth, before the University of Edinburgh between the years 1885 and 1891. These lectures, which have since been published, the first series under the title, *Scottish Philosophy*,¹ the second under the title, *Hegelianism and Personality*,² the third as a series of articles in the *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*,³ are an exposition and constructive development of certain phases of Scottish Realism, and a criticism of other systems of philosophy, particularly Post-Kantian Idealism, from the standpoint of the position thus attained. The salient feature of this theory, which is explicitly stated only in the third series of lectures, consists in a substitution of what the author calls epistemological realism or dualism for the metaphysical dualism of English and Continental philosophy. This new form of dualism differs from the traditional form of the theory in that it makes the independent or realistic existence of objects a fact of knowledge or conscious experience instead, as is usually done, of reality or existence. It is the purpose of the present paper to expound and criticise this new form of

¹ Edinburgh and London, 1885.

² Edinburgh and London, 1887.

³ Vol. I, pp. 129, 504; Vol. II, pp. 167, 293; Vol. III, p. 56. With the third series of lectures should be read Professor Pringle-Pattison's Inaugural Address, "The Present Position of the Philosophical Sciences" (1891), published in *Man's Place in the Cosmos*; the criticisms of the series offered by Professors Jones (*Mind*, N. S., Vol. II, pp. 289, 457), Watson (*PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, Vol. II, p. 513), and Ritchie (*PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, Vol. III, p. 14); and, finally, Professor Pringle-Pattison's replies to these criticisms (*Mind*, N. S., Vol. III, p. 1; *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, Vol. III, pp. 56, 568). It has not seemed worth while to notice these replies at length, since they seem to effect no real change in the author's position. They merely excuse, as unfortunate ways of putting his case, statements and difficulties which are organic parts of his theory. He cannot properly retract these statements, therefore, without retracting the whole theory.

realism, by means of which Professor Pringle-Pattison hopes to retain the truth and to avoid the errors of other philosophical positions.

The doctrine of epistemological realism has its origin in the conviction that, despite the fact that realism contains indispensable elements of truth, all past attempts to formulate such a theory have ended in failure. "There are in fact two worlds, and to this fundamental antithesis we return. To the one world belong . . . all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, to the other the thoughts and feelings of the individual."¹ Professor Pringle-Pattison contends, however, that most modern thinkers, following Descartes and Locke, have not been satisfied to assert this dualism in its true form as a fact of conscious experience, but have insisted upon interpreting it as a dualism of existence. They have thus come to regard the world as made up of two substances, separated, as Hamilton says, 'by the whole diameter of being.' Professor Pringle-Pattison sees clearly, however, that if the world is thus broken into two parts, knowledge becomes impossible. "But, if matter is defined as the precise (metaphysical) opposite of mind,—if we start with the presupposition that they have nothing in common, that the one just is what the other is not,—the growth of the subjective nightmare is perfectly intelligible. . . . No sort of knowledge, indeed, would be possible of a world of things whose relation to consciousness and the forms of thought was conceived as a mere negation. . . . A real metaphysical dualism would cleave the universe in two, leaving two absolutely non-communicating worlds."² Classical British philosophy, which makes this interpretation of the dualism of experience, and which consequently ends in scepticism, may thus be regarded as an exhibition of the evolution and self-refutation of metaphysical dualism.³

In opposition to this theory, Professor Pringle-Pattison develops his conception of epistemological dualism. He insists that, in reality, the world is a double world only for knowledge or conscious experience; that it is only in this relation that the

¹ PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. I, p. 514.

² PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. III, pp. 60, 61, 505.

³ Cf. *Scottish Philosophy*, p. 15.

object is separate and distinct from the subject, and independent of it. He maintains, moreover, that this separation is the presupposition of knowledge. "Knowledge means nothing if it does not mean the relation of two factors, knowledge of an object by a subject . . . Separation and difference are the very conditions of knowledge; if it were not for the difference where would be the need of knowledge? Each thing would actually *be* everything else . . ., all things would be together, an indistinguishable conglomerate of mutual interpenetration. It is individuation, distinctness, that calls for knowledge and gives it scope."¹ It follows, therefore, that the subject's conscious states are not the object, as subjective idealism maintains; nor is the mind, as the theory of immediate knowledge asserts, in direct or immediate relation to things. Subject and object are rather independent aspects of experience, between which, so far as knowledge is concerned, there is no identity or relation. "The table which is in immediate contact with my organism is as completely and inexorably outside the world of my consciousness as the most distant 'star and system' . . . The world of consciousness, on the one hand, and the (so far hypothetical) world of real things, on the other, are two mutually exclusive spheres. No member of the real sphere can intrude itself into the conscious sphere, nor can consciousness go out into the real sphere and as it were lay hold with hands upon a real object. The two worlds are, to this extent and in this [epistemological] sense, totally disparate . . . The world of real things is transcendent with reference to the world of consciousness; the world of objects . . . is trans-subjective or extra-conscious. In other words, it falls absolutely outside of, or beyond, the little world of consciousness."² The world of objects may thus properly be described as a world of "epistemological things-in-themselves," and the existence of such a world must be asserted as strenuously as that of metaphysical things-in-themselves must be denied.

Though subject and object are thus completely sundered so far as experience is concerned, Professor Pringle-Pattison main-

¹ PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. I, p. 513. See also pp. 504, 505.

² PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. I, pp. 514-516. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 143.

tains that they are yet fundamentally related as regards their real nature or existence. He realizes that if this were not the case, that if objects were completely severed from subjects, they would not be known to us, and would not, therefore, be objects of our experience. The fact that we know them proves, on the contrary, that they are related parts of reality; that they are members with us of one world. In truth, then, objects are related to subjects in existence, and separate from them in experience; ontologically or metaphysically considered, the world is one, epistemologically regarded, it is a double world of independent subjects and hypothetical objects.¹ Professor Pringle-Pattison thus presents the complementary doctrines of metaphysical monism and epistemological realism as the truth of classical dualism, and it is on the basis of this revised form of dualism that he hopes to obtain a tenable realistic interpretation of experience.

This change from metaphysical to epistemological dualism makes necessary, the author believes, a corresponding change in traditional English and Scotch theories of knowledge. If objects are real, and if they are known to thought, subjectivism and the doctrine of the immediacy of perception are incomplete accounts of the knowing process. The first theory falls into error in that it maintains that knowledge is concerned, not with objects, but only with its own conscious states, and the second, in that it represents the mind as directly and immediately knowing things.² In reality, however, both positions are false; thought is, indeed, concerned with objects, but only through the medium of subjective states which, though they refer to and represent things, at the same time separate us from them. Professor Pringle-Pattison insists, moreover, that the representational aspect of the cognitive process is its most essential characteristic. "Knowledge implies a reference to that which is known. . . . Knowledge bears in its heart, in its very notion, this reference to a reality distinct from itself. . . . Knowledge as knowledge points beyond itself to a reality whose representation or symbol

¹ Cf. *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, Vol. I, pp. 145, 513; Vol. III, p. 61.

² Cf. *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, Vol. I, pp. 512, 517; Vol. III, p. 61.

it is. . . . The very function of knowledge . . . is to disclose to one being the nature of beings and things with which he is in relation, but which are different; *i. e.*, numerically and existentially distinct from himself."¹ He believes, furthermore, that it has been the neglect of this aspect of thought which has led to subjectivism. Various philosophers, following the procedure of psychology, have looked upon ideas merely as facts of consciousness and nothing more, and consequently have been compelled to maintain that the mind knows only its own conscious processes. In the concrete, however, ideas are not mere subjective facts; they are rather subjective facts which refer beyond themselves to objects which they represent, and which they thus enable us to know. But if this is the case, subjectivism is clearly a product of what the author calls the 'psychologist's fallacy'; it results from the false substitution of a psychological for an epistemological account of knowledge. To escape the difficulties of this position, however, he believes that one has only to recognize the concrete reference of ideas to things, in which case knowledge becomes a significant process of representation.²

Professor Pringle-Pattison's program is now before us. The author realizes, however, that this new form of dualism is not without its difficulties. If objects are separate and extra-conscious existences, if, moreover, we do not know them immediately but only by means of representations, the question arises, how do we know that they exist, and if they exist, that our representations of them are true? Common sense does not, of course, raise this problem. Dogmatically confident of the existence of objects

¹ PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. I, p. 504.

² Professor Pringle-Pattison, of course, regards subjectivism and representationism as essentially different positions. Thus he explains, "Now it is one thing to say that the mind knows things only by the intervention or by means of the ideas it has of them, and another thing to say that ideas constitute the 'immediate object' of the mind, and that 'our knowledge is only conversant about' ideas. The last is so far from being true that it might be more correct to say that our mind is never conversant about ideas . . . unless in the reflective analysis of the psychologist. Otherwise, our knowledge is always conversant about realities of some kind; to say that we know by means of ideas is simply to say that we know; but ideas are nought except as signs of a further reality, and from the first they are taken not *per se*, but in this symbolic capacity." (PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. II, p. 169.)

and of the validity of knowledge, it regards such sceptical and critical questions as essentially frivolous. Subjective and immediate theories of philosophy likewise seek to avoid these vexatious problems, the former by denying the existence of objects, and the latter by denying the chasm between ideas and objects. From the standpoint of representationalism or realism, however, it is evident that these methods of solving the difficulty are inadmissible. The true course of philosophy, Professor Pringle-Pattison holds, must rather be to admit the necessarily subjective character of knowledge, and the separation in experience between subject and object, and to try to show that, despite this fact, objects exist and knowledge is valid.¹

Such a demonstration must begin with our own conscious states, since these are all that we directly or immediately know. "Subjective states," we are told, "are plainly our data; it is there we have our foothold, our *pied à terre*; but unless we can step beyond them, metaphysics in any constructive sense can hardly make a beginning."² The problem of thus passing from individual states to extra-conscious objects, he conceives in consistent dualistic fashion as the principal problem of epistemology. "The question which epistemology finds before it is the relation of the *individual* knower to a world of reality—a world whose very existence it is bound to treat at the outset as problematical. How, or in what sense, does the individual knower transcend his own individual existence and become aware of other men and things? It is this relatively simple and manifestly preliminary question which epistemology has to take up."³ Unless this problem can be solved, Professor Pringle-Pattison seems ready to admit that his theory ends in a scepticism as thoroughgoing as that which characterizes the older dualism. In the third series of lectures, accordingly, he addresses himself to a solution of this all-important epistemological problem, with the hope of relieving his theory of this traditional difficulty.

Prepared by this clear recognition of the logical requirements

¹ PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. I, pp. 512 f., 516 f.

² PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. I, p. 138.

³ *Ibid.*

of his theory for a proof of the existence of objects and the validity of knowledge, the reader is somewhat surprised to find Professor Pringle-Pattison maintaining that, from the nature of the case, direct or experiential proof of either of these things is impossible. He points out, with admirable clearness, indeed, that in order to directly prove that objects exist we should have to know the objects at first hand, and that this, because of the representational character of knowledge, is impossible. He shows, furthermore, that if we cannot know that objects exist, or what their nature is, we cannot directly know that our percepts correspond to them. "The feat of comparing our percept with an unperceived thing is, as Berkeley incisively argued, forever impossible; we cannot get behind our own knowledge, and know without knowing."¹ "Thought cannot ultimately criticise its own validity. To do so would require a second species of thought to sit in judgment upon our first or actual thought, and a third thought to test the validity of the verdict thus obtained, and so on *ad infinitum*—a species of never-ending appeal as wearisome as fruitless."² He thus concedes that direct proof of either the existence of objects or of the validity of knowledge, from the nature of the case, is impossible.

Though direct proof fails him, Professor Pringle-Pattison feels that there is yet a valid indirect proof of these important beliefs. Indirect proof of the existence of objects is found partly in the instinctive and universal belief of mankind in such an existence, and partly in the failure of idealistic theories to give a sane or intelligible account of experience. Universal belief in external existence, he maintains, results naturally from the fact of the objective reference of ideas. "'When I perceive a tree before me, my faculty of seeing gives me not only a notion or simple apprehension of the tree, but a belief of its existence; and this judgment or belief . . . is included in the very nature of the perception.' This judgment of existence . . . is yet found, on analysis and careful consideration, to be the root of the whole matter. The definite judgment of existence by which an impression is, so to

¹ PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. III, p. 59.

² *Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 90.

speak, transfixed . . . carries with it the idea of an object—that is, in germ, a real world to which we are related, and of which we have, in Reid's language, 'an irresistible and necessary belief.'"¹ Occasionally, to be sure, the author speaks of this proof as "crude" and "naïve" and "uncritical," and adds that realism "cannot save itself by a mere appeal to instinctive or unreasoned belief," and that, so far as it has done so, it has rightly been treated by succeeding philosophy as a "negligible quantity." At other times, however, he regards the fact of universal belief as at least a partially valid proof of the existence of epistemological things-in-themselves. Thus he remarks, "It may be a matter for consideration at a later stage whether the mere fact of this universal, primary, and ineradicable belief is not itself an element in the problem; except on the hypothesis of universal irrationality may it not be argued that the provision of nature in this respect is hardly likely to be a carefully organized deception?"²

The proof, however, upon which Professor Pringle-Pattison primarily depends for the establishment of the doctrine of epistemological realism is found in the supposed failure of non-realistic theories to give an intelligible or sane account of experience, except in so far as they imply the existence of a real world upon which conscious experience depends. Realism, he thus maintains, can best be established "by showing that Idealism as an epistemological doctrine *only exists as a criticism of Realism*, and derives any plausibility it possesses from the surreptitious or unobserved importation into its statement of our ineradicable realistic assumptions. Were it not for these assumptions the idealistic theory could not be stated in words. Idealism is really an attempt to obliterate the distinction between knowing and being, which it finds established in common belief and in the realistic theories. . . . Now on such a theory it is pretty evident that the distinction of Knowing and Being . . . would never have arisen, and would not have required therefore to be explained away. Hence, it may be repeated, Idealism exists only as a

¹ *Scottish Philosophy*, pp. 103, 104.

² *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, Vol. I, pp. 507.

criticism of Realism. When developed itself as a substantive theory, it leads to a view of existence which is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the doctrine in question. By such a line of argument Realism is left in possession of the field, and a critical or carefully guarded Realism is established as the only satisfactory, indeed the only sane, theory of knowledge."¹

That subjective idealism and German Neo-Kantianism, when taken by themselves, do not give an intelligible account of experience, the author considers easy to prove. These theories, he contends, break down in that they regard experience as a self-existing reality, whereas in truth it is only a chaotic stream of subjective states. They thus commit themselves to the absurdity of an experience which is experienced by nobody and is an experience of nothing. "First the object disappears . . . and the world . . . is transformed into the dream of a dreamer. . . . Then the subject shares the fate of the object, and the dream of a dreamer becomes a dream which is dreamt by nobody, but which, if one may say so, dreams itself, and among its other dream-forms dreams the fiction of a supposed dreamer. This self-evolving, unsupported, unhoused illusion is all that exists."² In reality, however, experience is always dependent on a real subject and a real object, and consequently needs only, as in the case of the theories in question, to be revealed in its helplessness and nakedness to show its essential dependence on a real world. In actual thought, therefore, we are led by the requirements of causal explanation to connect the transient content of experience with an existence which is at least relatively permanent and self-existent, and which consequently brings order and connection into our otherwise fleeting experience. Professor Pringle-Pattison admits that this existence is only a "rational construction, an hypothesis to explain our experience," and he tells us that "if one is determined to be a purist, and to define things solely in their relation to sensitive experience—solely from the effects which he finds them to produce," he may, and indeed must, define this reality as a 'permanent possibility of sensation.' He believes,

¹ PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. I, pp. 511, 512. See also p. 517.

² PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. II, p. 302.

however, that the realist may feel "tolerably easy" when the talk is thus of permanent possibilities of sensation since, as he points out, no one but a pedant would insist upon this circumlocution instead of talking of real things.¹ He believes, moreover, that under the cover of such ambiguous expressions, the conception of a trans-subjective reality is secretly re-introduced into philosophy. And if this is the case, the expressions in question represent the passage of subjective idealism into realism, and the breakdown of the former position.

With subjective idealism thus disposed of, Professor Pringle-Pattison turns his attention to objective idealism, considering the theory principally in the form in which it has been stated by Hegel and Green. Against this form of idealism, he urges the objection that it deprives the world of all reality, and hence fails to give an acceptable account of experience. He maintains, indeed, that the essential characteristic of the position is that it interprets external existence as thought, and thus reduces the world to an 'unearthly ballet of bloodless categories'; it 'eviscerates reality of all inner content, and presents us with a set of labels or formulæ instead.'² Or, in place of interpreting objective existence as thought, he sometimes represents the theory as hypostatizing thought, thus again mistaking categories for things. In accordance with this view, he interprets Hegel as attempting, in the *Encyclopedia*, to deduce objective reality from the categories of the Logic. "His language would justify us in believing that the categories actually take blood and flesh and walk into the air, and that the whole frame of nature is no more than a duplicate or reflection of the thought-determinations of the Logic. . . . When he speaks, therefore, of the categories as the heart or kernel of nature, we require to be on our guard against the idea that logical abstractions can *thicken*, as it were, into real existences."³ The same substitution of abstractions for reality, moreover, is represented as taking place with reference to the subject. Thus it is maintained that Fichte, Hegel, and

¹ PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. II, pp. 310 ff.

² *Scottish Philosophy*, p. 203.

³ *Hegelianism and Personality*, pp. 132-136.

Green take the logical subject of the theory of knowledge, the mere transcendental unity of apperception, for a real or existing Self. "The form of knowledge being one, it [Neo-Hegelianism] leaps to the conclusion that we have before us the One Subject who sustains the world. . . . It seems a hard thing to say, but to do this is neither more nor less than to hypostatise an abstraction. It is of a piece with Scholastic Realism which hypostatised *humanitas* or *homo* as a universal substance."¹ Professor Pringle-Pattison thus holds that objective idealism sweeps existential reality off the boards altogether; that it reduces the world, in Kant's phrase, to 'a kind of ghost!' But despite this logical implication of idealism, it cannot be "any man's serious intention" to rob "the object of its substantiality," thus "reducing it to a dance of ideas or thought-relations." In reality, the idealist can have intended to assert only that the 'real is rational.'² But if this is the case, objective idealism, like the subjective type of the theory, implies the existence of a real world. Idealism in both its forms thus passes over into realism, which remains the only intelligible, indeed the only sane, theory of experience.

By these arguments Professor Pringle-Pattison feels that he has indirectly or inferentially established the existence of objects. It therefore only remains for him to find similar indirect evidence of the correspondence of percepts to things, and the epistemological problem, with its important consequences for life and thought, is, as he supposes, successfully solved. He believes that he finds indirect evidence of the validity of knowledge in the fact that the hypothesis of a lack of relation of correspondence between thought and things leads to scepticism. If, then, he argues, we are to avoid contradiction, if, indeed, we are

¹ *Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 32. The contention that thought cannot take the place of things is expressed, in general terms, in the well known dictum that logic cannot be made into a metaphysics, and this, of course, is the meaning of that formula. Speaking of the *Hegelianism and Personality*, where this thesis is most strenuously maintained, the author says, "My contention in the present volume is simply that knowledge is . . . a symbol or representation of reality, and that, however inseparably related, knowledge and being can never be identified." (*Hegelianism and Personality*, p. vi. See also PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. III, p. 57.)

² *Scottish Philosophy*, p. 202.

to give any intelligible account of experience whatever, we must assume a correspondence or representational relation between percept and object. "Epistemological investigation . . . if it is not to lead back to the skeptical idealism, . . . must tacitly presuppose . . . the harmony of the subjective function with the universe from which it springs. Starting from this basis, epistemology may afterwards return to prove its own assumption, so far as we can talk of proof in such a case. Epistemology supplies the indirect proof that this is the only hypothesis which can be consistently thought out without dissolving in absurdity or contradiction."¹ The author thus acknowledges that he cannot prove by knowledge the validity of knowledge, but he yet maintains that it is possible by a species of *reductio ad absurdum* to show the ineptitude of skeptical attempts to rob knowledge of its objective truth. The indirect proof of realism is thus paralleled by an indirect proof of representationalism. By means of these proofs, Professor Pringle-Pattison is confident that he has successfully disposed of the troublesome epistemological difficulties which threatened, for awhile, to overwhelm his theory as they have overwhelmed the dualistic theories against which he is contending.

With this outline of the theory before us, we may now proceed to inquire how far Professor Pringle-Pattison's proposed emendation of traditional dualism accomplishes the purpose at which he aims. The decision of this question turns upon our estimate of the value of metaphysical monism in overcoming the dualism which, in his opinion, epistemology must assume to exist between subject and object in experience. As a matter of fact, an examination of his philosophy shows that the doctrine of metaphysical monism plays little or no part in the construction of his system. It gives the author an opportunity, it is true, to assent to the classical arguments against dualism, and thus creates the impression that he has seen and avoided the defects of that position. In reality, however, the metaphysical identity which he posits between subject and object is a hyper-empirical bond of union which does not manifest itself in

¹ PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. III, p. 62. See also *Mind*, N. S., Vol. III, p. 20.

experience at all; it is a relation which is entirely mystical so far as actual experience is concerned. So far as experience is concerned, therefore, the dualism between subject and object remains complete; the two fundamental aspects of experience are as unrelated as in the theories of Descartes and Locke. But if this is the case, Professor Pringle-Pattison's theory cannot avoid the difficulties which characterize historical dualism. Having broken the world into an independent subject and independent objects, he has no choice but to restrict experience entirely to the former, and to admit that subjective states are all that we immediately know, and this in fact he does. The existence of objects is problematical, and has to be proved from the nature of conscious processes. The problem which is thus created, and which, in truth, is purely fictitious, is, because of the subjective character of knowledge, impossible of solution. This being the case, Professor Pringle-Pattison attempts to supply the lack of direct evidence by having recourse to his indirect or inferential methods of demonstration. These proofs, however, are not critical refutations of idealism, but only reassertions, against this type of theory, of the original position of representationalism and realism; they are in fact all based on the fundamental assumption that if representationalism is not true, knowledge is not possible, and that if realism is not valid, the world is an illusion. It is evident, however, that this disjunction is far from exhausting all the possibilities of the case, and that it would not be recognized as valid by any idealist. In reality, the over-individual and objective character of reality and the objective validity of knowledge can all be retained without accepting the position for which Professor Pringle-Pattison contends. The indirect proofs, therefore, do not establish the existence of epistemological things-in-themselves or the correspondence of percepts to them. As a matter of fact, the essential weakness of the proofs, as well as the close affinity of the author's whole point of view with the forms of dualism which he has rejected, comes clearly to light when he revives the well-worn appeal to faith. We cannot be absolutely sure, he tells us, that objects exist or that knowledge is valid; in the last analysis we can only trust that the world is

not a "bad joke," that it is not a place where "pitfalls are laid for us," and where the mechanism of knowledge is "expressly devised to defeat its own purpose."¹ His theory thus ends precisely where traditional dualism ends, viz., in the confession that the whole problem of knowledge is an impenetrable mystery, and that epistemological enquiry is a work of supererogation.

In so far, however, as Professor Pringle-Pattison's theory presents a debatable epistemological issue, it clearly turns upon the question of the adequacy of the category of representation to express the relation of thought to objective existence. But this, one might suppose, is to-day a question about which there can scarcely be a serious difference of opinion. If thought represents objects, what account can be given of the process of conception? In what sense can a concept correspond point for point to an object, when admittedly no general object exists? If, therefore, representationalism be true, conceptual thought must be a progressive falsification of the true nature of reality.² The category of correspondence, moreover, is as inapplicable to perception as to conception. For if percepts are assumed to answer in a one to one fashion to objects, they become mere data, and this conception, as is well known, has now been abandoned by both psychology and logic, both sciences having perceived with increasing clearness that perception and conception cannot be regarded as unrelated functions of thought. In maintaining a position which implies such a separation, Professor Pringle-Pattison puts himself at variance with one of the most generally recognized conclusions of mental science. To abandon the separation, however, is to abandon the representational theory, and with this goes the essence of Professor Pringle-Pattison's epistemological realism.

The difficulties which we have been noticing are not peculiar to Professor Pringle-Pattison's theory, or to the dualistic theories

¹ *Scottish Philosophy*, pp. 161 f., and *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, Vol. III, p. 59.

² Occasionally, at least, Professor Pringle-Pattison seems willing to accept this horn of the dilemma. Thus he says, quoting Bradley with approval, "The real is inaccessible by way of ideas. . . . We escape from ideas, and from mere universals, by a reference to the real which appears in perception." (*Hegelianism and Personality*, pp. 137 f.)

which he has rejected, but are to be found, as well, in every form of dualism. They are inseparable, indeed, from any theory which places reality beyond experience, and which consequently maintains only an external or comparative relation between thought and its object. Idealism itself, despite its insistence upon the necessity of monism, has not always escaped this pitfall. This is manifestly true of those idealistic systems which make the Absolute Consciousness, defined in terms which are a negation of finite experience, the fundamental reality. Like realistic systems, these theories break the world into two parts, one of which, being eternal and self-complete, falls outside the world of finite experience, and is thus, so far as finite knowledge is concerned, unknowable. But such an Absolute Consciousness, like the thing-in-itself, is wholly incapable of being brought into any real relation with experience. Experience, either in part or as a whole, is not a whit more objective or intelligible because this Absolute is assumed to exist. That this is the case becomes evident as soon as we try to estimate, in terms of the Absolute Consciousness, the degree of truth or reality of any actual process of experience. A human purpose or a bit of finite knowledge, so the theory holds, is valid in so far as it realizes the purposes already fulfilled in the Absolute, or expresses the totality of an eternally complete system of relations. It is evident, however, that this is only a thinly veiled restatement of the representational relation of thought and reality. It is not surprising, therefore, that in this case, as in the other, the correspondence test breaks down, because, in the nature of the case, the relation which is thus assumed cannot be made out in any given instance. Whether reality is an Absolute Consciousness or a thing-in-itself, it is equally impossible to get outside of our experience, and to compare that experience with an extra-experiential, and therefore unknown reality. If, therefore, the absolute idealist maintains the existence of such an external consciousness, and the correspondence of finite experience to it, he can do so, like other dualists, only on the basis of faith.

The trouble thus lies, not in realism or absolute idealism, but in the adoption of an external or trans-experiential conception

of reality. If we are to give an intelligible account of experience, if we are to interpret experience in terms which admit of verification, we must abandon the transcendent for an immanent conception of the real; we must look for reality, not outside of, but *in* experience. Such a change of view, of course, requires an alteration in our conception of what it means to be real. If reality is in experience, it cannot, from the nature of the case, be an existential or structural reality; it cannot be something which merely exists. From its very nature, experience is changing and developing, and cannot, therefore, have a place within itself for that which is either stationary or self-complete. If, then, we are to find reality in the world in which we actually live; if, moreover, we are to obtain a reality which we can know, and consequently verify, in real experience, we must leave off searching beyond experience for that which exists in and of itself, and must look instead for that which is most intimately bound up with experience; for that indeed which makes experience what it is, a world of intelligible and significant effort. Reality is thus not something which is independent of life, but rather that which is organically related to it; it is that which arises from its very heart, which emerges upon our closest dealing with it. And if we ask precisely what it is which thus gives intelligibility and worth to experience, the answer can only be that it is the organizing principles and ideals of intellectual and practical life. These, together with the processes which go to realize them, are a reality which can be known, and being known can be verified in experience. In terms of such a reality, moreover, the difficulties of the correspondence test of existential theories entirely disappear. Since reality is no longer external to experience and unknowable, the impossible question of the correspondence of percepts to an unknown object, or of the fulfilment of purposes in an unknown eternal consciousness, cannot arise. The question of the truth or reality of any portion of finite experience now becomes the legitimate and fruitful question of whether a given concept or purpose makes experience more intelligible or more worth while; to the degree to which it does this, it is real and true. The test of truth is thus simple and practicable; it is,

moreover, the one which we use in all our actual determinations of validity in intellectual and practical life. Viewed from this standpoint, Professor Pringle-Pattison's doubts concerning the validity of knowledge are entirely unwarranted; knowledge does organize experience and is therefore valid.

The change from the conception of an external to that of an immanent and ideal reality must be accompanied by a corresponding change from an existential to an organic or functional theory of the nature of experience. The various portions of experience can no longer be regarded as so many self-existing entities which persist in their own identity, except so far as they are somewhat modified by incidental relation to other things. To maintain this is to fall back into the external and comparative theory, the futility of which we have seen. We must rather assert, in opposition to this theory, that every part of experience, so to speak, is constituted by its relations to other parts of experience; it is what it is in virtue of its relations to other things. In reality, therefore, there are no self-existing entities, no hard cores, no 'things' that are 'related' to other 'things.' Experience, in truth, is rather an organic whole, in which every part of it is what it is in terms of every other part of it. But if this is the case, subject and object are not, as Professor Pringle-Pattison supposes, independent and relatively self-existing entities. There are, in truth, no independent minds, and no self-existing objects. We do not first have a mind and then come to know objects, and objects do not first exist apart from mind, as so many epistemological or metaphysical things-in-themselves, and afterwards come to be known by it. Rather to be a mind is just to stand in relation to, and to know, objects, and to be an object is to be a determinate function of some particular aspect of experience. Subject and object are thus organic or indissoluble aspects of experience; each enters as a real and constitutive factor into the life of the other, and makes it what it is. Experience is thus a life of which subject and object are distinguished, but at the same time, inseparably related functions. By this conception alone can the difficulties of dualism in all its forms be avoided.

ALFRED H. JONES.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Philosophical Essays. By BERTRAND RUSSELL. Longmans, Green, and Company, London, New York, Bombay, and Calcutta, 1910. —pp. vi, 185.

This volume consists of seven essays, all of which, with the exception of the last, "are reprints, with some alterations, of articles which have appeared in various periodicals." The first and longest essay, "The Elements of Ethics," is a succinct presentation of the ethical theory familiar to readers of Mr. G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica*, reviewed in Vol. XIII of this REVIEW. Essay II, "The Free Man's Worship," is an eloquent assertion of Stoicism. "Brief and powerless is Man's life; on him and all his race the slow, sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way; for Man, condemned to-day to lose his dearest, to-morrow himself to pass through the gate of darkness, it remains only to cherish, ere yet the blow falls, the lofty thoughts that ennoble his little day; disdaining the coward terrors of the slave of Fate, to worship at the shrine that his own hands have built; undismayed by the empire of chance, to preserve a mind free from the wanton tyranny that rules his outward life; proudly defiant of the irresistible forces that tolerate, for a moment, his knowledge and his condemnation, to sustain alone, a weary but unyielding Atlas, the world that his own ideals have fashioned despite the trampling march of unconscious power" (p. 70).

Among the lofty thoughts that ennoble man's little day, Mr. Russell regards mathematical conceptions as of prime value, and Essay III deals with "The Study of Mathematics." "For the health of the moral life, for ennobling the tone of an age or a nation, the austere virtues have a strange power, exceeding the power of those not informed and purified by thought. Of these austere virtues the love of truth is the chief, and in mathematics, more than elsewhere, the love of truth may find encouragement for waning faith. Every great study is not only an end in itself, but also a means of creating and sustaining a lofty habit of mind; and this purpose should be kept always in view throughout the teaching and learning of mathematics" (p. 86). But mathematics, "rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty—a beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture, without appeal to any part of our weaker nature, without the

gorgeous trappings of painting or music, yet sublimely pure, and capable of a stern perfection such as only the greatest art can show. The true spirit of delight, the exaltation, the sense of being more than man, which is the touchstone of the highest excellence, is to be found in mathematics as surely as in poetry. What is best in mathematics deserves not merely to be learnt as a task, but to be assimilated as a part of daily thought, and brought again and again before the mind with ever-renewed encouragement. Real life is, to most men, a long second-best, a perpetual compromise between the ideal and the possible; but the world of pure reason knows no compromise, no practical limitations, no barrier to the creative activity embodying in splendid edifices the passionate aspiration after the perfect from which all great work springs. Remote from human passions, remote even from the pitiful facts of nature, the generations have gradually created an ordered cosmos, where pure thought can dwell as in its natural home, and where one, at least, of our nobler impulses can escape from the dreary exile of the actual world" (pp. 73-4).

To one who takes such an attitude, of course pragmatism must seem a profanation of one of the shrines of the Free Man's Worship. Even if Mr. Russell's antagonism to pragmatism were not well known, the reader who has followed him through the first three essays just mentioned would confidently anticipate the verdict set forth in the next two essays, "Pragmatism," and "William James's Conception of Truth." "Transatlantic Truth" comes in for severe handling, and we all remember Mr. James's protest that pragmatists "affirm nothing as silly as Mr. Russell supposes," and that "the slander which Mr. Russell repeats has gained the widest currency" (*The Meaning of Truth*, pp. 272 ff.). Whatever be the merits of the question, a more searching examination of the *dogmas* of pragmatism it would be hard to find. Unfortunately, however, Professor Dewey's version of pragmatism and the modification of Mr. James's version given in *The Meaning of Truth* are left quite out of the discussion.

The sixth Essay, "The Monistic Theory of Truth," is a very subtle criticism of "the axiom of internal relations," and of the view of truth based upon this axiom.

The last Essay, "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood," presents Mr. Russell's own view. His doctrine starts from the existence of 'multiple relations': "a relation is 'multiple' if the simplest propositions in which it occurs are propositions involving more than two terms (not counting the relation)" (p. 180). "Take such a proposition as 'A loved B in May and hated him in June,' and let us suppose

this to be true. Then we cannot say that, apart from dates, A has to B either the relation of loving or that of hating. . . . 'A loved B in May' is a relation, not between A and B simply, but between A and B and May" (p. 179). "The theory of judgment which I am advocating is, that judgment is not a dual relation of the mind to a single objective, but a multiple relation of the mind to the various other terms with which the judgment is concerned. . . . We may therefore state the difference between truth and falsehood as follows: Every judgment is a relation of a mind to several objects, one of which is a relation; the judgment is *true* when the relation which is one of the objects relates the other objects, otherwise it is false. Thus in the above illustration, love, which is a relation, is one of the objects of the judgment, and the judgment is true if love relates A and B. The above statement requires certain additions which will be made later; for the present, it is to be taken as a first approximation" (pp. 180-1). One of these additions consists in ruling perceptions out from this definition on the ground that 'perception, as opposed to judgment, is never in error' (p. 181). The second addition introduces the distinction of the different 'senses' of a relation, and with this addition we are ready to understand the "exact account of the 'correspondence' which constitutes truth. Let us take the judgment 'A loves B.' This consists of a relation of the person judging to A and love and B, i. e., to the two terms A and B and the relation 'love.' But the judgment is not the same as the judgment 'B loves A'; thus the relation must not be abstractly before the mind, but must be before it as proceeding from A to B rather than from B to A. The corresponding complex object which is required to make our judgment true consists of A related to B by the relation which was before us in our judgment. We may distinguish two 'senses' of a relation according as it goes from A to B or from B to A. Then the relation as it enters into the judgment must have a 'sense,' and in the corresponding complex it must have the same 'sense.' Thus the judgment that two terms have a certain relation R is a relation of the mind to the two terms and the relation R with the appropriate sense: the 'corresponding' complex consists of the two terms related by the relation R with the same sense. The judgment is true when there is such a complex, and false when there is not. The same account, *mutatis mutandis*, will apply to any other judgment. This gives the definition of truth and falsehood" (pp. 183-4).

In comment I must confine myself to the statement of one difficulty that meets me in my attempt to accept this view. Mr. Russell agrees

with the prevailing tendency that regards the object of judgment as immediately present in the judging experience. In judgment what happens is that a new term, namely mind, is introduced into a relational complex by being related to the several terms and to the relation which together constitute this complex. If by the introduction of this new term the relation otherwise obtaining between the terms of this complex is changed we have falsity. But why *falsity* and *not mere change of relation*? Is every change a falsification? If not, then there must be something in the nature of judgment that justifies us in regarding this specific kind of change, brought about in the complex when mind is introduced as an additional term into it, as falsification and not mere change. Even if judgment were a relational complex in which mind forms one of the terms, could this definition be regarded as adequate when it fails to take any account of the fact that in judgment there is a *reference* to something other than just this complex of which mind forms a part? In other words can judgment be adequately described without making any reference to *meaning* as a factor in judgment? But of meaning Mr. Russell gives no account. He speaks of a complex in which mind forms a term, and of a *corresponding* complex in which mind does not form a term, but he does not tell us whether this 'correspondence' is an external relation. If it is, how is it relevant to the judgment? If it is not, what kind of a relation is it, and again how is it relevant to the judgment? So far as appears from this Essay, one might suppose that Mr. Russell, in spite of his careful study of pragmatism, had failed utterly to understand and to appreciate the problem of meaning which pragmatism squarely faces, whether successfully or not. In the case of such a thinker as Mr. Russell is, this supposition would without doubt be false, but at any rate Mr. Russell has failed to admit the reader into his confidence in this matter. The English School of Realism, of which Mr. Russell and Mr. G. E. Moore are such distinguished representatives, and which finds strong supporters in the 'American Programmers,' has before it the duty of setting forth its position on the problem of meaning; and until this is done this type of realism must remain unintelligible except to those who know the secret. The theory of external relations, *so far as it has been divulged*, is as hopeless in face of the problem of meaning as is the absolutist theory of internal relations. If the latter makes the problem forever insoluble for finite experiences, the former leaves it always irrelevant to any specific judgment. A realism without recognition of real meanings of some sort can hardly meet the needs of an age that has had the problem of meanings brought

to its attention so acutely by the pragmatists. Let us therefore hope that 'at their early convenience' these external-relation-realists may supply us with their solution of this problem.

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Siger de Brabant et l'Averroïsme Latin au XIII^me Siècle. I^{re} partie: Étude critique. II^me partie: Textes Inédits. Par PIERRE MANDONNET. Deuxième édition revue et augmentée. Louvain, Institut supérieur de philosophie de l'université, 1908-1911.—pp. xvi, 328; xxx, 194.

The work before us is an extremely valuable contribution to the history of mediæval philosophy, and Mandonnet has the good fortune to treat one of the most interesting periods in this history. The word Averroism at once suggests the excellent treatise of that master, Renan, *Averroës et l'Averroïsme*. In broad outline the subject is there laid down in masterly fashion once for all. We learn who the real Averroes was and what he taught; by "we" I mean those of us, and they form quite the majority of students of philosophy, who have not the leisure to read Averroes's commentaries in the original Arabic, or even in Hebrew or Latin translation. Renan also gives us a sketch of what Averroes meant for the Jewish rationalists of the middle ages, for the Christian Scholastics of the thirteenth century, and of the treatment he received in the time of the Renaissance in Italy, at the hands of the Averroists of Padua on the one hand, and the Humanists on the other. In all these matters Renan's presentation is masterly, but investigation and research in mediæval philosophy has not been at a standstill since the middle of the last century, when the first edition of Renan's book appeared. A great many details have been unearthed and brought to light on nearly every part of the Averroes problem, and not least on the history of Averroism in the University of Paris in the thirteenth century, perhaps the most interesting phase of the subject.

It is well known by this time that the second half of the thirteenth century was the most agitated period in the philosophical world of mediæval Christian Europe. With the rapid introduction of the great treatises of Aristotle hitherto unknown to the Scholastics, a new world of thought and speculation opened before the eyes of those who till then had been accustomed to slake their thirst for knowledge of the human and the divine by rehearsing Porphyry's questions about the nature of universals and Augustine's speculations concerning

the Trinitarian analogies in the world of nature and of man. Now a whole system of thought, risen full-fledged from the head of the Stagirite Jupiter, appeared in its grandeur, and no wonder that the students of the time took their fill of the honey thus offered to the eager palate. But there was danger lurking in the foreign sweetness, and those who were committed to Augustinianism became apprehensive of the novel doctrines contained in or evolved from the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. The eternity of the world, the unity of the human intellect, the determinism of the will, the independence of the reason, or the two-fold truth,—all these were so many thorns in the flesh of the true Catholic doctrine, as taught by the Church. Hence the repeated prohibitions to teach the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle in the Schools as well as the commentaries of the Arabians on the same. But the tide was not to be stemmed. The Church soon realized that conquest could be achieved now, if at all, only by an apparent submission to the enemy. It is to the credit of the Dominicans to have led the way in the Christianization of Aristotle, *i. e.*, in adapting his teachings to those of the Church and in endeavoring to work out a harmony where the two conflicted, instead of rejecting Aristotle *en bloc*.

Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas undertook this task and carried it through successfully for their time, but not without a hard struggle in which they opposed both extremes, the Augustinians, represented by Alexander of Hales, Bonaventura, Henry of Ghent, etc., and the out and out Aristotelians, who read Aristotle through the spectacles of Averroes, the "Commentator," and whose names till lately were not so well known to us. The harmonists, as we know, won the day, and the pure Aristotelians, or Averroists, as they were called, were condemned as heretics, hence no doubt the subsequent neglect of their works and the permanent loss perhaps of some of them. When Renan wrote his book he could scarcely name with any certainty a single representative of the Averroists. That there were such and what their doctrines were he had to learn from the refutations of their opponents, for both Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas wrote treatises "Contra Averroistas," and in particular on the problem "De anima," or "De unitate intellectus"—a heresy which seems, despite the abstruseness of the technical discussions, easily to have lent itself to popularization in the form that, inasmuch as the human mind was one in all men, Tom, Dick, and Harry can do any thing they please, and they are sure to be saved if any body is, since the soul of the saint is also the soul of the sinner. Renan suspects that Siger of Brabant,

already made famous by Dante in the tenth Canto of his Paradise, as a teacher of "odious truths (*invidiosi veri*) in the *rue de Fouarre* in Paris (*leggendo nel vico degli strami*), may be one of these Averroists intended by Thomas Aquinas, and having had access to the Mss. of the National library, Renan consulted the *De anima intellectiva* of Siger and discovered there traces of Averroism. But it was left for Baeumker and especially Mandonnet in the work under review to reveal to us the man Siger and his philosophical work.

A great deal of discussion has been raging around the name of Siger, in which not only the philosophers have taken part, but also literary historians and Dante scholars. He has been confounded with another Siger mentioned in mediæval documents—Siger of Courtrai, and made into an adherent of Thomas Aquinas, or at least a convert to Thomism, instead of an opponent. The events of his life, and particularly his last years and the mode of his death, have also been the subject of great difference of opinion. As to his works, no one had examined them seriously until Clemens Baeumker, the learned professor of the University of Strassburg (then of Breslau), in 1898 published the *Impossibilia* of Siger with a critical analysis of its contents and an introductory discussion of the events of Siger's life, as he was enabled to construct them from the scattered and fragmentary notices of mediæval documents. The following year (1899) came the first edition of Mandonnet's work on Siger, which contained an elaborate study of Siger's life, personality, and doctrine, with the historical and philosophical background completely sketched in—all this based upon a rich store-house of erudition drawn from the Scholastic literature of the time, from the documents of the University of Paris as published by Denifle and Chatelain (*Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*), and last but not least from the works of Siger himself,—as many as could be discovered in the European libraries. These works of Siger, with the exception of the *Impossibilia* published by Baeumker the year before, were given in an appendix. This was the first time that Siger was characterized as a result of an examination of all his extant works, and the result was very significant. Mandonnet reached a number of conclusions different from those of Baeumker. On the strength of a statement of Tocco, the biographer of Thomas Aquinas, Baeumker and others assumed that Siger was implicated in the attacks of William of St. Amour upon the mendicant orders in the years 1252–59. Mandonnet, I think, makes out a good case against Tocco, showing that his knowledge of the earlier activities of his hero is far from precise or trustworthy, and as the name of Siger

is not otherwise mentioned in this connection where we should expect it, as for example in the letter of Pope Alexander IV of the year 1256 in which he names three other persons beside William of St. Amour himself as "principales huiusmodi rebellionis et contumaciæ incentores," Mandonnet is undoubtedly correct in maintaining that the first well attested mention of Siger is of the year 1266 in connection with the university troubles.

Mandonnet is able also to connect plausibly Simon Duval's citation of Siger and Bernier de Nivelles before his tribunal for heresy with the condemnation of the former, March 7, 1277, by proving that the date of the summons is not 1278, as Baeumker thought, but October 23, 1277, from the Ms. act of summons as published in Martène-Durand, *Thesaurus Anecdotorum*.

The main difference between them, however, was in their judgment of Siger's place as a philosopher, and in particular of the character and authorship of the *Impossibilia*. Beaumker, following Hauréau, expressed the opinion that the *Impossibilia* is an anonymous refutation of certain theses maintained by Siger, hence all that may be attributed to Siger in this work are the theses and the arguments by which they are defended. The rest, and the more important part of the treatise, belongs to the anonymous author. Understanding the treatise as he did, and having no other works of Siger to go by, Baeumker had only external notices to depend upon in characterizing Siger as an Averroist.

Mandonnet, on the basis of the other works of Siger, in which points of contact are found with the solutions of the theses in the *Impossibilia*, refuses to accept Baeumker's view and regards the whole treatise as belonging to Siger, and as constituting in its present form a "reportatio" of Siger's formal disputations by one of his auditors or students. He cites other works of the same kind, and holds that these purely dialectic disputations as a matter of exercise in the art of argumentation were very common and formed a part of the intellectual discipline of the schools.

As for Siger himself, Mandonnet has no doubt that he is the chief representative of the Averroists in the University of Paris and the principal opponent of Thomas Aquinas. This he proves not only by the fact that the doctrines condemned in 1270 and 1277 by Etienne Tempier, the Bishop of Paris, many of which are Averroistic in character, affected principally Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia, since they were the only persons punished, and by the fact that the treatise of Thomas Aquinas, *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*,

is entitled in a Munich Ms. "Contra Mag. Sogerum," but chiefly by an examination of the extant works of Siger, in particular the *De anima intellectiva*, to which he is convinced Thomas Aquinas's treatise above mentioned is a reply. And in fact, whether Aquinas's work is directed specially against Siger or not, it seems quite evident from the seventh chapter of Siger's *De anima intellectiva* that he inclines to the belief in the unity of the human intellect. Whether his view is identical in all details with that of Averroes is irrelevant to the matter in question. Siger does not enter into all the particulars of the knotty problem, and he may reserve a certain degree of independent thinking, and yet belong to the Averroistic school, as it was then named. There is at any rate no doubt that all indications point to Mandonnet's view as the true one.

There was also a disagreement about the time of Siger's death, Baeumker maintaining, on grounds in themselves plausible, that he died in the years 1290-91, whereas Mandonnet on the strength of a letter of John Peckham, Archbishop of Canterbury, puts his death before 1284. This letter is dated November 10, 1284, and though it does not name Siger or Boethius of Dacia, the reference to the "two chief defenders" of the heretical doctrine (the unity of forms), "who ended their days miserably on the other side of the Alps, though not having originated in those parts," is, from what we know of the situation, not at all obscure or ambiguous. Siger and Boethius of Dacia are the two persons meant, and Peckham believed them dead when he wrote his letter in 1284.

Since the publication of Mandonnet's first edition in 1889, a number of things have happened. A new text was discovered containing a reference to Siger to the effect that, being unable to remain in Paris on account of his advocacy of heretical opinions, he went to Rome and there at the Roman Curia he was after a little while stabbed by his secretary in a fit of madness ("a clerico suo quasi dementi perfossus periit"). This important document enabled Baeumker (*Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. XIII, 1900, pp. 73 ff.) to identify with certainty the Siger of Dante, *i. e.*, our Siger, with the Siger of the Italian poem *Il fiore* who, we know, died in Orvieto. Of the three available periods of the Papal visits to Orvieto, Baeumker now decided with Mandonnet for the first, under Martin IV, 1281-84, and since we know that Siger had left Paris in 1277, and the text above referred to puts his death shortly after, 1282 is the date Baeumker finally decided upon.

In 1907 Bruckmüller presented a dissertation to the University of

Munich on the *De anima intellectiva* of Siger, in which he compares Siger's doctrine with that of Aristotle, Averroes, and Thomas Aquinas, and for the first time raises a doubt concerning the Averroism of Siger. It is fortunate that Bruckmüller's study, which is thorough and scholarly, is not vitiated by his conclusions, which are not conclusive. There seems no doubt that Siger was an Averroist, or at least was known as such. That he regards Averroes as the commentator of Aristotle *par excellence*, whom he takes as his guide in the interpretation of the latter, seems also clear, and the fact that he sometimes misunderstands Averroes, if we believe Bruckmüller, does not make him any the less an Averroist.

Latterly, in 1908, Baeumker, on the strength no doubt of Mandonnet's work, particularly his publication of Siger's writings, has retracted his statement respecting the character and authorship of the *Impossibilia*. He agrees with Mandonnet that it is a work of Siger and not written against Siger. He maintains, however, in a note of his latest volume on Witelo (*Witelo, ein Philosoph und Naturforscher des XIII. Jahrhunderts*, Münster, 1908, p. 573, note 2) that his view of Siger differs widely from that of Mandonnet. It would be interesting to know what Baeumker's view is on this most interesting and important subject, and the students of mediæval philosophy would be greatly benefited by a monograph on the philosophy of Siger from Baeumker's pen. If we are to judge from the sketch on mediæval philosophy which he contributed to the volume on the history of philosophy in *Kultur der Gegenwart*, Baeumker regards Siger as representing a radical Aristotelianism, or a moderate Averroism. His differences from Mandonnet must therefore be in detail.

Finally, the last stage so far in the Siger affair is the appearance of the second edition of Mandonnet in two volumes. The second volume, dated 1908, contains the original texts, the first volume contains the historical, biographical, and critical portion, and is dated 1911. The first volume is a very valuable piece of work. The treatment of Siger himself is preceded by a chapter on "The Influence of Aristotle on the Intellectual Movement of the Middle Ages," and a second on "The Influence of Aristotle on the Formation of the Doctrinal Currents of the Thirteenth Century." In the study of Siger, also, Mandonnet keeps constantly in touch with the history of ideas in the thirteenth century, and gives Siger his proper place in that history.

There are a few interesting additions, textual or in foot-notes, which may be referred to briefly. Interesting is p. 7, note 3, where he

expresses the opinion in opposition to Jourdain and Cousin that Boethius translated all the books of the *Organon*, and also the scientific and metaphysical works of Aristotle. The first statement seems to be proved from Boethius's own remark, "quod, qui priores posterioresque nostros analyticos quos ab Aristotele transtulimus, legit, minime dubitat," and other passages. The second point is not yet established. The fact that Boethius makes out a program of translating all the works does not prove that he carried it out. Nor is this proved by the fact that he cites the scientific works of Aristotle and shows a knowledge of their contents. The phrase, however, "de quibus melius in *Physicis* tractavimus" is important, though implicit faith cannot be put in the superscription of the Ms. Par. Nat. Lat. 14694—"Decem libri Metaphysicæ ex Versione Boethici," and the citation of Thomas Aquinas, "ut patet ex exemplaribus Græcis et translatione Boetii." How account for the fact that up to and including Abelard no one seems to have known Aristotle except as a logician? Abelard says he does not know any works of Aristotle except the *Categories* and the *Interpretation*. Mandonnet thinks they were lost for a time, and then rediscovered in Italy. Of interest, too, is his discovery that the condemnation by the Bishop of Paris in 1277 of two hundred and nineteen heretical propositions affected also Roger Bacon and Ægidius (Gilles) Romanus, though he proves at the same time that Renan and Hauréau were wrong in making Roger Bacon out to be an Averroist, that on the contrary he was a true Augustinian, and behind his day in understanding or appreciating the Aristotelian doctrines. His doctrine of the human soul is only superficially similar to that of Averroes, and is really derived from Augustine. The teachings which brought him under the ban of Etienne Tempier were not Averroistic, but had reference to his belief in astrology and the occult sciences. To defend himself against the attack of the Church, which he thought unjustified, he wrote the *Speculum astronomiæ*, which, according to Mandonnet, has been wrongly attributed to Albertus Magnus and incorporated in his works.

The second volume containing Sigerian and Averroistic texts has been increased by some important additions. The *Impossibilia*, which was omitted from the first edition, coming as it did in the wake of Bæumker's memoir on the subject, has now been added so as to complete the works of Siger in one collection. There has been added also for the first time an anonymous treatise of the Averroistic school, to judge from its doctrine, entitled, *De necessitate et contingentia causarum*. The *De erroribus philosophorum*, of which only the first

five chapters appeared in the first edition is now given in full, and Mandonnet provides it with a critical discussion of its authorship.

This discussion is, on the whole, very interesting, learned, and convincing, except on one point, where Mandonnet is guilty of undue haste in jumping to conclusions on the basis of superficial resemblances, and where a little circumspection and consultation of authorities would have saved him from a blunder. Fortunately the error in this case affects but a paragraph or two of his otherwise plausible and learned discussion. From the fact that the author of the *De erroribus philosophorum* cites Maimonides's *De expositione legum* for the latter's erroneous views, instead of the *Dux neutrorum* as the *Guide of the Perplexed* is called in the 13th century Latin translation and in the writings of Albertus Magnus, Mandonnet without further ado makes up his mind that the *De expositione legum*, which no other Scholastic quotes, a title, in fact, which Mandonnet has never seen before, is identical with the *Livre des preceptes*, which Bloch edited in the original Arabic in 1888. Without making any inquiries of those who know, what the *Livre des preceptes* might be, and whether it is at all likely that it can be the book meant by the anonymous author (even the titles are not strikingly similar), Mandonnet proceeds to build an hypothesis on this evidence of the author's unusual familiarity with Arabian and Hebrew sources, and decides that he lived in Spain.

The fact of the matter is that the *Livre des preceptes* was never dreamt of by the author of the *De erroribus*, as it contains no philosophical disquisitions of any sort, but is devoted to an enumeration of the six hundred and thirteen positive and negative commandments according to the good old Rabbinic tradition. On the other hand, the *De expositione legum* of the anonymous author is, strange as it may seem, the very book of Maimonides which Mandonnet and the rest of us would have expected the author to quote. The title is indeed strange, and yet not so strange as it might seem. The third part of the *Guide* is indeed devoted for the most part to an exposition of the laws, and the assignment to them of rational meanings. The first part is concerned with an exposition of the names of God found in the sacred books, and the earliest Latin translation, the one used by the scholastics of the thirteenth century, renders the author's purpose in the following words: "Istius libri prima intentio est explanare diversitates nominum quae inveniuntur in libris prophetarum." Upon the strength of this, the Munich Ms. of this first translation bears the superscription (by the Monks of Kaisheim, according to Perles, *Monatsschrift für*

Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums, XXIV, 1875, p. 10)
 "Rabi Moysis expositio nominum in libris prophetarum."

The citations given in the *De erroribus* from Maimonides's *Guide* are almost all wrong as far as the numbering of the chapters is concerned, if we adopt as a standard the division of Ibn Tibbon's Hebrew translation, which agrees with the Arabic original. There is a second Hebrew translation by Judah Charisi, which differs in the numbering of the chapters, and finally the earliest Latin translation, which Perles discovered in a Munich Ms. and which he proves to be based upon the Hebrew of Charisi, numbers the chapters consecutively throughout the book, thus differing from either of the Hebrew translations, both of which begin numbering anew in each of the last two parts of the book. The author of the *De erroribus* must have had a Ms. more like the Hebrew translations in the system of numeration of the chapters, for he gives the book and chapter in every instance. The Paris Ms. which Mandonnet used has marginal variants now and then of the chapter numbers as given in the text, and these variants are almost always correct. The rest of the citations should be corrected as follows: Mandonnet, p. 22, line 1, for LXXI read L; p. 22, § 5, insert ch. 23, 65 or 66; p. 23, § 7, for XIX read XXIX; p. 23, § 9, for II° libro read III°. The other quotations are correctly given, except where there is a marginal variant, in which case the latter is the correct one.

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Das Substanzproblem in der griechischen Philosophie bis zur Blütezeit: Seine geschichtliche Entwicklung in systematischer Bedeutung.
 Von BRUNO BAUCH. Heidelberg, Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1910.—pp. xii, 265.

It is a difficult and an ungrateful task to review this book. Greeted in Germany as a work of exceptional excellence, it is significant only as it is symptomatic. It purports to be an historical study; but the would-be historian possesses no historical imagination and has received no historical training. He makes a great display of knowledge of original sources, but has no conception of a critical evaluation of the texts which he cites in evidence. In a word, the work is historical only in the superficial sense that the several philosophers are passed in review in an approximately chronological order.

Dealing with the concept 'substance,' the author has no conception of the history of the term *οὐσία* or of other terms which may be employed in a similar way. Hence he is quite willing to impute the

use of it to Heraclitus in the sense it bears in Aristotle. To one who is desirous of light on the development of concepts, such want of method—not to employ a more truthful expression—is discouraging in the extreme. But this is a mere bagatelle. In keeping with the procedure in vogue among a certain class of ‘historians’ of philosophy, particularly in Germany, at the present day, Dr. Bauch accepts uncritically the presuppositions of such scholars as Zeller and Windelband, without the counterpoise which they possessed in a knowledge based upon wide reading and the study in detail of many special problems. Consequently the well-known Aristotelian bias of Zeller produces here its perfect fruit: passages which Zeller, restrained by a certain historical sense bred of long study, has foreborne to press, or which Diels omits (or includes, if at all, only because they serve to account for the doxographic tradition) assume importance in the author’s treatise. There are those even in America who think this procedure is proper, and look askance at any criticism of Aristotle’s statements regarding his predecessors, as if it were *lèse majesté*.

It is quite possible to hold Aristotle in the highest regard without accepting his pronouncements on matters concerned with the history of thought. Indeed, it may fairly be questioned whether it is possible rightly to appreciate the significance of his thought and writings without a clear perception of the *volte-face* which they produced and the extent to which they came to dominate subsequent ages. But how is this to be accomplished except by careful study, the first duty of which shall be to distinguish between his thought and that of his predecessors? The most unobservant reader of Aristotle cannot fail to perceive that he was not, particularly in matters of metaphysic, an objectively judging historian of thought, and that he was not even primarily interested in the history of thought. Every careful student will have observed the way in which he frequently refers to points made in the Platonic dialogues as if they had been the common property of philosophers from the beginning. He was a dialectician and a metaphysician first and foremost, though possessed of a pardonable pride which led him to regard his philosophy as the sublime event to which the previous course of thought was moving and in which it was to find its fulfilment. The obscure ‘hints’ of his predecessors were therefore noted and interpreted by him—naturally in accordance with his own philosophy. So fully was he dominated by his own conceptions that, as everybody now admits, he not infrequently misconceived the meaning even of his master Plato. In accordance with the psychology of the ‘überwundene Standpunkt’ it was quite impossible for him to grasp the

meaning of the Numbers of the older Pythagoreans, who had not yet conceived the abstract numbers with which the generation of Aristotle was alone conversant. Such unquestionable facts should give the historian pause and lead to a circumspect use of Aristotle and of Theophrastus, who appears in most matters to have accepted the interpretation of his master.

The study of pre-Socratic philosophy must therefore begin with a careful criticism of Aristotle and the doxographic tradition, not with an uncritical acceptance of their data. If evidence were wanting, a thoughtful study of Dr. Bauch's treatise would supply it in abundance, for it might well be characterized as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the implicit confidence in the historical accuracy of Aristotle and the doxographic tradition. To make this plain, we may take his treatment of Anaximander as one example out of many. According to Dr. Bauch, the *ἄπειρον* of Anaximander is the unitary, all-inclusive *ἀρχή* or *ὑποκείμενον* of all things ('das schlechthin letzte und höchste Prinzip'), producing them by an immanent necessity ('immanent notwendige Wirksamkeit,' alluding to *κατὰ τὸ χρεών*), and must therefore be 'metacosmical.' But since antiquity conceived of the metacosmical only in religious terms, the *ἄπειρον* is identical with Deity (*τὸ θεῖον*); and hence the cosmic process becomes one of penance and requital in the order of time. The *ἄπειρον* is Infinity itself ('die Natur des Unendlichen'), without qualities ('qualitätslos'). It is not a mixture, but it is the primary substance from which all things proceed, since it contains them not actually but potentially. [If this were true, we should be constrained to exclaim with Dr. Bauch: 'Bei Anaximander erreicht das begriffliche Denken also . . . bereits eine sehr bedeutsame Höhe!'] But is it true? One wonders what remained for Plato and Aristotle to do in the field of metaphysics! The story thus conceived must become a replica of the theological doctrine of original perfection, a fall, and a happy final redemption by the resurrection of a second Anaximander in the person of Aristotle.

What shall we say of this farrago of highly abstruse metaphysical concepts fathered upon Anaximander? Are we to impute to him the notion of abstract Infinity? Or will Dr. Bauch present historical evidence of a strict conception of unity before Parmenides? Will he support his interpretation of *ἀρχή* as *ὑποκείμενον*? The *ὑποκείμενον* implies a divorce between a thing and its qualities, the substratum lying supine while the qualities play like shadows over its surface. Is such a notion to be credited to Anaximander? I showed years ago, and Burnet has availed himself of the observation, that the early

Greeks did not possess the notion of abstract qualities: qualities were to them actual constituents. What then becomes of an *ἄπειρον* devoid of qualities? And what reasonable grounds have we for ascribing to Anaximander a 'metacosmical' entity, whether *ἄπειρον* or *τὸ θεῖον*? As for the penance and requital of the cosmic process in the order of time, this is a curious point which it is difficult to discuss without losing patience. The traditional interpretation of the passage in Simplicius dates from the time before the edition of Diels, which restored to the text the word *ἀλλήλους* inadvertently omitted in the Aldine. It is safe to say that if the word had stood in the Aldine text, no such interpretation would ever have been offered; but who is to stem the tide of an inveterate tradition? Regarding the 'potential' presence of all things in Anaximander's Absolute, the *ἄπειρον*, I am curious to learn whether there is any historical evidence for the concept 'potentiality' before Aristotle. There is perhaps a hint of it in the Atomists (say Democritus), but nothing more. Will Dr. Bauch disclose the evidence for such a conception in the time of Anaximander? He may of course refer us to Zeller or Teichmüller, as he does repeatedly refer the reader to Zeller and Windelband; but in such matters one desires more than the say-so of any hand-book, however excellent. This is not the place to set forth my own interpretation; but I may add that I dissent emphatically both from Dr. Bauch and from Burnet in regard to the meaning of *ἀρχή* in early Greek thought. Such questions cannot be settled off-hand, either on the authority of hand-books or on the basis of a few passages. What we require, and have a right to demand, is that those who express opinions about the history of Greek thought shall have arrived at their conclusions by actual historical research.

I should be pleased if it were possible to express a more favorable opinion of the later chapters of Dr. Bauch's book. With his confident reliance upon the authority of Aristotle, one might expect from him a discriminating evaluation and a true definition of Aristotelian thought; but even there, as in relation to Plato, the author fails at important points. The value of the book, so far as it may be said to have any value, lies in its symptomatic character, that is to say, when regarded as a representative of a sufficiently large body of writings purporting to present the history of concepts or of periods of thought without evincing a due sense of the requirements of historical method. Will Germany continue and advance the work of Zeller, Diels, and Gomperz, or must we look elsewhere for leaders who shall not slavishly bow down the knee to any master?

W. A. HEIDEL.

Les principes de l'évolution sociale. Par DICRAN ASLANIAN. Second edition. Paris, F. Alcan, 1909.—pp. xxiv, 296.

M. Aslanian in this work undertakes the heroic task of presenting a complete account of human evolution in society 'from an entirely new point of view.' "Je crois avoir trouvé la solution du problème de l'évolution de l'humanité," he declares. Unfortunately it is difficult to agree with the author on this point, or indeed to find in his work any solution whatever of the greater questions of social evolution.

The book falls into two parts, an analysis and a synthesis. In the former M. Aslanian sets out to define and explain such terms as 'progress,' 'instinct,' 'imitativity,' 'homogeneity,' 'solidarity,' etc. As M. Aslanian often employs terms in rather unusual senses, the necessity for definition is evident. Briefly put, the argument is as follows. All social progress depends on 'solidarity' within social groups, solidarity being defined as "un sentiment de mutualité se déterminant librement, excluant toute limitation de responsabilité toute prescription, et formant des groupes d'un caractère permanent" (p. 70). M. Aslanian refuses to admit any essential differentiation between the various races except in respect of solidarity. Yet solidarity in its turn depends on 'homogeneity.' One would have thought that social progress involved heterogeneity—some form of differentiation—no less than homogeneity, but the author makes the sweeping statement, "A mesure que la similitude des individus par rapport à leurs aptitudes et leurs besoins diminue, la solidarité libre et spontanée fait place à la contrainte ou à la désagrégation" (p. 94). We are next told to distinguish 'solidarity' from 'social bonds' (*liens sociaux*), which are definite ways in which the former expresses itself. These, according to the author, are two in number. "Ainsi la religion et l'idée de race sont-elles les seules caractéristiques de l'intégration des groupes" (p. 107). Such a limitation, like many others in M. Aslanian's theory, seems extremely arbitrary. Are not customs, manners, language, affection for certain ideas, for a certain territory, etc., equally expressions of social unity?

The 'social bonds,' the author proceeds to point out, have a subjective character. What is implied is the idea of religious or racial superiority, and all integration of groups depends on such a sentiment of superiority. Accordingly, there are two types of community, based respectively on the principles of 'theism' and 'nationalism.' All such integration gives individuality to the group so integrated, and this individuality reveals itself as a standard or mode of living (*train de vie*). With a discussion of the *train de vie* the author concludes his analysis of social factors.

The succeeding synthesis is very loosely related to the analysis. In the latter, stress was laid on the element of 'subjective superiority,' which presumably involves and is developed by the opposition of group to group. Now we are told that, in the social evolution which we have to consider, *all* changes are in the last analysis the result of a struggle between man and nature (p. 168). We are also told that social solidarity is an adaptation to geographical conditions (p. 175), and the main thesis turns out to be that there is a permanent movement of migration towards hotter countries. At the same time heat breeds 'heterogeneity' and so centers of culture tend to move northward. Homogeneity is attained in the degree to which a people adapts itself to its territory. It involves the development of democracy or 'nationalism' while heterogeneity produces autocracy or 'theism.' "Partout où le régime social a été une monarchie absolue, la population a été hétérogène" (p. 201). A further determination of direction is that democracy or 'nationalism' begins in the towns and spreads to the country.

The arbitrary character of M. Aslanian's method is seen in this identification of 'theism' and absolutism, 'nationalism' and democracy. It will be seen that M. Aslanian is always ready to attempt generalizations, even at the expense of history. Take, for instance, the statement above mentioned, that "le régime délibératif a toujours débuté dans les villas." M. Aslanian, after his manner, generalizes from conspicuous instances, but government by discussion has not *always* begun in cities. Thus the Germany described by Tacitus (*Germania*, c. xi) had a very marked system of government by discussion, a very democratic system, but there were no cities in Germany. Many other instances might be quoted of M. Aslanian's loose treatment of history. For example, he attributes the modern extension of democracy to the transformation of the means of transport. Of course it is due to a far greater extent to the development of the idea and system of representation.

Having discussed the direction of evolution, M. Aslanian devotes a chapter to an account of its 'acceleration.' His peculiar style of reasoning is very marked in this chapter. Civilization begins in the hot countries and moves towards the colder regions—*therefore* the evolutionary movement slows down. But man is inventive, and inventivity accelerates the process of evolution. "Par conséquent, le ralentissement successif du mouvement évolutionniste est accompagné d'une accélération successive en raison du progrès" (p. 229).

M. Aslanian adds a chapter on 'aberrations' wherein he places

the facts which he finds opposed to his generalizations. His view of 'aberrations' may be gathered from his statement that while normally the centers of culture tend to move northwards there are 'partial or total aberrations' southward which *always* come to renew the evolutionary movement (p. 288).

On the whole this habit of facile generalization makes M. Aslanian's book, in spite of occasional acute observations, very bewildering and unscientific. History he uses seemingly to furnish illustrations rather than inductions; anthropology he neglects altogether: consequently the reasoning is formal and abstract. The following passage is a fair instance of M. Aslanian's manner. He is discussing 'inventivity,' and remarks, "*La multiplication indéfinie, des moyens de l'existence se trouve même en contradiction avec la réalité en ce sens que l'inventivité, comme un phénomène collectif, ne se propage et ne devient persistante que grâce à la solidarité. Par suite, elle présume de l'homogénéité, tandis que l'humanité dans son ensemble est constamment hétérogène. Si l'humanité n'était pas hétérogène il n'y aurait ni lutte, ni inventivité, ni progrès. Ainsi, l'humanité n'est pas une réalité au point de vue de l'inventivité et de la solidarité*" (p. 240).

There is a further source of confusion in this work. Philosophy is regarded by the author as nothing but a study of universal history. But he is constantly employing philosophical and especially metaphysical terms and giving them what seems to him their true (certainly a new) signification. To give one instance, he defines idealism as "*un système sociologique, dans lequel on attribue aux idées ou du moins à certaines idées une puissance active et où on les fait intervenir comme la cause efficiente de phénomènes collectifs*" (p. xix). I do not know what this means, but I am sure no idealist would recognize his theory as so defined. Nor do I see much need for M. Aslanian's attack on idealism so understood. Certainly this is not the way to find "the solution of the problem of human evolution."

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

How We Think. By JOHN DEWEY. Boston, C. D. Heath & Co., 1910.—pp. vi, 224.

This volume undertakes to adapt the results of the author's logical theories to the guidance of the teacher in dealing with the rapidly multiplying studies in the modern curriculum. As the preface states, the "book represents the conviction that the needed steadying and centralizing factor is found in adopting as the end of endeavor that attitude of mind, that habit of thought, which we call scientific." The volume states in a simple way the different problems of thinking, with their solutions, and then makes applications to concrete situations and discusses the sort of training the child must be given to cope with them successfully. The whole treatment is marked by an entire absence of formalism; in fact, its aim seems to be to rid the school work of routine and it advocates the use of any means that may be adequate to that end. Wherever schematisation is indulged in, there is always a final caution that the method suggested should not crush out spontaneity, the recognized source of all thinking in the vital sense.

