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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

EDITED BY
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141395
13/1/17.

VOLUME XXIV — 1915

NEW YORK AND LANCASTER
LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO.

1915

PRESS OF
THE NEW ERA PRINTING COMPANY
LANCASTER, PA.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY.

THE Principle of Relativity is a mathematical principle by which spatial and temporal measurements are coördinated for observers in systems of reference which are in movement relatively to one another, and by which the equations are transformed when the observer passes from one system to another. Before we can understand the principle it is essential to understand the problem.

Let us suppose that while we are seated in a room some genie, like the genie of the lamp in the story of Aladdin, were to transport the room at a high velocity to some other part of the world, are there any means by which, limited to inside observation, we could know that the room was moving and could calculate the velocity and direction of the movement? Or, let us suppose that it is not the room by itself, but the whole solar system which has suddenly started a movement through space at an enormous velocity, impelled, we may imagine, by the kick of some Micro-megas at play in the universe. Were there no astronomers or other folk observing the stars, is there any purely terrestrial phenomenon, anything which would necessarily undergo alteration on the earth itself, by observing which we could know that we were being translated in a definite direction at a definite speed? Until a few years ago when the important experiment which I am going to speak of was made, it was thought that optical phenomena observed under laboratory conditions would reveal such a movement of a system, could even reveal its

direction and velocity, without any need to resort to observations of objects outside the system. The ground of this belief was the theory that light was transmitted in a medium at rest, that is, a medium not participating in any movement whatever of material systems. The medium was named ether, and it was distinguished as that which could not move from matter which could move. The difficulty of testing this belief was the practical one that, as the transmission of light in ether is at an enormous velocity when compared with any material movement known to us, the variation of this velocity due to a material movement must be too small to detect. Were, however, our system to receive an impulse such as I have supposed, giving it (relatively, say, to the 'fixed stars'), a velocity at all approaching the velocity of light, the change such movement would produce ought to be so great that it should be easily observable. Whether the ether is an actually existent entity is unimportant. What is important in the theory is that the ether is at rest while the material system moves. Let us imagine then that we are seated in a laboratory furnished with accurate optical instruments. We have the means of producing a beam of light, throwing it on a mirror placed in any direction we wish, and receiving it reflected back to us. And now our room begins to move. Let us suppose the velocity of the movement is half the velocity of light, then as we move and the light is propagated in a medium which does not move the beam we throw out at right angles to our direction will lag behind us. If we send two beams one in each of the two directions at right angles at the same instant, they will not be reflected back at right angles.

This was the supposition before the famous Michelson and Morley experiment. It was to test this theory that the experiment was designed. The difficulty was to find a movement with a velocity great enough to show the aberration, and an instrument delicate enough to record it. The experimenters used the earth's movement of translation in its orbit round the sun combined with the movement of the solar system through space, and so obtained a movement of translation for their experiment, which, though only $1/10,000$ part the velocity of light, was

yet a far higher velocity than that of any material movement we can produce. The instrument was contrived to show a variation in the velocity of light, as small as the 100 millionth, and this was at least one hundred times smaller than the variation they expected to find.

The experiment was such as I have already imagined in my fanciful illustration. The mirrors were placed in the two directions, parallel and perpendicular to the motion, and the whole could be rotated so that the positions of the mirrors could be reversed. A beam of light was arranged to pass from a source to each mirror whence it was immediately reflected to an observer and the expected shift of interference-fringes on rotating the apparatus was exactly calculated. But the result thus calculated was negative. No shift of fringes was observed, and if any existed it must have been at least two hundred times smaller than it ought to have been, and no reason was given to suppose that an effect even so small as this existed. Other experiments have since been made and all confirm the result, which is described as uniformly, even obstinately, negative.

Two important facts seem to be established by these experiments. The first is that it is impossible to discover the uniform movement of a system by optical experiments within the system. For example, to discover that the earth is moving without observing the sun and stars. And the second is that the velocity of light is constant for every observer, it is independent of the movement of the source of light.

These are the two experimental facts on which the theory of Relativity is founded. Before I try to show the revolution it has brought about in our ordinary notions of the nature of space and time, and in the concept of physical reality, let me give one more illustration drawn from fancy to show the difficulty there might be in discovering the alterations of the spatial and temporal proportions of our universe, should we find in the theory of relativity a reason to believe that space and time vary when moving systems undergo acceleration.

Suppose that Gulliver when shipwrecked on Lilliput, instead of waking up in his old proportions, had undergone during his

sleep a shrinkage to Lilliputian proportions, he would not have been able to discover that anything unusual had happened to him. It would have been impossible for him to know either that he himself or that the physical world had undergone a change. Yet he would have passed into a world in which all reality, spatial and temporal, with all the standards of measurement and all the clocks, had shrunk to one-twelfth of the proportions of the world in which till then he had been living. Compared with the former world feet would now be inches, and an hour would be five minutes. But as he himself would have shrunk to one-twelfth of his physical proportions he would be, and would continue to be, unconscious of any change of condition in his world. Physical reality would have suffered a complete snap, but psychical experience would have been continuous. Suppose that after a stay of one year, reckoned by his former system, twelve Lilliputian years, he were to return to his former world, and on returning were to be restored to his old proportions. He would still as before be unaware, and unable to be aware, of the new change in his spatial and temporal universe. But revisiting his family and friends, he would discover a strange discrepancy. He would have been absent one year, but would have aged twelve years, and his old world would be eleven years younger than he would expect to find it, for he would have been twelve years in Lilliput. If therefore a great change were to take place in physical reality, altering spatial proportions, altering temporal rate of flow, deforming the material universe, so long as we the observers continued ourselves to undergo the corresponding change we could not discover the fact. However great the alteration the world would remain for us the same world. And there is only one way in which in such case we could become aware of the change, and that is that we should be able to compare our experience with that of an observer who would not like us have undergone the change, but would have remained in the system we had departed from and returned to. Suppose now we ask ourselves what is the relation of Lilliputian space to our space and of Lilliputian time to our time? It is clear that we can give no answer, or rather that the only answer we can give

is that on the objective side there is no relation. They are not reconcilable with our ordinary notions of the conditions of the physical world. The Lilliputian space is not contained within our twelve times greater space, the Lilliputian time is not part of our twelve times slower time. If it were there would be a remainder, and there is no remainder. There is a one to one relation between them, but only for an observer who is able to pass out of the one system of reference into the other without himself changing with the change. Observe that in this illustration I am not supposing, as in Swift's satire, that these lands with inhabitants whose proportions are different from ours occupy some region of our own earth, and that their history is contemporaneous with ours. I am supposing that their space and time are actually different from ours.

According to the Principle of Relativity a change of the kind I have imagined is taking place at every moment. Space and time and matter do not exist independently of the movements which are taking place. The earth's rotation on its axis, and its annual motion, and the acceleration of the earth's movement in its annual revolution round the sun, involve a change in spatial and temporal proportions, a change which we cannot observe because we ourselves undergo the corresponding change in our proportions. We are in fact continually passing and repassing from Lilliput to Brobdingnag, and the truly extraordinary thing is that we should be able to discover it. It is a discovery of this kind to which the experiments have led, and upon this discovery the theory of Relativity is based.

Let us, then, examine some of the consequences which the acceptance of the theory of Relativity involves. I will take first the doctrine known as that of the abolition of the ether. The postulation of ether as the medium filling interstellar space was a necessary consequence of the undulatory theory. The notion of undulation or vibration involves as part of itself the notion of a medium which undulates or vibrates. There cannot be wave motion with nothing to support it. This necessity rests on the rejection by physics, as a fundamental axiom of the science, of the possibility of immediate action at a distance.

Electric and magnetic actions therefore can only be transmitted from point to point through space by the interposition of a medium. There was no such medium known or that it was found possible to make evident to sense perception. Ether had therefore to be hypothetically assumed. The argument still holds good, and physicists will no doubt continue to speak of ether in connection with undulation of light even when they are driven to deny to it every quality consistent with existence. The argument may be simply illustrated. It takes eight minutes for the light emitted by the sun to reach the earth—where is it during those eight minutes if there be no medium to transport it? And the negative argument based on the absence of any positive quality whatever that can reveal it is met by the familiar fact that the existence of air would be unknown had we no air pump. The ether pump may be awaiting discovery. Sir Oliver Lodge, who continues to support the ether hypothesis, meets the negative argument by pointing to the impossibility of conceiving that deep-sea creatures, however advanced in intelligence, could be aware of water. The notion of a luminiferous ether has had a strange and eventful history. At first a mere hypothetical *x*, it soon became a physical reality constituted with regular attributes and calculable in its action, finally supposed to be the primordial substance of the universe out of which matter itself has been generated. It was endowed with strangely contradictory attributes—frictionless, solid, incompressible, immovable, fixed and yet strainable, enduring unaffected the translation through it of matter. Not that there is anything necessarily fatal to it in the fact that its attributes seem self-contradictory; the reconciliation may merely await fuller knowledge. The theory of atoms has survived and developed, although serious logical difficulties in the conception of the atom were obvious from the first. And, indeed, we are not free from logical contradictions in any case, whether we hold that ultimate physical reality is continuous or whether we hold that energy and even time itself is atomic. The Principle of Relativity has deprived this hypothetical ether of every property but one, the absolute constancy of light propagation. But as

this absolute constancy is for every observer, whatever his own system of relative movement, instead of one absolute ether filling space, at rest and unalterable in relation to all systems of movement whatever, we must conceive the ether to be carried with and belong to every system of movement. Instead of one ether we must suppose infinite ethers, as many as there are systems of movement, and one for every acceleration of a movement, and to suppose this is precisely the same thing as to suppose there is no ether. Or we may state the argument against the ether hypothesis in another way. If light move at a constant velocity in an absolute ether, then to an observer in movement of translation relative to the ether, the velocity of light must appear greater or less by the amount of the observer's own velocity according to its direction. This expectation experiment has falsified. The velocity is constant, therefore the ether is of no use and may be abolished.

It follows also from the Principle of Relativity that neither space nor time is absolute, each is a function of the observer's system of reference. One and the same event which for observers in one system of reference is at one moment and in one point, is for observers in another system of reference two events separated by distance in space and interval in time. The familiar and simple illustration is that of objects dropped through the floor of a moving wagon. Two objects dropped in immediate succession is an event that to observers in the wagon occurs in one place and at one time. To observers on the soil they are two events separated in space by the distance travelled by the wagon during the time of their occurrence. For observers on the soil, for whom there is separation in space, there is also a time interval which does not exist for observers in the wagon. There are no two events separated to our observation in space for which it is not possible to conceive a system of movement of translation for observers in which they would be in the same place, and likewise there is no one event which for us is in one place and which might not for some system of reference be two events at different places. It was at first thought that at least time must be absolute, but it is clear that by the principle the time interval

is different for different observers; it must be shorter for observers to whom events occur in one place than for all other observers of those same events. Space and time therefore change and undergo alteration when we pass from one system of reference to another. One thing alone remains constant, the velocity of light. This velocity therefore assumes of necessity a rôle of the first importance in the new kinematic theory.

This new conception of the velocity of light as a finite critical velocity is also paradoxical when judged by ordinary notions. The velocity of light must be conceived as a constant finite velocity and also as a maximum velocity. And the Principle of Relativity introduces a new meaning into the conception of simultaneity. Two events can only be simultaneous if they are in the same universe, and they are only in the same universe if the distance which divides them in space and the interval which separates them in time are coördinated with the velocity of light.

The Principle of Relativity therefore regards every observer as the centre of a universe in which all events are coördinated for his system of reference by four coördinates, three for space and one for time, all variable. They undergo alteration with every change from one system to another, and with every change of acceleration of a system, and the only constant is the velocity of light. Let us illustrate it by an extreme case. Let us suppose that, from being an observer fixed to this system of reference we call our earth, one could be transferred to a system, say an atom, in which life as compared with our present life would pass in some thousand millionth of a second. Suppose now that from our new position on an electron we look out on to our new atomic system in place of our old solar system. One thing only will have remained constant, the velocity of light. Suppose then that our new system of reference is such that the light radiating from the centre of the atom takes eight minutes to reach our electron; then 90,000,000 miles will separate us from the source of light in space. The relation between this new space and time of the atom and the old space and time of the solar system will have nothing in it that is absolute, each is a function of the relative velocity of the observer's system. Each

observer will have eight minutes of time interval and 90,000,000 miles separating his light from its source, but there will be no standard for comparison of the space and time, the one will not be contained within the other. Five minutes of our old system may be a geological period of our new system. Einstein has calculated, for example, that were we to leave the earth in a system of translation moving at $1/20,000$ of the velocity of light and were to remain absent two years and then return we should come back to a world that had aged 200 years in our absence.

The theory has also led to profound alterations in the concepts of inertia and of mass as they figured in the old rational mechanics. These concepts undergo an entire transformation in the new kinematics. In the ordinary popular notion mass is quantity of matter. In the new theory, the inertia of a body is seen to depend upon the energy contained in it, and this implies a fundamental identity of mass and of energy. From this it can be shown that radiation must have a 'mass' and that mass is a function of velocity. Many controversial and unsettled problems arise however at this point with which it is not my purpose to deal. But it is easy to see that the discovery which has led to the formulation of this new principle must, if it is established, bring about a profound change in our ordinary notions of the nature of the physical universe. What is its significance? To mathematicians it is a very simple matter. It merely changes one postulate for another and works out a new set of equations on the new postulate. To physicists it represents a complete alteration in their conceptual framework of the universe. What are its relations to philosophy? Are there any metaphysical consequences implied in the new conceptions? I think there are, and I will now try to indicate them.

From the standpoint of mathematics and of physics it may easily seem that philosophy has no concern with the matter whatever. The principle is founded, it will be said, in scientific experiment and depends from first to last on scientific facts. Philosophy cannot decide for the physicist whether there can be a movement which exceeds the velocity of light; whether, for example, gravitation is or is not such a movement, whether or

not ether is an actual physical existence; whether, if it be, there can or cannot exist the means of making it manifest; whether it is necessary to suppose a real ether as the condition of the formation of an electro-magnetic field; whether energy is discrete or continuous. These are not metaphysical problems and metaphysics possesses no special means of solving them. On the other hand it is not difficult to show that the ether hypothesis is more than a scientific theory. It is a philosophy. It arose out of the logical necessity of representing the continuity of the universe. It is an attempt to represent that continuity in physical terms and on a physical principle. The failure of the hypothesis cannot be without relation to the main problem of philosophy.

The problem of continuity may be said to be the main problem of philosophy. What is the kind of reality which makes the universe one? Is it the kind we attribute to a thing or the kind we attribute to a mind? Are matter and energy the origin of the activity we experience in life and consciousness, and observe in external nature? And is some mode of matter and energy primordial? Or, is mind original and are matter and energy derived? To this problem the fate of the ether hypothesis is not indifferent, whereas the ground of its rejection, and the necessary choice of a new principle consequent upon its rejection, directly challenge metaphysical enquiry. In the most literal sense the principle of relativity leads beyond physics.

An ultimate discontinuity is unthinkable. This may be illustrated in many ways. The simplest is, perhaps, to show the vanity of the attempt to represent pure nothing in thought. Absolute nought is a pseudo-idea. It is the abstraction by thought of every order of reality. Could such abstraction be completely successful it would end, not in an idea of nothing, but in no idea at all. When we speak of nothing we find always that what we are thinking of is something, and it is the absence of this something which we try to represent in idea, but the something is always present in idea, even when we imagine it absent in fact, and we are always ourselves there in thought contemplating the void we imagine. Even the conception of an

ultimate discrete reality, atoms and the void, is not the idea of an absolute discontinuity. The void is the potential place of an atom. It is therefore not nothing. Continuity seems to depend on a physical principle. It appears absurd to suppose that the universe can hold together unless there is some entity, comprehensible by physical science, supporting the influences which radiate from part to part. If the continuity cannot be matter we must suppose ether, if it cannot be ether we must suppose at least geometrical space. The Principle of Relativity, whether its formulation is final or an approximation only, is based on the impossibility of regarding any physical entity, actual or hypothetical, as necessarily continuous. Continuity is not dependent upon an entity independent of the observer. It is the observer himself.

We ordinarily distinguish two kinds of continuity, namely, physical continuity and psychical continuity. The distinction is familiar enough, since it enters into all discussions concerning what constitutes personal identity. The scientific basis of continuity is illustrated in this doctrine of ether, for it was out of the necessity of finding such a basis that the doctrine arose. Were there any completely empty spaces, that is voids, in the physical universe, radiation would be inconceivable. There must be, therefore, in order that radiation may be conceived, a medium filling space. Matter cannot be that medium, for however tenuous we may imagine its form, yet its essential character is its mobility. Ether is conceived as a medium which is immobile. It may be strained but cannot be moved. There are no interstices in it. The contradictions, logical, physical and mathematical which the notion contains have always tended to leave its real existence in doubt; but even when its creators have been doubtful of its existence they have never been in doubt of the existence of a physically real space which would be empty if there were no medium filling it. Space in fact is itself often conceived as an entity in physics. Many now suppose that ether is unnecessary and that all that is wanted for the conceivability of radiation is the formation in empty space of the electro-magnetic field. But some kind of entity which will

enable us to form an idea of continuity seems essential to the conception of the physical universe. And this entity, whatever it be, ether or empty space, is immobile and unchanging.

The notion of psychical continuity presents a complete contrast to the notion of physical continuity. Instead of an entity required to be immobile and unchanging, it is change itself which is continuous. A psychical continuity is an identity which is preserved throughout a becoming which is absolute. This is true duration. This is, of course, the well-known theory of Bergson. Duration is not a succession of states that exist separately as states. It is neither temporal nor spatial in the sense in which space and time are modes of the external relations of a thing. Duration is essentially indivisible, and therefore not quantitative. It is quality, not quantity. If we think of life or consciousness as true duration, the parts of it are not spatially or temporally distinct within it but interpenetrate it. It is not therefore this kind of continuity that physics studies. If then we are forced by the Principle of Relativity to recognize that no kind of physical continuity can be ultimate, must we not seek this continuity, which is a necessity of thought, in mind? Is there any other way of interpreting the experimental conclusion that the velocity of light is constant for observers in different systems of reference? That ultimate continuity is psychical seems to me clearly and necessarily implied in the negative conclusion on which the Principle of Relativity is founded.

When we turn from the relativist doctrine of the abolition of the ether and consider the relativist theory of space and time, it is even more evident that ultimate continuity must be life and not something which lives. Whatever may be our view of the ether hypothesis, the conceptions of space and time cannot be indifferent to philosophy. The nature and origin of these conceptions are recognized problems of psychology and of metaphysics, and the consideration of them has given rise to many different theories.

In mathematics space is taken as constant and time as independent variable. In geometry space alone is considered. In chemistry space and time are both constant. In mechanics

space and time are both constant and are represented as the homogeneous background of movements and events. In the theory of relativity both space and time are variable. The three dimensions of space and the one dimension of time are four axes by which every event is coördinated with other events in a universe which is conceived as consisting of events. The coördinates are not absolute and independent, but tied to the event, relative to the observer and varying as his system of reference varies. Thus, for example, the acceleration which brings about a contraction of one axis of an observer's system relative to another system shortens the scales in proportion to the lengths measurable, alters the clock with the rate of flow of the system, so that continuity is maintained for the observer who has changed his system of reference.

The relativity of space and time is not a new doctrine. Indeed, when we consider the psychological origin of the conceptions of space and time, their relativity seems the natural conclusion to which the facts point. What is new in the relativist doctrine is the denial that there is any absolute space and time which can be taken as a standard of reference in physics, a standard by which all observed spatial and temporal relations can be regulated. It seems easier to admit this doctrine in regard to space than it is in regard to time. There are many considerations which seem to make it at least extraordinarily difficult to recognize an absolute space if such does exist. But with time it is different. Time seems to have something necessarily absolute about it. The moving point which divides our past from our future and which we call 'now', seems in its nature absolute. It must, we think, be one and the same for every system of reference whatever other relations systems may have. This 'now' seems to mark an absolute limit, in the sense that every event is in a time order of before and after in relation to it. This is one reason why time appears to have an absolute character which does not necessarily belong to space. There is yet another reason, namely, that time considered as a dimension, unlike the three dimensions of space, has an irreversible direction. On this irreversible direction depends the relation of cause and effect,

and it seems therefore that were time not absolute we could not assert the priority of the cause to the effect. Were the direction supposed reversible there would be systems for which effects would precede causes. This is the reason which Einstein gives for holding that a velocity exceeding the velocity of light is impossible. To the observer in a system moving relatively to other systems with a velocity exceeding that of light, effects would happen before their causes, and consequently the observer would be regressing in time.

The theory of the relativity of space and time, though often advanced in philosophy, has always appeared inconsistent with physical science. What is new therefore is its promulgation as a principle of physics and its recognition in the formulation of new mathematical equations. It is, however, just this physical form of the doctrine which is in accord with the philosophical distinction I have already noticed between duration and time. Duration is not a dimension, it is not in itself either a relation of measurement or an aggregate of units, or divisible into separate parts. It is simple and indivisible. Duration is not time, intervals of time are not intervals of duration. Quantitative distinctions are external to duration, brought about by viewing it against an intellectual background or scheme. Have we not in this doctrine the exact counterpart of the physical theory of relativity? What is ultimate is the change or becoming which constitutes the duration of the observer. What are variable are the axes of coördination, space and time, by which the observer unifies his external observation for his system of reference. What is constant is a relation of these axes of coördination. It is this constant relation for the observer which makes the phenomena of the external universe identical, however much, looked at from an independent standpoint, the system of reference may change. Is not this in effect to admit that the continuity of the universe is psychical?

It seems a great paradox to ordinary common sense to affirm, not merely that our experience of space and time is relative to ourselves, to our interests, to our attention, or to our mode of sense-apprehension, visual, tactual, auditory or muscular, but

that there is no absolute, physically real, space or time which our senses more or less adequately apprehend. Yet the argument is based not on psychological and metaphysical grounds but on mathematical and physical grounds. The relativity of space and time is a logical not a psychological postulate. But when we turn to the new theory of inertia, which depends on the doctrine that mass is a function of velocity, we seem to come up against a plain and glaring contradiction. The theory seems opposed alike to ordinary experience, and to intelligible scientific theory. "It is to the self-induction of convection currents, produced by the movements of its electrons, that the atom, which is formed of them, owes its apparent inertia and what we call its mass."¹ That an immaterial particle should possess mass seems contrary to our habits of thought, and is difficult if not impossible even to represent in thought. Mass and matter we commonly regard as one and the same thing. We ordinarily think of mass as quantity of matter. Even when we recognize that weight is a relation of masses and that the weight of any mass tends to zero as it is removed from other masses, while the mass which thus loses weight yet itself remains constant, it still seems a necessity of thought to accord to mass priority over movement. We have, therefore, in the electromagnetic theory of the origin of matter the assertion of a reality more fundamental than material reality. Is not this in full accord with the philosophical doctrine that movement is original and that things are derived from movement? "There are changes, but there are not things which change: change does not need a support. There are movements, but there are not necessarily constant objects which are moved; movement does not imply something that is movable."² The ground of this principle of original movement is that there is no way of deriving movement from immobility, because movement is more than immobility and the more cannot be derived from the less, but from movement we can derive immobility. Given original things, be they material atoms or the immutable Form or Essence of the Platonic Ideas, movement is something added

¹ Poincaré, *Dernières Pensées*, p. 201.

² Bergson, *La perception du changement*.

to them from without, or else it is not part of their reality but only an appearance. On the other hand, given original movement, things are derived by simple interruption, they are arrests or stops of a movement.

If, then, there be original movement where are we to look for it, and how are we to know that it is original? Clearly there is only one reality that can be original movement if we accept the Principle of Relativity. It can only be the reality we know in life and consciousness. Physical science offers us no standard of reference which is absolute, no unit of extension, no unit rate of time flow. The axes by which the universe is coördinated for each observer take the observer as their center and vary as his system of reference varies. This system of reference is to other systems a movement of relative translation. What then is there that is not relative in this universe of relations? Can there be any other answer than that it is the duration of the universe? And then what meaning can we give to this duration but that the universe lives, that is, that it is conscious in the widest sense of the term consciousness? The universe may not be conscious in the narrow sense of awareness or of individual self-consciousness. Whether it is or not is something which by the nature of the case we cannot possibly know. But that it is conscious in the sense that it endures as a living creature endures, by carrying along its past in its present activity; that it must be conceived as a living thing and not as the inert thing we call matter; this seems to be the plain deduction from the nature of knowledge and experience. There must be something absolute, and if the theory of relativity is true this is not space and time, nor any physically real entity fixed in relation to them. If continuity is not to be found in a physical principle it must lie in a spiritual principle. The Principle of Relativity therefore has an important metaphysical implication.

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THE TIME-PROCESS AND THE VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE. II.

IN our first article we considered the way in which men's estimate of the values that are realized in a human life is affected by the temporal position of the various realizations. We commonly estimate the worth of life in terms of the four values—moral, intellectual, æsthetic, and affective.¹ These four, we found, differ in the extent to which they can be separated from the life of the individual and considered by themselves: the intellectual and æsthetic values are more impersonal, and thus more readily detached, than are the moral and affective. That aspect in which they are most completely fused with the personality is revealed in intellectual and æsthetic activity, as distinguished from its products. And if we take this activity in the broadest sense, as including such mental alertness and sensitiveness as may characterize even persons of ordinary ability, we have these two more impersonal values in a form in which we can compare them fairly well with the more personal ones, goodness and pleasure.

Now we found that when men try to estimate the value of a particular human life, the question of the temporal relations plays an important rôle. The worth of an individual life, apparently, does not depend simply upon the degree in which any or all of these four values are realized in it: their presence in its later stages counts for more than their presence in the earlier ones. If a given value is to be more completely realized in one part of the life than in another, we regard it as desirable

¹ Whether religious value, as distinct from moral, should be added to this list is a question upon which we did not enter. For the purposes of our discussion it seemed permissible to leave it undecided, for the reason that even if the religious value is quite distinct, it stands in precisely the same relation to our problem as does the moral value, so that no new point of view would be gained by considering it separately. Throughout the discussion, moreover, the term 'moral value' has been used to designate inner attainment, the worth of the personality, rather than outward act.

that the fuller realization should be in the latter part. Simply to say, however, that the quality of the later stages is, somehow, more important than that of the earlier does not characterize adequately the peculiar relation that we suppose to exist. For many of our evaluations of life apparently imply the belief that the quality of the later stages is not merely more important, but of supreme importance, so that the quality of the earlier stages seems to have been wiped out by that of subsequent ones. Later happiness atones for earlier unhappiness (makes it as if it had not been), later goodness for earlier moral defect, later intellectual or æsthetic activity for an earlier want of it. But earlier joy does not atone in like manner for the later sorrow, nor earlier goodness for the later moral downfall, nor an earlier high level of thought and æsthetic sensibility for the later low level. The value of the later stages seems to cancel or destroy that of the earlier, but not to be in turn canceled by it. Thus the later stages seem to stand for the earlier in a way in which the earlier cannot stand for the later.¹

Now we saw that the extent to which a value is affected by these temporal relations appears to depend upon the degree of its fusion with the personality. Truth and beauty, considered quite in themselves, are above the vicissitudes of time and change. And even as the products of human activity, they are, regarded from one point of view, equally secure. The greatness of a scientific or artistic achievement cannot be destroyed by any later failure on the part of its author. But our estimate of the intellectual or æsthetic worth of the man, as distinguished from that of the particular achievement, is more or less affected by his subsequent failure. It is not then value as such that is influenced by temporal relations, but value as an integral part of human personality. And the reason why our estimate of hedonic and moral value seems to be more readily affected by temporal considerations is that these two ordinarily fuse with the personality more completely than intellectual and æsthetic value do.

¹ As a matter of convenience I shall regard the phrase 'supreme importance' as indicating this compensatory function that the later stages seem to have.

The outcome of our first article then may be expressed by saying that human beings show a marked tendency to believe that so far as the value of the individual life is concerned, its later stages are of supreme importance.¹ Later excellence, men seem to think, makes up for earlier defect, makes it as if it had not been; and in similar fashion later evil swallows up, destroys, earlier good. The task of the present paper is to try to determine the connection between this belief and the problem of the relation of the individual life to the time-process. My purpose is primarily neither to defend the belief nor to offer arguments in support of any particular theory of the time-process, but rather to ask what conception of the relation of the individual life to the temporal process is logically implied in the belief.

Some might feel inclined to dispose of our task at once by the simple method of condemning the belief outright. Men seem, they might tell us, to regard the later stages of life as supreme in importance, but this opinion, however cherished, is quite mistaken. If pleasure, and goodness, and intellectual and æsthetic activity have any value, they have as much at one time as at another. The belief to the contrary is simply one of the many errors to which popular opinion is liable. It seems to me, however, that we are scarcely justified in throwing aside the belief in this summary fashion. And in point of fact I think that few philosophers are willing to reject it altogether. Many whose theory of the nature of time seems incompatible with it try, none the less, to find some place for it in their account of reality. And since this is the case, it may be worth our while to inquire somewhat carefully into the relation between the belief and the various ways in which the temporal aspect of human life may be conceived. I proceed at once then to ask how we must regard the temporal character of the individual human life in order that our conception may be consistent with the belief in the supreme importance of the later stages.

The first thing to be said is that we must regard the time-

¹ In this paper, as in the preceding one, we shall limit our consideration to the life of the human individual. To ask as to the value of the life of the race, taken as a whole, would be to raise questions which are of much interest and importance, but which lie beyond the scope of this discussion.

process as having at least a certain degree of reality. For if time is utterly unreal, it cannot matter whether the so-called 'earlier' or 'later' stages of a human life contain more of happiness; and it must be equally indifferent which stages reveal the greater moral, intellectual, and æsthetic attainment. If our time-consciousness is altogether illusory, the distinction of earlier and later is void of real significance. All that we can admit is a whole whose parts exhibit various degrees of good and bad.¹ The order in which these degrees appear to us to be arranged and the direction of this order—the irreversibility of the time-process—have no significance. And thus it must be a matter of indifference whether the more complete realization of value is in what we call the earlier or in what we call the later part.

The acceptance of our belief then would involve the assertion that the order and the irreversibility of the time-process are real. But this is not all: it would involve also, I maintain, the reality of change, of the time-flow, of the passage of earlier into later. For unless change is real, the value of the later stages cannot cancel that of the earlier. Our defence of this thesis will occupy the greater part of this paper. As a first step we must inquire in what sense we are to conceive change as real. As soon as one asserts the reality of change or of the time-process,² a question arises as to the nature of the past. To some it seems that a consistent believer in the reality of change must ruthlessly banish past events from the domain of the real.³ But if we do this, have we a conception of the time-process that will justify our belief in the supreme importance of the later stages of life? At first glance it might seem that we have. As life goes on, one stage after another passes into non-

¹ I use the terms here in the broader sense in which 'good' includes all value, not merely moral value. The same usage appears occasionally in other parts of this paper, but I think that the meaning is clear in all cases.

² Throughout the rest of this paper I shall use the terms 'change' and 'time-process' indifferently to signify the concrete flow of events, the replacing of one (earlier) content by another (later). 'Time', if conceived as an empty form in which events are arranged, is at best real only in the degree in which any abstraction is real. Our concern here is simply to defend the reality of that aspect of life that we call change.

³ Cf. Bradley, "How, if we seriously mean to take time as real, can the past be reality?" *Appearance and Reality* (1897), p. 208.

existence. At any moment then we can say that the happiness of the past, being dead and gone, can in no way compensate me for the fact that I am unhappy now, and similarly that the sorrow of the past cannot interfere with my present joy. But though the past has no power to alter the value of the present, the present seems in a certain sense able to affect that of the past. The present, since it alone is real, is all in all. Hence its happiness sweeps triumphantly away the griefs of an earlier time; or its misery settles like a pall over the fair face of bygone joys. In the insistent reality of the present it is as if the joy or the pain of the past had never been at all. And the same thing, *mutatis mutandis*, may be said of moral, intellectual, and æsthetic achievement. I am only that which I am now. If I am now sinful or intellectually slothful or insensible to beauty, the virtue, the mental activity, the æsthetic sensibility of my earlier life shall avail me nothing. But if I am now high-minded, mentally alert, or appreciative of beauty, the intellectual stagnation, the æsthetic insensibility, or the moral weakness of my past is wiped out by the attainment of this later period.

But although it may seem at first thought that this account of the matter makes room for the belief in the supreme importance of the later stages of life, a brief reflection will convince us that it does not. For what we have been saying goes to show merely that present is more important for us than past, not that present and future are more important than past, or future than past and present. In fact, the inference that this way of thinking most naturally suggests is that the present has a value far outweighing that of either past or future. Now it is doubtless true, as we pointed out in our first paper, that for the naïve consciousness the present has precisely this supreme value. But what we have maintained is that for the higher insight of the reflective consciousness the future, if we can in any way overcome the disadvantages arising from its uncertainty, has greater value than the present. It does not, of course, even to the most highly reflective consciousness, give so keen a sense of reality as the present; but it has greater weight in determining the worth of life. Or, to put the matter more accurately, in

our most serious estimation of this worth we make our distinction, not between present on the one hand and past and future on the other, but between the earlier and the later stages of a process, each moment of which is in turn future, present, and past.

It is clear then that we cannot justify the belief in the supreme importance of the later stages by appealing to the unique reality that the present moment has for us. Nay, more, if this unique reality should beguile us into supposing that only because of it has the present more importance than the past, we should be forced in the end to admit that the temporal position of the various realizations of value in an individual history is of no significance whatever. For we should have to say that any stage of the history, when present, is of more consequence than any of the others—past or future—but that its peculiar importance vanishes when it becomes part of the past. And since each stage in its turn is present, no stage would ultimately have more importance than any of the others. Thus, given so much of good in an individual life, it must be a matter of indifference in what part of it this good is contained.

It seems clear then that if we interpret change as meaning simply the emergence of a given content into the status of 'present' and its subsequent lapse into the status of 'past,' and if we suppose further that what is past is completely gone, we cannot justify the belief that we are considering: so far as the defence of the belief is concerned, we might quite as well declare change to be illusory. But is it not possible to assert the reality of change and at the same time to take a different position with regard to the past? May we not suppose that although the time-process is real, the earlier stages of a human life do not fade into utter non-existence when the later ones come into being? That in the history of the individual which *was* real is still real, let us say, in a highly significant sense. The life of the human being is a unity, not merely when you take it in cross-section, but also when you take it longitudinally. Each of its successive stages includes within itself all the preceding ones, and includes them in such fashion that they are at once preserved and transformed. Let us ask in what the preservation and the transformation must consist.

The most obvious sense in which an earlier stage may be said to live on in a later one is found in the case of memory. Almost every one would admit that what is remembered has not utterly ceased to be, and that thus in a certain sense it may be said that the earlier stages, in so far as they are recalled, live on in the later. But the appeal to the fact of memory is far from giving us a solution of our problem. For in the first place, if no more of my past is preserved for me than my memory can illuminate, it is probable that the larger part of it is gone forever. And in the second place, quite apart from this consideration, it is obvious that the mere fact of memory can furnish no justification of the belief in the supreme importance of the later stages. The fact that a man happens to remember his former intellectual or moral deficiencies in no way provides a rational basis for our belief that these deficiencies are atoned for by his later attainment. Nor are we any better off in the case of past affective states. On the contrary, in this case it even seems at first glance as if the assertion that memory gives existence to the past might furnish an argument against the belief in question rather than for it. The memory of former pain, one might urge, may mar a present joy, and the recollection of bygone happiness may soothe a present sorrow; but if this is so, the affective value of the earlier seems to cancel that of the later in much the same way in which we have said that the value of the later cancels that of the earlier. So it might seem at first thought; but second thought shows that this is not a true statement of the case. For the affective tone and the affective value of any memory belong to the moment of the remembering, not to the moment of the experience remembered.¹ It is obvious then that the fact of memory does not indicate that the value of the earlier can in any degree cancel that of the later. But it is equally obvious that it cannot justify our belief that the value of the later cancels that of the earlier.

¹ This is borne out by the reflection that "a sorrow's crown of sorrow" may consist in "remembering happier things," and that similarly the recollection of a past painful experience may serve to enhance a present joy. It is borne out also by the fact that a pseudo-memory—a supposed recollection of a pleasant or painful experience that never actually occurred—would have the same influence upon the affective tone of the present consciousness that a true memory would have.

There is, however, another sense in which we may say that an earlier stage lives on in later ones; namely, that it has helped to make these what they are, that they are bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh. In this second sense we may declare that a man's life is a whole in which each moment bodies forth all of it that has gone before. Through memory a part of what I have been lives on in me, but in the fact of which we are now speaking the past is preserved more completely and in a more significant sense. This second fact also would doubtless be admitted by most of those who say that the past is non-existent. Few, if any, of those who make this assertion mean it in the bald sense in which it is opposed to the recognition of any continuity of character and conduct.

But when we have said that an earlier stage continues to live in a later one in the sense that it has helped to give this later its character, we have not gone very far toward explaining the compensatory function of the later stages. For it is comparatively seldom that we can say that the later good exists because of the earlier evil or the later evil because of the earlier good.¹ In most cases it seems that we must rather say that the evil replaces the good and that the good replaces the evil; that the later good exists in spite of, not because of, the earlier evil, and similarly the later evil in spite of the earlier good. Now in such cases it does not seem possible to explain the compensatory function of the later by an appeal to the influence of the earlier. At the same time I believe it to be true that the later stage has its compensatory power because it is what the earlier has

¹ The instances that are most commonly given in support of the assertion that evil leads to good are the spiritual enrichment that sometimes seems to result from suffering and the strengthening of moral fiber that comes from the conflict with obstacles of various kinds. Much has been said of the ennobling effect of the conflict with pain and difficulty; and I am far from wishing to deny the deep truth involved in the contention, although it seems to me that in our emphasis upon it we sometimes overlook the fact that in a large number of instances the effect is apparently the reverse of ennobling. Be this as it may, the point that I wish to make is that when a man's nature is refined by suffering or strengthened by the struggle against heavy odds it is not quite accurate to say that good has come out of an earlier evil. For the increase in moral strength, *e. g.*, which shows itself at a later period, came not from the obstacle (the evil), but from the heroic battling against it; and this was not an evil, but a good.

come to be. What I have in mind is not, however, the influence of earlier upon later, but a different relation, which we must now try to describe.

If one were to assert the complete determination of the later by the earlier, this would amount to declaring that the earlier contains the later, wrapped up within itself. And thus we could say that the very first stage of an individual history is virtually the whole life. Everything is there, folded up in that earliest stage; and what we call the living is simply the unrolling of a scroll upon which all the characters are already inscribed. But instead of saying that the earlier thus contains the later, one might reverse the procedure and say that the later contains the earlier. In our ordinary conception of the individual human life, we think of its various stages as so many different parts of it. The whole life would thus be the sum total of these stages. But from the point of view that we wish now to suggest, the life is to be regarded as a unity in a sense that makes the whole something other than this. We can perhaps best express our meaning by saying that the final stage in the history of a human being—assuming for the nonce that there is a final stage—is not a part of that history, but the whole; that it gathers up into itself and keeps in existence the entire past, which but for its maintaining power would be dead and gone. It is only with reference to the future, never with reference to the past, that we could speak of the present moment in a life as one of its parts. My present is my whole life, so far as that life has yet been lived; it is a part only in the sense that it, in its turn, will be taken up and preserved in what we call a later stage. According to this way of regarding the matter, the earlier stage is one with the later, not merely in so far as it is preserved in memory, not merely by virtue of the subtle influence of past thoughts and deeds upon present character and conduct, but also because the later stage *is* the earlier, the earlier enlarged, enriched, transformed.

This way of looking at the matter emphasizes the unitary character of the individual life. But it should not be confused with the doctrine that the human life is essentially a timeless

unity, which is revealed in varying degrees of completeness in the different parts of the temporal process. When I say that each human life is a unitary whole, I do not mean to imply that the unity is something that is once for all there and that the various stages are so many different manifestations of it. I mean rather that it is a unity that has its very being in time. Each stage in its turn is in a sense the whole life; but each new stage is more truly, because more fully, the whole life than any of the preceding ones were.

Now if the life of the human being is a unity of this kind, it is clear that the temporal position of the various realizations of value in it is a matter of profound significance. A man's life is more nearly identical with certain of its stages than with others: every new stage is more truly the life than any of its predecessors have been. And if this is so, we can understand, at least in some measure, how it is that the value of the earlier may be canceled by that of the later. We said above that the inclusion of the earlier stages in the later, implied in our conception, involves not only their preservation but also their transformation. The transformation consists in the fact that the earlier has come to be the later. Whatever may be true of change in general, the change that characterizes the life of a human being is not a replacing of one content by another content, but the transformation of the one into the other. Now if the earlier is changed into the later, we can see how the value of the later may stand for that of the earlier, how later good can atone for an earlier evil and later evil can wipe out an earlier good.

But at this point we must pause to answer an objection that may arise in the minds of some of our readers. Granted that the greater importance of the later stages of life could be explained on the assumption that has been made, one may yet ask whether it could not be equally well explained by a simpler assumption. May it not be that the later stages are more important than the earlier simply because the quality of still later stages depends more upon them than upon their predecessors? In the life-series $a, b, c, \dots n$, the stage g is more

important than *b* because of the strong probability that *h*, *i*, *j*, ... *n* will be like it rather than like *b*.

To this objection we can make two answers. In the first place, we can reply, men apparently feel that the quality of the later stages is more important than that of the earlier, even when that of still later ones is not in question. This is shown, I think, when we try to estimate the value of a life taken as a whole. When we survey a life that has been ended by death, we believe that the quality of its latter part is of the greatest importance. And while in many cases this feeling is probably in some measure due to the belief in immortality, I incline to think that it is equally strong in those who either reject the doctrine or are in doubt with regard to it. Of course it is open to any one to urge that even in these cases the feeling has its origin in the belief in a future life, and thus that those who reject the belief are yet unconsciously influenced by modes of thought that have their source and their sole justification in it. To discuss this assertion would take us too far afield; I can only say that personally I doubt its truth. Moreover, even if we should grant it with reference to the other values, it seems hardly possible that our estimates of the pleasure-pain value of the earthly life are thus influenced by a belief in immortality. The affective quality of a particular stage offers no guarantee of the quality of subsequent stages, whether in this life or in a life to come. Nevertheless men seem to feel that, judged from the point of view of pleasure and pain, a life is more desirable if the fuller realization of affective value is in the later rather than in the earlier part.

But it matters comparatively little whether or not this first answer to the objection that we are considering brings conviction. For the second, to which I now pass, seems conclusive. The objection proposes to substitute for our explanation one that has the advantage of being simpler. But unfortunately this substitute explains, not the fact that we are trying to account for, but a different one. At the very best our opponent has explained only the greater importance of the later stages; he has not explained their compensatory function, the power that

they seem to have to transform the values of the earlier stages. Even supposing that he has justified us in regarding the quality of the later stages as more important than that of the earlier, he has done nothing to validate our belief that later good makes up for earlier evil, and later evil spoils earlier good: he has not shown how it is possible that the quality of one stage should fix the value of the whole preceding life. For this compensatory function of the later stages the only explanation that we have yet found is that furnished by our conception of the individual human life as a whole that more and more comes to be.

Let us now gather up the threads of our discussion. We began by asking how we must conceive the relation of the individual life to the time-process in order to justify our belief in the supreme importance of its later stages. We showed in the first place that the order and the irreversibility of the time-process must be accepted as real. Next we made the assertion—to be defended later—that the reality of change must also be affirmed. At this point it seemed necessary to explain what we meant by asserting the reality of change, and in particular to define our position with reference to the problem of the existence or non-existence of past events. In considering this problem we limited ourselves to the life of the human individual. And the theory that we tried to develop is that the past of such a life is not altogether non-existent: it lives to some extent in memory; it lives still more completely in the influence of the earlier upon the later; it lives most truly of all in the sense that this later is what it has become and that thus it is held in solution, as it were, in this later.¹ And it is this third aspect of the continued existence

¹ If any one thinks that he finds in this conception some resemblance to a certain view of Bergson's I shall not try to dispute the point. I shall only say that if I have been influenced here by the doctrine of the French philosopher I have been influenced unconsciously, and that I have been led to my opinion by considerations quite other than those that seem to have moved him. Furthermore, the difference between my conception and his seems to me at least as great as the resemblance. I have tried to show that in the life of the human individual the earlier stages must in some way be preserved in the later, and that this preservation is something more than that which is afforded by memory or by the influence of the earlier stages upon those that follow them. Precisely what this 'more' is it is not indeed easy to say, and I must plead guilty to the charge of being rather vague upon this point. But I cannot see that we should gain anything by appealing to the con-

of the past that we must affirm in order to justify our belief in the compensatory function of the later stages of life. For only the evil that has become good is atoned for; and only the good that has become evil is spoiled.¹

Our contention then is that in order to justify the belief in the compensatory function of the later stages of human life we must assume the reality of change as characterizing that life in the sense that we have just described. We must now ask what can be said in support of this contention. A part of our defence has already been offered in connection with the discussion of the nature of past events. We have shown, I think, that we cannot justify the belief in the supreme importance of the later stages if we assert the utter non-existence of the past, nor if we regard the past as existing simply through its being remembered and through its influence upon later stages. We have shown also that we cannot explain it by appealing to the fact that in general the later stage has more influence than its predecessors in determining the quality of still later ones. But one more point remains to consider before we can regard our defence as complete. It seems fairly evident that *if we assert the reality of change*, we can justify the belief in the supreme importance of the later stages only by supposing that the later include the earlier and thus in a sense keep them in existence.

ception of 'unconscious memory.' About all that we can say is that the preservation of the earlier stages is a corollary of the fact that there are beings whose nature is essentially temporal, whose wholeness is something that comes to be.

Aside from the fact that I do not follow Bergson in appealing to the conception of unconscious memory, there is the further difference that my theory involves not only the preservation of the earlier stages by the later, but also the fixing of their value. The conception that I am trying to develop is something other than the mere notion of cumulation. The preservation of the past, whether through unconscious memory or by other means, is only a part of the matter; the transmuting of the value of the past is of equal or greater importance.

¹ It might be urged that our solution of the problem consists simply in an appeal to the conceptions of growth and development. And in the sense in which these terms are ordinarily used they have no doubt much in common with the conception that I am trying to present. I have tried, however, to avoid them because it seems to me that both concepts are sorely in need of a clarifying analysis. As commonly employed they have various biological implications which such analysis should bring out. And though not identical in meaning, they are frequently used as if they had the same significance.

But we have not as yet shown that we cannot vindicate it equally well if we deny the reality of change altogether. And we can imagine some reader protesting, at this juncture, in the following fashion. If the later stage is more important because it is more nearly the whole life, is it not clear that our interest is not in change, but in wholeness? And if so, does it not seem that the way in which men evaluate life can be defended equally well upon the assumption that change is a guise that reality wears for us, but is not characteristic of its inner nature? What we call a difference in temporal position is ultimately only a difference in degree of completeness; and the so-called later stage is simply a larger part of the non-temporal whole.

To this objection I reply as follows. It is indeed true that our chief interest is not in the time-process merely as time-process; one of our main contentions has been that the later stages are more important simply because the life that fills them is more nearly complete.¹ But this does not require us to admit that change is illusory. Moreover, I think it can be shown that if one admits that change is illusory one cannot justify the belief in the compensatory function of the later stages, no matter how strenuously one may insist that wholeness, rather than change, is the thing of chief significance. We shall now try to show this.

Let us designate by *a* one of the so-called earlier stages of an individual life, by *b*, *c*, *etc.*, somewhat later stages, and by *n* the final stage, assuming for the sake of the argument that there is one. Now according to the view that we are criticizing, which regards the temporal process as illusory, *n*, which we call the final stage, is, properly speaking, simply our view of the whole life, *N*; *A*, the reality corresponding to our *a*, is a small part of *N*; *B* is a larger part, which includes *A* within itself; *C* is a still larger part, which includes *B*; and so on. The series *A*, *B*, \dots *N*, which is the real order corresponding to our time-series *a* \dots *n*, might thus be symbolized by a number of concentric circles, of

¹ In other words, our chief interest is not in change as such, but in change as the form of human life.

which A is the smallest and N the largest.¹ Now according to our opponent, man's belief that if n be good its character atones for that of a , which we will suppose to be evil, can be justified without our assuming the reality of change. If the whole, N ,—represented to us in n , the final stage,—is good, it compensates for the fact that a certain part A ,—represented to us by a , one of the early stages—is evil. The excellence of the whole atones for the evil of some of the parts. But it is precisely at this point that we must raise an objection. It is only if change be real that the excellence of the whole can atone in the slightest degree for the evil of the part. If change is real it is possible, we have urged, that the part—one of the earlier stages—may be transmuted in the whole, the final stage. But if change is unreal, how can this be? If A becomes N , it is conceivable that N might atone for A . But if change is unreal, $A, B, C, \dots N$ are all equally existent, equally eternal. Now N , which by hypothesis is good, includes A , which is evil; but A does not in its turn include N . Hence for A there is eternally nothing but A . That is, there is no escape from misery or sin: a 'temporary' suffering or sin is really eternal. And if it be eternal its evil is not transmuted.

But, one may here interpose, does not our own experience present many cases in which the excellence of the whole cancels the evil of the part, and *vice versa* the evil of the whole the excellence of the part? In many a noble deed there is some slight admixture of unworthy motive; in many a glorious achievement of art there is some minor defect in conception or execution; and it is a commonplace of experience that

" Our sincerest laughter
With some pain is fraught."

Yet each of these wholes is 'good,' and its excellence seems to atone for the deficiency of some of its parts.

¹ The true nature of the relation of $A, B, C, etc.$, to one another and to N must be in great part unknown to us, since we view reality, not as it is in truth, but in its illusory temporal aspect. We must therefore emphasize the point that the series of concentric circles is merely a symbol of an order whose true nature we cannot describe. By hypothesis, however, the order $A, B, C, etc.$, is one of increasing completeness.

But, I ask, does it really atone? Is it not rather the case that if there be the least taint in the part, the whole falls short of perfection? It is true that we regard a slight defect as practically negligible. Because our experience seldom, if ever, shows us anything quite free from flaw, we accept with glad thankfulness that in which the good seems far to outweigh the evil, feeling that in the face of so much excellence it would be carping to allow our thought to dwell upon the defect. None the less, sober judgment must admit that the evil of the part is ignored rather than destroyed. Now what I am trying to bring out is the difference in this respect between an existing whole and a whole that comes to be. An existing whole cannot be completely good unless each of its simultaneously existing parts is good. But a whole that comes to be, might be completely good in spite of the fact that some of its (serial) parts were bad. It will always be true, if you like, that certain of the earlier stages *were* evil. But when they have grown into the final stage, they have *become* good.¹

I repeat then that if the temporal process be unreal, I can see no way in which the evil of some parts can be in the least degree atoned for by the excellence of the whole. There are indeed many who would try to escape from this conclusion by declaring that evil is illusory, but this theory offers no safe refuge. The definitive answer to all attempts to deny the reality of evil has been made by Dr. McTaggart, for one, in his paper on "The Relation of Time and Eternity."² To the assertion that evil is mere illusion we must reply, he says, that in such case the (undeniable) existence of the erroneous belief in it would itself be an evil.³

It is equally futile to try to avoid the difficulty by saying that evil is merely incompleteness. Evil is absence of value, lack of that which ought to be. And if it is this, it is not mere incom-

¹ Another point that might be urged is that in a whole whose parts are co-existent with it we can ignore the evil of some parts only if this is slight in comparison with the excellence of the whole. But in a human life, taken as what I may call a serial whole, the case seems to be different. A considerable amount of pain or intellectual or moral defect in the earlier stages is atoned for if the later stages are good.

² *Mind*, N. S., Vol. XVIII, pp. 343 ff.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 360.

pleteness; it is something other than being a part instead of a whole.¹ But if by the identification of evil with incompleteness one means rather that the sense of evil arises from our taking a part as if it were the whole, from our viewing it in isolation from the whole to which it belongs, this is simply going back to the doctrine that evil is an illusion. And we can reply to it, after the fashion of Dr. McTaggart, by urging that the fact that men view the part in isolation from the whole is itself an evil—is something other than incompleteness, is that which ought not to be.

There is still one more way in which we might try to reconcile the belief in the compensatory power of the later stages of life with the doctrine of the unreality of change. The character of the human individual, it might be urged, is something fixed and definite, which stands as an unchanging reality back of the process of our life in time. This changeless character—the true self—is manifested in different degrees of adequacy in the various stages of the life, but more fully in the later stages than the earlier, while the final stage is virtually a complete manifestation. The quality of the later stages is the more important because these reveal more fully what the life essentially is. This hypothesis may be regarded as an application to the individual life of Dr. McTaggart's attempt to reconcile the two doctrines of the unreality of time and the reality of progress.² We can refute it by the help of considerations that we have already used in attacking a slightly different argument.³ If the time-process is unreal, all the less and more adequate representations of the changeless reality exist eternally. And the existence of the more adequate can in no sense do away with that of the less

¹ This conclusion cannot be avoided, I think, unless we are prepared to say that the concept of value is merely a derivative from the concept of completeness. And this is by no means certain. Certainly the burden of proof rests with those who ask us to believe that value is such a derivative, and no satisfactory proof of this thesis, I think, has ever been given. It is one thing to declare that only the whole is altogether good and that thus any part must be in some degree evil—though even this proposition seems to some of us to lack adequate proof—and it is quite another thing to say that excellence is nothing but completeness and evil nothing but incompleteness.

² *Op. cit.*

³ See above, p. 31.

adequate. If the time-process is real, such atonement for the earlier by the later—for the less adequate representations by the more adequate—is conceivable; but if it is unreal, the atonement is not conceivable.¹

We have now considered the various ways known to us in which one might try to reconcile man's belief in the compensating power of the later stages of life with the doctrine of the unreality of change, and we have shown that each of these attempts must end in failure. We cannot as a result of our survey assert outright that the doctrine and the belief are incompatible; for perhaps one might attempt a reconciliation in some other way that has not occurred to us.² But I think that we are justified in saying that so far as we can at present see, man's belief in the supreme importance of the later stages can be defended only if we conceive the temporal character of human life in the way that we have suggested. As the matter stands at present, we must either adopt this conception or condemn as utterly mistaken our belief in the transforming power of the later stages. Now there can be little question that we feel it to be of vital importance that the fuller realizations of value shall appear in the later stages of a man's history. So long as a life falls short of complete attainment, we demand that at least it shall show

¹ The conclusion that is really indicated by Dr. McTaggart's argument is, to my mind, not that change is unreal, but that the universe, at present actually imperfect and in process of change, may eventually reach a state of perfection and that then change will cease. This is the only intelligible interpretation that I can give to the doctrine of the eventual passage of time into eternity. And it is, it seems to me, a theory that one might conceivably adopt, although personally I do not feel sure that perfection and change are incompatible. But although this seems to be the conclusion to which his argument points, it is evident that Dr. McTaggart would not be willing to accept it. For while apparently he would not object to the identification of eternity with changelessness, he is definitely committed to the doctrine of the unreality of change.

Professor Overstreet, in an article entitled "Change and the Changless" (this journal, Vol. XVIII, pp. 1 ff.), seeks to show, among other things, that a perfect being may undergo change. While there are some parts of his theory that I am unable to accept, it seems to me that on this particular point he has presented a forceful argument and that he has at least shown that the common belief in the incompatibility of change and perfection is open to question.

² It should be remembered also that we did not try to prove that value is something other than completeness but merely declared that the burden of proof rests with any one who may ask us to regard the two as identical.

progress—perhaps in happiness, certainly in intellectual power, in æsthetic sensibility, in moral attainment. And this conception of progress—important for all aspects of our nature—is so fundamental in our idea of the moral life that any theory of the time-process that robs it of its meaning fails to satisfy one of the most insistent demands of our being.

And with this I am content to leave the matter. I do not profess to have proved that my conception of the relation of the individual life to the time-process is correct. But it seems to me that I have shown that so far as we can at present see, we must either accept it or repudiate all those evaluations of life that give it its deepest significance for us.¹ Some there may be who will still maintain that the belief in the compensatory power of the later stages is a mistaken one. But when we consider how intimately it is related to our sense of the value of life we may well refuse to condemn it without strong reasons. That the majority of thinkers are loath to repudiate it is shown by the fact that many who assert the phenomenal character of the time-process still try to justify, by some means or other, the conception of progress.² With regard to this conception there are three questions that should be carefully distinguished. (1) Is progress possible? *I. e.*, is reality of such a character that either in the whole or in some part the later stages *might* contain fuller realizations of value than the earlier? (2) Is progress in this sense actual? (3) If progress is possible, is it significant, desirable, valuable? Is it any better than retrogression? Of course if a progressive series, taken as a whole, contains more good than a regressive one, we should unhesitatingly declare it to be better. But what our third question means to ask is whether, given a certain amount of good in the series as a whole, progress is any more to be desired than retrogression. It is this question with which I have been concerned in the present discussion. For the purposes of this study I do not care to

¹ I should not wish it to be thought that this is the only consideration that leads me to accept the essential reality of the time-process. But my concern in this discussion is not to examine the arguments for and against that doctrine.

² *E. g.*, Dr. McTaggart (*op. cit.*) and Professor Howison (*The Limits of Evolution*, 1904, pp. 373 ff.).

know whether progress is actual or not. What I have tried to show is that *as* progress it can have no value unless the later stages can compensate for the earlier as the earlier cannot for the later. *I. e.*, unless there is such one-sided compensation, it can make no difference—given a certain amount of value in the whole of a particular life—whether that life in its course progresses or retrogrades. And thus even if there were progress, it would be, *qua* progress, of no significance.

Now if one declares that change is phenomenal it is not easy to see how one can assert the possibility of progress at all. But even if we waived this difficulty and assumed that one might reconcile the two doctrines of the unreality of time and the possibility of progress, we should still be unable to see how the later stages of a life could in any way compensate for the earlier. And in this case, though we might be willing to grant that progress is possible in the life of an individual, we should have no ground for regarding it as significant, as any better than retrogression. If however we accept the reality of change and if further we conceive the temporal aspect of human life in the way that I have proposed, we have a theory that implies the desirability of progress and thus furnishes an adequate basis for our most fundamental judgments as to the value of life.

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ON RELATIONS.

PURE mathematics has often been defined as *the science of abstract relations*, that is, of relations abstracted from entities, from qualities and from quantities. If such it be there is a question whether it may consistently be termed a *science*. Science, however, is not only the analytical and comprehensive knowledge of entities existing in relations; it is also the theoretic statement of the *relations* in which and by which the entities exist. If the relations can be abstracted from their relata and treated abstractly, that is a *method* of science or of philosophy, or even an abstract science of the relations; but according to the hypothesis it is not a science of the relations as subsisting among entities, and still less a science of entities. Those who hold that science is knowledge of *entities* would regard the methodical, analytical, or mathematical treatment of abstract relations as a branch of logic or of philosophy but not as a science. Philosophy also is largely a rational theoretic statement and critical discussion of relations among entities. Recently it has become so in a more especial sense than ever before. Philosophy, it would now seem, cannot proceed without further discussion of relations. A brief study of the logic of relations is therefore a proper propædæutic.

The attempt to define relation in general, or in the abstract, has usually led to the admission that whatever is meant by it is indefinable in simpler terms, irreducible in logic and in metaphysics, as are entity, element, and substance. It seems valid in logic to generalize relation, but in metaphysics and in science it is with the plural, *relations*, that thought and knowledge are engaged. Relations are *not* entities, nor elements; they are *not* the substantive terms; they are *predicative* to substantive terms, or to entities. The terms,¹ or entities, to which the relations are

¹ It is regrettable that this word is so often used ambiguously, now for entity, now for name. Here it intentionally makes the transition between "substantive terms, or entities," and "linguistic terms," and "names," in the following sentences. Hereafter *term* will more consistently be distinguished from *entity* and from *relatum*.

predicative are not predicative of their relations; they do not define them. Yet language has distinctive and attributive terms for most relations, and these may indeed be used as grammatical and as logical substantives. That is terminology, however, not definition, even though the linguistic term that names a relation denotes one or both of the logical terms thereby related. Thus the relation between part and whole is named the *part-whole relation*, and the relation between subject and object is termed the *subject-object relation*; the relation of the volume of a gas to the temperature and the pressure may be termed the *volume-pressure relation*, and the relation of history to geography may for convenience be called the *geographical relation*, yet these names do not define or describe the relations, though as names they may signify definite classes and imply definition, as definition may summarize description. So the complex relations of woman to social organization may briefly be termed *the woman question*, but that term does not define either what woman is or what the question is. Nor does any term, whether linguistic or logical, *define* the relation which it denotes or into which it enters. Hence relations are indefinable in simpler substantive terms.

But predicatively relations may be defined; distinctive predicative terms may state in what the relations are predicative to their relata. It may then be validly stated that *all relations subsist among entities or elements, and all entities subsist in relations. There can be no entity without relations*; absolute being without *any* relations is unknowable, inconceivable. How could an entity be known or conceived without entering at least the relation of being known or conceived, that is, a relation of some kind to knowing subjects? Wholly unknowable and inconceivable entity could not subsist in any ulterior universe, nor in any metaphysical system, without *some* relation to such system or to its parts. The very terms system, universe, imply relations; and to deny all relations in any metaphysics would be to contradict the terms of our logic.

Relation implies entities; *there can be no relation without relata, entities related*. A mathematical point may be regarded as con-

sisting in relations and nothing else; but, if so defined, it would be a mere position, not an entity; nor would the geometrical line, consisting of points, be a real entity, nor the geometrical square, nor the cube, nor any geometrical configuration of relations, though of course the graphical representations of such would be entities and material. It seems convenient, however, even if not quite consistent, to extend the term *entity* to the field of geometry, even to points and lines, whether graphically represented or merely ideal, and to regard a point as a geometrical element.

Relations, subsisting among elements, are with them constitutive of complex entities. The only entity that is conceived as existing without parts is a mathematical point, and that is conceived as an element existing in geometrical relations, and constitutive of geometrical entities. In entities having parts there must be relations among the parts. Properties, or qualities, are not substantive entities, nor elements, but are predicative of relations internal to the entities and affecting other and external entities. *There can be no composite entity without internal and constitutive relations.*

Again, relations are constitutive of entities, the parts, or elements, or components of which they relate. Conversely, entities are constituted of components and relations. To the complex entities the components and the relations are *internal*. To the components those same relations are *external*. *A relation may be internal to a complex but external to the elements or components of that complex.* An obvious corollary is that the relations of a thing may some of them be external and some of them internal. A complex may have external relations to other external things, and these relations, external to the things of lower order of complexity or organization, would be internal to the more comprehensive complexes thus constituted; and so forth through all the spheres of the universe of entities subsisting and existing in relations. More briefly, *a relation may be external to one complex while it is internal to another.* The terms *external* (*extrinsic*) and *internal* (*intrinsic*), or *constitutive*, are thus *relative* to the order of complexity, or to the sphere of existence penetrated by the analysis.

These predications have prepared the way for a definition in substantive, though not in simpler terms: *Relations are modes of existence, in which entities exist and by which entities are constituted into more complex entities.*

Relations always constitute with the entities or elements that they relate complex entities predicatively different from the relata. Thus the things *A* and *B* in a relation *r* compose a complex entity *ArB*, which is different from *A* and from *B*, and in which the complex *Ar* differs predicatively from the relata, from *A* and from *B*, and in which the complex *rB* likewise differs from the relata. For a concrete example, the handle of a tool is one thing; the handle *and* its relation to a hand is a complex other than either handle or hand, and other than that special relation of handle to hand; the handle *in* the hand and the hand *holding* the handle are complexes logically different, both predicatively and substantively, from handle and from hand and from the special relation. It is the relation that renders these complexes different from the relata.

We should avoid confusing the thing *A* with the complex *Ar* or with the relation *r*, for, as was said above, they are three different things. There is a question whether the relation enters or becomes part of the relata and whether these are thus modified by the relations. From this question has arisen the controversy whether relations are *always* internal to their relata or *always* external. As in most controversy, there has probably been too much opposition on both sides. It is not so much a question whether relations in general enter into the constitution of things in general, for it is usually admitted that they do; it is rather a question whether the thing is the same with the relation, or in it, as it is without it.¹ The answer depends upon

¹ Professor Perry in his *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 319, has stated this opposition very moderately: "But according to the theory of the externality of relations, terms acquire from their new relations an added character, which does not either condition, or necessarily alter, the character which they already possess."

"According to the contrary view, relations penetrate, possess, and compromise their terms, so that it is impossible to separate the terms from the relation without destroying them."

"The procedure of logic and mathematics—any procedure, in fact, which employs the method of analysis—is necessarily committed to the acceptance of the

what is meant by 'the same.' If *same* means continuously identical in constitution of parts and *internal* relations, in properties and *inherent* attributes, then the hand *is* the same, and the handle *is* the same, whether they are in the special conditioning relation or not; but the *action* of the hand and the *function* and the *utility* of the handle are by virtue of this relation what they were *not* when the hand and the handle were separate. It is to the action, function, utility, or other resulting complex that the special relation is internal or constitutive; to the attributive, functional, potential complex Ar , or to rB , the relation r is internal, that is, the relation modifies the properties or potential functions of the hand, or of the handle, and *adds* to what may be attributed to either; and it is likewise internal to the actual, completed complex ArB , to the terms of which it is not merely attributive but predicative. In other words, the hand becomes *effectually* changed by its holding the handle, and the handle becomes *virtually* changed by entering the hand. Yet hand and handle, A and B , remain physically and *internally* the same, flesh and wood, active and passive, agent and instrument.¹

This brings us back to the statement that some of the relations of a thing may be internal and some of them external, and that a relation may be internal to one complex, or in one aspect, and external to or in another. As there are degrees of complexity for entities, so there are degrees of complexity or complicity for relations. Some relations, such as that of radius to circle, are comparatively simple, or may be described in simple or familiar terms. Other relations, for instance, that of terrestrial tides to the attraction and the position of the moon, are very compli-

externality of relations. The method of analysis presupposes that the nature and arrangement of the parts supplies the character of the whole. If such were not the case the specification of the parts and their arrangement would not afford a description of the whole, and one would have to be content with an immediate or mystical apprehension of it."

¹ In another aspect the externality of relations to the attributes or qualities of the relata is stated by Mr. Bertand Russell: "The view I advocate is, that a term a may have a relation to a term b without there being any constituent of a corresponding to this relation. If this were false, simple terms could have no relations and therefore could not enter into complexes; . . ." *Journal of Philosophy*, v. 8, p. 159.

cated. Some indeed, such as the relation of the demand for pork to the supply, can not be extricated and completely analyzed, can not be conveniently or scientifically formulated. The statement of such complicated relations is theory involving hypotheses, conventions, and approximations. Then some relations are more general, that is, they are found in a broader range of various things, or phenomena, as the relation of demand to supply, in general, or the relation of weight to mass, or of name to class. Other relations, whether simple or complex, are special to definite classes of things, and may be defined in specific predications, or with specific terms, for instance, the relation of a mosquito to what we call a mosquito 'bite.' And some relations may be quite individual.

Philosophers may argue that, as a thing can not be completely or even adequately known or described apart from its relations, these are in that sense internal and constitutive. The distinctions drawn in the foregoing paragraphs may perhaps help to clear our thoughts of that confusion of *relata* with relations.¹ An illustration may show, furthermore, how common sense and indeed all science are dependent upon such distinctions being sustained. This acorn in my hand is, let us assume, an object existent in reality. It is *conditioned* by external relations, spatial, temporal, causal, and perceptual, yet it is apprehended as discrete, as defined by bounds, as confined by its exterior, and as constitutionally distinct from other things, with which it has evident external relations, from my hand, from the tree out of whose bud it developed, from the sunshine whose energy has been stored in its tissues. We need not forget, nor deny, these exterior and ulterior relations, but to comprehend them now as part of the acorn or as constitutive of it as an *acorn*, or to apprehend the acorn as but an incomplete part of the tree, or of the universe, would be very inconvenient, would be as poetically transcendent to present thoughts and purposes as it

¹ For instance, there is something like confusion in the following: "A relation then may be described as the whole situation into which the terms which stand in the relation enter; so far, of course, as the situation concerns the relation." . . . "Now if a relation means the whole relevant situation into which the terms enter, there can be no entry into the relation distinct from the relation itself." S. Alexander, *Mind*, N.S., v. 21, pp. 307 and 313.

would be to prewise here the potential oak-tree that might arise if the seed were planted, or to see in our little acorn the future timber that shall fortify a ship's side against an angry sea.

Yet our acorn is internally complex. Let us turn to the microscope and the molecule. We enter here a universe of infinitesimals. The unit is no longer the acorn, but the cell, the atom, the electron. To these the constitutive relations are external. If we could analyze the atom and the electron, we should probably find that they too are constituted within and within of internal elements and motions and relations. But in a method of such omniscient comprehensions the human intellect may be dazzled by too many lights, the reason overstrained by the glare of illumination. It is not strange that those philosophers who maintain the internal theory of relations in its extreme statement should sometimes seek relief in the penumbra of a mystified metaphysics or in the ineffable twilight of poetry. In this view all things are interrelated and interpenetrated by their relations, everything entangled in an infinity of relations, which ramify to the bounds of the universe; nothing can be separated by analysis, nothing distinctly known, nothing comprehensively described, not until knowledge is as complete as the universe is unitary. Things are mere centers of perception or attention, and science is merely a tissue of convenient conventions and approximations, an imperfect makeshift. Thus the internal theory of relations issues in an anti-intellectualist philosophy.¹ Here is a rallying-ground for the neo-vitalist, for the intuitionist, and for the mystic. The philosopher Bergson and the scientist Driesch are too scientific themselves to intend utterly to disparage science, but some of their intrinsically poetic writings seem likely to mislead followers, who may not only write metaphysics poetically but may habituate their reason to revel in poetic imaginations.

It is scientific, also philosophic, and indeed poetic, to conceive that all things are complexes of internal elements and relations, existing in relations that are external to them while internal to larger complexes, that all things are relative, that relations are

¹ Prof. E. G. Spaulding in his "Defense of Analysis" in *The New Realism* (pp. 164-169), has criticised this theory very acutely.

all constitutive, and that the constitution of things is unitary, the universe. In fact to deny this is unscientific and unphilosophic. *Pace*, pluralists. If we avoid confusing entities with their relations, and with the complexes of which the entities and their relations are constitutive, we may, however, analyze and define things as discrete, without negating either relativity or unity. Each thing being a component of a more comprehensive complex, we may analyze the more comprehensive in terms of the more elementary, and the elements we may describe as parts of the complex. But the terms and the definitions should denote only the complexes whose logical extension they comprehend. And the external which *conditions* an entity should be distinguished from the internal which is *constitutive* of it.

In our perceptual and analytical knowledge we are dealing with objects that appear as discrete and with terms that are accepted as definite. What the term *acorn* denotes is the class of objects of specific form, constitution, and properties. Internal and external relations may be connoted or implicit, but in the term they are not explicit, nor in any simple predication or judgment into which the term may enter. It is convenient and it is logical to use the term as definite for this distinct class of objects. The very purpose of terms is to delimit definite denotations. The definition tends to include some of the external relations; "the relations tend, with familiarity, to become attributes of their *relata*."¹ But this tendency should not lead to the confusion of the terms with their external relations; for it is inconvenient, and if the tendency is carried to the extreme it is impossible for thought in its various processes and operations to support the burden of everywhere comprehending *all* the relations that may subsist in the reality of the universe.

Terms and definitions, it is true, are only means in the development of knowledge, and analysis and description apply especially to the comprehensive mode. Immediate apprehension of things in their concreteness, their flux and change, and the intuitive beliefs and interpretations of the human mind may indeed afford us more vivid, intimate, and satisfactory knowledge of

¹ Tawney, PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. XXII, p. 303.

reality. Not too much, however, should be made of the difference between the apprehensive and the comprehensive mode; and, so far as biological and intellectual values are relevant, the conceptual and comprehensive knowledge is no less valuable to life than is the intuitive and perceptual, while it tends to become of even higher value to intelligence. This synthetic, comprehensive knowledge depends upon consistency in terms and in definitions.

To confuse a thing with one of its relations, to think that *A*, or *B*, is *r*, is less unpardonable than to confuse one relatum with its correlate, that is, to mistake *A* for *B*. Thus, to assert that the line between two points is the relation between them, as did the philosopher James,¹ is hardly less erratic than to declare that the line is the distance. *The distance-in-that-direction* is the special relation between the two points; but the line is not that relation, it is not the distance; it is the graphical, or the metrical, correlate having its own other relation to that relation of the distance. In these cases we are dealing with confusions of relata with their correlates. It is by similar confusions that certain 'new realists' and 'radical empiricists' merge the conscious state with the objective entity with which it is correlated, or knowledge with the thing known, or the experience with that of which there is experience.

The way has now been prepared for a consideration of relations of dependence. That relations are constitutive of entities implies that complex entities are dependent on the relations as well as on the relata. That the entities are dependent on their constituents is not, however, reason for saying that those constituents are all dependent upon one another within their complex, that the parts are dependent on the whole, or on one another. But what is meant here by *dependent*? Are related entities always dependent on one another? These questions go very deeply, involving the logic of causation and contingency, and the constitution of all systems and of the universe. If 'in relation with' and 'constituted of' meant dependent on, everything would be dependent on everything else and on all relations,

¹ William James, *Principles of Psychology*, v. 2, pp. 149-150.

and nothing would be extricable or distinct. This use of the term 'dependent' in its most extensive sense would be in keeping with the extreme doctrine that all relations are internal, as held by certain philosophers.

But that doctrine we have rejected. Nor is it admitted here that relation *always* implies dependence, that every thing is dependent (in a proper sense of the term) upon all the things to which it is related. That every thing is dependent on *some* thing is indeed an ontological postulate verified throughout the domains of science. On the other hand, that some things are independent of certain other things is quite consistent with knowledge and with terminology. A more positive distinction may now validly be stated. Things are not all dependent upon all other things in the universe, even though they be all inter-related. A thing *A* may be in a relation *r* to another thing *B* without being dependent on *B*. This is especially apparent in such abstract relations as those of mere likeness or analogy or position. A white-oak tree might be in the peculiar relation to another white-oak tree of being antipodal by precise measurement, so that the two trees would stand out from the extremities of a diameter of the earth; but this relation would in no wise make them dependent on each other for anything in the nature of oak-trees. If there is any kind of dependence in this relation, it must be more sophisticated than significant. If similarity and analogy are kinds of relation (and are they not usually regarded as such?), then the arm of a derrick is related to the arm of any man, though it is dependent upon those arms only that made it and those that are working it. And the relation of equality does not render the equal things dependent on one another, nor does the relation of distance, however small, unless some other relation to some other thing determine some direct or partial dependence. Two cities in proximity may be dependent on each other in many ways, not by reason of the nearness itself, but through economic relations resulting from the proximity. Relatedness does not always imply dependence of the relata on one another.

Dependence is not a status subsistent in a special kind of rela-

tion in which one thing is necessary to the existence of the other thing as such. If the one cannot exist without the other, the dependence is *complete*; but if destroying or changing the relation, or one of the relata, produces a corresponding change or variation in the other relatum, the dependence is *partial* or *variable*. For instance, the relation of the candle-flame to the candle is completely dependent; for, when the candle is consumed, the flame ceases. Yet dependence is seldom so simple as in this instance. Even here the flame is dependent on other things also, on a supply of oxygen, on the match that lights the candle, on the hand that applies the match, and so through the degrees of contingency. Many of the facts and happenings of life and of history are reducible to this type of dependence upon an 'efficient cause,' interrelated with many contingent causes. The candle too has its history, and for its qualities the candle-flame depends upon the special properties of the candle and its materials. And the action of the hand that lights the candle has also its history of contingencies too intricate to be traced and apparently endless. The sinking of the steamship Titanic was directly caused by her striking that particular iceberg, but it was dependent also upon a net of contingencies which determined that the icebergs should have drifted to that latitude and longitude and that that particular low-lying iceberg should have been at that moment in the steamship's path; and why she had not taken the safer course farther south, and why her speed had not been reduced when warnings had been received, and why she was in danger of that kind of iceberg and that kind of collision, and so forth through the maze of whys and wherefores. This is the type of the accident with a history conditioning it. It may be contrasted with the type of a history with a salient accident upon which the causation turns and seems chiefly to depend. The conquest of England by William the Norman depended mainly upon England's being in that special state of disorganization and upon the aggressive ambition and vindictive character of William. That Harold was shipwrecked and that under William's compulsion he made promises which soon afterward he broke, these are accidental and contingent.

Between these two types of historical happening there are all possible intermediate kinds of complex contingency, in life, in history, and in science.

The relation of the tree to its shadow on the snow exemplifies another kind of dependence, which may be termed *dual*, as contrasted with the candle-flame, which exists in *simple, complete* dependence on the candle, though changeable by various *contingent* relations. The shadow is completely dependent not only on the tree but on the sunlight. Its changes depend indeed on the changing position of the sun. It has, however, other variable relations with the intensity of the light and the contour of the ground on which it falls. So there is constant change in the shadow's branches or tracery on the snow. Here also many interrelated contingencies condition the presence of the tree and the sunlight and the snow.

An interesting type of contingent dependence is that of lock and key. This is the type of *constant, or permanent physical correlation of the parts of two complex things*, whether natural or constructed by art. Apart from its key, the lock is a lock and is *structurally* complete; and the key is a complete key apart from its lock. But there is a structural relation between this particular key and that particular lock. The locksmith would say that the lock were incomplete without the key, as the builder would say that the door were incomplete without the lock; but what they are thinking of are the complexes, door-with-lock and lock-with-key. As was said before, the components should not be confused with the complexes. Now suppose the door has never been locked to debar entry, that the key has never been turned in the lock, but has lain in a drawer. The door and the lock would still be structurally related, and the lock and the key would still be structurally correlated, but the relations would then be of not actual but merely *virtual* dependence. The relation of the lock to the door would become actually dependent on the relation of the key to the lock, if a hand were actuated by a purpose to lock the door. This contingent dependence may be symbolized by $Hr''Kr'LtD$, and is thus *triple*, while the dependence on each term is complete. The

permanent physical correlation of the key with the lock is, however, the most significant part of the complex relation. There is also a contingent dependence upon the adjustment of the door to its jamb. Thus a relation of dependence may be itself dependent upon other relations of dependence, or a relation may imply contingent dependence, or things may be dependent in one relation whereas in other relations or conditions of change they may be non-dependent or but *virtually* dependent. Natural science is replete with instances of similar physical, structural and functional correlations, in which complete dependence is contingent or virtual.

Another type is that of complete dependence upon a variable quantitative relation. For instance, the soap-bubble blown from the clay-pipe by a child depends upon the pipe as the candle-flame depends upon the candle, but it also depends upon the comparatively constant pressure of the child's breath and the steadiness with which the pipe is held. A little jerk and the bubble bounds away from the pipe and drifts into the air. It floats so far and no farther. The liquid film evaporates; the surface tension can no longer retain the gaseous contents, and the bubble dissolves in a breath of the breeze. Beyond a certain limit of pressure the bubble would burst at the pipe and vanish. Here we have variable quantitative relations of complete and of partial dependence. Mathematics and physics are largely occupied with such relations.

To the physiological and psychological correlations with physical entities another type is intermediate. The rainbows in the misty spray of a fountain are contingently dependent upon a special relation of refracted sunlight to the spray. The *rainbow-light* is completely dependent upon the spray playing into the sunlit air, and variably dependent upon the changing sunlight shining about the fountain. When the sun is shining brightly there and the misty spray is in the sunlight, we may say that rainbows are there a plenty, but they are unseen till the children come there and from all possible angles find them and delight in them. As optical phenomena, rainbows have this duality of aspect. The physical entity and the physical relations consti-

tute what we called the 'rainbow-light.' This itself is of dual dependence on sunlight and on spray, is quantitatively and contingently dependent on the dispersion of the light by the drops of spray. The physiologico-psychological relations, the peculiarities of the eyes, the angles of vision, and the chance and changing positions of the children in their motions, and the psychological variations of sensation, these too are of dual dependence, and are virtual or contingent. In this complex relation we have duality of relations themselves of dual dependence; and it is typical of physiological and psychological phenomena of stimulus and response, of all things seen, and heard, and felt, and of all things known. Surely, in the face of such common duality, we should not fear the terms *dualism* and *correlation*.

If all entities subsist in relations and if relations are constitutive of complex entities, the question remains, are relations real? The relations that are constitutive of real entities should be regarded as real, or the entities would be real as respects their components and non-real as respects their constitutive relations. That would be a confusing consequence. One would hardly know whether to regard a candle-flame in relation to its candle as less real than the candle without the flame, or indeed as less real than the candle-flame without the candle; and the celebrated smile of the Cheshire cat would indeed be more real without the cat than with the cat. To deny categorically that relations are real would render the term *real* not only one of the vaguest but one of the most valueless in philosophy.

We should not, however, hypostasize relations as though they were entities. That would be as bad as to confuse them with their relata. They may be apprehended or comprehended in various degrees of knowledge, they may be perceived or conceived in various modes or situations, they may be expressed or represented by various means or methods; yet they have not existence as have entities and qualities. Relations are not easily cognized or conceived apart from their relata; and some things can hardly be separated in thought from their external relations; yet relations are neither complexes of components nor of qualities; they may be real, but they are not existent. From the psychological

view, “. . . the relation itself becomes a special conscious content distinct from the contents which are related, though indeed inseparably connected with them.”¹ That this distinct content is not merely ideal is more explicit in the following statements by the psychologist Angell: “. . . that the consciousness of relation is a basal factor in all activities of attention; that our attention is sometimes more, and sometimes less, directed toward the extant *relations* than toward the *things* related; but that no moment of cognitive consciousness is wholly lacking in the awareness either of relations or objects.”² James, merging reality in experience, is quite explicit in asserting that relations are real: “. . . *the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as ‘real’ as anything else in the system.*”³

The relation of contact of two bodies is as immediately apprehended as are the bodies themselves, or the qualities of the bodies; and it seems consistent to state that the contact is as real as the bodies are. Of course there may be a mere optical appearance of contact relative to the position from which two bodies are seen; but then the relation is not one of contact but of *apparent contact*. Contact moreover is physically relative, and is qualifiable in thought. The relation of the acorn to the oak-tree is in this sense real only when the acorn is on its twig; when the acorn is in my hand, its relation to the tree is ideal, or conceptual, or remembered. This is not to say that the same relation may now be real, now ideal; for these two cases imply two *different* relations; the relation of *the acorn on its twig* to the tree is real; the relation of *the acorn in my hand* to the tree is ideal, or conceptual. But in cases of virtual or contingent dependence a realizable relation may be cognized as real, or converted into a real relation. There may be an ideal relation of rainbow to fountain, or contingently a realizable relation, or conditionally a real relation of the refracted rainbow-light to the fountain’s spray.

Relations would thus appear in dual aspects; they would be

¹ Wundt, *Outlines of Psychology* (1897), p. 250.

² J. R. Angell, *Psychology*, 4th ed., p. 248.

³ *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 42. (The italics are his own emphasis.)

regarded as real in the constitution of real entities, whether known or unknown, and in perception and attention; in conception and in thought, in judgment and in reasoning, they would be regarded as ideal, as subsisting in the relating tendency of the mind. When the relata are not apparently connected or dependent, or the dependence is unknown or virtual, the relations may appear to be ideal rather than real. This duality of aspect and this apparent vacillation between reality and ideality arise from similar duality in consciousness and in knowledge, and similar vacillation between the cognition of reality and the cognition of ideality. But the relations themselves are some constantly real and some constantly ideal, as the entities they relate are some real and some ideal. Ideal and conceptual relations are contrasted with real relations as ideas and concepts are contrasted with realities. Yet underlying all is the universal reality.

In general most relations are real, though some are merely ideal. In their reality, however, as in their being, they are different both from entities and from ideas; they differ from entities in that they are not existent; from ideas they differ in that they are real, or, if ideal, are but *constitutive of or attributive to* ideal complexes or complex ideas, are not simple ideational or cognitive elements; however complex, they are attributive or predicative to their relata; yet they may be substantive in logic, as they are in grammar. Relations that are constitutive of real entities are real in that they are involved in the reality of the entities; relations that are constitutive of ideal or conceptual entities are ideal or conceptual, unless they are apprehended as real. An ideal complex or comprehensive concept may be partly composed of real entities and real relations. The concepts of science are thus composite of real and empirical elements in rational combination with conceptual relations and ideal entities. Relations that are external to real entities may be real. Unknown entities existing in relations are real, if their existence can be verified; and their external relations, if these can be verified, are also real. Ideal entities too may have their external relations, and these may either be ideal or be real, be conceptual or be perceptual.

This doctrine that in general relations may be and mostly are real can not be definite until reality has been defined; yet in treating of relations it seems proper to answer these questions, for we shall find that reality itself cannot be discussed comprehensively without reference to the relation of subject to object and the relation of entities to being and to existence.

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THE DILEMMA OF DIDEROT.

M. RENE DOUMIC,¹ in a critical essay entitled "Who is the Author of the Works of Diderot?", has thrown out, as a kind of provocative aside, a question of curious interest in itself, and of which the answer takes one rather farther than might at first be supposed. "Another question," he says, "has to do with a kind of mystery which surrounds the last years of Diderot. Whereas, for a dozen years he had published book after book: the *Pensées philosophiques*, the *Bijoux*, the *Lettre sur les aveugles*, essays on dramatic art; suddenly he ceased to publish, and, for more than twenty years, the only work which he gave to the public was the dull and tedious *Essai sur les règnes de Claude et Néron*. What could have been the cause of this sort of retirement?" Of no other great writer of the century is this true. And the question becomes almost an enigma if we remember that "the moment when he ceased to publish was precisely that which saw the completion of the *Encyclopédie*": it was the moment too when Diderot, thanks to Catherine II, became financially independent; the moment, therefore, to which he had looked forward all his life for seriously attempting the creative work which vexatious responsibilities and grinding toil had hitherto made impossible.

The plausible, surface answers to this question are all alluded to by M. Doumic, and easily disposed of as inadequate; and it seems to him that a satisfactory answer, at the present moment, is not to be had. Yet he proposes an "hypothesis, for what it is worth." The hypothesis is that Diderot, who possessed the qualities and the defects of the bourgeois, "had also the supreme ambition of the clerk who for forty years has worked faithfully at his desk, or of the man of affairs who has, during his whole life, been up at six o'clock in the morning: the desire, namely, to be one's own master, to be dependent on no one, to follow one's fancy, to enjoy life from day to day, and take the hours as

¹ *La littérature française*, V, p. 87.

they come." And in support of this hypothesis we are presented with the letter, often quoted, which Diderot wrote to Mlle. Volland, September 10, 1768. "I do nothing, absolutely nothing, not even this *salon*. It is true that at night when I go to bed my head is full of the finest projects for the morrow. But in the morning, upon rising, there is a disgust, a torpor, an aversion from pen, ink, and paper, which is an indication either of laziness or declining powers. It is much pleasanter, with legs crossed and hands folded, to remain two or three hours with Madame and Mademoiselle, bantering them about everything they say and everything they do. When at last they grow weary of me, I find it is too late to begin any work, so I dress and go out. Where? In faith, I know not: sometimes to the house of Naigeon, or Damilaville."¹

For this hypothesis there is doubtless something to be said. The correspondence of Diderot in 1765, about the time of finishing the *Encyclopédie*, reveals the pleasure with which he looked forward to his vacation, to a life of solitude, to days free of care spent with his books and his friends. But the letter which M. Doumic quotes proves rather too much, if it proves anything; the inference from it being that Diderot ceased to publish because he ceased to write. Now, it cannot be maintained that Diderot had ceased to write. The letter just quoted must not be taken for more than it is worth,—the expression of a passing fit of depression and disillusionment. In the letters of this period Diderot does not often profess to be idle; more often his tale is of some work going on; and over against the letter in which he says that he does absolutely nothing, one might set many others in which he complains of working day and night. "I think I have never worked harder in my life," he writes to Mlle. Volland, July 4, 1769. "I retire at an early hour; arise at break of day; and as long as the day lasts I stick to my study. . . . My publishers wish to print two volumes at a time."²

It is quite true that much of what he wrote during these years was written for others,—for Grimm, or Galiani; that much of it took the form of rough notes scribbled on the fly leaves of the

¹ *Oeuvres complètes*, XIX, p. 272.

² *Ibid.*, p. 309.

books he read,—notes not written for publication so much as to satisfy an insistent demand for self expression. But it has generally been supposed that much of Diderot's most original and characteristic work was produced after 1765; and the elaborate edition of his works, prepared by Assézat and published in 1876, confirms this supposition. Yet it is precisely in connection with this supposition that the essay of M. Doumic raises an interesting question. It is well known that M. Dupuy, in a critical study of one of the minor works of Diderot, the *Paradoxe sur le comédien*, has shown that the 'revision' of this work, which Assézat, along with every one else, attributed to Diderot himself, was in fact an astonishingly free recasting of Diderot's original sketch by Naigeon. And on the basis of this revelation, M. Doumic raises the larger question of whether the other posthumous works of Diderot were left by him in their present form, or whether they were not also 'revised' by Naigeon: who, after all, it is the primary purpose of his essay to ask us, was the author of the works of Diderot? It is from the point of view of this larger query that M. Doumic looks at the fact that Diderot published almost nothing after 1765: was it perhaps because there was nothing to publish,—nothing but work for others, or rough sketches which were later elaborated by Naigeon, or another, after the manner of the *Paradoxe sur le comédien*.

That Naigeon revised rather freely many of the manuscripts which Diderot left with him is quite possible. He was the man to do that sort of thing, and Diderot gave him full authority to do it. Yet it is most likely that his activity in this respect was confined to the less important manuscripts, of which the *Paradoxe* is itself an example. That Diderot did not write the *Paradoxe* in the form in which it was published after his death, one can easily suppose; that he did not write *Rameau*, for example, or the *Physiologie*, or the *Entretien*, or the *Refutation*, one can less easily believe. If Diderot did not write these works, who else, one may well ask, could have written them? Certainly not Naigeon. These works, to mention no others, are in conception so original, or in substance so profound, so oddly fashioned in point of form, so unpremeditated in point of arrangement, that

the completest criticism, it is safe to suppose, will never seriously deny that they are in fact the works of Denis Diderot.

And so the question remains, why did Diderot, who published many books when he was too busy, as he tells us, to do good work, publish none when he acquired the leisure to write, and did in fact write, some of the most profound and original works of the eighteenth century? It is quite right, in answering this question, to take M. Doumic's hypothesis for what it is worth. And it is worth a good deal. Diderot is surely the great writer of the century of whom it would be least safe to assume that publication would follow production. Expression, for Diderot, was a primary need, like breathing; a flow of talk satisfied this need best; lacking that, he wrote. Besides, some of his later works, such as the *Entretien*, were of such a nature that publication was not to be thought of. But these considerations scarcely explain why, having published almost everything that he wrote up to a certain date, he published, after that date, almost nothing, although he wrote more then than ever before; and this in spite of the fact that his publishers, as he tells us, "wish to print two books at a time." The explanation I think is partly to be found in what may be called the dilemma of Diderot; and the explanation is perhaps worth noting because the dilemma of Diderot brings into relief those social and intellectual conditions which gave to French thought in the latter part of the century a peculiar direction and a distinctive character.

II.

Modern critics and biographers of Diderot have remarked the extraordinary versatility of the man. There was scarcely any field of knowledge wholly unfamiliar to him, scarcely any question interesting to the men of his day to which he had not given much thought, or about which he was unable to say something really worth while. This was also the opinion of his contemporaries. Voltaire thought him "perhaps the one man capable of writing the history of philosophy."¹ "In every branch of human knowledge," said Marmontel, "he is so much at home . . . that

¹ *Oeuvres complètes*, XLIV, p. 190.

he seems always ready for what is said to him, and observations made on the spur of the moment strike one as the result of recent study and long meditation."¹ His published works tell the same story,—mathematics, natural science, philosophy, romance, poetry, the drama, literary and art criticism, political economy and political science, the psychological novel; and although he produced, with one possible exception, no masterpiece, nor scarcely anything systematically thought out in any of these fields, he threw the search light of his imaginative intelligence upon all of them. And Diderot's versatility was something more than familiarity with all fields of knowledge. It was the versatility which comes of the capacity to take in respect to every subject, for experimental purposes as it were, the most opposed points of view, to understand instinctively intellectual conceptions the most divergent, to experience with genuine sympathy the most antipathetic emotional states. Diderot was, as some one has said, the century itself: in him all the currents of that age, deep or shallow, crossed and went their separate ways.

And yet the multiplicity of Diderot's interests is largely on the surface; the variety of subjects with which he was occupied has somewhat obscured the essential unity of purpose which guided his all-embracing intellectual curiosity. Although he professed a profound contempt for metaphysics and religion, it is not too much to say that the only things which interested him vitally,—and it is perhaps in this that he is most truly representative of the century,—were precisely metaphysics and religion. It was not after all metaphysics that he despised, but a particular type of metaphysics,—the metaphysics that had been so largely shaped by mediaeval Christian thought; nor religion that he hated, but the Christian religion as embodied in the Catholic Church; and his aversion from the prevailing type of metaphysics and religion was tinged with contempt and hatred just because he desired above all things to put in their place a new metaphysics and a new religion, a metaphysics rationally defensible and a religion morally sound.

¹ *Mémoires*, I, p. 487.

Of these two interests, the more fundamental was that which centered in the theoretical and practical aspects of conduct. The extraordinary enthusiasm of that age for 'virtue'—"ce fonds de rectitude et de bonté morale, qui est la base de vertu," as Marmontel defined it¹—is revealed by the most cursory glance at its literature. A generous action fired even those men like Voltaire about whom there was something hard and metallic. The statement of Fontenelle, that he had "relegated sentiment to the eclogue," aroused in the cold and upright Grimm a feeling very near aversion.² The little Abbé Galiani greatly displeased Diderot one day by "confessing that he had never shed a tear in his life." Tears were thought to be the outward sign of an inward grace, and Diderot, whose tears were never far from the surface, struck his contemporaries precisely by those qualities which, by inclining them to weep, were the sure evidence of his being a man of virtue: much more than his penetrating intelligence, it was his good heart that won their devotion. His friends, says Madame d'Épinay, regard Diderot as more profound than Voltaire, "but above all it is his character about which they grow enthusiastic. Grimm says that he is the most perfect moral man he knows."³ And nothing could have pleased Diderot more than to feel that he deserved such a tribute. His devotion to virtue and morality was something more vital than the intellectual interest of a student of ethics; he wished not only to analyze virtue, but to practice it, and to induce others to practice it. He was always "preaching morality," as Sainte-Beuve says: always possessed of a profound faith in it as a reality, and as the most vital reality; always searching for an immovable basis for it in reason and nature; and although never able to find for it a quite satisfactory basis of that sort, still he preached it to the end of his life. "There is nothing in the world," he wrote about 1757, "to which virtue is not preferable."⁴ Twenty years later he was of the same opinion. "I am convinced that even in a society as ill ordered as ours, where the vice which succeeds is

¹ *Mémoires*, II, p. 195.

² *Correspondance littéraire*, III, p. 345.

³ *Mémoires*, I, p. 405.

⁴ *Oeuvres complètes*, XIX, p. 449.

often applauded, and the virtue which fails is almost always ridiculed, I am convinced, I say, that on the whole one can do nothing better for one's own happiness than to be a good man."¹

It was this profound faith in the reality and value of true morality that inspired the hatred which Diderot professed for false religions, of which Christianity, as embodied in the Catholic Church, was the chief; false, not primarily because they were based upon false premises, although that was true enough, but because they made bad men. "Wherever people believe in God, there is a cult; wherever there is a cult, the natural order of moral duties is reversed, and morality becomes corrupted."² It should be possible to have a religion based "upon the primitive and evident notions which are found written upon the hearts of all men." Such a religion, he thought, would have no unbelievers. Such a religion it was the business of philosophy to establish; or rather, 'philosophy,' as Diderot understood it, *was* such a religion; a religion which would approve itself, not primarily because it would have no unbelievers, but because it would make good men. The extraordinary lack of reserve exhibited by the writers of the century, and especially by the greatest of them, the amazing frankness with which they laid their souls bare to the public gaze has sometimes been noted as a curious phenomenon. In fact nothing could have been more in keeping: 'philosophy' was something infinitely more to them than a body of correct inferences; it was a faith, to be justified, if at all, only by the conduct and the motives, and particularly perhaps by the motives, of its devotees. Unbelief and immorality were synonyms in the language of the Church, and it was therefore essential that the man who published his unbelief as the foundation of a new morality should wear his heart on his sleeve for the world's inspection. "Yes, I am an atheist; but look into my heart and examine my conduct and you must admit that an atheist may be a good man." Diderot has always the air of crying this aloud. Rousseau's *Confessions* is only the most striking example of the disposition, shared by most of the reformers of the age, to disrobe in the market place in order to

¹ *Op. cit.*, II, p. 345.

² *Oeuvres choisies*, V, p. 16.

reveal the shining beauties of the natural man. "It is not enough," said Diderot, referring to the theologians, "to know more than they do: it is necessary to show them that we are better, and that philosophy makes more good men than sufficient or efficacious grace."¹

"It is not enough to know more than they do;" yet that was necessary too: to know more than they do in order to undermine the intellectual foundation of their false system of morality; to know more theology than the theologians in order to refute their theology; to know more science in order to discredit their appeal to miracle; to know more history in order to disprove their claim to authority; to know more psychology in order to expose the viciousness of their moral regimen. This is the secret of Diderot's interest in science and philosophy. To discredit the old theology it was necessary to attack metaphysics; and although Diderot professed to be occupied only with scientific experiment, it is clear that in his philosophical and scientific works, from the *Pensées philosophiques* to the *Physiologie*, his primary interest is in questions of a metaphysical nature; scientific experiment was necessary only as a new means of approach. What interested him in the *Physiologie* was the ontological question: Is all mind, or is all matter? What interested him in the *Lettre sur les aveugles* was the bearing of a physiological experiment upon the question of the existence of a God. And Diderot inquired so intently into all the specific scientific activity of the day just because the new metaphysics, the new conception of the origin and nature of the universe, was necessarily to be based, as the old metaphysics had not been, upon positive knowledge derived from observation and experiment.

The solution of the metaphysical problem which commended itself most strongly to Diderot, which he set forth towards the close of his life in the *Entretien* and the *Physiologie*, was what may be termed vitalistic materialism. All is matter, said Diderot, because without matter nothing can be known or explained: "The soul is nothing without the body; I defy you to

¹ *Oeuvres complètes*, XIX, p. 464.

explain anything without the body.”¹ To explain the soul in terms of matter he was quite willing to think of matter, even inorganic matter, as sentient; and many suggestive things are said for the purpose of showing, after the manner of Hamlet, how marble dust might be transformed into thought. What matter might be in itself seemed to him a fruitless question. The world is as it behaves; so regarded, matter is the manifestation, infinitely varied, and continuously changing, of the energy that moves the universe: a vortex of moving forces,—to this the substance of the world reduced itself in the final analysis.

As to the origin of a world thus constituted, one may find different answers in the works of Diderot. The deistic explanation, which he first accepted, after the manner of the English deists, was soon renounced; it raised more difficulties than it disposed of; and he was left in the end with no more satisfactory solution than chance. But if the world originated in a mere fortuitous combination of forces, what of its purpose and end? It would be difficult to inject purpose into an accident. And yet the accident seemed rational in its form and operation: nature was intelligible, and Diderot seems often, in his reverent apostrophes, to conceive of it as therefore intelligent; in moments of enthusiasm he all but deifies nature, attributing to it something very near beneficent purpose. But most often, when the question is presented directly, he can find no sufficient evidence for believing that the continuous change of form, constant and uniform though it might be, was a change from ‘lower’ to ‘higher,’ from worse to better; so far as reason went, it seemed quite as likely that the universe was returning to the dust heap from whence it came.

It would doubtless be a mistake to think of Diderot as having worked out a coherent philosophy, upon which he was ready to take his stand against all comers. If he sometimes ran his thought in the mould of logical categories, he never left it there to cool and harden. Diderot’s mind was far too plastic, too continuously generative and creative, to formulate a rigidly

¹ *Op. cit.*, IX, p. 377.

consistent, a perfectly integrated explanation of things; far too curious and inquiring, having formulated such an explanation, to surrender to it past escape. In the very act of shaping a system essentially materialistic, we find him coquetting with notions which, if resolutely pursued, might have led him to the camp of Hume. "What do I perceive? Forms. And what besides? Forms. We walk among shadows, shadows to ourselves and others. If I look at a rainbow, I see it; but for one who looks from a different angle of vision, there is nothing."¹ Diderot has often the air of wishing to avoid the conclusions to which reason led him. But he had none of Rousseau's talent for ignoring difficulties; and the conclusions of the *Entretien* and the *Physiologie* are those which, had he thought it necessary to proclaim any, he would most probably have professed.

But then what was the bearing of such a philosophy upon the problem of morality and conduct? No question that it destroyed the intellectual basis of morality as taught by the Church; but it was one of the ironies of fate that the speculative thinking of Diderot, of which the principal purpose was to furnish a firm foundation for natural morality, ended by destroying the foundation of all morality as he understood it. This was the dilemma, that if the conclusions of Diderot the speculative philosopher were valid, the aspirations of Diderot the moral man, all the vital purposes and sustaining hopes of his life, were but as the substance of a dream. For reason told him that man was after all but a speck of sentient dust, a chance deposit on the surface of the world, the necessary product of the same purposeless forces that build up crystal or dissolve granite. Aspiration, love and hope, sympathy, the belief in virtue itself,—what were these but the refined products of mechanical processes, spiritual perfumes, as it were, arising from the alternate waste and repair of brain tissue? Freedom was surely a chimera if the will could be defined as "the last impulse of desire and aversion."² And "if there is no such thing as liberty, there is no action which merits either praise or blame: there is neither vice nor virtue, nothing which can properly be rewarded or punished. What is

¹ *Oeuvres complètes*, IX, p. 428.

² *Ibid.*, II, p. 175.

it then that distinguishes men? Good action and bad action. The bad man is one whom it is necessary to destroy rather than to punish: good action is good fortune but no virtue."¹ Surely if philosophy, which was to "make more good men than sufficient or efficacious grace," could teach nothing more reassuring than that vice is something for which the individual is not responsible, something to be avoided only in so far as it might be found out, it could furnish little inspiration for the preaching of morality. In that case, the religion of philosophy, Diderot was vaguely aware, must remain as vain a delusion as the philosophy of religion.

The works of his later years reveal this conflict between the two Diderots,—Diderot the speculative philosopher unable to ignore reason, and Diderot the emotional preacher of morality unable to renounce his conviction that good action is a virtue. Turning, for example, from the *Refutation*, written in 1773, to the *Physiologie*, written in 1774, we find there, as M. Caro says, "another Diderot revealed to us."² But the most striking, the most artistic presentation of the dilemma of Diderot, and perhaps a conscious and deliberate presentation of it, is to be found in that little masterpiece, the *Neveu de Rameau*, written about 1762, probably in reply to Palissot's *Les philosophes*, but revised later and given the form in which we have it about 1772-1774.³

The real Jean François Rameau appears to have been an eccentric who amused his contemporaries by maintaining that the end of all effort was to "place something between the teeth," and so accomplish the laws of mastication. With this concise philosophy of life as a nucleus, Diderot has constructed a character compounded of pure intelligence, swelled and festering appetites, and an entire lack of feeling for any moral obligation. "He shows the good qualities that nature has bestowed upon him without ostentation, and the bad ones without the smallest

¹ *Op. cit.*, XIX, p. 436.

² *La fin du dix-huitième siècle*, I, p. 219.

³ *Oeuvres complètes*, V., p. 361. There is a later edition by Monval, prepared for the *Bibliothèque Elzéviriennne*. The essential parts of the dialogue have been translated by Lord Morley and printed as an appendix to his *Diderot*, II, p. 285.

shame,"—so Diderot speaks of him. "I have," he is made to say of himself, "a mind as round as a ball, and a character as fresh as a water-willow":—a mind, that is, to which other men's experience has added nothing, a character shedding, as a water-willow sheds water, the effects of good and evil action. In no sense the product of society, unaffected by tradition or the pressure of conventional habit, Rameau is simply Diderot's materialism personified, a creature whose will is precisely nothing but "the last impulse of desire and aversion," a kind of Frankenstein's monster such as one might construct from the principles of Diderot's *Physiologie*, an example of the natural man, stripped of all 'artificial' accretions, functioning in society as it existed, in Paris, about the year 1772.

With this creature, whose outward circumstances are those of a finished social parasite, Diderot the moral philosopher enters into conversation; and the inimitable dialogue, touching upon many things, running hither and thither without apparent object other than to while away the hour, is in reality a searching inquiry into the basis of morality. Rameau is no straw man ingeniously constructed to fall over at the right moment. He is Diderot's other self, possessed of Diderot's powerful rationalizing imagination, and of his profoundly sensuous nature, looking out upon a corrupt society in the perfectly dry light of reason untouched by sentiment or any altruistic impulse.

Now reason tells Rameau that nature, that chance combination of purposeless forces, made him what he is, "sloth, madman, and good-for-naught"; and, not being responsible for what he is, he feels no obligation, and therefore no desire, to be better than he is, but only more happy. "Everything that lives, without exception, seeks its own well being at the expense of any prey that is proper to its purposes." Therefore he, Rameau, will seek his well being, his happiness, by the "vices that are natural" to him, and not (how could that be?) by the virtues that are natural to some one else. And this is his happiness, "to drink good wines, to cram one's self with dainty dishes, to rest on beds of down; except that, all is vanity and vexation of spirit." It is useless to appeal, as Diderot does, to the higher

pleasures of self-sacrifice; these are not higher pleasures because, for Rameau, they are not pleasures at all; quite useless to appeal to the welfare of society, for happiness is individual, society is but an abstraction, and the conventional morality is only "what every one has in his mouth but what no one practices," a convenient mask which enables "men to keep the vices that are useful to them while avoiding their tone and appearance." A strange notion you philosophers have, says Rameau in effect, and all systems of morality are based upon the fallacy, that "the same kind of happiness was made for all the world." What is good for you, Diderot, may be bad for me, Rameau, and while you may suppress me I deny that you can know what makes me happy.

The dialogue ends, characteristically enough, without reaching any solution. "I see," says Diderot, speaking of the happiness to be derived from self-sacrifice and the performance of duty, "that you do not know what it is, and that you were not even made to understand it"; and Rameau replies, "so much the better." The basic thesis, which Hume thought axiomatic, that a thing is good because useful, not useful because good, was accepted without question by both Diderot and Rameau. But what is useful, and who is to judge? The dialogue turns on this. To be sure, the useful is what brings happiness; but the irresponsible creatures of a mechanical universe found that what made one happy made the other miserable; their standards of happiness were simply incommensurable, and the compact moral world dissolved under their feet in a conflict of wills.

It is worth noting again that Diderot was engaged upon the Rameau between the years 1763 and 1774, for these were probably the years when he first became fully aware of the dilemma of which it is so perfect an expression. These were the years, on the one hand, when his philosophy received its extreme and final formulation in the *Entretien* and the *Physiologie*; on the other hand, these were the years also when the question of practical morality was presented to him in the most intimate and disturbing form possible,—in connection with the education of his daughter. One consolation at least for the folly of a precipi-

tate marriage Diderot found in the child who loved him, and the correspondence reveals to us how much he was concerned, as she came to maturity, to give her a good education, an education of which the chief part was to be, as he says in the *Rameau*, "a great deal of morality." It is true, he taught her some curious morality; but his principal aim seems to have been to demonstrate that "there is no virtue without two rewards: the pleasure of doing well, and that of obtaining the good will of others."¹ This was in 1769, and it was also in 1769 that the *Entretien* was written: so that one may picture Diderot the speculative philosopher, encased in his famous dressing gown, retiring, some morning of that year, to his study, and there engaged in explaining the soul in terms of matter and motion; but in the afternoon, transformed into the doting father, coming forth to teach his child a "great deal of morality," as he walks with her in the park. This very morning, perhaps, he committed to cold paper that desolating doctrine about the will,— "last impulse of desire and aversion." And what is the moral instruction which this philosophy inspires him to convey to his daughter in the afternoon? Something original surely, something profound, at the very least something unconventional? Not at all. Excellent bourgeois that he is, he tells her to be a good girl! So strangely remote sometimes, as Diderot found, is philosophy from life.

What use to preach "a great deal of morality" to a creature whose will is nothing but "the last impulse of desire and aversion"? This was the question which came to stare Diderot in the face about the year 1765; and about the year 1765 he ceased to publish. Diderot had no intention, indeed, of publishing works like the *Entretien*, as he told Mlle. Volland when it was written. Some great constructive work on morality, which should prove that "one can do nothing better for one's own happiness than to be a good man," was, as he tells us, "the most important and the most interesting to be written"; and that was the work which he most wished to write,— "which I would recall with the most satisfaction in my last moments." But

¹ *Oeuvres complètes*, XIX, p. 321.

he never wrote such a work. "I have not even dared to take up the pen to write the first line. I say to myself: if I do not come out of the attempt victorious, I become the apologist of wickedness; I will have betrayed the cause of virtue, I will have encouraged men in the ways of vice. No. I do not feel myself equal to this sublime work; I have uselessly consecrated my whole life to it."¹ Diderot never wrote such a work; but perhaps the "dull and tedious *Essai sur les règnes de Claude et Néron*" may be taken as a frantic, half-despairing effort, at the last moment, to thrust upon the world the fragmentary and ill-digested results of his thinking on the subject.

And why indeed should a man whose ambition was to contribute something towards the regeneration of a corrupt society publish philosophical works which taught nothing more reassuring than that "good action is good fortune but no virtue?" Or works on morality which had nothing more original to say than that virtue is good action? Under the circumstances, it would be as well perhaps to throw the manuscripts into the fire. Diderot did not, indeed, throw his manuscripts into the fire; but he gave them to Naigeon.

III.

The dilemma of Diderot is chiefly interesting as a concrete example of the fundamental intellectual difficulty of the century, —fundamental at least for those who were primarily concerned for the social regeneration of France. The empirical method, announced by Locke, and carried to its logical conclusion in one direction by Hume and in another by the French materialists, was thought to be an excellent instrument, so neatly did it shelve the Absolute, so effectively bring all values to the relative test, for undermining the theoretical foundations of the *ancien régime*; and, for this purpose, excellent it undoubtedly was: effective for purposes of criticism, but, for purposes of reconstruction, not so effective; and in truth Empiricism, so far from destroying the *ancien régime*, ended by intrenching it more firmly than ever. For the last word drawn from the premises of

¹ *Op. cit.*, II, p. 345.

Locke in that century was that man and nature were one. But if man was only a part of nature, if all his action and all his thinking were determined by forces beyond his control, then 'society' must be 'natural' too; superstition was in that case as natural as enlightenment, the *ancien régime* in France no less a state of nature than primitive Gaul or second-century Rome. The identification of man and nature, and the conception of both as the necessary product of uniform natural law, had done nothing more after all than to put blind force in the place of God, and by eliminating purpose from the world leave men face to face with the *reductio ad absurdum* that "whatever is is right."

A hopeless conclusion like this might satisfy a poet in search of resignation and an epigram; and in England, where most men, if not resigned, were fairly content with things as they found them, it was generally thought to be profound. In England, indeed, much keener men than Pope, if they were suspicious of the poet's epigram, were well satisfied with the philosopher's restatement of it in terms of relative utility, as Hume restated it: whatever is is relatively good, because relatively useful, useful in relation to the conditions that produced it: a statement which in our day has been illumined, but not essentially changed, by the scientific law of survival and the results of historical research. This solution of the ethical problem was perhaps the only one possible from empirical premises; at least it is the one which would most naturally occur to one steeped in the empirical philosophy of the time. But why, in that case, did it not occur to Diderot? One might almost say that it did. Diderot, curiously enough, was in some respects nearer the modern point of view than Hume. That utility was the test of virtue, he took for granted quite in the manner of Hume; he just failed of formulating the theory of evolution in terms of natural selection;¹ the idea of progress was ready to his hand; it remained only to combine these ideas, to interpret the philosophy of 'perpetual flux' in the light of the resplendent theory of perfectibility, to have anticipated most of the characteristic political and ethical

¹ Caro, *La fin du dix-huitième siècle*, I, p. 179.

speculation of the nineteenth century. It may well be asked why after all there was any dilemma for Diderot? Since he was on the very frontier of the promised land, why did he not enter and possess it?

The answer must be sought in those social conditions which determine the drift of fruitful speculative thinking. In France men were not content with things as they found them. If the French 'philosophers' were certain of anything, they were certain that the existing régime, so far from being best, was not even relatively good, but evil, and the parent of all evil. What they needed was a standard for judging society rather than a principle for explaining it. The overturning which men like Diderot dreamed of required some fixed and sure fulcrum not to be found in the shifting sands of relative utility. And so, in France, the Absolute, so contemptuously thrown out of the window early in the century, had to be brought in again, by some back stairs or other, at its close. To weigh the *ancien régime* in the balance and find it wanting, it was necessary to separate society from nature once more, to make a distinction between the natural and the artificial man, to disengage the abstract man, naturally good, from the tangled skein of temporary circumstance which made him bad.

It is well known that such a separation was effected by Rousseau: "man is born free, but is everywhere in chains," "naturally good, it is society which corrupts him,"—so ran the famous formula of the new dualism. But Rousseau cut the knot instead of untying it; and it is worth noting that many of those who denounced his methods were themselves seeking for some valid principle which would effect just this separation of the natural from the artificial man. It would be interesting to follow Diderot himself in the vain search for such a principle: his recurring interest in contrasting the sentiments of the savage with those of the civilized man; his attempt to find some instinct common to all men, such as pity, from which the social virtues might be derived; above all, perhaps, his desperate resolve, revealed in his correspondence with Falconet, to see in the lessons of history and in the judgments of posterity some stand-

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ard, more or less absolute, by which the particular act, the concrete institution, might be judged:—what was all this but the effort to discover, as Kant said, “the constant elements in man’s nature in order to understand what sort of perfection it is that befits him”?¹

Few men, it is true, were philosophers enough to be troubled by the difficulty which Diderot never solved, and which Kant himself solved only with the aid of Rousseau. To the unphilosophical person the difficulty presented itself in a less technical form. Many a ‘fervent soul,’ like Madame Roland, whose emotional nature had found abundant nourishment in the literature of Catholicism, renounced the harsh creed of the Church only to be chilled by the cold and barren rationalism of the very philosophers whose works had pointed the way to intellectual emancipation. “The atheist,” said Madame Roland, “is seeking for a syllogism, while I am offering up my thanksgivings.” “Helvetius hurt me,” she says in another place. “He destroyed the most ravishing illusions, and showed me everywhere a mean and revolting self-interest. *I persuaded myself that he delineated mankind in the state to which it had been reduced by the corruption of society.*”² Here was a mind already attuned to the siren voice of the man whose over-topping egoism enabled him to credit himself with virtues which he regarded as natural, while charging his neighbors with vices which he felt had been thrust upon him by an artificial society. To direct Kant on the way to fruitful speculation in the rare upper regions of pure philosophy, and at the same time to inspire Madame Roland and her kind with an unquenchable faith in the fair destiny of humanity, required other talents than those which Diderot possessed.

CARL BECKER.

LAWRENCE, KANSAS.

¹ *Sämmtliche Werke*, II, p. 319. Quoted in Hoffding, *Hist. of Phil.*, II, p. 72.

² *Works of Madame Roland*, II, pp. 108, 115.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

La Pensée et les Nouvelles Écoles anti-intellectualistes. Par Alfred Fouillée. Deuxième Edition. Paris, Librairie Félix Alcan, 1911. —pp. xvi, 415.

This volume is the last complete work which Alfred Fouillée gave to the world. A glance at the list of his writings shows how wide was the range of his intellectual effort and how active his pen. His death removed one of the most productive, and, it may be added, one of the ablest philosophers of the time. The newer currents of thought, which for the moment have made Bergson the almost exclusive centre of interest, have tended to withdraw attention from the more systematic and classical thinkers in France. Without doubt, too, the same influences have led to an enormous exaggeration, at least in popular thought, of the importance of what the new philosophy has to offer.

The fashion of the day in philosophy is unmistakable. There is a demand for something new and agreeable. Many, it is evident, are determined to take what they want, whether a clear title of possession can be established or not. Philosophy *à la mode* must first of all discredit science, proving it to be a bankrupt who escapes disaster only by a brave outward appearance. Scientific scepticism becomes the ready sponsor of philosophic and religious faith. When nothing is surely known one may believe anything one chooses; and the inability to offer complete and rigorous disproof of a thing, however improbable, constitutes 'the right to believe' it. If I cannot positively demonstrate that there are no snakes at the North Pole, I am quite at liberty to assert their presence there, and in case I may have wished to reach the pole, I can console myself for failure by the reflection that I thereby avoid the snakes. Philosophy must not be too rigorous in its criticism, but must leave numerous loose ends of belief dangling for the drowning to catch at. It must also have scrupulous regard for the natural desires and even the capricious longings of human nature. These, as immediate data of experience, will easily assume the rôle of intuitions. No one is so poor in mental resources as not to be able to afford the luxury of some amiable and consoling intuitions; and, thanks to the new philosophy, one is assured that these may be regarded as ultimate and authoritative truths. It is further a part of the new creed that those ideas which seem to work well are

true; and they are true because they work well, they do not work well because they are true. If hard pressed to justify any accepted belief one can always retire within the borders of mysticism. That is the silent land where no voice of logic or reason is heard, so that the traveler there is protected from every challenge of the intellect.

Such, in brief, are the prevailing winds of doctrine. Against them Fouillée set himself to write. In the preface of the work he points out that he was one of the first to react against the excesses of intellectualism. In his psychological analysis he gave the primacy to the will. But at the end of his career he found himself clearly opposed to the anti-intellectualists of the day, represented in various quarters by empiricists, intuitionists, pragmatists, sceptics, and those advocates of faith who desire the mantle of philosophy to give dignity to their theology. These misologists, to use Plato's term, however radically they may differ in other respects, all agree in accepting Pascal's dictum, "*Taisez-vous, raison imbécile.*" As the Chanticleer of the poet pretends that it is his morning song that makes the sun rise, so the new philosophy, losing the conviction of objective principles, makes truth depend upon subjective interpretations.

American readers of Fouillée's work will find their interest centering in the latter half of the volume, where he deals critically with the new philosophy of the sciences, with pragmatism, and with intuitionism. I shall confine the present discussion to this portion of the book, and shall attempt by a free rendering of the author's thought to present his essential position. The study of Fouillée may be warmly commended to American students of philosophy, and especially to our academic youth who, because reflective reason does not give them all they crave in the presence of the problems of existence, are often tempted to put their trust in short and easy methods.

In analyzing the modern philosophy of the sciences Fouillée finds that its pretended novelties reduce to three contentions, viz.: (1) the artificial nature of the definitions, principles, and postulates of science; (2) the purely provisional character of all scientific truths or laws; and (3) the acceptance of convenience as a criterion of the best conventions and as a substitute for truth.

It is inexact and misleading, he insists, to say with M. Le Roy and others that the concepts and definitions of science are decrees or fiats of intelligence for which one could substitute the opposite. In geometry, for example, the postulates which serve as definitions impose themselves upon us by virtue of our mental constitution in relation to the constitution of extended objects. They are therefore

not arbitrary, nor could the opposite be substituted for them. They do not depend upon any fiat, whether of one individual or of all individuals. It is true, of course, that different geometries, free from all logical contradiction, can be derived from different systems of definitions and postulates. It would be astonishing if this were not the case, since given principles, both true and false, must yield their logical consequences. Such inner logical harmony, however, proves absolutely nothing as to the truth of the principles themselves. If we suppose that only even numbers exist and gratuitously suppress all the odd numbers, there will result an arithmetic of even numbers. Or in a system of political economy one might assume certain elements of the actual order eliminated, for example, the altruistic sentiments which counterbalance in part the sentiments of egoistic interests. In such a system all sorts of logical consequences could be drawn which would be, like the present formulations of economics, partially susceptible of mathematical statement. One would not flatter oneself, however, that by such a procedure anything had been established concerning the actual economic order. And if the representatives of certain new geometries were as skilled in logic as they are in algebra, they would never imagine that they had established either possibilities or realities by their hypotheses and deductions.

What then of the contention of M. Poincaré and others that "one geometry is no more true than another"? All here depends upon what one understands by "true." If it mean simply internal coherence of demonstration following accepted hypotheses, then obviously any one will be as true as any other. But if truth be interpreted to mean truth of premises and principles as well as of consequences, the case is obviously quite different.

Fouillée also subjects to criticism the current views which would represent mechanics and astronomy as tissues of convention. What, he asks, of the inertia of matter as a mere postulate? "Admettre l'inertie, c'est appliquer le principe de causalité et conclure que, étant donné un système mécanique qui est animé d'un mouvement déterminé, une nouvelle cause mécanique sera nécessaire pour modifier le mouvement du système. Si l'on objecte que nous ne pouvons pas *expérimenter* sur des systèmes dégagés de toute influence extérieure, cela prouve précisément que notre affirmation de l'inertie est une déduction de l'absence de causalité spontanée qui caractérise la matière. Nous faisons abstraction de tout libre arbitre inhérent aux molécules matérielles; et comme, jusqu'ici, aucune molécule ne nous en a réservé la surprise, notre déduction et notre induction s'appliquent à la réalité.

Où donc est la convention? où est le décret de l'esprit? Nous sommes en plein déterminisme causal. Le jour où nous verrons un rocher se mettre vraiment *tout seul* en marche, nous en déduirons la présence en lui d'une volonté analogue à celle des êtres vivants, et il ne nous restera plus que deux choses au choix: ou bien adorer le rocher comme le sauvage, ou bien déterminer en biologiste ce nouveau genre d'êtres vivants" (p. 239).

For the rest, the theory that would make science consists of a group of conventions always moves in a vicious circle. No valid convention or hypothesis is arbitrary. It is always chosen for a reason and has its sufficient logical ground. Against the dictum of Poincaré that "Science is a collection of conventions that harmonize," Fouillée would assert that "Science is a collection of reasoned propositions that harmonize only in the measure in which they are not mere conventions."

In opening the discussion of pragmatism Fouillée seeks for a definition of the doctrine, a task made difficult by the diversified forms which it has taken; in fact, there are as many pragmatisms as there are pragmatists. "Pragmatism," he says, "is the theory which refuses to the intelligence a power of true, objective knowledge, and sees in it only an instrument of action useful and efficient for varied human ends."

As regards the psychological aspects of the theory there are shown to be significant resemblances to Fouillée's own doctrine of *idées-forces*, but also important differences which can not be disregarded. The doctrine of *idées-forces* recognized fully the dynamic and functional aspects of ideas. These aspects, however, Fouillée considers from a truly scientific point of view, that of causality. States of consciousness have unquestionably the power to produce effects. As these effects may be servicable for human ends, the principle of finality must be recognized and given its appropriate place. But finality will always be subordinated to a prior or superior relation, that of causal agreement between thought and the objects of experience, in other words, truth. The truth of experience is thus a case of reciprocal causality discovered in the mutual action of objects upon us and of ourselves upon objects. Instead of saying with James that the functional efficiency of ideas constitutes their entire logical content, Fouillée urges that ideas are efficient only in the degree in which they mean something logically and experimentally, only if they correspond to exact connections and relations. These connections may be of various kinds, existing between different judgments, or between the

objects of experience, or between our judgments and movements and these objects. The truth of an idea constitutes its power; the power of an idea, in itself alone, does not make it true. It is important not to reverse the order of these terms.

Pragmatists have insisted upon the cases in which we make ideas true by believing them, as when James asserts that the belief in one's ability to jump a ditch is a necessary condition of the successful jump. Fouillée in *La Liberté et le Déterminisme* has likewise said that it is necessary to believe in the possibility of victory over the passions in order to conquer them. But Fouillée well says that if our ideas can be thus realized it is due to the inner power and the external possibilities which these ideas include and express.

Another form of pragmatic statement says: "Think of a thing, and behold! it becomes something more." In this Fouillée sees the exaggeration and misapplication of a true doctrine. Obviously this proposition would apply only to such things as can be modified by the action of our thought. When, for example, I think of a beautiful star, it is I who become something more in thinking of its beauty; the star does not change in its serene course through the heavens.

The inner contradiction of pragmatism in maintaining that intelligence is only an instrument of voluntary action upon nature in the satisfaction of human desires, lies in the fact that successful action of this kind depends upon foresight. "Pouvoir et prévoir sont inséparables. L'intelligence, pour être un moyen d'action et de sentiment, doit donc être avant tout un moyen de connaissance et avoir une valeur de véracité" (p. 288). Thus the fundamental error of pragmatism is the confusion of reciprocal causality with finality, the act of intelligence seeking to understand the interaction of external things with the act of will pursuing subjective ends. Pragmatism not only misconceives the necessary agreement of our thought and our needs with objects, but it also misconceives the necessary agreement of one thought with other thoughts. This latter agreement, no less than the former, is a characteristic mark of truth.

Fouillée considers the various interpretations which pragmatic epistemology has offered. One of these is the identification of truth with that which is useful for life, which aids in the struggle for existence. But are all truths useful for life? How about the truth that we must all die? Not infrequently two opposing beliefs produce the same useful action, provided they are both held with equal assurance. Faith in Jehovah and faith in Baal may well have inspired the same courage in battle and have been equally efficient biologically. Can we

conclude that two such contradictory beliefs are at the same time equally true? Thought unquestionably has its origin in life and its function in the preservation and increase of life. But this is clear evidence that it has an objective value, since life is everywhere subject to determined conditions which are imposed by nature, not by our wills.

Pragmatism also invokes as a criterion of truth sentiments and feelings of satisfaction, including of course intellectual satisfaction. It is freely granted that the validity and harmony of ideas is a source of satisfaction, but the essential condition of such satisfaction is that there should be first of all a reality and truth independent of our satisfaction. He who reasons well is satisfied with his reasoning, but it is not because he is satisfied that he reasons well; people who reason badly are often quite as well satisfied with their folly.

American readers may recall that a writer of philosophy among us some years ago declared it to be a beneficent work to construct a "comforting" philosophy. It goes without saying that for most of us a philosophy constructed for this purpose would not be at all comforting, simply because it would always be open to the suspicion of having followed subjective desires rather than the objective order of truth.

The pragmatism of James, Fouillée finds, abandons in the end its characteristic position and in the last resort says obscurely what all the logicians say in clear terms, when it is admitted that ideas become true in so far as they aid us in entering into satisfying relations with other parts of our experience. For the relations which make one part of experience agree with other parts of experience are logical relations at the same time that they are relations of fact.

The religious significance of pragmatism also receives attention. Fouillée finds here the *arrière-pensée* of many of its advocates. Religion, so their thought runs, has utility; it consoles us in the midst of the evils of the world; it sustains us in sorrow, sickness, and death; it exalts and purifies the soul; hence religion is true. Religion is thus placed on the same footing as science; each is judged true by its practical efficiency. But this view again involves the confusion of subjective and objective without distinction or method. Scientific ideas prove their value by their efficacy in the sense that they permit us to verify the agreement of our conceptions and previsions with our sensations derived from real things. The touch-stone is outside of us, of our will, our desires. Religious ideas, on the contrary, involve reference to objects incapable, in their very nature, of such verification,

and their subjective effect upon our inner states, however happy it may be, is no proof of the objective truth of their content. False ideas, too, may be effective, and, where the ignorant are concerned, they are often more effective than true ones. What of the efficacy of religions among other peoples and other ages? The sacrifice of infants to Moloch gave to the Carthaginians a serene confidence and an indomitable courage, the sure pledge of victory in battle. To-day Islam exercises a tremendous influence upon its disciples. The *fatum mahumetanum* gives them strength in trial and resignation in the presence of death; the miracles of Mahomet transport their souls; and Mahomet's paradise with its *houris* fills them with delighted hopes. To conclude that the ideas belonging to the religion of Moloch and of Mahomet have objective value, and to compare their efficacy with that of science, is to identify two distinct and opposing kinds of efficacy, —one exercising itself upon given objects, the other upon ourselves without direct proof of anything outside.

The final verdict upon pragmatism in view of its historical genesis and relations is pithily and briefly expressed: “ *Vera, vetusta, nova, falsa.*”

The last chapter of the book is devoted to intuitionism, that form of anti-intellectualistic theory of which Bergson is at present the chief representative and sponsor. Tracing the historical descent of intuitionism, Fouillée notes that the characteristic feature of contemporary forms of the doctrine is that they seek to find super-sensible and super-rational intuitions, which Kant has denied, especially intuitions of life, of spirituality, of creative liberty, identified with the feeling of duration and becoming. Science, according to this view, proceeds only by means of concepts formed in the interest of practice, and is consequently pragmatic and utilitarian. Philosophy, on the contrary, gives a supra-intellectual contact with reality, a perfect knowledge, where knowledge and production coincide. The intuition of Plato, Plotinus, and Schelling, has thus descended from the world of intelligence into the stream of changing and temporal life.

The intuition of our own inner life reduces, says Fouillée, simply to the spontaneous or reflective consciousness of active or passive changes in us, which reveal nothing whatever except our own existence, or rather our becoming. As for the intuition of other beings, there are, it is said, two fundamentally different ways of knowing a thing, the first when one moves around it, the second when one enters into it. To this Fouillée replies: “ Sans doute; mais comment y entrer? et qu'est-ce ici qu' 'entrer,' qu'est-ce que 'tourner autour'? Voilà

la difficulté. Nous nous saisissons directement nous-mêmes parce que nous sommes tout entrés en nous; mais comment pénétrons-nous en autrui? Pour cela, la *comparaison* et l'*induction* semblent les seuls moyens *méthodiques*. On en propose pourtant un autre, par crainte des 'concepts,' produits de l'induction et de la comparaison; on propose la *sympathie*. Ainsi apparaît un nouveau sens de l'intuition; elle devient 'cette espèce de *sympathie intellectuelle* par laquelle on se transporte à l'intérieur d'un objet pour coïncider avec ce qu'il a d'unique et par conséquent d'inexprimable' " (p. 349).

But it is impossible to place myself within an object. I cannot coincide with it, still less with what it contains that is unique, inexpressible, and incommunicable; for then the object would be no longer unique; I should become its like, its double, or, still more impossible, I should become itself. The most intimate sympathy with one's fellows cannot escape the method of thought. Intuition, then, can at best yield a view only of our immediate inner states, and these have far less value for the interpretation of the world outside of us than have our concepts and ideas. As far as the representation of reality by pure sympathy is concerned, it could only result in transposing it into human terms, *ex analogia hominis*. All philosophers, to be sure, have agreed that our inner consciousness is the sole means by which we mortals can represent to ourselves the inner character of things, but they have also agreed that this means must be employed with method, and that due account must be taken of the way in which things manifest themselves externally to us. All possible sympathy with the stone in the road would not justify me in placing within it a conscious will as the savage does.

The intuition appears still more inadequate when we pass to the realm of the ideal. The very word indicates that we are in the presence of ideas, that we are obliged to 'Platonize,' to conceive a possible reality other and better than what now is. The supreme function of philosophy is to acquire ideas which may be forces capable of modifying reality, not merely in view of our material needs but rather in view of our higher needs. If by 'Platonizing' is understood the act of conceiving abstractions and of lending them a fictitious existence, then we need to be aware of the process. But removed from the abstract to living and concrete reality it must remain the essence of all philosophy: " Sans idées, pas d'ideal; sans idées, pas de réalité autre que le point présent de notre devenir individuel " (p. 361). The claim of Bergson that concepts are discrete and relative is ably treated by Fouillée. Of course they are, he replies,

and yet less so than intuitions. As for discreteness, it is the concept, not the intuition, that unites and binds together different times, places, beings, and consciousnesses. It is equally true that the concept is less relative than the intuition, attaining a larger degree of objective truth. As living beings ascend the scale they become more and more dependent upon the laws of life given in concepts and ideas, which enable us to escape the bondage of momentary stimuli and to act under the guidance of reflective intelligence. Instead of gaining the heart of things; intuitions have only a subjective reach of modal and qualitative affections within the individual consciousness. As regards the vital problem of epistemology intuitions completely fail. They are only points of view seized in passage and would be swallowed up in darkness were it not for memory, reflection, and the intellectual operation of the idea.

Bergson, replying to those who like Fouillée criticize the so-called immediate intuitions, says that the return to the immediate removes contradictions and oppositions by making the problem at issue disappear. "This power of the immediate," declares Bergson, "I mean its capacity to resolve oppositions by suppressing the problems, is in my view the external mark by which true intuition is recognized." The obvious but significant answer of Fouillée is that the problem is suppressed only in the sense that it is ignored.

For my own part, I believe that this answer goes straight to the heart of the matter. Indeed, it might well be made the text of an exposition of the rôle which the immediate or intuitive element really plays in our mental life. Of course the intuitions of immediate experience must make the conceptual problems which perplex us disappear, for by definition *they and not the problems* are for the moment the objects of attention. What is the significance of the emphasis which Bergson has freshly placed upon such immediacy? Is it anything new or marvellous? I think not. On the contrary, the truth is an old one, and, strangely enough, the very truth that all sound empirical method, both in science and philosophy, has taught over and over again. It is, in brief, the truth that the material, the content, of all thought must be caught in immediate and direct contact with reality, whether the real be external to us or our own inner life. This content speedily becomes outworn, fossilized, and inadequate, unless it is constantly renewed by fresh contact with the living stream of reality. The doctrine of immediacy is not a constitutive principle of knowledge, but a regulative maxim, which bids us never to rest satisfied with the past, but to keep every concept and idea open to

revision and enlargement by means of fresh observations, tests, and trials. Failing to obey this maxim, science easily degenerates into dogmatism, and philosophy into barren intellectualism. But the other side of the shield cannot be ignored. No sooner is the intuition secured than, by the inherent logic of the mental life, it is put in conceptual form, the form of ideas. Otherwise it will remain isolated and sterile, incapable of serving the ends of pure knowledge or of practical activity. The intuition is merely an immediate datum and is unrelated to our mental life as an organized system of ideas. To pass current either in our own world or in that of our fellows it must receive the stamp of the concept. From the circle in which we pass from immediacy to reflection, from intuition to conception, and then back again, there is and can be no escape. But to attribute to any so-called intuitions our ideas of free-will, spirituality, becoming, evolution, or creation, is a strange and misleading confusion; every one is a concept, the work of reflection upon a vast number of immediate experiences.

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Les Étapes de la Philosophie mathématique. Par LÉON BRUNSCHVICG. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1912.—pp. xi, 591.

This substantial work, which may be described as an attempt at a philosophy of mathematics on an historical basis, is divided into seven books. The first six of these books are in the main historical, giving something of the history of mathematical science as well as of mathematical philosophy. In the last book the author gives his own views in the form of a digest of the previous historical material. As the titles of the different books indicate, the author has endeavored to combine the topical with the chronologic treatment of the subject, and this he has skillfully accomplished by means of very generous omissions. Thus the book on arithmetic ends with Pythagoras, and the next book, on geometry, begins with Plato. The book on the evolution of arithmetism, coming after the criticism of Kant and Comte, deals rather lightly with the arithmetical ideas of Cauchy, Renouvier and Méray. Thus the whole history of arithmetic from the days of Pythagoras to almost the middle of the nineteenth century is omitted, and with it all attempt to estimate the leading arithmetical ideas of men like Gauss or what is technically called the theory of numbers. Similarly M. Brunschvicg dispenses with any systematic treatment of the significance of modern work on the theory of surfaces, line geometry, theory of functions, or vector analysis.

Non-metrical geometry, which some have regarded as one of the most original creations of the nineteenth century, is hardly mentioned (Von Staudt's name does not occur at all). In view of the vast amount of ground covered in this volume, these omissions (like the omission of any reference to the influential though superficial views on mathematics of men like Mill and Schopenhauer), would not be noted except for M. Brunschvicg's assertion (p. vii) that only in a complete survey of the progress of mathematical thought can truth be secured.

The three chapters which constitute Book I, are devoted respectively to the arithmetical operations of 'primitive' peoples, the mathematical content of the Rhind Papyrus, and the Pythagorean philosophy. No logical coherence of these topics is claimed, nor is there any intention to regard the Pythagorean philosophy as on the same level or 'stage' as 'primitive' or Egyptian thought. The reason given for bringing these topics together is that it is necessary to study the mathematical processes of naïve intelligence as well as the body of reflective thought. (M. Brunschvicg uses instead of the latter, the term *dogmatic*.) There is no attempt, however, to show any vital or organic connection between the dogmatic thought of Pythagoras and the unreflective thought embodied in contemporary Greek mathematics. M. Brunschvicg does, undoubtedly, give us many ingenious suggestions as to how reflection on the problems of mathematics determined the philosophy of Plato, Descartes, and Kant, but he never asks the question, why reflective thought, or the dogmatic tradition, arises at all? If he had, he might not have so readily accepted the prevailing misology which regards all dogmatic or philosophic systems as bodies of death, shutting up spontaneous thought, and having no function except the 'bookish' or pedagogic one.

Although Book II is entitled Geometry it by no means restricts itself to that topic, but contains very suggestive accounts of the mathematical philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, Euclid, and the Cartesian school. It seems rather peculiar that Pythagoras should be treated only under the head of arithmetic, and not at all under the head of geometry. But, according to M. Brunschvicg's theory (in which he follows Milhaud), the Pythagorean philosophy considered only finite integers as real, and the discovery of incommensurables lead to its breakdown and to the rise of the Platonic philosophy. This view offers grave difficulties, especially in view of the contributions which the Pythagoreans undoubtedly made to geometry and the antiquity which Aristotle attributes to the discovery of incommensurables; but it offers a very effective approach to the philosophy of Plato which

is thus presented as an effort to show that the intelligible extends beyond the realm of numbers. The Platonic method is shown to consist in the regressive analysis of the sensible data until we come to fundamental hypotheses, and these by a dialectic process are deduced from super-sensible principles. The first part of this, the belief that the function of thought is one of analysis, that it is exercised with the aid of the science of numbers and figures, and that step by step it discovers the mathematical relations in the texture of phenomena (p. 70), M. Brunschvicg regards as the essence of positive science and the truth of philosophy, and in that sense Plato did succeed in extracting from mathematics a universal method; but the second part, connecting the mathematical numbers with Ideas or ideal numbers, led to obscurity which caused the downfall of the whole Platonic system, and its replacement by that of Aristotle until the Renaissance. Here, as elsewhere, the author confuses the stages of his discourse with the facts of real history. In point of fact, of course, Platonism did not suffer any such fall or total eclipse, and in the form of Neo-Platonism at least (which does not happen to interest M. Brunschvicg), it kept up a rather vigorous existence. Moreover, the neo-Platonism of the Renaissance was not, as he supposes, altogether positivistic, but full of metaphysical speculation, as the writings of Kepler and Galileo amply testify.

Although Aristotle is painted as an empiricist, founding his organon on biologic science, and discarding the Platonic metaphysic (or meta-mathematics), still our author seems to have for him very little intellectual sympathy. If Platonism is "the science of the connection between ideas—real science," Aristotelianism is "apparent science, the science of verbal classification" (p. 45). M. Brunschvicg seems to be under the impression that Aristotle got his categories from the grammars of his day, and his grasp of Aristotle's thought in this connection is shown by the fact that he does not discuss the latter's theory of predication or the importance of the category of *οὐσία*. Possibly if he had, he would not have made the astounding and indefensible identification of the modern logistic movement with the syllogistic of Aristotle, since the former involves a radical criticism of the substantive-attribute theory of predication. In this connection it is well to note that it is essential to Aristotelianism to restrict mathematics to quantity, which modern logistics certainly does not. M. Brunschvicg also admits that the view of modern logic which reduces the major premise to an hypothesis is a departure from the Aristotelian theory.

It is significant of our author's own thought that he does not sympathize with Aristotle's effort to get from the order of knowing to the order of being (p. 79).

The *Elements* of Euclid is regarded as the product of the same spirit as the *Analytics* of Aristotle. Both succeeded in acquiring the appearance of eternal truth independent of historical origins (p. 85). But while outwardly modeled on the Aristotelian logic of classes, the material for a logic of relations is found in the *Elements*, especially in the books on proportion and on irrationals. But the Greeks could not free themselves from the view that mathematics is necessarily a qualitative study of quantity. It required the technical extension of modern mathematics, before the Cartesian generalization of geometry could become possible. By extending Algebra over the realm of geometry the Platonic idea of a universal mathesis is revived, and the algebraic equation becomes "the reason of the determination of the universe" (p. 121). Quantity is no longer drawn by abstraction from the observation of things, but is established a priori by the power of reason (p. 123). There is, to be sure, still in Descartes a certain amount of dualism between spatial quantity and pure algebraic quantity, but these are united into one by Malebranche and Spinoza. In the latter's *Ethics*, mathematics again becomes the science of pure ideas or reality (pp. 147-148).

Book III, dealing with the development of the infinitesimal calculus, and especially with the philosophy of Leibniz, seems to be merely an elaborate interlude or mere episode in this intellectual drama; for in Book IV, devoted to Kant and Comte, the Cartesian thought is resumed and space remains "with Kant the necessary mediator, with Comte the privileged mediator, for the connection of the abstract relations which constitute science, and the empirical facts which constitute reality" (p. 341). Thus the logic of spatial relations continues to dominate science. But the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry has shown that mathematics does not give us a unique determination of space, and the development of analysis has shown that the latter is not dependent on spatial intuition, while the development of physics has shown that the classical mechanics is not the only possible scientific view of the physical world. Hence, according to M. Brunschvicg, the reaction against the logic of spatial relations in the latter part of the nineteenth century. This reaction naturally takes the form of a Neo-Pythagoreanism, or revival of a philosophy or logic of numbers, and a Neo-Aristotelianism or revival of the logic of classes. Books V and VI are devoted to these two movements respectively.

Book V, on the Evolution of Arithmetism, is the shortest in the volume and seems to grow out of a preconceived scheme rather than out of its subject matter. It treats in the main of two topics: (1) the arithmetization of modern analysis, and (2) a certain French philosophic movement rightly called *finitisme* (Renouvier, etc.). The treatment of the former topic is very inadequate. M. Brunschvicg does not seem to realize that the movement began at the end of the eighteenth century with the work of Gauss, and even as far back as Lagrange, and that it is essentially part of the effort of modern mathematics to insist on absolute rigor in demonstration and to eliminate *spatia lintuition*, because the later—apart from Non-Euclidean geometry—is often misleading and almost always inadequate. The result of this purely technical movement has been to establish methods for our calculus or analysis that are demonstrably just as rigorous as the methods of finite arithmetic. Now the establishment of this homogeneity between the finite integers and other mathematical entities like irrationals, complex numbers etc. (the latter being operations of integers), does certainly render the position of *finitisme* (Renouvier, Evellin, etc.) untenable, but it does not seem to be decisive of the question of nominalism with which M. Brunschvicg connects it. Those who believe that imaginaries, etc., are pure fictions or nominal symbols must now believe that 2 or 7 are likewise so, whereas those who hold integers to represent something objective in nature, must now hold complex and higher numbers to be equally objective. The whole question really depends on whether we shall call all operations or transformations 'mental,' and to the solution of this question mathematics supplies only part of the material.

It might be noted, to the discomfiture of M. Brunschvicg's historical schematism, that the position of Renouvier that only finite integers are representative of reality, is really a reassertion of the Aristotelian doctrine that all actuality is finite and the infinite never more than potential; while logistic philosophers like Mr. Russell are in fact *Platonic* realists. However, M. Brunschvicg's sins in the sixth book, are more serious than schematic illusions.

This sixth book consists of three chapters, one giving an account of the formation of the logistic philosophy of mathematics, and the other two the author's criticism of the work of Mr. Russell.

The development of this philosophy is traced to the growth of symbolic logic and to the *Mengenlehre* of Cantor. The purely philosophical motives such as those which Russell owes to Moore are ignored,—probably because M. Brunschvicg does not think it neces-

sary to inform himself carefully about contemporary English philosophy (see his reference to Reid, p. 390), and seems to be unaware of the existence of a problem about the nature of judgment. But even the technical mathematical influences are not adequately appreciated. The account of the development of symbolic logic is based on insufficient secondary sources (see e.g. his reference to Peirce, p. 379), so that he does not realize how completely the logic of classes is subordinated in modern symbolic logic. While the account of the influence of Cantor's work is somewhat more satisfactory, M. Brunschvicg's schematism makes him miss here the predominant importance of the arithmetization of mathematics. The latter movement has furthered the main logistic thesis, viz., the identity of *pure* mathematics and symbolic logic, first by insisting on rigorous logical proof where formerly we were satisfied to rely on self-evidence or intuition, and secondly, by making the field of mathematics more homogeneous, it has pressed the necessity of greater generality in the definition of the fundamental operations of arithmetic. What, for instance, do we mean by *multiplication*, if this process applies to series? Here, contrary to M. Brunschvicg's assumption of the complete futility of symbolic logic for mathematical investigations (p. 426), symbolic logic becomes a real and needed help in mathematical research.

Although M. Brunschvicg puts his criticisms of the logistic philosophy in historical form, they are, in the vicious sense, *a priori*, *i. e.*, they are based on assumed self-evident principles which the subject matter in no way necessitates. Among the principles which M. Brunschvicg assumes, and from which he argues are: (1) that all logic is purely analytic, in the sense that it is based on the principle of identity, and hence there can be nothing in the conclusion which was not already in the premises; and (2) that truth can relate only to actually existent entities, hence a pure mathematics or symbolic logic which applies as well to physically non-existent entities must be futile for real 'science.' Now if the claims of modern logistics are inconsistent with these principles, may we not venture to ask whether perhaps these principles are false?

Let us consider the matter from the point of view of the enlightened empiricism which M. Brunschvicg professes and which insists on an examination of the facts of a case instead of an obstinate reliance on preconceived principles which tell us that certain facts cannot possibly be.

The fundamental thesis of the logistic movement is that the whole of what we call pure mathematics can be logically deduced from certain

principles which are also the principle of symbolic logic. This deduction they claim not only as possible but as actually having been accomplished in diverse works of which Russell's *Principles of Mathematics*, and Whitehead and Russell's *Principia Mathematica* may be taken as examples. Obviously the only way to answer this claim is not to keep on shouting forever: "This is impossible because logic can never give us anything but tautologies;" but to show that this alleged deduction or derivation breaks down at definite points. This is precisely what M. Brunschvicg does not do. Indeed there is strong evidence of the fact that he has not read the *Principia* at all, or the *Principles* with any care. The evidence for this serious charge against one who writes as an historian and claims for his judgment the character of being in some sense definitive (p. 394), is to be found in his claim that the whole of Russell's system is founded on the Aristotelian logic of classes and on an ontologic realism as to the existence of these classes. As a matter of fact the logic and ontology of classes figures very slightly in the main argument of the *Principles* and not at all in the *Principia*. Explicitly and emphatically the authors of the *Principia* point out that the ontologic existence of classes is in no way necessary for the argument; and the theory of types constructed to do away with the difficulty in the notion of a class of all classes is already indicated in the appendix to the *Principles*.

The other objections brought against the logistic position are based on the same lack of familiarity with the content of the *Principia* or *Principles*. Thus one chapter is devoted to an attack on the idea of an absolute deduction. But the *Principia* explicitly disclaims the idea of an absolute deduction and merely claims that the principles it sets up are sufficient to enable us to deduce the laws of mathematics from them; and while in the *Principles* Russell does argue for the Newtonian conception of absolute time and space, and the real existence of points and instants, his arguments only prove that the Newtonian position does not involve any self-contradiction, and can, therefore, logically exist. A careful reading of the *Principles*, however, shows that this argument is not a necessary part of the main thesis, and Mr. Russell, if I understand him, has already modified his position in regard to the absolute existence of points. But even if he has not, it would seem fair to demand of a historian that he distinguish between the fundamental thesis of an important intellectual movement and the particular beliefs of its most noted philosophical representative.

Another set of difficulties assigned as the cause of the alleged disso-

lution of the logistic philosophy, is the difficulty arising from an analytic interpretation of mathematics. Assuming quite needlessly that all logical procedure must be analytical, M. Brunschvicg finds in Russell's and Couturat's assertion about mathematical judgments being synthetic, evidence of the bankruptcy of logistics which professes to carry out the Leibnizian idea of a universal calculus and to be opposed to the Kantian view of a synthesis founded in a priori intuition. The procedure of this argument is based on a violent refusal to understand what is really very clearly stated. Russell, in his *Principles* and especially in his book on Leibniz, and Couturat in his *Principes*, very clearly and explicitly point out that logic cannot be founded exclusively on the principle of identity. This, however, is in no way an argument for the Kantian position that the proposition $7+5=12$ is logically indemonstrable or based on sensory intuition. That logical procedure involves some form of *intellectual* intuition or apprehension is, of course, necessary for the logistic position, and Russell and Couturat have clearly admitted it. In this connection M. Brunschvicg might be reminded that, according to his own account, the Aristotelian syllogism involves more than the principle of identity (whence the dogma, nothing in the conclusion which was not already in the premises), and that there is a tinge of biologic analogy in the Aristotelian conception of two premises uniting to generate a conclusion.

Still another argument against the logistic position appears incidentally (p. 402), but is very significant of the author's own position. According to the logistic position *pure* mathematics is not concerned with the truth of any proposition asserted, but only with the question of whether it does or does not imply another proposition. Now as false propositions also have implications, Mr. Brunschvicg is led to the view that the truths of pure mathematics can be of no significance for an objective science. "Truth that one could find in the highest degree in the logical fancies of an Edgar Poe or in the development of a systematic delirium, is surely not the categoric and intrinsic truth which is the condition of scientific knowledge" (p. 402). This is a popular fallacy based on the false belief that truth and science can deal only with the actual. If this were true there could be no such a theory as pure arithmetic. $2+2=4$ would be true only if actual chairs or tables were referred to. It would have no meaning when applied to the operations of a frictionless engine. This view, however, would make a science of physics impossible. Consider the situation when we have two rival physical hypotheses. Of the two surely only one can represent the actual facts.

If from a false hypothesis no conclusion could be drawn, we would have to know which hypothesis is true before we could draw any consequences, but the drawing of consequences would be entirely unnecessary. The actual procedure of physical science does assume that hypothesis and consequences are bound together by strict laws, even when the former is false; otherwise it could not pass from the (factual) falsity of the consequences to the falsity of the hypothesis. Pure mathematics and symbolic logic simply confine themselves to the study of these implications, and the distinction between the actual and the possible can have no meaning in pure mathematics. Hence also pure mathematics must be allowed to enjoy a certain autonomy or relative independence of physics, which, indeed, our author sometimes admits (*e. g.*, p. ix) although this admission is, of course, inconsistent with his refusal to admit a valid distinction between pure and applied mathematics and the kinds of truth involved in each (p. 453).

The alleged breakdown of the logistic philosophy leads to the final stage, the philosophy of intuition, on the basis of which our author elaborates his own philosophy of mathematics,—the final book (Book VII) being entitled “Mathematical Intelligence and Truth.” As, however, he claims this philosophy to be the direct result of history it is well to examine the methodological ideas which underly this attempt to found a philosophy of mathematics on history.

To the idea that history can enable us to solve the perplexing problems of our own day, M. Brunschvicg joins the related but distinct idea that the history of mathematical science is necessary to make the philosophy of mathematics intelligible. Now there can be no doubt that in order to understand the various mathematical philosophies of history we must know the character of the mathematical science with which they had to deal. The opaqueness of the usual accounts of the Platonic, Cartesian or Leibnizian philosophies of mathematics by historians unacquainted with the history of mathematics amply illustrates this truth. The interests of historical understanding, however, are not always identical with those of doctrinal evaluation. In discussing historically a philosophy like the Kantian we need to know the ideas of mathematics and mathematical physics of his own day, and the introduction of subsequent discoveries as to the adequacy or inadequacy of these ideas is likely to confuse our historical understanding. This point, at any rate, is insisted on in other fields of history.¹ Moreover, as M. Brunschvicg himself assumes, philosophers

¹ See the Presidential addresses of Lea and Dunning before the American Historical Association 1903, and 1913, in *American Historical Review*, 1904, and 1914.

have not always kept in touch with contemporaneous science. Thus in spite of all the work in modern geometry, analysis, and mechanics, Neo-Kantians like Natorp, still insist that we have *à priori* knowledge that space is Euclidean and that a non-Newtonian mechanics is forever impossible. The truth is that the problems of the philosophy of mathematics have always been profoundly influenced by general considerations arising from sources foreign to mathematical science, *e. g.*, biology, ethics, etc. Hence M. Brunschvicg's thesis of a perfect parallelism between the 'stages' of mathematical science and the 'stages' of mathematical philosophy is not maintainable; and, as a matter of fact, it is seldom very useful.

The second idea, that historical study of itself can enable us to settle controversial problems, is, judging by the frequency of historical introductions to all sorts of axiologic discussions, one of the dominant ones of our age. When one, however, examines these introductions they are found in most cases to be purely ornamental, or (in the case of writers who, like M. Brunschvicg, take their historicism seriously) they prove only those principles which their author has taken for granted in constructing his history. Indeed, how can anyone possibly organize a large tract of human experience in the way we call history without drawing on his own general ideas or philosophy? Even the doubtful argument that historical facts can speak for themselves could in no way be used here, for in this book we have no complete collection of all the facts, but, at best, a selection of what the author considers typical views.

The solidity of M. Brunschvicg's learning and his undoubtedly keen analytic powers make it rather instructive to note some of the confusion and self-deception to which he is led by the assumption that the history of a branch of philosophy can, apart from the direct analyses of the subject matter, prove anything as to the truth of contending views.

The idea of an instructive history of mathematical thought which presents 'stages,' obviously involves belief in something more than that a careful study of the great masters like Plato, Descartes, or Leibniz is helpful. The latter kind of study need not be chronologic and is obviously futile unless accompanied by an independent vision of the subject matter. The idea of a history of doctrines which, apart from external reflection, can establish philosophic truth must rest on the belief that the time process represents a necessary logical development. It was brought into the history of philosophy by Hegel who consistently with his pan-logism (*i. e.*, all the real is rational)

regards history as nothing but a logical unfolding. But though M. Brunschvicg does sometimes speak of certain doctrinal developments as necessary or inevitable owing to the nature of mind (*e. g.*, p. 369), he is certainly not a conscious panlogist. His actual account of the development of mathematical thought, at any rate, has more dramatic elements than is possible with an Hegelian solitary actor who has to be his own antagonist and peace-maker. The course of mathematical thought has spontaneity, it offers a thousand accidents of a natural stream (pp. ix, and 452); there have been false starts in the direction of dogmatism since the seventeenth century; great insights like those of Pascal (pp. 429, 439) have long been neglected; there have been unaccountable mental accidents like materialism (p. 307); and, worst of all, the prosperity or persistence of a doctrine is admitted to be no argument for its truth or falsity (p. 342). What doctrinal significance, therefore, remains to the historical order as such? From the standpoint of doctrinal truth must not Leibniz or Plato be judged like contemporaries? (*cf.*, p. 397).

It is, I suppose, perfectly natural and proper for a philosopher, especially one who writes an historical introduction to his views, to characterize his own thought as the final stage or great consummation toward which all creation has moved. But how about the previous stages? Are no crumbs of partial truth to be doled out to the form their services? In spite of the assertion that the originality of the new stage consists in that it does not wish to add a new system of mathematical philosophy, but "turning to history itself, it seeks the convergence and coordination of the results which have been obtained at different periods" (p. 463), M. Brunschvicg's attitude to all previous systems of mathematical philosophy is almost entirely negative. The great lesson which his history teaches him is that we must clear the ground of the *a priori*ism which has always infected mathematical thought, and return to primitive innocence (p. 458). I have tried to show that his refutation of previous philosophers like Russell, is flagrantly inadequate. But at best there can be nothing historical in the refutation of a philosopher who is still vigorously developing his thought. The whole futility of the pretensions of historicism seems to me to be admitted in the following passage, which I quote in the original lest my translation be suspected of interposing a distorting medium: "*Au contraire c'est à la condition d'avoir compris d'abord la science qui agit et qui s'étend sous nos yeux, que l'on pourra, éclairé par elle, restituer au passé ce qui a été sa vie et son actualité*" (p. 458).

When M. Brunschvicg characterizes the final or present stage of

mathematical thought as based on intuition he is unnecessarily projecting the stages of his discourse into a cold and non-compliant world. He argues indeed that mathematics is but the last of the sciences to receive the refreshing and fructifying breath of intuition (pp. 434-437), but he adduces nothing worthy of the name of evidence to show that biologists or physicists have actually changed their methods in accordance with the philosophy of intuition. Nor is it clear how they can possibly do so until we are vouchsafed a more definite explanation of what the method of intuition really means.