Thinking always grows out of uncertainty. "Demand for the solution of a perplexity is the steadying and guiding factor in the entire process of reflection." The solution of the problem is in terms of suggestions from past experience and prior knowledge, and these, when they present themselves, must be confirmed by related knowledge or by test. All training of thought consists in subjecting the different methods of problem-solving to suitable conditions and rules. But training thought implies certain native powers or endowments. These are found in curiosity, suggestion, and orderliness. The first sets the problem, the second makes possible solutions, and the third is essential if the solutions offered are to be properly tested before they are accepted. These are seen to be dependent for their development upon the habits of teachers and others in the environment, upon the nature of the subjects studied, and current aims and ideals. The result of this training should be to develop habits of logical thinking. Logical thinking means not the observance of any set forms. These too often lead to routine that renders thought unnecessary. Rather the student must be led to the habits of reflection that are adequate for the subject and for the individual's stage of development. If this end is attained through any study, that subject will be disciplinary.

Five steps may be distinguished in every complete act of thought. The first is the occurrence of a difficulty; the second is the definition of the difficulty; the third, a suggestion; fourth, the elaboration of the idea; and fifth, the corroboration of the idea and the formation of a concluding belief. No rigid rules can be formulated for the development of the processes, but the trained mind

is the one that carries each step far enough to fulfil the conditions of the problem. It is pointed out that in this process there is a constant movement back and forth from observation to general principles and from general principles to observation. This represents the relative part played by induction and deduction in all thinking. Neither can stand in isolation if they are to be of value. Analysis and synthesis are correlative in very much the same way. Interesting applications and elucidations are given of judgment used in the author's well-known sense, and a chapter is devoted to a treatment of meanings and of the uses to which they are put in every-day life and particularly in education. Much practical advice is given in two chapters on "Concrete and Abstract Thinking" and "Empirical and Scientific Thinking."

In the preceding paragraphs the reviewer has been summarizing very briefly the first two parts of the volume, devoted respectively to the preliminary problems in connection with training thought, and to the more theoretical logical problems. The third and last part is devoted more particularly to the practical applications. The first four chapters of this part treat, in order, of activity, language, observation and information, and the recitation as means or instruments in training thought. A fifth chapter embodies the general conclusions. Each of the practical chapters insists that problem-solving be made central, no matter what material is used, whether in play or in manual training. Activities are of value only in so far as they give independence of thought, and this they will do if they grow out of a problem and are adapted to its solution. Observation must similarly have a definite end — must have a bearing upon a problem that is real at the moment. Information, too, is of value, or at least of most value, if given after it has been prepared for by showing the child its bearing upon some problem, seen to be pressing for solution. It is suggested in the chapter on the recitation that the five formal steps of Herbart may be replaced to advantage by the five stages in the act of thought. It is emphasized throughout, however, that these steps cannot be rigidly followed, that any fixed system takes the life out of a recitation, and that the steps should at the most be apparent to the teacher, not to the pupil. The essence of the recitation should be to make it grow out of a real problem, grow through thought to a definite solution, and that this solution should be made general and applied in a real way.

Much more might be said both of the logical theory at the basis of the discussion and of the applications that are made to education. The volume is full of varied suggestions on both topics, but this may suffice to give an idea of the aim of the book and of the way in which its aim is attained. Suffice it to say that in both particulars it will well repay reading whether by the expert or the novice. It at once gives a concise summary of the author's logical theories, and constitutes a fascinating practical treatise on the art of teaching. It is to be welcomed as the first attempt to apply the modern logic, and as a discussion of educational aims and methods from a new point of view. In the opinion of the reviewer it is highly successful in each of its undertakings.

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Three Philosophical Poets: Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe. By GEORGE SANTAYANA. Cambridge, Harvard University, 1910.—pp. vi, 215.

This volume, the first in the series of *Harvard Studies in Comparative Literature*, contains the substance of six lectures which were delivered by Professor Santayana a year ago at Columbia University, and later at the University of Wisconsin, but which trace their origin to one of the regular courses in Harvard University. The circumstances of its growth may explain, if not excuse, an occasional lapse from the purity and elevation of style that one might look for in the opening number of such a series,—as when the author (p. 12) *broaches an idea by which he sets some store*—‘that poetry is essentially short-winded’; or when he speaks (p. 50) of Lucretius, with his usual ‘smack of reality,’ ‘painting death to the life,’ and of the ‘brave arguments’ which Lucretius offers us if we ‘still fear death instinctively, like a stuck pig’; or when he says (p. 140) that the *thought* of Goethe, who ‘was the wisest of mankind,’ ‘voiced the genius and learning of his age.’

We also wonder a little at the kind of apology which we read in the Preface of a work that is to usher in a scholarly series. Though the phrase ‘comparative literature’ has no precise meaning, and does not seem to be good English (as *littérature comparée* may be good French), such a title nevertheless would lead us to expect a form of literary criticism based upon the method of observation and comparison of details both small and great which has been followed by every critic of importance from Aristotle and Longinus to Sainte Beuve. Professor Santayana, however, calls himself ‘an amateur,’ disclaims the function of a learned investigator, and indeed seems to imply that scholarship and pedantry are the same thing—an amateurish but often ruinous mistake. When one is familiar with the writings of Munro and Bailey, for example, on Lucretius, it is painful to be told that an American book dealing with this poet ‘is no learned investigation,’ but ‘only a piece of literary criticism’—as if literary criticism could be founded upon something short of a first-hand knowledge.

As a matter of fact, however, Professor Santayana’s obligation to scholarship, for instance in the case of Dante, is not inconsiderable, or without discrimination. And his exposition of all three poets is more luminous than would be possible had he not turned to account the ‘facts’ and ‘hypotheses about these men’ which are ‘at hand in their familiar works, or in well-known commentaries upon them.’ He is, to tell the truth, more successful as an interpreter than as a critic, yielding himself up in turn to each of his chosen authors, until the students who attended his attractive lectures must have been successively convinced that each of these poets ‘was the wisest of mankind.’

As a critic, since he recognizes no permanent and decisive standards (p. 203), and has been willing not to carry his private researches to the point of making himself ‘a specialist in the study of Lucretius,’ or ‘a Dante scholar,’ or ‘a Goethe scholar,’ he is less convincing. ‘Tis a noble Lepidus, who loves Goethe as the Jupiter of men, yet he loves Dante, too, and finally leaves us with a hazy notion that he has an instinctive, though no rational, preference for the

Arabian bird of the Divine Comedy. To mention but one promising avenue of research, it might be that a systematic inquiry into Goethe's Neoplatonism, and his affinity in classical literature for Euripides rather than Sophocles,¹ would stamp him as an Alexandrian rather than the exponent of the loftiest Hellenism which so many Germans take him to be. Such a procedure might enable us to place him rightly in that scale of better and worse which the sentiment of humanity is bound to demand of the critic, and which the regulated impulse of the true critic is bound to furnish. Professor Santayana has a number of suggestive remarks upon the subject of Goethe's demonology, which is Neoplatonic; but Professor Goebel's study in *The Journal of English and Germanic Philology* (8:1 ff.) is more to the point.

I am convinced that the class of students for which these lectures were designed is more in need of clear distinctions and rational standards of judgment than of anything else which a teacher can directly impart; that the late Arthur John Butler, a specialist on the subject of Dante, but a universal scholar and a writer of well-nigh infallible taste, was justified in affirming of the *Divine Comedy*: "It is not too much to say that there is no one work of human genius which can equal it as an instrument of education, intellectual and moral;" and that, in spite of many fascinating passages by Professor Santayana in all of his lectures (such as that on the *Vita Nuova* in the middle of page 92), it is desirable to refer an immature reader to other essays upon the three poets here considered, in order that there may be no doubt in such a reader's mind as to the essential superiority of the great mediæval Christian poet over the melancholy bard of Rome, or the belated pagan of Germany. From the mass of interpretative literature, one may venture to single out the Introduction to the rendering of Lucretius by Cyril Bailey; the appreciation of Dante by Dean Church; and the remarkable essay on "Goethe and his Influence" by Richard Holt Hutton.

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CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

Lucretius on the Nature of Things. Translated by CYRIL BAILEY. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1910. — pp. 312.

This volume belongs in a series to which important contributions have already been made—for example, a translation of Hesiod by A. W. Mair, and one of Dante's *Convivio* by W. W. Jackson.

If every generation must have its own rendering of ancient classical masterpieces into the vernacular—and the wisest of modern scholars give their sanction to this form of popularization — it is odd that the poem of Lucretius should so long await a successor to the noble but uneven translation by Munro. Since the period of his labors, not only has our understanding of the original

¹ See the references in Goethe's *Gespräche* (e. g., *Gespräche*, ed. von Biedermann, 8:114); if these references show a theoretical preference for Sophocles, we must nevertheless remember that Goethe actually translated and imitated Euripides to a much greater extent.

been advanced by means of investigations into the philosophy of Epicurus; but, partly under the influence of Matthew Arnold's essay "On Translating Homer," and more through the example set by editors like Jebb and Butcher, the whole art of translation into English has attained to a new kind of perfection. Mr. Bailey approaches his task, then, with an unusual opportunity; and he brings to it unusual qualifications. He has the advantage of the tradition of Munro, upon which he builds; of his own edition of the Latin text (1898), with a dozen years of reflection for the improvement of some of its readings; and, doubtless, of the inspiration of Oxford, and Balliol College, and the informing genius of one of the most distinguished translators of all, the immortal Jowett.

Munro, thinks Mr. Bailey, "finally set the tone or color which Lucretius in English must assume"; "yet he did not always keep it;" so that "phrases and even passages of sheer prose give the reader the idea that Lucretius's muse allowed him only a fitful inspiration." But to the present writer the most serious flaw in Munro is the attempt to reproduce certain stylistic effects in the Latin by a departure from the normal arrangement of the English sentence. As for the supposedly arid tracts in Lucretius, or in any version of him, the average reader, who prefers gliding, or rushing, to meditation, will always find them, just as Byron and Shelley found them in *The Excursion* of Wordsworth—although no two slipshod readers may agree to call the same passage a desert or an oasis. At the same time, the translation of Mr. Bailey has an advantage over that of Munro in the distinction of the wording, and, on the whole, is more readable, though the anxious effort to secure a poetical quality through the vigor and concreteness of individual terms may have entailed some loss in the flow of the style. Munro worked fearlessly, having a natural command of pure English. In the volume before us we may note an occasional blemish, as 'this much,' p. 81, for *thus much* ('that much' seems not to be an Americanism, after all), 'voicing,' p. 7, for *uttering*, and 'the reason is not . . . far to seek,' p. 7, a formula that has served long and ill in the *New York Nation*.

The Notes (pp. 280-312) are painstaking and condensed. They offer a great deal of information which no student of Lucretius, whether a specialist or not, will fail to welcome. The Introduction is admirable in its kind. Two passages will illustrate its qualities of breadth and insight, both describing Lucretius.

"A fierce hatred of conventional superstitions and a yearning for intellectual liberty coupled with a sense of awe—deeply religious in reality—in the presence of nature, a strong desire for scientific method and accuracy of observation combined with a profound feeling of the beauty of the world and its works, an unswerving consciousness of natural law and the sequence of cause and effect counteracted by an equal stubbornness in defence of man's moral freedom—these are qualities which may engage attention, but cannot at all times awaken a vital sympathy. Yet these are antitheses familiar enough to our generation, and this is an attitude of mind which we are peculiarly qualified to understand" (p. 5).

"A keen active mind, eager in its pursuit of truth and not shrinking from hard thought in the attainment of its end, or from intellectual labor in the attempt to present it to others; and a profound poetic sensitiveness, alive at once to the greatness and the beauty of nature, and instinct with the feeling for accuracy in expression and the consciousness of the revealing power of language in its 'sudden flashes'—these are characteristics which strike one at once. And the closer study of the poem seems to disclose another feature almost equally marked. Whether or no we accept the legend of the love-philtre and the idea of insanity, we cannot refuse the testimony of the poem itself to an abnormal and even morbid strain in its author's character. The fierceness of the unceasing attack on the religious point of view—even on its shadow in a teleological interpretation of nature; the unnatural virulence of the onslaught on love; the almost brooding pessimism with which he anticipates the coming destruction of the world; such are the signs which lead one to think of Lucretius as a not quite normal personality—perhaps even not quite sane" (pp. 9 f.).

LANE COOPER.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

The Classical Moralists. Selections Illustrating Ethics from Socrates to Martineau. Compiled by BENJAMIN RAND. Boston, New York, and Chicago, Houghton Mifflin Company.—pp. xix, 797.

Wherever, for one reason or another, the original sources are not accessible, a book like this may be used to some advantage, in connection with a course of study on the history of ethics, for purposes of illustration. A wooden leg is better than no leg at all, and it is well that one should gain even a slight acquaintance with an author's work in tracing the development of ethical thought. It must not be forgotten, however, that a collection of selections is more or less of a makeshift, an imperfect substitute for something better, made necessary by the absence of proper library facilities. But, above all, users of such a volume as this should beware of falling into the error of the present compiler that it is "virtually a history of ethics" and that "the evolution of ethical thought is thereby revealed, stripped of its controversial material, from Socrates to Martineau." A book of documents is never a history, least of all a collection of selections from documents. A collection of fragments of men's thoughts upon ethical problems may serve as *illustrative* material, but it is no more a history of the development of ethics than the perception of an external world is natural science. Moreover, only a student who already possesses some knowledge of the history of ethics and the history of philosophy can make the proper use of the original sources from Socrates to Martineau; and it is not to be supposed that a beginner will succeed in getting a faithful picture of the evolution of Greek ethical thought by reading nineteen pages of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, thirty-two pages of Plato's *Republic*, thirty-eight pages of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, twenty-eight pages of Diogenes Laertius (in Yonge's translation!), and so on through Plo-

tinus. Nine pages of St. Augustine, five of Abelard, and thirteen of Thomas Aquinas will hardly give him an insight into the development of ethical theory in the Middle Ages! And the student would indeed be a prodigy who could get a clear and adequate conception of Kant's system by studying twenty-five pages of the *Grundlage zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (and ignoring the *Critique of Practical Reason*); or of Fichte's, by poring over twenty pages of Kroeger's translation of his *System of Ethics*; or of Hegel's, by struggling through twenty-four pages of that most difficult work, the *Philosophy of Right*. A person deceives himself who thinks he can acquire a knowledge of Schopenhauer's ethics by taking up fourteen pages of the *World as Will and Idea* (and ignoring *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*), or of Spencer's theory by limiting himself to the extracts from the two chapters of the *Data of Ethics* offered by Dr. Rand.

But there is no need of multiplying examples. No one can hope to learn the history of ethics from this book, though parts of it may be used by a judicious teacher for illustrative purposes in a course on the development of ethical theory.

FRANK THILLY.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

The Dualism of Fact and Idea in Its Social Implications. By ERNEST LYNN TALBERT. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1910.—pp. 52.

This monograph is Number 2 of the *Philosophic Studies* issued under the supervision of the department of philosophy of the University of Chicago. Its aim the author has summarized in the following seven points: "1. To state the general method of solving a definite problem as defined by that type of logical theory for which thought is practical, constructive, and purposive. 2. To suggest philosophical and social implications of the dualism of 'fact' and 'idea' within a problem. The implications are that emphasis of the 'fact' is the philosophical attitude of empiricism, and the social attitude of the 'occupation'; the emphasis of the idea is the philosophical attitude of rationalism, the social attitude of the 'profession.' 3. To show how the features of logical method and the corollaries of theoretical and practical attitudes serve to explain and to criticize the standpoints of Hegel and Karl Marx. Hegel is regarded as a rationalist, an idealiser of the 'profession,' and the established; Karl Marx adopts the general rationalistic framework, but uses it to denounce the 'profession' and the conventional, and to support the supremacy of the 'occupation.' At the same time he seeks to incorporate the empirical into his system and incurs the logical difficulty of fixating the 'fact.' 4. To illustrate the failure of the Marxian logical formulas in the light of succeeding events. 5. To describe the change in theory and practice resulting thereby. 6. To indicate the possibilities of the constructive attitude applied to some present social problems, by outlining factors in the situations producing them, and the means adopted for their solution. 7. To relate the constructive logical method to the theory of democracy" (p. 9). This seven-fold aim is carried out in seven chapters.

The author frankly states that the logical method that he has in mind throughout his discussion is the method presented in the opening chapters of *Studies in Logical Theory*. Consequently, to one holding another view of logical method, much of the significance of the discussion is lost. The monograph, however, is suggestive in its general purpose, namely, to interpret the logical attitude underlying important social problems. This purpose might have been more clearly set forth, and the continuity of the discussion thereby improved, had the author paused at times to point out to his reader the implications of his results.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE.

Erkenntnistheorie und Naturwissenschaft. Von OSWALD KÜLPE. Leipzig, S. Hirzel, 1910.—pp. 47.

The present discussion was delivered before the Königsberg meeting of the *Deutscher Naturforscher und Ärzte*, September 19, 1910. The writer takes advantage of the occasion to call attention to the great service performed by the famous Königsberg philosopher in effecting a reconciliation between epistemology and the pure sciences. But he also points out that Kant, being interested primarily in *a priori* problems, largely neglected the empirical or natural sciences and devoted himself to the pure sciences of mathematics and mechanics. Since Kant's day, it is true, this deficiency has been partially supplied, as is evident in the development of epistemological theory during the nineteenth century. But even yet the presuppositions of the sciences of experience (*Erfahrungswissenschaften*) have not been thoroughly worked out. This is the most pressing task of contemporary theory. To emphasize some of the problems incident to such a task is the remoter aim of the present discussion (p. 8).

The writer narrows the scope of his undertaking in the following way. Broadly, the epistemological problem of reality may be formulated under the following four questions: Is a positing (*Setzung*) of real objects permissible? How is the positing of real objects possible? Is a determination (*Bestimmung*) of real objects permissible? How is a determination of real objects possible? A full discussion of these questions would yield an epistemology based upon material hitherto almost wholly neglected and would afford the best chance for an understanding between philosophy and the particular sciences. Professor Külpe limits himself to a discussion of the second and fourth questions, in so far as they are related to natural science.

The details of the discussion we may omit. The important lesson which Professor Külpe inculcates is that the time has come when a theory of knowledge must be worked out in close and vital contact with the facts of experience, the objective order of things (p. 12). This is the lesson that both Kant and Hegel have taught us, though it sometimes seems that we are long in learning it. Whether the theory that meets this requirement should be designated scientific Realism rather than concrete Idealism is perhaps a debatable ques-

tion. It is unquestionably true that Idealism, which can find no way out of its empty and impotent universals to the objects of natural science, has overleaped itself and fallen on the other side (pp. 38-39). But it is not so certain that Idealism necessarily finds itself in this predicament.

G. WATTS CUNNINGHAM.

MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE.

Der junge de Spinoza. Leben und Werdegang im Lichte der Weltphilosophie.

Von STANILAUS VON DUNIN-BORKOWSKI. Münster in Westfalen, Aschen-dorfsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1910.—pp. xxiii, 633.

The subtitle of this work furnishes an indication of the method adopted by the author in the treatment of his subject. This method is described by him as the philosophic-constructive and historic-constructive method, and consists in an attempt to determine Spinoza's development by a reconstruction of the various movements, tendencies, *Strömungen*, which intermingled in the spiritual life of the period and determined its character. Hence the author discusses in considerable detail the influences originating from cabalistic teachings, from the Talmud, from Arabic sources, and from the naturalism of the times; also Spinoza's relations to scepticism, to Cartesianism, to Christian mysticism, and to scholasticism. In other words, the purpose of the author is not merely to furnish a biography of Spinoza's earlier years, but to produce a picture of the *Weltphilosophie* of the times, a picture in which the figure of Spinoza constitutes the focus where the divergent forces meet and interact.

The author makes no claim to revolutionary discoveries. Such discoveries are unnecessary to justify a book which gives us a more intimate insight into the development of Spinoza than any other previously published. In a work of this kind it is to be expected that many resemblances should appear between Spinoza's philosophy and earlier thought, resemblances which may tempt the reader to resolve Spinoza into his antecedents. In matters of this kind, however, the author has been commendably circumspect and conservative, and he takes issue with certain attempts, *e. g.*, that of Freudenthal, to overemphasize the dependence of Spinoza upon his predecessors.

In many respects this seems to be a notable book, a book which students of Spinoza cannot afford to neglect. The author is free from apparent bias, avoids unnecessary polemics, and combines scholarly treatment with lucidity of exposition. Moreover, he brings to his task an erudition which is almost appalling. The notes to the book consist of an appendix, largely *Belegstellen*, including about a hundred closely printed pages. This disposition of the notes leaves the presentation unencumbered and is an excellent feature of the book. The book is provided with an extensive index and contains about twenty portraits and facsimiles of manuscripts.

B. H. BODE.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

The Basis of Musical Pleasure, together with a Consideration of the Opera Problem and the Expression of Emotions in Music. By ALBERT GEHRING. New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1910.—pp. 196.

It is an agreeable task to commend a book so indubitably worth while as is Mr. Gehring's study of the *Basis of Musical Pleasure*. Musical æsthetics is perhaps the cloudiest region of a cloudy province, and most treatises on the subject appear to be framed in a thoroughly nebulous state of mind. Mr. Gehring, in contrast, brings to this region a real power of illumination; a faculty of analysis which enables him to separate out its problems, and a sense of proportion which enables him to direct attention to the really salient issues. This in itself is a service to sound thinking, and a service fully justifying the book.

The volume contains three essays. The title essay, or perhaps treatise, deals, in six chapters, with Tone, Form, Association, Symbolisation, and what the author terms "Tonal and Mental Parallelism." To it are affixed several interesting analytical appendices. "The Opera Problem" and "The Expression of Emotions in Music" are the titles of the two other essays, the latter of which is reprinted from this REVIEW.

The essay on the "Opera Problem" is perhaps the best example of the virtues which characterize the book as a whole. It is a strikingly clear analysis of the conflict of ideals—musical and poetic—which critics generally seem to find in this form of art. Mr. Gehring summarizes "the various conflicts and problems of the opera, as they obstruct the realization of the perfect artwork of the future," as follows: "First, there is the conflict between naturalness and dramatic singing; second, between formally beautiful and expressive music; third, between the words and the tones with which they are invested; fourth, between music and action; and fifth, between the various sensual and mental faculties" (p. 162). It is obvious that here we have a statement of issues rather than a conclusion, and it is precisely in statements of issues that the book excels; it invites thought rather than agreement or antagonism.

The author does, however, approach a conclusion in "the highest excellence seems to belong to music and drama in isolation. Combine them, and you pair off two hostile sets of demands" (p. 168). Here we have again the recurrent misconception—as the reviewer deems it—that opera is to be condemned because it is neither pure symphony nor pure poetic drama: a "morganatic union" of the two, Hanslick calls it; while even so stout a defender as Ernest Newman regards opera as but a half-way station to the symphonic poem, where you can "imagine the occasion of it all" in place of having this occasion staged before you. The whole criticism of musical æstheticians is that opera is not pure music and therefore (*non sequitur*) represents no *genre*. As a matter of fact, drama of any sort involves compromises which may be less difficult, but which are no less patent, than those of opera. Yet nobody disputes the legitimacy of the dramatic *genre* as an art-form. And Hanslick, when he concedes that 'our imagination is easily reconciled to the illusion' of the unnaturalness of singing dramatic words (in which he is

followed by Gehring, p. 149), essentially concedes the legitimacy of the opera as a self-sufficient art-form. The point with regard to opera is not that it is a bastard form, but that it is a difficult one.

In the essay on the "Expression of Emotions in Music" the author believes, as he states in his preface, that he "has solved a controversy which for half a century has vexed the thoughts and stirred the passions of musical theorists." To the reviewer's mind it seems a rare optimism that can hope to solve a controversial problem in the field of æsthetics, if solution mean the quieting of the controversy; nor in this case can the reviewer justify the optimism. Mr. Gehring has, it is true, performed a neat piece of lexicography in the analysis he gives of the ambiguous uses of the term "expressions" as applied to music. These uses are, to quote his equivalents, (1) "direct embodiment, representation, or denotation"; (2) "indirect embodiment, or connotation"; (3) "parallelism, contagion, or sympathetic arousal." To use more ordinary terms, the three uses are, first, imitation, as of things or events, second, expression of the composer's character or attainment, and third, expression of mood or emotion. There is no question of the unforgivable confusions of these meanings, and Mr. Gehring has done well to show them forth in detail. But clearing up ambiguities is not usually the end of discussion.

In fact, the reviewer believes that Mr. Gehring has already opened the road to new and not unfruitful discussion in the analysis of his third factor, "parallelism"—more especially as it is presented in the title essay, Chapters IV, V, and VI. Here, if anywhere, we have the kernel of the author's theory of the "basis of musical pleasure." I say "if anywhere," because there is an exasperating tentativeness in the expression of opinion in the book which makes it impossible to assign to the author any opinion without reservation. This is due apparently not to any absence of conviction, nor to any modesty in expressing it, but to a conscious assumption of the hypothetic mode, affecting one as something short of ingenuous. The net result is that the author is difficult to quote without misquoting.

Assuming this risk, we may outline what seems to be Mr. Gehring's original contribution to musical æsthetics. In effect it is an extension of the notion of Schopenhauer and others that music expresses or symbolizes the processes of volition—gives "the illusion and the exaltation of the triumphant will," as Dr. Puffer-Howes puts it. But with our author not the will only but "the mental flow in its entirety" is paralleled by musical expression. "Paralleled" rather than "symbolized"; for, he says, "symbolization is a kind of delineation. The tones imitate certain human or natural phenomena . . . ; and the mind recognizes them as such or at least tends to do so. In the case of parallelism, on the other hand, we can hardly speak of imitation, but rather of agreement. The tones harmonize with the operations of the mind, a relation which is not supposed to become an object of cognition" (p. 94). The distinction here made does not seem to be of much importance; for the meat of the theory lies in the fact of "parallelism," which becomes "symbolic" the moment that it is recognized.

The question of fact is discussed in a serial analysis of elements of agreement between music and the mental flow. The temporal analogies of succession and simultaneity,—the “network of themes and voices” in music being compared with the “spectrum of thoughts and feelings”; analogies of intensity; analogies of tempo (“some people’s thoughts progress at a heavy largo rate, others trip along in merry allegros”); analogies of measure, with our “subconscious” organic sensations especially; of melody, timbre, harmony, counterpoint,—all these and others are worked out at some pains and with very unequal success. Some of the analogies are obvious while others seem fantastic or remote. In the case of melody the analogical scheme has to be abandoned altogether: here, “May not the mental phenomenon and the musical counterpart melt together?” Melody does not photograph the mind; it coincides with it (p. 98). But if this be true of simple melodies, what are we to think of the analogical function of counterpoint, which “answers to the coexistence of parallel trains of thought or feeling”? The presence of melody in the contrapuntal effect destroys the analogy,—which, indeed, resolves into a mesh of contradiction.

Mr. Gehring’s theory is at its best when it is most general. The essence of musical charm is “facilitation of perception” (p. 109). “Musical progressions . . . gain a certain beauty through their agreement with the operations of the mind. The sounds, as they succeed one another, not only do not oppose the development of thought, but even assist it, drawing the thoughts forth as with magnetic force. . . . Ordinary experience is a struggle for existence, in which perceptions clash with great loss of vitality. Musical experience is an elysium with harmony and coöperation reigning supreme” (p. 111).

Here at all events is a new version of the musical *katharsis*. With Hauptmann music was an exemplification of Hegel’s dialectical Idea; with Schopenhauer it was the objectification of the striving Will; with many another theorist it has been the sensuizing of Emotion. Gehring, in one inclusive advance, makes it the parallel of Idea, Will, and Emotion in one Experience.

H. B. ALEXANDER.

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA.

The following books also have been received:

The Mediæval Mind. By HENRY OSBORN TAYLOR. Two volumes. London, Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1911.—pp. xv, 613; viii, 589.

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- Schopenhauer.* Par TH. RUYSSSEN. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. xii, 396. 7.50 fr.
- La nouvelle psychologie animale.* Par GEORGES BOHN. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. ii, 200. 2.50 fr.
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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scholastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*, I. Abtl.: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

La logique de l'action. J. M. BALDWIN. *Rev. de Mét.*, XVIII, 6, pp. 776-794.

Interest is the fundamental organizing factor in the life of action and of appreciation. Interests are at once the results and the representations of the organization of affective and conative tendencies. The generality of the factor of interest is conditioned by its lack of a common objective reference and its consequent limitation to the conformity of the acts and tendencies of a single person with the general type. This affective generalization is teleological in character, but it has not the determinateness or the fixity of cognitive generalization. Corresponding to a similar distinction in the cognitive realm, we note in affective generalization a distinction between mere customary, 'syndoxical' conformity and real, 'synnomical' agreement or practical universality. While conformity in the cognitive sphere is attained by means of the logical principles of limitation, exhaustion, etc., it is secured in the practical sphere through the transference by ejection of 'blocks' of interest. This process of affective conversion is verified by the substantial realization of our expectations in regard to one another's actions. That this sort of conformity is 'syndoxical' rather than 'synnomical' is made manifest by its opposite, non-conformity in the practical life, which arises, not so much through ignorance or lack of conscientiousness, as through the inner organization of interest on the part of different individuals. We thus see that personal coherence or conformity may, to a great extent, demand social non-conformity. As opposed to the distinctions, limitations, etc., of logical inference, affective assertion and negation are immediate, active, and appreciative reactions. The chief difference between cognitive and affective generalization rests upon community of interest or action. Since this community is limited to the organization of the individual's interests and since he can only transfer his own feelings and interests to others by a process of interpretation, we have not yet discovered the 'synnomical' element which

gives normative force to the general principles of individual conduct. This task remains over for a later article in the present series.

J. R. TUTTLE.

Schopenhauer's Type of Idealism. WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER. *Monist*, XXI, I, pp. 1-18.

Idealism says that objects do not exist outside our minds, that our own bodies exist only in our own minds or in the mind of someone else. To Schopenhauer this view seems simply a matter of clear thinking. Furthermore, no definite line, he says, can be drawn between life and dreams. The world of perception, to use a Hindu expression, is a "veil of Maja" (that is, illusion). But this language is literary and emotional, and must be taken with circumspection. Elsewhere Schopenhauer argues that, if the world were only a dream, it would not be worthy of our serious attention. His conception of the world as ultimately *will* implies that objects are not merely complexes of sensation, but have an inner being of a quite different character. And he also says that a perceived object must have some manner of existence in itself, else we should have absolute idealism ending in solipsism, and the theoretic egoist is a fit subject for a madhouse. The empirical character and the unfathomability of the world are evidence that it is more than phenomenon. Ueberweg, Volkelt, and others assert that Schopenhauer contradicts himself. "No object without a subject," he first affirms; and then, "There are things independent of a subject." The apparent inconsistency, however, is due to a double use of the term "object." When he says, "No object without a subject," he means no object that is distinct. In this sense he chides Kant for speaking of things-in-themselves as "objects." The desk, the stars, as groups of sensible qualities would not exist if not perceived. But something lying back of these qualities may exist independently of the perceiving subject. Our world of phenomena may be a dream and have no self-existence, but it is a dream that means something, and *that* is not a dream. An idealist then as to the world of our knowledge; but a realist in the sense of holding to a sphere of existence beyond the bounds of positive knowledge—that is what Schopenhauer seems to be.

J. REESE LIN.

The Idea of Feeling in Rousseau's Religious Philosophy. A. C. ARMSTRONG. *Ar. f. G. Ph.*, XXIV, 2, pp. 242-260.

Sentimental deism is the established form of Rousseau's religious philosophy. His is the religion of the inner light, founded on the *sentiment interieur*. The advent of the new religion of feeling was announced by the religious experience of Julie in the *Nouvelle Heloise*; the fourth part of *Emile* gave sentimental deism its classical expression; and the eighth chapter of the fourth book added the principle of the *religion civile*. Inward conviction is worthy of authority because the self is a judging, active being. Diverging from the free-thinkers, Rousseau denied the Helvetian identification of judgment and sensation, and

refused that doctrine as materialistic. The competence of philosophy to decide ultimate questions is denied because its answers conflict. Yet Rousseau mixes much philosophy with the appeal to sentiment. Man forms a unity in his religious functioning as well as in his non-religious life. Theories of the world and the demands of the heart inevitably interact. Nevertheless the final decision is not made by the intellect. The ultimate test is always the inward experience. The primary characteristic of the inner feeling is its subjectivity. This is both individual and inward. In matters of faith the individual attitude is always inculcated, except in the doctrine of the *religion civile* where Rousseau fixes a minimum of belief as necessary for the preservation of the state. Ideas come from without; sentiments, the final arbiters of belief, spring up within the soul. The disjunction between these is not complete, yet sentiments have the title to authority because they primarily refer to self. Moreover, they give subjective certainty, to which Rousseau attaches much importance. The operations of the discursive reason are prolonged and their issue doubtful, while the revelations of the inner light are direct and their issue clear. The inner light, however, applied in specific ways, contains definite cognitive elements, inner sentiment being equivalent to self-conscious awareness of the facts of mental life. Expositors of Rousseau often overlook the fact that as his deism advanced to its final stage, the inner sentiment became an appreciation of values. In contrast to many other writers Rousseau applies the criterion of worth directly to religious questions. Much more than Kant and the post-Kantians he makes the religious factor substantive and of inherent interest. Faith is the groundwork of morals; religion supports conduct. But there are motives to religious practice other than the purely moral motive, and it is possible for moral theology to sacrifice elements which religion cannot properly leave out.

J. REESE LIN.

Dépersonnalisation et émotion. L. DUGAS et F. MOUTIER. Rev. Ph., XXXV, II, pp. 441-460.

Depersonalization is an intellectual trouble, frequently the reaction from a strong emotion, which passes over into a moral debility. From observation of many cases, Janet concluded that strong emotion often has a dissolving effect on the mind, lessening the power of synthesis, inhibiting attention and will, and causing a feeling of unreality. The most acute form of depersonalization consists in being unable to experience emotion. Alexandrine, a typical subject, lamented her lack of love for her husband and children, and finally marveled at her indifference to her own condition. Sometimes a violent emotion raises the level of consciousness, instead of lowering it, and so breaks up this indifference. Both the malady and the recovery have species and degrees. The inability to participate in certain mental states may be because those states impose on the subject too great an effort of attention, of mental synthesis, and, on the contrary, because they do not arouse sufficient interest to hold the attention. The subject is often apathetic toward other things, but

takes strong interest in her malady. The emotional paralysis is sometimes due to autosuggestion. A sudden emotion causes the patient to forget that she cannot feel, and she is cured. The loss of the emotional tone peculiar to a man causes him to feel depersonalized. The subject madly seeks the emotion which he no longer experiences, hoping that, if he can recover that particular one, he will recover with it the sense of reality which he has lost. We distinguish the constitutional cases in which emotion is always below the normal level from the case in which a shock temporarily lowers the level. In the one, called *impersonalization*, the subject does not identify as his own the emotions he feels; in the other, which is *depersonalization*, only the warmth and color of the emotions is lost. Impersonalization brings no feeling of strangeness; depersonalization does. In the latter we find three elements: (1) the emotion which determines the crisis, (2) the absence of emotion which marks the state, and (3) the sense of strangeness which arises. The evidence shows that the emotions are on the same footing with the other psychic states. The subject attends without distinction to his emotions, his perceptions, and his memories, wondering why he experiences them. The malady is the rupture of the bond which attaches consciousness of self to the mental states of the subject.

J. REESE LIN.

The Psychological Explanation of the Development of the Perception of External Objects (II.). H. W. B. JOSEPH. *Mind*, No. 76, pp. 457-469.

This article is a criticism of the second part of Professor Stout's account of the genesis of the perception of external objects, this part dealing with the external reality of objects. Statement of Professor Stout's position: The recognition of the external reality of object arises from (1) motor adaptations, (2) projection of the self. (1) The particular motor adaptations concerned are those voluntary activities by which we bring into the field of consciousness sense-presentations which as to their own character are independent of us. For instance, we can open or close our eyes and thereby see or refuse to see the house and trees about us, but having opened our eyes and directed them to a particular point we have no power over what shall be the substance of our visual perceptions. This contrast of what I can and cannot do in the case of motor adaptation supplies an experiential element to attribute to external reality. (2) But the idea of the something to which this element is attributed is gained through the projection of the self. The not-self is constructed on the analogy of the self in this wise: we see and at the same time feel as our own the movements of our body. So when we see other similar movements which we do not feel to be ours, we assign them to some other self. Criticism: (1) If we suppose, as is desired, a being who knows nothing but a succession of conscious states, he would not arrive at a knowledge of externality through the sequence of not-self-initiated presentations upon self-initiated ones. The only inference conceivable on the part of such a being would be that some power like Berkeley's God forced upon us certain sensations while we ourselves brought about the others. (2) The discussion of the projection of the self

implies a knowledge of the relation of his mind and body on the part of the subject, which was, by hypothesis, excluded. The subject's body has been mysteriously transferred in the argument from a relation to the subject similar to that of other presented objects to a particularly intimate and well-understood relation to the self. If you start with separate sense-presentations and them alone, you must, like Hume, always keep to them and their combinations. The fundamental fallacy in such an explanation of the consciousness of externality is that it takes for granted a primary human consciousness of sense-presentations as distinct from things presented.

KATHERINE EVERETT.

Hellenistic Philosophy. GILBERT MURRAY. *Hibbert Journal*, IX, 1, pp. 15-36.

The decadence of the traditional Greek religion might seem at first sight to have left a clear field for the propagation of a new and vigorous philosophy. But a hankering after the old superstitions remained and vitiated the new intellectual growth. Thus, when chance or fate supplanted the Olympian gods and goddesses as the ultimate source of human weal or woe, these too before long became persons and divinities. Men fell to worshipping and placating Fortuna. This is what happened to the religion of those who, when the Olympian system fell, rejected all belief in gods. But on the other hand, there was at this period a two-fold constructive attitude toward religion: first, a worship of the heavenly bodies, and second, a recognition of the divine element in man. From wonder at the orderly movements of sun, moon, and planets, the Greeks passed to an adoration of them as divinities. But this worship became anthropomorphic. Not the sun, but Mithra; not the planet Mercury, but the spirit Hermes, was god. Such a religion readily assimilated the allegory and mysticism of the astrology of Eastern religions; by its aid men were taught how to escape the malignant influence of the planets, through mystic union with a god who lives in a region beyond the sun. But in the other phase of their religious thought, these Greeks found God in the divine element in man. In some men this divine element seemed to loom large. The cruder minds hailed their conquerors, their kings, and prosperous men as gods who controlled the fortunes of men and were to be worshipped. But the more thoughtful people sought a god in a man who ministered to the higher nature, who initiated them into the mystic rites, or in some way helped them spiritually. The essential characteristic of this whole Hellenistic spirit was allegorical interpretation. The world, they were sure, must be other and better than it seemed. Thus, often by a sickly artificiality and by symbolism, did they build up in a decaying age an idealistic interpretation of the world.

KATHERINE EVERETT.

La matière du devoir. ADRIEN NAVILLE. *Rev. Ph.*, XXXII, pp. 113-127.

The excellence of S. S. Laurie's book, *Ethics, or the Ethic of Reason*, lies in his attempt to provide duly in a system of morality for both reason and feeling,

for the truths of rationalism and of hedonism. But in spite of his liberal intention his system is too narrow. He admits as moral only the rational feelings, the feelings that indicate organization and harmony in the inner being. A perfectly fair view of morality would not neglect the true value in the pleasures of sense and in egoistic pleasures of every sort; but, on the other hand, it would insist that there is an end distinct from pleasure,—truth. There are two kinds of truth, the truth of scientific laws and facts, and the truth of value. Scientific truth, the satisfaction of pure intellectual curiosity, is an absolute end for the moral being, binding whether it bring pleasure or grief. The truth of value is the organization of goods on rational principles. Feeling, through its experience of pleasure, informs us of the content of the good; reason, in the construction of a truth of value, shows us the relation between present and future, the individual and the social good. Morality is the practice of the truth of values.

KATHERINE EVERETT.

Critique des méthodes de l'esthétique. CHARLES LALO. Rev. Ph., XXXV, 12, pp. 600-624.

Certain mystically-minded people deny the possibility of method in æsthetics. To them the beautiful is the ineffable, to be reached by intuition, not understood by intelligence. Pascal believed that in æsthetics all method was a sacrilege. This attitude is justifiable only in so far as it is a protest against an artificial methodology which proposes to create artists out of nothing but method. But these are not the only alternatives. It is not the ambition of a scientific æsthetics to make the unartistic, artistic, or the unappreciative, appreciative, but its true purpose is to understand and criticise artistic productions and the enjoyment of art as they really exist. Next to the absolute denial of all method, the greatest obstacle to a science of æsthetics has been the false problems set for it to solve. These problems are: Is æsthetics deductive or inductive, metaphysical or positivistic, integral or partial? This very manner of statement betrays a lack of understanding of method in general. Æsthetics like any other science must be all of these things in due measure. It must be inductive in that it gathers suggestions from experience, deductive in that it constructs hypotheses on the basis of the suggestions, and inductive again in that it carries the hypotheses to experience for verification. The metaphysical element in æsthetics is its technique, *i. e.*, the dominating ideal of the art and the forms appropriate for the realization of the ideal. The matter in æsthetics is empirical or positivistic. Æsthetics must be partial in that investigation by particular people is of necessity limited and special, but it is integral in that its ideal is a systematic whole. Thus æsthetic method is not defined by any of these terms to the exclusion of others. There are, however, three important problems which a true critique must solve: Does the æsthetic value exist as value or as fact? Can it be generalized? Is it autonomous or heteronomous? Answers to these questions would properly limit the conception of æsthetic method.

KATHERINE EVERETT.

The Moral Argument of Theism. GEORGE A. BARROW. Harv. Theol. Rev., IV, 1, pp. 119-135.

The moral argument of theism has for a long time not been subjected to a thoroughgoing logical analysis. Morality is a specifically human conception; it is a concept of the will, and deals with our social conduct. It is essentially finite in nature. It does not necessarily involve physical nature, as is recognized by popular religion. If the world be imperfect, its imperfection argues against God's existence; if it be perfect, it needs no ulterior explanation. The question as to whether the existence of the idea of morality demands the existence of a deity may be divided into two questions: Whether the existence of the moral judgment implies a God, and whether the existence of the moral will implies a God. As conscience is based on instinct, it implies nothing transcending humanity. The power of judgment, in general, may have arisen from man's conflict with nature. Either all will is moral, or all can be, at its purest. One can deduce no theism from the first, for it implies no universal power; in the second case, we deduce morality from a preconceived concept, which is not obtained by any induction from morality. Our real problems are, then, (1) What is the place of moral will in the universe, and (2) What does it logically imply? The chief task of modern theology in regard to the first question is to harmonise the so-called 'Christian' virtues with the laws and theories of organic evolution. If the presence of will in the world prove the existence of God, it must be because will partakes of the true nature of being. The real question here is, 'Is God good?', not 'Does He exist?' This latter must be settled on other grounds.

N. WIENER.

La vie psychique des animaux. E. WASMANN. Rev. Ph., X, 9-10, pp. 314-322.

One of the most disputed questions of psychology is whether animals are mere automata, or whether they have some sort of conscious life, and, granting the latter, how far this resembles the conscious life of man. Another question of the first importance is that of the mode and course of psychic evolution. The method of investigation is necessarily the comparison of the supposed evidences of conscious life in the animals with the behavior of man: The only psychic life we can know directly is our own; that of animals can be known only by analogy. It is one of the fundamental principles of animal psychology never to attribute the higher faculties to animals when their actions can be explained by assuming the lower faculties alone. The mechanistic interpretation of animal life has been found incompetent to explain the fact that animals learn by experience. The anthropomorphic interpretation is also untenable. The source of this error is the assumption—made necessary by the Darwinian theory—that human intelligence has arisen by evolution. An animal has not the capacity for forming abstract ideas, whether from its own experience or through the teaching of another; it has no spiritual life, but a mere life of sense. Hereditary instincts often mimic reason, as with certain ants. In-

vestigation has shown that certain animals that were for a time considered as having reason, are utterly incapable of reflection. Man is the only animal that has an intellectual life.

N. WIENER.

Realism a Defensible Doctrine. JOHN E. RUSSELL. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., VII, 26, pp. 701-708.

Realism only says that reality is not constituted by assent. Royce argues against it as follows: The realities of the realist are absolutely unrelated; therefore no one of them can know any other. The realist's idea and its object are both realities; the one cannot cognise the other. The realist, however, denies only the relation of dependence between realities; the realist's idea and its object, furthermore, need not be separate realities. Taylor gives two arguments against realism: First, the realist's doctrine contradicts the nature of reality; secondly, the realist is forced to define the unreal and the real alike,—independence of the human mind. The first argument can only disprove a realist ontology, not realism. In the second case, the realist need not think of independence of mind as constituting reality. It has been urged against realism that we can never know that an idea represents its object. However, idealism also fails to give us a road to absolute certainty.

N. WIENER.

Motive. J. L. STOCKS. Mind, No. 77, pp. 54-66.

Most definitions fail to explain the popular distinction of motives into conscious and unconscious. For a provisional definition of motive, let us say that motive is that disposition of a man in respect to an act in virtue of which it possesses an attraction for him. It demands some degree of reflexion, and is not applicable to acts done instinctively. It is the manifestation of a general attitude of the will. Unlike intention, it implies no end; it is something, so to speak, at the back of one's mind, which influences one's decision. It is not the feeling of teleological action, for a feeling cannot be a motive. Consciousness of motive is attention to that in the act adopted which makes it of service to the realization of the end which motive is the disposition to pursue. Unconscious motive differs from conscious motive simply in being more obscure. Motive cannot be sharply distinguished from character.

N. WIENER.

Le rôle de l'individu dans la formation de la morale. J. M. LAHY. Rev. Ph., XXXV, 12, pp. 581-599.

In explaining morality as a social product, sociologists neglect the rôle of the individual in the formation of ethical sentiment. An individual's acts and attitude are determined by his ideas, and his ideas are mental representations or images of sensible objects. To test the accuracy of the material of his notions, he has only to refer them again and again to sensible experience. This is the final criterion. Representations are associated and combined in all sorts of ways. For example, compare the looseness of connection in the

conversation of a lunatic with the closely-knit logic of Socrates. In general, the way an individual combines his ideas depends upon his social heritage and his environment. Every idea is accompanied by movement, conscious or unconscious. Among the classes of action thus related to human thought is moral action, whose distinguishing characteristic is its right to be termed good or bad, and its grounding in sanction. From the social standpoint, morality is an ideal of action worked out by society and sanctioned by it, which determines one's acts. But individuals often transcend or oppose an existing system of morality as sanctioned by society. The extent to which individual initiative is desirable depends upon the relation of the innovation to the existing order. The innovation should be assimilable. The more exact knowledge, *i. e.*, the more science, a man is master of, the better fitted he is to be a moral leader and reformer. For underlying every stable system of morality there must be a firm foundation of clear and rational knowledge. Whether or not a man's original theory of conduct is wise and good will be quickly proved by the sort of welcome it receives in that particular social group to which he belongs. A complete definition of morality then is: An ideal of action, worked out by society and sanctioned by it, which determines one's acts, and which the individual can modify so long as the ideal which he has created is not contradictory to the scientific representations of the group to which he presents it.

KATHERINE EVERETT.

Die experimentelle Untersuchung des Willensaktes. OTTO SELZ. Z. f. Psych., LVII, 4, pp. 241-270.

Ach's work *Über den Willensakt und das Temperament* renders voluntary action accessible to experimental research. His method may be called the combination method, since it is a combination of Ebbinghaus's method of repetitions and Müller's method of right associates. These principal problems are investigated—the phenomenal side of will, its dynamical side, and the motives and conditions under which it appears. The most extreme form of voluntary action which is the basis of his considerations, Ach calls *primary voluntary action*. Qualitatively, he recognizes four characteristics of volition—sensations of strain, the idea of end and of reference, the resolve *I will, really* (which is the principal characteristic), and the attitude of effort. It is very doubtful, however, whether the object of Ach's investigation really is volition. For instance, in his experiments on the resolve to accept the instructions, he seems rather to be investigating the effort of will directed toward the realization of the already accepted resolve. Ach, moreover, believes that he can show a connection between his conception of will and that of Wundt and Lipps, but it is difficult to see where such an agreement lies. In his quantitative investigation of the dynamical aspect of will, he measures the strength of the determination to carry out the task by the number of repetitions which previously established what he calls the reproduction tendency. Under his third problem, Ach treats of the voluntary act, the secondary volition, feeling and

temperament. By the term voluntary act, Ach understands the realization of the objective contents of the will. He investigates the complete voluntary act, for which the presence of the idea of reference—the means of realization, as he calls it—is necessary. He confines himself to the simple voluntary act, though his experiments really offer no favorable conditions for this investigation. If favorable factors are present, then the apprehension of the idea of reference is bound up with familiarities and produces the desired idea of movement. If, on the other hand, inhibitory factors are present, the intermediary experiences occur as an associated idea or the content of the aim in the form of an abbreviated will. There are three forms of the secondary will—the abbreviated will, the weak will, and the practised will. With practice, all forms are gradually transformed into the automatic act. A secondary result of Ach's investigation is that it throws light on the doctrines of feeling and of temperament. The origin of feeling depends on the efficacy of the determination. These so-called *determined feelings* coincide in part with the constellation feelings of Lipps and the intellectual feelings of Wundt. The whole work, despite its faults in certain details, is rich in suggestion and shows a marked advance in method. It is only by strong self-criticism that experimental psychology can hope to escape the unceasing controversy over will, due to the present unsatisfactory condition of things.

MABEL E. GOUDGE.

Practice Effects in Free Association. F. L. WELLS. Am. J. Ps., XXII, 1, pp. 1-13.

This is the first investigation of the effects of practice in free association. There were eight subjects in the experiment, one man, a physician in middle life, and seven women, nurses, with one exception under 30 years of age. In terms of Jung's classification, five of the subjects belonged to the *Sachlicher Typus* of association, one to the *Prädikattypus*, and two to the *Konstellationstypus*. One thousand different stimulus-words were used, which were unambiguous and familiar to the subjects. The words were written on separate slips of paper which were put into a box and thoroughly shaken. These slips were drawn by chance and made into 20 series of 50 words each. One series was given to each of six of the subjects each day until the entire number of series had been given. Then, on the two following days, the first two series of 50 words were repeated. The results are based on these 6,600 observations; especially on the two series which were repeated. The two other subjects made 500 observations each. The results show (1) a decrease in the association time; (2) a diminution of the individual differences in association time; (3) a differentiation and particularization of the response; (4) a tendency for the whole body of responses to move down in the scale of associations; and (5) a decrease in the emotive value of the experiment.

MABEL E. GOUDGE.

L'idée de vérité, d'après William James et ses adversaires. ANDRÉ LALANDE.
Rev. Ph., XXXVI, 1, pp. 1-26.

James's pluralistic metaphysics presupposes a methodology which he called radical empiricism, and its keynote lies in his definition of truth. The realist separates the world and the subject until he has no means of telling whether ideas are true or false copies of the eternal reality; the idealist makes both object and subject of the same nature, and deduces the individual facts *a priori*. Pragmatism believes in an external and independent reality, but one which is in harmony with the idea and which is of the same nature as that idea, since together they form the whole of experience. The true idea is the one which can be verified by the course of events and its verification consists in its applicability to the different facts of experience. The true is the expedient in our way of thinking and acting. For Dewey and Schiller verification and truth are two names for the same thing, but for James the truth of an idea lies in its ability to be verified. They agree, however, that the idea can never transcend the actual experience. Pratt objects that such a theory breaks down when the truth of ideas concerning experiences of past history, or the recognition of facts in the experiences of others, is under consideration. It is also conceivable that two people can form contradictory opinions of the same fact and each verify his opinion by experience. If each opinion is true, logic is impossible. To the first objection, James answers that we have sufficient confirmation for our belief through historical works and a consensus of opinion. In the second case, the pragmatist, like the idealist, can only believe in the existence of others. If disbelief in them would produce the same effect, the distinction between their existence and non-existence would be verbal. But the human soul demands more than the appearances of other beings,—it demands their sympathy and the response of their personalities to its own. For a similar reason we assume an external world; it is a means of satisfying desires. Our beliefs, however, are not true merely because they are satisfying; they must respond to an actual experience. There is no inherent truth in a proposition which exists when the individual and his assertions concerning it are suppressed. Its truth is a fact which is completed by adaptation and action. The pragmatist would admit that there is something in the true proposition which explains its success, but that something resolves itself into terms of actual experience, past, present, or possible. Pragmatism, indeed, approaches a philosophy of common sense in that it states, by the common use of words, that truth is that which is useful for an end. To level everything to its cash value seems perhaps to imply a moral materialism, an emphasis upon man's animal instead of his rational nature. But the pragmatist takes the world as he finds it. If man has a dual nature, both sides are considered in determining what is useful. To all objections which impute relativism, James replies by invoking the consensus of opinion of all thinking beings. Man is an individual, but also a part of society. By the elimination of irreconcilable individual opinions, science is formed. Experience is possible only as there is a harmonizing of thought among individuals.

CORRINNE STEPHENSON.

Instinct and Intelligence. CHARLES S. MYERS. Br. J. Ps., III, 3, pp. 209-218, 266-270.

Instinct and intelligence are generally considered as two distinct modes of mental activity but they are everywhere inseparable. The relation of instinct to intelligence is essentially similar to that of object and subject. Intelligence and instinct, choice and tropism, finalism and mechanism are our necessary anthro-psycho-interpretations of one and the same problem regarded from different standpoints. The rudiments of conation and meaning are present in instinctive acts of all kinds excepting under two conditions, namely, if there has been sufficient repetition of the act, or if the instinct is from the first unalterable. The subjective aspects of so-called instinctive and intelligent behavior differ only in degree. As to the alleged objective difference, the fixity of instinct which is contrasted with the plasticity of intelligence, we find from observation of wasps and ants that our criteria for intelligence is just as applicable to instinctive behavior. Insect life is fully explicable on the hypothesis of a series of reactions which are to some extent plastic and modifiable and which involve all the signs of conation and attention. Instincts are, within limits, improvable and have the feeling of activity and consciousness of end. To the list of instincts may we not add thought, reason, intelligence? The only difference between animal and human intelligence is one of degree, and we may also recognize in animal life occasional dim flashes of higher spiritual powers. Instincts, then, while not identifiable with reflexes, are not a *tertium quid* besides reflexes and intelligence, and we should speak, not of instinct and intelligence, but of instinct-intelligence. From the philosophical standpoint there is place for a finalistic interpretation: finalism is traceable to our experience of subject-activity, mechanism to our experience of object-activity. This subjective, finalistic, intelligent factor is not merely the awareness of ends but also distinct awareness that they are ends, and an increasing power to modify and frame fresh ends.

A. S. EDWARDS.

Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning. G. H. MEAD. Psych. Bul., VII, 12, pp. 397-405.

Only in the relation of mutual adjustment of social stimulation and response to the activities which they ultimately mediate, can the consciousness of meaning arise. It consists mainly in a consciousness of attitude on the part of the individual toward the object to which he is about to react. The feelings of readiness to take up a book, to spring over a ditch, to hurl a stone, are the stuff out of which arises a sense of meaning of the book, the ditch, the stone. The recurrence in memory of the past experience is the content which is commonly supposed to mediate this consciousness of meaning. An immediate content of sensation assimilates a content of imagery that insures a certain response. This assimilation in no sense guarantees a consciousness of distinguishable meaning. The more complete the assimilation, the less conscious are we of the actual content of response. That with which we are most familiar

is least likely to be distinguished in direct conduct in terms of meaning. That this familiarity is still a guarantee that upon demand we can give a meaning illustrates the point at issue: the bringing into consciousness of a meaning content is an act which must in every instance be distinguished from the mere consciousness of stimulation resulting in response. Thus the occasion for the consciousness of meaning is not found in the habitual act, nor is it to be found in the conflict of acts. In the field of social conduct, however, the feels of one's own responses become the natural objects of attention, since they interpret the attitudes of others which have called them out and because they give the material in which one can state his own value as a stimulus to the conduct of others. The elements in this consciousness of meaning are, firstly, a social situation; secondly, the consciousness of the value of one's own gestures in terms of the change in the actions of another; and thirdly, the terms in which this relation appears in consciousness.

A. S. EDWARDS.

NOTES.

Dr. Edward L. Schaub, of Cornell University, has been appointed assistant professor of philosophy at the Queens University, Kingston, Canada.

Professor M. A. Caldwell, of Ursinus College, has been appointed professor of philosophy at the University of Louisville.

Mr. Arthur U. Pope, of Brown University, has been appointed assistant professor of philosophy at the University of California.

Professor Ernst Meumann, of the University of Leipzig, has been called to the Kolonialinstitut in Hamburg.

The Walter Channing Cabot Fellowship at Harvard University has been awarded to Professor Josiah Royce. This fellowship is the income from a fund given to Harvard in 1905 and is intended to provide "an additional remuneration to some distinguished man in recognition of his eminence."

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals:

MIND, No. 78: *H. W. B. Joseph*, The Psychological Explanation of the Development of the Perception of External Objects (III); *F. C. S. Schiller*, The Humanism of Protagoras; *E. D. Fawcett*, The Ground of Appearances; *Alfred H. Lloyd*, Dualism, Parallelism and Infinitism; *J. W. Snellman*, The 'Meaning' and 'Test' of Truth; Discussions; Critical Notices; New Books; Philosophical Periodicals; Note.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XXI, 3: *J. S. Mackenzie*, The Meaning of Good and Evil; *F. Melian Stawell*, Goethe's Influence on Carlyle, II; *Ralph Barton Perry*, The Question of Moral Obligation; *H. S. Shelton*, The Spencerian Formula of Justice; *W. S. Urquhart*, The Fascination of Pantheism; *M. E. Robinson*, The Sex Problem; Book Reviews.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE PLATONIC DISTINCTION BETWEEN 'TRUE' AND 'FALSE' PLEASURES AND PAINS.

§ 1. What I have to say in the present paper is drawn, directly or indirectly, from the discussions of Plato and Aristotle. But I shall try to develop the subject in my own way, with only an occasional reference to the passages in question, and without examining them in detail.

Plato advances the distinction between true and false (*i. e.*, real and illusory) pleasures and pains against a commonly accepted view.¹ And in the main that view still holds the field. It is generally supposed—it is even sometimes asserted as “self-evident”—that there can be no question as to the ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ of pleasure or pain. Pleasure and pain—or ‘feeling’²—are in this respect marked off, if not from all other forms of experience, at least from all forms of ‘knowing’³ and of ‘willing.’

About the fact of any and every experience (feelings, emotions, sensations, beliefs, inferences, volitions, etc.), it is generally supposed that there can, in one sense, be no dispute. My sensations may be illusory, my beliefs, judgments, or inferences may be erroneous, my volitions morally reprehensible; but there can be no doubt for me that I *do* feel, sense, perceive, judge, or will, that I *am* moved to sorrow or anger. Upon this indubitable

¹ Cf. *Philebus*, 36 e. “ΠΡΩ. πάνθ' οὕτω ταῦτα, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν πάντες ὑπειλήφαμεν.”

² ‘Feeling’ is to be understood as equivalent to pleasure and pain, unless the context makes it plain that the term is used in a wider sense.

³ Throughout this paper I use the term ‘knowing’ to include all forms of experience in which anything is apprehended:—perception, *e. g.*, as well as judgment and inference (whether true or false), and again memory and imagination, whether waking or in dream.

certainty of the fact of consciousness, Descartes (it will be remembered) proposed to base all knowledge, as upon the primary self-evident *datum*.

But, at least within *some* regions of experience, a distinction is drawn between the 'fact' and the 'content,' between the 'that' and the 'what.' And though, for the subject experiencing, there can never be a question as to *whether*, there can in most cases be a question as to *what*. Within the sphere of 'knowing,' *e. g.*, a distinction is drawn between the *content* perceived, judged, or inferred, and the perceiving, judging, or inferring. When I perceive or judge, it is impossible for me to hesitate 'whether' I am doing so. *That* I am perceiving or judging—the fact—is for me beyond question. But there is an important question, for myself as well as for others, as to *what* I perceive or judge. For *what* I perceive or judge may be real or illusory (the 'content' perceived or judged may be 'true' or 'false'), though the perceiving or judging itself is always, equally and alike, actual and 'real.' Or—to avoid the dangerous term 'content'—we may follow Plato,¹ and put the distinction more simply, thus: "*Thinking* is something, and again *that which is thought* is something. The thinking subject, whether it thinks correctly or not, is actually thinking. But when it thinks correctly, its thinking, besides being actual, is further qualified as *true*. And when it thinks incorrectly, its thinking, besides being actual, is further qualified as *false*."

An analogous distinction is drawn within the field of 'willing.' For our volitions clearly differ in respect to their 'content' or 'what.' When I form a deliberate decision, there can be no question for me as to the fact. If I will at all, the 'that' is undeniably actual. Before my mind is made up, I may hesitate whether to decide thus or otherwise. But, whatever I may decide, the deciding itself, when once it occurs, is actual, and no question can be raised as to its reality or illusoriness. On the other hand, important questions arise as to the *what*: for *what* we will may be trivial or momentous, impossible of achievement or easy to realize, good or bad, etc.

¹ Cf. *Philebus*, 37 a-e.

Whether a similar distinction is commonly drawn in the sphere of emotion is matter of dispute. No doubt we speak of sorrow and pity as 'genuine,' 'real,' and 'sincere,' or again as 'hollow' and 'insincere.' And we distinguish between an anger which is fraught with danger and one which is trivial and relatively harmless. But many people would deny that these predicates apply to the 'what' or 'content' of the emotions. I may pretend (they would say) to be sorry or to feel pity, when the emotion is absent: and I may be moved more or less intensely or profoundly. But I cannot feel a sorrow or a pity which is real or illusory, genuine or insincere, deep or shallow. Nor do the epithets 'dangerous' or 'harmless' apply to the emotion of anger itself, but only to the volitions and actions which it inspires. Others, though not I myself, may question whether I am sorry or not; but nobody can question whether the 'what' of my sorrow is real or illusory. For the emotions 'occur,' or 'do not occur': their 'being' is their occurrence and it is nothing besides. If they are at all, they are 'real.' But to call them 'real' means only that they are occurring, and implies no contrast with a 'less real' or an 'illusory' form of their being.

But whatever may be generally thought about emotion, it is commonly assumed that in the spheres of 'knowing' and 'willing' a distinction between the 'that' and the 'what' must be drawn in the manner indicated above. And, on the other hand, it is commonly supposed that no such distinction applies to pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain, it is thought, are nothing but the subject's own feeling. No matter how much he may be deceived as to their occasions or their causes, the fact that he feels pleased or pained is beyond question; and *this*—the fact of his feeling—is the pleasure or the pain itself. If I feel pain, which I wrongly ascribe to a decayed tooth, but which the dentist convinces me is due to a contracted gum, neither my own misinterpretation nor the dentist's correction in any way affects the pain itself. For the pain is my feeling; and I do, actually and beyond question, feel pain. This—the fact of my feeling—is here the vital thing, and constitutes the pain. We must not say, "I am feeling a false or illusory pain," as we might say, *e. g.*, "My belief that $2+2=5$

is false," or "My perception of the bending of the stick in the water is illusory." We ought to say, "My pain—itself actual and real beyond question—is accompanied by the wrong interpretation, or the false judgment, that my tooth is decayed." Even now that I am convinced of my error, I still feel the 'pain of toothache'; for by 'the pain of toothache' I mean my feeling, and this still persists unaltered by the correction of my erroneous judgment.

§ 2. The view, which has just been sketched, is not 'self-evident,' but full of difficulty. But for the moment we are to develop the implications of a 'common opinion,' not to criticise it. Let us therefore follow its further development as impartial spectators, who neither endorse nor attack it.

The experiences which are pleasure and pain (we are to suppose) are nothing but the act or fact of experiencing. Pleasure and pain have no content or 'what'; or, rather, their 'what' is their 'that,' or the fact of their occurrence. They 'are' or 'exist,' but they have no character distinguishable from their existence.¹ Their *esse* is *sentire*: their 'being' is 'being felt,' and their 'being felt' is the mere lapse or change of consciousness which is the feeling.

Yet, when it is said that according to the common view pleasure and pain have no 'what' other than their 'that,' it is necessary to make two further explanations. For (i) the lapse or change of consciousness, which is 'pleasure,' is distinct from that which is 'pain'; and both are distinct from those conscious changes or occurrences which are 'knowing' or 'willing.' Hence pleasure and pain (the modifications of consciousness, which are these two forms of feeling) must possess a certain minimum of 'content'; *i. e.*, they must possess a character sufficiently distinctive to mark them off from one another, and from the other

¹ Plato (*Philebus*, 37b-37e) points this out as a paradox and as incompatible with the fact that we do actually qualify pleasures and pains. We speak of them, *e. g.*, as 'good' or 'bad,' as 'right' or 'wrong' and 'mistaken.' No doubt (as he shows) the ordinary view denies that we are here qualifying the pleasures and pains, and maintains that the predicates attach to other features within the total experience which accompany the feelings. But the ordinary view admits that there are differences of amount, differences of intensity and duration, in pleasures and pains; and that admission, as we shall see, must lead to a surrender of the whole position.

forms of experience. Some character, or a 'somewhat,' must be occurring, if *this* occurrence (pleasure) is to be distinct from *that* (pain); and if both are to be distinct from *those*, from the facts of perceiving, judging, willing, etc. And (ii) this minimum content, inseparably bound up with and absorbed in the 'that' which is pleasure or pain, may occur in different amounts or with different degrees of intensity, and may exist for longer or shorter periods of time. One pleasure differs from another, and one pain differs from another, as changes of more or less intensity and violence, and of longer or shorter duration. The character of the change (the minimum 'what' required to mark off pleasure from pain, and 'feeling' from 'willing' and 'knowing,') 'exists' with greater or less emphasis and duration. And these differences in the intensity and duration of the same minimum content constitute the only differences between this and that pleasure, and between this and that pain.

All other *supposed* differences between pleasures, and again between pains, are not really differences of them, but differences in the attendant circumstances:—differences in the occasions of the feelings, in the accompanying judgments, inferences, volitions, and so forth. If we are to speak strictly, there are not, *e. g.*, sensuous pleasures, æsthetic pleasures, intellectual pleasures; and there is neither the 'pain of toothache,' nor the 'pain of a broken heart.' There is pleasure—in different degrees and of different duration—felt *at* (*i. e.*, on the occasion of) the perception of beauty, the apprehension of truth, and the satisfaction of the appetites. And there is pain, felt with more or less intensity and duration on the occasion of our various diseases or misfortunes.

From this point of view, we may suggest an interpretation of the emotions, which will help to explain what was mentioned before: *viz.*, a certain hesitation in the common opinion on the subject.¹ An emotion, we may suggest, is not a distinctive form of consciousness, but a confused whole or composite of feeling, willing, and knowing. In all emotions there is present a factor, which is feeling; and, in respect to the feeling in it, emotion does

¹ Cf. above, § 1.

not admit of the distinction between 'that' and 'what.' On the other hand, those factors in the confused totality of an emotion which belong to 'knowing' or 'willing' undoubtedly admit of this distinction: and when we speak of an emotion as more or less 'real,' and as variously qualified in its 'what,' we are loosely transferring to the whole what applies strictly to some only of its constituents. Thus, because an emotion is a whole which is part 'feeling' and part 'knowing' and 'willing,' and because these constituents retain each its own nature in the compound, common opinion appears to hesitate and waver. But the hesitation is only apparent. For the conflicting statements, which we quoted as evidence of it, are true of *different* factors of emotion, or true of the emotion itself in respect to *different* constituents within it.¹

§ 3. What we have put forward as the 'common opinion' is beginning to appear so extravagant and paradoxical, that perhaps it will be doubted, not whether it is generally held, but whether anyone could ever hold it. Yet the pleasure and pain which 'occur' or 'do not occur,' whose 'reality' cannot be questioned, whose differences are only a more and less in degree or duration of the same minimum content—these 'indubitable facts,' which begin to look distressingly like the creations of faulty abstraction—are the pleasure and pain of the traditional hedonism and of the traditional criticisms of hedonism. It would be interesting, if we had the time, to establish this assertion by a detailed examination of the twistings and turnings and naïve confusions of some of the well-known discussions of hedonism. But we must content ourselves here with the briefest indications.

The advocates and opponents of hedonism have commonly assumed that pleasure as such can differ only in intensity and duration; and that the hedonistic ideal must consequently be, in some form or other, a maximum or 'sum' of pleasure. Hence Bentham's ridiculous saying that "Quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as poetry" has been attacked rather as an offence to the moral sense (which perhaps it is), than as

¹ I must not be supposed to endorse this interpretation of the emotions: see below, § 10.

involving an erroneous conception of pleasure (as it undoubtedly does). Hence, again, J. S. Mill's attempt to recognize and enforce qualitative distinctions in pleasure has been criticised as inconsistent with the very principles of hedonism, whereas it is inconsistent only with Mill's own conceptions of pleasure and of hedonism. Hence, finally, most of the current arguments for and against hedonism never touch the real issue. For its advocates enlarge on the merits of an ideal, which (as they assume) is homogeneous and quantitative; on the ease with which it can be used as a standard, or can provide us with a calculus to solve the perplexities of conduct. And their opponents retort that pleasures cannot be summed, that a sum of pleasures is not itself a pleasure, that the ideal of a maximum of pleasure cannot help us to determine how to act on given occasions, and so forth. But the advocates have not as a rule questioned the assumption that pleasures differ only quantitatively; nor does it seem to have occurred to them that moral philosophy is neither preaching nor moral deliberation. And their opponents (however ready they may be on other occasions to recognize the possibility of qualitative distinctions in pleasure, and to insist that it is not the business of moral philosophy to solve the particular problems of the particular agent) in their eagerness to overthrow the hedonists, advance 'refutations' which at the best are *argumenta ad hominem*. Thus, they forget to enquire whether the offence to the moral consciousness, which they find in the hedonists' doctrine, is due to the fact that the ideal is pleasure, or due solely to their mistaken assumption as to what pleasure is. And they forget that their arguments, which prove that the hedonists' ideal cannot provide a 'ready-reckoner' for the solution of moral perplexities, would prove precisely the same against any and every form of the moral ideal; and that whether they are right or wrong matters not two straws. For the moral ideal may be pleasure, or virtue, or self-realization, or the harmoniously organized life of a society, or anything else you please: but *what it is* has to be ascertained and confirmed by reflection upon conduct, and not by consideration of the part which it may, or may not, play in an agent's reflection antecedent to conduct. If I am in doubt how to act,

it may be easy or difficult or impossible for me to calculate which of the possible alternatives is more conducive to pleasure, or virtue, or self-realization. But neither the ease, nor the difficulty or impossibility, of such a calculation is relevant to the question whether any of these ends, or which of these ends, is the moral ideal. The moral ideal is real as the significance of actual conduct: and the agent may have been inspired in his action by a vague sense or (sometimes and very rarely) by a clear conception of it. But he does not derive rules from the ideal, and determine himself to act by a calculative application of them. His conduct is amongst the *data*, by reflection upon which the ideal may be discovered, and in which the ideal is in a sense embodied. An act of heroism or of villainy is no more the product of a 'calculus' deduced from the moral ideal, than a beautiful or ugly work is the effect of a calculative application (right or wrong) of the æsthetic ideal.¹

§ 4. Pleasure and pain, then (to return to the 'common opinion'), may occur with more or less emphasis, and may last for a longer or shorter time; but they admit no qualitative differences. There is a minimum content, sufficient to distinguish 'feeling' from 'knowing' and 'willing,' and 'feeling-pleased' from 'feeling-pained.' But even this minimum 'somewhat' occurring, which runs through the scale of more and less intensity and duration, is merged in the 'that' of its occurrence. Pleasure is 'feeling-pleased,' and 'feeling-pained' is pain.

And from this identification of the *esse* of pleasure and pain with *sentire*, it follows at once that the quantitative differences, which are still left to pleasure and pain, are not (like differences of quantity elsewhere) amenable to 'objective' measurement. Many critics of hedonism have emphasised the 'subjectivity' of feeling; but I do not know whether they have realized how radical and extreme that 'subjectivity' is, if pleasure and pain

¹ The æsthetic ideal is discovered and confirmed by philosophical reflection upon the things of beauty and of ugliness in nature and in art; and Beethoven's Symphonies, *e. g.*, are in a sense embodiments of the ideal, and amongst the *data* on which the philosopher reflects. But it would be ridiculous to suppose that, in order to compose them, Beethoven deduced rules of harmony from the æsthetic ideal, and selected chord after chord by calculating which, in accordance with those rules, would most conduce to the ideal.

are what 'common opinion' assumes them to be. For (1) the 'quantitative differences' cannot be expressed in terms of any unit. If one pleasure is 'more' than another, the 'moreness' is an indeterminate qualitative excess, which cannot be reduced to precision as 'so many times a definite amount.' I may be more pleased in drinking a glass of Château Yquem than in drinking a glass of beer; but I cannot estimate the former pleasure as twice as great as the latter, nor bring the amounts of the two into any determinate mathematical relation. And this—the impossibility of 'measurement' in any proper sense of the term—is generally recognized, at least by the critics of hedonism. Moreover (2), it is often recognized, and has been urged against hedonism, that each feeling subject is the absolute—because the only possible—judge of the more and less of his own pleasures and pains. For pleasure and pain are somebody's feeling pleased or pained, and their *esse* is somebody's *sentire*. The 'somebody,' therefore, is in each case the only person who can judge, since the pleasures or pains, which are to be judged, are his feelings: and he could only compare his own pleasures or pains with those of another somebody, if he could be himself and that other at the same time. Hence it is impossible, *e. g.*, to compare 'the pleasure of drinking' with 'the pleasure of thinking,' and idle to enquire whether the one is more or less intense, or more evanescent or enduring, than the other. For it is meaningless to speak of 'the pleasure of drinking' or 'the pleasure of thinking' in abstraction from the subject whose feelings they are. And if we take account of the subject, we can take account of one subject and of one only, *viz.*, ourselves. I can judge that *my* pleasure in drinking is more or less than *my* pleasure in thinking. But I can draw no inference as to the relative intensity of *your* pleasures in drinking and in thinking; nor can I possibly decide whether *your* pleasure in thinking is 'more' or 'less' than, or 'equal' to, *my* pleasure in drinking.¹ It is not, however, generally recog-

¹ It is clear from the above considerations that, if pleasure be identified with the feeling-pleased, Plato's question in the ninth book of the *Republic* ("which of the three types of life is the pleasantest?") is a senseless enquiry. And Plato's attempt to prove that some pleasures are more real than others is not merely, as he himself represents it in the *Republic*, the third and last argument to show that the life of the

nized, and yet (unless I am mistaken) it is a necessary corollary of the 'common opinion,' that (3) the appreciation of the 'more and less' in pleasures and pains is still further restricted. For if pleasure and pain are the feeling-pleased and the feeling-pained, and if their 'what' is wholly absorbed in their 'that,' it would follow that I can compare the intensity of my pleasure in drinking with that of my pleasure in thinking, only if I am simultaneously feeling-pleased in both these ways. I cannot compare my present pleasure in drinking with my memory of yesterday's, or my anticipation of tomorrow's, pleasure in thinking; or at least, if I do so, it is not *pleasures* which I am comparing. For how can I remember or anticipate a 'pleasure'—a something, whose *esse* is *sentire*, whose 'what' is wholly absorbed and merged in the lapse of consciousness which is its occurrence?¹

§ 5. The 'common opinion' has now been sufficiently developed, and we can proceed to examine it more closely. We have seen that the denial of the possibility of a distinction between true and false (*i. e.*, real and illusory) feelings, is connected with the denial of all qualitative distinctions between pleasures and between pains, and carries with it in the end the admission that it is impossible to ask which of two occupations or of two lives is the more pleasant. We can at most ask which of two simultaneous pleasures or pains is more pleasant or painful for the subject now feeling them, and he alone can answer this question.

φρόνιμος is the most pleasant. It is an attempt to establish a thesis with regard to the nature of pleasure, which must be true if the question as to the relative pleasantness of different lives is to have any meaning at all. For if we cannot intelligently ask with regard to a pleasure or a pain whether it is 'true' or 'false,' *i. e.*, 'real' or 'illusory,' then neither can we intelligently speak of one pleasure as greater than another, or of one pain as more intense than another. We can at most compare the relative intensity of our own pleasures, our own pains.

¹ Some psychologists hold that, if I remember that yesterday I felt pleased, along with the memory there occurs a fresh feeling-pleased. Hence the memory of a pleasure is accompanied by a pleasure, or is itself 'pleasant,' and may be called a 'pleasure of memory.' And they would apply the same principle, *mutatis mutandis*, to anticipation. But even if a feeling-pleased accompanies the memory, this 'pleasure of memory' is not *the* pleasure to which the memory refers. The pleasure, which *now* accompanies my memory of yesterday's philosophical discussion, may be less or more intense than my simultaneous pleasure in to-day's drinking; but I cannot infer that my yesterday's pleasure in thinking was less or more intense than my present pleasure in the debauch.

And, conversely, Plato's thesis that some pleasures and pains are more real than others, and that we must recognize 'false' or illusory pleasures and pains, is no isolated eccentricity in his doctrine. It stands and falls with the recognition of qualitative distinctions in pleasure and in pain—a recognition on which Aristotle, as well as Plato, insists—and it is presupposed in any attempt to compare the pleasantness of one occupation or form of life with that of others.

Let us begin our examination of the 'common opinion' by investigating the distinction between 'the fact of experiencing' and 'the what experienced' in the sphere of 'knowing.' There, as we saw,¹ the unassailable certainty of the 'fact of experiencing' is contrasted with a 'content' or a 'what' experienced, which admittedly may be 'real' or 'illusory,' 'true' or 'false.' *What* I perceive or believe may be 'false' or 'illusory' in various degrees, but *that* I perceive or believe is a fact beyond question. No doubt, if my perception is illusory beyond a certain point, it is called an 'illusion,' and if my belief is erroneous beyond a certain limit, it is called a 'prejudice' or a 'fancy.' But 'illusion,' 'prejudice,' 'fancy,' and similar terms, though they are applied to the whole experience, denote only the 'content' or 'what'; the experiencing itself, the 'that' which is the perceiving or believing, is not infected. It is not illusory or fanciful, but just an 'actual fact.' It is always 'real' or 'true' (if we like to say so) in a different sense of those terms, *i. e.*, in a sense not contrasted with a possible 'unreal' or 'less real' or 'false.'

Now, I venture to think that this distinction is wrongly interpreted, and is not tenable if thus understood. In any whole experience in the sphere of 'knowing,'²—*e. g.*, in any perception, judgment, inference, etc.,—we must, if we analyze it, distinguish the 'experiencing' and the 'experienced.' But, unless our analysis is faulty, the features thus distinguished are, and remain in their distinction, essentially correlative. There is an 'experiencing,' but it is *of* a determinate something or somewhat experienced; and there is an 'experienced,' but it is *for* a deter-

¹ Above, § I.

² Cf. above, § I, note 3.

minate 'experiencing.' The experiencing, if we separate it from the something experienced and take it unqualified, is neither real nor illusory, neither true nor false; for it is nothing but the product of a false abstraction. It is one factor reached by analysis of the whole experience, but a factor with an essential feature of its being omitted—viz., its attachment and necessary reference to the other factor; and the result of this omission is an 'experiencing' *per se* and unqualified, which is nothing nor (thus conceived) a factor in anything.

A 'true perception,' *e. g.*, we may say, is 'the perceiving of a fact,' or 'a fact manifest to a perceiving consciousness.' And we may distinguish the perceiving and the fact which is perceived. But the 'perceiving' and the 'fact' are essentially relative to one another, and only deserve these titles in that correlation. For to 'perceive'—in the sense in which 'true perception' involves 'perceiving'—is to apprehend fact; and 'fact'—in the sense in which 'true perception' is the apprehension of 'fact'—is what it is only *for* 'perceiving.' Again, we may describe an 'illusion,' or 'illusory perception,' as 'the perceiving as *thus* real what is not *thus* real, but falsely appears to be so,' or as a 'something misperceived, appearing deceptively to a perceiving consciousness.' And we may distinguish the experiencing (the perceiving or misperceiving) on the one hand, and the experienced (the something confused and wrongly appearing, the fact which is misperceived) on the other. But there is no false appearance, no deceptive something, apart from the perceiving which is *of* it; and there is no perceiving, which is a misperceiving, apart from the 'fact' of which it is, and which in this correlation is illusory, falsely-appearing, and deceptive. The burning desert sand is not a lake except for the perceiving of the explorer under mirage; and his perceiving, which is a misperceiving and misleads him, is not the perceiving of sand or of water, but of sand falsely appearing as water. Again, we speak of an 'imaginary' or of a 'dream' perception. I see, with the mind's eye, the waves breaking on the shore of St. Andrews: I 'recall,' or again, I 'imagine' them. I see my friend in a dream. And here too we may distinguish the 'seeing' or 'imaging' on the one hand

and the waves breaking which I imagine, or the friend whom I see in dream, on the other. But unless we keep fast hold of the essential correlativity of the distinguished factors, we shall fall into bottomless depths of confusion. *What* is it that I imagine or dream? Is it the real waves breaking, my friend himself? But my friend has long been dead, and there are not *now* any waves. Or is it 'an image' of these facts? But if it is 'an image,' where does it exist—in my mind, or in my head, or in the air before my eyes? And so forth, with absurdity after absurdity. Or shall we be told that it is precisely the peculiar nature of imagination and dream to annul space and time, and to put us in immediate contact with a real which is past or future, and distant in space? Then, whatever else this answer may mean, at least it is conceded that the 'perceiving,' which is involved in imaginary and dream perceptions, is different from the 'perceiving' involved in ordinary sense-perception. The whole experience here—as I should prefer to put it—is an 'imaginative perception' or a 'dream-perception.' We may analyze it, and distinguish a perceiving and a perceived. But we must not treat either factor as anything except in essential relation to the other. The 'perceiving' here is what it is essentially as the perceiving of a something imaged or a something dreamed; and the 'perceived' (the imaged sea-waves, the dreamed friend) is what it is only and essentially *for* the 'perceiving' which is imaging or dreaming.

The same holds in principle, and *mutatis mutandis*, of the other forms of 'knowing' and of 'willing'—wherever, in short, the distinction between 'fact of experiencing' and 'what experienced' is commonly applied. The distinction is the analysis of a whole; the factors, which are the two *distincta*, are reached by abstraction from the whole. And if the distinction is to be tenable, the abstraction must not remove what is essential to the factors as factors of their whole; *i. e.*, it must not remove their reciprocal attachment each to each, their correlative reference to one another. They are not 'factors' in any other sense. We cannot put the whole together by adding 'experiencing' in general to a 'somewhat' indeterminately experienced. But we can distinguish, within any whole experience, the determinate experiencing

of a determinate 'somewhat,' and a determinate 'somewhat' experienced only in a correspondingly determinate experiencing.

§ 6. It will be as well to remove what is in this connection a side-issue. For I shall be accused of subjective idealism in its most extreme form. Let me therefore point out (i) that I am not here maintaining that there is nothing real except what is experienced. I am maintaining only that, if we are considering a 'whole experience' (viz., any 'knowing' or 'knowledge,' anything 'willed' or any 'willing'), and if we distinguish within it an 'experiencing' and a 'somewhat experienced,' we must understand that distinction in a certain way. And (ii) by a 'whole experience' I do not mean a mere state of an experiencing subject. 'What is experienced' is, I am maintaining, essentially correlative to a determinate 'experiencing,' *i. e.*, it is other than it and is its other; and in this correlation (but not otherwise) the subject is experiencing and a somewhat is experienced. But the somewhat is no more a state of the subject than the subject is a state of the somewhat; and the whole, which is the correlation of the two, is certainly not a state of either one. If it be said that perceptions, judgments, inferences, willings, etc., have a place in the subject's mental history and, thus becoming past states of his 'knowing' and 'willing,' may be considered as 'whole experiences,' whose *what* and *that* are both alike mental, and which therefore are mere psychical states of the subject, I can only reply that I do not understand. For a mere psychical state, if it is anything at all (which I venture to doubt), is clearly not any form of 'knowing' or of 'willing.' And finally (iii) I am not here discussing the question—difficult, no doubt, and important in other connections—as to how far the analysis of a 'whole experience' must be carried. Can we, in psychology, *e. g.*, or in logic, without any—or without serious—falsification of the facts, treat a 'true belief' or a 'true perception' as a whole whose correlative factors are 'such and such an apprehended connection for such and such a form of judging,' or 'such and such qualities manifest to such and such a form of perceiving—vision, or hearing, or smelling, etc.'? Or must we, for the purposes of an adequate logical or psychological analysis, particularize the factors further; and if so, is there

no limit: or, if there is a limit, on what principles is it to be fixed? Is there no detail in *this individual* true perception (my true perceiving this fact here and now) or *this individual* true belief, which the logician or the psychologist may legitimately neglect as irrelevant? Or if—as I believe—the logician and the psychologist, like all men of science, inevitably and rightly discard a great deal as irrelevant; if they treat throughout of universals, types, and general forms; on what principle and where are we to fix the limit, below which all further particularization is legitimately neglected?

This question I recognize as difficult and elsewhere important. But I am not here concerned with it, and to discuss it here would be to draw a red herring across the path of our hunt.

§ 7. The distinction between *that* and *what*, between the fact of experiencing and the somewhat experienced, holds (as I am maintaining) in the spheres of 'knowing' and 'willing' only if it be understood in a certain way. And the distinction thus understood will not enable us to view the fact of experiencing as unaffected by the variations of the somewhat experienced. What is given, and what is actual, is the whole; and the whole is more or less real, more or less illusory, and characterized in various ways.

Thus, if I perceive a sheet of water, or if, deceived by a mirage, I perceive a lake in the desert, or if I perceive a lake in imagination or in dream, there is beyond question (we may say) in all these cases a fact of apprehending. But the fact of apprehending differs enormously in the four cases with the difference of what is apprehended; for it is impossible to maintain that in all of them there is an unvarying identical fact of perceiving and that the entire difference falls on the side of what is perceived. We may use the same term, and speak of the fact of apprehending in all these cases as an actual 'perceiving.' But this is possible only so long as we are content with an abstract analysis, which marks off 'perceiving' in the rough from, *e. g.*, judging and inferring without any attempt to trace its specific varieties. The 'perceiving' in the first case is 'seeing visible fact'; in the second, it is 'misperceiving,' the correlative of illusion and false appearance;

in the third, it is 'imaging'; and in the fourth, it is the 'perceiving' whose correlative is the phantasm of a dream.

And if it be objected that in all four cases there is the same 'perceiving,' but that it is combined now with true judgment, now with false interpretation, now with the play of fancy, and now with the judgment of a dreaming mind, I would ask what the objector means by 'combined'? Does the 'perceiving' fuse with the 'judging' or the 'play of fancy' so as to form with it a single 'fact of experiencing'? If so, then—though I do not think this way of putting the matter is clear¹—my position is in principle conceded. But if there is no fusion, and if 'combined' merely means 'added,' then—*e. g.*, in the illusion of mirage—*what* 'fact of experiencing' is for the subject indubitably actual? The perceiving of the sand in the heat-haze? But this is no fact of his experience at all. The misinterpreting the data? But of this again—of the fact of judging—he is not aware. And since he is not aware of either of these, he cannot presumably be aware of both of them added and together.

If now we turn to pleasure and pain, it would seem as if there too we must recognize an analogous distinction. There are pleasures and pains in dream and in imagination; and we speak of 'taking a real pleasure in our work,' as if it were possible for a pleasure to be illusory. Moreover, the feeling subject himself is sometimes in doubt whether he is feeling pleasure or pain. At the moment when the tooth is yielding to the dentist's pull, and is coming away from its socket, the victim certainly 'feels'; but (if I am to judge from my own experience) he is uncertain whether he feels pleasure or pain, or a hybrid of the two, or an oscillation from the one to the other.² My certainty 'that

¹ It is not clear, because, if it is *the same* perceiving which fuses in each of the four cases with a different factor so as to constitute with it a single 'fact of experiencing,' its *sameness* requires further explanation. A 'perceiving in general,' present identically and unchanged in all the determinate forms of perceiving, would seem to be the abstract generic nature:—a fictitious universal obtained by evisceration of the species, and not a constituent factor of any of them. On the other hand, an indeterminate perceiving, which is differentiated now as this and now as that determinate form of perceiving, is clearly itself different in each of the species, and is nothing except in them.

² I do not mean merely that the 'physical' pain of the wrench may alternate with, or may be accompanied by, the 'mental' pleasure of relief. The pleasure and

I am feeling' is here the certainty of an abstract 'that,' analogous to my certainty 'that I am perceiving' when my 'perceiving' may (for all I know) be the 'that' of an imaginative perception, or of a perception of mirage or of dream.

Pleasure and pain, I am suggesting, are 'whole experiences,' in which analysis must distinguish a *somewhat* occurring and a *that* which is its occurrence. The *that* and the *what* thus distinguished are nevertheless inseparably attached to one another, and the variations in the character of the whole, or again in its *what*, are necessarily also reflected in the *that*. For we must not treat the distinction as a resolution of the whole experience into an unchanging *that*, which is 'feeling,' on the one hand, and into a *what*, which is 'pleasure' or 'pain,' on the other. The *what* of the experience is pleasure or pain, only in so far as it is a *what of feeling*, *i. e.*, a *what* whose occurrence is feeling. And the *that* of the experience is 'feeling,' only in so far as it is the occurrence of a pleasure or a pain. And if the whole experience is—as a whole, or in respect to its *what*—illusory, imaginary, or dream; or if again it is—as a whole, or in respect to its *what*—characterized as æsthetic, or intellectual, or sensuous; then these differences of character must be reflected also as differences in its *that*. The 'feeling,' which is the occurrence of a dream-pleasure, must itself be distinguished from the *that* of a waking-pleasure; and the *that* of a sensuous pleasure or pain is different from the 'feeling' which is the occurrence of an æsthetic or an intellectual pleasure or pain. 'Feeling,' in short, is a vague generic term analogous in this respect to 'perceiving'; and we must recognize different specific forms of both these 'facts of experiencing.'

§ 8. The view just sketched is, I believe, sound in the main. I will try, in the rest of this paper, to explain it more fully by defending it against some of the more obvious objections.

"A pleasure or a pain," it may be said, "is either not a 'whole experience' at all; or it is a non-relational whole and in no sense analogous to those 'whole experiences' of 'knowing' and of pain to which I am here referring are both equally 'physical.' It is the sensation of the wrench, at the moment when the tooth is coming away from the jaw, which the victim may feel (i) ambiguously pleasant or painful, or (ii) simultaneously or alternately both pleasant and painful.

'willing' in which the distinction between a that and a what applies. A non-relational whole, even if we allow to it a certain inner diversity, cannot be analyzed into a plurality of related terms or factors, not even if the relations be viewed as 'correlations' and the factors as reciprocally conditioning constituents of the whole. Doubtless a pleasure (or a pain) is a 'somewhat occurring,' and doubtless its unity as a feeling-whole may contain a plurality in solution. But neither the plurality within its *what*, nor the *what* itself and its 'occurrence' are distinguishable for thought. If we can regard them as *distincta* at all, they are *distincta* which remain always in solution in the continuity of feeling; and to express them as *distincta* for thought—*i. e.*, as terms in relation—is necessarily erroneous."

There are occasions, it may at once be admitted, in which the whole world and our own self, and all distinctions between them and within them, are merged in one intense feeling. There is for us nothing, and we ourselves are nothing, but one overwhelming pleasure or pain. The burning intensity of the feeling, the 'agony' or the 'rapture,' overpowers and absorbs everything else. It is a 'whole experience' which clearly we cannot examine or criticise; for it possesses us, and we—who are to examine it—are lost in its immensity. Other people, indeed, and even the subject when he has subsequently 'come to himself,' pass judgment. There is pity, or sympathy, or condemnation for the poor deluded victim, who, in the obsession of ecstasy or of anguish, has lost all grasp of the proportions of things and no longer distinguishes the real and the illusory, the valuable and the worthless. And there is envy or admiration for the man who can lose himself and the world in the rapture of artistic creation or religious devotion. But this, it will be urged, is not to pass judgment on the value of the feeling itself, on its reality or illusoriness. We do not pity or condemn the victim *quâ* pleased or pained, but *quâ* deficient in 'knowing' and in 'willing.' If we speak of him as 'deluded,' we do not suggest that the feeling is a delusion, but that it causes delusions, that it has swept away all clear thought and strenuous endeavour. Nor, again, do we admire or envy the 'rapture' itself, but the religion or the art which occasions it,

or the liberation of a soul from the limitations of its finite existence—its voyage on ‘the illimitable ocean’ of truth or beauty—which we infer from it.

I will confess that I am not entirely convinced. For it is difficult to believe that to be lost in the agony of a nightmare, to be ‘beside oneself’ with the pain of toothache, to be overcome by the anguish of bereavement, and to be overwhelmed with the agony of despair and failure, are experiences which—either in their entirety, or at any rate *as feelings*—are equally and alike ‘indubitably actual,’ neither more nor less real one than another. And I hesitate to identify *as feelings* the rapture of the saint or the artist with the ecstasy of satiated lust, or the rapture which may possess us in dream. It seems to me a paradox to suppose that these experiences are, in one respect at least (*viz.*, as ‘feelings’), simply ‘pleasure’ or simply ‘pain’; intense indeed and all-absorbing, but otherwise alike in quality and none less real than another. But I will admit the objection for the sake of argument, and I will ask: How much is there of *such* pleasure and pain in human life, and was it to *such* experiences only, or primarily, that the ‘common opinion’ was referring?

§ 9. The answer to these questions can hardly be doubtful. Such experiences are relatively rare and abnormal. The pleasures and pains which occur for the most part in our lives, and with which primarily and in the main the ‘common opinion’ was concerned, are not these all-engulfing seas of ecstasy and agony, but features of a larger experience in which the subject is ‘knowing’ and ‘willing’ as well as ‘feeling.’ And here, as is abundantly recognized in popular phraseology, pleasure differs from pleasure in quality, and pain from pain; and both pleasures and pains may be ‘genuine’ and ‘solid’ and ‘substantial,’ or on the other hand ‘imaginary’ and ‘illusory’ and the phantoms of a dream.

“No,” it will be said, “you are shifting the ground and playing fast and loose with terms which we are trying to use with scientific precision. What you now quote as ‘a pleasure’ or ‘a pain,’ is a ‘whole experience’ which *inter alia* is pleasurable or painful. We have tried to be precise and to distinguish within an emotion,

or again within an experience of 'knowing' or of 'willing,' the adjectival aspect or the feeling-tone—the pleasurable or painful colouring—from the substantial elements of 'knowing' and 'willing' which are thus 'toned' or 'coloured.' Popular phraseology doubtless recognizes all the distinctions you have quoted, and many more besides. For pains are qualified as burning, gnawing, shooting, throbbing, racking, etc., and pleasures are called coarse or brutal, refined or subtle or delicate. But popular phraseology is popular phraseology, and its confusions must give place to the precise analysis of science. The same popular phraseology, if we followed its guidance, would persuade us that fears may be childish and hopes foolish. But though the wise man may hope like a fool, and the grown man fear like a child, the fear and the hope are neither childish nor grown up, neither foolish nor wise. So it is not the pain which burns or throbs or gnaws, nor the pleasure which is brutal or refined. The adjectives qualify not the feeling, but other elements in the 'whole experience' which the feeling 'colours,' of which it is the 'tone,' on the occasion of which it is excited, or with which it is in some way associated. We have, *e. g.*, a sensation of throbbing or of burning, and this is not in itself a 'feeling,' but a mode of 'knowing'—to borrow your own terminology. But the sensation is 'coloured' or 'toned' as painful; and this feeling-tone, excited by and associated with the sensation, differs in intensity and in duration from other pains, but otherwise, *i. e.*, in quality, is identical with them. So again the sensualist, the artist, and the thinker, feel pleasure each in his own success—the pleasure of satisfied lust, of triumphant artistic creation, and of solving the problems of speculative thought. And their pleasures excited by different activities, 'colouring' different occupations, and adjectival to different substantial elements of experience, may differ in intensity and duration. But nevertheless the pleasures themselves, as pleasures, are always the same in quality, are all alike actual, and neither more nor less real one than another. And if we imagine, or dream, or madly fancy what others, or we ourselves at other times, sanely perceive and soberly know, our illusory experiences will be coloured by feelings of pleasure or

pain the same in quality as those which attend our sane perceptions and waking activities. But the feelings themselves are not illusory, imaginary, or dream. Persuade a man that he has not really made his fortune, but only built a castle in the air, that he has not really written a masterpiece, but only dreamed it. The dream or the imagination will fade, and he will no longer be deceived by them. But what has faded is the 'knowing' and the 'willing' in the experience, for these alone could be real or illusory, true or false. The pleasure, which coloured the dream, vanishes indeed when the dream is over, since (like all feeling) it is only in the present; but it is in no sense depreciated in value or rendered illusory. It was, and remains to all eternity, 'real,' not as contrasted with the unreal or illusory, but simply as fact and actual occurrence."

§ 10. We have set aside the feelings of 'rapture' and 'agony'—the feelings, which are 'whole experiences' absorbing in their overwhelming intensity the subject himself and all his world. Such feelings may be said to 'impose' themselves with an emphatic actuality beyond all criticism. And we have admitted, for the sake of argument, and without being fully convinced, that no question can be raised as to their quality or reality. But we are at present concerned with the normal pleasures and pains; *i. e.*, with feeling which is admittedly a feature in, or of, a larger experience where the subject is also 'knowing,' or 'willing,' or 'knowing' and 'willing.' And the objection which we have just formulated applies what may perhaps be true of feeling, when feeling is all and there is nothing besides, to the feeling which is only a feature in a larger whole. We are asked to sweep away, as mere popular confusions, the innumerable phrases which suggest a different view.

Now popular phraseology is certainly an unsafe guide, and certainly scientific analysis is required. But is the analysis, which the objector thrusts upon us, scientific? Or is it fundamentally mistaken?

The ordinary experiences of mankind—perhaps all of them, certainly most of them—are either pleasant or painful. And, having regard to this character or aspect of them, we speak of

pleasures and pains with a qualifying adjective or an equivalent phrase; and sometimes (with more or less justification) we regard the experiences themselves as pleasures or pains. The pleasure or pain is never the whole experience, but it is a more or less dominant feature, and a feature which draws its character in part from the other constituents of the whole. Thus, *e. g.*, an experience of speculative thinking, or of strenuous action, is pleasant or painful. The 'feeling' is here relatively adjectival and subordinate, and we should not speak of either experience as 'a pleasure' or 'a pain.' But we qualify the pleasantness and painfulness as 'intellectual' or 'moral' pleasure and pain; and we undoubtedly suppose that the feeling, which 'colours' the more substantial elements of the experience, is itself affected by them. On the other hand, in those 'whole experiences,' which are called 'emotions,' pleasure and pain are more substantial constituents. 'Feeling' is here, it would seem, the basis which develops into richer and more complex forms of pleasure or pain, by taking into itself, and appropriating for its own growth, elements of 'knowing' and 'willing.' We might abstract the pleasure or the pain from philosophical thinking and moral endeavour, and still without serious error set ourselves to analyze these experiences. But to abstract the pleasure and pain from love or hate, from anger or jealousy, would at once remove the emotions in question, and would leave us with nothing to study.¹ Lastly, there are painful (if not also pleasant) experiences, in which the 'feeling' is so dominant a feature that we often speak of the whole as 'a pain,' making it the substantive and the other elements in the whole its qualifying adjectives. Thus, a painful sensation of throbbing is called 'a throbbing pain'; and the phrase means not only that we regard the painfulness as itself characterized by the other element in the 'whole experience,' but that we view the whole as substantially pain.

Now the analysis, which we are asked to accept as 'scientific,' resolves all these 'whole experiences' into 'knowing' or 'willing' (or into both 'knowing' and 'willing') as their substance, and into 'feeling' as an adjectival aspect. 'Feeling' is regarded as

¹ Contrast the view of the emotions which was suggested above, §2.

playing the same subordinate rôle in them all: it supervenes, in one of its alternative contrary modes (*i. e.*, as pleasure or pain) upon an experience substantially complete without it. And though, in supervening, it 'colours' the experience, the 'colours,' which it lays on, are drawn ready-made from its own very limited stock, and are in no way affected or modified by that which they colour.

For my own part I can see in this 'scientific analysis' nothing but false assumption and inapplicable metaphor. For in some of the 'whole experiences' in question (in the emotions, *e. g.*, or in a throbbing pain) the 'colours' are either the substantial basis of the whole, or at least as indispensable to its constitution as any of its other elements. And even when the pleasure and the pain are relatively adjectival, is there any reason to view them as unaffected and unqualified by the more substantial elements of the experience which they 'colour'? The philosopher's thinking or the hero's self-sacrifice are substantially complete (let us suppose) without the pleasure or the pain which in fact 'colour' them. Abstract the feeling in thought or in reality, and still these experiences are in the main and substantially 'the same.' But however true this may be, it in no way supports the contention that the feeling, which in fact 'colours' these experiences, is a pleasure or a pain in general and in the abstract. On the contrary, it is one and the same subject who feels and wills and knows; and the pleasure or the pain is the feeling of the subject, who is 'knowing' or is 'willing,' and moreover it is his feeling precisely in so far as he is *thus* 'knowing' or *thus* 'willing.'

Metaphors of some kind, I will admit, are inevitable; but the metaphor of 'colouring' seems peculiarly unhappy. A coloured object, let us suppose, is rightly analyzed as a material (*e. g.*, wood or iron) which is coloured, and a pigment (*e. g.*, red) which colours it: and in all coloured objects the material is relatively substantial, and the pigment relatively adjectival. The same red pigment, let us further suppose, when painted on wood and on iron, would *look* the same even to the acutest vision aided by the most powerful microscope. And finally, let us suppose,

the pigment would in fact *be* the same, and would not be affected chemically, or in any other way, by the nature of the iron or the wood. Let us suppose, in short, that a 'coloured object' is a 'whole,' which is rightly analyzed as material *plus* a qualifying, but unqualified, pigment. But from all this, I can draw only one conclusion: that a 'whole experience' is a very different kind of 'whole' from a coloured object.

§ 11. It is a wholesome discipline to summarize a discussion, if only because its defects will thus come more clearly into view. I will therefore conclude by retracing the course of the preceding argument.

It is commonly held that no question can be raised as to the reality of pleasure or pain, and my first task was to develop this common opinion. *What* we 'know,' may be true or false, real or illusory. *What* we 'will,' may be good or bad, important or trivial. On the other hand—so it seems to be thought—*what* we 'feel' is neither true nor false, neither good nor bad, neither real nor illusory. For 'feeling' has no *what* distinguishable from its *that*. The *esse* of 'feeling' is *sentire*; pleasure and pain are simply the feeling-pleased and the feeling-pained, the mere lapses of the feeling consciousness. And just as the fact of our 'knowing' or 'willing' (the fact of our perceiving, imagining, judging, deciding, etc.) is indubitably certain and sheerly actual, whatever we may 'know' or 'will,' so the fact of our 'feeling,' which is the pleasure or the pain itself and in its entirety, is beyond question 'real,' since it is sheerly actual. There is no possible sense in which one pleasure or one pain can be more or less real, less or more illusory, than another (§ 1). It would indeed appear that 'feeling' in general, whether pleasure or pain, must be qualitatively distinct from 'knowing' and from 'willing'; and that 'feeling-pleased' in general must be qualitatively distinct from 'feeling-pained.' But pleasures cannot differ qualitatively from pleasures, nor pains from pains. All pleasures are the occurrence of the same unaltered minimum content; and the emphasis and duration of the occurrence may vary, but not its character. Similarly, one pain may differ from another in intensity or duration—the occurrence, which is the feeling-

pained, may be more or less emphatic and more or less lasting—but pain differs from pain in no other respect (§ 2). So paradoxical a view might not unnaturally be regarded as an idle travesty. Yet—as I tried to show in § 3—it is in fact assumed by many of the traditional arguments for and against hedonism. And if pleasure and pain are thus identified with the feeling-pleased and the feeling-pained, a more radical subjectivity than is usually recognized infects the so-called ‘quantitative’ distinctions between pleasures and between pains. ‘Measurement,’ in any ordinary sense of the term, is impossible. Only the comparing subject’s present feelings can be compared; and he alone can compare them (§ 4).

In § 5, I proceeded to examine the distinction between the fact of ‘knowing’ and what is ‘known,’ between the indubitable *that* and the true or false (the real or illusory) *what* of ‘knowledge’; and I suggested that the distinction, as thus formulated, is untenable. In any ‘knowledge’ there is, no doubt, a somewhat apprehended and an apprehending of something; but these *distincta* are essentially correlative, and any variation in either of them is necessarily also a variation in the other. The supposed unassailable certainty of the ‘fact of experiencing,’ when the ‘fact of experiencing’ is perceiving, imagining, judging, or any form of ‘knowing,’ is therefore a mistake. The ‘fact of experiencing’ is inseparably bound up with the somewhat experienced. And as the whole—the ‘knowledge,’ which is the apprehending of something, or a something manifest to an apprehending mind—is true or false, real or illusory, both the correlative factors, which analysis distinguishes within it, exhibit corresponding distinctions. A detailed justification of this view would lie beyond the scope of this paper; but I endeavoured to illustrate it from the main varieties of ‘perception,’ viz., perception of fact, illusory, imaginative, and dream perception. And I anticipated and repudiated the charge of advocating ‘subjective idealism’ (§ 6).

Next, it was urged that ‘feeling’ demands an analogous distinction, since there too analysis must recognize the ‘fact of the feeling’ and the ‘somewhat felt’ as correlative and inseparable

distincta. Pleasure and pain are names which properly attach to the whole experience; and the whole experience is more or less real, less or more illusory. What is felt may be real and genuine, or illusory, dream, and imaginary; it may be characterized as sensuous or æsthetic or intellectual. And these distinctions are necessarily reflected in the 'fact of the feeling,' since that is nothing but the occurrence of the somewhat felt (§ 7). But if pleasure and pain are 'whole experiences' at all, are they not non-relational wholes, which do not admit of an analysis into related factors, even if the factors be conceived as correlative and reciprocally conditioning one another? Perhaps this is true of rapture and agony, the extreme pleasures and pains in which the feeling subject and his whole world are submerged; yet even then it seems doubtful whether rapture is always qualitatively identical with rapture and agony with agony. Differences of character, differences of reality and illusoriness, and not only differences of intensity and duration, seem to force themselves on our recognition even here (§ 8). And the ordinary pleasures and pains are not themselves 'wholes,' but features in larger experiences where the subject is 'knowing' and 'willing' as well as 'feeling.' The language of everyday life abundantly recognizes that such pleasures and pains exhibit qualitative differences, and are more or less real, less or more illusory, one than another. Against this recognition there appears to be nothing, except the claim of our opponents that they have substituted a precise scientific analysis for the confusions of popular phraseology. They maintain that 'feeling' is merely an adjectival aspect of such larger experiences, an aspect which colours the other more substantial elements of the whole without itself being in any way affected by them (§ 9). But this analysis seems on examination to be anything but scientific. For the pleasure or the pain in some of these whole experiences is no less substantial than the other constituents; and even when it is 'adjectival' or relatively subordinate, there is no reason to suppose that it is unaffected and unqualified by the elements which it is said to 'colour' (§ 10).

That neither 'knowing' nor 'willing' nor 'feeling' are mere

states of a self; that always, even in imagination and dream and error, and even in pleasure and pain, the subject is essentially in communication with something other than himself; and that all these experiences are more and less real, and less or more illusory—all this I have suggested and tried to maintain, though I can hardly claim to have proved it. But at least I may hope to have convinced others of what has long seemed certain to myself, viz., that the question which Plato raises with regard to the reality of pleasure and pain is one of the utmost importance. The view that 'feeling' is neither real nor illusory, but sheerly actual, is far from self-evident or obvious. If it is not untenable and false, at least it stands upon its defence. And I do not think the defence will be easy.

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THE RÔLE OF THE TYPE IN SIMPLE MENTAL PROCESSES.

ALL agree at present that most of our real consciousness concerns itself with things or ideas rather than with sensations or bare images. We see things, not sensations; we remember things and events, we do not merely re-instate sensations; and above all we reason about things and our actions are controlled by consideration of events. The treatment of meanings and other representatives of things in connection with reasoning has been altogether accepted and has been carried to a point of fair agreement by a number of recent writers. It is possible and interesting to trace the effects of similar references on logical memory, on perception, and on action.

But before the question of the effects of the use of references rather than sensations can be discussed, the problem of the nature of these references, of the ways in which things differ from sensations must be faced. Two theories are current as to how things or their representatives, the perceptions, are related to sensations. One is that a percept is nothing more than a combination or fusion of sensations or a combination of sensations with memories. The visual percept of a box would, on this theory, be made up of certain visual sensations of certain forms and gradually changing intensities where shadows were cast. The percept of the under surface of a desk is made up of certain tactual impressions combined or fused with visual images that have been received from similar surfaces and which are now suggested by the tactual impressions. In each case, perceptions are to be regarded as compounded of sensations. Where the original elements cannot be traced, it is assumed that some process similar to chemical combination results, in which the product is not at all like the elements that enter into it. The perception is related to sensations as water to hydrogen and oxygen. The second theory, which is current in different forms, is that the thing is not at all made

up of sensations, but that it is represented by a series or group of movements that have been made at different times in response to the thing, or in using the thing. These are reinstated to represent the object when it is recalled and are largely responsible for the qualities of the thing at the moment of its original perception.

Each of these theories is open to objections. A percept cannot be a mass of sensations, for sensations are not immediately distinguishable in the perception; and if one argues that the components are merely lost in the combinations, it is easy to show that the image regarded as made up of sensations is not at all like the object that it represents. This can be seen most easily in vision, where the image on the retina may be compared with the resulting perception. The image lacks all solidity, the angles are not as they appear in the interpretation we put upon the object; in every respect, the thing that we see is unlike the group of sensations that might be said to constitute the percept. The interpretation put upon the sounds that are heard are very little like the sounds that strike the ear. The hasty inaccurate speech is translated, if the words are appreciated at all, into perfect words. One is seldom conscious of the imperfections, unless they are unusual. The sensations, by every test that may be applied to them, are very different from the words that are heard, or the objects that are seen, or the objects or movements that are felt. It is sometimes asserted that the thing that is seen is merely an old memory or group of memories that is suggested by the sensations. This, too, is not sufficient, for one never has seen and never could see an object or even a plane surface in a way or from a position that would make the image correspond to the thing. A square object always has sides that converge in the image on the retina, while one sees them parallel no matter from what position one looks. A plane surface is always bounded by lines that are modified by the spherical surface of the retina. Straight lines seem to curve outward from the center and all lines will be similarly modified. One cannot appeal from sense to memory; for while certain of the abnormalities of sense have been seen more accurately earlier, others are never corrected in sense as we think them or as we see them in im-

mediate perception. Fusion of sensations or even fusion of sensations with memories can never give objects as they present themselves in perceptions or in memory and imagination.

The other theory has the advantage of starting from the assumption that sensations can never give things as we think them or see them. This theory developed from the recognition of that fact. If the actual mental content is not like the thing that is represented, some other content must be found that shall take its place. One that is always present in connection with perception and may be present in memory is movement. Many movements are often representative of things and events, and all might be, as is seen from the use of movements in speech. Uses and movements, too, play a very large part in the development of the idea of things. Movements, then, might very well constitute the means of interpreting sensations and of recalling and representing old experiences. Actual observation of perceptions or of memory material, however, indicates that they are not exclusively or even usually composed merely of movements. The qualities of things as we think or see them is not the same quality, or not exclusively or even essentially the same, as the qualities of movement. Recall a perfect square, then make or think one after another of all the movements that might be connected with a square. It will appear that the two sorts of consciousness have little in common. True, one can occasionally find movements in connection with the perception or with the thought, but they are not at all predominant in the consciousness of the object. And just as sensations cannot be so compounded as to make the representatives of the object, so movements are not adequate to the perception or to the memory. One cannot make movements that are as accurate as the differences that can be distinguished through the senses. One cannot sing as slight differences as can be perceived. Most persons have difficulty in singing accurately tones less than a half-tone apart, while they may distinguish differences of a fraction of a vibration. So, too, distances may be distinguished that are less than the least movement of the eye that may be accurately controlled. One can remember differences that cannot be represented by movements, and can

recall qualities that ordinarily have no movement connected with them in their appreciation. Movements, then, are not adequate to explain the percepts and memories, any more than are complexes of sensations. The theory, however, recognizes the problem, and is therefore a step in advance of the fusion theory.

As opposed to both of these theories, it seems to me that one must hold that the development of the idea of the thing or even the percept of the thing must be much more complicated, while the content of the idea must be largely made up of both sensations and movements. Far from looking at the development of the percept or of the idea of the thing as a mere complex of sensations, or of a group of movements, it is evident that the development is more complicated and requires much time for its completion. The various stages in the development of an idea cannot be followed in detail. Much of it must have taken place before the individual was fully conscious of the processes involved. But, if one may conjecture from what can be seen at later stages, it is probable that the development of these interpretations of sensations is not unlike the development of scientific hypotheses and theories. The image suggests the general outline, but it is modified by trial and use until it will harmonize with all of the various experiences under which that object or objects in general are seen. The eyes, for example, furnish two images of every object; by practice and through the use of the object it is found that two images mean one object. Almost from the beginning of intelligent seeing, the two images are always interpreted as one object, and slight departures are interpreted as an indication of the distance of the object rather than as increasing the number. Two touches upon contiguous fingers are taken to mean one object rather than two. If one object be held between crossed fingers it is taken to be two. In each case, one does not accept the sensations for their face value, but transforms them in the light of experiences.

This modification by experience is not at all conscious. Much of it must have been done before the individual was at all aware of the nature of the data or of the processes of manipulation.

In fact, it must have been done before the world or anything could be understood at all. It seems most probable that it was a process of trial and error. An interpretation was tried and when it failed, some other was tried in its place. This trial was in many cases actual and involved movement. One may have tried to handle or to eat the first object that gave two images to the eyes, and when thus tested it was found that the two images represented but one object. This final test was accepted as more real than the two images, and now when two images present themselves they are interpreted as one, because we know that when tested they will prove to be but one. Similarly, we overlook contrast colors or the shadows of the retinal blood vessels or other imperfections in the media of the eyes, because we have learned that a more adequate test would show that these are not external. On the more positive side, we ascribe qualities and positions to sensations or to groups of sensations that they do not have if these qualities enable us better to systematise our knowledge of the objects. Sounds are referred to a definite place on the basis of the different intensities of the sound as heard by the two ears or of the different qualities that a sound has as it comes from one direction or the other. These differences are not appreciated for themselves, but different references have been tried under varying circumstances until one is hit upon that most nearly suits the results of actual experience and use, and that is kept as the real interpretation. In every sense department and in every relation of experience these interpretations have been developed through the necessities of living. Now, when any occasion arises for their use, they are suggested. This resulting interpretation we may call the type, since it resembles the different experiences from which it has originated, but is regarded as more real than any.

The type, then, has developed in experience from the necessity of obtaining some means of harmonizing various experiences of the same object. It develops in the same way and for the same reason that the idea of the atom has been developed by the chemist, the idea of ether by the physicist, or the idea of the cell by the biologist. Each finds its principal warrant in the necessity

for some notion that will give order to the discrete experiences. Each has apparently developed by a process of cut and try until some idea has been found that fits the known facts, and each is changed as the known facts change. The ideas of science develop consciously, and usually as a result of purposeful investigation or thought, while the types of the practical life develop almost altogether without consciousness of the process and with no intent or awareness of the end that they are to subserve. The process of development is in part the result of mere passive comparison of different experiences; in part it is a process of correction of an image by use, by movements of different sorts. Probably in every case active uses have played some part in giving the type its present character. A table is known to have a square top because it will fit into a square corner, or because it must be sawed square when made, or when a similar object has been made. An after-image is not ordinarily noticed, because if you reach for it there is nothing there. The justification of the type is that it works when applied, whether the application is to organize knowledge or to supply food. However the type may have developed, it is accepted as real when it is developed, and as more real than the particulars from which it may have developed. These types are regarded as things and are opposed to the particular images which are regarded as mere sensations. In the same way, the atom or the molecule or the ether is regarded as the ultimate reality as opposed to mere colors. These fundamental principles and things are more real than the conscious qualities because they serve as a safer guide for conduct and for thought. Through frequent repetition the type is aroused at once on presentation of the stimulus. The sensory stimuli are altogether overlooked. We seem to perceive things at once in their real nature, and all of the steps that intervene are hidden. It is not at all appreciated that what we regard as the ultimate nature of things is the product of many different experiences and tests that have been made in the earlier life, and that what seems to us the immediate datum of our senses is really the outcome and formulation of much learning.

If, then, the type is the outcome of much experience and much

trial, the question at once arises, What is it in itself? What qualities does it possess as a mental state or mental process? This problem is rather more difficult than the question how the types developed. Sometimes types are thought of as slightly modified images, sensory processes with the inconsistent elements omitted, or with something else added that makes them fulfil conditions that the sensory impressions do not fulfil. Thus the ordinary visual percept loses shadows, the contrast colors, the after-images and shadows of retinal blood vessels that cover it; the curved lines are straightened, the obtuse and acute angles are changed to right angles, reflected images are interpreted as smoothness or polish, and to the flatness of the image is added the solidity of the third dimension. When these changes are made the image becomes a thing; the type replaces a mass of sensations. The retinal image and the type are in this case quite similar and the type is merely the image modified and elaborated. In other cases there is little imagery in connection with the type, and what there is is little like any particular experience. Of such a character is space. When one sees space, there is little distinguishable similarity to what one actually thinks. As you look out into the room, there is little in the way of imagery to discover. It is itself composed of other types of simpler character. One appreciates depth or distance in the third dimension and flat two dimensional space in various combinations and these together constitute space. If we consider the representation of the third dimension as characteristic of the spatial idea in general, we see ~~that~~ it cannot be a pure visual image; for, as Berkeley long ago said, distance cannot be seen; it is represented on the retina only by a point. The fixed stars and a point of light ten inches away have the same effect upon the retina. Nor can we say that the motor processes connected with the different adjustments of the eyes alone give the impression of depth, as there is no muscular sensation to be distinguished and different muscular adjustments in certain individuals and under certain conditions seem to give rise to the same idea of distance. The same reasoning excludes all the other possible suggestions for the exclusive content of the depth idea. Double images,

perspective, suggested reaching movements and movements of locomotion are not consciously present in the idea of depth, and may be present at times without the corresponding depth suggesting itself. In such a case it seems probable that the consciousness of the type is dependent upon more or less explicit reference to the different experiences and uses that have given rise to the type. Just as meaning may be said to depend upon the partial recall or readiness for recall of all the cases that are meant at any time, or recognition can be said to be due to the partially aroused past connections, so distance depends upon the partially recalled uses and responses that are suggested by the conditions at the moment. As you look at the black-board, the distance between it and the desk is partly seen as felt tendency to change the adjustment of the muscles of the eyes from one object to the other, partly it is a slight suggestion of the movement necessary to walk from one to the other, partly it is the appreciation of the way the distance would look if seen from the side; all of these and many other old uses, responses, and connected ideas tend to return under the present conditions of looking. Taken together, they give rise to a definite consciousness, and this consciousness it is that constitutes your type or standard of this distance. It is this distance freed from the limitations of the particular set of conditions and circumstances. But the consciousness of this type is neither sensory nor motor alone, but it is the felt possibility of recalling old uses and connected ideas. The center from which these suggestions irradiate is in itself hardly appreciable. The content is lost in its references. In the character of their content, types range from fairly specific images, corrected to meet the test of experience, to those in which the old uses and possibilities of use are practically all that can be discovered. Whatever content types may have they do together represent all things. Types are accepted as the ultimate reality and most of our thought and perception uses and deals with them.

After we have discovered the nature and origin of the type, the rest of our problem is comparatively simple. Types themselves may be difficult to understand and somewhat abstruse, but in

use they are the most simple and practical things imaginable,—probably just because they are things as we think them. For purposes of psychological description, all mental operations may be divided into two groups,—those that deal with the raw sensations and images, and those that deal with types, with things. It is probably truer to say that psychologists divide into two groups according as they deal with mind as if it were made up of raw materials or as if it were made up of types. For most of our actual thinking is in types; the raw sensations and images are useful only as they illustrate the simplest mental laws to which many of the more complex phenomena must be referred for an explanation. Of these two sorts of phenomena, the laws for the raw material have been most fully developed. This is natural because these laws are simpler and are also fundamental in many ways for the other sorts of material. Then, too, in experiments one must begin with new, unorganized materials, and it is only now that we are getting prepared for the more complicated, if more familiar, problems and conditions. Assuming that there are two different sorts of material used in all mental operations, we may proceed to the task implied in the title and compare in each field methods and results of dealing with raw materials with those of dealing with types.

The first place that we meet the type is in perception. As has been seen in the earlier discussions, the type dominates perception in practically every respect and in every detail. We see types everywhere, we feel types, or things, we hear types. Most of our difficulties in the psychology of sensation arise from the fact that we neglect sensations for their interpretations, for the types. We are not aware of the different sensations that arise from the moving member, because they are at once replaced by the idea of the amount and direction of the movement. The static sense gives rise to no independent sensations for the same reason. The stimuli from the semi-circular canals either merely call out the appropriate response, without coming to consciousness, or they are effective in consciousness only in arousing the idea of the position of the body in some typical form. They are lost in the interpretation. This fact that the sensations are always sub-

ordinated to the type and are often altogether indistinguishable in the result accounts for the unreliability of introspection in the study of sensation. It compels us to rely almost altogether upon indirect experimental methods in that field of investigation. And most of the controversies originate from a confusion of the type or interpretation with the sensations, or from the impossibility of freeing the sensation from these additions. Everywhere, then, we perceive things, not sensations, and these things are types. Things are types, space and time are types, relations are types. All the products of perception that have any meaning are types, are the products of much organized experience brought to bear upon the momentary stimulus, rather than the immediate effect of that stimulus upon the organism. The nearest approach to bare sensation is found in the after-image, contrast colors, and other processes of the sort that have no meaning in the outside world. Even these probably imply some little reference to earlier organized experience before they may be appreciated, and so cannot be called absolutely raw material. The study of perception, then, is almost altogether a study of types, and the essential part of the psychology of perception is a study of the laws of the development of types, which were discussed in the earlier part of this paper. The other important problems are the determination of how the type is suggested at a given time and why just that type and no other is suggested. The answer to these questions is familiar to all. Our present end is attained when we have pointed out that what is perceived at any time is the thing, and that the thing is not for psychology a mass of sensations, or a mass of movements, but a type, a concept.

More striking is the contribution of the type in the memory processes. More striking because there is in memory something to oppose to memory of types or of things, while in perception the type is everything. It is customary to distinguish rote memory from logical memory, and rote learning of nonsense material from learning of sense material. Logical learning deals most completely with types; nonsense material is the nearest approach to raw material, has least of the typical. Most of our learning after the very early years is of the logical sort, while most experi-

ments have been made upon nonsense material or with other forms of rote learning. The preference of investigators for the more mechanical learning is easily understood. It is much simpler to control, and the laws of learning that are exhibited are also involved in the more complicated sort. The differences between the two sorts of memory are primarily in the greater ease of learning, the more accurate and longer retention for logical learning. Twelve nonsense syllables require from twelve to sixteen repetitions for retention. The same number of words or ideas are retained after one repetition, in fact twenty-four words of verse may be retained with ease after one repetition, and ideas are probably more easily and quickly learned. Similarly, according to Ebbinghaus, more than half of the work done in learning nonsense syllables is lost within twenty-four hours, while when ideas are once thoroughly assimilated they persist for an indefinite period. Henderson found that reproductions of ideas were only from one-tenth to one-fifth less accurate after two days than immediately after learning. There is no extended investigation of the course for longer periods of time, although it is the sort of testing that all school work is assumed to involve. The probability is that the two sorts of material exhibit the same general course of learning and forgetting, except for the more rapid rate for the nonsense material. The laws that have been developed for nonsense syllables and similar materials apply to sense, and even to logical learning after proper allowance has been made for absolute values.

The explanation of the difference between the two sorts of learning develops naturally from the characteristics that the type possesses, and the way in which it has developed. When one learns a new idea in ordinary reading or conversation, the idea is not completely new or it would be neither understood nor learned. Rather, if it is an idea and not a mere mass of words, it must be in some way connected with what has been known before. It is similar to other things that have been seen or appreciated. These it recalls when understood. It is already connected with the system of knowledge, and this system of knowledge is nothing more than a system of types. It is a mass

of experience that has been systematized and harmonized through many perceptions, has been tested in actual practice or by using it to explain other elements of knowledge. Just as the perception is corrected by other ideas and by the tests to which the percept is put, so these types, which together make up the system of knowledge, have been worked over and corrected until the different elements constitute a perfect system. In very large part the process of correcting is through other perceptions; the only difference is that there is a little more working over in pure reflection, a little less of the sense contribution. When, then, any new idea is understood it is merely connected with some similar element in the system of knowledge.

When a new element is thus taken up, it gains some of the qualities of the type with which it is united. These types are little subject to decay with time. They are relatively permanent, and this permanence attaches at once to the new acquisition. Types are permanent primarily because of their frequent use. One thinks of table in general thousands of times where one thinks of specific tables once. One thinks of the principle of the conservation of energy daily, or hourly even, if one has anything to do with physical science. It is not forgotten partly because it is refreshed so frequently. Partly, too, the type or general principle is not forgotten because after things have been partially forgotten and reinstated several times they are much more permanent than when they have been learned but a few times. One, of course, need not at all go to these most abstract general principles for illustrations of things that have been impressed to the point where their retention is practically unaffected by the passage of time. It may be found in any of the simple principles of every day life. The catches on doors and windows, the phenomena of combustion, the simple laws of mental and physical hygiene become deeply ingrained in the same way, and when any new principle or fact may be referred to them it is understood, and with understanding it is prepared for retention. Most new ideas are thought of, when learned, not as new ideas, but as merely new applications of old things or laws. All that is needed, then, is not to learn the new in all of its relations, but

merely to make the one connection with the old. That can be done very much more easily than a new fact can be learned. Even if, as is frequently the case, it must be remembered as something slightly different from the general principle, the learning is very much easier than the unaided learning. Nonsense syllables must be gone over again and again, and the connections must be forged painfully one by one, and when formed they leave practically no trace except a slightly increased capacity for new learning that decreases rapidly with time. A new principle in physics or chemistry is at once referred to some familiar experience, and when several such ideas are acquired together and each referred to its place, they are fixed by a single repetition, and when fixed may be remembered for years. Even if the specific place and time at which the fact was learned and all other extraneous connections are forgotten, the fact itself will be remembered and may be used. The permanence that comes to the type from frequent use is immediately transferred to the specific instance that appears but once. In all learning of this sort the completeness with which the idea is understood is more important than the number of repetitions. This means that the essential thing is to connect the new with the type, and that this is not so much dependent upon repetitions as upon readiness to see connections, similarities, and analogies.

For recall, too, the thing that is understood is very much better off than the thing learned by rote. Recall depends upon the connections that are formed with related experiences, and the types, by the very nature of their development, are connected with hundreds of other events and possible occasions for reinstatement, while material learned by rote is connected with one or two associates only. As a result, facts that are understood are fairly sure to be recalled whenever they may be used, while mechanical learning insures return only in the particular connections of the first learning. Knowledge properly assimilated is, by general agreement, usable, and to be assimilated the particulars must be referred to types. In all three respects, then, reference to types aids memory. It makes learning easy, it makes the learning permanent, and it insures recall on the proper

occasion. Each of these advantages depends upon the fact that types have developed and been connected by manifold repetitions and applications. This means that the system of types is primarily a system of manifold connections, an organized system. The types, too, are capable of endowing the new element that is referred to them with their own connections. The new gets the benefit of the work done upon the old material at the expense of a mere fraction of the work.

Recognition has been even more closely related to types by the results of experimental work. There were for a long time two important bits of research on recognition that gave completely different results, the investigations of Wolfe and Lehmann. Wolfe worked with tones of slight difference in pitch and came to the conclusion that recognition had the same relation to time as had the retention of nonsense syllables for Ebbinghaus. Accuracy of recognition decreased rapidly with the lapse of time,—varied with the logarithm of the time, in fact. Lehmann worked with shades of grey for the most part and found that time had relatively little effect. Frank Angell with similar methods found that for half a minute the results actually were even more accurate for the shorter times. The difference between the two results can be explained by the degree that types were called in to aid in recognition. Wolfe's material was of tones too close together to receive any name, or other marks of identification. Lehmann's subjects on the other hand always made use of some word or other symbol that might be used as a basis of reference, as a type in the sense in which we use the term. They at first had five words and could then recognize five shades of grey with certainty. When they were trained to refer the shades to numbers, they could identify nine shades with certainty, or as many as they had developed types. All material that may be named or referred to other standards may be recognized with certainty over longer periods of time than material that is not referable to standards. The accuracy of the one is independent of time, the other decreases very rapidly with the time. The type plays much the same rôle in the recognition of familiar objects. If we recall an event from the past in some dim way, it seems to float

uncertainly until we can attach it to some very familiar event, with some house that we lived in at a certain age, with a certain school, or with some other memory that has been recalled sufficiently often to be part of the system of prominent events in our life. When we get the unfamiliar connected with one of these important landmarks, it is accepted as placed. It is not necessary to trace the entire series of events from it down to the present. The familiar series of events is a series of types. They have been lived through so frequently in memory and have so many cross references that they are never questioned. When the dimly familiar memory or face is connected with one of them we are satisfied. They give it their own qualities in the same way that the types give their own associates and permanence to the new idea that is understood.

That reasoning deals with these types in all of its operations goes without saying. The idea of types developed in connection with reasoning. Historically the notion has developed out of the concept; that was the first attempt to understand how a particular mental content could represent a number of different things. The concept and the type are practically identical; the type is used more for perception, the concept for ideas. Each of the stages of the reasoning process involves the type. Judgment is a process of understanding an object or situation, and understanding consists in a reference to the system of types or concepts. All reasoning in general terms deals with types and all proof is in terms of the system of knowledge. Suffice it, then, to say that reasoning in all of its phases can be understood only in terms of types.

Very much the same story can be told of action. As has been said, actions are very closely connected with the development of types, and with their development acts get organized about the typical as one phase of the development of the type. After the types are developed they control acts just as they dominate thought and observation. The acts are organized into groups that have been useful in a definite situation, and the group of acts is usually aroused at once as a result of thinking of some familiar typical end. Going in to dinner, going to a lecture, or

going to bed have been developed into consistent groups. Each is thought of as a whole, and its representative in consciousness is a type, a concept. This it is that ordinarily initiates the movement. If a situation is understood before action it must be by a reference to a system of types, and when thus understood the appropriate action is a part of the understanding and is made at once. Reference to its appropriate head and preparation for action are identical, or are, at least, parts of the same process. If the situation is not understood, but some action is demanded, the typical responses are tried one after the other, until one is found that suits the situation. In any case responses are made in organized groups that have been developed for typical situations; ordinarily a type of some sort is the stimulus that guides and controls the act, and the act is an integral part of the type. Action, like the more intellectual operations, is dependent upon, and finds its explanation in, the organization of experience, the organization that gives rise to types in thought, and in perception and memory.

In brief, then, mental life is everywhere concerned not with immediate sensation or image but with things, with real events, and ideas. These things or ideas or concepts are not composed of sensations, but they are results of working hypotheses that have sprung up spontaneously and have been confirmed by experiences, or have been modified with experience, until they have taken on a form that is adequate to experience. The mental life of any individual is an outcome of a system of knowledge that is adequate to his life. It is not merely made up of parts that are consistent with his experience but the parts are organized into a consistent whole of numerous interrelations. When thus organized and fully developed, the type is taken for the thing, the real. The system of types is the system of knowledge and this is the universe of ultimate reality. We usually oppose each to sensations and images as the external universe, as the true in opposition to the passing sensation or illusion.

When organized, this system of knowledge dominates every field of mental life. One perceives types and calls them

things. The sensations are lost in the type. We see only real things, the sensations serve only to suggest them. Memory, too, is of types. One does not learn an altogether new thing. One merely finds a new instance of a familiar type or some instance that demands a slight modification of the established type. Unless the new can be connected in some way with the system of knowledge, it will be learned only at the expense of a vast amount of repetition, and then probably will be learned only when some sort of new system has been developed. One remembers and recalls easily only the matter that has been understood, and to be understood is synonymous with being referred to the system of knowledge. Recognition, like understanding, is always by reference to organized experience. Every phase of reasoning develops from an interplay of the new with the familiar—of the unorganized with organized. Here, as everywhere, the effect of the system is contagious. When the new is referred to the old it takes on the characteristics of the old. The unorganized is organized, the unfamiliar becomes familiar. Action, too, grows out of organized knowledge. The motor system is organized *pari-passu* with the sensory. And acts are the outcome of referring a stimulus to its old organized responses. To be understood a stimulus must be appreciated by reference to the system of knowledge, and to be effective the act that results must have been organized. Ordinarily the organization of the response and of the knowledge are related parts of the same process. Everywhere, then, mind can be understood only with reference to organization and the resulting types and system. One sees types, one learns by reference to types and recalls through the system of types. One understands and proves through the typical, and acts are both organized about types and aroused by types. No mental process can be understood apart from the type. Without the system of knowledge mind would be chaos.

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PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE, 1910.¹

THE activity in 'religious philosophy' and in the 'philosophy of religions,' which last year produced so many interesting works, since then has not been so fertile; but it has not ceased.

M. Victor Monod, in his *Problème de Dieu et la théologie Chrétienne depuis la Réforme*, combines keen insight with a large use of historical material in an account of the manner in which the change in social ideals has transformed the theology of God as sovereign into one of God as moral person.² M. Segond, in his thesis for the *doctorat-ès-lettres*, attempts a complete psychology of prayer, based on an analysis of the large body of evidence on the subject to be found in mystical and theological writers.³ His psychology is not of the experimental type, which studies the phenomena from without, as one indifferent to them might, but rather a psychology based on an internal analysis made by a believer, and one which even tends to a certain degree to justify what it studies.

An important work left in manuscript by the late Professor J. J. Gourd, whose fine career in philosophy I commemorated in this REVIEW last year, has been published—*La philosophie de la religion*.⁴ It was unfortunately unfinished, and has been completed for publication by the addition of some extracts from an earlier book, and of notes taken in the courses which the author had given on the same subject. But this retouching affects only the last few pages. Three-fourths of the book had been prepared for publication by M. Gourd himself, who desired that it should be printed, even if his illness did not permit him to complete the revision. Besides, the first part of the work, which he was able to prepare completely himself, is also that which will certainly interest philosophers most. A fine preface by

¹ Translated from the French by Professor E. H. Hollands.

² Foyer solidariste, Saint Blaise.

³ *La prière, étude de psychologie religieuse*, Alcan.

⁴ One vol. 8vo, Alcan.

M. Boutroux gives the essential spirit of the work, and reminds us how intimately in the character of M. Gourd the man was united with the thinker. "It is not enough," he was fond of saying, "to know what philosophy teaches us; the essential thing is to practise it and to live by it."

His fundamental thesis is that the supreme value consists in the enlargement of the spiritual life. This enlargement takes place in thought, in action, in art, in social life, and has a two-fold character. On the one side, it is an expansion which proceeds by coördination, and as such obeys strict laws; on the other, it is an intensification, not subject to the conditions which limit it in its first form, but free from all law. This creative life of spirit, when it is conceived synthetically, and especially when it is symbolised in an ideal person, is precisely what we call religion.

This presupposes a proof, in the first place, that there is an element refractory to coördination, corresponding to everything in our experience which we can coördinate, and that this *in-coordinabile* has the characteristics of what we call the Divine.

That science consists in coördination cannot be doubted. Whether under the form of arranging perceptions in an ordered body of observations, or of the classification of particular instances, or of the implication of effects by causes, it always appears as a logical organisation which establishes continuities and identities. But every procedure of this kind supposes also the presence in things of a character opposed to this. The limit approached by the scientific study of causation is the absorption of the cause in its effect, their equivalence in terms of energy; but science exists only because that identity is not attained. If the effect differ in any respect from its cause, that in which it differs is an absolute novelty, and therefore an element which escapes our coördination. If, on the contrary, each fact be entirely explained by its antecedents, then there would be nothing new in it, nothing independent, nothing which was not implicit in what preceded it; every state of the world would be equivalent to that which produced it, and Eleaticism would be the only truth. Deny causal indetermination, and you at once make

causal determination impossible. The same thing is true of the species and its individuals; every assimilation presupposes a diversity which furnishes its matter. Again, we cannot convert qualities into quantities, or psychical into physical, without omitting from the systematic connection, which our understanding legitimately demands, a whole group of terms which are refractory to that connection, and which nevertheless alone make it possible. Perfect intelligibility would be radical identity under all categories, that is, it would be nonentity. It follows, therefore, either that nothing exists, or that reality is "thoroughly diverse" in one of its aspects. "All that is original and living in modern philosophy repudiates the identification of the real with the intelligible."

This element which is refractory to theoretical coördination is then neither chance nor miracle. It is not mingled with that in things with which science deals as the tares are mingled with the wheat in a sheaf, but it makes one body with it as color does with extent, or the individual with its universal. It introduces no exceptions into the world of regularity, and no *lacunæ* into that of continuity. It does not menace the results of science, for it is not 'against the law,' it is only without it. It is the Absolute, if one please, but a pure Absolute, freed from the parasitical ideas of infinity and necessity which have been often, and very wrongly, associated with it in the history of philosophy.

Nor is it the Unknowable. It does not follow because it is inaccessible to conceptual and scientific knowledge that it escapes every effort of our mind. One may comprehend it, even if it cannot be scientifically explained. The mode of thought which is proper to it, and which permits our mind to grasp it, is the direct envisaging by the mind of that which is individual.

But does it pertain to religion? Yes, if one can decide to abandon the outworn forms of the religious consciousness, and retain only the essential and permanent tendency which sustains it. Religion is mystery, intuition, revelation, beyond and superior to understanding. In its relation to the laws of science, it is supernatural. It is the introduction of an end for which discursive knowledge is only a means. Now the incoördinate

element is exactly all this. Our 'vocation as men' is a condition which dominates science, and is not itself an object of science. The positivistic attitude, experimental or mathematical, however legitimate it may be, yet needs a permanent corrective. That attitude habituates us to the ideas of uniformity, stability, the inexorable necessity of things, to the thought of our dependence on the physical world and on society, to the sentiment of our insignificance in the face of infinite time and space. If it alone ruled us, would it not paralyse all out action? *Cui bono?* would be the eternal question to which no answer could ever be given. We must either give up life, or else find another possible perspective, a point of view which allows of hope and confidence, and justifies action. Faith, which makes possible the discovery of the *incoordinabile*, is the synthesis of these three needs. In this synthesis it gathers up all that is fruitful in the ideas of religion. If it allows the anthropomorphic images and the physical miracles in which traditional theology used to formulate its conceptions to be lost, we need not regret them.

As beside science there is room for a different order of knowledge, so beside morality there is room for a practical attitude which goes beyond it, and which also deserves to be called religion.