I may interpose that I speak here not as a cold or unsympathetic critic. I have myself a sentimental attachment for a doctrine of intellectual intuition to cover the brute fact that we do apprehend intelligible relations that are not sense data, and to call attention to the important problem of immediacy in logic,¹ and I am therefore, ready to bless and be comforted by everyone who comes to speak in the name of my beloved doctrine. But M. Brunschvicg's message completely eludes me.

Intuition is sharply contrasted with logical deduction (pp. 395-396). It is a mental zone not of sense activity or logical reasoning (p. 428), yet it also includes (sensory) spatial intuition and logical deduction (as his remarks on Klein and Descartes indicate, pp. 450-451). Thus being neither sense nor logic and at the same time both it is fittingly characterized as "the profound work of intelligence" (p. 451). Nobody is likely to object to intuition if the latter is defined as "a method appropriate to the specificity of the object" (p. 440), but the only consequence which M. Brunschvicg draws from this is that the method of intuition must replace that of mechanism in physics and biology. But the adherents of mechanism in the latter sciences may well claim that the methods of mechanism are precisely those which are adapted to the specificity of their subject matter.

In the actual development of the details of M. Brunschvicg's own mathematical philosophy the idea of intuition is replaced by the idea of creative intelligence as the key to all the concrete problems of mathematics. Numbers, etc., are viewed as mental creations, and the peculiar harmony or truth which we observe in the fact that the results of our reasoning hold true of nature, is due to the fact that reason and experience are but two stages of the same creative mind or intelligence. So far as this rests on the general doctrine of idealism, it would take us far afield to attempt to discuss it here. I can merely call attention to the fact that the introduction of an omnipotent factor like mind or

¹ Refer to my paper on the "Present Situation in the Philosophy of Mathematics," *Journal of Philosophy*, 1911.

creative intelligence in no way removes such a problem as the contradictions involved in the notion of a class of all classes.

While in the historical portion of his work M. Brunschvicg is sometimes compelled to speak of accidents and failures in the progress of mathematical thought, in his expository book human intelligence seems to have smooth sailing and no resisting medium. Sometimes, indeed, he speaks of mathematical forms as approximations, but as there is no eternal truth outside of the processes of intelligence, it seems impossible to answer the question, approximations to what? In the main the work of the creative intelligence resolves itself into a long game of solitaire.

The motive which leads M. Brunschvicg to this position is quite clear and instructive to follow. Starting with the dogma that all logic is 'analytic,' and the vulgar prejudice that it can in no way help to extend our knowledge, he draws a very sharp distinction between the order of creation or discovery and the order of logic or exposition. In his insistence, however, on the all sufficiency of the order of invention or discovery he forgets or treats with contempt the order of facts.

The facts of mathematical science, however, distinctly refute the assumption of the sterility of deductive procedure. M. Brunschvicg insists that logic comes after "the spontaneous work of genius," and can only consecrate a victory already won or register the defeat. But even so, the implication that such "consecration" or "registration" is completely useless in extending the field of mathematics is absurd, unless we accept the view that genius works most fruitfully when its ideas are most confused. To believe this is really to revive the ancient but pernicious superstition that only the raving and demented are divinely inspired.

I bring this long, ungracious, and perhaps unduly censorious review to a close with the cheerful admission that it gives but a scant indication of the rich content of instructive study and suggestive analysis packed into this volume. The whole volume is written, in the main, with that admirable lucidity and regard for the gist of the matter which is characteristic of the best French exposition. Though the account of mathematical thought becomes more inaccurate as it approaches our own day, the accounts of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Kant are admirable examples of that painstaking scholarship of which the Germans are still serving as models. But as a positive contribution to the subject its usefulness seems to me vitiated by the naïve acceptance of many of the now fashionable views in philosophy that are

really in no way the outcome of laboratory experience or mathematical investigations; and I have deemed it worth while to call attention in this review to the difficulties of at least three of these fashionable views, viz., (1) the belief that logic, and reflective or 'dogmatic' thought are useless or worse, (2) the disbelief in or disregard of the Aristotelian distinction of that which is prior for us from that which is prior in nature, and (3) the wide-spread delusion that we can dodge the responsibility of a direct examination of the facts of a situation by coming in through the back door of history. Whatever may be the vices of modern logistic philosophy of mathematics, its adherents have at least tried to keep in mind the canons of scientific proof, and to eschew the rhetorical appeals which tend to make philosophy an irresponsible affair.

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Kant et Aristote. Par CHARLES SENTROUL. Louvain, Institut Supérieur de Philosophie; Paris, Félix Alcan, 1913.—pp. viii, 343.

This volume is the second French edition of the author's *L'Objet de la Métaphysique selon Kant et selon Aristote*, published in 1905, (which the present reviewer has not had the opportunity of seeing). The present title is, of course, more concise than precise. Actually undertaking a comparison only of two epistemologies, Professor Sentroul's work was crowned by the *Kantgesellschaft* in its prize-essay contest of 1906 on the subject: *Kant's Begriff der Erkenntnis verglichen mit dem des Aristoteles*.

The author, a former student of Cardinal Mercier at the École St. Thomas, Louvain, and a professor at Saô Paulo, Brazil, frankly champions the Stagirite. In contrast to the irreconcilable dualism which he sees in Kant's theory of knowledge, he points to the coherent epistemological structure of Aristotle. In the introductory first chapter, a general survey is attempted of the two theories; this is followed by a chapter on Aristotle's dogmatic realism, four chapters on Kant's theory of knowledge, and a final chapter on Aristotle's metaphysics. While the two philosophies are constantly compared in the treatment of the particular problems, Kant's system is accorded almost twice as much space as Aristotle's.

The Peripatetic epistemology defines truth as the judging of things as they really are. Is logical truth, then, the *adaequatio rei et intellectus*? Professor Sentroul objects to this formula (*arei*), in spite of the sanction which tradition has lent it. In the first place he finds no textual justification of it either in Aristotle or in St. Thomas; besides

it is objectionable on other than textual grounds; for (pp. 60-61), taken seriously, it limits truth to perfect knowledge and thus places it beyond human reach, yielding to man only the appearance of truth,—a relativistic conclusion wholly at variance with Aristotle's dogmatic realism. Accordingly, instead of the traditional formula *arei*, Professor Sentroul proposes, as more in accord with the spirit of Aristotle's philosophy the formula: Logical truth is conformity of Judgment [which is an identification] with a real identity.

The distinction which Kant makes between phenomenon and noumenon, knowledge of experience and the thing-in-itself, indicate how deeply Kant was impressed by the antinomy involved in the notion of truth. This antinomy had not escaped Aristotle; but in Kant's case the antithesis thought-thing is doubled by the antithesis universal-particular. Professor Sentroul distinguishes between two definitions of truth in Kant. According to the first, truth is the conformity of a judgment with the psychological laws which preside at its objective systematization (p. 110; cf. *Prolegomena*, §13, *Anm.* III). In defending his apparent insertion of the word 'psychological' into the Kantian definition, Professor Sentroul argues (pp. 110ff.) that, while Kant may not have intended to psychologize, he does psychologize, although not like Hume. Kant's second definition Professor Sentroul finds strikingly similar to the traditional formula *arei*: *die Uebereinstimmung unserer Begriffe mit dem Objekte*. These two definitions stress, respectively, the intellectual spontaneity and the receptivity involved in knowledge.

Chapters IV-VI are devoted to an interpretative analysis of the three stages of knowledge as conceived by Kant: "*So fängt denn alle menschliche Erkenntnis mit Anschauungen an, geht von da zu Begriffen, und endigt mit Ideen.*" Chapter IV, on "*La réalité sensible selon Kant*," takes the first clause as its motto. Professor Sentroul discusses in turn Kant's doctrine of the existence of an outer world, and his refutation of idealism; the way in which knowledge borrows an element from the outer world; and the contrast between Kant's doctrine of sensation and the Aristotelian. Both Kant and Aristotle demonstrate the existence of an outer world in essentially the same manner: my consciousness reveals me to myself only in my acts, which always imply some sense-impression, thus demanding as a cause the external 'thing' (p. 157). But, in the case of Aristotle, this proof is not inconsistent with the fundamental thesis of his system; while in Kant the principle of causality, defined as a category of the understanding valid only within experience, is illegitimately used to

establish the existence of 'things' which are by definition outside of experience (p. 164 ff.). As to the part which sensation plays in knowledge, Kant and Aristotle agree in recognizing the collaboration of the senses and the intellect, but they differ fundamentally in the function which they assign to the two in this collaboration. Aristotle's doctrine of sensation is connected with his doctrine that soul and body are form and matter of the same substance: in all cognitive synthesis the soul-reality uses its passive-active functions in order to comprehend the unity of the real object. Kant, however, would reject any such factual co-ordination of the senses and the intellect in the knowledge-process. The senses, he maintains, furnish only the necessary material for knowledge, which is not 'known' at all until it has been 'informed' by the *a priori* intuitions of space and time, and does not truly become knowledge until it has been conceptualized by the understanding.

The fifth chapter is entitled "*Le concept a priori selon Kant et la synthèse expérimentale.*" How does the knowing subject systematize its knowledge data? How can science be universal and necessary, when the perceived fact is isolated and contingent? The author discusses first Kant's structure of science, taken subjectively as a psychological phenomenon, and then its objective value. Comparing Kant's doctrine of the categories with the Aristotelian, he finds an essential difference between them. Aristotle's categories are the supreme predicates of the real: they are half-logical, half-ontological. Kant's table is one of purely logical concepts, paralleling the twelve functions of the judging intelligence. Instead of Aristotle's *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*, Kant would say *Nihil est in sensu, et in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in intellectu*. As regards the objective value of science, Kant certainly regards conceptual knowledge as objectively valid,—to be sure, only within the limits of possible experience. The very conditions which make conceptual knowledge necessary make it objective. The principles *a priori* which make objective knowledge and experience possible are indeed the very laws of nature, capable of being known *a priori*. This is Kant's 'transcendental idealism,' which he regards as synonymous with 'empirical realism.' Professor Sentroul calls it also "intellectual positivism" and thinks it demands a metaphysical complement.

To the metaphysical Ideas of Kant the sixth chapter is devoted. Kant's metaphysics is not an afterthought; incontestably and from the very start his intention was to put moral truths beyond the reach of scepticism, and his *Critique* is indeed a preamble to his metaphysics.

But science is experimental; metaphysics is not; it deals with the unconditioned, the absolute,—with concepts comprehending the collective unity, the totality of all possible experience, totality which, as such, is not itself possible as experience. And since all knowledge is knowledge of experience, the trans-experiential character of the metaphysical sphere makes its truths not known truths but truths of faith. Can metaphysics, then, be in any sense objective? This question, which speculative metaphysics can only recognize, the metaphysics of morals answers. Thus an objective metaphysics is obtained through the fusion of speculative and practical reason. The reality of things, a postulate for science and a hypothesis for speculative metaphysics, becomes for practical reason a thesis: it assures to man what speculatively can be only entertained. Hence the primacy of practical reason. To be sure, Kant wished to establish a close cohesion between science, metaphysics, and morals; but has he really established it? Professor Sentroul finds the radical vice of Kantianism to be epistemological dualism. For Kant the two parts of the knowledge total, the experimental-phenomenal and the dogmatic-moral, are independent: each complete in its sphere, and yet each incomplete, involving as it does the other. What he actually has, however, is not two realms of truth, but rather two orders of knowledge, neither of which satisfies all the demands of truth. If we stress the objectivity of truth, we find its model in experience; if we stress truth's normality, we find truth *par excellence* in metaphysics and morals. And we cannot take moral truth by itself and assert that it at least is in its own realm absolutely true; for the certitude of the practical order perishes along with *the* certitude of the theoretic order; for certitude as such and truth as such are theoretic (p. 281). Kant proclaims that knowledge is union, organization,—yet he ends by establishing radical differences and a barren divorce between all the modes of knowledge. He ends in the very disorder he wished to avoid. He begins with *nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*; he ends with the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible world. There are two parts in Kant's system, as Secrétan says: "*une science qui n'est pas vraie, et une vérité qui n'est pas sue.*" And this contradiction between Kant's speculative subjectivism and his moral dogmatism, touches the very heart of the Critical philosophy, even the purely speculative part. Renouvier has pointed out this contradiction in the distinction between the two faculties of the understanding and reason: the one knowing the phenomenal order, the other conceiving the noumenal.

The title of the last chapter (pp. 289-326) "*La science métaphysique selon Aristote*," suggests the contrast which Professor Sentroul draws between Kant's epistemological dualism and the unity in which Aristotle's system organizes the different branches of knowledge. Kant asks: How are synthetic judgments possible *a priori*? Aristotle's epistemological theory is the answer to a different question: How are judgments made effectively? What is the structure of judgments? Kant does not understand that all knowledge is expressed precisely by the verb *to be*; hence analytic judgments are for him vain tautologies. In the synthetic judgments, accordingly, the verb *to be* must signify, not a mental identification, but a connection. For Aristotle, on the contrary, all judgments are extensive; in all the copula indicates an identification. To know a thing is to recognize it for what it is, to see it identical under two different aspects. Judgments are classified by Aristotle, then, not according as they are extensive or not, but according as the knowledge of the identity expressed by them has its origin in the mere analogy of notions, or in the examination of existent things (p. 305). Aristotle's science of Being is a metaphysic systematic and rigorous, freed from mythology of any sort, and in contact with sense reality. For him these two, science and metaphysics, are homogeneous; both deal with the same reality, Being, although in different ways. The two coöperate; they need no reconciliation. What metaphysics says of Being, physics applies to bodies. This is the meaning Professor Sentroul reads into the expression: "Metaphysics has immaterial Being for its object," *i. e.*, metaphysics occupies itself just with Being, without considering its material aspects. Thus "not only is Aristotle's philosophy true, but it also best realizes the definition of philosophy as the science which achieves the unity of knowledge" (p. 321).

Professor Sentroul's conclusions can scarcely have caused him any surprise. At no stage of his work does his study of Kant appear to have affected his confidence in the Stagirite whom he champions so ably. To be sure, this work is no mere eulogy of Aristotle and St. Thomas; Professor Sentroul's point of view is catholic, but in both senses of the term. Indeed the very character of his conclusions makes his book of perhaps greater interest to the average philosophical student of today, whether he be orthodox Kantian or not. In all fairness, however, we must say that his account of Kant is less liberal and more insistent on literal accuracy and textual justification than his account of Aristotle. While Professor Sentroul appeals with equal confidence to the text of Aristotle and St. Thomas and quotes more

recent commentators whose views support his own estimate of Aristotle's theory, he is nevertheless ready, whenever his own interpretation of that theory lacks direct textual proof, or differs from the traditional view, to appeal to the spirit of Aristotelianism to which he always professes loyalty. Tradition has summed up Aristotle's conception of truth in the formula *adaequatio rei et intellectus*, which he finds unwarranted textually. But the formula he himself proposes: the conformity of judgment with a real identity, also lacks the support of Aristotle's text. Professor Sentroul adopts it nevertheless "*au nom de son esprit*" (p. 61). Leaving out of account for the present the validity of this particular interpretation of Aristotle's theory of truth, we readily recognize that, in an interpretative analysis of a system such as the Aristotelian, loyalty to its fundamental spirit is more important than mere textual adherence.

But Professor Sentroul's procedure is not equally commendable when, looking as he does throughout for the spirit of Aristotle, he nevertheless shows himself so ready to slight the spirit of Kantianism because of Kant's letter. Too much is he concerned with Kant's writing, too little with Kant's thought. He insists that Kant does actually psychologize in his notions of laws of thought, even though he admits that Kant does not *intend* to psychologize. Repeatedly he grants that Kant's real intention was to describe knowledge as an organizing process (*savoir c'est unir*). But he almost taunts Kant with the failure of his pen to meet the high demands of his spirit. His description of Kant's actual epistemological performance as irreconcilably dualistic is not the less condemnatory because he recognizes that Kant's fundamental epistemological ideal was experiential monism. In brief, Professor Sentroul gives us a liberal interpretation of the spirit of Aristotelianism, the deep meaning that it *can* have in our modern life, comparing it, not with a similar interpretation of Kant's inquiry and the implications of his problems, but rather with the shortcomings of Kant's actual record. Such a comparison can not but lead to an inadequate estimate of Kant. A philosopher wins immortality more often because of his questions than because of his answers: and of no one else in the history of thought is this truer than it is of Kant. Professor Sentroul reads the meaning of Aristotle in St. Thomas as well as in Aristotle's own text. In seeking the meaning of Kant, he should have shown a similar ability to pass beyond the textual frame of the *Critique*, and learn from the 'Holy Ghost' in Kant which spake in Fichte and in Hegel, not to mention other idealists.

The reviewer does not have at his present disposal the space neces-

dary to show that Kant's actual text does not lead to quite as hopeless a dualism as Professor Sentroul believes. Thing in itself, noumenon, and transcendental object are not necessarily synonymous to Kant, and a realization of the distinctions between the three is highly significant in understanding Kant's actual conception of the relation of knowledge to reality,—a point that Professor Sentroul might well have taken further into account. But, even granting that Kant's initial account of sensation, coupled with his phenomenalistic epistemology, do demand a twofold noumenal metaphysics with a resultant irreconcilable dualism, still a condemnation of Kant on the basis of a recital of these facts is scarcely a satisfactory procedure. The notion of knowledge and of reality alike in terms of experiential organization is the cornerstone of the Critical philosophy. The establishment of this cardinal truth is Kant's greatest achievement as, on Professor Sentroul's own admission, it was Kant's fundamental aim. But Kant was a pioneer, in many ways still a son of the old philosophic order, and the two *Critiques* contain much that is out of accord with the experiential monism of the true Kant. An interpreter of Kant may not overlook these echoes of Wolff and of Hume, and the newer confusions into which the formal Kant is led because of his inability wholly to free himself from the old confusions. But these occasionally fantastic doctrines should be recognized for what they are, excrescences for which allowance must be made, not fundamental doctrines whose untenability vitiates Kant's entire procedure. True enough, there is the Kant whom Professor Sentroul has portrayed for us, the hopeless dualist; there is also Kant the experiential monist. The two are indubitably incompatible. Professor Sentroul has emphasized the former, all but losing sight of the latter. Far more truly could he have vindicated the latter by showing his incompatibility with the former. The fact that Kant's abandonment of his own epistemological principles leads him into metaphysical puzzles is a proof, not of the untenability of his epistemology, but of the necessity to apply its principles even more thoroughly than Kant himself actually does. Kant is to be criticized, not for having failed in his method, but for not having trusted it sufficiently. The history of post-Kantian idealism manifests the progressive recognition of this truth and the completion of Kant's real work: the interpretation of knowledge and reality in terms of organic experience and intelligibility, a system which unites epistemology and metaphysics instead of tearing them asunder.

Kant's pen is all too frequently a poor vehicle,—a fact he doubtless recognized when he asked us not to read his book but to think it.

Professor Sentroul has given us a keen comparison of the spirit of Aristotelianism with the letter of Kant, and his conclusions are significant indeed. They would have been far more significant had he undertaken a comparison of the spirit of Kant with the spirit of Aristotle.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Three Studies in Current Philosophical Questions. By E. H. GRIFFIN, K. DUNLAP and A. O. LOVEJOY. [The Johns Hopkins Circular.] The Johns Hopkins Press, 1914.—pp. 99.

These Studies by members of the philosophical faculty of Johns Hopkins University are presentations of topics that are more or less prominent in current discussion. The first paper, by Professor Griffin, is on the topic, *Some Presentday Problems of Philosophy*; the second, by Professor Dunlap, is on *Images and Ideas*; and the third, by Professor Lovejoy, is entitled, *On the Existence of Ideas*. All of the papers are marked by a pleasing clarity and ease of style, and deal with present-day problems in a vigorous and stimulating way that abundantly repays a careful reading.

In the first paper Professor Griffin reviews the types of thinking that make the strongest bid for recognition on the part of the philosophically minded public. To the common sense man realism, as the doctrine that objects exist independently of our thinking, has obvious attractions. The difficulties, however, that are raised by the relativity of sense-perception has brought about a transformation of the old realism into the 'new' realism of the present day. This transformation has come about in connection with a revision of the doctrine of consciousness; but the realist has not as yet succeeded in making consciousness quite as 'external' to its objects as the doctrine of independence demands. Some objects appear to be plainly dependent on consciousness, and even those which are indubitably independent in some sense are so intimately bound up with meanings that the meanings must be regarded as constitutive. The doctrine of pragmatism is in no better case. Its attempt to eliminate representationism is a failure. Consequences may within very restricted limits be employed as a test of truth, but truth itself is a correct representation of its object, and need not in all cases resort to consequences, even as a test of its correctness. In this matter of consequences the writer seems to regard the pragmatic doctrine as rather obviously absurd. Since realism and pragmatism both fail us, the way seems to be cleared for absolute idealism. It avoids many of the difficulties that beset the other theories, but it is unable to cope successfully with the problems that arise out of the relation of the finite to the infinite or to banish the suspicion that the reality of time and struggle and evil go by the board. Hence "personal idealism," the doctrine that the universe consists of "a community of related selves," offers itself for our consideration. This doctrine is not subjected to criticism by the writer, save for the remark that it may place a disproportionate emphasis upon the individual. The paper accordingly concludes with the suggestion that the universe is neither the absolute monarchy of absolutism, nor the extreme democracy of personal idealism, but rather a

limited monarchy; in other words, that theism will perhaps mediate acceptably between the rival idealistic doctrines. The writer, curiously enough, passes over without any comment whatever the difficulties which have been urged so persistently against all forms of idealism and which have been chiefly responsible for the thought-movements of the present day. It may be added also that his interpretation of pragmatism is taken far too largely from James's loose and misleading treatment of 'consequences.' The criticism of pragmatism is essentially an attack on a straw man.

In the second paper Professor Dunlap propounds the heresy that images do not exist. He points out that images are quite unnecessary for knowing, since they are unable to perform the function of representing an object, unless there is an awareness or consciousness of the object to which the image is supposed to refer. But if such consciousness must be presupposed, it is plainly unnecessary to bring in an image for the sake of making such a reference possible. What is present as a basis for thought-operation is not an image, but the sensation that arises from muscular contractions. The unit of psychophysiological activity is the reflexly organized system of discharge. These units, as Professor Dunlap shows in interesting detail, become variously interconnected; and our experiences vary in a point for point correspondence with the variations in the total response. These responses produce muscle-sensations, which are the only direct content of thought, the indirect object being that which is thought about. Thought, in other words, is transcendent, since it surmounts the limitations of space and time. In a thought process the only discoverable constituents are muscle-sensations and the absent object. In our introspections, however, we do not always take these muscle-sensations at face value, but tend to refer them to the mode of activity that is concerned. If the muscles of the eye are involved, we are disposed to think that a visual 'image' is present, since this form of activity has to do with visual qualities.

The third paper, by Professor Lovejoy, comprises nearly sixty pages, and is much the longest of the three. It is concerned mainly with the view that "no such things as sensations or ideas, as non-physical entities, exist at all" (p. 52). This view holds that consciousness is incapable of having any special kind of content of its own; a contention with which Professor Lovejoy disagrees. His discussion is in the main a careful and searching criticism of neo-realistic views of consciousness, but limitations of space permit no detailed exposition. That experience presents no such 'inner duplicity' as to make of consciousness a distinct content accessible to introspection is conceded by Professor Lovejoy. The neural machinery, however, that is involved in perception and the facts of illusion, hallucination, etc., are held to necessitate the belief in an order of fact that is generically different from the physical order in three-dimensional space. The view that consciousness is behavior fails to give proper consideration to the fact that behavior is a matter of muscular contractions and is thus confined to the experiencing organism, to the exclusion of objects. Professor Dunlap's contention that muscular sensations are the sole content of consciousness is unworkable because it does not

account for illusions and also because there seems to be no remainder to be identified with thought, after we have abstracted the muscular sensations and the absent object. Professor Lovejoy also makes some suggestive remarks on certain confusions in the concept of consciousness, by way of accounting for the present reaction against earlier views of consciousness; and he points out that some of the main realistic arguments are borrowed from the idealism against which they are directed. His own conclusion is indicated by the closing remark: "I can not think the hypothesis of ideas—of non-physical and non-objective entities, which are in some instances capable of affording a mediate acquaintance with entities not themselves—to be in quite so forlorn a case as many acute and ingenious philosophers of our time suppose" (p. 99).

While the last two papers present some important differences, these differences seem less important than their agreement. The chief defect in Professor Dunlap's excellent essay, as the reviewer is disposed to think, is not that it is too radical, but that its radicalism is not maintained consistently. Although the author takes exception to the evidence of introspection in behalf of images, his objection is not based on the ground that this evidence involves a highly questionable assumption, but rather on the ground that careful introspection reveals muscle-sensations instead of images. It is much to be feared that no decision is possible along these lines. In making the same assumption as other introspectionists, Professor Dunlap precludes the possibility of a decision, for the reason that the issue itself is thoroughly artificial and beyond the reach of any intelligible criterion. The important question is not whether images or muscle-sensations are the content that is 'really' present, but whether it is permissible to raise such a question at all. It assumes the presence of a psychical existent which conceals its true nature from everybody, save an occasional introspectionist. The muscle-sensations are present, according to Professor Dunlap's view, but we generally overlook them completely. The time seems to have come to insist that our psychological friends translate these cryptic utterances into plain English. Do they mean that certain existences are present 'in our minds' and are yet wholly unconscious? If this be intended, what is meant by "in our minds," and how does such existence differ from non-existence? And is the fact that I can feel the operation of a muscle by attending to it conclusive evidence that there is a 'muscle-sensation' even when I do not attend?

The reason why Professor Dunlap retains these hypothetical sensations, the presence of which must be assumed even when it is least suspected, is presumably that these sensations or some similar material is demanded by a postulate which he adopts, apparently without critical examination. This same postulate underlies Professor Lovejoy's penetrating analysis and renders invalid his conclusion. This postulate is expressed in the contention that thought transcends space and time, an assumption which, as here used, introduces a conception of thought that is a heritage of former speculation and very much open to question. It assumes that if I think of the events of yesterday or of last week, there is a something called thought which is a

present existence but which possesses the marvelous power of reaching back across the intervening stretch of time to what is past and gone. This may be a correct version of the facts, but it can hardly claim self-evidence. With regard to space-relations, for example, a thought of this kind is assumed only if the object does not happen to be given in sense-perception. To perceive an object that is spatially distant does not require a space-transcending thought; to experience it in any other way does require such a thought. In this latter case we are required to assume a 'knower' that is spatially separated from its object—whatever that may mean. But to experience an object as 'over there,' beyond the present point of space or time, does not necessarily mean that we have to do with an epistemological relationship of knower and known. The gratuitous character of the assumption appears from the fact that no such knower seems to be needed in the case of sense-perception. And it is solely in order to furnish this knower with standing-ground in the present that recourse is had to muscle-sensations or images as a present content. The fact, however, that a past event is experienced now is surely no proof that any such astonishing feat of transcendence has taken place. The experience of the past is scarcely made easier of comprehension by converting it first of all into present fact and then proceeding to recover the pastness by an act of transcendence which, since it overcomes time, attempts the miracle of being both timeless and an act or process; and which incidentally makes the truth-problem an inscrutable mystery. In this form the problem of transcendence is a wholly fictitious problem. How we are able to experience the past is exactly the same problem as how we can experience anything else. But whether one agrees with the authors or not, the closeness of their reasoning and their skill in presentation entitle this issue of the *Circular* to the serious attention of all who are interested in the topics with which it deals.

B. H. BODE.

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La Morale et l'Intérêt dans les Rapports individuels et internationaux. Par J. Novicow. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1912.—pp. 241.

According to M. Novicow the terms self-interest and morality are identical, and there is no real antagonism between them. Only such conduct is moral as produces pleasure. The individual has no duty to society, he has only one duty: the duty to be happy. There is no need of the smallest atom of love of neighbor to establish morality on the firmest basis. The altruistic idea is not only useless but baneful. All this sounds like an overture to a Nietzschean *Umwertung aller Werte* and the repudiation of the morality of altruism. But the author does not "teach the overman" and the overthrow of the golden rule; the doctrine that might makes right has no charms for him. He accepts the traditional morality, but he finds its *raison d'être* in self-interest instead of in disinterestedness, rejecting "the insupportable and revolting paradox that the end of morality is the evil of the individual, hence his suppression, the non-being." The basis of morality is absolute respect

for the rights of the neighbor; but it is not from love of one's neighbor that one ought to respect his rights, but from love of oneself.

It is to one's interest to behave oneself; immorality is, after all, a mistake, a miscalculation of interests. "There is no *real* antagonism between buyers and sellers. . . . Every time a laborer uses violence to obtain a higher wage than the natural market-price, he robs himself. . . . The interest of the employer and that of the laborer are identical." Similarly, the idea that we can enrich ourselves more quickly by robbery than by work is false; the fact is, we enrich ourselves in the quickest way by scrupulously respecting the rights of the neighbor. "Evil does not come from each one's pursuing his own interest (life would be impossible without that); properly speaking, evil comes from one's not pursuing one's interest." When we violate the moral rules we are acting contrary to our interests; we are simply foolish, ignorant, incapable of seeing things from any but a narrow, personal point of view.

The same remarks apply to international morality. Bismarck did wrong in annexing Alsace-Lorraine,—not because he failed to consider the happiness of France (altruism), but because he did not consider the happiness of Germany (egoism). If Bismarck had seen clearly, he would have understood that greater harm would come to Germany from the effect of his action on the French people than good to Germany from the annexation of French territory. Olliver called Bismarck *un barbare de genie*. He was a barbarian, according to M. Novicow, because he acted harshly, because he had no regard for any one's rights and considered only his narrow and personal point of view. But he was not a genius,—*barbarian* and *genius* are contradictory terms,—for the simple reason that he acted immorally, that is, contrary to the interests of his own people. Genius is the capacity to see the most distant horizons and to attain the highest conceptions of the human spirit. When in 1890, after the failure of Baring Brothers, the Bank of France came to the assistance of the Bank of England,—at a time when France and England were not on good terms,—it was because the governors of the Bank of France comprehended the real interests of their institution. The sole difference between the governors of the Bank of France and the German government is that the former understood their true interest while the latter did not. When the political leaders of Europe understand their own interests as clearly as the financiers understand theirs, the European federation will become a *fait accompli*.

M. Novicow's attempt to rehabilitate the old philosophy of enlightened self-interest is characterized by clearness, simplicity, and directness, and there is nothing in the *practical* teachings of the book with which the most humanitarian moralist of our times will find fault. Unfortunately, however, the argument on which they are based is fallacious: enlightened self-interest, as M. Novicow conceives it, does not justify our traditional morality. It is true that if there were no such thing as theft, there would be no chains, no strong boxes, no fortresses, no breast-plates, no policemen, no lawyers, no judges, no soldiers, no marines, and so forth; and if all men were liars and

robbers and murderers, the social structure would fall to pieces and there would be a diminution of wealth, happiness, and welfare. It is true that the individual's chances of success and happiness would be diminished in a disordered society, that immorality as a universal law of life would defeat the very object of life. And it may be said, *in general* it is to the interest of the individuals of society to care for the public good. But it does not follow from this that the interest of this or that particular individual, in the sense of his pleasure, will be in every case, and so long as he lives, identical with the public happiness. If everybody behaved as certain captains of industry are said to have behaved, society would sink to the level of the primitive horde: in injuring others we (as a group) would be injuring ourselves (as a group). But the individual captain of industry who has succeeded in defrauding others without being found out can hardly be said to have damaged himself, to have diminished his pleasure-returns, to have robbed himself in robbing others. It may be true, as M. Novicow says, that it is not to the interest of judges *as a class* to sell themselves because judges receive the best treatment in countries in which judges do not sell themselves. But it may be to the interest of a *particular* judge to sell himself, nonetheless, in the sense that wealth will mean happiness for him personally; and the treatment of judges as a class may be a matter of perfect indifference to him. Only in case the judge is interested in something other than his own pleasant thrills can it be said to be to his interest to be honest. It is to the individual's real interest to be good, to respect the rights of his neighbor, provided we mean by his interest disinterested interest in others, provided we enlarge the notion of his self in the way in which philosophers like Green enlarged it. There is meaning in the statement that self-interest and morality are identical; but not in the sense that the particular thief is really robbing himself because if everybody followed this method of getting rich quickly, no one would get rich quickly. From the premise that universal theft destroys the welfare of the group it does not follow that a particular successful thief in a group in which theft is not universal will be unhappy.

FRANK THILLY.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

Ethik. Eine Untersuchung der Tatsachen und Gesetze des sittlichen Lebens. Von WILHELM WUNDT. Vierte umgearbeitete Auflage. Drei Bände. Stuttgart, Verlag von Ferdinand Enke, 1912.—pp. xii, 304, iv, 306, iv, 360.

The fourth edition of Professor Wundt's *Ethics*, which was first published in 1886 in a single volume, comprises three stately volumes, dealing respectively with the "Facts of the Moral Life," the "Development of the Moral World-Views," and the "Principles of Morality and the Departments of the Moral Life." The second edition (1892), from which an English translation was made (1897-1901), did not differ materially from the first; but the third edition, which appeared in 1903, underwent important changes, the part tracing the development of the systems of ethics having been almost entirely rewritten, and the sections on the will, the moral motives, the moral

ends, and the moral norms having been revised to meet the modifications in the author's doctrine of the will. There has been no change in Professor Wundt's general point of view so far as this fourth edition is concerned; but a partial revision of the work seemed desirable to him on the ground that a system of ethics which proceeds from the facts of moral life and the development of ethical conceptions, and aims to discover the principles of an ethics that is to be both empirical and normative, cannot ignore the advances made in special allied fields. In his opinion, a system based on the facts has an advantage over a purely speculative one: the conceptions of the moral life and the norms governing it being a product of historical evolution, ethics itself is subject to the universal process of development which all scientific labor undergoes. It is true, no new discoveries are made in the field of ethics such as are possible in the natural sciences and may lead to a complete revolution of theory. Nevertheless, ethics may profit by what ethnology and history learn concerning the moral phenomena of the present as well as of the past; new knowledge may be acquired here at any time which, though it can never alter the foundations of our own ethical convictions, may yet change our notions as to how these ideas have been developed and in this way have a bearing upon the basal theoretical problems of ethics. We must, therefore, pay attention to the results which have been reached by the new *Völkerpsychologie* with regard to custom, myth, and religion, or, where the conclusions are still in doubt, we must take a stand with respect to pending problems. In order to bring his own work into agreement with the latest results in the study of the relation of morality and religion, of religion and myth, the origin of the family and society, and similar questions, Professor Wundt has carefully revised the portions in the first volume of his new edition dealing with these topics. He does not believe, however, that the new knowledge has rendered inadequate the general ideas advanced in his *Ethics*; indeed, he finds that, occasional corrections apart, many of the views formerly offered by him as conjectures have been verified and supplemented by a profounder study of the *Völkerpsychologie*.

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An Introduction to Kant's Critical Philosophy. By GEORGE TAPLEY WHITNEY and PHILIP HOWARD FOGEL. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1914.—pp. viii, 226.

To remove needless obstacles from the path of the undergraduate who is seeking an acquaintance with Kant's critical philosophy for its own sake and not because of its bearing upon some special subject or problem, is the aim of the authors in this volume. To this end they have prepared a statement of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, following for the most part the Max Mueller translation. In this statement they have been able greatly to abbreviate the original without interfering with the progress or intelligibility of the argument, and also to omit many of the wearisome technicalities connected with Kant's division and sub-division of his subject-matter. Words of

comment and explanation appear from time to time; they are introduced sparingly and judiciously, however. The authors' original contribution consists chiefly in the excellent, although brief, historical introduction and a ten-page exposition of the significance of the Kantian standpoint, which is appended to the Deduction of the Categories.

The authors deserve praise for avoiding over-simplification; they have not attempted to make Kant easy for beginners or to write his philosophy in words of one-syllable. But to recognize this as a merit in their work is to furnish ground for possible doubt as to its value. Will such a statement, following with fidelity the order and even the phraseology of Kant's work, prove much more intelligible or attractive to the student than the original in a translation like that of Max Mueller? Certainly, it is the exceptional undergraduate who would give the time and effort required to master either. Such an exceptional undergraduate—to say nothing of the graduate student—might, it would seem, prefer to acquaint himself with a classic like the Critique of Pure Reason in its original form. Whatever one may think of the practicability of such an undertaking one must agree that in the present case the work has been well done. The authors, with the coöperation of the publishers, have produced a well-arranged, clearly printed, and easily handled little volume. Perhaps the quality last-named is its chief virtue—its very compactness, in contrast to the bulk of the original work, is inviting to the student and will encourage him in an effort to grasp its meaning as a whole and to discover the vital relation of its constituent parts.

HENRY W. WRIGHT.

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Maine de Biran. Critique et Disciple de Pascal. Par A. DE LA VALETTE MONBRUN. Paris, Libraire Félix Alcan, 1914.—pp. v, 322.

Although the name of Maine de Biran stands as the title of this volume, one is tempted to treat it as a work on Pascal, for the book, as the sub-title suggests, is a study of the influence of the latter upon Biran, involving not only a sketch of Pascal interpretation at the hands of Voltaire and Condorcet, but also an elaborate paralleling of the thoughts of the two thinkers upon the main points of philosophic doctrine, so that the effect is rather to throw into relief the ideas of the master than to emphasize those of the disciple. The difference in the intellectual power of the two men contributes to the same effect, though this difference appears unfortunately not quite so sensible to the author as one could wish. At any rate, the appearance of the book is fresh evidence of the present profound interest of the French in the personality and ideas of the seventeenth century genius.

The material used is largely the *Journal intime* of Biran, in which his spiritual development is recorded from the time of his youthful interest in Pascal, through the period of his alienation from him under the influence of the eighteenth century, down to his return to him and his last years in the Catholic communion. Only part of this material has been published and the author has done good service in drawing upon it for his purpose. Besides

this he has given us the annotations made by Biran in his copy of the Raynouard edition of the *Pensées*, which embody criticisms both of Pascal and of the Voltaire-Condorcet attitude toward him. The book also contains a partial bibliography of the Biran manuscripts and of his published works.

The results of this study are summarized in comparative statements of the doctrines of the two authors as to human nature, the social order, the sources of religious belief, the foundations of Christianity, and mysticism. In his exposition of Pascal, especially of the vexed point of his scepticism, the author follows the recent interpretations of Strowski and Boutroux, but tends to minimize unduly the Jansenist element in his thought and make it consistent with orthodox Catholicism. In similar spirit he commends Biran in his softening of the harshnesses of his master's ideas and in his less dualistic view of the relation between nature and grace. This is, of course, to ignore the spiritual tragedy of life as Pascal saw it, and to make unmeaning the agonies of his religious experience. And in general this is the impression we get of Biran's position, that it is an unsuccessful attempt to philosophize the teachings of his predecessor and to do what he had declared impossible, unite Stoicism and Christianity. No satisfactory theoretical solution of this problem being possible, there remained only the practical recourse of the Stoic's entering the Catholic Church. This he did, but unfortunately failed to realize that he had not wholly left his Stoicism behind. Our author also fails to realize this fact clearly but, nevertheless, he has given us materials for the study of a religious development which it is well worth while to understand.

NORMAN WILDE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.

Le Dieu de Spinoza. Par GABRIEL HUAN. Paris, Librairie Félix Alcan 1914.—pp. 338.

This is an astonishing revival of the theory that Spinoza's metaphysics is a flawless deduction. The system is defended not because of its fruitfulness for modern thinking but because its logic is invulnerable. Grant Spinoza the premise of a combination of Substance and Cause and from this flows in "an immanent procession" the modal world in all its diminishing degrees of perfection. The author has not only followed in detail the famous discussions of vexed problems, such as the compatibility of an indeterminate substance with an infinity of inhering attributes and with a differentiation into modes the meaning of the eternal life, of the fixed and eternal things, of the *idea ideae* of the *infinita idea Dei*, and proposed a solution in harmony with the system as a whole and Spinoza's express utterances, but he has also refuted with considerable plausibility traditional attacks upon the system which have long been considered unanswerable. Notably, he upholds Spinoza in his defense of himself against Tschirnhausen in the assertion of an infinity of attributes when only two are humanly known, and in the derivation of bodies with figures from the figureless attribute of extension.

It is to be said in favor of the author's manner of treatment that a sym-

pathetic study, even if over subtle, is always suggestive. On the other hand, this skilful defense succeeds partly by ignoring those questions which are now most vital, *viz.*—were Spinoza's assumptions and method sound. The book contains valuable summaries of the Spinozistic literature on particular points, *e. g.*, that of the various interpretations of the mathematical method in the footnote on page 31. Thirty-one pages are occupied with a Spinozistic bibliography.

KATHERINE EVERETT GILBERT.

Spinoza's Stellung zur Religion. Von GEORGE BOHRMANN. Giessen, Alfred Töpelmann, 1914.—pp. 81.

The gist of this book is the contention that in the *Theologico-Political Treatise* Spinoza misrepresents his real attitude toward revealed religion. Although Spinoza's task is merely the exegesis of a material which he takes as given, he nevertheless seems to accept the point of view of revelation as valid. But Spinoza's real opinion, the author asserts, was that supernaturalism is inconceivable. His least convincing argument is that this misrepresentation was due to timorousness and diplomacy on Spinoza's part. The key to the whole treatise is 'accommodation at any price.' Of course, any such assignment of motive must be in the last resort conjecture. But the interpretation of Spinoza as timid and artful, while made plausible by isolated instances and statements, seems more like an interesting reaction from the traditional extreme admiration for Spinoza's fearlessness than an appreciation of his utterances in the complete context of his life and writings. Moreover, this solution of the problem of the *Theological Treatise* only creates a new problem in regard to Spinoza's personality, for with his recognized courage and sincerity must be harmonized these opposing qualities. It is more probable that the inconsistency of his concessions to revealed religion sprang from an intellectual rather than a moral short-coming; that is, he did not always think out adequately the implications of his position.

The Appendix, on "Spinoza in England" (1670-1750), the most exhaustive study yet made of that subject, shows that English philosophers either ignored or wholly misunderstood Spinoza until the time of Coleridge.

KATHERINE EVERETT GILBERT.

Histoire de la Science Politique dans ses Rapports avec la Morale. Par PAUL JANET. Ouvrage couronné par l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques et par l'Académie française. Quatrième édition revue d'après les notes laissées par l'auteur et précédée d'une notice sur la vie et les travaux de Paul Janet par G. Picot, secrétaire perpétuel de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques. Deux tomes. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1913.—pp. ci, 608, 779.

The fourth edition of the classical *History of Politics* first published by Paul Janet in 1858 under the title, *History of Moral and Political Philosophy*, has been revised on the basis of the notes left by the author and contains a preface with extracts from Georges Picot's excellent account of Janet's life and works

which appeared in 1903. The work practically stops at the year 1789, with a short chapter on the publicists of the American and French Revolutions (vol. II, pp. 693-727); but there is a good analysis and *résumé* of the *Declarations of the Rights of Man* in France and America (Introduction to the third edition, vol. I, pp. v-lxxiii), and a brief Conclusion (vol. II, pp. 727-743) giving a meagre outline of French political thought in the nineteenth century and a scant note on the political literature of England and Germany of the same period. It is a pity that the author did not carry out his intention of publishing a third volume, during the years which intervened between the appearance of the third edition (1887) and the date of his death (1899), and bring his history down to the end of the nineteenth century. We have, however, a number of preliminary studies from his pen covering phases of the period in question, among them the following: *La philosophie de la révolution française*, 1875, *Histoire de la révolution française*, 1889, *Les origines du socialisme contemporain*, 1883, *Saint-Simon et le Saint-Simonisme*, 1878, *Babeuf*, the article *Tocqueville* in *Problèmes du xix siècle*, and two articles in *Revue des Deux Mondes*: *Charles Fournier*, 1879, and *Introduction à la science morale d'Herbert Spencer*, 1875.

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The following books also have been received:

- Greek Philosophy. Part I. Thales to Plato.* By JOHN BURNET. London, Macmillan and Company, Limited, 1914.—pp. x, 360.
- Our Knowledge of the External World As a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy.* By BERTRAND RUSSELL. Chicago and London, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1914.—pp. vi, 245. \$2.00.
- Henri Bergson. An Account of His Life and Philosophy.* By ALGOT RUHE and NANCY MARGARET PAUL. London, Macmillan and Co., 1914.—pp. vii, 245. \$1.50 net.
- The Philosophy of Change.* By H. WILDON CARR. London, Macmillan and Co., 1914.—pp. xi, 216. \$1.75 net.
- William James and Henri Bergson.* By HORACE MEYER KALLEN. Chicago, The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1914.—pp. x, 242. \$1.50 net.
- The Idealistic Reaction Against Science.* By PROFESSOR ALIOTTA. Translated by AGNES McCASKILL. London, Macmillan and Co., 1914.—pp. xiii, 483. \$3.00.
- Problems of Conduct.* By DURANT DRAKE. Cambridge, The Riverside Press, 1914.—pp. xiii, 455. \$1.75.
- Friedrich Nietzsche.* By GEORGE BRANDES. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1914.—pp. 117. \$.75.
- Essays on the Life and Work of Newton.* By AUGUSTUS DE MORGAN. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1914.—pp. xi, 198.
- The Analysis of Sensations.* By DR. ERNST MACH. Revised and Supplemented from the fifth German edition by SYDNEY WATERLOW. Chicago and London, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1914.—pp. xiv, 379. \$1.50 net.

- A First Book in Psychology.* By MARY WHITON CALKINS. Fourth Revised Edition. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1914.—pp. xxi, 428. \$1.00.
- An Introduction to General Psychology.* By ROBERT MORRIS OGDEN. New York, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1914.—pp. xviii, 270. \$1.25.
- Is Conscience an Emotion? Three Lectures on Recent Ethical Theories.* By HASTINGS RASHDALL. Cambridge, The Riverside Press, 1914.—pp. 200. \$1.00 net.
- The Philosophy of Christ's Temptation.* By GEORGE STEPHEN PAINTER. Boston, Sherman, French, and Company, 1914.—pp. 333.
- Life and Human Nature.* By SIR BAMPFYLDE FULLER. New York, Longmans, Green, and Company, 1914.—pp. xi, 339.
- Work and Wealth. A Human Valuation.* By J. A. HOBSON. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1914.—pp. ix, 367.
- New Proofs of the Soul's Existence.* By S. S. HEBBERD. Boston, Sherman, French and Co., 1914.—pp. 86. \$1.00 net.
- Fated or Free? A Dialogue on Destiny.* By PRESTON WILLIAM SLOSSON. Boston, Sherman, French and Company, 1914.—pp. 89. \$1.00 net.
- The Buried Ideal.* By CHARLES LAWSON. Boston, Sherman, French and Company, 1914.—pp. 183. \$1.25 net.
- Truth and Other Poems.* By PAUL CARUS. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1914.—pp. 61. \$1.00.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mèt.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.*; *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*.—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

The Psychology of Magic. CARVETH READ. *British Journal of Psychology*, VII, 2, pp. 166-189.

The simplest and earliest magical beliefs and practices are those connected with charms, rites, and spells. They owe their origin to imperfectly observed and analyzed coexistences and sequences of events. An action that has happened to precede a successful effort is repeated in the hope that it will again be followed with success. Emotional excitement also plays its part. By introducing unreal antecedent conditions magic has hindered rather than helped the evolution of true causal explanations. The causal sequence in magic being untraceable, it appears mysterious, and the more mysterious is magic the more powerful it is supposed to be. The mere expression, however, of a wish or volition is only believed to be efficacious in late stages of the evolution of magic. Since savages clearly distinguish similarity from identity and part from whole in their work-a-day life, their apparent failure to do so in sympathetic magic must either be an acquired incapacity, due to some fixed idea or dissociation that prevents them from perceiving the facts, or else merely be a case where the customary forms of speech prevent savages from expressing clearly distinctions that really exist in their minds. In imitative magic images may first have been employed simply as a means of fixing the attention, and only later have become a substitute for the man himself. Pantomimic practices, such as bringing on rain by spilling drops of water, or leaping to make the crops grow, may best be understood as attempts to set up or reinforce currents of causation, and not as themselves directly causative. Magical practices dissolve when rites come to be considered symbolic, and when they become attenuated and memory of their original meaning is consequently lost.

W. K. WRIGHT.

A Feudal Principle in Modern Law. ROSCOE POUND. The International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XXV, 1, pp. 1-24.

Our common law—perhaps the most vital and tenacious tradition of the modern world—has absorbed much that was developed outside itself: equity rules; Star Chamber, merchant, and admiralty law; ecclesiastical law of probate and divorce, beside statutory and reform laws of England and the United States. It absorbed the jurisdiction of the church in the twelfth century, and was victorious in its struggle against Roman law. Permanent as its establishment seems to be, there is for it another crisis at hand. Three of its world-wide principles are under indictment: Its doctrine of supremacy of the law, which is the pivot of the system, is being attacked in the United States. Its commercial law is codifying. The torts of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the doctrine of liability as a result of fault at least as applied to employees in large industries, are in danger of extinction. The shift from the older individualistic justice to the growing social ideal of justice, the rise of executive justice, extra-judicial commissions, the substitution of administrative for individual initiative in the enforcement of law, and the failure in the popular feeling for justice at all events—all these are evidences of growth which our judicial law-makers have scarcely the leisure to meet. Two forces have hindered the influence in law of economic pressure and class interest: the development of law logically from analogies and a conscious endeavor to make law express eternal ideals. We may therefore find in legal history the bases of analogies corresponding to different legal principles. Of the factors contributing to our common law, seven of the most important are: (1) original Germanic law; (2) the feudal law; (3) Puritanism; (4) contest between court and crown; (5) eighteenth-century political ideas; (6) pioneer and rural community conditions in the first half of the nineteenth century; (7) philosophical ideas which prevailed in the formative period in which the English common law was made over by us for the American courts. Among these the one anti-individualistic element, the feudal element, has always tempered the individualism of our law. The Roman individualistic law of the will is an alien conception in our own Anglo-American law the central idea of which is relation. In one the person is held responsible for what he voluntarily undertakes or wills; in the other, for acts which a certain relation (originally that of lord and tenant) imposed. This is the principle in our law of master and servant, in fiduciary relations, and in the relation of vendor and purchaser. Our modern insurance law and the law governing our public companies have become largely relational. Especially has the nature of the relation between the modern employer and employee developed duties of relation on the part of the former. Many of this class of our laws were introduced in the court of equity and were merely moral duties made law. The Roman individualistic idea of a legal transaction, sufficient as it may have been for our early pioneer life, has proved insufficient for the life which our great industrialism has developed. We are fortunate in having retained this

feudal principle in our law as a means of solving these problems as well as the problems of the future.

A. J. THOMAS.

Nature and Reason in Law. JOHN DEWEY. The International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XXV, 1, pp. 25-32.

The synonymous use of natural, rational, and morally right is a well-known fact of legal history. Nature and reason are, however, ambiguous terms meaning (1) the existent or previously given state of things; as opposed to (2) an adjustment to desired circumstances. Hence the morally desirable and also the just may mean (1) that which commends itself to the best judgment of the most experienced, or (2) the acceptance of the given distribution of advantages, as illustrated, for example, by the *laissez faire* doctrine. In this latter sense it is an abnegation of human intelligence. This attitude was furthered by the influence of Newtonian science. Human nature is not here a unique characteristic, but becomes a mere tracing of a benevolent cosmic wisdom. Moral action under such influence merely seeks to remove an interfering intelligence from the path of nature. These two types of logic are exemplified in the court decisions relative to due diligence and undue negligence. Due or reasonable foresight may mean (1) such as would in a given situation conduce to desirable consequences, or (2) such foresight as is merely customary in that situation even though the consequences are deplorable. This latter view renders the brute situation in terms of purpose or reason.

A. J. THOMAS.

La Conscience épiphenomène. F. LE DANTEC. Rev. Ph., XXXIX, 8, pp. 113-143.

A detailed treatment of the epiphenomenal theory of consciousness is justified by the fact that the majority of those who speak of it do not seem to understand at all what biologists mean by the term. We have two sources and two fields of knowledge, one relating to things outside ourselves, the other to things within. A little consideration shows that our physical knowledge of the external world is astonishingly comprehensive, minute and accurate. This fact must prove to anyone not blinded by preconceived notions that something from the external world, certain 'documents,' as it were, have penetrated within us and become part of our internal structure, awakening modes of consciousness which copy or translate outside events. Physical excitations of sense organs and the content of consciousness vary in such closely parallel ways that it is impossible to doubt a causal relation between them. Modes of consciousness are a faithful translation of modifications in our bodily protoplasmic structure, and these in turn of external phenomena. We have then a material construction which 'knows' certain details of its own structure. This personal consciousness in a material being gives us our problem. There are many facts about its structure of which the animal or man is totally oblivious, others of which he is dimly conscious, others which

he knows accurately. The case of the last suggests that consciousness may be built up of elements corresponding to those of physical structure. The difference between structural relations known and not known seems to be a matter of habituation or normality; it is the unusual which is accompanied by consciousness. The cognition of a world continuous in space and time is based on the spatial and temporal continuity of the protoplasmic structure of the central nervous system, the temporal continuity being effected through assimilation, the characteristic vital process. Our knowledge of the world is thus mediated by our knowledge of ourselves, and our subjective self is rigorously limited to our own protoplasmic structure. Hence a dilemma confronts us: either the life process builds up consciousness out of unconscious material elements, thus creating the absolutely new, or else the elements of consciousness exist in inorganic nature. Every reasonable presumption points to the second view. But it cannot be proved to one disposed *a priori* to the contrary belief. There is no way of 'proving' the consciousness, even of one's dearest friend; consciousness is not a phenomenon, is not capable of direct or indirect detection by our sense organs. Phenomena are physical; consciousness is 'something,' not a phenomenon, and which no language therefore really fits, but which accompanies phenomena. This is what led first Maudsley and later Huxley to call it an 'epiphenomenon.' The use of this term in other senses, particularly in medical science, seems to have led to the widespread confusion in regard to it in the present connection.

F. H. KNIGHT.

The Coming Philosophy. GEORGE SANTAYANA. J. of Phil., Psy., & Sci. Meth., XI, 17, pp. 449-463.

The fundamental thesis of Professor Holt's *The Concept of Consciousness* is that consciousness is nothing but its immediate objects, which are all exactly what they would be if no one were conscious of them. These objects include terms, propositions, relations, qualities, values, and emotions. They are all universals, *i. e.*, capable of entering into various contexts without losing their identity. Professor Holt's contention that propositions generate things and deduction dominates evolution is an abuse of logic and a reversion to a Platonic sort of metaphysics. Professor Holt identifies propositions with forces, deduction with causation, and definitions with things, and deduces all existence from a few dialectical elements. But this, like his ontological hierarchy, has "a strangely gnostic air." Professor Holt rightly condemns the notion of the subconscious; but, when he speaks of 'unfelt feeling,' is he not confusing logical character with natural existence? Consciousness is not that collection of objects which secures a response from the nervous system; it is some inward difference between feeling and not feeling, noticing and not noticing, anything. Professor Holt is continually contrasting the group of objects noticed with the remainder of being, instead of contrasting awakened attention with unconsciousness. Not once in *The Concept of Consciousness* is the concept of actual consciousness broached! "To think you have composed

consciousness by collecting its objects is like thinking you have created knowledge by collecting a library." Professor Holt identifies active cognition with passive images, and the latter with material objects. But an idea is not a dead object; it is transitive, indicating an operation of the mind; it is the act of conceiving. Ideas and sensations are no more identical with their objects than shots are with their targets. The field of consciousness, not to speak of consciousness itself, is a symphony of memories, suggestions, impulses, and inventions; it is a life and a discourse rather than a cross-section of an external world. Though the Realists try to abolish consciousness and ideas by identifying them with parts or collections of objects, "they are still idealists at the back of their heads." The new American philosophy (a fusion of transcendentalism, pragmatism, immediatism, and logical realism) is perplexed by confused thinking, half-meant, random assertions, undigested traditions, uncouth diction, and words turned from their right use. Yet, it is the coming philosophy, for its spirit and contributions are modern and American: but 'coming' need not mean coming to stay.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

Le temps en général et le temps Bergsonien en particulier. RENÉ DE SAUSURE. Ar. de Ps., No. 55, pp. 277-296.

We may well agree with Bergson that our states of consciousness are not quantities but qualities, and that they are not measurable but only perceptible. To this we may add that whatever is subjective is qualitative, and whatever is objective is quantitative. We cannot accept, however, Bergson's distinction between two kinds of time, between Time, which is a homogeneous and void medium of the order of pure quantity, and Duration, which is identical with our inner life and consequently heterogeneous and qualitative. If space is homogeneous, says Bergson, whatever is homogeneous must be space, for we cannot conceive two homogeneities. As a matter of fact, we do conceive time and space as two distinct and independent homogeneous mediums. For two homogeneous continuums may differ from each other by the number of parameters upon which they depend. Space is a tridimensional medium, while the structure of time depends upon a single parameter. It is true that we measure time by a spatial displacement, but it does not follow that the measurable time is space. It is natural to measure time by means of movement, because movement implies both duration and extension. But time and movement are not identical things: movement is a spatial change, while time is a change of any kind, and may be measured by any regular change, for example, by a change of color. There is no real distinction between the so-called spatialized time (quantitative) and real time (qualitative). There are not two kinds of time, any more than there are two kinds of space. Time is only qualitative or quantitative according as we look at it from the subjective or the objective point of view. It is concrete or abstract according as we place it in reality or in intellection. Bergson identifies the real time with the succession of states of consciousness, and concludes that it is a

qualitative and heterogeneous multiplicity. But time is no conscious reality by itself. Time can only be the "basis on which our states of consciousness detach themselves." And that basis can only be homogeneous, neuter, and *grisâtre*. What are heterogeneous are the facts of consciousness. But time itself (the actual moment) is one and the same individuality present everywhere, in all states of consciousness and in all things. It is in this sense that time is God. Duration, says Bergson, signifies invention, creation of forms, continuous elaboration of the absolutely new. If this sentence means anything at all, it can only mean that time is the universal principle which has created and is still creating the world. In this sense, the term "creative evolution," as employed by Bergson, is fully justified.

SUH HU.

A Defence of Idealism. GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. *Mind*, 92, pp. 473-488.

Mr. Ladd opposes cock-sureness and jauntiness in philosophical debate on the ground that all systematic philosophies have a common aim. The most extreme opposition, that between monistic Idealism and materialistic Realism, suffers a *reductio ad absurdum*, when the two eventually meet and fuse. Between the extremes of this opposition, agreements are found more important than differences. In order that there be discussion, each school must in some measure come over to the opposing point of view. The methods of opposing schools must also be the same, for only one method is possible, "and this is the way of rationalism, the method of reflective thinking." The opposition between the real and the ideal cannot ultimately be maintained. Every form of realism is essentially idealistic in the character of its philosophical tenets, and every idealism must take its point of departure from that which is actual in human experience. There is no purely factual experience. Ideas and ideals are facts, neither true nor false in themselves, but only as interpretations of reality. Ideals are essential to progress. No scientific law can be founded on 'mere' fact, for all laws are shot through with the ideals which are implicated in factual experience. Philosophy is therefore in its very nature some form of Idealism. How particular ideals may be made to stand together in harmony under the supreme Ideal is the perpetual problem of reflective thinking. Pragmatism and the new realism as critiques of the exercise of reflective reason may be of value, but if they would add anything to our knowledge of reality, they must become rationalistic in method, and thus acknowledge fellowship with other systematic philosophies.

D. T. HOWARD.

Die Geschichtsphilosophie Comtes u. Hegels: Ein Vergleich. F. DITTMANN. *V. f. w. Ph.*, XXXVIII, 3, pp. 281-312.

History for both Comte and Hegel is the development of humanity as a whole. According to Comte, history as a science begins only with positive philosophy, when the development of humanity is regarded as subordinated to unchangeable laws of nature. Freedom does not consist in arbitrariness,

but in the submission to the rationality of the necessary laws. The philosophy of history for Hegel is thought dealing with necessary and rational reality. There is no freedom without the consciousness of freedom, which is only possible in an organized state, where individual wills are unified in the general objective will. Thus Comte and Hegel agree in presupposing immanent lawfulness and in regarding freedom as subordinate to necessity, but differ in the conception of law as that of natural science on the one hand, and as the dialectic movement of an Idea on the other. For Comte, the development of humanity is an unfolding of finite human nature, and will reach an absolute end when it is all evolved in the complete positive stage, just as the life of an individual is completed in ripe, old age. As the end is from the beginning present in the germ of human nature, history must rest on a hypothesis of immanent teleology, as indeed a working hypothesis is necessary for every empirical science. The orderly series of historical facts involves continuity and necessity in all the steps of social development. The conception of natural laws implies also the relativity of facts to their conditions as against absoluteness of standard of judgment. For Hegel, too, the development of humanity is an evolving of human nature, but more specifically, it is the progress in the consciousness of freedom. The same analogy of history to an individual life is used by Hegel, only more thoroughly worked out. The teleological standpoint is a guiding principle for interpreting history. The continuity of history follows from the nature of the dialectic movements. All historical events are necessary steps through which the world Spirit develops; but their values are only relative to their times. Thus Comte and Hegel agree that development is an unfolding of unchangeable human nature toward an absolute end. They both accept the hypothesis of immanent teleology. They further agree in the continuity, necessity, and relativity of the steps of development. Comte sometimes even makes all truths relative to its time. Hegel, on the other hand, holds that philosophy can give absolute truth. However, Comte has at least one absolute standard, viz. his positive philosophy. (The article is to be continued in the first number of 1915.)

YUEN R. CHAO.

Psychological Doctrine and Philosophical Teaching. JOHN DEWEY. J. of Phil., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XI, 19, pp. 505-511.

The past influence of philosophy on psychology justifies a philosopher in discussing the procedure of the latter. The two distinct realms, physical and psychical, of naïve experience and science provoke difficult epistemological questions. According to received opinion the physical world is known only through external perception, yet, on the other hand, perception cannot get outside itself, and its nature can only be known introspectively. The probability that this dilemma was inherited from philosophy calls it to the philosopher's attention. The fact that as soon as a generation of behaviorist psychologists is self-trained these traditional presuppositions will be rejected, makes philosophical criticism hopeful. In such a revision the notion of be-

havior should not reflect the traditional dualism. Behavior must refer, not alone to the nervous system, but to all human conduct. By rejecting all artificial traditional distinctions between the psychical and the physical, epistemological questions will disappear, and psychology will become a theory of actual human nature.

C. CECIL CHURCH.

Definitions and Methodological Principles in Theory of Knowledge. BERTRAND RUSSELL. *The Monist*, XXIV, 4, pp. 582-593.

The analysis of experience in previous articles suggests certain definitions. Subjects are the domain, objects the converse domain of the relation, *acquaintance*. Cognitive facts involve acquaintance. Epistemology defined as an analysis of true and false beliefs and of their relations, together with a search for the criteria of true belief, admits psychical and logical aspects. Data must include all particulars and universals cognized otherwise than by inference, yet a datum in a subject matter need not be obvious. The fact of its being a datum might not be a datum. As acquaintance must always be acquaintance with some object, that object must be real. Unreality may be a notion due to the possibility of describing in the subject of a sentence what is not a constituent of the proposition expressed. In dream experiences, unreality may be inferred because these objects are less intimately related to the objects of waking sensations. All cognitive occurrences giving rise to error must be other than dual relations. The epistemological order involves psychical and logical considerations but does not assume knowledge of physics and physiology.

C. CECIL CHURCH.

Objectives, Truth and Error. E. H. STRANGE. *Mind*, No. 92, pp. 489-509.

Mr. Russell objects to most theories of truth, on the ground that they are incompatible with the existence of error, and he attempts to elaborate a theory of judgment which will overcome this defect. Mr. Strange, with the object of illustrating his own theory, reviews Meinong's theory of Objectives, which, in agreement with Mr. Russell, he finds unfitted to deal with error. After a further analysis of Russell's theory, which also is found wanting, the conclusion is reached that Meinong's Objectives must be retained, but with modifications. Meinong distinguishes between the object judged and what is judged about the object. The one is Object, the other Objective. Belief is always concerned with Objectives, and its truth or falsity depends on whether the Objective is fact or not fact. The difficulty of the position lies in the proposition that every judgment must have both object and objective. This gives us impossible objects. Mr. Russell points out that some sort of correspondence theory must be adopted, since truth and falsity concern beliefs, not objects. Belief does not imply, however, a dual relation between what is believed and a complex external fact, since in that case false belief would have an object. Belief is a multiple relation, which unites objects in an order which may or may not correspond to their order in Reality. This multiple

relation called belief is found, however, when examined, to be so extraordinary that our knowledge of other multiple relations is of no value in enabling us to understand it. Meinong's Objective is reinstated, primarily because judgments refer to Objectives rather than to objects. Objectives, it is proposed, neither exist nor subsist, though we may speak of them as 'true' or 'false,' 'fact' or 'not-fact.' The relation between Objectives and factual complexes, which we call truth, is ultimate and undefinable.

D. T. HOWARD.

The Distribution of Consciousness and its Criteria. ROBERT MACDOUGALL. Am. J. Ps., XXV, 4, pp. 471-499.

By what criteria shall we determine the distribution of mind? We use the unique case of the exact correlation between our own minds and bodies in a sort of inductive proof for a similar correlation wherever we observe a similar body. But nature presents a series of types diverging to forms which offer no practicable ground of comparison with our bodies. If we associate mental life with specialized activities or structures, we cannot assume it throughout this series, but must formulate criteria. Do we indeed find the whole of our own physiological activity reflected in consciousness? The classical answer is that only the activity of the central nervous system is immediately connected with mind. But on this hypothesis the systematic correspondence between our own minds and bodies is uncertain, since it depends on the integrity of connections which we cannot always demonstrate to be present or absent by the only available means, *i. e.*, observation of peripheral data. By a further distinction, consciousness is assumed to accompany only those motor changes which are associated with the cerebral cortex. But the same reaction may conceivably be controlled by higher or lower centres, and so must be interpreted not according to structure but according to situation. And the presence of the stimulus to consciousness at all depends upon modifying factors such as the focus of attention. Highly complicated reactions, such as reading and writing, sometimes appear to be automatic. If their dissociation from consciousness is actual, the whole inference of consciousness from behavior is discredited; if consciousness is assumed to be present, but because of inattention irrecoverable by memory, introspection as a test is invalidated; if there is dissociation within consciousness itself, the unity of consciousness is lost. We may however study mental types rather than mental activities in general, and consider (1) the series graded from normal human beings to anencephalics, especially if the cerebrum is assumed to be the structural basis of consciousness; (2) the early developmental stages of the normal individual; (3) and the taxonomic system of living forms. In these series we find ground, on observing the differences between lower and higher forms, for predicating physical activities unaccompanied by consciousness. Four conceptions attempt to define the province of consciousness: (1) Psycho-physical correlation is held to be universal; mind and matter are alike atomic. Here limits are not considered and continuity is assumed. (2) Consciousness is regarded as dependent

on a specific grade of physical organization, usually on the brain. Thus the meaning of the term consciousness, applied to organisms like our own, is protected, while continuity, especially apparent in the development of the embryo, is disregarded. This second sort of concept includes the notion of consciousness as a peculiar type of energy. (3) Consciousness is conceived as the concomitant of general or specific modes of response to the environment. We note decrease of consciousness upon introspection of our relatively fixed reactions, and find its highest degree where definite reactions have not been secured. Variability is here the criterion of consciousness. But wide variations might appear to exist, and still be automatic within their wide and yet limited field. (4) So consciousness is predicated where the whole organism is affected by change of stimuli, *i. e.*, where there is capacity to learn from experience. Although consciousness as the mark of imperfect adaptation is in a sense self-eliminative, it is saved by the development of new situations caused (*a*) by changes of stimuli and (*b*) by continual development of the 'margin of attention.' In general we may look upon consciousness as a unity of functioning, an irreducible reality appearing at various levels. But in determining its distribution, we must think of it as a complex of processes, in terms of which, as of Sentience, Constructive Perception, Recognition, Memory, we shall attempt to describe the world.

MARION D. CRANE.

Philosophischer Realismus. DR. BERNHARD VON LUDWIG. *Ar. f. sys. Ph.*, XX, 3, pp. 257-265.

The conviction that all human experiences (*Erfahrungen*) are facts (*Erlebnissen*) of consciousness is an essential feature of Idealism. From this it follows that no fact is isolated; all hang together in an inexplicable unity. Some arise from our own activity, others are irresistibly forced upon us; hence, the distinction between conception and perception. In its attempt to satisfy the demands of reason for a contradictionless unity, by supplementing with hypotheses the data of immediate experience, philosophy is led inevitably to the assumption of a plurality of individual conscious unities, united by a single, all-embracing conscious unity. The supposed antinomies of Idealism, emphasized by Dr. Franz Jünemann, are the result of a 'petitio principii,' or of a misuse of words, on the part of the Realist, himself. The alleged infinite regress of conceptions in the Idealistic account of perception is likewise illusory. The Realistic representative theory of perception presupposes a wholly unintelligible production of a conscious fact by a material process. Realism's supposed axiom of the external existence of a spatially extended world is simply an entirely unwarrantable hypostatization of a product of abstraction. Since dreams have all the characteristics of perception, the fact of perception is no evidence for such a world. The assumptions of Realism are not based on immediate experience and they lead to the grossest contradictions.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

The Motive of Individualism in Religion. WARNER FITE. Harvard Theological Review, VII, pp. 478-496.

Is the spirit of a free man compatible with that worship and love of God which is implied in any genuine religion? Mr. Bertrand Russell, in "A Free Man's Worship," seems to imply that a free man's religion is necessarily a religion of self-sufficiency. The historical individualisms, as well as the modern social moralities, base their arguments on natural instinct. They have a tendency also to regard individuals as mutually exclusive spatial units, whose unification implies sacrifice, on the ground that two bodies cannot occupy the same space or swallow the same food. They overlook the essential fact, that the social relation is constituted by spiritual communion between conscious beings. The right of the individual to self-assertion depends upon his being self-conscious, and hence not a means for alien ends, but an end in himself. But while self-consciousness implies self-assertion, it does not imply self-sufficiency. It involves a consciousness of outer realities and personal needs; it is not incompatible with reverence for goodness and wisdom. It especially recognizes the need for intercourse with others as the basis of all social value. Religion is the outcome of a deeper self-consciousness. In interpreting the Universe, the individual must hold a place as *one* in the kingdom of ends. "The starry heavens above me, and the moral law within me," suggest on the one hand the vastness of reality, and on the other the self-consciousness which evaluates and gives significance to this vastness. In this universe, is self-consciousness merely a fortuitous fact, or may man seek spiritual fellowship within it? This is the problem of religion. While Mr. Russell's essay arouses sympathy for the spirit of the 'free man,' it furnishes no justification either for freedom or worship. We may assert our significance in a world of significance, but not in an irrational world.

D. T. HOWARD.

Buddhist Influence in the Gospels. RICHARD GARBE. The Monist, XXIV, 4, pp. 481-492.

The Gospel stories seem undeniably affected by Buddhist influence, particularly in four cases. (1) The story, of the old saint Asita glorifying the Child Buddha, often appearing in Buddhist literature, resembles the story of Simon; and the angelic hymn, common to both, proves the dependence of the latter on the former. (2) The story of the temptation of Jesus has three most significant parallels in the early *Pāli* literature. The particulars of both versions, temptation in solitude, etc., are too coincident to permit a theory of non-dependence. (3) The account of Peter's walking on the water seems to be borrowed from such stories as that in the *Jātaka* where the disciple goes to the Buddha on the water, saving himself by faith. (4) In both Buddhist and Gospel accounts of miracles performed in creating loaves of bread the number five significantly occurs. Other loans are probable; but the fact of loans need not threaten Christian faith.

C. CECIL CHURCH.

The Development of Mahayana Buddhism. DAISSETZ TEITARO. *The Monist*, XXIV, 4, pp. 565-581.

We divide Buddhism into the Mahâyâna section, centering in Northern India and China, holding up the ideal of universal salvation, and the *Hînayâna* section of the South, holding up the ideal of individual salvation. The former is speculative, and its discipline is intellectual rather than moral. It has developed many sects. It neglects the moral side, emphasized by the Hînayâna division, boldly constructing the essentially Buddhist doctrine of non-egoism. With all Buddhists, this sect denies the ego-soul as a unit behind our consciousness; but it further denies the objective world an *Ishvâra* or personal creator. This negation is the road to a higher affirmation. Here birth, change, oneness, etc., disappear. Intellection becomes intuition. In a mysterious way this higher affirmation is the source of being and love. This doctrine modifies the severity of the conception of *karma*. The world, as a single spiritual system, permits the *karma* of the good to modify the *karma* of the ignorant,—which is a doctrine of vicarious sacrifice. The ideal is the deliverance of all, rather than the salvation of individuals. But the differences are not fundamental, and the two branches of Buddhism will soon unite to contribute to the promotion of peace and good will towards all beings.

C. CECIL CHURCH.

Emerson The Nihilist. CHARLES GREY SHAW. *The International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XXV, 1, pp. 68-86.

Emerson may be called an idealistic nihilist. His ideals are similar to those which later characterize Bandelaire, Wagner, Stirner and Ibsen. He is anarchistic, immoralistic, irreligious. With Poe, the irrationalist, and Emerson, the immoralist, as foci of American culture we must surmount the current scientism and sociality to a higher spiritual life. The necessity is lacking to go to Wagner and Ibsen, to Stirner, to Turgéniéff and Dostoievsky and Gogel, to Beyle, to Nietzsche. Emerson before all these emancipated the ego. He pictures society as a conspiracy against the ego, as an enemy of that foundation of spiritual life, the "I am that I am." The development of the individual is the divine necessity. Evolution of society can be but fleeting or fragmentary. A non-conformist, he knows not duty. Benevolence, with the other virtues, should be a spiritual spontaneity. A world of Emerson's would need no law. "To educate the wise man the state exists, and with the appearance of the wise man the state expires." Law is limitation; and limitation, man's only sin. His nominalism resists the synthesis which tends to make man pliable and stuff-like. Indifference—not efficiency—is the Emersonian apex. In Emerson's hypernomian morality we have the original form of Nietzschean "Beyond Good and Evil." As Ibsen delights in his 'heights,' so Emerson, in his 'Beyond.' Here there is no social conscience. The individual is the 'blond beast,' strong in his blue-eyedness. With Rousseau, he finds his historical premises in nature. With Schiller, he is a pagan child of the naïve, who knows no distinctions of inner and outer.

His wild individualism is indeed a life, and not an 'expiation.' "No law can be sacred to me but that of my own nature." Since Darwin we have been inundated with a pale sociality that needs the inoculation of Transcendentalism. Emerson's inner life was filled with a joyous self-reliant irreligion. 'If I am the Devil's child,' he says, "I will live then from the Devil." Emerson's strong individualism does not disown his debt to vice. He prefers to be classed among the goats rather than among the sheep. If our Anglo-American pragmatists did not lack the will to view their neat doctrine in the strong light of irrationalism and immoralism, they could claim Emerson as a prophet of their cult. He desires that "the universe be kept open in all directions," and that Jesus be not allowed to "absorb the race." There is a hint of dilettantism in Emerson. His anarchy, immoralism, and irreligion were perhaps merely intellectual. They seem not to have been the result of such spiritual storms as were hardly weathered by Ibsen and Strindberg. Swedenborgianism held for Emerson, as for the late Professor James, a secret stairway to the heights of spiritual life where is lost some of the seriousness of man's prayers and man's religion.

A. J. THOMAS.

The Function and Scope of Social Philosophy. HARRY ALLEN OVERSTREET. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XI, 20, pp. 533-543.

Modern philosophy in its regnant aspect has been an exceedingly one-sided affair, confining its function to the critical examination of the concepts employed by the mathematico-natural sciences. A new direction is now imminent. Philosophy must be the comprehensive critique of the concepts of all social sciences. The task of social philosophy is, first, to examine the intended scope of the concepts employed by a particular science; second, to determine whether or not in the elaboration of these concepts that science passes unconsciously beyond the intended scope; and, third, to find out what relation the special meanings assigned bear to the meanings which these concepts yield when they are regarded from a point of view which is thoroughly comprehensive. The organization of these social concepts is one which the social philosopher must himself effect. His first task is to make an inventory of the master concepts of the social sciences and to arrange them in some manner of organic relationship. Tentatively speaking, these master concepts are (1) work, (2) sex-life, (3) æsthetic enjoyment, (4) knowledge, (5) government, and (6) the good. A social philosophy, then, properly begins as a philosophy of economics, and proceeds to the elaboration of philosophies of sex-life, of æsthetics, of science and education, of law and government, and, finally, of ethics and religion.

SUH HU.

On the Psychology of Poetic Construction. An Experimental Method. RADO-SLAV A. TSANOFF. Am. J. Ps., XXV, 4, pp. 588-537.

The imagination is practically virgin soil for experiment. It has been treated (1) as a mystical or inexplicable faculty; (2) by earlier psychologists

as occupying a formal place within a system; (3) by modern psychologists variously as a manifestation of each and every mental process. The image of imagination has been experimentally compared with that of memory, and with perception, but such a study should include not only the image material, but especially the peculiar process of poetic construction. A study of the introspections of mediocre people upon the appreciation or writing of poetry would leave us still suspecting a distinctive process in the case of great poets. This process certainly cannot be discovered in casual anecdotes concerning their eccentricities. The study of their self-revelations, of questionnaires submitted to them, or of the 'Boswellizing' of an individual poet would be valuable; but the introspection of poets tends to vagueness or to inaccuracy, and particularly to a paralysis of the essential spontaneity of poetic imagination. Therefore the study of the poet's 'first draft' would seem to offer the best experimental record of the imagination, since it would show in detail the succession of images and the development of the idea. First drafts are difficult to find and to decipher, and would tend to be of particular rather than of general significance. But the author's study of a few first drafts justifies his hope that other similar studies will be made.

MARION D. CRANE.

Values and Experience. J. F. DASHIELL. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XI, 8, pp. 491-497.

Naïve human experience is an unmistakable but not a mere dynamism, for the agencies operative therein stand over against us brimful of meaning, *i. e.*, of value aspects. This ever-changing world of life tends to form itself into vortices, which are continually becoming organized in relation to each other. We, as a set of these organisms, make a distinction relative to purpose and activity, and regard the rest as extra-organic. Thus we find values. In so far, then, as a content is experienced it has value. Here 'value' is a primary category, which does not lose uniqueness when it is organized into organic and extra-organic. An arbitrary distinction drawn between values and things, between original data and what is precipitated out from them as 'things,' would utilize the dead concept of substance, which represents the dynamic as static. The distinction between subjective and objective follows that between the organic and extra-organic, but the whole real value is neither subjective nor objective, but simple and immediate.

MARION D. CRANE.

NOTES.

The fourteenth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association was held at Chicago, December 28-30, in conjunction with the meeting of the Western Philosophical Association. The president of the Association, Professor J. F. Tufts, delivered an address on The Ethics of States. This with the Report of the meeting will appear in the March number of the REVIEW.

The Fifth International Congress of Philosophy, which was to have been held in London during the first week of September, 1915, has been indefinitely postponed because of the war.

Professor Roscoe Pound will in April deliver a course of lectures at Cornell University on "Modern Justice."

We give below a list of articles in current philosophical magazines:

MIND, 92: *G. T. Ladd*, A Defence of Idealism; *E. H. Strange*, Objectives, Truth and Error; *W. W. Carlisle*, Intercourse as the Basis of Thought; *B. Muscio*, The Hegelian Dialectic.

THE MONIST, XXIV, 4: *Richard Garbe*, Buddhist Influence in the Gospels; *A. S. White*, Unity of World-conception; *Philip E. B. Jourdain*, The Principles of Mechanics with Newton from 1679 to 1687; *D. T. Suzuki*, The Development of Mahayana Buddhism; *Bertrand Russell*, Definitions and Methodological Principles in Theory of Knowledge.

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, VII, 4: *Francis G. Peabody*, Mysticism and Modern Life; *Warner Fite*, The Motive of Individualism in Religion; *Robert A. Woods*, Drunkenness; *Edward S. Drown*, The Growth of the Incarnation; *William Lawrence*, Pensions for the Clergy; *Benjamin B. Warfield*, The Essence of Christianity and the Cross of Christ.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XXV, 1: *Roscoe Pound*, A Feudal Principle in Modern Law; *John Dewey*, Nature and Reason in Law; *H. O. Meredith*, Class Distinctions; *Ellsworth Faris*, Origin of Punishment; *C. G. Shaw*, Emerson the Nihilist; *E. S. P. Haynes*, Divorce and Morality.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XXV, 4: *Robert MacDougall*, The Distribution of Consciousness and its Criteria; *Leonard A. Troland*, Adaptation and the Chemical Theory of Sensory Response; *Radoslav A. Tsanoff*, On the Psychology of Poetic Construction; *S. W. Fernberger*, The Effect of the Attitude of the Subject upon the Measure of Sensitivity; *Samuel C. Kohns*, The Association Method in its Relation to the Complex and Complex Indicators.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, XI, 10: *H. T. Woolley*, The Psychology of Sex; *H. C. McComas*, The Heredity of Mental Abilities; *F. G. Bruner*, Racial Differences.

XI, 11: *W. Brown*, Recent Literature of Mental Types; *S. Smith*, Right and Left Handedness; *R. S. Woodworth*, Voluntary Phenomena-Experimental; *F. L. Wells*, Dynamic Psychology; *V. A. C. Henman*, Reaction Time; *E. K. Strong*, Fatigue, Work, and Inhibition; *A. T. Poffenberger*, Psychological Effects of Drugs; *W. V. Bingham*, Five Years of Progress of Comparative Musical Science.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, XI, 21: *Norbert Wiener*, Relativism; *Edith F. Mulhall*, Experiments in Judgment.

XI, 22: *C. I. Lewis*, The Matrix Algebra for Implications; *H. G. Hartmann*, Are Realism and Relativity Incompatible?

XI, 23: *Morris R. Cohen*, Qualities, Relations, and Things; *W. P. Montague*, Professor Thorndike's Attack on the Ideo-Motor Theory; *L. W. Kline*, An Experimental Study for Classes in Reasoning and its Transference.

XI, 24: *Edgar A. Singer, Jr.*, The Pulse of Life; *H. G. Hartmann*, A Definition of Causation; A Reply to Professor Sheldon.

THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, VII, 2: *T. H. Pear*, The Role of Repression in Forgetting; *Carveth Read*, The Psychology of Magic; *W. H. Winch*, Mental Examination of School Children; *M. J. Reaney*, General Intelligence and Play Ability; *N. L. Perkins*, Value of Distributed Repetitions in Rote Learning.

VII, 3: *Agnes L. Rogers and J. L. McIntyre*, The Measurement of Intelligence in Children by the Binet-Simon Scale; *E. Roffe Thomson*, An Inquiry into some Questions connected with Imagery in Dreams; *Stanley H. Watkins*, Immediate Memory and its Evaluation; *J. C. Flügel and Wm. McDougall*, Some Observations on Psychological Contrast.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XXI, 5: *S. W. Fernberger*, On the Elimination of the Two Extreme Intensities of the Comparison Stimuli in the Method of Constant Stimuli; *Robert A. Cummins*, A Study of the Effect of Basket Ball Practice on Motor Reaction, Attention and Suggestibility; *Jean Weiden-sall*, Psychological Tests as Applied to Criminal Women; *M. F. Washburn*, The Function of Incipient Motor Processes.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE, XXXVIII, 3: *Friedrich Dittmann*, Die Geschichtsphilosophie Comtes und Hegels: Ein Vergleich; *Albert Kranold*, Methodologische Betrachtungen zum Problem der sozialen Fehlurteile; *Richard Müller-Freienfels*, Die Bedeutung der motorischen Faktoren und der Gefühle für Wahrnehmung, Aufmerksamkeit und Urteil. II.; *Viktor Stern*, Die logischen Mängel der Machschen Antimetaphysik und die realistische Ergänzung seiner Positivismus.

ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE, XX, 3: *Dr. Bernhard von Ludwig*, Philosophischer Realismus; *Bernhard Rawitz*, Über das Vergessen; *Johannes Schlaf*, Geozentrischer Bestand und Himmelsmechanik; *Georg Wendel*, Der Freie Wille und seine Bedeutung in der Erfahrung; *Hans Prager*, Über die erkenntnistheoretischen und metaphysischen Grundlagen der Rechts-philosophie; *Arthur Trebitsch*, Die Causalität im Lichte des "Denktriebes zur Einheit"; *Dr. Ernst Müller*, Vom Sinn des Widersinns.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, LXIX, 3 u. 4: *Gustav Rose*, Experimentelle Untersuchungen über das topische Gedächtnis; *Paul V. Liebermann und Géza Révész*, Die Binaurale Tonmischung; *Vittorio Benussi*, Die Gestaltwahrnehmung.

LXX, 1 u. 2: *Karl Reichardt*, Über den Vergleich erinnerte Objecte, insbesondere hinsichtlich ihrer Grosse; *L. Edinger*, Zur Methodik in der Tierpsychologie; *Anathon Aall*, Der Traum.

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE, XIV, 55: *J. Kollarits*, Observations de psychologie quotidienne; *J. Kollarits*, Contributions à l'étude des rêves; *R. de Saussure*, Le temps en général et le temps Bergsonien en particulier.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

ETHICS OF STATES.¹

THE lover of paradox can find no richer field than that of the ethics of states. On the one hand no institution has commanded nobler devotion or inspired loftier art; on the other, none has lent itself so ruthlessly to the destruction of every human interest and value, or has practiced so consistently what in common life we all call crime. On the one hand it has been presented by philosopher and publicist as the institution in which man may live nobly and well, as the institution in which freedom may be secured, or as the institution in which the organic unity of mankind is realized and the individual is raised to higher consciousness and larger horizons. On the other it has been convicted by history of organizing hatred more effectively than love; of organizing oppression more resolutely than safeguards of liberty; and of bending its energies and using its resources more unsparingly to destroy life than to save it. We should not expect to find in it the family affections, the charm of friendship, the ideals of religion. But we might look for respect for elementary rights. What are the facts? The State hales private persons before its bar if they violate person or property, break contracts, or enslave their fellows, but itself commits homicide, trespass, breaks treaties, and takes possession against their will of the persons and property of multitudes who have done it no harm.

¹ Delivered as the presidential address before a joint meeting of the American and Western Philosophical Associations at the University of Chicago, December 28, 1914.

And if we seek a final paradox, more striking than the others, we find it in the real or assumed solemnity with which nations at war on the one hand suppress discussion, claim that political considerations take precedence over morality, and regard victory as a mark of divine approval, while on the other they appeal to the justice of their cause and recognize the importance of giving it the color of self-defence. "Even victorious wars," said Bismarck, "cannot be justified unless they are forced upon one. . . . Success," he explained to Moltke when revising the Ems telegram, "however, essentially depends upon the impression which the origination of the war makes upon us and others; it is important that we should be the party attacked."¹ The present war has exemplified these various paradoxes in more striking form, but we do not need to look beyond the seas for illustrations of practically all of them. The story of Naboth's vineyard has been often repeated in the dealings of the United States with Indian lands. Our dealings with Colombia excited alarm in South America and have been condemned by many of our own citizens. Our first proposal as to the Panama tolls was at least a violation of what the other party to the treaty understood to be its meaning. The neglect of Congress to pass laws giving the Federal Courts the power to enforce treaty rights if these are violated by local communities like Louisiana or California, seems almost an equally flagrant sin of omission—it involves making promises which we do not take measures to carry out. If a private individual were similarly neglectful the law would certainly know how to deal with him. We know our own countrymen. We know English and German and French and Slav. We find their private morals not very different from ours. How can we explain the contrast between private and public conduct?

The simplest answer is that all the paradoxes come from confusing politics and morals. Politics is politics, as Machiavelli well knew. To apply morals to politics is like appraising electricity in terms of virtue instead of in volts and kilowatts. This is, however, too simple an answer, for it does not explain the anxiety of states for moral approval. Another simple answer is

¹ Bismarck, *The Man and the Statesman*, Vol. II, p. 101.

the old one that might is right. This may take either the cruder form that might makes right, or the more pious and plausible shape that strength of nations, though not of individuals, is the divine evidence of right and therefore any objections to the ethics of successful powers are to be condemned as puerile.

On either of these theories it is pedantic and futile to apply to great elementary forces or to the cosmos and its laws the petty measures set by human conventions of philosophic systems. It is like finding fault with the firmament because its stars are not arranged in kindergarten patterns, or complaining that gravity is inconsiderate to the man walking on an icy sidewalk. Another easy solution is, "my nation is sincere; others are hypocrites." But I venture to think this is too simple for the impartial scholar. I shall not essay the task of an appraiser of just what is right and wrong by an absolute standard. I attempt the more modest task of noting some of the historical and logical grounds for the paradoxes in political ethics. Such an explanation may not yield the virtuous thrill of superior morality which we feel when we hew Agag in pieces before the Lord, but it is perhaps more fitting for the consideration of a group of scholars in a neutral nation.

We should probably agree that the actual morality of men of European stock is a conglomerate of several codes. Five of these are:—(1) The code of self interest, based on the instincts for self-preservation, self-assertion, mastery, and possession, taking the rational forms of prudence, insistence upon rights, or ambition for expression and power. This is in so far praiseworthy as compared with inertness, sloth, or general weakness. (2) Closely related to this is the code of honor, which governs our behavior as members of certain types of special groups with some dominant interest or temper. (3) A third code, of legal standards, less emotional than that of honor, safeguards person, property, and contracts. It is important not between intimates but between dwellers in a country or parties to a bargain. (4) Fourth comes the code of family behavior, taught by the natural responses of parent to child, child to parent, or brother to sister. (5) Fifth, some more ideal code inspired by some cause, some personality, some imaginative vision, some response to personal

relations of friendship, or of a wider human group than that of honor.

Nations have the first two of these codes, self-interest and honor, strongly developed; they have rudiments of the third in international law. Some beginnings of the fifth we thought we had in science, art, literature, religion. But the balance of power between these different sets of controlling principles in the national state is very different from that which obtains in at least the more intelligent and orderly private citizen. In the individual the web of social relations of a positive sort has increased until it is unusual for even the selfish to assert nakedly his belief in the rightful preëminence of relatively exclusive self-assertion and self-regard. The reverse is true of nations. Preservation and even national expansion comes first, says Rümelin in his classic address—*salus publica suprema lex*. In the absence of any authority to secure mutual confidence a condition of mutual distrust prevails which enables a government to justify to itself almost any act on the ground of self-defense, and a proper manipulation of the press will go far toward convincing the people of the justification of the government. In the case of the individual's morals, law brings codes of honor before the bar of more rational and larger groups. With nations honor is given precedence over right. The statement of Sir Edward Grey that Great Britain would act in view of British interests, the national honor, and the nation's obligations, was perhaps not designed to place these three grounds of action in order of importance, but it would probably be generally accepted as representing such a scale in national ethics. In this series the order is,—first the direct, non-social, if not anti-social interests; second, the emotional interest bound up with some relatively exclusive group; third, recognition of relations to others, whether of free contract or of status. In individual morality the order is either reversed or else the terms interest, honor, and obligations, are given such ideal meanings as to make the exclusive aspect no longer relevant.

The important differences between the ethics of individuals and those of states are due in part to historical, in part to intrinsic

conditions. Historically we have in states a longer survival of the traits of morals between hostile or unfriendly groups. Intrinsically, organized states, like other corporations, are both more and less than individuals. They are more because they are trustees and protectors of certain interests and values for many members. They are less because in representing certain interests and purposes they take no account of many other interests and purposes. They are thus impersonal and subject to the limited morality which present society finds in all impersonal corporations.

Historically, two great forces have been active in the building of nations and empires, lust for conquest and desire of gain. The state has not ordinarily arisen as a further grouping of families and tribes. Practically all modern European states have arisen through conquest. The king and his band of warriors, gathered frequently from various tribes and countries, united only by lust of conquest and plunder, formed the political body which triumphed over clans or neighborhood communities. Here was a new method of organization which was more powerful than the old. After the first battle William the Norman with his handful of experts could hold in subjection the whole realm of England. Usually the political body included only the king and his warriors; the great mass of conquered natives remained in their kinships or communities, or as slaves outside the organization. They must obey it, they were not within it.

When once the conquest had been made, the king would defend the land against outside attacks, and enforce order within. He would impose his own peace and permit none but himself to seize person and property. Defense and sovereignty came first; protection to rights of subjects was not in the original intention but was wrested from the ruler by bargaining or by battle or by gradual enlargement of privileged groups. Law, which at first recognized few rights to any except the military masters, gradually gave protection to subjects, but it was only after centuries of struggle that the great mass of the people found freedom and a sense of participation in the power which previously they had been compelled to obey, or had followed with dog-like devotion

at the risk of property and life. Only in still more recent times has the state undertaken the care of health, the education of its children, the encouragement of science, the bringing of opportunity which makes the common resources available for the common man. The tradition of the national state is thus one of force, of hostility toward other nations, and of corresponding morals.

Within the last three hundred years another process has been operative in the formation and enlargement of states, which has also had an important influence upon public morality. The great colonizing movement, which began with the discovery of America, was more definitely and consciously economic in aim than the earlier types of state formation. North and South America, and later India and Africa, transformed England, Portugal, Spain, and France from nations to empires. The new possessions were at first managed largely for profit rather than for the benefit of the colonists or of the natives. The chartered companies, such as the East India Company, empowered to "make peace and war with the heathen nations" had little scruple as to the means by which they defeated rival companies or gained control over the lives and resources of millions. And when the home government began to look into the purposes and methods of these governments organized for profits, and to control the more flagrant abuses of power, there remained in the case of most of them the factor of differences of color, race, and religion between ruler and ruled. Imperial power under such conditions has been doubly dangerous to moral standards. "Impunity," says Bryce, "corrupts the ordinary man." It was generally understood that the American soldiers in the Philippines did things which they would have considered quite unworthy of military standards at home. It was publicly stated by members of the war department that the United States in its conduct of the war was not bound by international laws of war because the Philipinos had never been parties to international agreements. The famous order of General Smith in the Philippines to kill and burn and spare no boy over ten, or the address to the German troops departing for China at the time of the Boxer outbreak

could scarcely have been issued for warfare in the United States or Europe. Water torture or dum-dum bullets may be used against men of lower civilization. The insidious and corrupting influence of almost irresponsible government exercised by people of one race over those of another has been impartially set forth by Hobson. No doubt the administrator of high purpose and broad sympathy finds in such a situation opportunity for the finest loyalty to duty and the most sensitive regard for those who cannot help themselves; but not to look beyond our own borders, we know how shameful has been much of the history of our own administrative officials in dealing with the American Indians. If we are correctly informed, the zeal for the exploitation of this race has not lessened to this day and is still engaged in manipulating government for selfish ends.

The intrinsic character of the state and the nature of its organization are well adapted to maintain and reenforce the historical precedence of self-preservation and honor over justice, not to mention benevolence. On the positive side, as already noted, the state is more than the individual. It is in its idea the organization of men through which they achieve what is impossible for them singly. By its restraint of violence, by its enforcing of contracts, by its protection of rights, it makes possible in the individual just those moral virtues founded on peace, confidence, truth, and freedom from fear whose absence we deplore in the conduct of states themselves. It may be fairly said that the evils of present international politics are due not to too much but to too little political organization. And, in defense of the national state, it may be urged that it represents about as large a group as in the present stage of civilization can act harmoniously and feel its order to be autonomy and its culture its own free creation. We cannot do justice to the men now yielding up their lives, we cannot be fair to the honored and respected men, our own friends and colleagues on both sides of this present war, except as we recognize the full worth of that which enlists their devotion. We may freely acknowledge the high purpose of the state; we may even agree with Rümelin that the state is bound to maintain itself, and that under existing

conditions this may involve means that are abhorrent to our standards of morality.

But at the same time let us not fall into the fallacy of saying that evil is good. Going about armed, spending a large part of one's days and wealth in revolver practice, and of one's nights in listening at the neighbor's door to discover plots, devising means to catch him napping and studying the precise moment at which one may shoot first and still call it self-defense, lynching suspects, burning houses, and incidentally shooting the children of bystanders, all this may be 'necessary' in certain stages of savagery or frontier life. But no man can call it good. And in so far as nations conduct themselves in this fashion, we must challenge the situation. We must maintain that if our end requires such means we are in a stupid and pitiable condition. It is scarce worth applying terms of right and wrong except that the whole situation is wrong. Instead of glorifying national or imperial states, we should say: If this is the best they can do, we had better look for another principle of organization and reserve for that our enthusiasm and moral applause.

We are forced then to look to the aspect in which the state is not more but less than the individual, its abstractness of purpose, its methods of organization.

We are familiar with corporations organized for various specific ends and with the limits which these ends impose. Banks and manufacturing concerns are organized for profit. If a bank is asked for charity we feel it an appropriate answer that, while its stockholders or directors as individuals may respond, the bank's purpose does not authorize such use of funds. The manufacturing concern as such may serve the public, but its primary duty is to pay dividends upon capital invested. Our law and morality both recognize that bodies organized purely for acquisition need public control. Incorporate acquisitiveness is felt to be dangerous. The political corporation is more complex. It may include in its professed aims not merely the common defense, the establishment of justice, the blessings of liberty, but also the promotion of the general welfare. But even our Federal government, organized with so broad a purpose, has been very chary of

the general welfare in comparison with the common defense. Millions for defense, thousands for health or education, has been our national policy.

It may go without saying that the country has spent largely for education through state and local bodies. But the fact remains that the national government has not been concerned with the social and human needs of the people, and has probably suffered by its abstractness. European national states have concerned themselves more largely with human interests, but other conditions have kept the balance from inclining far in that direction. The central object of the national state has been on the whole power. The evils from which it suffers are, in part at least, due to the unregulated and only very partially responsible organization for power. Such an impersonal corporation has no room for feelings either humanitarian or resentful. It spares no one who opposes it; it turns not aside to indulge triumph or hatred. If I appeal again to Bismarck it is because he embodied more abstractly than any other this political principle and described more frankly its nature.

The consolidation and organization of Germany was for Bismarck a supreme consideration which sometimes called for war, sometimes for peace; sometimes for urging conquest upon a reluctant king, sometimes for a checking of that same king's desire for triumphal entry or for seizure of territory; sometimes for exciting public opinion through a revised telegram, again for bold resistance of a military party that would defend by striking first in order to catch the adversary unprepared. In all these the political as such is brought clearly into relief. For example, in speaking of the situation during the siege of Paris, when operations were delayed because of influences of a professedly humanitarian nature, Bismarck wrote: "A decision, memorable in the world's history, of the secular struggle between the two neighboring peoples was at stake, and in danger of being ruined, through personal and predominately female influences with no historical justification, influences which owed their efficacy, not to political considerations but to feelings which the terms humanity and civilization, imported to us from England, still

rouse in German natures." On the other hand, of the needs in 1866, he said: "Moved by this consideration" (*i. e.*, whether the feelings we left behind in our opponents were implacable) "I had a political motive for avoiding, rather than bringing about, a triumphal entry into Vienna in the Napoleonic style. In positions such as ours were then, it is a political maxim after a victory not to enquire how much you can squeeze out of your opponent, but only to consider what is politically necessary."

If power and prestige, or repute of power, are thus the primary purpose of national organization, it is natural that governments should have agencies in army and navy to maintain this power, and conversely that these agencies should react strongly to strengthen the national bent. It is against all human nature that a man of ability should be content to devote his life to practising for a game of golf without ever playing it. And here again we have the competent testimony of Bismarck. The man who deliberately planned to achieve by blood and iron the unity of Germany was not a mollicoddle or even a pacifist. Of Von Moltké he says: "His love of combat and delight in battles were a great support to me in carrying out the policy I regarded as necessary in opposition to the intelligible and justifiable aversion in a most influential quarter." And then referring to various occasions on which this professional zeal proved inconvenient he makes the following highly significant reflection: "It is natural that in the staff of the army not only younger active officers, but likewise experienced strategists, should feel the need of turning to account the efficiency of the troops led by them, and their own capacity to lead, and of making them prominent in history. It would be a matter of regret if this effect of the military spirit did not exist in the army; the task of keeping its results within such limits as the nation's need of peace can justify is the duty of the political, not the military, heads of the state. That at the time of the Luxemburg question, during the crisis of 1875, invented by Gortchakoff and France, and even down to the more present times, the staff and its leaders have allowed themselves to be led astray and to endanger peace, lies in the very spirit of the institution, which I would not forego.

It only becomes dangerous under a monarch whose policy lacks sense of proportion and power to resist one-sided and constitutionally unjustifiable influences."¹

The other organ of the state which shows the abstractness of corporate morals is the diplomatic service. The traditions of this service call for cunning, as those of the military arm for force. Its personnel is drawn largely from a special class. Its environment is specialized. Like the agents or attorneys of corporations it is urged to press claims which it knows are dubious or worse; it is supposed to have little discretion or conscience of its own, but to be governed by the needs of the government it represents. As is pointed out forcibly by Ponsonby in a recent article, it is in many ways a very inadequate medium for the great interests of the people concerned. Like the corporation attorney it is trained to be astute, it is not always likely to think greatly or to consider all the human issues at stake.

At this point the objection rises from many impatient of academic criticism: "You speak as though self-preservation needed apology or could be subjected to some assumed higher standard, whereas it is either itself the supreme value which tests all others or else is at least the most conclusive evidence of worth. In great part this is the familiar doctrine of survival of the fittest which it would be impossible to discuss within the limits of this address even if such discussion was necessary. But in part it has some new features. It professes to find that in modern conditions of struggle and survival it is really moral qualities which count. For Jack Horner the inference from plums to virtue may have been premature, for there was too much luck. Or to put it in religious terms, it was not capable of absolute demonstration that God was rewarding virtue. But now when plums are extracted not by rule of thumb but by organized research and systematic industry, when survival depends upon efficiency and efficiency depends upon science, organizing power, temperance, chastity, self sacrifice, and all the virtues, the case is changed.

Professor Münsterberg draws a parallel between success in war and success in business competition. "On the whole our

¹ *Op. cit.*, II, p. 103.

economic system is backed by the belief that free competition brings gain to the worthy and keeps down the less efficient. In this sense certainly no unfailing justice lies in the decision of the weapons, but, in the great average, history has proved that those nations will rise which are worthy of it and those will fall which deserve punishment from the higher point of view of civilization." If it be objected that an army is no better test of a nation's character than a football team of a university, the reply is: "The intellectual and moral qualities of a nation do come to expression in a modern war. It is not mere strength and not mere pluck, and least of all mere possession of guns which decides today in warfare. It is the total make-up of a nation with its thoroughness and its energy and the mentality and its readiness to bring sacrifices." The superiority of the German army "does not result from a merely outer professional war technique, but comes because the German army is the embodiment of the national soul with all its intellectual and moral energies." To be sure, the result of this present war may not afford an accurate test of moral superiority because there are more nations on one side than on the other. "The allied nations cannot prove any higher qualities . . . as their final victory would mean only a quantitative superiority." If one stood against one the proof would be conclusive. No one is concerned to deny the consummate scientific ability, the intellectual energies, the discipline, the loyalty, the heroism which are shown in a successful army. Yet when it is proposed to test moral superiority by a one to one contest, irrespective of the size of nations, it is difficult to see how we are eliminating quantity. Great Britain against the Boers, the United States against Spain, Germany against the Belgians,—these were one to one, but it would be a bold inference that these contests established such superiority as would justify the extinction of the lesser power.

The doctrine of efficiency as a moral criterion is also given a religious turn. "Victory in war is the method by which, in the economy of God's providence, the sound nation supersedes the unsound, because in our time such victory is the direct offspring of a higher efficiency, and the higher efficiency is the logical

outcome of the higher morals. . . . The Lord of Hosts has made righteousness the path to victory. In the crash of conflict, in the horrors of battlefields piled with the dead, the dying, and the wounded, a vast ethical intention has still prevailed."¹ Or finally war is given the moral function of serving as the instrument for a redistribution of territory from time to time according to the strength and therefore, it is assumed by those who would in this associate strength with merit, according to the desert or need of nations.

On this I offer two comments. (1) If any one thing stands out clearly before the judgment and conscience of the American people as the result of the recent decades of economic struggle it is this: While success may be secured by public service it may also be secured by strangling competitors, and for this latter purpose the moral virtues are not the qualities chiefly necessary. There is both fair and unfair competition, and the unfair has resources which will often win the day. Is there any less reason to hold that the political power which is most astute in forming alliances, shrewdest in calculating a favorable moment to strike, subtlest in provoking its rival into taking the offensive, most unscrupulous in bribery, will often find these means effective? And there is a deeper consideration for the sensitive conscience. Looking at business competition from a purely economic point of view, we might regard it as fair that the weaker should go to the wall, and the great corporation absorb all the smaller producers. Looking at political competition merely as a means of securing efficient organization, we might be indifferent to the disappearance of small states as political entities. But if economic replacement means at the same time reduction of the great body of citizens of a community to the status of employees; if it means control of legislatures, courts, schools, and churches by the great and efficient corporation, we pause. We have seen this tried more or less successfully in various cities and states and we don't like the taste of it. We have decided that unregulated business, even if more successful, is not to be trusted. An organization existing abstractly for profit needs to be controlled, we believe,

¹ Harold Frazer Wyatt, *The Nineteenth Century and After*.

by the conception of personal worth. Similarly, if we should look at political competition merely as a means of testing efficiency of government we might be indifferent to the disappearance of smaller states or to the tendency to monopoly. But despite all our own inefficiency in national, state and city government, we of America still believe there is a value in self-government. We are young compared with many of the lesser states of Europe or Asia. But to extinguish our national life would be we think a loss of something inseparable from our personality. The national tradition, with all its sins, does make a genuine factor in the higher spiritual life. To destroy any of the peoples which have come to a sense of national life violates the same sense of justice which holds sacred the life of the individual. To reduce by force the variety and richness found in the many peoples and races to one or a half dozen patterns might make for political efficiency, but it would be a hideous wrong. Lord Cromer well observes that democratic imperialists have two ideals which are apt to be mutually destructive, the ideal of good government, and the ideal of self-government. Every dweller in a democratic nation feels the conflict, but we of America at least are not ready to abandon the principle of self-government. Only by this is the kingdom of ends possible.

(2) The second remark is that the doctrine of survival as value, or as evidence of value, persists because it is half true. All value does presuppose some living, willing agent to appreciate and maintain the good. And while ideals transcend the immediate present life, it is also true that life transcends all present ideals and is constantly giving birth to new ones. Moreover, even as self consciousness involves a world of objects, moral valuation implies shaping out a moral world, and this means real achievement. Moral energies mean not thwarting and extinction but fuller life.

Yet it is certain that the doctrine in question in either form is only half true and is, in my judgment, the great materialism—the only one likely to do serious harm. Unless we are ready to go the whole way and deny that anything that exists is evil,

we must use some other standard of value than existence, not to mention the fallacy of ruling out of values the sympathy which may interfere with self-assertion, the love of art and letters which does not necessarily make for existence. If we admit—and I suspect that if the advocates of the doctrine should find themselves in the defeated party, they would be first to make the admission—that sometimes the worse conquers the better, if we grant that God ever permits truth on the scaffold, wrong on the throne, then, we abandon the principle of survival as a reliable criterion. *Die Weltgeschichte* may be indeed *das Weltgericht*, but it is itself judged by a still higher court. All that we prize most has come from the spirit which has not accepted the cosmic process or the historical process as a final valuation. Small as the world of the free creative spirit appears, its values are for its members supreme. The still small voice is more significant than the earthquake and the fire. It alone decides whether we shall acquiesce or fight on for what we hold to be right and truth.

Let us look also at honor which is often ranked highest in the ethical codes of states. There is no doubt that the appeal to honor touches deep chords in the natures of all of us. It lies near to splendid virtues. It seems to strike a higher note than self-interest. The latter can be stigmatized by opponents as greed or jealousy. But honor is so noble in its associations that if a nation goes to war to maintain its honor apparently there is nothing more to be said. To question the morality of such an act is to write oneself down as a coward or poltroon, and who of us wishes so to be regarded? It often asserts supremacy over any rational interests and brings nations to rash and destructive enterprise of war. It is relied upon by masterful directors of states to achieve results for which calm reflection upon future advantage would be inadequate.

To be sure, honor in the individual, though it vibrates with the finest emotion, is very curious in its workings. The honor of a soldier has almost to the present moment required him to fight duels, quite irrespective of the law of the land. It is only a decade since an incident in one of the European armies showed

the military code. Two boys grew up as playmates; one later entered the army and became a petty officer, the other entered the navy. On shore leave the sailor met his old comrade and extended his hand in friendly greeting instead of giving the due salute. The army officer in return ran him through and killed him. When asked why he did not arrest the sailor if he thought him wanting in respect, he replied that he remembered X, from whom a civilian had escaped, and who in consequence had been so taunted by his fellows that he was driven to suicide. A nominal penalty was imposed, but the man felt proud of his action, and was no doubt honored by his fellow officers. The honor of a gentleman has also been highly technical. To cheat at cards has always been dishonorable, to cheat a woman of lower station not always. Gambling debts are characteristically debts of honor; the tradesman may wait. If any doubted a gentleman's word honor must be kept bright by proof of sword, but where a lady was concerned honor required one to lie like a gentleman. With the rise of the middle class to dignity and power we began to hear of business honor, which likewise has its peculiarities. It is scrupulous in the payment of debts, but men of high standing have done some queer things in corporation finance without regarding them as dishonorable; and, on the other side of business relations, honor would hardly be tarnished by any sort of exploitation of employees. With the rise of the laborer to class consciousness he too has framed a code of honor, a *Herr-moral*,—paradoxical as such an idea would have seemed to the gentleman of older days. He looks upon the scab as the older gentleman looked upon the villain. The unionist's sense of honor will not permit him to take another union man's job; it would not be offended by soldiering on his own.

In certain respects the conception of what honor requires of the individual has been modified, largely by the leveling force of law, and the rise of new classes with new standards. In America it is not considered necessary to maintain honor by the duel, nor is manual labor so dishonorable as entirely to unclass the worker. A man may be willing to have a cause, even a murder, submitted to a court without losing honor. He may make it a part of his

honor to be reasonable, to keep his word, to protect the weak, in a word to incorporate into his code of honor the elements of justice and sympathy, as well as of strength.

National codes of honor resist this reconstruction. The essence of national honor to be guarded at all hazards is repute for strength. The way to maintain honor is to show strength, preferably by war, or, in the case of backward or smaller peoples, by punitive expeditions. Former President Taft has pointed out several instances in the diplomatic history of this country, as in the Canadian boundary question, or the Trent affair, when it has been loudly asserted that to recede from a claim or even to arbitrate, would be to lose honor. "To lay a finger on the honor of a State is to contest its existence," says Treitschke. "That State which will not be untrue to itself must possess an acute sense of honor. It is no violet to flower unseen. Its strength should be shown signally in the light of day, and it dare not allow that strength to be questioned, even indirectly. If its flag be insulted, it must ask satisfaction; if that satisfaction be not forthcoming, it must declare war, however trifling the occasion may seem."

By this conception of honor a democratic nation like our own is seemingly as likely to be swept off its feet as the more military nations of Europe. The fact is we are hypnotized by the words 'honor' and 'the flag' without asking whether honor may not have other standards than repute for strength, other supports than the sword. A press urged on to war by private interests of invested capital, no less than a press manipulated by governmental agencies, may make effective appeal to popular passions if it strikes this note.

It was such a conception of honor that inspired the demand in the United States for war with Spain when the *Maine* was supposed to have been sunk by external force. It was this which nearly involved us in war with Mexico. It was apparently a belief that Austria-Hungary's honor had been infringed upon and could only be satisfied by blood which lay back of Germany's declaration, "It is impossible for us to bring our ally before a European court in its difference with Servia." It has since been

shown that all ends not covered by the military conception of honor would have been secured by peaceful negotiation with Spain.

The legal code depends for its origin in the individual upon the presence of organized society, and in particular upon an authority which defends and enforces standards. The good citizen makes this legal code a moral law as well. Under this he is no longer compelled to defend himself by arms or to live in continual fear of lawless neighbors. Nations, unfortunately, have no such protection by a commonly recognized superior authority which is able to enforce the standards of right. Hence they live under more or less constant mutual fear. They act as judges in their own causes. They are not daily reminded of the presence of a law higher than the will of the individual. The process of building up a moral consciousness without any actual organization of international society is necessarily slow. We may sometimes affect to estimate lightly the standards of law in comparison with those of morality, but no student of history can doubt the influence of law upon the formation of a moral consciousness. Law has been the schoolmaster to develop the consciousness of duty, and we need not be too cynical in our judgment upon the morals of nations which have lacked this education.

For no one who looks at the world process as a whole can fail to note that in the situation which has driven us almost to despair of civilization there are, on the one hand elements of crisis and special strain, and, on the other, indications of an enlarging public consciousness which promises better conditions for the future. The elements of crisis and strain are familiar;—the rapid growth of European civilization due to science, invention, improved health, enlarging intercommunication and trade; the nearing completion of a process of conquest, settlement and establishment of markets, “by which all the races of the world have been affected, and all the backward ones placed in more or less complete dependence upon the advanced”;¹ the disintegration of states whose civilization has no unity of spirit and no genuine liberty or progress; the intensifying of race pride and national feeling due

¹ Bryce, *The Relations of the Advanced and Backward Races of Mankind*, p. 7.

in part to the awakening consciousness of backward or hitherto suppressed or isolated groups.

The indications of an enlarging public consciousness out of which a higher public conscience may be built are also evident. For economic purposes the whole world is becoming one, and each people is compelled to know and judge the foreign conditions which cause stringency and distress in its own land. As the enormous business corporations have brought out into the open the naked forces of competition, divested of all personal checks, society has been forced to a deeper view of the relations of economic forces to human welfare. It has adopted measures for control on the basis of fairness, not merely of efficiency. Politically are we not at a similar stage? The smaller states formerly carried on their petty intrigues, their petty wars; they resented with fierce irrational duels real or fancied insults to their military standards of honor; they pursued the ethics of self-preservation and expansion without serious check. But now we see the full meaning of it all. We see not only the survival of past jealousies and the rankling of past injustices, but also the results of making strength and power and selfish exploitation the determining forces in politics. The appeals which both sides make for moral approval mark a new stage in the development of a world conscience. Scientific studies are showing the artificiality of most of the differences between races and nations, sometimes regarded as so radical, and now in the heat of passion magnified into fixed grades of moral worth or infamy. May we not see also some promise of hope that, when the consequences of past political ideals and methods have been brought home in all their horror to all peoples, there will be felt the need of adding to political codes of self preservation and honor the further codes of justice toward others, of friendly intercourse, and even, remote as it may seem, of devotion to the uniting ideals of mutual understanding, mutual aid, common sympathy, and common humanity?

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THE PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY AND PHILOSOPHICAL ABSOLUTISM.

ALMOST every one of the older philosophical systems strove for an absolute certain foundation, *i. e.*, tried to establish beforehand some indubitable truth. It was considered the first task either to overcome scepticism or to attain a standpoint from which scepticism could be neglected. To-day the conditions of founding a philosophical system are different. If we do not wish to neglect wholly the fundamental problems and to accept as granted every assertion that is assumed, we also have to accomplish that first task, bequeathed by the older philosophy, but accomplish it in a somewhat different way.

The philosopher of to-day possesses a historical self-consciousness that his predecessors did not possess. He knows that his system is only one of the links of a historical development, like every system of his predecessors. Historical comparison teaches him that none of the great thinkers were able to find a final principle which could not be submitted to criticism, and that yet, on the other hand, the most fundamental criticism is never able to reveal definitively the erroneousness of a philosophical affirmation. The history of philosophical thought knows neither any indubitable truth nor any indubitable error. How can the philosopher of to-day hope to be able to find that final principle? Does he possess any particular evidence which would allow him to consider the standpoint of his philosophy as exceptional and to put it, with regard to its certainty, above all other standpoints?

There are, indeed, two kinds of philosophical systems which, notwithstanding the modern historical consciousness, still proceed on the assumption that they have found this exceptional standpoint. The first of these is irrationalism, which affirms that, having a basis more immediate and more comprehensible than the rationalism of the past, it occupies a privileged position; the

second is that philosophy which believes that it has succeeded in rising above the past owing to the richness of material with which it deals,—the result of the extraordinary development of science during the last period of modern history.

But the irrationalistic position must be stated and its validity proved in rationalistic terms, and it loses thereby its exceptional character; furthermore, not one but many irrationalistic positions exist, which differ among themselves no less than the rationalistic ones. The fundamental data of irrationalism are defined by every thinker in a different way. In the second place, the richness of material that modern philosophy owes to the exceedingly rapid development of modern science proves to be a doubtful advantage. The development of science is not only the attainment of new truths, but it is also the acceleration of the process in the course of which old truths are replaced by new ones. The facts seem to remain; but, as they are conditioned by the point of view of the investigator, their permanence is only apparent: numerically the same fact is not the same if we consider it as the object of another theory or as the manifestation of another law. In this way not only is modern philosophy unable to find any foundation for absolute system-building in scientific results, but, on the contrary, its own relative character is reflected in the whole domain of knowledge. The unavoidable conclusion forces itself upon us that every truth is only a temporary and partial view of some artificially limited side of experience, that it is valuable only from the chosen position, on the ground of accepted assumptions. On the other hand, every error is also temporary and partial, because it is an error only in relation to some truth.

The same relativity which appears in the domain of knowledge can be asserted also in the domains of morality, art, religion, economics,—in these fields it was observed at an earlier period and more clearly demonstrated by means of historical and ethnological researches.

We adopt the term 'value' for every thing which can undergo appreciation, which can be considered as positive or negative from any point of view. The following statement may then be

adopted: A modern philosopher who has sufficient knowledge of the advancement of science and sufficient historical and ethnological data concerning morals, art, religion, economics, must admit, that *all values are relative*. This means, generally speaking, that no value is absolutely positive and none absolutely negative, but that each one can be positive under certain conditions, negative under certain others.

Thus enlarged, relativity becomes a general property of human values, and would seem to compel philosophy to extreme resignation. The relative character belonging to historical systems of philosophy cannot any longer be regarded as the result of the imperfection of methods, of the deficiency of material, or even of the weakness of human mind, but becomes a particular expression of some general features, immanent in the essence of every value.

But still the philosopher who believes in absolute truth can reasonably doubt the strength of our conclusion, since it has been drawn only from a consideration of a certain historical state of culture: although absolute truth was not discovered in the past, it is not sufficiently proved that it cannot be discovered in the future. Granting for the time being the validity of this presumption, our faith in the possibility just stated will nevertheless not have any concrete, practical importance. It cannot be said of any particular truth, that precisely this one is absolute,—at least so long as we do not find the *criterion* of its absoluteness in comparison with other truths; this criterion, being itself a truth, or, more generally, a value, requires a new criterion, etc. Practically we remain for ever in the same position: we can refuse to be relativists, but we can never become frankly absolutists on the ground of any definite theory.

But still more can be said. Every theory, if it does not consider itself the only knowledge existing, must admit that all knowledge is relative. A theory that considers other theories besides itself as existing, thereby occupies a standpoint concerning them. The occupation of this standpoint cannot consist merely in the acknowledgment of those theories as entirely true, because by being absolutely acknowledged by this theory, they would be

reintegrated into it and would be its parts instead of being separate theories. So, if a theory occupies a standpoint concerning other theories, it submits them to criticism, *i. e.*, it considers as erroneous at least some of the assertions which those other theories consider as true. From this moment however this theory is obliged to agree as a matter of fact that at least some assertions are considered in certain conditions as true, in other conditions as false. But then it is necessary to extend this admission to all assertions, whenever acknowledged as true, so far as the criterion of their truthfulness is the same as that of the assertions which were rejected. But the only final criteria of truth are its evidence, its objectivity and necessity (or the evidence, necessity and objectivity of its consequences, if we admit the pragmatic idea of truth), and every truth is acknowledged only when it presents itself with those characteristics. Therefore, if some theory were to be considered as absolute, it would have to point out that it possesses exceptional privileges among all other theories, that besides its own objectivity, evidence, and necessity, it gives also such guarantees of its truthfulness as no other theory can give; it would have to prove that it could never, under any conditions, be considered as false.¹

Suppose, now, that philosophy, in spite of all, is unwilling to resign its claim to absolute validity—what will then be its task? Evidently, it must overcome, not scepticism, but this relativity which it finds around it and in itself; it must create a new theory which will justify its exceptional rights to absoluteness, and warrant not only that it is true, but that under no conditions can it be considered as false. In this way philosophy would become the first absolute value. We say that such a theory would have to be created; for no theory that exists can show any exceptional rights to absoluteness, as none stands above all possible criticism: each existing theory can be opposed by others.

Now, we have established already one truth which can justify

¹ Speaking of acknowledgment or rejection of theories, we admit implicitly that acknowledgment or rejection requires a complete understanding of the theory. We stand upon the ground of a subjectively perfect knowledge, *i. e.*, we remove the question of individual or social misunderstanding of theories, because this question has nothing in common with the truthfulness of the theory itself.

such claims and become a basis of such a theory: this truth is the assertion itself, that all values are relative. As soon as we acknowledge this assertion, which we call *the philosophical principle of relativity*, we admit the fundamental absolute principle, upon which we can build a system of relativism—the only absolute system possible.

Let us mention first of all, that a philosophical system has never yet been based upon the principle of relativity, and that such a system would therefore satisfy the above mentioned condition of novelty. The history of philosophy up to the present time shows either scepticism only or a partial relativism, in which the principle of relativity is not the final basis. Pure scepticism, as everybody knows, cannot be the basis of any system. As to partial relativism, its essence is, that some truths, not based upon the principle of relativity, are explicitly or implicitly acknowledged to be absolute, and are considered to be a constant condition of the relativity of other truths and values in general. We find, for instance, a theory of this kind in all subjectivism that considers all values as relative with regard to the subject, but acknowledges as absolute truths regarding the existence of the subject, regarding its individual, social or transcendental character, regarding its acting in time or independently of time, regarding the laws of its action, its mutability or immutability, its relation to other subjects, to its environment, etc. Even in pragmatism, which claims to be a relativistic philosophy, there are many such fundamental truths concerning the nature of man and of the world, their reciprocal relation, human necessities arising from this relation, the character of consciousness and of knowledge, etc. It is only with reference to these truths that other truths are to be regarded as relative, *i. e.*, the relativity of other truths depends upon the absoluteness of these. But it is easy to understand that there is no reason whatever to grant an exceptional importance to some truths in comparison with others, where there are not any exceptional proofs of their importance; in conformity with the same principle which causes all other values to be considered as relative, those truths which we have

primarily accepted must also be relative. And further, as the relative character of all values depends upon the absoluteness of these fundamental truths, then, since the latter are not absolute, the former are not relative, and so forth. We are evidently traveling in a vicious circle; partial relativism destroys itself.

In order to avoid this circle, we must define more exactly the position of our radical relativism.

First of all, in the whole sphere of our experience and of our thinking nothing but values can be found. It is impossible for us to ascertain any *entity* (*ens*, *substantia*, *natura*, consciousness, life, or what else), which would be a basis of values, a condition of their positiveness or negativeness, existing *per se* and *in se*. No entity can be given or thought of otherwise than from a certain standpoint, as content of a certain truth. Suppose some entity given or thought of, not as content of any particular truth (besides which other truths are possible), but in itself; the knowledge of it would be identical with it, would be no knowledge at all, but simply existence, of which we could not be aware, which we could not experiment with or think about. It is possible that something can be real, without being the content of our theoretical knowledge; but then it is immediately and in itself a value, a part of our practical, moral or aesthetical life.

We have already provisionally explained the principle of relativity, saying that every value is positive in some conditions, negative in others. But, as we see now, these conditions can be defined only through values and relations of values. The relativity of a value means that the value is positive in relation to some values, negative in relation to other values. Asserting that all values are relative, we assert therefore, that *all values are relative with regard to one another*, or that *there is no value, with regard to which others would be relative, and which itself would not be relative with regard to others*. Now, as in the whole sphere of our experience and thinking we find only values, *nothing can be ascertained that would not be a value, relative to other values*.

The principle of relativity, formulated as above, is indeed a universal truth, extending to the totality of values. Suppose we

meet some value (not this principle itself nor anything that is based on it) which will be positive in relation to all other values known and negative in relation to none, it will not yet be an absolute value, because we can always *create* a value in relation to which the first will prove negative—for instance, express an assertion contrary to the given one.

But is not the principle of relativity itself relative for the same reason? Can we not express an assertion disagreeing with it, which would make it relatively false?

Two assertions only could seemingly make this principle a relative error: the judgments '*some* values are absolute' and '*all* values are absolute.' But the first judgment itself is relative, it belongs to the sphere embraced by the principle of relativity. Standing on the ground of this principle, we can agree that any given values are absolute, but that this assertion is true only in relation to certain values, false in relation to others. The judgment '*some* values are absolute' will always be true from the standpoint of the acknowledged values themselves and in reference to them; it will be false in reference to and from the standpoint of some values other than the acknowledged ones. This judgment only seems to be opposed in form to the principle of relativity, owing to its inexact formulation; if we only determine these values which are to be absolute, it will be evident that we can really acknowledge them as absolute so long as they are considered in themselves, apart from some other values. And the second judgment, '*all* values are relative' can have a double significance. If the term '*all* values' is used here with the same meaning as in the judgment '*all* values are relative,' *i. e.* all values that have the claim on absoluteness, that appear with objectivity, evidence and necessity, however much in disagreement with each other they may be, then the judgment '*all* values are absolute' has no significance whatever, unless we change the meaning of the term '*absolute*' so as to identify it in its consequences with the term '*relative*.' But if the term '*all* values' means '*all* values of some kind, some class, some system, etc.,' the judgment '*all* values are absolute,' expressed in our termin-

ology, would be identical with the judgment 'some values are absolute,' which we have considered above.¹

Admitting therefore the supposition that an absolute system is possible, the principle of relativity, and that alone, could be its basis, because it is the only one that is not relative with regard to any other value. We have now to examine whether a system of philosophy could indeed be based successfully upon this principle. It is evident that a philosophy which wishes to be absolute cannot go beyond the limits of this principle, as it is the only absolute truth that can be attained at first. This means that the general relateness of values itself must be the subject-matter of such a philosophy.

In the first place, we emphasize that it would not be a suitable conception of the task of philosophy, as a theory of general relateness, if we should simply remove the positiveness or negativeness of values, explaining them, for example, causally, as empirically given facts of psychophysical, psychological or social nature. It is absurd for philosophy to define any truth, any good or beauty, as the result of the natural organization of the individual, of the economical needs of society, of the adaptation of living beings to their material environment, etc. As we have said already, in accepting Nature—material, psychical, or social—philosophy admits at the same time a whole series of values as absolute, and this leads to a partial relativism. Moreover, definitions of this kind do not concern the true, the good, or the beautiful, but only the fact that in the individual or the social consciousness there occurs some phenomenon (some feeling, desiring, thinking) which combines itself with some other phenomenon, some sentence, some more or less compound movement,

¹ Some formal objections may be still brought against the principle of relativity. First, it might be urged that, since the principle of relativity is demonstrated by way of reasoning, it admits implicitly the logical principles of reasoning, as absolute values. A second objection might maintain that the principle is contradictory in itself, when stated explicitly. For it takes the form 'All truths are relative except the truth that all truths are relative.' As we do not wish to lengthen unduly this article, we reserve the discussion of these objections for another occasion. Both objections can be removed without difficulty, but their discussion requires the introduction of new problems.

some material product of the artist's work, etc. These phenomena are objectively given to the investigator, who analyses them all; they are considered as natural facts and, as such, they have to be devoid of any element of valuation (although they are values when considered as subject-matter of some truths). It is evident that their combination also will be nothing more than a compound natural fact, given also to the investigator. But it is no less evident that this fact cannot be equivalent to truth, goodness or beauty, which are given not to the investigator, but to the investigated individual or society. Moreover, those facts, as subject-matter of truth, belong themselves to a particular theoretical system which is itself a small part of the world of values that it claims to express. Such a naturalistic system gives therefore only some scheme of this world, one of many schemes possible, and it is itself necessarily relative. We do not deny the usefulness of such schemes in particular sciences, but we do deny it in philosophy. The relations among natural facts are quite different from the relations among values, as they are properly speaking only the relations among the values of some particular order, *i. e.*, of some system of knowledge; a philosophy which tries to explain values as facts deprives itself thereby of the possibility of understanding in general the relations among values as values.

Philosophy must, then, begin by taking every value just as it is, with the whole objectivity of its meaning and its full claim to validity, but not in its subjective counterpart. The truth *is* a truth about something, not a proposition in which someone somewhere believes; the moral norm *is* an effective norm of the positiveness of conduct, not a social rule or custom which someone somewhere observes; a beautiful picture *is* a beautiful picture with some content and some meaning, but not a combination of colors on canvas, awakening somewhere in somebody definite associations of ideas and the feeling of admiration.

But, since values are relative with regard to one another, if a certain value is positive, this means that it is in relation with such values in regard to which it possesses precisely the character

of positiveness. And, because in conformity with the principle of relativity every value can be positive in some relations, it means that *for every value there is such a group of values, with regard to which it is positive*. If we call this group the *sphere of validity* of the value, we can state briefly that *every value has its own sphere of validity*. For every assertion there are limits within which it is positive, there are some other assertions, more or less numerous, in relation to which it is true. The same applies to moral and aesthetical values. A value is negative only if it is taken outside of its sphere of validity, in relation to some values which do not belong to this sphere. For example, the assertion that the sum of angles in a triangle is equal to two right angles, is true in the Euclidean geometry, false in other geometries, as that of Riemann or Lobatschewsky; duelling is a positive moral value in the morality of honor, and would be negative in the system of Buddhist morality; a picture of Cimabue was positively appreciated in the prae-Raphaelite period and evaluated negatively from the standpoint of the barocco.

Now, what kind of relation exists between the appreciated value on one hand and the group of values serving as a basis for its appreciation on the other? Is this relation accidental and changeable, or necessary and stable?

A simple consideration will allow us to answer this question. If that relation were accidental and changeable, there would be no objective values independent of the everchanging stream of individual and social life; every moment would bring with it new appreciations of the same values, and each appreciation would be equally justified, equally important. But really there exist standards of values, or better, standards of appreciation; and individual and social appreciations, as matters of fact, strive to approach to those standards. The latter, indeed, are not imposed as absolute, only as relative appreciations, but they are imposed unconditionally. We are not obliged to admit the geometry of Euclid rather than that of Riemann (unless perhaps because of some external reason of the conformity of the former with other practical and theoretical necessities); but when we accept the axioms and postulate of Euclid we are indeed compelled to

accept his other theorems, after having understood their relation to the admitted premises. The acceptance of the morality of honor is the result of some circumstances which seem accidental, as the fact of being born and educated in a certain social environment; but this morality, once accepted, necessitates the agreement of duelling; or—another example—we are not bound to be Christians, but if we agree with the Christian moral foundation, we cannot help acknowledging any particular precept, such as that of repairing the wrongs which we have inflicted or of repaying evil with good. In the same manner, the admiration granted to any particular style of art is not in any way obligatory in itself, but it implies necessarily the acknowledgment of the standard works of this style.

But here we meet naturalism again. There are, indeed, two kinds of necessary and stable relations. The first is a necessity of fact: a given cause is necessarily followed by a definite effect. The second is a necessity of rule: when certain premises are given we are obliged to come to a definite conclusion. Which of these necessities is to be found in the relation among values?

In the causal relation every concrete fact occurring in the life of an individual and a society is the combined result of all the facts that occurred up to this moment in the course of their respective lives; moreover, all the facts which occurred in the external world and conditioned the psychophysical organization of this individual or of the members of this society have an indirect or direct influence upon this one concrete fact. Thus every appreciation from this point of view is the direct expression of the individual's personality or of the society's culture, and the indirect expression of the whole past of the world. If on the ground of this supposition any objectivity of values could be attained, it would be merely an identity of appreciation, resulting from identical organizations and situations of many individuals or groups; 'objective' would mean only 'average.' It is evident, therefore, that the relation among values cannot be of this kind.

But still other arguments may be advanced. The appreciation

of any value does not depend upon other values independently of their quality, but upon groups of values of a particular species. A truth does not depend upon moral or artistic considerations, but upon other truths, and particularly upon a certain part of them: a mathematical truth upon mathematics, a historical one upon history and, perhaps, on sociology or psychology, etc. In the same way, a moral act or a moral rule is appreciated in relation to other acts or rules, a work of art in relation to other works of art. Perhaps among these groups there are other relations still to be discovered, but that is another question. Immediately, the positiveness or negativeness of a value is always the expression of its appreciation within a group of values of some particular quality.

Moreover, the group of values upon which the appreciation of some value is based is not limited to the sphere of experience of any individual, or to the sphere of culture of any social group. A truth is related to the totality of the science to which it belongs, and not merely to that part of the science which constitutes the amount of learning of any particular individual or group; only thus can assertions be controlled and criticized.

Furthermore, the necessity of a causal relation is not identical with the necessity of a relation among values: the former is external to the given situation, exists only for an observer; the latter is internal, exists for the subject itself who experiences the appreciation. We are not aware that any one of our appreciations is necessitated by our past history or by our personal character; we may come perhaps to this conclusion, but only after a few very complicated processes of reflexion, which must be preceded by the general if not explicit acknowledgment of the principle of causality in psychical life. On the contrary, the necessity of accepting a conclusion from given premises, of admitting a moral rule when some other rules are admitted, of evaluating positively some *chef d'oeuvre* of a style which we appreciate—this necessity is felt and acknowledged by us immediately as such. In the first case, the appreciating subject must stand at the point of view of the observer; in the second, the

observer, in order to understand the necessity, must occupy the standpoint of the appreciating subject.

But we are told that the necessity of relation among values is an illusion, which can be causally explained. Well, then the validity of this explanation is an illusion itself: there could be no necessity of fact if the necessity of rule did not exist. In affirming the existence of causality, in studying the causal relation of facts, we acknowledge and connect among themselves certain truths, and this acknowledgement and connection are already based upon some rules, they are the expression of some objective, necessary, and stable relations among truths.

We are, therefore, obliged to admit that these relations among values, which are the foundation of their positiveness or negativeness, possess a necessity of rules; on account of their general resemblance to the relation of premises to conclusion they may be termed *logical*.

In admitting such logical relations, we are not in any way untrue to the principle of relativity. Those relations were not given *a parte ante* as absolute logical values; they were not given at all before we reflected upon them, we had to do only with positive or negative values. Now these relations are given indeed, but *a parte post*, after one absolute principle—the principle of relativity—has been established; they are values, but as elements of our philosophical system. We can presume that they will prove absolute, *i. e.*, that the truth we shall discover about them will be absolutely true, but our presumption will be justified only if we can construct with their help an absolute philosophy.

Now, a group of values, united by a logical relation in such a manner that every one of them is necessarily and objectively positive with regard to the group as a totality, is a *system of values*. As every positive value has its sphere of validity and every value can be positive, we conclude that every value belongs to some system, or systems.

A system, if we consider it in itself at any given moment, is a limited unity, independent of the individual or social course of life. Individuals and society can make any system their own, not by confounding it with other values, which belong to

their own spheres of experience, but by *becoming* to a degree just this system. Indeed, we have established the fact that nothing can be ascertained except relative values; the contents of individual consciousness or of social culture are therefore constituted exclusively by values. Any system can become a part of individual or social life only on condition that the individual or the society shall actually realize in its sphere of experience those values and that connection among values which constitute this system; in other words, that a part of the individual's consciousness or the society's culture shall become this system.

Experience appears, therefore, as a plurality of systems of values, and each of those systems as internally connected in a logical manner, consequently as rational. But we must account for that part of the irrationality in experience which cannot be denied. There remains only one possible supposition: that there is no rational connection *among the systems of values themselves*. If the individual and social course of life appear as irrational—as they do indeed—it is because they are realizing, without order and incompletely, many different systems of values.

Moreover, any system is a limited logical unity only if taken in itself, at a given moment of time. But new systems appear and old ones develop in the course of time. There is a new difficulty which makes it impossible to return to any former theory of rationalism; the rationality of experience, even so far as it can be ascertained, is a rationality of some order different from that to which we are accustomed; it is not static and given once for all, but dynamic and becoming.

We can define now the conditions under which an absolute system of philosophy can be based upon the principle of relativity. The first task that imposes itself is a study of those relations by which values are connected in systems. Philosophy has to investigate the fundamental formal conditions of all system-building. As those conditions are at the same time the principles of positiveness and negativeness of values, philosophy partly rises above the general relativity in so far as its subject-matter is the foundation of this relativity itself. A small part of this

task was accomplished by traditional logic, but it will be necessary to widen the domain of this science in order to comprehend all systems of values, and not merely theoretical systems of truths; moreover, the new logic ought to consider systems as becoming, not as eternally ready.

The second task of philosophy from this point of view is to unify the totality of the systems of values in a new and universal system; this is the old, implicitly acknowledged task of metaphysics, which Hegel stated explicitly. But it must be conceived and accomplished in a new manner. The total experience is *not* rational, but this does not mean that it cannot *become* rational, that we cannot create a rationalism above it, which would be a factor of its rationalization. Should philosophy succeed, it would be indeed an absolute system, because every relative system would be an indispensable part of its material, and no given system could disagree with it. But, as new systems are continuously created, the rational unity of the world of values can be obtained only by rationalizing the processes of creation itself; thus the absolute philosophy must be a philosophy of creation and its system must be open to any new possibilities that may arise in the future.

Time will show whether such a philosophy is not merely possible in theory but also realizable in practice.

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THE EVOLUTION OF VALUES FROM INSTINCTS.

IN the literature upon values two general standpoints may be distinguished. First, there are those who attempt a psychological, or perhaps a biological explanation, who desire to think of values as organic in their constitution, and whose general attitude is decidedly naturalistic. Then, secondly, there are writers who derive their system of values in some sort of logical fashion, which may be admittedly a priori and rationalistic, or inductive and empirical, but at all events has little regard to the structure and functions of the psycho-physical organism.

Each of these methods is one-sided. The former gives to the problem of values a false simplicity, and overlooks much that is of moment in it. Although this method has the merit of scientific continuity, connecting values with simpler mental and physiological processes, it tends to cheapen them, to lose sight of their full significance, and to forget that the evolution of human values has become less and less a matter of the struggle for survival, and more and more concerned with a large variety of moral, aesthetic, religious and other goods that enhance the extent and significance of life. The second method has the opposite merits and defects. It freely recognizes and exalts all the higher intellectual and moral values, arranges them in systematic classifications, and perhaps hypostasises them as absolute and eternal. But such an account is obliged to leave a dualism between values which belong, it may be, to a world of appreciation, or to an over-individual will, on the one hand, and the descriptive empirical facts of science and every day life on the other. Such a dualism is unsatisfactory; and it seems rather arbitrary to declare it solved by decreeing that the philosopher's account of pure values is alone true and that all scientific explanation and analysis are a falsification of experience. Such a procedure is disappointing to the mind in its search for unity. We must try to unify scientific and philosophical accounts of value. To be sure,

this has been attempted. A particularly brilliant account, which everybody now reads who desires to become oriented in the problem of values, is Professor Urban's treatise.¹ But even this, as it seems to me, has not wholly bridged the chasm between psychological explanations of value and logical interpretations. His later chapters, especially the one in which evaluation is treated, do not clearly join themselves to his earlier psychological analysis. Whatever transition is effected is highly formal and abstract. He never treats the transition in specific detail, in order to bring out the connection between the psychological origin and later logical fruition of particular values.

Although only a very general preliminary sketch can here be attempted, this paper will endeavor to show (1) that a transition between the biological and psychological roots of valuation and its exuberant ethical, esthetic, and religious foliage is thoroughly feasible, and can be worked out in the case of particular values. The admirable account of the instincts given by Dr. William McDougall,² and the conception of sentiments and systems of sentiments which was originally the discovery of Mr. Alex. F. Shand,³ and has since been further developed in connection with the instincts by McDougall,⁴ and finally elaborated in Shand's recently published volume,⁵ furnish a basis for this transition. (2) The practical usefulness of such a conception of the origin of values for social and ethical problems will next be indicated. (3) It will in conclusion be argued that the reader may accept the account here advanced without being committed to any particular standpoint in biology or metaphysics, but that he will none the less find it illuminating and significant for whatever standpoints he may adhere to.

I.

The great sources of all impulses and desires in man, and hence the roots of value, are to be found in the primary instincts and

¹ *Valuation, its Nature and Laws.*

² *Introduction to Social Psychology.*

³ Articles in *Mind*, N. S., Vols. V and XVI. Chap. XVI, in Stout's *Groundwork of Psychology.*

⁴ *Op. cit.*

⁵ *Foundations of Character*, London and New York, 1914.

other innate emotional tendencies. McDougall, using as his criteria the presence of each in the higher animals and the possession by each of a distinct pathological history in human beings, has distinguished eleven primary instincts,¹ each with a specific mode of behavior. Sympathy, suggestion, imitation, and play are modes in which instincts interact, rather than distinct functional units; but like the latter they are innate dispositions. Each instinct possesses afferent and motor channels in the nervous system that are to some extent modifiable, while the central portions, the conative element and the emotion, are unchanging. Thus many of us learn not to feel afraid in the dark, and so to suppress innate afferent channels, while we become afraid of new objects, which indicates that new afferent channels have been opened. Likewise we may, through habit formation, acquire new modes of behavior when we feel fear in addition to those innately organized. Further, I should add—I do not know whether McDougall would accept this—there may be several innate or acquired motor channels to the same instinct and central emotion—*e. g.*, that of fear possessing flight and concealment among others—and when the instinct is aroused there may be, in man at least, more or less conscious choice as to the mode of behavior in which the instinct shall find its expression.² But greatly as the occasions that call forth these instincts and the modes of expression which they assume may be modified in the course of a human life, their central conative and emotional elements remain unaltered. Fear is fear and anger is anger, as unique impulsive and emotional experiences whenever we are under their influence. Carefully to be distinguished from these innate and centrally unmodifiable psycho-physical dispositions

¹ Flight with the emotion of fear; pugnacity with the emotion of anger; repulsion with the emotion of disgust; curiosity with the emotion of wonder; self-abasement with subjection; self-assertion with elation; and the reproductive, gregarious, acquisitive, constructive and food-seeking instincts whose emotions have not received names. I shall in this paper use indifferently the name either of the instinct or its attending emotion to express both, except when they need to be distinguished for the purposes of this paper.

² I am here speaking on my own initiative, and do not wish to attribute these statements to McDougall, although I hope that he will approve of them. This addition seems to me to meet a criticism of Shand's successfully.

are the sentiments, which are not innate, but on the contrary arise in individual experience, are subject to intelligent control, and as I at least believe, take their form very largely through the influence of the social environment. A sentiment may be roughly defined as an organized system of different instincts and emotions about some perceived or imaged object, class of objects, or abstract ideal that calls them forth upon proper occasions. For instance, one of the most important sentiments is love, an enduring tendency to feel tender emotion whenever a given object comes to mind, to feel anger when it is attacked, fear when it is endangered, etc. Morality, art, and religion, as I at any rate believe, owe the interests that they evoke to sentiments, and are not innate except possibly in the sense that there may be some hereditary tendency for the instincts and emotions to organize themselves in these systems as a consequence of their interaction with the social environment, though I very much doubt whether even this is true to any very great extent.¹

Logically prior to the appearance of the values themselves, and, as I believe investigation will show, also temporally prior in the development of the child and of the race, are to be found the psychological roots of the various human values in the primary instincts and other innate dispositions, chiefly in the unchanging central portions of the primary instincts. Whenever consciousness intervenes between stimulus and response the conative side of the instinct will be present in consciousness as a definite impulse in some direction. The affective side of the instinct—the emotion—may not be prominent unless the instinct is checked or thwarted in some manner as it seeks expression; in which case the emotion will appear, its function being to reinforce the conative impulse. If, in response to the stimulus, there is serious conflict within the instinct as to which of two modes of behavior shall be followed—*e. g.*, flight or concealment—or if there is conflict between two instincts—*e. g.*, fear and curiosity—

¹ We must remember that man has been civilized only a few thousand of the many thousands of years of his life upon the earth, and that during this time no biological changes have occurred in him, while his sentiments have varied enormously in every clime and with every civilization. They can hardly be innate in a biological sense.

the superfluous nervous energy, unable to find escape through ordinary efferent channels, will overflow into the sympathetic system and cause general turmoil and upheaval in the viscera, and intense emotional excitement will be felt. These startling emotional phenomena, being the most conspicuous, were the first to be studied and described—by Darwin, Mosso, Mante-gazza, *et al.*—and inspired the James-Lange theory, which is applicable only to them. Professor Dewey was perhaps the first to work out an explanation of these upheavals as due to conflicts between impulses to different reactions evoked by the stimulus.¹ To Shand belongs the credit of making it evident that these extreme emotional phenomena are not the fundamental feature of all emotion, and that really to understand emotions we must interpret them in the light of the part that they play in the economy of the organism as a whole, which means, in the light of innate and other dispositions that determine the course of mental activity, and only develop these startling organic manifestations under special conditions.²

If action follows stimulation, with only slight or even intense consciousness of impulse and emotion, shall we say that there is value present? Or shall we say that value is present wherever there is tendency in a given direction without the presence of consciousness at all? Some recent writers would reply even

¹ *Psychological Review*, Vols. I and II. A brief popular account is given in Angell's *Psychology*, Chap. XIX.

² *Foundations of Character*, pp. 1-6, 28-34, 177-180, 192-196, and *passim*. The writer owes much to the pragmatistic interpretations of valuation given by Professor H. W. Stuart in Dewey's *Studies in Logical Theory*, and Professor Irving King, *Development of Religion*. Both of these writers have made large use of Dewey's theory of the emotions. While this theory should now be corrected in details and assimilated to Shand's more comprehensive view, it seems to me that it remains valid in principle so far as it goes. Conscious emotion appears only when impulses are impeded, and extreme emotion with a large variety of organic sensations only when there is a conflict between impulses. This seems to me about all in Dewey's theory that is important for a theory of values, and that it is quite in harmony with Shand. It also follows that Stuart's and King's use of the Dewey theory in their interpretations of value may remain undisturbed by the acceptance of Shand's general doctrine of emotions. It is not necessary to agree with Shand in tracing values to Joy (*op. cit.*, 356, f.).

to this second question in the affirmative.¹ But if tendencies are devoid of conscious reference, of meanings of any sort, can we reasonably suppose that these tendencies are identical in principle with what they would be if meanings were present? It seems hard to see how any one can now deny consciousness, or at least the nervous stratum that attends it, the capacity to make a difference.² And if there is a difference in tendencies that are attended by consciousness, we should have to devise a new term to connote the instances where this is the case, if we extend 'value' to cover all tendencies. Nothing is gained, so far as I am able to discover, by using 'value' in the wider sense. It seems much better to restrict the term to impulsive tendencies of which the individual is conscious,—“affective-volitional meanings,” to use Urban's apt phrase. But is the extension of 'value' even now properly restricted? Have we values whenever an instinct is sufficiently evoked to give us consciousness of slight emotion? If we say Yes, then we shall need in some other way to distinguish these more rudimentary cases from those in which values are chosen as a result of more or less self-conscious, critical selection between conflicting impulses and ends. For surely it is fundamentally different to appreciate an end toward which one's way is blocked, but toward which one engages in random and unintelligent striving until it is attained—not unlike the trial and error movements by which white mice learn to enter labyrinths in the animal psychologist's laboratory—and to compare means and ends critically, to discriminate between meanings and to make a reasoned selection. Unless we are willing to pervert the significance of the term 'value' wholly, so that we shall have to substitute some other term for the mental experiences for which it has hitherto stood,

¹ E. g., Sheldon, *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, XI, p. 121.

² Cf. Judd's convincing presidential address, *Psychological Review*, XVII, pp. 77-97, excellent on this point though he utterly fails to comprehend McDougall, whose attitude is quite in harmony with his own. Cf. also McDougall's *Body and Mind*, and Hobhouse's *Development and Purpose*, and recent summaries of animal psychology, as Holmes' *Evolution of Animal Intelligence* and Washburn's *Animal Mind*. How any one can now be so dogmatic and unscientific as not to see that consciousness makes a difference, it is hard to understand.

it seems to me that we must restrict the term to values that in some sense are rational, intelligent. If raccoons and monkeys reason, and there are authorities who think that they do, one may accord to them some slight notion of values; but it seems impossible to attribute 'value' to the activities of white mice and guinea pigs, and still less to plants, and least of all to inorganic matter acting in accordance with the law of inertia, unless we rob 'value' of all the significance which it has had hitherto. Values must not be confused with lower forms of adjustment, although in a sense they have evolved from some of them, as will be shown.

1. Valuation, therefore, in the proper sense, first appears when in a conflict between instinctive impulses some sort of comparison between the ideas connected with these impulses is made, and a mediation or coördination is thereby effected. Reasoning, in other words, involves cognitive and ideational elements, and valuation involves a selection between these elements. The error in rationalism has not been in insisting upon this phase of the matter, but in abstracting this phase from the entire process, oblivious of the fact that selection among these ideational elements is always in some sense prompted by the conative and affective sides of our mental constitution, since without these there could be no preference. At its lowest level the consciousness of values might be illustrated by Professor Angell's¹ celebrated case of the man in the burning building, who rushes about in mad excitement, happens to notice some bed-clothes and makes a rope of these by which he escapes. Angell observes that if the man had not previously heard of using bed-clothes for this purpose he would be reasoning, in the sense that he would be abstracting through conception one aspect of a situation and making an application of it to his problem. Even at so low a level as this it can be said that we have valuation of *means* for achieving an end.

2. A much clearer and more unambiguous level of valuation is reached when we have conscious comparisons of *ends*. Such cases ordinarily involve a conflict between sentiments. If an

¹ *Psychology*, fourth ed., p. 294.

object or class of objects evokes instinctive and emotional reactions very often, some sort of an habitual attitude will be formed—in other words a rudimentary sentiment. A tramp cat may succeed a few times in calling forth from us a caress or a bit of food—mere passing expressions of tender emotion—and before we are aware of it, tender emotion toward the animal has become habitual, and it has established itself as a household pet. In other words, it has become the object of a sentiment. Now suppose that later we discover that the cat is a cruel and wanton slaughterer of birds who have made their nests upon our grounds, and towards whom we have also formed more or less of an attachment. A conflict between sentiments now ensues, and explicit valuation of ends emerges.

3. By the time that a stage of sufficient abstraction is reached so that the objects of different sentiments have become classified, the values or ends of each will have been given names. The values attached to objects of sentiments may be classified into two types:

(a) The first type is that in which the values are the objects that are the direct ends of sentiments grown up in consequence of the habitual instinctive reaction towards these objects. Such values are: food, drink, sex, enemies, children, long life, etc. Objects of these classes, it will be observed, seem to constitute the only values which the most primitive religions endeavor to conserve and increase.

(b) A second type of values are objects not themselves the direct ends of instincts, but believed to be connected in some way with the attainment of these ends. The two most important instances are economic and religious values.

Perhaps in man there are no objects to which the acquisitive instinct is innately attached, contrary to the case of some animals. But the acquisitive instinct powerfully reinforces the demand of other instincts for objects, and effects the accumulation of objects desired by other instincts. The sentiment which fosters the accumulation of capital probably always involves the acquisitive, constructive and self instincts, and fear in the refined form of prudence. In the case of many individuals the

sentiment includes within its system another sentiment, the love of family. Often the zest of business competition, which I believe to be a manifestation of the play impulse, and hence a modified form of the pugnacious instinct, also enters in those instances where a man delights in commercial strife for its own sake, and finds it more absorbing than anything else that he could do.¹ The acquirement of property therefore becomes a value, supported by a strongly organized system of instincts and emotions.

The laws of demand and supply, cost of production, increasing and diminishing returns, marginal utilities, and the like, are descriptive formulations of processes in which economic value is quantitatively increased or diminished. They therefore have their place in an account of values. But, after all, these laws and the whole economic process as it is studied by the economists rest upon the instinctive and sentimental basis just indicated; commodities could have no market values at all if it were not for the fact that they either directly or indirectly satisfy instincts and sentiments.

To a large extent religious values, like economic values, are concerned with objects associated with instincts, and appreciated as agencies that secure their satisfaction. Primitive religious sacrifice and prayer invariably have for their purpose the satisfaction of some instinctive or other innate impulse, *e. g.*, food, water, victory in war (pugnacity), safety from storms and other physical dangers (fear), sex, children, etc. The search for an innate religious instinct has been futile; there is none.² Even in spiritual religions the religious interest as a rule remains mediate.³ Only in extreme cases of aesthetic prayer⁴ and the highest stage of the mystic way, the unitive life,⁵ does the ego in religious

¹ McDougall, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 110-116.

² King, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-30. J. H. Leuba, *A Psychological Study of Religion*, pp. 7-9.

³ J. H. Leuba ("The Contents of the Religious Consciousness," *Monist*, XV, pp. 536-573) has shown how strikingly true this is of American Protestants to-day, even if he has exaggerated his point.

⁴ Anna L. Strong, *Psychology of Prayer*, Chap. V.

⁵ Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism*.

worship find in the Alter (God), the "home and fatherland of the soul," the satisfaction of all its strivings. And in this comparatively rare instance what has happened, of course, is that the conception of God has become inclusive of all other ends, and that accordingly the sentiment toward God has become inclusive of all other sentiments and instincts.

For the benefit of those who raise objections against tracing higher values back to the instincts, one may here point out that such a treatment of religion does not for a moment question its great value as a factor of prime importance in human progress.¹ The outcome of a psychological study of religion is to insist, I believe, upon the inestimable personal and social effectiveness of prayer and all religious worship; and to explain the nature of this efficacy psychologically is not to condemn but to justify an intelligent employment of religion. Both economy and religious piety are virtues that need cultivation in order to effect a solider and more stable organization of conative impulses, the former about more material goods, and the latter about the higher moral ideals. It remains open to the religious apologist who believes in evolution as a process of divine creation to survey the evolution of the religious sentiment in man as a process of divine revelation by which man becomes conscious of his Creator immanent within his own spiritual development. Such a form of religious apologetics would have the merit of not being antagonistic to scientific conceptions.

4. Hitherto we have been concerned with values attached to objects external to the evaluating individual himself, which are either themselves the ends of instinctive or sentimental desires, or are objects associated with the gaining of goods immediately desired. A stage which is later logically, at least, arises when the qualities of human character also become values. The men of the group have become reflective enough to appreciate certain qualities of character that lead to success in war and the chase, and, later on, in other aspects of associated life. The virtues accordingly appear. Thus Courage at its lowest level is the

¹ In fact I have elsewhere emphatically argued for the importance of religion as such a factor. Cf. *American Journal of Theology*, XVI, 403-407.

habit of suppressing instinctive fear and giving freer vent to pugnacity. Masculine Honor is courage plus self-feeling on the part of its possessor. And so of the other virtues, as I have suggested in another connection.¹ In each case, a virtue is critical approval of a mental habit or sentiment involving some desirable adjustment or coördination of instincts. All virtues are moral values, if we desire to distinguish thus, before the philosopher interprets them and makes them ethical values. Ethical systems are always concerned with the relationship between the agent and the objects that he desires. If attention is chiefly directed towards external objects and goods, and less upon the agent's personality, emphasis will be upon intention rather than motive, *e. g.*, in utilitarianism. If attention is upon motives and character, ethics will find in the virtues the chief ethical values, *e. g.*, by Aristotle. Or if attention is directed to the fact that a moral action always involves reasoning, this formal logical process itself, abstracted both from external objects desired and also from the instincts and sentiments which are the determinations of these desires, may be considered of chief ethical value, as is the case in some of the passages in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. A more concrete ethics would seek to synthesize the values derived from all three of these aspects and understand them in the light of the self as a whole. But the self as a reflective object of valuation appears at a later stage in the evolution of values.

The purely intellectual interest, love of knowledge for its own sake, is also a value and the object of a virtue and a sentiment. The dominant *motif* in the sentiment for truth² and the virtue of wisdom is curiosity or wonder, reinforced by practically all the other instincts as it comes to be felt that knowledge is power—power here signifying effectiveness to accomplish any of the ends and purposes which the various instincts and sentiments desire.

5. Aesthetic values are difficult of analysis, because, for one reason, they owe their origin, not to an instinct with definite

¹ PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, XXII, pp. 402-6.