Morality is an enlargement of wills by coördination, just as science is an enlargement of intellects. It also is built up partly on the basis of similarity, and partly on that of continuity and implication. It is a system of rules which govern our life. It makes honest men, men capable doubtless of refining the ideal which their age sets before them by their delicacy, or of making it more precise by their scruples; in the end, however, men who are characterised especially by abstinence from evil, and essentially of the legalistic type. Now in addition to such irreproachable conduct there are heroism and sacrifice, which make up the moral *incoordinabile*. This goes further than one supposes. The soldier in warfare, the pastor or the magistrate confronting arbitrary violence, the physician in the hospital, merely obey the moral law. Danger is written among the articles of their professional duty. True sacrifice is quite another thing. It is distinguished, in the first place, by the strength of its fervor.

It commences with those instances in which a man, while only doing his duty so far as the quality of the act is concerned, does infinitely more by the exceptional intensity of the sentiments which he incorporates in his action. But the especial characteristic of sacrifice is the way in which it transforms the logical hierarchy of moral ends. According to the only moral code which is capable of formulation, in a case of conflict, the more urgent and fundamental needs should prevail over others. If, for example, the passion for art or science were ruining one's health, a prerequisite for so many other moral ends, it would be one's reasonable duty to abandon it. Yet who would refuse to admire those who gladly make such a sacrifice, to the detriment of ordinary and moreover justifiable moral precepts? Who would be without feeling for the supramoral grandeur in the unreason of the absolute Christian, who gives his cloak to him who demands his coat, and who turns his left cheek to him who has smitten his right. "Sacrifice is the irrational element in practical life; by its end as well as by its intensity, it is directly opposed to law."

The moral code and sacrifice are thus distinguished as co-ordination and inco-ordination, in respect to the object of action, and as obligation and liberty in regard to its subject. Their opposition becomes even more striking as morality perfects itself, and carries sacrifice with itself to higher degrees of purity. At present this antinomy is a stumbling-block to theologians and even to sociologists. The only way to get rid of it is boldly to put heroism outside of morals, and in the sphere of religion. For who, so much as Christ, has baffled methodical formalists, the righteous who are merely righteous, proud of making their acts conform perfectly to the law? The folly of the cross, the folly of Christians, is the very phrase of the Apostle Paul. *Loss* is the essential character of sacrifice; not a momentary loss to be repaid with large interest, terrestrial or celestial, but a *loss* pure and simple, radical, final. And the paradoxical side of the matter, which yet cannot be denied if one consider the history of moral ideals, is that this loss is a good, and perhaps the highest of all goods. There is a joy in death, not only in a

useful and fruitful death, but in every death which is freely willed and chosen out of an heroic impulse. The splendor of the funeral march of Siegfried is due to the fact that turn by turn there burst out in it the motives of youth, of glory, and of beauty, in an ever more impressive contrast with the final sacrifice. Is not the belief in this moral *incoordinabile*, which almost defies individual freedom, also one of the fundamental characteristics of religion, and especially of Christianity?

Such a duality is perhaps even more evident in æsthetics. Here coördination is classic and harmonious beauty, perfection as Mendelssohn and Winckelmann understood it. It is not difficult to see in what direction the domain of art transcends this. The value of the sublime is no less high, and it can neither be systematised nor expressed by canons. It also is "without the law." It embarrasses the æsthetician just as the individual embarrasses logicians and heroism moralists. It is based on coördination, it presupposes it—since it is not a mere absurdity—but it surpasses it and makes it seem inferior. It is also obviously connected with religious tradition. Judaism, Hegel justly observed, is the religion of the sublime. It is because of this that the representation of God by images carved by human hands is so severely forbidden. Beauty is merely the expression of life. Trite as it may be to say it, it is a noteworthy truth that the sublime is a concrete witness to our sentiment and need for that which transcends life.

Finally, in the social order as well we find coördination and an *incoordinabile*. The coördinative activity is present in the life of society in so far as it is a system of connections and fellowships, both functional and morphological, subject to rules. As elsewhere, it produces an extensive enlargement. Its progress consists in uniting the greatest possible number of individuals, so that the society may represent the greatest power possible, both materially and intellectually. Like science, it first binds beings together in concrete groups, dominated by the principles of differentiation and adaptation, as for example in a family or in a city. Then it goes on to unite them in abstract groups, on the principle of similarity, such as professional, artistic or philan-

thropic guilds and societies. But this coördination is not the whole of social life. If the extensive enlargement of a society were the sole value involved, a small state would be wrong in jealously guarding its independence instead of enriching the vast organism of a neighboring state by allowing itself to be merged in it; and yet we regard its resistance as righteous. The reason is, that the social bond can also be enlarged intensively; in regard to social norms, as in regard to every other law, *insurrection* is sometimes a good. The anarchist is a criminal, since he attacks the law; but great revolutionists are heroes, for they are without the law. And by that very fact, they belong to the sphere of religion: *ubi spiritus, ibi libertas*. The same disposition which is the source of moral sacrifice and of artistic creativeness is present also in the great transformers of the social order. The sole true Church is the Church of Freedom.

This is Mysticism, if one like to call it so; but one of a very different type from that of the ecstasies who only free the soul by impoverishing it, by emptying it of all its diverse content. This mysticism, on the contrary, retains all the lower or incomplete forms of the life of spirit, and vivifies them by its effort to keep always in contact with the *incoordinabile*. "In spite of our weakness, some time or other we have all been given one of those moments in which we in some way seize the true root of our life, and elevate and enlarge our whole being by a mysterious effort. The reaction was doubtless brief. Our categories and distinctions took possession of us again at once. But it is no small thing to have disengaged ourselves from them for an instant, even though imperfectly and partially, not out of weakness, but out of superabundant strength. Not only have we thus unified our spiritual life, but we have also lifted the point of departure of our different disciplines to a higher level, and have given them a richer content and a keener insight than they had before. And even if everything takes the same position as before, it is at least with new meanings, which may perhaps make possible new developments."

For the expression of all these sentiments, for their consecration and effective evocation, it is well to retain the name of God, freed

from the outworn and inadmissible forms of traditional theology. The God of orthodoxy, useless to science, dangerous to morality, a mere hypostasis of the lower and conservative types of law, should be replaced by a conception which is not new, but really older than it, that which animated nascent Christianity and which fermented also in the souls of the first Reformers. God is no longer to be the Universal Being, but rather the Absolute; He is not to be the creator and controller of nature, but rather the liberator from its oppressive systematisations, the luminous centre of our hopes and of our possible consolations. And since He is thus the ideal expression of personality, we should conceive Him as personal and as free. A divine person is the only adequate symbol of incoördinate values, of what is 'beyond the law,' of the absolute. Thus we may retain all that is vital in traditional Christianity, especially in its Protestant form. "Without laying rash and disrespectfully revolutionary hands upon it," we may yet animate it with a spirit which shall free it from the formalism and bondage of the Law.

Such are the principal lines of M. J. J. Gourd's argument. I have been obliged, in order to make them clear, to omit the abundant ingenuity and philosophical subtlety of the details. Even in the guise of this very dry summary, perhaps, the reader may have felt that this is not only the last work of an able mind, but also the testament of a great soul.

To be sure, the work belongs to its age in many respects. It takes its place with exact precision in the movement of liberal Protestantism, which grows stronger from day to day. And it is also true that without the dissolvent criticism of Bergson and of William James, it would not have been possible, even for a fellow-countryman of Secrétan, to have expressed so completely his profound faith in that which is 'beyond the law.' Yet these are after all conditions, not causes, of the book; the doctrine of the *incoordinabile* is itself a manifestation of the spontaneity which it analyses.

It is of course open to grave objections. The two points most open to attack, in my opinion, are the radical identification of the *incoordinabile* with the divine, a step which it in many ways

resists; and the failure to give sufficient consideration to the fact that moral progress involves a common aim, a task which is being accomplished, so that great moral innovations, however unforeseeable and inexplicable they may be as to their circumstances, yet take their place in a convergent series, and thus supply matter for a higher form of coördination. The Absolute, as M. Gourd defines it, seems to me matter and means much more than end. But of how many meanings that term admits! They have almost nothing in common save the sentiments of ultimate value and of moral satisfaction which accompany them.

In another work in pure metaphysic which has just appeared, and which shows the same desire to justify its author's faith, and to give a proper place to the Absolute, this term has a different and almost precisely opposite meaning, since it stands for complete coördination. The work of which I speak is a study, partly historical and partly polemical, which M. Charles Dunan has just published under the title of *Les deux idéalismes*.¹

The *pars destruens* is the larger one in this work. In fact, according to the author, it is not even necessary to destroy; we need only to open our eyes to discover that all that lies before us is in ruins. All the metaphysical structures which men have tried to raise during the last three centuries have at once crumbled into dust. Public opinion has even come to take absolutely no interest in them, and uses the very name of metaphysics only as a term of disparagement. The chapter entitled "Modern Philosophy Judged by Itself" is extremely severe, but also extremely interesting, because of its entire lack of any complaisance or consideration. What has been done in the problem of knowledge? The ancients and the scholastics stated the true problem of Idealism with admirable clear-sightedness. Is there, or is there not, anything supraphenomenal involved in the phenomena of nature and in man himself? Is sensation quite crude, or is it interpenetrated by an ideal element? For the problem thus stated, and properly stated, Descartes substituted that of the origin of ideas, which led philosophy astray and made its discussions sterile. For two centuries the question whether there

¹ One volume 12mo, Alcan.

are 'innate ideas' was discussed. To-day the opinion is fixed that there are none of the kind of which Descartes was thinking. And as the Cartesian position was the representative, although a very misleading one, of the ancient Idealism, that also was considered as disproved. Its name became a *bonum vacans*, and was assumed by the doctrine which reduced external objects to objective states of consciousness. Because Cartesianism thus led astray the true rationalistic tradition, and Kant, because of those complications in his system in which he delighted, was unable to influence the majority of minds, to-day naïve Empiricism is the only standpoint of most educated men. Without criticism or hesitation, as if it were the most natural thing in the world, they make mere success their only standard, and do not see that such an apotheosis of practical ability is the bankruptcy of intellect. "The man who wishes to make a good and lasting work must be able to think, and to think correctly. What would become of civilisation, if political jobbers were our only statesmen, popularisers and mechanical inventors our only scientists, and arrangers of words, sounds, and letters our only artists? In failing to give thought its proper rank, Empiricism mutilates human nature, and thereby proves the nullity of the epistemology which produced it."

Modern metaphysics has also come to grief on the problem of God and on that of human destiny. Here again the supposed classical proofs, both metaphysical and moral, which drew all their strength from tradition only, fell at the first blow of criticism, and left behind a void which nothing has filled. The metaphysics of nature is no better off. Philosophers have declined to construct it, and the failures of their predecessors justify their prudence. Scientists care nothing for it; and their 'theories' are but partial systems, which they themselves feel in duty bound to describe as conventional, symbolic, and purely arbitrary. Pure science is not open to attack; but it is only a repertory of terms. So we have no real theory, and no determinate orientation which would allow us to hope for one.

The origin of this evil is in the method of "clear and distinct" ideas, that is, in the substitution of the mathematical and me-

chanical ideal for the Platonic, Aristotelian and Thomistic method, which respected the qualitative differences of things. Excellent though it was as a foundation for the sciences, or at least for those sciences which do not deal with life, Cartesian mathematising made all really philosophical speculation impossible. The prejudice in favor of universal mechanism, and the effort to maintain such a mechanism in its entirety, while merely superposing something else upon it, have been the radical vices of all modern philosophy—vices from which neither Spinoza, nor Leibniz, in spite of his efforts towards dynamism, nor Kant, held fast by the logic of his presuppositions, were free.—The greater part of the book consists in a demonstration, partly historical, partly dogmatical, of this thesis.—It follows that the true metaphysical method is quite different; it should proceed qualitatively and by conceptual analysis. In every individual which exists and is an object for sensation there is a universal *in re*, which does not exist separately, which cannot be ‘verified,’ but which is nevertheless an object of knowledge. This universal can be thought only as it is apprehended in a particular object; one cannot think without an image. But, nevertheless, imaging is not thinking; to think is to affirm as true or as real that which one images, and such an affirmation is an act of the intellect distinct from representation pure and simple. It is metaphysical; but is also the most normal and common intellectual operation. Active minds are constantly making metaphysics without being aware of it. Only philosophers sometimes abstain from doing so, and that by a critical attitude which it is impossible to maintain for long. Every conception which is not purely nominalistic and symbolic is a partial synthesis of experience. Complete philosophy would be a synthesis of these syntheses, made by the same procedure; its real object, therefore, is nature, and not a transcendent something which exists ‘in itself,’ apart from and outside of nature.

By adopting this standpoint, according to M. Dunan, we could found a metaphysic which would not be the brilliant but transitory system of an individual, but a work of long and patient effort, admitting of collaboration and of continuous and pro-

gressive advances. Such a return to the ancients should not mean the adoption of their system, but that of their admirably chosen method and categories, of the notions of idea and individual, form and matter. By the aid of these categories we should construct a *complete* conception of nature, homogeneous with the conceptions in actual use which facts of every order suggest to us. Science, history, the living tradition of mankind, and the religious experience of Christendom will furnish us precious materials which were lacking to the ancients; M. Dunan does not conceal the fact that he is a Catholic philosopher, and the spirit of Catholicism is very obvious in the background of his work. Such a total view will not be a certainty, but a probability subject to revision, and requiring the complement of faith. And just in the fact that it is this will consist its utility and its vitality. The passion for definitive certitude is an absurd and dangerous folly of youth, for philosophy as well as for individuals. It would be extremely unfortunate if, because they could not attain this puerile ideal, men should not try to attain any conception of life, its end and its value.¹

The reader will have noticed that much of this argument is open to question. For example, it admits, on the authority of certain physicists, doubtless of brilliant talents, but often and forcibly disavowed by their colleagues, that the ideal of science is analytic formulation in purely abstract terms, an algebraic nominalism the sole purpose of which is to supply the means of measuring and calculating phenomena in advance of their occurrence, without in any way representing them. If all that lies beyond these narrow limits is to be called metaphysics, then nine-tenths of the physicists would energetically claim the right to be metaphysicians; and in doing so they would assert that they were not overstepping the boundaries of science, since they rightly define it by its demonstrative validity, by the free assent which it evokes in men's minds, and not by any particular shibboleth imposing this or that method upon it. In a very noteworthy lecture on the Brownian movement, delivered several

¹One can get an idea of the nature of this positive philosophy from the large text-book in philosophy which M. Dunan published several years ago, entitled *Essais de philosophie générale*.

months ago, and published in the *Bulletin de la Société de Philosophie*, M. Jean Perrin, professor of physics at the Sorbonne, showed how large a place is held in modern science by this same concrete mechanism which the abstractionists wish to expel from it. On this point, then, the documentary bases of M. Dunan's argument are shaky. The radical perceptionalism which he professes is more disconcerting, but perhaps, in the last analysis, better justified. He reverses the celebrated saying of Malebranche: "The sun which exists above us is invisible; that which we see is but a phantom created by our senses and our understanding." For M. Dunan, on the contrary, the only Sirius which 'exists' is the brilliant point which seems to float in the air one hundred and fifty metres from me. *Ens est quod percipitur*. Such a view certainly makes little of the discordance between the perceptions of different minds. Is not existence precisely the objective value of a thought which is common to those minds? This is an obvious difficulty, which demands an answer. Yet it must be said that this perceptionalism, paradoxical as it may be, finds a place prepared for it by a tendency noticeable in France for several years. M. Bergson took an analogous position in his *Matière et mémoire*, and M. Binet in his *L'âme et le corps*. At present one often hears it said that "perception must be reinstated in the order of things." This thesis needs explanation, and doubtless correction as well; but it is certain that it represents an idea which is active at present. It is to be hoped that it may help towards a reform of our very unsatisfactory epistemology.

For the rest, whatever objections may be raised to the conclusions of *Les deux idéalismes*, one must admire in the book the force and subtlety of a profoundly individual thinker, whose only aim is to satisfy the demands of his intellect and of his faith, and who never makes any concessions to popular tendencies and tastes. Thought produced by pure love of philosophy is itself a great philosophic 'value.' It should be added that M. Dunan is a writer as well as a thinker. More than one page of his book would deserve a place in an anthology of *acute dicta* for the clarity and precision, the life and the zest of its style.

Why are there so many works in philosophy of which one could not say as much?

II.

I began this résumé with metaphysical works, because of their dignity. But it must be admitted, in accordance with M. Dunan, that such works do not take the first place in the attention of the public at large, or even in that of the philosophical public. The questions chiefly discussed continue to be those which have to do with the normative sciences, and especially with the possibility of a rationalistic ethics and the conditions of moral education, whether during or after the time spent in school. Ethical societies, although they are not numerous in France, at least keep up an energetic propaganda. Almost every week the men who are occupied with philosophy, with education, or with teaching, receive invitations to attend or to take part in discussions of questions of this kind. The Union of Freethinkers and Freebelievers, the group which bears the name of the review *Foi et vie*, are friendly rivals in this field with the Union for Truth, the Ethical Section of the École des Hautes Études Sociales, the Positivistic Society, and the League for the Improvement of Public Morality. The discussion is not acrid, save on one point: the criticism of secularistic ethics by the defenders of Catholicism. In France, and in Belgium also, the sociological theories of morality, and the school manuals of laïcised ethics, have been the objects of attacks which would be very interesting to us, if their talented authors had concerned themselves less with writers personally and more with their ideas. I will not undertake the analysis of these polemics, which lie outside of philosophy in too many ways. But within the limits of our proper subject, one of the most actively discussed questions continues to be that of the ends and means of moral education. The idea of an 'independent' ethics, once furthered by the admirable eloquence of Guyau, and which long seemed the only possible form of lay ethics, to-day has able adversaries. M. Delvolvé, already known by his essay, *L'organisation de la conscience morale*, has just attacked this vital question in a work entitled *Rationalisme et tradition*, the real subject of which is better expressed by its

subtitle, *Recherche des conditions d'efficacité d'une morale laïque*. Starting with the fact that however excellent a precept may be, it remains a dead letter for those who receive it from without, without any justification save abstract reasoning, he tries to determine, on historical and psychological grounds, what it is which must be added to normative judgments in order to make them rules efficacious in producing action. The result of his analysis is that ethical ideas, in order to exert real authority in practical life, must offer the following characteristics in as high a degree as is possible: (1) aptness to fuse with natural tendencies, that is, connection with an actual, strong and persistent form of spontaneous action; (2) an application which is general, and yet capable of being represented by a concrete intuition, since the abstract has no influence on conduct; (3) a great abundance of clear and stable elements, to facilitate attention and memory; (4) numerous associations with those ideas which recur most frequently in ordinary life; (5) a systematic connection with a common centre, allowing them all to be embraced in a single view.

Most of these psychological conditions were well met by the traditional education in morals, which was expressed in immutable religious formulas, connected with the existence and the will of God, personified in Jesus Christ, made an integral part of a complete organic view of life, and completed by the promise of rewards and the menace of future penalties. In the attempts at an independent ethics intended for school use, however, these conditions have been almost always disregarded. The anxiety to determine canons of morality and to justify them scientifically has made their authors forget that the thing of first importance was to make them potent and to express them in a form which would move the whole being. M. Delvolvé proves this by a comparative analysis of Christian and laïcised ethics under three heads of doctrine: marriage, suicide, philanthropy and charity. As examples of the Christian method of teaching he cites the Catholic Catechism, the Imitation of Jesus Christ, the *Pensées* of Pascal, Bourdaloue's sermons, the correspondence of St. Francis de Sales, and Malebranche's *Traité de morale*; as examples of

the laic method, the *Morale à l'école* of M. Payot, the *Leçons de morale* of MM. Rey and Dubus, the *Études de morale positive* of M. Belot, the *Pour l'école laïque* and the *Devoirs* of M. Jacob, and the *Solidarité* of M. Leon Bourgeois.¹ What does one see from this comparison? On the one side, few reasons are given, or none at all, but impulsive and inhibitory ideas, and motives well-adapted to bring about the realisation of the moral ideal, are brought effectively to a focus; on the other, there is ingenious reasoning, which is sometimes even profound and logically convincing, but the effect of which on consciousness is only superficial, and never sets in action the great energies of life. Here, much more than in theoretical difficulties, is the origin of what is to-day referred to in France as "the crisis in morals."

But once the evil is recognised, it may be escaped. It is only necessary to give up the dangerous ideal of an ethics which is self-subsistent, independent of any metaphysical theory, "evident as geometry," and demonstrating by irreproachable reasoning the grandeur of duties both individual and social. We must, on the contrary, make ethics depend intimately on an *idée-force*, as M. Fouillée would say, and on the most powerful of such ideas to be found. It is not difficult to discover this idea, provided one knows the history of moral education, and examines without prejudice the resources of the human mind. MM. Leuba, Boutroux, Hébert, Murisier, and Montmorand have all taught us the unequalled power possessed by the *sentiment of the divine*. Here, as August Comte so justly believed, is a motive for action unique in its efficiency, and the only one which can supply what we are demanding from education.

Up to this point believers applaud M. Delvolvé, and invoke him, not without reason, as a witness to the powerful attraction which the religious ideal exerts on unprejudiced moralists. But he was not fighting for their party, since he rejects the orthodox form of this sentiment of the divine almost as energetically as the most 'advanced' partisans of an independent ethics. He does not even retain the most general characteristics of the Christian

¹ M. Durkheim is also cited, but only as to a passage of his book *Le suicide*, in which he criticises the inadequacy of the present education in morals.

ideal, for he wishes to bring about a "naturalistic transposition" of the religious sentiment. No more dualism, no more transcendence; the consciousness of the unity of all being, of the community of all ends, and faith in their certain realisation—such is his own summary of the minimum of tradition which he would retain, and which he regards as sufficient to call into action the great energies of the human soul. Such a doctrine is well known outside of France; but until now it had scarcely any representatives here.¹ It is connected with the enthusiastic monism of Haeckel and M. Paul Carus, which has as its bases the sacredness of life, the morality of normal instincts, and the cultus of the complete development of the individual and the expansion of the species. Love in its double form, or rather in its double meaning, biological and sentimental, is the great impelling principle in this philosophy. The joy in life and in multiplying life are its fundamental sanctions. Of course, social feeling has a share in it, for who would think of eliminating it in our times? But it is clearly subordinate to the strictly vital impulse, the sentiment of universal optimism, and the faith that all of nature is good.—It may be interesting to recall that M. Delvolvé is the son-in-law of Eugène Carrière, the painter-philosopher, "visionary of reality," whose fragments and letters he published some years ago, and to whom, as artist and as philosopher, Professor Séailles has just devoted a book of criticism.² "Admiration of nature," wrote Carrière, "leads us to admire human nature, its conscious expression, and thus makes us comprehend that everything forbids us to degrade it." The inference, a logician might say, is somewhat bold, but however this may be, the passage would be an excellent epigraph for the conclusions of M. Delvolvé.

A more temperate work, and one more in harmony with the traditions of our philosophy, is that of M. Parodi, entitled

¹ M. André Cresson, who expounded it in his *Bases de la philosophie naturaliste*, (one volume 12mo, Alcan, 1907), did so with a discretion which showed how little philosophical readers in France were accustomed to it. On this subject one may also consult the chapter entitled "Haeckel and Monism" in M. Boutroux's work *Science et religion*, (Flammarion, 1909), analysed here last year.

² Eugène Carrière, *Écrits et lettres choisies*, Ed. du Mercure de France, 1907. G. Séailles, *Eugène Carrière*, Armand Colin, 1911.

Le problème moral et la pensée contemporaine. It is chiefly historical, and would be an excellent work to recommend to anyone who wished a general review of the various tendencies which have appeared among French writers on ethics during the past fifteen years. M. Parodi examines the biological type of ethics, as whose representative he chooses Dr. Metchnikoff, the sociological ethics of MM. Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl, the rationalistic, and at the same time social, ethics of MM. Belot and Landry, and the psychological ideo-motor ethics of M. Fouillée. He also mentions incidentally the ethical theories of Rauh, of Durand de Gros, and of Brochard. But M. Parodi does not restrict himself to an objective study of systems; he also draws his personal conclusions in a chapter which bears the modest title "The Data of the Ethical Problem." I do not believe that one could find a clearer sketch of the attitude towards this problem taken by the rationalism which prevails in the teaching of our schools. Doubtless, says M. Parodi, sociology is needed to instruct us and enable us to avoid utopias; but it is powerless to help us to a decision when we are really confronted by several possibilities. Then we must needs consult our conscience. But not every conscience is valid; only an *enlightened* and impartial conscience has any worth. Everybody admits this restriction; but what does it signify? Obviously that the impersonally rational has in some way a subsistence which is independent of individual minds, and has a value greater than their personal impulses. In all men, then, there exists a common higher nature which rules by right over the inferior nature. One must either deny the existence of any moral problem whatever, or else admit this hierarchy. Even to begin to reflect on good and evil, is already to accept the legislative power of reason.

In point of fact, however, has not reason almost always appeared in the history of philosophy as a destructive power? Stoicism ended in the praise of suicide and studied indifference to all the accidents, that is, to all the realities of life. Christianity issued even more definitely in hatred of nature and the flesh. Its rigorous practice would lead to absolute renunciation, strict chastity, and a suicide of the race. And modern rationalism

is no less negative; conscience, reflection, the search for reasons, are mistresses of doubt, indecision, and inaction.

There is a way out of this difficulty. Reins are a means to check a horse, not to make him go on. A rudder merely neutralises on one side the force of the wind or of the engine. Yet that does not prevent their being excellent as means of guidance. The same thing may be true of reason; the material for its guidance is not lacking. Without this material, which life alone supplies, the moral law would be merely an empty form, an abstract, ineffectual and useless principle. But once the material is given, reason governs and transforms it to a degree where it can no longer be recognised. The essence of morality consists entirely in this readiness to consider our spontaneous impulses from *above* and from *without*, objectively, and in relation to the legislation of reason. This inclination is a very real and efficacious one, for in beings such as we are, fashioned by all the discipline of science and of social life, "the need to think and to comprehend has become at times as profound and as irresistible as that to eat and drink." And so, even when it is reduced to the purely formal need of avoiding contradiction and inconsistency, the moral sense remains a principle of action. It may be supported by other sentiments; but its specific character is always that same power of thinking in general and universal forms which is also the necessary condition of rational knowledge.

"Thus," M. Parodi concludes, "moral action also involves an act of faith; but such an act is equally implicit in every activity whatsoever, in every effort towards the future, in every belief that tomorrow will go on where yesterday left off, in a word, in all of life. Evidence and logical certainty, rigorously considered, apply only to what already is or has been, and not to that which wills or which ought to be."—But this inevitable act of faith has to do with reason, and with reason only. We believe that our efforts have a meaning, that perhaps they will not be in vain. Thus we meet again the generous *sperabimus* of M. Fouillée, confidence in the effectiveness of our free action and in the value of human ideals, as the ultimate metaphysical postulate not only of morality but of all thinking and of all living.—And why

should we not admit that this elementary belief, when given a profound interpretation is already religious, in the broader sense of the word?

So at the end of the most 'laïc' of books we unexpectedly meet again the same idea of religion with which this article began. Yet it seems to appear here in quite another meaning than that of M. J. J. Gourd. Religion here is no longer that which transcends reason, but reason itself, manifested in the laws which it sets for knowledge as well as for action. But possibly this opposition is not so radical as it seems at first; for if the belief of which M. Parodi speaks is belief *in* reason, it is not a belief which is itself contained in reason and which enters into the coördination which it imposes on our conduct and our thought. It is the conditions of this labor of logical organisation, and consequently external to it, and on a different plane; it is not a product of the intellect, but rather the fundamental act by which the mind legitimates its attempt at a rational systematisation of knowledge and of action. Thus this belief really participates, for M. Parodi, in the character attributed by M. Gourd to the sublime and to sacrifice. To make use of an expression long out of fashion, but apparently now in favor again, one might say that this belief, also, belongs to the domain of the "*au-delà*."

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Dogmatism and Evolution: Studies in Modern Philosophy. By THEODORE DELAGUNA and GRACE ANDRUS DELAGUNA. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1910.—pp. iv, 259.

The *genre* under which this volume should be classified is not altogether easy to determine. The authors speak of the book in the preface as a series of studies making "little claim to systematic unity" except a "unity of purpose and of point of view." But this does their work both less and more than justice. It is not a collection of detached essays. The chapters are, as a rule, not self-contained nor intelligible separately. What we are given constitutes, as a matter of fact, two distinct treatises—though both are products of collaboration. Of these, the first presents a single argument in an admirably orderly and sequential manner, but is brought to an abrupt termination before reaching any clear solution of the problem discussed. The second treatise offers somewhat more definite and more constructive conclusions, but its argumentation is less consecutive and less coherent; and its contentions do not appear to gain any additional force from the reasonings of the prior part of the volume. Between the two parts, in short, there is no close relation,—and such as there is it is left to the ingenuity of the reader to puzzle out. Of the book's content as a whole, therefore, it is hard to speak in general terms. But though the work lacks unity of theme, and even though its unity of purpose is not always conspicuous, it gains a genuine unity of effect from the philosophical temper and method which characterize it throughout. The authors bring to the arena of philosophical discussion among us a welcome and somewhat unusual combination of qualities. We have for a time been passing through a period of heated partisanship in philosophy, and one of the most absorbing (and not necessarily least agreeable) occupations of philosophers has consisted in wondering, not always inaudibly, over the imbecility of their predecessors and contemporaries of other schools. Among the philosophical writers of the younger generation the authors of *Dogmatism and Evolution* appear 'more than usual calm.' While they cannot be charged with careless eclecticism, the line which they take is essentially that of a *Vermittlungsphilosophie*; they apparently aspire after the beatitude of the peacemakers, and seek to harmonize much of the doctrine of

Hegel with much of the doctrine of Professor Dewey. They are contemptuous neither of the past nor of the present; they endeavor to elucidate each by means of an analysis of the hidden presuppositions of the other, and by exhibiting the course of those underground and often unsuspected streams of influence which flow from the one to the other. Their treatment of the history of 'philosophy' is thus, to a somewhat exceptional degree, vivified by an alert and sympathetic apprehension of contemporary problems and of the most 'up-to-date' tendencies; while their discussion of contemporary problems gains a certain freedom from the limitations of prevailing intellectual fashions through a large and often penetrating understanding of former controversies and of disused systems.

From writers who so excellently unite a judicial temper, historical scholarship, breadth of intellectual sympathy, and logical perspicacity, American philosophy may expect contributions of substantial value. The total contribution made by the present volume, though it is not inconsiderable, is less great than such a combination of qualities might seemingly have made possible. It is not, I hope, too unappreciative a comment to make upon a book containing so much original and profitable matter, to say that it produces upon the reader the impression that the value of its content might easily have been doubled with a little more ripening. The first part needed to be completed; the second part to be clarified and unified, to have its ingredients boiled together until they were ready to crystallize; and the "unity of point of view" which doubtless connects the two needed to be made a great deal more explicit,—if the matter which the book contains was to take the form in which its potentialities should be fully actualized. There are here hints or fragments of ideas so interesting and significant that it is a pity that the presentation of them falls short of the maximum of effectiveness.

Of the first half of the volume I can speak only briefly. It surveys the whole of modern philosophy from Bacon to Hegel with reference to the views taken by the great epistemologists upon three closely related questions: (1) the existence of an immediate and infallible perception of truth; (2) the existence of ultimate simple elements of thought; (3) the externality of relations. All the pre-Kantian epistemologists, the writers show, in spite of their differences held identical views upon these three essentials; both rationalists and empiricists assert or imply that *some* truth is immediately and infallibly apprehended by the mind, that knowledge is built up by relating ultimate simple units of thought (either primary concepts or else

individual sense-impressions), and yet that the relations between these elements are extrinsic to their essence and existence. The argument by which the "common basis of empiricism and rationalism" is exhibited is a skilful example of the logical analysis of presuppositions in the history of thought; it will reward the reading of all students of philosophy. Yet even where the identity underlying opposing doctrines is successfully shown, it is less significant than the authors suppose. The "direct and infallible perception of truth," for example, which the rationalist asserts, is a perception of general and objective principles transcending the privacy and the transitoriness of the individual's consciousness; according to the strict empiricist, one has such perceptions only of the particular and momentary content of present experience. The 'truth' said to be 'perceived' in the one case is of an essentially different order from that said to be perceived in the other; so that there is, after all, little point in insisting that, in either case, the perception is said to be immediate and certain. It was, the authors go on to observe, in their common assumption of the externality of relations that both rationalists and empiricists became involved most deeply in logical difficulty; in Hegel we find philosophy definitely abandoning this assumption, and passing to the other extreme—to the doctrine of the essentiality of relations. But this too proves self-refuting. All of this historical analysis, especially in connection with this last question, seems to have been intended to lead up to an attempt at a solution of the problem; the authors seem about to show us a new way out. But unhappily that solution is only hinted at in two Delphic sentences (p. 110): "The plain fact of the matter is that expanding knowledge means, on the one hand, the *transformation of external relations into essential relations*, and, on the other hand, *the establishment of new external relations*. In other words, it means the solution of problems in terms which themselves raise new problems." I should not have supposed these sentences to be equipollent; and the fact mentioned in the first I do not find at all "plain." On the contrary, I am unable to conceive how any relation of any entity or concept can (in the proper logical sense) *become* 'essential,' if it has not always been so. If what is meant is merely that, with the progress of knowledge, originally disconnected facts are increasingly discovered to be necessary implications of general truths themselves necessary and self-evident, I still feel a difficulty; for I can observe in science no such universal tendency to exhibit all the empirical items of reality as 'organically' related by reciprocal logical implication. Since the discovery of such relations

could apparently only be a disclosure of implications already—and eternally—existing, the authors' "plain fact" would involve a metaphysics as rationalistic as Hegel's; while I do not suppose the most thorough-paced rationalist ever denied that a detailed apprehension of the way in which each separate item of the universe implies all the others must be attained by men gradually.

Yet this obscure formula is apparently meant to be the clue to the hidden unity of the two parts of the book, and to the chief thesis of both. For the work seems to have been planned as a comparison and a higher synthesis of pre-evolutionary and evolutionary epistemology. Both parts end with a hint that the philosophy for the future is to be found in some sort of combination of the Hegelian rationalism with the conception of knowledge as a process of development in which there continuously takes place not merely the accretion of new content but also the readjustment of internal structure. But the second part of the volume, unfortunately, in its treatment of pragmatism—which stands as the representative of evolutionism in the theory of knowledge—does not deal with any of the three specific problems with which the first part is concerned. The result is that the conclusion of the second part does not relieve the obscurity of the formula about the nature of relations with which we are left at the end of the first.

The criticism of pragmatism offered in the latter half of the book aims at the merit (somewhat rare in that controversy) of novelty. It is ostensibly a criticism from the inside; the conclusions of the pragmatists are controverted in the name of their premises. In this as in many other reforming movements in philosophy, the authors remark, the error of the reformers is not that they are too extreme but that, in their logic, they are not extreme enough. Their new creed is "only half-free from the grip of the traditions which it openly repudiates." Were it wholly free, it would not find so much to repudiate! A little 'instrumentalism,' no doubt, inclineth man's mind to pragmatism; but depth in instrumentalism bringeth men's minds about to something much resembling rationalism. Here, evidently, is a mode of criticism likely to be exceptionally interesting and essentially constructive, if it can be carried through.

Bearing in mind the notorious equivocality of the term, the writers have taken some pains to define which pragmatism they are discussing. In a useful and illuminating appendix, pragmatism is distinguished from several other doctrines that have frequently borne the name—though the result is an increase of the already deplorable confusion

concerning the meaning of the technical terms involved. In the body of the book, the pragmatism with which the authors propose to deal is characterized by them, in general terms, as an attempt—the first serious attempt—to apply evolutionary and, in particular, Darwinian principles to logical theory. In its essence, then, it is the doctrine of instrumentalism, which asserts “that thought itself has arisen as a mode of organic adjustment to environment, that its whole development has been, and is, determined with reference to this function, and . . . more particularly, that all distinctions and terms of thought, *i. e.*, all meanings, are relative to the specific conditions which have called them forth and to the functions which they perform.” The implications of the doctrine may, however, be more specifically divided into theories about (a) the meaning of ideas, (b) the criterion of truth, (c) the nature of reality. (a) The pragmatist theory of meaning is not altogether clearly or consistently defined; in the main, what the authors seem to signify by it is the contention that, when new ideas are acquired in the course of the learning-process (in consequence of the practical necessity for making finer discriminations between the circumstances under which a given object is advantageous and those under which it is injurious) the relation of the new idea “to the vaguer idea within which occurred the distinction that gave rise to it forms no part of its meaning.” With this seems sometimes to be joined as a part of the pragmatic theory of meaning the contention that the significance of an idea for conduct is always direct, immediate, and specific. (b) The pragmatic criterion of truth is defined as having two elements: first, the consistency of an assertion proposed for belief with already existing beliefs; and second, its serviceability in the guidance of conduct. Both elements are summed up by the pragmatist under the generic notion of ‘satisfactoriness.’ This generalization does not necessarily involve any disregard of the specific distinction between ‘intellectual’ and other interests demanding satisfaction; though it does imply that the test of truth is the magnitude of the satisfaction as a whole, no one species having any rightful claim to precedence over others. Such a conception of the criterion, however, carries with it the abandonment of any hard and fast distinction between belief and knowledge. What we are said to ‘know’ is merely what we believe most strongly, with the least sense of dissatisfaction and unrest, at any given time; absolute truth, incapable of correction, can, from this point of view, be at best only an ideal limit of the convergence and solidification of our now conflicting and tentative beliefs. (c) The pragmatist theory of reality is defined as the doctrine that

"nothing is real except in so far as it makes a difference to us," as the formula "that reality is the object of interest." This is a formula which I could wish to have amplified; as it stands I must confess that it conveys no very luminous idea to my mind. I should like to know what *kind* of difference a thing must make before it can gain the credit of being real. The formula has to the untutored ear a rather subjectivistic ring; it seems to suggest that the world consists of 'us' and of 'things,' and that the latter can subsist only by virtue of a certain relation to the former. But the charge of subjectivism, the authors tell us, cannot fairly be brought against pragmatism as they define it. Just how these three doctrines in particular are all logically engendered by Darwinian biology, or instrumentalist psychology, is not very plainly shown.

Our authors' own position with respect to the pragmatism thus defined is less firmly outlined than one could wish. At the beginning of their discussion of the doctrine they declare it to be "true at bottom, and especially true as against the opponents of pragmatism." But when one comes to their comments upon the three specifications of the pragmatist doctrine, one finds a rather mixed situation: (a) The pragmatist theory of meaning, as expressed above, is rejected. (b) The pragmatist theory of the criterion of truth appears also to be rejected. (c) The "pragmatist theory of reality" apparently nowhere gets discussed. One gathers that the authors have a good deal of sympathy with it; but just how much, and for what reasons, the reader will hardly be able to determine. Moreover, the criticisms urged against the first two theories are by no means exclusively made from an 'internal' or instrumentalist standpoint; and the essence of instrumentalism itself (as defined by the authors) is, as I shall show, unmistakably, though scarcely explicitly, repudiated. The result is that the reader gets a baffling sense of having before him an uncommonly interesting programme which is not completely executed or even consistently adhered to.

Of the criticisms upon the pragmatist theory of meaning I lack space to speak—though perhaps the most striking and most successful thing in the volume is the argument which shows, by the method of the functional psychology itself, that an idea is useful in the choice of effective action precisely in proportion as it has ceased to have direct reference to any *specific* mode of action,—in proportion as its definite meaning consists less of 'import' and more of 'content' (pp. 162–170). More significant philosophical issues, after all, are involved in the discussion of the pragmatist's account of the criterion of truth. This,

it is contended, errs, in the first place, in representing the conformity of a judgment with our logical demands as merely a means to 'satisfaction' as such. Pragmatists have been led to this view through their uncritical acceptance of an assumption derived from Darwinian biology,—namely, that "the whole utility of a newly arising function consists in the accomplishment of *previously existing* ends." Yet it is just this assumption which pragmatism, of all doctrines, should most promptly repudiate; to accept it is "to give up the whole instrumentalist position without a struggle." Mental evolution consists precisely in the emergence of new functions and new ends. Thus the desire for happiness has supervened upon the impulses making merely for survival, and given to the appetency of the highest animals a whole realm of novel objects. Similarly there has been evolved in man a desire for certain purely intellectual values—for 'truth,' form (consistency) or material (correspondence of expectations with facts). And to find this demand satisfied does not necessarily mean the attainment of any other kind of satisfaction, nor a preponderance of satisfaction *überhaupt*. "The total satisfaction of the agent is irrelevant so far as the truth of his belief is concerned." With so sensible a conclusion one cannot quarrel. But I am uncertain whether any pragmatist (especially if, as we are told, the will-to-believe is no proper part of pragmatism) would quarrel with it either. The argument of the authors seems to be aimed chiefly at the doctrines of James. That writer undoubtedly often expressed himself rather loosely upon this subject; but if his various utterances about "the purely theoretical consequences" of a belief be collated and their prevailing drift determined, I do not think it will be found that he really (or at least, usually) held that *any* sort of satisfactoriness, if great enough in amount, suffices to establish the truth of a proposition—except in those cases where all theoretic signs fail, and the will-to-believe is invoked as an unavoidable substitute. And other pragmatists, certainly, have been explicit in repudiating any such absurdity as the assertion that a proposition, however much it may fail in logical consistency or in conformity with the facts to which it points, may still be 'true,' if belief in it is found satisfying in other respects. In short, the authors seem to me to have here, as in some other cases, bestowed a good deal of excellently ingenious refutation upon an absurd theorem, suggested, possibly, by some of James's expressions, but not seriously held by him or by any one. It is true, however, that many writers have been prone to talk of pragmatism as an epistemology which in some important way emphasizes the instrumental or

adaptive office of thought; and against this fashion of speech the author's argument is a truly pertinent objection. How far it reaches they hardly seem themselves to realize. For it is not, as it purports to be, a criticism from an instrumentalist point of view; it is a criticism of instrumentalism as such from the point of view of a *non*-Darwinian biology. And the authors would have given their criticism more force if they had put it in this form; if they had explicitly said—what they have suggested—that instrumentalism is the belated application in logic of a certain set of biological presuppositions (*i. e.*, those of neo-Darwinism) just at the time when in biology itself those presuppositions are becoming obsolete. Present-day evolutionary biology by no means requires us to assume that all organic functions are exclusively adaptive, or that they exist solely by virtue of their survival-value. Thought, then, need be instrumental to nothing save its own peculiar ends—true beliefs. And when the trueness of a belief, in turn, is acknowledged to mean in practice—what, as we have seen, serious-minded pragmatists seldom plainly deny that it means—primarily the fulfilment of the ordinary logical requirements, or at any rate of some genuinely 'intellectual' or 'theoretic' requirements, then all the flourish of trumpets over the birth of an 'instrumentalist logic' begins to impress one as much ado about very little.

There are, it is true, epistemological theories which may be called 'instrumentalist' in a significant sense. Such is the doctrine of the legitimacy of believing whatever it seems invigorating to believe; such, likewise, is the seemingly (but only seemingly) antithetic doctrine, espoused by some Darwinian biologists, that the only way to determine whether a judgment be true consists in estimating whether those who believe it thereby become better fitted for survival. But neither of these appears to be accepted by those pragmatists to whom instrumentalism is most frequently ascribed; nor is either the theory under discussion in the present volume. A doctrine often called 'instrumentalism'—represented by Dewey and others—might more aptly be called tentativism. It consists (when separated from the metaphysical doctrine which the authors call 'humanism'), if I understand it, partly in a certain view about the conditions under which problems arise, partly in a view about the degree of finality to which knowledge can attain. Problems, it is declared, are relative to the concrete and definite situations in personal experience out of which they emerge, they are engendered by a discovered specific unsatisfactoriness (which may be an 'intellectual' unsatisfactoriness) in the adjustments thus far reached. And because the problems are thus

relative and concrete, the solutions will always be provisional, limited, pertinent only to the type of situation which gave rise to them, and, indeed, only to so much of that situation as had at that time secured attention. Problems which purport to transcend this relativity and particularity, which involve inquiries (in Dewey's words) about "some inclusive first cause, some exhaustive final goal," some "wholesale essence," are pseudo-problems, insoluble because meaningless. In so far as this view does not declare the actual *test* of truth to lie in the relation of a judgment to some extrinsic utility—survival, or happiness—I see no reason for calling it epistemological instrumentalism. It is really with this tentativism that the reasonings in *Dogmatism and Evolution* are much of the time concerned, and it is with this phase of the pragmatist movement that the authors appear to be most in sympathy. The principal constructive outcome of their book is a restatement of tentativism in a more moderate, a semi-rationalistic, form. They agree, for example, that "the ideal of deductive certainty" is one which "can only be progressively realized, that its absolute realization would, indeed, be the extinction of thought altogether," that "such knowledge as the rationalist dreamed of—final, irreducible, modifiable only by accretion"—is not to be expected by those who have acquired the evolutionistic habit of mind. "Our actual investigations into the nature of anything are always carried on with reference to some specific practical or theoretical interest, and it is this interest which furnishes a criterion for the success of the investigation." But the authors insist that the rationalist's dream is the *ideal* of thought, and that we ought to expect it to be progressively approximated—instead of making the essentially 'static' assumption that at all stages of the process knowledge must remain equally loose, fluid, particular, open to wholesale revision. The authors accordingly see no reason for belittling formal logic—which is a body of principles relating to 'concrete situations' in a highly generalized and indirect way, no doubt, but not on that account less pertinently or less usefully. Unless there were such a thing as 'formal' truth (which implies *general* criteria, that hold good irrespective of alterations of the matter referred to, and generalized premises that must be known or assumed to be true before the particular problem to be dealt with can be solved), we could never employ that very practical 'instrument of adjustment' called inference. The authors even fail to find in what I have called tentativism any good reason for not admitting, with some qualifications, that our mind possesses *a priori* categories which give to thought its form and structure. For

in the evolution of concepts, in the succession of man's interpretations of experience, "a certain relative stability belongs to the earlier members." To be sure, the later concepts do not supervene "as mere accretions to the earlier," but rather "as modifications which go to the formation of a more complex unity. But the earlier have nevertheless this preference: that as the further revision of the complex becomes necessary, this takes place as far as possible in the later elements; and only such portion of the correction as cannot be made here is passed back farther and farther, until the disturbing conditions are satisfied." In these early-evolved concepts which "are not observably affected in the course of ordinary experience," then, we have a system of categories standing out as "a pure form of thought, logically prior to all the particularity of experience." Thus we are, after all, brought by the road of evolutionism to "the standpoint of the Critical Philosophy—with this exception, indeed, that we do not regard it as an ultimate standpoint, and hence no longer expect a self-sufficient completeness in the view of reality which it affords." We are, in fact, brought even farther—to nothing less than Hegel's *Logic*; that work—so run the authors' concluding words—when "viewed as a provisional solution of a problem which, from the terms in which it is stated, can never be adequately solved, becomes a treasure-house of inestimable wisdom, which the pragmatist, of all men, cannot afford to despise."

The value of this reconciling conclusion depends, of course, upon its meaning; and I find the meaning a little elusive. Is it that the authors would have us adopt the main articles of the Critical and the Hegelian philosophies (which are two very dissimilar philosophies), merely adding thereto a pinch of modesty—a confession that we are not the Pope, and shall very likely find reason hereafter to revise our opinions, at least upon the less fundamental matters? In that case, surely, rationalism would gain the substance and tentativism merely the shadow. All the definite doctrinal content of our philosophy at any given time would come from the former; the latter would merely inspire an occasional polite admission of our fallibility. This last would be a salutary, but scarcely a startling or momentous result to have been caused by so large-sounding an event as the application of evolutionary conceptions to logic. Or do the writers merely wish to insist that we are in possession of a certain (not necessarily large) stock of truths which are at least so far valid *a priori* that we may pretty confidently use them as presumptions with which other propositions may be required to agree. So much, I suspect, nearly all

pragmatists would readily admit,—though it might justly be remarked by the authors, at this point, that the admission is one which those pragmatists who make it seem rather frequently to forget. But construed in either of these two ways, the authors' conclusion seems a less novel and less significant reconciliation of opposing philosophies than it has at first the look of being. I cannot but surmise, however, that neither of these constructions is adequate, and that when the authors have more fully and precisely explained the mediating view which they propose it may prove to contain much of philosophical moment. Meanwhile, it should be said that in dwelling so captiously upon the concluding synthesis of the book—which is little more than hinted at—I have done the book as a whole some injustice. For its chief merit lies in the ingenuity and penetration of its criticisms, and especially in the force with which it drives home the point that even the practical or biological serviceableness of thought depends upon the indirectness of the reference of the 'idea of an object' to action, upon the increasing accumulation of 'abstract' and well-defined concepts, and upon the acquisition of generalized conclusions of which the validity varies relatively little from one 'situation' to another. That with respect to these matters some pragmatists have at least been guilty of (from their own point of view) false emphases, which the authors of *Dogmatism and Evolution* successfully show to be false from that point of view, it appears to me to be impossible to deny. Some of the best qualities of the book show, perhaps, at their maximum in the two brilliant appendices, which are purely critical; of these, the second is Mrs. DeLaguna's vigorously reasoned article on "The Practical Character of Reality," which has previously appeared in this REVIEW.

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A Text-Book of Psychology. By EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER. Part II, pp. 303-556. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1910.—pp. 556.

In reviewing the first volume of this important text (PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, XIX, 1910, pp. 319 ff.), the writer postponed the discussion of certain features of the treatment until the entire book was at hand. It now devolves upon us to take up these matters, together with a sketch of the contents of the second volume and an estimate of the significance of the work as a whole.

In many particulars the treatise deserves and will receive unqualified praise. This fact enables one to point out certain of its short-comings

free from any sense of hypercritical fault-finding. Its lucidity of exposition, its accurate scholarship, its sanity of judgment upon controverted topics, its generally open-minded attitude toward new evidence on old problems, these and a dozen other similar qualities assure it a high and permanent place in the literature of psychology. In its own field one may feel sure that it will have no serious rival until we secure translations of the great works of Wundt and Ebbinghaus.

On the other hand, the reviewer feels that the second part of the book, taken in its entirety, is distinctly less representative of current conditions in psychology than was the first part. The omissions are more serious and the balance is rather less well preserved. A running commentary upon certain features of Part II will best serve to exhibit the basis of this opinion.

In the chapter on the perception of space, the author commits himself to a doctrine intermediate between those of Wundt and Hering, holding that extent in two dimensions is an attribute of certain sensations (and thus nativistic), whereas perception of the third dimension rests upon secondary rather than immediate data. The chapter brings together a considerable amount of the experimental observations on space perception and these are well organized and stated. It is perhaps least satisfactory in its discussion of illusions, the brevity of which is somewhat out of proportion to both the quantity and quality of the literature of the subject, as well as to its intrinsic interest.

The chapters on perception of time, qualitative (?) perception, composite perception (perception involving more than one form of sensory stimulus), pure and mixed perception, must be passed over very briefly.

Pure perceptions are such as contain no imaginal elements. The author gives no examples. With mixed perceptions, involving these elements, we are already familiar under the single term perception. It is in this connection that we are introduced to the author's account of meaning. This is as it should be and marks a distinct advance over the earlier practice of the *Outlines*. Meaning, he says, is always context and may at times appear as physiological tendency rather than as conscious significance. As far as it goes this is excellent functionalism, although it leaves one wishing for a somewhat fuller explication of the term context. Nothing is more certain, for instance, than that meaning is not wholly synonymous with context. Much which may fairly be regarded as context is quite irrelevant to meaning, unless one has simply logical context in mind and then the original proposition is tautologous.

The account of association is notable for two things—its all but complete omission of reference to the literature of association as applied to psycho-analysis (the exception occurs in the chapter on Action) and its overt acceptance with minor qualifications of Wundt's description of the mechanism of association, with its emphasis upon the importance of the elements of the ideational complexes and the principle of supplementing.

The chapter on memory exhibits several striking characteristics. The author commits himself to the doctrine that memory images differ from those of imagination in being more fleeting, unstable, and generally weaker than the latter, and in being accompanied by motor restlessness. This view is alleged to be at variance with the common conviction. No doubt there is much of truth in the observations (cf. Perky, *Amer. Jour. Psy.*, XXI, 1910, p. 422) upon which Mr. Titchener rests his conclusion. Certainly the facts reported are most interesting. But it is clear that so limited a group of experiments cannot be accepted as exhaustive; and the rather unguarded advocacy of the theory advanced is not in keeping with the author's customary conservatism in subscribing to new doctrines before they have been widely tested.

He has nothing to say of the important literature on memory training, nothing on methods of memorizing, nothing on transfer of memory training—all of them chapters in the experimental literature of very great interest. The fact that many of these studies have emanated from pedagogical sources would hardly seem to warrant their omission. Only an arbitrary delimitation of the field of general psychology could exclude them.

The chapter on action plunges at once into a description of the reaction experiment and comes to the surface again only after some twenty pages of discussion on this topic. The author considers the genesis of conscious action in the animal world and expresses hearty assent to the familiar view that originally all muscular acts were conscious, that reflexes and automatic acts have simply degenerated (or evolved) from their conscious state. One is little prepared in the face of this interest in the so-called phylogenetic aspect of motor development to find so small a measure of attention devoted to the manner in which the child and the human adult gain control over their muscles. It is difficult to understand on what ground this slighting of the topic can be justified. If it be said that in the case of the child we have no convincing evidence gained by trustworthy methods, and that in the case of the adult we have too little to warrant definite

conclusions, it may be justly replied that what we have is thereby rendered doubly interesting for discussion. Certainly all of it is more relevant to the immediate purpose than the consideration of evolutionary theories of volition, which must in the nature of the case be largely speculative.

In a closing paragraph of this chapter, Mr. Titchener challenges the permanent or general significance of pleasure and pain for conduct. He also denies most of the other functions which have been assigned to it. What he thinks it is for, or how he would account for it, the reviewer does not quite know. Did he not concern himself to criticise previous theories of its function, one might suppose that he regarded the whole problem as irrelevant to his immediate business.

The discussion of emotion is chiefly notable for an interesting critique of the James-Lange theory and for a shorter but equally interesting attack upon the law of dynamogenesis. To be sure, the author admits the more important contentions of these doctrines, although objecting to the sweeping claims of their more extreme defenders. He acknowledges that organic sensations of reflex origin are essential features of gross emotions and he recognises that ideational processes gain their ultimate significance through their influence over conduct.

The chapter on 'thought,' which is substantially a condensed account of his monograph on the *Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes*, is perhaps the most interesting, as it is quite the most illuminating, part of the book. The author lays about vigorously among the advocates of imageless thoughts, non-sensory relational elements, unanalysable elements and the like, and concludes to his own satisfaction—and to his reviewer's also—that sensations and images are always on hand, one or the other, whenever really conscious business is going forward.

The author's account of judgment is a modified edition of Wundt's view and offers one of the very few instances where he fails in remarkable clarity of exposition.

Lastly comes the self, crowded into three concluding pages in which we have our attention directed to the alleged fact that our acquaintance with the self, instead of being one based upon hourly and daily intercourse as has often been maintained, is in fact confined to very infrequent sallies, when for one reason or another our bodily sensations obtrude themselves, or some other equally accidental circumstance calls the poor creature to our notice. Miss Calkins's efforts to reconcile the structuralist and the functionalist to one another through her

psychology of self would seem to have made very little headway with the author of this treatise. The self of the epistemologist, the 'knower,' in all cognitive functions is never even sighted in this analysis.

Reverting now to a few points which were left open in the notice of Part I, it may be said that Part II confirms and emphasises the opinion previously expressed of the qualities of the book as a student's text. Advanced students will assuredly find it most valuable. For young students just beginning psychology, the class for which the *Outlines* was originally prepared, it will quite as certainly be of much less worth. There will unquestionably be a demand for a simplified and abbreviated single-volume edition.

Despite a certain amount of cross-referencing, the text suffers, especially in its later portions, from discontinuity of presentation. The reader is often dropped into the midst of a subject with slight warning of what he is approaching and with only meager suggestion of its relations to what he has just left. Such a procedure causes no great impediment to a student who already knows something of psychology. It may even serve as a tonic. But it must make costly inroads on the time of a beginner. Were it not for an unusual lucidity of exposition of the separate topics, this difficulty would be serious.

Taken as a whole, the volume shows considerably more flexibility of view in certain directions than the older *Outlines*. Indeed, the so-called functionalists (whose chief bond of union is their common conviction of the emptiness and futility of a purely structural psychology) may well feel that Mr. Titchener is slowly moving in their direction. Certainly if he dallies much longer with explanations of conscious processes in terms of nervous action, he will find himself willy-nilly in the camp of the enemy. One frequently is moved to wonder just why he stops short where he does.

When in studying voluntary action one has turned for an explanation of reflex activities to earlier conscious acts, as our author does, what logical justification is there for refusing to search for general explanatory biological conceptions of other forms of conscious process? Yet if one does so seek, he becomes in one essential respect a functionalist. He recognizes that an explanation of mental processes in terms of nervous action which does not attempt to learn what significance the nervous acts themselves possess is arbitrary and unsatisfactory. In several places besides that mentioned we find that our author has started to tread the primrose path.

His own practice in turning to the nervous system discloses a certain

kind of inconsistency. His psychological materials reduce to specific sensations, images, and elementary affections, all of which originally were structurally conceived. His physiological 'explanations' are mainly couched in terms of 'tendencies' or 'sets' of the nervous system, and not in terms of specific organs or their activities. No doubt, the author's neural terminology is capable of translation into such form as would permit a more satisfactory and more explicit type of explanation. But, as things now stand, a reader often feels that he has been given a metaphor rather than a usable explanation. If the metaphors only led out into a *larger interpretative point of view*, one would not object. As yet, however, this is only occasionally true, and then, apparently, in spite of, rather than because of, the conception of explanation adopted.

This is the point at which the main criticism must be entered against the author's view-point, recognizing cordially not only all that is good in it intrinsically, but especially acknowledging the skill and scholarship with which Mr. Titchener has developed it. In reading Mr. Titchener's book, one feels the lack of such guidance as was afforded the readers of James's *Principles* by the chapters on the Self, on the Stream of Consciousness and the Will. In his opening chapter, to be sure, he formulates his conception of the problem of psychology, but in presenting us with the solution of this problem, the mind which is its alpha and omega falls apart into disconnected bits, that are never quite satisfactorily recombined for us, and the reader is likely to go away with only fragmentary conceptions of the total organization.

This type of criticism does not screen an apology for introducing metaphysics into psychology, but it is a plea for the injection of more vitalistic notions. To seek for the explanation of mental phenomena in neural activities is a rather barren and formal enterprise, if you have no reason to offer, no suspicion to cherish, as to why these nervous processes should be what they are, or do what they do. It pushes explanation back one stage further and leaves the case in reality much what it was before.

We welcome heartily such signs as we have detected of the author's breaking away from his earlier and somewhat more rigid ideals of a structural psychology. We do not mean to allege that he himself is cognizant of such a change, much less that he intends it. On this issue we have no assertions to make. The fact of the change seems to us essentially obvious. We can only regret that it has not gone far enough to render him more broadly hospitable in his outlook toward

the dynamic features of the mind as contrasted with the more strictly static ones. His conservatism in the matter is in evidence in many trifling matters, and in some important ones. He eschews, for example, any conspicuous use of the conception of habit. The term itself appears only twice in the index, and the occasions of its use are quite incidental. The treatment of attention is marked by an effort to deal with the subject exclusively under his structuralistic conceptions of sensation, affection, and image. In point of fact the outcome is substantially indistinguishable from the account of attention given by authors quite guiltless of structuralistic leanings. These two instances may serve as illustrations of many others which might be chosen.

Meantime, apart from the value of the work as a sound and helpful presentation of modern psychology under the influence of experimental methods, it possesses no small interest in the indication which it gives that structural psychology is becoming more plastic in fact even though it cleaves in theory to its original ideals.

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Chrysippe. Par ÉMILE BRÉHIER. Paris, F. Alcan, 1910.—pp. viii, 295.

The series of monographs issued in France under the title "Les grands philosophes" has in the past maintained a high level of workmanship and M. Bréhier's contribution is not the least admirable volume in the collection. His subject is Chrysippus, and by that title we naturally understand him to mean a phase of Stoicism. He has done well to mark out his boundaries thus definitely; the title-page is, as it were, a sample of the judicious use of limitations which characterises the whole work: and in the sphere of Stoicism nothing is more requisite than well-marked limitations. As a rule we are content to take Stoicism as a cloud of doctrine, no bigger at first than a man's hand but at last spread out over the whole Roman world; we think at once of the early dialectical Stoicism, the middle ethical Stoicism, and that last phase when the consolations of philosophy were an anodyne for the cares of empire. Such an uncritical attitude does little harm to the spirit of Stoicism: for the spirit undoubtedly remained throughout extraordinarily constant to its own nature. But the method has distinctive vices: it blurs the outline of individual teaching; it shortens the historical perspective; above all it obscures the degrees by which Stoicism descended from its original severity to the loose meditations of its declining years. In spite of many good

books on Stoicism there is, we think, room for good books on Stoics; M. Bréhier has given us a model of the way in which a book can be written on a scholarch so as to illuminate the movement of the school from phase to phase.

The volume begins with a book on the life and works of Chrysippus; the second book is devoted to doctrine, which is treated under the three heads Logic, Physics, and Ethics. The general features of Stoicism are familiar enough not to require any mention here; it is sufficient to say that they are adequately treated by the author and admirably correlated and arranged. Only a few points can be selected at present for comment, and the limits of a review necessarily throw those points out of their right focus; so that the following remarks must, in justice to the author, be prefaced by a recognition of his excellent treatment and accurate scholarship.

In his treatment of the doctrines, the author lays considerable stress on the point that for the Stoics logic becomes dialectic (p. 63) and in consequence dialectic becomes something different from dialectic as defined by Aristotle. But, while this is a truth, it seems to have taken the place of a greater truth, and to be substituted for an adequate explanation of the lines along which philosophy in that age was moving. For the real significance of the development lies in the fact that Stoicism became itself dialectical, it not only had a theory of dialectic but it was itself dialectical and its treatment of problems shows again and again this mark of declining philosophic strength. This point should, we think, have been more fully treated by the author, and that would have assisted the improvement of his work in another direction in which we are inclined to think it falls short of the requirements. Briefly stated, this failure consists in not being sufficiently alive to the lines of connection between Stoicism and earlier Greek thought. M. Bréhier's command of material is great, but it is possible to do much more than he has done in the way of showing the evolution of a particular Academic or Peripatetic formula into a Stoic principle. The student of Stoicism as he grows familiar with his material becomes more and more conscious of the fact that Stoics and Epicureans were quarreling over the interpretation of rubrics and their headlines were texts from Plato and Aristotle. In this direction a very fruitful line of research opens out, and our recognition of M. Bréhier's apt references to Plato or Aristotle must be qualified by a sense of the greater extent to which this part of his work should have been developed. This would have greatly assisted the exposition of some doctrines, notably those of conviction and of destiny. As to the former of these,

the famous doctrine of the *φαντασία καταληπτική*, our author leaves us with the impression that his refinements are overdrawn. He rightly rejects any subjective interpretation; he sides therefore with those who regard the subjective certainty as directly dependent on the nature of the object (pp. 99-101). But a further qualification produces what is really an intermediate position; the power of producing conviction is immanent in the image and the 'objectivity' consists only in the fact that the image is prior to the activity of reason. Here M. Bréhier seems to have developed a subtlety that is out of place; he also seems to have overlooked the fact that a Stoic had to explain both the essence and the justification of the conviction. The essence is easily settled: it is simply the assent (*συγκατά θέσις*) which the Stoics made equal to conscious apprehension, thus reducing to a minimum the so-called passivity of the mind. But this tendency toward a theory of activity brought its own difficulties: the activities must be discriminated for they are not all right: in other words, there must be some justification for assent, so that error may be condemned as irrational assent, or unjustified assent. This leads to a position which virtually amounts to the assertion that truth is a quality of objects, and as such capable of *causing* truth in the inner judgments. This was an ineradicable weakness in the Stoic position: it came from the Platonic correlation of knowledge and being, inner perfection of knowledge with outer perfection of being: it succumbed to the attack of those sceptics who saw that certainty never is absolute, but is relative to the individual's power of judging evidence. The statement of Arcesilas that there is no distinctive mark which guarantees truth and that nothing is *in se* convincing shows that this was the last remnant of that dogmatic rationalism.

The second chapter deals with the physics and gives an adequate and pleasing account of Stoic views on physical questions, discussing the theories under the heads of dualism, cosmology, anthropology, destiny and religion. These sections are all very commendable; the one on destiny is specially interesting and may be selected for comment as typical of the author's manner. It begins with a résumé of the antedecents, Æschylus and Plato for example; it shows how the "Fate" of those writers grew in importance and became a doctrine rather than part of a doctrine; it treats of the Logos of Heraclitus; it links these together with the 'religious concept' of Stoicism; it shows finally that natural causation is not destiny, because the latter is no more than the assertion that natural events have a causal explanation. This last point is of special interest, for the student of Stoicism

rarely grasps the exact way in which natural causation and destiny are different notions. Natural causation is nothing more than a logic of events: it is a method, not a productive activity: as Goethe said of Time, it neither makes nor destroys anything. Chrysippus showed considerable acumen in seeing that over and above the scientific method (*e. g.*, of Deomcritus) there was a need for some explanation of unity; else, as M. Bréhier points out, the causal series themselves might be plural and disconnected. It is on 'sympathy,' the hidden union of all things, that the idea of destiny really rests.

From the subject of destiny we pass to that of liberty and the vital question of freedom in action, and here we find the two aspects, logical and ethical, adequately discussed. The logical aspect is a question of the reality of disjunctive judgments, and here the Stoic was acute enough to see that the 'either . . . or' type of judgment does not assert either or both of its alternatives, and therefore does not assert that the future issue is already determined. The latter problem, the ethical, is solved by the dialectical solution according to which the agent is not determined wholly by the factors but is coöperative, one factor among the totality of factors. This is clearly shown from Cicero's account in the *De fato* and the example of the cylinder whose motion is determined partly by the impulse which moves it and partly by its form or nature. It follows, on this analogy, that in the practical life we act under influences but in accordance with our specific nature, a solution that is creditable to Stoicism if not satisfactory for all time. M. Bréhier's exposition is admirable, but here as before his references to Plato and Aristotle seem somewhat inadequate. There can be no doubt that this is the historical descendant of Aristotle's doctrine that the agent is *συναίτιός πως* (E. N. 1114 b 23) combined with *Metaphysics*, vi. 3 (1027 b 10). This was itself only the expansion of a hint in Plato, and the idea presents a continuous development which seems to be overlooked as a rule, though noted by E. Caird in his work on *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*.

A chapter on "La morale" with an interesting section on the passions and a final section on the general idea of culture at this epoch brings to conclusion a book which any student of philosophy will find eminently profitable reading.

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Über Annahmen. Von A. MEINONG. Zweite umgearbeitete Auflage. Leipzig, Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1910.—pp. xiii, 403.

The second, revised edition of Meinong's *Über Annahmen* will be welcome to the many thinkers of varying shades of opinion who found

the first edition so extraordinarily suggestive. Larger by about a hundred pages, it includes much additional polemic occasioned by the wide-spread criticism of his doctrine, but it is further distinguished by the addition of new material on the subject of "objectives." This logical conception, "the importance of which," we are told in the preface, "first appeared in the writing of the first edition of *Über Annahmen*," leads to an extensive modification of the first five chapters. The remaining changes are mainly matters of detail. The chapters on the psychology of desire and value, although relatively unmodified in the body of the content, aim by extensive additional notes to recognize, if not to utilize, the recent developments in that subject.

The first edition sought to show the existence of a class of psychical acts or processes, half way between presentations and judgments, to which the name of assumptions must be given, and adduced reasons why these processes should not be subsumed under either of the other classes. Judgment, according to Meinong, differs from presentation in two ways, both of which belong to the act and not to the content of experience, namely, that it involves belief and that it affirms or denies. Assumptions keep the affirmation or denial but drop the belief. They are much nearer to judgment than to presentation, for it is quite proper to speak of them as judgments without belief, but not to say that they are presentations determined with regard to yes or no (pp. 277-8). A wealth of empirical analysis was adduced to establish these two propositions, and in the process new fields of psychological investigation were opened up. In the meantime, the *Gegenstandstheorie*, with its insistence upon the two points,—the cutting loose of the world of objects from the concept of existence and the apprehension of "objectives" (or the contents of affirmative and negative propositions) by thought and not by sense-presentation,—had been developed and published. The contention of the second edition is now, much more explicitly and convincingly, that there are many such propositions, apprehended and operated upon by thought, where judgment is definitely excluded, that is, where affirmation and negation remain, but where belief does not and cannot exist. Here, as for instance in the field of æsthetic objects (given by Meinong a large though by no means predominant place in the argument), assumptions alone are possible. The part which these acts play in both intellectual and emotional activities constitute a convincing proof of their reality and necessity.

It is at this point that the polemic of the book appears. Some of

Meinong's more important critics, while accepting the essentials of the doctrine of objectives, have denied the necessity of the rôle of assumptions in their apprehension. Thus Bernard Russell accepts the objectives but ascribes to presentations the power of apprehending them. Marty, on the other hand, is concerned to show that the definition of judgment can be so conceived as to cover the apprehension of all the types of objects and objectives that Meinong's analysis has distinguished. Meinong has, I think, sufficiently answered his critics on both points. Thus, I am inclined to believe, he is right in insisting that to say one can have not only a presentation of an object, but also of its existence or non-existence, involves a failure to distinguish. One can have a presentation of an object, but not of the meaning of a proposition about that object. "Let one hold the two objects, mountain and existence of the mountain, side by side before the mind, and the difference in the way of apprehending them, no less than the fundamental differences of these two objects, makes itself immediately evident. If the apprehension of the mountain is presentation, then the apprehension of its existence must be something else" (pp. 136 ff.). On the other hand, it seems equally true that to hold that the apprehension of the narrative of a novel or the action of a drama (according to Meinong among the most important cases of apprehension of objectives by assumptions) is in reality a matter of judgment, although of a special kind, is again to miss the essential point of judgment, and to involve the whole essentially bungling and untrue concept of "conscious self-illusion" (pp. 154 ff.). From a genetic point of view, assumption may pass over into judgment, but in the normal enjoyment of art one never really deceives himself. The æsthetic world remains a world of assumption.

Meinong has, I say, succeeded in maintaining his general point as to the existence and function of assumptions. And yet, when it is possible for one of his critics (Marty) to maintain that assumptions are impossible *a priori*, and for another (Kerler) to close his criticism with the statement that on looking back it is seen that there is not much left of the assumptions, one suspects that such misunderstandings are not merely matters of definition, but are due, perhaps, to some weak point in Meinong's own analysis. There is such a weak point, I am inclined to believe, and I suspect that it is to be found in the concept of pure presentation (*blosse Vorstellung*). I have criticised that conception, as it appears in Meinong's philosophy, at length elsewhere, and will not repeat my criticism here. Suffice it to say that the conception creates difficulties in his own classifications and gives

rise to misunderstandings among his critics. Meinong has done splendid work in breaking the fetters of a purely presentational psychology, and in establishing the sphere of non-presentational thought, but may he not have gone too far in denying the 'reality-coefficient' to presentations? Has he not, perhaps, distinguished *act* and *content* in knowledge too absolutely? I speak here as one who has learned much from Meinong's analysis, but believes that it must be supplemented by the genetic point of view and method. From that point of view these difficulties would, I believe, disappear. The pure presentation would be seen to be an abstraction, presentations having always an implicit presumption of reality, made explicit in assumption and judgment. From this point of view, also, what is act or function on one level of experience becomes part of the content of thought on a higher level.

Meinong, it should be said, recognizes the validity and importance of the genetic point of view. In his introduction he finds satisfaction in the fact that "this, the youngest, most difficult, and most hopeful of the psychological disciplines has chosen the doctrine of assumptions as a chief pillar in its structure,—not in the sense of mere appropriation, but of wholly original elaboration"; that "a thinker such as Baldwin has given the opposition of judgment and assumption a fundamental place in his *Genetic Logic*, and that the newest and most comprehensive treatment of the fundamental problems of the theory of value has made use of it in the most varied connections." Am I mistaken in thinking that the genetic point of view has had its effect upon his own presentation of the subject? At least there is discoverable a clearly marked tendency to give more weight to the aspect of *continuity* in both the cognitive and affective-volitional sphere, to supplement the rigid distinctions between presentation, assumption, and judgment, made from the point of view of analysis, with a more flexible view of their relations when seen from the standpoint of cognitive process. Thus, for instance, in his section on *Selbst-kritik* (pp. 233 ff.), he appears to allow to presentations the power of apprehension (*Erfassen*) of objects, even though unreal, although for their cognition (*Erkennen*) presentation must be supplemented by assumption. Again, the importance which the second edition gives to the rôle of assumptions in the bringing forward (*Aggredieren*) of objectives as the platform of new acts of judgment, seems to indicate an increased emphasis upon the functional relations of the processes of thought and many of the details of the treatment strengthen the impression.

Whether this be so or not, whether Meinong has or has not learned

from genetic psychology and logic, it is certainly true that genetic psychology and logic have learned much from him,—I should say, all psychology and logic. Thus, though at first sight not wholly apparent, his analysis of thought elements in general, of which the doctrine of assumptions is but a part, has an important place in the general attack upon this long neglected sphere of psychology, an attack in which, to be sure, the experimental method plays a much more conspicuous rôle.

There are, I am inclined to think, but two types of writers upon philosophical and psychological subjects: those who set out to write a psychology or a logic, as the case may be, and those who seek to solve certain problems irrespective of the name given to the results, or the methods employed. It is to the latter that Meinong belongs, emphatically so, and naturally he makes discoveries. In this matter of assumptions, as in other fields of study, investigations, concerned in the first place merely with the clearing up of a field of facts completely overlooked by psychology, have ended by going far beyond that field. Not only have the assumptions shown themselves to be important experiences that throw new light on old problems of epistemology and psychology, but they point the way to fields thus far unexplored. Not the least of these are the phantasy feelings and desires, and their rôle in valuation.

In an account of Meinong's *Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie*, published in this REVIEW, the present reviewer ventured to apply to its author the name of radical empiricist. Notwithstanding his doctrine of *a priori* knowledge, Meinong found the designation both proper and pleasing. I should like to make use of it again. Not only is this analysis of assumptions radically empirical in both spirit and method, but the entire treatment of objects and objectives with which it is so closely connected is in its very essence a disclosure of the variousness of experience. Only when we know how 'many-mansioned' the universe of reality really is can we hope to have a philosophy that shall rest upon anything but the flimsiest foundations.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

The Philosophical Theory of the State. By BERNARD BOSANQUET. Second Edition. London, Macmillan and Co., 1910.—pp. xl, 342.

Mr. Bosanquet's valuable contribution to the study of the nature of organized society has, it is a pleasure to note, reached a second edition. An Introduction of twenty pages is here added, defining the author's "attitude towards movements in European thought which have declared their nature more distinctly in the interval since the first publication of my work," and "the opening of Chapter VIII has been rewritten." The conclusions of the author remain what they were a decade or more ago. "I am convinced, then, that the ancient theory of the State can only be strengthened and amplified by the wealth of modern experience. And little as the present work can claim to deal with the whole province of recent State development and activity, I believe that, resting on a tradition derived from thinkers who have been the sanest and profoundest students of civilized life, it affords a serviceable clue to the interpretation of such developments" (Introduction, p. xl). "The essence of the theory here presented is to be found not merely in Plato and in Aristotle but in very many modern writers, more especially in Hegel, T. H. Green, Bradley, and Wallace" (Preface, p. x). "It is an unfortunate result of the semi-practical aims which naturally influence social philosophers, that they are apt to take up an indifferent if not a hostile attitude to their given object . . . and therefore, as I venture to think, they partly fail to seize the greatness and ideality of life in its commonest actual phases" (Preface, pp. x, xi).

For any who are not yet acquainted with the contents of Mr. Bosanquet's able critique of the state, a brief *résumé* of its contents may be given. A philosophical theory makes no attempt to cope with specialists in their several fields. "We all know that a flower is one thing for the geometrician, another for the chemist, another for the botanist, and another again for the artist. The general nature of the task imposed on philosophy is this: Aiding itself, so far as possible, by the trained vision of all specialists, to make some attempt to see the full significance of the flower as a word or letter in the great book of the world." The modern nation-state seems to be a reproduction on a broader scale of the ancient city-state, and the revival of the theory of Plato and Aristotle in terms coloured by the intervening reign of juristic conceptions is due to Jean Jacques Rousseau.

In comparing philosophical theory with sociology, it may be roughly said that sociological theory may be mainly (1) biological, (2) economic, or (3) juristic. (1) Evolution has imposed upon sociological research a characteristic bias, from which it is just perhaps beginning to shake itself free—the explanation of the higher, by which I mean the more distinctly human phe-

nomena, by the lower, or those more readily observed or inferred among savage nations or in the animal world. Mr. Spencer and Mr. Huxley are examined from this standpoint. (2) The theory arising from economic study contains a "thoroughly just assertion of man's continuity with the world around him" (pp. 30-31), and is only dangerous when the mechanical pressure of economic facts is contrasted too deeply with the influence of ideas. (3) The process by which philosophical theory transcends the conceptions of sovereignty and contract is related more fully subsequently. (4) Finally many recent students of society,—Giddings, Durkheim, Tarde, Le Bon,—recognize that social facts are a product of mind. "On Fridays we are told the passenger traffic returns of French railways, omnibuses, and steamers show a decline. What dumb fact is this? People do not like to travel on Fridays or prefer to travel on other days. What is this preference? The only unit that can really afford an explanation . . . is the living mind and will of the society in which the phenomenon occurs" (p. 43). This psychological method, however, is exposed to a danger. "Like every impartial science to which process and genesis are watchwords, it tends to explain the higher by the lower" (p. 49).

In Chapters III and IV, "The Paradox of Self-government," Bentham, J. S. Mill, and Spencer are ably reviewed, all of whom take the position substantially that "the liberty which a citizen enjoys is to be measured not by the nature of the governmental machinery he lives under, whether representative or other, but by the relative paucity of the restraints it imposes on him" (p. 72). In contrast with these several *prima facie* views of society stands Rousseau's *Contrat social*. Indeed the disentanglement of the two opposing views twined together in the pages of Rousseau is one of Mr. Bosanquet's achievements; and it is difficult to avoid his conclusion that Rousseau prepares the way for the idea that a higher freedom is possible in society than in any so-called state of nature. Mr. Bosanquet comments admirably on such passages as these: "To find a form of association which shall defend and protect, with the entire common force, the person and the goods of each associate, and by which each uniting himself with all, may nevertheless obey only himself, and remain as free as before." "In order, then, that the social pact may not be a vain formula, it tacitly includes the covenant which alone can confer binding force on the others, that whoever shall refuse to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the whole body, which means nothing else than that he will be forced to be free." "We might, in view of the preceding, add to the gains of the civil state the moral freedom which alone makes man master of himself; for the impulsion of appetite alone is slavery, and obedience to the law which we have prescribed to ourselves is liberty."

These paragraphs are interesting to the reader who supposes that the keynote of the *Contrat social* is struck in this opening sentence, "Man is born free and everywhere he is in chains," and recalls that the gospel by Jean Jacques was one of the inspiring causes of the French Revolution.

Chapter V, "The Conception of a Real Will," and Chapter VI, "The Conception of Liberty," are developments of the idea deduced from Rousseau

of the reality of a general will. In the face of this idea the problem of self-government is transformed, and the opposition between self and others, self and law has to be interpreted entirely afresh. "Our liberty, or, to use a good old expression, our liberties, may be identified with a system of rights considered as the condition and guarantee of our becoming the best that we have it in us to be, that is of becoming ourselves" (p. 127). In Chapter VIII, "Nature of the End of the State and Consequent Limit of State Action," there is carefully developed the valuable and luminous principle that state action in regard to the best life for the citizens must be limited to the "hindrance of hindrances," a principle which the author with his wide information and deep interests treats with admirable discrimination. The next two chapters deal with Rousseau's theory as applied to the state and also with an analysis of the modern state, in which Mr. Bosanquet gives, amongst other matters, an outline of Hegel's conception of the state. And the work closes with a keen philosophical review of the 'family,' 'neighborhood,' 'class,' 'nation-state,' and 'humanity' as ethical ideas. Taken altogether Mr. Bosanquet's volume gives the most complete and effective interpretation I am acquainted with of the view that the state is objectified reason or, as Hegel has said, the fulfilment of the absolutely free will.

The reviewer is very far from desiring to be critical, but he may perhaps appropriately call attention briefly to a question raised by T. H. Green, and commented on at length by Mr. Bosanquet himself. "To an Athenian slave," writes Green, "who might be used to gratify a master's lust, it would have been a mockery to speak of the state as a realization of freedom; and perhaps it would not be much less to speak of it as such to an untaught and underfed denizen of a London yard with gin shops on the right hand and on the left" (*Principles of Political Obligation*, p. 8). No one who is at all acquainted with Mr. Bosanquet's writings will question his knowledge of social questions, and may very well also assent to his reply to Green that "probably in fundamental matters there is as large a proportion of persons untaught and bred up between temptations among the rich as among the poor" (p. 290, *note*). But this does not seem to remove the whole difficulty, although it may well be a rejoinder to Green, nor does it seem to be enough to add that of course society at any time is far from perfect (p. 289). The trouble is more radical. When it is a case of *Socrates contra mundum* who is to decide then, whether it is *Socrates* or *mundus* which expresses the objective reason of Greece? Unless the State is to be helpless in such a predicament, it would certainly seem to be necessary that it should provide amongst its objective institutions an institution whose express right will be to criticize the state as it is or any phase of it. Liberty in the sense of absence of all external restraint ought not to be viewed as a mistaken ideal, otherwise the State would seem to be liable to periodical rebellion or revolution, but should rather be converted into an institutional right of reform. Such an institutional right might be understood to be found in a modern state in the press, platform, and pulpit, or more adequately still in "His Majesty's Loyal Opposition," all of them es-

sential requisites of self-government. In other words, unless the State recognizes by express institutions that it itself is not the objectified reason of man, it is not a self-governing state. It must preserve and encourage and even compel organized criticism of itself, as the only means of preserving its own existence. This seems to me to be the modification of Hegel which is rendered necessary by what may perhaps be called in general the English view of the inviolable freedom of the individual. The theory that liberty is obedience to the higher self as expressed in the social order is confronted by the theory that liberty is the absence of restraint, and the antagonism is overcome in a view that 'reform' is a necessary social or political institution. Whether this solution of the controversy between freedom and restraint is based on a correct logic, whether, that is to say, the solution is confirmed or invalidated by the view taken of the nature of reality, is a question which cannot be finally disregarded. But if Mr. Bosanquet's own logical writings are any criterion, a system of logic cannot be placed in an appendix to a theory of the state.

S. W. DYDE.

ALBERTA, CANADA.

Le Psiche Sociale, Unita di Origine e di Fine. Da ENRICO RUTA. Milano, Palermo, Napoli, Reno Sandron Editore, 1909.—pp. 382.

In his preface Signor Ruta states his purpose to be, "to show that among all races of men the history of thought is one, that all, subject to their different degrees of power, are marching toward the one end, that the mission of the human species on the earth is one; that men of every country, color, and tongue are co-operating therein according to the measure of their strength; and that this is so and cannot be otherwise, because it is a law of nature." To the present writer it seems that this programme is not fully carried out. The author does not seriously attempt to take cognizance of the whole "history of thought," even his treatment of the religious and idealistic tendencies in the different races of men, which subject occupies a very large part of the volume, is necessarily incomplete; and his presentation of the ultimate outcome of human progress, the "mission of civilization" is somewhat vague. In fact, the author anticipates this charge of insufficiency of treatment in his preface, and excuses himself on the ground of the necessary limitations of space; but it may be permitted to the reader to regret that the scope of the treatise was not more limited. There is ample evidence in this work that Signor Ruta is in every respect competent to discuss with adequate thoroughness and scholarship the many important and difficult subjects which are somewhat summarily disposed of here. The earlier chapters of the book occupy ground which has been pretty well worked over by previous writers. They treat of evolution in general, of the development of human faculty, and of the application to it of natural laws. The evident generalization of all is the law of reciprocity. Individual things belong either to the molecular world—amorphous and crystalline bodies—or to the cellular world,—which includes all forms of plant and animal life. In the latter, the individuals which affect their environment through function only are subject to the

"law of adaptation"; these are plants and the lower animals. To the "law of accommodation" are to be referred all primitive or uncivilized men, that is, those that adapt their environment to themselves through the empirical exercise of their will. Civilized man, who modifies his world consciously and with scientific foresight, acts according to the "law of correction." Apart from the nomenclature there is nothing novel in this classification. The analysis of the mental growth of the fully developed or creative consciousness called by the author the "Euripsyche" appears somewhat arbitrary: the three formative stages are given as feeling, with the grades of fancy, morality, and art; thought, with the grades of reason, intellect, and science; and will, with the grades of conscience, liberty, and social action (*azione civile*). Such an apparently artificial schematism as this needs at least more explanation and justification than is offered us. Of great interest and value, on the other hand, is the exposition of the important and essential part played by the creative imagination in the drama of human progress. This is treated of in the seventh chapter as "the invention of the non-existent." In the writer's view, the ideas of a god or gods, a Utopia, whether regarded as having existed in the past or as a possibility in the future, a life after death with rewards and punishments, and all similar conceptions, are necessary results of the human power to adapt its environment to its needs, and are means by which the "Euripsyche" works toward its goal, which is the highest life for humanity through mutual love and the intellectual development of all. Man is the creator of his own god, and the character of his divinity is suited to his needs. With progressive races and men, these ideals change, and at last science will take the place of religious faith. For "the law which governs the evolution of humanity upon the earth is the law of intellectualization or correction; by which man frees himself continuously from those laws which regulate the lower forms of life, and rises into the domain of laws regulative of those forms that are ever growing better." The destiny of mankind is thus conceived as one of human intellectualization by which each individual comes to co-operate in his degree in the uplifting and the happiness of all. This ethical life is itself the resultant of purely natural forces; supernatural beliefs having their place as means making to this end, but being eventually eliminated by the progress of scientific knowledge.

In the chapters devoted to the religious ideals and moral standards of the various races of men, Signor Ruta shows a wide knowledge of his subject and the ability to make it both interesting and instructive; it demands, however, a fuller treatment than is given it here. The serious student may also regret the absence in most cases of references to the original authorities. The account of the ideal content of the religion of the Greco-Italian people seems to the present writer not quite adequate even for a sketch of this fascinating subject; but in this as in other parts of his work the author gives us much that is stimulating and suggestive. The tone of the whole book is worthy of praise; while the standpoint is scientific, the outlook is idealistic in the best sense of the word.

E. RITCHIE.

La démocratie politique et sociale en France. Par ALFRED FOUILLÉE. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1910.—pp. viii, 218.

M. Alfred Fouillée is the French philosopher of to-day who is perhaps in closest touch and deepest sympathy with his time. Hence there is hardly a question now before the French parliament and the French public that is not touched upon in this last volume of his. He treats of the organization of democracy, the education of democracy, and the social problems that beset democracy, from the standpoint of a sociologist who is not governed by considerations of expediency but presents his remedies, whether popular or not. It is indeed obvious that some of M. Fouillée's suggestions will meet with little response from the practitioners of French politics, many of whom, last year, did not seem even to have heard of him when his name was mentioned in the House. But the author of the *Idées-forces* would be a poor philosopher if that were to deter him from offering his advice: he knows that sound and just ideas have a way of reaching even the class of people that do not generally go to philosophers for guidance and inspiration.

It is the first part of the book that is likely to prove of greatest interest to the American reader because it deals with problems common to all modern governments. M. Fouillée enumerates, and characterizes with his usual felicity, the fallacies and antinomies of every individualistic democracy. He shows that the abstract notions of liberty and equality, the much heralded 'rights of man' must be considered in the light of a higher principle, a principle including not merely the individual but society, not merely the present but the future. Liberty of the individual to govern himself has for its counterpart the responsibility of that individual towards the nation whom he governs. Moreover, the equality provided by the constitutions is often in practice the triumph of inequality, since it equalizes what is unequal. A nation is something more than an accidental collection of units; it is a living and permanent being, having an organization to preserve, traditions to defend, rights and duties to protect against passing interests and ephemeral passions. A broader and more intelligent representation is needed in a republic. To obtain it the means advocated by the author are the adoption of proportional representation in the elections to the House, and a reform in the composition of the Senate as well as in the election of the President.

M. Fouillée's chapter on the "idea of Fatherland" is an echo of recent French controversies between nationalists and internationalists and concludes with a very sound reconciliation of the claims of country with those of humanity. Likewise the chapter on modern education deals mainly with the problem of the neutrality of the school, which was so violently agitated in France last year. But it emphasizes also the author's strong protest against the utilitarian tendencies of the school system which, if carried to their extreme consequences, will lower all liberal professions and bring about "the oppression of the best by the worst." While the author is in all the other debates on the side of the moderate element, on the question of school neutrality he is very much opposed to all compromise with any creed, religious or philosophical. Ac-

cording to him, the state has the right to teach neither God nor the negation of God in the public schools. Strangely enough, one of the books recently mentioned by the clericals as having been expurgated of all religious references, even the most unobtrusive, is the famous *Tour de la France par deux enfants*, which was written in M. Fouillée's own home.

The closing chapter dealing with social problems opens with the statement that "social progress has always lagged behind material, scientific, and political progress;" nevertheless the author is able to show that the last century witnessed a steady growth of wealth and a general increase of comfort. While it is true that there has been also a movement of concentration of wealth, this concentration has been largely for the benefit of groups of men, instead of single individuals. On the other hand, the decline of the rate of interest has had for its counterpart a steady rise of wages (80 per cent. in fifty years) which refutes the socialists' contentions that the 'rich [have become richer and the poor poorer.' The progress of coöperation and association also points to a gradual betterment of the social and moral organism.

Nevertheless it is not as an apologist for the present system that M. Fouillée rejoices at these signs. For he realizes the force of the socialistic criticism. But he does not believe that collectivism is the ultimate and inevitable outcome of social evolution. The present wage system must give way to a system in which every workman will be the owner of his instruments of production, and every farmer the owner of the land he tills. This can be done, he thinks, without abolishing either property or freedom.

The conclusions of this book of candid and impartial criticism by a man who is in sympathy with the present regime of France is not one of discouragement such as one is likely to hear from an old man, *laudator temporis acti*. On the contrary, it is an optimistic and hopeful conclusion. M. Fouillée does not think that history should repeat itself and the same cycles follow each other for ever. He looks forward to a new era when revolutions will be replaced by evolutions and justice ultimately assure the rights of all.

OTHON GUERLAC.

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La philosophie de Léonard de Vinci d'après ses manuscrits. Par PÉLEDAN. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1910.—pp. xvi, 189.

This is a disappointing book. It undertakes to vindicate a place for Leonardo in the history of philosophy as the real creator of the modern experimental method. Out of the author's somewhat extravagant claims there remains a residue of which the philosopher will be glad to take account. The evidence shows without doubt in Leonardo a strikingly clear-sighted, though not very profoundly or systematically argued, positivistic attitude. But the presentation of the evidence is rambling, diffuse, and too much interlarded with marks of admiration. Over a quarter of the volume is devoted to a rather ill-tempered attack on Luther, and an attempt to show that, so far from being a factor in modern intellectual freedom, the Reformation was only an interruption of the liberalism of the Renaissance which was getting posses-

sion of the Church—a thesis backed apparently by a strong anti-German feeling. Incidentally, the writer's sentiments would appear to be anti-Semitic as well. Much less significance can be assigned to another side of Leonardo's philosophy, in which, however, the author seems to follow him with equal admiration. This is the doctrine of 'analogy,' through which after limiting 'experience' to the description of the laws of phenomena, a loose and fanciful way is found of reasserting the spiritual truths which the dogmatic scientist too hastily rejects. This consists to all practical intents in establishing a miscellaneous collection of psychological, ethical, and religious beliefs which happen to meet our approval, by discovering analogies to them in the natural world—much the same method as exemplified, for example, in Comenius's grounding of educational principles in nature. The point of view of the writer is perhaps sufficiently suggested in a quotation: "Trois voies conduisent à la vérité: la foi, la raison, et l'expérience. Chacune de ses voies correspond à une catégorie mentale, absolument irréductible; et le croyant, le philosophe, le savant ne mentent pas en prétendant posséder la vérité; elle résulterait de leur concordat. Jusqu'à ce qu'il s'établisse, la voile de la grande Isis, déchiré en trois morceaux, formera des bannières ennemies qui grouperont des fidèles, suivant la personnelle tendance." What is likely to be the philosophical fruitfulness of such a formula, the reviewer is not very much interested to inquire.

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The Presentation of Reality. By HELEN WODEHOUSE. Cambridge, University Press, 1910.—pp. x, 163.

Brevity, thoroughness, and incisiveness are among the qualities displayed by this essay, intended, says the author, "as a psychological preface to metaphysics," or "a description of knowledge from the point of view of a philosophical psychology." Knowledge, error, and the nature of reality, the latter in certain of its epistemological aspects, are successively treated in the fourteen chapters of the book.

The author's position may be described as epistemological realism. The thesis is maintained "that in all cognitive experience we come into immediate contact with objective reality, of the existence of which we have in experience an irrefutable witness, and that on all levels of cognition, sensuous or intellectual, this happens in the same way, namely, by the presentation of an object to a subject" (p. x. Cf. also pp. 65, 118, 146, 157). Simply "'to have a presentation,' for us, means . . . to know reality" (p. 4), and "even sensation, elementary as it is, must on my view, be still considered as knowledge of an object by a subject . . ." (p. 12).

The author finds matter for adverse comment in the aloofness of a scientific psychology from the problems of philosophy, deprecates the abstract treatment of sensation as "a mere modification of consciousness" which gives us no direct information about the real world, and disapproves of the idealistic position that knowledge is a creative act and the reality known a construction (pp. 7, 8, 72, 74, 76, 119, 124, 157). "Even if the whole world grows by means

of our interests: . . . even if nothing can exist except on condition that it is known: even then our knowing is not in any ordinary sense an act of construction or creation" (p. 8). Yet mere sense is declared inarticulate (pp. 64, 109); we never find in any presentation-continuum "all that might be there" (p. 22), and the idealistic inference is at hand that the reality which enters into sensation is likewise inarticulate, and thus unable to make good its claim to be the real. For the author "reality in the general sense is simply what does in any way present itself to us" (p. 69). As against pragmatism, reality "does not lie in wait for our thinking to make it," although "the discovery of reality does."

Naturally the same attitude appears in the investigation of the nature of error. "The most that we can say is that error means the failure of the real world to appear to us in a normal way" (p. 116), but why this account should invalidate other modes of description is not made clear.

The realistic position is maintained not without apparent contradictions, and the prophetic nature of the introductory warning that "throughout this essay we shall be on controversial ground" becomes apparent as we read. But each one of the chapters is full of interest for the special student of epistemology, presenting some problem that is of vital interest for a constructive metaphysical theory.

CARL VERNON TOWER.

SOUTH HINGHAM, MASS.

The Evolution of Mind. By JOSEPH McCABE. London, Adam & Charles Black, 1910.—pp. xvii, 287.

It is sometimes unfortunate that a scientific book should be judged by its pretensions. Mr. McCabe's book is well written, both from the standpoint of style and facility and clearness of expression. It would be a great gain to the scientific public if men qualified to write such books had the ease in writing and clearness of expression possessed by this author.

The author tells us that the issue of his work is quite distinct from that of modern psychology and from the work of Romanes and Lloyd Morgan. "My aim is, in short, to bring together whatever facts may be found to bear on the subject in a dozen sciences—chiefly, physics, organic chemistry, geology, paleontology, zoölogy, physiology, psychology, and anthropology"—surely a worthy, if colossal undertaking! Had the author claimed a modest knowledge, and had he admitted the reading of only a few well chosen works in comparative and human psychology, his criticism upon psychology and animal behavior might be allowed to pass unnoticed. But when in the introduction he says that he has "sought aid in the whole relevant literature of Europe and America," one feels disposed to make a few comments. In his chapter, "Mind in the Bird," he gives but a single reference to the bird literature of America and none to that of Germany, and there is no experimental literature on bird work in England except that of Morgan, which he cites. The single exception in the case of American literature is the reference to Thorndike's study of the chick. The work of Porter, Herrick, Scott, Conradi,

Rouse, and others in this country is entirely unnoticed; as is also the work of Hess and others in Germany. Consequently, there is little in the chapter but references to anecdotal literature, largely to that of Romanes. It must be said in all fairness to the author that he fails to find in this anecdotal literature anything bearing upon the question of mind in birds. Had he been familiar with the American and German literature on bird life, however, he would not have found such a disparity in ability to learn and to 'imitate' between the birds and the mammals. The chapter on the mammal brain is also supported by Morgan's work, that of Hobhouse, and the one study of Thorndike, *Animal Intelligence*. He regrets the fact that Thorndike has never given us his promised study on the primates (*Mental Life of Monkeys*, Monograph Supplement, *Psychological Review*, 1901)! I cite these failures merely to show that the author has no scientific justification for undertaking to write about a subject with which he is so little acquainted.

To come to the author's contentions. He finds no justification for the modern notion of coupling intelligence with a trial and error type of learning. He agrees with Weissmann's doctrine of unconscious thought, and finds in it an explanation of learning in most organisms below the mammals. We may form both conscious and unconscious associations. Learning can occur anyway in complex neural mechanisms (where the cortex is not highly elaborated) without any consciousness being present.

He fails to come to close quarters with the question as to where mind first becomes apparent. He examines the various orders of animals and gives us in a summarized statement the following vague expressions: "The Protozoa and the Cœlenterates may be summarily dismissed. In the succeeding worlds of the Worms, Molluscs, Echinoderms and Crustacea few and slender claims are made for the presence of an agency other than that of their nervous mechanism." "There may be a dull glow of consciousness in the fish."

With regard to the higher insects he is somewhat in doubt. "The only reliable (and still indirect) way to infer consciousness is from the structure of the brain, and the brain of the insect is so obscure, and so little analogous to that of man, that we can draw no confident conclusion." "The question remains whether the cerebral activities of the ant or the bee may not be accompanied with a dull glow of consciousness."

In the mammals we find our first advanced stage of consciousness. The author really attempts to make cortical differentiation the criterion of conscious development. All through his book he attempts to argue away from and to argue down the evidence from behavior where he fails to find a complex cortex. He does not show in any adequate way how the behavior of the simpler mammals differs from that of birds, fish, etc. His conclusion is really based upon structure.

He modestly leaves open the question of the ultimate nature of consciousness. He declines to see in it the emergence or accession of a new reality, "other than ether, or ether-compacted nerve." "Until we know the cortex sufficiently well to say that its structure throws no light on the nature of consciousness,

the question must be left open." "Every portion of the cortex has, of course, been submitted to the finest microscopical examination. I am not ignorant of the work of Ramon y Cajal, Flechsig, Waldeyer etc. But it is none the less true that on the functional side the human brain is still *terra incognita*." I may be doing the author an injustice in inferring that he apparently yet hopes to find consciousness in some region even more obscure than the pineal gland!

When the author comes to discuss the paleontological evidence bearing upon the "dawn of humanity" and "The Advance of Mind," he is dealing with a question with which he is apparently more at home. His treatment of the growth of the higher primates and earliest man-like forms in the different geological eras—of the slow development of higher mental processes in man, of the causes (crises, etc.) which led to a more rapid mental development—are all interestingly dealt with, but in a highly speculative way.

In conclusion we may say that the book cannot be judged by a scientific standard. In view of its many defects on the factual side and of the one-sided and warped view-point of the author, it is not even the type of readable book which ought to be recommended to the general public.

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The Works of Aristotle Translated into English: De mirabilibus auscultationibus.

By LAUNCELOT D. DOWDALL. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1909. Pp. 46 (unpaged).

This member of the series of Oxford translations of Aristotle, published pursuant to the desire of Benjamin Jowett, is in itself insignificant, being in no sense the work of Aristotle, and the translation does not compare favorably with that of the major works already issued. But the treatise possesses a certain curious interest and the translation is adequate for the purposes of those who are likely to depend upon it.

W. A. HEIDEL.

Death and Resurrection, from the Point of View of the Cell-Theory. By GUSTAF BJÖRKLUND. Translated from the Swedish by J. E. FRIES. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Company, 1910.—pp. xix, 205.

Gustaf Björklund is a compatriot of Swedenborg, and the present volume is characterized by the translator as "undoubtedly one of Sweden's most remarkable and interesting contributions to contemporary philosophy" (p. xv).

The author believes that he finds in the results of modern cytology a new way of solving the problem of the immortality of the soul. "Life is not a material force; no living being can therefore arise from dead matter; all life has a supernatural origin in a higher immaterial world" (pp. 122 f.). This is Björklund's position. He finds physical force and life to be two "essentially different principles" (p. 91). Opposing Büchner's endeavor to reduce human life and personality to "Force and Matter," Björklund shows the scientific inadequacy of materialism. Modern science has shown the impossibility of *generatio spontanea*. Harvey, Spallanzani, Hoffmann, and Pasteur have indicated with increasing certainty the truth of the principle *Omniem vivum ex*

vivo. To prove its thesis, materialism must show that inorganic forces can of themselves produce organic substance and life. If man succeeded in producing life in the laboratory, materialism would have no cause for triumph; for man's 'creation' of life is by no means synonymous with spontaneous generation of life by mechanical forces themselves. Organic substance is "a product which the forces of nature cannot spontaneously produce" (p. 107). Life is an essential characteristic of living beings, as materiality is of matter.

Now "every organism is a community, and, *vice versa*, every community is an organism" (p. 30). And it is from this point of view that Björklund restates his problem and tries to solve it. Humanity is immortal through the individuals comprising it; man is immortal through the individuals comprising him, *i. e.*, the cells; each cell, in its turn, is immortal through its more primary units, and so on *ad infinitum*, both ways. Life is immortal for the simple reason that life cannot become anything else: it can neither be spontaneously created nor annihilated. It cannot pass into anything but other forms of life.

In our study of the immortality of humanity, Björklund says, we regard it from the point of view of the man-units that go to make it up. He would consider man in a similar way, from the point of view of the cells. The soul of man is the collective 'soul' of the cells which form man's own building material, in the same way as the 'soul' of present-day society is the collective unity of our individual souls. To study the soul of man, one must be a cytologist, just as, to study the 'soul' of society, one must be a humanist. "What economic necessities are to man, the arterial blood is to the cells" (p. 146). But the soul comprehends "only the collective, not the individual wants of the cells" (p. 161). It is only in the collective co-operation of the cells comprising me that my immortality consists. My "translation" is my resurrection. Björklund's "immortality" extends both ways; he points out that free-existence and deathlessness imply each other.

The relation of man to infinity Björklund asserts, is now seen in a new light. "God is related to man as man is, not to the cell, but to the lower units of which the cell is composed. Between God and man there is at least one other organism that we know of, namely humanity" (p. 177). In thus systematizing all life in a graded series of orders, with God at one end and the hypothetically simplest cell-unit at the other, Björklund believes he has reconciled materialism and idealism. His position he calls "organic idealism" (p. 196).

The above conception of collective cell-immortality is certainly original. Whether it will satisfy the longings of all religious-minded "cell-societies," is an open question. One can well see how the goal of the cell is man. Does man, then, find *his* immortality in society, and ultimately in "God," the hypothetically ultimate goal of all life? Björklund's book has the defects of its merits. It is doubtful whether the cytological categories are of themselves adequate for the solution of a problem as distinctly philosophical as that of immortality. But the Swedish thinker is stimulating, and deserves careful attention.

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The following books also have been received:

- The Christian Doctrine of Man.* By H. WHEELER ROBINSON, M.A. Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1911.—pp. iii, 358.—Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Cournot et la Psychologie Vitaliste.* Par J. SEGOND. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. 166.
- Psychic Phenomena, Science and Immortality.* By HENRY FRANK. Boston, Sherman, French & Company, 1911.—pp. 545.
- Mental Mechanisms.* By WILLIAM A. WHITE, M.D. New York, 1911.—pp. vii, 151.
- Premiers Éléments de Pédagogie Expérimentale.* Par J. J. VAN BIERVLIET. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. 335.
- Un Romantisme Utilitaire.* Par RENÉ BERTHELOT. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. 413.
- De la Méthode dans les Sciences.* Par MM. B. BULLAND, LEÓN BERTRAUD, L. BLARINGHEM, ÉMILE BOREL, GUSTAVE LANSON, LUCIEN MARCH, A. MEILLET, JEAN PERRIN, SOLOMON REINACH, R. ZEILLER. Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. 364.
- A New Law of Thought and its Logical Bearings.* By E. E. CONSTANCE JONES. Preface by PROFESSOR STOUT. Cambridge, University Press, 1911.—pp. vii, 75.
- Philosophie de la Pratique.* Par BENEDETTO CROCE. Traduit de L'Italien par HENRI BURIOT et Le DR. JANKELEVITCH. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. vii, 368.
- Schopenhauer als Verbilder.* Vom GRAFEN HERMANN KEYSERLING. Leipzig, Fritz Eckardt, 1910.—pp. 127.
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- Le chaos et L'harmonie Universelle.* Par FÉLIX LE DANTEC. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. 193.
- La Pensée Contemporaine.* Par PAUL GAULTIER. Paris, Librairie Hachette et Cie., 1911.—pp. 312.
- Life in the Making.* By LOREN B. MACDONALD. Boston, Sherman, French & Company, 1911.—pp. 223.
- The Essentials of Psychology.* By W. B. PILLSBURY. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1911.—pp. 358.

- New Thought, Its Lights and Shadows.* By JOHN BENJAMIN ANDERSON. Boston, Sherman, French & Company, 1911.—pp. 149.
- The American Philosophy Pragmatism.* By A. V. C. P. HUIZINGA. Boston, Sherman, French & Company, 1911.—pp. 64.
- An Introductory Psychology.* By MELBOURNE STUART READ. Ginn and Company, Boston.—pp. 305.
- Some Problems of Philosophy.* By WILLIAM JAMES. New York, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911.—pp. 225.
- The Philosophy of Music.* By HALBERT HAINS BRITAN. New York, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911.—pp. 252.
- The Uncaused Being and the Criterion of Truth.* By E. Z. DERR. Boston, Sherman, French & Company, 1911.—pp. 110.
- The Volitional Element in Knowledge and Belief.* By DELO CORYDON GROVER. Introduction by FRANCES J. MCCONNELL. Boston, Sherman, French & Company, 1911.—pp. 168.
- Seekers After Soul.* By JOHN O. KNOTT. Boston, Sherman, French & Company, 1911.—pp. 208.
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- Kants Lehre von der Entwicklung in Natur und Geschichte.* Von PAUL MENZER. Berlin, Georg Reimer, 1911.—pp. 432.
- La Depersonnalisation.* Par L. DUGAS et F. MOUTIER. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. 218.
- Das Problem des absoluten Raumes und seine Beziehung zum allgemeinen Raumproblem.* Von ALOYS MÜLLER. Braunschweig, Friedr. Vieweg & Sohn, 1911.—pp. 151.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*, I. Abtl.: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

Les jugements hypothétiques. E. GOBLOT. *Rev. de Mét.*, XIX, 2, pp. 199–210.

The three functions of the terms of a judgment are those of subject, class, and quality. Since every quality may serve as the generic denomination of every subject to which it applies, it is always possible to interpret a concept in terms of extension. However, the use of the terms *extension* and *comprehension* simply introduces needless difficulties. The categorical judgment expresses a relation of inherence, whereas the hypothetical judgment expresses one of dependence. There are three types of hypothetical judgments,—those where the subject of the hypothesis and the subject of the consequence are different, those where they are identical, and those where they are indeterminate. The first type may be true either universally or apodictically, being universal in physics and other general sciences, and apodictic in mathematics. The second type, found in such special sciences as, for example, chemistry, sees that the existence of the attribute A, if it be present, demands the presence in the same subject of the attribute B, thus expressing a characteristic of the subject it pertains to. In the third type, the hypothesis and the consequence have the same indeterminate subject. To this form the analytic judgments belong whose conclusion is an incomplete repetition of the hypothesis.

NORBERT WIENER.

La notion moderne de l'intuition et la philosophie des mathématiques. L. BRUNSCHVIG. *Rev. de Mét.*, XIX, 2, pp. 145–176.

The three chief themes of the philosophico-mathematical discussion of the last twenty years have been those of the integer, of the logical class, and of intuition. To the first two there correspond real systems both of the philosophy of science and of metaphysics, whereas the third cannot well be stated definitively, and must not be arbitrarily limited by external tests of coherence.

The very life of religion, art, and metaphysics depends on intuition, and if theories of them fail to give an adequate account of this, they become mere artificialities of abstraction. Intuition consists in a reversal of the habitual train of thought. Since every true science is more than a mere sum of the individual facts it embraces,—since sociology is not merely another name for biology and biology for physics,—it partakes of intuition. It is by this and this alone that we are able to make such inferences as that of the existence of the soul. Intuitionism does not withdraw mathematics into the realm of the transcendental. Originally the term 'intuition' as applied to mathematics meant that its figures could be represented by sense-images. Later it meant that it gave by another route results that could be obtained by empirical methods. The calculus was regarded as based on intuition because the infinitesimal was something *de novo*, qualitatively different from anything previously known. It is true, however, that the intuitionism of Pascal served only as a stepping stone to the completed calculus, first given us by Leibniz. The time when intuition can and does come into play in mathematics is at the critical period when one science is being formed by the study of the limiting cases of another. Such laws as Poncelet's principle of continuity and Hankel's principle of the permanence of formal laws fail to apply universally when concepts of a new sort are introduced. All the different mathematical sciences, once considered as given *à priori*, are now reduced to mere points of view among an infinitude of possibilities. Whereas Hermite looked for demonstrations more formally rigorous, Weierstrauss abhorred abstract formalism. The important moment in mathematical research is when two domains, considered previously to be unrelated, come into contact and give mathematical thought, as when Galois developed his theory of groups or Riemann his theory of contorted surfaces. Intuition can furnish categorical truth to mathematics, which formal logic cannot do. Intuitionism tends to set right again the reversed trait of thought of formal logic, which is unable to account for its own axioms, but must needs hand them over to intuition. There are two stages in mathematical intuition: naive intuition, which gives us bands for lines and solids for surfaces; and refined intuition, of a perfectly rigorous and precise character, which gives us formulæ, etc. The phase of a demonstration that renders it a unity is, according to Poincaré, intuitively known. Intuition is the organizing principle of deduction, not its antithesis. The as-if character of mathematics and, as a matter of fact, of every science, should be recognized, and they should not be ontologized. Euclidean geometry should be judged on precisely the same plane as the systems of Lobachevski and Riemann. The pragmatic theory of science and mathematics gives them an arbitrary character from which intuitionism escapes. Intuitionism originated as a protest against the artificiality of intellectualism and against the reduction of mathematics to a mere system of formal logic by claiming for it 'universal deduction,' which is of use only as a pedagogic tradition, and which should be eliminated as far as possible.

N. WIENER.

Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft. EDMUND HUSSERL. *Logos*, I, 3, pp. 289-341.

Philosophy has never made good its historic claim to the character of a strict science. The critical spirit of the modern period has gone rather toward building up the natural sciences than toward setting forth with scientific precision the nature and limits of philosophical problems. The natural sciences are in possession of bodies of objectively verified knowledge which may be learned and taught, while philosophy is as yet the realm of opinions, views, stand-points. Hegelianism and romanticism have in modern times brought about both a weakening and a falsification of the impulse toward a strictly scientific philosophy. The latter tendency appears in naturalism, a reaction against Hegelianism; the former in the *Weltanschauungs philosophie* which is connected with Hegel's theory of the relative validity of each system of philosophy for its age. Naturalism is a result of the discovery of the connection of objects, according to exact natural laws, in a unitary space-time order. The natural scientist sees everything as nature, in particular, as physical nature. Psychical phenomena are accordingly viewed as secondary to and dependent upon physical phenomena. The positivist brushes aside as scholasticism anything that does not appear as a fact of experience, yet he cuts the ground from beneath his own feet by naturalizing consciousness and striving to reduce all norms and absolute ideals to terms of positive science. Regarding all previous philosophy as unscientific, naturalism wishes to base logic, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, pedagogy and even metaphysics upon psychology, and finally, to base the sciences of mind upon the physical sciences. But psychology, simply as a science of mental facts, is not adapted to perform a normative function. The solution of certain problems, immanent in natural science, must transcend the point of view of the natural sciences themselves. Taken as merely given, the psycho-physical relation itself remains a riddle. If epistemology is to investigate the relation between being and consciousness, then it can only consider being as consciously perceived, identified, distinguished, etc. Since objects, in order to be objects at all, must be given in consciousness, forms of givenness must be studied. This inquiry is a phenomenology of consciousness, not a natural science of the same. The fundamental error of modern exact psychology is the discarding of direct and pure analysis of consciousness in favor of the indirect inquiry after psycho-physically relevant facts. The few psychologists who recognize the need of this immanent analysis are regarded as scholastics. In spite of all its exact methods, modern psychology begins with certain terms of common usage and utilizes them in all further procedure without at any stage critically examining them. These concepts cannot attain their logical value through the course of heaped-up experiments, but must themselves be subjected to phenomenological analysis. Psychology tries to follow the procedure of natural science in taking experience as simply given. This method is justified in the case of natural science, since it isolates phenomena in order to ascertain their natures, their orderly causal connections, while psychology is the science of the phenomena them-

selves. In the latter case, the phenomena are, as it were, monads, have no separate natures, but one common nature, and do not constitute a causal order but a flux. There is here necessary a purely immanent investigation, over against the psycho-physical, an analysis, not through mere introspection, but through immediate examination of the character of consciousness. The natural-scientific point of view prevents us from seeing ideas or meaningful content and prevents an inquiry which is essential to a truly scientific psychology as well as to a genuine critique of reason. The psycho-physical analysis deals with the empirical relations between body and mind, but these psycho-physical correlations have little to do with the immediate characters which are discovered by a direct examination of consciousness. With the development of a systematic phenomenology, blinded by no naturalistic predispositions, it will be seen how impossible it is to base epistemology, ethics, pedagogy, etc., upon experimental psychology.

Turning to historicism, we observe that it gives rise to a relativism which entails the same sceptical difficulties as the naturalistic point of view. This historicism, or *Weltanschauungs philosophie*, abandoning the recognition of objective validity, views art, religion, custom, and even science and philosophy, as changing phenomena of human culture, yet in concluding to complete relativity from the flux of systems, it abandons the very test of all systems. This type of philosophy concerns itself with points of view of extended utility, theories of life, etc. which have grown up in the experience of the race. But while the idea of a *Weltanschauung* differs in every age, that of a scientific philosophy is not conditioned by relation to the spirit of an age nor is it limited to the temporal. Every scientifically established evaluation remains a part of the wisdom of all mankind. We must not allow all absolute ideals and norms to be lost in a mass of historical facts. A *Weltanschauungs philosophie* may help us in taking some provisional position, but we must remember that our real object is not a temporary position but a radical philosophical science, working from the ground up through rigid criticism. A *Weltanschauungs philosophie* may impart collective wisdom of an ethical, practical or theoretical sort, but what is needed is an impersonal, scientific method which shall add steadily to an accumulation of valid philosophical knowledge. Such a scientific philosophy will, to be sure, draw upon the historical past, not to piece together systems, but to ascertain what history has to offer toward the solution of definite problems.

J. R. TUTTLE.

Notes sur la croissance et la différenciation. L. WEBER. Rev. de Mét., XIX, I, pp. 34-63.

The study of embryology has failed to give us the desired clue to the how and wherefore of growth and differentiation. There has been a tendency to overexplain unjustifiably the facts and processes of development on account of the real scarcity of significant facts. The size of a primitive cell is strictly limited by the fact that whereas the volume to be nourished increases as

the cube of the radius, the absorbing surface increases only as the square of the radius. Cells set apart for especial purposes or having a complicated nutritive organization may form exceptions to this rule. Nucleus and cytoplasm are necessary the one for the other, although their quantitative relation may vary within wide limits. A cell may consist of one or several energids, *i. e.*, nuclei with their attendant cytoplasm. The concept of the energid is a very useful one. Polynuclear cells often reach very large dimensions. The energid, however, is very difficult to define in the schizophytes on account of their diffuse nucleus. In certain cases of reproduction where there is a tendency for the daughter cell to become smaller than the parent cell, after a certain number of generations there is some change in the life-cycle that restores the cell to its primitive size. The size of normal cells varies between an unknown lower limit and about a cubic millimeter. Surface-tension may have its effect in limiting the size of the cell. This may have caused sporulation. The size of cells may be limited by the process of mitosis, since it may be impossible for an overlarge nucleus to undergo it.

NORBERT WIENER.

La théorie de concepts chez M. Bergson et M. James. RENÉ JEANNIÈRE. Rev. de Ph., X, 12, pp. 578-598.

In an article in last year's January number of the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, James indicated a parallelism between Bradley and Bergson in regard to the rationalistic doctrine of the fragmentary nature of sense experience and of the unifying function of concepts. He held that Bergson reverses the Kantian theory, makes immediate sense experience a continuum, and gives the synthetic concepts only a relative and at best a partially representative value. This article gives rise to two questions: (1) Did James faithfully represent the thought of Bergson; and (2) are his reasons for approving of these thoughts convincing? In later numbers of the same periodical, Montague and Pitkin, of Columbia University, and Kallen, of Harvard University and a pupil of James', have expressed their opinions about the adequacy of James' representation of Bergson's views. Montague reserves judgment as to whether Bergson has been correctly interpreted by James and contents himself with criticizing the view represented by James as being an example of a sort of philosophical stimulus error. 'Thought' and 'thought about' must not be confused, nor can a static thought ever disrupt a non-static reality process. Pitkin is the first to question the James' version of Bergson. He emphasises the fact that Bergson insisted on the theoretical and not practical intelligibility of concepts. They do not veil our experience nor are they 'cut out' of our experience: they are our experience itself. Kallen denies that James was an inaccurate reporter of Bergson, and shows by parallel citations that Pitkin has done James an injustice. Concepts are taken by Bergson in the light of practical but not theoretical service. Reality is a flux and concepts of thought are immobile cross sections of that flux, taken under the illusion that these somehow mean reality. Finally, in the July number of

the same *Journal*, Bergson himself clearly indicates that James did not misrepresent, but indeed clarified the thought of Bergson, who incidentally also clears himself of minor charges brought forth by Pitkin. All this is in answer to the first question—the second question remains to be faced. In reviewing James' *A Pluralistic Universe*, Montague advances a number of objections to James' faith in the Bergsonian doctrines. The realist has no difficulty with the dilemma, how is it possible to reconcile the conviction of common sense that the same things can be at once distributively and collectively known, with the logical conviction that the experience of things as parts can not be identical with the experience of things as a whole. For the observer the thing *is* what it is *perceived as*, and the various experienced qualities are aspects that can therefore be coexistent in time and space. It is not 'fair play' to meet the situation by saying that it is logically insoluble. In the choice between acosmism and irrationalism, James has adopted the latter, but the rationalism that is thus discarded was of the poor variety which ascribes to the activity of thought a constitutive or reconstitutive function toward its objects. To these and other objections James briefly answers in a later number, and this answer in turn elicits a short rejoinder with the result that the situation is left almost identical with the former.

CHRISTIAN A. RUCKMICH.

Die phänomenologische Naturanschauung und der philosophische Realismus.

H. KLEINPETER. V. f. w. Ph., XXXIV, 1, pp. 46-67.

The facts of physical science have been discussed in the speech of daily life in a very free and easy manner. Their common interpretation no longer satisfies the modern demands for precision and exactness of thought. Many unsupported preconceived notions have crept into science because it has formed judgments before reason has accepted the demonstration as complete. Stumpf and Külpe have attempted to treat physics from the philosophical view-point and have contributed much to the subject. It does not appear, however, that Stumpf has successfully demonstrated the assertion that we must postulate processes beyond consciousness, if mention is to be made at all of law. We can renounce, on every hypothesis, that which happens outside of consciousness, without being obliged to neglect the regular processes which our world of sensation exhibits. Where is the door which leads out from the world of consciousness? Even a Platonic ideal world must first receive significance through its relation to the world of sensation; without this, it would be an idle toy or would have at best only a purely mathematical interest. Furthermore, ideas are not mere representations—which is still to be read in many text-books on logic—but they are symbols for mental activities which only by their harmonious association in a group can have a representation as the result.

The phenomenological laws of physics are those which merely describe facts without reference to any hypothesis, such as the principle of the conservation of energy or in short any law which makes use merely of the aid of

mathematics. Now there are in physics laws of another sort also, such, namely, as are expressed in the language of a definite hypothesis. Mach attempted the work of tracing back all these physical laws to the purely phenomenological, but he was only in a measure successful. But the work is possible and it will ultimately be performed. Such a discrepancy as exists is under the conditions of modern science no longer necessary, and it was to indicate this fact that the present article was written. The mode of viewing things as phenomena does not debar a philosophy or metaphysics, just as it does not prevent the investigator of nature from availing himself of a working hypothesis for his purpose. It is the duty of an exact science, however, to become free from all assumptions and to carefully discriminate between observed facts and the conclusions of theory. Although we know that we cannot peer into the nature of things and that we can but observe what displays itself before our eyes, yet at least the seeker after truth can and must distinguish clearly the hypothetical in physics from the certain.

GEORGE T. COLMAN.

Miracles and History. WILLIAM HALLOCK JOHNSON. Princeton Theol. Rev., VIII, 4, pp. 529-559.

Back of the questions of the credibility or the possibility of miracles lies the more important question as to their historicity. Objections to miracle are reducible to the scientific and the religious. But the deeper study of science is not only not averse to spiritual realities, but, by its insistence on the unity of the physical universe, gives to miracles, if admitted at all, universal significance and a truer dignity. In modern religious thought, on the contrary, depreciation of miracle is prominent. Some historians, as Langlois and Seignobus, hand over the subject to metaphysics and physical science, but this is to abandon historical evidence and do violence to historical method. The attitude of the historian, as correctly expressed by Schmiedel, is to accept the miraculous explanation only when all others have failed, and then, only upon the strength of unexceptional testimony. The prime requisite of approach is an open mind, and, at least, the admission of the possibility of the theistic postulate. The most convincing testimony in support of New Testament miracles is furnished, in the Acts of the Apostles, by Luke, whose training and self-restraint, and whose accuracy in regard to geographical details, entitle him to a hearing. Harnack, who explains many recorded miracles in the Acts by the theory of coincidence, has two objections to Luke's testimony: (1) Luke was superstitious—a Christian Scientist; (2) In the Acts he has altered his account of the Resurrection and Ascension at the end of his gospel in favor of a secondary tradition. But the first objection does not invalidate the testimony of a witness, and the second may be explained by the fact that Luke, in his gospel, wished only to give prominence to the appearance of the risen Christ, without burdening his narrative or obscuring this central fact with details. The demand for unexceptional testimony is also met by the Apostle Paul, who, although he gives no detailed

description of his miracles, yet, by his own experience, his own words and extended labors, furnishes a testimony for miracles which may not be set aside. Finally, the Gospels, both the Synoptics and John, contain evidence, though second hand, which is admittedly strong. The critical study of the gospels, aided by the progress of modern psychology and the rise of healing cults, have made for the trustworthiness of the healing ministry, if not for its miraculous nature. Two queries now arise: Can the psychology of suggestion adequately explain the healing ministry of Jesus? And can this be separated from the other miracles of the Gospels? The influence of mind over body cannot be doubted, and answer to prayer, although mysterious, may not be attributed to miracle in the strict sense. But the practitioners of suggestion, *e. g.*, the leaders of the Emmanuel Movement, and Christian Scientists, confess to cures only in the field of functional neuroses and non-organic diseases, while Jesus cured all manner of sickness and disease among the people. Further, in the case of demoniacal possession, if Jesus' lack of knowledge forbade correct diagnosis, the only explanation of dispossession is miracle. This discussion of the first query furnishes a negative answer to the second. The works of Jesus are inseparable from his personality, and if this is unique—if the figure drawn of him in the gospels, showing him to have control over human life and destiny is correct, as it is consistent, then the distinction between his power over disease, and that over nature and death loses its significance, and has little warrant in science or historical criticism.

MARK E. PENNEY.

The Meaning of Good and Evil. J. S. MACKENZIE. *Int. J. E.*, XXI, 3, pp. 251-269.

Is good an ultimate, indefinable datum, or is it relative to something else? This is a question long-vexed, and one as yet unsolved. Was Eve's action in eating the fruit evil? And, if so, Why? Was it because it was contrary to the divine command? If so, why was such disobedience evil? Was it because such action led to punishment, or because the attitude of obedience is good, or because divine commands indicate what is intrinsically good? In any one of these cases we arrive ultimately at something considered intrinsically good. Kant held the 'good will' to be the only intrinsically good thing. In this we find: (1) an attitude, which we call rational; (2) an act, which we describe as choosing; (3) an end, which is aimed at when we choose rationally. The act of choice seems an ultimate in all conscious life, and choice may be irrational in its beginnings. The difficulty is with the end, which is thought intrinsically good. A world in which rational choice had no real significance would be a world in which intrinsic good had no real significance. Good would then be an object which conscious beings choose, and would vary with the point of view of the beings who choose. But, if there be such an attitude as that of rational choice, there is also such a thing as intrinsic good, even though no conscious being chooses such an attitude. The fact that we are able to discriminate degrees of approximation to a rational attitude indicates that such an attitude

is an intelligible ideal. From the standpoint of that ideal rationality would be chosen, and hence would be intrinsically good. So we can say not only that good is the object of rational choice, but also that rationality is a good. If good is unintelligible apart from rational choice, then in choosing good we must choose rational choice itself. So that Kant's 'good will'—the attitude of rational choice—is an unqualified good. But to stop here gives a hopeless circle. The choice we choose must be distinguished from self, that is, it must be an intelligible universe. Pleasure is involved in rational choice, since the choosing of that choice pleases us. But a pleasure is ultimately good only when it is the subjective aspect of rational choice. The presence of what we experience as evil,—e. g., pain or a perverse choice,—has been thought to show that the universe is not completely good. But choice implies moral alternatives. A world in which there was no evil would not be a completely good world. Optimism holds that just enough evil exists to bring out the full content of the good. Pessimism holds that just enough good exists to bring out the full content of evil. One is bright through the strength of its darkness, the other is dark through the strength of its light. A world 'Beyond Good and Evil' would be neither dark nor bright; it would be invisible.

J. REESE LIN.

The Question of Moral Obligation. RALPH BARTON PERRY. Int. J. E., XXI, 3, pp. 282-298.

The 'feeling of moral obligation' is distinguished from other moral sentiments in that it is a species of self-consciousness. It is a sentiment of an agent with respect to *his own* action. We here have to do with a sentimental judgment, or a passionate experience which when cooled precipitates a judgment. We may paraphrase the feeling of moral obligation as 'the feeling that I ought or ought not to perform this action.' We may fairly ask just *how one feels, when one feels that one ought or ought not*. Here is a complex emotion which may be analyzed and finally brought under those laws of consciousness which psychology discovers. Or we may ask *how one comes to feel that one ought or ought not*. Such an inquiry eventually brings us not only to psychological but to biological and sociological principles. Or we may ask *what acts men have felt that they ought or ought not to perform*. This inquiry is affiliated in methods and laws with anthropology, comparative religion, and history. And we must attend to the simple question, 'What acts ought I to perform?' It is claimed that this last question may be answered in terms of the others, that is, *what I ought to perform is what I feel that I ought to perform*. To justify this it is argued that the feeling of obligation reflects the will of God, or the lasting interests of mankind, or it is held that the obligatory act is *any act, provided only that it be felt about the agent himself in a specific manner*. This is a question of fact. Does not one feel in a specific way *that* an act is obligatory? If so, the acts so judged, *when truly so judged*, have a common character other than feeling. If one seeks an end and is confronted with a situation, then there is *a right act in the premises*, regardless of any feeling

toward it or opinion concerning it. It is 'hypothetical,' as Kant would say, but valid. Moral laws define acts as vicious or virtuous according to their bearing on the field of interests which they affect. Typical moral experiences contain both a judicial and an affective exponent. This complexity is reduced to a pseudo-simplicity by such terms as 'appreciation' and 'evaluation,' or by such notions as Westermarck's 'emotions of approval.' But this is simply to exploit the equivocation which their dual nature makes possible. Most moralists are now agreed that goodness is relative to desire. This does not mean that the good is what is judged to be good. Value lies in the *desire relation*, which is prior to all judgment about it. There is a logical or strictly ethical question concerning the meaning of moral obligation which cannot be answered by any account of the genesis, history, or psychological structure of the sentiment. And it is impossible to make a rational appeal to anything but reason. Arguments do not compel feeling or action. An agent is always free to ignore the truth.

J. REESE LIN.

Étude expérimentale sur l'association de ressemblance. M. FOUCAULT. *Arch. de Ps.*, 40, pp. 338-360.

Two problems arise in connection with association by similarity: (1) May similarity be reduced to contiguity or *vice versa*? (2) Is similarity an associative force? Peter's recent results show that similarity is an associative force and that there are individual differences in the degree to which it is exercised. The present study is based on two sets of experiments. In the first, numbers were used, these being arranged in couplets according to four types, of which three showed similarity. There were eight couplets under each type and these were distributed over four series, two to each series in all possible orders. The method consisted of presenting successively to the observers the couplets of a single series. The degree of the impression was then tested; the first members of the series were given in succession and the observers attempted to recall the second members. This was repeated until the entire series had been impressed. In the second set of experiments nonsense words were used. Here, the method was similar to that of the first set; but composite and homogeneous series were used and the exposures regulated by a special apparatus. The experiments show (1) that resemblance between thought has no associative value; (2) that contiguity alone forms associative connections; (3) that similarity can act only in a secondary and indirect manner. There is the possible objection that association by similarity may be brought about through physiological intermediaries. The reply would be that we are here dealing with the appearance of images in consciousness, and that association is insufficient to explain such facts. Associative connections are only one of the many forces which determine the appearance of images.

MABEL E. GOUDGE.

Consciousness in Psychology and Philosophy. G. A. TAWNEY. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., VIII, 8, pp. 197-203.

The Greeks and Romans had no exact equivalent for our word consciousness. Modern philosophy and psychology recognize two meanings of the word: (1) consciousness is essentially self-consciousness; (2) consciousness is the various processes that constitute the mental life. Locke, representing the early English psychologists, identifies all states of consciousness with the states of self-consciousness. Again, from the empirical standpoint, mind is the same thing as consciousness,—it is the place where mental processes go on. This is the 'mind' of much modern idealism and modern philosophy. For the functional psychologist, mind is either a nervous system or else an individual and independent thing dwelling in the body and sustaining relations of contrast and exclusion toward all other things. Many students of philosophy and psychology to-day are looking for a substitute for the conception of mind. Professor Woodbridge holds that consciousness is simply an order of relations of implication and suggestion. Certain facts of experience, however, indicate that consciousness may more properly be regarded as the continuum of immediate value. As treated by psychologists consciousness is an individual affair, whereas, a man is a mere individual neither in his thinking, his emotions, nor his will. Psychology does not sufficiently recognize a man's dependence upon his social environment for his thought and emotions. We need a psychology of human conduct to supplant the psychology of consciousness.

MABEL E. GOUDGE.

Versuche über Vorstellungstypen. ALBERT FEUCHTWANGER. Z. f. Psych., 58, 3 n. 4, pp. 161-199.

The study is an investigation of types of imagery by the method of direct introspection elaborated by Marbe. Seven different kinds of stimuli were used, including nonsense syllables, words and phrases, simple questions, colored objects, and pictures. Tactual-motor images, words irrespective of the presence of images or sensations, and a consciousness of inner speech without at the same time any images of sensations were reported by the observers. Without exception auditory images occurred less frequently than either inner speech or visual images. The auditory images are for the most part verbal, with few concrete ideas. The visual-verbal type sees the spoken syllables, words, and sentences clearly while listening to and answering questions, but not clearly in loud and low reading and generally not in the perception of objects and pictures. All the observers report more verbal-motor images in recall than during the perception of the syllables, words, and sentences. Few visual images appeared with the nonsense syllables, more with the words, and the largest number with the sentences; on the other hand, more kinesthetic-verbal reactions occurred with the nonsense syllables than in the case of sentences. Changing the direction of attention considerably altered the reaction time. The visual type of observer could control visual images

more easily and quickly than could the kinesthetic-auditory type, but the latter could call up auditory and tactual images with much greater ease. There appears to be a correlation between imagery types as determined by the direct and the indirect methods. The modified Eckhardt method showed that the reproduction of memorized numbers was more interfered with in the auditory-kinesthetic observers by the distraction of counting, while the visualizers are more disturbed by the low reading. The method of Kraepelin gives a low correlation with the results of the direct method and showed the same differences in the number of auditory-verbal, kinesthetic-verbal, and visual reactions.

A. S. EDWARDS.

L'école de Wurtzbourg et la méthode d'introspection expérimentale. J. B. SAUZE.
Rev. de Ph., XI, 3, pp. 225-251.

From the time of Ribot and Richet, there has been much experimental study in the psychological laboratory. The methods have been those of physiology, neurology, anthropology, hypnotism, and phrenology, rather than those of psychology. In the last quarter of the 19th century the experimental psychology developed at Leipzig has combined the methods of psychology with those of physiology; and, although there has been little work done there on the higher mental processes, nevertheless the foundations for psychological research have been placed on firm ground. In the *Grundriss der Psychologie* (1893) Külpe maintained that the introspective method, in spite of its insufficiencies, was the fundamental method of psychology and the only one possible of direct application. A year later he proposed the following program: to analyze the processes and states of mind more precisely and specifically; to obtain a full and separate account of each phenomenon; to settle the meanings of the terms in common use, in order to overcome the existing ambiguities; to individualize methods, so as to make all questions strictly to the point; to utilize with great care the results of other workers; to exercise discrimination in the choice of subjects and of experimenters; to unify as far as possible the various methods. This program has been carried out with considerable success. Objections to introspection are fragmentariness of memory and dangers of suggestion; it complicates difficulties already existing and cannot expect to catch the obscure and fleeting phenomena of consciousness. But the objections are not fatal. Even the obscure and fleeting processes have the attributes of extension and intensity. Introspection is supplemented by the statistical method. Even so, however, it clears the way only in adult psychology; in other fields, such as child psychology, different methods must be used.

A. S. EDWARDS.

The Place of Movement in Consciousness. W. B. PILLSBURY, Psych. Rev., XVIII, 2, pp. 83-99.

With the exception of the affective processes, the clearness of the attentive consciousness, and the subordinate motor processes, there is nothing in mind

that has not been explained in terms of movement. The explanations fall into three groups: those of structures, of functions, and of the higher intellectual processes that lie on the border between structure and function. The advocates of the motor theory seem now to be attempting to revamp the innervation sense, reinstating it in its essentials, though without any new proof. In several of the theories, the qualities that are ascribed to consciousness as a result of movement are considered as having their origin in the cortical motor apparatus rather than in the sensory ends in the body of the muscles. The statements are justified only from theoretical needs. Stated in the current form, the theory is obviously very difficult to disprove and even harder to prove on the basis of definite evidence. So far as it is possible to know the facts, the only structural contributions of movement to consciousness are the kinesthetic sensations. The motor theory is right in emphasizing the part played by kinesthetic qualities in every domain. They constitute an important part of every perception process, color memory, and give tone to all of the intellectual operations; on the active side, they constitute the goal of all thought, and play an important part in the organization of experiences into systems of knowledge, and in making thought possible. Perhaps most important of all, the motor theory has rendered impossible the older form of explanation in which mental states were regarded as entities that were independent of all other mental activities present as well as past. Interrelation, context, attitude are now made the basis of all forms of mental explanation, rather than elements or entities. On the other hand, the motor theory claims too much. Not all qualities of perception or memory are of motor origin, and what is of motor origin can be ascribed to the motor cortex only indirectly through the kinesthetic sensations. No meaning, furthermore, can be given to the assertion that selection of conscious processes is in terms of movement. The attitude of the moment determines movement, not movement the character of the attitude. Again, the higher mental functions, although they involve movement, cannot be explained in terms of movement alone. Movements in and of themselves have no meaning, are not immediately recognized nor understood. Movements, too, acquire meaning, are recognized or judged, only as they may be referred to other mental states and finally to a systematized knowledge. To identify the motor theory with a functional psychology is to destroy the essence of the functional view of life and reduce functions to new and inadequate structures. Finally, movement cannot be regarded as the cause of any of the antecedent conscious states. The motor theory is one of the most valuable movements in modern psychology but it should take its right place. A complete explanation of any phase of consciousness must include both sensation and movement, recognizing their reaction one upon the other, as well as the reaction of one sensorimotor circuit upon others. Above all, there must be constant reference to the ever growing system of knowledge that develops out of sensation and is tested by movement, but which alone gives meaning to sensation and rational direction to movement.

A. S. EDWARDS.

NOTES.

The Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association will be held in Cambridge, in acceptance of the invitation of the Philosophical Department of Harvard University, probably on Dec. 27, 28 and 29.

The topic which has been selected as the leading subject for discussion is "The Relation of Consciousness, Organ, and Object in Perception." Leaders will be chosen for this discussion, and these leaders, together with the president, will act as a committee to formulate propositions and definitions on the subject, and these will be made known to the members of the Association as early as possible.

In addition to the above subject four others have appeared as seemingly representing, judged by the automatic vote of the association, topics of dominant interest to the members. Accordingly the Executive Committee has decided to introduce the innovation of asking for papers on these subjects, with the distinct understanding, however, that this action is not intended to exclude papers on other subjects.

These four subjects are as follows: 1. The Nature of Cause and the Place of the Conception in Metaphysics. 2. What, precisely, are we to understand by the term Evolution? 3. The Nature of Logic. Does the study of the subject deal with thought processes, or with quite non-mental terms and relations? 4. Do Persistent Illusions presuppose Consciousness? If so, what consequences follow?

Members are invited to submit papers on these or other subjects at any time previous to November 20th, and are requested to send along with the title a brief outline.

E. G. SPAULDING,
Secretary.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals:

MIND, No. 79: *F. H. Bradley*, On Some Aspects of Truth; *Gerald Cato*, Reality as a System of Functions; *D. Balsillie*, Prof. Bergson on Time and Free Will; *G. C. Field*, The Meaning of Human Freedom; Discussions; Critical Notices; New Books; Philosophical Periodicals; Notes.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XXI, 4: *C. Lloyd Morgan*, The Garden of Ethics; *Paul S. Reinsch*, Energism in the Orient; *Alfred W. Benn*, Milton's Ethics; *S. Radakrishnan*, The Ethics of the Bhagavadgita and Kant; *Ada Elliot Sheffield*, The Written Law and the Unwritten Double Standard; *Ramsden Balmsworth*, The Influence of the Darwinian Theory of Ethics; Book Reviews.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XVIII, 4: *Daniel Starch*, Unconscious Imitation in Handwriting; *Frederic Lyman Wells*, A Preliminary Note on the Categories of Association Reactions; *H. L. Hollingsworth*, Judgments of Persuasiveness; From the University of California Psychological Laboratory: *John M. Brewer*, The Psychology of Change: On Some Phase of Minimal Time by Sight (XIV); *G. M. Stratton*, The Psychology of Change: How is the Perception of Movement Related to that of Succession (XV).

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, VIII, 6: General Reviews and Summaries; Reports of Meetings; Special Reviews; Books received.