² I have treated of truth in this connection in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, X, pp. 652-656.

modes of behavior, but to the play impulse, a non-specific emotional tendency. Play, due perhaps to the overflow of nervous energy, economically used by nature in the preliminary exercise of instincts prior to, or at other times than during their serious employment, is disinterested, implies absorption in the object for its own sake, and finds expression in rhythm, imitation of serious activities, and spontaneous manifestations of joy. Aesthetic appreciation seems to me to be simply the play impulse attaching to certain objects and activities which are no longer valuable in any of the ways heretofore treated in this paper.¹ The serious engagement in these had formerly involved social coöperation and large expression of the gregarious instinct and contagion of emotions. Strong ties of sympathy knit men and women together while they engaged in dance, song, drawing, decoration, recital, or mime, for religious, magical, or other serious purposes, and the social consciousness, thus heightened, became an incitement to continue these activities for the sake of the pleasure involved in them. Hence a new sentiment, the aesthetic sentiment, became attached to them. The aesthetic sentiment is more variable and unstable than the moral and religious sentiments because its values are ordinarily regarded less seriously—in other words, more playfully—and the social group accordingly does not exact complete conformity on the part of individuals to its standards and traditions in this sphere. The genesis of aesthetic categories, as Professor Tufts has shown, is a matter of social as opposed to individual psychology. However social their origin, these categories must in some way take root in the minds of the individuals of each generation. This is effected through the stimulation of the play impulse, an innate disposition.

6. The last set of values to be discovered are those connected with the *self* as a whole. While the mind, except when suffering from pathological dissociation, is in some sense an organic unity, the position here set forth has been that within this unity the instincts and other innate dispositions are not only distinguishable by the psychologist, but also are felt by the individual as different

¹ James H. Tufts, "The Genesis of the Aesthetic Categories" in the *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, Vol. III.

conative impulses and emotions. Among these are the two self instincts and emotions, present even among some animals. About these as a nucleus, develops in man the self-regarding sentiment and later a fully organized moral self or personality. McDougall¹ has given a careful account of this development, which those who fancy that the evolution of the higher aspects of the moral life from the instincts is debasing ought to read. I only wish to add that after the self or personality has developed in the manner that McDougall has described, the individual comes to recognize the value of this acquisition, and to interpret the significance of all external values as well as the virtues in the light of their significance for the self as a whole.

The inclusion of the self in his system of values has always been difficult for man. In India it was first perhaps seriously attempted in later Brahmanism and Buddhism. The problem came to the front in the west with the ideal of the sage, variously formulated by Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics. The mystery religions and Christianity sought to effect transformations of the self. The chapters in the psychology of religion upon asceticism, purgation, mysticism, conversion, and sanctification deal with the various ways in which man has attempted to transform his entire self. On account of the inherent difficulty in evaluating the mind in its systematic unity as organized in the self, involving as it does, the use of judgments of individuality and purpose, the intelligent comprehension of the self as a value has been restricted to ethical philosophers, and the chief credit in this field is of course due to the neo-Hegelians.

II.

The foregoing account has attempted to sketch in exceedingly broad lines the evolution of the various types of values from the instincts. Under other topics much of the material that would be necessary to fill in the details of this sketch could be found in the works of McDougall, Shand, Westermarck, Stout, and others. What has been said here has perhaps been sufficient to show that it would be entirely feasible to write the history of the evolution

¹ *Introduction to Social Psychology*, Chaps. VII-IX.

of human values from the instincts and other innate dispositions. We have now to consider what advantages can be claimed in favor of this way of regarding values.

In the first place, continuity is preserved. The highest values are connected in a continuous series with the lowliest instincts. No dualism or hiatus is necessary at any point. And this advantage can be gained without losing sight of the fact that the higher sentiments involve infinitely more than mere survival value.

A second advantage is, that it becomes possible in some measure to discriminate between what is and what is not subject to modification in human nature, and how such modifications as are possible and desirable can be affected. The instincts in their central conative and emotional elements are unchangeable. They have come down to us from the animals, and in no time which we need to take into account can they be altered. However, through the organization of virtues and other sentiments man can modify and control forms of behavior in many ways: suppress and sublimate into artistic and religious creation those which are too raw and crude in their native modes of behavior like hunger and sex, direct into useful channels those of great but dangerous motive power like pugnacity, stimulate into greater activity those that are too sluggish like the acquisitive instinct, and open wider efferent channels for those which spontaneously find expression in too narrow circles, as tender emotion and gregariousness. Such changes can be effected, both by the individual man in his own development, and also by organized society through its means of social control.

Light is thrown upon various problems through the psychology of instinct and sentiment. In the light of the results of this field of inquiry the problem of the objectivity of ethical judgments takes on new significance.¹ Similarly, it is probable that the question as to what kind of universality is afforded by aesthetic judgments will become clearer. The religious senti-

¹ W. K. Wright, "Ethical Objectivity in the Light of Social Psychology," *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, Vol. XVII, pp. 518-528; "The Psychology of Primitive Justice," *ibid.*, Nov., 1911.

ment, as we have seen, is an organization of instincts about certain objects of worship in order to conserve values of importance to man. Within what limits are possible modifications of the religious sentiment in the future conceivable? Or is it possible, since the religious impulse is sentimental and not instinctive, that the values now conserved by religion will be conserved in some other way? In these days we hear much of socialism, and of milder programs for the 'socialization' of our institutions. It is objected to these proposals that it is impossible to change human nature. Well, just what is human nature, and in what sense is it absolutely fixed, and in what respects can it be altered? Such questions as these very possibly can be answered, or at least new light can be thrown upon them, by the method of analysis here advanced.

It may seem that I am making sweeping claims for the psychology of instincts and sentiments, and the objection may be raised that it would be impossible by means of any a priori analysis of instincts and sentiments to distinguish what is alterable and what is inflexible in them. It must frankly be admitted that such problems as I have mentioned could be solved only by taking carefully into account all the available data in the evolution and history of the institutions involved, and in practical social experience at the present time. In view of this concession it might be objected that such a procedure would merely complicate the search for empirical data, by stating in a peculiar terminology what could be much more easily understood without it. My reply is, that this technical terminology and point of view is needed to enable the investigator to know for what facts to look, and how to coördinate his facts after he has found them. Such a mode of analysis could of course be overworked, like anything else. But it does, I maintain, offer promising possibilities, and it can afford to rest its claims for truth upon whatever pragmatic value it may reveal in actual employment. The conceptions, in the form that McDougall states them (and which have been utilized in this paper), are very simple, and Shand's not greatly different conceptions are little more complicated. They will, I believe, be found to be fruitful, and to repay the

social or philosophical student manifold for the slight effort involved in mastering them.

III.

An argument for the derivation of values from instincts is liable summarily to be dismissed by many readers without serious consideration because they fancy that it presupposes some biological or metaphysical position objectionable to them: it takes vitalism or mechanism for granted, or it begs the question in favor of idealism, or what not. The best way perhaps to show that the conviction that values are derived from instincts is not necessarily founded upon any particular biological or metaphysical conceptions is to suggest some of the extremely different positions that could be held along with it.

On the biological side I do not see that the theory presupposes any particular doctrine as to the origin of instincts. The holder of the theory may be mechanistic in his sympathies. In that case he may believe that instincts owe their origin to fortuitous combinations of reflexes preserved by natural selection. A biologist with Lamarckian leanings might regard instincts as inherited habits due originally to the *besoin* of the organism. They could be regarded, no doubt, as a variety of Driesch's entelechies. McDougall has suggested that they may be regarded as differentiations of the 'will to live' or of Bergson's *élan vital*.¹ He himself, I suppose, regards them as in some sense functions of the soul, but he does not discuss this question in his defence of animism in *Body and Mind*. The instincts could easily be regarded as individuations of any over-individual will or Absolute that a voluntaristic philosophy might choose to postulate. The only qualification would be, that if the instincts are assumed to be determinations of any such vital impulse or over-individual will, intelligence is a further development from instincts, and not something external to them and superimposed upon them. The Bergsonian antithesis between instinct and intuition would thus be impossible. But the doctrine is not necessarily committed to a voluntaristic metaphysics, or to the

¹ *British Journal of Psychology*, Vol. III, p. 258.

primacy over facts of values, or of the instincts from which values evolve. A neo-Hegelian who believes that the universe is a system of internal relations might accept this view of the relation of values to instincts and maintain that the level of the instincts is an abstract determination of categories that later become *aufgehoben* into sentiments that are more inclusive and concrete, and hence truer interpretations of the universe as it is. In fact, it seems to me that the theory ought especially to appeal to neo-Hegelians who insist that the logic of development must be found within things that evolve and not be imposed on them from without. The psychology of instinct might from this point of view be regarded as a moment in a continuous logical evolution in which a higher and more concrete synthesis of reality is subsequently attained in the sentiments.

The neo-realist of the more common American type, with naturalistic bias, could combine this theory of the evolution of values from instincts with the biological theory that instincts are mechanistic combinations of reflexes. If there would be various hiatuses involved in such a genetic descent they at least would not be greater, wider, or more numerous, and probably less so, than would follow upon any other account of values that he could advance in the present stage of human knowledge. Neo-realists of the type of G. E. Moore or Bertrand Russell would have more difficulty in accepting such a conception of values. Their conception of values is so rigid, static, inflexible, and non-evolutionary, that change and development in the sphere of values seem irreconcilable with their objectivity. But, unless they are willing to be contented permanently with a Platonic dualism between values and existences, it is hard to see how thinkers of this type can permanently refuse to think of values as evolutionary.

It is, however, from the standpoint of a functional pragmatism that the writer himself surveys instincts and values. It is in situations in which instincts and impulses are inhibited, or come into conflict with each other, that man becomes fully conscious of the objects of his conative tendencies, and values come into existence for him. His earliest and most primitive values are of

direct biological utility, his later and loftier values are of utility for the fullest realization of all within him that prompts to achievement. The higher sentimental values are constantly reconstructed and enlarged to meet the demands of new situations.

A last objection needs to be met. If this hypothesis that values have evolved from instincts can be combined with so many different biological and philosophical conceptions, does it not dangerously approach the defects of a perfect hypothesis? May it not be safely ignored in discussions of more fundamental questions since, even if true, it is irrelevant to them?

This objection has already been anticipated in part. While biological mechanists and vitalists, and philosophical idealists, realists and pragmatists may all accept the theory if they wish, there is no one of these positions that will not be affected by its acceptance. The mechanist will have to regard values, or at least their neural substrates, as of actual significance in the economy of the organism. The vitalist will have to maintain continuity between instincts and intelligence *via* the sentiments, and not superimpose the latter on the former. The idealist, whether he believes in the priority of facts over values, or of values over facts, will in either case have to show how values grow out of more primitive psychical processes, maintain a continuity between the two, and not split the universe into dualisms of description and appreciation, reality and appearance, or what not.¹ The realist will also have to avoid dualisms and maintain an evolutionary conception of values. The pragmatist will have to discriminate between 'situations,' and recognize that human beings have deep-seated instinctive and conative tendencies that are little if at all modifiable by the experiential situations into which they enter, and that the reconstruction that takes place in situations is an adjustment and adaptation of the more fragile and instable elements within the situation to those that are stiff and unyielding.

¹ Continuity between mental processes as treated in philosophy and psychology should be maintained. Cf. J. E. Creighton, "The Standpoint of Psychology," *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, March, 1914.

So, in conclusion, it is maintained that values may be successfully traced back through sentiments to the instincts, and that this conception, though adaptable to the requirements of a large number of different biological and philosophical schools, is vitally significant and illuminating to them all.

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL
ASSOCIATION; THE FOURTEENTH ANNUAL
MEETING, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,
DECEMBER 28-30, 1914.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY

The fourteenth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association was held at the University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill., on December 28, 29, and 30, 1914, in conjunction with the Western Philosophical Association.

The Treasurer's report for the year ending December 31, 1914, was read and accepted, after being audited by Professors Creighton and Bode. Report follows:—

E. G. SPAULDING, SECRETARY AND TREASURER, IN ACCOUNT WITH THE
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION.

Debit.

Time account.....	\$357.57
Interest to January 1, 1915.....	11.33
Check account, January 1, 1915.....	92.02
Dues received.....	240.10
	<u>\$701.02</u>

Credit.

New Haven meeting:	
Entertainment.....	\$ 26.65
Secretary's expenses.....	23.60
Clerical services.....	26.50
Stamps and stamped envelopes.....	24.13
Stationery.....	3.10
Telegrams, express and miscellaneous.....	6.79
Printing, announcements, programs, reports and Proceedings	51.19
	<u>\$161.96</u>
Total time account, January 1, 1915.....	368.90
Total check account, cash on hand.....	170.16
	<u>\$701.02</u>
Total cash on hand.....	\$539.06

Audited and found correct:

(Signed) J. E. CREIGHTON,
B. H. BODE.

The following officers were elected for the ensuing year: *President*, Professor A. C. Armstrong, of Wesleyan University; *Vice-President*,

Professor W. E. Hocking, of Harvard University; *Secretary-Treasurer*, Professor E. G. Spaulding, of Princeton University; *Members of the Executive Committee*, to serve two years, Professors Morris Cohen, of the City College of New York, and W. M. Urban, of Trinity College.

Upon recommendation of the Executive Committee, the following new members were elected: Professor A. A. Bowman, of Princeton University; Dr. A. P. Brogan, of the University of Texas; Dr. Matilde Castro, of Bryn Mawr College; Dr. Ellsworth Faris, of the University of Chicago; Dr. Henry C. Hartmann, University of Cincinnati; Professor R. F. A. Hoernlé, of Harvard University; Mr. Rupert C. Lodge, of the University of Minnesota; Professor R. W. Sellers, of the University of Michigan.

The arrangements for the place and date of the next meeting were referred to the Executive Committee with power.

The Association discussed at some length the matter of the present organization of the philosophical interests of the country into three associations, The American, The Western, and The Southern, and considered such questions as the advisability of amalgamating these into one association, an American, with three sections, and, accordingly, of changing the name of the present American Philosophical Association. It was suggested that with such an organization both general and sectional meetings might be held, either each year, or in alternate years. The matter was referred to a committee consisting of the Executive Committee and three members to be appointed by the President with instructions that this committee receive suggestions and invite discussion.

The appreciation and thanks of the Association were expressed to Chicago University, and especially to Professors Tufts, Ames and Moore, for their generous hospitality at this meeting.

Respectfully submitted,

E. G. SPAULDING,

Secretary.

The following are abstracts of papers read at the joint meeting of the American and Western Philosophical Associations:—

Individuality through Democracy. G. C. Cox.

Democracy is defined, not as any particular institution, but as such an organization of humanity as will give to every individual the opportunity to realize himself in the fullest measure which is not incompatible with the development of all others. Democracy of the above type is the only organization of society which can develop individuality

in the full and complete form which is the goal of human endeavor. The tendency shown in history has been the steady emancipation of individuals through the acquisition of private property, and other so-called rights, the suffrage, and liberties of all kinds, though, of course the existence of temporary reactionary movements must be admitted.

It is necessary to differentiate sharply between that idea which puts the state first (Plato, modern German writers, Dewey and Tufts) and the English-American view (Spencer, Fite, and many others), which holds that the state has fulfilled its function only if it has given the widest possible freedom to all its citizens. The first view is essentially socialistic and at the same time fundamentally aristocratic. The paper maintains, in agreement with Fite and in opposition to Dewey and Tufts, that the conscious individual, not service of others, is the only true goal of humanity. It is not possible for the individual consciously to seek any other end. But it is also true that individuality can be attained only through the perfection of other individuals; hence the value of altruism. A practical consideration is that the multitude of suppressed individualities will always gain their opportunity in the end, in spite of the influence of the slave morality.

Justice and Progress. H. B. ALEXANDER.

The conception of Justice is grounded in the compromise of conflicting ends. Justice is essentially the virtue of a pluralistic world. Recognition of rights, obedience to law, are the virtues of the just; Adjustment, harmonization of discord, are the action of justice. These imply, in a world in which justice arises, a unity not quite unified, an organism not wholly harmonized, within which discontinuous interests passively surrender or actively quarrel. Evidently, the interpretation of justice must be teleological. The conflicts of which it is a recognition are conflicts of ends, aims, interests. So also its adjudications are of ends, aims. But the conflicts are *realistic*, of facts; the adjudications express not what aims *are*, but what they *ought to be*; they are of *rights*. Rights are essentially prospective, theoretic. Their sanction is the rational valuation of ends and aims: a judicial decision, to be just, must substitute for desires denied other realizable desires commended in their stead. The only principle upon which this can be done is an *assumption of human progress* as the fundamental sanction of Justice. How can such a sanction operate? Only by moral hypotheses, by definitions of rights, based on men's theoretic agreements, or upon actual practice. Laws and institutions are formal recognitions of such rights: their

function is to express the norm of progress, as conceived by any given generation. Thus, laws, the forms of the administration of justice, rest upon rights, which are the recognized theoretic aims of a generation.

Corollary to this: there is an hierarchy of rights, constantly being defined by history, which leads logically to *the right*, which is the theoretic end of progress. Similarly, an hierarchy of laws, expressing the structure of social evolution, leads toward a law of progress, as its ultimate formulation.

Justice, then, belongs to man's theoretic nature. It must find its satisfaction, not in the gratification of man's passional or appetitive soul, but in that of the intellective. Only when life and life's situations are made reasonable to men, reasonable teleologically, is justice done. And the definition of justice is: the individual's equity in human progress.

Democracy and its Melting Pot. H. M. KALLEN.

The meaning of 'democracy' has passed in modern times through three phases. Based originally on the doctrine of 'natural rights' which makes the *fundamentum divisionis* of the Declaration of Independence, it begins by a denial of all differences, in the conception that all men were created 'free and equal' with the right "to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Politically this principle was expressed in the doctrine of 'one man, one vote,' economically in the use of free land and the conception that 'America is opportunity.'

The second phase of the meaning of democracy came with the transition from agricultural to industrial organization, from rural to urban populations, from homogeneity of origin and tradition to diversity of origins and traditions, from a comparatively uniform distribution of wealth to the present very unequal distribution. In this phase the conception of democracy is socialized. Its attention is no longer fixed on the individual but on the machinery of government and the distribution of wealth. It tends toward an increase of political police power on the one side, and toward the increase in the flexibility of political power on the other. It still insists that government is an instrument aiming at the welfare of the governed, and that the machinery of government must be such, (*i. e.*, party government) as to be easily abandonable when it proves inefficacious. But it tends in practice toward the suppression of individualities, the centralization of power and the hypostasis of instruments. In this stage 'democracy' is instrumental and corrective, not intrinsic in its significance.

There are signs of the development of a new phase in the meaning of

'democracy' which may lead to a restriction of its intrinsicity. This phase turns on the rise to consciousness of factors long present in the state life of both Europe and America, but obscured in America by the scope of industrial enterprise, the ease of communication and the 'miracle of assimilation' in clothes, manners and newspapers. It has led to the conception that America is a 'melting-pot,' the womb of a newer and happier race, etc. But in fact nothing could be farther from the truth. First of all, it is biologically impossible. The urban and rural populations are stratified: first of all geographically, the layers of the races of Europe following the streams of migration westward: then industrially, different nationalities follow different employments; and finally socially, the upper classes being in the long run identical with the earlier comers.

The United States, is, in fact, a federation of politically and ethnically diversified peoples, who as they become more prosperous become more self-conscious and nationalistic. This is as it should be. 'Opportunity' can be only opportunity to realize one's capacities. These are determined by heredity and look back both historically and psychologically. The freedom of self-development implied in the declaration is now conceived as the freedom of a *social* self; this self is at its broadest efficacy ethnic. Spiritually the democracy of America tends to become a democracy of nationalities, each seeking in cooperation with the others, the perfection proper to itself. Such a democracy is however an exemplification of the Platonic principle of justice. Economic and legal considerations are secondary to it, as they represent means, while it is the unconscious *goal* of the peoples of the United States. Primary and coördinate with it is the question of education, as Plato points out, and the problem of justice should find its solution first through that, once the goal has been established, rather than through the economic and political changes.

What Philosophy can Contribute to the Conception of Justice. H. A. OVERSTREET.

Justice in its primitive form was the assignment of rights and duties in terms of the group to which the person belonged. The history of civilization has witnessed the gradual drawing away from that arbitrary form of justice to one in which rights and duties are assigned in terms of the quality of the person himself—his efforts, purposes, achievements, etc. In the spirit of this development the thought has prevailed that the one requisite for the attainment of justice is the removal of artificial group distinctions. In American life the further thought has prevailed that such removal of artificial distinctions has

actually been accomplished and that individuals are free to realize their lives unhindered by arbitrary limitations. Out of this has grown the conviction that, since each person is free to run his race unhindered, justice demands that each person should receive of life what goods, through his individual efforts, he is able to secure. To each according to what he can afford, has come to be, in the main, the principle of modern American justice. It becomes increasingly clear, however, that this principle fails to take note of the fact that there are fundamental needs which cannot possibly be met through the efforts of single individuals, and which must therefore be fulfilled through cooperative action. In laws governing conditions of labor and of habitation, in accident compensation laws, in provision for public education, recreation, etc., society is organizing itself in terms of a new principle of justice: namely, that where there are needs which cannot be met by individual action, society is obligated, through its wider resources, to fulfill the needs. The new principle has not yet received adequate recognition, for there are vital needs which society has not yet institutionally recognized; for example, the need for adequate medical aid, for equal access to legal advice and assistance, for full participation in economic processes and rewards. With the principle, to each according to his needs, must be placed its correlate: from each according to his realized capacities. Modern society commits flagrant injustice inasmuch as in many cases it demands of its individuals far more than the development of their capacities warrants. A just state will raise the capacities of its citizens to the level of its demands. The problem of justice then involves essentially the discovery of the fundamental needs of human personality. This is the peculiar task of philosophy. Economics, political science and law have been conspicuous by their disastrously inadequate conceptions of personality. It is for philosophy, with its wider psychological, ethical, and sociological resources, to build up a conception of personality that will strengthen and direct the new principle of justice.

Private Property and Social Justice in the Light of Social Psychology.

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT.

Collectivists and many other advocates of social reform maintain that the extensive substitution of public for private ownership of property is a demand of social justice. In opposition it has been urged that collective ownership is opposed to 'human nature.' But what is 'human nature' in this connection? We must look to social psychology for an answer. The aggressive assertion of ownership is instinctive, and preceded the appearance of collectivism in early group

life. The latter is therefore not more 'natural' to man than private ownership. But while acquisition and appropriation are instinctive, economy, like other moral virtues, is a matter of development. Moral evolutionists are agreed that the race first acquired the virtues of justice and benevolence in small personal groups and only later extended them to larger circles of humanity. The child likewise first has to learn to be just and benevolent in home and school. The virtue of economy is subject to the same laws of development. A democratic society therefore can only become economical on condition that its citizens are successful in the management of private capital. The moral virtues necessary to successful public ownership can be acquired by society on this condition. Society will then be able safely to undertake many of the various forms of amelioration proposed by socialists and others, such as approximate equality of education and other forms of opportunity, and insurance of every one against sickness, accident, unemployment, old age and death. Pragmatism, whose significance has been misunderstood by Walling, can be construed in favor of the positions of this paper. The aims of social justice and the right to private property are therefore compatible, and both may be secured in accordance with the psychology of human nature. Only that society can be called truly social in which every individual enjoyed free opportunity to develop his personality in every important respect, including a liberal education and the acquisition of private, income producing property.

The Psychology of Punishment. ELLSWORTH FARIS.

The paper seeks to point out, by means of an analysis of the punitive attitude, a single phase of the punishing situation which would justify the inclusion of punishment within the category of unjust acts. Punishment being considered as the infliction of suffering for a protracted period upon a member of a group against his will and with the definite purpose, on the part of the members of the same group, to cause the suffering, is believed to be unjust. For a just act is one which is due under all the circumstances, past, present, and future. "The just man," says Dewey, "is the man who takes in the whole of a situation and reacts to it in its wholeness, not being misled by undue respect to some particular factor." Punishment is always partial, always abstract, and becomes impossible when a concrete and completely social attitude is assumed. The personality of him who punishes is always divided. He is necessarily suppressing some part of his nature, is playing a rôle, is abstract and not concrete, is only partly social and is, therefore, unjust.

Three types of reaction to social stimuli are distinguishable, the impulsive, the abstract, and the concrete. The impulsive is illustrated by any ready-to-hand reaction, innate or acquired. This describes the psychology of the unpremeditated attack, but never that of punishment. The abstract attitude is illustrated in any professional attitude, and is seen in a modern court of justice where placing the prisoner in a previously defined class determines his punishment. This procedure necessitates the neglecting of many essential relationships. The concrete attitude describes those reactions in which we are able to put ourselves in the place of another. It alone is completely social. Impulsive and abstract reactions are useful and necessary. They save time and energy and are for definite and limited purposes. They should be reserved for those occasions and for those times only where there is no disposition to make them permanent. The injustice of acting abstractly as in punishment consists in making permanent what should be only very limited in duration and in permanently neglecting what should be continually kept in mind. Punishment may be due in view of part of the circumstances, it is never just in view of all of them. Correction should be substituted for punishment both as a technical term and as a distinctly changed attitude.

The Conflict of Moral Ideals. E. B. MCGILVARY.

Relativity in morality is unacceptable for two reasons: one is the fear that relativity would enfeeble moral obligation and the other is that it would dampen moral enthusiasm. Both reasons are fallacious. Moral obligation does not rest on a cosmical absolute, but on human interests, and so long as these keep alive, morality will draw from them its vigor. And for the same reason moral enthusiasm will remain; our enthusiasms do not need the authority of the universe to back them up, but may be the more lively from resistance. But if relativity be true, how do moral conflicts get adjusted. The answer is, 'By fighting it out.' The conflict of moral ideals is warfare, and the issue is determined by the methods of warfare. Sometimes the adjustment is by actual force of arms, as when slavery was abolished in the States by the military force of the Union. The victory of the Northern arms established a new ideal to which the descendants of the conquered submitted in the course of time. Our moral sentiments have a way of adapting themselves to the conditions which they meet. The critical battles of history have not had merely political results but also the result of establishing one of two contending ideals in each case. Had the Persians won at Marathon or the Turks at Lepanto the ideals of Western Europe would in all likelihood have been orientalized.

There are however other means than military force for establishing ideals, but these means are also adopted in warfare; such means are praise and blame, punishment and reward. Contending nations fight with vituperation as well as with swords and guns; and likewise contending moral ideals seek to beat each other down by disgust and contempt. They enlist in their cause human responsiveness to sinister emotions and to eulogy. They encourage their adherents by flattery and browbeat their opponents by maledictions. The prophets of all victorious historical ideals have wielded the lashing tongue. When an ideal has won and thus gained the allegiance of an age, the retrospect of that generation adjudges the process which brought this about as progress, because this process is estimated by the ideal that is thus established. The change which gives an ideal a place in this sum is necessarily esteemed progress by the ideal thus favored. Progress is always assessed by an ideal, and the assessments will vary with the ideals used. When *we* are fighting for an ideal, of course in *our* judgment the victory of that ideal is progress. The judgment of progress is as relativistic as any other judgment of value.

The Duplicity of Democracy. ALFRED H. LLOYD.

In general the democratic cry for equality at any time and in any context evidently must refer to fairly well and fairly generally established conditions, to a traditional type of life, the opportunities of which must have been widely realized by mankind as well as effectively exploited, and it must imply that its demand for equality is for the sake of the free development of some new type of life, of life under a new valuation, the old type being made by the equalization, by the dehumanization and objectification, only mediate to the new type. So, besides democratic equality being relative and contextual, and besides the mediation of it, besides its mediation of a new aristocracy, in democracy or in the life of society in which the demand for democracy appears we see also a certain duality or—because democracy has not usually been candid as to its own purposes—a duplicity of life and interest. This duality or duplicity, moreover, involves distinct difference in kind; since the passing and the rising aristocracies, between which the democracy stands, are objects respectively of attack and ideal endeavor or, again, are different as means and end are different. Indeed, the duality here seems very comparable with that of the material and the spiritual and, like it, must be understood as a moving or functional duality, not a metaphysically fixed one.

How, now, are democratic levelling and mediation accomplished?

Only by socialistic measures. Socialism should not interfere with pioneer life in any field or on any plane where competition and rewards to the best are important, but it seems both necessary to progress and humanly just when applied to already well developed ways and instruments of life. Unfortunately many people are socialistic without any thought of the mediation, just as many are democratic without thinking of the relativity of the equality.

Democracy, we may conclude, is no mere name for specific eras or for particular forms of local political organizations. Democracy is one of the two ever present motives in all social life, aristocracy being the other.

But, now changing the viewpoint a little, the nature of democracy and its demanded equality may be seen in the conditions and results of all conflict. Witness such things as fair play, balance of power, armed neutrality, rules of the game, agreement as to weapons, and so on. Conflict, incident to all aristocracy, tends to balance or equalization, both parties or all parties learning of each other, methods and powers thus becoming distributed; and, accordingly, the outcome is or at least always tends to be, a drawn battle. The drawn battle, however, means more than control and suspension of certain ways of fighting; it means also, besides this negative result, the positive benefit at once of mediation of these ways and so of the development of new ways, involving greater self-control and a new system of value, for carrying on the conflict. So in conflict may democracy be seen as lying between a passing and a rising aristocracy.

From all of which may be extracted two things. 1. Specific 'natural rights,' whenever a basis of democracy, must have been achieved, or earned, not given; and they always differ according to the aristocracies between which the democracy lies as mediator; and, 2. Peace has worth, not as a final cessation of all fighting, but as the means to a higher type of life and life's battling. "Democracy is no golden age; but the gold of all ages, which some new aristocracy is ever ready to enjoy."

Constitutional and Political Guarantees.¹ GEORGE H. MEAD. (No summary furnished.)

W. F. DODD.

Under every condition some actions of individuals should be free from governmental interference. But with changing conditions the

¹ This topic formed the subject of Discussion at a joint session in which members of the Philosophical Associations, of the Political Science Association, and of the Conference on Legal and Social Philosophy took part.

sphere of individual action that should be free from governmental control varies, and with such a change individual rights or interests must give way at certain points in the interest of the community at large. The safeguarding of individual rights would be simple were such rights definite and unchangable. Safeguards of individual right must seek to draw some line which will protect such rights and at the same time be sufficiently flexible to permit new governmental regulation as conditions change.

For the protection of individual rights there are two types of safeguards, (1) political, and (2) those judicially enforceable. Of political safeguards standing alone England furnishes the best example; of judicial safeguards (united also with political) the United States furnishes the best example. A study of the two types does not show that the judicial safeguard possesses any distinct measure of superiority. Under each system of safeguarding individual rights, the more important rights of property at least are to a fair degree protected. Yet political safeguards are more flexible and permit a more ready adaptation of governmental action to meet new conditions.

The Social Origin of Absolute Idealism. GEORGE H. SABINE.

Like all English philosophy, idealism was largely an interpretation of English social and political experience. The political philosophy of the first half of the nineteenth century, whether in the theory of natural rights or in the Utilitarian *laissez faire* politics and economics, rested upon the belief that liberty arises from the limitation of social control; it assumed a sphere of individual interests which ought not to be invaded. A partial realization of this ideal in practice produced a reaction against it which began to be general about 1850 and affected Liberal legislation in the seventies and early eighties. The constructive idea in this reaction was a more positive notion of freedom, issuing in the belief that society should use its organized power to guarantee, so far as possible, a certain degree of positive achievement; an opportunity, at least, for all citizens to enjoy the benefits of a civilized life. The self-realization ethics of the English idealists was an effort to theorize this belief. It rejects the older antithesis of social control and freedom, of public and private interest, of egoism and altruism. In its criticism of earlier philosophy it centered its attack upon subjectivism and individualism, considering the essential function of consciousness to be self-transcendence. Hence it regards social relations as a product of consciousness and therefore different in kind from spatial and causal relations between non-conscious beings. Reciprocally it regarded self-realization for the individual as impossible

except in the pursuit of socially beneficial ends; individuality and social organization progress *pari passu*. For the absolute idealist, however, the concept of a perfectly realized individual, or an 'eternal consciousness,' remains necessarily vague and largely without content. The social organization, therefore, since it supplies the content of the individual's ideal, tends to become absolute. The individual becomes an organ of society and self-realization is merely the finding of one's station in society. This is best illustrated in Bradley's statement of self-realization in his *Ethical Studies*. Absolute idealism thus becomes destructive of the ideal of positive freedom which it set out to establish. A metaphysical pluralism is the more natural accompaniment of such an ethical ideal.

A Re-characterization of Naturalism and the Impersonal. J. H. FARLEY.

Naturalism is not synonymous with materialism, mechanism, or externalism. It is not identical with extramentalism or positivism. It is not merely a doctrine of the self-sufficiency of nature in opposition to supernaturalism. It does not aim to show that laws give an exhaustive account of individuals. It is more than the methods and explanations of the physical sciences as applied to the world, etc.

Philosophical naturalism as distinct from scientific naturalism is a doctrine of the *absolutely fulfilled* treated as a *self-sufficient* affair without essential reference or relation to any process of fulfilling; without relation to any means, meaning, or reference, and without relation to the expression of any unfulfilled nature. It completely ignores, either tacitly or explicitly, real creativeness:

A doctrine which tends, though not always explicitly, to describe and explain the world in terms of absolute fulfillment; absolute fulfillment of the whole universe, and then we have the static absolutism so furiously assailed by pragmatism; absolute self-sufficient fulfillment of the parts, and then we have atomism and mechanism so uninspiring to idealism; absolute self-sufficient fulfillment of bits of sense experience and then we have so-called sensationalism so patronizingly derided by rationalism; absolute fulfillment of the faculty of reason, and then we have older rationalism so lacking in the eyes of functional psychology; the absolute fulfillment of rational system and logical order, and then we have the panlogism of intellectualism, of impersonal idealism so hateful to plastic and creative views of life: the absolute fulfillment of an object beyond the continual shifting movements of meaning experienced by the self, and then we have the Kantian thing-in-itself so irrational to Hegelian thought: the absolute self-sufficient

fulfillment of space, time, matter, motion, and force; and then we have crass materialism so depressing to spiritual life, the absolute self-sufficient fulfillment of elements by the rearrangement and combination of which mechanical or so-called naturalistic evolution attempts to explain the qualitatively new features in an evolutionary process as in Spencer's philosophy, or the absolute fulfillment of finalism which is mechanism turned futureward as criticised by Bergson.

Naturalism means a special interpretation of unity, of identity, of change, of causality, of potentiality, of relation, and of reality.

Voluntarism and the Problem of Objectivity. H. W. WRIGHT.

Only if thinking is an expression of will does its progress toward the goal of Truth necessitate a constant appeal to Reality. Will seeks to initiate such sequences of movement as promise to satisfy the greatest variety of interests. Thus it possesses both the power of movement in tri-dimensional space and that of choice among significant qualities. An idea is realized as end when it is re-experienced as the result of a series of movements or order of choices which can be repeated at will; it is thus converted from possibility to actuality by being brought into dynamic relation to actual existence. But the conditions of movement and of choice are fixed by Reality, which interrupts and alters the expected sequence of movements and likewise limits the range of choices. Thus reality is continually compelling will to make new plans and adjustments. In no case does it break into conscious experience forcing upon it new and foreign material. The material for our ideas must continue to be drawn from the stock of movements and of qualities originally furnished volition by instinct. But the order and arrangement of ideas thus constituted is conditioned throughout by objective reality. Reality is that which limits our wills; it is directly encountered only in action the results of which furnish the only real verification of our ideas.

The Logical Analysis of Intrinsic Value. A. P. BROGAN.

The first requirement in any scientific discussion of value problems is the rigorous definition of all other value terms by one or more value terms taken as fundamental in the value system. As extrinsic value terms (denoting worth as means or parts) depend upon intrinsic value terms (denoting worth as ends or wholes, such as 'good,' 'bad,' 'better,' 'beautiful,' possibly 'ought' and 'right,' intrinsic value terms alone will be discussed. Neither 'good' nor 'ought' can be taken as the fundamental value term. Apparently the relation 'better' (or its converse 'worse') is the only term which can be taken as fundamental within the system.

Analysis shows that the determining logical characteristics of this relation (and the postulates for a value system) are as follows. I sacrifice logical precision for popularity.

No. 1.1. Whatever *X* and *Y* are, if *X* is better than *Y*, then *X* is not identical with *Y*.

No. 1.2. Whatever *X*, *Y*, and *Z* are, if *X* is better than *Y*, and *Y* is better than *Z*, then *X* is better than *Z*.

No. 1.3. Whatever *X*, *Y*, and *Z* are, if *X* is better than *Y*, and *Y* is not worse than *Z*, then *X* is better than *Z*.

No. 1.4. If *X* is better or worse than anything, then *X* is identical with the fact that there exists an entity (or entities) having a certain quality (or relation), or *X* is identical with the fact that there does not exist such an entity (or entities).

No. 1.5. Whatever *X* and *Y* are, if *X* is not better than *Y*, then there is something better or worse than *X* and there is something better or worse than *Y*.

No. 1.6. All facts about non-existence are equal in value. ("Equal in value" means "not better and not worse").

These postulates suffice for all deductions about intrinsic value, except that additional postulates are required for the problematic operation of 'adding' intrinsic value objects (to avoid G. E. Moore's 'principle of organic unities.') With Russell's theory of logical types, postulates 1.4 and 1.5 could be replaced by a single postulate.

All so-called axiomatic or a priori knowledge about value is found to be the result of surely logical deduction from these postulates and the definitions of other value terms.

Examination of the relation 'better,' taken as fundamental and undefined within the value system, shows that "better" cannot be so adequately identified with any other (non-value) relation that this other relation can be used to define 'better.' For present human knowledge 'better' must be taken as a simple and unanalyzed relation. It must be studied as being what it is and not as being something else.

All arguments that such a value relation is 'subjective' or 'unreal' are based upon trivial fallacies. While there is no more certain proposition known to be true from which it can be deduced that this relation has a 'real' reference to facts, there is no reason for doubting that 'better' has all the 'reality' possessed by the relations studied by other sciences.

On this logical basis, with the help of inductive methodology, value discussions can become value sciences.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

The Philosophy of Change: A Study of the Fundamental Principle of the Philosophy of Bergson. By H. WILDON CARR. London, Macmillan and Company, 1914.—pp. xii, 216.

"This book is the outcome of a course of lectures on 'The Philosophy of Bergson' delivered in the University of London. . . . It emphasises the fundamental principle of the new philosophy, the principle that change is original. . . . From this standpoint I have endeavoured to present a clear and concise account of what seem to me the definite doctrines worked out in Bergson's philosophy." As a presentation of these doctrines the book may in a sense be said to have M. Bergson's approval. "In this task I have been privileged to have the advantage of friendship and personal communication with M. Bergson himself. He is in no way responsible for the order or the manner in which I have set forth the doctrines nor for the arguments with which I have supported them, but he has encouraged me by the deep interest he has shown in the work, and has discussed with me many of the more difficult problems" (Preface).

The nine chapters of the book group themselves about four general topics. The first two chapters are devoted to a consideration of the problem of intuition as the unique philosophical method and of the nature of the principle which this method discloses. The remaining chapters apply this principle to definite philosophical problems for the purpose of determining what light it throws upon them. Chapters three and four deal with the general problem of the relation between the two orders of reality, matter and life, particularly as that problem focalizes in the more special problem of the relation between body and mind, between the brain and consciousness. Chapters five and six may be said to concern themselves with the problem of perception, the nature of the percept and the part that memory plays in the perceptive act. Finally, chapters seven, eight, and nine have to do with the more ultimate problems of the nature of reality and man's relation to it—those age-old problems of God, Freedom, and Immortality which from the beginning have spurred the energies and taxed the powers of the human mind. This in a general way indicates the contents of the book before us.

Dr. Carr, following Bergson, insists that the novelty of the new

philosophy consists in two things: first, in the method which that philosophy employs, namely, the method of intuition; and, secondly, in the principle which this intuition discloses, namely, that change, movement, is original and ultimate. These, then, are the fundamental characteristics of this new system of thought, and it is appropriate that our review of the present exposition of that system turn about these two points.

I desire only to refer briefly to the doctrine that change is original. It must be admitted that the doctrine is suggestive, and that it offers a point of departure from which some of the ancient philosophical puzzles may be satisfactorily untangled. The problem of time and space has long troubled the minds of men, and it certainly may be questioned whether any system of thought is more suggestive in its dealings with this problem than is the system of Bergson. But the doctrine of the originality of change, as that doctrine is defined by the new philosophy, is not without its own difficulties. These difficulties I have already considered at length elsewhere¹ and I shall not enter into a consideration of them here. They might perhaps be summarised in the proposition: Pure duration, if interpreted literally, is a pure abstraction.

To this Dr. Carr would, of course, answer: From the standpoint of the intellect pure duration is an abstraction, but the new philosophy insists that we must transcend the intellect and attain to the point of view of intuition which reveals pure duration as an unquestionable fact. And with this answer the issue is joined. What is intuition, and how does it differ from intelligence?

Intuition "is the apprehension by the mind of reality directly as it is, and not under the form of a perception or a conception, nor as an idea or object of the reason, all of which are by contrast intellectual apprehension. There is, therefore, affirmed to be a capacity of directly knowing reality and a nature in reality of direct revelation" (pp. 21-22). It "is a direct apprehension of reality which is non-intellectual, and non-intellectual means that it is neither a perception nor a conception nor an object of reason, all of which are intellectual forms or. . . intellectual views of reality" (p. 22). All of this may sound strangely like mysticism, but it is far from it. The intuitive point of view, because of its very simplicity, is difficult to obtain; of it "we may say, as was said of the rich man who would enter the kingdom of heaven, that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle" (p. 3). But when we do succeed in obtaining it,

¹ This REVIEW, Vol. XXIII.

"it is no ecstatic vision that we get, no exaltation into a higher sphere. Rather we obtain a fleeting vision of the reality that underlies our common everyday experience" (p. 22).

Let us, following our guide, make an effort to enter into this simple and elusive experience. What do we find there? "If we fix the whole attention of our mind on this life of ours as we live it, if we realize to ourselves our life as it is being lived, we get an intuition of reality, that is to say not a thought of it, not a perception or conception of it as an object, but a consciousness of the actual life we are living as we live it. . . . We can only refer to it as an experience of life that we have in living. This is the intuition of reality. . . . It may be limited, but however narrow, momentary, fleeting, the vision be, we feel that it is not an external view of reality but an absolute experience of reality" (pp. 26-27). So far, so good; but is not this subjectivism? We get here an experience of reality, but it is within ourselves, deep down in the depths of our life as we experience it in the living of it. Now this would seem to be an all-important question: How can I be assured that the life which I glimpse in the living of it is in very truth predicable of the world about me? But the position in which we find ourselves is not subjectivism. Of course we cannot experience the life of an object in the external order just as we experience our own individual lives, "but we can enter into it by *sympathy*—make ourselves one with it in order to know its movement" (p. 32). The way of philosophy, then, is in the last analysis the way of *sympathy*—"the way of art."

But doubts and perplexities still harass the uninitiated. Just exactly what is the significance of the word 'sympathy' here? Dr. Carr, following Bergson, seems to think that the whole matter is definitely settled once the magic word *sympathy* is introduced into the discussion. But, for my own part, I must confess that the use of this word begs the whole question at issue. Certainly its meaning is not at all clear, and one is justified in desiring a further definition of it. If by 'sympathy' is meant what Kant would probably call a *pathological* fellow-feeling with sticks and stones, then I am sure that there is no sympathy in me; others may possess it, but in that case all I can say is that their experience is different from mine. If, on the other hand, 'sympathy' means the intellectual faith that experience is a unity and that the deepest nature of the individual is in some sense akin to the deepest nature of the great world about him, then I am at a loss to know how such a conception is in any sense a novel one; I had supposed that from the very beginning of metaphysical reflection

this same doctrine had been held in one form or another. Thus I find myself reduced to a dilemma. If Dr. Carr means by sympathy here anything that makes his intuition genuinely objective, his doctrine loses all of its fascinating novelty; if he means by sympathy merely subjective insight into subjective experience, his doctrine is of no universal concern.

As a matter of fact, Dr. Carr—and in this he is doing exactly what Bergson has done—makes intuition indistinguishable from intellect. In all of his discussions of the concrete problems with which he deals, it is an intellectual solution that he offers us. The problem of the relation between the mind and the body is solved, not by any ultra-intellectual intuition, but by downright reasoning in the orthodox fashion. He objects to materialism, that is, the doctrine that body produces mind, because it is unintelligible in the light of the facts; and phenomenalism he throws aside because of its 'absurdity'; while his own theory of 'solidarity' he presents as a theory which meets the demands of an exhaustive analysis of the situation. Likewise, all the other special problems are dealt with in a manner which one would suppose is the intellectual method. The discussion of the problem of perception, for example, is closely related to the realistic position (pp. 98 ff.), and might as appropriately have occurred in the writings of the neo-realists as in this book on the philosophy of intuition; while one would experience considerable difficulty in differentiating Dr. Carr's conception of freedom (cf. particularly p. 205) from that of Green and the neo-Hegelians generally. But the whole case is given away in our author's justification of the priority of intuition over the intellect. For consider: Why is intuition more reliable or rather more ultimate than intellect? The answer is a plain and direct one. It is that there is no way of passing from immobility to movement. Every attempt of science or philosophy to derive movement is unsuccessful and leads to contradiction, whereas, on the other hand, if movement is original we can derive things" (p. 34). In other words, if you begin with what M. Bergson and Dr. Carr call the point of view of intelligence you find yourself in insuperable intellectual difficulties: what you need to do is to derive another point of view which will relieve your intellectual embarrassment. But, be it noted, you derive this other point of view because of and by means of the intellect itself; without intelligence our minds would remain riveted to the point of view of instinct.¹ Now I suppose there is no reason in the nature of language why this new point of view should not be called

¹ Cf. *Evolution Créatrice*, pp. 191 ff.

the point of view of *intuition*, but there is every reason why it should not be called 'non-intellectual'; it is, confessedly, the very intellect itself that forces the new point of view upon us, and there would seem to be no justification at all for kicking down the ladder by which we climb. On the showing of the advocates of the new philosophy themselves, then, the cure for intelligence is not a *non-intellectual* intuition, but more intelligence, or, if one prefers, an *intellectual intuition*—what Hegel would doubtless call *begreifendes Denken*.

There is one assumption underlying this whole doctrine of intuition which one feels should be explicitly stated and definitely challenged. It is that the intellect by its very nature deals only with static categories, and that, consequently, dynamic and vital categories must emerge from some non-intellectual faculty or tendency of the mind. Is this assumption justifiable? There is no room here, of course, to argue the question in detail. But surely there is something in the contention that the whole history of the development of the biological and mental sciences contradicts the assumption. To question that physiology, biology, psychology, epistemology, and ethics employ dynamic categories and to insist that their point of view is *ipso facto* mechanistic seem to some at least to be flying in the face of the facts; while to deny that they are sciences is simply to amuse oneself with words. Here is an assumption which itself needs further consideration and without which this intuitional propagandism falls to the ground.

Apart from any considerations of method, Dr. Carr's discussion of the particular problems he deals with throws considerable light on them and incidentally enhances the significance of the point of view of the new philosophy. If space permitted, we might to advantage follow him in these discussions. It is possible, however, only to direct attention to a few particular points. The chapter on "Perception and Memory," and the one on "The World of Actions" in which the thesis, "there are no things, there are only actions," is defended, are two of the most interesting chapters in the book and constitute a valuable and suggestive contribution to the literature of the problem of perception. The chapter on "The Vital Impulse" throws considerable light on that dark side of the Bergsonian metaphysics; though it remains questionable whether Dr. Carr has satisfactorily explained why the 'tension' of life should 'extend' in the form of matter, and more than questionable whether he has made clear the exact relation between the individual centres of organic life and the great onward-flowing stream of life whose 'extension' the physical universe is.

For the new philosophy God and Immortality are still more or less dark problems, but Freedom is a blessed reality. "However narrow our outlook, our interest, our ideal, we actually do create, we actually do bring into existence something not only unforeseen but unforeseeable. It is true we share our freedom with all that lives, with life itself, but in our form is registered the greatest amount of free creative power which the life-impulse has yet evolved, so far as our vision extends" (p. 196). One must close the book, however, with the feeling that the question in what sense the creatures are also creators (p. 212) is still unanswered.

I should not be true to my own conviction were I to conclude this account without placing on record the fact that, outside of the works of Bergson himself, the book before us is, on the whole, the most stimulating presentation of the new philosophy which I have chanced to meet with. Nowadays when a reviewer finds in his hands 'An Account of the New Philosophy,' particularly if his first glance at the preface reveals the fact that the writer has the privilege of personal acquaintance with the creator of that system of thought, the fear arises lest the book before him prove to be nothing but a sort of rhapsodic summary of the inspired utterances of the great French thinker. But there is nothing of the sort in Dr. Carr's book. To be sure, one could hardly say that there is anything new in it; the expositor follows his author with conscientious faithfulness, nor does he attempt to add aught to the system. The book is, nevertheless, a straightforward presentation of the fundamental doctrine of the Bergsonian epistemology, and an unusually clear discussion of particular problems; it gives evidence on every page that its writer has thought the matter through for himself. Indeed, one is inclined to feel that Dr. Carr has in some respects at least improved upon M. Bergson himself; at any rate, one cannot lay the book aside without feeling that his ideas of the Bergsonian point of view have been considerably clarified. It is a serious argument, admirably sustained and forcibly presented by a writer who is firmly convinced that the new philosophy offers an easy solution for problems over which the older philosophical systems have labored in vain. This word of appreciation is made all the more gladly since, after a careful study of Dr. Carr's work, I still find myself unable to agree that all the difficulties which philosophers have hitherto grappled with—to a considerable extent unsuccessfully, perhaps—fade away like dew before the morning sun at the magic wand of *la philosophie nouvelle*.

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Behavior: an Introduction to Comparative Psychology. By JOHN B. WATSON. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1914.—pp. xii, 439.

Professor Watson's book will perhaps find its greatest usefulness as a program of research. Its second chapter, entitled "Some Problems Enumerated," offers suggestions for experimental work which, carried out, will do much to justify 'Behaviorism' as a methodological postulate. One is the more willing to admit this because, as anything more than a convenient delimitation of a field of study, Behaviorism is so defenceless that it seems unkind to attack it.

The other chapters of the book include one on "Apparatus and Methods"; two on instinct, with a very clear and interesting presentation of the existing state of opinion regarding the origin of instinct; one on "The Experimental Study of Habit Formation," with an excellent summary, which however includes no work on invertebrates, of recent work on animal learning; chapters on "The Fixation of Arcs in Habit," on "The Abridgement of the Learning Process" (by imitation and special training methods); on "The Limits of Training in Animals," with a discussion of the Elberfeld horses and other gifted animals; and on "Man and Beast." The book concludes with four chapters on sensory discrimination, based entirely on experiments with vertebrates.

Of the various detailed points raised for discussion in these chapters, we have space to mention one only. The treatment of the fixation of habit arcs attempts to get on without assuming any influence of pleasantness or unpleasantness in learning: the successful act is 'stamped in' and the unsuccessful ones are 'stamped out,' not because of agreeable or disagreeable consequences, but on the principles of frequency and recency, the successful movement being more frequently performed than the unsuccessful ones, and being the last movement performed in a given series. These principles, it may however be said in criticism, apply chiefly to that type of learning which involves a very slow dropping off of useless movements. The rapid type which occurs where strong unpleasantness is involved, as for instance the quick learning of Schaeffer's frogs to discriminate edible from inedible substances, seems to be due to the consequences of the acts. Watson's unwillingness to allow that unpleasant consequences can be influential in learning is apparently owing to a belief that the unpleasantness or pleasantness would have to operate as psychic factors: it is perfectly possible, however, to remain true to behaviorism and assert that the consequences operate through the withdrawing or seeking reactions that they involve.

The readers of this *Review* will be more interested in a consideration of the author's general behavioristic position than in criticism of details of exposition and interpretation. This position is, briefly, that psychology should wholly abandon introspection and confine itself to the study of movements. There seem to be several possible developments of this general point of view. In the first place, one may take the ground that there exist two fields for investigation, that of conscious states, to be studied through introspection, and that of external behavior, to be studied through external observation. Of these one may choose the latter as the more attractive. The easier field it certainly is: to some people, however, the conscious experience of man or animal will remain more interesting. It may be practically more important to know what a creature will do than how he will feel about it, but some of us have an incurable and disinterested curiosity to investigate his inner life. The only criticism though, which can fairly be made on the person who chooses behavior as his field of study, is that it would seem more appropriate for him not to call himself a psychologist.

That he does, in Mr. Watson's case, call himself a psychologist is due to the fact that he goes further than the position just described and denies the right of the true psychologist to exist. Here, again, such a denial might be made on two grounds. It might be urged that while there is a real domain of psychic phenomena, a real inner aspect to behavior, no scientific method for investigating it can be devised; that introspection is a failure and that no other method is thinkable. This position, however, cannot but involve a challenge to the scientific spirit. To confess that there exists a department of genuine phenomena, for the study of which the human mind is utterly unable to devise a method, is humiliating indeed. To avoid making such a confession, Professor Watson is really driven to the extremity of denying that there exists any inner or conscious aspect to behavior whatever, or at least that this aspect consists of nothing but kinaesthetic sensations.

The two phenomena that may be appealed to, the author thinks, as giving evidence against his position are the affective processes and the image. The former he interprets as instinctive forms of behavior, giving himself unnecessary pains here, one would fancy, since all psychologists would admit that they have a well-marked behavior or movement aspect, though not so many would agree to the Freudian contention, made by Professor Watson, that all emotions are derived from sex behavior. As for the image, it is reducible, he holds, to

slight movements of the muscles concerned with language. Here again, one would willingly admit that the image has always a motor aspect, and that language processes form an important part, though by no means the whole, of that effect. But to admit that affection and the image involve behavior is a long way from saying that they are nothing but behavior, and that one's world of imagery is a world of speech habits. It is worth noting that introspection must have led Mr. Watson to the conclusion that his mental imagery consists in kinaesthetic sensations mainly from his vocal apparatus. We are not justified in saying that it was bad introspection on his part: some minds may indeed be so poorly furnished with certain elements of enjoyment that their possessors live in a world divested of the glow of inner colors and the harmony of inner sounds. But the more fortunately endowed will reproach them for making their individual limitations the universal law.

The logical outcome of this position will clearly be, not only that "there are no centrally initiated processes," but that there are no peripherally initiated conscious processes except kinaesthetic ones. We are not aware of red as red, but if we are aware at all, we feel only the sensations resulting from our movements made in response to ether vibrations of a certain wave length. We do not consciously experience the peculiar *quale* of the smell of violets; we experience only the sensations of our own deepened breathing and of articulation of the word 'violets' under the influence of the vaporous stimulus. If we can reduce all conscious experience to kinaesthetic sensations resulting from behavior, it may indeed be hoped that methods of observing behavior will, on being fully perfected, enable us to record the movements and cast aside their accompanying kinaesthetic sensations as worthless for scientific purposes. But once allow that a human being can experience a sensation of color or of taste or of anything except his own movements, and you have admitted the existence of a phenomenon not to be expressed in behavioristic terms. Hence the behaviorist must logically hold that he is a being not only incapable of recalling sights and sounds in a world of mental imagery, but of consciously experiencing the colors and sounds in the world about him.

It is not necessary to oppose actively such a theory as this: it will fall to nothing of its own accord. There will remain the possibility of working on problems of behavior and problems of consciousness, side by side, with mutual helpfulness; and there will remain our cordial appreciation of the clear envisagement of experimental tasks and in-

genious devising of methods which make Professor Watson so fruitful a worker.

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The Ego and its Place in the World. By CHARLES GRAY SHAW. New York, The MacMillan Company, 1913—pp. xii, 523.

This work is a treatise on Metaphysics. Its fundamental thesis is the reality of the human Ego as realizing itself step by step through a process of self-affirmation which at once makes it more of a self and brings it into more universal relations with the world-order. The three principal stages of this process are; *Phenomenality*, in which the Ego is a centre for self-experience, and which finds its fullest realization in the aesthetic experience, by which the Ego reflects into itself and enjoys the whole senso-spatial order; *Activity*, in which the Ego through volition interacts with, and thus enters into vital and significant relations with the world, which, in turn, is thus known as an immanent causal order or World-Will; and *Substantiality*, in which, through intellectual activity, the Ego completely finds itself in contemplative unity with the World-Whole or Substance of reality. Corresponding to and embodying these three stages of the Ego's progress in self-affirmation and self-realization are respectively the *aesthetic*, the *ethical*, and the *religious life*. In the aesthetic experience the Ego seems passively to take up the sense-world into itself, but even this seeming passivity involves some self-activity and self-affirmation. "The artistic endeavour is none other than a form of ontological striving wherein the human spirit seeks the real in its most obvious guise, that of sense" (p. 403). In the ethical striving the self wills to mould the world to the fashion of its own desires and valuations and thus comes to closer quarters with the activistic nature of reality. In religion self-affirmation is completed through transcendence of the empirical world-order and union with the substantial, immanent, and universal Ground of causal activity.

The writer criticises realism and pragmatism; the former for its failure to recognize the active function of the self in the constitution of experience, the latter for its over-emphasis of the social and the utilitarian as criteria of truth, conduct, and reality. Idealism and rationalism he criticises for their failure to give the Ego a content or central position in reality. They make experience depend on the Ego and then treat the latter as an empty form. His own standpoint he calls intellectualistic. The intellect is the supreme phase in the activity of the Ego, and through it the world-whole is apprehended.

Professor Shaw's conception of nature is dynamic or energistic. His own favorite term for it is *activism*. All activity he regards as a species of volition. The space-world is phenomenal. The reality of which it is the expression is the causal order of a universal activity immanent in things. Activity involves change and change implies time. Hence time is half phenomenal and half real. All causality presupposes the trans-temporal or eternal Substance, the Unitary and Creative Ground of change. Causality is native to reality in the form of immanent activity (p. 277). This is the World-Will of which nature and the self are dual forms. The will to selfhood is the meaning and purpose of nature. As for the Ego or Self it is variously described as a Deed-Act (Fichte), *Vollthat* (Eucken), complete self-affirmation, a centralizing, totalizing, ontological impulse, etc.

The author vigorously and repeatedly protests against the mediocritising tendencies of contemporary life and thought, and especially against the undue influence of industrialism, socialism and democracy in philosophy. He evidently holds that these influences largely account for the failure of philosophy in metaphysics and in ethics to do justice to the place of the unique and the individual. He repudiates the validity of social categories of truth and exclusively social norms of conduct. He argues that the over-emphasis on the social is the chief source of the illusions of the day. He denies that the true spiritual destiny of the Ego is contained in social service or self-sacrifice. He holds that all the higher religious thought, with the exception of Buddhism, proclaims in some degree the self-same truth which is the burden of his work—the self-affirmation of the Ego, which is the true goal of both nature and society. The Ego is the centre and goal of dialectics. Reality is won and possessed only through the act of affirmation which is the total deed of the Ego.

Scientism cannot contain reality nor rationalism create it. It is created and comprehended through the Ego's free self-affirmation. The writer's standpoint for the interpretation of reality is an activistic intellectualism. Reality is a world in which the self attains true selfhood by free activity, of which the highest stage is intellect. Sense, will, and intellect are the three stages in this process of self-realization through self-affirmation. Automatic action is idealess activity; ideo-motor action is ordinary volition as accompanied by consciousness; free activity is volition dominated by the intellect.

The following are typical of his treatment of classical metaphysical problems. *Thinghood* is the synthesis and cause of qualities. *Space* is the phenomenal expression of activity, and indeed, of will. All

culture is the despatialisation of mind. *Time* is the activistic expression of change. *Mind* and *Body* are opposite and correlated expressions of the interactivity of things in a cosmical system of immanent causality which involves the substantial reality of the world-will. In causal interactivity there is no transference of states or qualities; there is an incitement from one thing which evokes a unique reaction in another thing. All forms of being are causally disposed. The world is an interactive system of centres of causality. The world is a vast field of action where the Ego, by interplay with its complementary opposites, affirms itself. Ideals and values are the creation or self-affirmation of the Ego in its world. Thus the Ego creates its own world of spiritual life and its content is culture. Just what culture is we are nowhere clearly told.

Reality is finally defined as that which cannot be resisted. The writer's theory is an aristocratic and individualistic doctrine of the cumulative development of selfhood in a world fitted for just this end. By ceaseless self-affirmation the Ego comes to ever closer quarters with reality, which it grasps and with which it unites itself by an activity of contemplative intellection.

I have tried to give a fair summary of the outstanding doctrines of a curiously constructed and perplexingly written book. A notable feature of it is the wealth of references to and citations from the literature of philosophy and religion and from belletristic literature, especially from recent and contemporaneous European writings. These citations and references often appear in pertinent contexts and are happy and illuminating. Often they raise the doubt whether the author does not read much more into his literary authorities than really belongs there. The book abounds in quaint and striking dicta. It abounds also in clumsy and obscure and sometimes even in ungrammatical sentences (perhaps due in part to careless proofreading). One annoying feature is the constant use of 'where' to introduce a sentence in places where the usages of good English demand 'whereas' or 'while.' The book reads as though it consisted of a lengthy and not carefully articulated series of lectures thrown together. The author doubles upon his tracks again and again and wanders round and round. I have much sympathy with many of the views expressed but I am sure that, had I not gone to the reading of this book with views akin to the writer's already formed, I should not have been convinced or even much instructed. There is scarcely any sustained argumentation or logical progression in the book. It presents a mass of *apercus*, reflexions, intuitions and citations repeated in a variety of

contexts. It claims to be a piece of philosophical dialectics but there is neither impulsion or compulsion in the dialectics. They do not move. It does not really grapple and wrestle with the fundamental problems of metaphysics. For example, there is no adequate examination of the problems of space, time, causality or the psycho-physical problem. The author's literary flank-turning movements do not circumvent the enemy. The most basic of all metaphysical problems—that of monism and pluralism—he simply skirts around, firing a few blank cartridges at it. I fail to grasp the import of the discussion of Immanent Causality and Ground or to see wherein his theory of Interactivity is an advance in the treatment of the psycho-physical problem. It is a pity that Mr. Shaw has not rigorously exercised upon his material the activity of self-criticism and striven harder for clearness, cogency, and progress in the development of his thesis. There is red meat in it but there is altogether too much gristle and fat. In spite of my own agreement with many of his positions and admiration for his command of literature, I am bound to say that the book is redundant, obscure, and unconvincing.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

What Can I Know? An Inquiry into Truth, its Nature, the Means of its Attainment, and its Relations to the Practical Life. By GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. New York, Longmans, Green, & Co., 1914—pp. vi, 311.

The preface to this volume appears to foreshadow a series of kindred treatises on the philosophy of life. Professor Ladd classifies the principal human problems as four, "What can I know? What ought I to do? What should I believe? What may I hope?" Each of these presupposes and builds upon the solution of its predecessors. But the first is "for every man fundamental and controlling in his attempt to find answers to the other three questions. We shall, therefore, consider this question first of all" (p. vi).

The problem of knowledge, as thus posited, may be analyzed in two contrasted ways. What can I know, may be interpreted as a question concerning the knowledge of the race. Or the personal question may be brought into the foreground. What can I know as a member of the human family, but myself a personal unit, with individual problems and limitations, in special circumstances, with my own needs and hopes and fears? Professor Ladd's discussion is directed to both phases of the problem. Out of his prolonged and deep reflection on philosophical principles he formulates a succinct, but coherent doctrine of knowledge. The psychology of knowing, the history of science, the progress of art, and morals, and religion are cited to show what knowledge is, according to its several degrees and forms. The nature of knowledge, its relation to reality, its presuppositions and its fundamental laws, the principal conflicting estimates of its validity, its chief attested results, these are passed in review in so far as they can readily be brought to the notice of the plain man. But, throughout, the practical and personal aim is also kept in mind. So we have epistemology put to concrete use in counsels to the seeker after truth which are intended to save him on the one hand from agnostic despair and on the other from sluggish reliance on common-sense or mere authority, which shall encourage him to use his powers while avoiding the temptation to overstep them, which shall guide him to a sound knowledge and a reasonable faith at the same time that they guard him against the hope of infallible certainty or the belief that in his thinking this has been attained.

These far-reaching questions, as we have intimated, are answered by Professor Ladd from the point of view which he has reached in his own long course of reflective thinking. For the most part, his results are not only wholesome and constructive in themselves, but they are stated in moderate terms. Later novelties in the epistemological field are also taken into account, though it cannot be said that the distinguished author gives to many of them a very hearty welcome. Pragmatism, neo-realism, Bergsonian intuition, the plural-

istic universe, all come in for criticism, for sharper thrusts indeed than any of the classical theories, except those which advocate a skeptical view of thought or a mechanical analysis of the real world. And as the doctrine is positive, so the style is planned for the comprehension of the knower little versed in technical forms. Without writing down to the level of the plain man, Professor Ladd has been at pains to phrase his conclusions as simply as might be. It may be questioned, however, whether more could not be accomplished in this direction. In particular, it would be a gain if the several chapters were preceded, in the English fashion, by summaries of their contents. It would also aid if in each case a review were added at the close.

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WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY.

Les inconnus de la biologie déterministe. Par A. de GRAMONT LESPARRE. Paris, F. Alcan, 1914—pp. 297.

By *biologie déterministe* the author means not a positive science but a philosophy constructed upon the assumptions of a purely physico-chemical biology. Such a biology assumes that all organic activities are capable of explanation as reflex actions, and that ultimately nervous functions can be reduced to manifestations of physical energy. It regards consciousness as an epiphenomenon having no essential part to play in the life of the organism. The author's purpose is to examine these assumptions in their application to various biological and psychological problems, and more particularly in their application to the problems of human activity. He discusses, in successive chapters, sensation, life, memory and heredity, intelligence, instinct, will, and the emotions, and seeks to show in each of these fields that physico-chemical explanation encounters an 'unknown' which creates an insurmountable difficulty. It is a pure assumption to suppose that, in the stages between the lower animals on whose behavior the theory of tropisms is based and the higher animals, no new principles appear. It is equally an assumption to suppose that physical and chemical laws can give a complete account of life; the contrary is in fact more likely. The truth is that memory, heredity, and instinct are insoluble mysteries; the alleged refutations of freedom merely beg the question. Intelligence, though not essentially more transcendental than memory or heredity, at least brings the difficulties into clearer relief. The fact that a series of conscious states can know itself as a series compels us to assume an intellectual principle distinct from matter, a principle active, simple, and autonomous. The individual intellect, however, seems not to manifest itself except in connection with the body. The author accepts the general principle of evolution but believes that Darwinian evolution, as a complete explanation, has broken down. In any case evolution cannot be regarded as the sole property of a mechanistic metaphysics.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

Berkeleys System. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Systematik des Idealismus.
 Von Dr. ERICH CASSIRER. (Philosophische Arbeiten, viii Band, 2 Heft.)
 Giessen, Alfred Töpelmann, 1914.—pp. vi, 169.

This monograph is an examination of Berkeley's philosophy from the point of view of the 'critical' school. It contains nothing essentially new, but the critical implications in Berkeley are suggestively brought out.

Berkeley at the outset denies the existence of general abstract ideas, and recognizes only the particulars of experience. Yet he goes on to develop between them a system of relations, which form the proper subject-matter of judgments. One particular may come to stand as a sign for an indefinite number of others, both real and possible. The resulting significant idea, in its representative function, Cassirer compares in detail with Kant's 'schema,' and regards the two as essentially identical. So he traces through Berkeley's system a rational element, which with the growth of Berkeley's thought approaches more and more closely that of the critical system. Within the field of particular ideas there is retained a definite distinction between subjective and objective, between appearance and reality, a distinction whose criterion lies in the regular and unitary system of laws according to which nature operates. "The connection of ideas, which in the first place was based on custom and experience, is transformed into a rational system, in which any earlier member is connected with all coming ones through the unity of order and of law" (p. 156). While Berkeley rejected the infinitesimals of the Newtonian and Leibnizian mathematics, and the absolute space and time of Newton, on the ground that they are alleged metaphysical realities of a kind inaccessible even to any possible experience, he accepted the whole Newtonian construction of natural law. This saved his idealism from dissolving into mysticism. In the laws of nature, it is true, we do not directly discern a rational necessity; we learn them as given in experience. But their absolutely rational character is guaranteed by the nature of the deity, the expression of whose will they are. Here, in the unitary, rational character of the world, viewed as a natural language of the deity, there is room for the central position of the critical philosophy, and almost an implication of it.

This is a bare summary of the principal conclusions of Cassirer. He makes a detailed analysis, often very illuminating, of the successive writings, with special emphasis on the later and perhaps less familiar ones. The work is marred by some unnecessary repetition, and a certain lack of orderly movement, but is of decided value as a study of Berkeley and of the critical position itself. There is an appendix on Arthur Collier.

The monograph is one of an extended series of studies of particular men and movements in philosophy, produced by the 'critical' school. These works have greatly contributed to the clear development of the school itself, and have thrown light from a definite angle upon the subjects treated. It would be in the interests of clear thinking if both pragmatists and neo-realists in America would clarify their positions by just such detailed historical analyses in terms of their own distinctive principles.

J. FORSYTH CRAWFORD.

BELOIT COLLEGE.

Henri Bergson: An Account of his Life and Philosophy. By ALGOT RUHE and NANCY MARGARET PAUL. London, Macmillan and Company, 1914.—pp. vii, 245.

In the preface to this work the author says that it runs on parallel lines with another volume which he has written in Swedish as a companion to the six volumes of his translations of Bergson's works. The Swedish manuscript was discussed in detail with Miss Paul, one of the English translators of *Matière et Mémoire*, and to her the author gives the credit for the form in which the work appears.

The book is simply a summary of Bergson's views. "The main principles and most important applications (of the new philosophy) are set out at length and in language closely following Monsieur Bergson's own, though rarely by quotation except when passages are taken from sources inaccessible without difficult research. Detailed criticism of opposing doctrines is for the most part either omitted or very much abridged, and arguments in support are shortened" (p. v). The purpose for which the book has been written is two-fold: "To bring out in the minds of some who have already studied the great works of this great thinker a clearer outline of what they have read," and to "serve others as a more or less popular introduction to his thought and as a work of occasional reference" (p. vi). The first chapter, which purports to be biographical, contains numerous quotations from works of Bergson that are difficult of access, and for that reason is one of the most interesting chapters in the book.

Considering the purpose which the author has in mind, the book is a good one. The summaries are, on the whole, clear and fairly comprehensive, though one could wish that the author had touched upon some aspects of the new philosophy which he has largely omitted from consideration; there is, for example, no detailed discussion of the problem of intuition which some, at least, feel is one of the most fundamental problems with which Bergson deals. But the book does well what it undertakes to do. One who may have the temerity to desire an evaluation of the new philosophy, however, will seek in vain here for assistance, except in so far as a faithful and tolerably exhaustive restatement of what Bergson himself has already said with remarkable lucidity may be helpful. The author apparently feels that he is dealing with a 'new revelation' (p. 35), and consequently he seldom allows himself to venture beyond the *ipse dixit* of the master.

The book is admirably printed on good paper. A very clear portrait of Professor Bergson faces the title page.

G. WATTS CUNNINGHAM.

MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE.

Pragmatism and French Voluntarism. By L. SUSAN STEBBING. Girton College Studies, No. 6. Cambridge University Press, 1914.—pp. 168.

The author of this compact little volume writes from the standpoint of intellectualism, and consequently is committed from the beginning to a criti-

cal attitude toward pragmatism and French voluntarism, especially toward that development of voluntarism which is represented by Bergsonian Intuitionism. Nevertheless, her treatment of these 'New Philosophers' shows that she "is not blind to the interest and importance of M. Bergson's work." She distinguishes carefully between M. Bergson's anti-intellectualism and the anti-intellectualism of the pragmatists. Both fail to give a satisfactory account of truth, but with the pragmatist it is because he identifies truth with one of its consequences, while with the Bergsonian intuitionist it is because he identifies truth with reality. Throughout the discussion of pragmatism the author assumes that pragmatism as a whole adopts the notion of truth presented by James in *The Meaning of Truth*, that "what works is true and represents a reality for the individual for whom it works." Thus in the consideration of the relation between truth and utility M. Bergson and his disciples are at the opposite pole from pragmatism. For while M. Bergson condemns the intellect because it *is* pragmatic, the pragmatists condemn any view of the intellect which makes it not pragmatic. For M. Bergson utility is rather synonymous with error than with truth. Where pragmatists substitute will and desire for the intellect, Bergsonians substitute the mystic faculty of intuition. These constitute two of the three ways offered by voluntarism for the solution of problems which the intellect has thus far left unsolved. The author classifies these methods as: (1) solution by extra-rational choice, such as the "will to believe" of James and the "wager" of Pascal; (2) solution by means of action, which constitutes part of the pragmatic method; (3) solution by means of intuition.

The criticism which the author passes on these three methods is that they are not solutions at all. The antinomies which they are supposed to solve are antinomies of reason and must be solved by reason. Any extra-rational solution is merely a confession that the problem is insoluble. The way to further advance lies, she thinks, in the complete development of the intellect, not in a resort to anti-intellectualistic methods.

The book as whole is stimulating, if only for the questions which it raises in the mind of the reader. The author's grouping of voluntarists may seem at times more or less arbitrary, and her treatment of other questions than that concerning the nature of truth somewhat confusing. In passing it may be remarked that the treatment of Fouillée's philosophy of *Idées-forces* should properly have been reserved for a separate work; for the author's general discussion of voluntarism and pragmatism, as opposed to intellectualism, leaves little room for an adequate treatment of a philosopher who was at once a voluntarist and an intellectualist, and who opposed with equal vigor the intuitionism of M. Bergson and the pragmatism of James.

ALMA ROSA THORNE.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

La morale della simpatia. Saggio sopra l'etica di Adamo Smith nella storia del pensiero inglese. Da LUDOVICO LIMENTANI. Genova, A. F. Formiggini, 1914.—pp. xvi, 260.

In a book, *I presupposti formali della indagine etica*, published in 1913, Signor Limentani developed an emotionalistic ethical point of view. In order to illustrate the fruitfulness of such a tendency in ethics, he was led to study the Scottish school which had brought this type of theory to a remarkable degree of maturity, and to examine particularly the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* of Adam Smith, in which the work of this school reached its culmination. This study has more than historical value, as our author declares, because the ethics of our own age has received its most characteristic impress from psychology and sociology and in this respect bears a resemblance to the English ethics of experience which anticipated it. The sentimental school represents a double reaction against the so-called rationalistic or intellectualistic systems, both because it regards the rationalistic method as an inadequate instrument of knowledge and because it looks upon reason as an inadequate determinant of moral conduct. But in order to succeed, Signor Limentani points out, it had to substitute for the vague and indefinite notion of sentiment the idea of some particular function of the affective life that operates in the discrimination of moral good from moral evil, of some particular pleasures and pains which attach themselves to the experience of our own conduct and that of others, and express themselves in the ethical judgment. And here is where Adam Smith advances beyond his predecessors. In sympathy he offers a principle both of the motivation of conduct and of the recognition of values, a principle which stands at the center of those intra-individual and inter-individual relations into which the moral life strictly understood resolves itself. The defects of his system are due, not to the nature of the method employed by him, but to his failure to apply it rigorously enough; not to his choice of subject-matter, but to his failure to delimit it adequately, to his insufficient appreciation of the need of recognizing its peculiar denotation, as for example, when he fails to differentiate the field of utilitarian valuation from that of aesthetic valuation.

Signor Limentani's book is not only an interesting exposition of Adam Smith's ethical theory, but a valuable contribution to the study of the development of the English anti-intellectualistic movement. It impresses one as a scholarly work that is based upon a careful examination of the sources and a wide acquaintance with the literature of the subject, and it is written in a clear and pleasing style. Among the parts which many readers will find particularly helpful are the sections (VI and VII) dealing with justice, prudence, and benevolence, and the problem of the relation between the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* and the *Wealth of Nations*. The author shows the untenableness of the view that the two works contradict one another, that Smith the moralist bases conduct upon sympathy while Smith the economist bases it upon egoism, as well as of the view that he makes an artificial distinction between an abstract *homo ethicus* and an abstract *homo æconomicus* for the pur-

pose of treating each one of them singly, seeking the specific laws of conduct which govern each.

FRANK THILLY.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

La filosofia di Giordano Bruno. Da ERMINIO TROILO. Roma, 2 vols., 1914.—pp. 160, 166.

These two little volumes, the first of which appeared in 1907 and is now reprinted, are devoted to Bruno's *Philosophy of Nature* and his *Philosophy of Mind*. Bruno is for Professor Troilo the *punto di arrivo* of the great thought of the Renaissance and the true glory of Italian thought. The process of reaction against the Middle Ages culminates in a philosophic revolution, the simple formula of which is comprehended in the word nature. Volume I contains chapters on "The Renaissance and the Philosophy of Nature," "Anti-metaphysics," "Bruno's Works," "The Coincidence of Opposites," and "Natural Philosophy." Volume II discusses "the subjective philosophy" of Bruno, which according to our author has never received adequate attention, and contains chapters on "The First Philosophy and its Dependent Disciplines," "The Rights of the Spirit," "The Doctrine of Knowledge," "Ethics," and "Conclusion: The Value and Real Efficacy of the Brunonian Thought."

Professor Troilo regards the nature-philosophy of Bruno as one of the greatest constructions of the human mind, which reaches magnificent heights and depths and is a marvelous symphony of science, philosophy, and poetry. It is a resolute negation of all transcendentalism and therefore an anti-metaphysical philosophy, a philosophy that excludes all teleologism, for which reason Professor Troilo calls it a *philosophia prima*. "A system which puts the immanent reality in place of the transcendent, which substitutes for the dualism of the natural and the supernatural the absolute unity of nature, which dissolves the finite in the infinite, is *prima philosophia*."

FRANK THILLY.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

Essai sur l'Immortalité au Point de Vue du Naturalisme Evolutionniste. Par ARMAND SABATIER. Paris, 1911, Fischbacher.—pp. xxix, 291.

Immortality is to be distinguished from persistence of matter; the latter no one disputes. It is the persistence of the various configurations or the various modes of organization of matter that is understood by immortality; this is what is called in question. The character of the affirmation or negation of immortality cannot be scientific, in the strict sense of the term: the subject matter is such as to preclude the possibility of scientific investigation. M. Sabatier believes, however, that, with the development of the spiritistic sciences, so despised once, but now fast winning the favor of scientists, the subject matter of immortality will be brought within the ken of exact scientific study.

For the present, however, the discussion of the problem must be mainly philosophic, though when the scientist takes it up as a philosopher, he has the

advantage over the philosopher of being able to make the starting point of his study a body of exact knowledge. The problem, as the scientist-philosopher would state it, then, is this: are there any analogies in the inorganic or organic subhuman world, as science knows it, which would form presumptive grounds for the belief in immortality of man?

The continued existence of material configurations, which is the immortality from the point of view of science, is a very rarely observed phenomenon in inorganic nature. In the organic realm, *i. e.*, in that realm in which the germinative protoplasma constitutes the basis of life, the phenomenon is common. This phenomenon is to be attributed to the peculiar qualities of rejuvenation or *le pouvoir d'amorce* of the protoplasma. The quality is an inherent capacity of the protoplasma to "draw from ambient conditions new elements whereby to replace the old and used-up ones." The *pouvoir d'amorce* is not, however, unconditioned: it is conditioned rather upon the capacity of organic forms to "orient themselves in the sense of evolution." Now man being a part of nature, and whatever future life there may be being also a part of nature, the same law of rejuvenation must hold good about man and must therefore attest to his immortality. But cannot human immortality, like animal, consist in mere terrestrial recreation? This is made impossible by the relation of nervous and vital energies: the former grows at the expense of the latter and, if the process is allowed to go far enough, there will come a moment in the development of the human protoplasma in which the reduced vital energy will no longer be able to support the highly developed nervous energy; a dis-equilibrium and a final collapse of the human being are thus bound to come. The increasing cases of nervous malady, the ever growing use of tobacco and intoxicants bespeak the death of the human protoplasma. The inherent inability, and contradiction in the law of the protoplasma leads one strongly to infer that man lives beyond the grave, unless, of course, one chooses to limit the law of re-creation to the terrestrial sphere. M. Sabatier believes in the existence of a "psychos" permeating the universe and in the existence of a psychic protoplasma of which the material protoplasma is the form and also the organ of accumulation of the "psychos." But this in no way changes his purely naturalistic arguments for immortality. He also incidentally treats the reader to a theory of art of his own, according to which art is an unilateral activity whereby the "psychos" is, at first, concentrated into plastic forms and is then gradually absolved.

GEORGE GETCHEV.

Benedicti De Spinoza Opera Quotquot Reperta Sunt. Edited by J. VAN VLOTEN AND J. P. N. LAND. Third Edition. Four volumes.—pp. I, x, 273; II, 331; III, 247; IV, VIII, 249. The Hague, Martin Nijhoff, 1914.

This edition, like the second which appeared in 1895, is in substance a reprint of the first, 1882-83, except for the omission of the Hebrew grammar. The change is in mechanical details. There are four small volumes instead of the three small ones of the second edition, or the two large ones of the first.

The first volume contains the *Ethics and Improvement of the Understanding*, the second, the *Political* and the *Theologico-Political Treatise*, the third, the letters, and the fourth, the *Short Treatise*, the version of Descartes, and the *Treatise on the Rainbow*. The large black print and the handiness of the volumes make this the most convenient edition of this very important work.

KATHERINE EVERETT GILBERT.

The following books also have been received:

- History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*. Vol. IV. By JOHN THEODORE MERZ. Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood and Sons, 1914.—pp. xii, 825.
- Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1913-1914*. N. S., Vol. XIV. London, Williams and Norgate, 1914.—pp. 438.
- Genetic Theory of Reality*. By JAMES MARK BALDWIN. New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915.—pp. ix, 355. \$2.00.
- Psychology, General and Applied*. By HUGO MÜNSTERBERG. New York and London, D. Appleton and Company, 1914.—pp. xiv, 487.
- A History of Psychology*. By OTTO KLEMM. Translated by EMIL CARL WILM and RUDOLF PINTNER. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914.—pp. xiv, 380.
- Introduction to the Science of Ethics*. By THEODORE DELAGUNA. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1914.—pp. vi, 414.
- The Principle of Individuality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green*. By HARVEY GATES TOWNSEND. Cornell Studies in Philosophy, No. 10. New York, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1914.—pp. v, 90.
- Readings in Political Philosophy*. By FRANCIS WILLIAM COKER. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1914.—pp. xv, 573.
- Fundamental Sources of Efficiency*. By FLETCHER DURELL. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1914.—pp. 364. \$2.50 net.
- The Modern City and Its Problems*. By FREDERIC C. HOWE. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915.—pp. vii, 390. \$1.50 net.
- L'intelligence sympathique*. Par GUDMUNDUR FINNBOGASON. Traduit par André Courmont. Paris, Felix Alcan, 1913.—pp. 239.
- Studi Vichiani*. GIOVANNI GENTILE. Messina, Guiseppe Principato, 1915.—pp. 458.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mët.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scholastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.: Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

Sensation and Imagination. BERTRAND RUSSELL. *The Monist*, XXV, 1, pp. 28-44.

The difference between sensation and imagination is a difference, not in the object, but in the relation. Sometimes, though rarely, their objects may be identical, and still they are intrinsically distinguishable. Different relations to objects are involved in the two cases. In sensation the object is given as 'now,' *i. e.*, as simultaneous with the subject, whereas in imagination the object is given without any temporal relation to the subject, *i. e.*, to the present time. Whatever time-relation may exist between the subject and the object imagined, no time-relation is implied by the fact that the imagining occurs. This theory accounts for what is called the 'unreality' of things merely imagined. This unreality consists in their absence of date, which will also explain fully their irrelevance to physics. This theory of the difference between sensation and imagination, according to our author, is more adequate than the other theories. First, the difference in causal relation to stimulus presupposes a knowledge of external reality, and theories of our knowledge of external reality generally rely on sensation to the exclusion of imagination. Secondly, the theory that images can be called up at will, in a way in which objects of sense cannot be called up, is also inadequate: our imaginations are also limited by our imaginative powers. Thirdly, the difference in force and vividness fails when we think of the powerful, compelling images which a strong emotion often brings with it. Lastly, those who attempt to distinguish sensations from images by the belief in their 'reality,' forget that this difference in respect of their reality must be derivative from some other simpler difference,—from the difference in the relation to objects. Dreams and hallucinations are to be classed mainly, though not wholly, with images.

SUH HU.

On Psychology as a Science of Selves. JOSEPHINE NASH CURTIS. *Am. J. Ps.*, XXVI, 1, pp. 68-98.

Miss Calkins said first that the psychology of selves is as valid a point of view as the psychology of mental content. Later, she regarded self psychology as a reconciliation between structural and functional psychology. Still later, it was claimed to be the most natural, consistent, and effective form of psychology; for both structure and function, considered apart from their significance to a self, are abstractions. Miss Calkins's conception of the self is not clear. She regards it as a fact that cannot be further defined, but can be described in terms of contrast with other selves. She identifies the self with the plain man's self, though the latter ought to include the body and soul. James's conception of the self is different from that of Miss Calkins. Instead of taking it as ultimate, he finds the ever present self in certain motions in the head. But self-consciousness for him is not primordial and is sometimes absent. The self for Miss Calkins has several characters. First, it is persistent. On this point, it may be remarked that non-persistence is true of the self in an equally valid sense, and that not only a self, but also a function can persist. Secondly, the self is unique. But ideas and functions and things are also unique; moreover, in such cases as losing one's self in a book, the uniqueness does not seem to apply. Thirdly, the self is complex, though Miss Calkins has not shown that complexity is less true of ideas and functions. In the fourth place, the relatedness of the self to other selves is important since Miss Calkins defines consciousness in terms of it and regards it as including the other three characters. This means that a part of the self would include the whole. Miss Calkins does not clearly distinguish between the self as knower and the self as known, though her psychology indicates such a distinction. A further difficulty with the conception of the self is that the study of the relatedness is limited rather arbitrarily to certain things. Another criticism is that the plain man's self is a logical meaning or interpretation of certain immediate data; in fact, Miss Calkins says herself that she is more interested in the meaning or value of consciousness. In the method of self-psychology, introspection is reflection rather than observation, and is therefore a logical and not a scientific method. Its problem is not primarily to describe, but to understand and apply its results. For the results obtained no account of the conditions has been given, hence we cannot verify them. Secondly, they are limited to the traditional topics of psychology instead of extending to all relations of the self. They are obtainable simply by reasoning in the arm-chair. To conclude, Miss Calkins's argument for the self as a basal fact is not convincing. Naturalness is no merit, since science must be abstract and not common-sense-like. As to consistency, self-psychology has not been thoroughly worked out. It is not effective either in stimulating further research or in helping such sciences as sociology and ethics, which are older than it. Judged by ordinary standards, self-psychology is a logical and metaphysical, but not a scientific study.

YUEN R. CHAO.

Qualities, Relations, and Things. MORRIS R. COHEN. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XI, 23, pp. 617-627.

This article continues a controversy with Professor Lovejoy, concerning primary and secondary qualities, and relations and qualities. The first point at issue between them concerns the status of secondary qualities in scientific explanation. Does science make use of the category of subjectivity in dealing with colors, and secondary qualities, and if so, is it essential to scientific procedure? The second point of disagreement concerns the possibility of the same object having different colors in different relations at the same time. Is there anything inherently contradictory in such a conception? Mr. Cohen replies in the negative to both questions. A discussion of relations and qualities has been advanced by Mr. Lovejoy, in connection with the consideration of primary and secondary qualities. According to Mr. Cohen, as he now defines his position, the distinction between qualities and relations is a shifting one. Qualities, which constitute the 'nature' of a thing, may be defined as internal relations; *i. e.*, relations *within* the system that constitutes the 'thing.' A thing contains a group of characters, which remain invariant so long as the thing remains. Thus a banker who fails to issue credits or receive deposits, ceases to be a banker. But such internal relations, while invariant within a given system, change with the context. Thus all transformations involve a readjustment between the inner and outer relations—between quality and external relationships. This view does not involve the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, but is based on change as observed. The invariant relations may be called rules in the process of the transformation of things; but rules which are immanent in reality, not in a mind apart. Professor Lovejoy's objections to this point of view are reviewed, and all are shown to be irrelevant. In concluding, it is remarked that pan-subjectivism and pan-objectivism come to the same thing, theoretically, although there is a practical difference based on words and symbols and the meanings we have come to associate with them. In this regard pan-objectivism seems best. Professor Lovejoy maintains that the category of 'things' is fundamental. But hard impenetrable things break up, under scientific investigation, into relational complexes and lose their grossness. The realism of hard things is an out-cropping of the pre-scientific Adam within us.

D. T. HOWARD.

Are Realism and Relativity Incompatible? H. G. HARTMANN. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XI, 22, pp. 600-607.

Realism and relativity are not as Professor Lovejoy characterizes them, "incongruous motives." The relativist must contrast the general dependence of each object upon all with a particular object's dependence on other specific objects in a given situation which amounts to independence. Scientific study discovers disconnections to be as positive as connections. Furthermore, abstract relativity must be reconciled with the abstract principle of conservation: *i. e.*, the extinction of one term conditions the rise of another.

Terms therefore can never be resolved into mere relations. But without dependence there can be no independence, since the qualities of objects demand certain situations for realization, and no single situation can exhaust an object's actuality. Independence, or the *existence* of terms, is thus implied in our conception of a thing, but the *nature* of terms must also be investigated. We must face the problem of the one-and-the-many. Bergson disregards the obvious resistance to analysis of simple units of knowledge, and more especially that of complex synthetic units of experience. Chemists and physicists who seek an elementary substance or unit, and Professor Lovejoy, who seeks a sensory *quale*, admit the lower limit and postulate a simple term, but tend to disregard pluralism and independence. We may, with the realists and Locke, also assert complex terms, under conditions, to be ultimate. But no one set of conditions, with its result, will have a monopoly on reality.

MARION D. CRANE.

Relativism. NORBERT WIENER. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XI, 21, pp. 561-577.

Views that a self-sufficient experience, *i. e.*, one not depending on anything else, exists may claim one such experience or object, or more than one. The latter position is equivalent to claiming that things can exist in isolation. Such an object could never come into our experience, for, in doing so, it would cease to be entirely self-dependent. The absolutist taking the former position shows that our experience must be coherent in cross-section and in sagittal section but we can not follow him in his assertion that there must be one completely self-sufficient experience. The absolute could never come into relation with its appearances without contradicting itself. Hence neither theory of self-sufficient experience is valid. We are forced to maintain that no knowledge is self-sufficient, consequently none is absolutely certain, none merely derived. We will call this view relativism. It is in agreement with pragmatism and Bergsonianism in its anti-intellectualism. It differs from pragmatism if the latter claims as absolute truth such propositions as Schiller's sophistical "Man is the measure of all things." In distinction from Bergsonianism it postulates no dichotomies between life and matter, purpose and mechanism, etc. Bradley's argument that an ultimate uncertainty of things would itself be a certainty overlooks the fact that a doubt may be only extremely plausible, not certain. Claiming only relative certainty for his own views, the relativist admits a low degree of certainty for his opponent's views. They are nascent relativisms. Relativism implies all knowledge, objectively considered, to be potentially, infinitely complex. Knowing things in relation to other things need never stop. Relativism agrees in this respect with the views of the plain man and the scientist.

C. CECIL CHURCH.

Nietzsche's Service to Christianity. EDWIN DODGE HARDIN. The American Journal of Theology, XVIII, 4, pp. 545-552.

Nietzsche is remarkable in his irreproachable personality and in his keenly critical mind. He exposes unsuspected weaknesses and stimulates organized Christianity to serious reflection. Nietzsche calls Christianity slave-morality, which does no good to the inferior and hinders the progress of the super-man. This doctrine serves not only as a contrasting background against which Christianity shines, but also as a model for Christians to live out the faith to its logical conclusions, which so many are afraid of. Nietzsche conceives the super-man as pitiless both toward himself and toward others, and he himself lived a life of fight against physical hardships. His regard for individual personality is a great service to Christianity. He loves reality and hates hypocrisy and self-delusion, and he bears whatever the truth leads to. By an irony of fate, the intrepid philosopher fell a victim of insanity and became an object of those Christian virtues which he had despised.

YUEN R. CHAO.

Die Handarbeit als Erziehungsmittel bei John Locke. DR. HERMANN BÜCHEL. Ar. f. G. Ph., XXI, I, pp. 61-77.

In educational methods, variously affected as they are by religious, sociological, and political movements, the influence of Locke is difficult to establish, especially in the work of his great follower Rousseau, the sentimentalist and republican. Locke, living the all-round practical life of an English gentleman, came to regard sensory experience as the foundation of our knowledge, and the exercise of our faculties as the source of truth. Sensory experience he emphasized as coming before its formal expression in language. His volume called "Some Thoughts on Education" appeared in 1693. Education for him meant a spiritual and moral discipline, affording first health, and then virtue, wisdom, breeding, and knowledge. His standard was thus both practical and aristocratic. For him training in the trades was not, as for Rousseau, a social duty, but, according to his epistemology, a psychological discipline, utilizing the play instinct of the child, doing away with idleness, affording healthful relaxation from specific brain work, and yet contributing to intellectual as well as to manual dexterity. He urged a knowledge of all trades, and thorough training in one of them. Knowledge of business methods, especially of book-keeping, he considered necessary, that a gentleman might know how to manage his property, and useful, for the development of his reason. Locke was perhaps influenced by the Little School of Port Royal, and certainly by the Order of the Oratoire, as well as by Rabelais, who emphasized sensory experience as opposed to the formal learning of the scholastics. Locke's educational theories are presented very unsystematically; the relation of manual labor to his epistemology is not fully worked out. His deficiencies are not compensated, as in Rousseau, by literary gifts, but his theories undoubtedly had their influence in the movement towards realism and away from a pedantic emphasis on form. This movement developed on both the sociological

and scientific sides. Most of the men who have adopted Rousseau's methods were influenced by Condillac, student of Locke. Trade schools in practice tend sometimes to sharpen class distinctions, and to encourage neglect of spiritual values, but they are useful for developing a sense of duty to society, as well as a respect for manual labor, and also in the training of the child's mind by way of his hands.

MARION D. CRANE.

The Psychophysical Basis of Moral Conduct. GUSTAVE A. FEINGOLD. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., Vol. XI, 25, pp. 680-687.

Hedonism holds that concepts are objective because inherent in human nature. Pleasure and pain are in this sense objective. Development is change from a less pleasant to a more pleasant condition, and starts with certain instincts and impulses biologically explained. We do not know whether the reactions of the amoeba indicate pleasure and pain. But since the behavior of man is much like that of the lower animals, either they have intelligence and moral intuition or these are abstractions. Representative knowledge is manifested in the sea urchin when it shrinks from a shadow. When we shrink from falsehood is it not, therefore, because of the same emotional fear? Yet emotions have their origin in sensation. Different responses to the same situation are due to different psychophysical states, not to wickedness. Pleasure and pain create ethical values; for example, sympathy is aroused by actions that have given us pain. If it be said that these psycho-physical causes have dropped out of consciousness, and that we now perform duty for duty's sake, the answer is that the pleasantness or unpleasantness is present, though unnoticed, and is discoverable by introspection.

ALLEN J. THOMAS.

Essai sur l'interprétation sociologique des phénomènes conscients. D. DRAGHICESCO. Rev. Ph., XXXIX, 9 and 10, pp. 225-250, 305-344.

The results of experimental psychology or psycho-physiology seem negative, and appear even to mislead investigators. They are successful only with physiological variations and the lower mental functions. As M. Kostyleff has pointed out, a crisis seems to be approaching. In some quarters psychology is being reduced to an applied science, anthropometry, in others, it is becoming metaphysical; in still others, investigators are turning with hope towards child study for light on psychical processes. It has long been evident that historical and social causes must explain our thought processes. Consciousness represents the relations of individuals in society. Writers like Durkheim and Tarde, following Comte, have begun to recognize this. The truth is that psycho-sociology should replace psycho-physiology in the study of consciousness. In defining consciousness, we may say it is that which continually emerges from the unconscious, past, or potential experience. The primitive man was a care-free and relatively unconscious being. With the advent of social interdicts, and socially imposed pains, his consciousness de-

veloped. When the horde was constituted into a tribe, various social activities of a brutal nature appeared. The pains inflicted by barbarous rites repressed the merely biological elements and stimulated the conscious ones in the primitive nature.

The factor which changed the horde into the rudimentary society, so that the compulsions of religion could begin their work, was the conquest of others so as to enslave them. This is the ultimate cause of psychical superiority, and it involves at the same time the germs of political, economic and juridical organization. Wars and the economic activities of the tribe, supplemented later by religion, were the agencies that by their pains and interdictions developed man's conscious life, for consciousness is the state of convalescence from pain. The complicating results of war, industry, and religion, with their throbs of pain and succeeding quiet, produce the mind. Self-consciousness arises from the opposition of others to the individual. Thus the human personality is explained as a product of collective life. Attention and the train of ideas are explainable as results of conscious states impressed by social agencies. Both attention and so-called 'association' are results of the mechanical operation of strong and weak states. Variety and wide social relations are essential to higher life. Personality will be complete when the life of humanity permeates every individual in a universal society. On the physiological side, the brain is the record of man's social life, but the mental acquisitions of the race are not transmitted by physiological heredity. They have to be 'inscribed' on each generation by education. Yet there is a strict parallelism between physiological and mental phenomena in the brain. The reflexes of the brain are kept active directly by excitations from the organism, and indirectly by social influences, such as war and industry.

C. CECIL CHURCH.

Intercourse as the Basis of Thought. W. W. CARLILE. *Mind*, 92, pp. 510-521.

There is no doubt that we depend upon the senses to furnish us information which is the basis of judgment, as for instance, in measuring. But since sensation is individual, how can it give us information that is acknowledged to be identical for all men? We find that sense can give us no information unless we put a question to nature. The ideas that enable us to put questions, it will be found, are derived from intercourse with our fellows. They enable us to give a judgment valid for all, because they are concerted questions. Truth is thus primarily a concept of intercourse, which is later extended to individual investigations. With the concepts and ideas acquired by intercourse, the mind is able to assimilate the new impressions and instances that arise in the course of experience. Since sensations are always individual, we may also inquire into the reasons for our belief in external independent reality. We find a compelled concurrence as regards certain of the information furnished by the senses. This concurrence is recognized only through intercourse, which thus gives us our most elementary knowledge. The reasoning is evidently from sense, as effect, to external reality, as cause. Causation is not invariable con-

junction, but in reasoning it is the reconstituting of a whole in experience from given parts. That this is inevitable, our intercourse shows. It is only as we concur in our belief in an external world which can be known through the fragments of sense, that causation as a concept is possible.

D. T. HOWARD.

The Vice of Modern Philosophy. W. H. SHELDON. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XII, 1, pp. 5-16.

The right way to ascertain what is the true philosophical problem is to ask, What do men want, that they philosophize? The needs of men may be grouped under the heads of Knowledge and Practical Well-being. Knowledge, being more inclusive, is the higher good of the two. The field of intellectual pursuits may be subdivided into the special branches of science, on one hand, and the all-inclusive philosophy, on the other. Philosophy represents the consummation of a progress in which each science is a stage. Such a knowledge, gratifying most fully the contemplative instinct, must also tend to promote the gratification of the other great instinct, that for practical welfare. This being the true philosophical problem, modern philosophy has fallen short of it, because the present systems have set aside that inclusiveness to which the superlative worth of philosophy is due. This failure may happen in either of two ways. First, a principle might be discovered to hold of the universe as a whole, which by its very nature could not, in any time, place, or circumstance, be turned to practical account. Secondly, a principle might be discovered which could not help to account for the specific character of any particular fact known to science. The kind of principle which *excludes* the satisfaction of other than contemplative needs cannot rightly be termed a philosophical principle. Nor can we call a principle genuinely philosophical, which cannot account for the specific character of things; for the superior value of philosophy over science lies in that it is broader than science, but it is not broader if it leaves out what the sciences contain. The 'schools' of present-day philosophy, it is contended, do for the most part announce just such intellectually and practically barren principles as described above. Not *all* their doctrines are such, of course; but the ones that are noticed, fought over, defended, and attacked most ardently, are in the main quite sterile. (Here follow the author's indictments against the various schools.) It is as if one, consumed by thirst, were offered an empty goblet, elaborately carved and of exquisite workmanship. He may, if his thirst permit, contemplate the goblet, and argue with friends over its proper description; as the dispute waxes hotter, he may even forget his thirst. This way has modern philosophy gone. The human race has need of a knowledge which philosophy alone is capable of giving but which it has not even attempted to furnish.

SUH HU.

Class Distinctions. H. O. MEREDITH. The International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XXV, 1, pp. 33-53.

Class distinction is indicated by the aversion to intimate relations—especially the relation of marriage—caused not so much by differences of wealth as

by the accompanying difference in cultural ideals. The origin of these differences in ethical, aesthetical, and intellectual ideals was thought by Adam Smith to be occupational. Recent biological investigations indicate, however, that heredity plays a large part. But it does not follow that, because differences between individuals are caused by heredity, therefore differences between classes are likewise so caused. Individuals and families tend to sink and rise in the social scale, and the ancestry of all classes is extraordinarily mixed. Thus are maintained class distinctions not caused by class heredity. There is reason to suppose that the difference in heredity endowment between classes is small. It is true that the leading positions are in general held by superior men; but in choosing these, society applies coarse and unintelligent measures, often passing over the ideally qualified for sentimental or conventional reasons. In explaining the diversities in class culture, we must, therefore, look to nurture, environment, and education, rather than to heredity. Two differences exist between the classes: a difference in income and a difference in occupation. The former and more important difference is a prime necessity for the development of artistic and intellectual tastes. For it makes leisure possible, permits a rarer and more precious environment, and gives a security without which even moral development is difficult. The standards of the working class are determined in the main by their expenditure and are in consequence so low that working people do not revolt against their conditions until their earning power is increased. The causes in the differences of income which divide society into two classes are three: (1) the use of ecclesiastical and political authority in the past to establish different standards of expenditure; (2) the force of accident in a society founded on speculation; (3) the effect of inherited wealth. The higher salaries are, as a rule, kept among the wealthy because of the fact that their children have greater educational opportunities. These conditions could be modified so that the incomes of all would be compatible with membership in one social class.

Culture has in the past been confined to classes stable through long periods of time and has been the result of gradual and unconscious adaption to stable economic conditions. If we are to have national culture in the future, it cannot be class culture; for there is now a constantly increasing fluidity between the classes. It cannot be a result of unconscious adaptation to conditions; for our industrial revolutions have caused a state of economic instability. The culture of the future must, therefore, be the result of the coalescence of the two existing classes into a single class consciously and critically aiming at national civilization.

A. J. THOMAS.

The Changing Conception of Property. HARRY ALLEN OVERSTREET. Inter. J. of Ethics, XXV, No. 2, pp. 165-179.

The primitive conception of property as a need, an extension of personality, or a permanent and fruitful means of controlling the external order, grew into that of property as what one by his labor has made part of himself, what one

has earned, and consequently possesses to do with as he likes irrespective of use or personality. But, owing to the ever increasing difficulty of determining with the advance of civilization just what has been earned, as a matter of social expediency property has come to mean what one may legally possess; and almost everyone to-day possesses property that he has not earned. Private property is justified, therefore: (1) in so far as it is necessary as an instrument of personality, (2) in so far as it has been earned, and (3) in so far as society for reasons of expediency has given it its legal approval. The second and third justifications are subordinate to the first: unrestricted control of earned property is unjustifiable when injurious to personality, and legalized possession is unjustifiable when disastrous to social health. With respect to property, therefore, a two-fold obligation rests upon society: to detect the degree of intrinsic right to property on the part of individuals, and to discover and correct all conditions of property ownership detrimental to personal and social health. At present, society cannot determine with exactitude the extent to which private property is intrinsically deserved. Society recognizes, however, two conditions of ownership detrimental to personal and social welfare: property in excess of needs and property inadequate to needs. Property in excess of needs assumes three forms: (1) property for individual and family consumption, (2) for control, and (3) for benevolence. Any surplus property to be used for consumption society should take or transfer. Surplus property for control must not be allowed to injure the lives of others. Surplus property for private benevolence can be eliminated by collective prevention or control of all situations requiring benevolence. By socializing such advantages as the individual cannot achieve unaided, and such burdens and casualties as he cannot normally provide against, society should aim to make good to its members any deficit of property below that required to meet fundamental needs.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

History versus Value. MORRIS R. COHEN. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XI, 26, pp. 701-716.

"Two principles are generally relied on as axiomatic in the popular philosophy of the day, *viz.*: (1) That nothing is explicable except in terms of its history, and (2) that the value of anything is independent of its history." The nineteenth century had unbounded faith in the more empirical, historical mode of interpretation, while faith in naïve rationalism is held to be typical of eighteenth century thought. While historicism in its origin was related to the romantic movement, it became positivistic, inductive and empirical in its development, and opposed itself to explanation in terms of abstract principles. The historical point of view has been taken so seriously by some thinkers that they have attempted to make it replace or supersede all independent method or standpoint of valuation. It is worthy of note that the more developed a science is the less use it makes of history. Physics and mathematics employ it hardly at all, and it is losing importance in the study of life-phenomena. Mr. Cohen estimates its status as a means of explanation in the *Geisteswis-*

senschaften. Economics, Jurisprudence, Politics, Ethics, Religion and Philosophy are reviewed, and in each instance it is shown that the historical method has not been fruitful. The chief reason for this failure is that history is a fine art as well as a science. Historical science consists in applying the laws of probability to the facts. But the facts must be supplemented, or selected out, and interpreted. We may, with the scientific historians, attempt to eliminate this personal element by definite rules, or we may glorify it along with Droysen, Treitschke, and the patriotic historians. The evolutionary or genetic method in the social sciences of today attempts to do both. Two concessions may be made to historicism. First, that it has a certain pedagogic value, allowing the presentation of material in an orderly manner. Secondly, it may be effective against absolutistic theories of value. In the last analysis, however, it will be found that historicism is rationalistic at heart, however empirical in profession. The denial of the existence of values apart from historical sequence is nominalistic, maintaining that only particular entities in time and space are real. Value and history are independent of each other, as the two blades of a pair of shears are independent. Both are necessary, and one cannot transcend the other.

D. T. HOWARD.

Why Should Law and Philosophy Get Together? JAMES H. TUFTS. Inter. J. Ethics, XXV, No. 2, pp. 188-196.

For ethicists to be interested in principles of law and lawyers to read a Journal of Ethics, each must master a new vocabulary. Law is concerned with what can properly be enforced upon others, ethics with what man may prescribe to himself. But their chief difference is revealed in their respective attitudes toward fundamental concepts. The task of the lawyer is to make concepts as definite and fixed as practicable, or to bring new cases under established principles or statutes; the task of the philosopher is to criticize fixed standards, to reconstruct, to elucidate the growing points of concepts, to point out the shift in meaning which is required if we are to make an old principle cover a new case. Yet the law too is a growing institution. The courts are legislative as well as judicial bodies. Every classification of marginal cases requires rethinking of principles. On the other hand, the growth of conceptions stressed by the philosopher necessitates a permanent something enabling us to use the same term without violence. The lawyer and philosopher should co-operate. Public and private standards of morality are interdependent. There is scarcely a concrete problem of ethics which does not demand for its solution a knowledge of law. The principles of law are not always adequate to current needs and ideas. Wider flexibility and orderly growth should be secured for law. The ethicist should have more influence upon public policy and opinion. We must undertake more seriously and with broader vision our task of considering our institutions and our ideals in their interrelation.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

The Principle of International Ethics. A. C. ARMSTRONG. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XII, 1, pp. 17-22.

Many thinkers hold that the morality of nations is identical with the ethics of individual life. Closer examination, however, shows that the matter is not so simple. Aside from certain practical difficulties which arise from the backwardness of the evolution of international morality, the fundamental consideration is, Can the analogy between individuals and nations ever be made complete? The collective character of international relations often gives rise to a kind of obligation quite different from that between individuals. Just as the head of a family may have certain duties which he might avoid, were he free from the family tie, so when a nation is in peril, the government may adopt every measure for its protection which may not be allowable between individuals. The representative character of the body politic further enhances the difference: a sovereign, a citizen, or even a flag, represents sovereignty and demands protection and respect. Disregard for these symbols of national sovereignty may lead to war. Thus, in point of devotion to duty, in loyalty to principles established, in fidelity to obligations assumed, in respect for the right of others, international morality must be raised to the same level as ethics in their personal form. This is the goal toward which moral evolution tends.

SUH HU.

The Ethics of War. BERTRAND RUSSELL. Inter. J. of Ethics, XXV, 2, pp. 127-143.

Although no single combatant of the present war is justified, war is not always a crime. Breach of treaty or of international law is only a formal justification for war. War is really justified only when it brings a balance of good to mankind. Private sorrow and anxiety, the sapping or brutalizing of the nations' fittest youth, injuries to non-combatants within the area of military operations, economic and social wrongs to all the world,—these are some of the evils of war. The economic injury is greater than is usually supposed: economic progress is the first condition of a tolerable society, of national advance, and, for the poorer classes, of many spiritual goods, if not of life itself. The greatest evil is the purely spiritual evil: the hatred, the injustice, the repudiation of truth, the artificial conflict, where, if once the blindness of atavistic instincts and the sinister influence of anti-social interests could be overcome, it would be seen that there is a real consonance of interest and essential identity of human nature, and every reason to replace hatred by love. There are wars: (1) of colonization, (2) of principle, (3) of self-defence, and (4) of prestige. Wars of colonization are justified when the civilization of the colonizers is undeniably superior to that of the dispossessed, and when the climate of the invaded country is one in which the invading race can flourish. Wars of principle are justified when at least one side is honestly convinced that the progress of mankind depends upon the adoption of certain beliefs, which, through blindness or natural depravity, mankind will not regard

as reasonable, except at the point of the bayonet. It is seldom, however, that a principle of genuine value to mankind can be propagated only by force. Wars of self-defence are justified only against an adversary of inferior civilization. What one civilized nation can achieve against another by means of conquest is very much less than is commonly supposed. If the facts were understood, wars among civilized nations would cease, owing to their own inherent absurdity. Non-resistance would seem not only a distant religious ideal, but the course of practical wisdom. Wars for prestige, honor or triumph, such as the present war, are never justifiable. They are largely the result of the secret, prejudiced, unenlightened diplomacy which controls inter-sovereign affairs and pledges to such paltry objects the manhood and heroism of the nations. Insistence upon brotherhood and coöperation and the solidarity of mankind may be the outcome of the present war. Nothing but the pride of wilful rulers stands in the way of the settlement of all disputes by a Council of the Powers deliberating in public.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

A Definition of Causation: A Reply to Professor Sheldon. H. G. HARTMANN. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XI, 24, 655-667.

The definition of causation advanced by Professor Sheldon in four articles previously published in the same journal, is taken under consideration. Professor Sheldon's conclusions are summarized under three heads: (1) that two types of causation clearly emerge, "a certain serial type called a self-repeater, and one of comparison," (2) that the "cause is *two* terms," and not "*one term alone*, where Hume and his successors always looked for it," and (3) "that there is a *necessity* in the existent world." Points two and three are considered. Professor Sheldon's conclusions are accepted, but his argument in favor of them is rejected. Granting that a cause consists of two terms, as Locke held before Hume, what constitutes them a cause? What is the essential difference between two objects which are non-causal, and two which act as a cause? Professor Sheldon fails to give an adequate basis of distinction. In this connection he overlooks the importance of change in the causal situation, and the thought-process which is essential to such a distinction. In the second place his principle of 'sameness' with a difference in "existential time," is inadequate. Not 'sameness,' nor position in existential time, would identify the cause from that which is not a cause. In the third place, he fails to recognize the constructive process which any specific solution of the cause-effect relation necessitates and entails. We must assume two terms for our cause, and we must assume that they are neutral or effective, partial or indifferent, in respect to each other, in order to arrive at a distinction between the causal and the non-causal. We may not be able to explain why some objects should be effective, and some neutral, in respect to each other, but must simply agree that they are so. Professor Sheldon bases his third conclusion, that there is necessity in the existent world, upon the contention that necessity in cause and effect is based upon sameness with a difference. The emphasis is upon

sameness, thus reversing Hume, who emphasized difference and disconnection. However, the mere sameness itself does not constitute a causal necessity. Moreover, such sameness and difference presuppose an intellectual discrimination, of which Professor Sheldon takes no account.

D. T. HOWARD.

The Power Behind the Throne. ALFRED H. LLOYD. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., Vol. XI, No. 25, pp. 673-680.

The spirit of freedom is subordinating visible authority as never before. History shows a deliberate preparation for this freedom of the spirit. Behold dogma freed by art, art by naturalism, and these by anti-rationalistic philosophy. This gradual emancipation may be divided into five battles or cultural disciplines: (1) rude hand-to-hand contests for external gains; (2) diplomatic contests with sensuous appeal; (3) the rational game of science and industrial competition played with acquired control; (4) heroic adventures, showing philosophical boldness and personal attitudes—a breaking away from law and order, reason and form; (5) the closing fight of liberation and final achievement. In this fourth battle, which we now enter with all our achieved discipline, vitalism in its challenge to formalism makes creative life the test of success.

ALLEN J. THOMAS.

NOTES.

The death of Emeritus Professor Campbell Fraser, of the University of Edinburgh, occurred on December 2, 1914, at the age of ninety five years. Professor Fraser held the chair of Logic in New College 1846-56, and from 1856 to 1891 was professor of Logic and Metaphysic in the University of Edinburgh in succession to Sir William Hamilton. The following paragraph is taken from an article in the *Scotsman*, written by Professor A. S. Pringle-Pattison, the present occupant of the same chair: "In the class-room Professor Fraser's teaching was not perhaps of the kind most calculated to arrest and interest the ordinary undergraduate, but he had a singular power of awakening and stimulating the philosophic instinct in his best students. Emphatic testimony was borne to this characteristic in the warm address presented to Professor Fraser by his old honours students on the occasion of his academic jubilee in 1906. 'In philosophy I am a seeker,' was a motto of which to the end of his life the Professor was fond, and it is on this feature that the signatories of the address lay stress. 'You never sought to impose upon our minds a dogmatic system of belief, but with a deeper trust in the eventual harmony of the results of all serious and independent thinking, sought to stimulate us to a constant individual effort in the pursuit of truth. And while yourself a scholar whose work upon the classics of English philosophy has achieved a world-wide reputation, you never failed to set before us a higher ideal of philosophical study than that of mere scholarship and research—the ideal which we saw exemplified in your own work as a thinker and teacher, of ever-renewed and unwearying meditation on the questions that are most ultimate and fundamental in the higher spiritual life of humanity.' It was a natural consequence of this characteristic that the Edinburgh class of Logic and Metaphysics became a training-ground of philosophical thinkers who went out to fill Chairs in most of the Universities of the English-speaking world. During his thirty-five years' occupancy of the Chair between 6,000 and 7,000 students passed through his hands. No fewer than seven of his pupils have held Chairs of Philosophy in the Scottish Universities, while nine others have become Professors in the Universities of Australia, India, Canada, and the United States. The Chair of Green in Oxford and the Chair of Sidgwick in Cambridge were both filled by philosophers of his training. In the kindred study of theology were to be counted, in like manner, at least six Principals and six Professors who received from him their first impulse to philosophic thought."

The following statement signed by a large number of the philosophical teachers and writers of Great Britain has been issued:

"The war in Europe has made it impossible to carry through the arrange-

ments for the Fifth International Congress of Philosophy, which was to have been held in London in September, 1915. Before July of the present year (1914) the arrangements for the meeting had, to a great extent, been completed. The leading Universities of many nations had appointed delegates, and a very large number of distinguished Continental and American scholars were preparing to take part in the proceedings.

In announcing the necessary abandonment of the arrangements for the Congress of 1915, we, Members of the General Organising Committee, desire to express an earnest hope that the confederacy of the entire philosophical world, which has subsisted since the inauguration of the series of Congresses in 1900, and seemed to have attained the rank of a permanent institution, will not be set aside for a longer time than outward circumstances render absolutely imperative. We are confident that the common interest in philosophy which has expressed itself so effectively in the past meetings of the Congress will prove to be an enduring bond.

We are returning the subscriptions of Members as the Congress cannot be held at the time appointed. But we pledge ourselves, as soon as possible after peace is restored, to promote with all our power the continuance of this international bond, either by renewing the invitation to meet in this country or by obtaining an invitation from a neutral country."

We give below a list of articles in current philosophical magazines:

THE MONIST, XXV, 1: *Richard Garbe*, St. Thomas in India; *Bertrand Russell*, Sensation and Imagination; *K. C. Anderson*, Orthodox and Liberal Christianity. A Via Media; *Philip E. B. Jourdain*, Newton's Hypotheses of Ether and of Gravitation from 1672 to 1679; *Lynn Thorndike*, Some Medieval Conceptions of Magic.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL, XIII, 2: *Abbé Noël*, The Soul of Belgium; *Paul Vinogradoff*, The Slavophile Creed; *E. Lyttelton*, What Next? *Récit d'un professeur de Louvain réfugié en Angleterre.* (In French and English); *James Sully*, Göttingen in the Sixties; *Herbert Strong*, The Jews through Roman Spectacles; *James Moffatt*, Meredith and his Fighting Men; *Edward Willmore*, "Why Are We Fighting." A Reply; *F. S. Marvin*, The Unity of Civilization; *L. T. More*, The Scientific Claims of Eugenics; *D. Noel Paton*, A Physiologist's View of Life and Mind; *George Haw*, The Religious Revival in the Labor Movement; *D. A. Wilson*, Germans, Tartars, and a Chinese Patriot; *G. H. Powell*, Thoughts on Pacificism.

THE HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, VIII, 1: *James L. Barton*, The Modern Missionary; *J. P. Jones*, The Protestant Missionary Propaganda in India; *Howard N. Brown*, Immortality; *Aurelio Palmieri*, The Russian Douk-nobors and their Religious Teachings; *John P. Peters*, Excavations in Persia; *Benjamin W. Bacon*, After Six Days.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY, XIX, 1: *Ralph Barton Perry*, Religious Values; *J. M. Powis Smith*, Religion and War in Israel; *George Cross*, The Modern Trend in Soteriology; *Clyde Weber Votaw*, The Gospels and

Contemporary Biographies; *W. C. A. Wallar*, A Preacher's Interest in Nietzsche, *Shirley Jackson Case*, The Religion of Lucretius.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XXV, 2: *Bertrand Russell*, The Ethics of War; *Arthur Ponsonby*, International Morality; *H. A. Overstreet*, The Changing Conception of Property; *Albert Kocourek*, Law and Other Sciences; *J. H. Tufts*, Why Should Law and Philosophy Get Together; *John E. Boodin*, Social Immortality; *Joseph Dana Miller*, Difficulties of Democracy; *W. M. Salter*, Nietzsche's Moral Aim.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, XI, 25: *Alfred H. Lloyd*, The Power Behind the Throne; *Gustave A. Feingold*, The Psychophysical Basis of Moral Conduct; *John Pickett Turner*, Philosophy and Social Attitudes.

XI, 26: *Morris R. Cohen*, History versus Value.

XII, 1: *W. H. Sheldon*, The Vice of Modern Philosophy; *A. C. Armstrong*, The Principle of International Ethics.

XII, 2: *G. A. Tawney*, What is Behavior?; *Edward L. Thorndike*, Ideomotor Action: A Reply to Professor Montague; *Walter S. Hunter*, A Reply to Some Criticisms of the Delayed Reaction.

THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, VII, 3: *Agnes L. Rogers*, and *J. L. McIntyre*, The Measurement of Intelligence in Children by the Binet-Simon Scale; *E. Roffe Thompson*, An Inquiry into some Questions connected with Imagery in Dreams; *Stanley H. Watkins*, Immediate Memory and its Evaluation; *J. C. Flügel* and *Wm. McDougall*, Some Observations on Psychological Contrast.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, XI, 12: *J. H. Leuba*, The Task and Method of Social Psychology; *W. McDougall*, Recent Social Psychology in Britain; *A. L. Kellogg*, Crime and Sociology; *E. Faris*, Psychology of Religion (Practical).

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE, 1913-1914.¹

LOUIS COUTURAT is dead. During the first days of the war, when the bustle and commotion on all high-ways was at its height, the carriage in which he was traveling was run down by a heavy automobile, rushing at top speed. He was killed at once. The public at large can have no idea of the extent of this loss. But those who are engaged in the study of logic, logistics, mathematical philosophy, and the philosophy of language, know that in these fields he held first rank in France. His first-hand information on some questions was unique; but it was surpassed by the power and quality of his mind. He had in him none of that surface originality which displays itself in unexpected formulas and striking phrases to pique the attention. But he possessed the rarest kind of originality: he illuminated every study that he undertook. With a natural gift for deductive reasoning he united that absolute moral rectitude which never accepts a dubious compromise, even in the most abstract thought, and that tranquil confidence in truth which knows that "reason will always be right in the end." And this is why all his works impart the charm of fine and sincere clearness,—a quality which hostile critics of the French mind often regard as the opposite of profundity, but which, on the contrary, is inseparable from true profundity, such as is shown by solid, conscientious, precise intellects, who do not take delight in accessory complications but always go directly to what is *essential*.

To begin with, as a brilliant student in the literary section at

¹ Translated from the French by Dr. Alma R. Thorne.

the Ecole Normale, where he graduated with first rank in philosophy and wrote a thesis in excellent Latin on *Les Mythes de Platon*, he had formed a taste,—under the influence of the lamented Jules Tannery¹—for mathematical philosophy. Here also he took first rank at once through his principal thesis, *L'infini mathématique* (1896), a great work which is still the best guide for those who desire to take up this kind of study. In the first part of the book the technical generalization of the idea of number was studied; in that connection he gave a philosophical analysis of the infinite and of continuity, in harmony with contemporaneous mathematical work. Then taking up again, as a logician, the ideas of number and magnitude, he established their fundamental characteristics and refuted almost line for line Renouvier's celebrated arguments against the infinite, abstract or concrete. He showed that there is no contradiction inherent in the idea, provided one define the question at issue with precision. Going back ultimately to the antinomies of Kant, he discovered there a flaw in logic, rising out of a confusion between the infinite of reason and the infinite of the imagination. "In conclusion," he said, "in spite of criticism, metaphysics is possible; and in spite of neo-criticism, an infinitistic metaphysics is probable."

The study of the infinite led him to Leibniz. He undertook to reconstruct the logical conceptions of that great thinker and to establish their connection with his metaphysic. After having compared scattered texts in the various fragmentary editions extant, he saw the need of verifying and completing his results by means of an investigation of the unedited fragments. He went to the Hanover Library to consult its rich collections of the unpublished manuscripts of Leibniz. "I never expected to do more than to glean after the editors," he wrote, "but I gathered in such a heavy harvest of new documents that I have been obliged to recast my book entirely, and wholly to rewrite certain chapters."² Two works resulted from this labor: a volume of Leibnizian *Inédits* containing more than two hundred

¹ PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, XXII, 4, p. 366.

² *La Logique de Leibniz*, Preface.

new fragments, some of them of the greatest philosophical interest; and a large work called *La Logique de Leibniz* (1901), possessing incomparable precision and a wealth of documentary material. In this book he shows us a phase of Leibniz's genius formerly neglected in favor of the theological and metaphysical speculations. In the notion of judgment, as defined in the *Discours de métaphysique* and especially in some of the fragments collected in the *Inédits*, Couturat discovered the very principle of the *Monadologie* and *Théodicée*.

Simultaneously Mr. Bertrand Russell was publishing his *Philosophy of Leibniz*, in which he arrived by another route at very similar conclusions. For several years Couturat had had relations with Mr. Russell, though in connection with other questions. He was engaged with M. Cadenat's French translation of Russell's *Principles of Geometry*, to which he had added with the author's consent a few notes of his own. The coincidence of their labor on Leibniz, begun without any preliminary exchange of views, naturally augmented the friendliness of their relation. In a series of articles for the *Revue de Métaphysique* (1904), later collected in one volume, Couturat introduced Mr. Russell's *Principles of Mathematics* to the French public. The book soon became widely known among philosophical mathematicians. How much attention Couturat devoted to this kind of questions is easily seen by noting the list of the articles which he wrote on such subjects for the *Revue de Métaphysique* and the *Enseignement mathématique*. Perhaps the readers of this article may recall his discussions with M. Poincaré, in which the celebrated mathematician often found his adversary better armed than he was himself, and on some points invincible. Meanwhile he was publishing in the *Scientia* collection an abridgment of Schröder's *Algèbre de la Logique* (1905). The course in logistic which he gave in 1906 at the Collège de France (as a substitute professor for M. Bergson in the chair of modern philosophy) was highly appreciated by the few who are capable of judging that kind of work. His introductory lecture (on "La Logique et la Philosophie contemporaines")

is a vigorous plea for 'pure' logic as opposed to the psychologism of pragmatism. It appeared in the *Revue de Métaphysique* in 1906.

But the study of Leibniz led him, on the other hand, in a new direction which soon absorbed all his attention. Among the great hopes which the author of the *Nouveaux Essais* had had was that of discovering a universal language, logically constructed according to principles analogous to those of algebra, and capable of giving men an international means of scientific communication and analysis. In the unedited fragments which he brought to light Couturat had discovered several important documents upon this point; and in the *Logique de Leibniz* he had shown how Leibniz all his life long had entertained, revised, and perfected this project. Gradually the great philosopher convinced his historian, who set to work to study for himself the question of artificial languages. First he made a historical study of the subject, to find out what had been done in the field. This investigation was entirely new, and the results astonished many readers; they formed a great octavo volume published in 1903 with the collaboration of a distinguished mathematician, Professor Leopold Leau.¹ This history, which begins with Descartes, analyzes at greater or less length, according to their importance, about sixty artificial linguistic systems; but it shows especially something which could scarcely have been foreseen,—that there exists in the succession of these systems a kind of progress, a gradual rationalization, which impels them toward a final state capable of definition. There exists therefore a type of international language which is, so to speak, necessary and virtually preformed, the completion of which would realize the idea of Leibniz; at least in so far as it serves to give civilized people an easy and more precise means of communication than do their natural languages themselves.

As soon as he had made this discovery, M. Couturat considered it his duty to devote himself to the realization of the project.

Of all the artificial languages whose mechanism he had studied,

¹ *Histoire de la Langue universelle*, by Louis Couturat and Leopold Leau, Hachette, 1903.—A second edition was published 1907 and another work, *Les Nouvelles Langues Internationales*, appeared in 1908.

the most nearly perfected then was Esperanto. But even this left something to be desired upon certain points. *La Délégation pour l'adoption d'une langue auxiliaire internationale*, representing a great number of commercial and scientific societies, had adopted Esperanto with the reservation of making a certain number of modifications which would constitute a simplified and revised Esperanto, known since then under the name of *Ido*.¹ M. Couturat ardently devoted himself to pushing this to the last degree of perfection and to popularizing it. With his turn of mind and his logical ability he established a system of general derivation, founded on an analysis of relations, which made of the language a logical mechanism of remarkable precision.² He was supported by linguists of the first rank, notably by Professor Jespersen of Copenhagen. But there arose some extreme difficulties. Certain leaders of the Esperanto movement had appeared ready to welcome improvements at once. M. Couturat, for his part, thought to serve their cause and expected the most favorable coöperation from them. But a contrary and powerful party was formed which refused to admit the least modification, even when visibly advantageous.³ Any sort of change seemed to them to indicate a lack of loyalty to the work of their master, Zamenhof, as well as a danger to the spread of their language. On the other hand, M. Couturat would not allow any sacrifice of the scientific ideal to these personal considerations, or even to questions of opportunity. He said,—quite rightly, it would seem—that it would be impossible to perfect a system after it was already crystallized by general usage. These were years of strife and sometimes painful discussions, during all which this indefatigable worker, at the cost of admirably regular daily labor, realized at least all the scientific

¹ *Ido* was at first the pseudonym of M. de Beaufront, an Esperantist who had had a very great share in the elaboration of these reforms.

² See: Couturat, *Etude sur la dérivation dans la Langue Internationale*, Paris, Delgrave, 1910. The first edition, printed in 1907 under the title, *Etude sur la Dérivation en Esperanto*, was addressed especially to Esperantists and has not been put into circulation.

³ For example, besides the regular formation of derivative words, the suppression of consonants with a circumflex over them or decomposed into digraphs; the more complete internationalization of radicals, etc.

part of the work which he had assigned himself. With the collaboration of the international Academy of Languages, created in 1909, he built up the complete vocabulary of *Ido* upon the logical principles of derivation which he had established; published dictionaries for the usual language¹ and for technical vocabularies; and edited from 1908 to his death a monthly magazine, *Progreso*, entirely in *Ido* and easy for any cultivated man to read almost at first sight. There appeared also several scientific articles of great interest.²

This special labor did not distract his attention from philosophy. In proportion as he plunged more deeply into linguistic work this great rationalist perceived the need of clarifying and coördinating its principles. I called attention in a previous article³ to his paper, *Sur la structure logique du Langage*, and his communication of January, 1912 to the Société de Philosophie. He returned to the subject the following year, in an article, *Pour la Logique du Language*. At the same time he was collaborating on the *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie*, which the society publishes, giving first a careful critique of the text and then a proposal of international roots, capable of adaptation to a system of methodical derivation for an artificial scientific language such as that on which he was working. Finally, he had just given to the *International Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, organized by M. Ruge, an article of some length entitled "Les Principes de la Logique," which contained six chapters on propositions, propositional functions, concepts, relations, methodology, and the logic of language.⁴

It was in the midst of such activity, so vigorous and fruitful, that a tragic accident removed him from his field of labor, in the fullness of maturity, when he was only forty-six years old. If the

¹ New dictionaries of greater length, which he had just finished, are now being printed.

² Notably a resume of the *Cours de Grammaire générale* by M. Meillet, a professor at the Collège de France in 1911-1912. The book has a philosophical character in many of its parts. (Delagrave, editor).

³ PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, XXII, 4, p. 373.

⁴ Translated into English by B. Ethel Meyer, in the *Encyclopædia of Philosophical Sciences*, Vol. I, *Logic* (under the editorship of Sir Henry Jones). London, Macmillan, 1913.

soil of old Europe is as yet too much ravaged by barbarism to allow the works of peace to come to fruition there just now, may the good seed which he sowed with so much courage grow and ripen in America!

II.

When we turn to general philosophy there is another man recently deceased who must be mentioned first of all. Alfred Fouillée, tireless worker that he was, left among his papers a book which was nearly finished and which has now been published by his old pupil, M. Boirac, the present rector of the Académie de Dijon. Its title is *Esquisse d'une interprétation du Monde*. Those who know already the work of Fouillée will read with pleasure this metaphysical synthesis of his ideas; but in particular those who do not know his work will find here in a brief form and an easily understood style the systematic exposition of his whole philosophy;—it might almost be said that they will find here an outline of contemporaneous philosophy, especially of French philosophy. It is a very instructive document on the ideas and theses upon which discussion has fed during these last few years, with a mention of the most representative works dealing with each point. Although he lived long in retirement and had not taught since 1878, Fouillée zealously kept himself in touch with all that was being discussed in philosophical circles and with all the important works. The first part of his book is a critical review of some of the 'interpretations of the world' which have been current in our epoch: the idealistic interpretation, as given by M. Lachelier; the phenomenistic interpretation, of which Renouvier furnishes the type; the interpretation in terms of extension and motion, which is purely mechanistic, and though adopted by many scholars of to-day, is a continuation of the Cartesian tradition; the pluralistic and pragmatic interpretation, to which he had previously devoted one work; the 'interpretation in terms of duration' or the Bergsonian interpretation; the evolutionistic interpretation, either Spencerian or Nietzschean, —or the contrary type which he calls 'dissolutionistic'; and finally the interpretation of the world in terms of energy, in

connection with which he gives a vigorous critique of energism and of its verbalism when it is transported from the domain of pure physics to that of things in themselves. Like Leibniz, Fouillée believes that every doctrine which is really thought contains in itself a principle of truth which animates it; it does not require refutation, but merely correction and modification,—modification through the absorption of each particular view in a more comprehensive view. To this he devotes the second part of his work,¹ which points out the possible reunion of all the familiar doctrines of our time in the three theses of, first, *idées-forces*, which are shared respectively by the philosophy of intellectualism and the philosophy of action; second, auto-determinism, which makes us see the world as a work in which we participate; and finally, the *volonté de conscience*, which, like a perpetually tense spring, sets the whole machine in motion. The will to live, the will for power, are only imperfect approximations of this. Life and power which are unconscious are equivalent to nothingness, and the will could not will them. Has man ever envied the terrible but unconscious force of an earthquake? The will for power is chiefly the will to come into full self-consciousness and to hold a large place in the consciousness of others.

This consciousness of others must be conceived as essentially defined by reason. In opposition to pragmatistic voluntarism and the philosophies of intuition, Fouillée vigorously defends the cause of rationalistic, or intellectualistic voluntarism. In spite of all the present-day agnostics, he remains convinced of the principle of universal intelligibility. In that respect again he holds firmly to the Leibnizian tradition. But I have already spoken in these pages of his preceding work, *La Pensée et les nouvelles Ecoles anti-intellectualistes*.² It is enough here to recall this characteristic feature, the 'will for consciousness,' which serves to define the book.

We may connect the book of M. Fouillée with that of M.

¹ I am speaking of ideas and not of the material division. The positive theses of M. Fouillée and their justification are found both throughout the volume and in the form of appendices.

² PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, XXI, 3, pp. 291-294.

Louis Weber, *Le rythme du Progrès*. In spite of the modest sub-title, "Etude sociologique," by which he voluntarily limits its bearing, it is really a general philosophical idea which he has expounded: a view of the whole of human progress is possible only by means of a philosophical view of reality. In one sense, we depend on reality: M. Weber is a transformist and does not doubt that the human race is the prolongation of animal races, very akin to that of the ape. In another sense, reality depends on us; because the world is known to us only by means of the laws of our thought, and to discover the rhythm according to which thought has developed is to determine beforehand certain fundamental traits of nature which thought will represent to itself. The dualistic conception of progress, as M. Weber conceives it, ends by confirming partially, but also by limiting the philosophy of pragmatism.

This is his central idea: the rhythm of progress is neither the linear progress which Condorcet conceived, nor the succession of the three stages recognized and vulgarized by positivism, nor the passage from homogeneity to heterogeneity, which Spencer used as the basis of his philosophy. It consists in the repeated alternation of two moments: a technical period, dominated by impulse, by practical creation, action, and, later, by industry; a period of reflection, dominated by intelligence, consciousness of self, disinterested scientific thought, and philosophy.

In the beginning, that is to say, in the most remote period which our thought can reach, man must have been an industrious animal,—superior no doubt to other animals, but one utilizing the properties of stone for striking very much as the bird utilizes the resistance of the air for flying. It is even possible that the primitive techniques have thus been consolidated into instincts; for M. Weber does not see, as M. Bergson does, a radical divergence between these two, but, rather, a close relationship. Nothing appears to him more conservative than the domain of handicrafts: "they are traditions, and possibly the prototypes of all tradition." Here the *positif* is not a late stage of evolution; it is its beginning.

But among these techniques there developed one which presented exceptional and particularly fruitful characteristics: language,—whether by gesture or by sound. Words, as Noiré well saw, are tools; but Noiré did not deduce from this idea all its consequences. In the labor done by means of the axe, the hammer, the needle, there were formed associations of images which contained in germ the mechanical conception of the world. When man speaks, on the other hand, and when by speaking he makes one of his kind come to him from a distance, he forms the idea of a different kind of causality, that of a world which is immaterial in appearance, and in which remote actions rule; these are afterward regarded as magical actions, and later as spiritual actions.

This technique of language depends on the anatomical constitution of man, in so far as he is an animal; but it is greatly broadened under the influence of social life. "Between the forces which words set free no individual experience may decide; it is the tribe which establishes between them the imaginary hierarchy to which it remains thereafter faithful, without suspecting that it prostrates itself before the phantoms of its imagination."¹ It is the tribe, too, which assents to making words the signs of ideas; the work done on words, exchanges of words in the absence of things, give rise to a special mode of activity, which is reflection. "The second moment of the neural phenomenon, the motor discharge, does not come to an end; but the energy expended in movement is concentrated on ideation; and the attention, instead of being absorbed in motor images, is fixed on these objects of ideation. Thus the consciousness of the idea may begin to appear."²

Thenceforward there would be an alternation between these two forms of human activity, the one trying especially to utilize things, the other trying to comprehend their nature, to form an internal image of them having a theoretical and contemplative character. In prehistoric times the end of the paleolithic period seems to have been characterized by an admirable industry; the

¹ *Le rythme du progrès*, p. 175.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 203-204.

neolithic period, which follows it, manifests especially a religious and moral activity. To this epoch there succeeds a great epoch of technical progress, a period which we do not know much about, because it manifested itself in action rather than in thought; at this time were invented the auger, the saw, the plane, the tongs, the scythe, the wheel, the lathe, the carriage, the pulley, the loom, the bellows, and the plow. On the other hand, Græco-Roman civilization exhibits before all else a reflective and intellectual period. It is followed by scholasticism, and even by classical philosophy. All of that forms but one great cosmic epoch in which conceptual and contemplative thought largely takes precedence over industrial activity.¹

In these days technical progress is reviving. The machine tool is an instrument of the second degree. It comes in part from science, but in still greater part, it precedes science. We use a number of forces and agents of which no theory is as yet formed; we make electricity work, without knowing its nature, just as the ancients used fire without having explained combustion. Thence comes pragmatism, which would have had no root in the seventeenth century. Thence also arises the hope of a new period of rational intelligence which will eventually explain all this technique.

Civilization is therefore governed by a law of the alternation of two states, in which man the industrial animal, and man the speaking and social being rule by turns. For Comte, progress tends toward a definite and perfect state, a predetermined limit. The positive state is a stable equilibrium, *infiniti erroris finis et terminus legitimus*, as Bacon said already of modern science, and Kant of his transcendental system. There, in fact, lies a most widespread belief of philosophers. They always want to know the ending of the story. Spencer himself announces the future reign of perfect adaptation. M. Weber proposes that we give up this obsession. "The rhythm of the two states," he says, "is an open one." And yet does he not sketch the end, though very

¹ The thesis of M. Weber was very brilliantly discussed at the Société de philosophie, notably by Messrs. Parodi, LeRoy, and Meyerson. See the *Bulletin* of the Society, in the numbers for February and March, 1914, pp. 61-140 (Paris, Armand Colin, ed.).

discreetly, in an indication of synthesis? Does he not show the social man and the worker, the thinker and the engineer, mingling their works more and more intimately? Moreover, does he not observe that in the intellect there is not only a unity of synthesis, but undoubtedly a "unity of principle and of substance"? Thus the Alpha would already have preformed the Omega; dualism would give way to unity, and the end, in a certain sense, would go back to the beginning.

Is it possible that this idea will never be entirely absent from philosophy? That is exactly what is suggested most prominently in the book of M. Bonet-Maury,¹ which bears the title, *L'Unité morale des Religions*. It has as an epigraph this sentence from Auguste Sabatier: "In proportion as men live more profoundly and become more intimately conscious of their own spiritual nature, they discover the same altar, recite the same prayer, and aspire to the same end." He tries to prove this by a review of various systems of morals, such as the Chinese, Brahmanistic, Buddhistic, Persian, Hebraic, Mohammedan, and Christian; and he joins thereto the testimony of the international congresses of religion. It must be recognized that so large a review, made in a small volume of two hundred pages, is necessarily somewhat rapid and incomplete. But the idea loses none of its value on that account, and possibly it is more comprehensive than the author himself seems to indicate. It is easy to smile sceptically at dreams of unity. And I admit that in this present time, when one half of Europe refuses to consider the other half as populated with its 'kind,' the ideas of Christian brotherhood, of a common Father, who has made all men in his image, and who would reunite them in his bosom,—all that may seem rather utopian. Nevertheless, let us not lose either hope or faith. We must either renounce all philosophy of 'becoming' and so be lost in the thought of an unintelligible chance, of a simple triumph of momentary force, or we must recognize a *vection*, a progress in a determined direction; hence a scale of values and an ideal. The thought of Aristotle and of Auguste Comte goes to the root of the philosophical problem; the idea of convergence alone gives

¹ Emeritus professor at the University of Paris (Faculty of Protestant Theology).

meaning to transformations. But it must not be understood that this is a finished convergence, reaching its end at a definite date. The error of Auguste Comte was not in conceiving a 'final stage' of the human intelligence, but in imagining that it would be entered upon about 1880, after which it would only be necessary to enjoy it and take one's ease. A 'final state' is never more than an ideal, a point of convergence determined no doubt, but a point beyond all assignable distance, like the vanishing point of parallel lines in perspective. We see it, define it, mark it in a picture; but we can never reach it.

III.

A few years ago *Æsthetics* received too little attention in France. In the 'plan of studies' for the classes, and in the requirements for the bachelor's degree,¹ instead of constituting an entire section, like logic and ethics, it is indicated merely by a short rubric limiting itself to the words: "Notions sommaires sur le beau et l'art." In the classical treatises on philosophy it frequently appears only as an appendix or as a chapter of psychology, which has led many to mistake its true character and its analogy with the other normative sciences.

A revival seems recently to have begun. The causes for it are too lengthy to enumerate. I will mention, among others, the numerous publications on the History of Art which have appeared during these last few years, and especially such comprehensive works as M. Combarieu's *Histoire de la Musique*, of which two volumes have already appeared and the third is announced; or the *Histoire Générale des Beaux-Arts*, edited by M. André Michel, the tenth volume of which is now out. All syntheses, even though they are not by themselves philosophical, allure the philosopher. It is the same with works that touch upon 'origins'; and whether one understands by that word the prehistoric, or applies it to the appearance in children of the artistic instinct, there is no lack of material.

Moreover, this movement preserves in many respects a peculiarly psychological character. M. Delacroix has given at

¹ See PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, XIV, 4, p. 454.

the Sorbonne a course in art, rich in information and closely analyzed, but with the emphasis laid on his own specialty, which is psychology. A special study is made of the relation of æsthetic facts to the common functions of the mind: for example, rhythm is studied from its rudimentary form, the rhythmic character of perception, the rhythmic apprehension of sensorial groups, to its refined use in poetry or music; again, motor coördination and psycho-motor coördination are studied from their rudimentary form in the first movements of a child, from infantile sketching,¹ to the plastic arts. This is not an attempt to reduce the superior forms to the elementary forms; on the contrary, an attempt is made to prevent confusions of this kind and to point out always what new conditions transformed a banal fact into an æsthetic fact. To this positive analysis he joins a severe and salutary criticism, calling attention to the vagueness of a certain number of banal ideas,—the reduction of art to play, the theory of *Einfühlung*, etc. I know how much this course has been appreciated by those who have had the good fortune to hear it. He has presented the facts, and promulgated ideas which cannot fail to be influential.

If we pass now from the chair to the texts, we find in many of them this same psychological character. In M. Kostyleff's work, *Le mécanisme cérébral et la pensée*, nearly half of the book is devoted to a discussion of poetic and literary inspiration. *Le sentiment de la nature et son expression artistique*, by M. Dauzat, is a kind of psychological album, in which there is gathered a rather happy choice of landscapes, classed sometimes according to their *genre* (as field, sea, mountain, forest), sometimes according to epochs and races. Each category is illustrated by typical examples, by references to pictures, or by citations from poets and prose writers. The author's chief aim is to analyze the elements out of which are formed both a feeling for nature and the means by which writers and painters have succeeded in evoking it. Without doubt he does not entirely abstain from passing judgment. But it is exceptional.

L'esthétique de la Lumière, by M. Paul Souriau, a professor

¹ See, in particular, the very curious monograph of M. Luquet, entitled, *Les Dessins d'un enfant*.

at the University of Nancy, is also particularly psychological in character, but in a very different way, and it is much more scientific and compact. M. Dauzat writes for the general public; M. Souriau for technicians or philosophers, who are able to make an effort to give sustained attention and to take an interest in minute analyses and precise discussions of theories of perception. In this book 'Æsthetics' is used from the very beginning in its true etymological meaning as a science of the sensation of light, and its different varieties; then, as application and consequence, the science of its relation to the sense of beauty. So it comes about that coloration, intensity, diffusion, orientation, heightening of light, the scale of light-values in a picture through its relation to that of nature, are at first studies in themselves, then studies from the point of view of the effect which they produce, for the determination of distances, the boldness of the relief, the delicacy of the model, or the affective expression which they suggest. Being given an 'effect' which is incontestable, for example, the strong luminosity of a picture by Claude Lorrain, or of an aquafortis engraving by Rembrandt, he discloses the mechanism which produces it: in the one he shows the mingling of a central effect of false light with the diffusion, reflections, and sight-lights, which are combined in it; in the other, he shows the process of leveling down on one side all the lights and on the other side all the shadows, while carrying them to their maximum intensity. The appreciative point of view, properly speaking, as it is revealed in this book, tends especially to point out what education the artistic enjoyment may receive from a technical analysis, and the conclusion is a brief complaint against those who think they see an antagonism between science and the sense of the beautiful.

It is not so in the case of the work of M. Paulhan, *l'Esthétique du paysage*, although the author is best known as a psychologist. In the first lines the question of value is put in the foreground: "Why are there landscape artists? Why are people interested in their works? Certain æstheticians regard the landscape as a secondary genus: should their judgment be accepted or revised? And why?" If he mentions realism it is

to comment with marvelous keenness upon the injury which a too exact imitation may do to the value of art in the proper sense of the word. I know no better comment on the profound saying of Topffer: "The painter, in order to imitate, transforms." No doubt the psychologist is found repeatedly on the side of the æsthetician, who cannot do without him; but it is in the same way and with the same necessity that he is found on the side of the moralist who seeks to define good and evil. For example, psychology—we might say experimental psychology—refutes the current theory that painters reproduce nature in different ways because their eyes tend to perceive it in different ways. But this statement would not have so great an interest if it did not teach us that we must judge the transcription made by a painter as we judge a piece of reasoning, a feeling, or an action, and not as we judge a piece of individual anatomy. When he says that three words sum up the difference between the picture and nature,—simplification, generalization, transformation,—it is necessary to understand that these are the characteristics of the *valuable* work and not those of any worthless daub. The proof of this is shown immediately by reference to Rosa Bonheur's "Labourage nivernais," in which there is not enough simplification, and in which the too high finish of the clods of earth is a fault. The chapter devoted to "the soul of landscapes" is primarily a penetrating analysis of expression, of its importance and its media: it is a chapter which makes it easier to *understand* certain pictures; but it is a question here of judging and not merely of understanding; and the conclusion of M. Paulhan is that "La Tempête," by Ruysdael, takes as high a rank as "Les Bergers d'Arcadie"; that landscape painting rises to the heights of human poetry, philosophical poetry, "great art." If it is true that "art has a thousand *admirable and legitimate* forms," it is no less true that "all the schools are not of equal worth, and it may be that some of them are worth nothing at all."

Finally the normative point of view, and even the claim for this point of view, *ipso verbo*, are shown in the *Introduction à l'Esthétique* by M. Ch. Lalo. Perhaps he even assimilates the

'normative' a trifle too much to the 'prescriptive' and to the 'imperative.' In the domain of art it is difficult to prescribe an order of values; appreciation, which is in other respects a less authentic species of the normative genus, is here of supreme importance. But in this case the difficulty is perhaps due only to a somewhat lax use of words. As a compensation, the decidedness of M. Lalo's point of view happily contrasts with the vague generalities which are so often found in 'dogmatic' æstheticians; and whether we accept his opinion or not, it furnishes a lively note, very agreeable in the midst of so much that is colorless. When he overwhelms the impressionistic critique, "the false *genre* which thinks to be itself a work of art in the criticism of works of art, and which unceasingly oscillates between the need and the impossibility of erecting values into absolute norms," one would like often to add marginal notes, but there is evident a depth of common sense and of reason which sets one's mind at rest. When the author gives us in his book an example of intelligent dogmatism, of scientific æsthetics, one may rightly demand a finer distinction between the social and the 'synonymic,' between the objectivity of values and the objectivity of the laws which govern the genesis and transformation of values. Some remains of old evolutionistic plaster may be perceived among the good freestone; but the freestone remains, and that is the important thing. The way in which he enumerates, demonstrates, and discards "the false problems of the æsthetic method" may be accounted a useful and vigorous clearing-up.¹ It will be easier to discuss the true problems of this science if they are defined and reduced to the following three points: Are there values in art, or only facts? Are these values individual, or impersonal? Specific, or reducible (as Wundt believed) to more general norms? These, it would seem, are only the problems relative to the possibility of an æsthetic. If one wishes to limit himself, as M. Lalo declares he is doing in his work, to the statement of the "prolegomena to all future æsthetics which would claim to be a science," these problems are in fact the essential ones; all that one could say, at most, is that the first

¹ "Should æsthetics be inductive or deductive? Metaphysical or positive? Unique or divided among specialists?"

two questions are really one; that there would be no values at all if our appreciation of the beautiful were merely individual and subjective. But does it follow therefrom that these are the fundamental problems of æsthetic method? This is much like saying that the fundamental problems of biological method consist in knowing whether or not truth and falsity exist, as universally valid terms, and whether or not life is reducible to physico-chemical forces. Yet, exhaustive or not, these problems are real and well put. M. Lalo brings to their solution a very praiseworthy contribution. The distinction which he makes between the beautiful in art and the beautiful in nature, and, in the latter, between the two sentiments which he calls *anesthétique* and *pseudesthétique*, certainly marks an advance in analysis. He calls that the anæsthetic feeling for nature which rests directly upon wellbeing and satisfaction, such as comes from a sense of repose and freedom, an easier and more oxygenated respiration, an emancipation from conventions and social cares; in short, which comes from man's return to his true physiological *milieu*; for our body has not evolved so rapidly as our technology, and in our manufactories, stores, offices, libraries, and laboratories it remains much as it was formerly in the chase, the keeping of flocks, or the tilling of the soil. The pseudo-æsthetic feeling is quite different: it is that which denotes the perfection of a being in its own *genre*, the biological excellence of an animal well-balanced and perfectly adapted, a perfect type of his species and of the qualities which assure its continuance: such a specimen is a superb linden tree, standing by itself in a rich soil, freely developed in all the luxuriant force of its vegetation and not threatened with any obstacle to destroy or disfigure its characteristic form. In the first sense, all nature is beautiful; in the second sense, it is only those rare specimens selected from among all the individuals whose vital effort has more or less miscarried. Finally comes the beauty properly known as æsthetic beauty in art, which is intimately allied with technique, and which assumes, on one hand, a material and special processes of translation, and, on the other, an individual temperament which expresses itself at the same time that it reproduces (and transforms) an external datum,

or plays freely in the realm of sonorous images. And this beauty, in its turn, goes back to the natural objects, makes us apperceive them by means of the categories and the habits of the artist,¹ and makes us say of a landscape that it is a 'Corot'; whence comes a third form of beauty in nature, which differs from the first two and which properly merits the name of æsthetic beauty. It is produced when chance or the physical play of light puts before adequately trained eyes a picture which might be regarded as designed, though it may not be.

Accordingly, M. Lalo makes a great deal of technique, and less of nature. In the worship of Nature which most artists affect he sees scarcely more than a pious tradition, in which faith is not always present. Realism seems to him, in æsthetics, a most unfruitful doctrine, since its effect would be precisely to abolish the specific and normative character of art values. But is it therefore necessary to proclaim, as he does, that "the true artistic faculty is the consciousness of the trade"? Is it necessary to adopt, as he also does, the equivocal and dangerous ideal of 'art for art's sake,' the barren motto of art and sport? This aspect of the theory and the absence, as pointed out above, of a distinction between the collective and the synonymic, appears still more in the article by the same author, entitled, "programme d'une esthétique sociologique."² In spite of the excellent suggestions on method which the article contains, these views limit very narrowly its controlling idea. It seems to me that it is possible, without absorbing the æsthetic ideal into logic, ethics or sociology, to maintain (at least as a working hypothesis) a view which would be more readily defended, more easily harmonized with a philosophical view of human nature, and more truly expressive of the value of æsthetics.

¹ "The greatest benefit derived from artistic education," says M. Souriau in the work mentioned above, "is that which comes from teaching us how to enjoy better the beauty of things. When we have learned to take pleasure in a combination of tones in a picture, in the quality of a tint, we shall better appreciate their value as we discover them in the real world. Suppose we accustom ourselves to regard the world as do colorists: we shall admire the velvety darkness of the night, the transparency of a projecting shadow, the dull gleam of a twilight pool, the delicacy of the gray tints in a clouded sky or in the effects produced by a mist. . . ."
Esthétique de la lumière, p. 62.

² *Revue Philosophique*, July, 1914.

IV.

We shall not be leaving the domain of philosophy very far if we speak of a movement that is chiefly psychological in character. This movement, which has become widely extended in the last few years, is frequently though incorrectly spoken of as 'objective psychology'; it might be called, with more accuracy, *the psychology of reaction*.

What is psychology? It is extremely difficult to define. Some would define it as the science of the facts or of the states of consciousness; others deny, and not unjustifiably, that there are facts 'of an internal world,' different in nature from an 'external world.' Some find here a study which is capable of grasping reality in the most direct manner, in all its reality, either in a critical sense, as M. Lachelier does in his celebrated article "Psychologie et Métaphysique,"¹ or in a realistic and intuitionistic sense, as M. Bergson does in his *Introduction à la Métaphysique*, or in *Matière et Mémoire*. Others consider it only as the study of an accessory phenomenon of the nervous system, "which could function just as well," they say, "without consciousness as with it." Among all these divergences a doctrine is formulated, at first by the biologists who are devoted to the study of zoölogical psychology, and then by all psychologists together,—a doctrine which has owed its great success to the distinctness of its point of view. It consists in defining animal or human psychology by means of a study of such behavior as is not reflex in character or a stereotyped reaction in the species, but which is modified under the influence of previous states or acts of the individual, as, for example, the behavior of the horse which refuses to cross a bridge on which he formerly met with an accident. To this order of questions belong all the facts of education or spontaneous experience, of training or of initiative, which have been taken to indicate the intelligence of animals. They must be studied entirely 'from without,' as

¹ Published in 1885 in the *Revue philosophique*. This article and, in general, the teaching of M. Lachelier, have exercised the greatest influence on philosophical opinion of to-day. It marks in France the first philosophical reaction against the theories of 'independent psychology,' such as those of Bain, Maudsley, Taine, and Ribot.

one studies a muscular contraction, an attitude, a secretion, without making the least hypothesis as to the mental state of the being who reacts; and yet they are somewhat psychological in character, in the sense in which the word is taken when applied, in the case of man, to the prediction of the conduct of a given individual under certain circumstances.

The work of Russian psycho-physiologists, particularly that of Pavlov and of Bechterev, has greatly reinforced this point of view (which the crabbed and complicated language of M. Nuel a decade ago rendered at first somewhat questionable). In some articles published recently in the *Journal de Psychologie*, the title of which does not fully indicate their importance,¹ Pavlov himself expounded the principle of his method, and Madame Marcelle Dontchef-Dezeuze has just completed a résumé of his entire contribution to psychology, in a volume bearing the title: *L'Image et les réflexes conditionnels dans les travaux de Pavlov*. Simultaneously there appeared a successful translation (by M. Kostyleff) of the great book of Professor Bechterev, with the title, *La psychologie objective*, which develops analogous ideas.

The central idea is that of the 'conditional reflex,' the so-called 'associated reflex' or 'conjunctive reflex.' All of these expressions are equivalent, and all of them, I regret to say, express their meaning very badly in French. I am not competent to appreciate the good or poor choice of synonyms for corresponding Russian expressions, but it would be very desirable if this phenomenon could be designated in our language by some more satisfactory formula. If we take a dog, for example, we may declare that as soon as we give him a piece of meat, or even if we merely show him a piece, he secretes saliva; and by special arrangement we may easily collect and measure up this saliva. The salivation is a primitive reflex, at least relatively primitive: it is the starting point of experience. Now let us assume that each time we give a piece of meat to the dog, we sound a certain note, for example, the D-natural. At the end of a period of time, varying according to the animal, the mere sound of the D will

¹ "Excitation psychique des glandes salivaires," 1910.—"L'Inhibition des réflexes conditionnels," *ibid.*, 1913.

serve to excite the characteristic flow of saliva which was formerly produced by the coming of the meat. The reflex will have been displaced and associated with a new stimulus. And the remarkable thing is that the C-sharp and the E-flat will neither of them produce the effect: the sound inductor is determined between narrow limits.

Instead of using a note we may use a visual sign, an excitation on some point of the skin, or the removal of an object: the reflex becomes associated with it just the same. In every instance disuse effaces the reaction thus established, while exercise establishes and reinforces it. Diverse influences may exercise upon it a momentary inhibition, which, without destroying the influences, hinders them from producing their effect under certain well defined circumstances. Such is the fundamental fact which would be the basis of the psychic development of all beings, which would engender all experience, and which would furnish psychology with an 'elementary phenomenon' comparable to the mathematician's addition of units or term to term correspondence.