VIII, 7: General Reviews and Summaries; Special Reviews; Books Received.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL, IX, 4: *Sir Oliver Lodge*, The Christian Idea of God; *J. W. Marriott*, The Kingdom of the Little Child; *Professor B. W. Bacon*, The Mythical Collapse of Historical Christianity; *Rev. P. H. Wicksteed*, M.A., "Magic"—A contribution to the Study of Goethe's *Faust*; *Professor John Dewey*, Maeterlinck's Philosophy of Life; *James Devon*, The Criminal, the Criminologist, and the Public; *President Charles F. Thwing*, The American Family; Religion in Jerusalem at the Present Hour, by *A Resident in Jerusalem*; *Otto Julius Bierbaum*, Dostoyeffsky and Nietzsche; *Rev. R. H. Coats*, Lancelot Andrewes and John Bunyan; *Rev. J. Dawson*, The Invasion of the Sky; *Rev. W. Wooding*, The Pre-Christian Jesus; *Rev. S. Udny*, Dante and the New Theology; Discussions; Reviews; Recent Books and Articles.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, VIII, 12: *Cassius J. Keyser*, The Asymmetry of the Imagination; *Reginald B. Cooke*, The Theistic Readjustment of Idealism; Discussion; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VIII, 13: *W. H. Winch*, The Faculty Doctrine, Correlation, and Educational Theory (I), *Knight Dunlap*, Rhythm and the Specious Present; *Savilla Alice Elkus*, Mechanism and Vitalism; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and New Books.

VIII, 14: *Durant Drake*, The Inadequacy of "Natural" Realism; *W. H. Winch*, The Faculty Doctrine, Correlation and Educational Theory (II); Discussion; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VIII, 15: *John Dewey*, Brief Studies in Realism (I); Discussion; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

THE MONIST, XXI, 3: *Eugenio Rignano*, On the Mnemonic Origin and Nature of Affective Tendencies; *Charles C. Peters*, Friedrich Nietzsche and His Doctrine of Will to Power; *Editor*, Max Stirner, the Predecessor of Nietzsche; *John Wesley Powell*, Becoming (Poem); Criticisms and Discussions; Book Reviews and Notes.

ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE, II Abt., XVII, 2: *Julius Fischer*, Wesen und Zweck der Kunst; *Kristian B. R. Aars*, Kausalität und Existenz bei Kant; *Dr. Josef Reinhold*, Die psychologischen Grundlagen der kantschen

Erkenntnistheorie; *Ramendra Sundar Trivedi*, Die Wahrheit; Die neuesten Erscheinungen auf dem Gebiete der systematischen Philosophie; Systematische Abhandlungen in den Zeitschriften; Zur Besprechung eingegangene Werke.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XXXVI, 6: *J. de Gaultier*, Scientisme et pragmatisme; *E. Tassy*, Essai d'une classification des états affectifs; *Plesnila*, Les origines de la mort naturelle; Revue générale; *J. Baruzi*, La philosophie religieuse d'après quelques livres récents; Analyses et comptes rendus; Revue des périodiques étrangers.

XXXVI, 7: *A. Rey*, Le congrès international de philosophie de 1911; *F. Raul*, Pensée théorique et pensée pratique; *G. Davy*, La sociologie de M. Durkheim (I); *E. Tassy*, Essai d'une classification des états affectifs Analyses et comptes rendus; Livres nouveaux.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE, XI, 6: *J. Toulemarde*, Le tempérament nerveux; *L. Garriguet*, L'évolution actuelle du socialisme français; *M. Gossard*, A propos de quelques imperfections de la connaissance humaine; *E. Bruneteau*, La loi naturelle; Analyses et comptes rendus; Recension des Revues et chronique.

XI, 7: *P. Duhem*, Le temps selon les philosophes hellènes; *J. Toulemonde*, Le tempérament nerveux; *Dr. R. Van der Ekt*, Les faits de Lourdes, A propos d'ouvrages récents; *E. Bruneteau*, La loi naturelle; Analyses et comptes rendus; Recension de Reviews.

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE, 41: *D. Katzaroff*, Contribution a l'étude de la récongnition; *Ed. Claparède*, Récongnition et moitié; *H. Preisig*, Notes sur le langage chez les aliénés; Notes et discussions; Bibliographie.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA, III, 3: *Robert Ardigò*, Estema idea logisimo; *Federigo Enriques*, La filosofia italiana al Congresso di Bologna; *B. Varisco*, Dio e l'anima; *Paola Rotta*, La rinascita dell' Hegel e la filosofia perenne; *Luigi Valli*, Le filosofia che non vissero; *Roberto Menasci*, Infinito e indefinito in cartesio; *L. Michelangelo Billia*, Per l'io di Cartesio e di tutti; Bibliografia filosofica italiana (1910) a cura di Alessandro Levi; *Guido Della Valle* (R. Mondolfo)—*J. Walther* (*E. Marconi*), Recensioni e Cenni; Notizie; Atti della Società Filosofica Italiana.

LA CULTURA FILOSOFICA, V, 3; *A. Aliotta*, Il problema dell'infinito; *Dott. E. Fabbri*, Lo studio delle passioni in Cartesio, Malebranche e Spinoza; *G. Calò*, Profili pedagogici; Recensioni; Fra Libri e Riviste; Necrologio.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN 1910.¹

IF one studies the principal movements of German philosophy in recent years, one will find that in 1910 the development has been continued along the previous course. It is true that in philosophy more than in any other field the temporal succession coincides with the logical order. We recognize thus that during the past year the same characteristic motives and internal conflict have been at work. On the one hand, there is philosophical *analysis*, which in epistemology and logic brings about an ever finer sifting and separating of the various elements of thinking, a movement embodying the principle of limitation and differentiation. On the other hand, there are attempts,—they are not yet much more than attempts,—at a new metaphysical *synthesis* of all existence. The fundamental deficiency of contemporary philosophy lies just in the fact that these two functions, the analytical and the synthetical, from whose union and interpenetration alone a great *Weltanschauung* can arise, do not co-operate, but pursue their aims each for itself and independent of the other. Analysis, which in its progress of making subtle distinctions has accomplished astonishing results, is in danger of losing its positive contents and of degenerating into mere play with definitions; while synthesis, on the contrary, is still in need of critical formulation and so fails to present its results in finished form and with the power of conviction. Nevertheless, the era of Critical Idealism from Kant to Hegel, which still has the strongest influence upon present German philosophy, is best fitted to exemplify this union of the two modes of reflection. The

¹ Translated from the German by Dr. L. R. Geissler.

continually growing importance which Hegel, the great dialectician and systematizer, has gained in modern epistemology and logic as well as in metaphysics, is perhaps a favorable sign that the two fundamental forces of philosophical thought begin to converge toward a point of intimate reunion.

Although the most recent German philosophy has not given up its Kantian leaning, yet it cannot be denied that even those thinkers who once strictly maintained this attitude have begun to manifest a new striving beyond the limits of historical and neo-Kantian Criticism in one or the other of the two directions which I have indicated at an earlier date. It is either in the direction of logic or in that of metaphysics. The close connection which Transcendentalism has brought about between the laws of thought and the laws of being, which is the characteristic feature and the historical significance of this philosophy, is again being dissolved. The strict objectivity which Kant had sought in a conceptual, categorical penetration of the world of facts, of phenomena, is projected by some into the thought-act, by others into a metaphysical reality beyond the world of phenomena. This turn becomes especially clear in the work of the stricter Kantians, in so far as it extends into our times. A good opportunity to study this change is offered by the *Festheft der Kantstudien* in commemoration of Otto Liebmann's seventieth birthday. A number of well-known thinkers have united to do honor to the deserving scholar by a critical and profound presentation of the main points of his teachings. The introductory essay by Windelband is a general characterization of Liebmann, whom he calls the truest of all Kantians. In the latter's first writing, *Kant und die Epigonen*, he rejected the metaphysical elaborations of the *Vernunftkritik* as well as naïve materialism, and demanded a return to the master himself. This persistent loyalty finds expression more in his general mental attitude than in his positive conclusion. His method is the strict study of limitations: instead of having his problems end more or less dogmatically in a solution, he searches out their sources, tries to analyze their meaning, and finds in such analyses the measure or degree of possible solution. Although Liebmann has no sympathy with

relativism, yet his standpoint is anthropological, his concept of knowledge is limited to the specifically human forms of consciousness,—beyond this there exist mere suppositions, vague hypotheses, but no facts of knowledge.

Liebmann's various theories are presented with more detail in the following essays. His epistemology is described by Adickes, his conflict with empiricism by Hugo Falkenheim, his treatment of the relation of philosophy to mathematics by Walter Kinkel, his doctrine concerning the organism by Hans Driesch, his criticism of the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism by Richard Hönigswald, and his attitude toward Criticism and Nature-philosophy by Bruno Bauch, while Fritz Medicus writes on Liebmann as a poet.

A new and extensively planned work by Ernst Cassirer on *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff, Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik*¹ belongs also to the thought-sphere of neo-Kantianism. It is divided into two parts, an investigation of the concepts of things and relations, and secondly, of the system of relational concepts and the problem of reality. Cassirer starts from formal logic, the realm that should be the profoundest basis of all knowledge and thought, and shows that this study,—and in particular its most important feature, the theory of the formation of concepts,—is no longer compatible with the principles of the scientific understanding of the world, although even Kant considered it still in the form laid down by Aristotle as ultimate truth. Mathematics, as well as the various branches of natural science, no longer fit into the schemata of this theory. Its fundamental error lies in the doctrine that concepts arise through *abstraction*, a dogma which originated in the Aristotelian metaphysics, but which is no longer adequate to the modern conception of the universe. The positive and productive method of forming concepts cannot be explained by a negative operation, the omission and *forgetting* of individual characteristics. The most vigorous activity of the intellect, as it manifests itself in conceptual thought, ought not to be reduced to an intellectual weakness, *viz.*, the inability to retain the singular, the particular.

¹ Verlag von Bruno Cassirer, Berlin, 1910, pp. vii, 459.

This theory is especially disproved by mathematical concepts, which do not arise from manifold sensory impressions, but from a constructive unity. Concerning purely empirical concepts, furthermore, it must be emphasized that their origin in a number of common impressions is possible only if this common feature has been ascertained by an act of identification. It is hence not merely a matter of compared and related contents, there is required also an *activity* of comparing and relating, a productive principle of the formation of concepts, which by no means must always be one of similarity and comparison. By reason of this principle the various aspects of the given are examined from different angles, and the resulting *series-formation* (*Reihenbildung*) is the way in which we arrive at concepts. "We do not select from the manifold before us certain abstract parts, but we secure for its members an unequivocal *relation* by unambiguous interrelationship, thinking them connected through an inherent law. The place of the genus-concept in the old logic is taken by the mathematical concept of function which is to be extended also to the study of natural sciences. The concept possesses no substantial, intrinsic content, it is merely a law of the combination and co-ordination of members of the series. As long as one believes that all definiteness is exhausted by constant characteristics, by things and their attributes, so long of course does every conceptual generalization signify a mutilation of the conceptual content. But the more the concept is, so to speak, freed from its concrete existential content, the sooner, on the other hand, will its peculiar functional effect become apparent. The fixed attributes are replaced by general rules which allow us to view at a glance a whole series of possible determinations." The concept is thus not a fixed content but the living process of thought itself.

On this basis Cassirer examines the order of the various concepts, of the series-formations in the system of sciences, both in mathematics and in the natural sciences. His philosophical concept of truth and reality is similarly characterized as being interpreted functionally rather than substantially. Cassirer is an anti-metaphysician; for him there exists nothing but a

sphere of completely determined experience. The neo-Kantian attempt to unite the positivistic view of the universe with Criticism is here pushed to its extreme. Knowing for him is exhausted by the logical co-ordination of the various empirical data, but it does not contain any reference to a trans-subjective, transcendent existence. There is in principle no opposition between subjective and objective, even if one includes the phenomena of hallucinations and dreams. There are only differences of degree in the whole of experience: one content possesses greater constancy for the whole system of experience than another. It is inherent in the nature of this consistent functionalism that it leads to a relativity of truth and reality, but a relativity of which Cassirer rightly holds that it has nothing to do with a physical dependence upon the individual thinking subjects. It is a logical dependence of the various parts and members of experience upon the whole of experience. Knowledge is thus not something definite and given once for all, it is rather an infinite movement whose ideal aim is the elimination of variable, and the substitution of constant elements in the functional coherence of the given. In this turn there is revealed not only the above noted relation to modern positivism, but also a beginning of the transition from the standpoint of the historical Kant to that of Fichte and Hegel, which we meet among many of the most recent thinkers.

Bruno Bauch's book on *Immanuel Kant*, which appeared in the Götschen Collection,¹ belongs also to the more strictly transcendental movement. It is an extremely clear and instructive presentation of the Kantian philosophy, which in its brevity and conciseness allows the main points of this doctrine to stand out clearly and tangibly. The author rightly takes especial pains to free the concept 'transcendental' from its usual misinterpretations, which would refer it either to a psychological or a metaphysical sphere, while in reality it is the most profound basis of experience. As such it cannot,—like any other principle of orientation,—be itself a part of this foundation: it cannot be itself empirical but must be given *a priori*. The historical and

¹Leipzig, pp. 207.

actual content of the critical philosophy is thus put in a truer light than in recent interpretations, which attempt to fuse somehow the transcendent with the transcendental. The relatively detailed presentation of the transcendental doctrine of knowledge, passing from the *Æsthetics* to the *Dialectics* and summarizing Kant's complicated train of thought with clearness and precision, is followed by two briefer chapters on the practical philosophy as well as on the *Æsthetics* and teleology. Although Bauch does not bind himself dogmatically to any standpoint, yet in general he is related to the Marburg school. One may say that the difficult task of reproducing such a differentiated and complicated system as the Kantian within a small space has received here a most happy solution. Another and larger work by the same author, *Das Substanzproblem in der griechischen Philosophie bis zur Blütezeit*,¹ rests on a similar methodical basis and attempts to present systematically the historical development of the concept of substance in ancient Greece. It deals with the history of the abstract concept of substance which, aside from the feature of constancy, possesses as yet no concrete content, whether material or psychical. If this concept of substance constantly varies in the historical development, there must be something common in all these variations which returns and which, so to speak, forms the substance of the concept. Bauch defines this element very precisely in the Introduction. The substance is the permanent *within* the change, not that which persists *at* the change. ("Die Substanz ist das *im* Wechsel Beharrliche, nicht das, was *beim* Wechsel beharrt.") Space, time, causality, identity do not belong to the substance, though they are the pre-suppositions of the change, but are not directly concerned with it. The substance is not the change but the changing, or really the basis of the changing persisting in the change. This sharp dialectical analysis of the concept of substance, which at the same time illuminates Bauch's peculiar midway position between experience and metaphysics, enables him to express more clearly than most of the previous presentations the finer logical nuances in the treatment of this problem by Greek philosophers. This

¹ Winter, Heidelberg, pp. ix, 265.

holds true especially in the opposition of Heraclitus to the Eleatics. Bauch shows that this opposition is not absolute, that even Heraclitus, the philosopher of flux, recognized and required a substance which he spiritualized in a peculiar way. The change or rather the principle underlying it, the logos, is, in distinction from the changing, the persistent substance. How far back the investigation goes is shown by the chapters on the beginnings of the formation of scientific and mathematical concepts. The discussion of the problem reaches its climax in the sections on Plato and Aristotle, and these sections are especially effective, because here the most important motives of the two great views of the world come into clear relief by reason of their being grouped around the central problem of substance. However differently these two greatest Greek philosophers have defined it, there is yet a common element in it, something that serves as an eternal prototype, namely, this: neither of the two define substance dogmatically as either matter or mind, neither project it entirely within or without the world of phenomena, but they find in it the real common borderland of the immanent and the metaphysical reality. They have thus attained that scientific and epistemological form of the concept of substance which was later taken over and further developed by Kant.

The transcendental logical standpoint is clearly worked out in an essay by Heinrich Rickert, entitled *Vom Begriff der Philosophie*, the first article in the new journal *Logos*, of which we shall say more later on. The study has some resemblance to the author's recent investigations *Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie* published in the last volume of the *Kantstudien*, as it continues their theme. Rickert attacks first the view, widely held, which perceives the starting point and stimulating moment of philosophical reflections in the splitting up of Being into objectivity and subjectivity, in the supplementation of the objectifying scientific methods by the expressions of the subjective, psychological, inner life. It is in general the rigid opposition of an external and an internal world which according to this point of view justifies philosophical investigations. This has some bearing on the contrasts of intellectualism and voluntarism, passivism and activism, determinism and

indeterminism, pantheism and theism, mechanism and teleology, dogmatism and criticism, empiricism and rationalism, naturalism and idealism. Over against this Rickert emphasizes the fact that the true boundary line does not run within existence, between the subjective and objective halves of reality, but between the total existence, whether subjective or objective, and that sphere which lies beyond all being, beyond all existence and reality, that is, the sphere of *values*. The value belongs as little to the subject as to the object; it is rather the measure for both. Only the visible substrates of the values, the *goods*, as well as the psychic *evaluations* are real, the former as objective, the latter as subjective phenomena. But they must not be confused with the intrinsic, timeless value. The chasm between value and reality must however be bridged somehow, the dualism must be dissolved into some synthetic unity. Rickert seeks it in the concept 'import' (Sinn), *i. e.*, in that intellectual relation of the subject to the values which disclose to him their internal nature. What is here called import is not exhausted in a psychic, temporally limited act, it is not absorbed in mental contents nor mental acts, but points beyond them to the realm of values. In a most remarkable discussion Rickert shows that in psychology and in metaphysics analysis of reality and interpretation of import are often confused. Again, import is not identical with value, merely because it points toward the value. Rickert finds thus the desired bond between value and reality in the fact that the individual, from within the realm of his psychic, experiential reality, by reaching beyond it can establish an intelligent relation to the eternal spiritual values. Such experiences are on the one hand psychic realities, on the other hand a transcendent value is revealed in them.

In his conception of the nature of value, and especially in extending his objectifying, non-evaluating (wertindifferent) method of observation uniformly over physical and psychical being, Rickert resembles in many respects Münsterberg, to whom he is also related in his methodological inclinations toward Fichte. But Rickert diverges from Fichte's metaphysical basis even farther than Münsterberg. Metaphysics seems to him a mere roundabout way taken by the idea of value, and hence a super-

fluous addition, for in reality all values have to be applied and related to the given world.

In view of this great significance which Fichte has gained in most recent years, the publication of a selection of his works in six volumes by Eckardt (Leipzig) is a welcome undertaking. In the past year the third and fifth volumes have appeared, which contain, among other writings, later editions of the *Wissenschaftslehre*, furthermore *Der geschlossene Handelsstaat*, *Die Bestimmung des Menschen*, and *Die Bestimmung des Gelehrten*.

We have seen above in the case of Cassirer how the attempt of neo-Kantianism to pass from the objective to the functional, from the rigid substance of abstract thought to the vital activity of the concrete mind, involved necessarily Fichtean and Hegelian motives. It is undoubtedly true that Kant had fettered knowledge to definite, finished, logically irresolvable facts of objective and subjective contents. He had not passed either beyond the thing-in-itself, from which his *material* of knowledge was derived, or beyond the conception of the categories as natural *forms* of the thinking subject, into which his knowledge is moulded. However vigorously he strove beyond the contingency of actuality to the intrinsic validity of logical values, he yet encumbered these values with facts, and thus robbed them of their unconditional necessity. This last barrier could be removed only by a view in which the opposition of subject and object underlying knowledge was no longer absolute but merely relative, so that the contrast had to be deduced from knowledge in a logical manner, because such a view alone allowed the problem of knowledge to rest, not upon irrational facts, but upon rational laws of thought. The removal of this barrier was begun by Fichte and Schelling, who started with a psychical totality from which they tried to derive the ego and the non-ego, while Hegel brought this development to a conclusion by defining that totality as a strictly logical one which produces out of its immanent necessity the different moments, subjective and objective reality. Not even neo-Kantianism which, better than its creator, freed the main transcendental thought from metaphysical, realistic, and subjectivistic implications, was able to overcome a last remainder, which

had its origin in the principles of the Kantian doctrine, not merely in its defective historical form. According to Kant all knowledge consists in the fact that the sensory manifoldness is put into definite forms, the categories or synthetical principles. The sensory manifoldness, which as such is and remains irrational, and the unity of rational thought stand thus like strangers opposed to each other, like two mechanically separated things which are to be brought together again in a mechanical way, a method which Fichte had ridiculed as "*Formgebungsmanufaktur*." Indeed, the process of knowledge is too organic and unified not to provide for the distinction within it of form and matter, as abstract *moments* as well as real *parts*. Unity and manifoldness are correlative terms which have meaning only with reference to each other and must not be isolated. There is no absolute manifoldness outside of unity, and just as little is there unity which is not unity of a manifold. It is a naïve idea to suppose that on the one side time and space produced an infinite manifold, while on the other side thought brought forth the bond of unity; rather both are posited in the original thought-act through and for each other.

This step had already been taken by Cohen in his *Logik des reinen Erkennens*, where he had insisted upon the unitary development of all determinations from pure thought according to the logic of "origin." Recently Paul Natorp in his work *Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaft* (Wissenschaft und Hypothese XII)¹ draws the same conclusion. The standpoint and different discussions of this work show certain similarities with that of Cassirer, although in the former the relation to Hegel is much more definite. Knowledge is not a sum total of closed suppositions, but an infinite process. "We can no longer speak of a given object." "The object is rather the *problem*, the task *ad infinitum*. And thus knowledge as directed to an object is of necessity a synthesis in Kant's sense, *i. e.*, augmentation, or continual progress." The creative, fundamental function of thought is therefore not analysis in the usual meaning, but synthesis; or rather, what is called analysis presupposes on its

¹ Teubner, Leipzig, pp. xx, 416.

side the original act of synthesis, for all analysis presupposes contradiction, and the proposition of contradiction has its positive form of expression in the principle of identity. This seems to be merely tautological, but in reality it is synthetical in as far as it deals with an identity which is at first thought of as different; and in all identity the difference and manifoldness is contained in it as a moment which is overcome or annulled, but which for that very reason must also be presupposed in it. Although this may strike at the deepest root of Kant's synthetic unity, yet this interpretation is historically not a true one, but points,—according to our earlier discussion,—toward the further development from Kant to Fichte and Hegel.

Upon this foundation Natorp erects the system of fundamental logical functions, beginning with the relation of judgment to concept. These must not be presupposed as existing, they must be deduced from the fundamental act of knowledge, the correlation of union and separation, which we meet in the principle of identity. In the same way the fundamental logical functions in their interrelation develop out of this fundamental act, and in their presentation Natorp follows somewhat loosely Kant's system of categories. The category of quality especially, which takes the place of the principle of the concept-formation, receives an extended transformation. This discussion excels in subtleness and logical precision, and the same is true of the further studies of number and calculation, whose results agree in many cases with those of Cassirer, of infinity and constancy, and of the nature of space and time.

The book concludes with a chapter on the spatial-temporal order of phenomena and the mathematical principles of science. The author discusses here the problems of absolute space and time, of mass, substance and energy, in accordance with the latest hypotheses of research. Natorp attempts,—as likewise Cassirer had tried to do,—to show that the principle of relativity of all existence does not lead to pure empiricism, but on the contrary, that it is quite compatible with critical, transcendental presuppositions. The essential difference from Cassirer seems to lie in a modification of the standpoint or the methodical

progress of the discussion: the universal functionalism which Natorp likewise substitutes for a substantial world-view, is developed by him more out of a single root, as the expression of a single process of thought which creates out of itself all categories. In this lies, as I have shown above, the historical relation to Hegel.

An essay by Julius Ebbinghaus on *Relativer und Absoluter Idealismus*¹ leads us into the midst of Hegelianism. It does not attempt to develop new contents of knowledge or to construct a new system of knowledge; it aims to throw light on the process of knowledge, on knowing as such. Knowledge does not mean, as abstract theories assume, that the individual grasps a foreign object lying outside of him, dressing it in his own forms, or approaching and assimilating it. Knowledge is not a relation between a finite ego and a finite non-ego; it is rather an infinite unitary totality which contains the ego and the non-ego as correlative moments. The subject is not the starting-point of knowing, for it is, like the object, something already known, from which the knowing itself is separated as an independent, absolute, intrinsic value.

The pamphlet gives evidence of penetration, clearness, and vigor of linguistic expression. And yet it is not quite possible to see how this exposition of the process of knowing, undertaken in Hegelian spirit, can lead to a concrete knowledge of the world by which one would be able to grasp the essence of the various contents of being.

Against this extreme movement which has found a number of gifted representatives among the younger generation, Windelband expresses himself in a lecture on *Die Erneuerung des Hegelianismus*.² He thinks it has only a relatively small justification. The perfect systematic form, the optimistic and universalistic features are the stimulating moments to which Hegel's philosophy owes its renewed power, not the dialectic method, which Windelband rejects. The lasting justification of Hegel's standpoint and the return to it are due to his use of the history of the world,

¹ Veith & Co., Leipzig, pp. 72.

² Winter, Heidelberg, pp. 15.

as a basis of orientation. While Kant, and still more his successor Fries, tried to derive the eternal value of reason from a psychological analysis of mental life, Hegel transferred his studies into the realm of world-historical events. "We take part in universal reason merely as historical beings belonging to a species in the process of development. History is therefore the true organ of philosophy, or to speak in Hegelian language: the objective spirit is the habitat of the absolute spirit. For this reason recent philosophy is about to return to the Hegelian method, which consists in deriving the principles of reason from the historical cosmos as it presents itself to experience in the science of civilization." The inner connection of these rational principles can be only partly reconstructed from the history of civilization, because we lack the organ of insight into its absolute completion and inner necessity. Windelband, who from principle holds strictly to the Kantian limits of knowledge, rejects the proposition of Hegel and the Hegelians, according to which we possess such an organ in the dialectical method.

A less close relation to Fichte and Hegel exists in the writings of Goswin Uphues, who, as I believe, is not fully appreciated. I will mention here only his three most recent publications, *Erkenntniskritische Logik* (pp. viii, 151), *Erkenntniskritische Psychologie* (pp. viii, 140), and *Geschichte der Philosophie als Erkenntniskritik* (pp. xiii, 174).¹ Uphues, who is a strict anti-psychologist, directs transcendental reflection more into metaphysical, Platonic spheres. Object of knowledge is for him that which is absolutely necessary, which cannot be otherwise. The logical laws, even those of the so-called formal logic, are not merely laws of thought but laws of being. It is in the nature of truth to be non-temporal, not only as regards conceptual judgments, *i. e.*, those of mathematics, which deal with matters that are valid without reference to time, but also in the case of factual judgments, *i. e.*, the judgments of empirical life which treat of things that come and go in time. The fact itself is temporally conditioned; but the judgment that this fact occurs now, that it is temporally conditioned, this judgment is non-temporal. The contents of conceptual

¹ All three are published by Max Niemeyer, Halle.

judgments are extra-temporal, the contents of factual judgments are intra-temporal; nevertheless, if it is a real fact it is also non-temporal. The metaphysical turn in Uphues consists in the fact that he refers truth back to a *transcendent* basis, a divine consciousness, instead of allowing it to rest in itself, as pure logic does. The conceptual judgments which express the nature of a thing are founded on the notion that they are *thought* by God, while the factual judgments which signify the existence of a thing rest on the notion that they are *willed* by Him.

A metaphysical, if not a logical and epistemological, reference to the post-Kantian philosophy of identity, especially to Schelling and Hegel, is evident in the works of Eduard v. Hartmann. His doctrine of the Unconscious reminds one of Schelling, while the closed architectonic structure of his system, which may indeed be called the last philosophical system, resembles Hegel. This system is not so much to be found in his chief works as in his posthumous publication *System der Philosophie im Grundriss*.¹ Even the external structure of this undertaking, which is planned on a large basis, does full justice to the systematic point of view. The work is divided into eight volumes which have appeared one after another in the course of the last few years, so that the whole system lies now before us completed, giving us a far vision into the world of thoughts of its creator. The first volume is entitled *Grundriss der Erkenntnislehre*, and in it the methods and aims of philosophical reflection are analyzed. The object of knowledge, if we begin with the world of phenomena, is the dualism of the physical and the psychical, of the material world and the mental life. This leads up in the second volume to a *Grundriss der Naturphilosophie*, and in the third volume to a *Grundriss der Psychologie*. The question of a common root of the physical and the mental, the problem of the absolute nature of the world, results in the fourth volume in a *Grundriss der Metaphysik*. Since the Absolute must be determined not only in its content but also in its value, the next volume is a *Grundriss der Axiologie oder Wertlehre*. In the remaining three volumes on Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, and Æsthetics, the relation of man to the Absolute receive special treatment.

¹ Published, as are the previous works, by Haacke, Bad Sachsa im Harz.

In his epistemology Hartmann calls himself a transcendental realist. While naïve realism confuses the world of consciousness with the real world, and the transcendental idealist denies a reality outside of consciousness, transcendental realism distinguishes between the real world and the world of consciousness which is simply an image of it. Hartmann assumes that sensory qualities are only subjective, but that the forms of time and space are also forms of the things-in-themselves, outside of consciousness. The method of this metaphysics, strangely enough, is not supposed to be deductive or dialectical, but inductive. The induction, however, does not lead from one phenomenon to another, but from experience to metaphysical hypotheses. It is not immanent like positivism, it is transcendent. Yet it lies in the nature of all inductive reflection that it leads only to hypotheses and probabilities and not to apodictic, absolute truth. Nevertheless, Hartmann rejects all higher metaphysical claims, as they overstep the limits of knowledge. He thus constructs a series of hypotheses concerning the realm of the things-in-themselves. As a philosopher of nature he accepts dynamism, not materialism. A complex of unconsciously acting forces underlie the external corporeal phenomena, not mere inert matter, which in passive existence fills the space. He calls this doctrine an atomistic dynamism. Similarly, all activity and synthesis in mental life points toward a creative Unconsciousness whose reflection only appears in our consciousness which is nothing but a constant flux of images. The common root of nature and mind lies in the Unconscious which Hartmann defines again in a dual way, as something dynamical and also logical, *i. e.*, as will and as idea. The tendency to combine Schopenhauer and Hegel, which is found among many modern thinkers, *e. g.*, in Nietzsche and in Wundt, is very markedly embodied in Hartmann. Consequently, he is not an absolute pessimist like Schopenhauer. In so far as a logical idea reigns in this world, it fulfils rational purposes. Teleologically considered, that is, with reference to the *criterion of purpose*, Hartmann calls himself even an optimist; from the point of eudemonology, that is, with reference to the *criterion of pleasure*, he is a pessimist. Both points of view are

combined in such a way into a doctrine of redemption as to recognize the evolutionary principle, the rise of mankind to higher stages of development, and yet to find the real goal of development in the supreme dispersion of all illusions and in the ultimate absorption of the world-process through the Absolute.

Another group of thinkers are less interested in the doctrine of the categories than in the phenomenology of knowing, and follow therefore not so much the philosophers and metaphysicians of identity as men like Fries, Bolzano, and lately also Wolff, all of them with more of a metaphysical turn of mind. To this group belong Husserl, Marty, Meinong, Nelson, Pichler, and others. As in most movements so here, one cannot draw fast lines of distinction, and yet one may say that these men transfer the center of their investigations from the content of knowledge to the function of knowing. In this connection two valuable historical works must be mentioned which have appeared this year: Hugo Bergmann's book *Das philosophische Werk Bernard Bolzano's*¹ and Hans Pichler's study *Ueber Christian Wolff's Ontologie*.² Considering the great influence which Bolzano's work has exerted on a wide range of modern epistemology, Bergmann's presentation of this philosophy is certainly of more than historic-literary significance. Pure logistic (Logismus), as its renovator Husserl has pointed out, finds its real origin in Bolzano. Bergmann gives a complete and carefully worked out summary of this peculiar philosophy, which with all its subtle analyses is not always free from trivialities in its results. Its methodical and logical aspects are most valuable: less fertile is it for psychology, ethics, æsthetics, and metaphysics. In the appendix Bolzano's contributions to a philosophical foundation of mathematics are considered. The most interesting part is undoubtedly the doctrine of the propositions-in-themselves, which form an anticipation of the modern anti-psychologistic position. The proposition-in-itself (Satz an sich) is the unitary logical meaning of a statement, as contrasted with the wavering, changing ways of their psychological representations. It signifies the

¹ Max Niemeyer, Halle a. Saale, pp. xiv, 230.

² Dürr, Leipzig, pp. 91.

inner import of a thought, which is independent of its process of being thought. Bolzano, strangely enough, extends this objectivity of the propositions-in-themselves to true and false judgments alike, which is rejected by Bergmann, because he sees in it merely a criterion of truth. On the whole Bolzano in his epistemology and metaphysics stands close to Leibniz, to whom in the last analysis Bolzano's followers, the exponents of logistic as well as those of the theory-of-objects (*Gegenstandstheorie*), are related, as opposed to the neo-Kantians and neo-Hegelians. In this connection the philosophy of Christian Wolff, Leibniz' truest disciple, which had long been believed to be forgotten beyond recall, has been restored to new life. Pichler, in his above mentioned monograph, honors him as the real founder of the theory-of-objects which we usually connect with Meinong's name. Although Wolff calls it ontology, it is not merely a doctrine of being or existence, because it refers to all kinds of objects in general, independent of the question whether they exist or not, for example, even to the objects of mathematics to which directly no existence can be attributed. Existence is not an essential property of objects, and the ontology is thus a "*daseinsfreie*" reflection. Wolff develops the axiomata of ontology, especially the proposition of contradiction, which is not a subjective law of thought in the sense of formal logic, but the most general law of all objects. Wolff's attempt to deduce from this axiomatic proposition the proposition of cause is untenable.

Pichler tries to see in Kant's transcendental logic nothing more than the sketch of an ontology in the old sense, as he in general endeavors to lower Kant's originality and to find in his *Kritik* a mere bent in the subjective and psychological direction. Although it is of course impossible thus to exhaust the motives of the Kantian philosophy, it is nevertheless of interest to find that its connection with Leibniz and Wolff is closer than the history of philosophy usually assumes. In general, it looks as if the further development of philosophical reflection will gain a new anchorage in the relations of similarity and contrast which exist between Kant and Leibniz.

The compass of epistemology is too narrow to include all sorts of philosophical publications. In the various sciences, in the arts, in the personal and social life, the desire grows more and more intense to pass out of the realm of facts, from their isolation and diversity directly to the totality of a *Weltanschauung*. This desire underlies modern neo-romanticism with its leaning to metaphysics, which at present finds its strongest guide in Bergson, whose influence is rapidly growing. His principle of intuition is doubtless a romantic one with a close resemblance to Schelling's views. Whatever attitude one may take toward it, certainly one must admit that abstract, analytical understanding is not the organ by means of which one can penetrate into the innermost depths of the world-process. For the purpose of gaining a metaphysical view of the world the following alternative arises: either to give up logical thinking and to return to the standpoint of non-reflective intuition, or to seek beyond rigid, abstract analyses a still higher form of thinking which can take up into itself the richness of concrete experience and adapt itself to its rhythm. This elasticity of thought, which in great philosophers does not remain in cold and distant contrast to intuition, but rather organically unites with it, has received a beautiful description in Georg Simmel's little book *Hauptprobleme der Philosophie*.¹ He is not so much interested in the completed, so to speak, crystallized philosophical results and their mutual relations, as in the spiritual movement of reflection which leads to them, in the process of crystallization itself. He examines thus the fundamental motives of philosophical understanding of the world, namely, the contrast between the mystic and the transcendental reflections on being, the dialectic movement of the conceptual contrast between being and becoming, the ambiguous relation of subject and object, and finally the nature of ideal postulates and their connection with reality.

From another point of view Friedrich Jodl, in his extremely stimulating work *Aus der Werkstatt der Philosophie*,² undertakes to analyze that peculiar, in its last depths mysterious, mental

¹ Göschen, Leipzig, pp. 175.

² Hugo Heller, Wien, pp. 31.

impetus from which philosophical creations arise. He distinguishes between the merely scholarly technical work and the intuitive creative philosophy which permits us to see the whole universe in a new light. "The grinding of optical lenses,—the work by means of which poor Spinoza supported himself,—is a symbol of the activity of the philosopher in general, that is, of the kind of philosopher whom I have in mind. All philosophers grind lenses, artful glasses through which to take a view of the whole world, glasses which color this view in different ways, now illuminating, now obscuring it, glasses which will bring to an astonishingly clear focus many things that otherwise remain invisible to the unspectacled eyes, glasses through which again one does not notice other things that to the layman's eye seem necessary and essential parts of the world, glasses through which much is seen in quite different forms, order, and connection, glasses, finally, which sometimes distort the view of the world of everyday life to a degree of unrecognizableness." In every philosophical system there is furthermore an empirical moment which depends upon the historical conditions, the specific origin of the particular system. There is also to be added as a further presupposition the individual's power of independent development, of forming new postulates and new thought-possibilities. "Every original philosophy, especially its principle, its fundamental idea on the basis of which it reconstructs the world in thought, involves a discovery." Of course it is not a discovery of sensory facts, but of methods, of principles of order in the universe. The tragedy of philosophy consists in the fact that every great thinker claims to possess the ultimate eternal truth. There is one solution of this tragic conflict: although the great conceptions of the world do not exhaust the nature of truth itself, yet they are eternal elements in it; their manifoldness and mutual oppositions merely reflect the manifoldness and contrasts inherent in the object which they try to understand, namely the universe.

An unfailing symptom of the increasing tendency of our time to collect the manifoldness of our internal and external experiences into the unity of a world-conception is manifested in the under-

taking to give to these attempts an external meeting-point. This is the purpose of the journal *Logos*, an international periodical for philosophy of culture, which was recently founded. It is edited by Georg Mehlis in Freiburg i. B., with the co-operation of the most well-known scholars, as Eucken, Gierke, Husserl, Meinecke, Rickert, Simmel, Tröltzsch, Weber, Wölfflin, and Windelband. The philosophical penetration of the most various realms of culture, of sciences, of art, of social-ethical, legal, national, and religious life is intended to prepare the formation of a unitary, philosophical system. For this reason the journal does not dogmatically bind itself from the start to a fixed program. It lays down only one presupposition, that all its co-operators are filled with the consciousness of culture, *i. e.*, with the idea that culture is not an isolated temporal phenomenon, but the revelation of an eternal universal rationality. "Without the belief in some logos inside or outside of life, a philosophy worthy of this name is altogether impossible." The journal is managed by an international committee which is divided into national editorships. The *Logos* has thus far published a number of interesting contributions by renowned authors. Besides the essay by Rickert already mentioned, we find studies by Emile Boutroux, Simmel, Benedetto Croce, Leopold Ziegler, Kroner, and others.

It is hoped that the external success will correspond to the internal value of the undertaking which is based upon its cultural tendency and which after the first samples is no longer to be doubted. Concentration upon a broad basis of discussion is especially to be desired at the present time, when so many productive forces are active, whose difference of standpoints is a hindrance to a fertile co-operation.

The same striving after a philosophical penetration of culture which has been the guiding principle of *Logos* has concentrated itself in another work with the significant title *Weltanschauung*.¹ It discusses in different articles by wellknown scholars the problems of philosophy and religion. Twenty authors, among whom are Dilthey, Joël, Wiesner, Driesch, Adickes, Natorp, Simmel,

¹ Rechl & Co., Berlin, pp. xxii, 484.

Deussen, and Tröltsch, have joined forces,—in order to study the eternal values of the present mental life, which are based upon a higher reality dwelling above the changing interests of the time,—so that they might co-operate in the formation of an unitary world-conception. With due differentiation of all stand-points this conception is to find its unity in rigidly opposing every kind of positivism, whether based upon natural science or upon empirical psychology, by establishing the inadequacy of a mere study of facts as an ultimate universal method, in seeking the ultimate and Absolute not in finite, transitory phenomena but in the infinite, eternal values surrounding and penetrating the former, and in finding the springs of a higher metaphysical and religious life wherever man strives beyond mechanical necessities of being and thinking to cultural communities.

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THE EXTERNALITY OF RELATIONS.

NO other logical question is more important for contemporary controversy than that of the externality or essentiality of relations; and none is in greater need of clear formulation. That all varieties of opinion in the matter are currently entertained is well known. The neo-Hegelians and their allies hold to the theory of essentiality in its extreme form. The realists, or neo-Leibnizians, as they may be called, hold as firmly to the theory of externality. And the pragmatists occupy the position of common-sense mediators, setting down some relations as essential and some as external; or else holding that any relation may be external or essential according to the purpose of the moment. Yet it may be questioned whether the disagreement between the various parties is as wide as their mutual misunderstanding. To adopt a striking phrase of Ludwig Stein's, "*Sie philosophieren einander vorbei.*"

Under these circumstances what appears to be most needed is not argument but analysis. For the issues are not one but many, and in current controversy they have been almost inextricably entangled. It will be the main object of the present paper to formulate a few of the more important problems that have been confounded. It seems to me that when these problems are properly distinguished, their solution is a comparatively simple matter.

There are two points which I shall have to take for granted, but which, I suppose, will be readily conceded. The first is that there are no entities which we conceive as standing in no relations. In particular, if there are existing things other than our own ideas (in the widest sense of the term), relations are conceived to exist between such things. We do indeed recognize relations between sensations, images, feelings, desires, etc. But when we say, for example, that gold is heavier than iron, the terms of the relation are understood to be gold and iron, whether

gold and iron are identical with our concepts of them or not. Accordingly, I shall assume it to be an error to hold that the terms between which relations are conceived to obtain are mere ideas, as distinguished from the real things to which ideas refer. This assumption is tolerably safe, because no modern thinker of importance (except perhaps Locke) would have thought of questioning it.

In the second place I shall assume that propositions of the form $A \text{r} B$ (or, A stands in a certain relation to B) may be as clear to us as any other propositions whatsoever. This does not mean that our concepts of relations are absolutely clear and distinct and final; but simply that no other class of concepts is to be regarded as distinctly superior to them. We have no reason to suppose, for example, that 'gray' is clearer than 'darker than'; that 'line' is clearer than 'between'; or that 'class' or 'proposition' is clearer than 'includes' or 'implies.' This assumption is also, I think, quite safe, though in former times many thinkers would have objected to it. For recent logical studies have proved that concepts of relations must always have a place among the fundamental assumptions of every department of thought. Every set of geometrical axioms, for example, must contain some indefinable relation such as 'collinear with,' 'between,' or 'farther apart than,' as well as some indefinable entity such as 'point.'

The doctrine of the externality of relations appears in three principal forms, which we shall consider in order.

In its first form the doctrine is to the effect that relations are external to the essential nature of all realities, whether these realities are conceived as individuals, as classes, or as ideal types. What is, is; and it is what it is, without consideration of anything else. By 'reality' is in general meant an object of possible knowledge, where knowledge is supposed to be distinguished from opinion by its absolute certitude. In this form, the doctrine is doubtless as old as the distinction between the essential and the non-essential; but it finds its first clear expression in the philosophy of Plato. Consider, for example, the definition of justice in the *Republic*. Is it not extraordinary that justice in the

individual (or in the state) should be defined in terms which take no account of the individual's relations to other individuals (or of the state's relations to other states)? But Plato's thought is, of course, that the just man (or state) must have a certain inner nature of its own, which underlies and accounts for its characteristic behavior in its various relations. This inner nature, then, is what a satisfactory definition of justice must set forth. Why is it, on the other hand, that the thoughtful mind cannot rest content with sensible things as true realities? It is because all that we can say of them is relative. *A* is great as compared with *B*, and small as compared with *C*. Attempt to treat it as a substance which is great or small in itself, and you make it both great and small, and thus fall into irretrievable contradiction.

The doctrine thus takes for granted that realities have essences, which are either simple, and thus indefinable, or are definable in simple terms; and it affirms that the relations in which a substance stands form no part of its essence. It is obvious that a similar doctrine may apply to certain of the *qualities* of things; that is to say, these may be divided into essential qualities, or attributes, and non-essential, or external, qualities. It thus appears that the question of the externality or essentiality of relations is logically subsidiary to the question, whether, and how far, the distinction between the essential and the external is valid; that is to say, whether, and within what limits, adequate definition—definition in terms of the absolutely simple—is possible. For it is on such definition that the distinction between the essential and the non-essential, in its strictest acceptation, rests.

In order to avoid the discussion of this deeper question, let us for the moment confine our attention to the field in which, if anywhere, adequate definition is possible—namely, the mathematical sciences; and let us assume that the definitions of mathematics are, or may be made, entirely adequate. If, then, the externality of relations can be demonstrated here, it becomes highly probable as a general theory. If it is false here, it loses all claim to our allegiance.

Now it is precisely in the field of mathematics that the theory of

externality is most evidently false. For if we consider the indefinables of any branch of mathematics, and ask how their meaning is expressed or conveyed—how, for example, one geometrician can be sure that he means the same thing by ‘collinear’ as other geometricians do—it is at once obvious that it is only by means of the set of axioms in which they appear. The indefinables may, to be sure, have for each man an additional common-sense meaning, which may vary somewhat from man to man; but this is rigidly excluded from scientific discussion. *For the science* the indefinables mean what the axioms make them mean. Their relations to each other, as set forth by the axioms, *are* their meaning, so far as mathematics is concerned. If this is true of the indefinables, it is true *a fortiori* of all other mathematical terms—that their meaning is constituted by their relations; not to mention the fact, that it is always (to an unknown extent) indeterminate what terms ought to be chosen as the indefinables in which to define the rest.

Let these statements not be misunderstood. It is always necessary in the applications of mathematics that there be some means of recognition by which we may be assured that the same classes of phenomena are constantly used to exemplify the same indefinable terms—that ‘point’ in one axiom is given the same denotation as ‘point’ in the other axioms. But what the mark of recognition may be, matters not at all. Thus a logic of classes has been devised, all of whose axioms apply equally well to the classes within a given universe and to the areas within a given total area. For the purposes of this sort of logic an area *is* a class—except that one must not mix together in the same discourse areas and the classes ordinarily so called. It may, then, be said that the meaning of the mathematical indefinables, as expressed in the axioms, is strictly external to the additional meaning which the terms invariably possess in the ‘concrete’ applications of the science. But that would hardly warrant us in saying that the scientific meaning is external to the essence of the terms in question. If anything is ‘external,’ or unessential, it is that additional particularity of meaning which the application involves.

Judging, then, by the example of the mathematical sciences,

we are led to reject decisively the classical doctrine of the externality of relations; and now it may be observed that very similar considerations apply in all other realms of thought. In order that conceptions may be definitely communicable, they must be reduced to conceptions of relations. The very meaning of words is determined by usage—by the way in which the words are connected with each other and with concomitant circumstances. There is no way of directly comparing your conception of red with mine. Their likeness, when critically examined, means no more than this; that they are similarly related to other conceptions which are accepted as alike. This is true even of conceptions of relations. These can be definitely expressed only by means of relations of relations. In the last resort, of course, the whole possibility of communication rests upon the fact that men feel somewhat the same under similar circumstances. Thus we take for granted, until the contrary is proved, that what is red for one man is red for another, and that each man's red differs from gray and green. This assumed, or rather *presumed*, likeness of our experiences in company with one another forms the point of departure for all science. It is, however, a point of departure that has constantly to be criticised and corrected; and each more definite formulation takes the form of a more accurate statement of the relations in which the term in question stands. Thus, while it is true that the objects of our experience are never wholly analyzable into relations—that our world is not a system of relations of relations in which nothing is related—nevertheless it remains true that the clearer and clearer our conceptions of the world become—the more closely they approach the mathematical type—the more largely they may be expressed in relational terms. Whether there is any final limit to this process in brute data of feeling in which no relational content is to be detected may be worth discussing, but it does not concern us here.

The question remains, whether, while some relations are essential, others may not be external, or non-essential. Here again the ulterior question is, what validity the distinction between essential and external possesses. For if nothing is external to anything else, assuredly no relations are external. But here also

the ulterior question may be safely shelved. For if the distinction between essential and unessential is admitted to have any application at all, then surely some relations of some things are unessential to them. No definition can include everything. Generally speaking, the progress of our knowledge is marked by a deepening as well as clarifying of our conceptions. They mean more, as well as mean more definitely. Thus both qualities and relations which have formerly been conceived as external become included in the essence; and there is no definitely assignable limit to this process. Even temporary qualities and relations, which at first view appear to be clearly superficial, since the reality persists when they have passed away, may become essential when they are seen to characterize a definite stage in a typical order of development. In this sense the puppy's blindness and dependence upon his mother are essential to the hound. It may be added, though this is a little aside from the question, that the capacity for entering into temporary relations and (under the requisite conditions) of exhibiting the temporary qualities is often clearly essential. It does not belong to the essence of water to be liquid or solid. But to freeze at a certain temperature, and melt again as it grows warmer, is essential to it if anything is. Or, to take Descartes's famous example of the piece of wax, it is from our present point of view ridiculous to say that what the wax really *is* is simply a certain mode of extended substance. The behavior of the wax under varying conditions (which is, of course, conceivable as its relations to these conditions) is what essentially characterizes it. What in all respects behaves like wax *is* wax.

So much for the first and historically most important form of the doctrine of externality. Its influence pervades the whole of ancient and modern rationalism, and has not been without effect upon empirical movements also. That what a real entity is in itself is one thing and its transitory and even permanent relations are another, is a delusion if ever there was one. Like many other traditional delusions it reaches its climax in the strangely contrasted philosophies of Leibniz and Spinoza. Spinoza sets it down at the forefront of his system. Substance is that a con-

ception of which can be formed independently of every other conception. And Leibniz's windowless monads, while ideally connected in a universal harmony, are none the less each absolutely independent of its relations to the rest. Few of us are now inclined to worship Hegel; but one debt to him we must not forget. It is he who said: "The proposition that we cannot know the nature of things in themselves has passed for an important piece of wisdom. Things are in themselves in so far as abstraction is made from all that they are for other things—which is as much as to say, in so far as they are thought of as without any characteristics at all, as mere nothings. In this sense it is true enough that one cannot know *what* the thing in itself is."

We must now note in passing a second form of the doctrine, in which the notion of essentiality has fallen away. The question now is, whether the relations in which a thing stands are external to its qualities, essential or external. Can a thing enter into a new relation without changing any of its qualities? So far as I can see, the question has no precise answer, because the distinction between a quality and a relation is not precise. It is indeed easy to point out relations which no one would think of calling qualities, and *vice versa*; but the middle ground is not so clearly marked. Thus redness is a quality and nearness is a relation. But weight—is that a quality or a relation? Weight at the equator, to be more precise? I do not think that there is any definite answer. Clear thought is forever resolving qualities into relations with (of course) new qualities underlying them; as the mass of a body underlies its weight. With this proviso it seems safe enough to answer the question propounded—whether the relations of a thing may vary without change in any of its qualities—in the negative. At the same time it must be remembered that some relations are very superficial, and the qualities which they induce are very superficial also. Sometimes, however, we are urged to believe that the least change in any of the relations of a thing must involve some change in all its qualities. I see no reason why we should accept this. A change of place may or may not bring about a change of color: though, to

be sure, if the surface of the object were large and the movement were considerable, it would require an extraordinary concomitance of circumstances to make hue, tint, and saturation at every point exactly the same as before.

More important are the questions which arise in connection with the third form of the doctrine; but I shall have to discuss them with similar brevity. In recent controversy the question of the externality of relations has frequently taken on a new meaning: Are relations, or may they be, external to each other, *i. e.*, independently variable?

It is sometimes urged as a very weighty consideration, that spatial relations are largely independent of each other; for example, that a point may change its distance from a given point without changing its distance from a given line; and sometimes neo-Hegelians seem bound to contest statements of this sort. To these thinkers a change in one relation suffices to make the term in some degree a different term; and how can different terms stand in the same relation? This neo-Hegelian position appears to me to be utterly unsound. It is simple and innocent enough to hold that our conceptions of relations are not wholly clear and satisfactory, and consequently that no relations, as we conceive them, truly exist—simple and innocent, but futile; for a complete scepticism of relations is tantamount to a universal scepticism. But when relations, such as distance from a line or a point, are once assumed as truly existing; then to question their apparent mutual independence is more than futile. It is playing fast and loose with the facts. If points are points, and lines are lines, and points are distant from lines and from other points, then it is sheer caprice to question the proposition that two points may stand at the same distance from a given point and at different distances from a given line. Such questionings have no scientific or philosophical significance.

So far, then, the externality of relations is obvious enough. But are we entitled to go further? It is to be observed that if some relations are mutually independent others are quite as clearly interdependent; *e. g.*, the distance between two given masses and the attraction between them. Furthermore a few

given relations are sometimes sufficient to determine a whole class of relations; as the distance of a point from three given planes entirely determines its spatial relations. The question arises, whether the relations in which a thing stands may not be divisible into distinct groups or systems, between which an entire independence exists. It is to be observed that a somewhat analogous question arises in the case of qualities. How far are these external to each other? It seems clear that some qualities may vary independently of some others—the pitch and intensity of a tone, for example—while some are more or less definitely inter-connected. It has often been held that simple qualities are all equally compatible with one another. Bacon, for example, supposed that all the characteristics of any substance, such as gold, were reducible to a few simple forms; and that if one knew these forms and possessed a technique for bringing them about severally, one might change any substance into any other. One might give lead one by one the forms which characterize gold, and then the one-time lead would be gold. That the qualities of any concrete object are analyzable into such forms no one in our day would seriously suggest; though it must be confessed that the actual interdependence of qualities is (as Locke observed) only slightly known to us. I venture to suggest that much the same account must be given of the mutual implications of relations. That a change in any one relation or determinate group of relations, in which a concrete object stands, might take place without affecting *any* of its other relations, is an enormous assumption, which we have no motive whatsoever for making; though just what the detailed interconnections are, we must generally wait for experience to inform us.

To the bald question, whether relations are external or not, I do not see that any single answer can be given. All depends upon what is meant. That relations in general form no part of the essential nature of real beings, is, I think, clearly false. That some relations are unessential to some real beings is true if unessential has any acceptable meaning at all. That relations are external to qualities is, again, a vain presumption; but we have no reason to suppose that every relation is bound up with every

quality. Finally, the mutual independence of relations is a matter of more or less, which must for the most part be empirically determined.

I wish to add in this place a few words upon the prior question, as to the distinction between the essential and the non-essential. It has, I think, three different, but closely connected, meanings.

1. 'Essential' may mean, relevant to the accomplishment of a particular purpose or set of purposes. In this sense, what is essential in a horse depends upon what you wish to do with him—work him, race him, eat him, or sell him. What is essential for one purpose may be utterly non-essential for another. This is the sense upon which pragmatist writers have generally insisted. It has, however, in my opinion, a very limited importance in logical discussions.

2. 'Essential' may mean essential to a concept; that is to say, necessary to its discrimination from other concepts; or, if the concept can be defined, contained or implied in its definition. The peculiar efficiency of conceptual thought rests upon the degree in which it remains constant despite changes of purpose. The horse of science is a horse irrespective of your hopes and fears. Or, if we say with the pragmatists that a horse is always a horse only for the purpose of logical classification, we must remember that this purpose is not simply one among others—that it is not only an end in itself, but a means adapted indifferently to all other possible purposes.

It is notorious that many of our concepts are too vague to admit of exact definition. They are doubly vague; first, because the characteristics which they include are themselves confusedly understood; and secondly, because few if any of these characteristics are inseparably included. *The concepts are not of logical species, but of types*, which admit of an indefinite amount of divergence in all manner of directions. Such concepts, moreover, are peculiarly liable to change, and, in particular, to development. With reference, therefore, to such concepts, the term 'essential' does not admit of a perfectly precise application. It is a matter of more or less, and, even at that, admits of no precise measure.

The philosophical criticism of common sense has generally consisted in pointing out the vagueness of its concepts; and it has been the perennial hope of the system-makers that the whole body of the sciences, or at least some select portion, might be purged of all confusion. It is evident, however, that only a very limited realization of this hope has been attained. Vagueness, to be sure, is a matter of degree; and the concepts of science are, in general, far more definite and constant than those of common sense. But, with the possible exception of pure mathematics, all the sciences contain among their fundamental concepts some of which no precise account can be given; and this is probably not less true of epistemology and metaphysics than of any of the special sciences.

Where a concept can be defined, or where its meaning is determinable by means of a set of axioms, the distinction between essential and non-essential becomes fixed. In this connection it is worth while to remember that in the mathematical sciences definitions are wholly superfluous except as time-savers. All the propositions of mathematics can be directly expressed in terms of the indefinables. In fact, in this field definition is not primarily of concepts but of symbols. As Couturat has expressed it, a mathematical definition "is a logical equality (an identity), of which the first member is a new sign which has as yet no sense, and of which the second member, composed of *known* signs (among which, therefore, the sign to be defined does not appear), determines the sense of the sign in question. . . . A definition is *not a proposition*, for it is neither true nor false; it cannot be proved or disproved; it is a *convention* which has to do simply with the employment of a simple sign in place of an assemblage of signs." The distinction between essential and external is therefore in this field perfectly trivial except as applied to the indefinables; and as applied to them it amounts only to the distinction between theorems that are, and those that are not, demonstrable from the set of axioms that constitute the meaning of the indefinables. Thus it is essential to the Euclidean point that it be not a member of two such sets of points as are commonly called lines parallel to the same line; but it is external to it that

the set of points constituting a segment shall contain points corresponding to all real numbers. A new axiom, the Cantor-Dedekind axiom, may be added to cover this property, as is done in the theory of sets of points. But then the meaning of 'point' has been enlarged; and what was before external to it is now essential.

3. 'Essential' may mean essential to a reality (the sense called for in the first part of this paper); which is as much as to say, essential to a final concept of the reality, a concept which need nevermore be modified. But it is to be noted here, that it is only as an afterthought that we can reflect upon our possible or probable degree of ignorance, and thus formulate the distinction between what is essential to the concept as such and what is essential to the reality which the concept represents. In the actual employment of concepts, the two meanings coalesce. To think a concept and to think of a reality are the same.

Whether or not we possess, or can hope to possess, finally satisfactory concepts is a further question, which I cannot discuss here. But if we do possess them it is again within the limits of pure mathematics that they are alone to be found. And on this assumption what has been said above as to the concepts of mathematics applies directly to the realities which these concepts represent.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PUNITIVE JUSTICE.¹

MORAL philosophers since the time of Plato have usually contended that justification for the punishment of criminals is to be found in the possibility of effecting their reformation, or, in the deterrence of others from committing similar offences. To assert that punishment is prompted by the mere emotion of anger and the desire for vengeance, seems not only to fail to give it moral justification, but also to insult the higher sentiments of humanity. Yet it must be confessed that there is an overwhelming mass of evidence that has been interpreted to show that the instinctive root of punitive justice is to be found in resentment. Westermarck has been the last to collect and arrange this evidence, which he has marshalled against opposing theories with his usual elaborateness of detail and copious citation,² and it must be confessed that he has very convincingly traced the evolution of punitive justice from the primitive emotion (or as I should prefer to say, instinct) of resentment.³

But while this derivation of our moral ideas of punishment from resentment seems unquestionable, why is it that the moral consciousness of most reflective people to-day vigorously resents the charge of such a derivation? As Westermarck himself observes in a passage that possibly may not be in accord with the main drift of his thought: "It is one of the most interesting facts

¹ I wish to express my large obligation to Professor F. C. Sharp. The general point of view here advanced is largely my reaction upon reading his published contributions, and of personal conversations with him, although in saying this I do not wish to implicate him in any of my conclusions of which he would not approve. I have also availed myself of the suggestions, and tried to meet the objections of Professors Tufts, Tawney, Ewer, Haynes, Swenson, Weir, and others who took part in the discussion of the original draft of this paper, read at the meeting of the Western Philosophical Association at Minneapolis last winter.

² *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, especially chaps. I-VII.

³ It is unfortunate that there is not yet a uniform terminology for describing the various instincts and emotions, and that the distinction between them is not observed. In this paper I follow Westermarck's terminology in the main, though occasionally I have substituted terms according to the more careful and discriminating usage of McDougall's *Social Psychology*.

related to the moral consciousness of a higher type, that it in vain condemns the gratification of the very desire from which it sprang. It is like a man of low extraction, who in spite of all acquired refinement, bears his origin stamped on his face."¹ There must of course be some psychological explanation for this aversion to the vengeance theory. And if we believe, as social psychologists generally do, that the more refined sentiments are ultimately dependent upon instincts and emotions for their origin and support, we must expect that the decided unwillingness of most people to admit that they demand the infliction of punishment upon social offenders from a desire for retribution, and their strong preference for the other explanations of punishments, can be traced to an instinctive source.² Then, too, even though we agree with Hume that the reason is the slave of the passions, yet in its servile position it cannot have been wholly without influence upon human moral attitudes in this domain.

Accepting Westermarck's account as substantially correct, it will be the purpose of this paper to show that there are other instinctive and also rational factors present in the demand for punitive justice, of which the retributive theory, taken by itself, does not adequately take account.

In the first place, to trace punitive justice back to resentment is not to trace it to its source. For resentment is not the primary spring of any form of action. Unlike other instincts and emotions, it is not evoked by any specific group of stimuli, but only by the thwarting and suppressing of some *other* impulse, which must first have been excited.³ As Westermarck points out, resentment is essentially protective in its function. In the case of man, being protective can only mean that it comes to the defence of some objects that he holds to be of value by reason of some other impulse that he has.⁴ Any attack upon his person is an

¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 93.

² Westermarck notes the appearance of these ideas in his account, but gives no satisfactory explanation of their psychological origin.

³ Cf. McDougall, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-61. The "anger" here described is the simpler form of Westermarck's "resentment."

⁴ Westermarck's hedonistic tendency has led him to overlook the subsidiary character of resentment, and to connect it directly with the experiencing of pain. Obviously pain as an affective experience (in distinction from the sensation) can only be experienced in case some impulse is thwarted.

attack upon his impulse to self-assertion, and such attacks are always sharply resented. An attack upon private property similarly is an attack upon the acquisitive instinct. Any thwarting of the sex instinct arouses the fierce resentment of males. An attack upon her young is a thwarting of the maternal instinct, and arouses the fierce resentment of the female. An attack upon a fellow member of the social group is resented because of sympathetic contagion of emotion, since members of a primitive social group feel the same emotions as the member who is attacked, and feel the same resentment at the thwarting of his impulses that they would at the thwarting of their own. Such sympathetic contagion of emotions presupposes as a condition of its presence the gregarious instinct.¹ It could hardly take place in a primitive social group, if the injured party were not a member of the group.

The foregoing are, I think, the chief instincts that are protected in their gratification by resentment, and serve as the foundation of the demand for retributive justice. The sole function of resentment is to protect these impulses, and thus allow the individual full self-assertion and self-expression.

Westermarck elaborately describes how the resentment expressed in the infliction of punishment comes to be measured. In place of comparatively indiscriminate attacks on the offender and his kinsmen, only the offender himself comes to be punished, and he only in proportion to the measure of his offence, *e. g.*, in the *lex talionis*. It seems clear here that the resentment instinct is in some way inhibited or regulated in its expression. It does not enjoy free play; something holds it in check. What causes this inhibition or regulation? Westermarck's explanation is² that it is probably due to self-regarding pride—though why this should tend to limit vengeance I do not see—and to imitation—the offence being imitated in the retaliation—and that the punishment is also limited by the sympathy that the tribe feels for the offender because he is a member of their social group.

¹ The strength of this instinct among primitive people is almost inconceivable to us. Cf. Dudley Kidd, *Savage Childhood*, pp. 74, f.; and Tufts, in the *Garman Commemorative Volume*, p. 33.

² *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 179.

The last named factor is, I believe, the most important. The original factor behind both the desire for retaliation and sympathy for the offender, is the gregarious instinct. It is this instinct that causes the men in the group to feel the same emotion of resentment as their injured fellow. And it is also the gregarious instinct that prompts them to feel a measure of tender emotion for the offender, who is also a member of the social group. The gregarious instinct, therefore, works both ways.¹ It arouses both the emotion of resentment against the offender, and the tender emotion in his favor.

The fact that the retaliation is usually, at least at first, an imitation of the offence is significant. This imitation originally is non-rational, but later leads to the employment of reasoning in the measurement of punishment. We may suppose the original non-rational imitation to have come about in this way. On account of the conflict between the different instinctive impulses mentioned in the preceding paragraph, avengers hesitate before inflicting punishment upon a wrong doer. While they are hesitating, the details of the offence recur to their imaginations. The retaliation that follows is simply a case of ideomotor action upon the suggestion thus offered, and is wholly non-rational. When, however, society becomes better organized, and the tribal chieftain or other constituted authority comes to act as arbitrator, a new principle enters. In his selection of punishments one who frequently acts as judge will be influenced somewhat by the recollection of punishments he has chosen in the past, and will continue to employ these in cases where they are not exact imitations of the present offence. This implies some detachment of his attention from single instances, and the establishment of precedents. Custom imitation readily develops from this, and

¹ The importance of insisting that the whole procedure here is primarily dependent upon the gregarious instinct will be brought out in the course of this paper. The term as here employed has a wide connotation. To avoid cumbersome of expression through the introduction of distinctions unessential to the argument here, the term is supposed to imply the presence of sympathetic contagion of the emotions of other members of the group, and tender emotion for them — instinctive tendencies dependent upon the presence of the gregarious instinct and usually accompanying it, but not necessarily involved in it. Roughly speaking, the term as here employed is synonymous with Gidding's "consciousness of kind."

more and more comes to take the place of the psychologically simpler and more immediate form of imitation. With this detachment of attention from specific instances, and the adoption of more generalized attitudes we evidently have the germ of reasoning. Later developments of imitative retaliation come to involve a high order of reasoning, as is instanced in the careful manner in which the *lex talionis* is worked out in detail, with due regard to ranks and privileges, and systematic measurement of penalties, as in the Code of Hammurabi. The point to be noticed is, however, that here reasoning can only serve systematically to measure punishments in the service of accepted basic principles which rest upon instinctive factors. Further moral evolution was not due so much to additional refinements of reason in the measurement of retaliation as to further development and co-ordination of the instinctive factors involved.

At a higher stage of culture the idea of forgiveness appears. When an offender repents he ceases to be an object of resentment. Confucius, Buddha and Jesus bid us to forgive him. Westermarck's explanation here is that with repentance the cause of resentment is removed. The offender no longer is an offender because his heart is changed. But is this explanation sufficient? It may be impossible for him to make reparation for the wrong that he has committed. Why should his tardy repentance turn the edge of resentment at the evil he has done, and win forgiveness for him? Moreover, how are we to understand why forgiveness comes to be looked upon at this stage of development not merely as permissible and commendable, but often even as a duty?

Here again we must go back of the resentment instinct to its origin in the gregarious instinct. In the high state of culture where the ideas of forgiveness and pardon first appear, the gregarious instinct has become greatly refined and strengthened. It now operates in the mind of the offender so as to cause him to feel tender emotion for the man whom he has injured, and hence leads him to repent of the wrong that he has done. It also effects in the social group a very extensive contagion of the emotion of the penitent, so that his grief over his wrong doing

is felt and appreciated by all. Hence society is ready to forgive him, or at least to mitigate his punishment. And so far as the gregarious instinct is effective in insisting emphatically enough upon the social value of the offender, it even becomes a duty to forgive him.

As a further expression of the gregarious instinct, this duty is extended to the member of the social group who has been injured. He also must forgive the man who has wronged him. As a member of the group it is his duty to feel the same tender emotion and consequent impulse to forgive as the rest of the group. It is with reference to the injured individual, probably, that the principle of forgiveness as a duty is first applied. Duty always implies a conflict between impulses, and in this case the conflict is between social pressure and individual inclination. In his mind the resentment instinct is stronger and more immediate, while tender emotion is decidedly weaker; but the consciousness of moral obligation to feel and act as the group feels and acts arises within him as a mandate of the gregarious instinct, and the sympathy and tender emotion in such cases accompanying it.

At this plane of advancement the leaders of society have become to a high degree self-conscious and reflective. Forgiveness involves not only a highly developed constructive imagination in order to put one's self so completely in another's place as to appreciate his repentant emotions, but also a large balancing of other emotions and impulses, many of which are antagonistic to the offender. Such an attitude, if sincerely and understandingly adopted, implies reasoning of a high order. When forgiveness is looked upon as a duty there is still more difficult adjustment of impulses in the interests of an inclusive self, and the obligation to effect this adjustment is felt with the involuntary respect and awe produced by the categorical imperative. However, it is necessary to attribute this highly rational and self-conscious attitude only to the great spiritual teachers and their most highly cultured and sincerest disciples. The masses of their followers, so far as they have externally conformed to these teachings at all, have probably done so more under the influence

of the idea of prestige to be gained in this way, or with the desire for social approval, than from a rational appreciation of the true meaning of forgiveness.

We can now see the instinctive basis for the reformatory theory of punishment. Like the notion of forgiveness it rises comparatively late in evolution, and at a stage where the gregarious instinct has widened its scope so as to prompt to some extent to the recognition of all men of at least the same nation as neighbors and brothers. While an offending criminal arouses resentment as an offender against the public good, yet he in part claims public sympathy as himself a member, though an erring member, of society. If he can be reformed, then he will be forgiven. And today, we are even willing under some circumstances to discount his prospective repentance, and to release him upon probation. Our willingness to do this is largely proportioned by the extent to which the offender arouses tender emotion or pity in us. The liability of this is increased if the offender is youthful or unfortunate, or if the social conditions by which he has been surrounded have been unfavorable and it is felt that society has not given him a fair chance.