We recognize here, transformed and based on experience, the psychology to which Condillac and the Associationists aspired. That is why these researches are of interest to general philosophy. The highest psychical reactions and the most complex, must have developed gradually from this very simple mechanism. They would be 'superior reflexes'¹ as rigorously determined in their production as the condensation of steam in the pipe of a still. The experiences of Pavlov, hedged about by extreme precautions for the maintenance of the *milieu* in the same state, show a perfect precision of the response of the organism under divers influences which we ordinarily call mental. All the psychic life, we may conclude, from the most simple organisms to the most complex, consists therefore in slight modifications of the chemical equilibrium in the nervous substance. We have a kind of freedom, in the sense that the same

¹ The following are some typical subjects of which the second part of Bechterev's work is composed: "Simple reflexes; neuro-psychic reactions, associated reflexes; imitative reflexes; symbolical reflexes: language (three chapters); personal reflexes: the arts. The social order and imitation."

causes would produce sensibly different reactions, according to what we are,' that is to say, according to the actual state of our nervous system and according to the experience which it has accumulated. But this freedom forms no obstacle to the possibility of enveloping everything in universal representation in which the least important phenomena necessarily result from a well defined law. "A time will come (no matter how far distant it may be) in which mathematical analysis, based on natural-scientific analysis, will embrace in magnificent formulas all these equilibria and will finally attain to being included in them itself. This ideal of perfect intelligibility, enveloping even the intelligence itself, is an old and splendid conception of philosophy. It is curious to see it revived again by physiologists at a time when physicists, on the other hand, seem to find pleasure in showing up the narrow limits of their theories and the amount of the inexplicable and irrational which they find to be an inevitable residuum in all their explanations. The mathematician himself, in our day, no longer takes science for the expression of the essential laws of reality. It is evident that the biologist gives the physicist and the chemist more credit than they ask him to give. He thinks that if he can consolidate his science with theirs he may attain thereby perfect intellectual satisfaction. Without doubt this is an illusion, but the most stimulating and honorable of illusions. For, if it is not true that one may reach the fullness of intelligibility, the meaning of progress is nevertheless that of increasing intelligibility. To direct one's course on earth it is often useful to imagine that one is traveling toward a star.

In the meantime we must be careful. Is it well, at this time, to approach the higher mental functions in this way? There is a great gulf separating the reactions of the salivary glands from artistic productions and moral appreciations. And that is why we must deny to psychological physiology the right to monopolize for its own profit the name of 'objective psychology.' The objective is not essentially that which is material and experimental; it is that which has the power of putting

¹ Pavlov, "Les sciences naturelles et le Cerveau," *Journal de Psychologie*, January, 1912.

minds in harmony, whatever else may be the process employed to arrive at that result. There is something of the objective in the psychology of consciousness and sympathy; there is something of it in the reflective and critical psychology: one grants as readily the distinction of conscious and sub-conscious, of true and false, as the distinction between sensitive and motor nerves. The objectivity of mathematics, in the branches most widely removed from observation, for example in the geometry of Lobatchevsky, is no less positive than that of biology. Likewise, there is an æsthetic objectivity, however restricted its content may be estimated to be. Therefore let us not confound the objective with the perceptual, or even with the mechanical. It diminishes the extent of the genus to reduce it to one of its species, even if that be its best representative, or the most common.

The psychical life in its most interesting higher form is found in the field of values, appreciations. Assuming that we admit that the psycho-physiologist, trusting to the exactitude of his method and his liking for unity, extends his outlines to the entire field of mind, and that he considers moral judgments as a variety of 'conditional reflexes': strictly speaking, his attitude is legitimate; but he thereby places himself in a most unfavorable situation for the analysis and comprehension of what he observes. In the presence of justice and self-sacrifice he is like a physicist who would fortify himself with a powerful microscope in order the better to perceive the beauty of the Mona Lisa. His description will all be perfectly true, but also perfectly irrelevant. In the field of psychology we need to-day as never before to see things in their normal scale and to guard against the encroachments of a certain form of 'objectivity' which is very good in its own province, but which is only one among other forms of objectivity. What ought to be is not the same thing as what is. In a time when international treaties are derided, when neutral countries are ravaged, children massacred, and the University of Louvain is but a heap of rubbish, it is not fitting that philosophers should let this distinction be obscured.

I think, moreover, that in France the general opinion of cultivated men would be unanimous in claiming its value. I have

just been reading a remarkable article on the subject in *La Paix par le Droit*, by M. Ruysen, the well-known pacifist who is now a professor at the University of Bordeaux. What can the defenders of "peace through justice" say now? As a matter of fact, they say that the present war has brought them support from unexpected quarters. The journalists and politicians who were most willing to scoff at the Hague tribunal are to-day proclaiming that the end of the war, its justification, is the definite substitution of law for violence in international relations. The real storm, as M. Ruysen points out in a mass of citations,—has disclosed in France an extraordinary moral unity, the program of which is to combat unceasingly and to the end (which is the destruction and uprooting of militarism in Europe), the mad rivalry of armaments; and especially that ideal of domination and hegemony which is the cause of militarism and which is a permanent menace to the peace of civilized nations. No people has the right to dominate another by force: small and large states should organize between them guaranties of justice, peace, and equality, like those which the citizens of a prosperous republic enjoy. That is the popular *Credo*. So it comes about that flagrant violations of right have brought to light the unshakableness of the idea of justice; and its objectivity, though it may not be the objectivity of a *fact*, is none the less imposed with an equal force of conviction upon the consciousness of all who keep their eyes open.

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BERGSON AND SCIENCE.

THE most casual reader of Bergson would gain the impression that he is under some obligation to science. Strangely enough the opinion appears to be general that science in turn owes nothing to Bergson. To most actions in the world there is a reaction, and there is also some kind of mutuality in most human relations. Science may possibly have something to learn from a great modern philosophy such as that of Bergson.

A universe that is in eternal flux has little place for finality, and finality is the bane of science. If a great industry wishes to carry out a practical research, the difficulty is to find men whose minds are not hopelessly closed by the sense of the finality of their present knowledge. The more elaborate their education often the more hopelessly rigid are their ideas. Every advance of science has to contend, not only with the natural difficulties of a great problem, but also with the ideas of scientific men. As we look back on the history of science, we are slow to admit that the movement has been anything but a steady advance from small beginnings to the present goal. First was the chemical atom. Then the chemical atom was broken up into the smaller atoms—the electrons. That was merely an advance, a progress. The atom of Dalton is still with us. Yes, but this takes no account of the idea of finality that was once attached to the old atom, nor to the prejudice that such finality created in the minds of those who were called upon to contemplate the possibility of that atom's divisibility. Newtonian ideas of gravitation survived the disruption by Faraday of the idea of action at a distance. The achievements of Newton and Laplace have not been disturbed by those of Faraday. But the statement conveys no suspicion of the fact that had Faraday been well trained in the physics of the eighteenth century he, perhaps, would not have had the courage to act upon his own ideas.

The sense of finality is very persistent and stands in the way of growing knowledge. If we think of present knowledge as a

mass surrounded by the boundless space of nescience, we may imagine growth taking place by some kind of addition coming to the surface. But science grows not as a stone by increasing size through mere mechanical addition. It grows more as an organism would. The most apparently insignificant accretion may profoundly change the whole character of the mass of hitherto acquired knowledge. It may help scientific men if they consciously realize that all is a flux, that change is the fundamental nature of reality, and that if we once see things as they are we shall say there is nothing but change, pure mobility. Perhaps the useless, stubborn, obstructing element of human conservatism requires just such drastic treatment.

Science has indeed played sad havoc with the finality of human concepts. A concept is enriched by some experience and soon it acquires a new extension of the intellectual grounds covered by it. Magellan's circumnavigation of the globe gave the concepts 'up' and 'down' a new meaning and an extension of that of 'gravitation' to the motion of the moon in its orbit. Embryology and paleontology so profoundly changed the concept 'species,' introducing continuity into the conceptual realm of biology, as indeed to throw this whole concept into an almost hopeless flux, rendering it incapable of definition. The physical concept of 'mass' is yielding to the modern idea that it is a function of the movement of a body's lines of force extending into boundless space.

In Bergson the concepts take on a new extension and new content. 'Life,' 'Materiality,' 'the self,' 'duration,' and many more on Bergson's pages convey meanings they never had before. It is the nature of philosophical and scientific progress to keep their concepts in a flux. This is true because of the nature of the world in which we live and because of the character of our concepts. The mind approaches reality with certain concepts because they satisfy a human need, give humanity control of reality. The superiority of one system of concepts over another will be determined by their superior capacity for increasing human power. The eternal flux of concepts points to the unlimited capacity of nature to respond to the needs of

men. *Science made* will always assume an air of finality, presenting a logically completed system. From the ever-growing needs of men will come ideas changing the boundaries and content of the concepts of science, disintegrating the old scientific structure and building it anew. The difficulty is that the finalists always possess an advantage and their use of it is shamelessly detrimental to progress. The new ideas can never at first justify themselves. Their origin discredits them. They spring from the domain not of the intellect but of the intuition. Their origin is often very plebeian, more than plebeian. For in the matter of intuition it is believed by some that bees and wasps have a decided advantage over men. But, be that as it may, science in the making comes from the realms of intuition. Out of this fact comes the need on the part of scientific men for some kind of philosophy of intuition. If we are to exercise any conscious control over the advance of science, we need at least to respect, if we cannot understand, the source of new concepts. There can be little doubt that they have an origin outside the domain commonly assigned to the intellect. The most fertile concept in modern physics is that of energy. It was very late in finding its way into science. The intuition of the workers of the world long ago found it. The concept of work expressed that which they gave the world and that which in turn the world valued. The intuition of work, of energy, was involved in the efforts of that endless line of seekers for perpetual motion. But into physics the concept never entered fruitfully until Helmholtz tried to explain to his own mind why these seekers for perpetual motion had universally failed in their quest. The latter must involve a violation of some great law of nature. In the effort of these generations of unsuccessful seekers was contained an intuition of the concept of energy which in Helmholtz's hands proved so fruitful in multiplying the power of physical science. Bergson expresses the fundamental nature of the quest for a new concept as follows: "In order to generalize we have to abstract similarity, but, in order to disengage similarity usefully we must already know how to generalize."¹ This simply means that intellect alone cannot generalize. Intuition cuts the knot. We

¹ *Matter and Memory*, p. 208.

search the continuum that is reality for that which will satisfy our need. We take that satisfaction where we find it. In this part of the process of forming concepts the lower animals may possess an advantage over us. The coyote who loves kidney fat does not perceive other qualities in the animal in which he finds it. He is simply looking for kidney fat. He 'lives generality.' He does not think it. We too must live it before we shall ever think it. Out of the life of the world spring the concepts which enrich science. These concepts come to science through the intuition of genius. And often, as in the case of the concept of energy, it is the genius of humanity. Nothing can be more grotesque than to demand of scientific ideas a proof of their fertility at their first appearance. Before their final acceptance they will have undergone the most rigorous testing. We are not overburdened with ideas. The world has always suffered from a poverty of them. Science is not all a patient collecting of facts. That alone would never give the smallest advance. The epochs in science have been marked by the advent of new concepts springing from the depths of human intuition.

The other form of finality against which science has had to contend has been a foe in her own camp. Before the days of the researches in radioactivity some physicists believed that the great laws of nature had all been discovered. The discoveries of the future would be in the 'sixth decimal place.' There was nothing to look forward to but greater precision in the statement of laws already discovered. Behind the scenes in our phenomenal world, explaining all its activities, was a perfectly definite mechanical system of atoms and molecules, which predetermined all the events of the material world with scientific exactness. A materialistic philosophy had been built upon this view of the physicist. All the events of the world for ages to come were predetermined by the present state of this atomic and molecular machinery. The revelations of radioactivity set the date of a renaissance in the activities of physicists. The atomic and molecular mechanism suddenly became very complicated. The atom, formerly supposed simple, became a universe in itself.

If a chance discovery in one small department of physical research can so complicate the 'scheme of things,' what assurance can we have that the mechanism lying back of nature's scenes is not infinitely complex, that anyone of a number of phases of that infinite complexity might have been discovered first? It seems absurd to think that the scheme could have been unravelled only in one way. Nature, infinitely complex, could respond to any one of many modes of approach. The course of evolution of science was not predetermined by the nature of science herself already existing in nature, awaiting discovery. The history of science began to assume some significance. Science had hitherto been its own history. Consider the logical form of the completed scientific structure. There in its very logical nature you had the one and only possible story of its evolution. But for a nature explained by a mechanism of infinite complexity there could be as many sciences as genius could suggest ways of approach. Now add to this the idea that these ways of approach spring from human intuition, that each method of approach comes from something unique in the personality of a Faraday, say, then the work of science becomes creative like music and art, and the history of science is determined by the personality of its great masters. Mach, long ago, in his *History of Mechanics*, called attention to the influence exercised upon the course of science by the personality of men. If Faraday had not been possessed of his peculiar intuition of the fundamental character of physical action and reaction, electromagnetic induction would not have been discovered when it was, and the discovery of the law of the conservation of energy would have been much delayed. The course of the history of nineteenth century physical science would have been greatly changed. We cannot think that someone sooner or later would not have discovered electromagnetic induction. Yet we may easily imagine that, without Faraday's intuition regarding the impossibility of action at a distance, the course of investigation and discovery that led through Maxwell to electromagnetic waves and wireless telegraphy might have been delayed a century or so.

Creativeness cannot be described nor its work understood in

intellectual terms. But this does not afford the slightest reason for ignoring its existence. In another field, it looks as though science would be compelled to acknowledge the presence and activity of a creative power—in the evolution of the forms of life. Evolutionists have never been able to give an adequate explanation of the development of a complex organ like the eye. The method of science is to analyze the eye into elements. Now each of these elements must be brought into existence, made a permanent possession, by natural selection. They must be assembled and coördinated. The difficulty is to see how the assemblage of elements can possess survival value at each stage of that evolution. Natural selection could not have preserved a single one of those elements of the functions of seeing without the presence of coördinate elements that make it effective. The great creative force in nature must proceed in some way quite different from that suggested by human logic. Man's mind is only one of the remote tips of one of the upper branches of the tree life, and is of itself unable to explain the processes going on in the trunk.

The creative activity in nature has much in common with that working in the evolution of human science. A fertile idea has survival value from the start. The discovery of Oersted suggested to Faraday the idea of the procedure that led to his discovery of electromagnetic induction. But the idea working in his mind was larger than that of this one impending discovery. His intuition held the germ of the law of conservation of energy. In the intuition that led Faraday in those years and in the discovery in which it found expression was the complete function of what is now known as the electrical transmission of energy. The whole science of electrical engineering is simply that of this one function, viz., the force acting upon a wire carrying a current in a magnetic field—expressing itself in evermore complicated forms. The whole science of electrical engineering was in the intuition that carried Faraday through those years spent in the search for electromagnetic induction. This fundamental function in electrical engineering science possessed survival value at every stage of its evolution, from the vaguest outline of it in

Faraday's physical instincts to the complicated modern power plant. May it not be true that at every stage in the evolution of a complex organ like the eye it possessed survival value, not because it gave expression to what we now call seeing, but to some function, the forerunner of seeing, useful for purposes of survival. Side by side with the evolution such as we would have seen looking at it from the outside and describing it in terms of a mechanical assemblage of the elements to be found only in the perfected organ, was another evolution moving parallel to the first, the evolution of a consciousness, the last expression of which is vision as we now know it. The same thing may be said of the whole of materiality, the whole of our science. No assemblage of mechanical elements will give us a real whole. Each new fact or law of science stands where once was an apparently insurmountable obstacle to an advancement much larger than that particular fact or law. "Everything happens as though the grip of intelligence on matter were, in its main intention, to *let something pass* that matter is holding back."¹ Just before every advance materiality is standing in the way of a movement of the human spirit. All the energy of the spirit is summoned to overcome the obstacle. "The materiality of the machine does not represent a sum of means employed, but a sum of obstacles avoided; it is a negation rather than a positive reality."² The whole of our perceptual world is but a small part of reality on this view. The great thing to be considered is that the perceptual, the scientific, the materialistic is not isolable, but maintains the most intimate relationship with a greater reality that will not be made subject to the categories of the mind. In the process of scientific discovery this greater reality is constantly manifesting itself. The problem of the investigator is stated in perceptual terms. The method of attack is in such terms. But the solution comes through something more than a merely logical activity. It is profoundly intuitive. All the perceptual elements of the problem seem to pass into the inner life of the discoverer. Poincaré has described the process of mathematical discovery. The perceptual elements of the problem are first

¹ *Creative Evolution*, p. 183.

² *Ibid.*, p. 93.

considered in conscious intellectual activity, where everything assumes a logical form. Strenuous effort is made to effect a solution. This conscious effort fails. After a long season of rest, suddenly, without warning, an attitude that must lead to a successful solution comes up into consciousness. Some would explain the result as the outcome of a subconscious mental activity. This is simply to insist on imposing the logical activities of the conscious mind upon the profounder functions of our nature. The hypothesis of subconscious mental activity is made in the interests of maintaining intellectual activity as the only possible form of rationality. If we knew more we should seek to derive our conscious intellectual activities from the more fundamental ones.

One of the most startling facts concerning human nature revealed by the slightest introspection is this,—of what a very minute portion of our world are we distinctly conscious at any one moment. At any given instant how many of the significant persons and things in life are out of mind. A football player attempting to stop an opponent carrying the ball is absorbed in the momentary action. How much even of the present game is he, at this moment, forgetting. He is not distinctly conscious of the score up to the present instant. The goal is not pictured in his mind. He has probably no visual image of the people in the grandstand. How very much of the game he is playing is out of the player's mind, to say nothing of the countless motives that have had their part in bringing this player into the field. While these things are all out of mind they are not outside the player's being. While he is not distinctly recalling the score, the quality of his present attitude is very accurately determined by it. While he does not in his moment of absorption picture the goal, that goal is directing his present action. Should the spectator on the side lines be withdrawn, something would be taken from the character of his immediate performance. There is in his instantaneous attitude a certain quality that would not be there were it not for the friend who is now far away but who will read a report of the game. When we are absorbed in any given action only a minute portion of our experience is distinctly

figured in its visual outline. But in our attitude are the great purposes of life and the countless things that give us our motives. All our world, at any given instant, lying outside our distinct image of reality, is nevertheless acting in us. It is all there blending into one attitude, one purpose, one special motive, like many tones blending into a single harmony. External phenomena have all entered into a kind of chemical combination with one another, while the separate elements of the combination have lost the individual properties that they possess in the distinct form of consciousness. There is a definite unity in our momentary action, our attitude. The diverse elements of persons and things which blend into the single attitude have lost their individual identity. But they have not passed into a mythical realm of the unconscious. They have become one unified attitude, which will on the slightest hint break up into the diversified elements distinctly visualized. There is a continuity between these two forms of consciousness as they pass the one into the other, this unity passing into multiplicity which breaks in upon that unity with as little surprise as when we awaken to a sense of the presence of a friend in the same room with us after our absorption in a book. The return of a sense of the friend's presence is not like one coming from the dead, for the friend has been in our active mental attitude all the time, no matter how deep the absorption. We know that in some remarkable way the multiplicity of persons and things with which that unity breaks up was with us all the time. This describes one of Bergson's fluxes. The human spirit moves from the realm of this unity, the intuitive, where being and knowing are one, the realm of the uncategorized, the personal, where everything interpenetrates everything else, the realm where we possess only activities and attitudes, where consciousness is qualitative, to the realm of multiplicity, spatiality, where impenetrability is the universal law, the categorized, the logical, the perceptual, the impersonal, the realm of science. Here is a movement that gives rise to the great dualisms in human thought. In the place of these dualisms Bergson substitutes a creative movement. When the ends of the movement are considered the dualism is

absolute. For the riddle of the dualism Bergson would substitute the riddle of creation. But it is to be a creation with an order in it. The great dualism at the beginning and at the end of the movement is to be bridged by the movement itself characterized by a perfect continuity. In a continuous movement of this kind there should be any number of possible points of arrest. The movement in our own consciousness has been made possible by the whole history of our evolution, and evolution is known to cover up its tracks, to erase its continuities. To find as many points of arrest as possible then is desirable in maintaining the hypothesis of such a movement. We can not arrest it at any point we choose. Yet in the great world outside us Bergson finds a similar movement. In it we may distinguish stages. "The movement at the end of which is spatiality lays down along its course the faculty of induction as well as that of deduction, in fact, intellectuality entire."¹ Logical induction and deduction then are points of arrest in this movement. Beyond these points of arrest lie the limits of the movement, spatiality. Other points of arrest are indicated. This is the movement of the supra-consciousness. He says: "Consciousness or supra-consciousness is the name for the rocket whose extinguished fragments fall back as matter; consciousness, again, is the name for that which subsists of the rocket itself passing through the fragment and lighting them up into organisms."² This movement of the supra-consciousness is parallel to the above described movement of the human mind. It is this movement of the supra-consciousness that has laid down deduction and induction on its way to spatiality, and which "creates at once the intellectuality of mind and the materiality of matter." But in this movement the supra-consciousness does not go so far into spatiality as does the human mind. The latter has followed the movement of matter towards spatiality but has gone farther and become more spatial than matter is. For modern physics shows that in reality matter interpenetrates. The human mind on the other hand breaks up matter into distinct bodies. This movement is creative, each moment of it shows something unique,

¹ *Creative Evolution*, p. 216.

² *Ibid.*, p. 261.

something that is an epigenesis upon all that went before. The movement creates matter, it creates intellect, logical powers and spatiality. The creations are real and absolute. One end of the movement materiality, intellectuality, spatiality, is just as real as the other end which is life, intuition, interpenetration. At the one end we have that which constitutes a scientific order, where prediction is possible. But the movement that creates the scientific order, the movement that is forever re-creating it, is not a scientific order. It is an order such as is exemplified in "a Beethoven symphony which is genius, originality, and therefore unforeseeability itself."¹ These two orders are two forms of rationality that reign over reality. In the scientific realm we have the one form. In the realm of life and intuition we have another form, an æsthetic one, the kind of rationality that is found in a Beethoven symphony. This is giving to rationality a new meaning but we have need of a concept that will cover the whole ground. The movement symbolized by a Beethoven symphony is certainly different in character from any physical movement we know. According to Bergson's theories, it is unique in each moment of it. Each moment of it is something new created, each moment of it presents a difference of kind. Yet the movement is a perfectly continuous one. The total movement results in an accumulation of differences of kind that amount to an absolute dualism when the beginning and the end of the movement are compared. Yet throughout it all a continuity prevails. This is not a movement such as that of a point describing a line, not a movement of spatial changes, but one of qualitative changes. The successive moments of the movement are unpredictable from anything that precedes, like the next step in a curve that is determined by an infinite number of derivatives of successive orders, yet like the next step in the curve, continuous with what went before. This is certainly a new kind of continuity, a qualitative one, but we do to some extent intuitively sense it. If we could re-live the life of the race in the evolution of the human consciousness from instinct to intelligence, we might feel and realize its perfect continuity

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 224.

and its perfectly creative character. To make this a working hypothesis it is not necessary to re-live history and to experience the continuity any more than the finding of the missing link is necessary to the theory of Darwinian evolution.

If we grant that a movement may be continuous and yet each moment of it have in it something uniquely different in kind from what went before, there is no additional difficulty in understanding how in the process of that movement the human consciousness might create itself into an identity with something which was external to itself in another phase of its being. To make such an action possible, the supra-consciousness and the individual consciousness must interpenetrate, must have much in common. "Intellect and matter have progressively adapted themselves one to the other in order to attain at last a common form. This adaptation has, moreover, been brought about quite naturally, because it is the same inversion of the same movement which creates at once the intellectuality of mind and the materiality of things."¹ In some such way as this we may understand Bergson's claim to occupy a place above both realism and idealism and embracing both.

The order of that movement that starts in the realm where being and knowing are one is the order of a Beethoven symphony, but a Beethoven symphony which is repeated many times in our lives. Each moment of that movement is unpredictable from anything in the preceding moment. Yet from habit we know what to expect, as we do in hearing the great musical composition for the fiftieth time. Thus it is that a certain quality, a certain tone in the inner intuitive life, is always issuing into an outer creation of a character quite definitely related to the inner. In other words there is a definite psycho-physical parallelism between the inner, the personal, the intuitive and the outer, the spatialized, the materialized world; between the order of the Beethoven symphony and the scientific order. The inner intuitive life is the self and the other is the objective world. Bergson's psycho-physical parallelism is not between the physical organism of the individual, and his psychical life, but between the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 206.

inner personal life and all outer reality, something of which the human body is but a small part. The parallelism between the two explains Hume's difficulties in his efforts to find the self. "I never catch myself at any time without a perception and never can observe anything but the perception." So completely did Hume find the outer world identified with the self that he doubted the existence of the latter. When Hume, looking for himself, found only a perception, the self had reached the terminus of a movement where it had actually created itself into an outer reality. All he had to do was to stop looking for anything, even the self, and the inverse movement would carry him back into the realm of intuition where the overwhelming sense of self is asserted. The moment that the self tries to picture itself, to give itself form, it moves out into the realm of spatiality where only perceptions are experienced. We know we have a self as long as we do not try to find it. We lose it the moment we look for it. The inner life, the life of intuition, is the self. The creative movement is the expression of the creative effort of the self. At the inner terminus of the movement the self is one with all its past, perhaps one with all reality. Interpenetration is the great fact here. At the outer terminus of the movement is perception, and there the self is at one with as much of a reality as interests it.

Each execution of the movement from inner to outer is much the same, like the great symphony played for the hundredth time. But it is a creative movement, each repetition is never quite the same. The movement itself is in flux. The outer reality is in flux. All the movements are creative. Nature is ever being made anew and always changing. We too are ever changing. The question naturally arises: If nature's inmost reality is changed, where is science possible? Science deals with constancies. Change permeates our world to its inmost core. We may trace a curve with a certain degree of approximation if we know its mathematical law. That is, if we know the derivative of a certain number of low orders of a function, say the first, second and third, provided the derivatives of the higher orders approach constancy over a certain short course of the curve.

But if all the derivatives of the higher orders to infinity are variables, and each derivative a new function, the whole movement of our curve is change of the profoundest kind. Prediction of its course becomes impossible. Likewise it becomes impossible to isolate a something, an unchanging somewhat, of which we may say it is, putting into the 'is' the sense that the something endures unchanged for an appreciable time. This would be the aspect of reality to us if the span of our duration should be indefinitely lengthened. By shortening this span of duration all the higher derivatives of the function approach constancy during the course the curve takes in that short span of duration, and we progress toward a view of reality in which changes are momentarily, at least, inappreciable. Here science finds its province. Here it can trace with some degree of approximation future movements of the curve. Its work is thus relative to the particular span of our duration. But even with this limited span of duration all would still appear changed were it not for the coarseness of our senses which do not detect the incessant change really going on. In the domain of life, of mental life, of psychology, the change is more in evidence and in these fields science must meet some of the difficulties it would experience in the realm of matter itself were the span of our duration considerably lengthened. In such a lengthened span of duration we would say there is nothing but change. We could not say that it is nothing that changes, for the idea of a nothing would itself be inconceivable. Nothing is a negation of something. The idea of something appears only on the indefinite shortening of the 'rhythm of our duration.' When that rhythm is lengthened to an unlimited extent, or when our senses should become unlimitedly appreciative of all changes, no matter how minute, all idea of a something would disappear together with its negative nothing, and the only reality would be change, pure mobility. Science finds its province by carefully defining, stating and respecting its relations to this mobility. Science exists for beings of a shortened duration, of coarse senses, and in fields where apparently unchanging somethings may be isolated. The work of science is never a finality. However, its work is a

part of reality. It is a reality created by the never ending movement of life, and of individual minds which spring from the great life movement. It is a reality in flux. The scientific order occupies for us the commanding position in all the fluxes that constitute reality. As the spirit moves from inner to outer and back, ever enriching and enlarging itself, the scientific order, the perceptual order, is the one cross-section of the whole movement at which we can control everything. The perceptual life gives the intuition its material. The manipulations we attempt in the scientific order are the challenges to intuition to its creative effort. "There are things which intelligence alone is able to seek, but which, by itself, it will never find. These things instinct alone could find; but it would never seek them."¹ Between the two orders of rationality is a remarkable parallelism, a most intimate interrelationship. The scientific order owes its existence to the creative movement of the other order, and it depends upon it for its health and its vitality, and its never ending process of re-creation.

The order typified by the Beethoven symphony must be respected in every process involving growth. Scientific concepts are made and grasped through intuition. Every act of the human being is a creative one, originating in instinct, in intuition and seeking objective expression. Every single act of this kind is only a part of a larger act that is seeking expression, in other words, every creative act is the part of a creative purpose born in the fundamental instincts, the intuition of the personality. These acts and their larger purposes have survival value for the individual; otherwise they would never express themselves. No matter what complex idea may be in the process of being grasped, that part of it that is possessed at any moment must have survival value. There is no such thing as learning the separate elements of a great principle or anything else, each element one at a time, and later assembling them into a whole by a purely mechanical process. The human mind does not work that way. It grasps things by wholes. It dissociates the wholes into elements, but it never assembles mechanical elements into a whole. The first

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 151.

beginnings of understanding the law of the conservation of energy can be made by a mind that has already enough of that law in intuition to give it survival value for that mind. This survival value comes from the fact that any given act of understanding is part of the larger act, a purpose, yes, a life purpose. The mind acts creatively along lines that associate its special act with life purposes. Every element of a scientific education, whenever we look at it in a partially completed state, must represent what was once an obstacle to the instinctive movements of the whole personality. To this end educational material should not be organized out of the abstract elements into which logical analysis divides it up, but it should be organized into a hierarchy of purposes having an appeal to the instincts of human beings. The world's scientific achievements should appeal to the learner as a system of problems out of which purposes spring, organize themselves, and come to fuller expression. Our courses of instruction should be alive with the spirit of research. But they should present that spirit not alone in terms of its final product but in its origin, in the instincts and the intuitions of the mind. We are very ineffective in our attempts to pass our scientific heritage along to coming generations.

The current ideas of genius are most unscientific. Genius makes its contributions to science through intuition. In all phenomena the principle of continuity reigns. But not so with the prevailing ideas concerning genius. Find a quality that is possessed in a striking way by one object, one may be sure that all objects possess that quality in a degree. All men possess some genius and it is a positive, worth-while asset. The education of every human being must come forth out of his own personality, must be his own personal creation. To facilitate individual effort towards education, the achievements of the race should not make the appeal of a museum with its classified fossils, or of an encyclopedia or even of a textbook with knowledge de-organized, mechanized on some logical scheme. But if human achievement in science is presented in terms of a possible system of organized human purposes, the personality feels the appeal of something it can assimilate. The individual's education must

be an expression of his growing personality, fed by the achievement of the race organized into ends that appeal. The material is in most intimate relationship with the largest spiritual reality. Our interests should be largely in *science in the making* rather than in *science made*. Human genius, human personality even in its most humble form, is an asset of scientific worth. All our power of controlling our world comes from the attempted application of scientific concepts to reality. Bergson is regarded by some as an anti-intellectualist. His whole effort, however, is to apply intellectual procedure to the mastery of the whole spiritual reality. His philosophy represents not a restriction but an extension of intellectual effort. As the mathematician takes that piece of incomprehensibility, the square root of minus one, and operates upon it in a perfectly comprehensible way and obtains useful results, so Bergson seeks to apply intellectual methods to incomprehensible intuition and thus to gain some control over this undoubted faculty. In the light of these ideas science is the pursuit of power, power in controlling our world. The history of science is the history of the growth of human power over the forces and energies of nature, not the discovery of a truth hidden in nature waiting to be found. Scientific and philosophic education is the evolution of the individual's sense of power, the expression of his personality.

The universe is one of order. But there are two kinds of order. The materialistic order is the field of science. The other order typified by the Beethoven symphony is the field of metaphysics. The close interrelationship of these two orders brings science and metaphysics into very close fellowship. Sometimes "science, theory of knowledge, and metaphysics find themselves on the same ground."¹ In such close relationship there is no need of substituting metaphysical explanation of phenomena for scientific. The determination to push scientific explanations just as far as they can be possibly pushed must be persisted in at all hazards. For example, when, in discussing instinct, Bergson speaks of "sympathy between the amphipod and its victim"² the idea of sympathy meeting a metaphysical need is

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 198.

² *Ibid.*, p. 173.

not used to the end of finally closing the scientific problem involved in the study of instinct.

The modern scientific movement is a new force in human affairs. Repeated attempts have been made to understand its meaning and nature, the real essence of scientific method. We naturally like to reach some kind of an intelligent consciousness of what we are doing. An early attempt in modern times to attain such a consciousness was Bacon's *Novum Organon*. No one would today claim that attempt was wholly adequate. Other attempts followed Bacon's. It is entirely possible that modern philosophies like Bergson's may help us to a clearer consciousness of the real aim and character of natural science.

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KANT'S RELATION TO HUME AND TO LEIBNITZ

KANT'S manner of formulating his fundamental problem—
How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?—may well seem to the modern reader to imply an unduly scholastic and extremely rationalistic method of approach. Kant's reasons for adopting it have most unfortunately been largely obscured, owing to a very natural but now the less mistaken interpretation which has usually been given to his own personal intentions. They have been supposed to prove that the immediate occasion of the above formula was Hume's discussion of the problem of causality in the *Enquiry into the Human Understanding*. Kant, it is argued, could not have been acquainted with Hume's earlier and more elaborate *Treatise on Human Nature*, of which there was then no translation, and his references to Hume must therefore concern only the later work. Wainwright has done valuable service in disputing this reading of Kant's autobiographical statements. Kant does not himself make direct mention of the *Enquiry*, and examination of the passages in the *Prolegomena* and in the *Präface* in which Hume's teaching is under consideration seems rather to point to the earlier argument of the *Treatise*. This is a matter of no small importance: for if Wainwright's view can be established, it will enable us to appreciate in a manner otherwise impossible, how Kant should have come to regard the problem of a priori synthetic as being the most pressing question in the entire field of speculative philosophy. The essential difference between the *Treatise* and the *Enquiry*, from the standpoint of their bearing upon critical issues, lies in the wider scope and more radical character of the earlier work. The *Enquiry* discusses the problem of causality only in the form in which it emerges in particular

Notes on Kant's Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason

These passages are of no more importance, and call for more highly qualified than I possess, when we turn to the article.

causal judgments, i. e., as to our grounds for asserting that this or that effect is due to this or that cause. In the *Prolegomena*, Hume raises the broader question as to our right to postulate that events must always be causally determined. In other words, he there questions the validity of the universal causal principle, that whatever begins to exist must have a cause of existence; and he does so on the explicit ground that it demands as necessary the connecting of two concepts, that of an event and that of an antecedent cause, between which no connection of any kind can be detected by the mind. The principle, that is to say, is not self-evident; it is synthetic. The concept of an event and the concept of a cause are quite separate and distinct ideas. Events can be conceived without our requiring to think antecedent events upon which they are dependent. Nor is the principle capable of demonstration. For if it be objected that in questioning its validity we are committing ourselves to the impossible assertion that events arise out of nothing, such argument is only applicable if the principle be previously granted. If events do not require a cause, it is as little necessary to seek their source in a generation out of nothing as it anything positive. Similarly, when it is argued that as all the parts of time and space are uniform, there must be some cause determining an event to happen at one moment and in one place rather than at any other time or place, the principle is again assumed. There is no greater difficulty in supposing the time and place to be fixed without a cause than in supposing the existence to be so determined. The principle, Hume concludes, is not rational in character. It is an instrument useful for the organization of experience, and for that reason nature has determined as to its formation and acceptance. Properly viewed, it expresses a merely instinctive belief, and is explicable only in the naturalistic manner of our other propensities, as necessary to the making of some practical need. "Nature has determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel."

From this naturalistic position Hume makes a most vigorous attack upon the empirical philosophies which profess to establish general principles by inductive inference from the facts of

experience. If the principles which lie at the basis of our experience are non-rational in character, the same must be true of our empirical judgments. They may correctly describe the uniformities that have hitherto occurred in the sequences of our sensations, and may express the natural expectations to which they spontaneously give rise; but they may never be regarded as capable of serving as a basis for inference. In eliminating *apriori* principles, and appealing exclusively to sense-experience, the empiricist removes all grounds of distinction between inductive inference and custom-bred expectation. And since from this standpoint the possibility of universal or abstract concepts—so Hume argues—must also be denied, deductive inference must likewise be eliminated from among the possible instruments at the disposal of the mind. So-called inference is never the source of our beliefs; it is our fundamental natural beliefs, as determined by the constitution of our nature in its reaction upon external influences, that generate those expectations which, however they may masquerade in logical costume, have as purely natural a source as our sensations and feelings. Such, briefly and dogmatically stated, is the sum and substance of Hume's teaching.¹

Now it was these considerations that, as it would seem, awakened Kant to the problem of *apriori synthesis*. He was, and to the very last remained, in entire agreement with Hume's contention that the principle of causality is neither self-evident nor capable of logical demonstration, and he at once realized that what is true of this principle must also hold of all the other principles fundamental to science and philosophy. Kant further agreed that inductive inference from the data of experience is only possible upon the prior acceptance of rational principles independently established; and that we may not, therefore, look to experience for proof of their validity. Thus with the rejection of self-evidence as a feature of the *apriori*, and with the consequent admission of its synthetic character, Kant is compelled to acquiesce in the inevitableness of the dilemma which Hume propounds. Either Hume's sceptical conclusions must be ac-

¹ For justification of this interpretation of Hume I must refer the reader to *Mind*, Vol. XIV, N. S., No. 54-5.

cepted, or we must be able to point to some criterion which is not subject to the defects of the rationalist and empirical methods of proof, and which is adequate to determine the validity or invalidity of general principles. Is there any such alternative? Such is Kant's problem as expressed in the formula: How are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?

It is a very remarkable historical fact that notwithstanding the clearness and cogency of Hume's argument, and the appearance of such competent thinkers as Thomas Reid in Scotland, Lambert and Crusius in Germany, no less than thirty years should have elapsed from the publication of the *Treatise* before Hume found a single reader capable of appreciating his results at their true value.¹ Even Kant himself was not able from his reading of the *Enquiry* in 1760-2 to realize the importance and bearing of the main problem. Though in the *Enquiry* the wider issue regarding the general principle of causality is not raised, the scope and meaning of the problem is for us who interpret it in the light of Kant's later speculations made sufficiently clear, and accordingly we cannot be absolutely certain that it was not a re-reading of the *Enquiry* or a recalling of its argument² that suggested to Kant the central problem of his Critical philosophy. The probability, however, is rather that this awakening took place only indirectly through his becoming acquainted with the wider argument of the *Treatise* as revealed in James Beattie's extremely crude and unsympathetic criticism of Hume's philosophy.³ Beattie had great natural ability, and considerable literary power. His prose writings have a lucidity and crispness,

¹ To this fact Kant himself draws attention, "But the perpetual hard fate of metaphysic would not allow Hume to be understood. We cannot without a certain sense of pain consider how utterly his opponents, Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and even Priestley, missed the point of the problem. For while they were ever assuming as conceded what he doubted, and demonstrating with eagerness and often with arrogance what he never thought of disputing, they so overlooked his inclination towards a better state of things, that everything remained undisturbed in its old condition." (*Prolegomena*, p. 6; Eng. Trans., p. 5.)

² The word which Kant uses is *Errinerung* (cf. below, p. 293 n). There are two main reasons for believing that Kant had not himself read the *Treatise*. He was imperfectly acquainted with the English language, and there was no existing German translation. And, secondly, Kant's statements reveal his entire ignorance of Hume's view of mathematical science as given in the *Treatise*.

³ Cf. Vaihinger: *Commentary*, I, pp. 344 ff.

and a felicity of illustration, which go far to explain the widespread popularity which they enjoyed in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Their literary quality is, however, more than counterbalanced by the absence of any genuine appreciation of the deeper speculative implications and consequences of the problems which they discuss. And this being so, he is naturally at his worst in his criticism of Hume. In insisting, as he does, upon the absurd practical results¹ that would follow from the adoption of Hume's sceptical conclusions, he is merely exploiting popular prejudice in the philosophical arena. That, however, may be forgiven him, if, as would seem to be the case, the quotations which he gives verbatim from Hume's *Treatise* really first revealed to Kant the scope and innermost meaning of Hume's analysis of the causal problem. The evidence in support of this is entirely circumstantial. The German translation of Beattie's *Nature of Truth* was published at Easter, 1772, i. e., in the year in which Kant, in the process of his own independent development, came, as shown by his famous letter to Herz,² to realize the mysterious problematic character of *apriori* knowledge of the independently real. He was then, however, still entirely unconscious of the deeper problem which at once emerges upon recognition that *apriori* principles, quite apart from all question of their objective validity, are synthetic in form. We also know that Kant was acquainted with Beattie's work; for he twice refers to Beattie's criticism of Hume.³ What more probable than that he read it in the year of its publication, or at least at some time not very long subsequent to the date of the Herz letter? The passages which Beattie quotes from the *Treatise* are exactly those that are necessary to reveal the full scope of Hume's revolutionary teaching in respect to the general

¹ These Hume had himself pointed out both in the *Treatise* and in the *Enquiry*; because of this he rejects scepticism as a feasible philosophy of life. Kant's statement above quoted that Hume's critics (among whom Beattie is cited) "were ever assuming what Hume doubted, and demonstrating with eagerness and often with arrogance what he never thought of disputing," must undoubtedly refer in a quite especial degree to Beattie. That is exactly what we feel in reading him.

² *Werke*, X, pp. 123. It is dated February 21, 1772.

³ In *Prolegomena*, p. 6 (above quoted, p. 291 n), and p. 8 (Eng. trans., p. 6): "I should think Hume might fairly have laid as much claim to sound sense as Beattie, and besides to a critical understanding (such as the latter did not possess)."

principle of causality. There seems, indeed, little doubt that this must have been the channel through which Hume's influence chiefly acted. Thus it was that at long last, and as it would seem by a circuitous path, through the quotations of an adversary, Hume awakened philosophy from its dogmatic slumber,¹ and won for his argument that appreciation which despite its cogency it had for thirty years so vainly demanded.

Let us now turn our attention to the rationalist philosophy in which Kant was educated. Hume's contention that experience cannot by itself justify any inductive inference forms the natural bridge over which we can best pass to the contrasting standpoint of Leibnitz. Hume and Leibnitz find common ground in denouncing empiricism. Both agree in regarding it as the mongrel offspring of conflicting principles. If rationalism cannot hold its own, the alternative is not the finding of firm foot-hold in concrete experience, but only such consolation as a sceptical philosophy may afford.² The overthrow of rationalism means the destruction of metaphysic in every form. Even mathematics and the natural sciences will have to be viewed as fulfilling a practical end, not as satisfying a theoretical need. But though Leibnitz's criticism of empiricism is identical with that of Hume in its main contention, it is profoundly different both in its orientation and in the conclusions to which it leads. While Hume maintains that induction must be regarded as an irrational process of merely instinctive anticipation, Leibnitz argues to the self-legislative character of pure thought. Sense-experience reveals reality only in proportion as it embodies principles derived from the inherent character of thought itself. Experience conforms to *apriori* principles, and so can afford an adequate basis for scientific induction.

¹ Cf. *Prolegomena*, p. 8: I honestly confess that my recollection of David Hume's teaching (*die Erinnerung des David Hume*) was the very thing which many years ago [Kant's writing in 1783] first interrupted my dogmatic slumber, and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction." Kant's employment of the very strange term *Erinnerung* may perhaps be interpreted in view of the indirect source of his knowledge of Hume's main position. He would bring to his reading of Beattie's quotations the memory of Hume's other sceptical doctrines as expounded in the *Enquiry*.

² Kant, it may be noted, classifies philosophies as either dogmatic (= rationalistic) or sceptical. Empiricism he regards as a form of scepticism.

There is a passage in Hume's *Enquiry* which may be employed to illustrate the boldly speculative character of Leibnitz's interpretation of the nature and function of human thought. "Nothing . . . [seems] more unbounded than the thought of man, which not only escapes all human power and authority, but is not even restrained within the limits of nature and reality. . . . While the body is confined to one planet, along which it creeps with pain and difficulty, the thought can in an instant transport us into the most distant regions of the universe. . . . What never was seen, or heard of, may yet be conceived; nor is anything beyond the power of thought, except what implies an absolute contradiction." This passage in which Hume means to depict a false belief, already sufficiently condemned by the absurdity of its claims, expresses for Leibnitz the wonderful but literal truth. Thought is the revealer of an eternal unchanging reality, whose validity is in no way dependent upon its verification through sense. When Voltaire in his *Ignorant Philosopher* remarks that "it would be very singular that all nature, all the planets, should obey eternal laws, and that there should be a little animal, five feet high, who, in contempt of these laws, could act as he pleased, solely according to his caprice,"¹ he is forgetting that this same animal of five feet can contain the stellar universe in thought within himself, and has therefore a dignity which is not expressible in any such terms as his size may seem, for vulgar estimation, to imply. Man, though dependent upon the body and confined to one planet, has the sun and stars as the playthings of his mind. Though finite in his mortal conditions, he is divinely infinite in his powers. Leibnitz thus boldly challenges the sceptical view of the function of reason. In opposition to the limitation of thought to the translating of sense-data into conceptual forms, he claims for it a creative power which enables it out of its own resources to discover for itself, not only the actual constitution of the material world, but also the immensely wider realm of possible entities. The real is only one of the many kingdoms which thought discovers for itself in the universe of truth. It is

¹ Quoted by Beattie (p. 295), who, however incapable of appreciating the force of Hume's arguments, was at least awake to certain of its ultimate consequences.

the most comprehensive and the most perfect, but still only one out of the innumerable others which unfold themselves to the mind in pure thought. Truth is not the abstracting of the universal aspects in things, not a copy of reality, dependent upon it for meaning and significance. Truth is wider than reality, is logically prior to it, and instead of being dependent upon the actual, legislates for it. Leibnitz starts from the possible, as discovered by pure thought, to determine in an *apriori* manner the nature of the real.

This Leibnitzian view of thought may seem, at first sight, to be merely the re-emergence of the romantic rationalistic ideal of Descartes and Malebranche. So to regard it would, however, be a serious injustice. It is held with full consciousness of its grounds and implications, and reality is metaphysically reinterpreted so as to afford it a genuine basis. There is nothing merely mystical, and nothing undefined in its main tenets. Leibnitz differs from Malebranche in being himself a profound mathematician, the co-discoverer with Newton of the differential calculus. He also differs from Descartes in possessing an absorbing interest in the purely logical aspects of the problem of method; and was therefore equipped in a supreme degree for determining in genuinely scientific fashion the philosophical significance and value of the mathematical disciplines.

Hume and Leibnitz are thus the two protagonists that dwarf all others. They realize as neither Malebranche, Locke, nor Berkeley, neither Reid, Lambert, Crusius, nor Mendelsohn ever did, the really crucial issues which must ultimately decide between the competing possibilities. Each maintains, in the manner prescribed by his general philosophy, one of the two possible views of the function of thought. The alternatives are these: (a) Thought is a merely practical instrument for the convenient interpretation of our human experience; it has no objective or metaphysical validity of any kind: (b) Thought legislates universally; it reveals the wider universe of the eternally possible; and prior to all experience can determine the fundamental conditions to which that experience must conform. Or to interpret this opposition in logical terms; (a) The funda-

mental principles of experience are synthetic judgments in which no relation is discoverable between subject and predicate, and which for that reason can be justified neither *apriori* nor by experience: (b) all principles are analytic, and can therefore be justified by pure thought. The problem of Kant's Critique, broadly stated, consists in the examination and critical estimate of these two opposed views. There is no problem, scientific, moral or religious, which is not vitally affected by the decision which of these alternatives we are to adopt, or what reconciliation of their conflicting claims we hope to achieve. Since Kant's day, largely owing to the establishment of the evolution theory, this problem has become only the more pressing. The naturalistic instrumental view of thought seems to be immensely reinforced by biological authority. Thought would seem to be reduced to the level of the sense-organs, and to be an instrument developed through natural processes as a means of adaptation. But the counter-view has been no less powerfully strengthened by the victorious march of the mathematical sciences. They have advanced out beyond the limits of Euclidean space, defining possibilities such as no experience reveals to us. The Leibnitzian view has also been reinforced by the successes of physical science in determining what would seem to be the actual objective character of the independently real. Kant was a rationalist by education, temperament, and conviction. Consequently his problem was to reconcile Leibnitz's view of the function of thought with Hume's proof of the synthetic character of the causal principle. He strives to determine how much of Leibnitz's belief in the legislative power of pure reason can be retained after full justice has been done to Hume's damaging criticisms. The fundamental principles upon which all experience and all knowledge ultimately rest are synthetic in nature: how is it possible that they should also be *apriori*? Such is the problem that was Kant's troublous inheritance from his philosophical progenitors, Hume and Leibnitz.

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PRINCIPLES OF VOLUNTARISM.

I.

A TENABLE theory of knowledge must furnish both an adequate conception of the end and goal of all thinking and an effective method of determining how far ideas contribute to the attainment of this end. It must tell us in what Truth consists ideally, and how particular ideas may be actually verified. The need for holding both of these requirements distinct, and for emphasising each equally, may not be at once apparent. One may seem to imply the other as a matter of course: we cannot discover the aim of thinking (it would appear) without throwing light on the process of its attainment and, conversely, an investigation of the actual procedure of obtaining knowledge is bound in some measure to reveal the essential character of knowledge itself. Yet the history of epistemology shows how difficult it is to do equal justice to both aspects of the knowledge problem, how interest in one aspect almost inevitably leads the investigator to slight or misunderstand the other. Thus the school of Rationalism has been chiefly interested in the end or goal of thinking, which it has understood as a self-consistent body of ideas, a unified system of thought. From the ideal of thought as thus conceived, it has derived a criterion of truth, coherence or consistency. The actual process of obtaining knowledge turns out thus to be a logical exercise, yielding a system of concepts possessed of an admirable internal consistency and coherence, but lacking the one essential of real existence. The Empiricist school, on the other hand, has always been inclined to treat the problem of knowledge historically: it has sought to find out the different ways in which specific facts are actually discovered. Thus Empiricists have dwelt chiefly upon observation, experiment, and induction, as methods of securing knowledge. Generally, however, they have neglected the end or aim for the sake of which observations and experiments have

been made; they have been content to let an assortment or miscellany of facts represent Truth to them, thus failing to satisfy thought's demand for system and completeness. Now, if we are to profit by the development of philosophic ideas, we must seek to avoid both of these opposing errors. We must so conceive of the end and aim of thought that its realization shall necessitate a constant appeal to actual existence, and so understand the process of discovering new facts that it shall contribute to the universal aim of all thinking.

Of how this task may be accomplished we receive a valuable suggestion from the development undergone by the two historic standpoints just mentioned. For both Rationalism and Empiricism appear in earlier and later stages of development. Descartes and the earlier Rationalists believed that we obtain true knowledge when by a process of conceptual analysis we discover the implications of certain first principles which are already inherent in the nature of intelligence (and whose eternal truth is signified by their clearness and consistency). For Locke and the earlier Empiricists knowledge was accumulated by comparing and combining the ideas received ready-made through the channels of sense-perception. By neither party was knowing conceived as a constructive or creative activity; by both it was understood as a becoming aware of that which, as truth or as fact, existed already formed or finished. According to the later Rationalism represented by Kant, however, we gain knowledge when, by creative synthesis, we organize the data of sense into a coherent system whose constitutive principles derive validity from the service they perform in such work of organization. In a more fully developed Empiricism appearing finally as Pragmatism, thinking is conceived as an activity of adjustment, essentially experimental in character, which seeks verification for ideas in the results of purposive action. Thus we see these two theories, ancient antagonists, becoming less one-sided and more concrete as they become more *dynamic*, giving a larger and larger place to action in the cognitive process.

The direction of development in modern epistemology clearly suggests, therefore, that we may hope for a final solution of the

knowledge problem only if we refuse to separate theory from practice, only if we insist upon treating thought as an expression of will. For it is only in so far as the ideal of Truth—a coherent system of ideas complete because comprehending all reality—is pursued as an end of will, a practical task, that its attainment involves a constant appeal to objective reality. We may analyze ideas and combine them into systems without interference from, or sanction by reality, but we cannot act upon ideas without receiving the judgment of reality upon them. If knowing is a species of voluntary activity, Truth—as James has said in a pregnant passage—is one species of Good, the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief.

II.

The problem of knowledge thus broadens into the problem of conduct, since thought is itself a species of voluntary action and in voluntary action alone we come into direct contact with objective reality. Is there not reason to hope that the operation of will, the original activity of our nature, would, if genuinely understood, give us a key to the meaning of human life and the world of human experience? Undertaking with this expectation, then, the study of volition, we find ourselves in need of a preliminary definition which shall, at least provisionally, fix the meaning which we give to the word. To formulate such definition is not so very difficult—at least after a troublesome preliminary question is satisfactorily disposed of. This question is whether we shall feel obliged to define will altogether in terms of the events and processes described by the natural sciences and especially Biology, or whether we shall admit as equally valid, and possibly more relevant, the standpoint of the normative sciences and, in particular, Ethics. Now to insist upon defining volition altogether in terms of organic behavior, thus ruling out of court the conclusions of the sciences of value, moral and social, seems the sheerest pedantry; it is equivalent to rejecting the direct and natural way of approaching the subject in favor of the indirect and artificial, and this upon methodological and scholastic grounds. Suppose, then, that we

look directly at the operation of will in the conduct of man, as it manifests itself in the evolution of human society and civilization, and also in our own choices and pursuits. What do we find? We find first that volition is a factor in the physical world of bodies and motion, that it directs the movements of the physical organism which it inhabits and, in consequence, influences the movements of other bodies both living and non-living. But we find it playing also quite a different part: that of choosing between objects in accordance with their comparative value as ends. The objects which constitute this second realm of ends are related, not according to their position or sequence in the mechanical order, but according to congruities or incongruities of meaning, in a teleological system. The standing of an end as member of such a teleological system is determined by its degree of comprehensiveness, by the number of lesser interests for which it provides. So viewed, in the light of human history and experience, will appears as a power constantly striving so to control the forces of nature and adjust the tendencies of social life as to bring about the most comprehensive satisfaction of human personality. Condensing this statement with a view to conciseness, we obtain a working definition of volition. Will, we therefore define as *that power in man which strives to initiate such sequences of movement as satisfy the greatest variety of interests.*

In adopting this definition we recognize that will aims in its operation at extending and enlarging the scope of its own activity. Hence it might not inappropriately be described as a self-expanding, or self-organizing, activity. Thus we should relate volition to the self-preservative tendency characteristic of all life—not deriving it from life or regarding it as a further development of the instinct of self-preservation, however; since will as we conceive it is the original activity of conscious experience and the source of all its principles and categories. The description of volition as a self-expanding activity is not incorrect; it is insufficient because abstract. The definition just proposed is by contrast concrete because it attributes the ability of will to extend the range of its own activity to two powers which it possesses, the power of coördinating movements and the power

of choosing between interests. Will comes upon the scene equipped with the ability to initiate movement having three parameters and to appreciate the comparative value of generic qualities or characters. This ability we usually explain as the outcome of action performed before the advent of volition and due to instinct or impulse, through whose operation certain complexes of qualities have become associated with definite kinæsthetic ideas. Such explanations are subject to the qualification made above that they all presuppose will as the fundamental activity of human experience, and hence cannot possibly reduce it to a secondary or derivative status; but with this reservation admitted, they are useful to illustrate and enforce our main contention that volition does not undertake incidentally to direct movement or, in lieu of something better, interest itself in such satisfactions as our human situation affords; it is such a coördinating of movements as increases the variety of possible satisfactions.

To volition, kinæsthetic and teleological experience are essential; with volition both are originally given. The experience of movement contains both sensational and affective constituents. On the side of sensation it is analyzable into experiences of pressure and of strain, with associated visual images. Here the original experience is perhaps that of striving against and overcoming resistance, on several points simultaneously or on one (or more) successively. Teleologically, the root experience is one of latitude or scope, of the liberty to range unhindered within a definite circle of interests. The qualities which promise satisfaction and to which interest attaches fall into a limited number of classes, being distributed among the familiar sense-departments. To these qualities names are given which fix their status as universals. They are not of course experienced separately, but joined in complexes of endless variety. The constituent qualities of these complexes are distinguished because we find the same ones present in different combinations. Some are of interest directly because they promise satisfaction themselves, such as tastes, odors, touch qualities, etc. Others, such as colors, shapes, sounds and the like usually attract indirectly

because they are signs of the presence of qualities valuable on their own account. Certain complexes of qualities (objects necessary for existence, like food) are at first supremely attractive. But this original pleasantness does not decide their permanent value or result in their habitual choice. It causes them originally to be sought and realized; but their comparative value for volition depends upon the range of further activities to which they open the way. Thus the value of food for a developing will depends upon the strength which it supplies for further activities. Moreover, as it gains further use of its powers, will discovers ends which promise a greater variety of satisfactions than these objects of natural desire. While a handful of bananas may give strength for a day's journey or a cave within a rock a night's shelter, a herd of cattle will provide a winter's sustenance for a family and a house serve to centralize their diverse activities and employments during a period of years. Through experimenting with different qualities and groups of qualities volition seeks to discover which are thus most comprehensive and, through the elaboration of movements, endeavors to provide for their realization. Thus arise an order of movements and a realm of ends; but no matter how highly organized the system of purposes, or how complicated the plans of movement of a voluntary agent, they are all made of material originally given to volition in the form of kinæsthetic or teleological qualities.

To discuss at all fully either the kinds of movement which volition is able to initiate and direct, or the interests among which it can choose, is manifestly impossible. It will be sufficient to recognize that both movements and interests fall into two main classes. Of movements there are first the main bodily movements of trunk and limbs by which objects are moved and manipulated and the location of the body itself is altered, and, second, the movements of the speech-organs and muscles that determine facial expression, by which meaning is communicated to other agents and their conduct influenced. Interests are also divided on a parallel line, into those which appeal directly to the agent and those which are indirectly appreciated through

communication. (This duality, present in both the order of motion and the realm of ends, is the root of the difference between the world of nature and that of inter-subjective intercourse.)

The regular operation of will proceeds through three stages. The first is that of ideation. In contrast to objects that are actual, that is, maintained by present effort of attention and by established motor adjustment, is set an object which is possible (or ideal), that is, the outcome of incipient coördinations of movement and the source of future satisfactions. The second is action. The sequence of motor adjustments which promises to result in the imagined object is initiated and carried through. The third is satisfaction. The object chosen is experienced as the result of effortful action and the source of further possibilities of satisfaction. The unity thus established between chosen interest and requisite motor adjustment is immediately experienced in a feeling which, whatever it may be called, feeling of unity, of achievement, of power, is unique and conclusive. The office of volition is frequently (and correctly) said to be the realization of ideas as ends. What then is meant by realizing an idea? An idea is realized when it is re-experienced as the result of a sequence of movements, and thus made the source of varied possibilities of satisfaction, and a starting-point for new efforts of action. The ideal object is thus converted from possibility to actuality by being brought into dynamic relation with actual existence. Suppose that on a hot day I resolve to visit the shore of a near-by lake, being attracted by the thought of the comfortable seat which I expect to find on the sands of the shore, the cool refreshing breeze that will blow, and the pleasant view it will afford. I take the road that I believe leads in that direction and set out on my walk. Finally, I arrive at the lake-shore, pleased that I have found my way and prepared to enjoy the features of the situation that appealed to my fancy. My idea of the lake has been realized in that direct way in which all ideas are originally realized—by action and fulfilment.

Thus far we have considered but one factor in the conduct situation, the human will, with its capacities and mode of opera-

tion. But will does not operate in a vacuum; it is conditioned in all its activity by objective reality. This is then the other factor in the realm of human conduct. Now objective reality is not to be deduced or derived from will; it must be accepted as equally ultimate with volition itself. It is not even inferred from certain results of voluntary action; it is directly experienced in all volition. Objective reality is directly experienced as that which permits and in this way sanctions, or which frustrates and thus denies, the activity of will. Reality gives its sanction to our will when it permits the course of action voluntarily undertaken to reach its intended goal. It negates volition by interfering with such course of action and bringing it to an unexpected outcome. But whether favorable or unfavorable, the voluntary agent receives the verdict of reality when he essays to act. In action the will is face to face with objective existence.

In cases where objective reality gives its sanction to chosen lines of conduct and thus validates their guiding ideas, its mode of influence seems clear. It permits the sequence of movements to proceed uninterrupted to their intended goal. Reality introduces no new factor, makes no positive contribution of its own. But in the opposite case, where reality checks or frustrates the proposed action, the case is different. Here it does appear to force upon operative volition new and unwelcome facts, to break the continuity of voluntary action by thrusting in foreign and intractable material. This type of experience makes realists of us all: where objective existence rises before us as a wall of stone, blocking every effort of our will, a stone-wall against which we can beat our heads, full of idealistic theories as they may be, in vain. The problem here involved is of momentous importance. How does objective reality act to limit and circumscribe volition? We must if possible get light upon this point for it is the crux of the whole matter. Let us turn back to the illustration of voluntary action lately used. Suppose that I am walking over the road which, the guidepost assures me, leads to the lake. I come to a place where the road goes over a bridge which spans a deep ravine through the rocky bed of which a small stream flows. I see that the bridge is dismantled, prepara-

tory to reconstruction. I halt at the edge of the ravine and survey the prospect. The sides of the ravine are steep but I see a way to descend and climb the other side. The stream at the bottom is low and numerous rocks in its bed offer stepping-places to cross. I descend, cross with some effort and difficulty, scale the opposite bank and continue my journey. Or imagine that I reach my intended destination without such interruption but find that the expected features do not materialize. The wind is blowing off-shore perhaps, or there are swarms of mosquitoes. I must either go home disappointed or, may be, walk around to the other shore of the lake. Now in either case reality has interfered to limit or frustrate my will. How has it done this? Certainly not by forcing upon me hitherto unknown experiences, by injecting into my consciousness foreign elements! Unexpected, disconcerting, the experiences were, but not altogether unfamiliar. The motor adjustments required to go down into the ravine were nearly if not quite as well-known to me as those incidental to walking over the bridge—if they had not been I could not have negotiated them. The sultry heat and the mosquitoes were as familiar as the cool air and fresh breeze—if they had not been I could not have recognized them. No, in the first instance reality limited my will by interrupting the expected sequence of movements and forcing me to alter them, if indeed I wished to continue acting at all and not meet disaster which should terminate my career as a voluntary agent. Objective reality forced me in a most unwelcome way to make new adjustments, to reverse my program of action. In a similar manner in the second case it thwarted my will by denying me the outcome I expected from my course of action. Instead of being permitted to relax my efforts in a choice of the enjoyments offered by a seat on the lake-shore, I was forced to immediate readjustments whose results were so unpleasant as to convince me that I must journey farther if I wished to taste the pleasures I sought.

The process of action in which we receive the verdict of reality upon our ideas has been sketched only in the most summary and, it may justly seem, superficial manner. The most of our actions, like the one used in our illustration, are far from

being simple movements or even single motor coördinations. They consist of a series of motor coördinations, the perceived result of one being the cue for the performance of the next, and so on through to the end of the series. More accurately, the result of each successive motor adjustment, as perceived, must contain the plan for the next movement required by the projected program of action. In going to the lake I walk down the garden path to the street; this, when I have reached it, I perceive as the street which two blocks north crosses the road that I think leads to the lake; following the street for two blocks I come to the crossing of the road which I perceive as going east towards the lake. Now, in the cases where reality thwarts our actions, it does this by bringing one of the motor adjustments to an unlooked for result, which is identical with forcing us to change our plan for the succeeding movement, such change being at variance with our pre-conceived program and leading us away from its expected goal. So the walk around the bend of the road to the brow of the ravine brings me not to the unbroken span of the bridge but to the gaping abyss of the ravine. One may ask at just this point if reality does not force me to change my course of conduct by presenting me with new facts? Were not the facts of the broken bridge received by my perceptive faculties the occasion and cause of my change of action? To this question the answer is that my perception of the bridge as broken was itself a new plan of action—a broken bridge is a bridge that cannot be crossed but must be gotten by in some other fashion. But the questioner may persist: Was not the new plan of action with its ideas of motor response evoked by certain qualities presented by the bridge as an existing fact? These existing qualities were in this instance those of form and color—as I approach the bridge its floor does not present an expanse continuous with the roadway, instead it breaks the continuity of the latter with an irregular shadowy gap. But this objection is removed by a more detailed analysis of the motor coördinations involved. The unexpected and disconcerting appearance of the bridge comes from the unexpected adjustments which I am compelled to make, of muscles connected with the visual sense.

Instead of sending my gaze freely and without hindrance along the dusty-brown streak which is the sign of open road and uninterrupted passage, I am compelled to readjust my sense of sight to the presence of a darker segment dividing the aforesaid dusty-brown roadway into two sections. But why are the eye movements thus interrupted and forced to readjustment? Because the break is there compelling me to do so? No, this would be getting the cart before the horse; it was the interruption of the expected continuity that forced me to divide what promised to be continuous into three sections. We seem here to have come to the limits of analysis and are face to face with the ultimate fact. In such cases, we are compelled to make readjustment because *objective reality checks, hinders, and makes impossible, our attempted movements.*

A final question may be briefly answered before we proceed. Do we then never experience qualities *as qualities*, that is, as general characters or universals, and not forecasts of movement? Yes, we do, when the action is completed, when the sequence of movements reaches its intended outcome. Then the object we experience is not such as requires from us an effort of movement, but such as offers to us a choice of satisfactions. These possibilities of satisfaction resident in objects hold at all times and for all wills; they are hence universal qualities or characters. Because such satisfactory qualities were anticipated, the action itself was undertaken, and the fact that they are thrown open to the choice of the agent shows that it has reached its intended goal.

The facts just stated in regard to the limitations imposed upon our wills by objective reality have an important bearing upon the relation of thought to this objective reality. Indeed, if the account given is correct, it contains more than a hint of the solution of this most difficult problem of epistemology. In the first place, we see that it is in an important sense true that we can know only our own ideas, which are not themselves reality, but interpretations of reality in kinæsthetic or teleological imagery. To these interpretations Reality says yes or no; it does not do this, however, by breaking into consciousness and forcing upon our attention new and unwelcome facts or objects.

It says no to our ideas by forcing us when we are acting upon them to stop and form new ideas which are of course new plans of action or working hypotheses, to be tested by immediate action. Reality thus rules out certain of our ideas but supplies us none to take their place. We are obliged ourselves to formulate the new theories and hypotheses. And the materials to be used in these formulations must be drawn from the same limited stock out of which the rejected ones were formed. If the real situation compels me to essay climbing down into the ravine instead of walking over the bridge as I expected, the component movements are as familiar to my thought as were those of my earlier program and drawn from the same original experience of motion. Hence it is quite incorrect to say that objective reality supplies the material of our ideas while intelligence gives the form. The material is, rather, given along with the power of thought or of will itself. No matter how widely our thought may range, its constituent materials must be motions in a world of three dimensions and qualities which fall within a limited number of sense-departments. Thought is provided with these materials already formed in judgments as the outcome (we say) of instinctive adjustment. No other material than this is available to thought, nor given in the most surprising or unusual experiences of action. Imagine that reality interrupts the expected sequence of our voluntary activities by way of an accident—that I come to the broken bridge on a dark night and plunge over into the ravine. As long as I retain possession of my senses and can make any effort while falling, it is only to struggle in familiar ways, to move trunk and limbs with the vague expectation or hope of producing an accustomed result. And if I were conscious at all after striking, it would be of qualities which I recognized as pain, hardness, wet, etc. Indeed, if the proposal is made to derive one of the two factors, form and matter, from objective reality and the other from subjective intelligence, it would seem more reasonable to hold that reality supplied the form while intellect furnished the matter. But this statement would be subject to such reservations as would largely destroy its significance. For it cannot be denied that intelligence or will furnishes an

important part of the form of our experience as well as the matter. To be capable of realization, and hence known as true, movements must have regularity of procedure and qualities retain their specific characters and relationship of subsumption. The material of knowledge takes from the first the form of judgment—judgments of existence and of value. Besides the material, then, the fundamental relations which constitute the framework of the objective world are furnished by will itself; for how could ideas be realized at all unless movements could be depended upon to proceed in fixed sequences and qualities to maintain their relations of inclusion and exclusion? But within the framework thus provided, the orders of existence and of value, particular events and qualities are related according to the dictates of reality delivered in the manner just described.

III.

After an idea is realized in action, it becomes a permanent possibility of satisfaction. Such ideas are preserved in their dynamic relations by thought. Thought appears originally as a factor in the operation of will, as that ideating activity by which future actions are planned and satisfactions anticipated. It develops into a specialized form of volition which exhibits all the essential features of will under its own characteristic form of idea. Its aim is to formulate an ideal system which shall represent all the objects that can be realized, *i. e.*, all possible satisfactions of the human will. This supreme end, Truth, is of course but an expression of the supreme end of volition, under the form of idea or belief. Truth is sought by thought as any other end of volition is pursued—by effortful action. The effort of thought is expended in an attempt to correlate and organize ideas that have been verified and stand as facts within the most coherent possible system, and to devise new actions and experiments in order to verify ideas which, if facts, would tend to fill in the gaps and thus complete the ideal system. Its rule is that of consistency: that objects shall preserve their identity and retain their relations of sequence and subsumption. This principle is of course only an expression of the unity of volition:

objects in order to be attainable must remain the same and have permanent relations.

An objection may be interposed at this point to the treating of thought as a special expression of will which is said to exhibit all its characteristic features, on the ground that we have by definition asserted movement to be an essential factor in volition while thought does not involve motion at all. This apparent inconsistency disappears, however, if we make allowance for the changes undergone by the essential features of volition as a result of their being cast in the form of idea. For while thought does not move about in the world of actual perception, it does, when dealing with actual existence, project and correlate movements. Not that it merely represents or imagines movements that have actually occurred; it really constructs figures and postulates motions within its own ideal medium, as the development of pure mathematics amply proves. Moreover, in thus constructing ideal systems and sequences of movement for the purpose of organizing the facts of existence, it is under the control of objective reality, just as actual movement is. In this case reality appears in the guise of ideas which have been verified and stand as facts. These established facts in the realm of thought challenge, check, and frustrate proposed theoretical constructions, just as objective reality interrupts and upsets the courses of action which we undertake.

In constructing its ideal system, thought, as we have seen, relates ideas dynamically—in terms of the activities required to produce them. These activities, it has appeared, are of two main sorts, movement and choice. The objects which thought represents as real are consequently conceived in terms either of the movements required to attain them or of the various qualities which these exhibit when attained. In this way there develop simultaneously in the realm of thought two conceptual orders, the mechanical and the teleological. The first is of course the material world, the world of objects impinging upon one another in space; the second is the ideal or spiritual world, the world of qualities related by congruities or incongruities of meaning. The former is the world of existences, of temporal and spatial

contiguities; the latter is the world of essence, of qualities related by identities of character.

Each of these worlds may be seen to have developed through three stages correlated with, and consequent upon, the steps which volition itself has taken in pursuit of complete satisfaction. In the mind of primitive man there is no thought of separating the two orders, although in his confused intelligence each is discernible in its incipency. His world is an aggregate of things all having particular place and existence, while at the same time possessing generic qualities and satisfying common human interests. On the mechanical side he understands little of the effect of objects upon one another, conceiving them almost exclusively in relation to his own bodily movements (and the movements of supposed beings like himself); teleologically, he comes to have some dim idea of how qualities are related according to degree of generality, recognizing at least that some are more and some less common. The next stage in the evolution of thought comes after man has learned by increasing experience how objects act upon one another, and comes to depend for desired results not altogether upon his own bodily movements but upon the movements of other bodies, their causes, which he, by his own hands, sets in operation. On the side of value, there is a dawning recognition that qualities may be related not merely by the extent of their generality or commonness, but also by virtue of their varying comprehensiveness—certain ends like wealth or reputation receiving special attention not because they are so widespread or common but because they include so many further satisfactions. The third stage in intellectual development comes after man has gained large control over the forces of nature and extensively organized his social and political life. Rapidly enlarging experience of the actual world leads him to separate in his thought the mechanical from the teleological orders and his increased success in dealing with the forces of nature after he has made this separation encourages him to render it complete. Secondary qualities are therefore eliminated entirely from the material world and it is conceived altogether in terms of motion, as a complexus of movements varying in

direction and velocity. Far-reaching social and political organization leads human thought to attempt a formulation of the teleological order likewise complete in itself, and exclusive of the mechanical. Thereupon mechanism, with its necessary particularity and incompleteness, along with space and even time perhaps, are transcended and reality is conceived as a completely organized system of ends, all being finally included within an absolute and all-comprehensive end, or Good.

Thus the two worlds, mechanical and spiritual, have come to confront one another in modern thought, so different as to seem out of any conceivable relation, even that of antagonism. Is this dualism final? Thought is naturally restive under it, for such dualism conflicts directly with the intellectual ideal of coherence and unity. Yet, if our account of its origin be correct, it can never be removed, nor can the two orders be united by any purely theoretical construction. This is impossible because the difference between them goes back to the fundamental nature of will itself, and hence conditions the very existence of thought as a special development of volition. Since, moreover, the dualism between movement and choice, necessity and freedom, goes back to the will itself, it can be removed only by activity of volition. It will be removed only when the order of movements is experienced as affording complete satisfaction to the system of personal interests. To bring this about is a practical task, not a theoretical problem. The spiritualization of the world is an end to be realized, to be realized by action, by effort and striving to adjust mechanical forces to the needs of personal development. And its achievement, like any other achievement, must first be experienced immediately in an emotion of satisfaction. Obviously, the reconciliation of nature to spirit, as a task of the human will, has not yet been accomplished, nor has the feeling of final satisfaction which is the crown of completely successful labor been yet experienced by any man. If this experience of ultimate unity, of final synthesis, has been anticipated in part by anyone, it is by the man who, laboring for the welfare of humanity, invents a machine, organizes an industry, administers a government, founds an institution, which he sees working for human betterment.

If we thus view the reconciliation of mechanism and purpose as a practical or moral task, we shall have reason to regard the separation of the two orders, and particularly the exclusion of all value and meaning from the mechanical order, as a sign of promise rather than a cause of discouragement. For it is only as the mechanical world is emptied of all quality and conceived in terms of movement solely that it is capable of thoroughgoing mathematical, that is to say, intellectual, formulation. And it is through such mathematical formulation that human science will be able to analyze existing movements into their simpler components and discover new combinations which may by experiment prove to increase the fullness of human satisfaction. Modern civilization is the result of just such increasing subjection of the forces of nature to the interests of human development, due to the constructions of pure science. But the work promises to be long and full of difficulty and danger. Human volition will scarcely be equal to the task unless sustained by a faith in its potency and permanence. Such beliefs as that in the permanence and potency of personality, and the ultimate triumph of spirit over matter, are of course but postulates; they are verified as all beliefs are, by the results of action, by the aid they give us in accomplishing our task, in overcoming the world.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Greek Philosophy. Part I. Thales to Plato. By JOHN BURNET.
London, Macmillan and Co., 1914.—pp. x, 360.

One who has spent more than half of his life in the endeavor to comprehend a complex subject, finds it neither an easy nor a grateful task to write a brief review of a book covering that same subject, particularly if the author merits and commands his respect and admiration, while his exposition fails to command his assent to its conclusions.

Professor Burnet's latest volume cannot be considered entirely by itself. The part of the subject comprised in Book I the author had twice before discussed at greater length in successive editions of his *Early Greek Philosophy*, and some of the matters treated in Books II and III had been anticipated in the preface to his edition of Plato's *Phædo*. The intimate knowledge of Plato which this new volume displays is the fruit of long years of study, to which we owe his admirable text of the complete works of that all-important writer. It is therefore not necessary to say that such defects as the exposition of Greek thought under review may be found to have are not due to ignorance, but are matters of judgment and therefore disputable. Of the impossibility of arriving at judgments which will compel the assent of all competent judges, particularly in so difficult a field of inquiry as this, the author and the reviewer are equally aware, and neither expects the impossible. The reviewer, as such, has the advantage however that, where so much is concerned with hypotheses, he is for the time being not the advocate of hypotheses but the *advocatus diaboli*.

Since in this review attention must be chiefly directed to points at which our author fails to carry conviction, it ought to be said emphatically at the start that the book is rich in valuable suggestions which we may confidently expect to have a fructifying influence on future attempts to write the history of Greek thought. This is perhaps as great praise as one may hope to win at the present stage of the inquiry; for the very conception of such a history on defensible principles is yet in its infancy. Professor Burnet has in this volume given the best hints hitherto offered on one vital point, the value of Aristotle's statements regarding his predecessors. The more im-

portant task of evaluating the doxographic tradition as a whole and in detail still remains to be accomplished: Diels' monumental *Doxographi Graeci* merely laid the indispensable foundations for the inquiry by showing in outline what belongs to that tradition.

The office of the historian of thought in a bygone age is the philological interpretation of texts. His success, a knowledge of the available texts being assumed, will depend on his comprehension of the total intellectual life of the period, and in particular of the fields which border on that to which his special inquiry is directed. Professor Burnet's acquaintance with such outlying fields is considerable, particularly with that of ancient mathematics; in other directions, as in respect to Greek medicine and Greek history and geography, it is clearly deficient. The attentive reader who has cultivated that ground cannot fail to note the influence of the direction of interest betokened by his virtues as well as his defects. They, and they alone, explain to the writer our author's conception of philosophy and of science. On p. 11 the problem of reality ($\tauὸ ὄν$) is said to be the dominant of Greek philosophy, and we read elsewhere that for the purposes of this history philosophy means all that it meant for Plato and nothing that it did not mean for him. As to the first statement, it does not and cannot apply to the Milesians, though they are accounted philosophers; for their interest was directed to origins, as is shown by their *κοσμοποιία* and by their devotion to geography and history. In fact, it cannot be made to agree with the implications of the second statement, even if one accepts Professor Burnet's own account of Plato's philosophy. By his account, if the writer grasps its meaning, Plato's real interest was not directed to $\tauὸ ὄν$ or to metaphysics. In the later dialogues such concepts as $\tauὸ ὄν$, $\epsilonἶν$, *πολλά* are stripped of metaphysical, certainly of all ontological meaning: they become logical terms, are defined, and enter into judgments formed to meet the data of experience. This is logic pure and simple; in other fields the relative terms 'hot' and 'cold' are brought from the region of the absolute and are submitted to an analogous definition, which, as Professor Burnet remarks, raises the demand for a thermometer. This is not metaphysics, but what the writer would call science. Similarly one may dispute the view that Socrates, whether or not he adopted the Pythagorean 'forms' outright or postulated ontological Ideas, was primarily interested in the problem of reality. That he accepted certain entities as real, chiefly the soul, conceived in the manner of the Orphics, and probably certain concepts of fundamental importance for ethics, is indeed to be inferred from Plato's

Apology; but the same document leaves no doubt that these were the given points of departure for his thinking as for his missionary endeavors, which aimed in the last resort to draw the practical consequences in conduct from the 'hypotheses.'

Professor Burnet (p. 100 sq.) speaks of the Hippocratean treatise on *Ancient Medicine* as "a revolt against cosmology," and of the Sophists (p. 101) as in "a revolt against science." To the writer this is strange language. Protagoras, who made a beginning of a rational classification of the parts of speech, and so initiated the study of grammar; Gorgias, who distinguished and developed the more intricate figures of thought and of speech, paving the way for an analysis of style; or Hippias, who displayed an intelligent interest in history and in the establishment of a unified chronology as well as in the higher mathematics and astronomy—are these to be credited with leading a revolt against science? They unquestionably either revolted against ontology or ignored it, but one must adopt a questionable and hardly intelligible terminology before one can well speak of their activities as hostile to science.

The truth seems to be that our author is so engrossed with the 'Pythagoreans' that he fails altogether to appreciate the aims of the Milesians and of the entire Ionian tradition, although of such is the kingdom of the present and presumably of the future in science, as that word is currently used. Pythagoras was an Ionian *émigré*, carrying with him the scientific interest of the Levant, which in the West, under Orphic influences, took on a different or at least a more specialized form. The first Milesians, besides their interest in mathematics, concerned themselves with origins and history. Their cosmology was a cosmogony, a history or story of the origin and ordering of the cosmos. Aristotle clearly felt that this was not true of the Pythagoreans: he says "they mean to give a cosmogony" (*κόσμον γεννᾶν*), but their principles do not lend themselves to such a conception. No one will appreciate better than Professor Burnet what Aristotle is doing when he says that they mean to do a thing. The Pythagoreans confined their scientific activity to the mathematical side, and ignored the quest for origins and history. To pursue this point farther would lead us too far; but it is of importance both for the history of Greek philosophy and for the understanding of the limitations of the book under review.

From what has already been said one may perhaps gather what the writer means by saying that in his opinion our author, though he has devoted much thought to the Pythagoreans, and in many ways credits

them with more than they are entitled to claim, in other respects does them less than justice. Failing to grasp the significance of the Ionians, he fails also to appreciate the true importance of the Pythagoreans, who emphasize the *εἶναι* where the Ionians stress the *γενέσθαι*. Professor Burnet's old difficulty about *φύσις* lies here; but this too we must pass over lightly. The specific contribution of the Pythagoreans to Greek philosophy is the metaphysical strain, which begins with them or with Parmenides, who was, like them, under Orphic influences. Until we perceive this fundamental fact and see its consequences, the history of Greek philosophy must remain for us a sealed book.

Professor Burnet in this volume is chiefly concerned with the Pythagoreans, with Socrates, and with Plato; and a judgment of its results will depend in good part upon the acceptance or rejection of his methods and conclusions. Since the writer has been prevented from completing his own history of early Greek philosophy solely by his inability to arrive at a satisfactory detailed view of the part played in it by Pythagoreanism, one will readily understand why our author's account of the Pythagoreans has engaged his thoughtful attention. An acceptable solution would be warmly welcomed, from whatever quarter it came. The confidence one would feel in it would be doubly great if it had the support of a scholar who has devoted so much study to it as our author. His solution has been rejected with regret because it seems indefensible. In the first place, Professor Burnet seems to attach too much weight to the late lists of Pythagoreans, by which pretty nearly every thinker who was not directly an Ionian is claimed for the school. In view of the known vitiation of the tradition about the Pythagoreans, too much caution cannot well be observed regarding it. Thus, in the writer's judgment, there is no satisfactory evidence that, say, Alcmaeon, Philolaus, Simmias, and Cebes were in any real sense Pythagoreans. What is clear is that they were physicians, interested, like many whose work is preserved in the Hippocratean Corpus, in philosophical problems. As for Alcmaeon, it is clear that Aristotle did not regard him as a Pythagorean. Presumably he did not so regard Philolaus. He never mentions him, though his pupil Meno quotes his medical doctrines. Theophrastus is thought to have reported astronomical and cosmological views of Philolaus; but the evidence is in favor of the conclusion that these summaries derive from the Posidonian *Vetusta Placita*. All the references to a philosophical or mathematical treatise of Philolaus are suspiciously late. If Plato had really derived

his *Timæus* from such a book, Aristotle must have known it, and if he knew it, it were a miracle if he had passed the fact and the name of its author over in silence. Even Timon apparently did not know the author from whom he charged Plato with filching his treatise. Later, when a book roughly meeting the long felt want existed, its author is named. This is too insecure a foundation for critical history. We have not even the certain knowledge that Aristoxenus regarded Philolaus as a Pythagorean. One must either find firmer supports than those which Professor Burnet produces, or one must reconstruct the story. Then, too, much is classed as Pythagorean which is extremely doubtful, such as the theory, if it be a single theory, which Parmenides set forth as the "Opinions of Mortals." There are elements in it which point to Ionia and differ essentially from anything we have a right to call Pythagorean. What is most nearly akin to Pythagoreanism in Parmenides is his definition of the One. But we do not know whether he was "converted" to Pythagoreanism, as Diogenes Laertius says, by Ameinias, or to Orphism. Professor Burnet apparently owes his "conversion" of Parmenides to my essay, "Die Bekehrung im klassischen Altertum," although for reasons not altogether obvious he prefers to refer to Professor Diels, who says nothing about it.

As regards Socrates, also, it is difficult to agree with our author's account. That Socrates was a Pythagorean, or the head of a Pythagorean school—indeed, of any school whatsoever—would seem to be the last view to be taken by any one who accepts Plato's *Apology* as the starting-point for his inquiry. The burning of the phrontisterion in Aristophanes' *Clouds* is poor evidence to overbalance Plato's *Apology*, the character of the Socratics, and the eloquent circumstance that, whereas Pythagoras, Plato, Epicurus, and other 'founders' received divine or heroic honors after death, such were not accorded to Socrates, whose personality and martyrdom invited them in an extraordinary degree. This fiction rests in fact on the dubious foundation of the falling away of the 'Pythagoreans' Philolaus *et al.*, after whose apostasy Socrates "restores" the order. It is to be hoped that nobody will take this seriously. That Socrates adopted the Orphic conception of the soul, which Pythagoreans shared, is no doubt a fact; it may likewise be a fact that Socrates adopted the Pythagorean "forms" and adapted them as *ἄρτοι* to define the concepts needful for ethics. One may even go farther and grant that he could and did conduct such debates as occur in the Platonic dialogues which Professor Burnet assigns to him; all these taken

together would not make him a Pythagorean, rather than an Eleatic or a Heraclitean.

The Janus-bust of Socrates-Plato presents a perplexing problem, to which every one who deals with either of the great thinkers must address himself. A sober writer will be fully aware that he has not one chance in a million of solving it satisfactorily, but will propose his solution as the ancient mathematicians did theirs of the quadrature of the circle. To have offered an intelligent and intelligible hypothesis, even if it prove unacceptable, is no mean achievement, and is likely to be productive of much incidental good. Professor Burnet's proposal comes not unexpectedly, as it was announced in his edition of the *Phædo*. In one respect the writer is happy to find himself in agreement with our author; for both have held for many years that the problems considered in the earlier dialogues of Plato were really those of the fifth century B.C., and that the "Sophists" who discourse with Socrates are not mere pseudonyms for Antisthenes and his kind. But here the agreement in principle ends; for Professor Burnet holds that Plato gives an account of, say, Protagoras, which is essentially true and historical, whereas the writer maintains that this view is neither susceptible of proof, nor capable of explaining the data which any acceptable theory must take as its points of departure. The dialogues themselves contain unmistakable indications of restatements and developments of positions taken by prominent Sophists, which, however they may be minimized, are fatal to such a view. The ascertained practice of artists in kindred literary kinds, as in tragedy or the mime, renders such a theory highly improbable. Are the parts of Amphion and Zethus in the *Antiope* of Euripides historical? Or are the speeches of the 'historical' *Persæ* really historical? The concepts which are developed and criticised in the dialogues of Plato are those of the fifth century because, as the writer has long held, practically all scientific and philosophical concepts which play a conspicuous rôle in the thought of later times were then defined and enunciated with tolerable clearness. The case is not unlike that of German philosophy in our time. The fundamental problems and concepts were formulated and boldly proposed in the period extending from Wolff to Herbart; what has come since consists for the greater part of elaborations and varying combinations of the elements thus constituted. Even to-day it is perhaps more worth one's while to criticise the ultimate positions of Kant, Hegel, and Herbart, whether one chooses to present them in the terms of their creators or in a form suggested by latter-day developments, than to address one's objections to the system of one of the Epigoni.

That in the earliest of Plato's dialogues there is much of Socrates, no one presumably will doubt: that in the latest there is relatively little, is also unquestionable. To the eye of the reader the line may be called a continuum. The historical student cannot content himself with this otiose conclusion, but will endeavor to divide the line. The difficulty comes when one tries to find a natural point of cleavage. For Professor Burnet the *Thaetetus*, *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, and *Philebus* are of vital importance, and the attentive reader will have to confess that at these crucial points his theory fails. Our author may be conscious only of the effort to defend his own procedure, but the critical spectator knows that the anxiety displayed betrays the weakness of the position taken. This is of course not equivalent to saying that nothing of value results from the discussion; on the contrary, at many points excellent interpretations of Plato are to be found, if only the reader is competent to weigh and distinguish.

In reconstructing Plato's philosophy—or, as some would prefer to say, his later philosophy—from data furnished by the later dialogues by Aristotle and by the Platonic *Epistles*, our author shows at his best, though even here one cannot follow him blindly. For example: one cannot accept without wincing his view, shared by other eminent authorities, that the *Epistles* are genuine. The opposite conclusion, at which the writer arrived twenty years ago, has been year by year more surely confirmed by frequent readings and continuous study. This is of course not meant to refute Professor Burnet; yet there are difficulties which mere blinking will not remove. Thus, to affirm that the words (*Ep.* II., 314 C, quoted by Professor Burnet, p. 212), "There is no writing of Plato, nor will there ever be. What go by the name really belong to Socrates turned young and handsome," are "a perfectly serious statement," is surely a hard saying, no matter how one may interpret the passage. How it can be said that words which are apparently silly are seriously intended οὐκ οἶμαί γε τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πόρρω που ἤδη σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος. While such passages—and the one cited does not stand alone—do not prove that there may not be considerable historical truth contained in the *Letters*, they are calculated to abate one's confidence in the collection as affording autobiographical statements regarding Plato's inner life and experience.

As a whole, then, the book under review is in the writer's opinion to be accepted for what it purports to be, to wit, one scholar's attempt to state his conclusions regarding a period of Greek philosophy to which years of intelligent, thoughtful work have been devoted. It

contains many innovations which, though giving evidence (to apply Plato's words) *ψυχῆς στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας*, fail to stand the test of the critical reader; but it is certainly provocative of thought, and, since such books are rare, it is destined to yield results which no man can forecast. There is not a dull page in the volume, and there are few which will not be found to have contributed something of value to the discussion.

One thing more ought perhaps to be said. The impression left by the book on the mind of one who is acquainted with the literature of the subject is not altogether pleasant because of the way in which credit is given for suggestions derived from others. Consistency in this regard is perhaps a counsel of perfection more easily given than observed; but where a few creditors are remembered and others are ignored it is to be expected that the latter will be more ready to forgive than to commend the procedure. At various points the writer felt sure that his monographs and scattered essays had given the suggestion which Professor Burnet embodied in his exposition, though he is credited with nothing but controversy (p. 27, note). Controversy is an idle thing, and no one is great enough to deserve to be made the subject of it. If there be nothing but controversy in an article or a book, it hardly merits the honor of being mentioned by a serious scholar.

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Philosophy of the Practical, Economic and Ethic. Translated from the Italian of Benedetto Croce by DOUGLAS AINSLIE. London, 1913, Macmillan & Company.—pp. xxxix, 591.

Clarity of conception, logical symmetry in divisions, absolute certainty of attitude mark the thought of Croce. Distinction of style and historical background, frequent allusions to general as well as technical literature, make a worthy vehicle for the thought. There is not a query, a 'probably' or a 'perhaps,' or an 'I think.' Instead there is a calm assurance which rests its case upon its positive statement or upon the inconsistencies of opposed doctrines. In its opposition to eudaemonism and utilitarianism it sides with Kant, "after whom no serious philosopher can be anything but a Kantian in Ethic" (p. 401). In its insistence upon a concrete universal as the object of the ethical volition, as well as in occasional employment of the dialectic process, it is Hegelian. In its definition of the universal as "perpetual development, creation, progress," it is in accord with the pragmatism which it denounces.

There is no compromise with empiricism. "The philosophical method demands complete abstraction from empirical data and from their classes, and a withdrawal into the recesses of the consciousness, in order to fix upon it alone the mind" (p. 9). Psychologically, for example, we may if we please classify certain processes as feelings, but "to classify is not to think philosophically," and such a psychological classification has no place in philosophy. And the relation of philosophy and ethics to history is equally independent. If we wish an empirical and naturalistic discipline it is appropriate to build upon historical material. But if by a science of the practical and of morality is understood a Philosophy and an Ethic, a demand for previous study of history "is an irrational pretension, because the true relation is exactly the opposite: from philosophy to history, not from history to philosophy" (p. 104). Indeed, "when we prove the historical origin of anything, with that very proof we destroy its universal value" (p. 101 ff.).

The philosophy of the practical is considered under three main heads: (1) The general nature of practical activity including (a) its relations to theoretical activity, and (b) its dialectic or the problems of necessity and freedom, good and evil. (2) The special forms of practical activity, namely, economics and ethics. (3) Laws.

Under Part One it is maintained that the theoretical and the practical exhaust the acts of spirit. Feeling, if by this we mean not merely psychological classes but a genuine act of spirit, not only does not exist; it cannot exist. Logical necessity requires two forms, a duality that is unity and a unity that is duality. Practical activity presupposes theoretical activity; the converse thesis that the theoretical depends upon the practical contains this much of truth, that there is unity of the spiritual functions. But pragmatism, "the school of the greatest confusion that has ever appeared in philosophy," confuses certain true theses as to the stimulating effect of the will upon thought, et cetera, with a substitution of the will for the work of thought. "Whoever in thinking says, 'thus I will it,' is lost for truth." In other aspects the independence of the practical is vigorously maintained. So-called practical concepts such as 'good,' and 'ideals,' are sometimes alleged to be presuppositions of will. In fact, judgments of value are posterior to the will. "This is a good thing" really means "I will this." The theoretical deals with the existent, the practical creates the future. It is not possible to will the existence of what exists. Volition is not the surrounding world which the spirit perceives; it is a beginning, a new fact. Error is not

ignorance; it is the affirmation of knowing what we do not know. "We err only because we wish to err." Croce even justifies the "Holy Inquisition," not in its ferocious practices but in its eternal idea—practical measures to induce the erring to correct themselves.

Under the dialectic of the will the dilemma of free *or* determined action is rejected. The volitional act is declared to be at once free and determined. It is determined because it must arise in a definite situation and must change with the situation, but it is also free because it does not remain fixed in an actual situation nor repeat and make a duplicate of it. Volition produces something new: it is initial creation and therefore act of freedom. And further, development of the dialectic gives the poles of good and evil which are nothing more or less than freedom and non-freedom. Evil is thus essentially a negativity or contradiction. Why is this contradiction? It is "owing to the multiplicity of the desires in respect to the singleness of character of the volitional act." Why should there be such multiplicity concurrent with the demand for unity? The answer to this is found in the very conception of evolution. "The inquiry into the dialectic of the volitional act enters in this way into the very heart of reality." In this section the Hegelian tradition is evident despite the translator's dictum in the preface to the *Æsthetic* that the Philosophy of the Practical "contains hardly a trace of Hegel."

Part Two employs the dual division into economic and ethic, which makes a very convenient classification of ethical or supposedly ethical categories. "The economic activity is that which wills and effects only what corresponds to the conditions of fact in which a mind finds itself; the ethical activity is that which, although it corresponds to these conditions, also refers to something that transcends them. To the first correspond what are called individual needs, to the second universal needs" (p. 312 f.). Utilitarian systems of ethics have simply confused these two activities, each of which is legitimate and important in its sphere. The calculation of pleasure and pain is out of place in valuing life, although calculation in economics is appropriate. "No one would wish to live his life again, not because the sorrows always exceed the pleasures, but rather because man is not a consumer of pleasures; he is a creator of life." Kant was right in maintaining the autonomy of ethics but failed to see that the useful, happiness, well-being, has an autonomy of its own. Kant was right also in insisting that ethic is formal, in so far as this means that spirit—the end of ethical will—is universal, although he was mistaken in the supposition that logical universality is itself the ethical universal.

What is the universal? It is "the Spirit, it is Reality, in so far as it is truly real, that is, in so far as it is unity of thought and willing; it is Life . . .; it is Freedom, if a reality so conceived be perpetual development, creation, progress."

Part Three defines Laws as the volition of classes of acts, as contrasted with processes which are not volitional, or as contrasted with economic and ethical acts which have for their content not classes of acts but individual acts. In ethical action one may be governed by principle; to be governed by a law may be a valuable step toward freedom or ethical will.

Such a summary must overlook the many fine *apperçus* and acute analyses. Not the least favorable feature of the book is its orientation of various philosophical views with reference to the author's own position. These features, added to the excellencies noted above, make the book a notable contribution to the literature of idealistic ethics.

Is such an ethical system an adequate account of the moral consciousness? Its fundamental dilemma has often been pointed out: either it must rest in such empty categories as unity, duality, universality, or it must borrow from experience the content which distinguishes love from hate, justice from injury, real freedom from formal freedom. And despite the author's criticism of Kant's formalism, it is difficult to see how his own principle of universality can escape the dilemma. Man "should will not only his own self individualized, but also that self, which being in all selves, is their common Father." "The moral individual has this consciousness of working for the Whole" (p. 446). How does one know of other selves and what can one know of them, unless by the give and take of coöperation and conflict, of suggestion and sympathy? A 'Whole,' even if spelled with a capital letter, is no more moral than a part unless it mean something quite other than a mathematical or logical unity; and, for one, I can not see how to get the ethical content which actually is found in the moral consciousness without some recognition of social factors; nor the full meaning of evil unless we consider not merely its character of 'negativity' but its actual consequences in hate, sorrow, disappointment, and remorse. Moreover, the author's doctrines of the universal as Progress, and of volition as in essence creation of a new, seem peculiarly difficult to reconcile with his doctrine that to prove the historical origin of anything destroys its universal, that is its moral value. The latter doctrine seems to rob volition of its greatest moral significance, namely reconstruction of ideals. In our day, particularly, it will be hard to convince men that they have no

responsibility in this respect. Nor will it be easily accepted that we have nothing to learn for our ethical philosophy, to say nothing of our moral guidance, by studying the struggles and achievements of the past.

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Prinzipien der psychologischen Erkenntnis: Prolegomena zu einer Kritik der historischen Vernunft. Von WALTER STRICH. Beiträge zur Philosophie, Nr. 5. Heidelberg, Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1914.—pp. vi, 363.

This book adds one more to the long list of books and articles dealing with the principles of psychology. In all this literature only one point seems to be absolutely clear, viz., that there is no substantial agreement about psychology, either in respect to its aim or its accomplishment. The exact nature of the principles which the psychologist must use to explain mind is apparently as much in doubt to-day as ever it was, a sad disillusionment for those who, only a generation ago, thought the problem was solved with the creation of the psychological laboratory. This disagreement does not, indeed, justify the scepticism which sees in mind an object so complex as forever to defy conceptual analysis, for it may be that the present ebullition of psychological methodology is only the prologue to a period of great psychological discoveries, somewhat as the early seventeenth century ushered in the physical sciences with a welter of logical speculation. Even now, perhaps, some psychologist is developing in use a method which, by its fruitfulness, will do for psychology what Galileo's work did for physics. Controversy over method may well be essential to progress, but until a recognized method shall emerge, the logical controversy is doomed at least to appear unfruitful, and to estimate accurately the value of any contribution to the controversy must remain impossible.

Accordingly we approach the present criticism of the principles of psychology with a measure of scepticism not shared by the author. For Dr. Strich the problem is an analysis of reason itself, and the results are to be legislative for the procedure of psychology; his purpose, indeed, is to show that an explanatory psychology is in principle impossible and that all such attempts are on a wrong tack. The object of his analysis of psychological principles is to lay the foundation for a critique of reason supplementary to that of Kant, which he seems to regard as final so far as it goes. Kant's critique, however, contains a dogmatic element in so far as Kant assumed that his pure reason is identical with reason in general (p. 4). Epistemo-

logical monism, which assumes that causality is the only instrument of knowledge, must be supplanted by epistemological dualism, which is based on the proof that knowledge of the mental does not follow the causal law. What is required is a critique of historical reason which shall do for the mental sciences what Kant did for the physical sciences. Such a critique would lay the logical foundation of history; the present work, however, is only the prolegomena. The principles which Dr. Strich seeks, therefore, are conceived by him as *a priori* forms of reason analogous and supplementary to Kant's categories. Kant himself, Dr. Strich holds, recognized the need for such supplementation when he assigned a value to teleology as a regulative principle in biology.

If we neglect the claim to *a priori* validity, it is clear that Dr. Strich's conception of a critique of historical reason involves two questions which may be, and in fact have been, considered as independent. The first and most general of these is the logic of the historical sciences, a question on which much has been written during the last few years, especially in Germany. The discontent with Kant's one-sided devotion to the physical sciences might almost be called general, and is a natural consequence of the fact that the historical and social sciences were as absorbing an intellectual interest for the nineteenth century as the physical sciences were for the eighteenth. This tendency may well be recognized as one likely to produce lasting changes in philosophy; indeed its effects are already well marked. The second question is the one to which Dr. Strich more particularly devotes himself, the question of the logical nature of psychology. He seems to consider it self-evident that the historical sciences are mental sciences and that psychology is the foundation of them (Preface). This is of course the traditional opinion, but it requires some justification in view of the fact that the most elaborate attempt so far to establish a logic for the historical sciences has taken another position. Windelband and Rickert have insisted that the historical sciences do not and cannot formulate laws of nature, but they regard a 'nomothetic' psychology as possible; hence they abandon the distinction between physical and mental sciences and deny the dependence of the historical sciences on psychology. Dr. Strich, on the other hand, keeps the familiar alignment of the sciences and regards the attempt to state laws in psychology as a blunder. The historical sciences are mental sciences and psychology is the fundamental historical science.

The fundamental opposition on which Dr. Strich bases his epis-

temological dualism is that between space and time. "Kant investigated knowledge only in so far as it is connected with space. There is, however, a knowledge which must be characterized precisely by the lack of space as a method" (p. 5). The distinction is between the categories by which phenomena are to be thought. In themselves phenomena as they are perceived are neither physical nor psychical. Metaphysically the world may be said to be merely the infinitely many series of the experiences of subjects; it is a world of monads, each monad having its own world of experience (p. 15). Tones and colors, for example, are in general merely *Weltbestimmtheiten*; they can be thought as belonging to nature, the system of things related causally in space, or to the subject, which is a temporal unity subsisting merely in the conscious relations of its contents (pp. 9 f.). Hence follow all the essential characteristics of the two kinds of knowledge. Natural science constructs the concept of a 'one' world in space, a world consisting of timeless elements causally related. No element in this world has a history, for each is eternal and unchangeable, except in respect to its spatial relations. The mental, on the other hand, belongs to no 'world' but only to the monad, the temporal system of the subject. Hence there are no mental elements, the relations of which 'in' consciousness psychology can formulate; the theory of mental elements, to the refutation of which the author devotes much attention, is an unwarranted spatializing of mind. There are only moments of experience which are felt as like other moments or different, and in all cases this identification is a purely mental process not explainable by the objective likeness of the stimuli. Moreover, what we call a moment is determined solely by the synthesis of experience. The subject is not 'in' time, as the scientist understands time; it *is* time, a series of absolute moments (pp. 51 f.). Clearly, then, psychological knowledge is historical, since any moment can be understood only by its relations in the sequence of moments; similarly, there can be only individual psychology, since there is no mental 'world' but only the moments of monads.

The point of view of the book thus outlined in Chapter I is elaborated and applied in the later chapters with considerable repetition. The fundamental category of historical reason is will (Chapter III). As selective attention, will is active in both thought and perception; in no case can this selective capacity be explained by association or by the effect of the stimulus. Will is not a phenomenon but 'an idea *a priori* of the psychological reason' (p. 101). Its act must be conceived as a creation out of nothing (p. 97). In the historical reason,

therefore, end plays a rôle analogous to that of cause in pure reason, for a temporal unity implies an end (p. 129). In a developing series the end is present from the beginning as immanent determination or will (pp. 134, 144). The opposition between the pure and the historical reason thus corresponds to that between what is and what ought to be (p. 169). "The reality of the historical moment is not grounded in a preceding reality of which it is merely a change, but only in the reality of the historical subject. As the act or creation of this it exists. Real time is an eternal creation out of nothing" (p. 170). "The world, historically considered, we can define only through the act of the ego" (p. 194).

The conception of the subject, however, is extended to include the organism, and therefore biology is held to be an historical science; 'soul is only another name for the unity of life' (p. 161). Life or the organism is a necessary category of thought, a principle *a priori* (pp. 57, 110, 159 f.). Biogenetic laws, therefore, are not laws of nature; they are only the recounting of a self-repeating history (p. 134). In general, the individual nature of psychology is no bar to generalization (pp. 322 ff.). Events may be repeated without end and individuals may be alike to any extent; there is therefore a psychology of groups, *e. g.*, of Americans or of artists. In no case, however, can these generalizations be called laws of nature, since the latter term applies only to the relations of timeless elements.

The aim of pure reason is explanation (*Erklären*); that of historical reason is understanding (*Verstehen*). Psychology is intuitive rather than inductive; ultimately psychological knowledge is self-knowledge. The thought or action of another can be understood only in so far as it can be re-experienced in ourselves; we understand another only when we realize his purposes and the situation in which he acts, ultimately when we understand his character. For psychology, then, the standpoint of solipsism is justified; only so far as likeness exists is there a bridge from one monad to another (p. 320). The process thus described, while it refers to an obvious fact, is scarcely adequate as an account of sympathetic knowledge. The mere similarity of my experience with another's would surely never convince me that these experiences really belonged to another. The author, however, does not discuss the relations between his monads.

It is evident that Dr. Strich's analysis of the historical reason brings together concepts that at least appear to be very different. Granting that biology, psychology, and history do involve real process and that the physical sciences do not, it is still a question whether their

differences are not logically more important than their similarity. In particular, history is not thus accounted for. The historical interest in events as unique appears to be a different kind of interest from that in processes which are indefinitely repeated, even though both may equally be processes. The fact is that Dr. Strich overestimates the logical differences between the generalizations of biology and psychology on the one hand and those of the physical sciences on the other. It is indeed true that the former do not concern 'timeless' elements but only the repetitions of temporal unities. But the laws of timeless elements do not have a sort of generality at large, as he seems to suppose. They are hypothetical statements of something that is universally true under certain conditions. What these conditions are is not determined *a priori* but by the needs of the science. If, then, it should be necessary, as Dr. Strich supposes, to assume the organism as a category, certain propositions might be universally true under the conditions imposed by that category. Such propositions would then be logically similar in nature to the laws of mechanics, even though they carried a teleological implication, and the relations expressed would be as 'timeless' as those between two atoms. The same is true of psychological generalizations. The more fundamental distinction would then lie, as Rickert maintains, between these efforts to generalize, from whatever point of view, and the historical interest which aims to express the individuality of its subject matter in a series of unique values.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

A History of Philosophy. By FRANK THILLY. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1914.—pp. xv, 612.

The idea of an orthodox philosophy is, to use Berkeley's phrase, a manifest repugnancy, and nothing is more abhorrent to the spirit of philosophy than the attempt to give the student the one tenable theory of the universe; as nothing is more distressing to a teacher than to have his pupil bolt his ideas and regurgitate them, on demand, for inspection. So, in spite of the familiar criticisms, which recur at regular intervals, the introduction to philosophy by way of its history remains the best method of approach, for it is the only way in which a student has any chance of being protected from the prejudices of his instructor. Prejudices may, indeed, peep through the cloak of impartiality in which the historian hides, but a free use of the sources will minimize their influence. One sends a student to the history of philosophy that he may sojourn for a while in the worlds of those whose vision has been broadest, in order that he may be able to face

present day problems from the vantage ground of the history of thought,—just as the much traveled man when he returns home is able to view his native land and its problems in larger perspective. The history of philosophy is a cure of the provincialism which comes from isolation in time,—in one's own time, and from isolation in some little hamlet of the world of mind. The value of the study is obvious, its aim clear, but, where is one to find a suitable textbook? I suppose every one's experience here is pretty much the same. One tries one book after another, and is never quite satisfied with any. And so a new history of philosophy by Professor Thilly, who is already so well known as a past master in the art of clear exposition, is sure to receive a ready welcome from all teachers of the subject, and to be given a fair trial.

Many of the virtues of the work are apparent at a glance. Professor Thilly has, with a large measure of success, lived up to his own determination to preserve an impartial and objective attitude, and to keep his own views from obtruding into his discussions. Only once in a while does he forget himself and let the critic get the upper hand, as in his treatment of John Stuart Mill. He has, moreover, in dealing with the different philosophers, continually sought to emphasize those of their views which were historically most significant in determining the course of philosophic thought. This is what a history of philosophy must do if it is not to be a mere record of the *placita philosophorum*, which is what too many historians, with the Teutonic conception of thoroughness, have given us,—as dreary a business as Homer's catalogue of ships, and quite as futile. And so Professor Thilly has succeeded in bringing out the continuity of the development of philosophy without distorting the views of the philosophers. Most histories of philosophy are either histories with a purpose, the purpose, namely, of establishing the historian's own philosophy as the sum of the wisdom of the ages; or else they give us a succession of philosophies which resemble kaleidoscopic pictures, each pretty after its fashion, all intricate and more or less fantastic, and none very definitely related to what goes before and what comes after. Professor Thilly has hit the happy mean.

It is another excellent feature of this work that it brings the history of philosophy up to date. Many of the philosophers who have become influential in recent times have indeed to be summarily presented; but nowhere is Professor Thilly's skill more manifest than in the way in which he succeeds in packing the gist of the matter into a few pages or paragraphs, and putting his reader forthwith at the angle of vision of the philosopher in question. Curiously enough, he seems more

successful in doing this in the case of the philosophers whose views are opposed to his own than of those who are his brothers in the faith. For example, to represent Professor Royce as a mere continuer of Hegel, is misleading and inaccurate. Professor Royce has recently put himself on record in definite protest against this slander.

Last, but not least of its virtues, the book is written throughout in a simple, clear, definite, straightforward style.

Professor Thilly gives approximately half of the book to modern philosophy, a quarter to ancient, and a quarter to medieval (including the Renaissance). In assigning so large a proportion of space to the middle ages the conscience of the historian has been satisfied at the expense of the serviceableness of the work as an introductory textbook. Nothing can, indeed, be more unjustifiable than the cavalier way in which the whole medieval period is all too frequently disposed of in non-Catholic texts. Yet one may well question the wisdom of giving a quarter of the book to that period, and for this reason: the way of life, and the fashions of thought, in the middle ages make the medieval mind far more remote from us than the Greek. To understand the greatness of that period, to appreciate the vitality of its thinking, one must literally soak in its atmosphere; one must bring to life again the experience of which the medieval philosophers were the interpreters, and this means a thorough study of the whole historical, social, political, religious and intellectual setting. Apart from this, one is pretty sure to carry away the old prejudices, that the medieval philosophers spent their time in idle and profitless debate, and in the spinning of hyper-subtle distinctions. Failing such an exhaustive study, one had better be content to sample the medieval mind by extensive reading in one or more of its representative writers.

This may seem an ungracious criticism, for what Professor Thilly has undertaken to do he has accomplished with rare skill. But looking at the matter from the point of view of the teacher in search of textbooks, I could wish that the work had been published in two volumes, sold separately. The section devoted to the modern period is by far the best part of the book from the point of view both of scholarship and of execution. It is particularly refreshing to find the German philosophers of the great period interpreted with a clearness and elegance truly French.

In dealing with the early Greek philosophers Professor Thilly has given a clear and compact statement of what are usually regarded as their most significant ideas, under the captions, *The Problem of Being*, *The Problem of Number*, *The Problem of Change*. One seems to catch here an echo of Hegel and Windelband, and the headings

are misleading. Surely change was not a 'problem' to the Heraklitiens; it was the fundamental fact. The problem with the Pythagoreans was not so much number, as rather the sway of number in nature. Still any attempt at such simple classification is inaccurate. Professor Thilly's account here is too clear-cut to be intelligible. It is too much as if Thales awoke one bright day and said: "I guess the world is made of water." Later comes Anaximenes and says: "Let us try air." The importance of the pre-Socratic period lies in the fact that then certain concepts first took shape which have ever since, for good and for ill, influenced the whole course of speculation. To appreciate their appearance and their hold one must see how they emerge from the tangle of confused ideas found in the early gropings of science and of philosophy. In particular is it necessary to make more of the beginnings of science, and especially of the brilliant work of the too much neglected pioneers in medical science.

The most disappointing part of the work is that which deals with the great Greek triumvirate. This is largely due to the fact that Professor Thilly has not allowed himself enough space. Abstractly, and from the point of view of modern prejudice, it may be justifiable to give nearly twice as much space to Spencer as to Socrates, more to Mill than to Plato, more to Locke than to Aristotle. But in view of the immense influence which these Greeks exerted, not only in the middle ages, but on all subsequent western thought, and in view of the greater difficulty in interpretation, this is, waiving all question of relative value, an error of judgment.

In the account of Socrates Professor Thilly has leaned too exclusively on Xenophon. Some recent writers may have gone to the other extreme in ascribing most of Plato to Socrates. But, if so, it is certainly an error in the right direction. There is nothing in Professor Thilly's portrait to make one say, that is the way the man must have looked who could exert such unparalleled influence on his pupils.

Plato, however, suffers most. His philosophy, when reduced to the dry bones of logic, resembles but little the Plato of the Dialogues. One must deal with Plato's philosophy as one would with the philosophy of any poet. It is rich and varied and many-sided, and in very truth an interpretation of life. The key to his vision may indeed be found in the 'doctrine of ideas,' but that doctrine was never with Plato cut and dried. It receives its best, its concretest interpretation in the sixth and seventh books of the Republic. But how barren the doctrine seems when we read that "the universe is conceived by Plato as a logical system of ideas: it forms an organic spiritual unity, governed by a universal purpose, the idea of the Good, and is, there-

fore, a rational moral whole" (p. 64). This is Plato phlebotomised. Compare Thilly's account with the living interpretation which Nettleship has given. And where do we find Plato ever teaching that "knowledge is the correspondence of thought and reality" (p. 62). Throughout this account, brevity accentuates the defects of our author's virtues. The story is often made simpler than the facts warrant. For example, in ethics, Plato is represented as having two distinct, and apparently unrelated, conceptions of the good life: one, more in accord with his metaphysics, which leads to asceticism and mysticism,—the view of the *Phaedo*; the other, a concession to the fact that the soul is after all fettered by the body, which leads to the soberer interpretation of the cardinal virtues, as worked out in the *Republic*. But surely these are not simply two alternative views. Was Plato ever caught in orphic dualism? I doubt it, although there is an undercurrent of orphicism in many of the *Dialogues*, including the *Republic*. But when Plato has made the *Republic*, the best and completest expression of his philosophy, center around the discussion of righteousness, in the individual and in the state (*δικαιοσύνη* is a more general term than our "justice"), we should interpret his other, and more fragmentary statements in the light of that work.

Aristotle is fairer game, for his language is generally as wizened as his physiognomy is said to have been, and it was he who first taught philosophy to speak a *jargon apart*. But when Professor Thilly seeks to give English equivalents of the technical terms the result is not always enlightening or defensible, as, for example, "dynamic" for *δυνάμει ὄν*, and "realization or completion" for *ἐντελέχεια*. But the fault we have to find with this account is not so much that it is inaccurate in details as rather that, as a whole, it fails to give an adequate impression of the living value of Aristotle's vision. This is not the man whom Suetonius described as "Nature's private secretary, dipping his pen in intellect," not the man who was for Dante the "master of those who know," not the man in order to study whose works Goethe wanted to live over again.

It requires courage in these days to write a comprehensive history of philosophy, and of course the critic can always find many minor points of interpretation to which he would take exception. But that is a profitless business. Of the work as a whole we can only speak with approval. It possesses so many rare and striking excellences that it is not at all unlikely that experience will prove it to be the best introductory book in the field.

CHARLES M. BAKEWELL.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Die Philosophie des Unbewussten. Von W. WINDELBAND. Festrede gehalten in der Gesamtsitzung der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften am 24. April, 1914. Heidelberg, Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1914.—pp. 22.

From the time of Descartes to the present, the hypothesis of the unconscious, in one form or another, has never been absent from modern philosophy; it is to be found in the systems of Leibniz, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and von Hartmann, while the notion that the conscious is only the upper limit of activities rooted in the unconscious is to-day a common belief both of popular and technical psychology. Looked at from the standpoint of methodology, the hypothesis presents the following peculiarities: It is not strictly verifiable, since the unconscious as such cannot be experienced; it can be called into operation only where the physical substrate of mind is insufficient to explain the facts; it presupposes that the mental may be either conscious or unconscious, for the unconscious is not merely the physical.

The first great mental fact that calls for the application of the unconscious is memory. So far as memory is merely passive, it may be referred to the traces of earlier excitations in the brain substance. But reproduction takes place according to all sorts of meaningful connection; memory is therefore a system ordered according to meaning, and this cannot be conceived by any scheme of brain tracings. The second fact that demands the unconscious is implication, the fact that an idea seems to include all that is implicit in it, even though much of this may not be conscious. The implicit goes far beyond memory; for all the geometrical properties of a triangle, for example, may be said to be implicit in its definition and in the nature of space. Thus in general the valid *a priori* is always an unconscious element in experience which points to a higher regularity working in the individual. Empirically this leads to the social life, as in language. It suggests also a *Bewusstsein überhaupt*, but this goes beyond experience.

From the time of Descartes's sharp distinction between *res cogitans* and *res extensa* there has been a general tendency to identify mind with consciousness. This has been evidenced by the effort of physiological psychology to parallel mental state with brain state, and by the traditional but inadequate contrast of mental and physical sciences. If, however, as seems likely, psychologists are led more and more to the admission of an unconscious, the identification of mind with consciousness must be given up, and this must lead to a revision of the concept of mind and of its metaphysical presuppositions. The establishment of psychology as an empirical science does not alter the fact that of all sciences psychology stands in the closest relations with philosophy.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

Work and Wealth. A Human Valuation. By J. A. HOBSON. New York and London. The Macmillan Company, 1914.—pp. xvi, 367.

While this is an economic rather than an ethical treatise, it will be of interest to philosophical readers because of its attempt to give an ethical evaluation to economic laws and processes. The *summum bonum* is "human welfare," or "organic welfare," the latter biological term being "extended so as to cover the entire physical and spiritual structure of human society" (p. vi; cf. pp. 12-16). Every act of production, distribution and consumption must be valued with regard to its aggregate effect upon the life and character of the agent, and upon the social organism. In ordinary economics 'costs' appear entirely on the production side, and 'utilities' on the consumption side of the account. On the contrary, in his 'human valuation,' Mr. Hobson finds that some production, like the creative work of the artist, is practically devoid of 'human costs' and contains great 'human utility' to the producer himself, as it affords him pleasure and self-realization. His 'cost' is therefore simply his 'keep' (p. 44). 'Human costs' keep increasing as work becomes less creative and more imitative, and in sweated labor outweigh 'human utilities' altogether. The 'human utility' of consumption varies with the consumer and the quantity of goods that he consumes, and some forms of consumption involve very heavy 'human costs' (p. 159).

The standpoint of 'organic welfare' with its 'human values' and 'human utilities' furnishes a suggestive mode of analysis which is applied to a wide variety of the subjects discussed in economic treatises, such as the origins of industry, real income, the costs of industry (here of course 'human costs'), machine production, the supply of capital, the 'human costs' and 'utilities' of distribution and consumption, scientific management, and the distribution of leisure.

The psychological motives that lead to the accumulation of capital are analyzed in a suggestive way. Mr. Hobson thinks that much of the accumulation is due to the "automatic saving" of the surplus income of the rich, and is therefore "costless," while middle class saving involves 'human cost,' and that the inducement of interest is therefore necessary to evoke it. The savings of the working class are made at very heavy 'human costs' and are undesirable. It seems as if Mr. Hobson ought to recognize a large 'human utility' in thrift and the development of character that attends it.

The "human law of distribution" is that each should contribute in accordance with his ability to each in accordance with his needs (Chap XII). Neither ability nor needs, however, are equal. The services exacted of different members of society should therefore vary with the capacity to perform them without excessive 'human cost.' Some, through taste and talent, are capable of larger desirable consumption, and therefore equality of opportunity according to needs means some inequality of income (pp. 164, f.).

The 'human' claims of labor are forcibly presented. Labor should not be bought and sold like a dead commodity on the market, in which rates of wages are regulated by some natural, fortuitous, or organized scarcity of

supply quite beyond the control of a working family and bear no relation to its human needs. Piece work is "the most complete denial that the human needs of the worker have any claim to determine what he should be paid" (p. 192).

The inducement to individuals to perform efficient social service rests upon the recognition of society as an organism. Consequently the author is at some pains to develop this conception in his later chapters. After it has once become fully recognized that society possesses a unity and life of its own, each will find in social service, not a sacrifice, but an enlargement of his personality. Sound as is this ethical doctrine, Mr. Hobson's attempt to work out a philosophical statement of society as an organism seems crude, and he overworks the analogy between individual citizens and cells in a biological organism.

This volume will in no sense serve as a substitute for traditional interpretations, either in economics or in ethics, and still less as a synthesis of the two. The economic process does not now go on under the regulation of 'human costs' and 'organic welfare,' and it is doubtful whether it ever will be able to do so. Nor am I convinced that it would be wholly desirable from an ethical point of view that it ever should. But, however that may be, a normative treatment, like Mr. Hobson's method of 'human valuation,' can never take the place of a factual description of economic processes as they actually do go on. Moreover, Mr. Hobson makes large use of some very questionable economic doctrines, like that of surplus value. He arraigns the leisure class severely, and perhaps with justice, but without allowing at all for the 'human' services which it performs. Even the devil, one would suppose, ought to have his due. On the ethical side the book is inadequate in the vagueness of 'organic welfare' as the moral ideal. The antithesis between 'human costs' and 'human utilities' seems to rest upon an uncertain psychological basis. The analogy of society to an organism is crudely put, and probably exaggerated, fine and true as are some of the ethical conclusions deduced from it. But the method of 'human valuation' may well supplement, although it must not supplant, traditional methods of interpretation. And perhaps this is all that the author means to claim for it. As a pioneer work in the highly important but neglected *terra incognita* that has been permitted to grow up between the fields of economics and ethics, Mr. Hobson's volume is highly valuable, and deserves careful study.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT.

Mechanism, Life and Personality. An Examination of the Mechanistic Theory of Life and Mind. By J. S. HALDANE. New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1914.—pp. vii, 139.

This little book is made up of four lectures delivered in the Physiological Laboratory of Guy's Hospital. It is of especial interest because the author is not only well-known as an eminent and active physiologist, but also as a philosophical student and writer. It is the breadth of view and critical spirit

derived from his philosophical studies, one feels safe in asserting, that enables Dr. Haldane to see that "if the mechanistic theory is wrong, this does not prove that the theory of the vitalists is right." Indeed, he dismisses vitalism summarily as "unproved, unintelligible, and practically useless as a scientific working hypothesis" (p. 30). The trouble with the vitalistic theory is that it stands on the same plane, as it were, with the theory of mechanism. "As they [the vitalists] admitted the hypotheses of physics and chemistry with regard to the material and atomic constitution of the universe, and based all their observations and methods on these assumptions, the natural consequence was that in matters of detail they always found themselves with either what appeared to be physical and chemical phenomena or with something unintelligible" (p. 62).

Dr. Haldane is, however, mainly concerned with an examination of the mechanistic theory of life. He points out that the mechanical theory had a certain methodical justification during the older period when physiological research followed methods that were crude and primitive, but that the aims and direction of modern investigation are making more and more evident both the impossibility and the inadequacy of this mode of explanation. "As a physiologist I can see no use for the hypothesis that life, as a whole, is a mechanical process. The theory does not help me in my work; and indeed I think it now hinders very seriously the progress of physiology. I should as soon go back to the mythology of our Saxon forefathers as to the mechanistic physiology" (p. 61). In the general plan of many modern text-books of physiology, the author says, there is absolutely no place left for the living body as such. "The fact that the body lives as a whole, each organ or part fulfilling its proper functions and adapting itself to every change, is scarcely touched upon, while vast mass of unrelated and unassimilable material is carefully recorded and described" (pp. 91-92). What is necessary, Dr. Haldane maintains, is to abandon the attempt to write the account of living things in terms of mechanical causality, and to adopt frankly the category of organic determination. This is the idea which guides physiology at every turn, suggesting new problems for investigations, and determining the divisions of the subject. "To leave it out of account in physiology, or to treat it as an 'heuristic principle' of very uncertain value, seems to me about as foolish as it would be to reject the idea of mass in chemistry and retain the phlogiston theory, as Priestley and Cavendish actually did until their deaths" (p. 88).

To adopt the category of life as a basis for physiology involves, as the author goes on to explain, the abandonment of the assumptions of the mechanistic theory with regard to the world as a whole. Even in physiology the idea of life carries us beyond the individual organism to a wider organic whole apart from which many of its functions are unintelligible. But when the characters that belong to conscious organisms, or persons are considered, still further consequences of this new conception become evident. It is to this subject that the author devotes his fourth lecture, which is entitled 'Personality.' The philosophical conclusions which are here indicated belong in

general to the point of view that is described as 'objective idealism.' The lectures were written for students of physiology, and one does not expect to find more than an outline sketch of a philosophical position. The main interest of this little volume for the philosophical reader is to be found in the fact that it is a vigorous protest by a well-known working physiologist against the view, still very widely accepted, that it is only in the causal terms of the physical sciences that the nature and functions of living organisms become intelligible.

J. E. C.

The Ethical Implications of Bergson's Philosophy. By UNA BERNARD SAIT. Archives of Philosophy, No. 4. New York, The Science Press, 1914.—pp. 183.

In leading up to the special theme indicated by the title, two thirds of this book is devoted to a detailed, systematic statement of Bergson's views on almost every subject in the field of his writings. The work is based on an exhaustive study of everything Bergson has published, and exhibits extraordinary industry. In consequence it is the most complete and systematic account in English of Bergson's teachings. It does not at all fall into the class of 'introductions' to Bergson for beginners; it is too full and perhaps too dry for that. But it is of decided value in correlating each part of Bergson's teaching with the rest, and in giving the substance of his teaching divested as far as possible of the master's brilliant style and illustrations.

It is surprising to find how well Mrs. Sait has been able, without forcing the thought, to bring together the contents of the various writings into a unitary whole. The prime difficulties in Bergson's philosophy, indeed, will be thought by critics to stand out all the more saliently; but around these the interconnections of the various teachings are clearly drawn, and on the whole convincingly. There is no trace of the rhapsodic praise too common in admirers of Bergson. In fact the author does not commit herself to more than a provisional acceptance of his views. But she admirably succeeds in presenting those views in a colorless, deliberate and comprehensive exposition.

On the ethical side the work passes beyond exposition. The author recognizes Bergson's failure as yet to deal explicitly with ethical and religious problems, but maintains that there are, however, certain implications of his philosophy which, if carried out, would have a definite ethical and religious bearing. This leads her to undertake to construct the ethical doctrines that seem to be implied in the views which Bergson has expressed on other subjects. In this connection it is found necessary to correct or broaden Bergson's account of society. The creative impulse which has become scattered in different worlds and in different species and individuals in this world, tends to work out an adjustment with matter in diverse ways, usually at the expense of its own freedom. In man only does conscious intellect leave room for intuition to get back into the depths of its own duration and attain true freedom. But the personalities of all men are rooted in a common life-principle, and enter into their own free being more fully as they attain relations of sympathy with

each other. Bergson has described the common life of men only in terms of their intellectual acquisitions and practical achievements; but beyond these there is, correlative with the differentiation of personality, a social interpenetration on the deeper levels of intuition which is the method of real freedom.

Without aiming to contradict Bergson's non-teleological theory of evolution, the author presses as far as she can those general tendencies of the life-impulse that make for progress of a more or less definite character. She gets here something very like a purpose. "The direction of the life-principle is surely being best expressed in so far as there is fuller realization of social harmony as based on the interpenetration of the deeper experiences of men." This direction of life toward social harmony gives a standard of value, in terms of which Mrs. Sait then works out acutely and in some detail a general ethical theory of good and evil, right and wrong, and the various moral attitudes toward these. In this she has been influenced by the point of view of Professor Dewey. For the student of Bergson the contributions of special value here are the suggested enlargement of Bergson's view of freedom on the side of its social significance, and the interpretation of the fundamental movement of life as in some sense purposive.

J. FORSYTH CRAWFORD.

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Milton and Jakob Boehme: A Study of German Mysticism in Seventeenth-Century England. By MARGARET LEWIS BAILEY. Number 1 of *Germanic Literature and Culture: A Series of Monographs*, edited by JULIUS GOEBEL. New York, Oxford University Press, 1914.—pp. x, 200.

The author of this monograph has not been successful in showing that Milton was influenced by Boehme, nor is she able to give objective evidence that the poet knew of the work of the "Teutonic philosopher"; though his "industrious and select reading," and his promiscuous perusal of "all manner of tractates" make it probable that he had seen some of Boehme's writings. Miss Bailey's failure to appreciate the range of Milton's reading, with her consequent attribution to Boehme of ideas drawn from other sources, is the weak point in her book. She assumes that the poet was affected chiefly by the popular ideas of his time, and forgets the more important literary influences. For example, his account of the earthly paradise (p. 157) may be fully explained by reference to many authors with whom he was well acquainted, from Ovid to Samuel Purchas. On occasion, she even overlooks his familiarity with the Bible, and makes the words

the Pleiades before him danced
Shedding sweet influence (*P. L.* 7. 374-5)

a proof of the similarity of his beliefs to those of the German, from whom she quotes: "the stars or constellations operate in man," etc. Milton is obviously thinking of Job 38. 31: "Canst thou bind the sweet influences of Pleiades?" And to make the poet's allusions to astrology an evidence of his affinity with Boehme is absurd. Indeed, there seems to be in him little trace of the doctrines

that especially distinguish the mystic. Milton's familiarity with Neoplatonism came partly from the very authors whom Miss Bailey mentions in her historical survey, without suggesting that he had read them; there is direct evidence for his acquaintance with Porphyry, Saint Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and "thrice great Hermes" (*Il Penseroso*, 88), who according to the monograph is the "father of magic" (p. 7). The context in *Il Penseroso* reveals something of its author's study of magic, and suggests the Kabbala. Further, Milton had some knowledge of the important Neoplatonist Philo Judaeus, and was a devoted student of Plato himself. His understanding of Neoplatonism and magic, from classical, Jewish, and Christian sources, surely ought to be investigated. The author's statement that the idea of the temptation in *Paradise Regained* could not have been obtained from any other source than Boehme (p. 160) hardly endures comparison with Calvin's exegesis of the temptation in his *Commentary on a Harmony of the Evangelists*. A command of theologians and commentators, such as the Fathers, and Calvin and Paraeus, was an important part of the poet's intellectual equipment. It will remain difficult for any one properly to estimate him until this almost untouched subject has been systematically dealt with.

Though unfortunate in its main problem, the monograph is of value. It recognizes the importance of Neoplatonism in literature, and endeavors to deal with certain manifestations of it. One may hope that the work will stimulate other students to trace the effect of the Alexandrian philosophy on literary thought up to the present; the subject is little understood and of great significance. Miss Bailey's account of current English mysticism in the time of Milton presents material that no student of the period can afford to neglect.

ALLAN H. GILBERT.

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La Riforma della Dialettica Hegeliana. Giovanni Gentile. Messina, Guiseppe Principato, 1913.—pp. ix, 306.

This is an interesting and instructive collection of essays by the Italian neo-Hegelian Gentile, all of which except the first, from which the book takes its title, have already been published in various Italian periodicals during the years from 1904 to 1912. The common purpose running through these papers is to help in clarifying, in diverse ways, the fundamental notion underlying the reform of the Hegelian dialectic. All of them, indeed, center around the problem of the identity of history and philosophy, and all of them lead towards the author's own system of thought (a new Hegelianism), a philosophy of absolute immanence, which he describes as an "actual idealism" ("because it considers the idea, which is the absolute, as *act*") or as "an absolute spiritualism" ("because only in an absolute idealism, which conceives the idea as *act*, everything is spirit"). "Thought is being and the consciousness of being, life and the mirror of life." The process of reality, this infinite and eternal dialectic which is thought, is *history*, hence philosophy is history and is the conquest of history in the thinking of it: it is living history in the thought of history;

thought, it is to be observed, always conceived as pure activity, and therefore never limitable by the empirical determinations of the fragmentary history in space and time: our thought, but absolutely *ours*, because absolutely *actual* (p. 258). "The history of thought becomes in the new dialectic the process of reality, and the process of reality is no longer conceivable except as the history of thought. The ancient man felt himself melancholically separated from reality, from God; the modern man feels God in himself, and celebrates in the potency of the spirit, the true divinity of the world" (p. 7).

The following essays are included in the volume: "The Reform of the Hegelian Logic and B. Spavento." "Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic" (suggested by Professor Baillie's book), "The Concept of the History of Philosophy," "The Circle of Philosophy and of the History of Philosophy," "The Value of History and the Formal Absolute," "Kantiana," "Two Historians of Philosophy" (Zeller and Höffding), "The Concept of Progress" (criticism of Delvaille's *Essai sur l'histoire de l'idée de progrès*), "The Activity of Thinking as Pure Activity," and "The Method of Immanency." One of the satisfactory features of the present work (and of Italian books in general) is its acquaintance with and consideration of the literature of other lands than the writer's own.

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The following books also have been received:

Know Thyself. By BERNARDINO VARISCO. Translated by GUGLIELMO SALVADORI. London, George Allen and Unwin, Limited, 1915.—pp. xxix, 327. \$2.75 net.

What Ought I to Do? An Inquiry into Morals. By GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. New York, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1915.—pp. 311. \$1.50 net.

American Thought. By WOODBRIDGE RILEY. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1915.—pp. viii, 373.

A Historical Introduction to Ethics. By THOMAS VERNON MOORE. New York, American Book Company, 1915.—pp. viii, 164.

Light from the East. Studies in Japanese Confucianism. By ROBERT CORNELL ARMSTRONG. University of Toronto Studies in Philosophy. Published by the Librarian, University of Toronto, 1914.—pp. xv, 326. \$1.50 net.

Germany in the Nineteenth Century. Second Series. By A. S. PEAKE, BERNARD BOSANQUET, and F. BONAVIA. Manchester, The University Press, 1915.—pp. xvi, 254. \$1.25 net.

The Good News of a Spiritual Realm. By DWIGHT GODDARD. Ann Arbor, Dwight Goddard, 1915.—pp. 379. \$1.00.

The Theory of Psychoanalysis. By DR. C. G. JUNG. Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series, No. 19. New York, Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co., 1915.—pp. 135.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scholastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.*; *Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

Die Religion als Problem der Philosophie. JULIUS FISCHER. *Ar. f. sys. Ph.*, XX, 4, pp. 427-464.

Religion as part of the problem of philosophy includes the concept of God, and the concept of man's relation to God. Since it goes beyond experience, the concept of God is metaphysical. In order to make religion a problem of reason, we must find a rational connection between metaphysics and experience, between the unconditioned and the conditioned. We may start with the proposition that out of nothing nothing comes. This proposition rests for proof on experience, but is supported also by reason as having apodeictic certainty. Sensory impressions precede judgment *temporally*, but *logically* they presuppose rational principles of this sort. Kant recognized this necessary and effective presence of reason in the twelve categories, but held that they have no objective significance apart from us, so that they can assert nothing concerning the unconditioned. He taught expressly however that appearances have objective reality. This is in effect to say that causality is valid objectively and so unconditionally. Causality depends ultimately on the proposition that out of nothing nothing comes. Now all experience comes to us in space and time. We might naturally expect these to be ideal forms of our subjective thought activity in Kant's sense, and also objective forms of the real world. Time and space are infinite, since neither can be limited by anything but itself. We must distinguish here the mathematical and logical concepts of infinity. In mathematics we seem to infer the infinity of the finite. We mean however not infinite magnitudes, but simply the infinite possibility of the enumerating process in consciousness. From this concept we cannot conclude to the reality of time and space. Logically the concept of infinity is first a negation and then a transformation (*Aufhebung*) of the finite. So it transcends the visible world, and is in so far a metaphysical

concept. The mere thinkableness of this idea does not however prove it real. But there is a difference between the infinity of time and that of space, for space appears as real in all its parts, and so is present in its infinity. Time on the other hand is present only in the moment, the 'now.' Time passes and presupposes therefore something which persists independently of it,—*i. e.*, unconditioned eternal energy, which in order to persist takes form in space. So time and space are the real forms of the eternal energy. Matter, which depends on space, is derived from this energy. From such a metaphysical point of view scientific conclusions remain valid, but further conclusions can be adduced to extend the scientific view of the world, in order to account for life and thought. Now the proposition "Out of nothing nothing comes" is as valid for metaphysics as for experience. The limits of our experience imply a reality behind them. The concept of development, in which we might seek for this reality, requires a beginning and an end, but development is in time, and time is infinite. We are led therefore to the metaphysical assumption that the highest being is in itself eternally present, but appears to our consciousness as development. What can we know of this being, of its relation to the world development and to us? Now the unconditioned is rational because it is logically necessary to our thought, as the final conclusion from the concept of cause and effect. Kant takes experience as his presupposition and so makes causality subjective. But we find on the other hand that experience presupposes causality as unconditionally valid. We do not know objectively the final unconditioned cause, or energy, but we can say that it works in us, so that we know its effects subjectively. We must conceive of it as the bearer of knowledge and thought, and so as subject. The concept of God may be substituted here for that of the unconditioned cause. Religion as the concept of God is thus made a rational problem. Is the world development then a purpose or a caprice of its subject? The unconditioned manifests itself in the nature of things, with respect to which we are not free, and in logical thought, where freedom is demonstrated by the possibility of error. Since we experience regularity in the nature of things, we must assume here purposiveness rather than caprice. So natural science becomes part of the content of religion. I experience my own activity only as effect, as object of my consciousness, but I conclude to myself as free cause of this effect, and so conclude directly to the unconditioned, and thus to the identity between God and myself. Psychology therefore becomes part of the content of religion, and religion as the concept of the relation of man to God becomes a problem of reason. Religion as it has developed in history does not of course rest on a logical construction such as the foregoing. In the history of consciousness, the universal concept develops before the idea of the particular, since the universal affords an image of what is common to single impressions, and so of what affects consciousness most often. Since all error is particular, primitive man tends to exclude error and imperfection from his universals, especially that greatest of imperfections, death, and so arrives at the concept of an eternal being, the type concept of the race (*Pflci-*

derer), and thus at the idea of God. The theme of religion is always a human experience. In natural religion the problem is one of dependance: How shall we influence God to do us good? The problem in spiritual religion is human freedom: How shall we be free from sin? These questions are always answered in religious fables, which indeed tend to conceal the central fact of religion,—human experience in its relation to God. It is noteworthy however that the four spiritual religions brought a particular man into relation with God and made his life the content of religion. Buddhism solves the problem of freedom by withdrawing man from the life of sense; Islam declares him to be determined by the will of God; Mosaism makes him free under the law, but Christianity conceives love to be the very lawgiver. If we act in love we may err, but we cannot sin. To be free is to be unconditioned, to be unconditioned is to be God. If man is free from the yoke of sin he has returned to God. So true Christianity is not dogma, but a concept of human experience, of man's relation to God.

MARION D. CRANE.

Ueber den Begriff des Naturgesetzes. BRUNO BAUCH. *Kantstudien*, XIX, 3, pp. 303-307.

Hume rightly remarked that there is no contradiction in supposing, *e. g.*, that snow should cool one day and burn another day. But Kant observed that the possibility of having any phenomenon as a fact depends upon a law of some sort. A scientific experiment would be a mere particularity unless it is assumed to contain universal validity. Pure phenomenon without any possibility of determination, of reproduction, or of control is an abstraction, so that striking out the regularity strikes out the phenomenon itself. It is the very possibility of experiment and science that argues for the existence of a rule. Mere regularity, however, such as that of the meetings of a society, is not a natural law. Kant defines a natural law as a rule in so far as it is objective. As such, it allows no case of exception. Galileo conceived natural laws as empirically discovered determinations of general causal necessity. But he assumed also that nature can be treated mathematically. Both illustrate the point that a natural law is a general complex of categories filled with empirical concreteness. Kant's categories, however, should not be taken as mere forms of thought. Knowledge must refer to objects. The separation of intuition and category must not be taken too seriously. The system of categories is the logical foundation of natural law, though the unity of the particular system of twelve categories should be regarded as a unity through their correlation, and as being capable of development. While the possible development of the system of categories is infinite, it is an infinity which has a constancy and stability, which in fact makes the progress of knowledge possible. Natural laws are special determinations of categories, but are universals with respect to the special cases. They depend not only upon empirical content, but also upon the correlation of the several categories. Helmholtz rightly calls laws general concepts (*allgemeine Gattungsbegriffe*), but they should be regarded neither

as *res*, nor as mere names or psychological representations, but as logical functions. A confirmation of this is found in the recent tendency in logic and mathematics away from psychologism and positivism. The concept as function is closely related to mathematical functions, which, if not taken too formalistically, must have reference to truth value. Thus, the conception of a variable presupposes some orderly connection of quantities, and a mathematical function is not a mere correspondence of one quantity to another 'arbitrary' quantity, but expresses a definite coördination between one progression of quantities and another progression. A function is different from the value of the function (*Funktion-Sein*). While every function is a unitary whole as a determining principle, it needs for its completion something to be determined. So with the functional character of the concept, Kant obtained the synthesis between the extremes of regarding the universal as the mere abstract, and hypostatizing it as a metaphysical entity. The concept is not abstract, but *abstrahent*, not concrete, but *concretent*, *i. e.*, through it alone can the concrete be dealt with scientifically; for the possibility of every special determination depends upon the nature of its universal. The predicate 'equilateral,' *e. g.*, cannot be applied to such a universal as 'circle.' The concept is a positive disjunction that underlies the possibility of being determined, while mere abstractions would mean the negation of all determinations. A natural law, then, must be a concept, *e. g.*, it is the concept of falling as $s = t^2(g/2)$ that the law determines. The logical character of natural law as the ground of the particular assures its objectivity and frees it from psychologism. While all specifications diverge, they converge with reference to the concept, and special historical events are no exceptions. The so-called categorical contingency is a *contradictio in adjecto*. To be sure, the material of knowledge does not coincide with knowing, any more than the value of a mathematical function coincides with the function; but if it is hypostatized as something absolutely real in itself, then it is nothing. The object is not directly given, nor merely given up, but is a product (*Ergebnis*). With this conceptual meaning of the nature of natural law and of objectivity, one can arrive at the intelligibility of nature as Kant finally did in the *Critique of Judgment*, where he transcends the dualism of form and matter. And even in the science of to-day, and in everyday life, reality is rational if and only if we look at it rationally.

YUEN R. CHAO.

Goethe und die spekulative Naturphilosophie. CARL SIEGEL. *Kantstudien*, XIX, 4, pp. 488-496.

Fichte holds that all nature is product of the activity of consciousness. Schelling is not satisfied with this view, and expects to find the principles of that activity reflected in objective nature. He finds the principle of triple gradation in the formless, the crystal and the organic bodies, in the lives of the plant, the animal, and the human being, in vegetation, irritability and finally consciousness. He also finds the principle of polarity in the phenomena

of electricity, magnetism, optics, chemism and biology. Proceeding with a wholly different method, Goethe arrives at the same result, namely, that polarity and potency (*Potenzierung*) are the 'driving-wheels of nature.' Goethe stood in personal relation to Schelling, and his "Metamorphosis of Plants" and his first work on optics which had appeared when Schelling was only 15 and 16 years old, were of no little significance to the Romanticist, whose philosophy of nature, we may well say, is in a sense an attempt to vindicate Goethe's views of nature by means of Fichte's theory of knowledge. These characteristics of nature,—polarity and potency,—play an important rôle in Goethe's various scientific studies, especially in his optics. His study of the art of painting led to his discovery of the law of the antithetic relation between the warm and cold colors. This law, which is a law of color sensations, is, according to him, also valid for the objective world of colors. The idea of potency finds expression in Goethe's conception of a universal type ascending by metamorphosis and pervading the whole organic order. This universal type, according to him, is not only an instrumental scheme for classification and comparison, but also the model after which nature forms her manifold organisms. Here again Goethe draws no dividing line between the subject and objective reality of nature. Thus we may say that Goethe unconsciously did what Fichte and especially Schelling consciously sought to do: namely, to extend to objective reality the categories of the Ego.

SUH HU.

Nietzsche und Schopenhauer. DR. MICHAEL SCHWARTZ. Ar. f. g. Ph., XXI, 2, pp. 188-198.

The time has now arrived when an objective estimate of Nietzsche's philosophy can be made, since all the material required for such an undertaking is at hand. Nietzsche's literary remains, and especially his correspondence with Erwin Rohde and Peter Gast, afford us a deep insight into the inner workings of his mind, and help toward an understanding of his philosophical significance. In view of these writings it becomes clear that his development was a continuous and logical growth, so that the customary division of his career into three distinct periods will have to be given up, or at least greatly modified. His long-awaited autobiography has also appeared. This most interesting human document is not the conventional narrative, but rather a history of Nietzsche's spiritual development. In spite of the fact that Nietzsche rejected Schopenhauer's doctrines, he was strongly influenced by this philosopher. Nietzsche's earliest philosophy, and indeed, the views expressed in his *Geburt der Tragödie*, are merely a working over of the third book of Schopenhauer's *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. In this so-called first period of his development he accepted, in their essentials, Schopenhauer's Metaphysic of Will and his Pessimism. But while Schopenhauer held to two ways of salvation from the evil of the world, through art and through morals, Nietzsche held to the former alone, giving it his own peculiar interpretation. In the so-called middle period of his activity, the 'positivistic,' he still re-

mained under Schopenhauer's influence. He held, in agreement with his predecessor, that Reason is merely the instrument of the Will, and never tired of pointing out the irrationality and alogicality of ordinary human life. And again in the third and most fruitful period of his activity, his doctrine appears to be merely a development and extension of the second book of Schopenhauer's *Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, that is, his Metaphysics of Will. In the chief works of this period Nietzsche raised the "will to live" to a universal principle, and it became the "Will to Power." It thus appears that he was dependent upon Schopenhauer throughout his life, and to this is due the unity and coherence of his productions. He took over from Schopenhauer the problem of the value of life, but became the defender of life in opposition to the former. In the *Biodocee*, the central point at which all the threads of his philosophy are gathered up, we discover that he views his life-work as divided into two parts, the Metaphysical-Aesthetic, and the Naturalistic-Aesthetic. Both are described as "Dionysian." Thus he speaks of his *Geburt der Tragödie*, in which the Dionysian exaltation of life (*Lebensbejaung*) first appears, as his first "Transvaluation of all Values." This is indeed, a central thought in all his writing. There appears to be some difficulty in reconciling the doctrine of the recurring cycles of existences with the idea of the *Übermensch*, for the latter requires a continuous development toward the Beyond-man or a goal, with which the notion of a circular progress seems to conflict. Zarathustra, it may be said, is a type of the superman, who at that time he regarded as a product of natural selection. But in his last book (*Der Wille zur Macht*), he comes to reject natural selection, and to substitute what we may call spiritual selection. The weak will be unable to endure the thought of the return to life, with all its suffering and sacrifice, and will accordingly be rooted out, while the strong will seek to impress their lives with the seal of eternity, and will become strong through struggle. The idea of the cycles of existence will thus become the instrument of a spiritual selection, and produce the Beyond-man. Thus Nietzsche's development seems to have consisted in the growth of the idea of the Dionysian *Lebensbejahung*, which, he said, was original with the Greeks, and expressed in the Dionysian mysteries. He opposed his belief in life, and in spiritual development through the joyful acceptance of life's challenge, to the Christian ethics which, in his opinion, damned life in the interests of an other-worldly ideal. Nietzsche is indeed, as Joel has remarked, a priest of Bacchus. That exaltation of life, that joy in living which reaches the ecstasy of intoxication, which is the secret of his personality and of his philosophy, is truly Bacchantal. Nietzsche is the resurrected Dionysius.

D. T. HOWARD.

L'intérêt. L. CELLÉRIER. Rev. Ph., XXXIX, 12, pp. 491-512.

Educators since the time of Socrates have recognized the importance of interest to the art of teaching, but they have been slow in its psychological study as a means of promoting their work. Current theories of interest such

as the Herbartian, the affective theory of Lippe, or the spontaneous attention doctrine of Dewey, emphasize different elements of the phenomenon and so confuse and mislead one. In the presence of such conflicting views direct study of facts by introspection and by observation of other persons is necessary for a complete theory. Such studies performed, advisedly on children, indicate that interest is not, like sensation, a simple state, but is rather a complex process involving perception of an object, recognition of its capacity to satisfy an instinctive tendency, and the consequent holding of attention upon the object. Hence interest has elements of attention and feeling, but is neither of these alone. It is a subjective state aroused by objects; therefore we have interest, rather than different interests. Sub-conscious elements of our life, directing us to our instincts and needs, may become conscious and tangible in states of interest. Interest involves the selection of objects on the ground of their capacity to satisfy instincts and desires. Variation in such capacity causes a variation of interest. The instincts involved are definite ones, like hunger or fear, rather than indefinite tendencies; however, the instincts for the acquisition of knowledge and for activity may be regarded as general elementary tendencies furnishing the most of the early occasions for the manifestation of interest. The distinction between direct and indirect interest is illusory; considered as a process it is indirect; considered in relation to its object it is direct. The instinct for activity is most basal and other instincts develop only gradually. With such development abstract thought becomes possible, and, on such conception of the growth of instincts and intellect, educational practise should be founded.

C. CECIL CHURCH.

The Mind's Knowledge of Reality. GEORGE P. ADAMS. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., Vol. XII, 3, pp. 57-66.

No knowledge is possible unless the mind can somewhere come into direct and immediate contact with real being, and know that this, its possession, is indeed knowledge, know what it means 'to be real.' This primitive knowledge must be immediate, *sui generis*, self-supporting, and unquestioned. Yet, all that is directly and indubitably certain about any immediate experience is that it is not real being, but presentation, idea, or content of consciousness. An 'immediate experience' is not equivalent to an 'object known to be real.' To ascribe reality to an object requires, in addition to an immediate experience, an assertion that that incident is true or points to the real; or, in other words, involves an *evaluation* of immediate experiences. But every qualitative distinction (such as that of truth and falsity) made within a given class of objects (such as immediate experiences) implies a reference to something outside that class as a standard or basis of evaluation; and a knowledge of this standard is presupposed by any judgment which asserts the existence of such qualitative distinctions. The character of true experiences must be known before the true and false can be discriminated, and the mind making the appraisal must have possessed a knowledge of reality

which is not an awareness of its experiences. Knowledge of what reality means cannot be acquired from experience, for that experience, if known to be valid or real, requires a prior knowledge of what 'to be real' means. An immediacy other than experience is necessary to make intelligible this original knowledge. Immediate experience cannot furnish the direct and primitive contact with reality which knowledge presupposes. We must have recourse to the concept of *a priori* ideas, a knowledge of reality different in kind from the presence of content in experience, an underived, unacquired function of the mind, making experience significant and the life of reason possible. If an object of experience can be known to be real, it is because the mind first knows what 'to be real' means, and thus equipped, finds an instance, an illustration of reality in immediate experience.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

Where do Perceived Objects Exist? D. DRAKE. *Mind*, 93, pp. 29-37.

To assert that the peculiarities of perceived-objects are due to well-known optical laws or are physically explicable is no answer to the question: "Where do they exist?" To say that perceived-objects (such as the drab tree of the colour-blind man) occupy the same portions of space simultaneously with alien real-objects, fails to explain why perceived-objects are not efficacious there; why they cannot be discovered by others than the particular perceiver; and how they were mysteriously projected out into the world, since they bear the ear-marks of a particular organism, and are undeniably functions of that organism's brain-process. To conceive of reality as any number of interpenetrating spaces, does not account for the fact that science finds but a single temporal-spatial order. To locate perceived objects in some *terra incognita* outside the natural order leads to ontological dualism and is no better than confessing them mental. Representative Realism can include perceived-objects, and indeed all known facts, in one coherent, homogeneous, natural order, and explain consciousness and illusions, without implying a dualism of substance, or an absolute cleavage of the physical and mental. Representative Realism locates perceived objects, not at the real-object point, but at the brain-point of the world order. Perceived-objects are each an effect and representation in a different organism of the one real-object beyond the organisms. They vary concomitantly with variations in the real object, and act as functional substitutes (not miniatures, copies, or pictures) of the real-object in the lives of the organisms. Any real-object is outside a real brain; and its representative, the perceived-object, is outside the perceived-brain; but the perceived-object is inside the real-brain or consciousness of the percipient. What a bystander would describe as a brain process exists in his own real-brain or consciousness; and represents the real-brain or consciousness of the person perceived. There are representations of past and future events and of absent objects. Consciousness is a group name for these organically interwoven elements, and is composed of the same stuff as the rest of the world, and was evolved from it. The mechanism of memory and the close

causal connection of its elements constitute its unity. We know directly only representations or perceived-objects. We can never be absolutely certain that there are any corresponding real-objects. But we must assume the latter in order to explain the peculiarities and fragmentary character of the former.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

Religious Values. RALPH BARTON PERRY. The American Journal of Theology, XIX, 1, pp. 1-16.

The central theme of every serious philosophy of religion is the *conflict* of religious values, and we must have a principle of reconciliation or of rational choice: we must have a unit or standard of value enabling us to estimate the varying reports of different religious philosophies respecting the good that man has inherited and can expect. The present article purposes to suggest a way of applying to the study of religion such an empirical analysis and classification of values as that of Meinong and his followers. There is 'value' when there is "having of what one likes" or "getting of what one wants" or "the fulfilment of interest." "The fulfilment of an interest, including interest, object, and the peculiar relation between them, may be called an *intrinsic* value, in the sense that such value does not involve reference to anything beyond itself; whereas any means or condition of such fulfilment would be an *extrinsic* value." Extrinsic values are *real* if they are objects that exist independently of the interested subject's consciousness of them; *ideal*, if they are imaginative representations of real objects of interest. Extrinsic values are *immediate* if they are objects that fulfil interest indirectly, are wanted for themselves; and *instrumental* if they owe their value to their efficacy in producing objects of immediate interest. If cosmic reality consists of or contains the fulfilment of some interest, it possesses intrinsic value; but it is its extrinsic value, its relation to the fulfilment of human interests, that constitutes its *religious* value. Ultimate cosmic forces are real religious values, and the works of the cosmic or religious imagination, ideal religious values. Any type of cosmic reality would have a real, immediate, religious value in fulfilling the contemplative, intellectual, cognitive or philosophical interest of wonder, curiosity, or the desire to know and to see what unity and order there is in the world. But it requires a particular sort of a cosmic reality, a concordant reality or another mind or an unfailing companion, to have such value for the æsthetic and social interests. In so far as man owes to the nature of the cosmic reality all things affecting human interests, cosmic reality has a real instrumental religious value, positive or negative in proportion as these things are good or bad. Ideal, immediate and instrumental religious values attach to objects created by the cosmic or religious imagination, and may consist of true belief-values, subjective belief-values, or conscious fictions. Examples of ideal religious values are belief in the supremacy of spirit or the triumph of the good, or symbol and myth. Furthermore, ideal religious values may be positive or negative, good or bad, according as

they are wholesome or morbid, depressing, and misleading. In their relation to other or *secular* values, religious values may be *auxiliary*, facilitating the fulfilment of secular interests; *disciplinary*, correcting and reducing the demands of the secular life by stressing the fact that in the nature of things only a few of life's interests can be fulfilled, and this at the cost of the renunciation of the rest; or *compensatory*, substituting new interests, goods, and hopes for secular losses, evils, and failures.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

The Pulse of Life. EDGAR A. SINGER, JR. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XI, 24, pp. 645-655.

Mr. Singer has set forth on other occasions the theory that life and mind must be defined in terms of behavior, whether observed or expected. This method of interpretation has appeared revolutionary to some, and in order to justify it, he feels called upon to picture life as it appears to one who holds to definition in terms of behavior. What is the relation of life to mechanism? The world as mechanism seems widely separated from the world as the medium of life. To bridge over this chasm, many inventions have been produced by philosophy, the most notorious of which are: (1) that which attempts to make life consistent with mechanism by making life mechanical, and (2) that which tries to make mechanism consistent with life by making mechanism alive at every point. The first account is materialistic, the second monadistic. Materialism fails, because it cannot account for purpose. Any given individual may be classed either with or without reference to purpose. A triangle, ateleologically defined, *must* be three-sided and a plane, it *may* be the best form for a given fashion of musical instrument. A musical instrument, teleologically defined, *must* be capable of producing a pleasant sound, and *may* have the structure of a triangle. According to these two ways of definition we get teleological and ateleological sciences. With regard to a living being, which is it, a thing of purpose or a mechanism? Evidently both. Mechanism fails to explain life, because the latter does not come under the ateleological concepts. In the case of monadism, there is also a failure to account for purpose, for the essence of purpose is freedom. The invariance of purpose in a variety of mechanical situations is freedom. Now in a system whose points are mechanically connected there is no room for freedom. Life then must be a phenomenon of the whole group of points. How can a kind of grouping introduce freedom into a system whose points are not free? If we regard reality as an "infinite sea of mechanism," and purpose as a certain wave-like form or pulse passing through the whole as a wave through water, we get an effective analogy. This purpose may be further described as self-preservation. A science of life, on such a conception, must regard purpose as the average common result of a type of act. It will be the science of the probable in the domain of self-preservative behavior. Most of the activities of the living being, it appears, tend to maintain life, as the various parts of a wave movement continue the movement as a whole.

D. T. HOWARD.

Philosophical and Social Attitudes. JOHN PICKETT TURNER. J. of Ph., Psy. and Sc. Meth., Vol. XI, 25, pp. 687-691.

Belief in human progress is a modern attitude of mind. In the Homeric age, not men, but gods won the battles. Later, both in India and Greece, we find *man's helplessness* wrapped up in the doctrine of eternalism. Note that the Euclidian conception points to a completed world beyond our perception; and that the central doctrine of Stoics and Epicureans alike is *self-control*; while, in Christianity, not only nature and the social order, but human nature as well, are beyond man's power to regulate. Due, however, to man's original predisposition to manipulate things and his consequent, though largely accidental, success in science, we have entered upon an age of freedom,—of power over natural forces; and eternalism has ceased to hold sway over metaphysics.

ALLEN J. THOMAS.

Natural Rights and the Theory of the Political Institution. GEORGE H. MEAD. J. of Ph., and Sci. Meth., XII, 6, pp. 141-155.

Since the eighteenth century it has become possible to revolutionize the government by taking proper legislative and judicial action: it is more difficult to change the customs and attitudes of the community itself and to this end current reforms are directed. Declarations of rights like that of the French constitution of 1795 seem to embody self evident principles but for us they lack definite content because the inherited dynastic power that stimulated them is no longer a condition which we face. They are abstract because that to which they refer needs, for us, only to be designated, not analytically defined. The political and economic individuals that seem to us so abstract were, in their day, concrete, every-day persons. They were designated by reference to hindrances to what, in the thought of the speculators, seemed vital activities. For Spinoza an understanding of the individual was largely an account of the emotions which were to be overcome, not an account of the positive content of reason, *i. e.*, a mystical emotion. Hobbes, likewise, defined the individual in terms of hostile impulses threatening a warfare between all men, not in terms of the social state to which man rightfully belongs. Locke and Rousseau continued to express the rights of man in terms of negative conditions; and they left the good unformulated. In the struggle of labor for the right to combine, the contests have always been over specific restrictions. Rights are always formulated in this way; thus their essential character is not revealed. Studies in the history of human culture show that rights did not exist prior to their recognition in society. Society gives the right its recognition. We are brought to the question of what beyond its recognition is involved in a right. In the notion of the common good as the end of both society and the individual we have a conception arbitrary to neither of these units. There is no limit to such common goods, and so no limit to rights, but they depend on circumstances and cannot be permanently formulated. In case of a variance between a common interest and an institutionally vested

right, the latter should give way to the former. Institutions are but the tools of a community; they are not civilization or ends in themselves. Concrete common needs are the basis of true rights. In case of doubt as to whether apparently common needs are really genuine, it may be well to have the institution help decide, but it should not be allowed to hinder such a decision. Institutions of government must give way to common human needs.

C. CECIL CHURCH.

On Having Friends: A Study in Social Values. GEORGE A. COE. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XII, 6, pp. 155-161.

The few studies of social values that have been made have confined themselves to the actions of children and crowds: developed minds have rarely been the objects of direct attention in this connection. This article aims to suggest the problems concerning adult social acts and attitudes by examining the familiar experience of having a friend. Analysis of experiences of intimate friendship show that the friend himself, not the advantages he gives, is the valued object. Friendship is antithetical to barter. The giver of the gifts experienced in friendship is valued above his gifts because he has experiences of his own. His experiences are valued. Friends have one another. Social psychology has rarely tried to analyze the value thus realized. It has examined such processes as suggestion; it has given a genetic account of social intercourse; it has shown that such an experience implies the knowledge of other minds and refutes the atomic theory of mind. With the fact that social experience means multiple experience, social psychology has done but little. The description given by functional psychology evades this problem when it treats consciousness merely as a means of adjustment: we adjust ourselves *to* consciousness, not merely through it.

C. CECIL CHURCH.

NOTES.

Professor Maurice De Wulf, Professor of Philosophy at Louvain, and member of the Belgian Academy, has accepted the invitation of Harvard University to lecture on Philosophy during the first half of the academic year, 1915-1916, and will begin his work in September, 1915.

The subjects of his courses will be History of Medieval Philosophy, and Aristotle's Metaphysics.

Professor De Wulf is the well-known editor of the *Revue Neo-Scholastique*. Two of his works have been translated in English—*The History of Medieval Philosophy* and *Scholasticism*.

Professor Bernard C. Ewer of Reed College will go to Brown University next year as locum tenens in philosophy during the absence of Professor Everett.

We give below a list of articles in current philosophical magazines:

MIND, N. S., 93: *F. V. Merriman*, The Rise and Fall of the Platonic Kallipolis; *O. Strachey*, Mr. Russell and Some Recent Criticisms of his Views; *D. Drake*, Where do Perceived Objects Exist? *P. Narasimham*, The Vedantic Good.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, XII, 3: *George P. Adams*, The Mind's Knowledge of Reality; *George Santayana*, Some Meanings of the Word Is; *John E. Russell*, Professor Hocking's Argument from Experience.

XII, 4: *Garry C. Myers*, Affective Factors in Recall.

XII, 6: *George H. Mead*, Natural Rights and the Theory of the Political Institution; *George A. Coe*, On Having Friends: A Study of Social Values.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, XII, 2: *R. M. Ogden*, Report of the Secretary of the American Psychological Association; *W. C. Ruediger*, Report of the Retiring Secretary of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. XII, 3: *L. W. Sackett*, The Sequence of Topics in Beginners' Psychology.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XXII, 1: *R. S. Woodworth*, A Revision of Imageless Thought; *Knight Dunlap*, A New Measure of Visual Discrimination; *John W. Todd*, An Electro-Mechanical Chronoscope.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XL, 1: *Dr. G. Dumas*, La contagion de la folie; *A. L. D.*, La paramnésie et les rêves.

XL, 2: *Dr. Graßet*, Les sciences morales et sociales et la biologie humaine; *L. Dauriac*, Le langage musical; *N. Kostyleff*, Sur la formation du complexe érotique dans le sentiment amoureux.

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE, XIV, 56: *A. Descoendres*, Couleur, Forme ou Nombre? *V. Cornetz*, Fourmis dans l'obscurité; *P. Bovet* et *S. Chryssochoos*, L'appréciation 'objective' de la valeur par les échelles de Thorndike; *C. Huguenin*, Reviviscence paradoxale.

KANT-STUDIEN, XIX, 3: *Bruno Bauch*, Über den Begriff des Naturgesetzes; *Ernst Curtius*, Das Schematismuskapitel in der Kritik der Reinen Vernunft; *Heinrich Scholz*, Zu "Alexander von Joch"; *Hans Pichler*, W. Windelbands Einleitung in die Philosophie.

XIX, 4: *E. Gehrcke*, Die erkenntnistheoretische Grundlagen der verschiedenen physikalischen Relativitätstheorien; *C. Siegel*, Goethe und die spekulative Naturphilosophie; *A. Rava*, Fichte und Reimer; *A. Leibert*, Bericht über den ersten Kongress für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft; *Bruno Bauch*, Parallelstellen bei Hume und Kant.

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, XXI, 2: *Dr. J. Zahlfleisch*, Einige Bemerkungen zum Intellektualismus an der Hand des Leibniz-Clarke'schen Streites; *Carl Fries*, Zur Methodologie des geschichtlichen Denkens; *Dr. Michael Schwarz*, Nietzsche und Schopenhauer.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, LXX, 5 u 6: *Stefan Baley*, Versuche über den dichotischen Zusammenklang wenig verschiedener Töne; *Stefan Baley*, Versuche über die Lokalisation beim dichotischen Hören; *Hans Henning*, Das Panumsche Phänomen.

LXXI, 1 u. 2: *Konrad Lambrecht*, Über den Einfluss der Verknüpfung von Farbe und Form bei Gedächtnisleistungen; *Karl Groos*, Untersuchungen über den Aufbau der Systeme; *Otto Schultze*, Über Lernzeiten bei Grösseren Komplexen.



THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE EXISTENCE OF THE WORLD AS A PROBLEM.

OF the two parts of this paper the first is the significant one. As a study in formal analysis, it attempts to show that there is no problem, logically speaking, of the existence of an external world. Its sole point is to show that the very attempt to state the problem involves a self-contradiction: that the terms cannot be so stated as to generate a problem without assuming what is professedly brought into question. The second part is a summary endeavor to state the actual question which has given rise to the unreal problem and the conditions which have led to its being misconstrued. So far as subject-matter is concerned, it supplements the first part; but the argument of the first part in no way depends upon anything said in the second. The latter may be false and its falsity have no implications for the first contention.

I.

There are many ways of stating the problem of the existence of an external world. I shall make that of Mr. Bertrand Russell the basis of my examinations, as it is set forth in his recent book *Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy*. I do this both because his statement is one recently made in a book of commanding importance, and because it seems to me to be a more careful statement than most of those in vogue. If my point can be made out for his statement, it will apply, *a fortiori*, to other statements. Even if there be those to whom this does not seem to be the case, it will be admitted that my analysis must begin somewhere. I

cannot take the space to repeat the analysis in application to differing modes of statement with a view to showing that the method employed will yield like results in all cases. But I take the liberty of throwing the burden upon the reader and asking him to show cause why it does not so apply.

After rejecting certain familiar formulations of the question because they employ the not easily definable notions of the self and independence, Mr. Russell makes the following formulation: Can we "know that objects of sense . . . exist at times when we are not perceiving them?" (*op. cit.*, p. 75). Or, in another mode of statement: "Can the existence of anything other than our own¹ hard data be inferred from the existence of those data?" (pp. 73 and 83).

As already indicated, I shall try to show that the identification of the 'data of sense' for the purposes of generating the problem already involves an affirmative answer to the question—that it must have been answered in the affirmative before the question can be asked. And this, I take it, is to say that it is not a *question* at all. A point of departure may be found in the following passage: "I think it must be admitted as probable that the immediate objects of sense depend for their existence upon physiological conditions in ourselves, and that, for example, the colored surfaces which we see cease to exist when we shut our eyes" (p. 64). I have not quoted the passage for the sake of gaining an easy victory by pointing out that this statement involves the existence of physiological conditions. For Mr. Russell himself affirms that fact. As he points out, such arguments assume precisely the "common sense world of stable objects" professedly put in doubt (p. 85). My purpose is to ask what justification there is for calling immediate data "objects of sense"? Statements of this type always call color visual, sound auditory, and so on. If it were merely a matter of making certain admissions for the sake of being able to play a certain game, there would be no objections. But if we are concerned with a matter of serious analysis, one is bound to ask whence come

¹ I shall pass over the terms "our own" so far as specific reference is concerned, but the method employed applies equally to them. Who are the 'we' and what does 'own' mean, and how is ownership established?

these adjectives? That color is visual in the sense of being an object of vision is certainly admitted in the common sense world, but this is the world we have supposedly left. That color is visual, is a proposition about color and it is a proposition which color itself does not utter. That color is seen, or is visible, I do not call in question; but I insist that the bare statement already assumes an answer to the question which Mr. Russell has put. It presupposes as a condition of the question existence beyond the color itself. To call the color a 'sensory' object involves a like assumption of the same kind but even more complex—involving, that is, even more existence beyond the color.

I see no reply to this statement except to urge that the terms 'visual' and 'sensory' as applied to the object are pieces of verbal supererogation having no force in the statement. This suppositious answer brings the whole matter to a focus. Is it possible to institute even a preliminary disparaging contrast between immediate objects and a world external to them unless the term 'sensory' has a certain effect upon the meaning of immediate data or objects? Before directly taking up this question, I shall, however, call attention to another implication of the passage quoted. It appears to be implied that the existence of color and 'being seen' are equivalent terms. At all events, in similar arguments the identification is frequently made. But by description all that is required for the existence of color is certain physiological conditions. They may be present and the color exist and yet not be seen. Things constantly act upon the optical apparatus in a way which fulfills the conditions of the existence of color without the color being seen. This statement does not involve any dubious psychology about an act of attention. I only mean that the argument implies over and above the existence of the color something called seeing or perceiving—noting is perhaps a convenient neutral term. And this clearly involves an assumption of something beyond the existence of the datum—and this datum is by definition an external world. It may be questioned whether without this assumption the term immediate could be introduced. Is the object immediate or is it the object of an immediate noting?

And this brings us to a further point. The sense objects are repeatedly spoken of as 'known.' For example: "it is obvious that since the senses give knowledge of the latter kind [believed on their own account, without the support of any outside evidence] the immediate facts perceived by sight or touch or hearing do not need to be proved by argument but are completely self-evident" (p. 68). Again they are spoken of as "facts of sense"¹ (p. 70), and as facts going along for knowledge with the laws of logic (p. 72). I do not know what belief, or knowledge mean here; nor do I understand what is meant by a *fact* being evidence for itself.² But obviously Mr. Russell knows, and knows their application to the sense object. And here is a further assumption of what is, by definition, a world external to the datum. Again, we have assumed in order to get a question stated just what is professedly called into question. And the assumption is not made the less simple in that Mr. Russell has defined belief as a case of a triadic relation, and said that without the recognition of the three-term relation the difference between perception and belief is inexplicable (p. 50).

We come to the question passed over. Can such terms as 'visual,' 'sensory,' be logically neglected without modifying the force of the question;—that is, without affecting the implications which give the force of a problem? Can we "know that objects of sense, or very similar objects, exist at times when we are not perceiving them? Secondly, if this cannot be known, can we know that other objects, inferable from objects of sense but not necessarily resembling them exist either when we are perceiving the objects of sense or at any other time" (p. 75)?

I think a little reflection will make it clear that without the

¹ Compare the statement: "When I speak of a fact, I do not mean one of the simple things of the world, I mean that a certain thing has a certain quality, or that certain things have a certain relation" (p. 51).

² In view of the assumption, shared by Mr. Russell, that there is such a thing as non-inferential knowledge, the conception that a thing offers to belief evidence for itself needs analysis. Self-evidence is merely a convenient term for disguising the difference between indubitably given and believed. Hypotheses, for example, are self-evident sometimes, that is obviously present for just what they are, but they are still hypotheses, and to offer their self-evident character as 'evidence' would expose one to ridicule. Meaning may be self-evident (the Cartesian 'clear and distinct') and truth very dubious.

limitation of the term 'perceiving' by the term 'sense' no *problem* as to existence *at other times* can possibly arise. For neither (a), reference to time, nor (b), limitation to a particular time, is given either in the bare fact of color or of perceiving color. Mr. Russell, for example, makes allusion to "a patch of color which is momentarily seen" (p. 76). This is the sort of thing that may pass without challenge in the common sense world, but hardly in an analysis which professes to call that world in question. Mr. Russell makes the allusion in connection with discriminating between sensation as signifying "the mental event of our being aware" and the sensation as object of which we are aware—the sense object. He can hardly be guilty, then, in the immediate context, of proceeding to identify the momentariness of the event with the momentariness of the object. There must be some other ground for assuming the temporal quality of the object—or that 'immediateness' belongs to it in any other way than as an object of immediate seeing. How is it, moreover, that even the act of being aware is describable as 'momentary'? I know of no way of so identifying it except by assuming that it is delimited in a time continuum. And if this be the case, it is surely superfluous to bother about *inference* to 'other times.' They appear to be assumed in stating the question—which thus turns out again to be no question. It may not be a trivial matter that Mr. Russell speaks of "that patch of color which is momentarily seen when we *look at the table*" (p. 76, italics mine). I would not attach undue importance to such phrases. But the frequency with which they present themselves in discussions of this type suggests the question whether as matter of fact 'the patch of color' is not determined by reference to an object perceived and not vice-versa. As we shall see later, there is good ground for thinking that Mr. Russell is really engaged, not in bringing into question the existence of an object beyond the datum, but in *redefining* the nature of an object, and that the reference to the patch of color as something more primitive than the table is really relevant to this reconstruction of traditional metaphysics. In other words, it is relevant to defining an object as a constant correlation of

variations in quality, instead of defining it as a substance in which attributes inhere—or a subject of predicates.

(a) If anything is an eternal essence, it is surely such a thing as color taken by itself, as by definition it must be taken in the statement of the question by Mr. Russell. Anything more simple, timeless, and absolute than a red can hardly be thought of. One might question the eternal character of the received statement of, say, the law of gravitation on the ground that it is so complex that it may depend upon conditions not yet discovered and whose discovery would involve an alteration in the statement. If $2 \text{ plus } 2 \text{ equal } 4$ be taken as an isolated statement, it might be conceived to depend upon hidden conditions and to be alterable with these. But by conception we are dealing in the case of the colored surface with an ultimate, simple datum. It can have no implications beyond itself, no concealed dependencies. How then can its existence, even if the perception be but momentary, raise a question of "other times" at all?

(b) Suppose a perceived blue surface to be replaced by a perceived red surface—and it will be conceded that the change, or replacement, is also perceived. There is still no ground for a belief in the temporally limited duration of either the red or the blue surface. Anything that leads to this conclusion would lead to the conclusion that the number two ceases to exist when we turn to think of an atom. There is no way of escaping the conclusion that the adjective 'sense' in the term 'sense object' is not taken innocently, but as qualifying (for the purposes of statement of the problem) the nature of the object. Aside from reference to the momentariness of the mental event—a reference which is expressly ruled out—there is no way of introducing delimited temporal existence into the object save by reference to one and the same object which is perceived at different times to have different qualities. If the same object—however object be defined—is perceived to be one of color at one time and of another color at another time, then as a matter of course the color-datum of either the earlier or later time is identified as of transitory duration. But equally, of course, there is no question of inference to "other times." Other times have been used to

describe or define *this* (brief) time. A moderate amount of unbiased reflection will, I am confident, convince anyone that apart from a reference to the same existence, perduring through different times while changing in *some* respect, no temporal delimitation of the existence of such a thing as sound or color can be made. Even Plato never doubted the eternal nature of red; he only argued from the fact that a thing is red at one time and blue at another to the unstable, and hence phenomenal, character of the *thing*.

Mr. Russell gives a specific illustration of what he takes to be the correct way of stating the question in an account of what, in the common-sense universe of discourse, would be termed walking around a table. If we exclude considerations to which we have (apart from assuming just the things which are doubtful) no right, the datum turns out to be something to be stated as follows: "What is really known is a correlation of muscular and other bodily sensations with changes in visual sensations" (p. 77). By 'sensations' must be meant sensible objects, not mental events. This statement repeats the point already dealt with: 'muscular,' 'visual' and 'other bodily' are all terms which are indispensable and which assume the very thing professedly brought into question: the external world as that was defined. 'Really known' assumes both noting and belief, with whatever complex implications they may involve,—implications which, for all that appears to the contrary, may be indefinitely complex, and which, by Mr. Russell's own statement involve relationship to at least two other terms besides the datum. But in addition there appears the new term 'correlation.' I cannot avoid the conclusion that this term involves an *explicit* acknowledgment of the external world.

Note, in the first place, that the correlation in question is not simple: it is three-fold, being a correlation of correlations. The 'changes in visual sensations' (objects) must be correlated in a temporal continuum; the 'muscular and other bodily sensations' (objects) must also constitute a connected series. One set of changes belongs to the serial class 'visual'; the other set to the serial class 'muscular.' And these two classes sustain a point to point correspondence to each other—they are correlated.

I am not raising the old question of how such complex correlations can be said to be either 'given' or 'known' in sense, though it is worth a passing notice that it was to account for this sort of phenomenon that Kant postulated his threefold intellectual synthesis of apprehension, reproduction and recognition in conception; and that it is upon the necessity of such assumptions of correlation that the rationalists have always criticized sensationalistic empiricism. Personally I agree that temporal and spatial relations are quite as much given in experience as are particulars—in fact, as I have been trying to show, particulars can be identified *as* particulars only in a relational complex. My point is rather (i) that any such given is already precisely what is meant by the 'world'; and (ii) that such a highly specified correlation as Mr. Russell here sets forth is in no case a psychological, or historical, primitive, but is a *logical* primitive arrived at by an analysis of an empirical complex.

(i) The statement involves the assumption of two temporal 'spreads' which, moreover, are determinately specified as to their constituent elements and as to their order. And these sustain to each other a correlation, element to element. The elements, moreover, are all specifically qualitative and some of them, at least, are spatial. How this differs from the external world of common sense I am totally unable to see. It may not be a very big external world, but having begged a small external world, I do not see why one should be too squeamish about extending it over the edges. The reply, I suppose, is that this complex defined and ordered object is by conception the object of a single perception, so that the question remains as to the possibility of inferring from it to something beyond.¹ But the reply only throws us back upon the point previously made. A par-

¹ The reply implies that the exhaustive, all at once, perception of the entire universe assumed by some idealistic writers, does not involve any external world. I do not make this remark for the sake of identifying myself with this school of thinkers, but to suggest that the limited character of empirical data is what occasions inference. But it is a fallacy to suppose that the nature of the limitations are psychologically given. On the contrary, they have to be determined by descriptive identifications which involve reference to the more extensive world. Hence no matter how self-evident the existence of the data may be, it is never self-evident that they are rightly delimited with respect to the specific inference making.

ticular or single event of perceptual awareness can be *determined* as to its ingredients and structure only in a temporal continuum of objects. That is, the series of changes in color and shape can be determined as just such and such an ordered series of specific elements, with a determinate beginning and end, only in respect to a temporal continuum of things antecedent and succeeding. Moreover, it involves an analysis which disentangles qualities and shapes from contemporaneously given objects which are irrelevant. In a word, Mr. Russell's object already extends beyond itself; it *is* part of a larger world.

(ii) A sensible object which can be described as a correlation of an ordered series of shapes and colors with an ordered series of muscular and other bodily objects presents a definition, not a psychological datum. What is stated is the definition of an object, of any object in the world. Barring ambiguities¹ in the terms 'muscular' and 'bodily,' it seems to be an excellent definition. But good definition or poor, it states what a datum is *known* to be as an object in a known system; viz., definite correlations of specified and ordered elements. As a definition, it is general. It is not made from the standpoint of any particular percipient. It says: *If* there be any percipient at a specified position in a space continuum, *then* the object may be perceived as such and such. And this implies that a percipient at any *other* position in the space continuum can deduce from the known system of correlations just what the series of shapes and colors will be from another position. For, as we have seen, the correlation of the series of changes of shape assumes a spatial continuum; hence one perspective projection may be correlated with that of any position in the continuum.

I have no direct concern with Mr. Russell's solution of his problem. But if the prior analysis is correct, one may anticipate

¹ The ambiguities reside in the possibility of treating the 'muscular and other bodily sensations' as meaning something other than data of motion and corporeality—however these be defined. Muscular sensation may be an awareness of motion of the muscles, but the phrase 'of the muscles' does not alter the nature of motion as motion; it only specifies *what* motion is involved. And the long controversy about the existence, and conditions of immediate quales of bodily movement testifies to what a complex cognitive determination we are here dealing with. Were they psychologically primitive data no question could ever have arisen.

in advance that it will consist simply in making explicit the assumptions which have tacitly been made in stating the problem—subject to the conditions involved in failure to recognize that they have been made. And I think an analytic reading of the solution will bear out the following statement. His various “peculiar,” “private” points of view and their perspectives are nothing but names for the positions and projectional perspectives of the ordinary space of the public world. Their correlation by likeness is nothing but the explicit recognition that they are all defined and located, from the start, in one common spatial continuum. One quotation must suffice. “If two men are sitting in a room, two somewhat similar worlds are perceived by them; if a third man enters and sits between them, a third world, intermediate between the two others, begins to be perceived” (pp. 87–8). Pray what is this room and what defines the position (standpoint and perspective) of the two men and the standpoint ‘intermediate’ between them? If the room and all the positions and perspectives which they determine are only within, say, Mr. Russell’s private world, that private world is interestingly complex, but it gives only the original problem over again, not a ‘solution’ of it. It is a long way between likenesses within some one private world to likenesses between private worlds. And if the worlds are all private, pray who judges their likeness or unlikeness? This sort of thing makes one conclude that Mr. Russell’s actual procedure is the reverse of his professed one. He really starts with one room as a spatial continuum within which different positions and projections are determined, which are readily correlated with one another just because they are projections from positions within one and the same space-room.

What is the bearing of this account upon the ‘empirical datum’? Just this: The correlation of correlative series of changes which defines the object of sense perception is in no sense an original historic or psychologic datum. It signifies the result of an analysis of the crude usual empirical data, and an analysis which is made possible only by a very complex knowledge of the world. It marks not a primitive psychologic datum but an outcome,

a limit, of analysis of a vast amount of empirical data. The definition of an object as a correlation of various sub-correlations of changes represents a great advance—so it seems to me—over the definition of an object as a number of adjectives stuck into a substantive; but it represents an improved definition made possible by the advance of scientific knowledge about the common sense world. It is a definition not only wholly independent of the context in which Mr. Russell arrives at it, but one which (once more and finally) assumes extensive and accurate knowledge of just the world professedly called into question.

II.

I have come to the point of transition to the other part of my paper. A formal analysis is necessarily dialectical in character. As an empiricist I share in the dissatisfaction which even the most correct dialectical discussion is likely to arouse when brought to bear on matters of fact. I do not doubt that readers will feel that some *fact* of an important character in Mr. Russell's statement has been left untouched by the previous analysis—even upon the supposition that the criticisms are just. Particularly will it be felt, I think, that psychology affords to his statement of the problem a support of fact not affected by any logical treatment. For this reason, I append a summary statement as to the real facts, which are misconstrued by any statement which makes the existence of the world problematic.

I do not believe a psychologist would go as far as to admit that a definite correlation of elements as specific and ordered as those of Mr. Russell's statement is a primitive psychological datum. Many would doubtless hold that patches of colored extensity, sounds, kinesthetic qualities, etc., are psychologically much more primitive than, say, a table, to say nothing of a group of objects in space or a series of events in time; they would say, accordingly, that there is a real problem as to how we infer or construct the latter on the basis of the former. At the same time, I do not believe that they would deny that their own knowledge of the existence and nature of the ultimate and irreducible qualities of

sense is the product of a long, careful, and elaborate analysis to which the sciences of physiology, anatomy, and accurate processes of experimental observation, have contributed. The ordinary method of reconciling these two seemingly inconsistent positions is to assume that the original sensible data of experience, as they occurred in infancy, have been overlaid by all kinds of associations and inferential constructions so that it is now a work of intellectual art to recover them in their innocent purity.

Now I might urge that as matter of fact the reconstruction of the experience of infancy is itself an inference from present experience of an objective world, and hence cannot be employed to make a problem out of the knowledge of the existence of that world. But such a retort involves just the dialectic excursus which I am here anxious to avoid. I am on matter of fact ground when I point out that the assumption that even infancy begins with such highly discriminated particulars as those enumerated is not only highly dubious but has been challenged by eminent psychologists. According to Mr. James, for example, the original datum is large but confused, and specific sensible qualities represent the result of discriminations. In this case, the elementary data, instead of being primitive empirical data, are the last terms, the limits, of the discriminations we have been able to make. That knowledge grows from a confusedly experienced external world to a world experienced as ordered and specified would then be the teaching of psychological science, and at no point would it be confronted with the problem of inferring a world. Into the arguments in behalf of such a psychology of original experience I shall not go, beyond pointing out the extreme improbability, in view of what is known about instincts and about the nervous system, that the starting point is a quality corresponding to the functioning of a single sense-organ, much less of a single neuronic unit of a sense organ. If one adds, as a hypothesis, that even the most rudimentary experience contains within it the element of suggestion or expectation, it is granted that the object of conscious experience even with an infant is homogeneous with the world of the adult. One may be unwilling to concede the hypothesis. But no one can

deny that inference from one thing to another is itself an empirical datum, and that just as soon as such inference occurs, even in the simplest form of anticipation and prevision, a world exists, like in kind, to that of the adult.

I cannot think that it is an insignificant coincidence that the type of psychological analysis of sense perception with which we have been dealing came into existence along with the introduction of the method of experimentally controlled observation which marks the beginning of modern science. Modern science did not begin with any discovery of a new kind of inference. It began with the recognition of the need of a different sort of data if inference is to proceed safely. It was contended that starting with the ordinary—or customary—data of perception hopelessly compromised in advance the work of inference and classification. Hence the demand for an experimental resolution of the common sense objects as data for inference in order to get data less ambiguous, more minute and more extensive. Increasing knowledge of the structure of the nervous system fell in with increased knowledge of other objects to make possible a discrimination of specific qualities in all their diversity, and it brought to light the fact that habits, individual and social (through their influence on the formation of individual habits) were large factors in determining the accepted or current system of knowledge. It brought to light, in other words, that factors of chance and other non-rational factors were greater influences in determining what men currently believed about the world than was intellectual inquiry. What the psychological analysis contributed was, then, *not* primitive historic data out of which a world had somehow to be extracted, but an analysis of the world, as that had been previously thought of and believed in, into data making possible better inferences and beliefs about the world. Analysis of the influences customarily determining belief and inference was a powerful force in the same movement to improve knowledge of the world.

This statement of matters of fact bears out, it will be observed, the conclusions of the dialectic analysis. That brought out that the ultimate and elementary data of sense perception are

identified and described as limiting elements in a complex world. What I have now added is that such an identification of elements effects a significant addition to our resources in the technique of inquiry devoted to improvement of knowledge of the world. When these data are isolated from their logical status and office, they are inevitably treated as self-sufficient, and leave upon our hands the insoluble, because self-contradictory, problem of deriving from them the world of common sense and science. Taken for what they really are, they are elements detected *in* the world and serving to guide and check our inferences about it. They are never self-enclosed particulars; they are always—even as crudely given—related to other elements in experience. But analysis enables us to get them in the form where they are keys to much more significant relations than present themselves in their crude form. In short, the particulars of perception, taken as complete and independent, make nonsense. Taken as discriminated objects for the purposes of improvement, reorganization and testing of knowledge of the world they are invaluable assets. The material fallacy lying behind the formal fallacy of which the first part of this paper treated, is the failure to recognize that what is doubtful is not the existence of the world but the validity of certain customary inferential beliefs about things in it. It is not the common sense *world* which is doubtful, or which is inferential, but *common sense as* a complex of beliefs about specific things and relations *in* the world. Hence we never in any actual procedure of inquiry throw the existence of the world into doubt, nor can we do so without self-contradiction. What we do is to doubt some received piece of 'knowledge' about some specific thing of that world, and then set to work, as best we can, to rectify it. The contribution of psychological science to detection of elementary data and of the irrelevant influences which determine the inferences of common sense is an important aid to the technique of such rectifications.

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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENT.

TO the greater number of psychologists the attainment of psychology to the rank of a science is equivalent to its freedom from any taint of epistemological theory. And on the side of the philosophers the belief has been reciprocated. As an epistemologist one has no concern with psychological doctrines. One may accept them all—in so far as they are orthodox psychology—without having his idealism or his realism one whit affected, for the issues are wholly distinct.

Now, doubtless the specialist in the psychological laboratory has no concern with the epistemological bearing of the theory of elements. But the psychological theorist, as distinguished from the mere experimenter—the Newton or Galileo of psychological science—surely has. And, on the other side, if one accepts one's epistemology with a capital E and fortifies oneself with an 'objective reference,' one may well afford to turn one's back on psychology and all its works. But for those of us—and we are many—who have come to feel that 'epistemology' is a bad word, and that 'objective reference' is no better than a vital principle, the theoretical conceptions of psychology are of deep interest. How does the psychologist conceive the 'conscious process' when he leaves off metaphor, and what is its relation to the object of cognition? When one introspects and attends to a complex process such as a percept, just what is he doing, and how does it differ from his observation of the object perceived? The truth is, it seems to me, that if we accept what the psychologist seems to mean—although he does not always agree with himself—we are committed to a perfectly hopeless treatment of the problems of cognition. Perhaps it is the consciousness of this that makes the psychologist so anxious to turn his back on all epistemology.

But the psychologist by no means speaks with a single voice. On the one side we find the functionalist with his claim that psychology is continuous with logic; on the other side the behaviorist, with his biological affiliations and his contention

that psychology does not deal with conscious processes but with conscious behavior. Perhaps the extremes are not so far apart as they seem, but tend to meet. But with them we are not here concerned. Our interest is in the orthodox school of analytic and experimental psychologists, who conceive psychology as a science of conscious processes.* It is they who adhere most strongly to the doctrine that psychology is one thing and epistemology another. Psychology, in their view, deals solely with the existential (as opposed to the meaningful). It is a natural science, and its task is the analysis and description of the processes of conscious life, and the laws of their order and succession. It deals with knowledge only in so far as it is an event, a temporal process running its course as a part of the psychical life of an individual. With its validity the psychologist has nothing to do, nor even with it as a knowing of *something*. The question of its validity is a logical question; the question as to how the temporal process constitutes a knowledge of objective fact, is epistemological—a question of meaning and not of existence.

But if psychology deals solely with the existential, what are the existences which it studies? They are not—the answer comes quickly—existences in the sense of substantial entities. The psychologist is not committed to the assumption of a set of mental things which we can observe by an ‘inner sense,’ and which are conceived as more or less closely analogous to material things. He, like the rest of us, believes he has thoroughly shaken the dust of representationalism from his feet. But if we press him for a positive answer to the question, he takes refuge in the assertion that the conscious processes he studies are only abstractions from our common concrete experience, abstractions from a particular point of view, just as ‘atom’ and ‘organism’ are similar abstractions gained from different points of view. Or else he may say, as does Wundt, for example, that the subject matter of psychology is the total content of experience in its immediate character, while natural science deals with experience as mediate.¹ And yet the psychologist is able, like the rest of us, to discuss seriously the problem of psycho-physical parallelism; as

¹ *Outlines of Psychology*, trans. by C. H. Judd, Chap. I.

if it could be a real problem if the psychical is not conceived as an order of being set over against the physical. Even when the psychologist refuses, as he commonly does of late, to discuss parallelism (except perhaps as a 'working-hypothesis'), his refusal is based on the ground that the problem belongs to metaphysics, and not on the ground that from his own point of view he finds it essentially meaningless, a mere blind alley in the development of reflective thought. One cannot have sound science and bad metaphysics; for even if the scientist turns his back on metaphysics, he is bound to feel its influence, just as the respectable people who segregate their slums are affected by them. In the case of parallelism, it happens too, that the problem was engendered in the rise of modern psychology itself, and will remain a problem until the development of psychological conceptions shall have exposed its barrenness.

But to return to closer quarters with our question—how does the psychologist conceive of his existents, conscious processes? We can best discover by contrasting his view with that of his forbears, the English empiricists. The empiricists frankly treated ideas (to use the term in the Lockean sense) as entities, a sort of psychical 'thing.' And further, as a result perhaps of this way of looking at them, they were committed to that hopeless confusion of existence and meaning which has so often been pointed out. "Locke's ideas, then, and James Mill's ideas, were meanings, thought-tokens, bits of knowledge; the sensations and ideas of modern psychology are *Erlebnisse*, data of immediate experience. And the change of standpoint brings with it a second principal difference between the older and the newer sensationalism. Meanings are stable, and may be discussed without reference to time; so that a psychology whose elements are meanings is an atomistic psychology; the elements join, like blocks of mosaic, to give static formations, or connect, like the links of a chain, to give discrete series. But experience is continuous and a function of time; so that a psychology whose elements are sensations, in the modern sense of the term, is a process-psychology, innocent both of mosaic and concatenation."¹

¹ *Experimental Psychology of the Thought Process*, E. B. Titchener, pp. 26-27.

Modern psychology, then, substitutes temporal process for substantive entity.

But we must go farther. The empiricists' conception of ideas was not perfectly simple. It was always more or less confused, besides undergoing some modification in the development of the school. First of all, ideas were conceived as entities of which the mind is directly aware and which it manipulates, pulling them apart and putting them together to form new complex ideas. This is notably Locke's way of thinking, and it is the basis of representationalism. Second, ideas are conceived after the analogy of the material atom. They are capable of acting on each other, and unite themselves under the "gentle force" of association, into groups. Instead of their being contents of the mind, entities *of which* the mind is aware, their mutual behavior, or reciprocal action, *constitutes* our knowledge, and does away with the necessity for a mind or self as distinct from them. This view is found in Hume but is not consistently worked out. The third conception of ideas is never clearly formulated but is at times suggested. We find Locke, for example, writing: "For let any idea be as it will, it can be no other but such as the mind perceives it to be; and that very perception sufficiently distinguishes it from all other ideas, which cannot be other, *i. e.*, different, without being perceived to be so."¹ This is the doctrine that the *esse* of ideas is their *percipi*, the doctrine of immediatism. Ideas are exactly and only what they are felt to be, which is as much as to say that they are not entities *of which* we are aware or *to which* we can attend, for when we attend to a thing we see more clearly *what* it is. An act of comparison is not necessary to distinguish an idea. Nay, an act of comparison is impossible, for the relation of difference is not something to be discovered—it is itself a bit of experience. If the idea is not experienced *as* different, it is meaningless to ask whether it may not, after all, really *be* different. This is a view remote indeed from Locke's usual treatment. It is an instance such as doubtless Professor Titchener has in mind when he says, "it is only incidentally that they leave the plane of meaning for that of existence."²

¹ *Essay*, Bk. II, Chap. XXIX, § 5.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 25.

It is this third conception of the idea which the modern psychologist develops. The sensations with which he deals are not sensations *of*, but sensations. And they are not contents *of* which we are aware, but are themselves qualitatively colored awarenesses; or, to use a word which admits the present participle, *experiencings*. "Now, when, having the sensation, I say I feel the sensation, I only use a tautological expression: the sensation is not one thing, the feeling another; the sensation *is* the feeling. . . . The same explanation will easily be seen to apply to Ideas. . . . To have an idea, and [to have] the feeling of that idea, are not two things; they are one and the same thing."¹

What makes it possible for modern psychologists to maintain this view, and to stick to the plane of existence, is their treating the idea as process. So long as the idea is content, one must fall back upon an act of apprehension. But the idea as process embraces and unites act and content as aspects of itself. Listen once more to Professor Titchener. He is criticizing Brentano. "And while I cannot accept the distinction of act and content, I believe that the distinction rests upon a truly psychological foundation, that the logic is the logic of psychology. There are, in a certain sense, a hearing, a feeling, a thinking, which are distinguishable from the tone and the pleasure and the thought. Only, the distinction comes to me, not as that of act and content, but as that of a temporal course and qualitative specificity of a single process. . . . The way in which a process runs its course,—that is its 'act,' that is what constitutes it sensing or feeling or thinking; the quality which is thus in passage,—that is its 'content,' that is what constitutes it tone or pleasure. The durational and the qualitative aspects of mental experience (I use the term 'qualitative' in the widest possible sense) are discriminable as aspects, though they are inseparable in fact; and the psychology of act and content does good psychological service if we take it to insist that the discrimination is essential to a complete analysis. Experimental psychology, I should readily admit, has not hitherto done its duty by duration. Nevertheless, we have in the idea of 'process' an instrument that

¹ Jas. Mill, quoted (approvingly) by Titchener, *op. cit.*, p. 52, n.

is adequate to its task, and that relieves us from the fatal necessity of asking help from logic."¹

One might say that the *esse* of the conscious process is not only *percipi* but *percipere*. The distinction, then, between our awareness and what we are aware of is one that psychology has no place for; perhaps we might better say, has no place for 'as such.' Translated into the existential language of psychology they are rendered as durational and qualitative aspects of mental experience. 'As such' the distinction transports us at once to the plane of meaning. For example, I see the page before me and am aware of the printed words. But as an experimental psychologist I must not speak in such terms. My awareness of the page, described in existential terms, is a complex of brightness sensations, together with the strain sensations due to my eye and head muscles, etc. It is these 'feels' which *constitute* my awareness of the printed page. So I may think that the alleged degeneracy of the French is a gross libel on a noble people; but that is only what my thought, like the White Knight's Song, is *called*, what it really *is* is a kinæsthetic image (or sensation complex) of the word 'degeneracy' and a fleeting image of placards in Paris streets. But the fleeting image of placards again is only the 'name' of the process. The image really is a memory image of splotted white against a dark background, etc., etc.

The question which inevitably occurs to us, of course, is how all these transitory 'feels' with their qualitative specificities can constitute my awareness of the printed page or my thought about the French. This is the question which the psychologist usually ignores, leaving it to the poor epistemologist.² Sometimes he explains, as the White Knight might have done to Alice,

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 60-61.

² "In fact the associationists dealt, on principle, with logical meanings; not with sensations, but with sensations-of; not with ideas, but with ideas-of; it is only incidentally that they leave the plane of meaning for the plane of existence. The experimentalists, on the other hand, aim to describe the contents of consciousness not as they mean but as they are. . . . I do not say, of course, that experimental psychology ignores meaning; in so far as meaning is a phase or aspect of conscious contents, it is taken account of; but it is taken account of *sub specie existentiae*." Titchener, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26.

that it is the same song, the same concrete experience that is being described by the epistemologist and the psychologist. The distinction is only in the point of view and the descriptive terms applied, and so long as the terms are not confused, there is no difficulty. Oftener, however, he offers an altogether different sort of explanation, namely, that meaning is to be construed in terms of *function*; a view which will come up for consideration later on.

Instead of raising the question of meaning or reference, let us ask how the processes themselves are discovered and analyzed. How, in particular, is the elementary sensation discovered? The question is urgent because of the psychologist's contention that the sensation is not a cognitive element. To have a sensation and to be aware of the sensation are the same thing. "The way in which a process runs its course—that is its 'act' . . . ; the quality which is thus in passage, . . . that is its 'content.'"

But if having the sensation is being aware of it, it would seem that it stands in no need of discovery, and that introspection is performed each moment of our conscious life. But, perhaps, after all, it is not quite accurate to say that to have a sensation and to be aware of the sensation are the same thing. The quality in passage is the content. Let us say then that to have a sensation, say 'cold,' is to feel, or be aware of, cold. There is no difficulty about being aware of cold and of attending to cold. But is the cold we feel itself the conscious process? No, that is not quite true either. It is only one aspect of the conscious process, the content side. There is also the 'act' (of awareness) which is "the way the process runs its course." Now I have no wish to quibble, but this surely is far from clear. Does this refer to the constant changes in the quality, and are these changes in the 'cold' what is meant by the "passage" of the quality. We can, of course, observe these changes, but then they would fall on the side of content. But, after all, this is laboring the point. If we can and do attend, in introspection, to conscious processes, and not 'things' and their qualities and relations, then these processes are *contents* and not processes whose *esse* is *percipi* and *percipere*; not processes exhibiting 'act'

and 'content' as aspects of themselves. And the psychologist does hold that introspection is an observation of processes and not of things. "It is . . . natural and customary to think not of mental processes, but of the things and events about us,—while it is, as I believe, absolutely necessary to get rid of things, and to think only of the mental processes, if we are to have a science of psychology."¹ Similarly, it is generally held (James is a notable exception) that in psychological analysis, *what* we analyze is not the 'things' to which the psychical complex may refer, but the complex itself. But if this is so, then the psychical complex is frankly accepted as *content*, and the conception of it as 'process,' which was, it will be remembered, to relieve psychology "from the fatal necessity of asking help from logic" is tacitly given up.

Is it objected that this is not fair; that the psychologists avowedly accept the idea as content all along, and just for that reason it is open to introspective observation; but that it is also at the same time act by virtue of its process character, and for that reason it is utterly different from the substantial entities of the empiricist? If this objection is made, the reply is that if the idea is content and observable only by a special sort of observation called introspection, it is no whit better than the atomistic hybrid of existence and meaning of the old empiricist, and leads inevitably to the same epistemological quagmire. Or if, as it may be said, introspection is not a special sort of observation different in kind from the observation of the things of common sense and natural science, but is to be distinguished only by its peculiar subject matter, viz., conscious processes, then the case is just as bad, and we are committed to the same hopeless dualism of thoughts and things. On the other hand, if the idea is *act*, it is not in so far open to observation, unless we invoke a self outside the stream of conscious processes. But may not one process, itself 'act' and 'content,' be in its entirety the 'content' of another process, observable by the 'act'-side of the later process? In reply, I would say, that the identity of the first process with the 'content' of the second is not one of

¹ Titchener, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

existence but of meaning. If I attempt to recall my experience of a moment ago I recall the *what* of the experience, its 'content' and not its 'act.' A passage from William James is relevant here. "It is the destiny of thought that, on the whole, our early ideas are superseded by later ones, giving fuller accounts of the same realities. But none the less do the earlier and later ideas preserve their own substantive entities as so many several successive states of mind. To believe the contrary would make any definite science of psychology impossible. The only identity to be found among our successive ideas is their similarity of cognitive or representative function as dealing with the same objectives. Identity of *being* there is none."¹

If we pause now and ask how far modern psychology, by its conception of ideas as conscious processes, has, after all, transcended the empiricistic conception of them as substantive entities, the answer must be that the advance is more apparent than real. It has not succeeded in carrying out consistently its program of treating conscious life in purely existential terms, and in complete freedom from epistemological entanglements. In particular, we have found it tacitly giving up the saving conception of the purely existential process or occurrence, whose *esse* is *percipi* and *percipere*, and falling back on the conception, inherited from the English empiricists, of the idea as content, as that of which we are aware, thus quitting the plane of existence for that of meaning.

That this outcome was to be expected, appears upon an examination of the conception of *process*, as employed by the modern psychologist. As it is used, the conception of the idea as process is supposed to free us from the necessity of conceiving the idea as thing. Now 'process,' in the ordinary application of the term, denotes a continuous change or series of changes taking place in some thing or things, or in their relations. As applied in psychology, however, the change is hypostatized, and the process is conceived as pure event or occurrence. This is admittedly a radical step, and one we might justly regard with suspicion. What is there to be found in the nature of the idea

¹ *Prin. of Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 174-175.

to warrant such procedure? The only characteristic, so far as I know, that is pointed to by the psychologists, is the *changefulness* of mental contents. "The experimental psychologist deals with existences, and not with meanings; and his elements are processes, whose temporal course is of their very nature, and *not substances, solid and resistant to the lapse of time.*"¹ "The ideas themselves are not objects, as by confusion with their objects they are supposed to be, but they are occurrences, *Ereignisse, that grow and decay and during their brief passage are in constant change.*"² But this characteristic of change, thus singled out to distinguish ideas from things, is, if anything, an evidence that they are things like those of common sense and of science. For it is only a rationalistic metaphysic that has need of unchangeable substances. Moreover, to characterize idea as process because it is in constant change is a sheer confusion. A process itself, while it *is* change, does not itself necessarily *undergo* change.

The motive for conceiving the idea as process seems to be in part to distinguish it thereby from idea as meaning. "Meanings are stable," says Professor Titchener, "while experience is continuous and a function of time." Now, of course, if one is going to think in terms of psychical existents at all, they must be distinguished from meanings. I think of evolution, but the evolution of which I think is not a psychical existent immediately present to my consciousness. My thinking of evolution is, however, it is claimed, to be described psychologically as the immediate experiencing of certain mental processes. Now if these processes are not themselves entities of which we are aware, but processes embracing within themselves awareness and content, they are not open to introspection as existences subject to growth and decay. On the other hand, if they *are* open to introspection as something other than the things and relations of common sense and of science, they are as truly entities as the atomic ideas of the empiricists, and lead to all the difficulties of representationalism.

¹ Titchener, *op. cit.*, p. 34; italics mine.

² Wundt, *Phil. Studien*, VI, p. 389; italics mine. Quoted by Titchener with this comment: "Now I dare say that you have heard or read dozens of statements to this effect." *Op. cit.*, p. 27.

Our next concern will be the attempt to show that psychology also employs the alternative conception of the idea which is to be found in classical empiricism, and which was referred to Hume by way of illustration. It is the conception of the idea as an entity *capable of behavior*, as a being of capabilities or potentialities. The first notable employment of this conception of the idea was by Berkeley in his theory of general ideas. It amounted to this—that the generality of an idea is not a question of what it is, but of what it does; not a question of structure, but of function. In themselves, as existents, general ideas, like all others, are particular and concrete; their generality is due to the fact that they have a capacity for calling up a great number of similar ideas. Now this view is worlds removed from the doctrine that the *esse* of ideas is *percipi*. If they are capable of behavior, of performing function, there must be a great deal more to them than their surface *percipi*. They are indeed real things, whose properties are only discoverable by observation of their behavior under varying conditions. Again, our perceiving and thinking and knowing, instead of consisting simply in the immediate experiencing of ideas, *i. e.*, of the co-presence of elements in or to consciousness, is constituted by the functioning of these elementary entities.

This is a familiar view, and one implicitly accepted at times by almost every writer on the subject whom I have read. But it is really an impossible conception to apply consistently, once its implications are realized. Suppose we adopt this conception of ideas. They must then be real substantial entities, fairly comparable to physical things, but set over against them as psychical. How are they to be discovered? If they are open to observation, then it must be by some sort of “inner sense.” But perhaps they are not open to direct observation but are merely assumed to exist. But on what possible grounds? We often do, it is true, assume entities to exist which are not open to direct observation. But they are always conceived after the manner of things we are familiar with. Thus the prototype of the atom is an idealized billiard-ball; and if physicists and chemists have been forced to ascribe to the atom properties quite foreign to

any known billiard-ball these are, after all, conceived as analogous to properties of other known objects. But where shall we look for a prototype for our hypothetical mental element? What properties shall we ascribe to it to make intelligible to us its mode of constituting our perceptions and memories and thoughts of the world? No, modern psychology is amply justified in turning its back on any such enterprise. And yet, this conception, though openly repudiated, still lingers to darken counsel.

Perhaps it is somewhat of an exaggeration, however, to say that it is openly repudiated. At least it is true that in discussions of meaning, a whole group of writers frankly make use of this conception. I refer to the contention that meaning cannot be treated in terms of structure but must be construed in terms of function. This may indeed be called the orthodox view ever since it was urged so forcibly by Bradley. Professor Stout, for instance, is writing from this point of view in his treatment of the distinction between noetic and anoetic experience and the relation of the one to the other. "Presentations," he says, "become perceptions, ideas, and conceptions, only so far as they fulfil the function of making thought discriminative."¹ William James defines conception as "the function by which we thus identify a numerically distinct and permanent subject of discourse." And he adds: "It [conception] properly denotes neither the mental state nor what the mental state signifies, but the relation between the two, namely, the *function* of the mental state in signifying just that particular thing. It is plain that one and the same mental state can be the vehicle of many conceptions, can mean a particular thing, and a great deal more beside."² And finally Professor Titchener, himself, writing as an exponent of experimentalism, says: "It is, for instance, axiomatic for the experimentalist that a sensation cannot function alone; at least two sensations must come together, if there is to be a meaning; the single element can do nothing more than go on; so far as cognition or function is concerned, *sentire semper idem, et non sentire, ad idem recidunt*."³

¹ *Analytic Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 47.

² *Prin. of Psych.*, Vol. I, p. 461.

³ *Op. cit.*, Notes to Lecture I, p. 215.

But the problem of meaning is a very special problem, and, as we have already seen, is supposed to transport us at once from the domain of psychology to that of logic. It is only, it may be urged, in so far as the psychologist allows himself to be entangled with logical considerations that he is betrayed into this manner of thinking, and has need of elements capable of functioning.

In the first place, my quarrel is just with this very attitude—with the supposition that the psychologist can live unto himself in this fashion, leaving to the rest of the world insoluble problems created by his own presuppositions. The problem of meaning is a real problem; and if we treat the psychologist's assumptions with any seriousness, it is a perfectly insoluble problem, whether we are psychologists or logicians or mere inquirers.

In the second place, if the psychologist is not justified in attempting to describe the phenomena of mental life in disregard of meaning—if existence and meaning do not permit of being cut asunder by a Solomon's blade—then we should expect to find the psychologist in theoretical difficulties within his own province. Some of these difficulties I have tried to point out already, and it will be easy to discover, I think, that the conception of mental processes as entities capable of interaction is not confined to doctrines arising from a confusion of logic and psychology, but pervades all psychological theorizing.

The very distinction between structural and functional psychology depends for its significance upon the implicit assumption of this conception. The distinction is, of course, borrowed from biological science, and is carried out by analogy with the structures and functions of the biological organism. Perceiving, judging, willing, feeling,—these are functions; while the psychical complexes involved in these acts are the structures, comparable to the organs of the body. But the structures of the body are studied because they enable us to understand how the functions are performed; and the units of structural organization are determined with reference to functional differentiations. Now if there is any pertinence whatever in treating psychical complexes as structures, it is only because it is assumed that they

can in some way explain how the functioning is brought about. And if the element itself, as Professor Titchener asserts, is, like the molecular constituents of the cell, not a functional but a structural element, since it is only *complexes* which are functional, still it can be supposed to constitute an element in these complexes only if it is conceived, like the molecular constituents of the cell, as capable of reacting upon other elements.

Of course all this is mere analogy, but the analogy is treated very seriously by the psychologist, and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that he means to say that psychical existents really perform functions. If only psychological writers would leave off metaphor and analogy and say exactly what they mean, it would lead, I believe, to a wonderful clearing of the atmosphere. If one reads through a few chapters of almost any psychological writer from Wundt to Boris Sidis, with his eye open for metaphor and analogy, the result is amazing. And the metaphors are not literary merely but too often form the very bone and tissue of the argument, especially at critical points. It is the inevitable outcome, I believe, or surface symptom, of deep-seated theoretical confusion—confusion in the conception of the nature of the subject matter of psychology itself.

There is probably no doctrine more characteristic of present-day psychology than the doctrine that the sensation is an abstraction, a hypothetical construct, assumed by the psychologist to account for the complex structures of conscious life. Just how much and what is meant to be conveyed by this is not perfectly clear. If it is an abstraction, one would suppose it was not open to direct observation, but that its existence and properties were inferred from the characteristics of, and the changes undergone by, the complexes supposed to contain it, much as the existence and properties of the chemical atom are inferred. But this supposition is obviously untenable unless one openly adopts the objectionable view we are discussing. Moreover, if we ask on what grounds the sensation is assumed as an element, the answer is that it is found as a result of introspective analysis. It is never experienced in isolation, always occurring along with other sensations, but it is artificially isolated by an act of atten-

tion. Is it then open to direct introspection, after all? Apparently not; for what we get by this analysis is not the simon-pure article but, in Professor James Angell's words, "symbolic representatives of the components of actual experience, . . . but not the prototypes themselves."¹ But why suppose these actually observed colds and reds and pressures to be symbolic representatives of unobservable prototypes at all? Why should one assume these prototypes as components of actual experience, unless one hopes by means of them to account for the characteristics of, and changes in, our actual experiences themselves?

But there remains a deeper question. Why suppose our actual experiences—the sights and sounds of ordinary life—to be psychical complexes at all? To be sure, the pictures on the wall are complicated arrangements of patches of color, and the voices and street sounds are combinations of many tones and noises; but unless we are prepared to say with Wundt that "the idea of an external body, for example, is made up of partial ideas of its parts,"² it is quite a different matter to say that our consciousness of these phenomena from moment to moment is likewise a complex. If there are such things as psychical complexes at all, they must be composed of elements, and these elements must be such things as are capable of forming complexes, namely, *existents conceived after the analogy of physical entities*. If psychology is not willing to adopt this conception, it must give up the claim to be a natural science "dealing with the mere course of psychical events as such . . . and the laws of co-existence and sequence between these events." (Bradley.) It must cease to regard itself as dealing with the existential in abstraction from all meaning; it must give up the categories 'element' and 'complex,' and find some other formulæ to express the empirical facts which it has itself discovered.

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¹ *The Relations of Structural and Functional Psychology to Logic*. The Decennial Publications of the Univ. of Chicago, 1st series, III, p. 4.

² *Outlines of Psychology*, trans. by C. H. Judd, p. 29.

THE METAPHYSICS OF NIETZSCHE'S *IMMORALISM.*

THE accounts and estimates of Nietzsche's ethical teaching have been considerable in number; but no systematic endeavor has been made to examine the metaphysical basis of his ethics and to interpret his so-called Immoralism in the light of his Metaphysics. It may be that Nietzsche's express repudiation of Metaphysics has tended to mislead his interpreters; they may have been induced to overlook his Metaphysics and to regard him wholly as an Ethicist. Whether this be so or not, Nietzsche's ethical teaching is determined by a quite explicit metaphysical view, and many of his utterances regarding morality are to be understood and properly appreciated only by reference to their metaphysical background. It is the aim of this article to set forth Nietzsche's metaphysical standpoint, to bring his ethics into relation with it, and to outline a few general characteristics of Nietzsche's philosophy.

I.

The key to Nietzsche's philosophy is to be found in his view of consciousness. He interprets consciousness from a biological standpoint. In its origin it is purely utilitarian; in its range it is determined by its usefulness in maintaining and furthering the welfare of the body (Leib).¹ It is a purely secondary phenomenon, not the goal of the evolutionary process.² It is a sign that the bodily organization is not proceeding smoothly, that there is friction, that there are obstacles to be overcome. It shows that the organism is ill-at-ease, that it is not satisfied, that it is not properly adapted.³ But, above all, it reveals that the body is growing, that it is still in the process of becoming, that a higher body is being formed.⁴

¹ *Will to Power*, 505. (The numbers refer to Aphorisms.)

² *Ibid.*, 709, 711, 523.

³ *Ibid.*, 440.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 676.

Knowledge is to be regarded purely in respect of the degree to which it conduces to preservation, and to increase of strength and power, bodily health and vitality. Nietzsche regards truth as simply that kind of error without which a certain species of living being would not be able to exist.¹ Thus, for example, Nietzsche holds that the unalterability, the regularity and uniformity, of which science speaks, do not belong to reality, but are simply 'interpretations' or creations to suit practical needs. The whole question turns solely upon the practical necessity of a particular species of organism which, in order to self-maintenance and continued success, requires a certain exactness or regularity, and which can thus record its perceptions and capitalize its experiences.² The whole world of 'appearance' is a figment created to serve this general end; it has its origin in our endeavor, for practical purposes, to schematize life, to find something stable. Such a schematization, such a mechanization of all phenomena, is necessary as a preliminary to all action, to all further growth, if that is to take place through the instrumentality of consciousness. Nietzsche, in consequence, refuses to ascribe any absolute validity to such entities as mind, reason, thought, subject, object, things. These find their origin in the fact that we require to understand the actual world according to a scheme of Being devised in our effort to make the world subject to ourselves, in our effort to gain mastery over nature. They assume their significance because of the part they play in the fulfilment of practical needs. The world of the stable and unchangeable becomes the world of "true being" in contrast to the world of "false appearance."³

What Nietzsche means by this schematizing or mechanization is that the phenomena of consciousness are only a few elements selected out of the huge mass of phenomena which remain beyond consciousness, and that these elements are given a certain fixity and stability. They are taken out of a certain setting which remains unknown to us. Hence consciousness is

¹ *Op. cit.*, 493.

² *Ibid.*, 480, 623, 707.

³ *Will to Power*, 508-522.

totally inadequate to the expression of the nature of reality. Its phenomena are all atomistic.¹ Nietzsche means that we become conscious of phenomena but we never become conscious of their connections with any degree of adequacy. They have causal relations which remain completely beyond consciousness and concealed from our knowledge.² Science believes that it discovers real causal relations between things; but these need not be regarded as being what really exist any more than the causal relations of mythology or those which appear in dreams are real. The causal relations which science discovers have their superior significance over those of dreams and mythology in that they meet more satisfactorily the practical necessities of a certain mode of life.³

Nietzsche, however, goes further than this. Consciousness mechanizes phenomena and can never give us real causal relations. But he regards the accepted conception of causality itself as a fundamental error, or at most as having no other validity than utility. The conception of causality means the sundering of the actual condition into two parts—an effect and a cause. The source of this conception is psychological, namely, in the inner facts of will, in the belief that in the act of willing, I (or the conscious Ego) am a causal agent. In Nietzsche's view, the prevalent conception of will is wholly false; it is based upon the phenomena of consciousness; it accepts these as a true representation of what is real. Psychology speaks of will and end, of the attainment of an end through an act of will on the part of the subject, of the end as a 'motive' to action. But Nietzsche holds that all this is a schematizing of reality, an interpretation, a metaphor inadequately expressing the nature of what does happen. What is called in Psychology an end is only a very small element selected out of the mass of phenomena constituting the life of the organism and consisting of the latter's effort after self maintenance and further development. What is fundamental is this organic struggle. In the organism is all

¹ *Op. cit.*, 478.

² *Ibid.*, 524, 676.

³ *Götzen-Dämmerung*, "Four Great Errors," 4. *Human, All-too-Human*: I, 12-13.

causality to be found, but it is then of such a kind that cause and effect fall together, activity and end are fused together. Consciousness destroys, breaks up what is thus bound together; it separates things out, but does so inadequately since it constructs links to bridge the gaps it makes.¹

Nietzsche's view of consciousness involves a doctrine of the unconscious (or subconscious). Consciousness is very superficial. It is at most only a faint facsimile of the vast unfathomable reality behind it. Of the numerous influences taking effect every second we feel scarcely anything at all, of the numerous phenomena happening every minute we know very little. In comparison with this mass of phenomena, sensations, thoughts, and other mental states with their different contents, are insignificant and occasional. Consciousness appears as an instrument of a wider and far greater power. The conscious Ego is merely an instrument created in the service of this greater power. All conscious purposes, all valuations, all conscious willing are only means by virtue of which something totally different is attained from what is present in consciousness, or from what consciousness supposes. Thus, for example, we may think that we are pursuing our own pleasure, but we may be really striving after something wholly different, for which pleasure is but a means, or of which it is only an ingredient. We are in the presence of an activity to which it would be necessary to ascribe an incalculably higher and more extensive intellect than the one with which we are directly acquainted.²

Nietzsche does not leave this Unconscious in any state of vagueness. He gives it a quite definite significance. The greater power, the greater intellect, in whose presence we are, he calls the self (*Das Selbst*). He at the same time identifies it with the body (*Leib*) and distinguishes it from the conscious Ego. "*Zurück zu Leib und Leben*," is his standpoint. Life is for him something quite concrete, it is the living body, the organism. The essential character of all life is a tendency towards growth in power and strength, towards greater com-

¹ *Will to Power*, 545-552, 692, 668, 675. *Götzen-Dämmerung*, "Four Great Errors" (*Die vier grossen Irrthümer*). *Beyond Good and Evil*, 16, 17.

² *Ibid.*, 676. *Zarathustra*, "Von den Verächtern des Leibes."

plexity; and all such growth is a matter purely of the body. The fundamental nature of every organism is its inner power to create, to mould and to utilize environment so as to grow. This inner power, this struggle initiated from within, Nietzsche calls a Will to Power. The organs and structures of the body, its instincts and its instinctive activities, are instruments fashioned by the Will to Power in its struggles for increased strength. The self, the body, is an enormous reason, a Will to Power, an unknown source of wisdom that acts as a powerful commander, that compels, conquers, rules. It is that which lies behind all conscious life and exerts a disturbing but also a controlling influence upon it. It dominates the conscious Ego. It is, for example,—and Nietzsche cites himself as an instance—the source of all inspiration; the power that breathes or speaks through one is not an alien deity, but the self, the man as he really is.¹

What Nietzsche calls the Unconscious thus becomes of greater importance and value than the Conscious. The springs and flights of the conscious Ego or of thinking are a means to the ends of the self, to its increase of power. The end and goal of life lie beyond consciousness. Nietzsche regards it as a profound error to view the conscious state as the most valuable state. Consciousness is only incidental, at most a superfluous thing, destined to disappear and to be superseded by perfect automatism. We must seek perfect life there where it is least conscious, least aware of its logic, its reasons, its ends. The reasons which men endeavor to find for their conduct are often wide of the mark; and a contemporary philosopher has remarked that metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe on instinct. In Nietzsche's view, such unconsciousness of ends and reasons belongs to every kind of perfection; one acts perfectly only when one acts instinctively. Attempts to grasp the grounds of our conduct are signs of disorder in our life. They reveal that the established ways of acting and established

¹ *Zarathustra*, "Von den Hinterweltlern." "Von den Verächtern des Leibes." "Von der schenkenden Tugend." "Von der Selbst-überwindung." *Will to Power*, 254, 676, 689.

beliefs are in process of dissolution, that they are decaying and giving place to new adjustments.¹

This idea of the unconscious, of the self, of the body, has a biological and physiological basis. The unconscious, the body, is the seat of innumerable phenomena and connections; it is a reservoir of enormous powers.² But only a very small part of all these appears in consciousness. To understand the nature of the unconscious, of the body as a seat of innumerable phenomena, more fully, it is necessary to set forth Nietzsche's view of the organic process.

The fundamental assumption underlying Nietzsche's theory of organic life is that the world—not merely the organic world as usually understood in contrast to the inorganic—consists of a certain quantum of force or Will to Power, distributed in a finite number of centers. (Nietzsche speaks of force and Will to Power indifferently, the two being identified through the ascription of an inner will to the force or energy spoken of by science). This assumption of a Will to Power is something of the nature of a gleam of insight; it is a thought which suddenly through a chance incident occurred to Nietzsche and which, because of the light which it threw upon the phenomena of the world, laid complete hold upon him and became the pivot of his interpretation of that world. This Will to Power is not to be understood after the manner of psychological analysis (as has been shown above). It is the inner struggle and self-initiated effort of each organism to grow at the expense of its environment. It is an organic activity in which end is embedded.³

Every organism is a center of Will to Power. It endeavors not to remain as it is but to become greater, to gain nourishment, to increase its power, to accumulate force, in a word, to grow by the absorption of other forces. But as, on Nietzsche's view, there is nothing but a limited amount of Will to Power, and this Will to Power is distributed in a limited number of centers, any growth on the part of one center is secured at the expense of another or other centers. The organic process thus becomes

¹ *Op. cit.*, 423, 430, 439, 523, 707.

² *Ibid.*, 532, 659, 674.

³ *Will to Power*, 619, 644, 647, 668, 728.

viewed as a continual distribution and redistribution of force or power; in one center after another the amount rises to a certain degree and then recedes, the simplest and least complex centers alone remaining imperishable.¹

Nietzsche here views the whole process of organic life in its concreteness. This process is, for him, not teleological. Evolution is not a straight line, the terminus of which is the motive of the process. He is here opposing such a view as that of Hegel which sees in History the development of the 'Idea' or of self-consciousness; or such a view as tends to find always in the latest forms and structures what is highest and best, as finds, for example, man (the species) to be the richest fruit of the organic movement. Evolution or the process of organic life is not an advancing development. It contains both synthesis and dissolution or decay; and both are necessary. All the 'worse' qualities are involved as well as the 'better.' The range of organic life is rather like a huge experiment in which some successes but also an incalculable number of failures take place. There is, throughout, not merely the organic world but the inorganic as well, only a simultaneous movement of all organisms and all forces, a movement which is random, confused and conflicting. The character of this movement and the continual rise and decay which is actually witnessed have their source in the struggle which each center of Will to Power wages with every other center in its environment. Each center strives to become as strong as possible, strives towards "life in its highest power." Each thus acts as a check upon the other; some attain a higher point than others, the height reached depending upon the economizing of the forces absorbed.²

The organic process is interpreted individualistically. Evolution, wherever one cares to look, is always a process of differentiation, a process carried on in individuals, a process where differences between individuals become more marked, where clefts and gulfs become more deeply set, where each individual center tends to express more clearly its unique and incomparable nature. Any advance that does occur takes place in individuals

¹ *Will to Power*, 639, 688, 689, 715, 1066, 1067.

² *Ibid.*, 90, 684, 709, 711, 639, 1027.

alone; a species as a whole does not advance, for gain in height is counterbalanced by loss in breadth. What happens is simply that the relation of the members of the species to each other changes; to use a metaphor, instead of advancing abreast in a line, they veer round until the line becomes jagged and uneven.¹

An individualism of this kind sees in the evolutionary process a tendency towards the concentration of life's forces in the few as against their dispersion in the many. The process is inherently a striving on the part of each individual center towards greater fulness and complexity. The species, society, the state are not ends in themselves, nor are they entities supreme over the individual, but are means to the production of the highest possible types of individuals. Such have been as yet only occasional appearances; they have arisen at rare intervals, only, however, to decay again, dissolution being facilitated by their very greatness, by their richness and complexity. Yet it is in them that the possibilities of life are revealed and that the nature of the organic process is most fully shown.²

The only realities which Nietzsche accepts are organisms or more generally, individual centers, characterized as a certain quantum of Will to Power. And the fundamental nature of each is to struggle with every other in its neighborhood for superiority in strength and range of dominion. The struggle in Nietzsche's view is not for existence but for power. Though the fight takes place between one center and those in its immediate environment, yet, in Nietzsche's view, all the centers balance each other in such a way that all phenomena whatever become reflected in each center. The results, it may be so put, taking place in one area make themselves felt in the neighboring area, and the latter makes itself felt in the next. The effect is, in consequence, cumulative. Individuals are not isolated but standing in an attitude of offence and defence. The condition of the world as a whole is mirrored in the state of the individual center.³

The body—the human organism—is one of these centers of

¹ *Will to Power*, 646, 684, 886.

² *Ibid.*, 660, 684, 881.

³ *Ibid.*, 567, 634, 636, 637, 689.

Will to Power. The form which it has assumed is a result of the struggle which it has waged with other centers. Its organs, its instincts and instinctive activities, are instruments fashioned to enable it to gain supremacy. For centuries this effort has proceeded until vast forces have become stored up. It is the essential nature of the body to have advanced and to continue to advance through history, creating itself through hostilities. Every movement that has taken place, however remote in time or region, has left a trace in the organic constitution or physiological condition of the body. It has become the seat of enormous powers, the scene of innumerable phenomena and connections.¹

These physiological conditions and phenomena are what Nietzsche means by the unconscious. Each center has an unconscious ascribed to it. But it is also important to remember that these organic states and these phenomena of which the organism is the seat are at the same time a reflection or mirroring of cosmic states and phenomena. Nietzsche here is completely dominated by biological and physiological ideas. The unconscious is the body with its various functions and processes. All these are carried on unconsciously; the organic process has gone on for centuries unconsciously; a great and wonderful organization has been effected unconsciously—an organization so wonderful that science at its highest levels can accomplish nothing approaching it. Physiology reveals, for example, how the body has enlisted into its services numerous minute organisms in order to protect itself and minister to its own strength and vitality; it reveals how, in some way not quite understood by science, the body can render itself immune against hostile organisms. This organizing force which operates unconsciously and yet with such intelligence, with such reason that it awes even the man of science, is what Nietzsche calls Will to Power. It is not to be distinguished as soul in contrast with body; body and Will to Power mean the same thing. It is the self which is in its very nature creative.

¹ *Zarathustra*, "Von den Verächtern des Leibes." "Von der Selbst-überwindung." "Von der schenkenden Tugend." *Will to Power*, 686, 687.

The struggles and activities of the self, of the Will to Power, of the body, never come fully into consciousness. Consciousness is only a narrow area of the wide expanse of the unconscious. All consciousness is the bringing of some element up to the surface out of the depths of the self of individuality. It is an 'interpretation' of the physiological state of the body made for practical purposes. Nietzsche seems to hold the view that in all knowing we know only our own organic states; the activities of the organism may be directed to something which is, in relation to it, extra-organic, but we know of what is extra-organic only through the states of our own organism. The fundamental nature of the activity of the body, of the self, of the Will to Power, is creation. Creation is to be understood in the Nietzschean sense as organization, the bringing into play of new reactions spontaneously, instinctively, to meet the continually changing conditions of the world, the unconscious establishment of new modes of living, new types of behavior, new lines of conduct. What is called mind is simply the herald and echo of these struggles and triumphs of the body. All that comes to be expressed in consciousness has been already organized and is simply a result. Before a judgment can be made, for example, the process of assimilation must already have taken place; there lies here an intellectual activity which does not appear in consciousness. Judgment is of the nature: 'this and this is so and so.' This implies an identity; and Nietzsche sees in this assertion of identity a Will to Power. It is the result of a will which decrees; there shall be as great identity as possible. This means, as Nietzsche maintains, there is no Will to Truth but only a Will to Power.¹

The element of necessity or compulsion which is present in thinking has thus, on Nietzsche's view, its source in the fundamental Will to Power. It is biological; its utility lies in furthering the growth of the body. What expresses itself through consciousness is the self, the Will to Power. What are expressed are its activities and conditions of existence. With every new degree of strength attained, new views and new horizons open

¹ *Zarathustra*, "Von der schenkenden Tugend." *Beyond Good and Evil*, 36. *Will to Power*, 478, 530-533, 561, 511.

out. With every elevation of man older interpretations—and these are narrower interpretations—have to be cast aside. And the one activity behind them all is the self, the Will to Power.

The metaphysical root of Nietzsche's conception of freedom lies in this idea of creation. It is the self which decrees that this 'shall be so and so.' It is this necessity which appears in knowledge; and men falsely ascribe it to the constitution of the world. The values which things have, have been put upon them by men themselves—by men in their deeper nature, and no values can be known in things that have not been first ascribed a value. The way is thus opened for man to work out his own destiny; he is the creator of his own world and master of his fate. But to become master is a task to be accomplished, and this is the problem of Nietzsche's ethical teaching. This has now to be considered in relation to his general metaphysical attitude.¹

II.

Nietzsche's ethical teaching has two aspects: first—a destructive criticism of existing morality, and secondly—a positive construction of a new moral code on a new basis. He himself sums up the essence of his teaching as "a transvaluation of all values." But he also speaks of it as a 'Moral Naturalism' and a 'Natural Immorality.' All these terms are to be understood in the light of his metaphysics.²

The morality which Nietzsche attacks is prevailing morality, the accepted moral code which is on the whole the Christian code; but he identifies this code with every morality that has hitherto been taught, for example Platonism, Paulinism, Spinozism, Kantianism, Schopenhauerianism. He considers them all of one type because they have all the same defect, and this defect has the same source in each.

Morality, that is, the teaching of Christianity, of Schopenhauer and generally of all who preceded Nietzsche himself, has always found the source of values in consciousness, for example, in conscious states such as pleasure, in increase of consciousness,

¹ *Will to Power*, 616, 675. *Zarathustra*, "Von der Selbst-überwindung," "Von tausend und Einem Ziele." *Human, All-too-Human*, I, 16.

² *Will to Power*, 299.

in obedience to conscience, in submission to a categorical imperative, to a 'thou shalt!', or to a divine law. It lays stress upon motive, consequences, pleasure, happiness, reward and punishment. It has its basis in the acceptance of the categories of reason—end, unity, being, etc.—as belonging to the constitution of the world and as being the measure and the standard of all phenomena. It has come to be a belief in spiritual values, in values that are above nature. It has come to be a belief in a 'true world,' as against the 'false world of appearance,' the former being permanent, eternal, unchangeable, the latter being fleeting and deceitful. It emphasizes virtue as being the transcending of the world of appearance, the world of the senses and of nature, and as being the attainment of a 'true world,' of spirituality, of likeness to the divine.¹

Such an attitude as this gives rise to certain moral values. A conception of 'good' and 'evil' is formulated. There appears an effort to improve man in accordance with these values. There originate different castes, determined according to the degree to which their members approach the ideal, according to the degree of spirituality, of resemblance to the divine. This, in Nietzsche's view, is the source of the priestly caste which becomes the exponent of these moral values, and at the same time a standard for individuals of the lower types and the typical guide in the improvement of man. The priest conceives himself as the best type, and the types opposed to him as contemptible, as something to be vigorously crushed, to be pursued with deadly enmity. No differences, no opposition can be allowed. Just as all external disturbing factors must be crushed, so also all inner restless impulses, all 'sinful' tendencies must be rooted out. To secure peace, a doctrine of equality of each with each is taught. The duty of each consists in humility and obedience to the divine will and law which the priest interprets.²

The outcome of such teaching is decadence, and ultimately nihilism in the form of helplessness and denial of the worth of

¹ *Will to Power*, 12, 461, 707. *Beyond Good and Evil*, 34. *Zarathustra*, "Von den drei Verwandlungen," "Von den Hinterweltlern."

² *Will to Power*, 139, 141, 334, 871, 923. *Götzen-Dämmerung*, "Moral als Widernatur."

the world and of life. The weaker types bind themselves under this code, thereby strengthening the power of the priestly caste, but at the same time gaining in this union protection against, and sway over, the stronger types of individuals who constitute a very small minority. The priestly code becomes the morality of the herd of weaklings, of those who unite because they have not the power and ability to maintain themselves individually. But this morality prevails at the expense of the stronger men. It crushes out a large number of the instincts and activities which constitute life. It becomes only a very small part of life, and it ultimately ceases to be even that small part. The senses, the body and all its natural functions, are slandered, vilified, degraded. In the extreme issue, not this world but another is to be sought; not this life but another is of value. To renounce this world and this life, to seek this other world and this other life is the moral duty of man.¹

The effect upon man himself is that he becomes diffident of his own powers; he distrusts his stronger instincts and seeks to crush them completely out. He lives continually in fear of himself; he dreads transgression; he stands under the menace of future punishment and reward. He comes to view himself simply as subject to a moral governor of the world, and all phenomena as the effect of a moral order.²

This is the morality which Nietzsche opposes. It puts a curse upon all the human instincts, especially the strongest and most vigorous. Because of this, it robs life of its glory and leads to pessimism. There are individuals, however,—and Nietzsche is one—who feel themselves repressed, choked, suffocated in the presence of such a morality. Here, then, is a case where all such individuals must be courageous enough to become conscious and to test deliberately all that has been attained. Nietzsche does not mean to assert here that consciousness is the most valuable form of life, but the demand to become conscious, the need of becoming conscious, arises as a result of friction and distress in the activities of the organism.³

¹ *Will to Power*, 116, 141, 222, 343, 567, 258. *Götzen-Dämmerung*, "Die Vernunft in der Philosophie," "Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen," 35, 36.

² *Will to Power*, 141, 343, 351, 461. *Genealogie der Moral*, II, 14-18.

³ *Ibid.*, 1007, 1008.

To become conscious means for Nietzsche in this connection, to question the value of the existing moral values, to find under what conditions these values, such values as 'good' and 'evil,' were invented, to criticize morality. This comes in his treatment, to be a denial of the absolute validity of prevailing morality; he decomposes it and limits the range of its activities. But in this he is true to his metaphysical doctrine that consciousness is a sign of disorder in our life, that any attempt to grasp the nature of our conduct is a sign that the established ways of acting are in process of dissolution. What Nietzsche himself endeavors to do is to remove the curse which morality puts upon life, to regard the instincts which have been hitherto vilified with the reverse of the established feeling, to restore to life the glory of which it has been deprived, to justify life even in its most terrible aspects, to create once more a faith in this world and in this life in place of a faith in a 'Beyond' and in a moral ruler of the universe. This is Nietzsche's ethical doctrine of the "Transvaluation of all values." He holds it is not necessary to create new instincts; the instincts which are to come into play in the future already exist; they have been repressed and have simply to be liberated and assigned their proper value or set in a new light. Only in this way is it possible to overcome the danger inherent in morality.¹

Nietzsche, as has been shown, finds that this morality is based upon the acceptance of consciousness as the source of values. This is the origin of all its defects. The phenomena of consciousness are only a very small part of the mass of material, and consciousness, in consequence, can never be used as a standard for life. It is inadequate to be one. Conscious phenomena have only a practical value. The categories of reason, which morality utilizes to determine the value of phenomena, are creations of man; they are instruments in the service of the Will to Power. But what morality has done is to project these into the constitution of the world. It has believed and maintained that values are given to men, that the world has a certain worth which men must accept, that phenomena, actions, conduct, have

¹ *Genealogie der Moral.* Vorrede, 6. *Will to Power*, 55, 254, 258, 327, 423, 1005, 1007. *Beyond Good and Evil*, 33.

a certain value in themselves, have a certain quality characterizable as 'good' or 'bad.'

From this Nietzsche concludes that morality is a misinterpretation of the world. It is the 'greatest lie' of all times. Yet it is not utterly false, and why? Because even this lie, this misinterpretation, has utility. In it is exemplified simply the naïveté of man in making himself the standard by which to measure the worth of the world. The standard which he uses is created by himself, by the Will to Power. Thus Nietzsche sees even in prevailing morality a creation of the Will to Power; but it is a creation the utility of which lies in serving the Will to Power of the weak and the decadent, and which fosters degeneracy the longer the lie is allowed to dominate men. This limited utility of morality, which constitutes its defectiveness, has its origin in the reversal of the real state of matters, in the acceptance as of supreme worth of what is only of secondary significance, in the failure to perceive the human source of all these moral values and standards, and in the consequent enthronement of these standards as authoritative over the whole of man's life. In short, the compulsive and authoritative element in morality has been misunderstood.¹

Instead of seeking values and the source of values in consciousness, we must seek them in the unconscious, in the self, in the body. This is the metaphysical significance of Nietzsche's doctrine of the "Transvaluation of all values." What he is here asserting is that life is its own standard and weaves its values from within itself. This is where the source of authority is to be found. The value for life is the only and final test.²

This unconscious, the self, the body, is the seat and scene of innumerable phenomena, and consciousness is an 'interpretation' of these phenomena. These phenomena are states of the organism, physiological conditions. All such phenomena, Nietzsche maintains, are absolutely homogeneous. He means by this

¹ *Will to Power*, 141, 200, 215, 258, 276, 292, 616. *Zarathustra*, "Von alten und neuen Tafeln" 9. "Von der Selbst-überwindung." *Beyond Good and Evil*, 60. *Genealogie der Moral*, I, 2.

² *Will to Power*, 254-258, 272, 382, 439, 440, 507, 514, 616, 493. *Zarathustra*, "Von der schenkenden Tugend."

that they are neither moral nor immoral; they are what he calls 'natural.' All differentiations in this homogeneity are a result of 'interpretation.' There are no moral phenomena but only a moral interpretation of phenomena. Activities have not a quality in them which can be called good or bad. All names of virtues, all such names as good and bad are simply images or metaphors. What is called morality is an interpretation of various modes of organic activity. All moral judgments are systems and a language of signs in which the processes maintaining or injuring the welfare of the organism and in which the conditions for preserving and furthering that welfare are revealed. They are the forms which consciousness gives to modes of life and types of activity which the body or the self has established already in order to preserve its power and to increase it if possible. Conversely, using this position as a key, Nietzsche maintains that moral valuations can be utilized as a means to the discovery of the physiological conditions, of the nature of the soil out of which they have grown, and can be made a test of progress or decadence in consequence.

This is what is to be understood as Nietzsche's 'moral naturalism' or 'natural immorality.' Morality consists simply of natural processes interpreted in a certain light. A 'moral' is a method of living which long experience and experiment have tested and proved efficient, and which at last enters consciousness as dominant. Its authority lies in its value for Life, and this value has been put upon it by life itself, or the Will to Power, which has created it to serve itself. The source of morality of all moral valuations or interpretations lies beyond morality itself; the latter is a product of 'natural' forces. The state, for example, is an organization of natural phenomena—trade, police, punishment, external defence and so forth. The rights of marriage and of property rest upon a natural basis. The great mass of moral activities are unconscious, instinctive reactions and adjustments, organic, natural in character. All these phenomena have been regarded as 'moral' because there is present a consciousness of ends and values, a consciousness of 'moral agency.' But Nietzsche holds that the conscious Ego

is never a causal agent, and the end which we seek and seem to realize is really only a factor isolated from its physiological context, and is a means to something beyond consciousness. The factors producing or leading to a certain line of action are not 'grounds' in the usually accepted sense of 'moral grounds' of an action, but are causes which in the form of physiological conditions lie beyond consciousness.¹

On this view, morality is merely a means to ends beyond morality. It serves ends of which the moral agent is never conscious; it is an instrument in the service of the Will to Power, of the body. It is created to secure the welfare of the body, to maintain and further bodily strength and power. As the condition of the body changes, new values come into being. Moral valuations vary with the degree of vitality. Life is a continual flow; to remain immovable is impossible; there must be either advance or degeneration. Hence there is no finality in moral values, there are no values which are fixed, stable and imperishable. The values that are at any moment established must soon again be opposed, subjected to criticism, and dissolved to make way for new ones. But this same process in which old values are destroyed and new ones established is, in Nietzsche's view, possible only through the employment of a host of natural and immoral (that is, opposed to, or involving opposition to existing morality) forces. Only so can new values make headway. Morality rests upon non-morality and immorality.²

Nietzsche's criticism of existing moral values, and the source in which he finds all morality to arise having been set forth, it now remains to sketch shortly the new type of moral being who embodies his transvalued values, and the new ethical code which he constructs on the basis he has found. The outstanding features of the new type of individual, the superman, are organization, egoism, autonomy, atheism, optimism.

Science speaks of the influence of environment, but Nietzsche sees that the same environmental influences which lead to

¹ *Will to Power*, 717, 675. *Götzen-Dämmerung*, "Die vier grossen Irrthümer," 3.

² *Will to Power*, 266, 272, 306, 311, 461, 786. *Zarathustra*, "Von tausend und Einem Ziele." "Vom Wege des Schaffenden." "Von alten und neuen Tafeln," "Auf den glückseligen Inseln." "Von der Selbst-überwindung."

degeneration in one case lead to advance in the other. The difference is explained through the idea of organization. To understand this idea, it has to be remembered that Nietzsche regards the individual organism as embodying in its constitution, in its structure and its processes, the history of the world. It embodies all the phenomena of evolution and contains within it all the possible tasks of the future process of evolution. Hence arises the significance of organization; it is the amassing, the concentration of forces, in order to lead to "life in its highest power"; it is the harnessing of the various instincts of life in such a way as to secure the highest harmony and most frictionless functioning of the organism; it is the exploitation of the forces of life in such a way as to economize, prevent waste and produce the greatest possible result.¹

What Nietzsche is aiming at through this idea of organization is a strong, healthy, well-knit manhood, though for him manhood is always in the form of individuals, not in the form of the average of a mass. He desires the husbanding of the enormous powers of life in such a way that continuity may be secured between generations, that one generation may build upon the foundations laid by its predecessors, that it may develop organically from the already existing stem and attain thereby greater strength. If this is not done, the son will have to begin where his father began. It is on this ground that all squandering of forces or of strength raises in Nietzsche that feeling which he calls pity or suffering, and no other kind of pity will he allow. A man born of parents who have squandered their strength and resources and who have stored none, is in Nietzsche's view already a bankrupt; he contains no promise for the future, and it is according to this promise that the rank of an individual is determined.²

The individuals who become the focus of the different forces operative in the past, in whom are concentrated the results of a long period of a nation's peaceful development, who balance the most conflicting elements in one harmonious personality, who

¹ *Will to Power*, 686, 956, 883, 687, 639, 906, 966, 689, 109. *Zarathustra*, "Von der schenkenden Tugend."

² *Will to Power*, 398, 681, 334, 987, 367, 923. *Beyond Good and Evil*, 293. *Genealogie der Moral*, II, 24. *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, 382.

can so exploit environment as to enlist hostile factors in their own service and turn hostility into friendly support: these individuals are the organizers. Morality has hitherto endeavored to remove antagonism by crushing one or other of the antagonists. Nietzsche sees in such antagonism the very essence of life. Morality has slandered natural impulses because men have not been able to control them; and it has selected the weaker impulses and developed them to the exclusion of the stronger. This, Nietzsche holds, is due to weakness; it is disorganization; it arises from inability to organize. Men possessed of organizing power welcome hostility, obstacles, difficulties; they find in overcoming these the glow of life; the effort brings forth in them the sense of power and triumph.¹

These higher types are rich, complex individualities, are men of all-round development. They embody in full measure all the instincts of life, but these are not a chaos; they are ordered, made subservient to the one instinct for health and strength. There is no necessity to crush out any elemental factor; it has only to be mastered and utilized for the one supreme purpose. Nietzsche's position is that if the body is radically sound, there need be no fear of the 'spiritual' condition. An individual who is thoroughly sound organically has such a superabundant vitality that he transforms even the darkest spots of the earth. He no longer understands what 'evil' means. He has simply to let his instincts 'go,' and they carry him along in the right direction. This is life in its most positive form, and bears within itself all safeguards against waste, against viciousness.²

Nietzsche cites Cæsar, Shakespeare, Goethe, Napoleon as actual instances of what he understands to be the 'higher types.' Why he regards these as types of his ideal is that they are strong rich individualities in whom the elemental natural instincts are fresh and vigorous, in whom life's forces of several generations have become concentrated to explosive point and imperatively compel to a rearrangement of the world and the emergence of new values. Their 'higher nature' does not lie in

¹ *Will to Power*, 962, 966, 995, 1025, 870, 889, 933. *Beyond Good and Evil*, 200, 201.

² *Will to Power*, 883, 905, 906, 933.

any effect they may produce, even though this be the shattering of both hemispheres. Thus he does not glorify the career of Napoleon; the latter lost 'fineness' of character on account of the nature of the forces over against him and the means he had to employ. Goethe is the best example of Nietzsche's ideal. In Napoleon we see only one side of that complex individuality—the terrible, because of the circumstances in which he stood. This is simply an instance of the truth that all growth towards loftiness necessitates growth downwards into the depths and into the terrible. It is the same principle that is enunciated in the more familiar dictum that a loving parent must be able to chastise his children, or that a generous man must have a hard heart.¹

Nietzsche expressly maintains that his higher type of man is the exact opposite of the vicious and the unbridled. The higher types do not know what these terms mean. These terms have been invented in reference to types of men who are disorganized, weak, unable to regulate their impulses. They are disordered. They cannot in consequence be used as a standard for the higher individuals whose life shows no such disorder.²

The lower types have and must continue to have their own system of morality, the outcome of their own physiological condition. Nietzsche does not advocate the destruction of prevailing morality; and this is in accordance with his general metaphysical attitude. The mass of moral individuals and the prevailing morality are the contrasting and opposing factors necessary for the existence of the higher types. They develop in the latter the sense of power, the "Machtgefühl," the consciousness of how much is attained in them, the consciousness or the feeling of their own uniqueness and the unique quality of their life. Without the contrast of the lower level, this consciousness would be impossible.³

But this morality represents also what has been hitherto

¹ *Will to Power*, 966, 1026, 883, 876, 1027. *Götzen-Dämmerung*, "Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen," 44, 48-51. *Zarathustra*, "Vom höheren Menschen 5." "Vom Baum am Berge."

² *Will to Power*, 868-870.

³ *Ibid.*, 886, 936. *Genealogie der Moral*, II, 2.

attained in the process of evolution. It is in accordance with Nietzsche's idea of organization that this attainment should not be destroyed but should be enlisted in the service of the higher individuals. Morality has fashioned machines out of individuals; it has fitted each into a scheme, it has moulded all men alike, it demands complete submission to its dictates. This machine, these 'moral' individuals are the soil on which the supermen can devise their higher mode of existence. Nietzsche does not mean that the supermen act by force towards the lower types or that they exploit them blindly and capriciously. This would signify a general depreciation of human life. What Nietzsche's position seems to be is that the supermen are magnetic and commanding personalities who influence weaker types by way of suggestion. What is decisive is quality of life. Exploitation presupposes these for whom it has a meaning. All organization rests on the assumption that there are those who are prepared to play the part of an instrument. This latter rôle Nietzsche hands over to the ordinary moral individuals, they can accomplish many small, yet necessary tasks, and thereby set free the activities of the higher type for the further development of the possibilities of life.¹

This is the egoism which Nietzsche maintains to be inevitable and the only egoism justifiable. It is not an egoism based on pleasure or happiness, but on quality of life. It is not an egoism which asks how much it can draw to itself for its own enjoyment, but one which has regard to the future by preserving what has been attained in the past and by increasing that amount by an individual contribution. For Nietzsche, life means hardship, danger, struggling; it is a sign of a superman that he will run risk, face danger, love adventure, and Nietzsche sneers at the philosophies of pleasure, happiness, comfort, security.²

The basis of Nietzsche's egoism is the simple fact that a certain quality or type of life must always be lived by an individual. It is not lived by some entity called society or the state. But this

¹ *Will to Power*, 361, 404, 866, 881, 901, 936, 319.

² *Ibid.*, 957, 784, 785. *Götzen-Dämmerung*, "Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässe," 33. *Beyond Good and Evil*, 228, 265. *Zarathustra*, "Von alten und neuen Tafeln 5."

egoism is completely subservient to the recognition that an individual holds that type of life in trusteeship and that he cannot be justified in squandering that life. Here lies man's responsibility, but in Nietzsche's view, it is a self-responsibility.

Nietzsche's ethical teaching seems at first sight to destroy all sense of responsibility; he attacks the conception of responsibility. But he does this because he understands responsibility to have reference to conscience, a divine law, an alien authority, reward and punishment, a universal law. All these he denies, and with their denial responsibility disappears. He simply substitutes, however, a new conception of responsibility, which he most frequently terms "*Redlichkeit*." The essence of this responsibility lies in the unique character and creative power of individuality. Every individuality is unique, it focusses the world from a certain position, and it is the individual's life-work to develop his individuality so as to reveal its uniqueness. This is accomplished in the formulation of a law which is the interpretation of his incomparable nature. It is a law which he creates for himself, which he evolves out of the depths of his individuality, in which he comes to know himself.¹

This is Nietzsche's view of autonomy. The higher types are self-legislators. This autonomy, however, is not that of Kant. The latter is for Nietzsche simply a form of heteronomy, it is submission to a universal law, a law which holds for all men. A law, in Nietzsche's sense, holds simply for the individual himself. It merely symbolizes what he demands of himself, what he is capable of doing, and what he can allow himself. The rights which a man receives stand in proportion to the duties which he assumes, and to the problems for which he feels himself mature. This autonomy and the freedom accompanying it are things to be attained and maintained through constant effort; and the amount of effort required is a test of the degree and worth of the freedom.²

In this idea of autonomy and creation lie the grounds of Nietzsche's atheism. A creator, and one who knows his creative

¹ *Zarathustra*, "Von der schenkenden Tugend." "*Vom höheren Menschen*, 8." "*Vom Wege des Schaffenden*." *Beyond Good and Evil*, 227. 6. *Will to Power*, 409, 767, 926, 876.

² *Will to Power*, 871, 872, 770. *Zarathustra*, "*Vom Baum am Berge*."

power, must necessarily be atheistic. Creation is impossible and can have no meaning if there is a deity or a moral ruler of the universe. Nietzsche so interprets morality as if it were indissolubly bound up with a belief in a 'beyond' and a faith in a sanctioning deity, in reward and punishment. The Nietzschean autonomy and the prevailing morality become in consequence mutually incompatible and exclusive.¹

In this same idea of creation or organization lies the metaphysical root of Nietzsche's optimism. The world is a creation of the individual, the values it possesses are put into it by ourselves. Things are pleasant or painful because we have first put values upon them. It is, therefore, meaningless to ask what is the worth of the world or of life. It is only the weak man who finds no worth in the world; the world reflects only his own condition; the world becomes just what one can make it. The strong man, in whom life glows in its most positive form, transfigures the world, finds himself in it.²

Such an optimism is not that which sees in the increasing sacrifice of all, in the growing expense of all, the surest way to the benefit of all. This for Nietzsche is really a loss to everyone. His optimism lies in the conception of organization and how much it can accomplish. It is that which arises when man feels himself free to shape his life, when he knows that the power of moulding it lies within himself, when he finds that there is no need to stand in fear even of the most dread fatalities.³

III.

There remains the third part of our task, to consider the main features which Nietzsche's philosophy presents—a philosophy which claims to have rediscovered the path to a bold affirmation of life after centuries of error and confusion.⁴

Nietzsche stands under two very direct and immediate influences. These are Schopenhauer on the one side, and biology on the other. His theory is a reaction against Schopenhauer,

¹ *Will to Power*, 253. *Beyond Good and Evil*, 53. *Genealogie der Moral*, II, 2. *Zarathustra*, "Von der schenkenden Tugend." "Auf den glückseligen Inseln."

² *Will to Power*, 260, 675.

³ *Ibid.*, 866.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 54.

induced by the effect which biological ideas have upon him; and the solution which he gives to his problem is a combination of Schopenhauer and biology.

The influence of Schopenhauer is seen in Nietzsche's doctrines of the body, of the Will to Power, of force, of the unconscious. The blind, unconscious striving and groping; the presence of will everywhere, even in the inorganic world; the self-contained world, the life and movement of which is a process in which it consumes itself; the body as being something objective, the immediately and best known: these are fundamental positions in Nietzsche and they are all Schopenhauerian ideas.¹

The influence of biology is seen in Nietzsche's dominating conception of organization. In this conception are united the ideas borrowed from Schopenhauer and from biology. The principle of life, the organizing power which the body possesses and which is seen in the repair of loss and wastage, is identified with Will, with the blind unconscious groping and striving.

The outcome of the union of these two influences is a theory which is opposed to certain doctrines both of Schopenhauer and of biology. To both of these belongs the doctrine of the Will to Live or of the struggle for existence; and Nietzsche opposes it. The expression 'will to live' is for Nietzsche absurd, since will and life are for him identical. He opposes it, too, on the ground that it over-emphasizes the part played by the environment by assuming an inadequate supply of the means of subsistence. This latter condition cannot be granted to be always the case. Competition exists between individuals even when the means of subsistence are sufficient for all.²

In laying stress upon the inner organizing power, Nietzsche comes into conflict with the theory of natural selection, which has always tended to explain the organic process too mechanically. This is a defect which scientists have recently sought to overcome by theories such as organic selection, or by theories which assign a more important rôle to mind.

¹ *The World as Will and Idea*, Bk. II, pp. 18, 20, 26, 27, 29.

² *Will to Power*, 647, 684. *Zarathustra*: "Von der Selbst-überwindung." *Beyond Good and Evil*, 13. *Genealogie der Moral*, II, 12. *Götzen-Dämmerung*, Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen, 14.

These points have to be remembered when it is said that Nietzsche's theory emphasizes the organic movement in all its fierceness and brutality. The organic movement for him is not a result of physical and external factors, but the principle within it is more akin to intellect, to mind: it is intellect or mind on a vaster scale than that which we directly know.

The significance of his Naturalism is not exhausted by the mere assertion that he attempted to transplant into morality the aggression, ruthlessness and cruelty which constitute the process of organic evolution. Such a statement does injustice to Nietzsche's theory. He does base his ethical teaching on biology, and it is on that account naturalistic. He finds in the sphere of biology the principle which he seeks to see operative also in morality; but that principle is not cruel, ruthless aggression. It is organization. Nietzsche sees the essence of evolution to be a concentration of forces in an individual, a striving to reach in the individual the highest possible quality and power of life. It is this tendency which Nietzsche lays hold of and endeavors to make more effective in human life. He sees in morality simply an effort to counteract this fundamental trait of evolution or of organic life, and the result for him is that everywhere there is a squandering of human resources through failure to organize the various forces of life to produce the fullest results. He wishes to see some positive accomplishment, embodied in a concrete living individual, as against the prevailing moral types who practise a merely negative virtue in such forms as charity and self-sacrifice.

These negative virtues are the outcome of human weakness, really for Nietzsche of disorganization, and lead to still further disorganization, in that such a morality, being binding for all, ultimately reduces all to be weaklings ministering to weaklings. Against this, Nietzsche calls for organization, so that the waste of resources may be fundamentally stopped; and with this achieved, the prevailing negative morality has the grounds of its existence removed.¹

Such a Naturalism is distinct from that of Rousseau. It is

¹ *Götzen-Dämmerung*, "Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen," 35, 36.

not a question of a 'return to Nature,' but 'an advance to Nature.' It is a naturalism which maintains that man at his highest embodies nature most perfectly, reveals in fullest degree the real tendency of nature. It is a naturalism which maintains that the perfect moral individual finds the roots of morality in the depths of his own individuality; that there is nothing higher than life itself; that it is meaningless to degrade life before lifeless phantoms, before its own creations. Morality hitherto has been unnatural, anti-natural, because it has ignored these facts and found a supernatural source for moral values. Nietzsche's naturalism opposes this supernaturalism and anti-naturalism. When we see a truly moral individual, then we see a successful embodiment of what nature strives to attain, we see a product of a long continued effort, training, and discipline, we see in concrete form the same principle as is everywhere operative throughout nature.¹

A second feature of Nietzsche's thought is its anti-intellectualism. It has a deep vein of scepticism. It is pragmatic in character. Practical value is the test as to the truth of knowledge. This characteristic in Nietzsche's philosophy is connected with his Heracleiteanism. Change is fundamental; everything is in continual flow. There are no fixed and imperishable truths. He expresses distrust in the ability of consciousness to lead us to the real inner nature of things. He consequently is opposed to almost every philosopher from the time of Socrates down to Schopenhauer. He is hostile to Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel. The intellectual movement he regards as originating with Socrates; and he holds it to have been the first step towards the disintegration of life. All intellectualism is disintegrating or disorganizing.²

Nietzsche regards the Pre-Socratics as being of a nobler type than those succeeding Socrates. His reason for doing so is that they still showed the play of impulse and instinct in its perfect natural unity or balance, as yet unbroken by any activity of

¹ *Götzen-Dämmerung*, "Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen," 48. *Will to Power*, 120.

² *Götzen-Dämmerung*, "Das Problem des Sokrates." "Die Vernunft in der Philosophie."

consciousness. Life flowed without friction; adjustments were easily and unconsciously or instinctively secured. What Nietzsche is here praising as the highest form of life is the dark, silent, unconscious movement of life. Though silent and dark, it is a movement yet rich, deep, and pregnant with result. It is on this ground that he makes use of philology in tracing the development of morality. The names of virtues were first coined under that type of life represented in a Pre-Socratic era, a 'natural' life (not in Rousseau's sense). These names have their significance in a reference to bodily health, vigor and vitality. Intellectualism has resulted in a distortion of the meaning of these names. Nietzsche wishes to restore their original significance. A new type of individual must be produced, to whom they may be applied in their new significance. This new type is mirrored in the 'natural man' of pre-reflective days, but is greater, richer. He traverses a longer path; he passes through the disintegrating influences of reflection and criticism; and comes out beyond them in a condition which gathers up all that has been attained, but which harmonizes it, reduces it to its natural unity and balance once more.¹

Nietzsche's so-called materialism must be considered in reference to his scepticism, to his view of consciousness, in order to be properly understood. Nietzsche's theory is often called materialistic because of his doctrine of force and the two consequent doctrines of the superman and the eternal cycle. He always speaks of force or power and degrees or quanta of force or power. On this ground is based the view that the superman is a brute exercising force and struggling ruthlessly to gain power. This ignores, however, the rôle which Nietzsche assigns to consciousness. Consciousness is always a mechanization of what is real; it can 'interpret' things only, and it does so quantitatively. What is real is qualitative; it is life in its concreteness. The 'force' which Nietzsche means is not mere physical force or energy as understood by science. That is an interpretation of the real. Nietzsche maintains we come nearer to the real in our experience of struggling, striving, desiring than we do through

¹ *Götzen-Dämmerung*, "Das Problem des Sokrates." "Was ich den Alten verdanke." "Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen." *Genealogie der Moral*, I.

the scientific concept of force or energy; and on this ground he ascribes an inner will to energy or force, thereby raising its status rather than lowering that of the will.¹

A certain degree of strength, force or power, is the conscious representation of a certain quality of life. Thus the process of evolution which is interpreted as a continual distribution and redistribution of force, a continual gain or loss in power or strength is really a physiological condition felt as varying in quality, now higher and now lower. The superman is the man who embodies a certain level or type of life. An analogous case may be cited to illustrate Nietzsche's meaning. Modern chemistry views the properties of the chemical elements as being somehow dependent on their atomic weights and varying as the latter vary. On this view it arranges the elements according to their atomic weights in a periodic system, which at the same time expresses a gradual variation in their qualities, and in which the elements with the highest atomic weight manifest the most wonderful and complex properties. Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal cycle is, similarly, a faint facsimile in consciousness of the real, endless, qualitative process which constitutes the inner nature of the world.

Among the pre-Nietzscheans with whom Nietzsche has affinity are Heracleitus and Leibnitz. He has affinity with Heracleitus because of their common acceptance of the principle of change as fundamental and because of the doctrines which each connects with this principle. Monism, evolution, synthesis and disintegration, conflict and opposition, purposelessness of the world-process, the finite and self-contained nature of the world, the life and movement of which is a process of self-consumption, the relativity of properties and of values to a being with definite sense-organs and definite capacities for the determination of values, an eternal repetition of the world-movement in cycles, the perishability and instability of everything: all these are ideas common both to Heracleitus and Nietzsche. They diverge, however, in their theory of knowledge. For Heracleitus the senses are untrustworthy, they give an impression of fixity in things

¹ *Will to Power*, 660, 619, 639, 564. *Genealogie der Moral*, I, 13.

which is fictitious. For Nietzsche the senses are trustworthy; it is we who put this character of fixity upon things. The element of scepticism in Heracleitus has its source in the nature of sense-experience; in Nietzsche it has its source in the nature of thought and reason.¹

Nietzsche approaches to the theory of Leibnitz at several points. His pluralism, his perspectivism, the part which the concept of force or energy plays, the essentially active nature of each real center or monad, the dynamic character of his theory, as well as its somewhat mathematical form, the unconscious life in each center, the important part assigned to the concept of the organic: these are points which are paralleled in Leibnitz. Both strive to formulate a theory of optimism. But Leibnitz is completely dominated by theological considerations and manifests an intellectual tendency; and these two facts render him in the spirit of his theory antagonistic to Nietzsche.

Among the philosophers since Nietzsche's time, there is one whose work will bear a very interesting comparison with that of Nietzsche. This is Professor Bergson. It may be said that their doctrines are closely similar. The main difference between them is that Professor Bergson is, at least hitherto, wholly metaphysical and has not attempted to work out an ethical theory, while Nietzsche is predominantly ethical and his metaphysics is of subordinate importance and less fully elaborated in consequence.

Nietzsche and Professor Bergson are both under the influence of modern biology and its results. They both make use of biological ideas to reach a solution of their main problem, and this problem is in both cases to establish freedom. Professor Bergson pursues a line of thought very closely allied to that of Nietzsche; and there appear in the former the main ideas which are found in the latter. These ideas are the practical, mechanizing character of consciousness; the distinction between a superficial ego or self and a deep-seated real ego; criticism of evolution as a process determined by environment; denial of teleology; accep-

¹ *Götzen-Dämmerung*, "Die Vernunft in der Philosophie," 2.

tance of the principle of organization and of creation; and the important rôle assigned to instinct.

For Professor Bergson, life is wider than intellect and intellect cannot grasp it entirely. Science adopts a mechanistic attitude; its knowledge is symbolic, and the deeper science attempts to penetrate into the nature of life, the more symbolic it becomes. It breaks up what is a real concrete living whole, and sets its parts side by side so as to appear mutually exclusive. Science finds its material to be real and positive; but it is truly only a system of negations. It is the absence of reality rather than the presence of reality. In the operations of the intellect there is a suppression of positive reality.¹

Professor Bergson maintains that the unity imposed by the understanding on nature is factitious. It is a type of unity which belongs purely to the intellect; it is of a mathematical, spatial, geometrical kind. Science seeks such a unity or order as this in nature, because it is the one which the intellect requires, which it can find and which will satisfy itself. This is simply a case of the mind's finding itself in Nature, discovering what it itself imposes upon nature. The things and objects of nature, as well as events, are more or less fictions satisfying the demands of the intellect.²

The intellect has its origin in practical necessity. Its rôle is to be an instrument to action, and to fulfill this rôle it fashions a world of concepts, an intelligible world. This world is purely symbolic. True reality is a perpetual growth; its unity is organic not mechanical. Things and states are only views taken by the mind of the process of Becoming; they are points in the continual flow of reality, comparable to the series of snapshots taken of a moving scene for cinematographic purposes. Intellect regards these points as immobilities, while they are really transitions.³

Professor Bergson's view here is exactly that of Nietzsche. It is, that intellect assumes its fictions to be real. It believes it finds these fictions in nature, while what is the true state of affairs

¹ *Creative Evolution* (translation by A. Mitchell,) pp. 206 ff., pp. 218 ff., pp. 169.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 207-210, 229, 261 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 47 ff., 55, 169-172, 288, 319-320.

is that intellect projects its fictions into nature without knowing it and in finding them again is finding only itself. And Professor Bergson, like Nietzsche, criticises ancient and modern philosophical systems from this standpoint. All these attempt to interpret reality on the basis of the cinematography of the intellect; they all rest on the assumption that the static entities of the intellectual world are adequate to express what is real; they are all intellectualistic in character.

In consequence of their view of the intellect, both these thinkers hold that its functions, its operations, are an inversion of the nature and tendencies of life. The former is a disorganization, the latter is organization. The former views everything quantitatively, the latter is purely qualitative. Intellect resolves the organized into the unorganized. Life, on the other hand, is a true continuity, a reciprocal penetration of states. It is more than a mere putting of parts together. Its nature is expressed by the terms organization or creation. It implies an inherent tendency to react upon the environment and to make it subservient to itself in the production of new forms, in the securing of growth, in the creation of organized instruments.¹

The real self as distinct from that superficial self understood by the intellect is organic in character. Its states are blended or fused. It is in this conception of a real, a deep-seated self, that Professor Bergson, like Nietzsche, finds a key to freedom. Freedom is established by showing the inapplicability of the conception of causality to this concrete self. Causality is a conception formulated on the basis of the procedure of the intellect. It rests upon the static, discrete entities with which intellect deals. Both Professor Bergson and Nietzsche refuse to accept 'motive' as a determining cause in the action of this real self. Freedom for both lies just in the creative nature of the self; the latter is the source of action; it is a self-moving center. Freedom is simply the expression of personality, of individuality

¹ *Creative Evolution*, pp. 61, 170 f., 235 f. *Time and Free Will* attempts to show how conscious states are purely qualitative but have been treated quantitatively by scientists and others.

which is not reducible to the quantitative terms employed by intellect.¹

In this conception of the self and of life as a spontaneous, unmotivated source of energy lies the opposition of Professor Bergson and Nietzsche to prevalent theories of evolution—such as the mechanical and the teleological. These are both rejected: the one because it over-emphasizes the part played by the environment as a cause in evolution, the other because evolution shows no coherent plan but a ceaseless birth and decay, a continual creation of new types which no sooner have appeared than they become things of the past. Evolution is an experiment in which there arise many results unforeseen. It involves much hazard, but at the same time much reward. The end which any action seems immediately to secure is but a very small part of what is involved in that action. It is bound up with a mass of other factors which in part may appear only in the course or at the conclusion of the action.²

The tendency of Professor Bergson and Nietzsche is sceptical and pragmatic. There is a distrust of intellect, and greater faith is reposed in instinct. Instinct stands within the real, intellect stands outside it as a spectator. The paths of Professor Bergson and Nietzsche diverge, however, in their endeavor to show the relation between intellect and instinct. For Professor Bergson, a higher faculty—intuition—must come into play and give the quintessence of intellect and instinct. Intuition reconciles both. For Nietzsche, intellect is but a secondary and temporary phenomenon; it is brought into exercise to satisfy some need of the moment; and on this being accomplished, it gives way once more to instinct. Instinct is the supreme type of life and intellect is but a means to the establishment of such a life. Professor Bergson attempts to show a way to a knowledge of reality, to give us a means of grasping the real; and in this way he modifies his scepticism. For Nietzsche, a knowledge of the real remains unattainable and unnecessary; we can pro-

¹ *Time and Free Will* (translation by F. L. Pogson), pp. 12 f., 128, 168-170, 231. *Creative Evolution*, pp. 1-12, 50, 262, *et passim*.

² *Creative Evolution*, pp. 104-110, 133-136, 49-50. *Time and Free Will*, pp. 168-170.

duce only a faint facsimile of reality but it is suitable and adequate for our needs. Nietzsche's scepticism remains unqualified. Professor Bergson would seem to give some independent value to the theoretical life itself, Nietzsche refuses to give any.¹

From the preceding general considerations of Nietzsche's theory, it is evident that there are many elements in it which are not wholly new. But, on the other hand, its pragmatism based on biological grounds, its conceptions of organization, creation, freedom, and its optimism and atheism based on these conceptions are all so woven together as to produce a theory which as a whole and in relation to the time of Nietzsche can only be characterized as new and distinctive. His anti-intellectualism and his insistence upon the supreme importance of healthy instinct, combined with his view of organization are elements which have a special significance in relation to the tendency of the German State in his time and later. It was entering upon a period of great organization and has carried this organization very fully out. It does not seem too much to say that Nietzsche is a reaction against this tendency. The organization of the German State is a purely intellectual structure with, according to Nietzsche's theory, numerous consequent defects. It has turned the structure, which ought to be a means, into an end and converted it into a mould to which life must conform. With its faith in intellect, it has despised the value of instinct and instinctive wisdom; it has set a check upon individuality; and, as in all cases of the conversion of means into ends, it has brought about a ruinous waste of the resources of life.²

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¹ *Creative Evolution*, pp. 186-188, 251. *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (translation by T. E. Hulme).

² See such passages as: *Götzen-Dämmerung*, "Was den Deutschen abgeht." *Götzen-Dämmerung*, "Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen," 16, 27. *Beyond Good and Evil*, 251. *Human, All-too-Human*, I, 442.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF BERKELEY'S ETHICAL THEORY.

THOUGH Berkeley wrote no systematic ethical treatise, it is clear from the *Commonplace Book* that he at one time intended to write in detail on morals. In the sanguine pages of the *Commonplace Book*, the "new principle" is destined to solve all problems and simplify all sciences. All previous thinkers had been "embrangled in words," and Berkeley regards it as his God-appointed task "to remove the mist and veil of words."¹ It was his hope that the exposition of the new principle would do this, and enable men to see things as they really are. Even in the *Principles* his claims for his new doctrine are as insistent as ever. His principles "abridge the labor of study and make human sciences more clear, compendious, and attainable than they were before."² After making this claim, he goes on to state some of the consequences in mathematics and natural philosophy. But as to the consequences in ethics only a few hints are given. "If the principle be applied to morals, errors of dangerous consequence to morality may be cleared, and truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent." "But," says Berkeley, "the difficulties arising on this head demand a more particular disquisition than suits with the design of this treatise."³ It is a sign that Berkeley regarded this as tantamount to a promise to deal specially with ethics that in the second edition of the *Principles*, published in 1734, when he had abandoned the project of this special dissertation, this sentence is omitted. Again, in the *Commonplace Book* he remarks that there are three kinds of truth—natural, mathematical, and moral.⁴ These three kinds of truth are to be found in the three departments of useful knowledge, natural philosophy, mathematics and ethics. He

¹ *Commonplace Book*, I, p. 33. All references are to the Oxford edition (1901) of the *Works*.

² *Principles*, I, p. 334.

³ *Ibid.*, I, p. 339.

⁴ *Commonplace Book*, I, p. 37.

intended to treat of all these in detail, but in no case was that intention carried out, though we know from the closing sections of the *Principles* the general lines on which he would have handled the problems of mathematics and physics. And we have several tracts dealing with these sciences, *e. g.*, *Arithmetica*, *Miscellanea Mathematica*, *De Motu*, *The Analyst*, and *A Defence of Free Thinking in Mathematics*. It was Berkeley's purpose to deal with ethics in Part II of the *Principles*. He set to work on this undertaking after Part I (what we know as the *Principles*) was completed, but never finished it. The unfinished manuscript was lost during his travels in Italy and he never attempted to re-write it.¹

But though accident has deprived us of this specifically ethical treatise, yet scattered up and down Berkeley's work there is a fair amount of writing on ethical subjects. It is enough not merely to enable us to reconstruct the main outlines of Berkeley's system, but also to trace the development of his views. The *Commonplace Book* teems with suggestive remarks, which probably give some idea of the argument of the lost Part II of the *Principles*. In addition, three of the dialogues in *Alciphron* are mainly ethical, and there is much valuable matter in *Passive Obedience*.

Berkeley's jottings in the *Commonplace Book* show that in ethics, as in other departments of philosophy, he was deeply influenced by Locke. Such isolated entries as "Morality may be demonstrated as mixt Mathematics," cannot be understood without reference to Locke. Most of Berkeley's memoranda in the *Commonplace Book* have Locke in view; and in order to appreciate their meaning it is necessary to have in mind Locke's theory of ethics.

Ethics, for Locke, is a perfectly demonstrable science, because

¹ In the *Commonplace Book* (I, p. 19) Berkeley speaks of "The two great principles of morality . . . to be handled at the beginning of the Second Book." There can be no doubt that "the Second Book" refers to the projected Part II of the *Principles*. In the *Commonplace Book* he frequently speaks of "the First Book" and comparison of the points mentioned with the *Principles* (Part I) shows that "the First Book" always means the *Principles* (Part I). In a letter to the American Samuel Johnson, Berkeley says that he had made considerable progress with the Second Part, but lost the manuscript during his journeys in Italy.

in ethics we have "real knowledge." He gives two examples of sciences in which we have this "real knowledge," (i) mathematics, (ii) ethics. Both these sciences consist of perfectly demonstrable propositions. Both are concerned, not with simple ideas, which always imply as their archetypes external things, but with complex ideas, which are their own archetypes. Both deal with those abstract ideas which Locke calls "mixed modes and relations." The mathematician considers the properties of the triangle as abstract ideas. The idea of a triangle is so framed as to make it possible that a 'real' concrete triangle should conform to it. But whether such a 'real' triangle exists is irrelevant to the mathematician. Similarly, in ethics we deal only with abstract ideas. Ethics is a purely abstract science. To the moral philosopher it is of no moment whether a concrete just act anywhere exists.¹ Mathematics and ethics are both demonstrated on the basis of certain definitions and axioms. Between moral ideas there are the same necessary relations as hold between mathematical ideas. "I doubt not but from self-evident propositions by necessary consequences as incontestable as those in mathematics the measures of right and wrong might be made out."²

Locke never altogether abandoned his belief in a mathematically demonstrated science of ethics,³ though he came to feel less and less able to demonstrate it himself. This is clear both from the changes which he introduced in the fourth edition of the *Essay*,⁴ and from his correspondence with Molyneux. Molyneux repeatedly requested him "to oblige the world with a treatise of morals . . . according to the mathematical method." Locke replied (September 20, 1692) expressing distrust in his own ability for the task; but promising to consider it. Nearly four years later he finally declined to undertake it.

It is thus not strange that Berkeley, already keenly interested in mathematics, should have felt that the mathematical demon-

¹ Cf. *Essay*, III, p. 12 and IV, iv, p. 8.

² *Ibid.*, IV, iii, 18. Cf. III, xi, 16, and IV, xii, 8.

³ The examples which Locke gives (IV, iii, 18) are justly said by Berkeley to be "trifling propositions." (*Commonplace Book*, I, p. 39).

⁴ Compare the fourth edition with the first at IV, ii, 9.

stration of ethics was a task ready-laid to his hand. Locke had given one hint of the precise way in which the mathematical method might be applied. For Locke, "Certainty is but the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, and demonstration nothing but the perception of such agreement by the intervention of other ideas or mediums."¹ Now in mathematics algebra had been of use in supplying these intermediate ideas, and Locke thinks that by applying a kind of algebra in ethics a demonstrably certain system will be produced. Berkeley was not slow to fasten on this hint. "N. B." he says in the *Commonplace Book*, "to consider well what Locke saith concerning Algebra—that it supplies intermediate ideas. Also to think of a method affording the same use in morals, etc., that this doth in mathematics."² Berkeley was keenly interested in algebra (cf. the many references in the *Commonplace Book*, and the article "De Ludo Algebraico" (1707) in *Miscellanea Mathematica*). Algebra is itself a department of pure mathematics, for algebra deals with signs abstracted from the things signified. But the algebra of ethics would be a branch of applied mathematics. Thus "Morality may be demonstrated as mixt Mathematics."³

Berkeley never worked out his algebra of ethics.⁴ But he

¹ *Essay*, IV, iv, 7.

² *Commonplace Book*, I, p. 40.

³ *Ibid.*, I, p. 46.

⁴ It is noteworthy that nearly every philosopher of the seventeenth century believed in a mathematical treatment of ethics. There is, of course, Spinoza's *Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata*. In the *Ethica* of Geulincx there are many suggestions of the applicability of mathematics to morals. And Leibniz also holds that it may be convenient to treat ethics by the geometrical method. (*Nouveaux Essais*, III, xi, 17 and IV, xii, 8). In England, as Professor Gibson has pointed out (*Mind*, 1896), Cumberland, in addition to Locke, held this view. It is also present in Hobbes. There are probably two main reasons for the prevalence of the view at the time:—(i) So long as Scholasticism held the field, the validity of ethical criteria rested ultimately on the authority of the Church. But with the coming of the Renaissance and the Reformation, the problem of the authority of the moral standard became a very real one. How was moral heterodoxy to be met? To this question there were two answers. Ethics must again become theological. Or ethics must become mathematical. These were the only alternatives. Therefore those who, for any reason, disliked the idea of a theological ethics, or considered it philosophically inadequate, were driven to attempt to demonstrate ethics mathematically. For the philosophers of the seventeenth century as a whole, science means nothing but mathematics and mathematical physics. When the seventeenth

said enough to show that his system would have diverged widely from Locke's. The difference between their systems of ethics would have been identical with that between their theories of mathematics. For Locke, geometry is a pure science, dealing only with relations of universal ideas, abstracted from all concrete experience. On the other hand Berkeley holds that geometry is essentially practical. The *Principles* cut away the speculative parts of mathematics, leaving only what is practical and useful.¹ Geometry deals throughout with concrete existence. In a precisely similar way Berkeley's theory of ethics differs from Locke's. Ethics is for Locke a pure science which omits all question of the realization of abstract ideas in the concrete matter-of-fact of moral experience. But Berkeley's view is very different. Ethics is an applied or practical science. It does not consider relations of ideas by means of intervening ideas.² Berkeley holds that ethics is a demonstrative science which, like mathematics, deals with words or signs and not with ideas. We can have no certainty about ideas, as Locke supposed.³ It is possible to reason about ideas, but demonstration can be only verbal.⁴ "To demonstrate morality it seems one need only make a dictionary of words, and see which included which."⁵ Words are signs and the reason why demonstration is possible and easy with regard to signs is that they are arbitrary. Hence the demonstrability of mathematics, which deals solely with signs.⁶ Further, Berkeley believed that Locke's abstract ideas do not exist either in mathematics or in ethics. An abstract idea of triangle is impossible. Equally impossible is an abstract idea of justice. On Berkeley's theory, we reason always about a particular, which stands for all other particulars of the same kind.

century attempts to treat ethics on the mathematical method, it is simply feeling after a scientific system of ethics. (ii) It was partly due to Descartes that mathematics came to be the science of the day, and Descartes' influence was largely responsible for the unanimity with which the seventeenth century endeavored to reach a mathematical system of ethics.

¹ *Principles*, I, p. 326; I, p. 331.

² *Commonplace Book*, I, p. 40; I, p. 43.

³ *Ibid.*, I, p. 43.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, p. 50.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I, p. 39. Cf. I, p. 37 and I, p. 55.

⁶ *Ibid.*, I, pp. 45-47.

We take this or that just act, ignore all irrelevant features, and make it stand for and represent all other just acts.

The only difficulty in the way of such a system of ethics which Berkeley mentions is the practical difficulty of reaching agreement with regard to its definitions. The definitions which mathematics employs are not questioned, because the learner comes to them with no preconceived ideas. He is willing to take them on trust. But in ethics it is otherwise. Men approach the subject with presuppositions of their own. They cling to these primitive convictions, and refuse to come to any agreement in the definition of terms.

One very real difficulty which Locke had mentioned is denied by Berkeley. Locke had pointed out that the complexity of moral ideas increases the difficulty of dealing with them by the mathematical method. But Berkeley sees nothing in this.¹ Yet if 'complexity' be extended to include the relations and context of moral ideas, Locke's point becomes a very real one. On Berkeley's theory, if we take a particular triangle it is possible to abstract what is irrelevant to its triangularity, and the particular may be taken to stand for all particulars of the same kind. And, as we have seen, Berkeley thinks the same thing may be done in ethics. But it is not thus possible to isolate a just act. If it be cut loose from its context, it may be no longer a just act. Its justice may consist precisely in the complex relations in which it stands to its environment. But though Berkeley was certainly not aware of this difficulty in the days of the *Commonplace Book*, it is clear from *Alciphron* that he appreciated it later. This may well have been one of the reasons why he abandoned the project of writing a mathematical science of ethics.

But probably another reason weighed with Berkeley. If ethics be a science demonstrable in the same way as mathematics, why has God allowed so much diversity of opinion with regard to its definitions and propositions? There is universal agreement that $2 + 2 = 4$. This agreement Berkeley attributes to God: God brings it about, arbitrarily but not capriciously,

¹ *Commonplace Book*, I, p. 51.

that all men should agree that $2 + 2 = 4$. But there is no similar agreement with regard to such a proposition as 'Polygamy is wrong.' Now why could not God have secured that all men should agree on moral matters? Locke, indeed, had suggested that God had laid down in the Gospels "so perfect a body of Ethics that reason may be excused from the enquiry."¹ But Berkeley saw that the ethical ideas of the Gospels were accepted by a portion only, and as he feared, by a diminishing portion, of mankind. If God had intended ethics to be as demonstrable a science as mathematics, he would have arranged that the definitions of ethics should be recognized by all men to be as eternal and immutable as those of mathematics. But God has not done this, therefore it cannot be his will that there should be a demonstrable science of ethics.

In Berkeley's works subsequent to the *Principles* no mention is made of a possible mathematical science of ethics. The writings of his middle and later periods, in so far as they are concerned with ethics, are largely controversial. Perhaps the most systematic account of his views is to be found in the *Discourse on Passive Obedience*, where he makes "some enquiry into the origin, nature and obligation of moral duties in general, and the criterions by which they may be known."² He takes it for granted that there are moral rules or laws of nature, which carry with them an eternal obligation. He holds that these natural principles of morality have three characteristics:—

(i) Natural principles of morality are also rational. In saying that moral rules are natural laws we interpret nature in the highest sense. The best moral principles are those which may be rationally deduced by the maturest reason. These natural-rational principles "grow from the most excellent and peculiar part of human nature."³ They are laws of nature, but they are also eternal rules of reason, because they necessarily result from the nature of things and may be demonstrated by the infallible deductions of reason.⁴

¹ Letter to Molyneux, March 30, 1696.

² II, p. 104.

³ *Alciphron*, II, p. 61.

⁴ *Passive Obedience*, IV, p. 108.

(ii) Natural-rational principles are also divine. This follows from the whole course of Berkeley's philosophy. Nature consists of divine symbols, and its general laws are simply the arbitrary but not capricious volitions of God. "Nature is nothing but a series of free actions, produced by the best and wisest agent."¹

(iii) Nature with its laws constitutes a system. "The Law of Nature is a system of such laws and precepts as that if they be all of them at all times in all places and by all men observed, they will necessarily promote the well-being of mankind."² Now moral rules are natural laws, and all the characteristics of natural laws belong to moral laws. Hence the same order and regularity which we perceive in the natural world exists also in the moral realm. But the moral and natural spheres are only partly coincident. The moral realm is necessarily natural, but the natural world is not necessarily moral. Vegetable existence possesses all the attributes of the natural, but we cannot predicate morality of it. But the moral world, as we find it existing among self-conscious beings, is a realm of ends, in which man living according to nature considers himself not as an isolated and independent individual, but as "a part of a whole, to the common good of which he ought to conspire."³

Tendency to promote or thwart happiness is the criterion of good and evil. It is a natural principle that we consider things in the light of happiness. Good is that which augments happiness, and evil that which impairs it. The *summum bonum* consists in happiness, and duty lies in the effort to attain the good and avoid the evil. It is the will of God that men should seek, not private pleasure merely, but the happiness of mankind as a whole. Berkeley draws a sharp distinction between pleasures of sense and pleasures of reason, but his view of the relative value of these undergoes a marked change between his earlier and his middle period. In the *Commonplace Book* (1705-1708), he does not recognize pleasures of reason at all. "Sensual

¹ *Op. cit.*, IV, p. 110.

² *Ibid.*, IV, p. 111.

³ *Alciphron*, II, p. 67.

pleasure is the *summum bonum*.”¹ In the *Essays in the Guardian* (1713), pleasures of reason and pleasures of sense are placed on the same level, so long as they are natural and not ‘fantastical.’ But in *Alciphron* (1732), pleasures of sense are degraded. The view that these constitute the *summum bonum* is strongly attacked. Sense-pleasure is natural only to brutes. Reason is the highest and most characteristic element in human nature, and rational pleasures are natural to man. It is interesting to note in Berkeley’s theory of knowledge a similar growing recognition of the importance of reason.

For Berkeley, as for all other British moralists, the problem of the relation of egoism and altruism is urgent. But in Berkeley’s ethical, as in his metaphysical philosophy, God solves many difficulties. This problem, among many others, would remain unresolved apart from God. Self-love remains the supreme principle in morality, but it is only at a low stage of moral development that self-love bids a man seek his own happiness only. Rational self-love seeks to regard the world *sub specie aeternitatis*. Self-love advocates only those kinds of actions that are supposed to be in accordance with the will of God. No purely selfish action can be conformable to the will of God. The Hobbist position of undiluted egoism is stated by Berkeley, but only to be refuted by the same arguments as Butler used.

The *summum bonum* cannot be mere temporal happiness. It cannot be confined within the conditions of time. It consists in eternal happiness. Now eternal happiness can be guaranteed only by God. Hence self-love lays down the rule that we act always in conformity with the will of God. The existence of God is required by morality as it is by knowledge. Berkeley’s general metaphysical position implies that apart from the existence of God to guarantee the regularity and invariability of our sense-impressions knowledge would be impossible. And so in ethics the supreme moral end would be impossible apart from God. But it is worth noting that Berkeley does not, as Kant does, attempt to base a practical proof of God’s existence on his indispensability for morality.

¹ *Commonplace Book*, I, p. 47.

The resemblance both in general and in detail between this theory and that of the other philosopher-bishop of the time is close and striking. Butler's moral philosophy is more systematically developed than Berkeley's; but almost every feature which has contributed to make Butler's work the greatest product of British ethical thought is present in Berkeley's scattered remarks. For Berkeley, as for Butler, reason is ultimately the basis of moral obligation, and the general happiness the *summum bonum*. For both, moral rules are also laws of nature, and action in accordance with nature leads to the attainment of the moral end. They take precisely the same view of nature, as a divinely organized system of ends. Both emphasize, in language strangely similar, the moral importance of the disposition to social life existing in mankind; and both are animated by the same principles of practical social idealism. Only in their view of the interrelation of the 'principles of human nature' do they diverge. Or, it would be truer to say that while Butler's chief originality lies in his moral psychology, Berkeley has almost entirely omitted to make any psychological analysis. But all in all, the similarities are so notable as to suggest the possibility that one was directly influenced by the other. But such a suspicion is really gratuitous. It is indeed just possible, so far as the dates of publication of their works are concerned, that each was indebted to the other. Butler's *Sermons* were first published in 1726. Berkeley's *Passive Obedience* appeared in 1712, and *Alciphron* in 1732. But there is no internal evidence whatever that *Passive Obedience* influenced the *Sermons*, or the *Sermons*, *Alciphron*. The resemblance may be quite sufficiently accounted for by the antipathy to Hobbes felt by both thinkers, and the similarity of the attitude adopted by them towards the tendencies of ethical thought represented on the one hand by the so-called Cambridge Platonists, and on the other hand by such men of the world as Mandeville and Shaftesbury. To Hobbism both Berkeley and Butler were fundamentally opposed, though Berkeley at least was influenced by the Hobbist doctrine that moral rules are natural laws. From the Cambridge Platonists both learned something—the immutability of moral principles

and the rational ground of moral obligation. Both regarded Mandeville's dicta as subversive of all morality. Towards Shaftesbury alone their attitudes diverged somewhat. Butler was more willing than Berkeley to admit that there was something in what Shaftesbury had to say. It is a serious misreading of Butler to class him, as many historians do, with the moral sense school; but at the same time, he is far more ready than Berkeley to learn from Shaftesbury. Berkeley's attitude to Shaftesbury, as we see it in *Alciphron*, is that of a man whose prejudices make him incapable of appreciating whatever truth may exist in the opinions of another with whom he does not see eye to eye.

When we consider the originality of Berkeley's metaphysics, it may seem strange that his writings on ethics make so small a contribution to that branch of philosophy. But it must be remembered that we have only fragments of Berkeley's thought on the problems of morality. What would we think of his metaphysics, if the *Principles* and the *Three Dialogues* had been lost? It may be argued that if Berkeley's ethical treatise had been preserved, it might have paved the way for as great an advance in ethics as his systematic works do in metaphysics. One thing at least may be said with certainty. It is clear from the scattered remarks which we do possess that Berkeley's ethical works would have shown the same two characteristics that assured his success in his metaphysical ventures. As Mr. Balfour has pointed out, two qualities are essential for the philosopher who is going to carry forward his science. He must have philosophical aptitude, and be mentally capable of speculation on the ultimate problems of life and knowledge. But in addition, he must possess the peculiar gift of being able to locate the exact point at which the next philosophical movement may best be made. It was for want of this special acumen that Clarke and Malebranche, in spite of their philosophical ability, were left in a philosophical backwater. But Berkeley had the faculty of noticing just where the next advance could be made. Hence his position in the main current of English philosophy.

It is clear that he did not at first perceive the point at which

the next forward step in ethics could be taken. The reason for this was that the main line of ethical thought did not pass through Locke. Berkeley's intuition was not at fault in believing that the main metaphysical advance lay through Locke; and he was enabled to do his own good work by putting his finger unerringly on the spot from which that advance might best begin. His initial mistake in ethics lay in thinking that progress might be made in that branch of philosophy also by observing and correcting Locke's suggestions towards a mathematical treatment of ethics. But Berkeley soon perceived that the path marked out by Locke led into a *cul-de-sac*; and he therefore abandoned the attempt to construct a mathematical system of ethics. In his later ethical work he makes suggestions which do place him right in the center of the line of ethical advance in England. That line led through Hume to Utilitarianism. Berkeley believes, as we have seen, that the *summum bonum* is not private pleasure but the happiness and general good of all. And he draws a sharp distinction between different kinds of pleasure. So far as we can tell from Berkeley's scattered remarks, he did not appreciate the problems which Utilitarianism has to face. As it is, it is an anachronism to call him, as Professor Campbell Fraser does, a theological Utilitarian. But he was moving in that direction, and if he had given to the question the thought necessary to produce a systematic work, he might have been the first Utilitarian.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy. By BERTRAND RUSSELL. The Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago and London, 1914.—pp. 245.

This book consists of lectures delivered as Lowell Lectures in Boston, in March and April, 1914. It is so attractive in itself, and its author is so well-known, that I think by this time it may be 'taken as read,' and I may offer some discussion without a preliminary abstract.

I have already said something of the book in my Address to the Aristotelian Society of London (November, 1914). I there suggested that a great part of the author's hostility to the classical philosophy was due to a confusion between bias by private wishes and attention to the problem of values, which, in connection with the enquiry into ultimate reality, I take to be the central problem of philosophy. Now I should like to approach the argument of the book more positively, and endeavor to ascertain what in Mr. Russell's own view the scientific method in philosophy, the method of logical analysis, characteristically is and does, and to form some estimate of its special contribution to knowledge.

The type of philosophy which Mr. Russell wishes to introduce is called 'logical atomism' (p. 4). It deals only with the logical form of facts (p. 185), and has a close affinity with mathematics, in that both alike must ignore any quality by which our actual world is distinguished from other possible worlds. But there is also a considerable difference; for while mathematics seeks to build up more and more complex results by deductive synthesis, philosophy proceeds towards the simplest statements of abstract form that can be obtained by logical analysis. In dealing, *e. g.*, with numbers, philosophy seems by analysis to go behind the facts, from which mathematics deduces more and more complicated theorems (p. 186).

I am not quite sure how far the logical-analytic method, rendered possible by the new or mathematical logic, is for Mr. Russell the sole method of philosophy. On p. 242 reference is made to a synthetic stage which follows on the analysis. But this stage, I gather, is not of primary importance in the argument of the present work.

It is emphatically claimed for the new logic in its logical-analytic application that it both permits and suggests a wealth of new hypothe-

ses (pp. 58-9); while the older logic in its philosophical application proceeds by condemnation of alternatives presented *prima facie*, and therefore is constructive only by negation (p. 8). "The old Logic put thought in fetters, while the new Logic gives it wings" (p. 59). I will return to this point.

Thus the logical-analytic method may be said always to go behind the facts as apparently given. The conception forms an antithesis, interesting at least to me, with my own conviction that truth and reality are always 'on ahead,'¹ i. e., in an object which knowledge at every stage is striving to indicate, but fails to specify completely. It is natural that I should look for a rationale of the contrast.

The sense in which the logical-analytic method, in the service of philosophy, goes behind the presented facts, is illustrated, I take it, by the cardinal theory of number, which I know mainly in the form which Mr. Russell himself has given it. The essence of the treatment is, I presume, to go behind the question, "What gives its meaning to any ordinal number?" viz., its relations with other ordinal numbers, and to ask what seems the prior and larger question, "What is meant by number or plurality as such?" And the answer is given by a definition of what it is to be a number, which *prima facie* at any rate avoids the correlation of it with any place in an ordinal series. Number as such, in a word, is that in which equal groups are equal, and it may be described by help of a one-to-one relation between the units of different but "similar" groups. Number is the "class" (to avoid assuming a common *property*) of the groups whose units bear such a relation to one another without remainder on either side.

The question has been raised² whether in this explanation the normal meaning of the unit, involving plurality, has not been "artificially described by circumlocution" rather than independently defined. However this may be, the point aimed at, as I judge, is to get a definition of number or plurality without including all that we associate with the building up of the ordinal system by relations between its places, in a word, by enumeration. And so far, presuming the definition to work, its characteristic of omission is obviously a merit. It is a 'reduction' of the facts to the simplest conceivable terms. The words "to reduce" often occur in the application of the method (pp. 78, 79).

The logical circumlocution employed to express the number of a class (p. 207)³ illustrates this method of reduction.

¹ See my *Logic*, II, p. 1301.

² Cassirer, "*Substanzbegriff u. Funktionsbegriff*," pp. 65-6.

³ Cf. Cassirer, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

It is needless for me to restate to Mr. Russell's readers the analogous¹ application of the method to the facts of the external world, making sense-data amenable to mathematical treatment (p. 122) or reducing our commonsense beliefs to a form in which nothing is assumed but "sensible objects" as given to an individual percipient (p. 78). The way in which classes of sensible objects and events are employed to serve as points and instants seems extraordinarily ingenious, and is, I suppose, successful for its purpose. The same remark applies to the mathematical theory of continuity and infinity.

Now what is the source of the peculiar character of the logical-analytic method? Why does it go towards the abstract and the barest form, instead of going, like previous philosophy, to the concrete and the content? The main reason will appear, I believe, if we look for a moment at the author's account of his data.² In mere principle—for it would be impossible here to pursue the argument at the length required—I take the rationale to be this.

Among many data which may be further reducible it is held that some irreducible data, such, that is, as are primitive psychologically as well as logically, have been discovered. The critical doubt, however complete, begins at a point beyond these. The consequence is that the construction of a world takes the form of reducing the reducible data to terms of the irreducible data, on which the whole fabric must ultimately rest. In getting at the irreducible data themselves no principle has been appealed to, unless psychological primitiveness were a principle, and therefore when it is desired to connect them with the whole of the experienced world there is no continuous method forthcoming which can lead up to constructions at once real and new. The only course open, therefore, is to turn analytical criticism upon the apparent, but apparently reducible facts, and to contrive reductions and circumlocutions by which they may be brought into terms of the irreducible data.

The irreducible datum for Mr. Russell is the 'sensible object'; not what we call, *e. g.*, the perceptible table—a relatively permanent object of perception to several percipients at once—but the *sensum*³ given to a single sentient in the particular momentary sensation (pp. 78-9). I take it the better opinion today is that such a *sensum*

¹ Cf. Mr. Broad's notice in *The International Journal of Ethics* for January, 1915.

² In noticing in *Mind* Mr. Russell's *Problems of Philosophy*, I wrote: "Must not a scheme of realism which leaves standing such poor fragments of our things and truths, and those so arbitrarily selected, go the way which Locke's has gone?" I think that the treatment of data in the present volume justifies my prophecy.

³ Professor Alexander's word.

is more than is given to sense, and less than is perceived as an object, so that it is not strictly a datum at all.¹ At any rate, *qua* self evident, such data yield no propositions; in so far as they yield propositions they at once become questionable. Mr. Russell's distinction between acquaintance and description (p. 144) holds good so far as this at least. These matters are so obvious that to accuse the traditional philosophy of 'maliciousness' towards sense and common sense (pp. 45-6) for insisting on them is really unreasonable. The point is perfectly simple, and Mr. Russell himself often asserts it, as in the reason he assigns why sense can not be illusory (p. 85). Its weakness is not that it tells you wrongly, but that it tells you, by itself, so little. This is why his account of verification (p. 81) seems so inadequate compared, *e. g.*, with Nettleship's.² It is a part of the reducing method.

If the critical doubt were more radical, it would be less insuperable. Take the case of the mind of others. It is not true that you have your own mind as an absolute datum, with the problem of leaping from that to the minds of others. The case is that you have to go by inference to your own mind past and future; and it is only another similar step to the analogous being of similar minds in others. When you have once turned your back on universal scepticism, as Mr. Russell agrees that you must, you have to test and reconstruct every datum of your world, and not some only. Mr. Russell's general description of the process (pp. 66-67) seems to me unimpeachable: "We are sceptical as regards every detail but not sceptical as regards the whole." The criticism of details is based only upon their relation to other details, not upon some external criterion.

In other words, the whole is the criterion. We are at first in possession of it most imperfectly; but in proportion as we approach to a critical re-statement of all the details we get nearer to the whole, and with it, to the explicit formulation of what we rightly believe in from the beginning. No one, I should have said, seriously holds that the evidence of his own senses is more certain than the law of gravitation, and I am not perfectly sure that Mr. Russell means to say that it is so (p. 67). The very word 'evidence' (of the senses) to which he appeals is a proof that we do not recognize sense-data as yielding self-evident fact, but only as on the level of testimony. 'Evidence' here does not mean 'Evidenz' (self-evidence), but the sort of thing that a witness offers in court.

The principles of criticism above stated would overthrow the whole estimate of degrees of certainty on which the theory before us relies,

¹ Cf. Scheler, Husserl's *Jahrbuch*, p. 454.

² *Remains*, Vol. I, p. 185.

and would substitute for it one more conformable to the practice of science and commonsense. The difference between the logical-analytic procedure and that which sees reality always 'on ahead' is due to the eclectic treatment of data by the former. The hunt for the psychologically primitive is the root of the evil.

Now I am brought to a consideration which Mr. Russell may repudiate, but which is welcome to me. In all philosophy, the meeting of extremes is very instructive, and it is my own conviction that modern thought is rapidly reaching a stage at which its underlying unity will be apparent as deeper than its differences. And I have been struck by the points of agreement, in great things and in small, between the ideas of the new philosophy and those in which I am interested.

First of all, I will venture the assertion that Mr. Russell's ideally constructed universe, lying entirely in the meanings of 'sensible objects,' might by a very slight change of emphasis be considered as an 'intentional' world, such as that of Husserl. Mr. Russell's world, of course, is not mental. But I suspect that no one thinks the world 'mental' in his sense of the term, *i. e.*, as states of private minds.

Passing to detail, I have said that the sketch of method on pp. 66-7, seems to me fundamentally just.

The opening up of fresh possibilities by logic in the logical-analytic method (see p. 3 above) is due, I think, to the 'reduction,' which moves in the sphere of relative possibilities, *i. e.*, possibilities which depend on incomplete determination, as when we give a meaning to a proposition about a round square. Such possibilities must always have an element of arbitrariness, of refusal to think things out. And though I do not believe that any logic can justify possibilities which have no roots at all in positive knowledge (contrast Russell, p. 10), I agree that an open attitude to alternatives and a ready suggestion of them is a desideratum in philosophy. And these appear to me to be offered by the progressive determinations of a concrete logic more liberally than by the regression of an analytic method. For at every step in the progressive construction alternatives are involved which could not be suggested at a lower level, and therefore the field of new suggestion and relative possibility widens as the positive construction advances. For instance, Mr. Bradley's attitude to the world of imagination and of dreams¹ furnishes more suggestive outlooks. It seems to me, than that of Mr. Russell (p. 95), although, and this is my principal point, the two have a great deal in common, the underlying

¹ *Essays*, pp. 46 ff, 460 ff.

test of reality being in effect the same for both. Again, there is a coincidence in their language with regard to ideal elements in nature, which become actual on being perceived;¹ and if one is reminded that at least their conception of ultimate Reality is divergent, one is yet not completely certain that Mr. Russell has in no sense an Absolute (pp. 166-7). Subject to the same reservation, the problem of 'one all-embracing space' and 'time' seems wider open to Mr. Bradley than to Mr. Russell.² And Mr. Russell's rejection, as I understand it, of dogmatic atomism and permanent individual substances³ is altogether in the spirit of one who has learned from Hegel.

The common point in all this is the denial that any particular element in the world can claim a special stability and preëminence because of its private existence, apart from its connection with other elements and their reciprocal demands on each other. Regressive, or progressive, our methods, it appears to me, are at one in this. Mr. Russell reconstructs physics out of our *sensa*; we reconstruct the whole out of all the details.

Further, I have almost a personal interest in Mr. Russell's theory of perspectives (pp. 87, 111) each of which includes a single aspect of things which are completed by their aspects in other "perspectives." It has really a certain kinship to a simile I have used myself to express my view of the external world.⁴ Of course Mr. Russell's perspectives are not, like mine, necessarily appearance to a percipient, and his suggestion is much more precise and meets more difficulties. For me, again, the thing, or group of aspects, is as real as its aspects, while for Mr. Russell it is merely a logical construction. Still, I venture to think our suggestions are analogous. But is not the thing, made up of aspects, an Identity in difference, dangerous to the argument of pp. 150-1, and of p. 39 note?

The relation of the mathematical infinite to philosophy (I recognize the remarkable interest of the quotation from Galileo) appears to me to admit of a *modus vivendi* on the line I have taken, which is here not very different from Mr. Russell's own (p. 180).

Philosophy has its own criterion of reality and value, that suggested by Mr. Russell, as I noted above, on pp. 66-7. It is by this that for philosophical purposes the mathematical infinite itself and all the hypothetical elements employed in this theory of continuity must be estimated with a view to ultimate reality and value. And I think

¹ Russell, p. 112. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 277.

² Russell, pp. 103-4. Bradley, *Appearance*, p. 286.

³ Pp. 105 ff.

⁴ *Essentials of Logic*, pp. 14 ff.

Mr. Russell is right in maintaining that the mathematical infinite is in no way identical with this philosophical criterion, which for philosophical purposes must always be the only criterion that matters, having sometimes been called the true infinity, but being simply and solely the character of reality or individuality. If we are asked how we get it, we get it as Mr. Russell would get it if he pursued his own suggestion. We must doubt every detail, and we cannot doubt the whole. Thus our process is that described on p. 67, only that the criticism in the light of the whole is extended to all the data. And before this criticism every detail, space and time included, shows signs of self-contradiction. If space and time are contradictory before the test of individuality or wholeness, that is for philosophy final. You may make a smooth world of them in mathematics, but that touches no philosophical point.

The general account of causation is in the main, I think, what any modern student would give. But I do not believe it can be justified by turning Mill's fallacy of simple enumeration into an *a priori* principle (p. 222).

On the problem of freewill and fore-knowledge I am in the main with Mr. Russell. But it seems to me that the relation of events to events in the case of a creature in which thought can modify motive should be distinguished from that in unconscious nature.

And here is a point that had always interested me. Is there not a contradiction in terms in the idea of absolute foreknowledge in the case of a creature whose desires can be modified by knowledge? Mr. Russell sets us on this line of thought himself, by suggesting that such fore-knowledge would actually be a good, which surely implies that it could affect the future. "A foreseen volition will have to be one which does not become odious by being foreseen" (p. 235).

My difficulty is this. With creatures morally imperfect, and also liable to have their desires modified by thought, it seems to me certain that foreknowledge of an act of their own (especially, in practice, foreknowledge long previous to the date at which desires leading up to it have begun to organize themselves) must modify the whole course of subsequent desire. In principle, I believe this must happen for *every* future action, for reflection on our known conduct always gives rise to ideals of different conduct. But, practically, at least a great part of our conduct, *ex hyp.* absolutely foreknown, would become odious to us, and we should be in the hell described by the words ἐχθίστη δὲ ὁδὴν πολλὰ φρονέοντα μηδενὸς κρατεῖν (Herod., 9, 16).

For surely it would be a flat contradiction to suppose that fore-

knowledge, *ex hyp.* absolute, could include in its vision a modification of future conduct, to be produced by itself. But otherwise, in case of an evil future, the foreknowledge must be false, or the creature must be in hell.

This is why, surely, in stories of oracle and destiny, we find that destiny becoming foreknown or foreseen takes mortal arms of force or guile, to prevent itself being averted by such foresight. So the dream came to Artabanus in Herodotus¹ and told him "he should suffer if he went on trying to avert what had to be," and threatened to burn out his eyes. It may be replied, "Causation is not compulsion." "Precisely," I rejoin, "but does not the hypothesis make it so? According to it, fore-warned is *not* fore-armed."

Then how meet Mr. Russell's point that "ignorance cannot be the essential condition of any good thing" (p. 235)? Why, thus, perhaps. It may be an imperfection inseparable from other imperfections which are inseparable from us. Mr. Russell's remark previously cited points in that direction. A creature with perfect foreknowledge would need a perfect will.

I hardly know whether I should mention that Mr. Russell seems to me to go a little beyond the line in the imputation of motives—such as the desire to obtain agreeable results and the system maker's vanity (pp. 237–8) and, in general, in his unfavorable moral comparison of the philosopher of the older type with the man of science. I stand just now for the principle that belligerents are not good moral analysts of each other, and I should apply it in this case also. And on "agreeable results" I will make one remark. Is it not a commonplace error which ascribes as a fact results of this kind to the great thinkers of the past and recent times? Take Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Hegel, and end up with Green or Mr. Bradley. Practically, as to the hopes and fears of human life, they all say the same thing. And is what they say acceptable to any mind which has not been trained, either in their school or in the school of life, to the extreme of renunciation and austerity? Does it differ in any way, which the man in the street would welcome, from what Mr. Russell says himself? I believe all this about private wishes and agreeable results to be a careless mythology, sprung from misinterpreting the language of great men down to a commonplace level.

For there are in Mr. Russell, I think, two men, as perhaps in all of us. There seems to be the common philosophizing man of science of the enlightenment, who believes metaphysics—or say, to be clear,

¹ VII, p. 17.

Platonic or Hegelian metaphysics—to be a tissue of superstitions founded on verbal fallacies. And there is, I believe, a man with a touch of philosophical genius, who divines and pursues much more than he has as yet embodied in his explicit thought. I do not mean that there is a man of genius in all of us!

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

Université de Louvain. Annales de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie.

Directeur: S. DEPLOIGE. Secrétaire de la Rédaction: L. NOËL.

Tome III, Année 1914. Louvain, Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1, Rue des Flamands. Paris, Librairie Félix Alcan.—pp. 628.

The present publication has a unique and tragic interest as the last issue of the philosophical transactions of the Institut Supérieur before the disaster which turned the eyes and the hearts of the civilized world with horror and pity to the ill-starred University of Louvain. The sense of tragedy is not diminished by reading these *Annales*, producing as they do the impression of peaceful preoccupation with the labors of scholarship and thought at the very moment when the blow was falling. Of late years the publications of the university have been a feature in the comity of European scholarship, and while in times like these the interruption of such labors is the least of all the calamities to which the world is subject, it is impossible to contemplate the broken record without feeling that it typifies in a striking way the incalculable loss in spiritual values which the war has brought upon mankind.

The volume before us contains ten contributions, of very unequal length and importance. Among these the first article, by M. Defourny, entitled *Aristote. Théorie économique et politique sociale*, claims particular attention. In this essay, which runs to about 130 pages, the writer attempts with skill and erudition to render Aristotle's theory of society intelligible and self-consistent by interpreting it in the light of history. It has been the custom of commentators to see in Aristotle's political writing a tissue of contradictions. To Oncken, for example (*Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles*), it appeared that his advocacy of a state monopoly ran directly counter to his rejection of commerce, and that the prohibition of interest on capital was inconsistent with the law of slavery, on which the wealth of antiquity depended; while the reasoned justification of slavery has naturally provoked very general adverse comment, on formal as well as material grounds. Such criticisms, according to M. Defourny, are largely the product of a failure to realize that Aristotle's political

thinking must be understood in the closest connection with the conditions prevalent in his day. "Aristotle is the philosopher of experience"; and his only fault is to have erected into universal principles what were only historical necessities (p. 35). The development of the historical background, therefore, is all-important and occupies the central portion of M. Defourny's article.

A striking result is the way in which this method, while furnishing a key to the solution of individual problems, at the same time brings these problems into direct logical relation, so that one conclusion follows inevitably from another. Thus it is easy to see how Aristotle's condemnation of interest is a corollary to his view of Chrematistic or the illegitimate pursuit of profit. In fact usury furnishes the extreme instance of the latter. The merchant masks the inequality of the sums exchanged by interposing the commodity between them: the money-lender dispenses even with this much of imposition. His method is Chrematistic at its worst. In the same way a state monopoly (and it must be observed that Aristotle does not favor private monopoly), so far from contradicting the condemnation of commerce, is the "complement and necessary corrective" to the latter position (p. 23).

Beginning with a careful statement of the distinction between *οικονομική* and *χρηματιστική* in the ultimate sense which Aristotle attaches to these terms¹—the second denoting the art of acquiring money, the first the art of securing for man the utilities of life—M. Defourny proceeds to exculpate Aristotle from the charge of inconsistency in condemning commerce which has profit for its end, while justifying the direct exchange of products. *Διπλῆς δ' οὐσης αὐτῆς (χρηματιστικῆς), ὥσπερ εἶπομεν, καὶ τῆς μὲν καπηλικῆς τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς, καὶ ταύτης μὲν ἀναγκαίης καὶ ἐπαινουμένης, τῆς δὲ μεταβολικῆς ψεγομένης δικαίως.* The point is that in the one case (that of commerce, *καπηλική*) money is exchanged for money through the medium of a commodity, while in the other commodities are exchanged for each other through the instrumentality of money. It may be remarked that Aristotle's terminology seems hardly consistent. If the antithesis of *οικονομική* and *χρηματιστική* is to be taken strictly, it is somewhat surprising

¹ M. Defourny makes Aristotle in his preliminary statement subsume *χρηματιστική* under *οικονομική*. This is perhaps to put the matter a little too decidedly. Aristotle is really referring to a current view or linguistic usage, which he introduces tentatively, in contrast to the decisive language which he uses of the preceding divisions of the subject. *ἔστωσαν δὲ αὐταὶ τρεῖς ὥς εἶπομεν. ἔστι δὲ τι [μέρος] ὃ δοκεῖ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι οἰκονομία, τοῖς δὲ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτῆς· ὅπως δ' ἔχει θεωρητέον. λέγω δὲ περὶ τῆς καλουμένης χρηματιστικῆς.* *Pol.* 1253 b 11-14.

to find the former included under the latter, and all the more so in view of the preliminary reference to the current view that just reverses the relation. The material difficulty, however, is that of really sustaining the distinction between commerce and legitimate trade. M. Defourny again solves the problem by means of his historical criterion. The geographical scale of modern commerce has rendered the Aristotelian distinction nugatory. Commerce to-day is a necessary device for bringing consumer and producer together, and from this point of view is merely a means of facilitating the exchange of products. But in the narrow world of classical Greece, where producer and consumer were neighbors, the middleman was a superfluity, and the system of direct sale (*i. e.*, personal traffic between producer and consumer) "infinitely preferable" (p. 15). Obviously this view presupposes a minimal estimate of intra-state commerce; and accordingly we find the writer, unfortunately without much show of data, controverting Meyer's comparison of the commercial status quo of Greece in the third century B. C. with that of seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe (pp. 65-66), and concluding that direct exchange was out of all proportion to commerce (p. 67). Doubtless his real grounds are to be found in what he says (pp. 60-61) as to the relatively undeveloped state of industry, and above all in the fact that where the city (*i. e.*, the urban community itself along with its agricultural annexe) is still the economic unit, the state is, comparatively speaking, self supporting, and no very extended system of international commerce is called for (p. 66).