The reformatory theory is a logical formulation of the practice of forgiveness, and involves the same elements of reasoning. Nevertheless, reasoning is here strictly limited in its scope, and is dependent upon instinctive factors. A strictly logical employment of the reformatory theory would be concerned with the character, intelligence, and educability of the offender, in order to determine by what sort of training his reformation could be most quickly and effectively achieved. The nature of his offence could enter into consideration as one feature of evidence of his need for some kind of corrective training. To some extent, as is well known, this is the attitude of a few of our most enlightened courts towards juvenile offenders. However, it is the belief of the writer that this attitude is rendered possible in this case only because of the tender emotion in humanity that instinctively responds to the appeal of childhood and early youth. With respect to adults it will be a long time before society can be expected to adopt so advanced an attitude.

It is probably a psychological impossibility that either the negro who commits rape upon a white woman, or the anarchist who murders a President, or even the bank cashier who embezzles the savings of a country community will ever be able to benefit by the reformatory theory. The negro may be a mere boy who has been reared in vicious surroundings and there may be little doubt that with proper training he might be developed into a useful man; the anarchist may have been the half-mad tool of some crafty and dangerous fanatic, and asylum treatment might greatly benefit him or even fully restore his reason; the bank cashier may have been tempted in a most natural and human way, and there may be no doubt of his sincere repentance and complete reformation. Yet public opinion would probably totally refuse to listen to a suggested application of the reformatory theory to such instances as these, and the person who seriously advocated its application might run the risk of himself becoming an object of public resentment. The tender emotion aroused at the thought of a woman's helplessness, terror, suffering and shame, intensified by the forcible though imperfectly understood emotion of racial antipathy in the first case; the powerful sentiments of reverence and loyalty to the head of the government hardly less strong in such situations in a republic than in a monarchy, the mighty gregarious instinct outraged by the attack upon governmental stability, reinforced it may be by some feeling of public terror, all combined with intense tender emotion for the President's grieved family and friends and the inclination to regard their loss as the loss of the nation, in the second case; and in the third, simply the acquisitive instinct potent in its hold upon small savers:—all these are cases where fundamental instincts and emotions are too deeply moved, and too vehement resentment is called forth to reinforce them to allow any considerable sympathetic emotion to be aroused in behalf of the offenders. The reformatory theory cannot be made to apply in such cases, not because logically it should not apply, but because in such cases human nature is so psychologically constituted that there is no instinctive basis to which a suggested application could successfully appeal.

Indeed, it would be unwise for the more enlightened leaders of society to secure a sweeping legal extension of the reformatory theory to aggravating offences, such as those just mentioned. Outraged public indignation would be certain to find expression in extra-legal forms of retaliation, such as lynchings, which hark back in their instinctive and emotional expression to the primitive eras before laws and courts existed. To try to force humanity to think in logical categories when these do violence to its deep-seated emotions and instincts would be as dangerous as it would be futile.

It has therefore been seen that the reformatory theory has a real instinctive foundation in human nature. But whether the theory can be made to apply in any given case is not simply a matter of logical deduction from its premises, but a much larger psychological question. It applies when it happens to be a correct expression of the instincts and emotions involved, and accordingly sympathy for an offender calls into play an affective response which neutralizes the indignation felt against him. But where this is not so, the theory cannot be made to apply.

The deterrent theory also has a psychological basis. Resentment, as has been observed, is essentially protective in its function. Retributive justice, having evolved as an expression of resentment, is accordingly protective. While animals and the earliest men unreflectingly felt and acted upon the promptings of resentment, the real survival value of this instinct was its protective function. When society became reflective, and perceived that two wrongs do not make a right, that to wreak vengeance upon an offender as it instinctively feels prompted to do, does not remedy the evil that he had done, society had either to cease to punish offenders, or find some moral justification for doing so other than the desire for vengeance. Under these circumstances the deterrent theory made its appearance. The wrong doer is punished in order to deter him and others from repetition of the offence. The deterrent theory thus appeared as a device to justify punishments already in use, and no longer felt to be justifiable on the ground of vengeance. Thus employed, it is really a correct interpretation of the function of punishment.

The latter had grown up directly out of the resentment instinct, and indirectly of course, from the gregarious and other primary instincts in support of which resentment arises. Its real function had been to protect these instincts in their free expression. Now, to proclaim this protective function of punishment as the deterrent theory does, is to interpret the real meaning, purpose, and function of the instinct directly involved.

However we must hasten to add that, like the reformatory theory, the deterrent theory has its psychological limitations. It can claim validity only where resentment exists, and can be applied only when resentment is felt. Society might often be efficiently protected by procedure against persons toward whom it feels no ground for resentment. But the moral consciousness is extremely reluctant to do this, however socially useful it might be. The real force of the considerations which Westermarck urges against the deterrent theory is to demonstrate the impossibility of extending the preventive principle to cover cases where no resentment is felt. To quote Westermarck here:

“According to the principle of determent, the infliction of suffering in consequence of an offence is justified as a means of increasing public safety. The offender is sacrificed for the common weal. But why the offender only? It is quite probable that a more effective way of deterring from crime would be to punish his children as well; and if the notion of justice derived all its import from the result achieved by the punishment, there would be nothing unjust in doing so. The only objection which, from this point of view, might ever be raised against the practice of visiting the wrongs of the fathers upon the children, is that it is needlessly severe; the innocence of the children could count for nothing. . . . Moreover, if the object of punishment is merely preventive, the heaviest punishment should be threatened where the strongest motive is needed to restrain. Consequently, an injury committed under great temptation, or in a passion, should be punished with particular severity; whereas a crime like parricide might be treated with more indulgence than other kinds of homicide, owing to the restraining influence of filial affection. Could the moral consciousness approve of this?”¹

¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 82 f.

Such instances are embarrassing to the merely philosophical advocate of the deterrent theory, who wishes to work out its application logically from the idea of prevention abstractly stated. In endeavoring to cover all cases, his theory becomes suspiciously complicated, and in the end he is obliged, either to concede that the theory will not always work, or else to admit with Leslie Stephen that "cases may be put in which it might be necessary to deter, at all hazards, even to the neglect of moral considerations."¹ But this last is as much as to say that "moral considerations" in these cases at least must be interpreted in some other manner than by the purely philosophical principle of deterrence. However, if instead of stating the principle abstractly, we interpret it as this paper has attempted to do, psychologically, as a statement of the function of resentment that has been the source of punishment, and do not try to apply the theory to cases where no resentment is felt, such instances as these of Westermarck's are rather a support to the theory as thus understood.

Professor F. C. Sharp and Dr. M. C. Otto have conducted an investigation into the attitude of students towards retributive punishment² by submitting to them a set of casuistical questions. While their investigation was conducted with rather a different problem in mind, their results clearly tend to confirm the view here advanced. The deterrent idea was very welcome to most students, while in aggravating cases they manifested unmistakable evidence of a primitive thirst for vengeance hard to reconcile with it. Moreover, they were usually reluctant to extend the deterrent idea on grounds of expediency to cases where there could be no reason for resentment.

The deterrent theory is thus a logical interpretation of instinctive reactions already deep seated in human nature before they were subjected to reflective criticism. It undoubtedly interprets correctly the biological function of resentment as manifested in punishment. At the same time the theory could

¹ *Social Rights and Duties*, Vol. II, p. 71.

² *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XX, pp. 341-357, 438-453; cf. also Sharp, "A Study of the Influence of Custom on the Moral Judgment" (*Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin*).

not and cannot on purely logical grounds be extended beyond the limits of the instincts that prompt to retaliation. Unquestionably the raw, primitive instinct for vengeance does not at the present time socially manifest itself untempered by rational considerations like the principles of deterrence, and reformation, except under extremely aggravating circumstances such as give rise to the mob. Nevertheless, deterrence cannot be extended beyond the limits of the instincts whose real biological significance it has successfully interpreted. This furnishes an instructive example of the mutual relationship between reason and instinct in human nature.

If the foregoing analysis has been successful in its purpose, it has correctly indicated the primary instincts involved in the demand for punitive justice, and some of the principal ways in which these instincts have been rationally interpreted and coordinated. It must be frankly admitted that an exhaustive treatment would have to take note specifically of many other factors. Among these would be the sentiments. The whole subject of the sentiments, however, at the present time is too vague to have permitted more than incidental reference to them in this connection; and on the other hand it has been found possible to establish substantial emotional foundations for punitive justice without taking them into account. Perhaps it is not an exaggeration to say that the sentiments serve, like vines, gracefully to cover the grim and somewhat repellent instinctive foundations of the temple of morality, rather than to afford it actual support. Another factor not taken into account is the influence of religion. Its function has been to give additional sanction to punitive practices originating in the instincts mentioned. Sometimes through their inertia, religions have retarded the normal development of more humane practices; and sometimes, by quickening the social conscience, they have furthered moral development along this as other lines.

In the moral judgments of individuals numerous other factors enter, whose interpretation would lead us into the domain of individual psychology. Of these only a few need be mentioned. The instincts vary in relative strength among different indi-

viduals. Consequently there are persons who feel strongly and frankly avow the presence of the naked impulse to vengeance, whereas there are others who insist upon keeping their native resentment so prudishly swathed in sentimental wrappings of various sorts that they deceive themselves into complete ignorance of its existence. The emotional desire for logical consistency is so strong as to cause many persons, among whom are occasionally philosophers, to insist on accepting all the logical consequences of a theory to which they have committed themselves, no matter how much it may conflict with other emotions, and even with common sense. This is likely to occur whenever strongly developed self feeling comes to the reinforcement of the desire for logical consistency, so that admission of inconsistency would seriously wound one's *amour propre*. To minds of a certain cast their own wrong doing arouses resentment against themselves, so that they feel keen pleasure in punishing themselves in various ways. If persons of this type happen to believe in a vindictive God, who must be even more angry at their sins than they are themselves, the religious sanction will strengthen this attitude. Possibly here is where we should seek for the psychological origin of the sacrament of penance. But numerous as these individual factors are, and much as some persons in all ages accordingly have varied from the typical moral judgments of their plane of development, it is believed that the analysis here outlined indicates the main path which the evolution of punitive justice has followed, and the instinctive basis on which it really rests to-day.

Of the three theories regarding punishment, the retributive theory, the deterrent theory, and the reformatory theory, public opinion at the present time is probably most correctly interpreted by the deterrent theory, which, as we have seen, is the resentment instinct interpreted and rationalized. The crude, untempered expression of resentment in the demand for vengeance probably only appears in the case of particularly shocking crimes, or in times of great popular clamor and excitement when the laws of mob psychology prevail, causing the more complex co-ordinations to break down, and the refined sentiments dependent upon

these latter to give way. The reformatory theory, on the other hand, has probably seemed too ideal and visionary¹ to have as yet gained the ascendancy either in law or public opinion. However, there is ground to hope that it will ultimately prevail, by assimilating what is of merit in the deterrent theory, and at the same time affording a freer and nobler expression of all the instincts and sentiments involved. So far as a more humane treatment of offenders, such as is implied in treating them sympathetically, educating them to useful callings, appealing to their honor, and releasing them on probation, can be shown to be more effective in diverting criminals from preying upon society and making useful citizens out of them, than punishments calculated merely to effect deterrence through fear, this theory will be able rightly to claim to be the most effective method of diminishing crime. Reformatory methods may then appeal to the preventive principle as well as to the reformatory principle itself. The reformatory theory will then be sure of winning public support and approval because it will be the most correct interpretation of human nature, since it will appeal to the most perfect co-ordination of human impulses possible. As the best way of preventing injury to society, it will appeal to the instinct of resentment become self-conscious and rationalized, and also through the ideas of reformation and forgiveness it will appeal to the gregarious instinct, the tender emotion, and the other fundamental instincts and emotions which prompt to a certain amount of fellow-feeling for the offender. As culture advances human nature will as a rule find expression in the attitude that expresses the fullest possible harmonization and co-ordination of its impulses, and only rarely in the more primitive and imperfect co-ordinations that have survived from lower stages of development.

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¹ Except in regard to juvenile offenders.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Die Phänomenologie des Ich in ihren Grundproblemen: Erster Band.

Von KONSTANTIN OESTERREICH, Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1910.—Pp. 532.

The problem of this book is the nature of the I, or self. This, as Oesterreich rightly declares, is a question of fact and must be decided by introspection. In Part I of the book he considers different theories of the self with a thoroughness which involves him in a complete discussion of different forms of consciousness. This division of the book is virtually, therefore, a treatise on general psychology. But of the detailed discussions, interesting as they are of theories of feeling, *Denkpsychologie*, and the like—this review will take no account, confining itself instead to the central problem, the nature of the self. The summary exposition which follows does scant justice to Oesterreich's wealth of citation and to his wide acquaintance with current psychological theory. It may be added that, except in the field of abnormal psychology, his references to English and American sources are less adequate than those to the German and French literature of the subject.

I. Oesterreich's own position is clearly stated. He holds as 'immediate fact (p. 7)' or 'immediate experience (p. 13)' that all consciousness is the consciousness of an *I*. To deny this is as absurd "as if one were to say that a motion exists which is not the motion of something (p. 7)." This *I* is a reality of 'distinctive character'; radically different from the physical reality (p. 5 *et al.*) so that it is absurd to speak of a "Physik des Seelenlebens." By I, or self,¹ is meant "that . . . whose states are feelings and which . . . always remains identical with itself" ("jenes Moment . . . dessen Zustände die Gefühle sind und das . . . stets mit sich identisch bleibt," p. 8). The whole book explains and limits and modifies this definition. The *I*, Oesterreich teaches is the subject of perceiving, thinking, and willing no less than of feeling (p. 225). "It is the *I* which perceives (p. 236)"; "there is no judging which is not the judging of an *I* (p. 157)"; "every willing is that of an *I* (p. 208)." Accordingly the *I*, or self, is not co-

¹ This review does not follow Oesterreich in his avowedly arbitrary distinction between the *I* on the one hand and the self, conceived as sum of the contents of the *I* at a given moment. Cf. p. 323.

ordinate with feeling, image, or will; it is "outside the series of all the other psychic contents," "*Ausserhalb der Reihe . . . allen übrigen Inhalten.*" (P. 12. Cf. p. 225.) And yet the *I* is no empty reality, or substance, independent of conscious contents, beyond or behind them (p. 230); rather it is within them and constitutes the 'central nature' of them. ("Es ist nicht ein für sich stehendes Etwas das noch jenseits der Gefühle noch neben ihnen stände, sondern es liegt in den Gefühlen.")

II. For this conception Oesterreich argues negatively by attempting the refutation of opposing views. The summary which follows of his arguments does not hold to his order. The opposing doctrines of which he takes account really reduce to two: (1) the aggregate theory, according to which the *I* is a 'simple aggregate' or 'sum of contents and functions' (pp. 233 and 122); and, second (2) the relation-theory which makes of the *I* a mere relation (*Zusammenhang*) of functions with each other (p. 239). The fundamental disproof of the second of these theories is, in Oesterreich's opinion, the following: so far from true is it that the *I* can be reduced to a relation that, rather, the relation presupposes the *I*. Indeed the only relation invariably occurring between conscious contents (or functions) consists in their all belonging to a self. "There is no other universal and complete relation." For example, "the concept of number which I happen now to have and the visual content of the green of the plant before my eyes" are simultaneous processes; "but there is no relation between them excepting in so far as both proceed as functions from the same *I* (p. 241)." The aggregate theory is opposed by a direct appeal to introspection. "The *I* which we mean is not identical with the bundle of phenomena (*jenem Bündel von Erlebnissen*). These phenomena are rather states and functions of the *I* (p. 237)." Thus, in the end, as Oesterreich never fails to insist, the existence of an *I* fundamental to its perceptions, feelings, and the like is a matter of immediate experience and, therefore, not demonstrable. The *I* is "a kind of thing which one can merely indicate (*auf das man nur hinweisen kann*) but which one can as little demonstrate to the *I*-blind as one can demonstrate color to the color-blind. . . . He who sees it not, or who seeks to deceive himself about it with empty words, can not be helped. Such immediate experiences can be apprehended (*ergriffen*) only in the immediate experiential judgment (*Erfahrungsurteil*), but can not be demonstrated (p. 13)." To Husserl, who objects (p. 235) that in absorbed consciousness—in reading, mathematical study and the like—this consciousness of self disappears, Oesterreich

replies that we are, in these cases, not unconscious but inattentively conscious of self. "Of course," he adds, "when we are absorbed in an act we are not expressly conscious of the *I* as centre of the act. But this does not mean that the *I* is not present. . . . It is the *I* which is absorbed in the reading or occupied with the mathematical demonstration. Perception, reading, reflection are only thinkable as the perception, reading, and thinking of a subject (pp. 235-236)."

One widely-held form of the aggregate theory¹ Oesterreich, for a reason which will presently appear, considers in great detail (chapter II). This is the sensationalistic conception which reduces the *I* to a complex of sensations. In the form of the theory which has its origin with Condillac (pp. 27 ff.) the self is identified with the sum of all sensations; but this view, as Oesterreich points out, leaves no room for any distinction between self-consciousness and consciousness of the external object. But, as held by most psychologists, the sensationalistic theory identifies the self with the complex of 'bodily sensations' and, in particular, of organic sensations. In opposition to this doctrine, Oesterreich urges several considerations: (1) The organic sensations, in the first place, are often confused with the feelings, pleasantness and unpleasantness (pp. 18, 66 f.). A supposedly sensational theory may really therefore be an affective theory masquerading under another name. (2) There occur, moreover, well-known cases of depersonalization, in which cœnæsthesia remains (p. 49). If the organic sensations constituted the consciousness of personality this would be impossible. (3) The well known pathological cases in which the patient externalizes his own body, regarding legs, arms, or head as foreign to him and part of the external world (p. 52) offer an argument complementary to the last. For these cases show not only that organic sensations are unessential to self-consciousness but that they may be referred to outside objects. (4) As final argument, Oesterreich adduces the observation embodied in the *Einfühlungstheorie* of modern æsthetics (pp. 94 ff.). According to this view, the æsthetic subject attributes to external objects sensational experiences similar to his own. Such a theory could not have arisen, Oesterreich suggests, if one distinctive consciousness of self centered in precisely these experiences.

III. The important error in Oesterreich's account of the *I* is, in the opinion of the writer, his constant identification of self-consciousness with feeling. He has described the *I* as 'that whose states are feelings,' and he formally substitutes an affective theory (*Gefühlstheorie*) for the

¹ Oesterreich does not explicitly classify the sensationalistic as a form of the aggregate-theory, but he treats it as such.

rejected sensationalistic conception of the self. He argues for this affective theory somewhat as follows:

Sensational predicates are applied to external objects, not to myself: I describe myself as sad or happy, not as red or salt (p. 35). And this holds of all sense qualities. More than this: cases in which—as in the recovery, through operation, from congenital blindness—the sense-consciousness is suddenly widened give no indication of any corresponding widening of the feeling of personality (p. 41). Finally, pathological disturbances of the affective consciousness usually involve confusion of the sense of personality (p. 37). But each of these arguments, and all of them together, fail to carry conviction. It is true that external things are red, soft, sweet (and related), but so are they pleasant and unpleasant. And though objects do not joy or grieve neither do they see, hear, nor smell. On the other hand, the I feels but it also perceives and thinks. In a word, the distinction between 'subjective' and 'objective' is to be sought not, as by Oesterreich, in the contrast between affection and sensation, but rather in the distinction, on which he lays proper stress, between 'function' (or 'process') and 'content.' Contents of all kinds, affective as well as sensational and intellectual, are distinguished from functions, perceptual and conceptual, as well as emotional and volitional, precisely in the sense in which Oesterreich distinguishes the psychologically objective from the psychologically subjective.¹ He is unquestionably right in holding that one is more vividly conscious of self in emotion than in perception; but, as he has himself suggested in his criticism of Husserl, perception *includes* a consciousness, however inattentive, of self. In truth, Oesterreich may repeatedly be quoted against himself in his conception of self consciousness as essentially affective. "All psychic processes," he says, "are states or functions of a subject, belong to an I . . . and are impossible without it. In all such occurrences as perception, . . . imagination, judging, doubting, feeling, and willing, the question, 'who perceives,' imagines, etc., is unavoidable. And always, the answer can be only, "An I perceives, etc."²

¹ Cf. the writer's *A First Book in Psychology*, pp. 3 ff., for the use of the term 'impersonal, private object' in place of 'psychic content.'

² A rigorous criticism of the theories which identify self-consciousness exclusively with sensation, or with feeling, or with will may be found in Gustav Kafka's scholarly *Versuch einer kritischen Darstellung der neueren Anschauungen über das Ich problem* (*Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie*, 1910). Kafka's general conclusion is that it is epistemologically, not psychologically, necessary to assume the existence of an I which is a mere subject, not an object, of consciousness—which is, in other words, devoid of specific content, a formal and empty 'point of relation.' The inconsistency of asserting the existence of an I which, by hypothesis, can never

IV. This review has so far concerned itself with the first, and longer, division of this phenomenology of the self. To many readers, however, Part II on "The Apparent Splitting (*die Scheinbare Spaltung*) of the *I*" will seem to be more important. The problem of these later chapters is to determine in how far the phenomena of so-called alternating and multiple personality tell against the alleged identity of self.

Oesterreich's arguments and conclusions are based on observations of his own subjects and on a wide study of the literature, technical and untechnical. He quotes Amiel, Maine de Biran and Goethe, Plotinus and Pascal, St. Augustine and St. Theresa, as well as Janet, Flournoy, Sollier and Prince. He distinguishes between depersonalization, or loss of personality, and dissociation, or multiplication, of personality. Within the latter, he contrasts successive with simultaneous dissociation—alternating with coincident personality. He also lays stress on the difficulty of distinguishing between relatively normal changes in the consciousness of personality (as in religious ecstasy, in artistic creation, in neurasthenia) and abnormal disturbances. He concludes that, in each of the typical cases which he carefully examines, the alleged loss or change of the personality-consciousness is a change in specific content—a disturbance of feeling (pp. 322 ff.) or of memory (p. 356) but not a loss or complete change of personality. It has been so described simply because the 'aggregate theory' of the self as mere complex of contents is "dominant in French and American psychology to-day," so that change in the specific content of the self has been wrongly identified with loss of personality.

Oesterreich finds strong confirmation of this view in the records of the introspection of the very persons who figure as instances of lost or changed personality. The following are examples of these unintended testimonies: "It seems to me that I am not myself"; "I am no longer conscious of . . . who I am, what my name is"; "I longed to become my old self again"; "Can I ever find the poor *I* which seems to have vanished?" "I was not I."¹ It is clear that if the old self were lost there would be no *I* which could mourn, in this fashion, over its own change. The situation is that which Azam described in discussing his well-known subject, Férida: "She realizes . . . that her character undergoes a change. . . . She does not believe be experienced seems to the writer to be shown by the whole trend of Oesterreich's argument. The two works, issued at almost the same time, admirably supplement each other. For a more extended comparison of the two, cf. a brief paper by the writer of this review in the *Psychological Bulletin*, for January 1912.

¹ These quotations are made, p. 323, from Janet, Wernicke, Taine, and Pick.

herself to be another person. She is fully aware that she is always like herself (*sich selbst ähnlich*)."¹ In Oesterreich's words: "there is no absolutely selfless condition, even in depersonalization. . . . Selflessness appears only when there is no longer any psychic life (p. 323)." "In no case," Oesterreich concludes (p. 500), "which we have met has the unity of consciousness suffered at all." The fluctuations and dissociations affect only the content of the *I*.

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Individualism. By WARNER FITE. New York and London, Longmans, Green, and Company, 1911.—pp. xix, 301.

In the four lectures which compose this book we have an interesting study of the relation of the individual to society. The motive of the book is a protest against the tendency of modern thought to regard the individual as a product of the social order and to identify morality with altruism and self-sacrifice. In opposition to this tendency the author seeks to show that the individual as conscious agent "is the original source and constituent of all value," and that therefore there can be no higher standard of obligation for him than that derived from his "personal ends and ideals" (p. 5). He maintains, however, that in the degree in which individuals are conscious their personal interests "are strictly coördinate" (p. 5).

The exposition of the theory begins with the conception of individuality. There are two ways of regarding the human being—in his external and in his internal aspect. In the external aspect he is a mechanical object among other mechanical objects, and his movements are determined by mechanical forces. In his internal aspect he is the conscious being, who acts knowingly and whose choices cannot therefore be "the blind outcome of mechanical forces" (p. 11). If men were simply mechanical individuals, there would be no possibility of their adjusting themselves to one another: a billiard ball cannot change its course in order to avoid striking another ball. But because men are conscious they are capable of an indefinite amount of adjustment to one another: a purpose which I have formed without in the least taking you into account will inevitably be changed, in some respect, as soon as I understand that it is in conflict with some purpose of yours. And this merely as a matter of my intelligent self-interest. For the intelligent being sees that he cannot realize his ends without taking into account the fact that all about him are other conscious beings, possessed of ends which *they* are trying to realize.

¹Quoted, pp. 355-356, from *Hypnotisme*, pp. 85, 105, 110.

But what is a conscious being? The essence of consciousness is that it is unity in multiplicity. Material things may be many *or* they may be one. But an idea (a meaning) is both many *and* one. And the essence of conscious choice is that it is a unitary response to a number of conflicting situations. A choice which was completely conscious would harmonize all the conflicting elements in the situation. In so far as one aim is sacrificed to another, our choice is not intelligent, but is akin to the "unconscious mechanical movement in which one object is . . . more or less displaced in the attainment of another" (p. 65). The function of consciousness, then, is to overcome the incompatibilities which from the mechanical point of view are ultimate. The degree in which we do this measures the degree in which we are conscious. And in so far as a man becomes conscious, he becomes free from natural law—*i. e.*, the law of habit. But at the same time he becomes an end in himself and a law unto himself—a source of value. "Value appears in the world when a being which is . . . moving . . . becomes aware of . . . his movements and thereby capable of asking whether this is the direction in which he wishes to move." The consciousness "of yourself as a moving power . . . is all that creates for you an end or makes any object an object of value. It is therefore inconceivable that this value should be other than the value which the object has for you" (p. 89).

From this point of view it is absurd to speak of the duty of sacrificing oneself for others. The source of all obligation is in individual ends. But this does not mean that the interests of others are not to be considered. For "so far as I know my fellow" I am bound "by the same logic that bids me to get out of the way of an approaching train, to include his interests among those to be considered" (p. 175), and this for the simple reason that his interests determine for me the conditions through which my own interests are to be realized. Thus the mere "knowledge of the nature and presence of others is sufficient to impose a genuine social obligation" (p. 172).

We may now consider the nature of human society. The difficulty with much of our social and ethical theory is that it has tended to think of men as mechanical individuals. "From the mechanical standpoint . . . the typical expressions" of a man's individuality "are his occupation of space and his consumption . . . of material goods." Hence the interests of mechanical individuals are conflicting. And if society is composed of such units "the common good can be purchased only by individual sacrifice" (pp. 23 f.). But in a society of conscious individuals the case would be different. Among perfectly

conscious beings there could be no ultimate conflict of personal ends, and for two reasons. In the first place, as has been said, conscious beings have an indefinite capacity for mutual self-adjustment. And in the second place nature and natural resources are not, for them, fixed quantities; if the "possibilities of the world . . . are a function of ourselves the notion of a limit" to these possibilities "falls at once to the ground" (p. 49).

But in their present estate men are far from being perfectly conscious. Hence their interests seem to conflict. In the case of conflict the only thing for the individual to do is to regulate his conduct by the principle of *enlightened* self-interest, not by the principle of self-sacrifice. The Greek ideal of justice is nobler than the Christian ideal of brotherly love and self-sacrifice. The social problem is a problem, not of renouncing personal interests, but of adjusting them "in mutual satisfaction and freedom" (pp. 200 f.). It is "a technological problem," to be solved, not by love, but by intelligence (p. 297). With conditions as they now are, the interest of some will inevitably be sacrificed more or less to that of others. But this sacrifice should never be voluntary. The method of intelligent self-assertion will accomplish the desired end with far less suffering and waste of energy than the method of self-forgetfulness.

Lack of space prevents my doing justice to the wealth of illustration which Professor Fite brings to the support of his theory and to the suggestive way in which he applies it to the problems of corporate wealth, socialism, *etc.* We may, however, note briefly his adherence to the doctrine of 'natural rights' and the 'social contract.' The individual is not the product of society, and his rights are not derived from the social order. "The unintelligent" as such have "no rights" (p. 239). The intelligent have rights solely because they are intelligent. The 'social contract,' while absurd as an historical explanation, is an admirable "expression of the *meaning*" of the social order; as men become more intelligent, the law becomes more and more "the authoritative statement of the terms of a mutual agreement" (pp. 258 f.).

Professor Fite has given us a most interesting book. The exposition is direct, simple, and concrete. Both for the general reader and for the student the book is full of suggestion and stimulus. And many of the criticisms of modern society and modern social theory are just and timely. But one lays down the book with the feeling that some of the difficulties have not been fully faced and some of the main contentions not completely established. That the human individual is an ultimate source of value is one of the points which seem to me

not satisfactorily proved. There is indeed a certain fine sense in which it may be said that all one's duties are duties to oneself. That is, there can be no moral obligation for a man that is in real conflict with the demands of his 'higher' or 'ideal' self. But one may grant this and still refuse to admit that the individual as such is the source of value. It may quite well be true that a value can have no authority over me until I become conscious of it, and yet not be true that the value owes its existence to my being conscious of it. It seems to me that Professor Fite has not proved his point in this case.

The great difficulty that arises from making the human individual an ultimate source of value is of course the difficulty of finding any objective basis for morality. Professor Fite tries to meet this difficulty by the doctrine of an ultimate harmony of human interests, which is due to the indefinite capacity for mutual self-adjustment that belongs to conscious beings as such. Here again I feel that he has not succeeded in fully establishing his contention. If we could show that the lives of all human individuals are included in one greater life, we should have more reason to insist that there can be no real conflict of human interests, that all the diverse purposes of men must be ultimately in harmony as included in the one supreme purpose. But in this case of course the individual consciousness is not the ultimate source of value; and if we take it as the ultimate source, it is doubtful whether we are justified in saying that all human ends are in their essence harmonious. If men have the degree of isolation which is implied in regarding each one as an independent source of value, I do not see how we can unreservedly assert an ultimate harmony of their interests. Professor Fite contends of course that it is implied in the very nature of intelligent beings that they will strive to adapt themselves to one another. But if nothing is important to me except my own ends and if I can attain them without considering yours, why should I consider yours? Professor Fite would doubtless say that I cannot attain mine without considering yours. But that this would always be the case remains, I think, to be proved; in a universe of the sort which Professor Fite's theory seems to imply, I do not see why it should infallibly be the case. But even if we refrained from pressing this objection the practical aspect of the theory would still contain an element of difficulty. Let us grant that there is no ultimate conflict between men's real interests. The fact remains that under present conditions, as the author readily admits, there is much apparent conflict. In the case of such conflict how ought one to act? Shall one say, 'The opposition between my interests and yours cannot be

real, and hence if I follow the path of self-interest I shall be doing my duty by you'? Or shall one rather say, 'The conflict cannot be real, and hence if I seek your good I shall at the same time be subserving my own highest interests'? It is clear that to show that there is no real conflict is not to tell us how we ought to act in the face of an apparent one. Professor Fite says that in all such cases we should be guided by the principle of self-interest. But is this obvious? The apparent conflict of interests is due, we are told, to the fact that we are only imperfectly conscious. Now if this is so, is it not at least possible that the 'voice of duty,' as we call it, or the stirrings of sympathy may be a safer guide than the promptings of self-interest? It may be that if my self-interest were fully enlightened, it would never lead me to work injury to another. But it does not follow that for the partially developed consciousness the promptings of an imperfectly enlightened self-interest will be the safest moral guide. With the author's protest against the sentimental or the hypocritical eulogizing of self-sacrifice I heartily agree: exhorting men to do what they cannot do or what the exhorter himself never does is not particularly useful. But on the other hand it seems to me that Professor Fite fails to do complete justice to an important fact of modern life, the fact, namely, that in the present state of human society 'my duty' or 'my own highest interest' sometimes presents itself to me in the guise of the interest of another. I do not mean that he wholly overlooks this fact. And I am not unmindful of the high plane of thought in which his whole argument moves. But it seems to me that in his revolt against the sentimental eulogizing of self-sacrifice and 'brotherly love' he has failed to emphasize sufficiently the importance, for the moral life, of human sympathy and of that aspect of men's experience which we call 'the conflict between duty and self-interest.'

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Philosophie als Grundwissenschaft. Von JOHANNES REHMKE. Leipzig, Kesselringsche Buchhandlung, 1910.—Pp. vii, 706.

Philosophy, the author tells us in the preface, has been "ein buntes bewegtes Bild" (p. iii) of world-views, none of which have gained general acceptance. One might then either adopt the Fichtean position, and regard philosophy as the expression of one's own personality, or he might try to be content with the study of the history of philosophy. Yet neither of these courses would satisfy our natural craving for a *Philosophie als Wissenschaft*. Difficult to attain as this will always be, we must continue to seek it with all our powers. Professor

Rehmke accordingly, with that unabated courage which marks the lover of philosophy, has made a fresh effort in this direction; and we have now one more system to add to the long list. Yet it is not a system in the bad sense of closing forever certain lines of inquiry, but rather in the sense of starting from a clear point of view and aiming at objective demonstrable certainty. The knowledge which the author seeks will not be phenomenalist, but will hold of things as they are, and it will have the "Bodenständigkeit" (p. iv) of the *Fachwissenschaften*, i. e., will be such that "der Gegenstand *aus sich selbst* seine Erklärung findet" (p. iv). At the same time it is, as we shall see, a thorough, almost radical, empiricism.

The book is divided into three parts, "Grundlegender," "Kritischer," and "Abschliessender"; treating respectively of philosophy as the one fundamental science, of epistemology as no true part of philosophy, if indeed worthy of study at all, and of certain metaphysical doctrines resulting from the first part. By far the greatest interest lies in this first part; it is the positive, constructive portion, and occupies nearly two-thirds of the book (pp. 1-430). It is worked out with real minuteness, and on account of its novelty we shall expound it in some detail. What is knowledge? Simply that which satisfies our instinctive desire for unquestioned and perfectly clear certainty about the given. *Wissenschaft* then is "das Unternehmen das Gegebene fraglos zu bestimmen, und Erkenntnis heisst das fraglos bestimmte Gegebene" (p. 15). Since this "given" is necessarily given to consciousness, the term "Bewusstseinsbesitz" is often used to denote it; that term is preferable to "Bewusstseinsinhalt" because it does not connote psychical characters. ". . . fordere ich den Leser auf, in dieses Wort nichts mehr hinein zulegen, als was hier gesagt ist: Bewusstseinsbesitz als Gegenstand der Wissenschaft oder der Erkenntnis" (p. 15). Further, we are warned not to confuse "given" with "real": "given" is the widest possible term. ". . . nicht nur das 'Wirkliche' ist Gegebenes, sondern zu diesem gehört in gleicher Weise das 'Nicht wirkliche,' weil auch dieses zum Bewusstseinsbesitz gehört" (p. 15). While then the not-real has a certain respectable status, the not-given is pure *nichts*. To speak of something beyond the given which we cannot know is to speak of nothing at all: if there are limits of knowledge it must be within the given. "'Unerkennbares,' das nicht 'Gegebenes' sein soll, ist ein sinnloses Wort" (p. 17). There may indeed be objects given to some one not myself, or to some past experience of my own which I cannot repeat; and really Spencer's "Unknowable" is conceived in this wise (p. 23).

Knowable means only "Gegebenes, das *schlechthin fraglos* bestimmt werden kann" (p. 19). Accordingly all the given is within the pale of the knowable. "So steht das Wort des Grenzers von den Grenzen menschlichen Erkennens als leeres Wort da" (p. 27).

After two sections of these preliminary definitions, we come in the third section to the more particular study of the given. "All that is given is particular, without exception (p. 34); even universals (which are given) are particular in that they differ from one another. Since now the given comprises universals and individuals, there will be two groups of sciences, the "Allgemeinwissenschaften" and the "Geschichtswissenschaften." These study respectively certain given universals and certain groups of given individuals. The former include mathematics, physics, logic, ethics, physiology, psychology, chemistry, philology, biology; the latter include all historical sciences (p. 38). The given, in accordance with what was said above, here includes the not-real as well as the real—viz. in the case of mathematics which studies the given and ideal. Now in the universal group we find a distinction. Some universals are of widest application, some of less wide. The widest comprise the object-matter of the universal sciences when considered absolutely or as such. "So hat die Mathematik zum Beispiel mit der besonderen Räumen und Zahlen zu tun, sie fragt aber nicht, was deren Allgemeinstes, "Raum schlechtweg" und was "Zahl schlechtweg" sei; und die Physik, deren besonderer Grund besondere Veränderungen des Dinges sind, fragt . . . nicht was dessen Allgemeinstes, also was "Veränderung schlechtweg" und was "Ding schlechtweg" sei: und die Psychologie . . . was "Seelisches schlechtweg" sei (p. 39). There is then need of a particular discipline "in dem wir das Allgemeinstes des Begebenen überhaupt zum besonderen Gegenstand machen und schlechthin fraglos zubestimmen suchen" (p. 39). This is "Grundwissenschaft" or philosophy. The author's definition here seems to the reviewer akin to the concept of "Gegenstandstheorie," although in the absence of bibliographical references it is difficult to be certain. Professor Rehmke's use of the terms "space absolutely," "thing absolutely," etc., and his use of "given" as indifferent to actuality, point in this direction.

Has philosophy any presuppositions? Every special science is in its own field quite empirical, though presupposing the concept of its subject-matter. All such concepts it is the business of philosophy to study and "fraglos zu bestimmen." Philosophy however does not deduce them, for it presupposes no axioms, but only "setzt zwar Gegebenes voraus, dieses aber als völlig unbestimmtes Gegebenes, sie

setzt also *nur Gegebenes schlechtweg* voraus" (p. 47). Even logic, universal as it is, assumes as subject-matter the judgment (p. 83) and is therefore not *Grundwissenschaft*. Now as to the content of philosophy: the principal, because most universal, category is that of *thing*. The problem is "was das 'Ding schlechtweg' als besonderes Gegebenes sei, um. . . . Allgemeinste schlechtlein fraglos zu bestimmen" (p. 88). The thing as given is found to consist, first, of a "Dingaugenblick" or momentary object. We now see that the author is referring solely to physical things (or concepts of them), for he designates as the three necessary and sufficient conditions of a "Dingaugenblick" quantity, form, and place (*Ort*). He gives no *rationale* of these three; they seem to be just so given. He insists strongly on the importance of place to a thing. It is here treated as absolute and distinguished from *Lage* or relative situation in that the *Lage* presupposes *Ort*, but not conversely (pp. 104, 105). At this point a discussion of the nature of contradiction is brought in, suggested by the topic of *place* and motion. The author takes an empirical view of it—viz., that whatever is given cannot be contradictory—akin to that of James, Paulhan and others, and opposed to the general rationalistic doctrine. No names are mentioned here, and in the opinion of the reviewer the subject is treated with perhaps a little of dogmatism. In fact the position of the book seems weakest in regard to its conception of logic. By basing logic on the theory of judgment, Dr. Rehmke would naturally tend to overlook the truth that there are certain implications, hardly derivable from the theory of judgment, which the philosopher's reasoning must obey. For example, do not relations and terms imply each other? Can the one be more fundamental than the other? Judging from his statements about "*Ort*" he would seem to regard *term* as more fundamental than relation (pp. 105–106); and his statements about quantity indicate the same view (pp. 105–106). Again, he claims to have eliminated the difficulty as to a thing being one while it changes, by his doctrine that the thing is itself the series of moments in time (see later); but surely he should at least have squared himself with Mr. Bradley's dictum that "to identify the diverse" is the essence of contradiction.

Things are differentiated by diversity in any or all of the three "Bestimmtheiten," quantity, form, and place. But a thing is more than a "Dingaugenblick"; it is a succession of them, "die Einheit von Dingaugenblicke im Nacheinander" (p. 148). A thing may then change without contradiction, since by definition it includes change. The old contradiction of a moving thing is answered thus: "Ein

einzigster Dingaugenblick also zeigt das Ding weder in Bewegung, noch auch, wie eben die Eleaten (s. den fliegenden ruhenden Pfeil) irrenderweise meinten, in Ruhe" (p. 187), for *rest* is a relation as well as motion. Two theses follow: all change is both loss and gain in quantity, form, and place (pp. 169 ff.), and no "secondary" qualities can be constitutive of a thing, for they have not "place": "zu der Empfindung als besonderem Gegebenen ein Ort nicht gehört" (p. 199). The doctrine is that things are primary qualities united in place.

The other groups (only two are found) of given facts, besides things, are conscious states. These are utterly different from things and irreducible. Philosophy finds them coördinate with the physical, and its relation to psychology is on a par with its relation to physics (p. 207). Place is quite lacking to the psychical; in fact, the two groups of "given" facts agree only in that both are given to consciousness. The ancient puzzle of the relation between body and mind now appears. The "double-aspect" theory splits on the rock of the ultimate difference between physical and psychical (p. 217). The author's solution is dualistic. Mind and body are two "givens" united into a working system ("Wirkenseinheit"), but they do not together constitute one individual. *That* assumption has caused all the trouble. The self, or uniting principle of mind is, as readers of the author's *Allgemeine Psychologie* will recall, the logical subject; that of the body is place. The two interact constantly. That this is possible is argued in a difficult discussion of causation (pp. 245-295) which defines that category as a three-term relation. "Das Wort 'Ursache und Wirkung' umfasst also nicht zwei, sondern *drei Gegebene*, und die Wirkenseinheit ist ein dreigliedrige Einheit" (pp. 255-256). The reviewer would repeat the criticism made above as to the neglect of logical implication. Is causation *intelligible* without a thread of identity between cause and effect? If not, the author's view of interaction would be illogical. But he is evidently a most thorough-going empiricist, for he does not seem to feel the constraint which many philosophers feel, of certain rationalising axioms. We recall a remark: "die Grundwissenschaft, unter deren 'Gegenständen' allerdings auch die Veränderung schlechtweg sich findet, eben mit dem Gegebenen schlechtweg zu tun hat, und, wie ihr demnach der Fragesatz 'wie ist Gegebenes überhaupt möglich?' ein leeres Gerede ist . . ." (pp. 190-191). Once admitting the intelligibility of interaction, however, we find progress easy. The will is the type of causation, though it does not act directly on the mind, but on the body. The real (inner or outer) is defined thus: "'Wirklich' ist ein Einzelwesen, das *wirk-*

oder Wirkung erfährt" (p. 300). It thus comprises physical and psychical alike but is only a part of the given.

The important result here seems to be that man is not simple but compounded. As conscious he is simple, as in-a-place he is simple; as twofold he acts upon, and is affected by, both the psychical and physical. "Eine stetige Wirkenseinheit von Leib und Seele ist also der Mensch. Dieser bedeutet nun aber nicht auch selbst wieder ein besonderes Einzelwesen . . ." (p. 306).

Returning to the physical world, we come to the question, are there simple ultimate things (atoms)? Ultimacy as a working unit must not be confused with indivisibility (p. 331). The question belongs to science (p. 350). Other questions considered are: Is the physical world (Dingwelt) one? Is anything imperishable? The former is answered in the negative, the latter in favor of the eternity (*in time*) of simple things. "Ewigkeit also kommt dem wirklich unteilbaren Dinge [atoms, if there are any] und dem Bewusstsein zu" (p. 420). And "ewig" here means "in jeder Zeit der Welt"—no timeless immortality for us!

Parts II and III must be merely outlined. The general thesis of Part II is that epistemology is no part of *Grundwissenschaft*, because it presupposes knowledge and its object (p. 438). Indeed it is a futile discipline, for it asks, how can the given be given? Still it might, if conceived as genetic psychology, be worthy of study. The difficulties of idealism, empiricism, rationalism, etc., would have been avoided if philosophers had not *separated*, but only *distinguished*, body and mind: "Liegen sie [epistemological schools] doch alle in demselben Spital krank an demselben Übel, nämlich an der irrigen Voraussetzung, dass Erkennendes und das Andere von einander Geschiedenes sei, ein Voraussetzung, die eben zu der toten Frage nach dem Gegebenen des Gegebenen führen muss" (p. 440). The theories are grouped under three heads: psychological (English empiricism), logical (earlier rationalism), and psychological-logical (Kantian rationalism). Rehmke's attitude toward the doctrine of a knowing subject behind all experience may be seen from these words: "Wer uns daher das Wort 'Erkenntnis subjekt' sagt und 'Nichtgegebenes' d. i. Nichts mit diesen Worte zum Ausdruck bringt, der lallt uns ein sinnloses Wort zu . . ." (p. 562). "Bin ich mir nun meiner selbst bewusst, so 'habe' oder 'besitze' ich auch mich, bin ich mir also, mit anderen Worten, selbst ein Gegebenes" (p. 562). His empiricism and anti-phenomenalism unite to form a realism.

The third part (pp. 582-700) emphasizes, among other things,

the author's realism, and shows him to a certain extent as an indeterminist. We gather some representative statements. "Es ist von der grössten Bedeutung, sich darüber klar zu werden, das, wenn wir von Ding und von Dingvorstellung reden, nicht Zweierlei, sondern *ein und dasselbe nur in zwei besonderen Betrachtungen* zur Darstellung kommt" (p. 611). "Wir legen aber sofort Einspruch ein gegen die Behauptung 'die Welt ist meine Vorstellung' wenn sie sagen will, 'die Welt gehört zu mir, der ich sie vorstelle, in dem Sinn, dass sie *abhängig* von mir, dem Vorstellenden, ist'" (p. 613). "Wir weisen diesen Traum einer Vorstellungs- und Erscheinungswelt vor allem auch aus dem Grunde ab, weil er gegen die Tatsache der Selbstunterscheidung des menschlichen Bewusstseins von dem Dinggegebenen offensichtlich verstösst, die deutlich lehrt, dass Dinggegebenes als solches nicht zum Bewusstsein gehört" (p. 616). Kant's epistemology is spoken of (p. 619 et passim) as "Dieser Erkenntnisroman Kants." "*Nichts, überhaupt nichts von allem Gegebenen ist als solches abhängig von dem besitzenden menschlichen Bewusstsein*" (p. 647), although indeed "Was für besondere Eigenschaften also das Ding als Besitz eines wahrnehmenden Bewusstseins zeige, das hängt ganz davon ab, was für ein besonderer Leib mit diesem Bewusstsein verknüpft ist" (p. 648). "Farbe, Ton, Härte usf. . . . von dem Leibe des Bewusstseins, dem es Gegebenes ist, abhängig ist" (p. 658). Some things or psychoses may not be effects, but only causes, for though causal connection is ubiquitous (p. 686) it does not always hold in both directions. There may then be freedom in the temporal, realistic sense. "Die Freiheit d. i. die Unabhängigkeit, deren sich das Bewusstsein als *wirkender* Wille bewusst ist, tritt . . . zu tage, weil dieses [Bewusstsein] als Wille eben niemals auch Wirkung erfährt und erfahren kann" (p. 700). Altogether Professor Rehmke has produced a most important, though a long and difficult, treatise, which should be welcome to the modern realistic school.

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Theories of Knowledge; Absolutism, Pragmatism, Realism. By LESLIE J. WALKER. London, Longmans, Green, & Co., 1910.—pp. xxxix, 696.

In the Preface to this volume written by Michael Maher, remark is made upon the large and increasing improvement manifest of recent years in Catholic philosophical literature both in English and foreign languages, and upon the constant appearance of new works which exhibit the genuine philosophical spirit. "A careful, patient and scru-

pulously fair consideration of an opponent's views if they are discussed at all, is the only profitable course at the present day, whilst the most effective form of philosophical criticism is that which, instead of singling out particular flaws, takes a large view of a system as a whole and then follows it out to its ultimate consequences" (p. viii). This is indeed to set a new and higher standard for Catholic philosophical literature; but it is an ideal which is fully realized in the present work.

The aim of a theory of knowledge, our author states, is to discover the nature of the relation existing between the object known and the knowing mind. Hence the epistemological problem is three-fold: "We have to analyse psychologically the nature and functions of those mental activities by which knowledge is acquired and to discuss the influence which they have on one another; we have to enquire into the conditions of knowledge, to ask what precisely is to be understood by subject and object, and how far knowledge is due to the activity of the one, how far to that of the other; and we have to examine the notions of validity, truth, objectivity, and to determine the criterion by which we may decide when these notions are applicable to an act of cognition and when they are not" (p. i). The main purpose of the book, that of reaching a solution of the problem of knowledge, may be most effectively pursued, the author believes, by considering the leading theories of knowledge, Absolutism, Pragmatism, and Realism, under each of these three heads; for the theories named "contain amongst them at least in germ the only possible solutions that can be given to the problem of knowledge" (p. 4). "Psychologically, knowledge may be regarded either as a function of the intellect or as a function of the will; or else we may hold that, while both will and intellect co-operate, their functions are distinct. Metaphysically the universe is either one or many, the origin of knowledge either subjective or objective, the distinction of subject and object either relative or absolute. And, epistemologically, truth is either theoretical or practical, and depends for its acceptance either upon its power to satisfy the intellect or upon its power on our practical needs and our will, or, it may be, upon both" (p. 4). The three theories in question have their roots deep in the soil of philosophical thought. Absolute Idealism recalls the Platonic theory of a world of *εἶδη* and the doctrine of Parmenides that the universe is one. Pragmatism revives the human standpoint of Protagoras and the perpetual evolution of Heraclitus' flux. Realism dates back to the time when man first began to record his thoughts in writing, found at length systematic formulation in the philosophy of Aristotle, and became the central feature of the Scholasticism of the

Middle Ages. The author thus proposes to pursue his enquiry into the subject of knowledge by a critical examination of Absolutism and Pragmatism as antithetical extremes which, by their elements of truth as well as by their admixture of error, point the way to Realism, the true view, which presents itself as a *via media* or, better, a higher synthesis which provides for the truth of the two extremes while avoiding their errors.

To treat exhaustively of these three theories with their variations, taking account of their psychological analyses, their metaphysical assumptions, and their criteria of epistemological validity, is no light task. Yet Father Walker carries his program through with great skill and admirable thoroughness. He is not merely a master of scholastic philosophy; he has made a special study of the development of post-Kantian idealism; and he possesses an encyclopedic knowledge of recent works upon epistemology and scientific method. The critical portions of the work are exemplary in their illuminating expositions and fair, yet penetrating, criticisms. The author's ability as a thinker and writer is shown in his lucid and masterly exposition of the development of the principles of Absolute Idealism from their origin in Kant's Critical Philosophy down to the present time. Much interest is added to the account of Pragmatism by the information given of the views of Continental thinkers more or less closely allied with Pragmatism, such as Simmel, Abel Rey, LeRoy, Papini, etc. It will not be necessary to follow out Father Walker's many criticisms of Absolutism and Pragmatism. The recent controversy between the two schools has exposed to general view the defects and inadequacies of both positions. It should be said that, owing to certain pre-conceptions perhaps, the author gains in some cases too easy a victory over his adversaries. Thus, for example the conception of an organic whole is said to be inapplicable to the universe because experience shows the organic relation as holding between members of the living organism only and does not warrant its further extension (p. 290). But what of the relation of conscious selves in the community of intelligence? Surely recent studies in social psychology have proved that *ego* and *alter* are organically related in genesis and activity. Again, the support which Pragmatism derives from a consideration of the function of mind in organic evolution is not estimated at its true importance; probably because the author does not accept the doctrine of evolution, holding that it is not yet established (p. 84).

Not the least valuable part of the book are the chapters devoted to the exposition of 'Aristotelian' or Scholastic Realism. A clear

statement, brief but comprehensive, of Aquinas' philosophy of knowledge by one who is able to interpret the system sympathetically and at the same time has a thorough understanding of the problems of epistemology in the present day is itself a noteworthy contribution. Only the general standpoint of this type of Realism—and with reference particularly to the relation of thought and its object in the knowing consciousness—can be indicated here. It is of course a view which in general idea is familiar enough to students of philosophy—the well-known 'correspondence' theory—but its detailed application to the processes of cognition contains much that is interesting and instructive. "The Realist then begins to philosophise from the point of view of common-sense. Accordingly, he understands by knowledge a psychical act or state in which somehow the nature of objective reality is revealed to the human mind, and by truth the correspondence of knowledge with objective fact" (p. 28). "Sensation is an effect produced in a sentient organism by an objective cause which it resembles; and that resemblance is not destroyed by the coöperation of the organism in the production of the effect" (p. 389). The correspondence between sensations and objects is not exact in every detail; but "though the *quality* of sensations tells us nothing of the nature of objects, it tells us a great deal about their differences, and consequently is of immense value for knowledge since thereby we are enabled to distinguish one thing from another and so to make them objects of further research" (p. 383). "Between the extensity and configurations which characterize sense-perceptions," however, "there is clearly a correspondence" (p. 385). Within the sphere of thought proper the different intellectual activities are sharply distinguished. "Apprehension is simply the process by which from the phantasm, image or sense-impression, the idea is obtained" (p. 392). "When, therefore, in an act of intellectual apprehension, the phantasm determines the idea it communicates to it that objectivity which itself unconsciously possesses on account of its own determination by the object" (p. 393). Through judgment ideas are combined; through inference systems of ideas. "The idea corresponds with some real entity in the objective world or the self; the judgment corresponds with some relation holding between these entities in that they imply a rational plan; systems of ideas, complex concepts, theories, correspond with the systematic coördination and correlation of real things; always provided and in so far as reality itself is their determining cause" (p. 417).

One who reads this book with the history of modern philosophy in mind will look forward with especial interest to the author's discussion

of the question of the criterion of truth. For it was the difficulties of this question that led Locke to depart so widely in the course of his *Essay* from the position of common-sense realism which he took in the beginning; and it was a keener perception of these same difficulties that impelled Berkeley and Hume to their destructive criticism of this view. We have a right to expect that the present-day exponent of the realism of common-sense will meet these difficulties which, exposed with increasing clearness in the development of English Empiricism, caused Hume to deny all true objectivity and certainty to knowledge, and finally led Kant, in his Copernican change of position, to find a basis of objectivity within the limits of conscious experience. But in such expectations we are disappointed by the present work. Indeed we are confronted by a fundamental ambiguity at the very beginning of the discussion of this matter of the Realist's criterion of truth. Common-sense Realism, we are told repeatedly, is belief in a world of objects independent of, and external to, the thinking self (*e. g.*, pp. 657 and 678). It is surprising, therefore, to read in an opening paragraph of the chapter on the "Criteria of Error in Realism" that "The only comparison possible for us is a comparison of things as thought and things as perceived. The realist asks for no 'miraculous second-sight' by means of which to detect the agreement or disagreement of the copy and original, of idea and reality" (p. 623). The correspondence in which truth consists arises, we are told, "when the content of thought has been determined by the object to which it is referred" (p. 625). But how are we to know *when* the content of thought is thus determined by the object? We must assume that thought and perception when functioning normally give us knowledge, *i. e.*, are determined by their objects. Our problem then is to consider the conditions under which, in exceptional cases, these activities go wrong. It is therefore not the criterion of truth but the criteria of error which we have to establish; "we must know what other causes may determine the content of thought besides the object to which it is referred" (p. 625). Now "false appearances" in the field of sense-perception may be due either to objective or to subjective conditions. An analysis of these conditions furnishes us with two useful criteria of error in regard to sense-perception. "First, we must be careful to take account of the circumstances under which perception takes place and, if abnormal, must experiment in order to discover whether the special circumstances make any difference to what we perceive. And, secondly, if accuracy of detail is required, we must make use of instruments which place the senses in conditions

in which they are known to be reliable" (p. 627). These are useful and necessary precautions to take where error is suspected or known; yet surely this roundabout procedure is not followed when we reject sense-experiences as illusory. It is rather their inconsistency with our organized experience which causes us to question their reality, an inconsistency which becomes apparent when we essay to act upon them, if not before. As to the criteria of error in memory the author's suggestions are even more indefinite and unsatisfactory. If the correspondence of the idea with the percept is the condition of truth, the Humean criterion of vividness would seem to be the reasonable test in most cases of memory. Here if anywhere in actual fact, however, it is 'coherence' which is the mark of truth. Turning in conclusion to the criterion of truth (in distinction from criteria of error), the author maintains that for the Realist it is "nothing more or less than objective evidence. We assent because we are forced to do so by the object itself; because it is the object itself and not some other object or cause which seems to have determined the content of our thoughts, and so to have manifested itself to our mind. We assent because that to which we assent is 'obvious' and we cannot help assenting" (p. 641). Moreover, what has been said of the trustworthiness of human faculties in general applies to our neighbors' as well as our own. We are consequently justified in accepting the testimony of others in regard to facts, providing we have reason to believe that their observations were made with due care and we have no cause to suspect an ulterior motive. This position of the author with reference to the credibility of human testimony is somewhat important since it furnishes him with a ground for accepting as true or trustworthy the great portion of the traditional ideas and beliefs of mankind. But to his position here one who is acquainted with the circumstances under which science has developed must take decided exception. While for the ordinary conduct of life it is a sane and sensible rule thus to accept the testimony of others, it is nevertheless an incontrovertible fact that scientific knowledge has made progress largely through disregarding the accepted ideas of mankind and adopting views totally at variance with popular tradition. Plenty of human testimony can be secured at present for the existence of facts such as, for example 'pre-natal' influence, or for the occurrence of supernatural manifestations, which science does not even consider seriously—and the continued success which attends the use of its own methods of explanation justifies science in this attitude.

The author has failed therefore in his main purpose of proving that

Realism is that synthesis of Absolutism and Pragmatism which is needed by the thought of the present. To one who believes that the history of philosophy records a genuine progress in the solution of philosophic problems, such failure would seem to be inevitable. For, as the author himself remarks, the fundamental principles of both Absolute Idealism and Pragmatism were enunciated by Kant in his critical philosophy, and his Copernican revolution was the outcome of a development in which the inadequacy of other theories was conclusively demonstrated and, in particular, the position of common-sense was subjected to an annihilating criticism by the English Empiricists. Shall philosophy make progress then by abandoning the ground thus gained, a ground upon which both Idealism and Pragmatism stand, and returning to the discredited Realism of common-sense? Decidedly not: the 'standpoint of experience' with the conception of knowledge as a process of organization and the interpretation of truth in terms of function and value within such organizing process, must be retained and progress made forward from this standpoint. Idealism and Pragmatism have both doubtless gone to extremes, each interpreting the organization of experience in a one-sided and inadequate way—Idealism with undue emphasis upon the intellectual and Pragmatism with a like exaggeration of the practical or even biological aspect of the process. Is not the 'higher synthesis' to be sought along the line of a more adequate and comprehensive interpretation of the process of organization itself, neither narrowly intellectual or practical, but wide enough to include both aspects of experience in a higher unity—perhaps an ethical interpretation which includes both theoretical and practical activities within an ideal of the Good which represents the complete satisfaction of intelligent volition?

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

William James. Par Émile Boutroux. Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 1911.
—pp. 142.

Analyse et critique des principes de la psychologie de W. James. Par A. Ménéard.
Paris, Félix Alcan, 1911.—pp. 466.

The passing of a spirit like that of William James was bound to evoke a multitude of appreciative and critical estimates of its varied and genial manifestations. Among the first of these to appear in book form are the two here to be considered. It is quite natural and fitting that both should emanate from the land which from the first received his thought most enthusiastically and most sympathetically. The Celtic vision of William James, which at times awakened but a stolid amazement among his own countrymen, and but a veiled contempt among the rank and file of German *Gelehrten*, found its intuitive appeal immediately and permanently acceptable to the Gallic mind. It was only after the rounding out of his pragmatic method of philosophising that the concretely minded American was aroused from the lethargy of its German rationalism to an enthusiastic support of this new way of looking at things. But it is James's lasting legacy to the philosophic thought of his country that by means of this vehicle, so naïvely practical and concrete as it appears to be on its surface, he should nevertheless have brought to the fore that wider range of intuitive truth which generations of German training had so effectively stifled.

The manner in which this wider reach of the religious consciousness comes to its own as a sort of *tertium quid*, both to supplement and to bridge the gap between the phenomena of mind and matter, is most sympathetically and convincingly traced by Professor Boutroux in his little volume. Beginning with a sketch of the career and works of William James, in which the intimate character of the union which existed between the man's life and his philosophy is clearly attested, the author proceeds to outline, briefly but comprehensively, the various phases of his philosophy as they unroll in his psychology, the point of departure for James, through the psychology of religion—which justified for him his wider reach—on to the pragmatism of his method and the suggestions of his metaphysical views of a radical empiricism. Then follows a chapter on his pedagogy and a concluding summary.

In the chapter on psychology we note the approach through anatomy and physiology, and the speedy conviction that the 'idea' is a unique phenomenon which physical science alone would never be able to grasp. Between the methods of strict analysis analogous to the procedure of the physical sciences, and that of the spiritualist with his constant reference to an incorporeal soul-substance, James evokes introspection as the proper method to attain a living synthesis of the views held by both associationist and spiritualist. From this

follows the conception of the 'stream of consciousness' as a 'multiple unity and a unit multiplicity.' But pure description fails to produce a science. Accordingly the physiological conditions of mental phenomena must be studied in the closest causal relationship to the conscious flux. Parallelism is accepted as a working hypothesis in which the transition from mental to physical, and from physical to mental is often so insensible that one draws the most likely conclusion that all nerve centers responded originally to spontaneous and intelligent excitations, some of which in the course of evolution have been raised to the order of true voluntary responsiveness, while others have sunk to the level of mechanical activity. The purpose of psychology becomes the study of the personal consciousness with its teleological activity by means of which it conserves that which is of interest and eliminates the remainder. The data of psychology are, in the last analysis, of two sorts: (1) the effective existence of thoughts and feelings, (2) the knowing function which with the aid of these may compass certain realities which are other than these states themselves.

The psychology of religion brings us into touch with these deeper realities. It is impossible to solve the problems of marginal consciousness, the phenomena of alterations of personality and religious exaltation, by reference alone to the state of mind which we call focal. Communication with God and with other minds by ecstatic contact plunges us into the deeper consciousness of the subliminal self where an interpenetration of mind with mind is in order. This deeper experience bears a relation to ordinary psychological phenomena similar to that which the psychological bears to the physical, but it is also more profound, and thus reveals the fact that the objective world of physical science is in reality but an artificially separated portion of an infinitely complex current of experience.

Contrary to the Kantian tradition, pragmatism refuses to make its debut as an epistemology. Beyond the fact of consciousness, which always implies the self, is the broader fact of *sciousness*, the real phenomenon of existence, in its endless flux. Thus reality is not a function of truth, but truth a function of reality. To know if an idea is effective there is no need to reduce it to its physical conditions; it is sufficient to consider it in itself since when the idea is present the phenomena are produced. The scientific conception gives me but a world of pre-existent connections, whereas the religious idea creates as it affirms. Reality is given only in direct living experience, and truth as a static factor is unknown. Our experience differs from reality, its object, only in so far as it is taken 'piece-meal.' In the total 'sciousness' which is revealed to us *par excellence* in the religious experience, we apprehend the identity of subject and object.

While pragmatism is essentially but a method, the radical empiricism for which it stands sponsor reveals the underlying plurality of the metaphysical substratum. Thought is generally maintained to be a function of the brain, but what do we mean by 'function'? It may be a productive agent, or merely a transmitter. It is the latter view which James accepts. Physiology can

neither prove nor disprove the independence of mind, but psychical research has tended to show that its independence is a fact. As for logic which opposes such radical opinions, it has no ultimate force in a philosophy which champions the passionate vision of an ecstatic and declares that logic but explains afterwards that which is first revealed to us intuitively. So long as we think only with the logical mechanism of our intellect, we are isolated each in his own consciousness, but so soon as we plunge into the deeper experience of our intuitive 'sciousness' we break the barriers of isolation, for here mind meets at once both mind and matter in the essentially pluralistic flux of things eternal.

It is this view of the eternal incompleteness of things which makes the outlook of William James upon the problems of education so fascinating and suggestive. The human will may play a rôle in the order of existence. How to develop its latent possibilities is the primary problem. Science deals only with partial truths. Art on the contrary produces reality whenever it makes itself manifest. Pedagogy is an art using science with intelligence and freedom for the production of new truth. The pedagogy of William James deals not with ends but with means. On the basis of our manifold habits, acquired to meet the complex exigencies of life, how may we draw out the latent spontaneity which alone makes for progress? The first stage in education is evidently mechanical: the acquisition of habits. The second stage is the cultivation of ideas which not only conserve the past, but bring before us something unique, at first a mere possibility, which, however, by the proper employment of our natural resources may be made a reality. The third stage consists in the direction of these ideas toward things of value. Constantly maintaining the virtues of courage, abnegation, purity of intention, perseverance and good will, we must be always in pursuit of the new order, an ideal worthy of the name. Such is life, a continuous and ever stimulating problem which unrolls before us in response to the promptings of our inmost will for change.

James proposes no new system of philosophy, indeed, the conception of radical empiricism which he advances is essentially anti-systematic. Philosophy, life, reality are all constantly *in the making*, they are never *made*. 'Im Anfang war die Tat,' he quotes; yet as Professor Boutroux sagely remarks, if reason divorced from activity is, in a purely logical sense, but a series of inert categories, so too, is action when reduced to a pure concept but a blind and meaningless change. It is only as the two are given together in experience that they interpenetrate and render meaningful and in a true sense progressive the constant passage of the eternal flux.

In M. Ménard's volume we have a convenient summary for French readers of the fundamental principles which James has laid down in his larger work on psychology. On the whole the author has accomplished his task with care and intelligence, although at least one of his compatriots¹ has doubted whether the result is worth the effort expended upon it. In a land where the writings

¹ F. Mentré in *Revue de philosophie*, 11^e année, 1911, pp. 93-94.

of James have been so much read and discussed, one may indeed doubt the value of a work which, while bearing the stamp of sincere discipleship, lacks the breadth of real constructive criticism. M. Ménard has read his Bergson, and is inclined to see the principles of James through Bergsonian glasses. In attempting to point out the frequent similarity in the views of these two philosophers, he is apt to apply a Bergsonian interpretation where it is not entirely justifiable. For instance, he reads directly into James's presentation of psycho-physical parallelism the Bergsonian doctrine of time and space. In James's doctrine of the conscious flow he sees Bergson's consciousness of pure time getting itself externalised in spatial form as physiological process. This same doctrine also affords the explanation for spontaneity and free will, which, to be sure, James accepts but does not attempt to explain on psychological grounds. The Bergsonian interpretation is important, no doubt, and its relevance in this place is unquestioned, but in his application of it M. Ménard is inclined to lose sight of the fact that James's *Principles* is a collection of relatively systematic psychological discussions in which metaphysical problems, although occasionally mentioned, are consistently passed over as inappropriate to a psychological treatise.

The central feature of M. Ménard's work consists in an attempt to show the consequences of James's psychology with respect to the possibilities of scientific procedure in this field. James's arguments against the atomistic conception of the Wundtian school are carefully studied. Accepting James's postulate that consciousness is continuous rather than discrete, Ménard reaches the conclusion that psychological analysis is impossible, and therefore a quantitative treatment—the *sine qua non* of science—out of the question. Since nothing permanent can be postulated in psychology, we are limited to a descriptive treatment supplemented by such borrowed assistance as may be obtained from physiological hypotheses and experimental results, on the one hand, and a study of the physical conditions of sensation and reaction, on the other. The result is not an independent science.

This conclusion is no doubt fairly evident, but had the author been better acquainted with the recent advance in modern psychology in its attack upon the nature of those 'feelings of relation' and 'tendency' to which James ascribed so fundamental an importance, and which, because of their inherent vagueness, M. Ménard regards as the principal stumbling block to a scientific analysis of mind, he would have realised that a scientific analysis, and even a psychic causality, are quite among the possibilities of modern psychology, even though a mathematical treatment of the phenomena is still a problem for the future.

It was of high importance to emphasise strongly, as James and Bergson have done, the totally different character of the psychic data from those of the objective sciences. It is becoming increasingly evident to many psychologists that the rigid postulate of Wundt regarding psychological procedure has not been as fruitful as it was expected to be. The problems of the 'exact' psychologists have been largely concerned with externals on the borderland

of physics and physiology, while the larger problems, both practical and theoretical, have been persistently ruled out of the laboratories as unfit for scientific treatment. It was denied that they could be scientifically handled because they could not be subjected to exact experimental measurement. We are now in the midst of a striking reaction against this point of view. The practical problems are being attacked everywhere as problems of education, behavior, and the like. The theoretical problems, too, have recently been brought into the laboratory and successfully dealt with as problems of systematic introspection by Külpe and his pupils, and by Binet, Woodworth and others. But the question of psychological method has yet to be thoroughly worked out. The Wundtian method was definite and clear cut, modeled as it was on physico-mathematical principles. The more advanced methods are frankly tentative and incomplete.

To put the question quite simply, we may affirm a body of purely psychological phenomena which *demand*s scientific treatment. Equally, we may deny that science, in the broadest sense, can work alone with mathematical formulæ. The descriptive stage precedes the exact stage in every science. This stage necessarily involves analysis, and analysis involves classification. The logical outcome of classification is an irreducible element. The objection to psychological elements has been that they are not *real*. It apparently does not occur to the critics of psychological analysis that the elements of the chemist are perhaps not *real*, nor even necessarily irreducible, as has been evident in the successive pushing back from molecule to atom, and from atom to corpuscle.

It is, indeed, doubtful, in the light of modern research, if the conscious complex is reducible to sensational elements as was formerly held. But this by no means prevents the search for other elements of a different nature to supplement or even displace those of the early associationists. My own conclusion is that psychology may be no less a pure and independent science because its methods are as yet uncertain, and its results incomplete. It was the lasting merit of William James, the psychologist, that he insisted on a broad and catholic tolerance in his presentation of the problems and guiding principles of the young science, and that he denied the ultimate value of a narrow objective treatment. I do not find in my reading of the *Principles* any indications of lack of faith in man's ability to handle psychological problems in a true scientific spirit.

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The Individual and Society, or Psychology and Sociology. By JAMES MARK BALDWIN. Boston, Richard G. Badger, 1911.—pp. 210.

Those who are familiar with Professor Baldwin's earlier writings will find in this latest volume little that is new, it being only, as the author himself tells us, "in a sense a sort of popular resumé" of his own larger and more reasoned works.

The two most fundamental doctrines of the book are brought out clearly

in the first two chapters: (1) It is essential to distinguish between various modes of collective life,—(a) “the instinctive or gregarious group” which is biologically determined and is based on inherited tendencies, (b) “the spontaneous or plastic group” which is determined by feeling and impulse and is based on social heredity, on learning and imitation, and (c) “the reflective or social group proper” which is determined by intelligence and is based on reasoned motives and ideals. Only this last form of organization is social in the true sense of the word. “Every social situation is constituted by the thinking and acting of certain individuals, in varying degrees and sorts of co-operation or opposition constituting the social relationship” (p. 29). The key for the interpretation of social phenomena, therefore, must in every case be found not in biology but in psychology. (2) The sociological unit is not the ‘single person’ but the ‘socius’; “the social relation is in all cases *intrinsic to the life, interests, and purposes of the individual*” (p. 28). The normal development of the individual, therefore, inevitably brings him into essential solidarity with his fellows. In reply to the question, what in that case still remains true of individualism, Chapter III, “Competition and Individualism,” tells us that “growing solidarity results in a cessation or diminution of individualism” (p. 82),—a careless statement of the fact, more accurately expressed in other chapters, that with growing solidarity *mere* individualism, in the sense of an atomistic self-reference inevitably wanes. Not only does the intensity of the biological struggle for existence diminish, but its point of incidence is shifted. “It is now a struggle between groups, not one between individuals” (p. 83); “the organized whole faces the competition with other wholes of interest or utility” (p. 115). The discussions in Chapters IV and VI concerning the principles that underlie the social institutions of school, state, and church, and those involved in business organization, aim to illustrate the fact that the traditional contrast between individual and social interest is artificial and mistaken. Collectivist theory must not be carried to the extreme, as it is, for example, in the case of Socialism; nor must individualistic doctrine, as it is, for example, in such theories of religion as that of Professor James, in which the unique personal and subjective aspect is overemphasized and the fact is disregarded that “the religious experience is normally developed within the control of social and moral motives,” and that “the religious spirit seeks social embodiment and normally finds it” (p. 142). Believing, then, that the motive to individualism is not entirely subverted, the author devotes a chapter, “Social Invention and Progress,” in pointing out how it enters into that continuous and coherent social movement called progress. Natural selection cannot secure progress but only “preserve and extend the group in which a social type is present”; “the type that is worth selecting and extending arises *within* the group by processes of internal organization” (p. 148). Social progress depends upon the psychological factor of invention, upon the fact that man has imagination as well as perception, thought as well as mere recognition, ideals as well as sentiment for the actual. All advance in knowledge and in science, as the *Genetic Logic* has shown us in such careful detail,

rests on schemata, on processes of experimentation, on hypotheses or proposals suggested by the imagination. Society pares down and refines the novelties suggested by original minds and thus gives them entrance into the domain of the socially selected and accepted; "then the individuals of successive generations receive them by social inheritance and reinforce them in turn" (p. 155). Whatever tends to disturb this concurrence of the individualistic and collectivistic factors, "this oneness of ideal and aim, marks retrogression, since it tends to mutilate the individual by separating him from the social body, or to destroy society by depriving it of its original minds" (p. 156). In conclusion, Chapter VII outlines the various problems which divide Social Science into its various fields, an account based on the article "Social Science" in the author's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology.

Thus, Professor Baldwin has presented in an interesting and suggestive way the important truth that society and the individual are not two separate forces that make "grudging concessions each to the other," but "two sides of a growing organic whole, in which the welfare and advance of the one ministers to the welfare and progress of the other" (p. 170). This itself, however, implies the fallacy of the contention, referred to above, that there is "a sphere of direct competition, a struggle for existence, between groups of individuals, communities, states, etc., and war is its most evident method of settlement" (p. 115). There can be no hard and fast line between groups of individuals any more than between one individual and other individuals or society in general. The principle of rationality and of self-consciousness is a principle of universality. It was just by shutting himself up against the outside world in his self-sufficiency, that the Stoic came to recognize that he was a citizen of the world; and just in so far as Christian and Buddhist attained to a knowledge of the self, were they led to see that all men are kin and that war, therefore, is at best a form of suicide. Environment, geography, need for food, etc., must be reckoned with in the interpretation of social phenomena and of the facts of human history, but such factors, or the struggle for existence, are inadequate for our understanding of the relations, not only of individuals, but also of groups of individuals. Underlying all such relations, including war, are, I dare say, such psychological motives as religion, honor, ambition, revenge, and self-enlargement.

Professor Baldwin has also done well again to insist on the unique character of the self and the 'socius.' The self is not an object among other objects or society, a compound composed of such atoms or elements; nor can the self properly be conceived as analogous to a living cell or society as an organism. Almost a century ago, Hegel insisted that society could be adequately interpreted only by transcending the principles of natural and of biological science and employing the categories of cognition, volition, and self-consciousness. And yet the very persons who have been freest in the use of the epithets 'a priori' and 'mere speculation' have, in coming to the social sciences from their more familiar fields of physics, mechanics, chemistry, and biology, introduced such terms as 'static,' 'dynamic,' 'equilibrium,' 'adaptation,' 'organ-

ism,' etc., all of which suggest misleading analogies and lead to, as well as result from, false interpretations of social phenomena. That enormous interest in biological evolution which led to the biological invasions of the fields of logic, ethics, religion, æsthetics, and psychology, as well as of sociology, ought itself to have shown the necessity of adjusting categories to subject-matter and the fallacy of interpreting the higher in terms of the lower. The very fact that something has a place within a developmental process, tells us not only that it has *grown out* of its antecedents but also that it has *outgrown* them. It follows, as a corollary, that everything must be explained in terms of the specific and unique level of development that it occupies. To interpret society in terms of physics or chemistry or even of biology, must, therefore, inevitably give us an inadequate and distorted view of it. It is, I think, Professor Baldwin's genetic point of view and his philosophical insight, rather than the fact that he happens to be a psychologist, that leads him to insist that social science must in all cases allow and demand a psychological interpretation of its data. In insisting, however, as he does, that whatever exists at any given level 'shows' and that we must not transcend in our explanations these actually appearing factors, he seems to be doing violence to the teleological basis of his treatment and to the most essential characteristics of development. Unless we somehow take into account a final cause or end that is operative throughout the entire process, (1) we have no principle by which to determine the selection or the arrangement of the various levels; (2) we have no principle of intelligibility for the process as a whole but merely descriptions of various so-called levels; and (3) we are tempted to regard the later stages as having merely more or additional characteristics instead of as having genuinely and absolutely transformed all that has preceded. And to this temptation Professor Baldwin succumbs when he represents the genetic movement by the diagram of two diverging lines and tells us that the added spaces "show the increased area of facts and principles peculiar to each mode beyond those of the preceding" (p. 51). While it is recognized that the control of intelligence in man over "the play of brute biological forces" "is seldom quite lacking," we are nevertheless told that if we resort to a biological interpretation of collective life at all, we "should restrict its application to those facts of the social life in which instinct operates with least complication from psychological functions, and in which there is present no interference due to intelligent restraint and choice" (p. 53). We should be far safer, I think, in maintaining with Green that man has no mere 'animal' instincts or impulses but that his whole life is genuinely transformed, to a greater or less extent, by the principle of reason or intelligence that differentiates him from the brute creation.

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Die unendlichen Modi bei Spinoza. Von ELISABETH SCHMITT. Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1910.—pp. viii, 136.

In this monograph we have an admirable study of one of the most obscure and difficult features of Spinoza's philosophy. The various interpretations which have been made of the doctrine of infinite modes may be reduced, Frl. Schmitt thinks, to three: that of Camerer; that of Rivaud and Wenzel; and the interpretation adopted by most of the earlier students of Spinoza, which conceives the infinite mode as the infinite totality of the particular modes. Each of these interpretations contains something of truth. But all fail in one important respect: they describe the more or less external properties of the infinite mode without determining its essential nature; and for this reason they fail to show how it can be the common element in the particular modes, or their cause, or their infinite totality. To remedy this defect is the chief purpose of Frl. Schmitt's penetrating and exhaustive study.

The doctrine of infinite modes appears in the earliest portions of the *Short Treatise*, and its development continues throughout the rest of Spinoza's life. It is worked out much more fully for the attribute of extension than for that of thought. This is due partly to the fact that Spinoza never quite frees himself from the tendency to make thought dependent upon extension. To the last, the human mind is described as the idea of the essence of the body. And from this point of view it would seem that if you can show that the particular human body proceeds necessarily from the nature of the attribute of thought, you have accounted for the human mind as well. The essence of a particular body is a certain proportion of motion and rest. Spinoza declares, however, that not only the essence, but also the existence, of particular bodies is derived from motion and rest; and further, that if there were in extension nothing but motion or nothing but rest, there could be no particular things. "But how is it that the nature of . . . this pair of opposites gives the possibility of an infinite specialization?" (p. 50). Frl. Schmitt suggests the following explanation. Motion and rest are not absolute opposites, but pass over into each other through an infinite number of intermediate grades. They are the two poles of an intensive reality or force. The infinite mode is a real being, whose essence involves the possibility of an infinite number of quantitatively different modifications. But since whatever in God is possible is also actual, these possibilities must be realized. The infinite mode is thus the cause of the existence, as well as of the essence, of particular things. It is essentially an infinite activity, an infinite *potentia suum esse conservandi et operandi*. And by virtue of this nature it is the principle of specialization, the ground of all particular existence.

Now particular bodies, as proceeding from the infinite mode, would be eternal and unchangeable, as *it* is, but actual bodies are transitory and changeable. To meet this difficulty Spinoza introduces the distinction (in the *De Intellectus Emendatione*) between simple and compound bodies. Simple bodies combine to form compounds or 'individuals.' The individual is a whole of parts whose mutual relations of motion and rest are governed by a

unitary law; and this law is the essence of the individual. The number of parts may increase or decrease, and if this change exceeds certain limits the individual perishes. Hence while the simple modes of motion and rest are changeless and eternal, compound modes (particular bodies) are changeable and transitory.

Just as simple bodies combine to form individuals, so individuals may combine, under a unitary law, to form a larger individual. Larger individuals unite to form still larger ones, till at length, as Spinoza says, we have "the whole of nature as one individual." This supreme individual is infinite. Also, unlike the lesser ones, it is eternal and essentially unchangeable: for since it is the whole of nature, the only changes of which it admits are rearrangements of the simple and compound bodies within it; and these changes, being subject to the law of the whole, do not affect its essence. In this 'whole of nature' we have a new kind of infinite mode. In *Epistle 64* and in the *Ethics*, I, 23, Spinoza explicitly recognizes two grades of infinite mode, one proceeding directly from the attribute, and the other from an infinite modification. For extension the infinite mode of the first rank is motion and rest; the 'whole of nature' is the infinite mode of the second rank. But it is necessary to show that the second, both in its essence and in its existence, follows from the first. Spinoza does not actually furnish the proof, but Fr. Schmitt supplies the lack by an admirable bit of interpretation (pp. 92 f.). The infinite mode of motion and rest (the first infinite mode) must, from its very nature, manifest itself eternally in all the many different degrees of intensity which can be distinguished between its opposite poles. Now in this form of its existence (*i. e.*, as totality of all possible proportions of motion and rest) it is still infinite quantity of motion and rest, governed by a single law; and it is still a unity, "since its parts are distinguished from it only modally. But these characteristics . . . are preserved in a form so changed that the mode in this *Daseinsweise* can and must be regarded as a distinct total-modification of itself, *i. e.*, as a *second infinite eternal mode, following from the first*. In the first, quantity and its law were an indistinguishable unity; in the second, total quantity and total law form a systematic whole of an infinite multiplicity of simple bodies and special laws, which act upon one another according to the law of the whole," but in ever-changing ways.

Thus we can see how the second infinite mode is related to the first. But the more important problem, how the first proceeds from the attribute, is left unsolved. From the nature of the attribute of extension it follows that the mode must be infinite and eternal, but that it is motion and rest we learn "not from the nature of its assigned cause, but only from experience" (p. 97). Nor is the gap between attribute and infinite mode filled in the case of thought. Here the infinite mode of the first rank is infinite intellect. It is not deduced from the nature of thought, though Spinoza's doctrine of God's omniscience serves somewhat to hide the gap. In general the doctrine of infinite modes is less fully worked out for thought than for extension. In the *Short Treatise* infinite intellect is conceived chiefly as the systematic connection of all the

finite modes of thought. In the *Ethics*, however, it seems sometimes to be regarded as having causal efficacy. If the parallelism between thought and extension were carried out perfectly, infinite intellect would have to be conceived as the opposition of conscious and unconscious (or sub-conscious), as an infinite intensive potency, which manifests itself in all the different degrees between consciousness and unconsciousness and which thus by its very nature contains the necessity of infinite specialization. Occasionally Spinoza seems about to say something of this sort; but it is only vaguely suggested. Ideas are never explicitly described as definite proportions of consciousness and sub-consciousness, but always as ideas of the essences of bodies.

The distinction between two kinds of infinite mode is not clearly indicated in the case of thought. In the *Ethics* the *idea Dei* comes nearest to being what we should expect for the second infinite mode, but ordinarily Spinoza seems to identify it with infinite intellect. Frl. Schmitt is inclined, however, to interpret the *facies totius universi* of Epistle 64 as including the second infinite mode both for thought and for extension. Spinoza is justified in employing the term thus, because "all modes of the different attributes (if we abstract from the attributive coloring) are really the same metaphysical being," one and the same *Urmodus*. In the phrase *facies totius universi* "the moment of order, of conformity to law, is emphasized, and this must actually be identical in all the attributes" (p. 116).

Frl. Schmitt's exhaustive study makes it clear that the conception of infinite modes is an integral part of Spinoza's philosophy from the beginning to the end, and that he was continually at work upon it. But why is it, she asks, that a doctrine which the philosopher himself evidently regarded as highly important should be given to us only in hints and fragments? The answer must be found in the fact that contradictory tendencies are struggling together in the system. *E. g.*, the metaphysical parallelism demands that infinite intellect should be an opposition of conscious and sub-conscious. But Spinoza, regarding consciousness or understanding "as the better part of the mind . . . and sub-consciousness or imagination as defect," could not bring himself to posit sub-consciousness in the infinite intellect (p. 128).

The limitations of this review have prevented me from following in any detail Frl. Schmitt's study of the development of the doctrine and from giving many of the arguments offered in defence of the interpretation. For these the reader must turn to the book itself. I can only add that upon nearly all points the argument seems to me convincing and the interpretation exceedingly suggestive. The book is an admirable piece of work and one which will be of real value to all students of Spinoza. The chief lack which I have felt is the omission of any consideration of the meaning of eternity in Spinoza's doctrine. In view of the teaching that the eternal, infinite mode is the ground of temporal things, it seems desirable that there should be some discussion of the way in which Spinoza conceived the relation of time and eternity.

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The Mystical Element in Hegel's Early Theological Writings. By GEORGE PLIMPTON ADAMS. Berkeley, The University Press, 1910.—pp. 67-102.

This pamphlet constitutes the fourth number of the second volume of the University of California Publications in Philosophy. It is devoted to a study of the development of Hegel's thought during the decade from 1790 to 1800, and it is based upon the collection of Hegel's early writings made by Dr. Herman Nohl in the volume entitled *Hegel's theologische Jugendschriften*. According to the writer of the pamphlet, there was a time in Hegel's early philosophical career when he was inclined to accept as adequate the Kantian and the Enlightenment ideas of morality and religion. "But throughout this earlier and non-mystical period there emerges an increasing sympathy with certain motives of mysticism, an increasing distrust of the adequacy of the Kantian and Enlightenment philosophy of religion" (p. 70). The purpose of the present study is to trace these non-Kantian elements to "their culmination in the period of full-fledged mysticism" (*ibid.*). "There are two chief non-Kantian motives in these early writings: first, recognition of the emotional nature and appeal of religion; and, secondly, sympathy for the concrete, the historical, the positive, and, above all, the social aspects of religion" (p. 71). The growing manifestations of these tendencies of Hegel's thought the writer traces, in a very clear manner, through the fragments dealing with the religions of the Greeks and the Jews. The social bonds that characterise the Greek religious rites and ceremonies appeal very strongly to Hegel; and, in the earlier fragments, the contrast which he draws between the *Volksreligion* of the Greek and the private, personal religion of the Christian is considerably to the disadvantage of the latter. But in a later series of writings, placed by Nohl in the last two years of the decade, we find a new and more profound interpretation of Christianity, in which are disclosed the culmination of Hegel's mysticism and the background of his later philosophy. The nucleus of this group of writings is the category of Life, *Leben*,—that full, rich, immediate experience, for which the Kantian categories are inadequate and which transcends discursive thought. "The chief interest of mysticism, here as elsewhere, lies in asserting the necessity of going beyond the categories of discursive thought, of reflection, which deals only with objects, and opposing to this something higher and more immediate. . . . What Hegel's later philosophy attempts is the working out of the logic of this experience which transcends discursive reason" (pp. 95-96).

This essay is quite interesting to the student of Hegel. In the first place, it gives one an insight into a period of Hegel's philosophical development that has too long remained obscure. But, above all, in the second place, it throws further light on some of the dark sayings of the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic*. The writer of the essay pauses from time to time to emphasize this aspect of his study. Furthermore, we get here foregleams of the Dialectic. And it is extremely significant that "the Hegelian Dialectic, when it is first discovered and noted, is a movement of life, and not a movement of logic" (p. 92). To the student of the maturer system, then, these earlier writings

are not without significance; and the present study of them is very illuminating.

But one is inclined to question whether the experience upon which Hegel is insisting in his category of life may rightly be called mystical. It is, indeed, an experience that cannot be exhausted by the mechanical categories of the *Critique of Pure Reason* or by the abstract universal, the moral law, of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. It is an experience that is more immediate than are the categories of discursive thought. But, when we have said so much, we have not necessarily identified the experience with the immediacy of mysticism. For the immediacy of mysticism we usually think of as an immediacy that transcends all mediation; and it is not clear that Hegel has in mind such an immediacy. If the identification is to be made, therefore, it would seem that a more detailed justification of it is necessary. This demand becomes all the more emphatic, when we recall the nature of the immediacy that is worked out in the *Phenomenology* and the *Encyclopædia*. For here we find that immediacy is the result of an elaborate process of mediation and that an unmediated immediacy is fundamentally erroneous. And, in the light of this fact, we are led to suspect that the immediacy of *Leben*, even at this early period in Hegel's development, means for him something more than mystical intuition.

Again, the writer of the essay is sometimes inclined to speak as if the younger Hegel were more faithful to experience than was the Hegel of maturer years. "Needless to say, the later Hegel became enmeshed in a metaphysical web of his own, and did not remain true to these more modest yet more significant intuitions of his youth" (p. 75). This way, however, danger lies. The notion that Hegel deserted experience in the *Encyclopædia* seems to me completely erroneous. It is interesting to have disclosed to us the fact that the hold of the younger Hegel on experience led to his break with the Kantian and Enlightenment philosophy; but we should never forget that the Hegel of later years was just as faithful to experience. If the Dialectic had its birth in the historical and concrete, it seems certain that it never lost its birth-right.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

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A Beginner's History of Philosophy. By HERBERT ERNEST CUSHMAN. Vol. II. Modern Philosophy. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911.—pp. xvii, 377.

Not a great deal more needs to be added to the account of Professor Cushman's first volume which appeared in a recent number of the REVIEW. The same pedagogical treatment which constitutes the chief claim to attention on the part of the former volume is attempted also in dealing with the modern period; and while in the nature of the case the proportion of space given to the general progress of civilization has here to be decreased considerably in the interest of the presentation of systems, there still remains a sufficient difference of emphasis to justify the book as an addition to the texts now in the field. Both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, which chiefly give

occasion for the special merits of the plan, receive a pretty satisfactory treatment, though the tendency is more generally apparent than in Vol. I to be a little too encyclopedic. In view of the difficulty of the task, Professor Cushman seems to me most successful in the endeavor to convey a sense of the continued and all-important interpenetration of the scientific motive in modern thought. The latter part of the book, beginning with the chapter on the German Idealists, I should consider the least adequate for the purposes of the inexpert reader. It may perhaps be said that since a text-book account of the Germans is bound in any case to be tolerably blind, it is better to devote to them a few pages of general appreciation than to try to be more detailed while still running the almost certain risk of falling short of clarity. But such a plan to be successful at least demands an excessive simplicity, and a careful avoidance of those highly generalized and subtle motives which come most easily from the pen of the philosopher when he is attempting a short-hand statement, and from which the amateur is likely to get few distinct ideas; and Professor Cushman does not succeed altogether in escaping this danger. The exposition of Kant, it may be said however, is much less open to such a criticism, and as a means of introducing the student to him seems to me to compare very favorably with similar attempts. The period succeeding German Idealism is still more sketchy, and there might easily be a difference of judgment about the relative proportions of space assigned, and the choice of names included. One might question, for example, whether Herbart deserves nearly nine pages to less than one for Comte, and a line or so for Spencer. But it is to be said that a book which is professedly a text book and nothing more, is probably wise in declining to deal otherwise than cursorily with the complications of recent philosophy, and so the choice of material has to be more or less arbitrary.

Of points of interpretation which I have noted, I will call attention to only two or three. The account of Descartes' method as an attempt to derive all other ideas from the original certainty of self, seems to me at least questionable of the major part of his treatment. In Kant, again, the distinction drawn (p. 243) between the conscious individual and the consciousness of humanity is not altogether easy to connect, as is here attempted, with Kant's traditional distinctions; and the statement of Fechner's parallelism (p. 359) suggests a confusion with a different type of theory. Professor Cushman's volumes however are to be approached primarily as essays in the pedagogy of philosophy. Such efforts, intelligently made on principle, are to be welcomed, and I can only repeat my conviction, expressed with reference to Vol. I, that the present attempt has many merits.

A. K. ROGERS.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

English Philosophy: A Study of its Method and General Development. By THOMAS M. FORSYTH. London, Adam and Charles Black, 1910.—pp. xii, 231.

The purpose of this work, as the author states in his Preface, is not to give a history of English philosophy but rather an outline of the development of

philosophical method among English thinkers. It confines itself, therefore, to the most general conceptions of the problem and procedure of philosophy. The book starts with Bacon, who at the very beginning impressed upon English philosophy the experiential character which it has always kept. Hobbes corrected Bacon's neglect of deduction and brought to light the need of discovering the basis of knowledge in experience. To this problem Locke and his successors addressed themselves. Their results, however, were largely vitiated by their confusion of epistemology and psychology and the consequent breach between experience and reality. This problem was taken up by the Scottish School, which never succeeded, however, in escaping entirely from the subjectivism of its predecessors. In this connection Dr. Forsyth touches briefly upon J. S. Mill's theory of matter and discusses somewhat more at length Spencer's theory of the Unknowable. The consummation of the development away from subjectivism was reached only in the conception of "Experience the Material of Reality" (Ch. VII). This discusses Ferrier, John Grote, T. H. Green, and Mr. Bradley, who is regarded as bringing this phase of English philosophy to an adequate conclusion. Chapter VIII, "Knowledge as Relative to Practice," gives a summary of the treatment of this problem in English philosophy, beginning again with Bacon and concluding with a short account of Pragmatism. Chapter IX, the last of the historical chapters, is a more than usually detailed account of Mr. Hodgson's view of philosophical method.

Though the book is mainly devoted to history, the author's purpose is constructive. He calls the work his 'voyage of discovery' and he states in his Preface that the study of English philosophy has created in him the conviction that at least three principles, all equally essential, may be regarded as established. These are "the experiential method, the fundamental identity of experience and reality, and the relativity of knowledge generally to life or practice" (p. vi). Postulating an experiential method from the start, English philosophy has progressed mainly by developing the implications of such a method. This development has followed a number of separate lines, by the combination of which Dr. Forsyth believes that it is now possible to obtain a total view of the nature of philosophy (p. 216). The results are summed up at greater length in the last chapter of the book, but the three principles mentioned in the Preface are the essence of them.

As an historical study, Dr. Forsyth's work is seriously injured by the pre-supposition with which he approaches English philosophy. He regards it, not as one chapter in the development of philosophical theories, but rather as an example of philosophical development generally. "Each different course of philosophic development is but a special instance of the unfolding of the principles, the one philosophy that works itself out in all" (p. 3). "It would seem to be not unreasonable, therefore, to take one development as illustrative of all" (p. 4). Having taken this radically non-historical attitude toward English philosophy, Dr. Forsyth inevitably falls into certain difficulties. He is compelled, for example, to treat English philosophy without reference to the foreign influences that have acted upon it. At two points in particular this

defect is more than usually injurious. He must make a laborious and not altogether clear transition from Hobbes to Locke, instead of connecting both men with contemporary Continental thought. And similarly he is forced to connect T. H. Green with Hamilton through Ferrier and John Grote without reference to the overwhelming influence of Kant and German Idealism. Moreover, the notion that English philosophy is illustrative of philosophy in general, is responsible for the extreme generality, not to say vagueness, of Dr. Forsyth's results. As he himself practically says (p. 4), almost any other period of philosophy might have been used to illustrate the same principles. Serious historical study seems almost superfluous when it learns no more from a period than it might have got from any other. Finally, it is to be feared that Dr. Forsyth has not wholly escaped the most serious danger of using history for illustrative purposes, that of deciding in advance what history illustrates. It is hard to believe that Dr. Forsyth's 'voyage of discovery' was not more accurately charted before it began than he himself knew. To mention only one important example, it is not clear on historical grounds why Mr. Bradley's conception of the primacy of feeling should be taken as the mature conclusion of English philosophy without reference to Professor Bosanquet's criticism of the theory of judgment on which it is mainly based.

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Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit.

I Band. Von ERNST CASSIRER. Zweite durchgesehene Auflage. Berlin, Verlag Bruno Cassirer, 1911.—pp. xviii, 601.

The first edition of this work was reviewed at length in this REVIEW, Vol. XIX, pp. 647 ff. As the author states in his preface to the new edition, the three years which have elapsed since the publication of the first edition have been spent by him mainly in systematic researches, the results of which have recently been published in his *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff*. But Dr. Cassirer had already stated in the first edition of his historical work that, in his conception, the systematic study of the problem of knowledge and the study of its history are inseparable. He now returns, therefore, to the examination of the historical sources in order to embody more perfectly in his presentation of the evolution of the problem of knowledge the results of his systematic study. The result is a pretty complete revision of the earlier edition of his work. The revisions, he states, are mainly in the first volume (all that has yet appeared of the new edition), though the section dealing with Gassendi in the second is to be rewritten. The length of the first volume is not increased, but a number of changes of arrangement have been made. The notes, which were originally printed together at the end of the volume, have been placed below the text. The introductory section on Greek philosophy has been omitted and this space has been used to make additions to many sections. The discussion of Bruno, which formed a separate chapter in the first edition, is now made a part of the chapter on "Naturphilosophie." Though no very long additions have been made at any single point, numberless

smaller changes and additions have been introduced and almost no section is precisely as it was in the earlier edition.

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The following books also have been received:

- Lessons in Logic.* By WILLIAM TURNER. Catholic Education Press, Washington, D. C., 1911.—pp. 302. \$1.25.
- Lectures on Fundamental Concepts of Algebra and Geometry.* By JOHN WESLEY YOUNG. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1911.—pp. vii, 247. \$1.60.
- The Stunted Saplings.* By JOHN CARLETON SHERMAN. Sherman, French and Co., Boston, 1911.—pp. 50. \$.60.
- Spinoza as Educator.* By WILLIAM LOUIS RABENORT. (Teachers College, Columbia University Contributions to Education, No. 38.) Teachers College, Columbia University, New York.—pp. vi, 87. \$1.00.
- The Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism.* By FRANZ CUMONT. Second Edition. The Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, 1911.—pp. xxix, 298.
- Kirchner's Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Grundbegriffe.* Von CARL MICHAËLIS. Sechste Auflage. Dritte Neubearbeitung. Leipzig, Felix Meiner, 1911.—pp. vi, 1124.
- Die Gemütsbefriedigung als Angelegenheit der Ästhetik.* Von RICHARD SKALA. Wien und Leipzig. Wilhelm Braumüller, 1911.—pp. 92.
- Prophezeiungen: Alter Aberglaube oder neue Wahrheit?* Von MAX KEMMERICH. München, Albert Langen, 1911.—pp. vi, 435.
- Die Philosophie des als Ob.* Von H. VAHINGER. Berlin, Reuther and Reichard, 1911.—pp. xxxv, 804.
- Entwicklung und Kritik der Erkenntnistheorie Eduard von Hartmanns.* Von NOAH ELIESER POHORILLES. Wien, 1911, Hugo Heller & Cie.—pp. vi, 147.
- Das Wesen der Religion nach A. Ritschl und A. E. Biedermann.* Von VALENTIN HACK. Leipzig, Quelle & Meyer, 1911.—pp. 56.
- Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts von D. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.* Von GEORG LASSON. Leipzig, Felix Meiner, 1911.—pp. xcv, 380.
- Le "Faust" de Goethe: Esquisse d'une Méthode de Critique Impersonnelle.* Par ERNEST LICHTENBERGER. Paris, Felix Alcan, 1905.—pp. 36.
- Le Faust de Goethe: Essai de Critique Impersonnelle.* Par ERNEST LICHTENBERGER. Paris, Felix Alcan, 1911.—pp. xi, 223.
- L'Avarice; Essai de Psychologie Morbide.* Par J. ROGUES DE FURSAC. Paris, Felix Alcan, 1911.—pp. iii, 185.
- Philosophie et Science de la Nature par Arthur Schopenhauer.* Première Traduction Française, avec Préface et Notes. Par AUGUSTE DIETRICH. Paris, Felix Alcan, 1911.—pp. 193.
- Traité de l'Enchaînement des Idées Fondamentales dans les Sciences et dans l'Histoire.* Par A. CURNOT. Nouvelle Édition, Publiée avec un Avertissement par L. Lévy-Bruhl. Paris, Hachette et Cie., 1911.—pp. xviii, 712.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mèt.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*, *I. Abtl.*: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

Theoretisches über "Gestaltqualitäten." ADHEMAR GELB. *Z. f. Psych.*, LVIII, 1 u. 2, pp. 1-58.

Very diverse opinions are at present held in regard to *Gestaltqualitäten*, or form qualities. Genetic analyses have brought widely differing results. The purpose of this paper is to make clear the different views on the subject, to discover their points of agreement and difference, and to see if any of these views can be accepted. Often facts have been introduced that had no real bearing on the subject; in other cases the real explanatory factors have been omitted. Ehrenfels claims that certain complexes appear as unities, as things absolutely closed within themselves. A melody, for example, he maintains, is more than the sum of its individual members and this surplus is form quality. His reasons for thinking so are, firstly, the fact that a melody may be recognized though played in different keys; and, secondly, the fact that a different arrangement of the same tones gives a different melody. Form quality is therefore defined as a positive ideational content which is bound up with the occurrence of mental complexes, themselves containing independent mental processes. Ehrenfels seems to imply that a melody is not the sum of its individual tones but the sum of their mutual relations. In criticism of this view it is urged that the additional something which exists in a mental complex is not an additional quality but a complex which must itself be composed of various contents; moreover, if the recognition of a melody depends on the equality of relations, then a melody is recognized because of the presence of the same relations and in spite of the change in key; thirdly, this assumption of relations is in contradiction with Ehrenfels' view that form quality is a given and not a produced content. In discussing the relation between form qualities and relations, a question which Ehrenfels has not considered, Meinong maintains that these experiences of relation must be either parts of the original constituents of the complex or parts of the funded content. Under either

assumption the nature of the funded content becomes questionable. One of Meinong's difficulties is that in the course of his reasoning logical and mathematical considerations creep into psychological description. A more difficult problem lies in the question whether or not sensations from different sense departments may be considered as parts of a complex. The idea of a temporal continuum composed of a succession of discrete momentary impressions which are held together by a form quality is accepted by Meinong and Witasek. This conclusion, however, is not based on careful psychological observation and is not tenable. Indeed there is little possibility of any satisfactory explanation at the present time. According to Meinong, relations such as similarity and difference are not perceived but experienced through ideational production (*Vorstellungsproduktion*). For this there is, however, no introspective warrant. Lipps's contribution is the contention that the experiences of relation are the result of apperception or of the direction of attention on a certain mental content or object. After discussing the theories of Husserl, Kriebig, Cornelius, Marty, and Stumpf the conclusion is reached that relations are peculiar individual mental processes. They are not a class of sensory contents but are bound up with the concurrence of at least two mental processes. These experiences of relation are parts of the whole as surely as are the sensory constituents inasmuch as they lead to reactions as inevitably as do the sensations. A mental complex is fully characterized by its constituents and the experiences of relation that exist between them. No other mental processes, such as unity or coherence, need to be postulated.

A. S. EDWARDS.

Pragmatic Elements in Modernism. ERRETT GATES. *Am. J. Ph.*, XV, 1, pp. 43-56.

In his philosophy, the Modernist is an eclectic. He takes his metaphysics from absolute realism, his epistemology from Kantian empiricism, and his logic from pragmatism. French Modernists have identified themselves with a school of philosophy called the Philosophy of Action, but in this respect they stand alone. Modernists are not interested in philosophy for its own sake. They are attempting, within the Roman Catholic Church, to synthesize modern science and democracy with Catholic dogma and institutions. For this purpose, they have had recourse to pragmatic principles, though they have not adopted the system as such. The two principles generally accepted are that experience is the source of all knowledge and the test of all validity, and that usefulness, or practical consequences, is the criterion of truth. Religion has never established itself firmly by any other means than these. Since the scholastic proofs for the existence of God have lost value, the modernists have recourse to actual experience of the divine, and affirm the sovereignty of conscience as an organ of religious knowledge. Such an experience, however, is not purely individualistic, but is also the experience of a divine impulse which reaches all men as members of a social organism. Christianity is a living and developing experience; dogma and institutions are simply the body

wherein it preserves its life. They have grown up in the past only as they have answered a human need and they must perform a like service in the present. Following the pragmatic distinction between fact-judgments and value-judgments, Modernists distinguish between truths of fact and truths of faith. Though they accept the results of scientific and historical investigations, these have no effect upon their faith, for this is a function of the spiritual life. Dogma and institutions are but symbols whose values depend upon the spiritual preparation and insight of the worshiper. One can accept that which has value for him and, without in any way compromising himself, leave the rest.

CORRINNE STEPHENSON.

Idealism and the Conception of Forgiveness. J. W. SCOTT. Int. J. E., XXI, 2, pp. 189-198.

Modern idealists can no longer believe in forgiveness as traditionally conceived. For forgiveness cannot be the recognition of the atonement for past evil by present good, if, as they hold, an act can never be abstracted from the agent, the context, and the consequences. Neither do they believe that the acts to be forgiven are those which the self cannot help, which are the unmediated expression of personality. On the contrary idealists think that the one act not to be forgiven is that which issues directly from the true self. But the only act with this origin is the act of moral synthesis and that is always good. All other acts can be forgiven for an act itself is altered as its setting, which is the life of the agent, enlarges and improves.

KATHERINE EVERETT.

On the Association Functions of the Cerebrum. SHEPHERD IVORY FRANZ. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., VII, 25, pp. 673-683.

The motor cortical mechanisms of the cerebrum and those for hearing, touch, and vision are understood and localized. But there is a vagueness in regard to the functions of the association areas. These few facts are known: in the frontal association area are located centers for speech and writing; in the posterior association area are centers for the understanding of auditory and visual speech; the frontal regions are clearly associated with the production of movements, especially those of a complex character; in the posterior association area is an area for the understanding, through the medium of the skin and motor sensations, of the character of objects; the results of work on monkeys and cats indicate that both the frontal and the posterior areas are concerned in the formation of simple sensorimotor habits. In the formation of an association many, perhaps thousands, of cells in different areas of the cortex are active. In a visuo-motor association, for example, these cortical areas act successively: visuo-sensory, visuo-psychic, posterior association, anterior association, intermediate precentral, precentral. From the first two we get perceptions, from the last two, reactions, and the second two are links between the sensory and motor ends, and between the two cerebral hemispheres. The phenomena of aphasia and apraxia show that both areas so called are associ-

ation areas. The frontal areas have a more direct connection with the motor areas than the posterior have. Studies in apraxia show this. In dementia the frontal region degenerates more than the other regions, and in imbecility it is undeveloped. The posterior areas are more closely allied with the sensory spheres. These are large in intellectual men, and clinicians locate sensory aphasia there. The sixfold association process above indicated appears complex, but it is simpler than the actual physiological process. From the point of view of this article we can understand the conflicting views of aphasia, the localization of the attention and inhibition centers in the frontal lobes, and we may see why intellectual centers may be located in the frontal and posterior association areas. It is premature to speculate regarding all the distinct anatomical areas, but we have evidence sufficient to warrant our conclusions regarding distinct functions for the hitherto little understood association areas.

J. REESE LIN.

Zur Psychologie der Systeme. HERMANN GRAF KEYSERLING. *Logos*, I, 3, pp. 405-415.

Profound thought may be defined as thought which has made sure of the truth of its assumptions by a thorough criticism. Thinkers go astray in their reflections for three reasons. First, because the ideas serving as the material of thought must be manipulated according to the laws of the mind's working, these laws or symbols are hypostasized and mistaken for objective reality. The *ratio cognoscendi* is made a *ratio essendi*. Second, philosophers confuse the products of their own imaginations with their true constructive descriptions of reality. Psychologically the two are the same. The third hindrance to our knowledge of reality is the conviction that all reality must be comprehensible, and that it can be known by the concepts already in use. But truly original insights cannot fall into the old schemes. It is recognized that many useful principles of mathematics and physics are not conceptually explainable. The third fallacy has led to the discounting of many genuine experiences of reality. It must be remembered that the old philosophical systems meant much more than could be expressed in the conventional formulations of the time.

KATHERINE EVERETT.

Die Erkenntnis der Dinge an sich. HANS CORNELIUS. *Logos*, I, 3, pp. 361-371.

An analysis of the apparently simple distinction between an ordinary object or thing and the appearance of the thing, gives rise to numerous problems. In the first place, we cannot be sure of the correspondence of the appearance with the thing itself, because we cannot know what may happen during the transformation of nerve stimulation into conscious perception. Second, the object as it appears is conditioned partly by the percipient, and to know the thing itself we must eliminate this foreign factor, which is impossible. Such reflections as these led to dogmatic idealism which denied the

existence of things in themselves. Such a view as this is rid of the problem of how brain stimulations are projected into an external space, for all objects are our own perceptions of them. Moreover, it is an advance in thought because it asks, and does not beg, the question of our perception of things. But dogmatic idealism explains objects only while perceived, not the persisting object. A better idealism explains the thing in itself as that coherent and permanent body of laws which governs our perception of an object, and the appearance as the momentary impression of the object during our actual perception.

KATHERINE EVERETT.

The Psychological Explanation of the Development of the Perception of External Objects (III). (*Reply to Prof. Stout.*) H. W. B. JOSEPH. *Mind*, N. S., XX, 78, pp. 161-181.

Professor Stout's reply in the January issue of *Mind*, calls for two specific rejoinders. First, what he means by an extensive character belonging to presentations as such is not clear. Why is the whole of parts, which is apprehended, a presentation rather than the external world itself? What relationship does he assert to hold between the presentation and the external world? Second, although Professor Stout's previous article appeared to be an account of the transition from the sense-experience conditioning the awareness of an external object to that awareness itself, he now disclaims belief in any such transition. What relation does he then assume between these two? But the chief defect in Professor Stout's article is the unintelligibility of his theory of presentations. At times, they seem to be identical with sensations. They then form a series of self-subsistent entities, like Hume's impressions, and are opposed to a parallel series of material objects. The connection between the two series is not adequately explained. At times, a presentation is a mere condition or prius of the awareness of external objects. But sometimes a presentation is identified with matter as it is in itself, or with a partial aspect of matter. At other times, a presentation is described as meaning for me, an external object, but for another, a state of my brain. But Professor Stout's article suggests beyond his own statement, certain weaknesses in psychological procedure in general. Psychology aims to analyze the mind just as any mechanical science analyzes a physical material. But a scientific account of the soul can deal only with fragmentary exhibitions of its behavior. The soul as a whole cannot be comprehended by a science proceeding in this manner. Moreover, the nature of rational thinking is not exactly or adequately expressed in terms of cause and effect. Such a phenomenon as the so-called "association of ideas" is typical of a legitimate psychological subject-matter. Properly speaking, psychology is not a science, but a collection of detached inquiries.

KATHERINE EVERETT.

Für und wider den Monismus. PAUL SCHWARTZKOPFF. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XVII, 1, pp. 44-99.

From theological and Kantian dualisms rose attempts to unify the world by means of one immanent world-principle. An idealistic pantheism or a materialism resulted, and the effort to unite these two disciplines has yielded the modern systems of monism, which differ according to their different conceptions of this world principle; their different interpretations of the identity of God and the world and of God's consciousness and personality. The majority of the monists hold to a practical identity, God and the world being but different aspects of the same thing. The world ground is an immanent world cause, and God an active God, dwelling in the world. From this point of view results an immanent, causal monism with which Lotze, Eucken and the writer mainly agree. Should God withdraw from the world, the laws of nature would become the true God. In opposition to deism real monism demands the immediacy of the activity of God in the world. Among other types of monism, the functional and developmental are worthy of consideration, especially the latter, because of its teleological explanation of the world organism. The criticism of monism in general will concern itself with the fundamental principle of the all-one as the immanent world-unity. Now, though the supporters of monism reject any world-cause, even as immanent, lest it be dangerous to monism, they put in place of it the all-substance, which, in the concrete, is only a veiled cause. Any form of transcendence, they reject necessarily, since it does not attach an equal value to both cause and effect. Every cause and effect in the phenomenal world points to some immanent cause, something inherent in the nature of the phenomena. Their reciprocal action may represent a secondary causality, but it goes back to an immanent, primary one. The world cannot be made up of a mere sum of separate objects, it must be an organic whole, it must have some inner principle of unity. This is the world-cause, which is immanent in all the separate things and their actions. If this inner substantiality of each individual is destroyed, the whole world-system breaks down. Some monists would change the individual into a bare function of the all-one, but rather is it to be conceived as possessing a certain independence on its own account. It performs its own particular work while at the same time it participates in the common work of the whole. The causal working of things requires the support both of the universal substance and of the individual. If, as in the case of Kant, a substantial world ground is discarded as an appearance, a mere form of thought, the all-one cannot be considered as the support of the world of phenomena and of activity, and these have no support as such. It does not suffice, in answering the question of the relation of the all-one to the individual, to say that the latter is only an appearance, nor to hold to a settled relation between an inactive substance and active modes. There must be real life in the substance, or the cause of the activity of the individuals would be something external to and greater than the substance itself. The final unity of substance and individuals lies in their activity. The individuals have a recip-

reciprocal action among themselves, but the world principle is active in these reciprocal activities also. Much of the confusion of monism on this point is due to the antithesis of two other fundamental principles, mind and matter. This antithesis corresponds to the inner-outer dualism. What we experience directly is inner activity. The outer material can be experienced only indirectly. This externality of what is mediately experienced naturally assumes a spatial, visible, tangible form, becomes "matter" for the directly experienced "mind." The essentially distinct character of these two forms of experience finds expression in the tendency on the part of some monists to speak of an attributive, essential dualism-in-monism. The problem of the outer and inner leads to the consideration of the consciousness and the personal character of the universal cause. Some monists regard God as over-personal, over-conscious. Must over-personality, however, somehow embrace personality, if it is to pass beyond it? It is here that the ethico-religious aspect of monism comes into consideration. The non-existence of a personal God seems to be an essential principle of a truly monistic position. The consciousness of the universal must be a sort of completed purposiveness, lacking the limitations of personality in the usual sense.

CORRINNE STEPHENSON.

Zur Methode der Philosophiegeschichte. NICOLAI HARTMANN. *Kant-Studien*, XV, 4, pp. 459-485.

The history of philosophy is conditioned in so many ways by other fields of thought and investigation that it appears, at first, to be the most dependent and limited of studies. Yet it presents an especial sort of sequence, that of the continuity of thought or the history of problems. In the problem we find a unity which bridges over the temporal gaps between systems and relates the points of view of different philosophers. Since the continuity which the problem affords is of a vital, methodical character, the history of philosophy may be, on the basis of this conception, the most independent branch of historical investigation. A problem-history does not necessitate the ignoring of all the individual peculiarities of philosophers, for many of these particulars have systematic significance, yet we should begin with attaining a comprehension of fundamental systematic problems and only work toward personal details as border-problems. Individual philosophers do not create these systematic-philosophical problems. They arise from the objective content of the sciences and from the nature of reason itself. Hegel, while right in maintaining that on the whole there is a systematic continuity in the temporal sequence of stages in the problem, was wrong in supposing the development to be antithetical in character, undeviating, and uniformly progressive. Historical stages need not coincide with stages in the development of the concept. We need only affirm that on the whole every historical stage contains within itself a systematic step. The problem is a systematic element or factor which is the presupposition at once of historical continuity and of systematic unity. Only by reasoning on the basis of the necessary development of philosophical problems is it possible

to bridge over the serious lacunæ which we find in the history of philosophy. The method which is required by a problem-history is qualitative rather than quantitative, since such a history is concerned, not with the chronological arrangement of facts, but with the interconnection of problems. In connection with this method, problems may be considered as transcendental conditions of the possibility of the history of philosophy, points of view for the sifting and sorting of historical material. These problems point in all directions, to the future as well as to the past. Opposed points of view which appear perennially in the history of philosophy are systematic rather than historical. Onesidedness results from the necessary limitation of the activity of an individual philosopher, but it tends to be counterbalanced by opposite onesidedness. These oppositions may be ideally transcended in the light of the conception of the unity of historical continuity or the eternal self-unification of history, though this is a limiting conception and does not signify the demand for an absolute history. This method of focusing upon historical-philosophical problems was foreshadowed in ancient times by Aristotle and revived in more developed form by Hegel, while the work of many contemporary writers indicates its vitality and promise.

J. R. TUTTLE.

The Evolution of Religion. SHAILER MATHEWS. *Am. J. The.*, XV, 1, pp. 57-82.

In applying the term evolution to religion, it is necessary to consider the nature of religion, its development into species as it has been conditioned by its environment, the traces of the lower in the more highly developed religious forms, and the survival of the socially fittest. The more complex systems of religion may indicate the trend which the evolution of religion has taken, but to find the original "cell," one must go back to man's first conscious attempt to place himself in a beneficial relationship with the superhuman forces of his world. Religion may not imply a belief in a supreme person but it does imply a conception of the environment as somehow personified. Primitive religions deal with environment directly but as the tribal organization develops, religion enters into a naïve, anthropomorphic stage. Instead of external forces being treated *like* persons, they are treated *as* persons and later as leaders of the tribe who were to be placated by sacrifice and thanked by gifts. As one tribe subjugated others, the tribal god was considered as monarch over the gods of the conquered peoples, and his relations became less those of a father and more those of a lawgiver. In some cases the superhuman monarch of the nation came to be regarded both as the superhuman monarch of the world and as the moral ideal. Only a few religions have advanced beyond the monarchical conception. Brahmanism has become an impersonal cosmic philosophy; Judaism and Christianity have gone into a quasi-transcendental sphere. Christianity has also tried to add rationalizing formulas in which to correlate itself with a developing world view. At present it is plainly in a process of evolution. Scientific thought has shown the inadequacy of the monarchical or paternal conception without showing the next stage of those conceptions by which

the significance of the religious life is to be intelligible. In a sense we are back with the primitive man,—face to face with nature as a whole. Religion is either to be replaced by natural science or to start on a new cycle of development. Probably the latter, for, though we cannot think of the whole in terms of monarchy, we can think of it through the discovery, within it, of the presence of personality. As human personalities, we are as truly the expression of forces resident in the whole as are the laws of physics. Man must recognize in his environment the extra-human elements, which have been termed personal, and which can condition situations in which they and he mutually react. In so far as he does this he is religious. Religion, being involved in evolution, bears traces of past stages. The monarchical characteristics are the most tenacious, but they too are shaping themselves in accordance with modern ideals. Religion, without institutions, is of small significance, but these institutions must be adapted to changing, social requirements. The modern world must be reconvinced that religion is more than a survival and that the appeal to the universe in terms of personalism is justifiable, after concepts inherited from less complex social experience have been abandoned. In the struggle for survival, the religion best fitted to sociological conditions is the one that will survive. The future will show, not an annihilation of one religion by another, but a union of their elements grouped about some nucleating conception and forming an organic whole. Christianity, in its vitally ethical and theological sense, is just such a conception. In this universal Christianity, the truths of the other religions will be embodied but there will be within them that unifying, rational exposition of a personal reconciliation with a cosmic God of love, which is Christianity's essential contribution to religious evolution.

CORRINE STEPHENSON.

L'evolution morphologique du langage selon Wilhelm Wundt. A. HUMBERT.
Rev. de Ph., XI, 2, pp. 113-140.

The empirical tendencies of modern philosophy have served to re-establish the connection between the particular sciences and philosophy. Wundt, for instance, in his *Voelkerpsychologie* has treated philosophically the formation and evolution of linguistic material. The original value of gestures and words, he holds, was subjective and individual,—they expressed feelings and did not designate objects. From the point of view of meaning each word indicates an object, a quality, or a state, and is a noun, adjective, or verb. Other parts of speech are of recent origin. The distinctions of gender primarily had no reference to sex, but indicated the dignity of the object named. Living beings were opposed to inanimate beings. The Hamitic and the Semitic languages continue this distinction of words as of only two genders. In other languages names of adult men were of one gender, those of women and children of another, and names of things without life of a third. Hence the three genders of the Indo-European languages. For number some Australian languages have no distinction, and the Mexican used the plural only to signify superior beings. Sometimes the demonstrative pronoun indicated plurality.

This also was indicated by collective, indefinite names, and sometimes by onomatopœia. Eventually this was done by abstract prefixes or suffixes. Three steps in the development of declension are known. In the first there are no distinctive forms for the cases, in the second an excessive number of casual forms express relations between ideas, and in the third the number of cases is limited to those of essential relations. Where case was externally determined the development followed the order of perception, the subject, the object, and the determination of the object being shown respectively by the nominative, the accusative, and the dative and genitive cases. The emotional elements are the points of departure in internal determination of cases. The subject or the object was indicated by accent or syntactical position. Wundt considers emotional emphasis the source of the distinction of cases. All cases internally determined are dependent on psychological associations, except that of the subject. Originally the verb had no temporally distinct character, since consciousness presents objects and their qualities on the same temporal plane with states of consciousness. Thought later eliminated the time index from all but the states of consciousness. Finally a verb came to be the expression of the thought or will of the subject. A perception of action in objective form probably originated in an emotional state. The third person which denotes objects of thought is, like metaphysical "substance," a projection into the world of objects of an invariable substratum of the changing states of consciousness. In this sense things are the "third persons," since they express the durable element of our objective representations. Voice, mode, and tense evolved in the order given. Tense is a late development. Primitive man related events as present. Then, as now, each spoke what might be called his own dialect, having expressions peculiar to himself. For that reason the psychology of language is a chapter of social psychology. Its materials are furnished by common elements, through values of words accepted in accordance with social agreement.

J. REESE LIN.

Philosophical Significance of Mathematical Logic. B. RUSSELL. Rev. de Mét., XIX, 3, pp. 281-291.

From a philosophical point of view the most brilliant results of mathematical logic are the exact theories of infinity and continuity. In infinite collections, for example, the assemblage of finite integers, we can establish a one-to-one correspondence between the entire class and a proper part. Thus, the cardinal number of an infinite class is the same as the cardinal number of a certain part of the class. The traditional contradiction in the concept of infinity resulted from the assumption that all members obey complete induction. Closely allied to the problems about infinity are those concerning continuity, and their solution is obtained by the same method. The paradoxes of Zeno and the difficulties encountered in the analysis of space, time and motion are completely removed by the modern theory of continuity. According to this the continuum consists of an infinite number of distinct elements. It is true that these elements cannot be obtained by continual division but it does not

therefore follow that they do not exist. The mathematical theory of motion employs the notions of function and variable. The effect is conceived as a function of the cause and, instead of finding a single cause for a given effect, a functional formula is determined which is made to comprehend an infinite number of causes and effects. The notion of function is bound up with mathematical deduction. In most cases of deduction the subject of the proposition is of least importance. The validity of the deduction depends uniquely on its form. Pure mathematics is not arbitrary in this assertion, for it is necessary that the hypothesis should *truly* imply the thesis. If we make the hypothesis that the hypothesis implies the thesis we can deduce nothing from this unless the new hypothesis *truly* implies the new thesis. We therefore need true propositions for the subject of implication. If we take as premises propositions which are not true the consequences would not be truly implied by the premises. This necessity for true premises involves the important distinction between a hypothesis and a premise. Rules of deduction have a double purpose, at first as premises and then as methods for deriving conclusions from hypotheses. Now if the rules of deduction were not true the conclusions derived by their means would not truly be conclusions so that we cannot derive true conclusions from false premises.

The consequences of the analysis of mathematical knowledge have an important bearing upon the theory of knowledge. Mathematics requires propositions not based on sense experience. If it is argued that mathematical truths are derived by induction, it must be remembered that sense experience can never demonstrate the principle of induction. But sense experience concerns the particular and is meaningless aside from the principle of induction. Traditional empiricism is thus refuted, but it does not therefore follow that idealism is true. Idealism—at least every theory derived from Kant—assumes that *à priori* truths derive their universality from the fact that they express properties of the mind. But general and *à priori* knowledge must possess the same objectivity that is enjoyed by the particular facts of the physical world. Logic and mathematics force us to admit a certain scholastic realism, the existence of a world of universals, which has subsistence though it does not exist in the same sense as particular objects. We have immediate knowledge of a number of propositions about universals: this is an ultimate fact. Pure mathematics, logic, is the resumé of all that can be known, directly or by demonstration, about certain universals.

J. GREENBERG.

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The Influence of the Darwinian Theory on Ethics. RAMSDEN BALMFORTH.
Int. J. E., XXI, 4, pp. 448-465.

The present generation has come to realize that the theory of evolution does not supplant, but rather deepens, the spiritual and idealistic view of life, that we need the developed for the comprehension of the undeveloped, and that intelligence and ethical purpose are only partially explained by reference to simpler phenomena. Not only have we changed our conceptions of the

general significance of evolution, but also of the processes involved. Fitness for the struggle for existence no longer means the possession of mere strength or cunning, but just as truly, such qualities as prudence, temperance, fidelity, sympathy, self-sacrifice. Natural selection means, in the case of human beings, the selection of the fittest and best in an environment which shall conduce to the development of more nearly perfect types of life. Since we are not merely products of, but factors in, evolution, it should be the aim of our education and legislation to produce such an environment. If natural selection is to have fair play, all unearned increment should be turned over to the State for such purposes as education. The resulting superior environment would foster a less individualistic and more truly social type of character. Moreover, until we go much further in providing a healthy moral, mental, and physical environment, we should be cautious about replacing natural selection by the rigorous artificial selection advocated by eugenicists. Lastly, we must recognize that the survival of the best types is not furthered, but hindered, by international war.

J. R. TUTTLE.

Schopenhauer as an Evolutionist. ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY. *Monist*, XXI, 2, pp. 195-222.

The various meanings with which Schopenhauer endows the Will fall into two classes. On the negative side, the Will is allied to the thing-in-itself or the Vedantic Absolute, and, like Spencer's Unknowable, forms the dark background of experience, inaccessible to the understanding. On the positive side, it is a power manifested in phenomena, an impetus toward the multiplication and individuation of entities and toward a struggle for survival among the modes of existence. It is with the Will in this second, concrete, and objectified sense that Schopenhauer is more characteristically concerned. The conception of the Will as an eternal striving or becoming might well have lent itself to an evolutionary development, but in his earlier period, we find that Schopenhauer, following his theory of the archetypal essences of phenomena, holds to the essential invariability of species. In *Der Wille in der Natur*, however, while criticizing certain theories of Lamarck, he affirms a belief in the origin of species from one another through descent, on the ground that the homologies manifested by the skeletal structure of various species demand such an hypothesis. In the treatise, *Zur Philosophie und Wissenschaft der Natur*, 1850, Schopenhauer develops a thorough-going evolutionism, the astronomical, geological, and biological features of which may be mainly traced to Laplace, Cuvier and Robert Chambers. A belief is here affirmed in the spontaneous generation of the lower species, in saltatory mutations among the higher, and in the simian descent of man. Certain comparisons may be made between the systems of Schopenhauer and Spencer. In the case of each, an essentially mystical and negative metaphysics forms the background for an evolutionary philosophy of nature. At the same time, Spencer's aim is to represent the whole evolutionary process in terms of the redistribution of matter and change in the direction of motion, while Schopen-

hauer's evolutionism is characterized by the production of absolute novelties, the attempt being, not to do away with teleology, but to dissociate teleology from anthropomorphism by means of the concept of a blind purposiveness in the Will.

J. R. TUTTLE.

Reality as a System of Functions. GERALD CATOR. *Mind*, N. S., XX, 79, pp. 342-357.

A function is defined in terms of its independence of its other. All real things are functions, and are real in proportion as they are functionised. All things are also systems of functions, demanding analysis, and elements of functions, demanding synthesis. Functionalism may be proved by showing the relativity and hypothetical character of anything you please, for example, of the given object, or of the ego of the present instant. Even "nothing" is defined by abstraction from the universe. Functionalism surpasses ordinary Idealism in that it is as clear in its statement and conception of the functional character of the subject as of the object. Any possible objection to this view develops into a confirmation of it, for such a doubt is one of the infinite number of partial truths demanding as supplementation for themselves the systematic whole. God is this functional system as a self-conscious Absolute. But his absoluteness embraces our relative views of the world. The plane of the individual mind depends on the comprehensiveness of its syntheses, that is, its proximity to the absolute point of view. Temporal succession is our limited interpretation of God's eternal order.

KATHERINE EVERETT.

On Some Aspects of Truth. F. H. BRADLEY. *Mind*, N. S., XX, 79, pp. 305-342.

The charge that such an Idealism as Mr. Bradley's starts from axioms is due to a misapprehension of its method. Assuming only that we must think, that is, that we must satisfy the mind's theoretical need, it proceeds by means of experiments on reality. For example, that reality is a many in one, and that relations are internal and not external, are the results of experiments. The fundamental conclusions thus obtained are that reality is, in general, a mediated intelligible whole, and is, specifically, experience. This criterion of intellectual satisfaction is more intelligible and successful than the criteria of Darwinism and of Pragmatism. How does this Idealism deal with certain important logical problems? The problem of truth's reference to an object beyond itself is solved by abandoning the abstract separation of the knowing subject and its object. The two are aspects of one reality. The subjective element in any particular judgment is the irrelevant, for a judgment is always an abstraction for a particular purpose. In one sense no judgment transcends itself, for every judgment contains implicitly the whole of reality; yet every judgment does transcend itself in that it reaches toward a reality which it can not explicitly express. The problem whether I may think a truth which has never been thought before is solved by a distinction. As a particular judg-

ment with its unique context, my truth is new, but as an element in an eternal reality, it was waiting for my discovery. To say that we "make truth" is not only a violation of good usage, but a one-sided emphasis on the aspect of the finite expression of truth. The relation of truth to reality is that of ideal aspect to absolute whole. Truth must always fall short of that perfect grasp of reality which it intends. In no intelligible sense can truth be said to copy reality. Rather it abstracts from reality. Any truth is good in the degree to which it has attained reality. Nothing is good *in se* but the absolute. This view of truth is subjectivism or relativism only in the sense that there is no truth outside of and beyond finite minds. But there is a real distinction between subjective and objective in terms of this theory.

KATHERINE EVERETT.

Kausalität und Existenz bei Kant. KRISTIAN B. R. AARS. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XVII, 2, pp. 171-192.

Kant nowhere defines *object* or *external existence*. Conceived causally, the latter is to be inferred from its effects through a sort of logical deduction, or it is to be regarded as a purely regulative concept having no reality whatever corresponding to it. Notwithstanding some inconsistencies in his usage, Kant, doubtless, held that the causal category applies to the thing in itself, or objective reality. Of course we should have to ask how that which is timeless can, at the same time, be existent, and effect results in a time order. This question is met by a strange displacement: eternity is substituted for *temporal change*, but *duration* still remains. The application of the causal category to phenomena is quite as obscure as its application to noumena. Kant gives no definition of the causal concept but takes refuge behind the vague expression of a rule. Existence, in both noumenal and phenomenal forms, is supposed by Kant to be quite independent of causality. This means that causality is an hypothesis furnished by the understanding, and by no means on a par with existence. But, as the abiding elements in phenomena—atoms, material *stuff*, etc., are really noumenal, how can we predicate causes of our transient experiences? The answer is, only in a pragmatic way. Transitory experiences really have their causes in the things in themselves conceived through hypotheses in the legitimacy of which we believe. They are the real, unknowable truth, whereas the phenomena are the unreal, but pragmatic form of truth. Kant may, therefore, be called a pragmatist. There is a strong empirical element also to be found in him. Over against the latter, however, stands the a priori element in which is included the old concept of an innate property of the soul. This has its roots in the notion of soul faculties, the existence of which can be known only by their effects, *i. e.*, through the application of the category of Causality. Otherwise a dualism results, in which an earth-spirit is placed over against the highest God. Objective reality or noumenon would be identical with the latter, and the world of experience would be an appearance in the consciousness of the earth-spirit. Objective reality, according to Kant, cannot be spacially extended, because everywhere and always we

come upon the spacially extended, and all our expectations are formed to that end. But this is no reason at all. If one should suddenly be translated into a spaceless world, he could only say that his a priori certainty of space intuition had deceived him.

MARK E. PENNEY.

NOTES.

The death of Professor Felice Tocco, of Florence, one of the best known of Italian philosophical scholars, is announced. He was born in 1845.

Professor Warner Fite, of Indiana University, is spending the first semester of the present academic year as lecturer on philosophy at Harvard University. He will be succeeded as lecturer at Harvard during the second semester by Professor George P. Adams, of the University of California.

At Cornell University, C. A. Ruckmich has been appointed instructor in psychology, and Dr. Elijah Jordan, assistant in philosophy.

We give below a list of the articles, etc., in the current philosophical periodicals:

MIND, No. 76: *F. H. Bradley*, On Some Aspects of Truth; *Gerald Cator*, Reality as a System of Functions; *D. Balsillie*, Professor Bergson on Time and Free Will; *G. C. Field*, The Meaning of Human Freedom; Discussions: *A. W. Benn*, The Origin of the Atomic Theory; *E. D. Fawcett*, A Note on Pragmatism; *Henry J. Watt*, Feeling and Thought: A Restatement; Critical Notices; New Books; Philosophical Periodicals; Notes.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, VIII, 8: General Reviews and Summaries; Special Reviews; Books Received; Notes and News.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XXII, 1: *Felix Adler*, The Relation of the Moral Ideal to Reality; *Nathaniel Schmidt*, The New Jesus Myth and its Ethical Value; *James Seth*, The Problem of Destitution: A Plea for the Minority Report; *A. K. Rogers*, Godwin and Political Justice; *Waldo L. Cook*, Fraternal Basis of Socialism; *G. W. Super*, Ethnic Morality; Book Reviews.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, VIII, 16: *G. Santayana*, Russell's Philosophical Essays (III); Discussion: *E. N. Henderson*, Do We Forget the Disagreeable?; *W. L. Bush*, The Problem of the "Ego-centric Predicament"; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VIII, 17: *Mary Whiton Calkins*, The Idealist to the Realist; Discussion: *Evander Bradley McGilvary*, Professor Dewey's "Action of Consciousness"; Societies: *R. S. Woodworth*, New York Branch of the American Psychological Association; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

VIII, 18: *Walter T. Marvin*, The Existential Proposition; Societies: *H. L. Hollingsworth*, New York Branch of the American Psychological Association; Reviews and Abstracts of Literature; Journals and New Books; Notes and News.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY, XV, 3: *Benjamin B. Warfield*, The "Two Natures" and Recent Christological Speculation. I. The Christology of the New Testament Writings; *Douglas C. Macintosh*, Is Belief in the Historicity of Jesus Indispensable to Christian Faith?; *Benjamin Wisner Bacon*, The Resurrection in Primitive Tradition and Observance; *Kaufmann Kohler*, Dositheus, the Samaritan Heresiarch, and his Relations to Jewish and Christian Doctrines and Sects; *John Alfred Faulkner*, A Word of Protest; Must Christians Abandon Their Historic Faith?; Critical Notes; Recent Theological Literature; Brief Mention; Books Received.

LOGOS, II, 1: *Georg Simmel*, Der Begriff und die Tragödie der Kultur; *Heinrich Rickert*, Das Eine, die Einheit und die Eins. Bemerkungen zur Logik des Zahlbegriffs; *Georg von Lukács*, Metaphysik der Tragödie; *Sergius Hessen*, Mystik und Metaphysik; *Viktor Weizsäcker*, Neovitalismus; Notizen; Bücher.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE, I Abtl., LIX, 1 u. 2: *Max Levy-Suhl*, Studien über die experimentelle Beeinflussung des Vorstellungsverlaufes (Dritter Teil); *Wilhelm Sternberg*, Das Appetitproblem in der Physiologie und in der Psychologie; *Otto Selz*, Willensakt und Temperament. Eine Erwiderung; Literaturbericht.

LIX, 3: *C. Stumpf*, Differenztöne und Konsonanz (Zweiter Artikel); *Johann Dauber*, Über bevorzugte Associationen und verwandte Phänomene; Literaturbericht.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE, XXXV, 2: *F. M. Urban*, Über den Begriff der Mathematischen Wahrscheinlichkeit, II; *Paul Barth*, Die Geschichte der Erziehung in soziologischer Beleuchtung, XVI; Besprechungen; Notiz.

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, XXIV, 4: *David Neumark*, Materie und Form bei Aristoteles. Erwiderung und Beleuchtung (Schluss); *M. Horten*, Die Erkenntnistheorie des abu Raschid (um 1068); *Bruno Jordan*, Beiträge zu einer Geschichte der philosophischen Terminologie; *Heinrich Romundt*, Die Mittelstellung der Kritik der Urteilskraft in Kants Entwurf zu einem philosophischen System; Rezensionen; Die neuesten Erscheinungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte der Philosophie; Zeitschriftenschau; Zur Besprechung eingegangene Werke.

ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE, II Abt., XVII, 3: *Alexander Maszkowski*, Das Relativitätsproblem; *Constantin Brunner*, Die Lehre von den Geistigen und vom Volke; *A. Levy*, Der Begriff; *Kurt Peschke*, Der Zweckgedanke in der Rechtsphilosophie; *Paul C. Franze*, Einheit von Natur, Moral und Religion; *J. Clay*, Die Natur; Rezensionen; Die neuesten Erscheinungen auf dem Gebiete der systematischen Philosophie; Zeitschriftenchau; Zur Besprechung eingegangene Werke.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XXXVI, 8: *J. A. Sikorski*, Les Corrélations Psychophysiques (avec fig.); *G. Milhaud*, La Définition du Hasard de Cournot; *G. Davy*, La Sociologie de M. Durkheim (2 et dernier article); Analyses et Comptes Rendus; Revue des Périodiques Étrangers.


XXXVI, 9: *F. Le Dantec*, Vie Végétative et Vie intellectuelle; *A. Chide*, La Catégorie de Relation; *J. Pérès*, Le Pragmatisme et L'Esthétique; Observations et Documents: *G. L. Duprat*, Le Rêve et la Pensée Conceptuelle; Analyses et Comptes Rendus; Revue des Périodiques Étrangers; Livres Reçus.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE, XI, 8: *X. Moisant*, L'Individualisme de Carlyle; *P. Duhem*, Le Temps selon les philosophes hellènes (second article); *M. Gossard*, A propos de quelques imperfections de la connaissance humaine (troisième article); *M. Sérol*, Les Inclinations; *R. van der Elst*, Cours de la *Revue de Philosophie*; Analyses et Comptes Rendus; Recension des Revues.

REVUE DES SCIENCES PHILOSOPHIQUES ET THÉOLOGIQUES, V, 3: *A. Gardeil*, La "Certitude Probable"; *P. Doncoeur*, La Religion et les Maîtres de l'Averroïsme. Ibn Rochd.; *J. B. Frey*, L'état originel et la chute de l'homme d'après les conceptions juives au temps de Jésus-Christ; *H. D. Noble*, L'Individualité affective d'après S. Thomas; *M. S. Gillet*, Bulletin de Philosophie; *A. Lemonnyer* et *B. Allo*, Bulletin de Science des Religions; *M. Jacquin*, Bulletin d'Histoire des Institutions ecclésiastiques; Chronique; Recension des Revues.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XIX, 4: *E. Boultroux*, Du rapport de la philosophie aux sciences; *E. Durkheim*, Les jugements de valeur et les jugements de réalité; *P. Langevin*, Le temps et la causalité; *H. de Keyserling*, La réalité métaphysique; Communications des Sections; Compte-rendu général.

REVUE NEO-SCOLASTIQUE DE PHILOSOPHIE, XVIII, 71: *C. Sentroul*, La vérité et le progrès du savoir (suite et fin); *Jos. Cochez*, Plotin et les mystères d'Isis; *D. Nys*, L'énergétique et la théorie scolastique; *G. Legrand*, Saint Augustin au lendemain de sa conversion; *F. Palhoriès*, Bulletin de philosophie morale: Les Systèmes en présence; *M. DeWulf*, Le mouvement néo-scolastique; *J. de Ghellinck*, Réminiscences de la dialectique de Marius Victorinus dans les conflits théologiques du XI^e siècle; Correspondance; Comptes rendus; Notes; Ouvrages envoyés à la rédaction.



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