These considerations in the end point to the actual conditions of political and economic development in and up to Aristotle's day. Rejecting the view rendered fashionable since 1854 by a group of writers which included Mommsen, Viollet, Karl Lamprecht and Emile de Laveleye, that among all primitive peoples arable land is held and worked in common, M. Defourny takes as his *point d'appui* the opposite theory broached by Fustel de Coulanges with regard to Greece and Rome, and definitely established by Guiraud (*La propriété foudrière en Grèce*). Thus the institution of private property is the background against which Aristotle's political (and, following it (p. 108), his *economic*) thinking must be projected. Private property however must be understood as originally vested not in the individual but in the family (p. 47). "Autorité patriarcale, propriété familiale et propriété indivise, économie domestique fermée: voilà les traits essentiels de l'organisation sociale dans la Grèce primitive" (p. 48). The state is the product of the union, from one cause or another, of

family groups—a historical view which Aristotle supports. (The importance of this for his ethico-political views on the family in relation to the state will be at once apparent.) The transformation of undivided property—mines, forests, pasture lands—into communal property follows and perhaps contributes to the causes that call for a definite political organization. Further rupture of the patriarchal system is due to the necessity for a division of industry, and issues in a machinery of exchange and the institution of the temporary labor association (*χρήσεως ἕνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου*), *e. g.*, for the diversion of a stream, the chase, or fishing expeditions at a distance. To the same causes is to be traced the origin of slavery, which results from the necessity of restoring the natural balance between the growth of wants and the increase of wealth, which had been disturbed by the dissolution of the patriarchal system.

Such are the main historical features, both actual and as understood by Aristotle, which underly the prescriptive requirements of the *Politics*. "Property ought to be in common without ceasing to be private—that is Aristotle's great principle" (p. 99); and the principle follows naturally from the idea of an order in which "each family is a complete state. The land is possessed in common by the members of this state. No one can say: 'this is mine.' Even when combined, the forty or fifty persons composing the domestic group could not say together: 'this is ours.' The life of the family exceeds in a signal manner that of its members. It stretches far beyond the latter into the past and goes on into the future without limit . . . a circumstance which explains the interdict upon sale, gift and dismemberment of the patrimony" (p. 100). Aristotle suggests that in the interest of the state each citizen should possess two pieces of land—"one in the immediate neighborhood of the town, the other on the confines of the territory. The security of the state would thus be better assured. The citizens, confronted by equal danger, closely bound to one another, would be interested for the same reasons in the defence of the frontier" (p. 99). The form of government which promises to realize these requirements most effectively is the rural democracy, of which Aristotle is a "warm partizan" (p. 102). From this all the rest naturally follows by way of prescriptions, political and economic, having as their aim to preserve the democracy in the form in which this is best realizable (p. 107 sq.). Such, *e. g.*, is the law which would prohibit the artisans and merchants assembling in the absence of the peasants. The contradiction of maintaining the necessity of slavery on the ground that the slave exists by nature, and at the same time

advocating his emancipation under certain circumstances, is explained away by referring the two propositions to two phases of political development. "The first proposition applies to the parts of the country where the closed domestic system of economic government is sufficiently well preserved, the second to the regions where the arts and crafts (*le métier*) have reached a certain point of development" (p. 68).

Throughout, the force and suggestiveness of the argument are indisputable; but the conclusions reached suffer from want of a direct handling of the historical data as such. The writer is too apt, when dealing with strictly historical matters, to avail himself of secondary sources, and the statements of Aristotle himself are too frequently adduced in support of theses which should have been made good independently. Sometimes the logic of the argument is strained. For instance, M. Defourny admits that loans for productive rather than commercial enterprises are legitimately remunerated by interest, and asks whether in view of this there is any contradiction in Aristotle's absolute veto upon interest. He answers in the negative, on the ground that morality does not legislate for mere possible or imaginary cases. But this is just the point. If morality does not legislate for all possible cases then it has no right to express its legislative enactments in the form of absolute propositions. A similar criticism holds good of the statement already referred to, that Aristotle's only fault consists in his having erected into universal principles what were only historical necessities. Surely in the case of an ethical philosopher, as distinct from the casuist or the practical legislator, such an admission amounts to a very grave charge indeed. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the whole contention is infected by a flaw due to a certain ambiguity in the initial assumption that Aristotle is "the philosopher of experience." This may mean one or other of two things. Either we may take the assertion in the sense of the traditional view that regarded Plato and Aristotle as representing an *a priori* and an empirical standpoint respectively; or else we may understand the proposition to refer merely to the statistical method which Aristotle constantly employed. (In the present case we think of the collection of 158 constitutions made by the school, although it must be remembered that the publication of the *Politics* long antedates the completion of the collection.) According to the view which we adopt, the significance of Aristotle's position as the philosopher of experience will be limited to the question of method or else will extend to the content of his conclusions as well. M. Defourny does not

seem to have oriented himself clearly as between the two interpretations; and the result is the somewhat jesuitical attempt to make 'historical necessity' take the place of philosophical absoluteness.

The second article, by A. Diès, entitled *L'Idee de la science dans Platon* is based on the sound notion (which of course does not commit one to the extravagant claims of the Hegelian school of interpreters) that Plato's method is by means of provisional solutions criticized and followed up in successive dialogues (p. 194). Epistemology and ontology are closely parallel. Thus knowledge (which is the translation of *la science*, ἐπιστήμη) is throughout defined, by reference to its object, as knowledge of being. Ontological reality thus postulated at the outset, reveals upon analysis a set of conditions which determine at once its own nature and how it can be known. Being cannot exist except as a plurality. This is an epistemological implication. "Just as doing isolates the nature of acts (*i. e.*, endows them with the specific character in virtue of which we call them now cutting, now weaving), so knowing isolates the nature of being" (p. 160). To know is to distinguish. A plurality of supersensible forms signalizes at once what might be called rational experience (the experience which *is* knowledge—what Plato himself calls dialectical experience) and the historical genesis of Platonism. In this way a number of principles emerge, furnishing between them the conditions of knowledge—the "principle of intelligibility" (*i. e.*, the sacred postulate that knowledge *shall be*—*Sophist*, *Parmenides*); the "principle of objectivity" (*Republic*—πῶς γὰρ ἂν μὴ ὅν γέ τι γνωσθῆι); the "principle of arrest" (*Cratylus*—"Il ne peut y avoir science ni dans une série infinie d'actes de science ni d'une série infinie d'objets de science qui s'évanouissent à mesure qu'ils se posent"); the "principle of determination" (*Cratylus*—"Il ne peut y avoir science d'un être que ne précise aucun mode d'être"); the "principle of permanence" (*Cratylus*, *Republic*, *Philebus*); and the "principle of distinction" (*Cratylus*). The conception of knowledge as the knowledge of *beings* leads to the problem of *relations* and demands the translation of the laws of "rational experience" into the language of pure logic. A temporary substitute for the final solution along these lines is found in the Good, which, however, it is never possible to relate satisfactorily to the other forms.¹ The principle of relations is worked out negatively and positively in the *Sophist*.

¹ "Centre d'objectivité, l'être sera forcément participé par la forme déterminée qu'est le Bien, et pourtant, forme intelligible et déterminée, l'être ne peut tenir son intelligibilité que du rayonnement intelligible qui descend de cette cime du Bien" (p. 195).

It is difficult to see what exception can be taken to this presentation except on a ground that is hardly relevant, since the author is careful to disclaim all pretensions to *completeness*. Were it not so, it might be pointed out that Plato's conception of knowledge must be determined not only affirmatively by a study of what knowledge is, but also negatively by determining *what for him is not knowledge*. This latter method would imply an examination of two things—what we might call, (1) infra-epistemological, and (2) hyper-epistemological forms of cognition. Of the former (true opinion is the most crucial instance) a fairly adequate discussion occurs. But of the latter (comprising the whole realm of those profoundly significant and supremely important truths that can be grasped only in the form of myth) little notice is taken. In this connection it seems hardly enough to represent the (conception of the) Good as a mere temporary substitute for the method of relations. If it is a substitute it is so in the sense in which so many things in Plato might be described as substitutes; *i. e.*, it is a loose end, dropped for a time but not relinquished. The use of the teleological method in the *Timæus* is surely evidence that Plato was not done with the Good after the *Sophist*.

This article is followed by two on St. Thomas Aquinas. M. L. Becker contributes a note on the text of a passage—(1^a P., Quæst. CV, art. 5): *A propos de l'influence de Dieu dans l'opération des Créatures*; and M. Grabmann writes on *Les commentaires de saint Thomas d'Aquin sur les ouvrages d'Aristote*. The latter article deals with questions of literary history, technique and method, the sources utilized, and St. Thomas' own reflections, concluding with an estimate of the value and importance of the commentaries. These in the writer's opinion may be looked upon as preparing the way for sympathetic relations between the marked Aristotelian tendencies in modern thought (the entelechies of Hans Driesch are adduced as an example) and the neo-scholastic philosophy.—A brief résumé of Chinese philosophy by M. Vincent Lebbe brings out a primitive theistic and metaphysical vein in pre-Confucian times, illustrates the anti-metaphysical but still theistic, and above all ethical standpoint of Confucius and his school, and comments on the pantheistic atheism of Tchou-Hi, who has set the learned tradition for later times. In a concluding passage in which the writer touches the interesting question of the relation between the Chinese Pantheon and the philosophical conception of the divine, this interesting remark occurs: "We see the cult of these 'saints' (the canonized benefactors of the race in remote antiquity) encumbered with ever more and more ceremonies, while that of God

remains simple and more pure. An example of the strange mental attitude which we also remark, alas, among more than one catholic people, where the cult of the saints sometimes threatens to obscure and stifle the old official liturgy" (p. 300).—An extremely interesting and valuable contribution is that by M. J. Lottin, to which we shall return in a moment. For the rest the volume includes two psychological articles, one by A. Michotte and F. Fransen—*Note sur l'analyse des facteurs de la mémorisation et sur l'inhibition associative*, and one by F. Roels—*La recherche du mot de réaction dans les expériences d'association*. A short exposition of the Catholic vein in contemporary French literature by M. Robert Valléry-Radot belongs to the realm of pious rhetoric rather than of philosophical reflection, but is interesting as illustrating the presence for some time in literature of that spirit of faith and earnestness which the war has brought out in such a remarkable way in France.—A chronicle of the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie brings the volume to a close.

The most extended and perhaps the most significant article in the *Annales* is that by M. J. Lottin entitled, *Le problème des fins en Morale*. In this paper, which occupies nearly 200 pages, we have a very careful and telling criticism of the views of the French sociological school (as well as of their opponents) in ethics. The whole leads up to an attempted rehabilitation, in the light of modern methods and criticisms, of the classical view that the question of morality is a question of *ends*. The first chapter deals with the work of such writers as Brochard, Lévy-Bruhl, Bayet, Belot, Durkheim and Rauh. It is shown that criticism of the tradition in ethical thinking takes two main forms: (i) by denying the possibility of moral philosophy as a science of duties, and (ii) by denying the deductive method in ethics. To its critics the view of ethics as a science of duty appears not rational but theological, and Kant was wrong in thinking that he was founding a rational ethics. M. Brochard's conclusion is that a normative science of action is unthinkable, and in this he is supported by Lévy-Bruhl. The fundamental problem, viz., the possibility of a science of ends, is touched in a negative way by M. Belot when he maintains the complete heterogeneity of the terms 'true' and 'moral,' and pronounces the combination 'theoretical ethics' ridiculous (p. 311). M. Durkheim criticizes the deductive method, which formulates rules for all times and places, on the ground that it is based on the postulate of abstract human nature, and M. Belot on the ground that it negates the *specificité* of moral facts, and issues in the impossibility of distinguishing moral from immoral or morally indifferent activity.

The criticism is very obvious in the case of Kant. (One instinctively recalls Georg Simmel's powerful indictment of Kant along identical lines.) The conclusion here is that morality does not depend for its existence upon speculative principles. It is not invented. It exists as given.

The second chapter includes two articles, the first entitled: *La science des mœurs*, the second, *Le problème des fins*. The former gives a general résumé of the views of MM. Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl. According to M. Durkheim the morality of a people is constituted by concrete facts of a perfectly specific nature, to be studied wherever they occur by an autonomous science. More precisely, ethics deals with certain social phenomena—viz., certain judgments of men in society, of a practical and obligatory nature. These must be treated as natural phenomena, and the discovery of their laws is the business of ethics. It is possible that a general law may be discovered for all moral facts; but scientific procedure forbids us to presuppose this *a priori*.—The second article takes up in detail, "The System of M. Durkheim in its historical evolution," "The thesis of M. Lévy-Bruhl," and "The ideas of M. Bayet." It will be enough to indicate the writer's conclusion. He maintains that neither M. Durkheim nor M. Lévy-Bruhl succeeds in basing a genuine moral philosophy on the study of moral practice. The former, maintaining the necessity of a solution to the problem of ends, really reaches his conclusions by the aid of "extra-sociological conceptions" (p. 384). His view is actually founded, not on a science of morals, but on a *métamorale*. Lévy-Bruhl on the other hand, unwilling to establish the final ends of human activity on metaphysical speculation, is forced to *postulate* these ends (pp. 398–9). M. Bayet is equally unsuccessful in resolving the problem by means of pure science.

In the concluding chapter, entitled "Le problème des fins dans la morale rationnelle," M. Lottin begins by stating wherein the problem consists. There are really, he maintains, two problems: (1) a practical problem, having to do with the technical and pedagogical question of educating the will (what end do I desire to realize?); and (2) a theoretical one (what end ought I to realize?). The present inquiry is limited to the theoretical issue. The question is whether I can *prove* that I *ought* to will, and the answer is that the problem of duty is one that *necessarily* propounds itself before the tribunal of reflective reason. The problem of ethics is first of all theoretical. Before being practised morality should be known; and the writer commits himself to the somewhat unfortunate statement, which can hardly

be pressed: "le problème moral relève de la raison, tout comme les propositions de la géométrie."

The concluding portion of the essay deals with "the method which must be followed in order to resolve the problem of ends." The difficulty confronting the sociologists has been that of deriving by any deductive method the actual content of morality from such a universal law of duty as the Kantian; and it was a consciousness of this difficulty that has led them to deny both the universal law and the deductive method. M. Lottin draws a distinction between a universal law in the *de facto* sense and the moral law which serves as a norm of action. In the second place, the question is raised whether social sanctions really cover moral distinctions exactly. May there not be moral facts specifically individual? The conclusion is that legal sanction is an extraneous consideration from the specifically moral point of view. What is sanctioned may be so because it is moral, but it would remain moral even if it were not sanctioned. This brings us at once to the moral judgment, which is a psychological *fact* but is based on objective reason. Hence, just as there is a physical induction by which the sociologist seeks to discover real causes of real facts, so "there is a psychological or *metaphysical* induction, which seeks the why and the wherefore of our moral judgments" (p. 463). In his account of this M. Lottin begins with an assumption similar to that which Mill makes in formulating the problem of logic—the assumption that in its capacity to know the truth intelligence proceeds on evidence which may be either mediate or immediate. The latter sort of evidence gives us the *form* of morality, the former its matter. The formal principle is stated in terms redolent of Aristotle. There is the same use of teleology in defining the moral end, and of the conception of conformity to nature, the same epiphenomenal view of pleasure. "Le bien est ce, qui est conforme à la nature de l'être: ce jugement est immédiat et n'a rien de mystérieux." "Le bien est donc la *fin naturelle* de l'être ou ce qui s'achemine vers cette fin. . . . Ce qui est conforme à la nature de l'homme, est *bien* moral, pose l'homme dans sa *fin* naturelle ou l'y conduit, et est la source objective du plaisir moral" (pp. 464–5). Then follows a really significant point. In reply to the objection that such formulae tell us nothing as to the content of morality, the writer replies: (1) that while they may indeed be empty of matter, they are not empty of *meaning* (and their meaning is objective); (2) that there is no question of *deducing* the matter from the formula. The latter expresses only an objective relation of an ideal order. ". . . Si un acte est conforme

à ma nature, il est moralement bon. La vérité de cette proposition ne porte que sur la relation, non sur le premier terme." The importance of this last statement will be seen at once if we consider that it really brings ethics into line with science in general, not indeed in the sense of the sociologists, but in respect of the real significance of both and of the difficulties with which they are beset. The crucial truth about all genuinely universal scientific judgments is that, so far as their applicability to a world of *facts* is concerned, they are strictly expressible only in hypotheticals, and this brings them exactly into line with ethics in the difficulty of relating form and matter.—As regards the question of matter, the writer maintains that certain acts are of directly moral significance, others are not. There is therefore room for intellectual doubt in the case of the latter. But, adds M. Lottin, doubt is capable of being resolved, and this once more is the business of reason. Reason has the two-fold function (1) of 'delimiting' the matter of morality, having regard to the circumstances of the case, and (2) of establishing (*i. e.* [p. 470] not *deducing*, but *verifying*) the *obligatory character* of ends that have been judged good or morally *desirable* in the light of the formal notion. "What are these deeds exacted by my nature? Certain of them appear immediately endowed with this [obligatory] character. In other cases proof is necessary. Among the latter certain acts, abstractly considered in view of their object, will succeed in presenting themselves as morally good, without appearing obligatory. But think of the individual man in certain personal circumstances, circumstances of time, place, etc. Then think of the acts involved. Consider them concretely in the light of their object. They will appear as demanded by the concrete nature of the man."

This brief outline will give some idea of the main features that distinguish a really admirable attempt at a synthetic view of morality. The merit of the attempt is due to the fact that the writer, while dealing with the detail of modern controversy, is oriented throughout by the really great things in ethical thinking. He reads Kant with the eyes of Aristotle and Aristotle with the eyes of Kant, and he improves the position of both by bringing to bear upon it the results of recent attempts at a scientific analysis. In this way he succeeds in preserving what is most valuable in the classical tradition and presenting afresh, in a thoroughly original combination, the Good of Aristotle, the Obligatory of Kant, the content of morality as natural and the form as ideal—the whole being made accessible to man's power of rational judgment.

ARCHIBALD A. BOWMAN.

PRINCETON.

American Thought. By WOODBRIDGE RILEY. New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1915.—pp. viii, 373.

The scope and intention of Professor Riley's book is fairly indicated by the titles of his ten chapters. These are, in order: Puritanism, Early Idealism, Deism, Materialism, Realism, Transcendentalism, Evolutionism, Modern Idealism, Pragmatism, and Notes on the New Realism. Each of these chapters is in the form of an essay characterizing a metaphysical movement, sometimes a formal school, sometimes a dispersed sentiment. As the several movements are taken in the order of their introduction, the book has the general features of a history of American thought; and this historical character of the work is accentuated by its mode of treatment,—sketches of personalities and outlines of doctrines standing out above the vein of critical comment. There is also a typical developmental generalization, of the sort that lifts an historical work from mere chronicle to the field of theory: "In the seventeenth century we find men's interest chiefly centered about God. In the eighteenth century that interest is twofold: it concerns itself with nature as well as with God. In the nineteenth century the interest has transferred itself mainly to nature. The same transfer of thought takes place in politics. In the seventeenth century the interest centers in the king; in the eighteenth century in both king and people; in the nineteenth century the people fill the foreground." This indicates the point of view from which Professor Riley conceives his work: metaphysical speculation in America must be interpreted against a background of social facts; in the earlier period these are predominantly political,—hence, his generalization; in the later period, of contemporary thought, physiological and racial factors are made the stresses of differentiation. History as determined by environment is the motive by means of which the author would unify his subject.

And yet this motive is by no means so important in the consequence as in the pronouncement. It maintains its pertinence in the initial chapters reasonably well, but it fades as the book progresses and is forgotten at the end. At the last, the character of thought itself is so complex that the greater complexity of the national conditions whence it emerges is not even imaginatively suggested, and the historical presuppositions of the work disappear. In fact, Professor Riley's book is somewhat readily divisible into two groups of essays—chapters I to VI, forming something short of half the text, being actuated by the historian's consciousness, chapters VII to X, dealing with contemporary schools, being critical and at times controversial in

spirit. Doubtless this is natural enough (for it is no easy thing to maintain one's contemporaries in perspective), but it spoils the historical unity of the work.

Conceived as a history, there are other conspicuous lacks. To begin with, the book wants documentation. Few readers can be supposed to be acquainted with the whole body of literature, especially in that earlier field which Professor Riley has made distinctively his own, and none, I imagine, but would feel grateful for more liberal and explicit references and a more frequent citation of the *ipsissima verba* of the authors studied. Professor Riley employs the method of condensed paraphrase, frequently without citation of *opus* or *locus*,—a method which not only destroys harmony of style, owing to that imitative coloration of the phrasing which is inevitable to it, but which also, when as in this case the author mingles criticism with exposition, leads to exasperating uncertainties on the part of the reader. A thoroughly capable example of stylistic shoddiness, due to this method, is the paragraph on Witherspoon, pp. 127-128; and this is no solitary instance. As is the custom of the day, a 'select bibliography' is given at the end of the volume; but it is of no particular value in the reading of the text,—and in passing, it might be remarked that such bibliographies are of real assistance to students only when accompanied by notes characterizing the content and significance of the works cited.

Even more serious, if the book is to be regarded as a history, are the defects of matter. Very likely there is no conspicuous metaphysical movement in America which Professor Riley has altogether missed (unless we regard some of the more popular religious philosophizing as metaphysics), but so far as the contemporary movements are concerned he has given accounts that are neither historically full nor proportionate. Names of not a few of the elder generation of living philosophers, who have done much to shape our thought, are conspicuously absent; books that have been the talk of their day, and are presumably not yet forgotten, find no mention; the work of only one philosophical journal, and that one long defunct, is characterized; and viewing philosophy as predominantly the work of the chair in this country, Professor Riley's academic map of the United States will be found to be sparsely dotted. Surely there is something approaching absurdity in endeavoring to give a historical view of American idealism on the sole basis of the work of Harris and Royce and Ladd; or in omitting from a characterization of contemporary thought the psychological and epistemological contributions of men of the calibre of Marshall and Fullerton and Strong; or in ignoring Santayana in the

discussion of realism. But doubtless Professor Riley's reply would be that his *American Thought* is not a sketch of the history of philosophy in the United States, but a group of essays upon its characteristic phases. So conceived, it is a pleasure to own that the author has given us a stimulating and suggestive book. There are still deficiencies, if we judge by the title; for "American thought" suggests to the mind unprepared many other forms of mental activity besides the metaphysical,—political, social, scientific, aesthetic,—which must be taken into any complete account of the national mind, even on its speculative side, and which Professor Riley leaves untouched. But within the metaphysical field which alone he cultivates, he has missed no movement of importance; he has succeeded in bringing out the various lines of thought with definition; and it is surely a valuable exercise for any thinker to see his problems in the light of the body of ideas with which custom and tradition have surrounded him.

The program of the book might be expressed in some such fashion as this: The seventeenth century brought Calvinistic theism to the New World shores, but Calvinistic predestinarianism and self-depreciation could not persistently thrive in the free and vital life of a nature-conquering race. Hence, in the eighteenth century Calvinism rapidly succumbed to the optimistic deism of English and the free-thinking materialism of French importation. Scotch realism, the next comer, likewise found a friendly soil in a country whose problems were mainly outward and material, while Berkeleyan idealism was suffocated for want of a congenial atmosphere of inner subtlety. Nevertheless, Puritanism had in itself an ineradicable spark of the idealistic fire, and this, new-colored with optimism, burst into the brilliantly variegated transcendentalist nature-worship of the Concord school, our first "native philosophy." But the turn of attention, from God to nature, was fatal to a consistent idealism; and here the conflict of science and religion emerges, immensely intensified by the reception of the Darwinian doctrine and the Spencerian philosophy of evolution. In this we find the entire stress of thought laid on the material universe, with the spiritual disappearing. Meantime, however, German immigration had brought the fatherland's idealism into prospect, and at least the universities were captivated by the theorizings of the philosophers of the absolute, first acclimated by Harris, then romanticized by Royce, and finally critically adapted to the scientific spirit by Ladd. But in all this there was as yet no national American philosophy; transcendentalism was native, but adapted only to New England; the others were importations. Pro-

fessor Riley gives us the impression that all along the soul of the nation had been longing for a philosophy that it could call its own, dissatisfied with Old World offerings, blindly fumbling for its own inmost possibilities. At last its eyes are opened and national thought "emerges triumphantly in pragmatism," the philosophy of the practical. Peirce, Dewey and James represent the successively logical, social and emotional steps in the development of this philosophy—a development which, as our author sees it, represents the decline from science to temperament, from reason to jubilation. Yet even here the tale is not ended. In pragmatism, to be sure, we have at last a true all-American philosophy, suited to our practical and boisterous life; but we live in hurrying times, and the twentieth century cannot be expected to remain content with anything that harks back to the *fin de siècle*. Neo-realism is the newest of schools, and, if we may draw inferences from impressions, it is the one which, in our author's opinion, strikes a final and authentic note,—as it were, a precocious child austerey reprimanding its befuddled masters.

I see that I have been led into metaphor. The reader of Professor Riley's last chapters will hardly wonder at this, for he will have just turned from such a display of figurative discourse as leaves the mind bewildered with its own illumination. Apparently the quiet vocabulary of reason is regarded as no fitting vehicle for a true impression of current American thought; we must never forget the land in which we live; and so, in place of logical analysis of doctrine, we are familiarized with the clatter of cash-register and ticker, the hoot of the klaxon, and the jangling cant of politics and enterprise. The style gives all the breathless suspense of the 'movie,' but it also gives one the cinema's uneasy suspicion of having lost the substance of the show,—in this case, the sense of the argument. Doubtless Professor Riley does not expect anyone to accept his characterizations of the several philosophies as more than sketches, drawn with a touch of the cartoonist exaggeration; and doubtless he will be very well content to leave in his reader's mind the image his book suggests to me—of a somewhat impudent child precociously lecturing his elders,—always with the proviso that the lectures are interesting.

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H. B. ALEXANDER.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

History of Psychology. A Sketch and an Interpretation. By JAMES MARK BALDWIN. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London, 1913.—2 vols., pp. 382.

This little book (a contribution to the series, *A History of the Sciences*) will doubtless be received with varying emotions by different readers,—probably with more interest and satisfaction by the philosopher than by the professed psychologist.

For one thing, if it does not indicate a distinct disenchantment with the psychology that calls itself scientific, it at least accords it a very modest place. Again, both the amount of space given to modern psychology and the topics selected for treatment, are bound to meet with severe criticism.

The history of psychology, the author holds, is concerned with "the different ways in which men have looked upon the mind, or self or thought-principle" (p. 1). Modern Psychology, though based on sounder data, acquired by safer methods, sums up what we think and think we have a right to think about the self or soul. Like the others it is still an interpretation of mind. This broad view of the subject is further justified by the fact that "although the narrower, scientific interpretation of mind plays an important rôle, it is doubtful whether it is as influential practically as the mystical and unscientific views which arose earlier and dominated human thought for long ages" (Vol. I, p. 15).

This broader conception has in the main dominated such histories as we already have—for instance, those of Dessoir and Harms; and, like theirs, Baldwin's work is in good part a history of philosophy from a special point of view. In this respect, in the view of the present writer, the treatment, such as it is, is wholly competent, although the author himself lays no claim to special knowledge. In one respect, the work is admirably done. While the great conceptions and discoveries of this thinker and that are mentioned, they are with considerable skill kept subordinate throughout to the theory of the 'mental principle' itself. Baldwin has had the advantage of the work of these other historians, and as a result, it may be unhesitatingly said, the material is much better organized than in the histories that have preceded.

The principle of classification of epochs and periods is, of course, the writer's own. He uses his genetic principle of 'recapitulation' in a thoroughgoing way. Three epochs, prelogical (primitive), spontaneous (Greek), and reflective (modern), belong to the history of thought and the history of the person alike. The first he describes as a period of 'psychosophy,' borrowing Dessoir's term, and is emotional and mystical in character, corresponding to the practical and a-dualistic period of the child's apprehension of the self. The Greek period is still unscientific—unreflective in the sense that the view

of the self is not exact and critical, but remains subordinate to the larger view of the world or nature taken as a whole. It has three periods: the projective or Pre-socratic, the Socratic or subjective, and the objective or Aristotelean. In the mediaeval or 'substantive' period the distinction between mind and body becomes fundamental and culminates in the explicit dualism of Descartes. The modern period is characterized by a reflective and scientific interpretation of this dualism, mind and body having become explicit presuppositions of reflection. Baldwin's interpretation of the entire movement as one of growing dualism, while in accord with the genetic rule of interpretation, is not, he is careful to point out, in any sense due to it, both Harms and Klemm having made it central in their interpretation. The analogy with the progress of individual thought merely reinforces traditional interpretation, as for instance that which finds in Socrates the transition, by way of the Sophistic reaction, to subjectivism and idealism.

I have already spoken of the dissent which the treatment of modern psychology is bound to raise. The author recognizes the embarrassment that arises from the variety of problems and wealth of results of nineteenth century psychology. The treatment must be decidedly selective, and the selection, here as elsewhere, is made with a view to illustrating further the interpretation which looks upon psychology as "a body of knowledge and theory about the mental principle or self." This portion, covering about one-third of the book, discusses first "general points of view" and, second, "special lines of work."

Distinctively modern psychology has its origin, according to Baldwin, in two factors: the Locke-Hume *motif*, which is personal and individual, and the Rousseau-Comte *motif*, which is social and collective (Vol. II, p. 44). To these he seems to ascribe about equal importance. "Philosophical psychology since Kant, in so far as it has issued in any distinctively 'contemporary view of mind,' holds what may be called the 'actuality' theory (Vol. II, p. 160). The present day has seen the refined and reflective restatement of older theories, but it has its own preferences as well. The pendulum swung widely to the left when the new nerve psychology substituted the brain for the mind, touched the middle point in the theory of psycho-physical parallelism, and in the present decade is swinging to the right in the reinstatement of the spiritual theory."

As for special lines of work, the main topics are, Physiological and Experimental Psychology, Genetic Psychology, Social Psychology, and Affective Psychology. While the first is in the main given what seems to be its proper perspective, it is yet perhaps the least satisfactory section. The results may indeed be, as the author says, "broadly considered, disappointing," but the few paragraphs given to psycho-physics and mental chronometry can scarcely be said to give an adequate view of the experimental side. There is, for instance, no hint that reaction experiments are more than mental chronometry. Attention is not mentioned in the experimental section. There is no suggestion that experiment has ever been applied to the 'higher mental processes' and the practical applications of experimental psychology are not mentioned.

The genetic and social sides of psychology naturally receive full and adequate treatment. Here the author writes with sympathy and authority and the result is an admirable summary. Under Affective Psychology are included, somewhat arbitrarily, a variety of topics, such as Kinaesthesia and the theory of emotion, Affective Revival and Affective Logic, Attention, Einfühlung, etc. The author finds the revolt against intellectualist theories of feeling, led by Ribot, one of the most important movements in modern psychology and makes it an important element in his own philosophy of Pancalism.

This is to be sure a most inadequate summary of this part of the book, and is, indeed, likely to suggest its weak rather than its strong points. It is only fair to say that when the principle of selection is borne in mind, this treatment of special topics appears in better perspective than a mere summary would indicate. This effect increases upon a second reading.

The last two chapters give a 'genetic interpretation' of man's thought about the mind. It is interesting to note the author's final characterization of the reflective period in psychology from this point of view. "Modern psychology merely reflects the alternatives which philosophy has worked out in its various systems, so far as these concern the mind. It is with respect solely to variety and refinement of enterprise, to richness of data and power of criticism, that advance and novelty appear. It is in becoming completely self-conscious that it corresponds to the reflective period of the individual. The choice, among these varied alternatives—as for instance the rationalistic, positivistic, immediatistic attitudes toward the mind, is, for modern culture and for the individual thought alike, largely a matter of temperament" (Vol. II, p. 197).

The book is clearly written and readable throughout, has a good index and bibliography, and is adorned with portraits of leading thinkers, reproduced by permission of the Open Court Publishing Co. It is to be welcomed, not only as a really usable history of psychology, but as a book which, read in connection with courses in general psychology, may be expected to give life and interest to many problems otherwise meaningless.

WILBUR M. URBAN.

TRINITY COLLEGE.

A History of Psychology. By OTTO KLEMM. Authorized Translation with Annotations by EMIL CARL WILM and RUDOLF PINTNER. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914.—pp. xvi, 380.

The writer of a history of psychology has considerable liberty in the selection of his material, for, as Ebbinghaus once remarked, "psychology has a long past but a brief history." Indeed, one is inclined to doubt if the time is yet ripe for an historical approach to its problems. A perusal of the volume before us does not entirely dispel this doubt. Many will find the selection of topics arbitrary, and will seek in vain for certain evidences of systematic development which an historical survey might be expected to reveal.

The volume is divided into three parts. The first treats of the general

tendencies of psychology, the second of the development of the fundamental concepts of psychology, while the third aims to sketch a history of the most important psychological theories. In the first part we find metaphysical and empirical psychology contrasted. Dualism and monism are taken as the categories which provide the metaphysical bases of the science. The discussion is hardly adequate. The brevity with which the views of ancient and modern philosophers are presented renders the account less satisfying than that which can be secured from the average student's history of philosophy. Neither here nor elsewhere in the volume is the important problem of the body and mind relation mentioned. Under the heading, Empirical Psychology, is traced the historical development of descriptive and explanatory psychology. The latter culminates with a section devoted to experimental psychology. Beginning with the contributions of Weber and Fechner, the experiments on reaction-time, sense perception, and the determination of threshold values are the ones chiefly emphasized. One misses a reference to the epoch-making experiments of Ebbinghaus on memory. Some space is devoted to Ach's work in establishing the awareness of meaning and relation, but unfortunately the statement of his differentiation of these two forms of imageless content is made ambiguous through an evident error in translation.

Part II traces the emergence of psychology as a science, the history of the concept of consciousness and its definition, the classification of the contents of consciousness, psychological methods and measurement. Two chapters are mainly devoted to the work of Fechner and the subsequent modifications of his results. In Part III the most important psychological theories concern sensation, spatial perception, feeling and volition. Under the heading Theories of Sensation the history of the doctrine of specific energy is developed and this is followed by descriptions of modern theories of vision and audition. Theories of spatial perception appear in a more distinctly historical setting, and several interesting pre-scientific notions on the subject are recounted. The theories of feeling are chiefly contemporaneous, while those of volition give scope for developing various aspects of the problem of freedom.

The volume is translated into clear and readable English. Not having access to the German original the reviewer is unable to comment upon the fidelity of translation. A few apparent inconsistencies may, however, be noted. Johannes Müller, the physiologist, to whom frequent reference is made, appears most frequently as *Johann*. "Schulze-Aenesidemus" has a strange look, and a later reference to "Schulze" fails to identify the two as referring each to G. E. Schulze. A reference to "the fantastic nature philosophy of Timaeus" is questionable in view of the greater importance attaching to the name of the creator of this character, Plato. Ebbinghaus's briefer *Psychology* is twice cited from the original abridged version of *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, although the English translation would have been a more useful reference. Certain citations of works in German translation might have been amended to indicate the equally accessible originals.

R. M. OGDEN.

The Theory of Beauty. By E. F. CARRITT. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1914.—pp. 304.

The purpose of this volume is to show that divergent systems of aesthetics "are all intelligible attempts to state the same experience." The result adduced is "that in the history of aesthetic we may discover a growing consensus of emphasis upon the doctrine that all beauty is the expression of what may be generally called emotion, and that all such expression is beautiful." In the first chapter, on the subject-matter of aesthetics, two guiding principles are set forth: first, that beauty is what pleases in the mere contemplation, and, second, "that it takes two, a subject and an object to make beauty, but the object and our reception of it cannot be thus considered apart and in abstraction." The second chapter, on the method of aesthetics, is mainly negative in its treatment of misconceptions whereby aesthetics is taken as a substitute for art, for genius, for taste, as impossible,—by reason of the irrationality of their subject,—or as a loose physiological consideration of aesthetic perception. The misleading exclusion of nature from aesthetics is also discussed in connection with those methods of attack which emphasize imitation, the moralizing purpose and technique in art.

The following six chapters examine critically as many different theories of beauty. The first is the 'hedonistic-moral' theory, ascribed to Plato in his treatment of beauty as educative. The second is the 'realistic-typical' theory, for which Plato is also responsible in his doctrine of imitation. Modern instances of both points of view are given. 'Intellectualist' theories, as exemplified by Kant and Hegel, and 'emotionalist' theories such as are advanced by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche follow, while the 'expressionist' theory of Croce forms a climax, it being the theory to which the author gives his chief support. One important phase of Croce's aesthetic is, however, rejected, namely, the identification of intuition with expression. This principle, advanced by Croce as essential to a subjective idealism, is criticised both on empirical and on theoretical grounds. Empirically, it is maintained that some intuitions appear to be unemotional and hence cannot be expressed. Theoretically, it would seem that an expression to be communicative must imply the perception of a really existing medium, which in turn would be an intuition not itself expressed. The last argument points not only to the existence of intuitions unexpressed, but it is also fatal to the subjective idealism advanced as the reason for identifying intuition with expression.

A chapter on the *sublime* deals with the ambiguity of current theories on this subject, and concludes that the essence of the sublime consists in the triumph of beauty over the uncongenial, whether it be such because of an external hostile relation to the human will, or because of an extrinsic treatment of the subject, *i. e.*, as it may appear to us, rather than as it is in and for itself. A chapter is devoted to the inseparability of form and expression, another to criticism of the *Einfühlung* theory. The latter is regarded as at best a vague attempt to describe what the expression theory has more aptly incorporated as its basic principle,—namely, that "we can find expressed in art only what we ourselves have somehow experienced."

The following brief excerpts will serve to summarize the point of view attained by the author in his concluding chapter:—"That of which we are aware . . . is not thereby beautiful; it only becomes so when it is contemplated without practical interest, without scientific abstraction, and without existential judgment, *as the pure expression of emotion.*" "The experience of beauty is an *activity*, and hence in its own way good and pleasant. . . . Its activity is *contemplation of passion*, . . . in it we embody or express in sensible form our feelings; bring before our minds for contemplation what we had already somehow been or done." The volume is attractively written. It suggests wide and appropriate reading on the subject together with much acute and sympathetic reasoning. The theories presented are all treated with a nice regard for their respective merits. The work as a whole is saved from too great technicality of treatment by the abundance of well-chosen illustrative material, chiefly from the poets. This imparts a freshness to the style, and constantly reminds the reader that he is dealing with the concrete elements of beauty, rather than with the prosaic details of philosophic theory.

R. M. OGDEN.

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS.

Art in Education and Life. HENRY DAVIES. Columbus, Ohio, R. G. Adams and Company.—pp. xii, 334.

The purpose of this book, as stated in the introduction by Professor George Trumbull Ladd, "to emphasize the essential character of education as involving feeling, judgment and the higher perceptions which relate to the beautiful in nature and art (p. viii), can scarcely be commended too highly. The author's preface which follows is entirely reassuring and very interesting. The experience of the author during his teaching at college, "that the educated young men who came to me, among their many fine qualities of mind, were singularly lacking in sensitiveness and delicacy of feeling in matters pertaining to art and beauty" (p. ix), must harmonize with the judgment of many another college teacher. The conclusion stated on page ten of the preface that the responsibility for this discouraging state of affairs rests upon the public school is about as true and about as false as similar judgments placing responsibility for similar defects in all manner of subjects upon the school lower down. The college teacher has a well established reputation for tracing all the deficiencies found among his students to the public school. In the present case the criticism seems well founded, for the American public school, especially the primary and small school, has given but little effort to the cultivation of taste. That it is rapidly turning to this task is indicated by the number of recent books written on the subject of art in the school.

Chapter III—The Aesthetic Resources of the Schools—calls attention to the possibility of making the building, grounds, play, and work contribute to the cultivation of good taste. Chapter VI, entitled Democracy and Art, is interesting for its criticism of the current ideals, or lack of ideals, in democracy. Excellently conceived as the purpose of the book is the execution

is not what one would desire. Little or nothing is added to our growing literature on the subject and the book will be peculiarly irritating to those familiar with the generally approved practices of book making. Quotations are given throughout without complete references: the schematic headings and sub-headings add nothing to clearness and detract from beauty. A book concerned with such a subject should also set a better example of book binding and printing. A bibliography of no particular value is added; also an index.

H. G. TOWNSEND.

SMITH COLLEGE.

The following books also have been received:

- Naturalism and Agnosticism*. Fourth Edition. By JAMES WARD. London, A. & C. Black, 1915.—pp. xvi, 623. \$3.25.
- Modern Philosophers*. By HARALD HÖFFDING. Translated by ALFRED C. MASON. London, Macmillan and Co., 1915.—pp. xii, 317. \$1.40.
- Societal Evolution*. By ALBERT GALLOWAY KELLER. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1915.—pp. ix, 338. \$1.50.
- Principles of Understanding*. By HENRY STURT. Cambridge, The University Press, 1915.—pp. xiv, 299.
- What Should I Believe*. By GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. New York, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1915.—xiii, 275. \$1.50 net.
- German Philosophy and Politics*. By JOHN DEWEY. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1915.—pp. 132. \$1.25 net.
- The Limitations of Science*. By LOUIS TRENCHARD MORE. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1915.—pp. 268. \$1.50 net.
- The Social Problem*. By C. A. ELLWOOD. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1915.—pp. 255. \$1.25.
- Hume's Place in Ethics*. By EDNA ASTON SHEARER. Bryn Mawr, Bryn Mawr College, 1915.—pp. 86.
- War and the Ideal of Peace*. By HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL. New York, Duffield and Company, 1915.—pp. 234. \$1.25 net.
- Trends of Thought and Christian Truth*. By JOHN A. W. HAAS. Boston, Richard G. Badger, 1915.—pp. 329. \$1.50 net.
- Psychology and Parenthood*. By H. ADDINGTON BRUCE. New York, Dodd, Mead & Company, 1915.—pp. 293. \$1.25 net.
- Religious Values and Intellectual Consistency*. By EDWARD HARTMAN REISNER. Columbia University Contributions to Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. XIX, No. 1. New York, The Science Press, 1915.—pp. 59.
- Militancy versus Civilization*. By ALFRED W. TILLET. London, P. S. King and Son, 1915.—pp. 59.
- Goethe*. By PAUL CARUS. Chicago, Open Court Pub. Co., 1915.—pp. 357.
- Le Dualisme et le Théisme de Kant*. Par MARIN STEFANESCU. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1915.—pp. 103.
- Le Dualisme logique*. Par MARIN STEFANESCU. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1915.—pp. iv, 197.

La Notion du Nécessaire chez Aristote. Par JACQUES CHEVALIER. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1915.—pp. 303.

Étude critique de L'Axiochos. Par JACQUES CHEVALIER. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1915.—pp. 144.

Die Ethik und der Krieg. Von OSWALD KÜLPE. Leipzig, S. Hirzel, 1915.—pp. 44.

Una nuova fase dell'Economica Politica. Di N. R. D'ALFONSO. Milano, Società Editrice Libreria, 1915.—pp. 62.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mèt.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scholastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.*: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

On the Experience of Time. BERTRAND RUSSELL. *The Monist*, XXV, 2, pp. 212-233.

This article contains an exposition of the following definitions and propositions. Definitions: (1) *Sensation* is a certain relation of subject and object, involving a kind of acquaintance with particulars which enables us to know that they are at the present time. (2) Sense-data belonging to one (momentary) total experience are said to be *present* to their subject in the experience in which they are objects. (3) *Simultaneity* is a relation among entities, which holds between objects present to a given subject in a single experience. (4) *Now* means "simultaneous with *this*," where 'this' is an object of sensation of which I am aware. (5) *The present time* is a class of all entities that are *now*. (6) *Immediate memory* is a relation which we have to an object which has been a sense-datum, but is now felt as past, though still given in acquaintance. (7) *Succession* is a relation which may hold between two parts of a sensation; it may be immediately experienced, and extended by inference to cases where one or both of the terms of the relation are not present. (8) Of two events succeeding each other, the first is called *earlier* and the second *later*. (9) An event which is earlier than the whole of the present is called *past*, and an event which is later than the whole of the present is called *future*. Propositions: (A) Simultaneity and succession both give rise to transitive relations, while simultaneity is symmetrical, and succession asymmetrical, or at least gives rise to an asymmetrical relation defined in terms of it. This proposition is required for the construction of the physical time-series. (B) What is remembered is past. (C) When a change is immediately experienced in sensation, parts of the present are earlier than other parts. (D) If *a*, *b*, and *c* succeed each other rapidly, *a* and *b* may be parts of one sensation, and likewise *b* and *c*, while *a* and *c* are not parts of one sensation, but *a* is remembered when

c is present in sensation. Thus the relation of "belonging to the same present" is not transitive. The last three propositions are chiefly concerned with mental time.

SUH HU.

The Postulates of Deductive Logic. THEODORE DE LAGUNA. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XII, 9, pp. 225-236.

Mathematics fixes the meaning of symbols, (1) by definition in terms of symbols whose meaning is already fixed; (2) by exhibition of a set of standard formulae (postulates) in which the symbols occur. External connections as of words with things and feelings are so far as possible avoided. It is now recognized that all the branches of pure mathematics spring from the postulates of deductive logic. In geometry, which is one of the pattern sciences after which deductive logic is modeled, the postulates must be stated chiefly in the 'indefinables' used in ordinary discourse, and are properly to be regarded as the intelligible description of a certain class of relations. But the complete description of a class of relations is its definition, so that even those indefinables such as 'point' and 'between,' peculiar to geometry, are not absolutely indefinable, but are assumed as such for the science. The set of postulates by means of which the employment of the indefinables is fixed reduces to an instance of the first mode, mentioned above, of fixing the employment of symbols. Even if we were to work out a mathematical logic without knowing the meaning of its symbols, we must (1) use the ordinary rules of logic and the forms of our common speech in formulating directions for the handling of symbols; and we must (2) state eventually the *meaning of the symbols*, unless we are to be satisfied with a nonsensical result. So deductive logic must put the interpretation of its symbols before all else, and in so doing must employ common speech, making meanings as clear as possible by use of the dictionary. This process is not a mere concession to practical expediency but an essential propaedeutic to the system of logic. In systems such as those of M. Couturat and Messrs. Whitehead and Russell, certain postulates, such as the principles of deduction and substitution, are put into words instead of into symbols. But these principles might just as well be expressed in symbols, if it were borne in mind that the process of manipulating them is *a process of deductive inference*. Whitehead and Russell speak of "the first assumptions . . . that are required to make deduction possible." But if deduction were not already possible, no array of assumptions could make it so.

MARION D. CRANE.

The Social Origin of Absolute Idealism. GEORGE H. SABINE. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., Vol. XII, 7, pp. 169-177.

T. H. Green speaks of the new conception of freedom and right as one of the influences leading to the reconstruction of moral ideas in England. Against the *laissez-faire* ideal, or notion of negative freedom popular in the first half of the 19th century, there was a revolt in English literature, politics, and

philosophy, expressing itself, for example, in liberal legislation between 1870 and 1880. There arose a newer ideal of positive freedom,—*i. e.*, an equality of opportunity to possess and enjoy the benefits of a civilized standard of life. This ideal the self-realization ethics of the English idealists was undoubtedly intended to theorize. These men were especially important for their criticism of hedonistic individualism. Green pointed out that desires are not for pleasures but for objects, and that these objects are inevitably social. Society indeed depends on the consciousness of a common good shared by its members, so that political institutions depend primarily not upon power but upon will. Not only is consciousness the organ of social relations, but the development of consciousness depends on social relations. Social recognition of rights and obligations develops individuality. The relations of individuals in society cannot then be understood as individualism would have it, in terms of physical categories. For the interpretation of consciousness new categories must be found. Unfortunately the English idealists interpreted it in terms of German absolutism, so that society for them tended to become an absolute, in which the individual *finds* his station. Bradley develops this tendency in his *Ethical Studies*. It has its source in absolutistic logic, which maintains that there can be no relation without inclusion in an overlapping unity. But as a matter of fact in social relationships between conscious individuals the unity and the relations are identical, and the inclusion is perhaps no more than a figure of speech. The individual in many cases must make rather than find his station. Upon this necessity rests the value and proof of positive freedom.

MARION D. CRANE.

A Revision of Imageless Thought. R. S. WOODWORTH. Psych. Rev., XXII, 1, pp. 1-27.

Attempts have been made to explain away imageless thought. Wundt's view of it as a 'total feeling' is hardly adequate, since a thought can be so definitely present in mind before it is expressed that it is the same thought in whatever language it is put. Nor does the presence of images and sensations in most thoughts prove that they are essential. Titchener's account of imageless thought as a limiting case of practice on the way to automatism neglects the positive side of practice, namely, that the blending of parts into more inclusive units must be effected by keen attention. In fact, new ideas usually occur to one without imagery. It is often objected that to describe a thought process as a thought of some object is information and not description. But this assumes that description can only be in sensory terms. In fact, even a description of imagination or perception must be stated in terms of an object, and not stated as a juxtaposition of elements. To meet the objection to the distinction between sensory and nonsensory contents, a positive theory of imageless thought will be given. The data of thought are largely memory content, and this has been found to be often imageless. The writer has found that nothing is recalled except such 'facts' as have been *noted*, some of which are imaginal, but others are not. As the facts need not

be recalled in the original setting, it depends upon the nature of them whether the recall is imaginal or imageless. From the above, it is proposed to formulate a hypothesis that all recall is of facts previously noted, freed from their original setting. Objections from reports of images as being "fully equivalent to actual experience" can be explained away. Recent studies of memory show that memorizing depends upon specific reactions on the material, by noting its features. An experiment the writer has made shows that mere contiguity, or 'movement of attention,' or 'will to remember,' is not a sufficient condition for memorizing, and that there must be a specific reaction upon the relation to be memorized. Experiments with learning of nonsense drawings by T. V. Moore, etc., show that a non-sensory analysis of the drawing is more important than visualization. The theory offered here may be called the mental reaction theory. The perceptual reaction is not an image, but each reaction contributes a specific content. With regard to the question of patterns in sensory complexes, this theory is the same as the theory of synergy, as opposed to the theories of synthesis or apperception and of systasis. The pattern is numerically distinct from the sensory elements. From the psychophysical point of view, sensation is a primary response to stimulus and perception a secondary response, which follows the former so closely that there is a fusion between the two, which makes them hard to distinguish.

YUEN R. CHAO.

Practical versus Literal Truth. DURANT DRAKE. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., Vol. XII, 9, pp. 236-243.

There is apparently no way to avoid ambiguity between practical and literal truth, since a figurative or exaggerated statement often conveys truth which could not be put so effectively in literal form. Compare for example the forceful if inexact declaration, "Where there's a will there's a way," with the literal statement, "If you would find a way, you must have the will to find it." Many dogmas, such as that of justification by faith, cannot be taken literally, and yet by suggestion to the convert they release a power very efficient in practical life. The uncritical believer often sees deeper into life than the sceptic. Recognition of these two differing uses of language might do away with the confusion encountered in pragmatism. If a belief works, there must indeed be truth in it, although literally taken it may not be true, and when so taken may stand in the way of sound historical or cosmological judgments. Let us at least be tolerant of those who cling to old forms which they no longer accept literally, in order to keep alive certain experiences.

MARION D. CRANE.

L'Originalité et L'Universalité dans L'Art. A. JOUSSAIN. Rev. Ph., LXXIX, 3, pp. 231-260.

The work of art is a résumé of the life of the artist, since he puts his knowledge of life into it. For this reason the masterpieces of art are the work of mature life. Even in depicting the life of another, the artist puts himself

into his work. For this reason, all the works of a particular artist have a character in common, which is the expression of his originality. A work of art is universal, as well as original. It speaks a language which appeals to all men. How can originality and universality be united in this intimate way, since they seem opposed? An answer to the question involves a study of the aesthetic sentiments. Psychologists have represented the aesthetic emotions as disinterested. But they are related to desire and instinct, and even to the sentiment of utility, as is revealed by our habit of attributing beauty to means which are well adapted to their ends. All aesthetic emotion is related to desire. What satisfies desire, or benefits the organism, is most apt to be beautiful. The love of beauty does not, then, as Schopenhauer would say, result from the negation of the will to live. On the contrary, we find ourselves in the work of art, we embody ourselves in it, and thus raise our lives to a higher plane. For we pass beyond mere desire, and become subordinated to the object. The sentiment of beauty is the realization of the self in the object contemplated, and its connection with desire is found in the fact that we sympathize most easily with what satisfies our desires. In desire, however, we seek the object which will satisfy; when we admire an object, we already possess it. The aesthetic sentiment is not desire as such, but is the love excited in us by the objectification of the desirable object. This relation of desire to the object is an unconscious one, and forgetfulness of self in the object is what constitutes the chief characteristic of the aesthetic emotion. We tend unconsciously to reproduce the emotions which we have had before, and art gives satisfaction to this tendency. The love of the beautiful is therefore based on our unconscious unity with things, in which we identify ourselves with the world, and feel at harmony with it. Every one of our perceptions, of course, has about it a great deal of memory material. The concentration of a plurality of experiences into the unity of instantaneous vision may be called intuition. This is an interpretation of reality in functions of the past. Every man must interpret nature in the light of his own experiences, and the depth and extent of his life will determine the breadth of his interpretations. A man is born into an environment whose influence he cannot wholly escape, and his art will have points in common with that of his age and country. On the other hand, his own will to live will express itself in reaction against the environment. In the last analysis, man and his environment are complementary, and the individual's environment is the world as interpreted by him. In this interpretation intellect plays a smaller role than intuition. The great genius is never moved by intellect alone, but allows his nature to express itself spontaneously, and intuitively. Art, then, is inseparable from will, and originality and universality are compatible because the nature of man is conformable to the nature of the world, and he is able to conceive and express in some measure the spirit of the living whole.

D. T. HOWARD.

Nietzsche's Moral Aim and Will to Power. WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER.
Int. J. E., XXV, 3, pp. 372-403.

The aim of this article is to correct certain current misconceptions of Nietzschean philosophy—among others that his ideal is mere power, that might makes right, that the 'blond beast' is his ideal of manhood. Extracts from the middle and later period of his writing will perhaps serve this purpose: Force is to be revered only so far as reason blends with it. Authority in order to command others is not desirable. "It costs dear to come to power: power makes stupid (*verdummt*)."

"To rule and *help the highest thought to victory*—that is the only thing that could interest me in Germany." And it is presumably of Bismarck that he says: "Rule? Force my type on others? Horrible! Is not my happiness just in contemplating a variety of types?" Nature as such never was Nietzsche's model, nor adjustment to nature his moral ideal. He believes in different levels of power. Animal force becomes spiritual. Morality, the law of group life, no less than intelligence, is a means to power. Yet society is not the highest level of human life. Great individuals spring from and rise above society. Beyond the comprehension of most of us, they are half like Epicurean gods in their loneliness and solitude. Each new level of power rises from the level beneath it, the present level being a means to that highest reach of life, the superman. Power only can attain this goal. Good is "all that increases the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man." Life requires effort, and higher life higher effort and greater will to live. Here we have the antithesis of Schopenhauer, of Buddhism, and of certain types of Christianity. Great individuals tend to stand alone. Gregariousness is the measure of weakness. This is the reason that Nietzsche rates aristocratic morality higher than mass morality. It is the morality which has identified itself with this latter class that he repudiates. He prefers the morality of such men as Plato and Heraclitus—the morality of men who would naturally have *ruled*. He despises those who depend on glory, on vanity, on hypocrisy, on fear, on mere prudence—all those qualities which look to others for nourishment, which show lack of self-dependence and original creative force. His strong man does not gain power for the sake of luxuries; he would then be weak. Nor is he a swashbuckler. He can "lead a cause, carry out a resolve, be loyal to an idea." "There is force" says Nietzsche, "in mildness and quietness." To have complete power over a person we must win his heart. Higher power also makes the cruder power unnecessary. Machines shall work for man while he becomes stronger—more spiritual. The function of the philosopher is not merely to describe things as they are, but to make what is and was the basis of *creating* the future. To think is to grasp things in order to get control over them. For Nietzsche power is the root of self-control. Weak people have the power of their impulses but no surplus with which to control them. Strength is, however, increased by training, discipline (*Züchtung*). This, the higher meaning of asceticism, becomes the need, the nature, of the strong (spiritual) man. The word Personalism would perhaps best describe Nietzsche's general ethical view. He rejects the

pleasure-pain morality; the word 'egoism' would be misleading; the word 'individualism' is equally objectionable; he is not a friend of anarchy. Nevertheless persons are for him the summit of human evolution—strong, self-directing, final specimens who naturally rule mankind.

ALLEN J. THOMAS.

Humanism and Science. JOHN FREDERICK DASHIELL. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., Vol. XII, 7, pp. 177-189.

Professor Warner Fite holds that pragmatists, in exhibiting instrumentalism, (1) have made absolute the mechanical view of science because of its human uses; (2) have built up an arbitrary and subjective world order and scientific outlook; (3) and have interpreted all the needs of men in terms of bread and butter, overlooking intellectual and social needs. Professor Fite suggests that, combining realism and pragmatism, we regard nature as both objective and personal. But (1) Dewey and Schiller both plainly repudiate the mechanistic conception of the world order, and together with James emphasize the superiority of experience to theory as a teacher. (2) Schiller and Dewey make a clear distinction between reality as *found* by us, and reality as determined by us. (3) Moore points out that intellectual needs grow out of the "bread-and-butter" needs, which are primary biologically and genetically, but not necessarily in degree of honor. Also both Moore and Dewey insist on the social character of cognition, regarding it as the relation of public attention toward a more or less objectified subject matter. Professor Fite's insistence on a human relationship with nature, in which we shall develop a special regard for its *motives*, is part of a current anti-formal, anti-intellectualist reaction. But we do not normally feel the world over against us as purposeful, but rather we conceive it dimly as manifesting dynamic activity in relation to us. The scientist wishes to investigate the *power* back of such activity. He does not claim to be able to work out the interior purposes of things, but rather to find out how things may be controlled. Nature is mysterious and wonderful just because it refuses to be understood in terms of human motives.

MARION D. CRANE.

Les sciences morales et sociales et la biologie humaine. DR. GRASSET. Rev. Ph., XL, 2, pp. 97-137.

To regard the moral and social sciences as simply a chapter in General Biology is disastrous to Ethics and Sociology, because it means the negation of such ideas as good, merit, praise, blame, responsibility, obligation, and duty—the very basis of Ethics, and, likewise, of fraternity, social solidarity, love of neighbor, altruism, helping the weak, mutual assistance, and coöperation for continuous, indefinite progress—the very basis of Sociology. General Biology substitutes for these conceptions such notions as strife, natural selection, universal egoism, struggle for existence, 'might makes right,' survival of the strong and elimination of the weak. Obviously, General Biology cannot serve as a foundation for the moral and social sciences, since

it disregards the very notions upon which the latter must be based. It is advantageous, however, to base the moral and social sciences upon some positive, experimental science. Human Biology, the science of man, will answer this purpose. The moral and social sciences are peculiar to man. General Biology, the science of what is common to all living things, does not take account of the characteristics which are peculiar to man and which differentiate him from all other creatures. But Human Biology is concerned with what is peculiarly human, with the specific differences of man as a fixed species, as well as with such features as man holds in common with all other life. Human Biology envisages man as a whole, with due regard for both his psychical and physiological nature, and emphasizes activity and function more than structure. Its method is scientific: positive, experimental, and both objective and subjective. It finds three characteristics peculiar to man and differentiating him from all other species: (1) superiority of intelligence; (2) capacity for indefinite progress in the accumulation and utilization of the discoveries and acquisitions of the past; and (3) freedom, in the sense of rational or self determination. It finds that the laws of human nature and human conduct are quite different, and quite differently presented, from those of animal nature and conduct. It is true that Human Biology cannot give birth to the ideas of duty, merit, good, just, and moral obligation, and that biological laws would not be binding on man unless he were already in possession of these ideas. But Human Biology discovers and verifies these ideas as universal facts or "*idées-lois*" of human nature. Since human nature is identical with itself at all times and places, it is the duty of every individual to obey the laws of Human Biology, especially the law of protecting, preserving, and enlarging one's life and the life of the species. In this way the two phases of Ethics and Sociology are scientifically built up: the normative portion, anterior and superior to science, though discovered empirically by science, and the practical portion, the direct object of Human Biology. In this way, too, the constant and variable elements of Ethics and Sociology find their place, and a complete science and art of Ethics and Sociology are erected on a scientific foundation. Biological laws and duties have three sanctions: moral, legal, and biological. Biological sanctions are the biological perils to which non-observance of biological duties expose the individual and society. Biological duties (and their corresponding perils) may be classified into four groups: (1) duties of the individual to himself; (2) duties of the individual to other individuals; (3) duties of the individual to society or to the human species; and (4) duties of society or individuals in society to the individual. Human Biology helps to solve moral and social problems by making them scientific questions capable of study and solution by scientific methods. All moral and social sciences, having and wishing to retain a scientific character, are based on the knowledge of biological laws, duties, and perils, as defined and characterized by Human Biology. Human Biology,—which should be as essentially distinguished from Animal Biology as the latter is from Vegetable Biology—affords the moral and social sciences a basis and point of departure,

which General Biology (or any other positive and experimental science) is incapable of affording.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

On the Meaning of Social Psychology. ROBERT H. GAULT. *The Monist*, XXV, 2, pp. 255-260.

Social psychology studies the social behavior of human beings, *i. e.*, the interactions or adjustments that occur among men and women and children, not excluding the more or less automatic social habits which were of conscious origins. Social psychology implies a social consciousness, by which is meant that aspect of human consciousness in which one takes cognizance of one's relations to others; in which one voluntarily seeks to control another's reactions; in which one anticipates one's reaction to the possible behavior of others; in which one makes adjustment to an ideal; and finally in which one responds to what "everybody else is doing." This social consciousness may lapse according to the law of automatization, and may also be intensified by appropriate reaction. Social psychology is also interested in the sense of social unity, which has its basis in the sense of one's own personal identity and is conditioned by the consciousness of kind. Social psychology discusses the means by which to bring about those reactions appropriate to the environment, and also the processes by which old forms of adjustment are replaced by new ones.

SUH HU.

Justice and Progress. H. B. ALEXANDER. *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.*, XII, 8, pp. 207-212.

The conception of justice is grounded in the compromise of conflicting ends. Accordingly the adjudications in which justice finds its expression are adjudications of ends and aims. The whole idea falls within the domain of teleology, and clearly its interpretation must be teleological. The teleology of which justice is the form, however, is not of the simple and elegant philosophical type. Rather, its progressions are by jolts and hitches: it is a fumbler in the dark after the true way. The sanction of rights is reason. This justicial reason must be teleological in form; must define practicable ends; and must recognize that all proper desire is for the good. These axioms of the justicial reason rest upon the fundamental principle that law in human institutions is an expression of faith in the indefinite melioration of man's nature, in his progress towards perfection. Justice finds its fundamental sanction in the assumption of human progress. The advance of the procedure of justice, like the advance in natural science, has been made only by the method of trial and error. Particular applications of justice are the consequence of particular hypotheses. This assumption of human progress is to moral science what the law of uniformity is to natural science. Justice may be defined, in a more individual sense, as "the individual's equity in human progress," a definition which will be found not unfruitful as a principle of legislation.

SUH HU.

Philosophy and the New Justice. HARRY ALLEN OVERSTREET. Int. J. E., XXV, 3, pp. 277-291.

The advance from the primitive form of justice wherein the individual right was identical with class right to the modern ideal of justice wherein the quality of the individual is the essential factor, has left us with the conviction that in our age people do actually 'start even' in the race of life and without artificial handicap. The prevalent belief that men should have only what they can afford is based on the belief that they actually receive and possess according to their natural capacity. It is, however, evident that men often need productive employment, protection against a debilitating wage and debilitating conditions of labor, as well as better conditions of health in general. Recently the conception has quietly developed in our midst that society should meet these needs. The belief is increasing that the modern problem of justice is largely economic; for about us we see everywhere human powers suppressed, interests thwarted, and eager possibilities rendered impotent. Yet conventional economics with its neutral definitions of utility, cost, and value cannot hope to cope with the difficulty. There is, however, evidence that a new economics is forming in which the important place which is now given to production will be given to distribution. In this new economics the social philosopher will play a large part in working out the principle: to each according to his needs, and its correlate: from each according to his realized capacities. A society must say, 'thou canst,' which is equivalent to saying 'thou shalt.' The problem of the philosopher is here thoroughly to work out the nature and the scope of the human factor.

ALLEN J. THOMAS.

The Justification of Punishment. JOHN LISLE. Int. J. E., XXV, 3, pp. 346-359.

Punishment in the sense of social sanction is necessary if we are to have society; and it is needed precisely in the degree that society is needed. Any auto-social act—any act, that is, which is contrary to the will of the social body—for this reason demands punishment. By this necessity alone is punishment justified. Through the introduction into criminal law of moral and religious ideas this goal has been obscured. Indeed the word punishment is itself inaccurate because of the idea of expiation which it contains. That the general desire for vengeance is not the justification of punishment is shown, historically, by the fact that punishment began with the acceptance of fines. The failure of punishment is due then, not to the fact that it fails to satisfy the appetite for revenge, but to the fact that reformation and repression are made ends in themselves and its true purpose, social protection, is thus lost sight of. Prevention is to be the key note of our future criminal law. A board of criminologists composed of alienists, doctors, and sociologists will investigate each crime to the end that those conditions which allowed its commission may be permanently corrected.

ALLEN J. THOMAS.

La Dialectique du Cœur. J. SERRA. *Rev. Ph.*, LXXIX, 3, pp. 209-230.

Irony and enthusiasm, although hatched in the same breast, appear to be mutually conflicting, and to produce by their strife a painful discord within the soul. This appearance of conflict, however, proves upon examination to be the movement of the dialectic of the heart, manifesting itself in intuition and intellect, which have a common root in the life of impulse and activity. As the intellect formulates and represents in symbols the reality which is given more richly and adequately in intuition, and as intelligence draws its life and *élan* from intuition, so irony is inspired by sentiment, and is a false and inadequate representation of it. But intelligence can never wholly reproduce what is given in intuition, although it constantly struggles to do so, and the result is a perpetual state of contradiction between the incessantly multiplying contents of intuition, and the acute efforts of the intellect to represent the former in its own fashion. The desire to know is constantly frustrated by the infinite richness of things, and the disappointment thus arising is expressed in irony. On the other hand intuition is stimulated by the intellectual check, and carries us onward to new enthusiasms and enterprises. Thus the two constantly reinforce and stimulate each other. The result, of course, is impetuosity and restlessness of spirit, but so inseparable is this element from all mental activity as to be in some degree the measure of the enthusiasm which engenders it and carries it forward. In the social as well as in the individual life we may trace this dialectic of the heart. Social enthusiasm and satire are the individual impulses writ large. The love of knowledge and truth for their own sake is an enthusiasm engendered within the spontaneous life of intuition, and its result is science, with its multitudinous schemes and representations. When enthusiasm fails, irony stimulates it to renewed efforts.

D. T. HOWARD.

Mysticism in Present Day Religion. RUFUS M. JONES. *Harvard Theological Review*, VIII, 2, pp. 155-165.

Interest in mysticism is following the collapse of traditional elements in religion. The latter mysticism, whose prophets are usually students rather than direct communicants, is said by one of its best exponents, Evelyn Underhill, to be a way of enhanced life towards higher levels of reality, a goal arrived at by an arduous psychological process, the "mystic way." Souls who pass this route are fortunate revelations of the *élan vital*. Von Hügel does not recognize this mystic way but holds that the mission of the mystic is to bear testimony to the "infinite in man." Deussen claims that the "mystic tendency" is fundamental in human nature, the mystics being possessed of it in a high degree. For Hocking, enhanced life is characteristic of the mystic. Turning to the mystical experience, itself, we find it an undivided whole of experience, intensely joyous, enriched with insight, and pregnant with deeds. In the historical conception, on the other hand, the underlying conception is that of a unity with the Godhead, a conception unfortunately joined with dialectical

classical philosophy. It requires liberation and translation into terms of our own times. Even the conception of the "mystic way" falls somewhat in accomplishing this desideratum; it takes too much account of the classical dialectic and too little of the depths of the religious experience. The mystic experience must be a dynamic impulse to a keener and deeper insight to life.

C. CARL CHURCH.

The Contribution of Professor Royce to Christian Thought. JOHN WATSON BUCKHAM. *Harvard Theological Review*, VIII, 2, pp. 209-277.

Since Edwards, no American has contributed more to religious thought than has Professor Royce. His interests have continually been in religious problems. His first book, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, dealt mainly with the limitation of the idea of God, where he conceives of him as Universal Thought; drawing the argument for the existence of such a being from the nature of error. The Inclusive Thought which makes finite error possible is God. In *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy* he makes the Divine Being include not only Thought but Will. God is the Absolute, related to our experience as an organized whole to its fragments. This absolutism reaches its full expression in *The World and the Individual*. Here "universal experience" becomes uplifted to "universal selfhood." Perhaps the task of establishing a religious monism in which the one can also be the many is too Herculean even for as keen and sincere a mind as that of Professor Royce, but the work is a monument in philosophical literature. To such an Absolute Whole, personality is assigned almost in vain, while individual selfhood is hardly retained. During the last decade Professor Royce's mind has turned to more practical and to moral problems. In *The Problem of Christianity*, the central thought is that of the "beloved community," loyal to itself because loyal to the Spirit who created it and who holds it together. The conception of God in these lectures is uncertain; at times it is associated with the "community," the "spirit of the community" and with the "love of the community." Admittedly, the community corresponding to this ideal does not exist. The ideal church is not yet actual. In the second series of these lectures the "principle of interpretation" is made to throw light upon both the problems of religion and of philosophy. The "community" is a community of interpretation: self-knowledge is interpretative knowledge; the most useful member of the community is the interpreter. The doctrine of the atonement is related in this conception, which represents God as incarnated in the community and winning finite selves by his sorrow. Professor Royce does not sufficiently recognize the need of a Universal Interpreter. These doctrines can not adequately be designated as a form of Hegelianism; they are original contributions to religious thought.

C. CARL CHURCH.

NOTES.

The next meeting of the American Philosophical Association will be held at the University of Pennsylvania during the last week of December.

The Executive Committee of the Western Philosophical Association has accepted the invitation of Washington University, St. Louis, to hold its next meeting at that University. The meeting will take place in the spring of 1916, the exact dates to be hereafter announced.

Dr. Durant Drake of Wesleyan University has been appointed professor of Ethics at Vassar College.

Professor Warner Fite of the University of Indiana has accepted a call to the chair of Ethics in Princeton University.

Professor S. Alexander of the University of Manchester, has been appointed Gifford Lecturer on Natural Theology in the University of Glasgow for sessions 1915-16 and 1916-17.

Dr. Grace Neal Dolson has been appointed professor of philosophy and psychology at Wells College succeeding Professor E. C. Wilm, who has been called to a similar chair in Southwestern University, Texas.

Dr. Alma R. Thorne, assistant in Philosophy and Education at Cornell University, has received an appointment as Instructor in Education at Smith College.

We give below a list of articles in current philosophical magazines.

MIND, N. S., 94: *H. A. Prichard*, Mr. Bertrand Russell on Our Knowledge of the External World; *E. E. Thomas*, Lotze's Relation to Idealism; *J. L. Stocks*, Plato and the Tripartite Soul; *Angelo Crespi*, Idealism and Religion in Contemporary Italian Philosophy.

THE MONIST, XXV, 2: *Preserved Smith*, The Disciples of John and the Odes of Solomon; *Ludwig Boltzmann*, On the Methods of Theoretical Physics; *Bertrand Russell*, On the Experience of Time; *Philip E. B. Jourdain*, Newton's Hypotheses of Ether and of Gravitation from 1679 to 1693; *Robert H. Gault*, On the Meaning of Social Psychology.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, XII, 7: *George H. Sabine*, The Social Origin of Absolute Idealism; *John Frederick Dashiell*, Humanism and Science.

XII, 8: *James T. Shotwell*, The Discovery of Time; *H. B. Alexander*, Justice and Progress; *Elsie Crews Parsons*, The Aversion to Anomalies.

XII, 9: *Theodore de Laguna*, The Postulates of Deductive Logic; *Durant Drake*, Practical versus Literal Truth.

XII, 10: *James T. Shotwell*, The Discovery of Time; *George Clarke Cox*, Professor Adams and the Knot of Knowledge.

XII, 11: *Harry Allen Overstreet*, Conventional Economics and a Human Valuation; *George Clarke Cox*, Individuality through Democracy.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XXV, 3: *Harry Allen Overstreet*, Philosophy and the New Justice; *F. Melian Stawell*, Patriotism and Humanity; *Ralph Barton Perry*, Non-Resistance and the Present War; *C. Delisle Burns*, Moral Effects of War and Peace; *Jessie Taft*, The Woman Movement and the Larger Social Situation; *John Lisle*, Justification of Punishment; *Edward Chauncey Baldwin*, Permanent Elements in the Hebrew Law; *W. M. Salter*, Nietzsche's Will to Power.

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, VIII, 2: *Rufus M. Jones*, Mysticism in Present-Day Religion; *Clifford Herschel Moore*, The Ethical Value of Oriental Religions under the Roman Empire; *William F. Lofthouse*, The Atonement and the Modern Pulpit; *Edward F. Hayward*, Religious Reserve; *John Wright Buckham*, The Contribution of Professor Royce to Christian Thought; *Edwin H. Hall*, Sir Oliver Lodge's British Association Address.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY, XIX, 2: *Benjamin W. Bacon*, Jewish Interpretations of the New Testament; *Shirley Jackson Case*, Religion and War in the Graeco-Roman World; *Henry Preserved Smith*, Protestant Polemic against Roman Catholicism; *Clyde Weber Votaw*, The Gospels and Contemporary Biographies; *Edward Scribner Ames*, Mystic Knowledge; *Wilson D. Wallis*, Missionary Enterprise from the Point of View of an Anthropologist.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, XII, 3: *L. W. Sackett*, The Sequence of Topics in a Beginner's Psychology.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XXII, 2: *George A. Coe*, A Proposed Classification of Mental Functions; *Knight Dunlap*, Color Theory and Realism; *Thomas H. Haines*, Point Scale Ratings of Delinquent Boys and Girls; *C. E. Ferree* and *Gertrude Rand*, A Preliminary Study of the Method of Flicker for the Photometry of Lights of Different Colors, Part I.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XL, 3: *J. Segond*, La dialectique du coeur; *A. Joussain*, L'originalité et l'universalité dans l'art; *Ossip-Lourie*, La manière de la lecture.

XL, 4: *L. Dugas*, Les mémoires extraordinaires (têtes bien faites et têtes bien pleines); *L. Dupuis*, Les stigmates fondamentaux de la timidité, I.

XL, 5: *Th. Ribot*, La pensée symbolique; *E. Beauchal*, L'objectivité des jugements esthétiques; *L. Dupuis*, Les stigmates fondamentaux de la timidité.

KANT-STUDIEN, XX, 1: *N. Hartmann*, Logische und ontologische Wirklichkeit; *O. Ewald*, Die Deutsche Philosophie im Jahre 1913; *August Messer*, Ueber Grundfragen der Philosophie der Gegenwart; *Bruno Bauch*, Idealismus und Realismus in der Sphäre des philosophische Kritizismus.

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, XXI, 3: *Karl Zöckler*, Der Entwicklungsgedanke in Schellings Naturphilosophie; *Franz Mockrauer*, Paul Dessen. Ein Nachwort zu seinem 70. Geburtstag; *Dr. Kratzer*, Die Frage nach dem Seelendualismus bei Augustinus.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOCIOLOGIE, XXXIX, 1: *Luise Cramer*, Kants rationale Psychologie und ihre Vorgänger; *Friedrich Dittmann*, Die Geschichtsphilosophie Comtes und

Hegels. Ein Vergleich. II; *Georg Wernick*, Der Begriff des physikalischen Körpers nach Mach. I.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, LXXI, 3 u. 4: *Th. Ziehen*, Beitrag zur Lehre vom absoluten Eindruck.

LXXI, 5 u. 6: *Friedrich Oetjen*, Die Bedeutung der Orientierung des Lesestoffes für das Lesen und der Orientierung von sinnlosen Formen für das Wiedererkennen derselben; *Walter Baade*, Aufgaben und Begriff einer "darstellenden Psychologie."

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA, VII, 1: *V. Varisco*, La filosofia del Cardinale Mercier; *R. Mondolfo*, La filosofia in Belgio; *L. Ambrosi*, L'Università di Lovanio e Maurizio de Wulf; *A. Pastore*, Filosofia e Poesia nell'opera di Maurizio Maeterlinck; *Z. Zini*, La riforma politica e sociale nel pensiero di un grande belga; *L. Negri*, L'evoluzione sociale secondo Guglielmo de Greef.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

ON INTOLERABLES

A STUDY IN THE LOGIC OF VALUATION.

I.

TO be able to say, 'this is unthinkable, inconceivable,' and to say it with conviction, has ever been felt to be the beginning of wisdom. Man, greedy of this certainty, has tried in many different ways, often dogmatically and gratuitously, often with rare critical insight, and again with a final inner compunction, to set such limits to his thought and will.

But with time we have become critical of these fruitful exclusions. To be able to say with conviction, 'such and such a thing is inconceivable,' requires that one shall be either very knowing or unknowing, very simple or very astute. One learns that it is not inconceivable that water should be hard, that polyandry is not unthinkable. Our notions have been constantly revised, in the world of nature and morals alike, until finally there is nothing the opposite of which we find inconceivable except, perhaps, a few formal logical propositions.

On another point also man has learned wisdom in this matter. Not only has he discovered that he has constantly confused the unimaginable with the unthinkable, but that many propositions which he thought to be certain because their opposites are inconceivable, are really so merely because they are *intolerable* to his feeling and will. The philosophical saint of the Middle Ages found it inconceivable that the most perfect Being, having once been thought, should not also exist. To the post-Kantian

philosopher, on the other hand, it is "intolerable that the highest inspirations of reason, appreciative of values, should have no existence, power and validity in the world of reality." The Cartesian rationalist found it "inconceivable that God should deceive"; for the voluntarist of today it is intolerable that the world should be mere appearance, or illusion, and from this intolerability for his will he argues the absolute existence of its objects.¹

In the light of these facts, the whole question of intolerables invites discussion, for no such discussion exists. If the existence of inconceivables, *i. e.*, of propositions the opposites of which are inconceivable, is the *sine qua non* of an intellectualistic philosophy, so the *sine qua non* of any 'value philosophy' must be the existence of certain ultimate value or values the opposites of which could properly be described as intolerables. The fact that precisely such intolerables are constantly being consciously or unconsciously assumed must be apparent to any one familiar with modern philosophy. Whether, as is often hastily supposed, they are ultimately reducible to the wilful and 'romantic' demand that the universe shall satisfy us, because the opposite would be intolerable, remains to be seen.

The question of the existence and nature of such intolerables is indeed the first problem which such a critical discussion invites. But immediately other questions arise. How is the intolerable related to the inconceivable? Are they two sides of the same shield, as is often supposed, for instance, in a type of idealism such as Bosanquet's? Are any propositions about reality deducible from them? What is their place in a system of values? These questions, and others like them, indicate the range of problems thus opened up, and the place such a discussion may properly claim in philosophical thought.

¹ Thus, Münsterberg says, "Our will is anchored in the depths and has become a valuation with absolute *existence* (*italics mine*), as soon as we will with the consciousness that we cannot possibly will otherwise as long as we will a world at all; that we would give away ourselves, and the world would lose its meaning, if we were not to will this will!" But to give away ourselves, to have the world lose its meaning, would be intolerable--this is I suppose the tacit completion of the argument.

II.

And first as to the question of fact. Are there any intolerables? Intolerables *überhaupt*? There can be no doubt, I think, that we use this predicate with the same implication of universality with which we use inconceivability. Is such a use justifiable?

I have interested myself in gathering examples of those things that the philosophers find intolerable. They range all the way from the unrequited affection of the most ephemeral insect to the eternal pains of the damned, from the thought that two and two should not make four to the thought that the entire world of sense and thought should be an illusion. "Nietzsche," says Rickert, "found absolute physics intolerable, but who does not?"

It is apparent from the start that distinctions are here in order. In the first place, there is evidently an equivocation in our use of the term intolerable similar to that found in the term inconceivable. The inconceivable is often identified with the unimaginable. What we can contemplate in the sense of imagination is wholly a psychological matter. Similarly what we can tolerate in contemplation is in at least one sense of the word wholly a matter of sensibility.

That there are psychological limits to sense and sensibility we are well aware. I find things unbearable in this sense and pass into unconsciousness and die. So also, there are limits to my sympathetic contemplation of distress and horror, beyond which lies madness. On the other hand, we can get used to anything, it is said, even hanging, and in so far as sense and sensibility are concerned this seems to be very nearly true. It is in no wise different with that form of sensibility we call moral. It is intolerable, we cry, and lo we tolerate it—first endure and finally embrace. There is scarcely an element of our moral sensibility (it is the old story of relativism) the opposite of which has not been found tolerable enough. The *a priori* intolerable, such as incest, seems a chimera.

Perhaps then we may say that as a matter of fact everything imaginable is also tolerable to some sensibility,—malevolent delight in torture, the contemplation of the pains of the damned,

in short the opposites of all the ordinary objects of desire, sensibility and sympathy. Ugliness may become a delight, untruth an atmosphere in which we find ourselves at ease. Death, against which ordinary sensibility revolts, may become a boon, and complete extinction, which Ferrier thought *a priori* inconceivable, may not only be conceivable, but tolerable and actually willed. And as for the intolerables of the philosopher, 'absolute physics' or an illusory world, these may not only be tolerable but, as any one who has read the philosophers knows, the source of peculiar delights. Nothing in itself is intolerable, and therefore, nothing in this sense is absolutely valuable. Actual transvaluation of values, even metaphysical values, is possible without limit.

But more than this—and this is a point that I consider especially worthy of note—there are innumerable situations actually intolerable to us in reality, that become tolerable enough in imagination and thought. I refer here to the extension of the limits of the tolerable through artistic forms of representation.

The cardinal illustration of this is, of course, tragedy. The paradox of tragedy, the topic of endless discussion, is just this: that we find the intolerable tolerable, that we take delight in pain, and that what we flee in reality, we seek in the form of aesthetic illusion. Tragedy is, however, merely the most conspicuous form of this curious division of our natures. That which one would not tolerate, much less will, in the world of moral realities, one not only endures but by sympathy actually wills in the world of poetry and fiction. Any one who has observed this curious world must have wondered at the strange indulgence crimes of passion and irresistible desires there enjoy; at the reversal of moral values, the possibility of indefinite transvaluation this world affords. But strangest of all is the extension of the tolerable in the tragic. Before the tragic destruction of the moral hero, for instance, we stand with a moral indifference, nay with a tragic elevation, an aesthetic delight, which presents, as Th. Lessing has said, an axiological fact of a peculiar and significant sort. It is just this extension of the tolerable through the aesthetic which commanded Nietzsche's attention. Insight into

madness and error, even as a condition of life, would be without art "*gar nicht auszuhalten.*" He suggests that in art we can bear what we otherwise could not.

With the psychology of these phenomena—with the debated question whether our sympathetic participation has to do with 'real feeling' or *Schein-gefühle*—we need not bother ourselves here. It is sufficient that the *assumption* of the reality of the object is the condition of the aesthetic contemplation, and that a sphere of reality is created in which the limits of what is endurable and tolerable for our sensibility are immensely extended, and that this must be taken into account in our problem of ultimate intolerables. I emphasize the point here because of important bearings later.

If, then, to draw these facts together, we understand by the tolerable that which is endurable for sensibility, there seems ground for saying that no objects of such sensibility are intolerable *überhaupt*.

III.

Is this then the end of our study? Rather may we not well ask whether this is really what is meant by the philosopher when in one way or another he makes use of this concept of the '*a priori* intolerable,'—when, for instance, immortality is established for a Kant because the opposite is intolerable for the moral consciousness, or when Lotze finds it intolerable that the highest inspirations of reason, appreciative of values, are without power and validity in the world of reality? Evidently it is not. Whether rightly or not, these thinkers believe that such postulates as these, the opposites of which are for them intolerable, and for which they assume universality, are somehow independent of the mutations of sensibility described. Between sensibility and the apprehension of value a distinction is made, a distinction analogous to that made by such intellectualists as Anselm and Descartes between that which can be thought and not imagined, and that which can be imagined but not thought. Is such an analogy capable of being carried out? Is it not conceivable, at least, that, while there are no objects or situations which, as a result of

habit and custom and dulling of sensitivity, may not become tolerable, and none which through imaginative contemplation in the aesthetic mode may not become not only endurable but actually enjoyed, there may yet be postulates of the will, the opposites of which would really be intolerable in this axiological sense?

I believe not only that the distinction here made is valid, but also that the philosophers who, in implying this distinction, insist that there are intolerables for the 'practical reason' or for the 'pure will' are essentially sound. They may be wrong in their definition of the intolerable; none of them may have hit upon that which is really intolerable; but the principle underlying their position is not only valid but of considerable theoretic importance. In developing my position I will make use of an illustration which seems almost made for our purpose. It is a paragraph from Wundt's *Ethics* on what might be characterized as the 'limits of moral contemplation.'

"If we could be absolutely assured," Wundt writes,¹ "of the misery of a descendant living two centuries hence, we should probably not be much disturbed. It would trouble us more to believe that the state and nation to which we belong were to perish in a few generations. The prospect would have to be postponed for several centuries at least before our knowledge that all the works of time must be destroyed would make it tolerable. But there is *one idea that would be forever intolerable*, though its realization were thought of as thousands of years distant: it is the thought that humanity with all its intellectual and moral toil, may vanish without leaving a trace, and that not even a memory of it may endure in any mind." From the intolerability of this conception Wundt actually goes on to infer the reality of its opposite. "The confidence in this reality is born," it is true, "of faith not of knowledge," but of a "faith based on a dialectical analysis of the concept of moral end which shows that every given end is only proximate, not ultimate,—is thus finally a means to the attainment of an imperishable goal."

¹ *The Principles of Morality* (Eng. translation), p. 82.

This is, I repeat, an illustration made, as it were, for our purpose, and is worth close consideration for several reasons.

In the first place it purports to be an empirical analysis of our actual sense of value, and is made by a psychologist not accustomed to speak hastily in such matters. It fairly represents what men feel in the matter; at least the answers to a questionnaire submitted to my students for a number of years leads me to think so. In the second place, the illustration brings out clearly the distinction between sensibility and value with which we have been concerned. For you will note that, as the matter is here presented, it is precisely *the contemplation of the destruction of that which appeals most to our sensibility*, namely our less remote descendants and the nation to which we are attached, *that is tolerable*, while the idea that is absolutely intolerable, no matter how remote in time its realization is conceived to be, is one that makes no immediate appeal to our sensibility and sympathy, namely the thought of the ultimate futility of effort, the ultimate destruction of values.

In the third place, it contains the nerve of all the arguments from the intolerable with which we are here concerned. However it may be phrased, whether as an "instinct which tells us that reality is the support of values" (Bosanquet), as the postulate that 'the universe must satisfy us' or as the 'conservation of values,' it is always *because the opposite is intolerable* that the truth of the propositions is believed.

Has then *this* intolerable the universality here claimed for it? As yet we are dealing merely with the question of fact, and I think we must admit that there are many who do not find it so. Not only do they find it wholly tolerable to contemplate the possibility of the opposite of this postulate of the conservation of values, but also the certainty of the still more drastic picture which physical science is supposed to give of our world and its passing away. Nietzsche may have found absolute physics intolerable, but certainly Mr. Russell and others do not.

I think, however, it is perfectly fair to doubt whether the expressions of the latter should be taken at their face value. When

Mr. Russell, for example, in his discussion of tragedy in the essay entitled "The Free Man's Worship," finds it possible, not only to endure with resignation, but even to find a certain tragical elevation in the very thought that Wundt finds intolerable, may we not well ask whether it is not really an aesthetic attitude with which we are here concerned; whether it is not precisely a case of that extension of the tolerable through aesthetic contemplation of which we have already spoken? There are, as we have pointed out, probably no limits to what may be found tolerable in such aesthetic contemplation, but it may well be questioned whether such a mood can be, or should be taken as final.

That it is essentially an aesthetic attitude, and indeed one akin to that with which we face the destruction of the tragic hero, will not be doubted by any one who has read the essay in question. It is, moreover, a mood common enough, and one wholly accessible to any one with the powers of abstraction and isolation necessary to aesthetic contemplation. But that this dissociation of value and reality is ultimately possible may still be questioned. The question we have come upon here really involves one of the fundamental problems of value theory. Are the values of the true, the good, the beautiful, independent values; or do they all presuppose the ultimate value of reality? Von Hartmann has a striking passage that runs somewhat as follows: "The beauty-value of the world abstracts from all reality in that it is concerned wholly with aesthetic appearance. From the positive character of this value it follows, no more than from the world's value for knowledge, that also as reality, as a sum of objective real things, it has a positive value. Suppose the world were a paragon of evil, a miscarriage or a hell, it would still be a value for knowledge, and for the artist beautiful even though this were merely that the painter might study the light effects of this hell or the poet sing the pains of the damned."¹ Now what impresses me in a passage such as this is not the moral insensibility which seems to underlie it. I am willing to believe that the veriest hell might be endurable for the scientist while he is dis-

¹ *Grundriss der Axiologie (System der Philosophie, Bd. V)*, p. 8.

covering say new processes of combustion, or for the artist while he is striving to catch the light which in very truth never was on land or sea. I can indeed put myself in his place; I can share his moments of abstraction. But that he should say that this knowledge and beauty have value in any ultimate sense; that in the face of the complete dissociation of reality from the good, he can speak of values at all, passes my comprehension. Such dissociation is not intolerable for sensibility perhaps, but for any ultimate contemplation, ontological or metaphysical if you will, it is intolerable. Somehow the *positive* value of the beauty or the knowledge *does* imply that the objects, *as reality*, have a positive value.

That there are relative dissociations of this sort every one must of course admit. A novel, we are told, may reach the highest value of beauty and yet its characters may historically, as objects of logical truth connection, be without any value. Moreover, the deed of the hero may be a moral crime. On the other hand, an achievement may deserve the highest possible ethical estimation and yet may nowhere offer a hold for aesthetic enjoyment. These are perhaps extreme statements. It may well be questioned whether an element of logical truth connection is not a presupposition of beauty; whether the highest possible ethical estimation does not include an element of the aesthetic. But, assuming them to be relatively true, these partial dissociations cannot be taken as ultimate, nor can partial discrepancies between value and reality be pleaded as an argument for complete and final dissociation.¹ They represent moods of our sensibility, but it is false philosophy to crystallize these moods into absolute values. Life constantly shows us these values clashing with each other—our whole existence is filled with the tension of their opposing forces—but so soon as we attempt to live an entire life, to bring the moods of life together, these contradictions do become intolerable, and the contemplation of their final dissociation would be the genuinely *axiological* intolerable.

It may, of course, be said that we do not need to bring the moods of life together, to live an entire life, in order to value.

¹ Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 300.

We do not need to ask what the meaning or value of *it all* is in order to experience the separate values. Such a demand itself is, you may say, but an expression of individual wilfulness or sensibility. Either it is a matter of sensibility—it depends upon what sort of man you are, as Fichte would say—or a merely wilful voluntarism which declares that ‘the willing of a unitary world is the condition of our discussing values at all.’ I am not such a man; I do not find it necessary to will such a world. Therefore the opposite is not intolerable. Therefore there is nothing more to say.

I do not believe that we are left in such a situation, and the reasons for this belief will appear in the course of the discussion. But, returning to the point which occasioned this digression, I feel sure we may at least say, after this study, that the tragical elevation in the face of a world totally indifferent to values is a mood of sensibility—a mood indeed that we may all share at times, but still with most of us a mood and not a belief. Its possibility is but an extreme case of certain psychological laws of our sensibility, and constitutes no valid argument against the essential intolerability of an absolute dissociation between value and reality.

In the case of Mr. Russell a certain luxuriating in the emotions which the contemplation of this dissociation induces, suggests even a kind of sentimentality. For him the good is not only a quality of some timeless essences, but the meaning of this quality is that these essences ought to exist, or, if anything exists at all, it ought to conform to them. That he should find a certain perverted sublimity in the contemplation of the “abysm of wrong” which the total indifference of reality to this demand discloses, may perhaps be conceivable. There seem to be no limits to possibility in this direction. But that he should think that the good is somehow good, notwithstanding, is hard to understand. One should not call names in philosophy, but this mythical good seems to have betrayed Mr. Russell into a form of sentimentality which is much more objectionable than that alleged to be displayed by those who say things must be valuable in order to exist at all.

Let us then seek to generalize the results of our analysis thus far. We have been concerned with the simple question of fact, and there are two facts which seem to be of importance. In the first place, if by 'intolerable' we understand intolerable for some sensibility, there seem to be no limits to what our sensibility may find tolerable. Transvaluation of values seems to be in this sense practically unlimited. In the second place, the facts compel us to recognize that there is no value the opposite of which cannot be affirmed. That which is intolerable to the ethical consciousness may be tolerable from the aesthetic or scientific point of view. That which is intolerable to either of the latter may be easily taken up into the moral. But there seems good reason for believing that a distinction between sensibility and valuation is justified by the facts, that in this sense we may distinguish between an aesthetic imagination and a genuine contemplation of situations, and that for the latter there are situations that are genuinely intolerable, intolerable *überhaupt*. Such a situation is the absolute and final dissociation between value and reality which Wundt's illustration brings vividly before us.

IV.

Suppose then there is something intolerable, in this ultimate, *axiological* sense—what of it? Surely, the reader will exclaim, you do not propose even to consider the possibility of using that as a basis of any inference about reality. Certainly, it will be said, you ought not to assert the truth of any proposition about the world because you find the contemplation of its opposite intolerable. Even in formal logic the principle of the inconceivability of the opposite is already in bad odor; do you hope, at this late day, to reassert it in a region where it would be still more precarious?

To this I will answer merely that precisely such reasoning has formed the basis of a very respectable portion of philosophy, and I propose to examine it on its own merits. For by this time it must be clear, not only where the intolerable is supposed to be found, but also what use is made of it. There is, it is held,

'an instinct that tells us that reality is the support of values,' and in some way the certainty of that proposition is supposed to follow from the intolerability of the opposite. Lotze is certain that values 'have existence, power and validity in the real world because it is intolerable that they should not.' Bosanquet uses the same line of thought in his argument for immortality, showing however, that it is merely the 'conservation of values' that we really want. In short, there is a considerable body of philosophical thought that holds to the principle that 'reality must be ultimately valuable,' or must 'conserve values,' however you may wish to express it, and rests the truth of this principle upon the intolerability of the opposite.

But why is it supposed that from this intolerability of the opposite we can conclude that there is this necessary relation between value and reality?

It is at this point evidently that our critical study begins. Wundt, as we have seen, rests it, not upon empirical knowledge, but upon what he calls a "dialectical analysis of the moral end," and in this, I think we may say, he fairly represents what is in the minds of thinkers of this type. Some such *a priori* necessity is, I presume, taken for granted in the view we have been exposing. But, in order that we may attack this problem with any hope of success, a more careful preliminary analysis is necessary, and I must ask the reader to bear with a somewhat technical discussion.

In the first place, the problem must be restated, and somewhat more broadly. If this belief rests upon a dialectical analysis, it is ultimately an analysis of the value notion rather than of the moral end. For moral end may conceivably be but one type of end, and it is now generally admitted that ends presuppose values, rather than values ends. We have then the more ultimate question, whether the intolerability of the opposite of this relation of value to reality springs from any dialectical analysis of the value notion itself.

In the second place, the problem must be divided. We must first ask whether there are any *a priori* propositions about value

at all, and whether these lead in any way to propositions about reality. It will then be time to ask whether this specific belief in the conservation of value is justified. For it is entirely possible that the first may be true and the second untrue.

Are there then any *a priori* elements in value, and valuation? That is, are there any *a priori* propositions about value; and if so, how are they related to actual, empirical valuation? Both of these questions, for they are really different questions, as we shall see, require the most careful consideration.

One way to approach the problem of the *a priori* is to ask this question, whether we can contemplate the opposite of a proposition. It is possible, for instance, to contemplate a world in which men never die, but not one in which two and two do not make four. "We feel," says Mr. Russell, "that such a world, if there were one, would upset the whole fabric of our knowledge and reduce us to utter doubt." How is it now with the world of values? Are there any propositions here the contemplation of the opposite of which is—we will not as yet say intolerable, but impossible?

Now, as we have already seen, there are many things in this sphere also which men have thought they could not contemplate, but which nevertheless they can, perfectly well. It would be possible, I suppose, to contemplate a world in which any actual valuation should be reversed, a world for instance in which lying should be put above truth, and ugliness preferred to beauty, a world even in which one could say, "Evil (in the narrower sense) be thou my good." We can contemplate a world in which men never die, and perhaps equally a world in which happiness is not better than unhappiness, or life better than death. It seems possible to contemplate any transvaluation of values whatsoever—at least that is the inference to be drawn from the results of the first part of this paper. *There is no value the opposite of which cannot be affirmed.*

But this by no means settles the question of the *a priori* in the realm of value. It must, for one thing, be patent that any such transvaluation, however complete, leaves the value re-

lation itself untouched. I may say, unhappiness is better than happiness, untruth better than truth, evil be thou my good, but the relation 'better' in all cases remains. For myself, I think that this 'form of value' is an inseparable aspect of all objects as such, that every object must fall somewhere in the scale of positive or negative value with the same *a priori necessity* that an object must be either existent or non-existent.¹ But without insisting upon this point, which may be disputed (it has been held for instance that this is true only of existents), it is sufficient for our purpose to make clear that, *given any value objects*, this relation is necessary, and that any transvaluation of values leaves the form of values untouched.

It is then impossible to contemplate a world in which values do not fall into a relation of 'higher and lower.' Any value order is conceivable, because it is empirical in origin, but given a world in which there are any three values whatever, it is inconceivable that one of them should not fall between the other two. This lies in the dialectical analysis of the value notion itself, and the opposite would upset the whole fabric of value no less than the contemplation of a world in which two and two do not make four would upset the whole fabric of our knowledge.²

There is then, I think, beyond question something that may be said *a priori* about value as such, quite apart from any relations of particular values to feeling and will. That there are other propositions of this character I do not deny, and am inclined in fact to believe. But this is sufficient for our present purpose.

Having found then something that may be said *a priori* about value, let us see what bearing it has upon our problem. Our question was this: Granted that there is any *a priori* knowledge of value, can we proceed to any propositions about the relation of value to reality?

Now, if we examine closely the proposition under consideration, two things will, I think, become apparent. In the first place

¹ See in this connection, Simmel, *Philosophie des Geldes*, chapter 1.

² A similar position is taken by Th. Lessing in his *Studien zur Wertaxiomatik*, Leipzig, 1914, chapter 2.

it is clear that, because we cannot contemplate a world of values in which the relations in question are not found, it by no means follows either that we know what these relations are, or in fact that there *are* any values in reality at all. From the inconceivability of the opposite no propositions about reality can be inferred.

In the second place, it is equally clear that while this proposition about values is one the opposite of which is inconceivable, it could scarcely be said to be intolerable. Indeed when one looks at the matter closely the word 'intolerable' in this connection seems to be meaningless. It has meaning only in connection with feeling and will, and the proposition here made about value is concerned with value as such, with value as contemplated apart from reality and apart from feeling and will. For while every object that becomes a value, and thus enters into relations with feeling and will, takes on necessarily these relations, this 'value form,' the form lies in the nature of value itself, irrespective of any relation to feeling or will.

But let us look more deeply into the question. And first, let us see whether there is not after all some relation between the inconceivable and the intolerable. Certainly the inconceivable does not bring with it the intolerable, for intolerability has meaning only where feeling and will are concerned. But if there were some necessary dialectical relation between the cognition of value and actual valuation, between value and feeling and will, that which is intolerable might have some definite relation to the inconceivable.

That there is such a necessary relation between value and feeling and will is widely held. It is held, for instance, that it is *a priori* evident that we ought to pursue what is good. If, it is said, I have recognized that A is a value, then I must rationally will A. This, we may safely say, is an intuitive principle. But there is more than this. For, if it be true that of two values one is necessarily higher than the other, I ought rationally to seek the higher rather than the lower. Again, let us assume that, given two values, A and B, A *plus* B is greater than A or B

alone; then it follows that I ought rationally to seek A *plus* B rather than A or B separately. This latter principle of the 'maximization of value' was held by F. Brentano to be the one absolutely evident value law, wholly independent of any specific content, and as such the natural and intuitive sanction of morality. It is not necessary for our purpose to discuss either the ethical significance of these principles of 'pure value' or how they are applied to the matter of fact of actual valuation. Our sole point here has been to show that there are, not only *a priori* propositions about values and their relation, but also about valuation, that there are intuitively necessary relations between the principles that apply to pure values and volition. In making this point, moreover, we have also seen that *the very principle or principles, the opposite of which it is impossible to contemplate, are so related to will that, if we will at all, we must will according to them.* It is impossible to contemplate our will as willing otherwise. In this respect the *a priori* propositions about value differ from others. The recognition that A is a value is itself already the beginning of willing it, and the willing of a value implies willing according to the intrinsic nature of value as such.

The first condition of a relation between the inconceivable and the intolerable, namely a relation of the *a priori* form of value to will and feeling, is thus secured. But observe what immediately follows. Think for a moment what this transition from the world of pure value laws to actual valuation (feeling and will) implies. Sharply as we may distinguish between the two, between laws of value as such and laws of will, does there not yet lie in the very possibility of this transition, nay in its very necessity, the presupposition that the object or ends of this will are possible? *If actual volition (and valuation) is the realization of values in the world of existents, does not the possibility of such valuation presuppose that reality in its structure does not contradict the essential constitution of values?* If, for instance, the principles of degree and of the 'maximization of value' lie in the very nature of value as such, would not then a world in which the opposite were true, that is, a world in which there were really no higher

or lower (not merely in the limited ethical sense of course), and in which increase of value were impossible, would not such a world, I ask, be in very truth an intolerable world? We should then have to 'will our world,' for no man can escape that, but in willing that world, we should will in accordance with principles that are in direct contradiction with the structure of that world.

This is the critical point of our entire discussion. We do not say that such a situation is *inconceivable*. We do say that it is *intolerable*. And from that intolerability a belief in its opposite necessarily springs. Some belief about the relation of value to reality springs from the 'dialectical analysis' of value itself and is not derived from our experience of values. In this respect the type of thinking we have had under examination is in possession of a sound intuition.¹

V.

With these general results of our technical analysis in mind, let us return to the more concrete world of ethical and religious aspiration in which the actual intolerables are found. Let us examine some of the suppositions which it has been found axiologically intolerable to contemplate.

That which Wundt found intolerable is that values, whatever they may be, should not be conserved. In this he represents a feeling so fundamental, that Höffding has thought himself justified in regarding such belief in conservation of value as the essence of all religion, and indeed, ventures so far as to call it an axiom. We have seen that there is reason for holding that there are propositions about the relations between value and reality the opposites of which are not only intolerable in the axio-

¹ In saying this, however, two points must be kept in mind. We have not committed ourselves to any specific statement of this relation. Whether it includes necessarily the assumption that reality must be ultimately valuable, that values are progressively realized, or that values are conserved, are questions for further consideration. Again, it cannot be repeated too often that we do not infer this relation of value to reality from the inconceivability of the opposite. From the inconceivability of the opposite no propositions about reality can be inferred. But we hold that the genuinely intolerable is in a different position. We could not say that it is impossible abstractly to contemplate a world in which the structure of reality is in direct contradiction with value. 'Absolute physics,' though intolerable, is certainly possible to contemplate.

logical sense, but also for which this intolerability constitutes a certain kind of evidence. Has this so-called axiom of the conservation of value this evidential character?

That which is already evident is the following. For valuation (and volition) to have any meaning, the world of reality must not be in contradiction with the *a priori* structure of value. The principles of serial order and of 'maximization of value,' lie in the nature of valuation as such. A world in which the opposite were true, that is a world in which there were really no higher and lower, and in which maximization of value were impossible, would be an intolerable world. The transition from abstract value and its laws to valuation presupposes to this extent the possibility of our volitional ends. Does it also presuppose the conservation of value?

On the surface at least, it certainly does not. It would, for instance, seem possible that actual valuation in the way of preference of the higher over the lower value, of the larger over the smaller, that will in the sense of increase of values, should go on in a world in which there was an actual shrinkage of values. Even if value were decreasing in the world, we could still apply the *a priori* principles of valuation to it. Valuation is not incompatible with pessimism. We could make the best of a world actually going to the dogs.

But on closer inspection this scarcely seems to be the case. In the extreme case of pessimism cited (although there has never been an absolute pessimism either in religion or philosophy) there must at least be the continuance, the conservation, of the value order already achieved. As Höffding in his illuminating discussion of this subject remarks, "Even in pessimism there must be an underlying faith in the conservation of value, for were all value to disappear the relation between value and reality must disappear also." The fact of the matter is, to state the point briefly, valuation is an irreversible process. The postulate of maximization of value, which is merely the *a priori law* of value as such translated into terms of will, presupposes not only that the ends of will are possible, but progressively possible.

But this 'progressively possible' is in turn compatible only with irreversibility, and this implies conservation.¹

In my own mind, therefore, there is little doubt that the assumption of progress, or the irreversible process, is as essential to the logic of valuation as the assumption of the uniformity of nature is to science. There is just as little doubt that 'progress' or the maximization of value implies its conservation. That the opposite of this is *conceivable* I readily admit. Whether values *are* conserved is a matter of experience, and as in the case of "Justice" in Maeterlinck's *Blue Bird*, we may perhaps admit that "we have not lived long enough to know." But that the opposite is intolerable, and that from this intolerability springs an evidence of a peculiarly incontrovertible kind I am just as certain. For this we have all lived long enough, for it is not a matter of time at all. What is evident here is, *not that values are conserved in the world, but rather that values are not really values, if the essence of value is not conserved.*

VI.

In the space that remains to me I wish to make two further points which will serve to bring out more clearly the significance of the position here developed, and to guard against certain misconceptions. I have sought to show that as a matter of fact there are intolerables—not merely in a psychological, but in an ultimate, axiological sense. I wish now to ask: what is the significance of this for a theory or 'system' of values? In the second place, I have accepted in principle the type of philosophy that takes as its corner-stone the 'belief that reality is the support of values.' I wish now to defend this position from what seems to be an attack based upon a gross caricature of its real meaning.

As regards the first point—the bearing of the fact of the 'existence' of such intolerables upon the 'system of values'—I think it must be clear by this time that we must be exceedingly

¹ See in this connection, Ostwald, *Der Energetische Imperative*, which, although there is abundant room for criticism of many of its positions, yet brings out this aspect of the logic of valuation admirably.

wary in our use of this conception. It is, for instance, a tempting thought that we have in this principle of the intolerability of the opposite a means of determining ultimate values, the 'absolute' value or values, the highest good upon which all others depend. To make my meaning wholly clear I will take as illustration an actual use of the principle in this way. It is an argument used by Dürr in his *Ethics* to prove that personality and not 'life' is the highest value.

"That life (and the increase of life) is not the highest good, if not immediately evident, can be shown in the following way. The magnitude or importance of a value, in a certain sense, depends upon or corresponds to the unendurableness of its opposite. The opposite of life is death, certainly a wholly endurable condition. The opposite of the value which we have called personality or self consciousness is not, however, the passing away of consciousness, but the condition best described, perhaps, by the theologians under the term spiritual death. The absolute contradiction with one's self is the most frightful condition which the human mind can conceive. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that after a certain approach to this condition the unhappy individual whose fate this is, seeks to save himself through the repose of non-existence. Barbaric therefore is the imagination of those who see the essence of damnation in the eternal inescapability from such a condition. *When once one has lived himself into this line of thought he can have no longer any doubt that the value of personality is the highest value for every man.*"¹

Here, clearly, the principle of the intolerability of the opposite is used to establish the highest value, and since unendurableness is assumed to have degrees, to establish also, by implication, an order of values. Without committing ourselves too far to all the theoretical implications involved, we may, I think, readily admit that such a line of thought does establish what may be called a practical order of values. I am, for example, convinced that when in a similar fashion Paulsen asks us whether we can endure the contemplation of a life of unmixed pleasure (a state

¹ Dürr, *Grundzüge der Ethik*, p. 325.

procured by a hypothetical drug that brings with it no pain or ill effects, but one in which there is no life-struggle or development of personality, no touch with reality), our negative answer does establish the fact that pleasure is not the highest value, and the realization of personality does take a higher place in the scale. Moreover, I believe that the determination of these practical absolutes, the *minima* and *maxima* of valuation, is the only way to develop an empirical scale of values, as I have developed at length in my book on "Valuation."

But this is obviously not the point at issue here. It is rather this. Can we use the principle of intolerability to establish some value or values as absolute upon which all the others depend,—for instance, the value of truth, or of personality? If so, we must reverse the position already taken. We have said that there is no single value of which the opposite may not be contemplated, none the opposite of which may not be affirmed, and I think we must hold fast to this conviction. From the intolerability of the opposite we can no more deduce actual values (this seems to be Münsterberg's method) than from the inconceivability of the opposite we can deduce propositions about existence.

It is the failure to recognize this fact that accounts for all the differences and contradictions in ethics and value-theory generally. We must recognize once and for all that there is nothing which is called value or not-value in actual experience which is absolute or possesses value wholly in itself,—neither life nor humanity, neither cosmos nor highest pleasure, neither personality nor state. And, on the contrary, there is nothing that experience teaches us to hate and avoid that is absolutely and for all cases shown to be not a value,—neither death nor loss of happiness, neither fame nor destruction, order nor anarchy. No single condition, no special function or quality can be called in itself valuable or valueless. There are, it is true, absolute elements in value, propositions the opposites of which are inconceivable, but they concern the 'form' of value, not its empirical content. There are absolute elements in valuation, there is that the opposite of which it is intolerable to contem-

plate; but it is not the opposite of any particular valuation, but rather of that which underlies all valuations,—namely, the postulate that if there is any value at all it shall have ‘existence, power and validity in the world of reality,’ that whatever is essential in our actual values, must be conserved.

The second point is the examination of what I consider to be a caricature of the real meaning of the point of view in philosophy under discussion. I refer to the attacks made upon it by a school of thought which, delighting to call itself realistic, thinks that by applying the question-begging epithet ‘romanticism,’ the case is already half won. In rejecting this romanticism and all its works, it insists that ‘things need not be good and beautiful or spiritual in order to exist at all.’ It can contemplate with composure a world in which there were no necessary relations between value and reality, and even if it found the situation intolerable, this would be wholly irrelevant, for it is simply a psychological fact among other facts. This is the limit of its wisdom.

Now, after what has preceded, the present writer will hardly be accused of such simplicity of mind as to suppose that ‘the universe must satisfy him,’ and that, when he has once found out what it is that he really wants, he can be sure that that is the way things really are. I hope it is reasonably clear by this time that, like his realistic and tough-minded colleagues, he can also contemplate abstractly the possibility that things do not need to be valuable in order to exist, and that he is not likely to think that he can pass from the value of a thing to its existence. But it ought also to be clear that to characterize in such a fashion the view here developed is nothing less than a caricature.

This type of criticism has recently been stated vigorously by Mr. Bernard Muscio, in an article entitled “Degrees of Reality.”¹ It rests so clearly, I think, on just such a caricature of the position it attacks, that a brief examination of its main point may serve to clarify the issue.

“The notion of degrees of reality is,” Mr. Muscio properly recog-

¹ PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, November, 1913.

nizes, "eminently a value conception." "The ground and justification of the metaphysical argument which employs the notion is an assumption concerning the nature of the Universe; and philosophy is by no means compelled to make this assumption." "When we strip off the detail . . . the inference from the existence of certain qualities in the parts of the universe to the proposition that the universe possesses these qualities in the highest possible degree, is an appeal to faith. . . . This assumption takes one of two forms: either, that what we believe to be the best exists, or, that the conditions exist for the realization of what we believe to be the best. The distinction between the two forms of the assumption may be disregarded so far as our present purpose is concerned. The judgment that every one is supposed to make may be stated in the form: The Universe will satisfy us. Having accepted this judgment as true, the task of philosophy is to discover what kind of Universe *will* satisfy us. When this has been done, philosophy has merely to add the footnote: The Universe, ultimate reality, has such and such a character" (p. 591).

Now I see no reason for dissenting from the statement that this assumption, *viz.*, that the universe will satisfy us, is one that philosophy is by no means compelled to make. I think myself that it is wholly gratuitous. Also, though I do not think that this assumption is by any means the same as the assumption that what we believe to be the best exists, or that the conditions exist for realizing *what we believe to be the best*, yet I am ready to admit also that the latter are assumptions that philosophy is not bound to make. There is, I have repeatedly insisted, no value the opposite of which may not be affirmed, no value the opposite of which we cannot contemplate. But I do see *every* reason for doubting that the assumption that the universe will satisfy us is one that every one is supposed to make; and for doubting also that the conception of degrees of reality is based upon this assumption.

It is here that the caricature of the view under discussion, which makes it apparently so easy to demolish, is to be found.

Such a view is possible only in case we assume that value is adequately definable in terms of satisfaction of a subject, a view which the slightest acquaintance with the discussions of value would show to be untenable. The assumption which is really made, as we have already seen, is that reality does not contradict in its structure the *a priori* principles of valuation. As for the idea of degrees of reality, it has nothing to do with the assumption that the universe will satisfy us. It rests upon something quite different. *It lies in the value notion as such*, that every object has either actually or potentially a place in the scale of value, and this notion of degree inevitably transfers itself to reality which the value notion implies. But this implication has to do neither with desire nor belief, but only with insight. It does not rest upon the romantic or sentimental belief that things must satisfy us or be good or beautiful in order to exist, but upon the cool recognition that we are bound, by the very structure of our being, to act as though the order of value were also the order of reality; and that to deny this means the intolerable inanity of finding interest in the unreal. It has been a favorite pose of recent philosophy to grow eloquent over the superiority of the type of mind that can find pleasure in just this inanity, and can contemplate with equanimity the final divorce of value and reality—probably as a reaction against the excesses of pragmatism and of some forms of idealism. To me, as I have said, it does not seem heroic, but sentimentalism of the worst sort.

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PERSONALITY AND THE SUPRAPERSONAL.¹

I. *Ultimate Values as Personal Values.*—All ethical philosophies—except one—have this point at least in common: they all agree that ultimate good or value is to be found only in states of conscious life, that nothing else than such states or such life can be conceived as good in itself, for its own sake. On this axiom the construction which follows is founded and if it is false the construction certainly fails. Yet to me the statement is self-evident, so self-evident that it seems impossible to disprove any contradictory view, for there is no more ultimate premiss by which to test its truth or falsehood. If any one maintains that there are other ultimate values than those of conscious life, I cannot argue against him; for I do not understand him. I know of no other ends-in-themselves than these. If any one maintains that there may conceivably be other ultimate values or ends in themselves than conscious beings, this remains for me as blank a possibility as any other towards which our experience lends no support. For me, the terms 'ultimate value' and 'good-in-itself' are bereft of meaning when they are applied to any object which is not conscious life, to anything impersonal. Nothing which does not live and strive can seek for good, and no state of that which does not live and strive for good can be called good-in-itself.

It is impossible to prove what is axiomatic, but by the aid of some preliminary distinctions we may bring out more fully its significance. In the first place, we do not say that all states of conscious beings are good in themselves, but that *only* states of conscious being can be good in themselves. Obviously not all such states are good, for we seek to alter them in our very search for good, and may even, in extreme cases, regard the cessation of conscious being as better than its continuance. If

¹ Paper read before the Scots Philosophical Club, at Edinburgh, December 19, 1914.

only states of conscious being can be good in themselves, then only states of conscious being can be evil in themselves. To say 'good in itself' is to claim that something ought to exist, to say 'evil in itself' is to claim that something ought not to exist. But neither claim is made of the impersonal. Its existence is regarded neither as good in itself nor as evil in itself, but only in relation to conscious life, as furthering or retarding *its* good, as fulfilling or diminishing *its* value.

Here a second distinction emerges. The conscious being *seeks* after his good (and that of others as well as his own), always seeks though he does not always find. His good is realized, therefore, not in his mere existence as conscious subject, but in or by relation to what is objective. A difference of relation, a difference of object, certainly does not leave unaffected the value or good of the subject. In a word, the intrinsic value or value-in-itself which we express by the term 'person' is somehow dependent on extrinsic values, on what is not value-in-itself. In so far, for instance, as any environment, social or material, of a conscious being evokes his faculties, satisfies his needs, arouses any emotion or activity in him which can be regarded as good—stimulates, for instance, his sense of the beauty or nobility of living—in so far that environment is an extrinsic value. Whatever fulfills or makes possible intrinsic value, while itself not also intrinsic value, may be named extrinsic value, being good or worth not in its own right but as accomplishing this service.

Further, it may accomplish this service either immediately or mediately, either by its very existence or as the condition of the existence of some other object sought. Contrast, say, a work of art and a machine in this respect. The former satisfies the subject directly, by its presence; it is an object which the subject seeks to have or to create, finding worth in the mere having or creating. At the other extreme stands the mere machine which subserves intrinsic value indirectly, not in its existence as object but in its products alone. It is noteworthy that the person can be regarded by his fellows as coming under any of these categories, either as intrinsic value in respect of personality or as

immediate extrinsic value in respect of the stimulus of his presence or society or as mediate extrinsic value as serving, like a machine, the ends of these others. In effect persons are so interdependent that they naturally fall in respect of one another under not one but all three of these categories at the same time. The real ethical and social question is one of priority as between these. Is the person regarded by others as primarily an intrinsic value, such as they regard themselves, or is he primarily an extrinsic value, is he to them finally perhaps a mere machine, his value as person counting least, his value as means being the first or only consideration?

To this point we must return later. Meanwhile I have tried to insist on the distinction of mediate from immediate extrinsic value, because we sometimes tend to confuse one of these, immediate extrinsic value, with intrinsic value. There are outer objects which we seek, as we say, 'for themselves,' which we see to be good as the God of Genesis saw the whole world to be good. We seek nothing further from them than to know or perceive or experience them, to be in their presence. But this, we must clearly remember, is not to say that these are values-in-themselves or intrinsic values. It is for us that they are values, and what is not value-to-itself cannot be value-in-itself. It is the seeing and the knowing which is good in itself, not the seen and the known. If we say we want those outer objects for themselves we really mean that we want to see and know them. It is we who taste and see that they are good, we in whose experience of them their goodness, though not their existence, lies. As value the person stands utterly by himself, for it is the person which alone realizes value; but as subject of value he is necessarily dependent upon object of value.

But what, it may be said, of those 'objects' which are not 'outer,' what of 'thoughts' or 'ideas' which also, no less than outer or material beings, we can distinguish from the minds which have or think them? Are these extrinsic or intrinsic values? But the very question involves, I believe, a confusion. Unless we are illegitimately using the term 'idea' for that of which we

'have' an idea, the distinction of mind and its ideas is not at all like the distinction of mind and outer objects. The idea can have no existence whatever except for the mind, and if we speak of conscious life as value-in-itself we are including ideas in the sphere of value-in-itself, though not as something in any way apart from mind. We cannot attribute value to ideas except as attributing value to minds. That the Idea or Notion, however interpreted, should be the goal of conscious life, that this so-called content of personality should endure, like the kernel extracted from a nut, while personality itself passes away, is a doctrine to which I can attach no meaning. The succession of persons on this view resembles, if it resemble anything at all, some monstrous cosmic torch race in which the torch is everything and the bearers of it nothing, in which victory belongs to the torch alone, not to those who sweat and run to win.

II. *The World of Persons as a Unity*.—Starting from our axiom that ultimate value can attach to persons alone,—‘persons’ being here employed as inclusive of all conscious beings that in any degree at all can strive towards what they conceive as good and so become ends to themselves—we have next to enquire as to the nature of that whole of values, if there be such, into which persons enter or which together they constitute. We conceive the physical world as one coherent system in spite of all the spatial separations of its parts, in spite of the various and the seeming contrary manifestations of its forces. Can we likewise conceive the world of persons, regarded as ultimate values, as also a coherent system, in spite of the distinctness, difference, and only too real oppositions involved in their pursuit of their ends? The question thus raised concerns not merely the coherence or unity of particular groups, communities, and associations of persons, but the necessary basis of all such unities, the ground of inter-personal coherence revealed in the very nature of the distinct persons so uniting, so cohering.

I propose first to criticise certain conceptions of that unity which seem to me to rest on fallacy, next to review the actual facts on which, as I believe, any true conception must be based, and

finally to show that these facts do reveal the reality and the nature of a coherent spiritual world, regarded as a whole of values.

III. *False Conceptions of that Unity.*—There is one fundamental fallacy to which almost all false constructions of this whole of values may be traced, *the fallacy that a whole inclusive of units can be represented as a macrocosm inclusive of microcosms of the same order.* We seek a unity inclusive of many like elements or individuals, and we often obstinately refuse to think this more comprehensive unity, to name this new synthesis, except in terms of the like elements which are unified or synthesized. We think of a system of persons as a person, a system of organisms as an organism, a system of minds as a mind; but the identification is in every case fallacious. It is just as if we were, for instance, to think of an army as itself a soldier, or a constellation as itself a star. It is in fact a logical impossibility that the unity attained through the co-ordination of like objects of any kind should itself be of the same character as the unity of each of the like objects so co-ordinated. If any microcosms were just miniatures of any macrocosm, then that macrocosm would not bind together, could not be the unity of these microcosms. A system of persons can no more be a person than a system of planets can be a planet, or a system of triangles a triangle.¹ If we mean by the suprapersonal the whole in which persons are united, then the suprapersonal cannot be a supra- or super-person.

This fallacy is such an obstacle to the true understanding of the ethical unity of persons that it may be worth while to examine it in some detail. It has two chief forms, one the conception of the whole of persons as an organism or superorganism, the other the conception of the whole of persons as itself a mind or spirit. In reality the microcosm in this instance is an organico-psychical unity, neither organism (as usually understood) alone nor mind (as usually understood) alone; but the difficulty

¹ It may be objected that, for example, a system of armies may itself be an army; but in this and all similar cases the unit turns out to be not a true unit, but itself a system of units. So an army is finally a system of soldiers and a society a system of persons.

of comprehending the macrocosm as also such an organico-psychical unity leads to the emphasis of either aspect in the attempt to construct the whole in terms of the unit.

(a) *The Whole of Persons as Organism.*—The conception of the whole of persons as forming one organism or body may be traced back to the very beginnings of social reflection. It is natural to explain the greater or remoter in terms of the smaller or nearer unity, and there are always sufficient points of resemblance to make the identification of nature plausible. Our first question, when we turn to consider any kind of object hitherto unconsidered, is rather, What is it like? than, What is it? For we cannot say what it is until its nature is fully explored, but we can at once say what it is like in terms of what we know already. So it was natural to compare the unity of communities to the unity of the body, and we still speak of a 'body of men,' 'the body politic,' 'the mystical body of the church,' and so on. But we must remember that it is one thing to find resemblances, another to find identity, one thing to find analogy between organism and community, another thing to say that community *is* organism or organic. It would be an interesting study to trace how, for instance, during the Middle Ages, men began by finding points of resemblance between communities and bodies and ended by finding identity of nature. The grotesque conclusions to which the thorough-going identification of these two unities must lead are revealed with mediaeval candor in such writers as John of Salisbury or Nicolaus of Cues, a study of whose works would, I submit, form in this respect a most useful introduction to the study of Spencer and of Schäffle.

Here we are concerned with only one aspect of this identification. If the whole of persons is conceived of as possessing the kind of unity which an organism possesses, persons being related to one another as either the cells or the organs of organism are related to one another, then the whole of values which we are seeking becomes itself a value of the whole distinct from any values of the parts. Strictly speaking, I think it is illegitimate to attach teleological attributes to organism at all. When we

speak of organism we speak of an abstraction, though the abstraction is perfectly legitimate when what we are investigating is itself the organic or physiological *aspect* of living things. But it is different when we are investigating the conscious or psychical aspect, and we cannot talk of value or end except in terms of consciousness. Since then it is just this aspect which is left out in the abstraction 'organism,' it is inappropriate to talk at all of organism as end to itself or of its parts as means to that end. We may, a little loosely, speak of the cells and organs of organism as serving the end of the whole, though the whole then becomes not the organism but the organico-psychical being. Thus we get, by a somewhat dubious process of construction, the conception of a structure with a single intrinsic end to which all its parts are interdependent means; and it is after this fashion that we are sometimes asked to construe the end of society. Society is then to be regarded as having an end in itself which is other than and beyond the ends of its members, an end to which they are in so far merely contributory means. Humanity, for instance, is thus conceived of as an end to which all men are but ministers, nationality as an end to which all the members of a nation are mere instruments, and so forth.

It is easy to show that this mode of conception is really a disguised form of an absolute-idea theory which, when plainly expressed, we agree in rejecting, since it regards as transcendent that which is in reality immanent. It regards humanity as something more than men, nationality as something more than the members of a nation. It suggests that it is possible to work for humanity otherwise than by working for men, to serve nationality otherwise than by serving the members of a nation. In so far as the end and value of society are regarded as other than the ends and values of its members taken as a whole, the latter count for less than before, becoming in so far mere means to an end which is beyond, not merely each as individual, but all as collective. Not only can we not give meaning and concreteness to such a value, but the postulation of it deprives of actuality the values we actually know. If the whole be such as

to have an end which is realized otherwise than as the fulfilment of the ends of its parts or persons, then personality is in so far an illusion; for it rests on the being of each as an end in itself, and all its striving is understandable only on the supposition that each person and the other persons for whom also he strives are ends in themselves.

It is doubtless a permissible *hypothesis* that personality is an illusion, it is possible that we are in this sense, to use Browning's words, "God's puppets." But it is well to realize that this is the implication of the doctrine we are criticising. If it were true, it would mean that we are working for an end we do not know, as the puppet serves an end it does not know. It is well also to realize that *ex hypothesi* we can never give significance to this conception, which must remain a blank possibility. It raises an insurmountable wall in face of which our philosophy can never even begin to advance. Finally, it is also well to realize that we must always philosophize on the ground of what we actually know and feel, for that at least must be part of reality, however great the portion which remains unknown, undreamed of in our philosophies.

In passing we may note that, if we cannot conceive the whole of values in terms of organism, we can still less conceive it in terms of mechanism. This is contradictory from the outset; for the parts which are related into mechanism are doubly not for themselves, since the whole is by definition not for itself. Dr. Bosanquet, for instance, suggests more than once that "If minds were visible as bodies are, . . . they would not look like similar repeated units, but rather each would appear as a member of a mechanism pointing beyond itself and unintelligible apart from others—one like a wheel, another like a piston, and a third, perhaps, like steam."¹ This mechanistic view I believe to be the most fundamental and vicious of all social fallacies. So interpreted, both the likeness, here unduly minimized, and the difference of persons have their *raison d'être* wholly outside themselves, wholly extrinsic. So personality becomes meaningless.

¹ *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 50.

(b) *The Whole of Persons as a Mind or Spirit.*—The form of fallacy we have been considering does not stand by itself, but owes what plausibility it possesses to its association with a second form of fallacy which we must now examine, that according to which the whole of persons is conceived as constituting a mind or spirit, a 'collective' or 'superindividual' mind, which in turn may itself appear as an element in an 'absolute' or universal mind. This fallacy we have already refuted in showing that no whole can have to its units or parts the relation of macrocosm to microcosms; but its prevalence justifies a fuller consideration of it.

Here I am not at all concerned with the question whether there be some 'oversoul' in the sense of a greater mind or spirit into communion with which any or all individuals of a lower order may enter. Were that contention established it would leave this argument unaffected. What I am concerned to deny is that the actual unity constituted by any whole or system of minds can be represented as itself a mind. It was so conceived, though I think with unhappy results, by Plato in the fourth book of the *Republic*, and it is still so conceived by influential psychologists and philosophers to-day.

Dr. McDougall, for instance, writes as follows: "We may fairly define a mind as an organized system of mental or purposive forces; and in the sense so defined, every highly organized human society may properly be said to possess a collective mind."¹ But this is to repeat the 'macrocosm-microcosm' fallacy. A mind is no more definable as an organized system of mental forces than a planet is definable as an organized system of planetary forces. If when many minds enter within a system of mental relations they thereby constitute or 'possess' a collective mind, why, for instance, when many soldiers enter within a system of military relations should they not constitute or 'possess' a 'collective soldier?' There is in truth common or social mind in the sense of the common or typical mental characteristics involved and developed in all society, and we may *in*

¹ *Psychology*, Home University Library, p. 229.

this sense speak of the 'mind of a race,' the 'soul of a people' and so forth. But the term 'collective mind' is mere confusion.

I have tried to show elsewhere¹ that this doctrine of the 'super-individual mind' is finally due to our taking 'the individual' in an abstract sense, as if society were something set over against its members instead of being realized in them. If we understand that 'the individual' is always also the social individual, the abstractness disappears, and with it the need for a transcendental 'social mind' as the unity of society. Another form of the same illicit abstraction is found in the use often made of the term 'self' in this connection. We are told, for instance, that in society the self 'transcends itself' by entering into the larger unity of mind. But what is this 'self-transcendence,' and which item in this double and contradictory selfhood is the real self, that which transcends itself or that which is by itself transcended? We wander here in a region of contradictions. What poor selfhood is it that in all experiences of any depth must be 'transcended'? Do you mean by self-transcendence only that in certain experiences the self enters into relation with something other than or beyond itself? But is not that true of *all* experience? The conscious being, the subject of experience, cannot act at all, cannot reveal itself, except in relation to objects, to a world. But why call that activity and revelation 'self-transcendence'? To enter into relation with a world beyond oneself, whether material or psychical, is not to cease to be oneself. To be shut off from these relations is not to remain oneself. To be wholly so shut off would be in fact to cease to be a self at all, to become nothing.²

¹ *Sociological Review*, April, 1913, and January, 1914.

² This is well illustrated by Ibsen in the 4th act of *Peer Gynt*. The irresponsible hero imagines he has found himself when he has merely become self-centred. His self, he boasts, is

"All that, in short, makes my breast heave,
And whereby I, as I, exist."

But the poet brings him after many disquieting experiences to visit a madhouse of which, in virtue of his theory of self, he is proclaimed King; and he learns that the logical fulfilment of that unreal selfhood is merely madness, for it is among the mad that

"No one has tears for the others' woes,
No one has mind for the others' ideas."

It is true we speak of being taken 'out of ourselves' when we become absorbed in some deep experience, even of being 'beside ourselves' when, if ever, we feel inspired. But obviously we mean by that simply that we are taken out of the ordinary circle of our experiences, out of the thoughts and emotions which are the atmosphere of our everyday life, into new and greater experiences. In such experiences we may be more, not less, ourselves. To call such experience 'self-transcendence,' in order to find the reality of selfhood outside the selves for whom they are experiences, is to trade solemnly on the literal acceptation of a metaphor. When, in particular, our experience is widened or deepened by communion with our fellow men, we are neither 'absorbed' in them nor they in us nor are all together 'absorbed' into one greater mind. The common experience of many minds does not become the single experience of one greater mind, nor the common will of many the greater will of one. It is still individual minds which enjoy the experience they recognize as common.

Those who cling to the contrary view speak of the distinction of self from self as merely 'formal.' But why formal? Can we conceive of minds as 'forms,' mere vessels, indifferently filled with 'contents'? When a self grows, does it merely become filled with 'contents,' 'notions,' 'thoughts'? It is implied that by the removal of the 'formal distinctness' the selves would coalesce. Again the spatial metaphor, and this time not true even of spatial things. When you can bring two peas together and make them coalesce into a greater pea—or even conceive them as coalescing—then we may perhaps talk of the coalescence of selves.

The same fallacy takes a wider range when we conceive the whole of values not as a social mind but as an *absolute* mind. It too falls under the general condemnation that we are then conceiving the unity or synthesis of the whole as either an enlargement or an apotheosis of the nature of the several units of the whole. If we so conceive it, we are inevitably compelled to deny the reality of the units. You cannot make a greater circle the synthesis of an array of smaller circles without in fact denying

that the smaller circles are really circles at all—otherwise the greater circle would merely enclose, not unify them. Likewise you cannot conceive a greater mind as the unity of a vast array of lesser minds unless you deny the reality of the lesser minds—otherwise the greater would merely enclose or control, and not be the synthesis of the whole. It is possible that a greater spirit may so enclose or control the minds or spirits which alone we know; it is not possible that it should be the synthesis of these unless in fact their meaning, their individuality, their distinct existence, is denied. That is why the Hegelians must ‘transmute’ or ‘merge’ the self in the absolute. They are really seeking to conceive the life of the whole as at once the macrocosm and yet the mere enlargement or apotheosis or ‘sublimation’ of the microcosm. They want to make the totality or universality or synthesis of mind or spirit at the same time *an* absolute mind or spirit, *the* absolute mind or spirit.

The real impossibility of this project was realized by Fichte, who saw that the expression ‘the absolute Ego’ was a contradiction in terms and, dropping the ‘Ego,’ spoke simply of ‘the Absolute’.¹ But his successors, while retaining his term ‘the Absolute,’ seem to have lost sight of the contradiction discovered by its author, and have come to speak as if the term still meant *an* or *the* absolute Ego or subject or mind. Hegel was himself on the whole willing to sacrifice personality to his Absolute, but *his* successors have latterly been evincing the desire both to have and eat their cake. The world is spoken of as a place where personality manifests itself, where souls are made, but the making is unreal after all; for nothing remains in the Absolute save that mysteriously detached ‘content’ with which the self was filled, the ‘content’ of a timeless being, and therefore nothing is gained, nothing is new. The sacrifice and the struggle avail nothing, for what exists in the end existed even so in the beginning. The making of souls proves as valuable as the making of ropes of sand. I believe, indeed, that here we are brought face to face with the final problem, if not of metaphysics, at least of ethics—

¹ For the significance of this transition it is sufficient to refer to Professor Pringle-Pattison’s exposition of it in *Hegelianism and Personality*.

the problem of reconciling the undoubted fact that the world we know is a world in which personality is achieved through time and struggle with the necessity of thought which leads us on the other hand to seek after a permanent reality which always was and is and shall be, changeless and without shadow of turning. It may be that the problem is insoluble; it is certain to my mind that the neo-Hegelian solution is no solution. For, whatever happens, we must make our account with our experience, and this Absolutism can never do, since it is bound to a conclusion which involves the denial of the reality of experience, of change, struggle, and time, of the process without which personality is not achieved, and thus of personality itself. The new philosophy of Bergson, which boldly denies the aforementioned necessity of thought, may be equally one-sided in an opposite direction, but at any rate, in insisting on the reality of change and time and becoming, it in so far rests on the foundation of what we know, it makes its account with experience. It is the strength of philosophic faith to believe in that which is invisible, but it is only the weakness of faith to deny the visible on that account. And possibly it may be the final act of philosophic faith to believe that there is no appearance which is not also an element of reality, nor any necessity of thought which can contradict, however it may reinterpret, the experience of life itself.

The same fallacy meets us again in certain theological doctrines of the immanence of deity. Here again the suprapersonal becomes the macrocosmic person, now conceived not as above the personal microcosm but as revealed within it. Like the absolutist, the immanence-theologian wants to have and eat his cake. We may regard deity as immanent and revealed in every manifestation of life and spirit, and in so doing we may do well; or we may regard deity as the highest manifestation of spirit, the highest towards which even the lowest feebly reaches and looks, and again in doing so we may do well. But we cannot regard deity as at once both the whole and the highest, as both the unity in which all life is one and some ideal personality towards which all life perhaps tends in its degree. If God is really the whole

there is no need for us to seek Him in one direction rather than another. For we are already in God, and in every activity we are equally finding Him. 'Not I but the God in me' will be true of every action, and will serve neither for approbation nor condonation, for neither is now needed. The distinction of higher and lower disappears, or at any rate becomes merely one of more and less.

It is most certainly true that we can seek nothing which we do not already in part possess, that we can worship nothing whose nature we do not adumbrate in ourselves.

" Wär' nicht das Auge sonnenhaft
Die Sonne könnt' es nie erblicken;
Läg' nicht in uns des Gottes eigne Kraft
Wie könnt' uns Göttliches entzücken? "

It is also true—and more relevant to the mood of the seeker and worshipper—that we worship what is *beyond* ourselves, seeking not meaningless identity but effectual communion. It is not that the part seeks the whole—how can it?—nor that the part worships the whole—again how can it? It is needless and illogical to assume that a being absolutely wise and good need be comprehensive of all personality, still less of all reality. I can see no philosophical reason to suppose that if there be one all wise and all good spirit there should not be any number of beings beside Him and not merely absorbed within Him. Nay, I see no contradiction in supposing that if there be one spirit all wise and good there might be others likewise all wise and good. The contrary view rests on an unfounded analogy between physical completeness and psychical perfection. If we create God after our own image, if we regard Him as *a* mind or spirit, possessing in perfection the attributes we ourselves possess in part, it is not the unity or whole of spirit we so conceive. If on the other hand we prefer to give the name of God to this great cosmos of life within which all particular things live and move and have their being, possessing not only the perfected nature of any one part or kind of being, of man, humanity, or soul, but the unity and nature that no part can ever possess, since it is that which binds it to the whole—then we renounce the conception of a God after

our own image and should honestly accept all the consequences which flow from the renunciation.

It may be objected that in speaking of God as perfect Spirit you have left out the third of the necessary trinity of attributes involved in perfection. You have regarded Him as all wise and all good, but to be perfect involves being all powerful as well. Complete the trinity and it appears that what is perfect must also be all comprehensive, for what is all powerful must be universal, in and through every activity of the cosmos. It must be answered that the attribution of omnipotence to any existence is contradictory if that existence be only a part, and meaningless, if it be the whole of reality. If it is the whole to which you attribute omnipotence, over what is it omnipotent? If only a part, the part again becomes the whole, for the attribution to it of omnipotence deprives the rest of character, of existence. If one person be literally all powerful, all other persons are phantoms. If, however, I really have power so much as to move a finger at my will, so much as to conceive a thought, that power destroys the present claim to omnipotence of any other power in the universe. To be all wise does not, any more than to be all good, involve such all-comprehensiveness of the being so endowed. One aspect of omniscience may, indeed, be the knowledge of the power, which is the knowledge of the nature, of all other beings. It is therefore a possible attribute of a personality, as all goodness is, but omnipotence is an impossible, because finally an unmeaning, attribute of any personality. The understanding of this truth would, among other things, set the whole problem of evil in a new light.

Enough has perhaps now been said by way of showing the directions in which we must not look for the understanding of that whole of values or persons to which each particular person is bound. We may now turn to the positive aspect, and consider the actual facts relative to this whole of persons, seeking finally for an interpretation or synthesis of these facts.

IV. *What we Really Know of Suprapersonal Unity.*—The facts in whose interpretation we must find our whole of values,

our suprapersonal unity, are pre-eminently those relative to the *interdependence* of persons. The mere fact of *likeness* of nature or *identity* of type is wholly inadequate as a clue. This type-identity compels us, indeed, to think of some common origin of life, or, as it were, some single mould whence living beings have issued; but it does not reveal the character of whatever present and continuous unity holds all the representations of any type, the realities which manifest the type. To find this unity we must enquire into the relations between those representatives, and particularly the relations of interdependence.

These relations fall into two great orders. One is the *successive* dependence of the generations, of every life upon those which have preceded; the other is the *reciprocal* dependence of contemporaneous lives within the community. The one binds through time, the other in every present stage.

(a) The former is revealed primarily as biological succession. Herein each life is utterly dependent, being derived from pre-existent lives. The person looks beyond himself to a future of other persons. Much of the life and activity of each individual is meaningless on the assumption that he lives merely for himself; and this applies to his psychical as well as to his organic nature. On the organic side, "so far as we can at present understand the matter, the physiology of death, and that of reproductive and social activity in all their wide manifestations, belong to the physiology of the species."¹ Likewise much of the psychical nature of every person, his desires and affections, lose meaning, until we realize that these are directed, not to the present life alone of himself and others, but to the future life of those who are to succeed. In this way each knows himself, body and spirit, to be part of, to belong to, a whole of persons continuous through time.

Besides this direct dependence, there is the wider dependence due to the social transmission of the gains of the past and present to the future. Whatever any generation has thought or wrought becomes a kind of capital, expressed in symbols or mechanisms

¹ J. S. Haldane, *Mechanism, Life, and Personality*.

of many kinds, and thus becomes, through the educability of all young life, the *means* to the increase of personal values in all succeeding generations. We are thus doubly the heirs of the past and confer a double legacy upon our heirs. (And of course the evil no less than the good is transmitted.) Now the higher the standard of life the greater is this legacy. For each individual life starts from a seeming-common basis of nescience and inexperience, and the higher it advances from this state the more educable must it have proved. Thus where society is most advanced it is most dependent on the past.

It should also be remembered that since each new life unites the inheritance of two parents, and each of these again of two others, and so on, every life within any area of effective community derives itself from an intermixture of stock so extensive that, if we go back far enough, it must make every person the direct descendant of a whole community. Nay, if we can think back still further and remember that communities themselves have not lived in isolation from the first but have arisen out of one another, it may appear that wherever we have community of type at all there we have also common origin, common biological dependence. Life, though it reveals itself in individuality, arises out of essential and ever-completer intermixture. Each new life owes itself, not to one linear series of past lives, but to a whole past race, finally, perhaps, to a whole past history of the universe.

This historic dependence must not be misunderstood. The successive children of the race owe their lives to their parents, and finally to the whole race, but they are not themselves mere reproductions of past lives, merely epitomes of the race. Life is always new. Intermixture is the universal way by which all higher life renews itself, but there is something more in this renewal of life than we can hope to understand. Intermixture alone makes nothing new. It is the process by means of which new life is created, it does not account for the newness of that life. Each new life is a new centre of initiative, of individuality, which we can never explain wholly in terms of past lives. Again, though no life can be understood as existing for its own sake

alone, it can still less be understood—as Mr. Benjamin Kidd, for instance, would have us think—as existing for the sake of the succession alone, for the sake of the future alone. So to think of it is to reduce the whole chain of values to universal unintelligibility. Each becomes then a means to future values which in turn prove to be themselves but means to a remoter future, and so in *infinitum*. Unless we understand that each life is also for its own sake, we cannot understand how it is for the sake of other lives.

(7) Persons or selves are bound up in contemporaneous no less than in historic interdependence, and here we reach the facts which must of all reveal the nature of superindividual unity. For the relations we are now to consider, unlike those already considered, are *reciprocal* relations. Herein persons are united in common dependence upon one another. In heredity one being is dependent upon other beings who are not in turn similarly dependent upon the former, one generation is dependent upon previous generations which do not owe a similar debt to their descendants. Historic dependence is the dependence of a chain of values through time, but this reciprocal social dependence is the common dependence of a whole of values in the present, and it is this which finally affords us the clue to the nature of a *whole of values through time* as well.

To understand it we must, I believe, start from the basis that all interdependent selves are essentially alike, and that it is this likeness which alone makes all social relations between them possible. Some hold that in respect of social interdependence it is difference which is primary, and in proof of this they point to the complementary services social beings render to one another, services made possible by their differences. There are two great orders of such complementary service, one based on the organic differences of the sexes, the other based on the differences of aptitude, intelligence, occupational interest, and so on, which determine the great system of the division and co-operation of labor. But here too, we must note the differences, though in one case the very precondition of life, and in the other a necessary

means of its progress, are still subsidiary to a likeness of nature in those who present them. Made possible by the difference of the sexes, is there not a value which is a value alike for each, one end which each alike seeks and attains, is there not also a sentiment which has one name for each and one meaning for each? Just as physiologically even sex-differentiation is a differentiation of like structures, so psychologically and socially it is likeness which is still primary, which gives meaning to the difference, which makes the high harmony of the sexes possible. Similarly in the sphere of the division of labor: for that division is simply a means of co-operation, and men co-operate because they all alike find value, directly or indirectly, in or by means of the common product of their labor. The harmony of men in society is not the extrinsic harmony of the parts of a machine, but the intrinsic harmony of beings who are alike in being like ends to themselves. The only social relation where difference is really made the basis of the division of labor is the force-determined relation of master and slave, wherein the like nature of the slave is denied in making him simply a means to the ends of another: but that is also the denial of society.

We conclude that the interdependence of persons within society is essentially an interdependence of the like interests, and thus of the like values of persons: and we regard this as the final reason why the inter-personal harmony of persons, and the "suprapersonal" whole thus established, cannot be understood in terms either of mechanism or of organism (at any rate as we usually conceive organism), or again in terms of some personal or suprapersonal mind of which persons are constituent parts but whose meaning or value is in some way apart from or beyond these persons. The supreme fact that the individual seeks not his own personal welfare alone but something wider or greater, so far from invalidating, really establishes this conclusion. For whose is the wider, greater welfare that we seek, if not that of a whole of persons, and how can we seek their welfare unless we conceive it as if like nature to our own? How can we understand or seek a greater value except in terms of the value we find in ourselves? How can we even

sacrifice ourselves to others, to our country it may be, unless we sacrifice the lesser for the greater of two values, comparable because like?

Further, this case of the sacrifice, *strictly so-called*, of the individual for his society, is an abnormal case, and, when it is rendered necessary, is so rendered by the imperfection of society, by its failure, by that disharmony which is the relative absence of society—not by its essential nature. The capacity for sacrifice, in the strict sense of that term, measures the socialization of the individual, but it measures also the disintegration of the social world to which he belongs. Normally the social being fulfills and does not sacrifice his value in his devotion to his society, in the service of the whole of which he is a member. Nearly all moralists have understood this truth, that the service of others is not sacrifice but fulfilment of oneself. One cannot freely seek any end, whatever it be, without both revealing and fulfilling one's nature in the search, and the greater the object of devotion the greater the fulfilment of the subject, since each fulfills his life in fulfilling the ends for which he lives. Conversely, if the end pursued has value at all, the attainment of it is necessarily a social service as well. He who seeks knowledge, wisdom, beauty, power over nature, or any universal end whatever, seeks a good which is meaningless unless it is a good not for the seeker alone but potentially for the world. He cannot really fulfill himself without serving others, nor can he really serve others without fulfilling himself. Yet this in no way detracts from the worth and nobility of the service, for he who seeks any universal end is in the best sense disinterested, devoted, that is, to the end he pursues, and attains success only in the measure of his devotion.

Thus, once again, it appears that society is neither prior nor posterior to the members of society; it exists finally in and because of their essential interdependence.

V. *The Interpretation of the Foregoing Facts.*—In the light of the foregoing facts of interdependence we may finally seek to understand the nature of the whole of persons. We started from the axiom that all ultimate values are personal values, and we

have seen further that these values are all interrelated, members of a system of values. It follows that the whole constitutes both a sum and a system of values, and we have now to show how it can at the same time be both.

The very expression 'sum of'—whether it be 'parts' or 'pleasures' or 'individuals'—has fallen under a perhaps justifiable philosophic ban. Yet it seems to me quite clear that the whole of persons is, whatever besides, a sum of values, in the sense that, if the whole of persons has intrinsic value, every person must as such have or be intrinsic value. If the general argument to this effect seem insufficient, the following considerations, based on our ordinary estimate of values, may be added:

1. We generally feel that, if any personality is lost, it is a loss of the whole, even though the loss seem infinitesimal in relation to the whole.

2. What affects many persons or lives, whether beneficially or disastrously, we regard, *ceteris paribus*, as intrinsically of greater significance than if it affected only one or a few of these; in other words, a greater value is concerned in the event.

3. We accept as right the sacrifice of the one or the few for the many. If then it is right, it is because the greater value is thereby conserved, but if it is also sacrifice, it is because some lesser value is thereby lost.

Many similar considerations might be adduced, but they all lead simply to the general position we have already adopted, *viz.*, that if values are ultimately personal and if the whole of persons is not itself a person and thus a value other than that which its units are or contribute to one another, then the whole is, whatever besides, a sum of values.

But persons, so far as society extends, are essentially interested and interdependent, and does not the expression 'sum' connote mere aggregation without system, the very antithesis of society? The answer is simple. If I say that one value is dependent on another, I do not mean that, because existing in that dependence, it is any the less a value. On the contrary, I mean that if it were not for the other it would not be *what it is*, *i.e.*, an existent value.

Its value, in other words, is independent of its dependence as a value. Persons do form the completest system or whole of which we have knowledge, but that fact does not derogate at all from the claim of the least unit in that system to be a value in itself.

Further, the system which they form is not itself a further value of *the same order* as the persons who form it. It is necessary to be very clear on this point. For it is here that a system of intrinsic values differs from any system of extrinsic values. Take the illustration of a number of precious stones of various sizes, set and arranged to form an ornament. Here the constituent parts are themselves values, but the whole which they form is more valuable than the total of their separate values. But can we regard a system of values-in-themselves as similarly a greater value-in-itself? A value-in-itself is a value-to-itself. If the unity is then a value in itself, it is a value to itself; and this supposition leads us back to the view we have already found it necessary to reject, that the system is itself a person or subject of values. But a system of values-in-themselves is not necessarily a value-in-itself, any more than a system of minds is itself a mind. If we ask then for whom the system is a value, we must reply, for its constituent units who are values-in-themselves. Here is the clue to the solution of our problem. A society is an extrinsically valuable system of intrinsic values. To regard the value of the system as extrinsic is not to minimize its importance. That on which intrinsic values depend may possess, does possess, the very highest significance, so that the preservation of it may be well worth on any occasion the sacrifice of many intrinsic values. But it is worth that sacrifice, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the persons who depend upon it, who are fulfilled thereby.

It is in the light of the *dynamic* character of every social system that the conception we have already attained gains its full significance. We must seek thus to attain a synthesis of the two series of inter-personal relations, the contemporaneous interdependence of persons and their interdependence through time.

We say that society endures through time, though its members pass away. This does not mean that society endures apart from

its members, but that society endures though its members are successive. How are we to understand this continuity? What do its members communicate to one another that there is this continuity maintained through their succession? In one word, they communicate society itself. As a flame is communicated from coal to coal, so is the life of society communicated, in conscious and unconscious ways, from person to person. It is communicated, not transferred. The inheritance of society, like that of life itself, is not a gift which one relinquishes when another receives it. And it is so communicated, so communicable, because it is in no sense outside its members, but lives only in them, is their nature or being in fact. Society is neither prior nor posterior to its members, for the term 'person' and the term 'social person' are at every stage of life identical in connotation. When persons enter into any social relation it is their respective attitudes towards one another which constitute the relation. The relation consists in their correspondent ways of being in respect of one another, in correspondent aspects of personality. If I love or envy or help another, it is I who feel or act so, and my conduct may raise a corresponding emotion or activity *of* that other; corresponding, in the sense of being a response to mine, not necessarily a response in the same kind—love may be answered by hate, envy by contempt. By every response a social relationship is created, being essentially an attitude of social beings towards or in respect of one another. My attitude towards another, his to me, would not be actual if either of us were for the other non-existent—but it is still *my* attitude and *his*. The flame of society arises only when person and person meet, but it flames *in* each of them, in no way outside them.

All this may seem very obvious, as in fact it is, but it is often ignored when we think of society or any particular social organization as permanent or continuous. We seem often to think of society as a permanent background to the lives of men, something therefore apart, or as a permanent home in which they shelter, something therefore above and containing them all. If we analyze more carefully we see that this is to confuse society with the

outer environment which it shapes. Consider, for instance, the character of permanence which social customs and institutions possess. A custom is a way of acting common to the members of a group, an institution is a definite form of relationship established by social beings in respect of one another. The custom endures only as it is impressed on and accepted by the like and plastic nature of the successive generations; the institution endures only as it is reaffirmed, re-established by the wills of the successive generations. Both are continuous just because they are thus renewed. They are forms of psychical activity, existent only as psychical fact. But like all psychical fact they determine outer environment. Men shape, accommodate the material world to the exigencies of customs and institutions, and the outer forms so created are also permanent, but permanent in a different way, from the inner or psychical forms. They are not rebuilt in the minds of the successive generations; they endure through generations as all outer objects endure, with a permanence correspondent to the degree of control man owns over outer nature. It is these that are the enduring house of the social spirit, built and improved, in the degree of his intelligence, by social man. All the equipment of life, the machinery by which man masters the world, the records of his achievements, the outer symbols by means of which knowledge is stored and the sense of beauty manifested—all these are the work and the treasure of society—but they are not society. To find the unity achieved by persons in community we must look for another kind of continuity and permanence than these possess. The unity we are seeking is the unity of a psychical system, which is continuous not as enduring apart from the minds which form it at any time but as communicated in the unique social mode of communication.

The full meaning of this unity is revealed only in the light of social evolution. In that process, so far as we know it, there can be traced a movement from a less to a greater coherence of society, such as at any rate to reveal the idea and the significance of a fully coherent world of persons. For instance, it would be easy to show, from a study of that process, that the greater the extrin-

sic value of the system grows, the more possible does it become for each to remain an intrinsic value both to himself and to others. But this is too vast a subject to be discussed within our limits here.

Finally, there is no whole of life achieved as it were an integer formed by the fractional lives of persons; there is a whole of life only in so far as the lives of any or all persons are themselves integral and complete in their kind, and this is made possible by the increasing dependence of all within a system which, as it grows completer, serves each the more in serving all.

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KANT'S METHOD OF COMPOSING THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.¹

SELDOM, in the history of literature, has a work been more conscientiously and deliberately thought out, or more hastily thrown together, than the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The following is the account which Kant in a letter to Moses Mendelssohn (16th August, 1783) has given of its composition:

"[Though the *Critique* is] the outcome of reflection which had occupied me for a period of at least twelve years, I brought it to completion in the greatest haste within some four to five months, giving the closest attention to the content, but with little thought of the exposition or of rendering it easy of comprehension by the reader—a decision which I have never regretted, since otherwise, had I any longer delayed, and sought to give it a more popular form, the work would probably never have been completed at all. This defect can, however, be gradually removed, once the work exists in its rough elaboration."²

These statements must be allowed the greater weight as Kant, in another letter (to Garve, 7th August, 1783) has given them in almost the same words.

"I freely admit that I have not expected that my book should meet with an immediate favorable reception. The exposition of the materials which for more than twelve successive years I had been carefully maturing was not developed in a sufficiently suitable manner for general comprehension. For the perfecting of its exposition several years would have been required, whereas I brought it to completion in some four to five months, in the fear that on longer delay so prolonged a labor would finally become burdensome, and that my increasing years (I am already in my sixtieth year) would perhaps incapacitate me, while I was still the sole possessor of my complete system."³

¹ Written as part of an introduction to a *Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*.

² *Werke*, X, p. 323.

³ *Werke*, X, p. 316. The twelve years here referred to are 1769–1780; the phrase 'at least' indicates Kant's appreciation of the continuity of his mental development. Hume's first influence upon Kant is probably to be dated prior to 1763. The choice, however, of the year 1769 is not arbitrary; it is the year of Kant's adoption of the semi-Critical position recorded in the *Inaugural Dissertation* (1770). Cf. Kant's letter to Lambert, 2d September, 1770 (*Werke*, X, p. 93). The "four to five months" may be dated in the latter half of 1780. The printing was probably commenced in December or January, 1780–81.

But the *Critique* is not merely defective in clearness or popularity of exposition. That is a common failing of metaphysical treatises, especially when they are in the German language, and might pass without special remark. What is much more serious is that Kant flatly contradicts himself in almost every chapter; and that there is hardly a technical term which is not employed by him in a variety of different and conflicting senses. He is the least exact of all the great thinkers.

So obvious are these inconsistencies that every commentator has felt constrained to offer some explanation of their occurrence. Thus Caird has asserted that Kant opens his exposition from the non-Critical standpoint of ordinary consciousness, and that he discloses the final position, towards which he has all along been working, only through repeated modifications of his preliminary statements. Such a theory cannot, however, explain either the specific manner of occurrence or the actual character of the contradictions of which the *Critique* affords so many examples. They are by no means limited to the opening sections of its main divisions, and careful examination of the text would seem to prove quite conclusively that they have no such merely expository origin. The publication of Kant's *Reflexionen* and *Nachlass*, and the devoted labors of Benno Erdmann, Vaihinger, Adickes and Reicke have indeed placed the issue upon an entirely new plane. It can now be proved that the *Critique* is not a unitary work, and that in the five months in which, as Kant tells us, it was "brought to completion" (*zu Stande gebracht*), it was not actually written, but was pieced together by the combining of manuscripts composed at very different times in the nine years that elapsed between 1772 and the completion of the *Critique*. Kant's correspondence during this period contains the repeated assertion that he expected to be able to complete the work within some three or six months. This implies that it was already, at least as early as 1777, in great part committed to writing. In 1780 Kant must therefore have had a large body of manuscript at his disposal. The recently published *Nachlass* is, indeed, part of it. We shall have constant occasion to observe that the *Critique* affords ample evidence of

having been more or less mechanically constructed through the piecing together of older manuscript, supplemented, no doubt, by the insertion of connecting links, and modified by occasional alterations to suit the new context. Kant, it would almost seem, objected to nothing so much as the sacrifice of an argument once consecrated by committal to paper. If it could be inserted, no matter at what cost of repetition, or even confusion, he insisted upon its insertion. Thus the first edition *Subjective and Objective Deductions* can, as we shall find,¹ be broken up into at least four distinct layers which like geological strata remain to the bewilderment of the reader who naturally expects a unified system, but to the enlightenment of the student once the clues to their disentanglement and dating have been detected. To cite another example: the *Second Analogy*, in its first edition form, contains no less than five distinct proofs of its main thesis, several of which merely repeat one another; and when Kant restated the argument in the second edition, he superimposed the new proof upon the other five proofs, which are still allowed to remain. Kant does, indeed, in the second edition omit some few passages from various parts of the *Critique*; but that was owing in the main to his desire to protect himself against serious misunderstanding to which, as he found, he had very unguardedly laid himself open. The second edition alterations are chiefly of the nature of additions.

Adickes' theory² that Kant in the "four to five months" composed a brief outline of his entire argument, and that it was upon the framework of this outline that the *Critique* was elaborated out of the older manuscript, may possibly be correct. It has certainly enabled Adickes to cast much light upon many textual problems. But his own supplementary hypothesis in regard to the section on the *Antinomies*, namely, that it formed an older and separate treatise, may very profitably be further extended. Surely it is unlikely that with the expectation, continued over many years, of completion within three months, Kant did not possess, at least for the *Aesthetic*, *Dialectic*, and *Methodology*, a

¹ Cf. Vaihinger, *Die transcendente Deduktion der Kategorien* (Halle, 1902).

² Embodied in his edition of the *Critique* (1889).

general outline, that dated further back than 1780. And doubtless this outline was itself altered, patched, and recast, in proportion as insight into the problems of the *Analytic*, which were those that so long deferred publication, deepened and took final form.

The composite character of the *Critique* is largely concealed by the highly elaborate and extremely artificial arrangement of its parts. To this general plan, based upon professedly logical principles, Kant has himself given the title, 'architectonic'; and he carries it out with a thoroughness to which all other considerations, even those of sound reasoning, are made to give way. Indeed, he clings to it with the unreasoning affection which not infrequently attaches to a favorite hobby. He lovingly elaborates even its minor detail, and is rewarded by a framework so extremely complicated that the most heterogeneous contents can be tidily arranged, side by side, in its many compartments. By its uniformity and rigor it gives a seemingly systematic order of connection even when that is wholly absent.

But we have still to consider the chief reason for the contradictory character of the contents of the *Critique*. It is inseparably bound up with what may perhaps be regarded as Kant's supreme merit as a philosophical thinker, especially as shown in the first *Critique*, namely, his open-minded recognition of the complexity of the problems dealt with, and of the many difficulties which lie in the way of any solution which he is himself able to propound. Kant's method of working seems to have consisted in alternating between the various possible solutions, developing each in turn, in the hope that some midway position that would share in the merits of each might finally disclose itself. When, as frequently happened, such a midway solution could not be found, he developed his thought along the parallel lines of the alternative views.

"You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. . . . Long experience has taught me that insight into a subject which I am seeking to master is not to be forced, or even hastened, by sheer effort, but demands a fairly prolonged period during which I return again and

again to the same concepts, viewing them in all their aspects and in their widest possible connections, while in the intervals the sceptical spirit awakens, and makes trial whether my conclusions can withstand a searching criticism."¹ "In mental labor of so delicate a character nothing is more harmful than preoccupation with extraneous matters. The mind, though not constantly on the stretch, must still, alike in its idle and in its favorable moments, lie uninterruptedly open to any chance suggestion which may present itself. Relaxations and diversions must maintain its powers in freedom and mobility, so that it may be enabled to view the object afresh from every side, and so to enlarge its point of view from a microscopic to a universal outlook that it adopts in turn every conceivable standpoint, verifying the observations of each by means of all the others."² "I am not of the opinion of the well-meaning writer who has recommended us never to allow doubts in regard to a matter upon which we have once made up our minds. In pure philosophy that is not feasible. Indeed the understanding has in itself a natural objection to any such procedure. We must consider propositions in all their various applications; even when they may not seem to require a special proof, we must make trial of their opposites, and in this way fight for delay, until the truth becomes in all respects evident."³

That these are no mere pious expressions of good intention, but represent Kant's actual method of working, is amply proved by the contents of the *Critique*. We find Kant constantly alternating between opposed standpoints, to no one of which he quite definitely commits himself, and constantly restating his principles in the effort to remove the objections to which, as he recognizes, they continue to lie open. The *Critique*, as already stated, is not the exposition of a single unified system, but is the record of Kant's manifold attempts to formulate and to solve his many-sided problems. Even those portions of the *Critique* which embody his latest views show that Kant is still unwilling to sacrifice insight for the sake of consistency. When he is guilty of special pleading—for he cannot be altogether absolved from that charge—it is in the interests of his logical architectonic, for which, as I have said, he cherishes a quite unreasoning affection, not in those of his central principles, that this occurs. So far from concealing difficulties, or unduly dwelling upon the favoring considerations, Kant himself enforces the outstanding objections to which his conclusions remain subject. If his teaching is on certain points very definite, it is in other hardly less important respects

¹ From letter to Marcus Herz, 7th June, 1777. *Werke*, X, pp. 116–7.

² From letter to Marcus Herz, 21st February, 1772. *Werke*, X, p. 127.

³ *Reflexionen*, II, 5.

largely tentative. This very greatly increases the value of the *Critique* as an introduction to modern philosophy. The student who has steeped himself in its atmosphere, however dissatisfied he may perhaps be with many of its doctrines, has had presented to him the main requirements which any really adequate metaphysic of knowledge must fulfill, and will at least never be in danger of underestimating the complexity of the problems with which philosophy has to deal.

Recognition of the patchwork method which Kant has followed in composing the *Critique* has two important consequences. In the first place, citation of single passages is quite inconclusive. Not only must all the relevant passages be collated; they must be interpreted in the light of an historical understanding of the various stages in Kant's development. We must also be prepared to find that on certain main questions Kant hesitates between opposed positions, and that he nowhere definitively commits himself to any quite final expression of view. Secondly, we may not proceed on the assumption that Kant's maturest teaching comes where, had the *Critique* been a unitary work, composed upon a definite and previously thought out plan, we should naturally expect to find it, namely in its concluding portions. The teaching of much of the *Dialectic*, especially in its account of the nature of the phenomenal world and of its relation to the knowing mind, is only semi-Critical. This is no less true of Kant's *Introduction* to the *Critique*. Introductions are usually written last; and probably Kant's *Introduction* was written after completion of the *Aesthetic*, of the *Dialectic*, and of the *Analytic* in its earlier forms. But it bears all the signs of having been composed prior to the working out of several of his most characteristic doctrines in the central parts of the first edition *Analytic*. Thus both Kant's introductory statement of the aims and purposes of the *Critique*, and his application of his results in the solution of metaphysical problems, fail to represent in any adequate fashion the new and revolutionary principles to which he very gradually but successfully worked his way. The key to the *Critique* lies in the earlier portions of the *Analytic*. The other parts of the *Critique* reveal

the Critical doctrines only as gradually emerging from the entangling influence of pre-Critical assumptions. Their teaching has to be radically remodelled before they can be made to harmonize with what in view both of their intrinsic character and of the corresponding second edition alterations must be regarded as Kant's maturest utterances. This was a task which Kant never himself attempted. For no sooner had he attained to comparative clearness on his central problems and briefly expounded them in the *Deductions* of the first edition *Analytic*, than he hastened forward to apply his new principles in the spheres of morality, aesthetics, and teleology. When the *Critique* appeared in 1781 he was fifty-seven years of age; and he seems to have feared that if he allowed these purely theoretical problems, which had already occupied his main attention for "at least twelve years," to detain him longer, he should be debarred from developing and placing on permanent record the new metaphysic of ethics which, as the references in the first *Critique* show, had already begun to formulate itself in his mind. To expend further energy upon the perfecting of his theoretical philosophy would be to endanger its own best fruits. Even the opportunity in 1787 of the second edition of the *Critique* he used only very sparingly, altering or adding only where occasional current criticism—his puzzled contemporaries still for the most part maintained a discrete silence—had clearly shown that his modes of exposition were incomplete or misleading.

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DISCUSSION.

BERTRAND RUSSELL ON NEO-REALISM.

THERE must be many who agree with the present writer that, in the recrudescence of non-idealistic tendencies, contemporary philosophy has lost more, through the necessity of traversing roads already travelled, than it has gained by the better delimitation of the issue between idealism and realism. All these should read with special satisfaction Mr. Bertrand Russell's papers, in successive numbers of the *Monist* for 1914. In *The Problems of Philosophy* Mr. Russell had already indicated his disagreement with the usual realistic criticism of idealism as 'plainly absurd' and had openly conceived of sense-data as mental.¹ In these more recent papers he gives reason for his dissent from that emphatic form of neo-realism which he aptly names 'neutral monism,' the theory "that the things commonly regarded as mental and the things commonly regarded as physical do not differ in respect of any intrinsic property . . . but only in respect of arrangement and context" (p. 161).² According to this view consciousness is a relation between objects comparable to the spatial or the temporal relation; and "ideas of chairs and tables are identical with chairs and tables but are conceived in their mental not in their physical context."

This reduction of consciousness to a relation perfectly comparable with physical relations is opposed by Russell primarily because such a reduction is inconsistent with our introspection. Being aware of my consciousness of *x* (a color, for example) is different, he shows, from being aware of a relation between *x* (the color) and *y* (whether *y* be taken as another color, or as a physiological process. Cf. p. 185; pp. 172-3; p. 436).

"It is difficult," Russell points out (in the second place) for neutral monism "to define the respect in which the whole of my experience is different from the things that lie outside." It is difficult, in other words, to account for the distinction actually made between myself and other realities. R. B. Perry's naïve explanation of a self, as that which is connected with a nervous system, is disposed of by the obvious fact that "in order to know that such and such a thing

¹ Cf. pp. 27, 29 f., 33 ff.

² These references are to the pages of *The Monist*, volume XXIV, 1914.

lies within my experience it is not necessary to know anything about my nervous system." In fact, as Russell is at pains to urge, in a later article (p. 591), "a knowledge of physics and physiology must not be assumed in theory of knowledge."

Neutral monism, in the third place, is entirely unable to account for the individuality of experience. A's experiencing of an object is one fact, and B's experiencing of the object is another fact, and neutral monism has no terms in which to describe the distinction (p. 438).

A final objection to neutral monism is its inability to account for error. If there were no distinction between mental and physical reality we should have to find in the physical world an "entity corresponding to false belief."

In the face of these trenchant criticisms one may well wonder by what right Russell retains his position among the neo-realists. The main reason for his opposition to idealism is, of course, his belief that 'extra-mental' objects exist. It will be well to scrutinize more closely the grounds of this belief. Mr. Russell argues effectively against solipsism in the extreme sense in which "our present experience" is asserted to be "all-embracing." For, he points out, "we may know propositions of the form: 'there are things having such a property' even when we do not know any instance." For example, I may remember that I yesterday knew, what I have to-day forgotten, the name of X, to whom I am being presented. But this disproof of solipsism is as compatible with a personalistic as with a 'realistic' philosophy. In truth, Mr. Russell never argues the existence of non-mental realities. In *The Problems of Philosophy* there occurs, to be sure (p. 74), the implication that the physical object must exist as cause of such and such sense-data. But, for the most part, both universals, "which may be experienced by two minds," and physical objects or 'things of sense,' are assumed to exist, somewhat as Mr. Russell assumes minds other than my own—though he calls this last a mere 'working hypothesis.'

To confess the truth, Russell's philosophy, as so far outlined, resembles nothing so much as old-fashioned Cartesian dualism. Of course he is not a dualist in the 'epistemological' sense of the term which the neo-realists have made fashionable, that is, he wisely rejects the 'representative' or copy-theory of knowledge. But he retains the ultimate distinctness of subject and object of knowledge. From the charge of holding so comprehensible a position Russell, however, is unhappily freed by his cavalier treatment of the self. In Russell's view, consciousness is a *sui generis* relation called experience,

or acquaintance, or awareness, between the subject, "an entity which is acquainted with something," and the object, "any entity with which something is acquainted" (p. 438. Cf. p. 1). But nothing can be known about the subject-term of this relation. "Subjects," he says (p. 441), "are not given in acquaintance"; nothing can be known as to their intrinsic nature; "they are known merely as referents for the relation of acquaintance . . . and other psychical relations."

For this conclusion Mr. Russell argues almost exclusively by reference to "Hume's inability to perceive himself" supplemented by the observation, "I think most unprejudiced observers would agree" (p. 440). It is very difficult to treat this argument seriously. If Mr. Russell is really concerned to eliminate the self from knowledge he should certainly take into account Kant's Third Antinomy and Transcendental Deduction of the Categories as well as Part IV of Hume's *Treatise*, Book I. He should analyze the full implication of 'knowing the subject' at all, even as mere 'referent.' He should explain the difference, on which, in his argument against neutral monism, he so strongly insists, between A's experience and B's experience. Finally, he should endeavor in concrete cases to reduce to mere 'referent' the 'I' which he so constantly invokes, as, for example, in the statement: "Memory makes us call past experiences ours. When we can remember experiencing something we include the remembered experiencing with our present experience as part of one person's experience." By this statement, Russell certainly is assuming that 'I am the same at one time and at another' and thus no mere referent; and he makes the same tacit implication of a really experienced 'I' in the attempt to explain "a certain unity important to realize but hard to analyze in 'my present experience'" by defining 'I' and 'now' in terms of '*my present experience*'¹ (pp. 5-6). The truth is that Mr. Russell, though an expert logician and often a good (if amateur) psychologist, does not always distinguish between logical validity and actual experience. No formal difficulty is involved in treating the subject as a referent and in regarding consciousness as a relation distinct from the subject. But, inconvenient as the fact may be from the standpoint of the logical formula, consciousness as actually experienced and as normally described is a self being conscious.

¹ Italics mine.

Since the foregoing paragraphs were written Mr. Russell has published, in *The Monist* of July, 1915, a paper on "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter" which supplements his conception of extra-mental reality and adds to his arguments against the idealistic account of physical reality. But for an obstinate error of 'common sense' Russell would assent, he declares, to its theory of extra-mental reality. Common sense is clearly correct in believing that what we see is physical and is as clearly at fault in believing that what is physical must be persistent (p. 401).¹ Russell holds first, that sense-data—what we see, hear, and touch—are "extra-mental . . . and among the ultimate constituents of matter"² and second in opposition to common sense that "the persistent particles of mathematical physics" are "logical constructions" (p. 402). Space, so far from being 'all-embracing,' is a largely individual affair. Each man's extra-mental object occupies a place (and time) of its own.

The theory of a multitude of three-dimensional spaces—not to name the "crude space of six dimensions" (p. 416)—might be argued for, Russell suggests, by the aid of symbolic logic, but the argument would be too difficult and too technical to be embarked upon in this article (p. 415.) The extra-mental reality of sense-data, so far as he argues it at all, he bases on two distinctions: on the fact that 'what I see,' and 'what I hear' are to be distinguished from 'seeing' and 'hearing' (p. 404), and on the fact that "colors and noises are not mental in the sense of having that . . . peculiarity which belongs to beliefs and wishes and volitions" (p. 405). But it is clear that the first of these arguments tells against solipsism only and that the second does not necessarily prove more than the fact that there is a difference between perceptual experience and other types of consciousness. Accordingly, the reader comes with great surprise upon the concluding sentences in which Mr. Russell, while disclaiming the conviction that his theory "is certainly true," adds that it "may be true" and that this is "more than can be said for any other theory" (p. 417), except that of Leibniz which he regards as "closely analogous" to his own. The idealist, as the earlier paragraphs of this discussion have indicated, concurs in Russell's criticism of other realistic systems and may well agree that, given Russell's constant, unjustified assumption of existent extra-mental reality, his account of it "may be true." But the idealistic reader will also insist that Mr. Russell's consideration

¹ References, in what follows, are to *The Monist*, volume XXV, 1915.

² Russell notes the approximation to the view of Nunn and to that of S. Alexander.

of the non-realistic position is, in an extreme degree, superficial; that he has not so much as touched upon the fundamental argument against the existence of non-mental realities and that he has argued against only the solipsistic form of idealism.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Introduction to the Science of Ethics. By THEODORE DE LAGUNA, Professor of Philosophy in Bryn Mawr College. New York, The Macmillan Co.—pp. xi, 414. \$1.75.

“*Unimportant if true.* Such,” in Mr. De Laguna’s summarizing comment (p. 268), “is the case with hedonism.” “Unimportant if true” will be, I am inclined to think, the college student’s impression of ethics as a whole after an introduction by Mr. De Laguna. According to Mr. De Laguna, ethics is to be treated as a science. His conception of science leans in the direction of empirical observation rather than of organized thought and seems to be modelled after natural history rather than after natural science. The result is that in his hands ethics becomes mainly a collection of interesting and somewhat curious opinions gathered by a foreign and non-human observer. That these opinions stand for life and death decisions on the part of living, thinking, and sadly perplexed human beings, is left somewhat remote. Like the specimens in a museum of natural history, it seems that ethical opinions have no inner and spiritual side worth speaking of.

This ostensibly scientific point of view, combining an ethical scepticism with a dogmatism of fact, determines in a rather interesting and consistent fashion (adopting for the moment the natural-history standpoint) the treatment of the whole subject. For example, the student is fairly exhorted not to attempt exact definitions; in other words, not to take ethical problems and distinctions too seriously. The discussion of freedom and responsibility is cut short by the statement—as a matter of settled scientific opinion—that a belief in determinism leaves the rationality of effort undisturbed,—really a very nice question. In the historical section, ethical theories are treated as external and also as isolated facts. It is thus, for example, that hedonism becomes “unimportant, if true.” If, in the case of modern hedonism, we go below the surface and study hedonism in connection with economic theory and the rise of industrialism (as it is presented by Sir Leslie Stephen in his “English Utilitarians”), we may reach the conclusion that hedonism represents an attitude towards life which is neither practically unimportant nor altogether untrue. And when Mr. De Laguna takes up the problem of ‘value,’ in Part III—

his nearest approach to the question of what I am to do—it seems that the problem of life is hardly more than a matter of effecting a neatly impersonal arrangement from a collection of impersonal needs of various shapes and sizes, like a child making patterns from kindergarten blocks.

I am therefore disposed to take Mr. De Laguna's "Introduction" as a triumphant refutation of the theory that ethics is an impersonal science. On the other hand, the book has the merits of the method along with the defects; and in many respects the workmanship is excellent. It is rich in apt illustration. No words are wasted in empty edification. And nothing is wasted in 'style'; if anything, the style is rather too casual for the complexities of the subject. Altogether, if we accept the natural-scientific point of view, we shall admit that the point of view is well worked out.

And from any point of view, the arrangement is excellent. Part I covers "The Field of Ethics" and is devoted mainly to the consideration of such general questions as the relation of character and conduct and the meaning of responsibility and freedom. Little space is wasted over the question, wholly uninteresting to the beginner, but usually the subject of lengthy formal discussion in text-books of ethics, of the relation of ethics to other sciences. Part II, comprising nearly half the book, gives us "The Classical Schools." Part III is constructive, under the title of "The Evolutionary Theory of Moral Values."

Here Mr. De Laguna seems to think that the introduction of the conception of evolution renders all earlier statements of moral problems meaningless. He is even disposed to treat the absence of an evolutionary standpoint in ancient ethics as somewhat reprehensible. In particular, the traditional antithesis of virtue and happiness has been exploded. And yet it seems somehow to reappear in the evolutionary view as an antithesis between radicalism and conservatism, between values to be realized (as I may put it) and values realized. It seems not to occur to Mr. De Laguna that under these terms the problem looms as large as ever. Perhaps this is because the evolutionary standpoint leads him to assume, opaquely, that progress (or shall we say, movement in an intransitive series?) is in itself a good.

But why should I strive for a higher level of personal culture when I am comfortable as I am? Why strive for a more complete social justice when present conditions suit me? And if it turns out that, in the order of evolution, the satisfaction of older wants is always

balanced—or overbalanced—by the appearance of newer needs, then what is the use of evolution? In general, what is the status of a value which is not an immediate cash-value? These are some of the questions that confront those who are actually undergoing the process of evolution and upon whom rests the responsibility of directing their own evolution—if direction is to be admitted. They seem to be unintelligible and indiscernible from the standpoint of evolution as an externally observed natural process.

Driving a motor-car is a very different thing from watching a motor-car go. Mr. De Laguna's science of ethics undertakes to watch human life go. I shall not deny that this is one of the points of view from which human life is to be treated. Life is, if you please, 'behavior.' But the behavior that is open to external and impersonal observation is so small a portion of the whole of life that a description of life from this point of view is bound to give us a collection of merely curious and unintelligible customs, like the habits of the lower animals. And nowhere is the inadequacy of the point of view more clearly illustrated than in the attempt to construct an impersonal ethics.

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German Philosophy and Politics. By JOHN DEWEY. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1915.—pp. 134.

It seems a far cry from the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the categorical imperative to German militaristic philosophy. The great European conflict has led to the revision of many of our interpretations and opinions, but it is hard to believe that the teachings of a Bernhardt had their beginnings in the system of the peace-loving and humanitarian sage of Königsberg. Many a harsh judgment has been pronounced upon Kant in our country within recent years, but, so far as I know, Professor Dewey is the first thinker to find the seed of what is now dubbed the Prussian theory of politics in the teachings of the great criticist. He regards as Kant's germinal idea the idea of a dual legislation of reason by which are marked off the realms of science and morals; causal dependence is sovereign in the one, freedom in the other. This, according to Professor Dewey, gives us the clue to the understanding of Germany; the chief mark of German civilization is its combination of self-conscious idealism with unsurpassed technical efficiency and organization in the varied fields of action. The more the Germans accomplish in the way of material conquest, the more they are conscious of fulfilling an ideal mission. Another feature of

the Kantian philosophy which has left its mark upon German thought is its emphasis upon the *a priori*. Now, empirically grounded truths are discussable, they have a humane and social quality; truths of pure reason evade the logic of experience and become the spoil of a logic of fanaticism. A hierarchically ordered State will feel an affinity for a philosophy of fixed categories. There are also elements in Kant's philosophy of morals which have led to dangerous consequences. The gospel of duty has an invigorating ring, but unfortunately it is empty and formal: it tells men that to do their duty is their supreme law of action, but it does not tell them what their duties specifically are. Moreover, the motive which measures duty is wholly inner, purely a matter of inner consciousness. Now when the practical political situation called for universal military service, the gospel of duty devoid of content naturally lent itself to the consecration and idealization of such specific duties as the existing order might prescribe. Individuals have always sacrificed themselves for their country's good, but in Germany this sacrifice, in peace and in war, has been systematically reinforced by an inner mystic sense of a Duty raising men to the plane of the universal and eternal. Furthermore, a gospel of duty separated from empirical purposes and results (upon human welfare) tends to gag the intelligence and is socially irresponsible. There is something uncanny, Professor Dewey thinks, in the scorn which German ethics pours upon a theory which takes account of practical motives. When an aggressive and commercial nation carries on commerce and war simply from the motive of obedience to duty, there is awakened an unpleasant suspicion of a suppressed "psychic complex."

Another Kantian idea necessarily leads to a philosophy of society and the State. Morality is the achievement of the self-conscious reason of man through conquest of nature. Man is by nature evil and morality a ceaseless battle to transform all the natural desires of man into willing servants of the law and purpose of reason. The natural relations of man to man are those of an unsociable sociableness; but mutual antagonism is more of a force in evolving man from savagery to civilization than are the kindly and sociable instincts. *Kultur* and civilization do not mean the same thing for the German. Civilization is a natural and largely unconscious growth; *Kultur* is deliberate and conscious, the fruit of natural motives which have been transformed by the inner spirit. Morality is necessary to culture; it is primarily not an individual trait or possession, but a conquest of the community won through devotion to 'duty.' We find such

thoughts expressed in German discussions of the war: the war is conceived as an outer manifestation of a great spiritual struggle, in which what is really at stake is the supreme value of the German attitude in philosophy, science, and social questions generally, the "specifically German habits of feeling and thinking." Similarly, society is conceived as something empirical and external, while the State is a moral entity, the creation of self-conscious reason operating in behalf of the spiritual and ideal interests of its members. Its function is cultural, educative; the furthering of an ideal ethical community. The same thing is true of wars which are really national. Conquest through conflict is the law of morals everywhere.

In Kant we find only the beginnings of this political philosophy, according to Professor Dewey. He is still held back by the individualism of the eighteenth century. Everything legal and political is conceived by him as external, unmoral. At the same time it is the business of the State to hinder hindrances to freedom: to establish social conditions of outward order in which truly moral acts may gradually evolve a kingdom of humanity. It therefore has a moral basis and an ultimate moral function. But Kant was cosmopolitan, not nationalistic, in his feelings; he upheld the ideal of an ultimate republican federation of states. There was, however, an aspect of Kant's doctrine which gave the patriotic Fichte his clue for transforming the Kantian philosophy. Kant had taught that the object of moral legislation is to realize the purposes of free rational action within the sense world. According to Fichte, the world of sense must be regarded from the very start as material which the free, rational, moral Ego has created in order to have material for its own adequate realization of will. His doctrine of the primacy of the Deed and of the Duty to achieve freedom through moral self-assertion against obstacles was one that could be preached with noble moral fervor in connection with the difficulties and needs of a divided and conquered Germany. The key to the political regeneration of Germany was to be found in a moral and spiritual regeneration effected by means of education. Education is the work of the State; hence the State must have the organization and power to control the conditions of life. The outcome of this reasoning is a State Socialism, based on moral and idealistic grounds, not on economic considerations. Fichte's ultimate goal is a universal state, which, however, cannot be realized until we have passed through a period of the nationalistic closed state. Only through the educational activities of the State and its complete regulation of the industrial activities of its members does

the potential moral freedom of individuals become an established reality.

Fichte's system was an effective weapon in winning the battle of bending the German sentiments of dualism and individualism to the spirit of national unity. After Jena, he urges the unique mission of Germany as a motive for securing national unity and the overthrow of the conqueror; the Germans are represented as the sole people who recognize the principles of spiritual freedom, of freedom won by action in accord with reason. For Germany to win is no selfish gain; it is an advantage to all the nations.

In the grosser sense of the words, Professor Dewey declares, Germany has not held that might makes right, but it has been told by its philosophers that it is the business of ideal right to gather might to itself. Past history is the record of the gradual realization in the Germanic State of the divine idea; future history must uphold and expand what has been accomplished. War is the final seal of devotion to the extension of the kingdom of the Absolute on earth.

In the last chapter, which to my mind is the best in the book, Professor Dewey traces the development of the German philosophy of history in Kant, Fichte and Hegel, and points out that the German attitude of the day has its roots not in Darwin or Nietzsche, but in the classical idealistic philosophy culminating in Hegel. He concludes that Kant still remains the philosopher of Germany; he thinks that the attempts of his successors to bridge the gap between the world of necessity and the world of freedom and set up a wholly unified philosophy, failed, historically speaking, but that they contributed an indispensable ingredient to the contemporary German spirit; they helped people the Kantian void of the supersensible with the substantial figures of the State and its Historical Evolution and Mission.

Professor Dewey has embarked upon what he himself confesses to be a precarious undertaking, in this interesting book of his, that of singling out "some one thing in German philosophy as of typical importance in understanding German national life." That one thing is what he conceives to be the germinal idea in Kant's philosophy: the doctrine of the two worlds. This idea is taken to be the key to our understanding of German civilization, its self-conscious idealism and unsurpassed technical efficiency and organization. It is true that German *philosophy* has for the most part remained idealistic, but it may well be doubted whether Germany as a whole (German life, German politics, German civilization) has been any more idealis-

tic in recent years than the other nations. We heard a good deal, before the war, of the materialism rampant in Germany, and of what writers were pleased to call the 'Americanization' of the German people. But admitting the idealistic predilections of the Germans, we cannot hold idealism or a *priorism* responsible for their exaggerated nationalism, any more than we can hold Christianity responsible for the notion that God is at heart a German and the faithful assistant of the German war department.

If we mean by Kantianism Fichtean and Hegelian political thought and philosophy, it is true that Kantianism helped to formulate a sense of Germany's national mission and destiny. Kant himself, however, was too big to fall into a narrow nationalism. Even Fichte in his patriotic period regarded German leadership in culture only as a preliminary stage in the progress to a larger humanitarianism, while Hegel believed in the alternation of nations, one giving way to the other in the march of civilization toward the realization of the divine idea. There is nothing inherent in the doctrine of the two worlds that compelled German idealism to take the course described by Professor Dewey; the line from Kant to Bernhardt did not have to be followed. To place the highest value on Mind does not necessarily compel one to place it on the German mind. The war of Independence aroused intense patriotism and nationalism in Germany, and idealism became tintured with Germanism. Philosophy was made to serve as the handmaiden of German politics. The Germans were not the first to consider themselves the chosen people of God nor will they be the last.

Professor Dewey's book, however, furnishes a most interesting and instructive account of the fortunes of a *Weltanschauung* pressed into the service of politics. It shows how the system of Kant made a union of mechanism and freedom possible, theoretically and practically; how Fichte developing Kant's thought compelled the world of sense into the service of the mind, and how, fired by the patriotic fervor of the times, he looked upon the German mind and a hoped-for Socialistic State as the temporary expressions of God's purpose to realize a higher human freedom; how Hegel interpreted political history as the overcoming of one great State by the other; and how these thoughts of Fichte and Hegel may be utilized to serve as an ethical justification of Modern Germany's demand for *the* place in the sun. And the book helps us to understand the soil in which the belief in Germany's mission as the leader of all the nations found nourishment; it shows that even without Darwin and Nietzsche the so-called philosophy of might could

have resulted, and most likely did result, from the laying together of the ideas of idealistic philosophers and the deeds of realistic statesmen. One is impressed, in studying the history of German philosophy in its relations with German politics, with the tremendous power of ideas when supported by practical efficiency and the will to succeed. In spite of its impatience with pragmatism, Germany seems to be the most pragmatist nation in the world today. Perhaps we may say, the German will to be a nation pressed into its service a system of thought which satisfied the idealistic longings of the German and yet permitted him to keep his gaze firmly fixed upon the good things of the world, which allowed him to revel in the realm of spirit and at the same time urged him to carry on trade and war. However that may be, the wish seems to be the father to a great deal of thinking which comes to us from Germany in these days of war, and only those who share the German wish can accept the German reasons.

Space prevents us from considering the concluding portion of Professor Dewey's suggestive book, in which he inquires into the problem which American life and philosophy have to meet today. His remarks in this connection are wise and deserve the attention of all who have the welfare of our own country at heart. He is right in pointing out that "the present European situation forces home upon us the need for constructive planning," and that "a philosophy which should articulate and consolidate the ideas to which our social practice commits us would clarify and guide our future endeavor."

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Know Thyself. By BERNARDINO VARISCO. London, George Allen and Unwin, 1915.—pp. xxix, 327.

This new volume of the Library of Philosophy is a translation of the author's *Conosci te Stesso* (1912). In the task of translating the work Dr. Guglielmo Salvadori has had the assistance of Professor A. E. Taylor, of the University of St. Andrews, who has read the manuscript in its entirety. The contents of the book fall into an Introduction, seven chapters, and three appendices. The Introduction is a general summary of the argument of the volume. The chapter headings are as follows: chapter I, The First Principle; chapter II, The Subject; chapter III, Reality; chapter IV, Fact and Cognition; chapter V, Thought; chapter VI, Unity and Multiplicity; chapter VII, The Absolute. The appendices deal with the following subjects: Experience, Religion, Philosophy; Human Knowledge; The *Great Problems* (*Massimi Problemi*) and its Critics. The translator has added a short but helpful index.

"Intelligendo se, intelligit omnia alia." These words, which St. Thomas Aquinas applied to God and which the author applies to the individual subject, indicate very clearly the point of view of the book, namely, that the knowledge of the self involves ultimately the knowledge of reality. Subject and object, we are told, are elements in one unity. Hence, in knowing the object the subject is really only becoming acquainted with itself; for the subject implies the object and is implied by it. "To construct philosophy, to study reality in its concreteness, is therefore at once to construct the theory of knowledge and to develop the cognition which the subject has of itself" (p. 7). In fact, I can never know anything but myself, since the object, known or knowable, is a constituent of myself. This, however, is not solipsism. "The true conclusion is this: I have no means and no right to assert or to assume anything which is not implicit in me. In other words, nothing exists which is not implicit in me: I am a centre of the universe" (p. 9).

But, as a self-conscious being, a centre of the universe, I am not wholly clearly conscious; my explicit consciousness is only a small part of my total reality. The great underlying sea of subconsciousness is as truly a part of myself as is my more explicit consciousness. "Over and above the clear or actual consciousness, there is another, and much larger, sphere of subconsciousness. And that such a subconsciousness exists, is an undeniable implication of consciousness. I remember; that, which I now remember, would not be that element of my consciousness which in fact it is, if it had not already been an element of subconsciousness. Our being clearly conscious is in every case the result of a process which implies subconscious elements, and partly takes place in subconsciousness" (p. xiv). However, there is no break between consciousness and subconsciousness; the latter, we are reminded, is no *deus ex machina* introduced into the discussion for the purpose of eliminating difficulties. It is rather the necessary presupposition of explicit conscious experience. "Consciousness is nothing but subconsciousness organized" (p. xiv).

The above considerations lead to the view that in the particular subject there are really two consciousnesses, or unities, namely, a primitive one and a secondary one. The primitive unity, or the unity of primitive consciousness, is so inchoate that we cannot represent it to ourselves with clearness—it is a "uniform aggregate, in which there are no distinctions." We must assume it, however, as the necessary condition of the secondary unity, which more properly is called the self. Between these two consciousnesses there is an organic relation; the primitive

unity develops into the secondary unity, and the development is a process of organization—the difference between them is only a difference in degree of complexity of organization, for the primitive unity is still a unity (pp. 39 ff.). “There are evidently several secondary unities. The question is, whether each of them is the development of a particular primitive unity, or whether all of them are the result of the development of one and the same primitive unity” (pp. 42–43). This question the author regards as a fundamental problem, it being one of the chief objects of the book to suggest the solution. The answer which he insists upon is, in short, that “the primitive unities are as many, irreducible to each other, as the real or possible secondary unities” (p. 43). Each primitive unity evolves into a necessarily single subject; while the existence of several subjects implies the existence of as many primitive unities (p. 45).

Obviously, subjects are related to each other; they form a system. It is true that the developed subjects are not all consciously related to each other; they are, however, potentially related. There is no subject with which it is intrinsically impossible for another subject to enter into relations, and “the possibility of entering into (explicit, conscious) relations is already a kind of (implicit, subconscious) relation” (p. 49). It is necessary to assume, therefore, that the primitive unities are related to all others. Thus the system among the subjects is a polycentric system, a system of many centres. “There are primitive (absolutely primitive) unities of consciousness or, more exactly, of subconsciousness; there are many of them, not independent of each other, for on the contrary each of them exists only in so far as the system exists, but, as unities, mutually co-ordinated and capable of developing through their reciprocal actions and reactions” (p. 54).

Our conclusion, then, is that the phenomenal universe (since every phenomenon is a distinct element in the experience, actual or possible, of a subject) is a unity in multiplicity. It is a system of many spontaneous unities, which are coessential to each other and which imply each other. “A multiplicity of spontaneous primitive unities, solidary with one another and therefore elements of one single unity: in this way, and in this way alone, the universe is conceived as a system” (p. 165). This conception removes the apparent antagonism between causality and rationality, between indeterminism and determinism. Causal relations and relative indeterminism arise from the spontaneity of the primitive unities of which the universe is composed; logical, or rational, relations and necessity are explained by reference to the essential solidarity of these spontaneous centres. But there is no

contradiction here: the spontaneity of each primitive unity, though it is the source of indeterminate variation, is controlled and regulated by its essential connection with the similar spontaneity of other primitive unities—just as the movements of the individual in the crowd are determined by the movements of the crowd, even though the individual is an irreducible element of the group (pp. 156-157).

Now it is obvious that, if these primitive unities thus imply each other, if they are several centres of one system, then they must have something in common. What is this *quid* in terms of which the spontaneities form a universe? It is "indeterminate Being—that Being which a subject cannot but think in order to exist, and of which every subject and every fact is a determination" (p. 265). Beyond this general and vague statement the author does not care to go in answer to this question, evidently of so much importance to his doctrine. He leaves us confronted with the alternative: either theism or pantheism, either Being has determinations which make it personal or it is identical with those "determinations by which the phenomenal world is constituted." His final word is that "the ascertained elements" are not sufficient to justify a choice (p. 266).

Such appear to be the main contentions of this substantial volume. From these general principles follow other considerations, which idealists and others from Berkeley down have insisted upon. Among them, and perhaps of chief importance, are the doctrines that "the reality of the physical world is simply its being a distinct element in the field of total experience" (p. 68); that "an abstraction, when it is not apprehended as such, transforms itself, for speculative thought, into an hypostasis" (p. 71); that every fact, including illusions, dreams and hallucinations, is real, but only in its relations (pp. 73 ff.); that thought and reality are coterminous, and no part of reality falls essentially beyond the limits of knowledge; and, finally, that knowledge is more than bare abstract cognition, involving as it does doing as well as thinking.

There is nothing new in all of this; indeed, there is nothing new in the whole book, except the manner of expression. Its fundamental doctrine is very closely related to the monadology of Leibnitz—so closely related, in fact, that it seems to the present writer to have attaching to it all of the difficulties of the Leibnitzian point of view. Berkeley, Hume and Kant are also drawn upon; while the author frankly recognizes his indebtedness to Hegel, whose doctrine he claims to refute only in so far as he "determines better and completes that doctrine" (p. 320). On the other hand, there is here no servile following

of another's ideas; the author makes a sustained and serious attempt to state in systematic form truth, which others may have contended for perhaps, but in which he firmly believes. And the result of his effort is a book which must be regarded as among the important works of contemporary thinkers.

If one were so disposed, one would not have great difficulty in finding faults, more or less serious, in the book. In the first place, while the author is willing to reserve judgment concerning matters on which he has not reached a final decision, he is inclined to be too cock-sure on other questions which, in the minds of some, are still debatable. And the reader soon grows weary of being reminded that comprehension of the author's point of view, though difficult, is necessary. Furthermore there are many points which are passed over in the discussion with too great rapidity and concerning which too much is assumed. For example, the assertion that consciousness is subconsciousness organized is not obviously true, indeed the meaning of the statement is not so apparent that he who reads may discern it; and yet I have nowhere found a clear-cut explanation and proof of the proposition. Of more serious import is the criticism that some of the basic tenets of the book are not made clear, either as regards their meaning or their justification. The primitive unity of consciousness, for example, is a fundamental category of the system which the author aims to build; and yet one searches in vain for a comprehensible definition of it, for a clear statement of the difference between it and subconsciousness from which it apparently somehow differs (p. 39), and for an explanation of how it evolves into that secondary unity of consciousness, that explicit consciousness, which is the content to which the pronoun 'I' usually refers. Despite these deficiencies, however, the book is stimulating and suggestive, and is a worthy example of what Italian thought has to contribute to the solution of our common philosophical problems.

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L'année philosophique. Publiée sous la direction de F. PILLON. Vingt-quatrième année—1913. Paris, Librairie Félix Alcan, 1914. —pp. 270.

The present volume of the *Année* contains articles by MM. V. Delbos, Lewis Robinson, Ch. Maillard, G. Lechalas, F. Pillon, and H. Bois, and a philosophical bibliography in which sixty-six works published in France during 1913 are reviewed by MM. Pillon and Dauriac, the latter of whom, for the first time since the *Année* began, has failed to contribute an original article.

In the first article entitled "Le 'Cogito' de Descartes et la philosophie de Locke," M. V. Delbos, taking account of the fact that Locke's opposition to Descartes is a commonplace in the history of modern philosophy, undertakes to trace certain currents of Cartesianism apparent in Locke's work. In developing the *Cogito* as a prime certain idea, Descartes also indicates the criteria of all true knowledge: clarity and distinctness of ideas. And by idea Descartes means all that is immediately conceived by the mind (vs. the body). Like Descartes, Locke proceeds from knowledge to things, not from things to knowledge; but, failing to appreciate Descartes' emphasis upon the priority of pure thought, Locke points to sensation as the original source of our ideas. Sensation, however, is not the only source of knowledge, and reflection demands recognition as the other source; in this way the Cartesian dualism of sense and understanding is partly assimilated by Locke. Descartes regards thought as the essence of the soul substance; Locke finds personal identity in the consciousness of self, thus advocating an ideal, instead of a substantial identity. That this treatment of the soul, by affecting the necessity of the Cartesian mind-body dualism, also tends to question its validity, is indicated by Locke's query whether God could not have conferred on matter the capacity to think. M. Delbos finds that Locke has taken from Cartesianism only a general idealistic method. Lacking a very clear idea of the Cartesian doctrine of truth, Locke regards intuitive and demonstrative knowledge as true because it seems to us to be true, without inquiring what it is that makes the apparently true really true. The correction and expansion of Locke's method by Berkeley and Hume result in phenomenistic idealism, freed alike from the notion of substance and from the notion of rational truth, both of which Cartesian doctrines Locke had appropriated without assimilating them. From another angle, we can see Condillac and his disciples disembarassing Locke's constructive method from the innate faculties which it had retained despite its opposition to innate ideas.

M. Lewis Robinson in his article, "Un solipsiste au XVIII^e siècle," discusses the work of Claude Brunet, a thinker whose boldness, outstripping Berkeley's both as a solipsist and as an idealist, places him in closer relation to Fichte than to the Bishop of Cloyne. Lacking the capacity to express his ideas effectively, or to link them to the philosophic thought of his age, Brunet's originality did not impress his contemporaries seriously enough to win him a place in the philosophic hall of fame.

The third article bears the title "Les antinomies mathématiques

de Kant et l'idée de temps." The author, M. Ch. Maillard, believes that Kant has arbitrarily limited the number of the mathematical antinomies by failing to include the antinomy arising out of the problem of the continuity of change: *Thesis*: All change in the world takes place by the addition of discrete states; *Antithesis*: All change in the world takes place in accordance with the law of continuity. Before turning to his discussion of this neglected antinomy, M. Maillard notes that Kant's solution of the first antinomy (the world has a beginning in time—the world has no beginning in time) is in reality an acceptance of the antithesis, and deals with the views of MM. Couturat and Milhaud and with those of the Russian thinker African Spir, which lead to the conclusion that the very existence of the present world implies a beginning of the world. The antinomy of change resolves itself to the following reasoning: if, in passing from state *a* to state *b*, the changing thing had to traverse an infinity of terms, *b* would never come into existence, since, by definition, the series is inexhaustible. Renouvier recognizes this opposition of our thought to the supposition that an infinite number of successive events could take place in the interval separating two of our perceptions. Kant's successors, Fichte and Schelling, attempt to solve this difficulty, Fichte by distinguishing between the real and the reflective Ego, Schelling by declaring that the infinite series is continuous for the productive intuition but discrete and synthetic for reflection. These views and distinctions are developed today by M. Bergson, who maintains the possibility of reconciling the continuity and the discontinuity of change by attributing the former to intuition and the latter to the understanding, a position which, according to the author, leads M. Bergson to contradictions. In direct opposition to Kant who, regarding the law of the continuity of all change as an indubitable principle *a priori*, ignores the antinomy therein involved, and to those of Kant's successors who have tried to maintain the possibility of an infinite continuity in change, M. Maillard upholds, in this antinomy as in the first antinomy of time, the validity of the thesis: the world has a beginning in time, and change is discontinuous. But does this mean that time itself has had a beginning and is discontinuous? This difficulty arises only when we identify temporal change with time itself. Real succession is discrete (Renouvier), but time itself is an abstract concept which need not logically exclude the concept of continuity (Hamelin). According to M. Maillard, if time is the simple schema of empirical succession, it has commenced with the latter; and if it is a concept, the continuity essential to it does not involve the

necessity of regarding change itself as continuous. The Transcendental Analytic demands a revision of the Transcendental Aesthetic and M. Maillard raises the question whether Kant himself was not conscious of the necessity of this revision.

M. Lechalas, in the next article, "Les années de maturité d'Eugène Fromentin," completes his study, published in 1911, of the apprenticeship of the great painter and writer of the Sahara, basing his discussion on the recently published volume of M. Pierre Blanchon, *Correspondances et fragments inédits d'Eugène Fromentin*.

In his article, "Comment s'est formée et développée la doctrine néo-criticiste de Charles Renouvier," the editor, M. F. Pillon, undertakes to explain how the general ideas of the neo-critical doctrine formed themselves in the mind of Charles Renouvier: the law of number, the principle of relativity, the idea of a first and absolute beginning, creationism, libertarianism, belief in the unity of God. The author discusses the origin and the development of Renouvier's thought, indicating the essential reasons which, in his view, make the powerful theory of Renouvier inconsistent and in need of correction and completion. The article takes its cue from one of the last chapters of Renouvier's work, *Esquisse d'une classification systématique des doctrines philosophiques*, and M. Pillon's general treatment is largely based on that work.

The last article, by M. H. Bois, is entitled "Le 'retour éternel' de Nietzsche." Readers of the Stoics, Plotinus, Blanqui, Spencer, Le Bon, Guyau, and others, know that Nietzsche was not the first exponent of the idea of eternal recurrence. But Nietzsche's expression and use of it were so striking that it has become in a peculiar sense a Nietzschean doctrine. Nietzsche's own record of his vivid experience in August, 1881, when the idea first "came to him" "at Sils Maria, 6500 ft. above sea level and much more above all things human," and of the deep emotional states to which the idea gave rise, has led his commentators to seek and find several psychological explanations of this episode in Nietzsche's life to which we owe so many great pages in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. M. Benoist Hanappier explains it as a case of false recognition. Again, as Fouillée and Höffding have noted, the philologist-philosopher Nietzsche could and probably did borrow his idea from the Greeks, or perhaps from Guyau or some other exponent of the doctrine of eternal recurrence. Moreover, there is record that Nietzsche was aware of this doctrine in his youth. So, alongside of the possible explanation of Nietzsche's experience at Sils Maria as a case of false recognition, there is the other explanation that Nietzsche

mistook for a radically new idea and for a while guarded as a secret a doctrine which was old, not only in the history of thought, but in the history of Nietzsche's own thought,—that Nietzsche's experience, in other words, was of the sort which M. Flournoy has designated as *cryptomnésie*. After this discussion of the psychology of Nietzsche's experience, M. Bois gives an account and a criticism of the doctrine of eternal recurrence as it was developed by Nietzsche. The sum of forces constituting the universe is constant and determined; the universe can neither diminish nor grow; the forces in the universe are eternally active. No matter how great the number of possible phenomenal combinations, therefore, infinite time has exhausted them all in the past, and universal evolution is thus bound to repeat itself and go eternally through the same immense cycle. Is this doctrine useful, in case it be true, and is it true, is it really tenable? M. Daniel Halévy finds in Nietzsche's thought an insoluble antinomy between his two favorite ideas, that of the eternal recurrence and that of the Superman, an antinomy evidenced in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, especially toward the end. On the one hand, humanity is urged to bring forth something higher, something new, the Superman; on the other, "there is nothing new under the sun." M. Ernst Horneffer, on the other hand, sees no contradiction between the two ideas. Only victorious life, only the Superman, could endure the idea of eternal recurrence. This idea is therefore the terrible instrument in the hands of the philosopher, to educate humanity up to the point where the idea will no longer be terrible. Thus M. Oskar Ewald has drawn two Nietzschean categorical imperatives:—one from the idea of eternal recurrence, "Act at every instant of your life as if that instant had an eternal value and were to multiply itself to infinity," and the other from the idea of the Superman, "Act always as if you willed that the Superman be born of you, seek as far as you can to realize him in yourself." But both of these categorical imperatives lose all their significance just as soon as we recall the rigorous deterministic basis on which Nietzsche's whole doctrine of eternal recurrence rests. If 'there is nothing new under the sun,' all our wishes and aspirations are 'vanity of vanities.' The miserable man can find scant inspiration in the prospect of the eternal recurrence of his wretchedness; even the happiest man, as Leopardi says, would find life unsatisfactory if only repetition, and no further happiness, were possible for him. Indeed, the Hindu doctrine of transmigration has an advantage over Nietzsche's eternal recurrence, for it holds out a hope of amelioration, while Nietzsche's inevitable circular round is disheartening. In any case,

whether useful or not, is the doctrine of eternal recurrence true, is it tenable? The absence of recollection by consciousness of the state which it is 'repeating,' the lack of any psychic thread of continuity, is the first radical objection to the doctrine. If the 'identical' world states differ *solo numero* and not in space and time, they are indiscernible, and in that case the repetition of indiscernible worlds is as absurd as their pretended multiplicity. And, on the other hand, if these world-states differ also qualitatively, then they are discernible, but are no longer identical, and the doctrine of eternal recurrence falls down. The difficulty with Nietzsche's whole conception is that it is so strangely mechanistic: it works to death the principle of the conservation of energy and treats the world as if it were constituted merely of atomistic groupings of forces capable of being mathematically calculated. Aside from the fact that even the physical science of today does not use the principle of the conservation of energy in quite as dogmatic a manner, there is one important point which affects radically Nietzsche's doctrine, and that is its failure to do justice to the inexhaustible character of psychic life. As Fouillée puts it, "Mechanically, nature always repeats itself; mentally, it always changes." Mind is essentially creative; it can grow indefinitely; its law is the law of renovation, of progress, of tireless production. It is because it believes in the possibility of progress that it feels called upon to work and finds life worth living and eternalizing. Indeed only on such a basis of belief in true progress can one intelligently strive to attain the level of the Superman.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Die Ethik und der Krieg. Von OSWALD KÜLPE. Nach einem Kriegsvortrag an der Universität München. Leipzig, Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1915.—pp. 44.

Professor Külpe offers in this book not a discussion of the ethical questions involved in the present European conflict, but an ethics of war in general, a deliberate and rational ethical appreciation of war. He finds that only a necessary war is morally justifiable and defines such a war as one that rests upon the irreconcilable opposition between the most vital interests of two states and is forced upon one state (or its ally) by the other. Hence a war is necessary and just only for the menaced or attacked party. All but extreme pacifists will admit the legitimacy of a war of self-defense, but Professor Külpe seems to forget his definition and includes other wars in the category of righteous conflicts. We find that offensive war too is justifiable under certain circumstances. Thus, it may be necessary for the development of a state that it take up the sword in order to remove historical obstacles which cannot be removed by peaceful means. Then, again, the demands of justice may compel a state to espouse a good cause, or the law of self-preservation may lead it to forestall an unescapable peril or menace by beginning hostilities itself. And the right of self-defense against an aggressor seems to be limited: the defending state must possess sufficient inner worth to make its preservation and security essential to the progress of mankind. And if I read our author aright, the worth of a nation is measured by qualities that make success in war possible. He tells us that a nation that stands the test of danger, that meets the new problems confronting it firm and united, that submits to discipline, that willingly makes sacrifices and is obedient to duty is worthy of preservation, and that a war that raises peoples and states possessing such qualities may be justified far beyond mere self-defense. War is a merciless but just process of selection, bestowing the prize of victory upon the fittest. War not only proves the efficiency of the victor, but demands and supplies the exercise of all moral forces for the protection and security of the state. Militarism is an excellent defense against effeminacy and exhaustion, against social disintegration and separation, and against the rank growth of cosmopolitan tendencies. Purification and unification are the great moral effects of the menace of war and of war.

I do not think that Professor Külpe has clearly worked out his thought; at any rate he has not presented it free from confusion and contradiction. But he seems to be in fundamental agreement with the recent militaristic philosophy of Germany. A necessary war is, after all, one that a nation must wage to realize its potentialities. "No healthy, vigorous, and growing state will allow any one to decide for it whether or not it ought to yield in a matter touching

its honor or existence. Nor is it to the interest of *Kultur* and progress that the formation of great and powerful states be prevented or impeded." "Where a people possesses qualities so unique that they cannot be replaced, the world would be deprived of moral and cultural values if no effort were made to secure and promote the continuance and development of such a people." "The value of a people for humanity is doubtless increased by its great achievements in economics and organization, in industry and commerce, in art and science, in theory and technics, and by its work as the teacher of other peoples and states." Such a state evidently has superior rights corresponding to its superior worth; when the vital interests of such a state are menaced by the vital interests of another state, directly or indirectly, it is in duty bound to go to war if it cannot realize its destiny otherwise. Such a war is necessary and just. And such a war "orders the fate of states according to the higher justice of history and distributes the goods of the earth according to the power to acquire and preserve them." It favors the efficient and gives the prize to the soundest, and its outcome is a test of the efficiency and the health of the state and obeys an ethical causality in conformity with which we reap what we have sown.

This kind of reasoning is not quite unknown in the United States, although we do not hear so much of "our manifest destiny" now as formerly. There is something plausible in the idea that a nation ought to occupy the place in the world to which its worth entitles it: this seems so just. But how shall we determine the worth of a people for humanity at large; who is to decide its worth, how and by whom shall the rewards of its merit be apportioned? By the abitrament of war, we are told. Owing to the selfishness, jealousy, envy, and distrust of nations, this may be the only practical means of settling these questions, but it certainly does not appeal to the human mind as rational and ethical, unless it be assumed that war will make all things straight, that "*die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*," that whatever is, is right and rational. And that we are not willing to grant. A victory for Germany in this war would prove nothing but Germany's strength and skill in war; a defeat for Germany would not prove that her contributions to science, literature, art, industry, and civilization are inferior to those of the Allies, or at any rate that she has done nothing for the progress of mankind. The annexation by Germany of Belgium, Holland, and Scandinavia would not prove anything but her superior strength in arms; many of us would regard such an event as a serious loss to humanity and as harmful to Germany herself in the long run. The worth of a nation is not determined by its ability to shoot.

The manner of conducting war follows, according to Professor Külpe, from the definition of a necessary war: *Nothwehr* calls for *Nothandlungen*; ruthless punishment is a painful matter of fact; the annihilation of towns in which *franc-tireurs* are active, the destruction of works of art and places of high civilization, the exploitation of the enemy's resources in the interest of the conqueror and to the hurt of the population, all these are morally justifiable. Indeed, the most ruthless war is the most humane war because it is the quickest way to peace and therefore leads to the removal of all the evils of war. If

this is really the case, it is surprising that nations do not kill their prisoners and the captured wounded instead of feeding and caring for them, that they do not take everything they need in the hostile country without paying for it, that they do not utterly destroy all property and the entire population when they withdraw from the enemy's country.

Like many other philosophies, this type seeks to justify the ways of man to God. Professor Külpe promised to give us an ethics of war in general; instead, he seems to offer an *apologia* of Germany's conduct in the present conflict. His theory cannot have sunk very deep into the minds of the German people or government; otherwise, they could not complain of England's entrance into the war or of any of England's acts during the war. England too has some vital interests to defend, she too believes or at least can believe that the world will "an englischem Wesen genesen," that she has a great mission to perform, that history will go astray unless she holds her own and perhaps other peoples' own. On the basis of the Külpeian theory, she has as good a case as Germany's; if she wins, she was right and the most worthy: to the victor belong not only the spoils but the moral crown. On such a theory no one can know which nation is worth while until the corpses have been counted: *der Lebende hat Recht*. And on such a theory ethics can do little more here than hold a post-mortem examination.

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Hume's Place in Ethics. By EDNA ASTON SHEARER. Bryn Mawr, Penna., January, 1915.—pp. 86.

The problem of this dissertation is to place Hume's ethics with reference to the three chief schools in the English ethics of his time,—rational intuitionism, the moral sense school, and utilitarianism. Hume's relation to the rationalists presents little difficulty,—except in so far as it is involved in what he has to say of the moral sense,—but his relation to utilitarianism and the moral sense school is a somewhat controversial question. Commonly, of course, he is regarded as a utilitarian, and Green set the bad example, which later idealists have followed, of making no adequate distinction between Hume's theory of desire and that of Gay, Tucker, and other utilitarians of Hume's time. On the other hand, some critics have counted Hume as belonging to the moral sense school. The question is complicated by the fact that Hume left two statements of his Ethics, Book III. of the *Treatise* (1740) and the *Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* (1751). It has been common for critics to find a distinction between these two works, particularly regarding the place of benevolence in human conduct.

Miss Shearer takes the position that the *Inquiry* and the *Treatise* present identical theories and that both maintain a native tendency to benevolence. She therefore regards the omission of sympathy in the *Inquiry*,—the most striking difference between the two works,—as indicating merely that Hume, in the more popular book, eliminated an abstruse psychological theory intended

to explain the occurrence of certain passions; even in the *Treatise* he had not used sympathy and the association of ideas as a means of reducing apparent altruism to self-love, after the manner of Gay. Throughout, Hume regards benevolence as psychologically simple and not compounded of simpler egoistic desires. In respect to this question Miss Shearer follows closely the analysis of Hume's use of association given by Professor McGilvary.¹

I believe it is to be admitted that a good case is established for this view of the relation between the *Treatise* and the *Inquiry*. Certainly it is fundamentally important to mark the wide divergence between Hume's use of association and that of Gay and the other utilitarians of the eighteenth century; a failure to make this distinction has caused much confusion in the interpretation of Hume's ethics. At the same time it is easy to overestimate the importance of the question. That Hume did differ fundamentally from the other utilitarians of his time, at least in the *Inquiry*, has been fully recognized by careful critics. Moreover, a preference for the *Inquiry* as a statement of Hume's ethical theory, such as that expressed by Professor Albee, is quite consistent with the admission that Miss Shearer and Professor McGilvary have made out their case regarding the *Treatise*. No one, so far as I know, has ever held that Hume's ingenious theory of sympathy added anything to the clearness of his ethics. The peculiar interpretation of association which Hume used in his explanation of the passions was not only different from that of his contemporaries but was purely an episode in the history of the association theory.

The identification of the *Treatise* and *Inquiry*, however, is not the chief point for which Miss Shearer contends. This is rather the closer identification of Hume with the moral sense school. Whether she would go the length of denying that he is a utilitarian is not perfectly clear. She does hold that he retained the moral sense throughout his system as a means of bridging the gap between a mere recognition of utility and an approval of it. But it remains a question,—and the matter might well have been discussed by Miss Shearer,—whether the psychological simplicity of moral sentiments is a sufficient reason for excluding Hume from the utilitarians, though it is to be freely admitted that this distinguishes him from his contemporaries in the school. In fact, it is difficult to see on what ground one would deny Hume a place among utilitarians, unless on the supposition that a recognition of original altruism is inconsistent with the principle of utility, a position that seems to be taken by Mr. Selby-Bigge in the introduction to his edition of Hume's two *Inquiries* (p. xxvi). But the utilitarian school has universally been considered to include not only Hume's contemporaries but also moralists of the nineteenth century who had largely modified the psychology of Gay and Tucker, and this partly under the influence of Hume himself. There is no sufficient reason why the greatest happiness principle must be held only in conjunction with the view that all motives are developed from an original desire for the agent's pleasure. When Mr. Selby-Bigge says that Hume differs from the moral sense school

¹ This REVIEW, Vol. XII, 1903, pp. 272 ff.; the title of this article is misquoted on p. 36.

only in a 'more destructive use of utility' he is underestimating the importance of this distinction. Hume is sufficiently distinguished from the moral sense school by his use of the principle of utility as a means of rationalizing the pronouncements of the moral sense, even though he does not regard benevolence as psychologically a derivative from self-love.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

Le dualisme logique: essai sur l'importance de sa réalité pour le problème de la connaissance. Par MARIN STEFANESCU. Paris, F. Alcan, 1915.—pp. iv, 197.

This work assumes that philosophy begins with the problem of knowledge and that all philosophers, in their effort to solve this problem, have been forced to start from a logical dualism,—such as the dualism of sense and reason, idea and fact, subject and object,—the resolution of which constitutes the philosopher's theory of knowledge. Since most philosophers have been dogmatists, in the sense that they believed it to be the business of knowledge to penetrate to the essence of things, their dualism has taken the form of a dilemma or an antinomy. Being forced therefore to choose between them, philosophers have attempted to reduce sense to reason or reason to sense, or, after Kant, to find a reconciliation of the two. Hence the endless controversy between the intellectualists and the anti-intellectualists, a divergence of theory which is at once fundamental and insoluble. The author undertakes, however, to show that it is insoluble only because the problem has been incorrectly stated.

His method is historical; that is, he examines logical dualism in its latest chief manifestation, the philosophy of Kant and contemporary Kantians, criticises the efforts of these philosophers to resolve the antinomy of sense and reason, and gives a solution of his own more satisfactory than these. As presenting the chief types of solution that have been offered, he chooses the phenomenalism of Benno Erdmann, the idealism of Cohen, the logicism of Husserl, the realism of Riehl, and the psychologism of Jerusalem. Husserl insists upon a pure, *a priori* logic and therefore upon the necessity of knowledge, while Jerusalem, in opposition to Husserl, denies the existence of *a priori* principles and therefore insists upon the relativity of knowledge. In fact, knowledge is both necessary and relative and hence each of these opposed views is forced tacitly to admit the legitimacy of the other. Erdmann, Cohen, and Riehl all, in one way or another, attempt a reconciliation of the two opposed phases of knowledge, but they succeed no better than Kant; their solutions amount substantially to extending to the object that combination of sense and reason which Kant had found in the understanding. The author regards as the chief discovery of Kant himself the thoroughgoing distinction between sense and reason made in the *Dissertation*. The mediation between the two by a third faculty, the understanding, which Kant attempted in the *Critique*, is both contradictory and inadequate, since they refuse to coalesce and the coalescence, even if possible, would not explain the actual nature of human knowledge.

The attempts at a reconciliation of sense and reason turn out, therefore, as fruitless as the pre-Kantian efforts to reduce one to the other; our only recourse, then, is to attempt a theory of knowledge upon the assumption of a radical dualism between them. Dualism taken in its full sense, the author holds, will explain both the double character of necessity and relativity in human knowledge and also the source of our dogmatic tendency. The problem thus stated calls for a definite answer, but owing to the extreme generality of the author's statement of his own theory of knowledge, it does not appear to get such an answer. His theory seems to mean little more than that sense and reason are reciprocal but opposed functions in the development of knowledge, a view which in some sense might be accepted by advocates of widely different logical theories. So far as sense and reason are reciprocal, M. Stefanescu seems to be saying much the same as those who in his opinion attempt the impossible reconciliation of the two, e.g., when he holds the categories to be hypotheses justified by their power to make experience intelligible. So far as sense and reason are opposed, the opposition is as arbitrary as he alleges Kant's reconciliation to be. Thus he defines the senses as organs which serve the individual in his struggle with all that is outside him; reason, on the other hand, manifests itself in everything opposed to the individual,—in nature, the family and society in general. The plain answer is that the facts do not justify any such distinction. Where is the evidence that the senses have any more to do with the struggle for existence than the reason, or that the reason has any more to do with society than with the individual, or that the struggle for existence has any more to do with the individual than with society? Starting with a distinction so arbitrary, the author is quite unable to make any effective use of his general principle, that knowledge consists in the conquest of sense by reason. This is too vague to be of much service to a theory of knowledge.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

The Socialized Conscience. By JOSEPH HERSCHEL COFFIN. Baltimore, Warwick and York, 1913.—pp. viii, 247.

"The purpose of this book," the author tells us in his preface, "is to suggest in present day psychological and sociological terms a working hypothesis—a moral criterion—by means of which the different types of moral situations may be met with some degree of consistency." This moral criterion is found in the "socialized conscience" or the conscience which judges the rightness of an act "in terms of its social effects." The moral end is "the realization of the social self or socialized personality," and comes as a result of having a "socialized conscience." The writer reaches his definition of the moral criterion after an analysis of moral control in primitive and civilized society (Ch. I), the moral situation (Ch. II), and the relation of the moral criterion to personality (Ch. III). In the remaining six chapters the writer seeks to apply his criterion to the moral situations as they arise in the home, the school, the vocation, the state, and the Church. The book closes with an attempt to state the moral ideal.

The task which the author has set for himself is an ambitious one. It presupposes familiarity with recent works on social psychology, the psychology of personality, the psychology of religion, and the psychological and ethical implications in the economic and political situations. The author has hardly measured up to his task. There is no reference either in the text or bibliographies to the works of Westermarck, Hobhouse, Baldwin, McDougall, Cooley, or Tarde. The list of literature at the ends of the chapters, and the bibliography at the close of the book are in fact so imperfect as to be of little or no value.

The writer is far from exact in his use of terminology. The reader is constantly at a loss to know what is meant by "objective" and "subjective" morality, the "institution of morality," "moral," "social," "socialized conscience" and the like. Constant appeal is made to the "moral law." The "highest standard of the moral life" is attained when a man "bows down to the moral law within his own breast" (p. 14). But what is this "moral law"? Is it the "socialized conscience"? And if so what does that mean? Or do we detect here an echo of Kantian intuitionism, in spite of our author's scorn for "traditional ethics" and his brave championing of the social and empirical point of view? Nowhere does the writer clearly distinguish between the 'social' and the 'moral.' The "supreme moral end" is the "realization of the social self or socialized personality" (p. 67). The most completely socialized self would then be the most moral. But in discussing the various institutions through which this process of socialization or moralization takes place, the writer seems to imply that the 'ethical' is less comprehensive than the 'social.' The school in addition to its other functions as a social institution has the "more specific duty of the moralization of its products." There are also certain "ethical problems" peculiar to the state, to vocational life, and to the Church. Is there then a phase of the social situation appropriated by the individual through the school or profession that is not moral, or that is perhaps less moral than other phases? If so, the writer's definition of the moral end must be stated quite differently.

As a matter of fact, little light is thrown upon moral problems by defining the moral end as a "socialized personality." If the writer means that an understanding of the total bearing of the act upon the social order is necessary to right action, this of course is perfectly obvious, so obvious as to be neither illuminating nor inspiring. It is more probable, however, that the writer conceives the moral end to be attained when the individual has assimilated the largest amount of social heritage, or, in other words, when he has become a completely socialized personality by becoming an epitome of all possible social situations. In this case the moral self would grow very much as a grease spot grows upon a sheet of paper, and its consummation would take place in very much the same mechanical fashion. Such an uncritical subordination of the individual to the moral situation would naturally prevent the writer from giving due weight to the part played by the individual's own initiative. He has no place for the geniuses who by virtue of their originality or even of

their intrinsic moral greatness are anti-social or at least transcend the immediate social order from which they spring. In fact it is difficult to see how from the author's point of view any moral progress is possible.

We can now understand what is perhaps the fundamental theoretical weakness of the work. The writer has no satisfactory philosophy of the relation of the individual to society. He gives us little or no insight into the psychological processes by which the child becomes moral through making himself social and solid with his fellows. To be sure, he repeatedly tells us that "society and personality are organic to each other" (p. 234). But we are not further enlightened as to the meaning of this and similar language.

Because of insufficient philosophical and psychological grounding, the discussions of the various institutions of school, state, Church, and the like lack meaning and point. To indicate the weaknesses of the industrial order, the press, or the Church, and then complacently to suggest that the remedy is to be found in a "socialized conscience" is not helpful. This vagueness gives to the book, in spite of its progressive spirit and the fairly good survey of social problems which it presents, an air of artificiality and even of futility. It would doubtless have made a better impression if the author had offered the last six chapters as a series of practical observations upon social problems, and had omitted entirely the constant appeal to the fetich of the 'socialized conscience.'

JNO. M. MECKLIN.

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH.

Problems of Conduct: An Introductory Survey of Ethics. By DURANT DRAKE. New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914.—pp. xiii, 455.

This book is a discussion of questions which are calling out a good deal of attention in a number of different fields at the present time. On the whole it may be called a treatise on ethical subjects, written, as it would seem, from popular and religious motives. The difficulty in deciding what the book is about may perhaps best be avoided by giving, in the author's own words, some of its characteristic doctrinal statements. In the point of view of the author, the purpose of the study of ethics is primarily "to get light for the guidance of life." But "the impression left by many ethical treatises, that everything is matter for dispute and no moral judgments are reliable," seems to the author unfortunate. He has therefore preferred "to offer a clear-cut set of standards . . . rather than to hold out to the student a chaos of confused possibilities." (*Preface*). Part I is a discussion of the evolution of morality, in which "the task will be not to criticise by reference to any ethical standards, but to observe and describe, as a mere bit of preliminary sociology, what it is in their lives to which men have given the name 'morality,' of what use it has been, and through the action of what forces it has tended to develop" (p. 9). Beginning with the first appearance of morality in the maternal instinct (p. 18), the author develops, through what he understands to be an historical and evolutionary account, a strictly biological and utilitarian

definition of morality in terms of a "gradual, though not continuous, progress towards *codes of conduct which make for the presentation of life and for happiness.*" The practical schemes determined by these codes "enabled men, by abstention from dangerous passions and from idleness, to make their lives efficient, interesting, and comparatively free from pain" (p. 31).

Part II is a discussion of the theory of morality and, in the main, remains consistent with the physiological definition arrived at in Part I. Here the author is not lacking in providing simple solutions for philosophical questions. The argument turns on a distinction of what is intrinsically and what is extrinsically good,—the distinction which is most commonly described in ethical theory as that of means and end. "To men everywhere it is an evil to be in severe physical pain or to be maimed in body, to be shut away from air, from food, from other people. It is a good to taste an appetizing dish, to exercise when well and rested, to hear harmonious music, to feel the sweet emotion of love. The fact that men argue upon judgments does not prove them true; but these are not judgments, they are perceptions. To call love good is not to give an opinion, it is to describe a fact. It is a matter of direct first-hand feeling, whose reality consists in its being felt. To say that these experiences are good or bad is equivalent to saying that they feel good or bad; there can be no dispute about it."

"This is the bottom fact of ethics. Different experiences have different intrinsic worth as they pass. . . . The good moments are their own excuse for being, a part of the brightness and worth of life. They need nothing ulterior to justify them. The bad moments feel bad, and that is the end of it; they are bad-feeling moments, and no sophistication can deny it. Conscious life looked at from this point of view, and abstracted from all its other aspects, is a flux of plus and minus values. . . . In the last analysis, all differences in value, including all moral distinctions, rest upon this disparity in the immediate worth of conscious states."

"We may say absolutely that if it were not for this fundamental difference in feeling there would be no such thing as morality" (pp. 73, 74, 75). The same fleshly principle is employed in determining the highest good. "That sort of behavior is best which will in the long run bring into being the greatest possible amount of intrinsic goodness and the least intrinsic evil" (p. 80). Goodness of conduct is "virtue," and "for intrinsic good the most widely accepted name . . . is happiness." With reference to the question, What is happiness?—"The puzzle is not to recognize it, but to get it. By happiness we mean the steady presence of what we call intrinsic goodness and the absence of intrinsic badness; it is as undefinable as any ultimate element of experience, but as well known to us as blackness and whiteness or light and dark" (pp. 80, 81). To make it perfectly sure that there is no other possible point of view for ethics than the hedonistic, the author finds that "the ultimate criterion must always be the greatest good of the greatest number" (p. 130). And "What makes one form of happiness more worthy than another is simply in the first place its greater keenness or extent or freedom from pain, and in

the second place its potentialities for future happiness or pain for self or others" (p. 143). Again, "In themselves all kinds of experience that are equally pleasant are equally worthy; there is no meaning to that adjective as applied to intrinsic immediate good" (p. 144). The author has a faith that the "consonance of this sketchy account of the basis of morality with Christianity and all idealism can be demonstrated" (p. 82).

The self evidence of the hedonistic point of view and the absurdity of any other position evidently appears to the author as beyond question. For of the 455 pages of the book only fifteen (pp. 148-163) are devoted to alternative theories. This is probably due to the author's scepticism with regard to ethical theory, since "our judgments are narrow and misrepresent actual values" (p. 82). Six pages are devoted to a refutation of Kant, although "as a theorist he is hopelessly inadequate" (p. 101). Self-development or self-realization "gives us no criterion" (p. 150), is "essentially pagan," and "inferior to the Christian ideal of service" (p. 159), and, "if taken strictly, is immoral" (p. 160).

Perhaps it is true that the author's psychologism carries him farther than he is aware; for although, in the matter of self-control "modern psychology . . . shows us clearly and exactly how to succeed" (p. 277), and as "all our moral education is, in psychological language, but so much 'suggestion,'" "we must practice auto-suggestion" (p. 279). In order to make the magic quite conclusive, "One can often convince ones self quite thoroughly of ideas one did not really believe in by this method of suggestion" (p. 281). This is Morality! But alas, "'Mere morality' . . . is not enough . . . we need more than morality, as the word is commonly used" (p. 288). "We must pretend to be happy" (p. 299); and "it will pay to pretend hard; when we have pretended long enough, we shall find we no longer need to pretend" (p. 300).

That this sort of thing should appear as the theoretical basis of a modern attempt at a treatise on ethics (and such this book pretends to be as is indicated by the subtitle) will seem surprising to those who have any knowledge of the history of ethical thought. Hence I prefer to let the above quotations go without further comment. Part III on Personal Morality and Part IV on Public Morality are discussions of present-day social questions, and in some cases would be quite worth while were the discussion guided by any well-defined principle. As to the book as a whole I fail to see any field in which it might be useful. The historical and the theoretical parts are negligible. The practical problems discussed are better treated in many recent books on economics and social theory. The style is entertaining, but there are many outbursts of eloquence on the sweetness and joy of living where one has a right to expect some sound analysis of the facts of life.

E. JORDAN.

BUTLER COLLEGE.

Die Grundlagen der Kantschen Philosophie. Von M. von DER PORTEN. Leipzig, Verlag Unesma G. M. B. H., 1914.—pp. 26.

This article now reprinted as a monograph was first published in the *Annalen der Natur- und Kulturphilosophie* (Band XII, Heft 1 u. 2). It contains a criticism of the fundamental principles of the Kantian philosophy from the point of view of 'monism.' Monists of the Haeckel type reject metaphysics. They agree with Hume concerning the impossibility of *a priori* knowledge. The author undertakes to show that Kant never proved its possibility and that therefore Hume was never refuted.

Kant's arguments for the *a priori* character of space and time and of the categories rest on bare assertions and not on rigid proofs. The categories for instance are regarded by Kant as *a priori* because they are derived from the forms of judgment of formal logic. But that formal logic is *a priori* is an unwarranted assumption. For monism formal logic is genetic and thus *a posteriori*.

The lack of a genetic point of view prevented Kant from recognizing the impossibility of *a priori* knowledge of any sort. This is particularly shown in his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. A genetic study of these judgments would have shown Kant their absolute relativity. Both forms have an empirical source. What appears at first synthetic becomes through a phylogenetic and an ontogenetic process, analytic. As a result of such processes certain judgments seem to possess apodictic certainty and assume the form of laws. Kant, unacquainted with the phylogenetic origin of all our knowledge, was led to explain the apparently apodictic certainty of some of our judgments by a transcendental source. The doctrine of evolution demonstrates, however, the relativity of analytic and synthetic judgments and their *a posteriori* character. With the rejection of synthetic judgments *a priori* the possibility of metaphysics must, according to Kant's own admission, also be rejected. Thus with the refutation of the *Grundlagen* of Kant's philosophy the road is open for a "monistic" epistemology.

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

Die philosophische Krisis der Gegenwart. Rektoratsrede von KARL JOËL. Leipzig, Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1914.—pp. 56.

This is a compact but lucid summary of the conflicting tendencies in the philosophy of the present day. Our age is witnessing a crisis in philosophic thinking. The republic of the exact sciences recognizes no longer the divine right of absolutistic metaphysics. In an age of specialization philosophy has itself attempted to become a 'special' science, relinquishing thereby its old established claim to universality.

What prevents philosophy from playing its ancient rôle? The lack of a synthetic and universal *Weltanschauung* is natural to an analytical and specializing age. The dualism between Life and Thought, however, now sundered as never before, is the main cause for the present crisis. The philosophers of

our time champion Life *or* Thought. Proclaiming Life as the deepest category the followers of Nietzsche, of Bergson, of Eucken, of Vaihinger, of Pragmatism, of Mysticism, of the New Romanticism are all united in assailing intellectualism. The subjective is made to triumph over the objective, the practical over the theoretical, the emotional over the rational. This one-sided insistence on an erroneous conception of Life is responsible for our scepticism and relativism. Everything flows as Life does. Truth itself is a current in the ever-changing stream of Life. Hence the modern appeal to Heraclitus and Protagoras.

Contrasted with these 'Life-philosophers' our age is not lacking in thinkers of Eleatic tendencies. The 'Neo-Kantians' such as Natorp, Rickert, Husserl—founders of 'schools'—emphasize valid method and rigid system. For them philosophy is an 'exact science,' whose aim it is to discover the timeless principles behind the flux of appearances, the constant norms, forms, types, laws, and values in our thinking and willing. *A priori* logic has come to its own once more.

Thus Life and Thought are estranged. The champions of *Logos* reduce 'life' to a scholastic formula, the advocates of *Bios* interpret 'thought' as one of the instruments and products of the flux. But the antithesis between Life and Thought is a false one. It is not true that Life is essentially irrational and thought essentially lifeless. Life is organic. Only as organism can Life exist. The essence of an organism is *order*, e.g., orderly relation of part to part within it. And organic order is also the very life of Thought. Only by ignoring the organic character common to both Life and Thought can the two be conceived as contrasted.

Our age longs for a synthesis of this false dualism. There are indications of such synthesis. A deeper analysis of the 'Life-philosophies' and the 'Thought-systems' themselves reveals the possibility of bridging the gap between them. The revival of Hegelianism is significant. And no less important is the 'return to Kant.' Kant's most vital contribution is the principle of synthesis, the foundation of the systems both of his earlier and his modern followers. Synthesis means organization and order. To the philosophy of the future is left the working out in detail the common active and creative character of Life and Thought and the discovery that Life thinks and that Thought lives.

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Friedrich Nietzsche. By GEORGE BRANDES. New York, The Macmillan Co.—pp. 117.

This book consists of four essays written at various times and now translated directly from the Danish. The longest and most important is that entitled "Essay on Aristocratic Radicalism," first published in 1889. Since it preceded the days of Nietzsche's sudden popularity, the author was unable to assume in his readers any knowledge of his subject, and he gave them bio-

graphy, exposition, quotation, and criticism. The result is one of the best short accounts of Nietzsche's general attitude toward life and culture and of his personality. Then follows a collection of the letters between Nietzsche and Brandes, originally published as a defense against the charge that Brandes had been so influenced by Nietzsche as to give up his own opinions and to become one of Nietzsche's disciples. The third essay (1900) is a brief attempt to explain Nietzsche's fame, while the fourth (1909) gives a sketch of his posthumous book, *Ecce Homo*.

Brandes considers that Nietzsche's value lies in the fact that he is a great personality, and so a vehicle of culture. He is able to make men independent and thus he frees them from intellectual bondage, as Schopenhauer had freed him. He unites in himself many extremes. Brandes calls him "this warlike mystic, poet and thinker, this immoralist who is never tired of preaching" (p. 51). In the light of subsequent events it is interesting to note that in 1889 the Danish critic regarded Nietzsche as typically German. He "continues the metaphysical and intuitive tradition of German philosophy and has the German thinker's profound dislike of any utilitarian point of view" (p. 51). Again, he and von Hartmann are said to reflect "the all-dominating militarism of the new German Empire" (p. 53). Yet Nietzsche won his first fame in other countries than his own; and if it has been more lasting there, it has not been more widespread nor more complete. In fact, in the third essay Brandes describes Nietzsche as in some way representing and appealing to the obscurer tendencies not of his nation but of his age (p. 104). He seemed opposed to all contemporary instincts; he was an aristocrat, he was irreligious, he ignored social problems, he opposed humanitarianism and the cult of happiness, he attacked both pessimism and the ethics that would take the place of theology; yet the age that stands for all these things has received his books with the greatest enthusiasm. Brandes thinks that this is due to his indomitable self-reliance, to the lyrical qualities of his style, to his psychological profundity and abstruseness, and to his fascinating combination of poetry and criticism.

The collection of letters, which were written during the last year before Nietzsche became hopelessly insane, is of especial psychological interest because they display his increasing absorption in the idea of his own supreme importance, until they finally end with the meaningless note signed "The Crucified." The *Ecce Homo* dates from the same period and shows the same characteristics. Nevertheless Brandes says, "The exaltation that marks the whole tone of the work, the unrestrained self-esteem which animates it and is ominous of the near approach of madness, have not deprived *Ecce Homo* of its character of surpassing greatness," and with this sentence he closes his book.

G. N. DOLSON.

Nietzsches Metaphysik und ihr Verhältnis zu Erkenntnistheorie und Ethik.

Von SIEGBERT FLEMMING. Berlin, Leonhard Simion Nf., 1914.—pp. 117.

To be comprehensible, this monograph should be read with a complete edition of Nietzsche's works at hand for frequent consultation. As it stands, the references are so numerous and a knowledge of their contents so largely assumed as often to render the text difficult to follow. There is much minute criticism of particular passages, much comparison with Schopenhauer and other philosophers. In conclusion the fundamental principles of Nietzsche's metaphysics are explained upon the basis of the distinction between the conscious and the subconscious. The latter is made the substance underlying and possessing the will for power, and certain inconsistencies in Nietzsche's theories are said to be due to their double origin. Some of them are the result of his conscious thinking, while others came from his subconscious tendencies. The book contains some excellent comments on the details of Nietzsche's philosophy, but as a whole is not of much value.

G. N. DOLSON.

SMITH COLLEGE.

Nietzsche and other Exponents of Individualism. By PAUL CARUS. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1914.—pp. 150.

Whatever Mr. Paul Carus writes is filled with an admirable devotion to the cause of truth, and expresses a genuine conviction of its supreme value. The present volume upon Nietzsche is no exception, and its aim and spirit are deserving of respect. Unfortunately, however, the accomplishment does not always correspond to the intention. The book does not lack interest, but it is full of repetitions and of generalizations that are too vague to be helpful. The principle of development in Nietzsche's philosophy is recognized (p. 67), but no use is made of it in the exposition, which consequently suffers loss in both clearness and precision. Moreover there are some errors of fact to be noted. Nietzsche did not end his career in an insane asylum, as is stated on page 7, nor was *Zarathustra* "the last work of his pen" (p. 71). That Nietzsche strangely disregarded the Darwinian theories (p. 32) seemed evident so long as judgment was necessarily based upon his "complete works," but since the publication of the additional material from his notebooks, this opinion is no longer tenable. The best chapter in the book is that upon Max Stirner (*Nietzsche's Predecessor*, pp. 74-91).

G. N. DOLSON.

SMITH COLLEGE.

The following books also have been received:

Three Lectures on Aesthetic. By BERNARD BOSANQUET. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1915.—pp. vi, 118. \$1.25.

Scientific Method in Philosophy. The Herbert Spencer Lecture. By BERTRAND RUSSELL. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1914.—pp. 30.

Madame De Staël and the Spread of German Literature. By EMMA GERTRUDE JAECK. New York, Oxford University Press, 1915.—pp. vi, 358.

Selections from the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense. Edited by G. A. JOHNSTON. Chicago and London, The Open Court Publishing Company, 1915.—pp. 267. \$1.25.

The Will in Ethics. By THEOPHILUS B. STORK. Boston, Sherman, French & Company, 1915.—pp. xii, 190. \$1.25 net.

Challenging a God. By HENRY ROSCH VANDERBYLL. Boston, Sherman, French & Company, 1915.—pp. 150. \$1.00 net.

The Metaphysics of Education. By ARTHUR C. FLESHMAN. Boston, Mayhew Publishing Company, 1914.—pp. 155.

Pragmatism and the Problem of the Idea. By JOHN T. DRISCOLL. New York, Longmans, Green and Company, 1915.—pp. xxvii, 274.

L'Esprit philosophique de l'Allemagne et la Pensée Française. Par VICTOR DELBOS. Paris, Bloud et Gay, 1914-15.—pp. 43.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mèt.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Nto-Sc.* = *Revue Nto-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.: Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

Mechanistic Science and Metaphysical Romance. JACQUES LOEB. Yale Rev., IV, 4, pp. 766-785.

In the two decades following the development by Clausius and Maxwell of the kinetic theory of gases, the physicists became mechanists; but the attitude of Kirchhoff, and especially the opposition of Ostwald and Mach in the nineties raised doubts, and, though Boltzmann defended the older position, for a time relegated mechanism to the background. Real basis for the doubt as to the validity of the mechanistic view was afforded by the fact that the existence of molecules continued to defy objective proof, so that Ostwald could characterize the whole theory as the result of an illusive craving for visualization. In the last decade, however, unquestionable proof of the reality of molecules and definite enumeration of the numbers in a given mass of matter have finally settled the old controversy. Science is placed finally on a mechanistic basis, and has assigned as its proper task that of giving a correct and complete visualization of all natural phenomena. The proof by counting the molecules, or determining Avogadro's constant, rests on a half-dozen or more independent lines of reasoning and experiment, leading to the same result, and differing quantitatively only in the decimal. Recently, great progress has been made in the application of mechanistic explanations to the phenomena of life. Thus it was observed that in the embryos of a certain fish, the hearts of all individuals beat at precisely the same rate, varying with the temperature. Van Slyke calculated, on the basis of the kinetic theory, the rate of ferment action, and showed that the variation in the rate of the heart-beat with increase in temperature corresponded closely with the temperature variation in the velocity of chemical reactions. The wide diversity in the rate of the beat among developed individuals is caused by differences in muscular activity and environmental conditions. A notable instance of the explanation of

phenomena of adaptation was the tracing of the wonderful 'instinct' of the larva of the butterfly *Porthesia Chrysorrhæa* to mechanical heliotropism. The grub, which under natural conditions unfailingly crawls upward on the twig as soon as hatched, toward its food, will under the influence of artificial light crawl in the wrong direction, and starve to death. The purely mechanical character of heliotropism itself is proved by the actual construction by John Hayes Hammond, Jr. of heliotropic torpedoes, and a "dog" which will follow a lantern carried in the hand. Science is mechanistic, based on experiment and exact measurement. Metaphysics is the reverse of all this. The romancing proclivity of intuitionistic philosophy is really traceable to a desire to reach results without undergoing the necessary labor. It is largely caused by the failure of our schools to give due prominence to the exact sciences. Such methods are not merely worthless, but do great damage as well. They appeal naturally to the emotions instead of to valid demonstration for securing conviction, and give rise to every form of prejudice, such as race hatred and the like.

F. H. KNIGHT.

La riforma politica e sociale nel pensiero di un grande belga. ZINO ZINI.
R. d. Fil., VII, I, pp. 91-103.

Émile de Laveleye belongs to that superior type of men who cherish the aim of organizing human life, that of the individual and that of the state—perhaps even that of the whole human race—according to an ideal plan of internal unity and external order. A member of the school known as Christian Socialists, the first link in the chain of his whole scheme of reform was an unshakable faith in the religion of the Gospels. Strained as his view can easily be shown to be, distorting the religion of spirituality and other-worldliness into a practical plan of organizing human relations, de Laveleye accepted it as fundamental. To him Christianity was another name for equality, democracy, socialism. His doctrines can be traced ultimately to Jean-Jacques Rousseau and eighteenth century French humanitarianism, but were more immediately connected with the writings of the nineteenth century religious-social reformers, Bordas-Demoulin and François Huet. A profound scholar as well as an idealist, de Laveleye has given us in his great work on the primitive forms of property (*De la propriété et de ses formes primitives*) the results of an exhaustive exploration of the vast field of economic and juridical history. A ponderous study in comparative sociology, its main interest is in the depiction and idealization of primitive patriarchal communism, such as still survives in the Russian *mir*, the *zadruga* of the southern Slavs, and the Swiss *Allmend*. With all his enthusiasm for democracy and political equality, de Laveleye conceded the historic tendency toward the fulfilment of the gloomy predictions of Tocqueville and Macaulay—increasing discontent, ending in anarchy and a new plundering of civilization by barbarians, only this time by those within the society instead of invaders from without—unless the nations are saved by some strong man on horseback. The only escape

from such a destiny, according to the great Belgian thinker, lies in a thoroughgoing reform of the primary economic institution, that of property. Property is the natural complement of liberty; men cannot continue equal in one respect and so grossly unequal in another as they are in existing society. Property must lose its private character and become a quasi-public institution. This is to be achieved by restoring its ancient status as an appurtenance of the family, hereditary and inalienable. The family itself must also be restored to its ancient place and significance, which it has largely lost. De Laveleye was an insatiable student of history, and drew from the lives of all peoples and all times—the ancients, the medieval and modern Slavs, Teutons and Latins—both inspiration and illustration for his theory and his propaganda. In all his vast exploration of human social life, his guiding thread and his sole principle of interpretation was his *faith*,—faith in God and in the destiny of man. An idealist and a lover of peace, he looked forward to the day when international relations shall cease to be conducted on the plane of the savage, whose only recourse is to kill any threatening opponent, and shall be raised to the civilized level where differences are adjusted by impartial tribunals at a minimum human cost.

F. H. KNIGHT.

Las Ciencias Nuevas Y Las Leyes Viejas. JOSÉ INGENIEROS. Revista de Filosofía, I, 1, pp. 270-310.

No progress is more resisted than that of general ideas. This conflict has been particularized many times since the Renaissance. The dogmatic teleology has survived in the current beliefs, and its consequent criteria have inspired the old laws to such an extent that its dogmas have been prolonged in the official culture of nations. There comes a time when the foundation logic of the institutions is in open contradiction with the later acquired truths. In the penal law we have this conflict, squarely placed. Founded more directly in metaphysical notions, this law has entered a period of acute crisis which makes extremely difficult the exercise of its social function. Locke and Condillac began the effective renewal of that most important philosophical discipline, psychology. Mind, spirit, pure reason, have been interpreted as biological functions developing in the history of the race and repeating this development in each member of the species. The functions of the mind are just as natural as any of the other functions of the human organism. The new direction of psychology has helped substantially to renew mental pathology. From being merely empirical as it was until the middle of this century, it is today a science, psychiatry, whose problems affect the penal code considerably, inasmuch as it is called upon to determine the responsibility or irresponsibility of the delinquents. Madness, formerly considered as an evil possession of the mind by mysterious individual forces, has become a functional disturbance of the cerebrum. Of the two tendencies, the mystic and the anatomical, we have illustrious representatives in Pi i Molist and Giné i Partagás. The former, in harmony with his faith, believed madness to

be a partial or total disintegration of the mind (*alma*), whereas the latter with an opinion formed according to his experience, holds that mental infirmity depends upon morphological or chemical changes in the cerebrum. These two conceptions clearly illustrate the teleological and the scientific points of view. The evolution of legal institutions is the fundamental conclusion of the modern philosophy of law. Crime is a transgression of the limitations imposed by society upon the individual in the struggle for existence. The penal law is a natural sociological formation, tending in every moment of its evolution to reflect the ethical criterion predominant in society. The idea of responsibility arises simply from attributing the harmful act to some being or object. Thus until a couple of centuries ago, animals, inanimate objects, and even corpses, were punished for injuries produced by them. Later, the mediated form of vengeance was substituted for the unmediated reflexive form. Gradually the injury to one or more persons came to be construed as an injury to society as a whole. But this natural and essentially utilitarian function of punishment became complicated by the introduction of the philosophy of the times, so that the defence of society became transformed into punishment of man's wickedness, guilt and sin. There is a tendency to exclude progressively whatever does not combine the double condition of 'similarity' with relation to a social aggregate, and of 'identity,' with relation to the same individual. The lack of 'social similarity' restricts the responsibility to the individuals of the human species. According to the criterion of identity, a person ought only to be punished for acts which conform to his character. When he did not desire the act, he could not be held responsible. The idea of free-will contained the basic error which later has come to imperil the efficacy of justice. The alienists have struggled, *in the name of the new science*, to widen the field of irresponsibility, *within the old laws*. The law claims the opinion of medical experts, forgetting that the latter frequently hold scientific ideas absolutely contradictory to the criterion of the law. For the practical ends of justice—the securing of social safety—serious psychic degeneration of an indicted person cannot constitute an extenuating cause, or one freeing from punishment. The irresponsibility of the degenerate might rather demand an increase of the penalty, if we remembered always that "the prisons of a nation shall be healthful and clean for the security and not for the punishment of those criminals contained within them." The evil pointed out, although serious, has sure remedies. There are, however, quack remedies, the best known being that of "semi-responsibility." The neurologist Grasset holds this theory, and in nobody is it more absurd. How can he reconcile his spiritualistic philosophy with this strange medical-juridical combination? Does semi-responsibility imply the loss of half or of part of the mind? It cannot be, because the mind is essentially insubstantial and indivisible. Opposing this theory, Prof. Gilbert Ballet, of Paris, protests against what he is accustomed to call "attenuated responsibility." According to Ballet, society ought to ask simply whether or not the indicted person is dangerous to society. Daily, subjects are adjudged abnormal and

confined, who by a later medical examination are pronounced sane, the result being liberty to repeat the crime. The essential theoretical postulates of "positivistic punishment" are two: (1) That the punishment, before conceived as social vengeance or punishment of guilt, be considered as a function of social defence, or as a reform of the individual; (2) that the punishment, which before was fixed and graded according to the crime, be indeterminate and proportional to the dangerousness of the delinquent. The old formula, "to so much guilt so much punishment," should be replaced by this other, "to so much danger, so much sequestration."

ALLEN J. THOMAS.

Qu'est-ce que l'association? F. PAULHAN. Rev. Ph., XL, 6, pp. 473-504.

Association, taken in the widest sense, is the most general, essential, and important fact of all reality. There is a difference between such associations as exist in chemical compounds, whose nature is not known, but whose laws are, and such associations as exist between two friends, of the nature of which we know something, but which may not have any rigid laws. Psychological and social associations lie between these extremes. Association is characterized by the convergence of elements toward a common result. Even in the case of independent merchants competing with each other, there is involved in their activity the common end of serving the same community. In all associations, there are differences as well as resemblances, only the former are subordinated to the whole. However satisfactorily things are in accord, the germ of opposition and struggle is always there; for perfect agreement would mean nothing short of identity of a thing with itself. Difference is an essential condition of unity. For instance, affinity is stronger between different kinds of chemical elements and between persons of different sexes than between similars. It is a question of division of labor among parts of the same whole. Even in the case of several men raising a stone, they do not all play exactly the same part. The same idea of liberty or evolution, for example, is different for different persons and in different ages; on the other hand, without anything in common, two things cannot even come into conflict. In an association, the other is subordinated to the service of the self, while in discord the reverse is true. In a conflict, the similarity is weakened and the conflicting elements tend to lose their common character. It can be regarded as a perversion of division of labor, where a sagacious adjustment might bring the differences to the service of a higher self. This failing, the resemblances which might favor a union form the basis of conflict, such as the case of war between nations that have many characters in common. The expression 'division of labor' should be understood in such a wide sense as to include also division of ideas and division of feelings. For not only do different individuals perform different tasks, but they perform them in their own peculiar ways with their peculiar qualities; and under different conditions the same quality may not be fit for the same function. Tarde has rightly insisted that in an association the differences tend to be obliterated through imitation

but one must remember that there is also a tendency toward differentiation, which is at least as strong. In the social realm, imitation is a leveler, and differentiation is the essence of aristocracy, which is but a form of division of labor. An association not only brings into relief existing resemblances among its elements, but the elements also acquire new common characters through existing in the same association. An association tends to grow and change, except in cases such as chemical compounds, in which the opposing forces are in relatively stable equilibrium. In a growing association, the individuals undergo an adaptation to the whole, of which imitation is only an instance. But continual adaptation tends also to suppress the individuals; and if everything were in perfect union with an all-absorbing substance, then all individuals would cease to exist and thence the substance itself. Such evanescence of an association as a result of perfect harmony is imperfectly exemplified in the dissolving of a society when its object is accomplished. For practical conclusions, it may be remarked that both imitation and division of labor are necessary to society, that some form of authority is necessary in society as it is in an organism, and that it should consist of those elements that best represent the whole, whatever the form of representation may be. Since all existence is in some form of association, all the foregoing considerations can be applied to existence in general. Evil or discord is not *an* existence, there is no evil in itself. It arises only from opposition of different elements, and always indicates the absence of a superior being that would unify them. Much confusion has resulted from the inaccurate use of the word 'exist'; thus, in saying that humanity exists, the term 'humanity' may mean the sum of the abstract qualities of men, the human species, or an organization of all human beings; and in the last sense, humanity is only in the sketch and cannot be said to exist in the same sense as nations exist. In an abstract sense, whatever exists does so with an equal claim; but in a concrete sense, that has more existence which is richer, more comprehensive, and more systematized.

YUEN R. CHAO.

La pensée symbolique. TH. RIBOT. Rev. Ph., XL, 5, pp. 385-401.

What are the causes, origin, and distinguishing marks of symbolic thought? Psychologically speaking, it may be viewed as a special variety of the *facultas signatrix* and as an imaginative creation. The symbol itself stands for a concept and its accompanying secondary states; it is a creative synthesis of the mind, usually communicating itself visually, but sometimes also in an auditory manner. Ferrero classifies symbols as (1) intellectual, (2) emotional, and (3) mystic, giving as the origin of the first two classes the arrest of the mind's activity midway in its course, due to the tendency to least effort. The problem of the symbol, he says, is the engendering of association between images or ideas and sensations such that the return of the sensation awakes the image or idea; its function is the awakening of conscious states in the individual in society. But Ferrero's hypothesis must be rejected; inertia cannot explain the origin of symbols. Brehier explains the origin of the

symbol thus: After an existing association between image and idea is broken, a new associative process, rejoining a new image to the idea, is formed, and the result is a symbol. Dr. Regis, summing up the position of psycho-analysis in reference to symbolism, says that the symbol is a primitive process of psychic activity. Freud explains the symbol by referring it to a creative or transforming activity and stresses the affective element, also noting that the logic of symbolism differs from ordinary logic. The symbol is really an imaginative creation, arising from the same mythic invention as the myth, but not developed as is the latter. Some symbols result from a regression from the complex to the simple. Metaphors are closely related to abbreviated symbols; metaphor, symbol and myth are ascending developments of a psychologic manifestation of one nature. The basic ground of symbolic thought is found in imaginative thought, which is always guided by the logic of sentiment, i.e., instinctive logic. Symbolism, having no place in the sciences, mathematics, etc., is nevertheless supreme in religion, art, and literature. Symbolic thought is a necessary part of our psychic mechanism, and is a persistent fact, though today imaginative thought bows to intellectual thought.

JULES G. PROCTOR.

Der Entwicklungsgedanke in Schellings Naturphilosophie. KARL ZÖCKLER.
Ar. f. G. Ph., XXI, 3, pp. 257-296.

The source of Schelling's nature philosophy was an immeasurable craving after unity. His material was nature itself, as reflected by the natural science of his time. In answer to the question of the German critical philosophy, How does nature come to be knowable? he postulates a transcendental principle of unity which applies to inorganic as well as to organic nature. This principle is the absolute productive activity called spirit. In us this spirit distinguishes itself as perceiving from the objects perceived, and can reproduce in thought the process of the development of nature. So all nature is a spirit striving towards consciousness. The essence of this spirit consists in two opposed functions, a positive or infinite, and a negative or finite. When a balance is set up between these two functions, we have a definite product. Matter is thus produced, and persists in order that spirit, which always exceeds its product, may have something to strive against, for it is in such striving that life and development consist. The absolute identity expresses itself in an infinite scale of degrees which Schelling calls powers (*Potenz*). These exist only as members of the series and each of them in its degree represents the totality,—i. e., appears as unity of subject and object. Differences of things are therefore quantitative, and do not exist in the absolute. But as we see it nature is the becoming of the spirit, which reaches its highest development in man, and in him realizes its narrower aim,—self-consciousness. A broader aim is realized in a work of art, because in it the artist achieves with freedom something which has the necessity of a natural product. He feels within himself the opposition between the unconscious or absolute and the conscious finite activity, and resolves this conflict in his work. Genius, which

puts infinity into its work, is thus the highest power, but it is not the absolute. If the absolute were reached, development would cease. Schelling postulates in the construction of nature dynamic forces (*Kräfte*) which are actual expressions of the transcendental principle of development. Positive or infinite activity appears as expansion, negative or finite as contraction, and to fix and regulate these unstable forces there is gravitation. These forces, with the exception of gravity, are outside our experience. Stability of forces is never exactly secured. The infinite continuance of development depends indeed on the inevitable residue of power which again separates within itself to set up new opposition. Observed qualitative differences of matter are partly accounted for by the action of the forces of expansion and contraction, which condition cohesion, density, and specific gravity. They are further explained by the action of imponderable upon ponderable matter, which in the form of ether and oxygen by combustion develop light. And light, which penetrates bodies as warmth, makes against rigidity for change, and so produces differences. Changes within our experience are effected in inorganic matter by magnetism, electricity, and chemical process. These processes do not thus occur in successive temporal periods, but are categories, or elements appearing to us in thought, which necessarily views things genetically. Galvanism, since it unites in itself the magnetic, electrical, and chemical processes, exhibits for Schelling the transition to organic process, and gives us the secret of life. The forces of organic nature are sensibility, irritability, and the forming principle, which are respectively higher potencies of magnetism, electricity, and chemical process. The cause of irritability is the external world, and by means of it sensibility, the inmost essence and higher nature of the organism, is aroused to new activity. The beginning of sensibility is the beginning of life. It cannot be derived further, since it is rooted in the fundamental world-forming activity. Irritability reconciles sensibility with the external world and goes over to an external activity,—the forming impulse, *which always exceeds its product*. So we have reproduction, either of a new individual of the same species, or of an artistic creation. The difference in living organisms depends upon a different distribution of the three organic powers. But there is always but one life, one fundamental force, in nature, and the individual life consists only in a concentration of this universal. Inorganic nature is the condition for organic nature, and there is unity throughout, a unity expressed in opposition and the effort to remove it. Polarity signifies for Schelling not only a law of nature, but a universal law. The idea of unity lies at the basis of Darwin's theory of development also, but this theory limits itself to organic nature. Darwin secures greater certainty in his proofs, but shows less imagination than Schelling. For Darwin an individual is perfect when it perfectly fits the environment; for Schelling the opposition between individual and environment, between subject and object, can never be overcome, for this would mean the end of development. The end in view is the *relative* perfection of the subject. Darwin's unity is mechanistic, Schelling's teleological. The principle of unity Schelling connects with life.

"Das All lebt" refers to the life of the whole. In this sense his theory is vitalistic, but it does not violate the concept of unity by postulating a distinct life principle, as do some vitalist theories. Schelling's elaborate imaginings may seem at first sight decidedly fictitious, but they are founded on observation of fundamental experience, such as that of artistic creation, and are above all significant for their insistence on the unity of nature.

MARION D. CRANE.

L'evoluzione sociale secondo Guglielmo De Greef. LUIGI NEGRI. R. d. Fil., VII, 1, pp. 104-109.

The great work of William de Greef was in studying, illuminating and supplementing the theory of social progress. Basing his study on a critical examination of four pairs of thinkers—Plato and Aristotle, Heraclitus and Lucretius, Pascal and Condorcet, Kant and Comte—he concludes that no theory has value unless viewed in its historic setting and taken in connection both with those which precede and those which follow it. Thoroughly imbued with the historical spirit, de Greef finds that theories conform to the temper and conditions of the age which calls them forth; eras of rapid progress are eras of optimistic theories, while eras of relative stagnation deny the reality of human progress. He himself is an ardent believer in progress. His principal original contribution to the theory of social evolution is, somewhat paradoxically, his theory of regression. In this field he has supplemented and confirmed Spencer's formulation of the course of development from the simple to the complex, by showing that when decay sets in, as in the case of social institutions which have outlived their suitability to the social environment, the movement is the logical reverse of that which Spencer describes. De Greef insists, however, that the disintegration of established social structures is always due to change in environmental conditions, and is preparatory and a necessary means to further growth along better lines. This thesis he illustrates by numerous examples of apparent regression in the fields of economics, art, philosophy, the sciences, politics, etc. In all cases he finds the retrogression a condition of progress. Two main enemies of the general advance of social evolution noticed by de Greef are economic inequality and the danger of war. The exploitation of man by man is analogous to parasitism, while war directly involves the return to lower stages of civilization, and is the greatest menace of the modern social order.

F. H. KNIGHT.

L'objectivité des jugements esthétiques. E. BEAUCHAL. Rev. Ph., XL, 5, pp. 402-422.

When and to what degree are aesthetic judgments respectively objective and subjective? Let us define the beauty of an object as constituted by the totality of its attractions when there is found among them an agreeable visual or auditory sensation. We are then in a position to consider all the arts. A

work of art may be valued by comparing the grandeur of the emotions it calls forth with the grandeur of the emotions called forth by the represented object itself. If there is no difference its merit depends on the nature of the subject. A work to be good must satisfy the senses, the feelings and the imagination, and must also possess technical value, especially in painting. In sculpture especially, perfect technique cannot make beauty. The indifference of the general public to most of the arts, the incompetence of most amateurs, and the passions and interest of artists, critics, etc., influence aesthetic judgments. But let us examine the intrinsic value of our judgments. As far as the body of man is concerned, owing to a variety of circumstances, the criterion can only be approximated. There is a more or less precise basis of appreciation as regards the head and the face. The appreciation of physical beauty varies with the point of view from which one looks at it. But two experienced critics, judging a person or a statue, would approximately agree and so give their judgment an objective value, though they might be subjective in their judgment of details. In judging works of architecture, the critic is not guided by nature or by a type following the relatively precise law of harmonious development, as he is in judging the body. Architecture possesses no universal general forms, and in it more than in any other art technique is independent of beauty. Judgments of architectural works of all categories are subjective in so far as certain people do not like a particular category—the Gothic style, etc.,—but in the same category, among persons of the same moral structure, etc., judgments generally harmonize. In judging natural scenery our tastes are fairly uniform as regards locations for permanent habitations, but they vary more widely with conditions as regards sites for temporary living, and in respect to mountain scenery, etc. In painting we demand a true appreciation of the beautiful. The technique of the painting and its fitness for the subject, the correctness of the perspective, etc., are open to criticism. There has also been established a canon of the association of colors and sounds. But in the main, the critic must give us his sensations and sentiments without much justification; the sentiments which a painting inspires are derived almost entirely from a conformity to structure tried by experience. The artist's mission is to express and develop in his own language the sensations and sentiments given him by his surroundings and atmosphere, and he can only be completely understood by those living in his own country and in his own time. All intelligent aesthetic criticism depends on such a knowledge of time and place. Aesthetic judgments are objective among normal men possessing similar tendencies at any one time in the same country, but in great part they are subjective,—communicated from one man to another, from social group to social group, from nation to nation, from epoch to epoch. "No single beauty is universally appreciated or in itself immortal."

JULES G. PROCTOR.

Les "fondements du caractère." G. DUPRAT. Rev. Ph., XXXIX, 11, pp. 428-445.

In 1893, Th. Ribot stated the problem: in what proportion are the elements combined to form the different psychological individuals? But what are the constitutive elements? To say that they are qualities, the analysis of behavior personified, is to commit the error of Scholasticism. Suppress the effects of these qualities, says Shand, and you have nothing left. Ribot had said that the elements of character are the tendencies, sentiments, attitudes and modes of being which one knows by introspection as emotions and likes or dislikes, and studies from without in their manifestations, of which conduct itself forms a part. We may object that these effective states also are entities. Individual character is an original synthesis of which the different elements, separated only by analysis, are branches of a single original stem, gradually differentiating and progressively integrating. Character is not a bundle of affective states. Whatever J. S. Mill thought about it, ethology would not have for its base the supposed laws of association by contiguity, resemblance or contrast. Let us postulate a psychic stream, proceeding not only by progressive integration of functions more and more differentiated, but by systematization, by the creation of more and more complex and abundant *ideo-effectif* systems. These are systems embracing at the same time a cognitive and a conative attitude and a sentiment. Shand recognizes a small number of primary emotions—fear, anger, aversion, curiosity, joy, grief. The systems are organized with view to an end and they subordinate instincts which respond to this end. He defines emotion as a concrete fact, such as fear or anger, susceptible to different degrees of intensity, inseparable from an innate impulse. Shand has formulated 144 laws as the basis of ethology. They are rather hypotheses to be verified than established results. The first law may be called the law of natural systematization in the psychic life, or more simply, the life of conscience. The mental activity tends more and more consciously to establish and to maintain synthesis, organization and systematic unity. This is a special statement of the biopscho-sociologic law of evolution. The sentiments are systems of spontaneously co-ordinated primary emotions. They imply the subordination of useful affective states and the inhibition of useless ones in the furtherance of an end. In the decline of character these impulses tend to recover their liberty. Various types of character arise in accordance with the preponderance of different primary emotions. For example, predominant anger makes one brave, aggressive and active; whereas sorrow makes for melancholy and pessimism; and curiosity increases the investigation of both objects and emotions. This is at least one of the sources of the tendency to mysticism and romance. The secondary emotions also play an important part in the permanent psychic organizations of the individual. For example, hope tends to maintain the direction of thought and of effort in the line of possible success. For that purpose it utilizes and specializes the energy of desire.

ALLEN J. THOMAS.

NOTES.

We regret to announce the death of Dr. Vida F. Moore, Professor of Philosophy and Pedagogy at Elmira College from 1901 to 1913.

The death is also announced of Dr. Stefan Witasek, Director of the Psychological Laboratory at Graetz, and of Dr. Ernst Meumann, Professor of Psychology at Hamburg.

Dr. Henry Slonimsky of Columbia University has been appointed Lecturer in Philosophy at John Hopkins University.

We give below a list of articles in current philosophical magazines.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, XXV, 4: *J. C. Meredith*, Perpetual Peace and the Doctrine of Neutrality; *Henry C. Emery*, What is Realpolitik?; *Morris R. Cohen*, Legal Theories and Social Science; *Alan J. Dorward*, Betting and Insurance; *W. K. Wright*, Private Property and Social Justice; *Elsie Clews Parsons*, Marriage and Parenthood—a Distinction; *J. C. Flügel*, Ethics and the Struggle for Existence.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XXVI, 3: *Elizabeth L. Woods*, An Experimental Analysis of the Process of Recognizing; *Amy E. Tanner*, Certain Social Aspects of Invention; *Sakyo Kanda*, Geotropism in Animals; *E. G. Martin*, *B. D. Paul*, and *E. S. Welles*, A Comparison of Reflex Thresholds with Sensory Thresholds; *G. Stanley Hall*, The Freudian Methods Applied to Anger.

THE HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, VIII, 3: *F. Crawford Burkitt*, Johannes Weiss: In Memoriam; *William Adams Brown*, The Permanent Significance of Miracle for Religion; *Francis J. McConnell*, The Function of the Educated and of the Uneducated Ministry; *Paul Elmer More*, Evolution and the Other World; *George Batchelor*, Three Notable Dreams; *Daniel James Fraser*, Recent Church Union Movements in Canada; *Thomas N. Carver*, What Ails the Church?

THE MONIST, XXV, 3: *Robert P. Richardson* and *Edward H. Landis*, Numbers, Variables, and Mr. Russell's Philosophy; *Hartley Burr Alexander*, The Definition of Number; *Bertrand Russell*, The Ultimate Constituents of Matter; *Philip E. B. Jourdain*, Newton's Hypotheses of Ether and of Gravitation from 1693 to 1726.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, XII, 6: *A. H. Pierce*, A Preliminary Report of Experiments on the Stereoscopic Efficiency of Vision.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL, XIII, 3: *Henri Bergson*, Life and Matter at War; *L. P. Jacks*, The Tyranny of Mere Things; *Evelyn Underhill*, Problems of Conflict; *Percy Gardner* and *A. W. F. Blunt*, Two Studies of German "Kultur"; *Hermann Keyserling*, On the Meaning of the War; *Maude Egerton King*, Gothic Ruin and Reconstruction; *E. F. Carritt*, "Shall we serve God for Nought?"; *M. W. Robieson*, German Socialist Theory and War; *J. M. Sloan*, Carlyle's Germans; *C. Marsh Beadnell*, Mind and Matter: A Hylozoistic View; *Laird Wingate Snell*, The Method of Christian Science.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE DETERMINATION OF HUMAN ENDS.

BETWEEN the scientific theorist, and the man of practical or imaginative ideals, there has tended to be a standing quarrel. It is crystallized in the familiar formula of opposition between what ought to be, and what is—a distinction which the scientist in his zeal for extending the province of ordered and rational apprehension feels himself continually led to question, and which the common man stubbornly refuses to give up. I am in a way setting out in the first place to give reasons for the belief that this opposition is an unavoidable one, and that science can never hope to bring ideals wholly within the scope of its special methods. The matter can most easily be approached in terms of the social ideal. Nowadays such ideals have come to be, possibly, the biggest thing on our intellectual horizon. Nevertheless, among the more academic intellectual tendencies, there is often visible a reaction in the opposite direction. And this disposition to adopt a tone of patronage and rebuke toward flaming enthusiasms and to confine the imagination rather to the sober task of catching the drift of the working laws of things as they are, the continued endeavor to beat back man's faith in his own ideal demands by calling to his mind their factual character, their relativity, their dependence on impersonal conditions, is perhaps natural and unavoidable. Still, if science is to persist in taking thus the whole situation in hand, there is a difficult question which she is bound to answer. She must let us know clearly how she proposes on her own part to go to work to formulate the ends which mankind shall follow—

a task for which she has clearly made herself in such a case responsible.

In answer to this, it has sometimes been found sufficient merely to refer to the world of fact. But clearly, when we once free ourselves from the first naïve provincialism of our own particular church or party or national affiliations, and look at the world, what we find is a vast confusion of conflicting cross currents of opinion and action; no single great and unquestioned sweep or tendency exists, outside the pages of the tidy-minded historical philosopher. What we need, in addition, is some clear mark that distinguishes between tendencies all equally existent. Our best card would doubtless be to discover some note of necessity, of deductive certainty; but if it should turn out that we have to fall back instead upon a merely empirical difference, there is only one obvious place in which to look for this, and that is in the character of dominance, success, quantitative superiority. This has a certain backing in a popular attitude which is notoriously common. It is what is called 'getting on the band wagon.' Much of the prevalent talk about progress, civilization, manifest destiny and the like, means just this, that we shall decide the line we are to take by looking about us to see what actually seems to be getting the upper hand, to be the biggest thing going, and then shall cast in our lot with it as that which appears likeliest to carry us to success.

As a genuine and defensible principle of choice, this has obvious drawbacks. To begin with, it is far from getting rid of the ambiguity in the situation. To pick the winner in the movements of the day is no simple task. Very noisy tendencies, tendencies stamped with approval by the trend of popular elections, tendencies that in a variety of ways seem for the moment to have the best of it, it may indeed be possible to discover; but this will hardly be held a sufficiently enlightening way for an intelligent being to decide upon his duty. And when we bring in the time element, the possibility of applying the criterion is seriously limited. How long is the tendency to have kept advancing, just how many votes must it capture, before it shall have proved itself the law of the world? As a matter of fact,

one has no way of deciding, at any rate without a digested philosophy of history; and that is a thing which the average man is not likely to have at all, and which the learned have in too great a variety to be serviceable. If success, then, means apparent and temporary success, it is a criterion that is palpably inadequate. If it means success in the long run, then, granting an initial assumption that the run has by this time been long enough to settle matters, I see nothing for it but to wait still further for the historians and sociologists to agree on what is the real trend of history, while taking the risk also that even then their judgment may have gone astray; or else—and this would seem the sounder logic—to recognize that the things which show the clearest title to permanence and success are the oldest and longest established things, and so take tradition as our guide.

There is a second reason also for questioning the appeal to success, and that is the fact that it has to the average man a distinctly unheroic flavor. It is frankly opportunism. Now if opportunism means simply that one must make use of circumstances to attain his end, and so adopt the method which seems most available at the moment, this is no more than the dictate of practical good sense. But if it means choosing our ends in the same way, or rather leaving them to be chosen for us by the march of events, it has in the past had none too good a name. It is this which on a large scale the principle would seem to prescribe. When a movement is young and helpless, and needs every assistance, stand aloof, for you have no way of telling as yet whether it is sound or not. When it has proved that it is bound to succeed anyhow without you, then is the moment to declare for it. There has always been something of a prejudice in favor of a different attitude. How else could what is even now best have made head against the brute immensity and inertia of the world? Every cause must once have been young. If it cannot approve itself until it has already shown that it will succeed, how is it ever to make a start? It is surely not man's business to find out how the wind is blowing, and then add his own breath to swell it; somehow he is clearly called upon to be master of his fate.

Now it may be said that this is relevant only in case we suppose that social and ethical tendencies are arrived at simply through empirical observation, and that it falls to the ground if science is able to arrive at real causal and necessary laws. And, to begin with what is clearest, there *is* one case where it may be admitted to be possible to forecast deductively the conditions of the future. The biological conditions of the continued life of individuals, and of the species as that is distinguished from society, set the extreme limit to the possibilities of human nature and institutions. But how little sufficient such laws are in themselves will be evident when we reflect, that all the immensely variegated forms that human working ideals take must in some measure have met these conditions, or they would not now be in evidence. But, when we ask, further, to what extent we can go beyond this, the answer would not seem to be clear. At once there begin to step in notions, not of life, but of certain kinds of life—the best life, the most widely extended life, the fullest life; and the biological necessity for these is something short of self-evident.

If we try to locate more definitely the source of those laws which have been actually suggested as a means of deducing social, as opposed to biological characters and forms, there is, so far as I can clearly understand it, only one well-defined answer,—the notion of adaptation to environment through the law of selection. But this notion depends for its plausibility largely upon a particular assumption. To be sure, we have a true principle of causation here. But anything whatever of course must have its cause; the question is whether these causes can be counted on to continue producing their effects. Certain biological conditions *must* be met, otherwise the whole problem lapses; but has the effect of the environment anything like the same intellectual compulsion? I say, only on one condition, that we arrest our conception of the environment, and make it a fixed and known limit or goal toward which change is supposed to be directed. The moment the notion is recognized as a fluid one, essentially relative to an organism in itself extremely unstable, the whole matter of prediction loses its force. To indulge in prophecy in

terms of a goal which shifts with every step of the progress towards it, would seem rather a waste of good time and energy. With every extension of man's powers and knowledge, even his physical environment automatically enlarges; and when the social environment is brought in, the fluidity of the concept becomes still more obvious. Thus, if one were trying to formulate purely objective tendencies, he would very likely be led to prophesy that when so-called inferior peoples come in contact with more civilized ones, they will tend to degenerate and disappear. But, if we take this as something inevitable, which therefore calls for acquiescence or for active coöperation, we are at once halted by the question whether it might not easily be quite otherwise. So long as dominant races have the same ideals that they commonly have had, we may expect the same results; but conceivably they might change their whole attitude and methods. In other words, we have a way of distinguishing in social and ethical affairs the permanent from the superficial trend only when we take the social environment as a fixed and calculable quantity; and this means also taking as fixed a so-called human nature in terms of its present dominant traits. In point of fact, the very proposal here misinterprets the purpose of science. The business of science is not absolute, but conditional prediction. The disposition to regard it as a form of clairvoyance, a means of peering into the future, in the deterministic sense, is to lose sight of its more significant value. It is true that to some slight extent science may predict the inevitable in this absolute way, in connection, say, with the larger operations of nature that are beyond our control. But such cases are themselves a sufficient indication that its justification lies elsewhere. If a collision in space were destined to destroy this planet, scientific foreknowledge of the fact would be a plain nuisance. Only as it gives a cue for human action does science mean to us anything at all important,—in so far, that is, as there are significant consequences which are not determined, but can be escaped. And for the most part not only the consequences, but the event itself, is hypothetical. The point of prediction is not that certain things must inevitably happen,

but, quite the contrary, that we are able to escape *anything* merely *happening* to us, and so escape the inevitable. In other words, the place of science in life is clearly a means to an end, and the end science itself is quite incompetent to set. An end is a thing that appeals to us as having importance or value; and values I see no way of enforcing in scientific terms. To be sure, appreciations may be brought indirectly in a sense within the realm of science; but they cease thereby actually to *have* value, or at least the same value; and with this loss their sovereign and legislative function disappears. The science of aesthetics, if there be such a thing, does not feel aesthetic values; these are outward facts to it, whereas in life their whole effectiveness depends on their being appreciated in feeling. A value is always something personal, and in the last resort undebateable; as Mr. Chesterton remarks, you cannot argue with the choice of the soul. The prestige of scientific method carries no weight whatever if the assumption of worth itself is once in question. One who accepts the scientific standpoint must submit to scientific reasoning; but if anyone, say a poet, were to deny that science is a fitting occupation for a man of sense, it would be utterly impossible to use scientific methods to refute him. The scientist can only point mutely to the self-evident value of science, precisely as the poet presupposes the self-evident value of poetry.

Now this suggests of course the alternative to either science or history as the *final* determiner of values or ideals. It is to human nature that we are to look, in the form of immediate appreciations of worth—subjective appreciations if you please,—and human nature considered in the light of its empirical character as a growing fact, which only gradually and tentatively comes after this fashion to a knowledge of itself. Science, in trying to make what has been, or what at present is, the standard for the future, is emasculating the idea of evolution. Mere change, in the form of a continual recombination of old elements, is not evolution; it leaves out the important fact of variation. A variation is something novel. To try to show that there is nothing in it which was not already there before is to deny

variation. And variation therefore, if it takes place, is concretely incalculable in terms of the processes which precede and do not contain it. It is a new departure, and has actually to show what difference it is going to make before we can sum this up completely in a new set of empirical formulae. And in ideals we seem to have precisely the variations which serve as the most significant instruments of human and social evolution. Variations are individual, and so, in their origin, are ideals. The point of an ideal lies in the fact, first, that it has still to be realized, and so is a novel element in factual experience, and, secondly, that it goes back for its motivation to a personal demand. The force of an ideal depends, not on my finding it true, but on my insistence that it shall be true; and this insistence sometimes may seem to be against precedent, against history, and the massed experience of mankind. It is a demand which I find in myself, not in nature or society. How indeed would progress be conceivable were it not for this budding forth in human nature of new insights and cravings, which thereupon try to constrain nature to their bidding? And whatever cooler and more critical minds may have to say, mankind seems likely to continue honoring such ideals, because it realizes, however vaguely, that out of them comes all the possibility of a higher good than has yet been attained. The sober caution of science, on the contrary, however admirable it may be in its own sphere, or even, as a corrective in practical life, is bound, when it is pressed too far, to leave the impression of over-timidity. It does too little justice to the free, living intellect of man. It bids us wait too much on occasion, be too timorous of risks, too distrustful of ourselves and our far-glancing intuitions, to appeal strongly to the perennial element in man's nature which longs for the world of adventure and which in his heart he admires and regrets even in the days when literature, and poetry, and religion, and enthusiasms generally, may seem to be giving place to the prim correctness of a philosophy that will take no steps for which it cannot give itself the most convincing reasons, and that will never believe the world is on its side until it can find its proof in brute and accomplished fact.

But now, after urging that the final motive for our choice is not objective but subjective, that it depends upon an incalculable impulse in ourselves, and that in the end we must trust ourselves and not the world, and have faith that what we want the world is willing to give on condition that we are prepared to wrest it by force even against odds, I am ready to agree that we may and should correct the interpretation of our wishes by the widest knowledge we can get of the way the world works. Unless we can find at least that the conditions of its satisfaction are present in the world, we have no right to retain it. So too when we have to deal with causes that have been in the world some time already, and have failed to make their way, we can pronounce, though even here with caution, that their continued ill-success seems to point to a lack of those objectively favorable conditions apart from which idealism becomes sentimentalism. This affords no ground for condemning what is in any true sense a new departure. But here again, if we find that we are calling for a new departure, and cannot back our own will by appeal to large social tendencies, in all likelihood we should do well to scrutinize ourselves more closely, and raise seriously the question whether it is real insight, or mere self conceit and crankiness, that is urging us. In point of fact, the greater prophets have usually been more conscious of their community with the past than of their own originality; and an insistence on novelty, on being advanced and ahead of one's age, is apt to be a bad sign. In the end, indeed, the deciding vote is with ourselves. If there is to be anything new and better in human life, some one must at some time begin it. It may be that the task is ours, and there is no sign of our mission except an unescapable sense of inner compulsion. To be sure, we take the risk. But that in itself is not irrationality; it may be only courage. And in the end, the long run, the scientific mind will judge us. If finally the effort comes to nothing, if it can get no point of attachment to reality sufficient to make it go, then its lack of success will inevitably be used to condemn it. My demand is not a proof that the ideal is justified, but only a reason that I should try to justify it. I should recognize that I am fallible, and to prove

that my ideal is right I must make good. But neither is the scientific test infallible, simply because, no matter how long it waits, there is still more time coming in which things will happen; and one of the things *may* be the reversal of what has seemed hitherto the settled direction of the world's movement. Between the two fallibilities, I see no way of methodic and scientific decision; which means that it must be left after all in the last resort to a personal decree, with its source in the manner of man I am, tempered however, it is to be hoped, both by knowledge and by common sense. But my main point is, again, that the two tests are made primarily for different occasions. The difference between the long run, and the short run, is the difference between an academic historical judgment on the past, and a starting point for new action and choice. The objective, the scientific judgment has the former purpose. It is final only in so far as a given choice has fallen below the level of a live alternative, has become dead and embalmed in the past. In our actual choosing, it may create a burden of proof. But in itself it is not, and is not meant to be, a final determiner of action. It must always leave open the possibility of a new turn to affairs which is a pure variation, a sport, a thing essentially individual and personal. And until the world has stopped growing, or until we are able to forecast the form it is to have when it does stop growing, the last word at any given moment of choice must be spoken, not by knowledge, but by a personal faith and demand,—by an ideal, that is, not in terms of an absolute and supernatural 'ought,' but as a personal and individual 'ought' irreducible to the formulas of objective fact or law.

It may perhaps be suspected that the bias which I am trying to justify as existing back of our practical choices, is not absent in my own choice of a philosophic standpoint. What it amounts to is perhaps describable as a preference for what might be called progressivism, or temporalism, or some such title; and a distrust, accordingly, of that form of the more conservative temper which commonly lies back of philosophic rationalism. And if I may turn briefly from the scientist to the philosopher, I am

compelled to believe that it is quite as impossible to determine concretely our ends by philosophic as by scientific reason. A short time ago I listened to a very eloquent sermon in which the preacher was endeavoring to point out how we may escape from the futilities and crowding narrowness of a life in time, and attain to a more permanent sense of worth. And his main suggestion, as I recall it, was two-fold: on the spiritual side we are released from time by a vision of truth, which is timeless and unchanging; and on the practical side, by identifying ourselves with some institutional form of life, which shall absorb into itself our small efforts, and give them consistency and lasting quality. I should be far from questioning the value of such thoughts; and yet they appear to me to fall short. To me, reason seems not the vision of eternal truth; it is the progressive attempt to realize, by adjusting it to the conditions of its exercise, a constant new stream of appreciative insight into what shall have satisfying worth for life, which must come, therefore, not from an intellectual perception of truths, but primarily from the unfolding of an inner nature, which at each new step sees things differently because it feels them differently. Truth may be vital, or it may be unutterably trivial; and which of the two it is will depend not on itself, but on its relation to these wants of which we slowly grow aware. So I find myself rather sympathetic with the radical, the enthusiast, the rebel and individualist. For a philosophy of absolute reason, on the contrary, the end would seem to be given. Our business is not to *elicit* it by experimenting—rationally of course—with our lives, but to *see* it, to direct the mind to the unchanging aspects of its intuitive certainty. But the consequence would seem to be, either that in order to maintain its claim to finality the end has to be put in such abstract form as to become a mere schema compatible with almost any working ideal of life, or else that, if it is to gain content, and at the same time escape condemnation as an arbitrary caprice of the individual, it must find reason embodied in the actual, and attain significance, as the preacher advised, by subjecting personal insight and initiative to the authority of institutions. Now I realize that it may be no argument to anyone else, but

it is a perfectly good reason to me that I *don't want* to sink myself in institutions. For the other and competing attitude one may think of Hegel, or even better perhaps, for the practical side, of Coleridge. For Coleridge, and the rationally-minded man of whom he is peculiarly the type, our true starting point in the practical field is, not indeed abstract principles of reason, but the philosophic *idea* implicit in the concrete institution. The truth of this is proved progressively by its success in rendering intelligible the facts in detail; and similarly it supplies an immanent principle of criticism, rather than an arbitrary and personal one, for testing and rejecting whatever is out of harmony with itself. It offers consequently for Coleridge the only real formula for progress. It frees us from the pressure of the accidental and the unessential, and leaves the way open for rational reform; while on the other hand it appeared to him equally to justify a sane conservatism, as against that "madness of ignorant vanity and reckless obstinacy" which was pushing the British Constitution towards democracy. If this is put in sufficiently general terms, there is doubtless much sound philosophy here. But, when we look more closely, we see that after all it supplies a foundation for progress, only in so far as we are satisfied to limit progress to the better realization of insights already achieved and embodied in human life. And it strikes me that it is at least significant that reason, so interpreted, did not prevent Coleridge from being a singularly unlucky prophet of political events. Looked at in the retrospect, we may allow that the intelligent and well-meaning conservatism of men of Coleridge's type has a valuable purpose to serve; but it is not just the service that it thinks itself performing. It acts, that is, as a brake upon the wheels of progress, which might, conceivably, be in danger otherwise of going too recklessly ahead. On particular issues nature is perpetually falsifying its predictions. Institutions which it has held up as the keystone of the social structure disappear, and society still hangs together; the things happen which were to produce universal ruin, and men still go about their business. And then the next issue comes up, and with unquenchable zeal and confidence this too is defended from

the encroachments of inexorable Time. The task, it may be granted, is one that needs doing, though it is perhaps a drawback that it seems so often to require a belief in the intellectual finality of one's own position, which one has only to live a sufficient number of years to find disproved by the course of events. Meanwhile it is not hard to understand that a different sort of person will be dissatisfied with the task of always pulling back, and will prefer to identify his interest with the issues that the future seems more likely to approve. For that change of some sort there is bound to be, would seem of all prophecies to be about the safest. And how the direction and issue is to be determined, again, I for one cannot conceive, unless we go back of institutional reason to those personal springs of conduct which, to be sure, need rationalizing, but which nevertheless in themselves are ultimate facts, that set the direction, and supply the motive power, of all our ends. In trying to justify what I prefer, inevitably I reach a point where the only thing left for me to say is that I prefer it. If one man likes the sense of attained results, of culture, and reflection on the past, and all the perquisites of an untroubled life and a settled order of things, and another likes adventure and struggle and the leaving behind of goals once reached, who is to say that one ideal is more reasonable than the other? A's world is unreasonable to B, because B doesn't like it; but with quite the same justification, B's will seem unreasonable to A. The will that things shall not change except within prescribed limits, that ends shall be confined to accepted insights, is just as much a personal will as that of the most inveterate anarchist or romanticist; it simply is under the disadvantage of failing to recognize itself as such, and of thinking that the *perception of a truth* is no different from its acceptance as a worthy object of endeavor; so that the rational objectivity of the former attitude can be transferred without change to the latter.

I have been arguing so far that our aims are set for us not by events, or by law, but by ourselves. We are not in the grip of a law of progress; progress itself depends upon new and untried expressions of creative spontaneity centering in individuals. But here

the scientist may return to his contention. As a matter of fact, he may say, however we may struggle to effect our wishes, we find in the end that we are borne on by larger currents which we cannot effectively resist. Possibly we cannot discover what concretely these are to bring about before the issue,—cannot, that is, use them for prediction. But nevertheless we are their creatures, and will in the end have done their bidding, not our own.

What I should have to say to this, in addition, is most easily approached by trying to give a slightly more specific formulation to my former thesis. Without attempting an adequate analysis, there are two main forms which effective working ideals in human history have taken. A wave of emotional expansion will sometimes pass from man to man, altering the relative scale of importance in the effective motives for action, discovering to the most prosaic unexpected springs of feeling, and producing conspicuous, if not always lasting, results. There are individuals whose ideals take constitutionally this simple emotional form; they represent the vague aspiration after a state of affairs that shall give play to some specialized and dominant trait, which thereupon is recommended to others in a way that aims primarily to disturb, by the mere force of contagion, the balance of emotional preference. The traditional method of the pulpit takes often this line; such also is the method of the jingo, the aesthete, the vivid sentimentalist of every sort. The defect of such an ideal is of course its uncertainty and lack of staying power, as well as its generally clamorous, short-sighted, and impenetrable quality of mind.

But if we are dissatisfied with the narrowness of ideals inspired by dominant impulses and emotions, we are already directed to another possibility. The *rational* ideal is simply the opening up of an insight into what shall constitute a more comprehensive and entire satisfaction and attainment, through a truer understanding of our nature. Such an enlargement of understanding will of course involve some shift in the relative importance of instinctive dispositions, but not in the way primarily of a mere emotional urge. Owing to the fact that commonly there are

no essentially new elements or motives involved, the possibilities of novelty here may be overlooked. We have had, for example, many labored arguments to prove that there was nothing original in Jesus' teaching. This aspect goes back to the Old Testament, this to Hillel, this to the Essenes; and the wonder grows accordingly that it ever should have been heard of outside of Palestine,—must we not have been misreading history all the time when we supposed that there actually was such a thing as Christianity and the Christian ideal? What is overlooked is the possibility that the new element may be just in the process of fusion. It is the necessary condition of success and expansion that there *should* be nothing fundamentally involved which, through its common presence in other men, cannot make a wide appeal; esoteric ideals are negligible. But if we, the multitude of the imitative and the uninspired, think that this does away with originality, and that the mere owning of the raw material of human nature, and its shared insights from the past, enables us to create a new and effective ideal, we have only to sit down and try.

But now if we find the essence of the genuine ideal not in mere feeling or wanting, but in a clearer understanding of ourselves, and of all that we are and want, we have at hand also the instrument which may free the ideal from subservience to the laws of necessity. One need not deny that such laws have actually ruled human life. But the moment man recognizes this, the means of freedom has been put into his hands. Statistics, for example, reveal a vast number of such laws, which are apt when our attention is first called to them to leave upon the mind a rather appalling sense of mysterious and stern fatality. Of course such a feeling is unjustified. If we can discover the actual causes which lead now to such a result, then we can, *if there is any general demand for it*, alter the statistics indefinitely. The so-called economic interpretation of history is an attempt thus to show on a large scale how all the aspects of man's life are the unintended outcome of a mutual interplay between given instincts and habits, and the conditions of the surrounding world. Now it is doubtless so that very many of our habits and

beliefs in the past have been the outcome of such an interplay; they are, in a well-defined sense of the word, necessitated. But it is just the difference of the present age that it is learning gradually to take control of its own destiny, instead of leaving this to economic forces. And it has the chance of doing this precisely when it comes to see what has been happening in the past; recognizing this, the influence no longer operates automatically. One may find an illustration in the new art of advertising and salesmanship, especially in its earlier days. This was a conscious attempt to do within a limited field what nature is supposed to be doing on a vaster scale,—catch us when we were not looking, and lead us to do something—in this case buy what the advertiser had to sell—which previously we had not been conscious that we wanted to do, and for reasons of which we equally were unaware. But the theory was inclined to overlook one important detail, that to succeed it must cover its tracks. People may be able to manage me so long as I do not suspect that I am being managed, but they must be very careful not to let me into the secret. I make my purchase at a shop, and the clerk asks me, “What else?” Theoretically I am supposed to respond unconsciously to the suggestion, and think up another purchase; actually it only prompts *me* to answer, “Nothing,” and leave the store, even if there is some other article that I very earnestly desire. Now substitute mother-nature for the advertising expert, and we have the same essential situation. Science, in stealing from nature the secret of how she has fooled us in the past, has put it out of her power to keep on fooling us in the future.

The practical conclusion of all this is, that no controversy is worth getting into which does not start by making clear what it is that each of the contending parties is after, and think desirable in the outcome. Reason may help arrange a compromise when once this point is settled, but not otherwise. What usually we do, on the contrary, is to assume that of course everybody wants the same thing that we do, and then proceed to show that we alone know the way to get it. It is this which vitiates, for example, a good share of the literature of eugenics,

as an infallible method of securing the right sort of human being, without the smallest agreement, or indeed more than the most cursory consideration, as to what sort of a human being we want. It is about the implications of this for philosophy that I shall confine myself in what I have still to say.

One thing which helps explain, as Professor James in particular has pointed out, why philosophers are so constantly at cross purposes, is that they have commonly supposed themselves to be without bias, a transparent medium through which pass unrefracted the rays of celestial reason. They may sometimes have a suspicion that their colleagues are not quite as free from prejudice as they ought to be; but this casts no doubt upon their *ideal* of the philosopher. Now I am not sure I know what in theory the ideal philosopher ought to be, but I think I have a fairly accurate notion of what the actual philosopher is; and I do not remember to have come across any whose results seemed to me freed from his extra-logical predilections and approvals. Every once in a while we have, with more or less pomp and acclaim, a new philosophy appearing which is to eliminate subjective differences, and by an infallible method separate out *simon-pure* philosophic truth from all spurious brands. The recent return to logic, in some of its expressions, would seem to be the latest of these. Now I suppose that one could get together a number of logical truths on which men could be made to agree if they understood them, provided one is not particular about what the truths are so long as they are true. But there is a point which all such endeavors are apt to overlook,—that the fact that, if people will agree to define philosophy in a certain way, it may lead to a growing approximation, does not show that they will be content so to define it. If a man has, in a virulent form, the mathematical or logical mind, he may be willing to exclude from the philosopher's task all those less absolute beliefs which center about our emotional and practical satisfactions. People who feel the same way will follow him in this, and those who feel differently will not, which leaves the situation very much as it was before. And my point is, again, that to refuse to see that there is a limit to logical compulsion here, and an

ultimate interest and direction which from the logical standpoint is arbitrary,—that the man, in other words, as well as his logic, is constitutive in philosophy,—is to limit one's usefulness through a lack of self knowledge.

But if this is so, it is said, does it not put a quietus at once upon all hopes for a final agreement in philosophy? I should answer in the first place: Well, isn't it still true that as a matter of fact philosophers are *not* agreed, and that they *do* have various notions of what even is desirable? What do you propose to do about this? How shall the fact be changed? The most obvious answer I have already referred to, and, for myself, rejected. Doubtless there will always continue to appear the notion that somewhere discoverable in the universe is a chain of close-knit reasoning which, starting from premises that no one can deny, will lead to conclusions that no one can escape. But surely the philosopher who today really expects to convert all his fellow-philosophers in such a fashion has a faith which is a little naïve. Besides representing, statistically, a high degree of improbability, it will seem to some also to be a wrong ideal, because a singularly unexhilarating one. Philosophy to them is an adventure. It is man's attempt to adjust himself on a grand scale to the universe; and it carries with it therefore the tentativeness, the possibility of blind alleys, the slow ripening and competitive experimentation, which is incident to the process of *self*-discovery. They would rather resent a world which marked down too strictly, by a ready-made rule of reason, the lines along which they are to make their quest.

But now it does not follow that even on such a showing the faith in an ultimate truth is bound to be defeated. Unless belief attends only on logic, this brute fact of his individual nature which gives a man a bias, may still itself be quite adequate to assure him permanent confidence in the results to which that bias points,—a much surer ground, indeed, than if he were wholly dependent on the vicissitudes of logical argument. Now this is where the most of us actually stand. When we express our faith that there is one truth that in the end must conquer, what of course we mean is that it is our own philosophy

that adumbrates this truth, and that philosophers are to compromise, and get together, by all coming round to our view. And within limits this is perfectly healthy and proper. Indeed, what I have all the time been maintaining is that, in the philosophic as well as in the practical field, all that any of us can do is to attain his own best insight, and then to fight for it; and we shall not fight effectively unless we believe that we are right, and our fellow wrong. But there is something further to be said. Not only does the recognition that philosophic as well as practical persuasion has its roots in personal judgments on life that differ in different men, not justify of necessity the conclusion that the discrepancy must be eternal, but it is, I am inclined to think, the only real ground for the faith that philosophers may some time get together. When I say that the world is a field of battle for competing ideals, whose final source is in the fact,—to be accepted, not deduced,—of a personal sense of value, I do not imply that these are given and unchangeable. On the contrary, I have already indicated my belief that they are subject indefinitely to development, and that the first step to the rational control of this development is to get them clearly before the mind as elements in the situation. Now one thing there is in particular, when we do this, that might very well make us have less confidence in the finality of our own bias. This is just the fact that we find other people, equally intelligent with ourselves to all appearance, with a different bias. This discovery might, to be sure, have a result not altogether favorable to the interests I have been trying to defend. It might break down my confidence in my own ends, and leave me in that state of mind which Carlyle hated so wholeheartedly under the name of "tolerance." There has often been, it cannot be doubted, a difficulty felt in holding together in the mind enthusiasm for an idea, and the admission that there are other ideas afloat equally worth attention. The enthusiast has tended to be the fanatic, surest of his ground when most certain of his opponent's viciousness or imbecility. 'No society,' writes Canon Hannay in a recent book on America, 'can be both enthusiastic and free,' meaning that the surer a man is of the

importance of his own beliefs, the less he will be willing to allow an open field to others. I grant that this usually has been the case. The earnest man has been the self-sufficient and intolerant man, and tolerance has been gained commonly at the expense of conviction. But I cannot see the necessity for this. I don't see why it is not possible to recognize that it takes all sorts of people to make a world, that most sorts have their relative justification, and their contribution without which the world would be the poorer; and at the same time not give up the worth of one's own ideal demands. So when I come to realize the variety of human interests that have helped determine philosophy, I need not at all lose faith in the one which is my own; but I may, and I think I should, be less dogmatically certain of its full adequacy and finality. I might say to myself: 'Well, I can see I never shall be satisfied unless these interests of mine are taken care of: but then here is B too; he is not quite a fool; and if he disagrees with me so totally, it may be that he has hold of something I have overlooked.' And if philosophers generally, instead of ignoring fundamental presuppositions in terms of the personal interest which guides them, and obstinately repeating over and over again their favorite form of dialectic, were to sit down and compare notes, and ask in a conciliatory spirit whether their ends might not somehow be found compatible, it is conceivable to me that philosophy might, in the course of time, come to resemble less a cockpit, and more a coöperative undertaking. But at least this cannot come about unless we first recognize the need; until we no longer are disposed to deny the obligations of our logic to personal motives and ends, or, admitting these, to follow our natural and unregenerate instinct to take our own first outlook as the only possible one for a rational being, which gives us the right to look down with scorn upon any one whose different sense of the relative importance of things has shaped his beliefs to a different end.

I may add just a word to indicate what it seems to me personally would be the metaphysical direction in which this would point. It suggests, at least, as the ultimate assumption we cannot get behind, something different from the common pre-

supposition of rationalism,—not reason, namely, but that empirical fact, a *reasoning being*—man—a being with a more or less determinate nature in an environing world, which it is his business to learn to know, and then to use for the progressive attainment of the ends which, through the same process of empirical experience, he comes gradually to realize. But both alike, knowledge and progress, the philosopher can understand and give unity to, only by tracing them back to their source, in the form of active dispositions and tendencies to thought and action, in the unitary life of that empirical being who for each man is himself, and so is, in terms of himself and his subjective seal of approval, rather than of scientific fact or of objective reason, at any given moment the court of last resort.

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WAS PLATO AN ASCETIC?

THIS question has been suggested by a striking passage in Mr. R. W. Livingstone's recent book *The Greek Genius and its Meaning to us*. Plato is there selected as an exception to that 'note of humanism' which belonged to his race: "Though in a thousand ways Plato is a Greek of the Greeks, in all that is most distinctive in his thought he is so far a heretic that if Hellenism had been a persecuting religion it would have been bound to send him to the stake. . . . His words might have been inscribed in the cells of Christian hermits to justify and sustain them in the austere asceticism of their retirement from the world." This is a bold, and a very arresting, breach with the usual opinion; yet I think most people will be surprised by the extent to which evidence can be adduced in its favor. It is plain, of course, that to place Plato definitely among the ascetics involves large discounting of some of his dialogues in the light of others which we take to be more faithful to his deepest thought. Nietzsche called him *praeëxistent-christlich*, but readers of the *Protagoras* and the *Republic* will want much persuasion before they agree that the author was next of kin to the saints of the desert. I propose in this paper to look at some of the more significant passages on the subject, passages especially from the *Gorgias* and the *Philebus*, and to ask whether they can be harmonized.

What are the chief points of interest in a philosopher's view of pleasure? They are four: Does he regard pleasure as *the* good? Does he regard it as *a* good? Does he admit differences of kind or only differences of degree? How does he apply his valuation of pleasure in building up his moral system?

I doubt whether Plato's answer to these questions can be stated with real consistency. We must of course allow some natural development between his earlier and his later writings, and we must carefully note the limits within which each view is explicitly affirmed. Nor must we forget the changing

circumstances both in his own temperament, and in external affairs, which affect every writer upon social science. But these are allowances which we always make when we are concerned, not with a precise legal document, but with a living and growing philosophy.

One dialogue, the *Protagoras*, seems to be through and through hedonistic. In sections 351-358 we might fancy we were reading John Stuart Mill. The argument runs as follows: pleasure is, by common consent, a *sine qua non* of the good life; why not admit that everything is valued, and must be valued, just in proportion to its pleasantness? We choose the painful only as a means to some greater pleasure, we reject the pleasurable only because the painful consequences which we foresee make immediate gratification not worth while. To deliberately choose that in which we see a surplus of pain is psychologically impossible; where we seem to do so we have committed an error of judgment. The phrase 'overcome by pleasure' is meaningless, for there is no antagonistic principle for pleasure to overcome; we move always and everywhere along the resultant line of competing pleasurable allurements. And like the sick man we may refuse our medicine because it is unpleasant. Often indeed we prefer a smaller but immediate to a greater but more remote pleasure; yet this case too is covered by our criterion, for the immediacy adds to the pleasingness. εἰ γὰρ τις λέγοι ὅτι "Ἄλλὰ πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ παραχρῆμα ἢ δὲ τοῦ εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον καὶ ἡδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ" Μῶν ἄλλω τῷ, φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε, ἢ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ; οὐ γάρ ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλω. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς ἰστάναι ἄνθρωπος, συνθεὶς τὰ ἡδέα καὶ συνθεὶς τὰ λυπηρά, καὶ τὸ ἐγγὺς καὶ τὸ πόρρω στήσας ἐν τῷ ζυγῷ εἰπέ ποτέρα πλείω ἐστίν.'

Different estimates of the size of any object accompany differences in the distance from which the object is viewed; just as we need mathematical units for mensuration, we require a hedonistic calculus to keep us right in valuing.

This anticipates the familiar 'Proof of Utilitarianism' in Chapter IV of Mill's essay; but it is more consistent than the modern argument in that the difficulty of nearer and remoter pleasures is met with genuine loyalty to the cardinal principle.

The illustration from physical magnitudes is ingenious, and is probably the best way out for those who refuse to recognize the fact of passion.

If we accept the Socrates of this dialogue as Plato's 'lay figure,' a mere mouthpiece for Plato's opinions, we must acknowledge flagrant conflict with the teaching of the later books. One need hardly cite passages from elsewhere, which undertake to show that man has other and higher aims than that of pleasing himself; one might refer to a multitude of dialogues *passim*. Perhaps the most decisive passage is in the *Gorgias* 499. Callicles there tries to set up a distinction between pleasures that are 'beneficial' and pleasures that are 'hurtful'; he hopes thus to escape the paradox of making every enjoyment as such good. Socrates rejoins that the distinction amounts to an abandonment of hedonism; a criterion other than pleasingness has been allowed; thus pleasure is not the supreme end. Nor is this any quibble with words; Plato points here with unerring instinct to the Achilles's heel of all hedonisms, ancient and modern. Such a contrast as 'beneficial' and 'hurtful' rests on the assumption that life is good, and that it is good for some other reason or reasons than its pleasurable nature to him who lives; otherwise there would be no reply to those who indulge in vicious or destructive pleasures under the motto, 'A short life and a merry one.' But the argument in the *Gorgias* does not stand alone; we find strewn everywhere passages about the struggle which man has to sustain against his sensitive nature, about the need of mastering desire, about pleasure as at best an accompaniment of right conduct, not the element which constitutes or determines rightness. No doubt Mr. Livingstone is thinking of these when he speaks of an inscription for the hermit's cell. At all events, we find in Plato many a metaphor which makes us feel that his place is with St. Paul, many a figure which reminds us of the flesh lusting against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh. And, while Mill might have used such phrases too, he could not have used them in Plato's sense; the ancient author asserted just what the modern author repudiated, namely, a standard of goodness which could not be resolved into a combination or refinement of pleasurable feelings.

Thus at first sight the *Protagoras* and the *Gorgias* seem irreconcilable. But we can meet the difficulty with a very simple solution; I suspect that the hedonism of the former dialogue was never entertained by Plato at all, and that he is simply reporting an historical debate at which he had been a listener. Beyond doubt the *Protagoras* belongs to his early period; it should probably be placed between the 'Socratic' list (the *Euthyphro*, *Laches*, *Carneades*, etc.), and the trio in which constructive Platonism begins. Lutoslawski formed this opinion on linguistic grounds; of his stylometric evidence I do not pretend to be a competent judge, but it is satisfactory to know that his conclusion coincides with that which is suggested by doctrinal content. The old sharp opposition of knowledge against ignorance is being softened, but the full-fledged theory of the 'Divided Line' in *Republic VI.* has not yet been reached. In short, we have before us the transition from Plato the pupil of Socrates to Plato the independent thinker. Now the antagonist in this dialogue is Protagoras, the *bête noire* both of Plato and of his chief. May not Socrates' argument be of the anatreptic sort, far from stating his real position? We know his dialectic maliciousness; it was plainly very hard to be sure when he was serious, and when he was playing for victory at a sophist's expense. The cult of pleasure is unlike what one would expect from the central figure of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*. May not this have been an ironical exhibition of the absurdities to which a man is led when he relies on that purely psychological method in ethics which Protagoras notoriously commended? If such a conversation had taken place, we may well believe that Plato would have gleefully committed it to a permanent record. But to decide upon the alleged asceticism of Plato we must ask whether in his more austere moods he has acknowledged pleasure to be a good at all. Was his sanction fairly invoked by the Neo-Platonists, six centuries afterwards, when they maintained that the flesh is by its very nature the seat of evil? Did he preach renunciation?

To discuss this by way of verbal quotation need not detain us long. In that very dialogue which I have cited as a polemic

against hedonism he admits enough to separate him sharply from the ethic of Plotinus. In the argument with Polus and Callicles it is shown that pleasure is not *the* good, but if Plato had held that it is *not good at all* he would surely have made this clear. On the contrary, he aims to prove that among goods pleasure is entitled to only a subordinate place, and that it is even *at times* to be judged evil because inconsistent with something better. The assumption is that pleasure *qua* pleasure is desirable, but that pleasure *qua* a hindrance to that which is more desirable must often be rejected. We have the very significant division of things into good, evil, and indifferent, with the allocation to the first class of wisdom, health, and *wealth*. We have the acknowledged that to inflict pain as a punishment for injustice is, so far, to produce evil, like the surgeon's 'cutting or burning' of a limb; it may however be worth while for the amelioration of character which it produces. In short, the attitude is one of comparative estimate: nothing is taken as morally incommensurable with anything else, pleasure is considered in every case on its merits. And the same position is, at least verbally, assumed in many another dialogue.

How far does Plato recognize a qualitative distinction such as Callicles hinted at? This problem is faced in the *Philebus*, and the answer may be paraphrased as follows:

"Pleasures may be either mixed or unmixed. In the former we have an element of pain; for example such states as the transition from suffering to its relief, or the violent excitements of which it is hard to say whether they are in the end enjoyable or the reverse. Such mixtures may occur either in the body or in the mind; when hunger or thirst is being satisfied the hedonic state is a blend of opposites; in sorrow or in revenge there is an element that is sweet and an element that is bitter. But we have also pleasures that are pure, those coming to sense from beauty of form or color, those coming to intellect from the acquisition of knowledge. As to the gods, if they have emotions at all—and to suggest this sounds indecent—we must assume that their pleasure is of the unmixed type; consequently this is the highest state. We must remember

however that we are not gods but men. The conclusion is that in drawing up our scale of values pleasure has a place; that place is far down in the list, lower than wisdom, lower than virtue, lower than scientific knowledge; we may say that its station is about fifth; and this station belongs only to such pleasures as are painless. This we assert though all the beasts in the world should maintain the contrary."

What one feels about this discussion in the *Philebus* is that Plato admits the legitimacy of pleasure with a kind of Puritanic grudge; his enthusiasm displays itself when he is arguing the negative aspect; sometimes he turns aside, as in section 49 to show that if we were all that we should be pleasure would attend all that we do; but he leaves us with the conviction that the only enjoyment low creatures like us can appreciate is a pleasure connected with elements that are evil. 'Because of the hardness of your hearts Moses gave you this commandment.' His analytic power is seen at its best in the incomparable passage of the *Gorgias* where he attacks the conception of the desirable life as a ceaseless round of fulfilled passion. Would not everyone wish, if he could have it, for the tyrant's power of doing always exactly as he chooses? No, the wise man would wish nothing of the kind; for limitless indulgence of appetite is like pouring water into a leaky vessel. The prior existence of pain is the *sine qua non* of joy in relieving it. Are we then to multiply our pains, keeping in view the possibilities of relief? How far would Callicles be prepared to go in such a direction?

When one asks how Plato has applied his view of pleasure to the construction of his moral system, a glib answer is often forthcoming. We are told that though enjoyment is not the good it is nevertheless, in his view, a necessary result of goodness. The body that functions well is pleased; the soul that is ordered and harmonious will have the joy of order and harmony. But it is the spiritual state which is the aim, the pleasure is but one among the effects. No doubt there is much truth in this, but one cannot help recalling the suggestion of *Philebus* 33 that the neutral condition attributed to the gods is intrinsically the highest. Was there not a basis here for the Stoic ideal of the

passionless sage? Perhaps after all Jowett was right when he summed up the situation thus: "So wide of the mark are they who would attribute to Plato entire consistency of thought or words." Yet for one clear conception on the matter we may be thankful to him, and we may well feel ashamed that so many modern writers have not profited by it. Plato distinguished in the most lucid way between pleasure and happiness. How many volumes by Utilitarian moralists have ignored this obvious contrast! How incorrigible has the assumption been that the happy man is he who adds pleasure to pleasure, as the capitalist in the prophet's picture added house to house! It has required much criticism to remove this monstrous idea of hedonistic mensuration from modern textbooks. Yet the whole fallacy was long ago exposed in Plato's antithesis of the permanent disposition with the fitful impulse, and in the image of the tyrant who never does what he wills because he always does what he wishes.

One might dwell on further confirmation of Plato's ascetic mood by pointing to the Orphic ideas with which his dialogues are strewn. It is manifest that a school of thought existed in Athens for which the joyous Olympian worship was anathema, a school which placed the centre of gravity in a future world, and turned its back, like some Christian fanatics of the past, upon all the concerns of the bright and breathing present. It is also plain that Plato, despite his denunciations of Orphism, had much sympathy with a few of its fundamental tenets. The *Phaedo* is full of them, and it would be rash to conjecture how far that other world, compared with which the body is our prison-house, was conceived in a genuinely Christian spirit as the explanation of the life that now is, and how far it was used to discountenance or disparage all that human nature values here. In the light of what we have seen, Plato may fairly be supposed to have leant to the 'other-worldly' side.

But the most persuasive reason for finding in him a deep vein of asceticism has yet to be noticed. It is disclosed by consideration of his attitude to the culture of his time. He must have been in the prime of early manhood when Socrates was

put to death. Hence he belonged to the generation just after the great Attic age; growing up during the Peloponnesian war he must have heard much about the brilliant Periclean circle that had passed away; he must have looked constantly at the monuments of the art of Pheidias in the streets of Athens; he must have witnessed in the Dionysiac theatre many a drama of Sophocles and Euripides. How far do his very voluminous writings reveal any appreciation for or any delight in that unique period in the aesthetic culture of the world?

One is astonished to notice how completely he ignores the whole subject. If we turn to any modern history of Aesthetics the paucity of references to Plato is very striking; we cannot but contrast the elaborate theory of Fine Art in Aristotle. Who had ever such a field as Plato had for such speculation? And, with all his protests against the 'imitative' arts, who had ever a finer artistic gift himself? It was a marvellous coincidence of material and critic, yet how little use was made of the opportunity! Aristotle, with all his analytic power, perhaps even because of that power, had no such equipment for the task. We have, of course many a penetrating suggestion, thrown out in the course of illustrating some ethical theme; we have enough to make us conscious of what we might have had. How greatly we should value a systematic dialogue *Φειδίας, ἡ περὶ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν*, or *Σοφοκλῆς, ἡ περὶ τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν*. We have nothing of the kind, for the *Ion* which begins by promising so much, and ends, with significant brevity by giving us so little, is mainly notable for what it omits. The defect is the more surprising when we remember one great moral interest which attached to the subject of art culture at the time. It is a subtle question of casuistry how far the mass of men may fairly be burdened with the provision of higher education for the few. Thucydides saw very clearly that this was the ethical issue in the justification of the *ἡγεμονία* of Athens; and in the famous Periclean speech we have the manifesto of the imperial party on the subject. With what brilliancy of argument and counter-argument that problem of international morality might have been lit up by Plato! And how amazing it is that he has passed it by! He

could not indeed be expected to deal with everything, and in the period of his activity the problem had ceased to be a burning one; still it must surely have interested him, and if he could find time for the philological speculations of the *Cratylus* we cannot but wish that he had used it upon this more rewarding theme. One cannot resist the conclusion that Plato said so little of art because on moral grounds he deliberately turned his back upon it, and such allusions as he has made to the subject go far to confirm the conjecture.

How striking those allusions are! The Athenian mode of life, defended against the Lacedaemonian in that speech of Pericles to which I have referred, was plainly thought to rest upon a great tradition, stretching back to the days of Miltiades, Themistocles, Cimon. Repeatedly in the dialogues some naïve controversialist supports his case by quoting these famous men. How does Plato treat them? In the *Gorgias*, for example, Callicles tries to shelter the art of the rhetorician by such an appeal to authority. Socrates had been insisting that rhetoric was no better than cookery; the one tickles the palate, the other tickles the moods of the Ecclesia. And he applies the comparison without scruple to the men of the past whose names had become household words. The question he says is: Did they or did they not improve the Athenian people in *character*? Nothing else matters. They were good men indeed, if by good you mean only τὸ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι, καὶ τὰς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς τῶς ἄλλων.

He will admit that in thus ministering to the whims of the ignorant they were more skilful performers than those who succeeded them. Let them pass as mere 'serving-men' of the State; but in the function which should have been theirs, that of moral guides and reformers, there is nothing to choose between them and the rest. What matters it if they were better at providing ships and walls and docks and the sort of thing that the Demos clamoured for? Even in their own debased art of managing the wild beast of the Agora they were failures, just as he is a failure who undertakes to deal with a savage biting horse and gets bitten for his pains. How many of these charioteers of the State were flung in the end out of the chariot!

How many of them were put to death or imprisoned, or banished! Their tricks of sycophany could not keep pace with the ceaseless changes of popular passion. And if they were sorry craftsmen even at their ignoble trade what shall we say when we come to judge them by a higher standard? Was not Pericles the great corrupter of the Athenians, the man who instituted pay for dicasts and ecclesiasts, making them cowardly and idle, lovers of talk and lovers of money?

Wherever the heroes of the public imagination are alluded to this is the strain in which Plato speaks. We can hardly realize today how deeply such sentiments must have offended his contemporaries, especially when he obtruded, as he often did, his admiration for the mode of life at Sparta. It was nothing short of a denial of the first tenet of an Athenian's faith.

Still more startling are his references to the drama. It is true that he admitted a moral value in art and poetry, but it seems as if he denied that the kind of art or poetry by which the State might be improved had ever been seen at Athens. To Aristotle, Sophocles appeared the very embodiment of ideal tragic power; his plays were the type of that 'purification' of the feelings at which tragedy should aim. To Plato the drama is just a form of rhetoric—the most scathing censure he could pass upon it. It is all so much flattery, the one object is to give pleasure to the spectators. To the idea of Art for Art's sake he is uncompromisingly hostile; such a thing must not be allowed even in the ideal state, much less in that second-best policy which alone is practicable for human nature as we know it. Over everything there must be a moral censorship; in the *Laws* the poets are to be directed what doctrines they are to teach, and they are to be ruthlessly punished if they diverge; a body, as Mr. Livingstone remarks "ominously called the Nocturnal Council" is to see to it that the regulations are kept. Perhaps strangest of all, Plato sees in the hideous stiff figures of Egyptian 'art' something superior to the creations of Pheidias, because they are determined in form not by individual fancy but by cast-iron rules. In short, he has that complete distrust of human nature which was the antithesis of the Athenian spirit, and in

deference to which he turns, suitably enough, to the city of Draco and Lycurgus.

Thus the quotation from Mr. Livingstone's book which I took as the text of this paper seems to embody a sound view of Plato. He was what Nietzsche has called a 'moral idiosyncratist'; the moral values for him transcended all others, and transcended them to such a degree as to make all others seem negligible. Verbally you can prove that he included pleasure among human goods; but his predominant mood was so Puritanic that we may almost call him a Philistine; if such a name seems absurd for the author of the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus* we may reply that he was congenitally artistic, and that he struggled in vain to overcome what nature had made him. Fortunately for the world he remained an artist *malgré lui*. And to me at least it seems that such an 'exception to the note of humanism' was a blessing to the Greek world of his time; Athens sorely needed an offset to aestheticism on the one hand and to the *Realpolitik* of Thucydidean men on the other. But why did Matthew Arnold do such scant justice to the author of the *Laws* when he pointed his famous contrast between Hellenism and Hebraism?

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THE FAITH PHILOSOPHY OF PIERRE CHARRON.

THE neglect which has overtaken "the heir of Montaigne" in the past century makes it a little hard to realize that during the seventeenth, and even the eighteenth, century he could have been fairly classed among "the best sellers" in popular philosophy. From 1618 to 1634 his *Sagesse* passed through thirteen editions, and in the Bibliothèque Nationale may be found thirty-nine editions covering the period from 1601 to 1672. As early as 1658 there was an English translation by Sampson, and Stanhope's version went through three editions in 1697, 1707, and 1729. New French editions appeared in 1762, 1782, 1783, 1789 and 1797.

The secret of this popularity is to be found in the reasonableness and common-sense which characterize all that Charron wrote and which made his chief work, what it purposed to be, a real manual of practical wisdom. An inveterate and ungrateful borrower, it is not difficult to trace the contents of his book back to the ancients, to Bodin, to Du Vair and to Montaigne, but when all is done one must acknowledge that in the whole there is a unity of spirit and matter all his own. It is not the voice of any one of his authorities we hear, but that of Charron himself, giving us in the light of the revival of learning the result of his reflection upon life. An ecclesiastic and a humanist, the ideal he offers us embodies the religion of the practical man of his day. Open minded, critical, worldly in a sense, he is also religious, maintaining the combination and balance with a sanity and reasonableness which appealed strongly to the common-sense free-thinkers of his own and the later age, calling out the approval of Bayle and Pope and Buckle and finding expression in the judgment of Bolingbroke that he had "as much mind and more sense than Montaigne." This common judgment of his admirers, that he had more system and balance than Montaigne, is endorsed by his latest biographer in his conclusion that, "Il écrit la Somme philosophique de l'humanisme au déclin du

XVI^e siècle."¹ It is this putting into systematic and readily intelligible form of the fresh compromise between culture and religion made necessary by the new learning that gave Charron his vogue during the two centuries following his death.

If any excuse is necessary for recalling the attention of the present to this old-time worthy, it might be found in the perennial value of the evidence that our wisdom is not of to-day nor yesterday. But a more specific reason lies in the fact of the inevitable injustice done, especially to second-rate men, by their being laid away with only a label to characterize their work; for the name applied by one age on the basis of its interests becomes misleading when perpetuated by another without new examination of the work itself. Charron has been labelled 'sceptic' in the past and sceptic perhaps he was; but to name him thus is to ignore aspects of his thought which have come to possess a more living interest to us to-day and which deserve equal recognition with his scepticism in any estimate of his place in the history of thought.

The life of Charron does not compose very well artistically.² There are no salient points, no crises revealing dominant moods, no strong influences on character, not even well marked stages in development. It is the life of a successful, self-contained and shrewd professional man, marked by changes from place to place but not by epochs in personal growth. It is an unexciting, middle-class narrative rather than a drama of spiritual conflict. Some have tried to make the influence of Montaigne a decisive and determining event, but there is no evidence that this, which was a real influence, disturbed the even tenor of his way or

¹ J. B. Sabrié, *De L'humanisme au rationalisme: Pierre Charron*, Paris, 1913, p. 281.

² The sources for the life of Charron are: (1) *l'Éloge véritable ou Sommaire Discours de la vie de Pierre Charron, Parisien, vivant Docteur ès droicts*, par G. M. D. R. (Gabriel-Michel de la Roche-maillet). This was prefixed to the second edition of the *Sagesse*. It is moderate, scanty, and not wholly exact. (2) *Lettres*, published by L. Auvray in the *Revue d'histoire littéraire de la France*, 15 Juillet, 1894. There are forty-seven of these in all, but they are fragmentary and give little light on the personality of the writer. The best account of the life as well as the best estimate of the man is by Sabrié in the work quoted, which also contains a good bibliography. The edition of the *Sagesse* quoted in this paper is the Amsterdam one of 1662. The second edition of the *Trois Veritez* has been used.

deflected him from his natural bent. Montaigne's friendship he enjoyed and his thought he absorbed, but it was all in the same quiet reflective way in which he wrote his books and made the decisions of his professional life. There are no events, no upheavals, no stress and strain, nothing momentous, nothing to vary the pleasant monotony of a rationally directed life.

Pierre Charron was one of the twenty-five children of Thibaud Charron, a bookseller of Paris. He was born in that city in 1541. Recognized by his parents as a promising child, he was given a good liberal education, and then studied law at Bourges, Orléans and Montpellier, at the last named receiving his degree in 1571. Returning to Paris he was admitted to the bar and listened with eagerness to the debates in the *Parlement*. Soon realizing, however, that without patronage his chances in law were small, he entered the church and rapidly gained recognition as a popular preacher, receiving an appointment from Marguerite of Valois and attracting the notice of the King of Navarre, at that time still a Protestant. Though much in demand in various quarters, Charron accepted in 1576 an appointment as canon and *écolâtre* at Bordeaux, which became his home for the next eighteen years, during the course of which he formed his friendship with Montaigne.

In 1588 he exchanged his office at Bordeaux for one at Condom and went through Angers to Paris and back to Angers in the following spring. While in Paris, in fulfilment of a vow, he tried to enter the Carthusian and then the Célestin orders, but was rejected on the ground of his years, as not having been accustomed to the rigors of the discipline. That he should have selected just these orders seems to indicate a serious moral purpose in his action, but what lay behind his attempt we do not know. The date suggests that the important political and religious disturbances of the time may have affected his usually calm spirit; for the murders of the Guises seem to have driven him into the ranks of the League for a short time in the spring of 1589 and brought him into disfavor with the royalists on their return to power almost immediately thereafter. But his partisan zeal soon cooled, and he writes a letter to the Sorbonne explaining

his temporary defection from the cause of established authority.

Returning to Bordeaux, his experience of the evils of religious war bore fruit in his first work, *Les Trois Veritez*, published anonymously in 1593. The book was an immediate success, calling for a second edition, which he acknowledged, in 1595. It was this work which brought him to the attention of the scholarly Bishop of Cahors, Antoine d'Hébrard de Saint-Sulpice, who induced him to come to Cahors in 1594. Here he remained until the approaching death of his bishop and his desire for a less active life led him to accept an appointment as canon and *théologal* at Condom, where he settled in 1600, buying a house over whose door he places his motto, *Je ne sçay*.¹ Here he lived with a friend and occasionally his niece in quiet contentment. "Mes plaisirs," he writes to Rochemaillet, "sont dedans ma maison, livres, devis avecq mes amys qui me viennent veoir; et pour ce j'estudie de rendre ma maison plaisante." Though maintaining a pleasant house, Charron seems not to have taken the same pains to make his sermons pleasant, for we find a deputation of citizens waiting on the bishop and complaining that they have been called unseemly names, such as ignorant and beasts. The bishop soothes them, Charron makes no apologies, evidently believing in the justice of his terms, and the people calm down.

His life at Condom was productive of two series of *Discours*, in 1600 and 1601, and of the *Traicté de la Sagesse*, 1601. The latter provoked sharp criticism and Charron prepared a second edition for which he tried in vain to obtain the approval of either the Sorbonne or the bishops. It was only after his death and with additional alterations that his editor succeeded in getting it issued in 1604. Meanwhile the Bishop of Boulogne, Claude Dormy, tried to induce him to accept the office of *théologal* at Boulogne with a view to bringing him into connection with the court, but Charron was loath to leave the warmth of the Midi—"le soleil est mon dieu sensible," he writes Rochemaillet. However, partly to arrange for his book and partly to meet the bishop, he went up to Paris, where he died suddenly of apoplexy, November 16, 1603.

¹ He seems not to have made use of his earlier appointment at Condom in 1588.

Of his personality as well as of his thought, one can well say, with Bonnefon, "il est plus célèbre que connu."¹ It is hard to see what is behind the not unkindly, yet inscrutable, face engraved for us by Gaultier, a face which fails to correspond with the perhaps too friendly portrait sketched by Rochemaillet in his charming life. Certainly he was no enthusiast, yet neither was he the genial indifferentist of the *Essais*. The weakness and folly of human nature which he saw as clearly as did Montaigne, provoked in him more than the smile of gentle tolerance, it roused in him a kind of cool passion for its exposure and reform. He was a preacher unmoved by his own preaching, a rational apostle of rationalism. Even in his friendships he was cautious, though he finally admitted to his intimacy his later biographer and editor, for whom he expressed some real warmth of affection. That this coolness of human feeling, however, led to any violation of social interests there is no evidence, in spite of the charges made against the integrity of his life by some of his enemies. He seems to have fulfilled his duties with punctilious care and to have given unusual satisfaction in his various charges. The incarnation of common sense, he had no extravagant desires or ambitions to lead him astray. Content to live modestly in the intellectual circles of small towns, entertained by his books and the few friends who could contribute to his life, doing his share of the business of the Church yet not spending himself overmuch for his fellows, he was the blameless exemplar of the Epicurean ideal of his own *Sagesse*.

And it is only as this dominant practical bent of his mind is recognized that we get the key to the interpretation of his principles. As a speculative theologian his position seems incomprehensible, but as a preacher and moralist he becomes psychologically possible. In the preface to the *Sagesse* he tells us that he is not seeking to form "a man for the cloister, but for the world and for the common and civic life." Comparing the value of various kinds of sciences he writes: "Parquoy tout absolument les pratiques sont les meilleures, qui regardent le

¹ P. Bonnefon, *Montaigne et ses Amis*, II, p. 212.

² *Sagesse*, I, c. 57.

bien de l'homme, apprenent à bien vivre et bien mourir."² So, too, as we shall see, his respect for the authority of tradition and his arguments from utility all indicate the humanist seeking, in those years of the religious wars in France, to call men back from high controversy to the ways of quiet living. One can almost hear the more strident voice of Hobbes in like manner seeking peace in the civil wars of England a half century later. It is not the voice of the speculative thinker, baffled in his search for truth and thrown back upon the problems of conduct, but that of the practical man interested in the rational life and mildly sceptical, not merely of the utility, but somewhat of the validity, of the speculative quest. It is not his scepticism making him practical but his practicality making him sceptical; for it is a short step from the idea that the knowledge of things ultimate is of little value to the further position that the knowledge itself is probably not very certain.

In reading the *Sagesse* for the first time the modern man is probably more impressed by its beliefs than by its doubts, but among contemporaries and successors it was the latter that attracted attention and made its author a favorite with the atheists and *Libertins* of the following century, fixing for him thereby his traditional place among the sceptics of the later French Renaissance. That there is essential truth in such a classification is beyond doubt, in spite of the recent brilliant interpretation of M. Sabrié, but that such a characterization needs qualification is equally true. His scepticism is superimposed upon a dogmatism as vigorous as itself, and both find their practical conclusion in a doctrine of faith.

Looking first at the scepticism, we find it suggested by two kinds of considerations: (1) those concerning the knowing process, and (2) those derived from its results.

1. In his theory of knowledge, Charron, though by no means a pure sensationalist, emphasizes the function of the senses: "Toute reconnaissance s'achemine en nous par les sens. Ce sont nos premiers maistres: elle se commence par eux et se resout en eux. Ils sont le commencement et la fin de tout."¹

¹ *Sagesse*, I, c. 12.

Nevertheless, if all knowledge came from the senses, those who have the better senses would be the wiser. On the contrary, the senses can perceive only the accidents and the appearances of things, but "les natures, formes, les thresors et secrets de nature, nullement."

Upon the weaknesses and contradictions of the faculties Charron bases his first general argument for scepticism. The senses give varying reports, do not agree among themselves, and have no standard of reference. "Mais qui le peut dire et les accuser qu'ils faillent, puis que par eux on commence à apprendre et cognoistre?" They rouse the passions of the soul by their false reports and are themselves in turn disturbed by the passions. The reason (*entendement*) has for its natural end truth, but the possession of this belongs to God alone. If a man should happen to stumble upon truth, "ce seroit par-hazard; il ne la sçauroit tenir, possedir, ny distinguer du mensonge." The means we use for the discovery of truth are "raison et experience, tous deux tres-foibles, incertains, divers, ondoyans." The strongest argument for truth is common consent, but "le nombre des fols surpasse de beaucoup celuy des sages," and the agreement is only the result of contagion and a blind following of those who began the dance.

In the *Trois Veritez*, Charron has discussed somewhat more in detail the disabilities of reason in respect to the knowledge of God. This work, although less generally known than the *Sagesse*, gives us a far juster insight into his philosophical position than does the latter, which is professedly a practical manual. In the first book we have the argument against atheism with the thesis that though human reason cannot know God, it is still reasonable to believe in his existence. On the negative side it is pointed out that the knowledge of God depends upon (1) his knowability, and (2) our capacity to know. As to (1), only the finite can be known, hence God as infinite is unknowable. The proof of God refutes itself, since a known God could not be God.¹ As to (2) our powers, they are not sufficient to understand even the finite, the effects, much less the cause of all.

¹ *Trois Veritez*, I, c. 5.

Moreover, we know things only so far as they are related to us and can be expressed in terms of our own nature; hence our anthropomorphic representations of the divine, as Xenophanes long ago pointed out, are not to be taken as objectively adequate. It is true that God's being is involved in that of all finite beings, but just as *materia prima* is unknowable from defect of being, so is God from excess of being: we know only media.

Taking up the principal arguments for the knowledge of God, Charron shows: (1) that we cannot know him from his effects since in this way no real knowledge can be had even of natural objects; nor (2) is the method of negation adequate for it is only a preliminary step to know what God is not; and (3) even the ascription to him of all position perfections gives us no definite idea and we are thrown back upon our inadequate images and approximations.

2. The second general argument for scepticism is less systematic than the first, consisting as it does in a collection of contradictory opinions and changed beliefs and curious customs—a collection neither original nor critical. It is strongly reminiscent of Montaigne, but displays a more definite purpose than is to be found in the *Essais*. There is no discussion of the logical significance of this variety of human belief, but the moral is drawn that, since opinions have changed and since there have always been two sides to every question, the wise man will not close his mind but face the fact that his own apparent truth may also be part of the universal flux of ideas.

This sceptical spirit finds expression in his analysis of the character of the wise man. The essential element in that character is expressed by the trait which he classifies as the second of the two main "dispositions à la Sagesse," "la liberté d'esprit, tant en jugement qu'en volonté."¹ This liberty of judgment consists in a certain openness and hospitality of soul, a readiness to receive and examine all opinions from whatever source without final commitment to any. It is to be an "esprit universel," a spectator of the universe, not limited by fixed law, custom and manner of life, but "a citizen of the world, like Socrates,

¹ *Sagesse*, II, c. 2.

and not a village, embracing in our affection the whole human race.”¹ It is, he admits, “à peu pres et en quelque sens l’Ataraxie des Pyrrhoniens, qu’ils appellent le Souverain bien, la neutralité et indifférence des Academiciens, de laquelle est germain ou procede, de rien ne s’estonner, ne rien admirer, le Souverain bien de Pythagoras, la vraye magnanimité d’Aristote.”² To attain this openness of mind we have but to consider the variety and change of opinion actually present in the world. There is no opinion which has not been doubted, no custom which has not been deemed good. To close the mind against enquiry, to regard any question as finally settled, to hold any conclusion as not open to revision, is possible only to the man who has not looked beyond his village wall.

And, similarly, liberty of will involves detachment from the non-essentials of life. The wise man will not entangle himself in affairs which are not his proper concern. He will remain master of himself and his affections, remembering that his first duty is to himself. Not that he is not to take his proper place in public life, but that he is not to waste his energies in response to every call. And the best way to ensure this aloofness and tranquility of spirit is to remember the rule “de se prester à autrui et ne se donner qu’à soy.”³

This freedom of mind Charron limits in two respects, in matters of social custom and in religion. It is freedom of *mind*, not of action, that he is urging. Charron is a strenuous conformist, a respecter of custom, a cherisher of tradition. Whatever may be the openness of a man’s mind to the value of other ways of life than those of his own community and age, he is to draw a sharp line between theory and practice and refrain from attempting to live by a standard of his own. It is not the part of a wise man to turn the world upside down. Nor is it the truth or worth of social habits that demands our respect: “Les loix et coustumes se maintiennent en credit, non pource qu’elles sont justes et bonnes, mais pource qu’elles sont loix et coustumes;

¹ *Loc. cit.*

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

c'est le fondement mystique de leur autorité."¹ In his appreciation of the significance of custom he outdoes Montaigne and, by anticipation, Pascal: "Qui l'a dict estre une autre nature, ne l'a pas assez exprimé; car elle fait plus que nature, elle combat nature."²

And, again, in matters of religion he refuses to admit a sphere for the questioning doubt. These are things too high for the human reason, mysteries which it is its highest honor to be called upon to believe. So far is this philosophic uncertainty from being a detriment to religion that it is the best preparation and ground for it. To be conscious of the weakness of human reason is to recognize the need for divine revelation. And so Charron suggests that missionary effort among the Chinese should begin by the preaching of this doctrine of probablism, believing that when once they have been convinced of the baselessness of their supposed knowledge they will welcome the offer of the certainties of Christian faith.

But before considering in detail this doctrine of faith which forms the capstone of Charron's system, we must look at the dogmatic elements of his thought which are no less fundamental for him than the sceptical. Indeed, in the expression of his certainties, he is more outspoken than in the case of his doubts, and this, not from policy, but from the depth of his conviction. For, though he had no faith in the eternal validity of the social conventions of his, or of any other age, and though he mistrusted the powers of the reason for the attainment of ultimate theoretical truth, he was too much a practical man and a preacher to doubt the fundamental principles of conduct. The *sagesse* which he offered to the world was not wholly a matter of suspense of judgment and balancing of probabilities—Pyrrho was not his only master. Hooker or the Cambridge Platonists might have written this passage: "Or le ressort de ceste preud' homie, c'est la loi de nature, c'est à dire l'équité et raison universelle, qui luist et esclaire en un chacun de nous. Il est aussi par jamais estre esteincte ny effacée, *quam nec ipsa delet iniquitas*:

¹ *Sagesse*, II, c. 8.

² *Ibid.*

vermis non morietur: universelle et constante par tout; est tous-jours mesme, egalle, uniforme, que les temps ny les lieux ne peuvent alterer ne desguiser; ne reçoit point d'accès ne recés, de plus et de moins, *substantia non recipit magis nec minus*.¹

Here Charron shows himself the inheritor of that Stoic tradition which formed the starting point of modern independent ethics. He adds nothing to it, but he formulates it more clearly and effectively than had before been done and, by the popularity of his writings, did much to make it the commonplace it became in the ethics and natural theology of the 17th century. Even in the 18th century, the social and religious philosophy of Rousseau, who possessed a copy of the *Sagesse*, shows evident signs of indebtedness to its doctrines. If it is too much to call Charron the founder of modern independent ethics (and the lack of originality in his work forbids this), we must at least recognize him as one of the earliest to give systematic expression to an ideal of life based, not upon authority, but upon reason and experience. Not only does he ignore the Church in the development of his rules, but he subordinates as well the masters of ancient thought and makes appeal to the facts of human nature as he finds them. Experience itself must show what are the principles of successful living.²

The character of the wise man as reason approves it, he sketches in purely pagan terms, essentially Stoic, but with traits from Epicurean and Platonic sources; for, like his fellows in this age, Charron was not nicely discriminative in his use of sources, whatever would point his moral he was glad to take. An optimistic naturalism lies at the root of his doctrine, "the way to be an excellent good man is to be thoroughly possessed with the sense of one's being a man."³ "He is said to be a wise man who understands upon all occasions how to show himself a man, by acting in perfect conformity to the fundamental and first rules of human nature."⁴ Acting thus involves the free expansion of one's nature, which Charron is by no means inclined to sub-

¹ *Sagesse*, II, c. 3.

² Cf. Bonnefon, *Montaigne et ses amis*, II, p. 277. L. Wessel, *Die Ethik Charrons*.

³ *Sagesse*, I, c. 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, preface.

ordinate to the social good. We are ourselves our nearest concern; and while the common interest is to be considered, we must not forget that finally it is our own good that is in question. "Qui oublie de honnestement et sainement et gayement vivre pour en servir autrui, est mal avisé, et prend un mauvais et desnaturé party."¹ It is the echo of Montaigne's precept, "jouir loialement de son estre."² Original sin is ignored, man is by nature good, salvation is not the acquirement of a new life, but the development and enriching of this. It is true that he adds a saving provision that the highest development is of course not attainable without grace,³ but the fervor of his conviction finds expression in his naturalistic faith in the possibilities of a rationally guided human nature. Not that life is rose-colored to him, far from it, it is at best a doubtful good which we might well have refused had we had the choice and known its risks, but its material is such that out of it we can, by taking thought, form an experience not unworthy of being called happy.

But not only do we find Charron dogmatizing on the fundamental principles of conduct, his Stoic tendencies show themselves also in his natural theology, though held in check by his distrust of speculation. It is true that reason is incompetent to give us a knowledge of the nature of God but it can show grounds for belief in his existence. In the first book of the *Trois Veritez* he discusses briefly the traditional arguments both natural and supernatural. The external proofs call for no comment: they are the usual implications drawn from the motion, composition, purpose, grades of being and goodness, of the world. These all point beyond themselves to some perfect ground of their existence. His treatment of the internal, or moral, proofs is somewhat more significant in its indication of his point of view, showing the primacy of the intuitional and practical factors in his thought. His first argument is from universal consent which he takes, in Stoic fashion, as indicative of natural and divine authority for the belief, and as something

¹ *Op. cit.*, II, c. 2.

² *Essais*, III, c. 13.

³ *Sagesse*, II, c. 3.

wholly different in its value from mere custom or habitual opinion.¹ Human nature in its essence, as a divine product, is good and contains in itself the fundamentals of truth. However broken up its rays may seem to be in passing through the media of many minds, there is yet a single *lumen naturalis* by which the wise may be safely led.

This same revealing instinct appears in the involuntary appeal to God in times of danger or disaster, "estant une inspiration purement naturelle, elle ne peut estre vaine."² And it is significant, as Sainte-Beuve notes, though with somewhat different purpose, that Charron's first movement, when stricken with apoplexy on the street in Paris, was to throw himself upon his knees in prayer to God.³ A third proof he finds in the facts of remorse. The supernatural proofs from demons, miracles and prophecies, we need not consider, though there is no indication that Charron does not mean them to be taken seriously.

But, passing now from his inherited Stoicism, we come in the conclusion of this same first book to what may rightly enough be called his philosophy of faith; and it is here that he offers us the considerations which we can feel to be the most weighty for him in deciding his attitude in religion and theology. We have here no added rational evidence nor any summing up of that which has been adduced, but a vigorous and whole-hearted plea for the right and duty to believe that which makes for the greatest expansion and satisfaction of life. "Nous disons que l'homme doit et est tenu par obligation naturelle et indispensable, de croire et tenir pour tout certain tout ce qui est en soy le meilleur, et qu'il vaut mieux estre que n'estre pas: et aussi ce qui faict plus au bien, satisfaction et perfection de l'homme." And this subordination of theoretical to practical values he justifies, in what we might well call biological terms, as the natural and necessary instinct of all animal life, as the condition upon which life goes on. "Toutes creatures selon ceste reigle employent tout ce qu'elles ont, à leur bien, profit et avancement: car c'est

¹ *Trois Veritez*, I, c. 7, p. 45.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Causeries*, XI, p. 203.

un express commandement de nature, du quel ne peut y avoir dispense ny excuse legitime. L'homme qui faict autrement, abuse de son intelligence, de son esprit, est un monstre, il se trahit et est ennemy de soy mesme."¹ Intelligence is thus regarded by him as a vital organ, similar to the others, whose natural purpose is the welfare of the organism and whose perfect functioning is tested by its fruits. A depressing theory is like an aching tooth, to be mended or gotten rid of as quickly as possible in the interest of pleasant living. He nowhere says that this practical value constitutes truth; but then he was not writing a logic.

Over the values of the religious life Charron grows eloquent. It gives us courage to know that there is a God on the side of right: it comforts us in affliction: it doubles our joy in rejoicing: it prevents the formation and execution of evil plans. Even if there were not sound proof of this truth, which, however, is far from being the case, we ought to take pains to convince ourselves of it in order that we may "live joyously and content in this belief."

And then he calls attention to the situation to which Pascal has given most dramatic expression in his famous figure of the wager. One cannot lose anything by believing in God, but may lose all by refusing to believe: "Qui nous en peut faire repentir, s'il n'y a aucune souveraine puissance au monde, à qu'il faille apres rendre compte, ny qui se soucie de nous? Mais au contraire quel hasard court celui qui mescroit, et en mescroyant quelle horrible punition à celui qui se mescomte."²

To the objection that the acceptance of the Christian mysteries upon faith is to open the door to all sorts of error and confusion, and that the wise man lives by reason and experience, he replies by pointing out how many things we hold for certain of which we have no proof? "In all the arts, sciences and professions, theoretical, practical and mechanical, the principles and fundamentals are received with reverence, believed and held as most certain without proof, reason or experience." The very facts

¹ *Trois Veritez*, I, c. 12, p. 95.

² *Ibid.*, p. 99.

of our birth, family connections and daily life are accepted without a shadow of hesitation quite without proof. Why should not our attitude be the same toward the facts of our religion? For Christian truth is contrary neither to nature nor to reason, for in that case "la verité mesmes seroit contraire à soy: mais outre, ou mieux encors, par dessus nature."¹

Finally, he offers us the authority of the sovereign as a more satisfactory means of reaching certainty than reason, sense or experience. The individual can find the repose he desires by committing himself to the one who ought to, and who can, determine his beliefs. Reason is the source of truth in science, but authority is the standard of faith. The former is in perpetual unrest and uncertainty, the latter is fixed and certain.

Interpretations of the relation of Charron's scepticism to his dogmatism have tended to minimize one or the other of the two elements in the interest of consistency, but about consistency Charron is not much concerned. Recently his ablest expositor has insisted that he was not a sceptic at all, but that his doubt was only an *arme de guerre* against the dogmatism of the scholastic pedants of his day, the "esprits faibles et plats" against whom he declares open war.² Their respect for authority, their *a priori* method, their complacent content with their own type of civilization and ignorance of any other, these all incite him to challenge them with the philosophy of Pyrrho as the best means of rousing them from their dogmatic slumbers. Only through scepticism can they be brought to forsake their partisan controversies and be made to listen to the voice of rational common sense. It is thus only the common offensive weapon of the age rather than the expression of Charron's own thought, whose real attitude is that of Montaigne as described by Villey, "une grande circonspection dans le jugement et une extrême prudence à se défendre des préjugés."³

This estimate is true in so far as it refuses to Charron the title of sceptic. He is fundamentally a Stoic rationalist believing

¹ *Op. cit.*, II, c. 12.

² Sabrié, *op. cit.*, p. 296, ff.

³ P. Villey, *Les Sources et l'évolution des Essais de Montaigne*, Paris, 1908, t. II, p. 155.

firmly in the validity of innate ideas as the fixed basis for conduct and knowledge. His *Sagesse* is the philosophy of enlightened common sense with its faith in the instinctive ideas of human nature. This faith is not a blind faith, unwilling to expose itself to the light of rational criticism, but is undogmatic, conscious of the possibilities of human error, and ever ready to re-examine its own foundations, though believing them actually firm. It is not against these intuitions that Charron directs his attack, but against the confused and varying prejudices of individuals and races. It is with reference to these that he demands prudence and circumspection, a weighing of evidence and a supense of judgment. In the expression of this demand there is no doubt that his statements exceed his beliefs and that his criticism is heightened to scepticism by the exigencies of his attack.

Yet, while he is not a sceptic, it is also true that there is in Charron a profound distrust of the sufficiency of reason to answer the deepest questions of life. Our intuitions, though valid, are limited in their scope. Beyond the natural world there is the supernatural world and into the secrets of this the reason cannot enter. It is not quite accurate therefore to characterize his scepticism as only an *arme de guerre*, for it does involve this real distrust of speculative theology and this strict limitation of the field of reason.

To do him justice, therefore, one must recognize the eclecticism dictated by his pragmatic bent. Epicurean and intellectual, kin of Montaigne in his individualism and appreciation of the worldly grace and culture of the Renaissance, he was Stoic in his faith in the fundamental instincts and beliefs of human nature. Sceptic in his recognition of the flux of opinion and the accidental element in custom and belief, as well as in his distrust of the power of the reason to attain to ultimate truth, he was Christian in his final world scheme. But, above all, he was the practical man interested in the philosophies of the past and the sciences of the present primarily as they bore on life, both in this world and the next. For this world the ordinary tests of truth were sufficient and his Epicurean-Christian type of sage justified itself by experience, but for the all inclusive truths reaching

beyond the present into the next world he claims the test of value and the right to believe whatever makes for the furtherance of the completer life. And this right to believe he asserts consciously and justifies explicitly so that, although it is not the main motive of his philosophy there is reasonable ground for classing him at least among the forerunners of the religious sceptics or philosophers of faith.

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DISCUSSION.

PRAGMATISM, SCIENCE AND TRUTH.

A FEW years ago, in discussing an article by Professor Fite on "The Experience Philosophy,"¹ I concluded in effect that he had saved himself from pragmatism only by so defining this doctrine that, in excluding himself, he excluded many if not all pragmatists. Much the same thing might be said of the Professor Fite's highly stimulating papers on "Pragmatism and Science" and "Pragmatism and Truth"² were it not that he here assumes the rôle of the evangel of a newer pragmatism—the voice of one crying in the wilderness of a mechanistic materialism calling upon pragmatists to repent and be baptized into a more "human" and a more "spiritual" pragmatism. Professor Fite's own figure for the function of these papers is that of the midwife assisting a half-born, half-strangled pragmatism into the world.

The first article begins with the observation that if pragmatists had been less interested in their 'new name' for old ways of thinking and more in the 'old ways' they would not have failed to see that "the first and greatest of their school" was Kant. Yet, in the paragraphs immediately following, Professor Fite points out differences between Kant and pragmatism so fundamental that it would seem they might well constitute sufficient reason for not reckoning Kant as "the first and greatest of the school." Especially is this true of the difference between the teaching of Kant and that of pragmatism concerning the relation between reason and desire, to say nothing of Kant's fixed categories. Upon just this difference hang the law and the prophets of pragmatism.

At all events, on this point of difference between Kant and the pragmatists Professor Fite stands with the pragmatists in holding that what is reasonable and what is true cannot be determined apart from human wants and needs. But now follows what to me is an amazing statement concerning the pragmatic conception of 'needs'—imputed in particular to American pragmatists and still more in particular to Professor Dewey and myself. "I think I am not wrong," says Professor Fite, "in saying that our American pragmatism is disposed to

¹ THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. XV.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. XXIII.

emphasize the need of bread and butter and to hold that spiritual needs are only bread and butter needs in disguise"! "Why do we need to look upon nature as a succession of cause and effect? Their answer is because we need it in our business; or better perhaps, because we need it in our factory. For the term by which they [Professor Dewey and myself] prefer to name their special brand of pragmatism is *instrumentalism*. Instrumentalism teaches that the categories of science are but so many tools or instruments . . . for gratifying our needs. And what needs? So far as I can see the only needs to be gratified by such instruments are the needs of bread and butter."

This last sentence might mean that since pragmatists emphasize science, and since, on Professor Fite's view—a startling one surely—the only needs which the categories of science serve are bread and butter needs, therefore the only needs that pragmatists *should* recognize are bread and butter needs. But Professor Fite has already gone further than that. He has said that for them "spiritual needs are only bread and butter needs in disguise." In the former discussion, to which I have referred, I complained of the lack of citations in support of Professor Fite's interpretations, and when one turns from the statements I have just quoted to such passages as the following the complaint again seems justified.¹ "The antecedents of thought (that is the 'needs' to whose problems thought is a response) are our universe of life and love, of struggle and appreciation." The passage then specifies such things as "snow on the ground"; "The Monroe Doctrine"; "the relation of art to industry"; "The poetic quality of a painting of Boticelli"; "The best way to reduce expenses"; "Whether and how to renew the ties of a broken friendship" (Professor Fite's typical instance of a 'spiritual' need). Again; "Anything—event, act, value, ideal, person, or place may be an object of thought. Reflection busies itself alike with physical nature, the record of social achievement, and the endeavors of social aspiration."² And again: "Thinking is a mode or stage of Conduct. And by 'conduct' the pragmatist means action which is seeking to maintain and develop that which (*i. e.*, anything which) is satisfying or to get rid of that which is dissatisfying."³ Do not such statements, and there are many similar, to say nothing of innumerable implications of the same

¹ Professor Dashiell in his recent admirable discussion of these papers in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* makes the same point.

² Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*, Chap. I.

³ *Pragmatism and its Critics*, p. 4.

meaning, justify the exclamation marks I have placed after Professor Fite's 'bread and butter' interpretation. And Professor Fite himself appears visited with some misgivings; for he says that he is convinced that his interpretation will be called 'vulgar.' But he does not give the reason for this conviction.

But the diagnosis of such glaring discrepancies as we have here, calls for something more deep-seated than careless reading. And this I think is to be found in certain dichotomies which Professor Fite retains and which pragmatism believes should be 'superseded.' One of these is the antithesis of 'the practical' and 'the spiritual.' For Professor Fite, 'practical' needs are bread and butter needs; the need for 'understanding,' for 'communion,' 'fellowship,' is 'spiritual.' For pragmatism, every need, whether for bread and butter or for companionship, in so far as its satisfaction presents a *problem*, is 'practical,' and as calling for specific means for its realization, it is 'material;' in so far as the process of satisfying the need reacts into the need, affecting both its content and value, it is 'spiritual.' How to proceed in establishing communion and fellowship with a human being is quite as 'practical' and may be a much more difficult problem than getting bread and butter from him. That every 'need' has its *Stoff*, its material, both on the side of its content and its 'instruments' seems equally clear. 'The communion and fellowship of the saints' could not be conceived, even by the saints themselves, without a 'spiritual body.' Spirits are kindred if their embodiments are kindred. And this is implied in Professor Fite's statement that the only way we can understand the solar-system is by construing it in terms "of our own human motives for action" (p. 420).

In the further development of this antithesis of the 'practical' and the 'spiritual,' mathematical and mechanical science is accepted as sufficient for 'practical,' *i. e.*, for bread and butter needs, but as quite foreign to 'spiritual needs.' "To look upon nature as a mechanism after the fashion of physics and chemistry does indeed satisfy the need for bread and butter. . . . But I cannot conceive any one to be satisfied with this mechanical view who feels that his need of living with her, or even upon her, is also a need for understanding and fellowship" (p. 415).

Here the pragmatist would reciprocate Professor Fite's midwifely services, by pointing out that even his humanism is not yet full-born, that it concedes too much to mechanism on the one side and too little on the other. The process of getting bread and butter is not only an affair of mathematical, physical, and chemical analysis—but of

'intuition' both of persons and things. It is 'practical' but it is neither purely mechanical, nor purely spiritual but social, 'human.' Moreover, the *problem of acquiring* understanding, whether of nature or of persons, always involves some sort of mechanism in its solution, *i. e.*, some kind of an equation of means and end which, I take it, is the essence of mechanism. The pragmatist is haunted by no terrors of mechanism—not because he has relegated mechanism to a realm of merely 'practical' or 'bodily' needs, but because he makes mechanical formulations 'instrumental' in the most 'spiritual' enterprises. And this suggests the query: Whether this recognition of the instrumental function of mechanics in the conduct of the most spiritual interests is not possibly a more plausible explanation of the pragmatists' "strange reverence for science" than Dr. Fite's suggestion that it is a case of the frailty that "likes to be seen on the arm of a Duke!"

The pragmatists' 'reverence for science' might indeed seem strange if it were true, as Professor Fite thinks it is, that pragmatism has accepted modern science "without criticism" (p. 426). But pragmatism is no less a critique of science than of philosophy. If it has insisted on the standpoint and method of science in philosophy, it has stood equally for the 'human,' if you please the 'spiritual,' element in science. Its doctrine is that the concepts and theories of science have validity so long, and in so far as they are of value in dealing with problems that are more than problems of mere bread and butter on the one hand, and more than purely intellectual problems on the other.

If it be true that modern science has taken some of its concepts as metaphysically final, it is difficult to see how we are to say, as Professor Fite does, that pragmatism takes the theories of science 'instrumentally' and yet without criticism. And, *a fortiori*, how can it be said that "the very name 'instrumentalism' means that the instrument, now *once for all accepted as such*, stands as a barrier to any deeper or more human interpretation of our needs?" The whole meaning of 'instrumentalism' is that no instrument *can* be accepted once for all except for the specific problem or problems for which it is forged. Instruments are forged for the specific work they are to do, and as the problems change the instruments must change.

It is puzzling also to read that pragmatism is guilty of "accepting the instrument once for all," and at the same time is "justly open to the charge of creating a subjective and fictitious world by constantly speaking as if an invention (*i. e.*, an 'instrument') were invented out of nothing," and by "determining truth by our specific and transient needs" and thus making truth "artificial and capricious." Pragma-

tism is thus by turns or at the same time, according to Professor Fite, too scientific to be human and too human to be scientific. But this, I think, is due to failure to see that pragmatism hath joined what Professor Fite still keeps asunder—mechanism and humanism. In this union, to be sure, both have surrendered their old metaphysical status in which, of course, no coöperation was possible.

The problem of truth Professor Fite poses as follows: "When the pragmatist asserts that the truth is what he finds useful to believe, the realist or natural scientist meets him with the question: But what of the facts? and the pragmatist then retorts by saying that any unwelcome experience he will decline to treat as a fact. But this only means, so far as I can see, that the distinction between truth and fiction is thoroughly artificial and capricious, and this is the charge which is most frequently, and, I should say, most justly laid at the pragmatist's door" (pp. 428-429). This means, I suppose, that if a pragmatist should awake to the "unwelcome experience" of finding his room ablaze, he would, or according to his theory he should, "decline to treat it as a fact."

First we may note the difficulty of squaring this account of the pragmatist's attitude toward 'unwelcome' experiences with the 'bread and butter' interpretation. In the latter, the pragmatist was portrayed as doing all his thinking, including the use of all the categories and mechanism of science, in order to get rid of the 'unwelcome experience' of hunger. Here he is supposed to decline to recognize hunger as a fact. And after having credited, or discredited, pragmatism with "a strange reverence" for the methods of modern science, Professor Fite could not retort that the only thinking the pragmatist should do is to think that the hunger does not exist. On the other hand, how strange it sounds to hear a philosophy that declines to recognize "unwelcome experiences" such as hunger, called a bread and butter philosophy! And when pragmatism thus turns its back on "unwelcome experiences," what is its motive to thinking? Or, have we another paradox of bread and butter thinking, to satisfy purely intellectual needs?

In the treatment of 'the independence of truth,' much of the discussion is about the independence of the 'fact,' of the 'object,' of 'reality,' and of the 'knower.' And one wonders if these are to be substituted in turn for truth, and if not, what the bearing of their independence is upon the independence of truth. Professor Fite's definition of truth would seem to preclude substitution. He conceives truth to be an 'agreement,' reached as a result of a process of

'bargaining,' of negotiation, between two beings whether these beings are persons or persons and things. However, the main constructive feature of Professor Fite's papers is the suggestion that the kind of knowing that occurs when one person knows another should be taken as typical, rather than the judgment about a table or even a green tree. And the next interesting point in his exposition is that in this process of 'bargaining,' between the knower and the thing known, "*all is being made—not only the agreement which constitutes truth, but the terms between which the agreement is formed, the knower as well as the object of his knowledge.*"¹

But what now of independence? In view of the passage just quoted Professor Fite's reply again presents difficulties. The answer is that, while in order to escape a world of 'hard' facts in which no bargaining would be possible we must recognize that in the process of bargaining, that is of knowing, not only truth but the knower and the object are being made, yet in order to be independent realists (which Professor Fite thinks we must be in any case), we must hold that in knowing "I am not made by the object, neither is the object of my knowledge made by me" (p. 518). Now there would be no difficulty here if in the first passage we understand by 'being made,' what evidently is intended, viz., being modified in some specific way, not created *in toto*; and if likewise in the second passage we understand that neither the knower nor the object is made *in toto*. All of which would seem to reduce to a favorite thesis of pragmatism that the knower is something more than a knower, and that the object is something more than a thing to be known. But Professor Fite seems to mean something different from this in the second passage as he further expands it. That the object is not made by the knower, means in the case of one person knowing another, *e. g.*, Plato, that "there is a certain unity of personality which is Plato's and which is not made by the way he is taken." And this unity may have "a consistency equal to that of the law of gravitation." Moreover, notwithstanding all that has been said about 'bargaining,' we are to understand that "the final agreement which we call truth is no mere adjustment, no mere compromise effected by rounding the corners of a square peg to make it fitter for a round hole, at the same time squaring somewhat the hole. So far as the agreement is a matter of compromise, thus far it is false." Again, if the meaning of this is that in any particular case of 'bargaining' the unity of personality is altered only in some specific manner, there is no difficulty. But

¹ P. 518. Italics mine.

if it means, as it appears to mean, that there is a core of personality which remains untouched and untouchable by this or any other 'bargaining,' then are we not in trouble? For we must now take the first passage in which both "the knower and object are being made" to mean that they are 'being made' in certain external and superficial aspects, while the "inner unity of personality" remains unaffected. Furthermore, we shall have on our hands in this inner unity of personality precisely one of those 'hard' facts which Professor Fite has convincingly shown must be rejected. On the other side, if Professor Fite disclaims this interpretation of the independent unity of personality, how then will his view of it differ from that of the pragmatist—even of the instrumentalist? For, as already indicated, the instrumentalist cannot even get his bargaining started without assuming as 'the antecedents of thought' beings of all kinds in interaction. But none of these are 'hard' beings, nor do they conceal a hard unchangeable core of personality under a soft exterior. There is no part or character of them that may not be modified in 'bargaining' with other beings.

But whatever the kind and amount of independence the knower and the object may have, what is the bearing of this upon the independence of truth? For neither the knower nor the object is truth. Truth, as Professor Fite says, consists in the agreement reached through bargaining between the knower and the object; furthermore, this truth is "all made" in the bargaining process. Of what then is it independent? And in what way has it more independence than instrumentalism gives it? Whether the bargaining is for friendship or for bread and butter, the 'agreement which constitutes truth' is reached in response to a need which is personal, human, and equally objective in both cases.

But what meaning is there now in calling this agreement, after it has been reached, either dependent or independent. From the standpoint of the question of its origin it may be said to be dependent upon all the elements in the 'bargaining' process. But as an achieved reality,—and to be truth the agreement has to be achieved,—what can its dependence or independence mean? The dependence or independence of things and persons that are or may become parties to the agreement is quite a different matter. But even these are not to be classified as dependent or independent, or as of varying degrees of dependence or independence at large, as one would classify things as round or square. The dependence or independence of things and persons is on *one another*, and is for specific matters in some

specific enterprise. But dependence and independence in this sense can not be predicated of an achieved agreement. And if not in this sense then in what significant sense do they apply? It is Professor Fite's complaint that pragmatism has ignored the problem of "the independence of truth." The explanation of this ignorance is that for pragmatism there is no such problem.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Genetic Theory of Reality. By JAMES MARK BALDWIN. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London.—pp. xvii, 335.

The nature of Professor Baldwin's latest volume is indicated more specifically by its subtitle, "The Outcome of Genetic Logic as Issuing in the Aesthetic Theory of Reality called Pancalism." Thus, the book relates to what the author calls Genetic Morphology, and really forms the concluding part of *Thought and Things or Genetic Logic*.¹ That it does not appear as the fourth volume of this comprehensive work is due to the fact that the financial difficulties of the London publishers of *Thought and Things* involved delay and some uncertainty of publication. Doubtless the appearance of the Genetic Morphology as a separate work entails a loss as regards convenience and continuity. Such loss, however, is more than offset by a greater concreteness due to the inclusion of anthropological and historical material which Professor Baldwin, as he states in his preface, had promised to the present publishers some time before.

The general problem of the *Genetic Theory of Reality* is that of interpretation. Interpretation, however, denotes not merely the meaning which reflective thought gives to experiences, but everything in the way of intent or recognitive content that attaches to the data of consciousness. However primitive an experience may be, it never consists of bare happenings; all facts and events involve meaning. The motives underlying this meaning are many, including not merely the developed interests of cognition and of ethical or aesthetic value, but association, utility, fear, awe, prestige, solidarity, tradition, instinct, impulse, habit, etc. Numerous as these motives are, it is nevertheless true that the sort of interpretation given to the objects of experience will vary, in general, with the level of mental development. A genetic theory of interpretation has the task of indicating and describing the various stages in the evolution of interpretation and of discovering the factors that underlie its progression. This

¹ The *Genetic Logic* falls into three divisions, Functional Logic (discussed in Vol. I), Experimental Logic (discussed in Vol. II), and Real Logic, which embraces both Genetic Epistemology (discussed in Vol. III) and Genetic Morphology (the subject of the present work). The general problem of these various divisions and their relation to one another has been indicated by the present reviewer in his account of the third volume, this REVIEW, XXII, pp. 314f.

paves the way for an inquiry into the contribution which each of the motives of interpretation makes to an understanding of the nature of reality and into the ultimate meaning which must be ascribed to reality as the outcome of the investigation.

Besides an extensive and valuable glossary, a very serviceable index and table of contents, and three appendices, two of which discuss the related views of Professor Ormond and Mr. Bradley, the present volume consists of four parts. Part I contains an account—largely a review of previous investigations—of the nature and development of interpretation from the standpoint of the individual, and of the realities that issue from such interpretation. The main stages of this progression, as Professor Baldwin's readers will recall, are the pre-logical, logical, and hyper-logical; and, since there are modes of apprehension corresponding not only to these three stages but also to those that lead from the earlier to the later, there are five such modes: intuitive, quasi-discursive, discursive, over-discursive, and the contemplative. Now, though rejecting both the logical postulate of an 'objective' reason, with whose unfolding the development of individual reason runs parallel, and the biological hypothesis of recapitulation, Professor Baldwin nevertheless finds empirical and psychological evidence of the concurrence of racial with individual development as regards the interpretation of experience. Racial interpretation also exhibits pre-logical, logical, and hyper-logical, as well as transitional levels. Correspondingly, there are five modes of apprehension. The earliest of these, described as mystical or religious, passes by way of the mythical to speculative and scientific interpretation; the latter is superseded by criticism, and finally by contemplation.

The characterization and evaluation of these various stages of racial interpretation form the subject of Part II, which comprises considerably more than one-half of the volume. The facts of ethnology and anthropology are utilized in support of the contention that, while early interpretation is not pre-noetic—all interpretation is noetic—or anti-logical, it is pre-logical in the sense of pre-discursive and pre-scientific. The dominant motives are emotional and practical; the interpretation is neither discovered nor confirmed by the individual as such but is largely accepted as the view of the group and of tradition; social sanctions and penalties inhibit personal criticism; facts subversive of 'collective representations' are either disregarded or ascribed to special agencies; negation is not logical but is determined by custom, personal caprice, etc., or by an intense

absorption in one event such as to exclude the awareness or appreciation of any other; there is no line of cleavage between ideas and actual realities, or between meanings due to intention and those of content, nor is there a distinction either of persons from things—witness the phenomena of animism—or between persons, as individuals, from one another: each regards himself as identical not with himself as an individual but with his group. It follows from these characteristics that primitive thought lacks certain of the essential requisites of logical interpretation. Logical contradiction, logical necessity, and the principle of excluded middle receive no recognition, and classification is based not on theoretical but on emotional and practical considerations. In illustration and confirmation of this account of primitive interpretation, Professor Baldwin introduces two instructive chapters elaborating certain of his earlier discussions of religion. Mention should be made particularly of an interesting, though not entirely satisfactory, argument designed to show that the religious object is either personal or suggests personality. Even more significant, as regards the main purpose of the present volume, is the conclusion that the religious ideal involves in its very nature a sharp antinomy between the actual and the ideal; this precludes religion from effecting an adequate synthesis of the various motives and factors of experience.

The advance beyond the pre-logical is mediated by the imagination. It is through mythical creations that thought is liberated and the logical stage of racial interpretation is ushered in. The various historical theories of reality are classified as mediate and immediate. The former include *actuality* theories, which are intellectualistic in character, finding reality in facts, truths, or principles, and *ideality* theories, which are voluntaristic and insist that reality must be interpreted in terms of ends, values, or norms. Both types of theory are acknowledged to render positive and indispensable contributions to the interpretation of reality, yet both are shown to be partial and, as such, inadequate. Criticism thus impels to theories of immediacy. But here likewise there are differences. Those who despair of speculation or are not speculatively inclined tend to fall back upon primitive, a-logical experience and thus to advocate mysticism, sensationalism, or immediate realism; others recognize the contribution of the processes of cognition and volition but are driven by the insuperable dualisms of the logical stage to an immediatism of a transcendent or hyper-logical sort. Both these types of immediacy theories are weighed and found wanting. The latter immediacy "is empty, apart

from the filling it receives from concrete experience of the mediate type . . . much as the first immediacy, that of the primitive, is blind except for the same resort. One lacks content, the other form" (p. 192). But there is a third sort of immediacy, that of synthesis, which appears "when processes themselves relatively distinct, and mediate in their type, fall together in a whole of synthesis and apparent reconciliation" (p. 193). An examination of various historical theories of this type leads Professor Baldwin to conclude that, as was discerned more or less clearly by Aristotle, Kant, and Schelling, a satisfactory synthetic reconciliation is to be found in aesthetic experience alone.

The elaboration, defence, and corollaries of the theory of aesthetic immediacy, that is, pancalism, occupy Parts III and IV of the present volume. Professor Baldwin's position finds clear expression when he states that it is not his purpose to isolate "one reality as being more real, more solid, more valid than others; for all alike arise in the normal process of experience. It is rather a search for that meaning of reality which brings together the various normal modes of control in the fullest and most comprehensive synthesis. . . . We reach an interpretation which finds in the aesthetic experience . . . such a reconstitution of the various reals in a synthesis of realization. . . . What we are justified in taking the real to be is that with which the full and free aesthetic and artistic consciousness finds itself satisfied. *We realize the real in achieving and enjoying the beautiful*" (pp. 276f.). "The whole of reality would be the entire experience of a consciousness capable of grasping and contemplating it as an aesthetic whole" (p. 303). In defence of the thesis, maintained with great skill and keen critical analysis, that the aesthetic interest is truly and adequately synthetic, the author marshals the results of recent investigations into the nature of the aesthetic consciousness and particularly of the schematic imagination. It is argued that in the higher semblant constructions the oppositions of external and internal control, as well as those of ordinary serious life and practice, vanish (pp. 231 ff.); that, "in contrast with the other great interests, whose objects are instrumental to further ends," the aesthetic interest is intrinsic, seeking merely the full inner meaning of its objects (pp. 235 f.); that aesthetic contemplation realizes the true and the good not merely "alternatively or in succession, but together, as factors in the larger ideal of the perfect," and, as the more integral process, it of right "supersedes and reinterprets the results of knowledge and practice" (pp. 236 f.); that the aesthetic object, as the theory of empathy

suggests, is a-dualistic, being a content which in itself mirrors the inner world (pp. 238 ff.); that "the aesthetic object not only possesses the quality of completeness or perfection, as far as its materials go, but it suggests the ideal in which all perfections unite and all virtues inhere" (p. 244); that aesthetic reality is an indissoluble union of the universal and the singular in the meanings which these possess both in theoretical and in affective logic (pp. 249 ff.); that aesthetic realization, in contrast with religious experience, presents a complete reconciliation of actuality and ideality (pp. 259 ff.) and of freedom and necessity (pp. 261 ff.); that aesthetic intuition is a union of the theoretical and the practical—and more (pp. 269 f.); that the aesthetic consciousness is non-relative or absolute in all the various legitimate senses of the term (pp. 277 ff.); that pancalism recognizes and adjusts "the opposing claims of rationalism and voluntarism" and offers "a constructive reading of the essential demands of the mystical and intuitive modes of apprehension" (p. 312).

The rich accumulations of ethnological and historical facts, the marked advances in psychological theory, and the perfection of evolutionary method have made it necessary to re-attack the problem of 'genetic morphology' so brilliantly treated in their own day by Hegel and certain of his followers, and by Comte. This need has been partially met in recent years, more especially by the labors of Wundt and Hobhouse, who, from their own special points of view, have contributed much toward illumining the path taken by racial interpretation. But much still remained undone, and it cannot be doubted that the originality of his method, together with the clearness and comprehensiveness of his vision and his exceptional capacity for discerning fruitful lines of distinction, have enabled Professor Baldwin to render a notable service to philosophy.

As compared with Hegel and Edward Caird, the author's procedure is psychological rather than speculative. Nevertheless, Baldwin agrees with his idealistic predecessors both as to the critical and interpretative functions of the mediate processes and as to the necessity of a higher immediacy such as will preserve the meanings elaborated by cognition and volition. His conception of this ultimate experience, however, is predominately affectivistic as contrasted with Hegel's and Caird's emphasis of the noetic—though Hegel's analysis of 'love' should not be forgotten—and the stress which Royce, for example, and Eucken in a different way, lay on the practical and ethical. As compared with Comte, Baldwin differs both in employing a truly genetic method and in including the scientific

along with the speculative interpretation as composing the intermediate stage of development, whose transcendence by a different mode of apprehension, that of aesthetic contemplation, he seeks to justify. In agreement with Comte, on the other hand, he refers to the earliest interpretation as theological, though he also, and more generally, speaks of it as religious. Now, if the term 'God' is to have any sharply defined meaning, the being denoted must be characterized as not only supernatural but also individual and personal. Such a concept, however, represents a relatively late achievement and the culture with which it is associated was anteceded by far more primitive conditions of life and thought. It is incorrect, therefore, to characterize the earliest stage of racial interpretation as theological. Nor is the term 'religious' appropriate. Religious experience, as Professor Baldwin himself insists (pp. 109-117), may be regarded as an abiding possession of mankind. If, in spite of its ubiquity and perpetuity, religion is to be singled out as marking the character of an era, several such eras must be recognized and these will be found to recur throughout the various periods in the development of thought.

The author follows the great majority, among the earlier writers in particular, in describing the earliest form of religious and social organization as totemic. But far more primitive than totemic culture, exemplified by the Australians, are the conditions among such isolated peoples as the Veddahs of Ceylon and the Semangs and Senoi of Malacca. A study of the most primitive operations of the human mind, therefore, should concern itself with pre-totemic peoples as well as with the characteristics of such relatively stable monuments of thought as are early languages. Incidentally, reference may be made to Baldwin's belief that "to the savage himself" the totem is a "symbol of his social group" (p. 50). It may be questioned both whether it is not contrary to ethnological fact and whether it is not a serious psychological error to represent the totem as having for early man the significance of a *symbol*. Rather was it felt to be, as Wundt has pointed out in his *Völkerpsychologie*, the deepest of realities—though not known, as remarked above, to the most primitive races—becoming a symbol only at the decline of the culture that bears its name. In view, furthermore, of the fact that there are individual, sex, and conception totems, as well as group totems, it is erroneous to say without qualification that the totem represents a symbol of the *social group*. Professor Baldwin's characterization of pre-logical interpretation would carry increased conviction and would prove more instructive even than it is, were it illustrated and tested more

freely by concrete fact. Indeed, is it possible to acquire a real understanding of early racial interpretation without raising the question as to how primitive man came to possess his *particular* institutions and the various *specific* norms that controlled his life, and how he learned the art of kindling fire and of fashioning so complex a weapon as the bow and arrow?

The present volume adds not a little to our insight into the nature of the aesthetic experience and to our appreciation of the wealth and penetration of its motives. One cannot escape the conviction, however, that had Professor Baldwin subjected aesthetic experience to the same thorough and relentless criticism which he bestowed upon the other modes of apprehension, his conclusions would have been very much more qualified. For are not Plato's warnings of the possible opposition between art and morality and of the capacity of the aesthetic to stimulate to the immoral and socially disastrous amply borne out by both theory and practice? Moreover, even though art reveals truths—indeed, truths otherwise unattainable—is it not far from including all the various theoretical modes of experience? Consider, for example, the antithesis between artistic production and the external control of particular fact evidenced in the case of historical events. And do not the recent cubist and post-impressionistic movements give striking evidence of a subjectivism that is inherent to a greater or less degree in all art, as well as in the aesthetic interest as such, and that contrasts sharply with the objective requirements of the theoretical interest? If, furthermore, logical theories are confronted by the *bête noire* of error, and ethical monisms are called upon to face the problem of evil, pancalism cannot escape a consideration of the actual presence of the ugly, to say nothing of the aesthetically indifferent. This necessity is recognized by the author, but his solution of the difficulty is far from convincing and is less clear than any other part of the volume. Still another inadequacy of pancalism as a philosophical creed is the abstractness of aesthetic experience evidenced (*a*) in its concentration upon a single object or bit of content to the exclusion of all the external relations in which it subsists and of all other objects or ideas—thus having a certain similarity to perceptual experience—and (*b*) in the fact that it involves a satisfaction, frequently spurious, and a release from the practical which renders it oblivious to all larger possibilities. Happily the ideals of mere efficiency and achievement are losing some of their glamor. Nevertheless, theory must take account of those principles to which ethical idealism and pragmatism are directing our attention, as well, in general, as of the temporal

aspects of experience. Once free from the grip of Baldwin's dialectic it is difficult to believe that pancalism is truly synthetic as regards these considerations. Finally, it may be added that Baldwin's emphatic teaching that the field of objective, external control as explored by science is the exclusive source of truth *qua* truth and that truth is ultimately subject to theoretical standards, is irreconcilable with his conclusion as to the philosophical ultimacy of the aesthetic experience and with the statement that a thing "is good and true *because it is beautiful*" (p. vii). That pancalism does not escape the dualism which so many have found it necessary time and again to point out in absolute idealism is honestly, though shyly, as it were (the word in brackets is the author's), suggested in the following quotation: "Nothing can be [finally] true without being beautiful, and nothing can be in any high sense good without being beautiful" (p. vii).

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Essais sur l'histoire générale et comparée des théologies et des philosophies médiévales. Par FRANÇOIS PICAVET. Paris, Alcan, 1913. —pp. viii, 415. Fr. 7.50.

In an earlier work, *Esquisse d'une histoire générale et comparée des philosophies médiévales* (Paris, 1905, 2 ed., 1907), Picavet made it clear that medieval philosophy should be studied as a part of the civilization to which it belonged. He had already endeavored to indicate in detail how this might be done, especially in his *Roscellin* (1896, enlarged 1909) and also in his *Gerbert* (1897). These three works, together with the present work, are all preliminary to the enterprise now so closely associated with his name,—the general and comparative history of medieval thought.

As in the *Esquisse* so now also in the *Essais* "many important problems of continuity and development of doctrine" must be disposed of by way of propaedeutic (Pref. p. v).¹ One may get a good idea of these problems, and of the substantial basis underlying Picavet's conclusions and justifying his reputation, from the first two chapters of the *Essais*. There he outlines the extraordinary program of studies carried out during the preceding twenty-four years at the Hautes-Études, and since 1906 at the Sorbonne. Like Baeumker and de Wulf our author is also making the largest possible use of coöperative effort. Moreover, his singleness of purpose has

¹ All references are to the *Essais*, unless otherwise indicated.

enabled him to follow the plan of completing the stages of his work by publication. Thus, all of the chapters of the *Esquisse* had already appeared, in whole or in part. And the same is true of more than half of those constituting the present volume (I–IV, VIII, X, XI, XIV–XVIII). The two works should be read together because of the repetition inevitable in such preliminary studies. Notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, the *Essais* possesses a certain unity, which the author has traced for his reader (Pref. pp. v ff.).

While Picavet's authority in medieval philosophy has become fully recognized, his importance for the general history of philosophy has not received the attention it deserves. The problem of writing the history of philosophy has engaged him from the outset, and his intellectual development has progressed from the broader field to the more restricted one, keeping ever in view the successive and simultaneous relations in the development of thought. He began publishing at the age of thirty-four, and his first publications covered concurrently the late Greek and Hellenistic and the modern French and German fields (1885–1889). Whereas de Wulf entered upon his work in the medieval philosophy directly, and Baeumker came by way of the Greeks and the Renaissance, Picavet made his approach through study of the Hellenistic and the modern philosophies. "It was," he says, "the Ideologists and the Romanticists who first led the moderns to impartial study and defense of the middle ages" (*Esquisse*, pp. 226 ff.). This idea constitutes the burden of his important work, *Les Idéologues* (1891). His mastery of the French philosophy is further evidenced in his edition of Condillac's *Traité* (1886) and his studies of La Mettrie and Maine de Biran (1889) and of D'Alembert (1894). His interest in and grasp of the German philosophy is clear from his translation of Kant's *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, with introduction (1888), his introduction to Léon Philippe's translation of Fichte's *Reden* (1895), and the provision for it in the program above mentioned. In 1888 he had treated the problem of writing the history of philosophy in an article entitled: *Histoire de la philosophie, ce qu'elle a été, ce qu'elle peut être* (embodied later in the *Esq.*, Ch. I). And the next year his ideas were illustrated in the work: *De l'origine de la philosophie scolastique en France et en Allemagne* (published as Vol. I, Bibl. d. Hautes-Études, sec. d. sc. relig.). After 1892 his publications were devoted for the most part to the medieval philosophy and the neo-Thomistic movement; the two being naturally connected through his conviction of the need of non-catholic scholarship by way of control and supplement (Ch. I, II, VIII, cf. *Esq.*, Ch. IX, X). But

the program of studies mentioned exhibits, as perhaps its most striking feature, the constant provision for recurrent study of modern and ancient philosophy along with that of his special field; and this both for text-criticism and doctrinal content. Thus the mind of our author has moved continually back and forth throughout the entire field, and at a time which coincided with the new impetus in the study of Hellenistic and medieval thought. Hence his training and gifts and preferences give him a unique place in all that concerns the writing of the history of philosophy.

Whether Picavet is able to complete his work in the field of his choice or not, he will have made a great contribution in his amassing of material for definitive proof of the very gradual development of thought. It is so easy to forget that "there has been an evolution and not a revolution in the intellectual progress of humanity" (p. 93), that his reiteration is salutary. And when he trenchantly sums up his attitude by saying, "that one civilization does not replace another overnight" (*Esq.*, 2 ed., p. 39, n. 2), his position becomes the more significant. For he believes in fact that the history of philosophy must be treated as a part of the history of civilization, and with due regard for the broadest possible background,—political, social, economic and cultural as revealed in arts, letters, science, religion and all institutions (*Esq.*, Ch. I). Nothing human is to be neglected in traversing the evolution of thought, if the historian of philosophy is to exercise the philosophic habit (p. 388). And with an eye single to the actual data our author would even, "from the standpoint of the scientific historian, refuse to make clear a conception which was not clear to its author" (p. 187). Thus, instead of the usual process of simplification in writing the history of philosophy, occasioned by excessive regard for expository and pedagogical demands, the logic of Picavet's attitude would be complicative. And he asserts most insistently "that our chronological divisions are artificial, and that the life of the spirit in man neither begins at that moment when we have decided to study it nor ends when it has ceased to interest us" (p. 79). Such an attitude carried rigorously through must obviously have a far-reaching effect on the conception of the history of philosophy. Picavet in effect really supplements Windelband. And the present volume contains various stimulating chapters which illustrate his idea of the continuity of thought. Such are: the Hellenic education of St. Paul (V); the problem of the Universal in the 12th century (VIII); Averroism and free-thought (XVI); the debt of Luther to the *Theologia Germanica* (XV); of Descartes to medieval thought (XVII); and of Rousseau to Favorinus (VII).

Much criticism of Picavet has been directed against the great importance which he attaches to Plotinus, whom he regards as the real 'master' of the middle ages (*Esq.*, Ch. V, *cf. ib.* II-IV, VI, VII). The exaltation of Plotinus by Drews, for example, rather pales by comparison; and our author has certainly given his critics ample opportunity, which he continues to do in the present work. In reality it would be safer to speak of the influence of Plotinic ideas rather than of Plotinus, bearing in mind the common momenta of the early centuries of our era. And the entire question of genealogy of that great synthesis would seem to be still sufficiently obscure to warrant caution in accepting the thesis in its extreme form. But it is illuminating, and it is also very important for Picavet's method. Thus, for example, when he says that mystics like Eckhart and Boehme, who continued the work of Eriugena and so of Plotinus, are the true ancestors of the great modern German philosophers such as Kant and Fichte and Schelling and Hegel and Baader and Schopenhauer (p. 14), new meaning is given thereby to the Romanticism in German Idealism. But when he counts among those who exhibit the influence of Plotinus an evergrowing host (*e. g.*, Jansen, Descartes, Arnauld, Thomassin, Pascal, Bossuet, Malebranche, Fenelon, Turgot, Leibnitz, Locke, Berkeley, Comte, and others, *v. Ess.* and *Esq.*, *passim*), he would seem to be venturing a *reductio ad absurdum*. Nevertheless he is thereby making just that use of his thesis which he regards as necessary to his method.

The clearest exposition yet given by Picavet of his method is to be found in the present work (Ch. III, *cf. Esq.*, I-III, VI, VII, X). An interesting application of his process of separating the essential from the accidental is found in the attempted classification of mystics (Ch. IV). His "religious-thesis" is especially prominent in the chapters on the idea of divinity during the early centuries of our era (Ch. VI), on the World-Spirit and the Holy-Spirit (Ch. IX), and on science, philosophy and theology in Islam (Ch. XIX, *cf. Esq.*, IV, VIII). The importance which Picavet attaches to the religious moment is based on his conviction that the medieval civilization was essentially religious in character (*Esq.*, Ch. II). And he regards Plotinus as the golden thread traceable throughout the whole course of their thought and connecting that age with our own (*Esq.*, *pref.*, pp. viii ff.). Moreover, this is true not only of Christian thought, both western and eastern, but of Mohammedan and of Jewish thought as well. Thus the "religious-thesis" centering in Plotinus makes possible a history of thought which shall take due account of the

simultaneous relations along with the successive. Picavet believes that specialization has so affected historians that an attempt should now be made in the direction of general history; hence his attention to the general history of philosophy. But a general history can be complete and adequate only when it is comparative in the sense just indicated. Such, briefly, is the meaning of his general and comparative method. In contrast with Zeller, for example, who is concerned only with the relation of succession, Picavet would refuse to consider chronology without synchronology. And he believes that the "pre-occupation with the divine" enables such treatment for his period, namely, the first century to the seventeenth. He finds that all of the thinkers of this period exhibit a common heritage of revealed religion, allegorical interpretation, and desire for union with God; hence their common effort to reconstruct Plotinus, and the close relation between their theology and philosophy and science. The sources of his idea are duly acknowledged (pp. 33 ff.), as also the aid in its elaboration (pp. 4 ff.).

So far as the idea is based on the religious moment there would seem to be little doubt of its correctness. The importance of the medieval theology is being more and more emphasized for a proper understanding of the philosophy of this period; and the amended title of this last volume is perhaps the best indication of our author's own growing conviction in this connection. Certainly the method has proved most illuminating for the period in question; so much so, indeed, that one may hope for an attempt at its broader application. Thus, for example, one might conceive of a similar procedure with the modern period, by use of the 'scientific' instead of the 'religious' moment. Its application to the ancient philosophy would be difficult because it presupposes a certain community of ideas. But research in the Hellenistic period makes ever more clear such community there; and the present tendency is rather away from extreme isolation of the early Greek philosophy, with some effort to rehabilitate in modified form the radical views of Gladisch. Picavet wisely limits his method to his own chosen field; but his success may well lead to attempts at wider application. One might hope too for an indirect effect of his work, namely, the stimulating of further interest in the studied *contrast* of opposite viewpoints between civilizations or within a civilization. Such study enables us better to estimate the adequacy of movements and systems (which is after all the chief function of the study of philosophy in its development), and is of value in checking a too easy-going acceptance of solutions.

The tenacious and persistent endurance of ideas is also involved in Picavet's conception. If thought penetrates slowly it also leaves off with equal slowness. The studies in the continuity of thought which this work contains furnish interesting illustrations of this. We have been familiar with the idea expressed by such men as Schleiermacher, Schopenhauer and Feuerbach, that Kant represents the real inauguration of modern as distinguished from medieval philosophy. And men like Saisset, Bossuet, Freudenthal, v. Hertling, and E. Wolff have done much to furnish specific proof of the debt of modern thinkers to their medieval forebears. But Picavet's stimulus to research in this direction is perhaps the most significant of all. He regards the more direct attention to the problem as a result of the Papal Encyclical of 1879 (pp. 335 ff.), and in his own case this has been true. His treatment of the Averroists and free-thought illustrates very impressively how the roots of the 'modern' spirit may be traced back into the 13th century and earlier; and much the same may be said of his study of Luther. This gains in significance when we bear in mind that it is the same kind of connection, though unconscious or even unwilling, as the deliberate connection attempted by Neo-Scholasticism (Ch. XVIII). His study of Descartes reviews most of the literature, and concludes that Descartes' originality is to be found in his contribution to 'scientific' philosophy, while he continues the philosophy and theology of the middle ages. Those who have suspected Descartes's direct obligation to Augustine and Anselm for the unique elements in his philosophy will find this study especially interesting. In particular Picavet again calls attention to Hauréau's discovery of the place which Eriugena and Eric of Auxerre occupy in tracing back to Plotinus the *Cogito ergo sum*, which is "more clearly expressed by Eric, and especially by Eriugena, than by Augustine" (pp. 14, 50, 340, *cf. Esq.*, pp. 139, 297). Our author also points out how the emphasis of Socrates on self-knowledge passed from the moral to the metaphysical significance in Plato, and in Plotinus to the theological. He might have indicated further how the theological is mingled with the epistemological, especially in Augustine, Eriugena, Eric, and Descartes, with its sharpest epistemological import in the last though as yet not divorced from the theological. With this idol shattered (the uniqueness of the Cartesian doubt) we may better understand Dewey's assertion that "the conscious articulation of genuinely modern tendencies has yet to come" (*Essays*, 1910, p. 61).

The two least successful studies in the book are those on St. Paul

and on Rousseau. The latter is found to have borrowed directly certain important ideas (on maternal nursing) from Favorinus; and so the second century is directly connected with the eighteenth (p. 176). Picavet could give his critics no better illustration of his ever imminent danger of passing from resemblance to identity. Plato's *Republic* or Tacitus' *Germania* might as well be connected with Rousseau by a like reasoning. A similar fault appears in the study of St. Paul, whom he regards as the real founder of Christian philosophy in all its bearings, since the Greek and the Jewish ideas were synthetized by him (p. 139). "St. Paul was to Christianity what the Pseudo-Aristobulus and Philo were to Judaism" (p. 137, *cf.* p. 132). This is very unlike the Picavet who elsewhere estimates Philo so high'y and magnifies the synthesis of Plotinus, and whose long labors have made clear that the synthesis attributed to St. Paul could not have come before the lapse of many centuries after him. One may justify a sceptical attitude here by recalling Pfeiderer's similar attempt to rehabilitate the older view, which resulted in impairing his rewritten study of Paul. It is one thing to pick up bits of philosophic parlance that have passed into popular usage, and quite a different thing to possess the philosophic training and ability necessary to a "founder of Christian philosophy in *all* its bearings." Friedländer has made very plain that any man of parts might have acquired such current philosophical ideas as Paul exhibits, without special training,—which Picavet elsewhere (p. 22) would also imply. Such a thesis as Picavet's must fall heavily on the ears of those who have sought to make a trained philosopher out of the writer of the Epistle to the Romans. That Epistle is little considered by Picavet; and his other citations frequently make as much against as for his thesis. Moreover, he softens considerably the opposition between Christian and Greek thought, in contrast with his earlier emphasis (*Esq.*, Ch. III, IV). However, we may gather that the proof is still *in processu* (p. 138), and the effort will undoubtedly have the effect of stimulating research. Its importance for his chronology is of course very considerable; but sharply outlined chronology is the last thing to contend for where the direction of one's labors is toward the obliteration of such distinctions.

The attempt at classification of the mystics arose in the course of his studies of Roscellinus (p. 73), and illustrates the separating of essential from accidental in his comparative method. The classification is unique, being an attempt to combine the principles of perfection and of pathology (Ribot and Thulié). It is threefold: those who seek

(1) complete perfection of personality (moral-aesthetic-intellectual); (2) one-sided perfection, making use of theurgy; and (3) no attainment of perfection, being essentially morbid. Each of the first two is divided further into three subordinate groups. However, after making these distinctions, Picavet calls attention to their inexactness and the non-chronological character of the classification. This seems much like bankruptcy of the original intent of the essay. Indeed, since all men strive in some sense toward perfection, and certainly all philosophers do as admitted (p. 97, *cf.* note p. 393), the classification might as well be of men or philosophers as of mystics. This is another unwitting illustration of the supreme importance attached by our author to the religious moment in man's thought. But the study is of real value in the corrected perspective it gives to the pathological element in the history of mysticism. It also exhibits how very difficult is classification in this realm, and it may give one a new respect for the quaintly complex classification attempted by Matthai.

The *Baconiana* constitute a quarter of the whole work, as follows: editions of Roger Bacon's works, past and future (X); Peter of Mar court, master in experimentation (XI); John, the disciple of Bacon (XII) Bacon's criticism of his contemporaries (XIII); and the two cultural tendencies of the thirteenth century (XIV). The delimitation of the problems, clarity of exposition, and stimulus to further research make all of these important contributions. All but one (XII) had previously appeared, in whole or in part. Two other studies have appeared since: "*La place de Roger Bacon parmi les philosophes du xiii^e siècle*" (Oxford Essays on Roger Bacon, 1914, pp. 55-88); and "*Roger Bacon, la formation intellectuelle d'un homme de génie au xiii^e siècle*" (*Rev. d. Deux Mondes*, 1^{er} juin, 1914, pp. 643-674). These are both in the author's best manner, and excel any of the Bacon studies in the *Essais*. His special work in this field goes back to 1893, when the program of studies at the Hautes-Études included Bacon's alchemy, and 1894, when the three *Opera* were carefully examined. After a lapse of eight years the program provided liberally for research on Bacon (1902-1907). And since 1911 Picavet has continued such study himself, and has directed candidates at the Sorbonne in the same field. He is therefore to be counted among the growing number of Baconian specialists; and his last publications would indicate an ever increasing admiration for this genius who has been so much misunderstood by critics and admirers alike.

One of the important contributions of Picavet has been his emphasis upon the twofold tendency during the 13th century. In addition to

the dialectical movement represented best by Thomas Aquinas, there was the other which took due account of exegesis and science as represented by Roger Bacon. And our author believes that the Church, by following the latter, could have avoided both Renaissance and Reformation. In 1904 Picavet presented this important idea before the Congress of Religions at Basel. In the same year Hilarin Felder published his important work (*Gesch. d. wiss. Stud. i. Franziskanerorden*), and two years before had appeared Hirsch's relevant study (Nolan's *Gr. Gram. Rog. Bacon*, Introd., sect. i-v). It is unfortunate that in republishing (Ch. XIV) Picavet has not made full use of these works, whereby he might have improved the historical setting here and added to his texts here and elsewhere. In Felder's work particularly the matter is presented in much better perspective. There (*o. c.*, pp. 402 ff.) it is made plain that the educational program had split on the rock of Dialectic, to which Paris gave exaggerated emphasis while Oxford retained the Trivium and the Quadrivium complete. The broader setting thus given would indicate that Bacon was not the originator though he was a most important part of a great movement; and for this view there is ample corroborative material in Bacon's own works. With this in mind one is less apt to be misled by the admiration which arises so naturally in reading Bacon alone.

In expressing the belief (Ch. XIV, *cf.* pp. 20, 230, and both more recent articles, *passim*) that the Renaissance and the Reformation might have been avoided, Picavet would seem to be misled by his sympathetic estimate of Bacon. It comes oddly from one who emphasizes so strongly the need and place of the French Revolution in the history of thought, and who has done so much to prove the persistent force of deep-rooted ideas. "Man does not abandon overnight all the ideas that have nurtured his spirit during the centuries," as he says so appropriately with Descartes in mind (*Esq.*, p. 73). If, then, the penetration and triumph of the scientific ideal has been necessarily very slow, it would seem vain to assume an exception in this instance. In such matters it is after all a struggle between institutional demands and individual initiative; and Bacon was too devoted a religionist to make allowance for this or even to see it. The fact is that Picavet oscillates between insisting that Bacon must be kept in the midst of his contemporaries (as do Saisset and Charles) and making him a real modern; notably he seems to have lost his earlier conviction that Bacon is not to be regarded as a forerunner of Positivism. But all who accept Picavet's "religious thesis" will be on their guard against any such violation of it as would be here involved.

The problems of biography (Ch. XI, XII) are of real importance in connection with Bacon's intellectual development and doctrine. Concerning John the conclusion is reached that it is impossible to identify him; very wisely, in the present state of our knowledge. Picavet has presented most of the material in attractive form, but has omitted an important passage in the *Opus Majus* (II, p. 171, cf. *Op. Tert.*, ed. Little, p. 61), whose puzzling and abrupt transition to "two youths" we may hope Picavet will attempt later to elucidate. Concerning Peter of Maricourt the conclusion is reached, after examination of certain passages not heretofore considered in this connection, that Charles was in error in making Peter of Maricourt both scientist and linguist. Picavet believes that Bacon's references are to two separate individuals, the scientist Peter Peregrinus and the linguist unknown. The reasoning involves the identification of Peter of Maricourt with Peter Peregrinus, and the improbability that the latter was a theologian. The systematic collation of data from Bacon concerning Peter makes the study a valuable one. In the absence of conclusive proof Picavet's conclusion is given as tentative (p. 254), but it would now seem to be his definite conviction (*v. Rev. d. Deux Mondes*, l. c. pp. 659 ff.).

Charles' identification of Peter of Maricourt with Peter Peregrinus is accepted by Picavet on the basis of the striking parallels enumerated by the former. However, there is a passage which has not been used by Picavet or any one else, so far as I know,—although Thompson (*Proc. Brit. Acad.*, Vol. II) and Picavet (*Deux Mondes*, l. c., p. 658) may possibly have noticed it—which is of great importance in this connection. In the *Opus Minus* (p. 385) Bacon refers briefly to the astrolabe, and adds the significant words: "*hoc quidem fieri debet de magnete.*" This reference to the magnet is most significant, if one bears in mind the contents of Peregrinus' *Epistola de Magnete* (written at Lucera, in Italy, in 1269). Unless there were at that time two scientists at work on the magnet and the astrolabe, we may take the identification as herewith complete. The "*Parisius nuper fuit*" (*Op. Maj.*, II, p. 208) has also a significance overlooked by Picavet; this is just what might be expected of one who merited the surname "Peregrinus" in that day. And a similar significance would lie in the references to the burning mirror (to which may be added *Op. Maj.*, II, pp. 221, 486, 535, 538).

Picavet's identification of the above scientist with the scientist elsewhere described by Bacon proceeds, I believe, on the assumption of a stricter terminology than can be attributed to Bacon. Assuming

such literal interpretation as Picavet seems inclined to accept, an even higher degree of probability may be secured from the passages cited and others. But the counter-passages, with their new considerations, force proof back into conjecture, in the present state of supplementary external evidence. Our author's rejection of the identification of the exegete with William de Mara is rather summary (note, p. 406), considering that Berger and Denifle accepted it. The rejection would rest on the improbability that a man described implicitly as contemporaneous with Robert Grosseteste, Thomas of St. David, and Adam Marsh, and explicitly as among the "senes" about 1267 (*Op. Tert.*, pp. 88 ff.), could have been a leader against the Thomists in 1282 or 1284 (the date of William's *Correctorium*). But the history of theology exhibits that it is just the older men who frequently lead against innovation. Moreover, Picavet would thus commit himself to the existence of two great exegetes, with the resultant discrediting of Bacon's emphasis upon the extreme rarity of such gifts; and he thereby impairs the very source of his induction. The further publication of works out of these times, including William de Mara's, is much desired for determinative data in all such matters.

It is expected that a complete edition of Bacon's works will result from the Oxford anniversary of last June. Its importance is great not only for conclusive determination of many points of Bacon's doctrine, but also as touching his historical credibility. Two of the studies (X, XIII) are important with reference to the latter. The most important part (pp. 218 ff.) of Chapter X is that concerning the much desired complete edition, and was written for the purpose of stimulating such an undertaking (p. 68). Picavet's splendid gifts for aperçu and program are here well exhibited, and he gives many valuable suggestions. He calls public attention for the first time, I believe, to the important indication which Bacon himself gave, for identifying the original manuscripts sent to the Pope, namely, certain marginal marks. But Picavet's uncertainty concerning their extent (p. 222) can be corrected, I think. By adding two passages (*Op. Tert.*, p. 68, and ed. Little, p. 61) to those mentioned by Picavet, there would remain no doubt that such marginal marks, for the purpose of facilitating the Pope's reading, were made in some parts of *all* three *Opera* and successively increasing in number. To be sure, if Mandonnet is right, the *Opus Minus* and *Opus Tertium* may not have reached the Pope (*v. Rev. Neo-scol.*, no. 77 and 78, 1913); but this writer's misunderstanding of "*scriptum principale*" makes against the view which he advocates. In any case, the indicated importance of the marginal

marks would still remain. Picavet makes no mention where it might be expected (pp. 258 ff.) of the difference between the *Epistola* (Gasquet) and the *Opus Tertium* concerning the period during which the disciple John had been with Bacon; Mandonnet makes much of this, and it is very important for the history of the three *Opera*. With such men as Picavet, Mandonnet, Duheim, and Little actively interested in the matter, we may hope for an early consummation of the desired complete edition. The latest list of the works and manuscripts, revised to date, will be found in the Bacon Essays, Appendix by Little.

Bacon's credibility is a problem of serious moment for the historian. There has been a tendency to discount the evidence of Bacon because of his apparent exaggeration, while at the same time the very dearth of material and the importance of the particular data furnished have caused the historian to give Bacon's statements high rank. In recent years, however, Mandonnet has made a real problem of the matter (*Siger, etc.*, 2 ed., I'me pt., pp. 239 ff.). Picavet makes no reference to Mandonnet's treatment, but his study of Bacon's criticism of his contemporaries (Ch. XIII, cf. also the later studies referred to above) will do much to dispel the clouds of suspicion created by Mandonnet. "Bacon's eulogies and criticisms are significant for doctrine rather than for fact" (p. 278). And he might have added that at least two of his eminent contemporaries also resorted on occasion to similarly severe criticism,—Albert against reactionaries, and Thomas against heretics. Bacon's own consciousness of the severity of his criticisms, frequently expressed, is the best evidence of sincerity in his statements; for the rest, only external evidence can be finally determinative.

Picavet's freedom and learning and method give a peculiar value to all contributions from his pen. His rare combination of comprehensiveness of view with mastery of detail, the best modern scholarship with clarity of exposition, and originality with sound judgment, make him a leader in the best sense of the word. And it is much to be hoped that he may succeed in completing the task which he has set for himself.

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A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century. By JOHN THEODORE MERZ. Volume IV. Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood and Sons. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1914.—pp. xii, 825.

The two earlier volumes of this work, of which the first appeared in 1896, were devoted to the "History of Scientific Thought in the

Nineteenth Century." These constituted Part I. Part II, the "History of Philosophical Thought in the Nineteenth Century," is contained in the third and fourth volumes. The author's plan of the history of nineteenth century intellectual movements requires as its completion "a study of that large body of thought which is buried in the poetical, artistic, and religious literature of the whole period, of that literature which does not profess to be either scientific or philosophical, which does not follow any definite method, but which is the spontaneous deliverance of individual minds" (p. 786).

Volume IV, which is now before us, completes the survey of the philosophical thought of the nineteenth century begun in Volume III. It also contains a very full index of both volumes. The method employed, as was pointed out in the review of the earlier volume in this journal (Vol. XXII, pp. 661 ff.), is topical rather than biographical. This section of the work is not a 'history of philosophy' but a survey of philosophical problems, a history of the main philosophical ideas which have entered into and influenced the thought of the nineteenth century. Volume III contained, in addition to an interesting chapter on "The Growth and Diffusion of the Critical Spirit," an historical survey of the problems, "Of the Soul," "Of Knowledge," "Of Reality," and "Of Nature." In the present volume there are the following chapter headings: "Of the Beautiful," "Of the Good," "Of the Spirit," "Of Society," "Of the Unity of Thought," and "The Rationale of Philosophical Thought."

The method adopted by the author of dividing the main philosophical problem into a number of special questions has obviously both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it facilitates a survey and comparison of ideas regarding special topics, and brings into clearer relief the outcome and permanent gains of philosophical thought in these fields. Moreover, such a comparison tends to show, the author holds, that some of the problems which he has treated "have become in the course of the century of more general, indeed of popular, interest; marking in some instance burning questions of the present age." Other problems, he finds, "have for the time being fallen into the background and are almost forgotten. Among the former we may single out the sociological problem as by far the most important and generally attractive. Connected with it, as of hardly less importance, are the ethical and religious questions. On the other hand, as belonging to the less attractive philosophical problems, we may name the problem of nature and the problem of the Beautiful" (pp. 591-592). In spite of the comparisons which

the method of dealing separately with special problems thus renders possible, one may still question whether it is not attended by a loss of philosophical continuity, and whether its employment in this work has not resulted in some loss of completeness and unity in presentation. The method necessarily involves a good deal of repetition in referring to the leading thinkers of the century under the various headings: it is impossible to treat the special problems selected entirely as isolated questions. But the very attempt to isolate these problems for purposes of comparison and discussion has led, it seems to me, to a kind of external mode of treatment that has to a considerable extent detracted from the interest and philosophical significance that belongs to them when considered in their systematic relationships. Perhaps too this method of historical survey is to some extent responsible for the author's judgment regarding the failure of the present age to attain or even to approach unity of thought. There is a sense, of course, in which any such a statement is true. Unity of thought is something that is never completely attained. Moreover, the vastly increased variety and complexity of the data afforded by contemporary experience render the task of surveying and unifying the whole field supremely difficult. Nevertheless, the philosophical thinkers of the nineteenth century, no less than their predecessors, have contributed to the work of unification. If one turns over the list of thinkers whose ideas Mr. Merz has surveyed, one will conclude, I think, that the permanent value of their treatment of special problems is in the great majority of cases dependent upon the possession of some genuine principle of unity. It is of course true that no one of them has succeeded in grasping or in formulating this principle in all its concrete unity in difference. The very conception of a closed philosophical system has become a contradiction for our thought; but the fact that unity has not been attained is not an indication of failure on the part of modern thought or a mark which characterizes it unfavorably when compared with the earlier systems.

Among the general characteristics of recent thought the author emphasizes especially what he calls the "synoptic" tendency, "the endeavor to reach a *vue d'ensemble*, a *Gesammtanschauung*; and this quite as much when we have to deal with the totality of things as when we confine ourselves to specifically selected regions of research." "This synoptic view," he goes on to say, "is complementary to, and has succeeded, the combined methods of analysis and synthesis which were introduced into philosophic thought under the influence of the natural and exact sciences in the earlier part of the nineteenth century"

(p. 786). Not only in philosophy has this tendency shown itself, but the natural sciences, mainly under the influence of evolutionary conceptions, have gained a new direction and increased vitality by the adoption of this point of view. In psychology this point of view has, in the author's opinion, shown itself especially fruitful and significant. This doctrine of the "synoptic view" is frequently referred to throughout this volume, both in the text and in footnotes; but it nowhere, I think, is fully developed and its consequences illustrated in detail. It would have added to the interest of the work if some systematic attempt had been made to criticize and evaluate the various philosophical theories surveyed in the light of this method.

Although the author's treatment is in the main expository rather than critical, his own philosophical standpoint and sympathies are indicated from time to time in general observations and remarks. He attaches more importance than historians of philosophy have usually done to the work of Schleiermacher and Lotze, although he acknowledges that the latter did not assimilate into his thought the modern conceptions of evolution. It is only fair to recognize that Mr. Merz's purpose in this work is to give an objective account of philosophical opinions; yet one may wish that he had set forth more clearly the principles which guided his own undertaking. One has somewhat the feeling of gathering information rather than enlightenment from the volume, and frequently finds occasion to raise questions regarding the underlying principles which have guided the inquiry.

Throughout this *History of Nineteenth Century Thought*, the author has confined himself, as he informs us, almost exclusively to England, France and Germany. Of the philosophical literature of these countries during this period the third and fourth volumes afford a useful and suggestive summary. One is here, as in the earlier volumes of the work, constantly impressed with the extent of the author's reading, and with the clearness of thought and expression which he has achieved. The value of the text is enhanced by extensive foot-notes, which are filled with instructive and suggestive matter. Mr. Merz has taken no narrow view of his task, and has carried his discussion and references beyond the limits of what takes the form of technical philosophy. The chapter on Society (pp. 420-590), in particular, contains much information that is not usually found in histories of philosophy. The same is also true, though to a less degree, of the chapter which is entitled "Of the Beautiful" (pp. 1-126). The general plan and method of presentation throughout the volumes which deal with philosophical thought make necessary some knowledge

of the various systems on the part of the reader. Its value consists in the very competent summary and retrospect which it presents, based on broad reading and careful interpretations.

In the author's view, philosophy occupies, as it were, a kind of middle ground between the objective realm of science and the more subjective and individual judgments that find unsystematic expression in literature. In accordance with this view, he writes at the conclusion of the volume before us: "A History of Thought will accordingly not be complete without tracing with equal diligence and with equal sympathy, in the spontaneous literature and the artistic creations of the period, the inventions of the poetical and the manifestations of the religious thought of this age."

It is to be hoped that the author will be able to realize his plan for the completion of this great work. The volumes already completed form an important contribution to the history of the intellectual movements of the nineteenth century. And the task which the author has set himself in his plan for the concluding volume, although difficult, is likely to throw important light upon the thought and mode of feeling of a period that has already become strange to our unassisted experience.

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Volonté et Liberté. Par WINCENTY LUTOSLAWSKI. Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris, 1913,—pp. xi, 352.

Volonté et Liberté is a curious book. Its writer claims that it represents the standpoint peculiar to the Slavs and especially to the Poles; but if this is the case, the Poles have gone to school to Trine and the other American prophets of New Thought. The thesis of the book is the establishment of the will as the ultimate reality and the production of an historical and metaphysical foundation for a more effective development of the individual and social will. Although the detailed study of proper modes of training belongs to the future, yet, since even this propaedeutic is to serve a practical end, much space is given to the consideration of practical questions.

At the beginning there is a sketch of the position held by the will in the history of thought. Materialism, idealism and pantheism form a preparation for spiritualism, which regards the external world after the analogy of the thinking and willing subject (pp. 22 and 77). In its most highly developed form spiritualism makes the will the center of every explanation of existence, and so may properly be called

clencherism. The latter is described as a union of philosophical spiritualism and religious mysticism, in that it declares every living thing to be the expression of an individual will, which, when mature, is in harmony with the will of its creator. Such a philosophy belongs peculiarly to the Slavs, because among them the political dominance of the Teutonic and the intellectual leadership of the Latin nations have produced a concentration of the attention upon volition. Descartes said, "*Je pense, donc je suis*;" but it was left to Cieszkowski to add, "*Je veux, donc je pense et je suis*" (p. 17).

The second chapter is entitled "Parallelism and the Unconscious" and from the scientific point of view, which its writer would doubtless disclaim, is one of the best in the book. The discussion of the deterministic implications of the theory of parallelism is excellent, and there is a constant insistence upon the reality of consciousness and upon the immediate nature of our knowledge of it (pp. 36-45). Yet here, too, the rejection of the offending theory seems to be primarily due to its cramping effect upon the will. A man must divest himself of prejudices, not because they are false, but because they will interfere with his liberty of action. He must emancipate himself by his own free act. In much the same way, after the reader has been made familiar with the abuses of the term *Unconscious*, he is exhorted to set aside a doctrine which will lead him to look for the causes of his actions outside himself. Instead there is proposed a rather crude modification of the monadology of Leibniz. Everything of which we are unconscious but which nevertheless appears in some fashion or other to exist in us, in reality belongs to one of the auxiliary consciousnesses. These are souls analogous to our own but of an inferior sort, and they have the direction of the physiological automatisms. Whenever an activity becomes habitual, the primary consciousness has handed it over to the care of an auxiliary consciousness (p. 55).

After a chapter concerning the relation between soul and body, which elaborates the thesis of multiple consciousness, there follow two upon the manifestations and the metaphysics of the will. Differences of opinion are primarily differences of volition (p. 93). Reasoning and feeling are both compelled to submit to the will. Although the former precede action and furnish the occasion and the material for it, they are not its reality (p. 97). The will of the individual monad may exercise influence, first, upon its own body and, second, upon other bodies and other souls. In doing this it not only chooses between alternatives, it creates new ones. The denial of such a possibility simply manifests a lack of experience. The con-

vinced determinist is a man who is not conscious of his own liberty, and so cannot comprehend those who know that they are free (p. 112). Since the soul is created by God, it in turn is able to create its own states of consciousness (p. 113), some of which exercise an influence upon other monads (pp. 114 and 127). The name given to a conscious state is *psychôme* and its description recalls Fouillée's theory of the *idées-forces*. The internal life of the monad manifests itself by the quality and the quantity of its influence upon the monads with which it comes in contact. On the other hand, the monad which has become aware of its liberty is able to exclude all external influence, which consequently cannot take place against its will (p. 127). Again, a monad can act only upon those monads with which it has something in common. It cannot create *psychômes* in other monads, but only evoke those already there. New states of consciousness require preparation and appear in a certain natural order, depending for their initial impulse upon the monad possessing them (p. 128). Once created, however, they can be called forth by the influence of other monads. Thus we act upon our bodies through that which we have in common with them. In every case of the exercise of external influence, the soul acts by producing in itself certain images or representations, which, once produced, engender the exterior effect desired. Consequently every voluntary action of the soul reduces itself to action upon the course of its own *psychômes*, and the relation between these *psychômes* and those desired in other monads is one of causal necessity (p. 130). Before the will has been awakened in the soul, the course of the *psychômes* will depend upon the influences received from monads superior to itself; but with the appearance of the will, there is a great change in the inner life. The soul that is conscious of its liberty is able to shut out superior influences and admit those that are of a lower order. This is what is meant by the Fall and original sin.

Chapters VI and VII deal with the axiomatics and the objects of the will. The latter present an ordered series, each member of which includes and surpasses the preceding. With the first appearance of the will, the soul seeks for pleasure, later on it chooses duty, and then, the good, which, among other aspects, has especially those of the true and the beautiful. Pleasure, duty and the good are ideals of the soul regarded as an isolated individual, and must give way to the political and social ends of humanity, culminating in the conception of a universal Church, which, though it seems at first the will by subjecting men to different kinds of obedience, in reality transforms

their aspirations and creates for them new pleasures, new duties and new conceptions of the true and of the beautiful. Finally, beyond and including all of these, is the love for a nation as distinguished from a state. This is higher than sexual love and also than the love for God. The completed development of a nation of men who are really free will be paradise on earth.

The last four chapters furnish a course of instruction for the man who is desirous of exercising his will to its utmost capacity. First comes the negative discipline made necessary by the fact that the search for pleasure has introduced into human life certain poisons, which should be eliminated. To attain perfection it is necessary to give up alcohol, tobacco, drugs, coffee, tea, chocolate and cocoa, meat, fish and eggs, and also markly to reduce the quantity of nourishment. The effect upon the reason and the character is said to be evident. Moreover it is necessary to set aside certain deleterious occupations, such as gambling, and to check the kindred emotions of fear, anger and jealousy. Considerable force may be acquired by such negative discipline, but if the strength thus gained is to be well employed, there must be added a positive training in the way of perfection. Many methods of attaining self-mastery have been proposed, and of these the most important are the Hindoo Yoga and Christian asceticism. Both have their advantages and neither should be despised nor ignored; but Christianity by its doctrine of the forgiveness of sin and by its use of the sacraments frees the soul from the belief in the power of fate, and at the same time does not limit effort to that of the individual but adds thereto the grace of God. The Christian ideal embraces all the essential elements to be found in the Hindoo conception and adds to the latter an intensity of social activity that has created modern civilization (p. 249). Nevertheless it is susceptible of improvement in two respects. It has paid too little attention to hygiene, while the holy men of the Hindoos always enjoy perfect health, and there is need also of a more natural classification of types of souls, where harmony, instead of being imposed from without, will be independent of any external organization or rule. The solution of these problems is promised by the American movement in favor of hygiene and by Polish Messianism.

Messianism is explained as the movement set on foot by various Polish exiles with the intention of regenerating society. Just as it was necessary for Christ to be persecuted, to die and to rise again for the salvation of individuals, so for the salvation of nations there must be a national sacrifice and resurrection. For this purpose the

Divine Will has chosen Poland. As a preliminary the wills of the Poles must be purified and strengthened. Their leaders claim to be loyal sons of the Church, and for the end they have in view, they would combine the practices of Christian asceticism with some of the Hindoo teachings, especially those concerning reincarnation. A belief in metempsychosis carries certain implications with it. If the soul creates its own surroundings by its free choice of action in a previous existence, then there is no reason to reject what our author calls the various branches of "applied psychology," namely chiromancy, phrenology, astrology and the rest. The essential doctrines of Messianism may be held without believing that the Polish nation is the one called to free the whole family of nations, and so the movement need not be confined to Poles and Polish sympathizers.

Under the caption "The Yoga of the Americans" Chapter XI deals with what are apparently regarded as the most characteristic products of American thought. Ever since the Declaration of Independence extraordinary efforts have been made in the United States for the transformation of human life, and from these have resulted the many communities, such as that at Oneida, and also the numerous varieties of New Thought, Eddyism, Fletcherism and the like. These are usually superficial, because the only ends proposed to the will are of a purely material nature; but nevertheless they have set their mark deep upon American life, and have produced a healthy and vigorous nation with a well-developed will. Chapter XII gives us the practical summary of the preceding three, namely a system of education, partly adapted only to children but capable in the main of being carried out by anyone desirous of training his will. It begins with the Hindoo control of breathing and the cultivation of penmanship, and ends with the spiritual exercises of prayer, meditation and contemplation.

What is to be said of a book like this? Perhaps that it is the logical outcome of a philosophy which regards the will as prior to the intellect.

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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

William James and Henri Bergson: a Study in Contrasting Theories of Life. By HORACE MEYER KALLEN. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1914.—pp. x+248.

The key-note of this book is its insistence upon the radical difference between the two philosophies which it undertakes to compare. While recognizing certain resemblances, Dr. Kallen maintains that the unlikeness between James and Bergson is far more marked than the likeness and that in most of their fundamental doctrines the two thinkers differ widely. Their chief points of agreement are temporalism and anti-intellectualism (in both of which James anticipated Bergson). For both of them reality is flux, and for both of them the static concept is inadequate to represent the living reality. But after we have mentioned these points of resemblance, the radical differences between the two thinkers begin to force themselves upon us. Bergson, in spite of the novel form in which his thought is cast, belongs to the old school, accepts the tradition that has dominated philosophy from the earliest time. Traditional philosophy shuts its eyes to the character of reality as manifested in experience and insists that it has a nature that conforms to certain of our ideals. "From Thales to Royce," it "has concerned itself with seeking proof, almost unexceptionally, for one or all of these four desiderates—the unity of the world; the existence of God, in some form of spiritistic substance, from theism to pantheism; the immortality of the soul; the freedom of the will" (p. 4). And whenever reality as experienced displays a nature that is not compatible with one or another of these ideals, the philosopher has condemned the experienced as mere appearance and has insisted that in its fundamental nature the universe is quite different.

Now Bergson, like all his predecessors, reconstructs "experience for the sake of desiderated values," whereas James takes experience as he finds it. "James summarizes and describes; Bergson interprets and transmutes." This difference between the two philosophers is shown "in method, . . . in the conception of truth, in the ultimate designation of reality, . . . in the conception of God, and of the origin and destiny of man" (pp. 50 f.). As to method, traditional philosophy holds that knowledge of absolute reality is to be gained by becoming one with this reality: Bergson's doctrine of 'intuition' shows his acceptance of this position; James, on the contrary, insists that the method of philosophy is identical with that of science. Again, Bergson's conception of truth is the traditional one: only intuition, which is James's 'knowledge-of-acquaintance' can give us the key to reality; conceptual knowledge, or 'knowledge-about,' is useful for practical purposes, but is a falsification of reality. James, however, does not regard concepts as thus alien to reality and hence does not follow Bergson in his wholesale condemnation of conceptual

knowledge. For Bergson, utility is "identical with unreality"; for James it is identical "with truth" (p. 100). Once more, the difference between the two philosophers is shown in their conception of ultimate reality. Bergson is systematic, architectonic, monistic; James's philosophy is a mosaic. Bergson, like Plato and Spinoza, condemns our ordinary experience as appearance; behind it he posits a single all-inclusive reality. For James the universe is what it is experienced as being and is thus of the strung-along type: there is no one predominant stuff, no one prevailing order; there are many stuffs and many compenetrating orders. Bergson makes a hard-and-fast distinction between the world of extension and the mental world. James declares that the two orders compenetrates and that a given entity belongs to the one or to the other according to the way in which it is used. In short, "for James, the fundamental fact is the immediate experience taken at its face value" (p. 169).

This difference in metaphysical theory leads to differences with regard to the conceptions of God, freedom, and individuality. Bergson's conception of creative evolution leaves no room for genuine chance, though it does admit of incalculability; James insists upon the reality of chance. Bergson makes the individual a mere limitation of the *élan vital* by matter and conceives it as secondary to and representative of the wider life; to James, the individual is the thing of supreme importance. Bergson's God is not a personal being, with whom we may come into relations, but rather the impersonal, sub-human and trans-human ground of all reality, from which have proceeded both the *élan* and the matter that opposes it. One might perhaps regard the *élan* as a kind of god, who is opposed by the evil principle embodied in matter. But if from this point of view Bergson seems to approach orthodox theism, we must not forget that behind the *élan* and matter is the impersonal, non-moral principle which is the source of both. And in like manner, while Bergson "asserts the probability of a Fechnerian hierarchy of beings" (p. 201), the fact that behind them all is the God of pantheism allies him "with historic . . . monism, with the radical anti-orthodox position concerning religion's God" (pp. 203 f.). For James, on the other hand, the question of the existence of super-human beings is a scientific question, and he recognizes their existence on the evidence of experience. Thus for him, the gods are in the world as a part of it, and are therefore finite, while for Bergson, though there may be gods, there is also the one all-inclusive reality, the traditional infinite.

That the differences between James and Bergson are many and important has been pointed out by others, as Dr. Kallen recognizes. But his detailed comparison and penetrating analysis form a welcome contribution to the literature of contemporary philosophy. For himself, he is a follower of James; but on the whole, his interpretation of Bergson is marked by insight and sympathy. Some readers, however, may feel inclined to protest against the assumption that James's attitude toward experience is in all respects superior to that of Bergson and the "older cosmologists." A philosophy that attempts merely to 'summarize and describe experience' may escape some of the dangers that lie in wait for one that tries also to 'interpret' it. But is the first one really

shouldering the whole of its burden? Is even natural science, the professed exemplar of pragmatism, content with summarizing and describing? While we may admit, then, that some of Bergson's attempts to solve philosophical problems are not altogether happy, we must remember that he attacks a number of questions that James, apparently, leaves unconsidered.

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The Limitations of Science. By LOUIS TRENCHARD MORE. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1915.—pp. 268.

This book is a popular discussion and criticism of some of the more 'metaphysical' parts of modern theoretical physics, in particular of the theory of relativity and the conceptions of matter, electricity, and the ether. The several chapters have all appeared as articles, four in the *Hibbert Journal* and one each in the *Philosophical Magazine*, the *Monist*, and the *Unpopular Review*, and though they are said in the Preface to have been rewritten to form a connected discussion, there is in fact much repetition and no very evident development from one chapter to the next. Each contains substantially the author's whole point, viz., that the legitimate function of science is limited to "the discovery of natural phenomena and their classification into general laws derived by logical mathematical processes" (p. 31).

Consequently the author regards all theories of the structure of matter, however formulated, as ontological and therefore extra-scientific. With a view to establishing this criticism he discusses Larmor's electro-magnetic theory of the ether, Lorentz's theory of electrons, Einstein's theory of relativity, and a variety of other hypotheses of similar tendency. The author argues that such entities as atoms, electrons, ether, and the like are purely imaginary and that the hypotheses which employ them are therefore not capable of empirical verification. They are, in fact, products of the creative imagination and are therefore quite as subjective as the other metaphysical substances which scientists have been accustomed to deride. The resulting theories of matter are at best wholly hypothetical; they are often almost, if not quite, incomprehensible; and they are very dangerous because they promote an uncritical attitude of mind among scientists. More serious than any of these, moreover, is the charge that these hypotheses are almost useless in promoting scientific investigation. In fact, the author undertakes to show (Chapter III) that all the enormous labor expended upon hypotheses about the structure of matter has scarcely taken their authors in principle beyond the point already reached by Descartes two and a half centuries ago, while experimentation and empirical investigation have gone their way and won their triumphs pretty much in independence of hypothetical construction (pp. 220 ff.).

This is undoubtedly the point at which the great mass of physicists will take issue with Professor More, and considering how vital this point is in his argument, there is surprisingly little in his book except assertion regarding it. He is quite right, of course, when he says that the mere co-existence of these

hypotheses with fruitful investigation does not prove that the investigation arose from the hypotheses. But, on the other hand, how does Professor More propose to show that the course of investigation would have been much the same if a large part of the hypothetical work had been different or wholly absent? Nothing in modern logic is more thoroughly established than the dependence of empirical investigation, whether experiment or mere observation, upon hypothesis (using the term in a wide sense and without the bad connotation which Professor More gives it), and nothing but a thorough logical analysis of physical investigation can show that there is a recognizable type of hypothesis which can be excluded on logical grounds before the investigation begins.

The limitation of science, then, follows from a supposed distinction between causal explanation or hypothesis on the one hand and the classification of phenomena in laws on the other. The author does indeed admit that this distinction is not altogether clear, though he seems to believe that it can be made for practical purposes in scientific work; certainly it is clear that unless the scientist can recognize an hypothesis when he meets it, the book loses its point. It becomes merely an exhortation to be sober-minded and critical, one of the least useful forms of criticism, since no one will admit that he needs it. Some of Professor More's examples, however, scarcely inspire confidence in his ability to 'spot' a vicious hypothesis on sight, for instance, when he distinguishes Darwin's theory of evolution, as dealing only with sensible matter and being capable of a rigid test, from natural selection, as creating fictitious substances and attributes. Surely this criticism, if it can justify itself, is sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of the soul and spirit; the great difficulty is that Professor More does not tell how he does it.

Surely it is clear that any such distinction as Professor More proposes to make between fact, theory, and hypothesis, is a matter of degree; it is no strange experience in science to see theories unsettled which were thought to be secure or to see theories accepted which were thought to be discredited. A judgment of final scientific inutility is hazardous in the extreme, and moreover this tentative character in scientific statements is not confined to a single group of generalizations that can be discredited as metaphysical; every important scientific advance surely throws a new light on every department of the subject. The truth seems to be that, though Professor More speaks in the terms of an economical or instrumental logic, he has a strong bias toward a scientific absolute; one feels in his writing the bias toward finality and an impatience of the tentative. The only question he is willing to ask about a scientific hypothesis is, Is it true? And if it is, he seems to think that science ought to be able to say so and be done with it. But this supposed finality of facts and laws never gets beyond the stage of unexplained assumption. There are numerous references to direct experience and some even to 'instinct' and common sense, but there is no attempt to say what experiences are direct or what convictions are certified by instinct or common sense. Empirical veri-

fiction is spoken of as if it were a simple and infallible test that could be applied without inferential interpretation. The necessity of assuming an objective world is insisted upon, as if there were a difference of opinion on the point or as if the method of science in some way were settled by it. And even innate ideas of space, time, and matter are suggested in a hesitating sort of way. But none of these suggestions is ever followed up and the supposed non-hypothetical basis of science remains quite shadowy. Such an uncriticised logical absolute is fundamentally at odds with the phenomenism that Professor More professes.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

Modern Philosophers and Lectures on Bergson. By HARALD HÖFFDING.

Translated by ALFRED C. MASON. London, Macmillan and Co., 1915.—pp. xii, 387.

This volume consists of lectures delivered at the University of Copenhagen during the autumn of 1902 and lectures on Bergson delivered in 1913. The first set of lectures, familiar to students in the German edition, is divided into three groups, designated respectively the "objective-systematic," the "epistemologico-biological," and "the philosophy of value."

In the first group Höffding places thinkers who set out with the special object of "elucidating the problem of existence." Wundt, Ardigò, Bradley, and Fouillée are given as representatives of this systematic tendency. The epistemologico-biological tendency is exemplified in the works of those who place the problem of knowledge first, as do Maxwell, Hertz, Ernest Mach, and Richard Avenarius. Under the heading of "the philosophy of value" the subjective philosophies of Goyar and Nietzsche associate on equal terms with the objective tendency of Eucken's thought and the psychologico-religious investigations of William James.

The arrangement of the lectures, the clear exposition of each philosopher's most important views, and the brevity of the summaries, make this little volume a valuable addition to Höffding's work as a historian of philosophy. As he acknowledges the incompleteness of his *History of Modern Philosophy*, which stops short with the year 1880, it might be expected that he would put forward this book as a third part of the *History*; but he regards it as an independent work, because it is more dominated by his personal convictions in its expositions and criticisms than was his historical work. There is no attempt to give an exhaustive account of any of the philosophers presented. Each study includes a brief biographical sketch, followed by a digest of the philosopher's contributions to modern thought. Critical comments accompany or follow all such digests and add much to the interest of the essays for the average student of philosophy. As an attempt to summarize in compact and readable form the achievements of thinkers whose work has become most widely known since 1880, the lectures are sure to be very useful in this English translation.

The second part of the book, devoted to the lectures on Bergson, is new, but

is treated in much the same way as the first part, though at greater length. There are six lectures, entitled as follows: "The Problem of Philosophy," "Intuition," "Psychology and Physiology," "The Philosophy of Evolution," "The Psychology of Will and Laughter," and "Metaphysic."

In general, Höffding's presentation of Bergson is objective, and the reader is left to make his own criticisms of the system. But it is interesting to find again the frequently made criticism of Bergson's doctrine of intuition, that it does not distinguish between the *intuitus immediatus* of pure perception and the intuition of advanced scientific thought, which is the total conception, or the conclusion of severe intellectual labor. That this last is to be reached only by passing through the "purgatory of reflection" is a conclusion which Bergson seems unable to draw, but one which leads Höffding to declare that Bergson's work paves the way for a sort of artistic perception rather than for a higher science. "It is the same opposition that exists between Sunday and week-day, between poetry and prose." (p. 299.) And poetry, as Höffding points out, is revealed only to a working mind. The opposition between it and prose is one which is to be overcome solely by the labor of the understanding. The cure, then, for the shortcomings of the intellect is the Hegelian prescription of more thought, further analysis, and finer distinctions, all leading to a new synthesis which is always reflective, never intuitive. Intuition, as Bergson generally uses the term, offers no solution of problems. In fact, as Höffding clearly demonstrates, when we pass to intuition, we pass to a state without problems. Bergson's main importance therefore lies in the interest which his views on the great questions of philosophy have aroused in his contemporaries.

ALMA ROSA THORNE.

SMITH COLLEGE.

The Principle of Individuality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green. By HARVEY GAYES TOWNSEND, Instructor in Education in Smith College. New York, Longmans, Green & Co.—1914, pp. vii, 32.

The student of Green's philosophy will be disposed to welcome this little monograph. It is the well-written work of a well-read man, and is devoted to the clear and accurate exposition of the main metaphysical positions underlying Green's ethical and political thought. After an introductory chapter on the problem and method of Green's metaphysics, the author expounds the individuality of the Object, of the Subject, and of God, in the remaining four chapters of the work. Under these headings he deals with the nature of the "timeless self," the "spiritual principle in nature," "significant evolution," and "Reality." Incidentally one discovers traces of the attitude towards Psychology which has made it a despised and neglected study at Oxford in the present day—an attitude for which Green is perhaps mainly responsible.

But the book is more than a mere exposition of Green's general line of thought. As the title announces, it is an attempt to rescue Green from the often repeated criticism that idealism of the kind he advances provides no standing ground for individuality. It is extraordinary how widespread this view is in the

present day: but the author has little difficulty in proving his point. The charge of 'subjectivism' he rebuts by showing that Green's position depends on an objective criticism of the implications of knowledge; that his problem and method are throughout metaphysical and critical, not psychological, and that no 'subjective' considerations enter in at all. The common criticism of the 'timeless self' as a 'psychological monster' he shows to be a serious error; for the eternal self is the logical ego, and to treat the logical ego as though it were amenable to psychological criticism is to argue beside the point. Only metaphysical criticism is relevant. The further charge that Green, like all 'intellectualists,' constructs a static universe in which change is impossible, he dismisses with equal ease. He shows clearly that Green's philosophy admits of 'evolution' in a more significant sense than that postulated by loose criticism. It is not change of position in space that can constitute real development, nor can this be measured by mere ticks of the clock. True evolution has meaning and value; it is spiritual, and consists in the progressive realisation of an immanent ideal, a process of self-determination in which the finite individual, in being able to know and will an end, is already in principle one with the ideal individual, God.

The author has thus succeeded in what he has attempted to prove, and it is perhaps ungracious to criticise him for not doing more. And yet there are many things for which one could wish. Why are only British and American writers dealt with? Have France and Germany no criticisms to answer or to develop? And the main objection—why is the standpoint always Green's? F. H. Bradley, H. Sturt, A. E. Taylor, and others are 'answered,' but why are we left just where we were before? One could wish that a contemporary writer would have developed the main idealist positions further, and by sympathetic and constructive criticism, based on personal insight into the problems, would have removed the vaguenesses, and from his later standpoint made Green's results clearer to us than Green himself succeeded in doing. The author has indeed attempted this task, but with only indifferent success. It must be confessed that, in spite of much painstaking research, the chief positions of Green's metaphysics remain no less vague than they were before. The author stands too near Green; he speaks too much the *verba magistri*. For instance, the relation between the eternal self and the empirical ego seems vague to others besides Professor Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, and is surely deserving of further elucidation than it receives from Green. The same difficulty in the philosophy of Kant has already received attention from Neo-Kantians (e. g., Carl Müller-Braunschweig, *Die Methode einer reinen Ethik*, 1908), and such constructive criticism might well be applied to Green also.

The book is clearly printed, with a good index, and is published as one of the "Cornell Studies in Philosophy."

RUPERT CLENDON LODGE.

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.

Readings in Political Philosophy. By FRANCIS WILLIAM COKER. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1914.—pp. xv, 573.

This volume is intended to furnish to students of political theories a series of readings from the works of some of the foremost political philosophers. It begins with selections from Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Politics*, and concludes with twenty pages of Bentham's *A Fragment on Government*; political theorists later than Bentham being omitted, Professor Coker informs us, in order to confine the matter within a single volume. For the most part the standard translations of works not written in English have been used. "Entirely original translations were required only for the selections from St. Thomas Aquinas, Marsiglio of Padua and the *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos*. The translations from Bodin and Grotius are in part original. The passages from Bodin's *De Republica* were translated with constant assistance from the Knolles translation of Bodin's French version of the work. For the *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* of Grotius the Latin text was carefully worked over in order to revise the translation by Whewell" (p. viii). The volume contains selections from twenty different writers, and each selection is prefaced by a short introduction giving a sketch of the life of the author and the circumstances under which he wrote. To each selection there is added also a list of references intended to direct the student to the works to which he may profitably go for fuller information than that which is provided by the brief introductions.

The selections seem to me to have been carefully and judiciously made, and the volume is likely to prove useful for the purpose for which it was intended. It would be easy to point out important omissions; but one has to consider the necessary limits of space imposed by a single volume that shall not be so large as to be unwieldy. Professor Coker has undoubtedly been wise in his decision "to include substantial parts of a few preeminent works rather than to cover a wide range of writings with brief passages from each." The introductions prefixed to each of the selections are the least satisfactory part of the volume. The plan of the work evidently required that these should be brief; but for that very reason care should have been taken to render the information they contain accurate and relevant, and to select what is most essential to bring out the significance of the passages selected. Difference of opinion will undoubtedly exist as to what it is best to include in such circumstances; but no one can question that misleading information is worse than none at all. I have noted a number of statements which are misleading in various degrees when they are not actually false: "The basis of Plato's philosophical system is Socrates' doctrine of reality" (p. 2); "Politics with Aristotle comes near being a distinct discipline, distinct from philosophy and ethics" (p. 54); "The aim of scholasticism was to merge into one system human and divine philosophy, to interweave the higher tenets of human reason—as set forth in Aristotle, with the doctrines of Christian theology" (p. 122); "Hobbes had always been a student of mathematics and philosophy" (p. 301); "This work [*The Leviathan*] includes also, as groundwork for its social philosophy, a treatise on 'Man' which constitutes the first part of the *Leviathan*" (p. 302); "Locke was born

and reared in a Puritan family. . . . He received his bachelor's degree in 1656, his master's degree a year later, and he became a tutor in Christ Church in 1660." "He was in France with Shaftesbury during the latter's exile, from 1675 to 1679; and he resided in Holland from 1685—the year of Shaftesbury's death—until 1689" (pp. 383-4).

J. E. C.

Philosophie des Möglichen. Grundzüge einer Erkenntniskritik. VON DR. JOHANNES MARIA VERWEYEN. Verlag von S. Hirzel, Leipzig, 1913.—pp. x, 240.

There are many different modes of treatment that may be accorded to such a problem as that of possibility. The one chosen by the author was doubtless determined by the origin of his studies in the subject, which, he tells us, began with some historical investigations that he made in the development of the problem of the freedom of the will and also with his strong interest in the philosophy of religion. After some preliminary discussion of the general relationship between possibility and actuality, the greater part of the book is devoted to the application of this relationship to the different fields of thought and practice. Throughout the whole, there are frequent references to the epistemological significance of the results obtained. A careful distinction is drawn between logical and empirical possibility, the importance of hypotheses and other conceptions of the possible and the probable is emphasized, and there is much description and discussion of the varying uses given to these terms in different contexts. Science, history and theology all receive their fair share of attention, and their most important aspects are considered. The book is written from the positivistic standpoint, and contains much that is sensible; but on the other hand, it is not particularly interesting nor does it show much originality.

G. N. DOLSON.

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The following books also have been received:

The Drama of the Spiritual Life. By ANNIE LYMAN SEARS. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1915.—pp. xxiv, 495. \$3.00.

Affirmations. By HAVELOCK ELLIS. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915.—pp. xii, 252. \$1.75 net.

War, Science and Civilization. By WILLIAM E. RITTER. Boston, Sherman, French & Company, 1915.—pp. 125. \$1.00 net.

The Natural Order of Spirit. By LUCIEN C. GRAVES. Boston, Sherman, French & Company, 1915.—pp. v, 365. \$1.50 net.

Baron D'Holbach. By MAX PEARSON CUSHING. New York, Columbia University, 1914.—pp. 108.

A History of Philosophy. By CLEMENT C. J. WEBB. New York, Henry Holt and Company.—pp. 256.

Studies in the History of Natural Theology. By CLEMENT C. J. WEBB. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1915.—pp. vi, 363. 10s. 6d. net.

A Theory of Time and Space. By ALFRED A. ROBB. Cambridge, The University Press, and New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1914.—pp. vi, 373.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. XV. London, Williams and Norgate, 1915.—pp. 441. 10s. 6d. net.

The Arya Samaj. By LAJPAT RAI. London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1915.—pp. xxvi, 305.

Vorgedanken zur Weltanschauung. Von W. STERN. Leipzig, Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1915.—pp. v, 74.

Les sources médiévales de la philosophie de Locke. Par EDOUARD KRAKOWSKI. Paris, Jouve & Cie, 1915.—pp. 212.

Le Ceneri di Lovanio e la Filosofia di Tamerlano. MICHELANGELO BILLIA. Milan, Edizione de "L'Azione," Rassegna Nazionale Liberale, 1915.—pp. 34.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de MH.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Nto-Sc.* = *Revue Neo-Scholastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abt.*; *Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

Mr. Russell on Our Knowledge of the External World. H. A. PRICHARD.
Mind, N. S., No. 94, pp. 145-186.

This article is a critical examination of Mr. Russell's account of our knowledge of the physical world as set forth in his Lowell Lectures and his recent article in *Scientia*. Mr. Russell unquestioningly accepts the empiricist's starting-point. He assumes that we know by perception only immediate sense-data, not atoms or permanent things. How then can we justify the beliefs of science and common sense in the latter? Their existence is not directly apprehended, nor can it be inferred from the data of sense. The new logic alone can vindicate these beliefs, by its method of logical, hypothetical or intellectual construction, substituting logical constructions for the supposedly inferred entities in the worlds of science and common sense. What Mr. Russell means by "construction" he does not make clear. It might at first seem that his position would lead to Berkeleianism or solipsism; but he maintains that all sense-data, though dependent on nothing else such as bodies or a substratum, have yet an existence of their own independently of being given in sense to any individual. The term "sense-data" he uses equivocally. Sense-data are regarded as physical rather than mental; but neither term is adequately defined. Mr. Russell holds that each individual lives in a private world, containing a private space made up of as many different spaces as there are senses. But this doctrine is untrue; only bodies, not appearances, can be spatially related. A plurality of spaces in any other sense than parts of one all-embracing space is an impossibility for thought. Since there is no such thing as 'a space,' there is no such thing as 'a private space.' Mr. Russell offers as a justification of this doctrine the thesis that no 'sensible' is ever a datum to two persons at once. But this thesis is established only by presupposing the very view which Mr. Russell is attempting to oppose, viz., that we perceive not spatially related appearances, but spatially related bodies, and

that two people can see the same body. Further, if what is given in sense exists independently of being so given, the sense-data of different persons cannot belong to worlds distinct from one another and from a world of science incapable of being given in sense at all. Once this independence is granted, there is no reason to maintain that all groups of realities are not parts of one world or one system. Mr. Russell can escape inconsistency only by meaning by private world, a world dependent on me, *i. e.*, such that if I had not existed it would not have existed. The appearances that are not appearances to me which Mr. Russell introduces into my private world apparently to give it completeness without which it would be difficult to describe it as a world at all, have no right to be there. Mr. Russell's doctrine of the space of perspectives, a physical space in which infinite private spaces are spatially related leads to such amazing results as spatially infinite systems of appearances which are appearances to no one, at finite distances from one another, the treating of infinite magnitudes as if they were points with no magnitudes at all and appearances which are in three places at once. It is impossible to think of such a 'physical space.' Space does not consist of an infinity of points. The process Mr. Russell describes presupposes a knowledge of itself, of physical space, and of spatially related bodies independent of the percipient. Mr. Russell would retain the terms of science and common sense provided they be given the meanings assigned them in his definitions; but to do this would render the propositions containing them untrue. The doubly relative term 'appearance' is used by Mr. Russell in an absolute sense, *i. e.*, as a reality that has a nature in itself apart from some thing or percipient of which or for which it is an appearance. But apart from the latter the term has no significance. Since things and appearances, though parts of a single apprehension, are realities differing in kind, neither can be defined or expressed in terms of the other. In defining a thing as "a certain series of aspects" or as "the class of its appearances," Mr. Russell tacitly assumes that what alone distinguishes the group of appearances he designates 'a thing' and constitutes their unity is the fact that they are appearances or aspects of one and the same thing of common sense. In fact, Mr. Russell never succeeds in offering a definition of 'a thing,' but only of 'one and the same thing' of common sense. The very statement of his view requires the language and presupposes the truth of the common sense view he wishes to supersede (that there are bodies which we see and is intelligible only because we already have this view. Mr. Russell has not faced the problems of showing that there is a common sense process by which from thinking of appearances just as appearances we come to think of them as appearances of bodies, and of giving a 'true interpretation' of the process including a definition of 'a thing.' The fact that there is no such process is Mr. Russell's greatest difficulty. Mr. Russell has more affinity with Hume than with any other philosopher. He should have shared Hume's attempt to show how the 'illusions' of common sense arose, though like Hume he would have been inevitably doomed to failure.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

The Ultimate Constituents of Matter. BERTRAND RUSSELL. *The Monist*, XXV, 3.

The world is divisible into mind and matter. Thinking, desiring, feeling, willing, and perceiving are mental occurrences; but objects of perception, the immediate data of sense, are not mental or subjective, but physical, outside the mind, and logically independent of the mind. Yet, since they are causally dependent on the body, sense-data are not persistent or indestructible; rather, they are fleeting, destructible or in a state of perpetual change, and do not continue to exist when no longer perceived. The persistent particles of Mathematical Physics, like 'classes' and 'things' of Common Sense, are not real or substantial, but simply logical construction or symbolic fictions. Persistence is an illusion arising from the approach to continuity in the series of unique, successive, momentary particulars that comprise our world. The world is a multitude of just such particulars, arranged, because of their relations, like notes in a symphony according to a plan, and bound together not by numerical identity but by continuity and certain intrinsic causal laws. Incorrect notions of space, time, causality, and matter have prevented philosophers from recognizing the physical, yet ephemeral, nature of sense-data, and from allotting them their rightful place among the ultimate constituents of matter or the physical world. Matter is a logical construction composed of evanescent particles, which may, when an observer happens to be present, become data of sense. The phrase, *the cause*, is misleading, since it implies a uniqueness that does not exist: any set of antecedents from which an event can be theoretically inferred by means of correlations may be called *a cause*. Time, like space, is an aggregate of corpuscles or atoms. The assemblage of all particles having a simple, direct, spatial relation to a given particular and simultaneous with it is called a *perspective*; the total of all particulars directly simultaneous with or successive to it, a *biography*. A perspective cannot be defined as all the data of one percipient at one time, for there are unperceived perspectives; and, likewise, there are biographies not actually lived. The total of perspectives may be termed physical space; but any such all-embracing space or any all-embracing time is a logical construction, for between different percipients' perspectives no direct, but only constructed, spatial and temporal relations obtain. Since it is not probable that two persons ever perceived the same object at the same moment of time, no two persons' spaces have a place in common. There are a multitude of these private or exclusive three-dimensional spaces, perceived and unperceived, which, when themselves arranged in a three-dimensional order, by correlating particulars regarded as members or aspects of one 'thing' or by manipulating them into the physicist's 'matter,' yield a six-dimensional space in which position is purely relative. Some such dissection of physical things into series or classes of particulars is the only way to overcome the conflict of Physics and Psychology and escape epistemological dilemmas.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

The Meaning of Causality. J. ELLIS McTAGGART. *Mind*, N. S., 95, pp. 326-344.

The two following characteristics of causality have been universally admitted: (1) Causality is a relation of Determination, in which the cause implies the effect. Implication is a relation between propositions or truths, and not between events, although the justification of our knowledge contained in these propositions is due to relation between the events themselves. (2) Causality is a relation between realities which exist. The five following characteristics of causality are not universally admitted: (3) In causality a certain activity is exerted by one term of the relation on the other, as illustrated by the connection between an act of volition and the event willed. (4) The cause determines the effect in some way in which the effect does not determine the cause. (5) In the relation of causality one term is *explained* by its holding that relation to the other. (6) The cause cannot be subsequent to the effect, but need not be prior. Also it is held that a timeless existent reality can be the cause of events in time. (7) A causal relation is always between substances, but always rests on a relation between characteristics. We shall include in our definition only the first two of these seven characteristics ascribed to causation, and say that causation is a relation of implication between existent substances. The seventh characteristic is involved in the fact that the relation of causality is one of implication, since implication is always of characteristics. But all characteristics (*i. e.*, qualities or relations) are universals. Hence any causal relation between particulars rests on a relation between universals. The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth characteristics of causation enumerated above must be rejected. (3) No reason can be given for asserting that the cause exerts an activity, except the evidence of introspection. But even when our volitions are causes it is not possible to demonstrate any such activity. (4) And if all conditions are fully stated, we cannot say that the one which would generally be called the cause determines the other more than it is determined. (5) The cause does explain the effect provided the events are merely taken as instances of a general law. But the law in its turn can only be explained by reference to some more general law, until we reach a causal law which is ultimate. All ultimate causal laws are empirical truths. (6) As for the contention that the cause cannot be subsequent to the effect, we must consider that we have not as yet found any criterion by which to distinguish the cause from the effect in a causal relation. And if the distinction between cause and effect depended solely on temporal order, there could be no causal relation between simultaneous events, or between two substances one or both of which is out of time. So that the most convenient course would seem to be to speak of causal relations as existing between two terms, but not to designate one of these terms as cause and the other as effect. Whether causation is universally valid is beyond the scope of this paper, but we can inquire as to what its universal validity would mean. For causality to hold universally it would be necessary that each characteristic of any substance in each case in which it occurred should be implied by some other characteristic which had occurred. The universality of causal-

ity is what is meant when we speak of the uniformity of nature. It can be stated so that it does not assert reciprocal determination, because the cause may stand for any characteristic which occurs in the universe, while the effect stands for only such characteristics as fulfil the required conditions with reference to the cause. If reciprocal determination is taken to mean that every determination of one characteristic by another is reciprocal, it is clear that reciprocal determination does not hold universally. The broader meaning of reciprocal determination is that every characteristic has at least one determination which is reciprocal. It is impossible to prove empirically that this law does not hold universally. On the other hand, it is also impossible to prove the law of reciprocal causal determination from the law of the uniformity of nature, even if the latter were itself established. It has sometimes been asserted that complete knowledge of any substance would imply complete knowledge of any other substance. The implication of the nature of each substance with that of every other is in one sense true, in that complete *knowledge* of one substance would give us complete knowledge of every other. But that this knowledge could be *deduced* from knowledge of one substance, even if we knew the laws by which one substance causally determines another, is not necessarily true so long as the two substances are related, as they very well may be, by some relation other than that of implication. The universal validity of causal determination is not self-evident *a priori*, and could only be proved by a chain of reasoning resting on premises known *a priori*. Such validity might be proved with respect to characteristics of certain classes, even if it were not proved with respect to all.

MARION D. CRANE.

The Subject-matter of Metaphysical Inquiry. JOHN DEWEY. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XII, 13, pp. 337-345.

A number of biologists hold that the application of a physico-chemical explanation to living organisms forces us to recognize that the world out of which life developed held potential within itself the possibility or potentiality of life, and that the consideration of such 'ultimate origins' must be metaphysical rather than scientific. But any intelligible question as to causation seems to be wholly scientific, taking us back through a series of changes. A question about ultimate origin or ultimate causation is either a meaningless question, or else the words are used in a relative sense to designate the point in the past at which a particular inquiry breaks off. There are however in all scientific investigations such irreducible traits as *i. e.*, specifically diverse existences, interaction, change. Inquiry concerning these might be called metaphysical, and would at least wean men from a futile concern with ultimate origins and laws of causation. Formulae for the ancient states of nature are not got by deriving the source of subsequent events from an original state, but by starting with some present existence, tracing its earlier course, and at some point condensing the main features of this course into a formula. When we explain change by such a formula, in order to escape reasoning in a circle

and to allow for interaction we must assume existences not covered by the formula, as for example the universe existing and including the solar system. So it is impossible to arrive at a formula which explains the whole. Potentiality is not a something which effects change, but refers to a characteristic of change. It signifies a certain limitation of present powers, due to the limited number of conditions with which they are in interaction, plus the fact of the manifestation of new powers under different conditions. And the very changes now going on have a tendency to expose the thing in question to these different conditions, which will call out new modes of behavior. So potentiality implies not merely diversity, but a progressively increasing diversification of a specific thing in a particular direction. Reference to the evolution of organization out of an earlier world, in which such organization was not found, means that the earlier condition was characterized by a change having the direction of vital and intelligent organization. Physico-chemical terms do not explain away the distinguishing features of living and thinking beings, but state their occurrence. The attempt to give an account of any occurrence involves the genuine and irreducible existence of the thing dealt with. Evolution seems to be a fact to be reckoned with in considering the irreducible traits of the world. If everything which is is a changing thing, the evolution of life and mind indicates the nature of the changes of physico-chemical things and therefore something about these things. Certainly the existence of vital, intellectual, and social organization makes impossible a purely mechanistic metaphysics, but it does not give us ground to say that the world as a whole is vital. "While metaphysics takes the world irrespective of any particular time, yet time itself or genuine change in a specific direction is itself one of the ultimate traits of the world irrespective of date."

MARION D. CRANE.

Response and Cognition. EDWIN B. HOLT. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XII, 14, pp. 365-373; XII, 15, pp. 393-409.

In the evolution of life comes the critical point at which the reflex activities develop systematic relations of interdependence which enable them to function as one whole—an integrated result which the biologists have called behavior. Many workers in animal psychology, and some in human psychology, have been coming to the conclusion that it is behavior and not consciousness with which scientific observation deals. A closer definition of behavior is needed to show the remarkable novelty involved in it. What is behavior? To obtain the correct answer we must abandon the bead theory and, adopting the functional view, ask the scientific question, What is the organism doing? Empirical study shows, not only that the organism is doing something, but that this is a constant function of some aspect of the environment. "Behavior is any process of release which is a function of factors external to the mechanism released." The peculiar novelty is the distinctively objective reference to the environment, not found in the inorganic world, and not in the organic prior to the integrated reflex response.

With a compact definition of behavior we may ask, How far are the phenomena generally attributed to consciousness intrinsically involved in behavior? Firstly, the object of consciousness and the object of behavior are surely identical. Then, that function of this object which behavior is, is will—what one does is identical with one's volitions. The knower of the cognitive relation is clearly the body for behaviorism; and, though the body may not take the place of the metaphysical 'subject,' it serves the only actually empirical wants served by this 'subject,' and it may be able to give a complete account of cognition without the services of the 'metaphysical subject.' Behaviorism, then, gives a content of knowledge, a willer, and a knower. What is its relation to three remaining psychological phenomena: attention, feeling, and personality? If attention be explained in terms of clearness, the tendency toward the seemingly necessary explanation of degrees of consciousness as degrees of organization of content atoms is toward behaviorism. Or, if attention be interpreted in terms of process, the specific response relation has abundant explanation. With its integration system it also takes care of attention at the unconscious stage and explains admirably the relation of habitual to conscious activity. Feeling, for behaviorism, is due to some modification of response determined by factors *within* the organism. From the definition of behavior and even a slight knowledge of living tissue, this phenomenon can easily be predicted. Behaviorism may well wait, to give its explanation, until psychologists have something at least resembling a scientific description of the phenomenon. Now, what is the soul? These functions, which the organism's behavior is of the object, are of various degrees of integration and in a well-knit character they become organized into higher forms of behavior, so that at every moment of life—unless there has been suppression—there is some interest (behavior) to which a man's "whole being is consecrated." The unthwarted lifelong progress of behavior integration is the transition from behavior to *moral conduct*. The sane man has no suppressions but his behavior is adapted to the environment; to be wise he must add scope. "Only the sane man is good and only the sane man is free." For behaviorism the personality is the attitude and conduct of the body. Only when the daily integration of behavior is successfully accomplished is the soul a unit.

Conclusion: Behaviorism can lay considerable claim to being the long-sought cognitive relation between 'subject' and object. The future of psychology—human as well as animal—lies in the hands of the behaviorists and of those who, wishing to resolve the subjective category of soul-substance into objective relations, have much of common ground with the behaviorists and may wish to join their ranks.

ELLEN B. ARMSTRONG.

The Logical-Analytic Method in Philosophy. THEODORE DE LAGUNA. J: of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XII, 17, pp. 449-462.

In *Our Knowledge of the External World* and "The Relation of our Sense Data to Physics," *Scientia*, 1914, Mr. Bertrand Russell sets forth the "logical

analytic" method as one of revolutionary importance in philosophy. He makes pure logic the central study of philosophy, although he does not hold to this strictly. Aside from certain differences, the method is like that of Descartes, who tried to analyze complex data to final simple and independent premises. The writer questions Mr. Russell's account of the method on the following points: (1) It is misleading to speak of "the very last stage of analysis." Is there a last stage? Moreover, analysis must be continually checked by synthesis. (2) The problem that the method undertakes to solve may not have a unique solution. (3) The attempt to fit materials for philosophy into logical frameworks leads to barren scholasticism. The maxim of the parsimony of assumptions is important, but should be taken with the precaution that the assumed entities need not be the most real. Mr. Russell's assuming of sense-data is a good working hypothesis so far as it goes, but the *sensibilia* that he claims to be inferred from them seem to be mere *Dinge an sich*. In the construction of the external world, he overlooks the psychological factors. As to the illustration of the value of the method, the application to mathematics has doubtless been of great value. Not so with the construction of the physical world. Considering the sense of sight for simplicity, Mr. Russell constructs a three-dimensional space by correlating different "private worlds" or "perspectives" by similarity. For example, a straight line in space can be constructed by a graduated series of similar perspectives in which a penny appears as a circular disc. This construction is theoretically inadequate, as it fails to give a finely articulated space, and practically impossible, as it would involve an impossible amount of recording of perspectives. Nor is this the way in which the world of physical space has actually been constructed. There, *measurement* plays the chief part. The definition of the matter of a thing as the limit of its appearances as their distance from the thing diminishes, is also weak. To sum up, Mr. Russell's task of the construction of the physical world is impossible, even granting the disputed existence of sense-data. As a matter of fact, observation never has to do with sense-data, but with material events built up by association.

YUEN R. CHAO.

Types of Pragmatist Theory of Truth. ALLAN TÖRNUDD. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XII, 18, pp. 491-500.

Among the significant features of the pragmatic theory of truth is the proclamation of 'satisfaction' as relevant to the determination of truth. This is bound up with a psychological theory of the meaning and function of ideas, which is accepted by psychologists far outside the camp of pragmatism proper. In narrowing down the pragmatic theory of truth, we must choose among several types of theory. The first is that which recognizes only certain *specific* satisfaction as relevant to the truth of a belief. Here belongs the theory that the truth of any pragmatically interpreted idea consists in the specific satisfaction experienced on acting upon the idea, because the content of the idea was just the expectation of that experience. If pragmatism is taken as a

theory of the criterion of truth, we find it interpreted as meaning simply that only the actual experience of *that* satisfaction which represents the whole object and intention of the idea, *proves* it to be true. The frequent attempts to correlate religious and scientific truths, by showing both to be true in so far as tested, belongs also in this class. We may also add here the theory that *any* satisfactory outcome of the act which is the practical expression of a belief makes it "true in so far forth." It eliminates specific satisfaction, but identifies 'validated' with experienced truth. These theories add nothing new to the older empirical views of truth. A second main type of pragmatism is the *any-satisfaction* theory. Here we get the idea, for instance, that the expectation of satisfactory experience in a future life is somehow warranted by the *present* satisfactory outcome of such belief. The outcome of the foregoing theories is that we find ourselves engaged in comparing particular expectations and experiences, and to their coherence, discrepancy, etc., and cannot make headway by introducing the idea of 'satisfaction' into the field. A third and more promising type of pragmatism, is not a theory as to why and what we can or must believe. It is not a theory of truth in the older sense. Its import is that the theoretically correct judgment does not satisfy on account of its correctness, but on account of its pragmatic usefulness. It would be better understood than it commonly is, if put in the form: 'the true (= theoretically correct) judgment is not found valuable on account of its truth' . . . This asserts that falsehood is often more valuable than truth. This may turn out to be the lasting part of the pragmatic theory of truth.

D. T. HOWARD.

The Logic of Judgments of Practise. JOHN DEWEY. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XII, 19, pp. 505-523.

Practical judgments, such as: 'A should do thus and so'; 'it is better, wiser, etc., to act thus and so', are marked from other judgments in the following respects: (1) Their subject-matter implies an incomplete situation. (2) It implies that the proposition is itself a factor in carrying forward the situation to its conclusion. (3) It implies that it makes a difference how the given is terminated, and that the proposition is to help to secure the better outcome. (4) A practical proposition is at once a judgment of the end to be realized and the means to be adopted. It may be noted here that the reciprocal nature of the practical judgment condemns both false idealism or utopianism, which does not consider means, and materialism or determinism, which regards situations as completely given. (5) Completeness in a practical judgment has reference not to data as such, but to their relevance to the end and its means. (6) Since the subject-matter is completed only by the issue, the truth or falsity of the proposition is constituted by the result of the verification. If this feature of the practical judgment is extended to apply to all propositions, then it will give a type of pragmatism. In this paper, the writer intends to apply the foregoing conclusions to the judgments of value. He holds that a judgment of value, which should be distinguished from the experience of a good, is only a

species of practical judgment. This means that a value-judgment is not complete in itself, but that value itself is something to-be-given by future action. Value is concerned with the traits of objects only in so far as they enter into a possible and foreseen course of action. Value is not subjective, but practical. It is objective and existential in so far as it is an active factor in a practical situation. Valuation should be distinguished from merely recalling a previous value. To judge value is to institute one where none is given. The assumption that valuation is always referred to some fixed standard as the end rests on an ambiguity of the term end. In the sense of *de facto* limit to judgment, it is no value at all. In the sense of the completing object of the judgment, its value will depend upon a judgment, based upon weighing the claims of different factors and not upon comparison with a model. The reason why ones does make value-judgments if things do not already possess values is that the situation demands it, and the situation is not one of mere incompleteness, but has a specific character. It is true that we always consider the results of previous valuations, but we must also consider the changes of situation. In some degree, all valuation is a revaluation. The contention that the object of a practical judgment is some change in the given, depending upon, and constituting the subject-matter of the judgment, is not to be taken to mean an action of mind on matter. It is rather a logical point, that the realm of propositions presents in a realm of *possibility* the specific arrangement of things which overt action presents in actuality. This clears the road for considering on its own merits the general pragmatic hypothesis.

YUEN R. CHAO.

Logische und ontologische Wirklichkeit. N. HARTMANN. Kant-Studien, XX, 1, pp. 1-29.

Logic and epistemology ordinarily subordinate reality to possibility or necessity. Most theories of knowledge agree with Kant in defining the possible as whatever is in accord with the formal conditions of experience, the real as whatever is in accord with the material conditions of experience, and the necessary as whatever is in accord with both the formal and material conditions of experience. But these definitions are open to four objections: They make it possible (1) for that which is not in accord with the form of knowledge to be real; (2) for that which does so accord to be unreal; (3) for the real to be contingent or indeterministic; and (4) they exclude from the realm of necessity all non-sensible connections, such as the *a priori* connections of mathematics. For traditional Logic possibility, reality, and necessity form the so-called sphere of logical modality; and such a three-fold scale is inevitable for the evaluation of knowledge or judgments as such. But for a graduation of the modes of being this scale is inadequate, since it lacks certain modes altogether and does not exhibit the positive relations that obtain between the others. In estimating ontological modes, therefore, the following scale should be substituted:

(undifferentiated reality and unreality)		↑	Reality	(possibility + necessity)
	Necessity		Realization	(prevailing necessity)
	Possibility		Development	(prevailing possibility)
	Impossibility		Unreality	(undifferentiated possibility and impossibility)

In this table it is to be noted that, though possibility and necessity are indifferent to one another, they fall within the same modal genus, while reality, which stands to them in the relation of dependence, belongs to quite another modal sphere. Ontologically reality is not a middle grade between possibility and necessity, as it appears to be logically. It is, however, the synthesis of possibility and necessity, which ontologically it presupposes, and to which nevertheless it is logically indifferent. Reality is more than either possibility or necessity, its indispensable elements, and therefore caps the scale of ontological values with necessity second—inverting their logical order—and impossibility, as the most negative, last. Between necessity and impossibility stands possibility, and between reality and unreality stand the ethical and aesthetic modes of being: realization and development. Impossibility involves unreality, but not vice versa. Unreality is indifferent to impossibility and also to possibility and necessity, though not to their synthesis, reality, which it excludes. Impossibility, and also possibility and necessity when taken separately, are indifferent to reality, though the latter when taken together, involve reality and exclude unreality. It is especially to be noted that this table of ontological values is entirely independent of the table of logical values. The order of the certainty of knowledge is not the order of the modality of being.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

Idealismus und Realismus in der Sphäre des philosophischen Kritizismus.
BRUNO BAUCH. Kant-Studien, XX, I, pp. 97-117.

Historically idealism and realism are intimately related, having a common origin in Kant; and even to-day their connection is closer than that between subjective and objective idealism. Messer is wrong in holding that objective idealism leads to subjective idealism and the latter to solipsism: Kant is not a reversion to Berkeley nor Berkeley to Stirner. It is its inquiry into the possibility of experience that distinguishes transcendental or objective idealism from the solipsism of Stirner, the subjectivism of Berkeley, and the phenomenalism of Schopenhauer, and enables it to refute the latter. So long as one fails to recognize an objective conformity to law, conditioning experience, the objectivity of the external thing is lost, whether one sees in space an empty conception or an absolute reality. Illusionism is the common goal of subjectivism and dogmatic realism. Only the concept of knowledge as a logical, functional whole, and of space as a mathematical, law-abiding system of relations can guarantee the reality of the external object. Transcendental idealism does not take back into the subject the reality of the object, nor does it try to deduce from the essence of consciousness a hostile content or corporeal

world. It is wholly one with realism in recognizing the external object's claim to reality, even when this object is not presented in subjective consciousness. All objectivity transcends the subject, a truth which is emphasized in Kant's conception of the thing-in-itself, intended by Kant for a transcendental, logical function, although apparently hypostatized at times into an independent metaphysical entity. It was on this point that idealism and realism first historically parted; the one contending that the subject and object were different, yet correlative, members of a single functional whole, the other hypostatizing the object as a 'Ding-an-sich' independent and outside of knowledge. According to objective idealism, as soon as this external object ceases to be a transcendental logical function and becomes a transcendent thing-in-itself, it loses its meaning and objectivity and remains a chimera or self-contradiction. This abandonment of things-in-themselves establishes idealism's right to be called empirical and realistic, even while maintaining that the transcendental ground of empirical reality is neither real nor empirical, neither things nor facts, but the laws of knowledge, their conditions, whose objective validity is independent of empirical experience. These conditions, however, do not form a second world beside or behind the empirical, for neither factor is anything without the other. Likewise, the eternal world of value, which must be presupposed as independent of the subject, is not a duplicate world, but an ideal, an eternal mission, realized in the one reality. Idealism and realism are not contradictory antitheses as Messer asserts. They agree that the external object is independent of "subjective knowledge"; but realism adds, "and of all knowledge." Idealism, however, is far from seeking from realism "peace at any price." If realism persists in its demand for an absolute existence outside the sphere of rational necessity, it must remain uncritical and unreasonable; such an empty unreality precludes discussion. But if realism will acknowledge the necessary and rational conditioning of all reality, it will then become critical and rational and will be taken up into (aufgehoben) transcendental idealism in the Hegelian sense of this term.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

NOTES.

Professor E. C. Wilm, formerly of Wells College, has been appointed professor of philosophy in Boston University.

Mr. R. M. MacIver, formerly Lecturer in philosophy at the University of Aberdeen, and the author of the article which appeared in the last number of the Review on "Personality and the Suprapersonal," has been called to a chair of Political Science in the University of Toronto.

Professor A. A. Bowman, of Princeton University, has volunteered for active service in the British army and has received a commission in a regiment of Highland Light Infantry.

Professor Maurice de Wulf, of the University of Louvain, is this semester giving courses at Harvard University on Mediæval Philosophy, and on Mediæval Interpretations of Aristotle.

We give below a list of articles in current philosophical magazines:—

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, XII, 16: *William M. Salter*, Nietzsche's Superman; *Charles W. Cobb*, On the Notion of Infinity.

XII, 17: *Theodore deLaguna*, The Logical-Analytical Method in Philosophy; *A. H. Jones*, The Method of Psychology.

XII, 18: *Henry F. Adams*, The Relative Importance of Size and Frequency in Forming Associations; *Allan Törnudd*, Types of Pragmatist Theory of Truth.

XII, 19: *John Dewey*, The Logic of Judgments of Practise; *C. I. Lewis*, A Too Brief Set of Postulates for the Algebra of Logic.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY, XIX, 3: *Arthur Cushman McGiffert*, Christianity and War—A Historical Sketch; *Stanley A. Cook*, The Significance of the Elephantine Papyri for the History of Hebrew Religion; *Gerald Birney Smith*, What Shall the Systematic Theologian Expect from the New Testament Scholar? *Theodore B. Foster*, "Mysterium" and "Sacramentum" in the Vulgate and Old Latin Versions; *Ernst von Dobschütz*, The Abandonment of the Canonical Idea.

THE JOURNAL OF NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASE, 42, 8: *H. Valentine Wildman, Jr.*, Psychoses of the Feeble-minded; *William McDonald, Jr.*, Mental Disease and Language.

42, 9: *Charles B. Davenport*, The Feebly Inhibited. I. Violent Temper and its Inheritance.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XXII, 4: *Lillian J. Martin*, An Experimental Contribution to the Investigation of the Subconscious; *June E. Downey*, Emotional Poetry and the Preference Judgment; *C. G. Bradford*, An Experiment in Association; *H. F. Adams*, A Note on the Effect of Rhythm on Memory.

XXII, 5: *Foster Watson*, The Father of Modern Psychology; *Mildred Loring*, An Investigation of the Law of Eye-movements.

MIND, N.S. 95: *Professor Pringle-Pattison*, Alexander Campbell Fraser, 1819-1914; *J. Ellis McTaggart*, The Meaning of Causality; *F. C. S. Schiller*, The New Developments of Mr. Bradley's Philosophy; *E. E. Thomas*, Lotze's Relation to Idealism.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, XL, 9: *A. Leclère*, L'Obsession et l'idée prévalente; *G. Truc*, La psychologie de l'ontologisme.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, XXII, 5: *E. Boutroux*, Allocution au congrès de philosophie mathématique; *L. Cahen*, Un fragment inédit de Condorcet; *C. Bouglé*, Remarques sur le polytélisme; *D. Roustan*, La Science comme instrument vital.

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE, XV, 57-58: *Th. Flournoy*, Une Mystique Moderne (Documents pour la psychologie religieuse).

XV, 59: *A. Descœudres*, Les tests de Binet-Simon comme mesure du développement des enfants anormaux; *P. Ceresole*, L'irréductibilité de l'intuition des probabilités et l'existence de propositions mathématiques indémontrables; *Ed. Claparède*, Expériences sur la mémoire des associations spontanées.

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, XXI, 4: *Dr. Kratzer*, Die Frage nach dem Seelendualismus bei Augustinus; *Luise Krieg*, Das Substanzproblem eine philosophiegeschichtliche Darstellung; *Joh. Zahlfleisch*, Die Kausalität bei Kant in neuer Beleuchtung; *Paul Stähler*, Über die Beziehungen Fichtes und seiner Schule zur universität Charkow (Russland).

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR POSITIVISTISCHE PHILOSOPHIE, II, 3-4: *Petzoldt*, Die biologischen Grundlagen der Psychologie; *Kleinpeter*, Das Kausalproblem—ein Scheinproblem; *Dworetsky*, Zum Unterschied zwischen Fiktion und Hypothese, zwischen naturwissenschaftlicher und historischer Begriffsbildung; *Pagel*, Zur Lehre von der Rechtsnatur des Völkerrechts; *Bernhard*, Toleranz und Intoleranz.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE, LXXII, 3-4: *Adolf Korte*, Beiträge zur psychologie der Gestalt und Bewegungserlebnisse.

LXXII, 5-6: *Auguste Fischer*, Weitere Versuche über Wiedererkennen; *R. Hohenemser*, Über Konkordanz und Diskordanz; *R. Hennig*, Eine unerklärte optische Täuschung.

REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA, I, 4: *Angel Gallardo*, El instinto de las hormigas; *Alfredo Colmo*, Los estudios filosóficos en nuestra enseñanza oficial; *Augusto Bunge*, Los fundamentos biológicos de la moral; *M. S. Victoria*, El positivismo en la educación argentina; *Julio Cruz Ghio*, Preceptos morales para los hombres nuevos; *José Ingenieros*, La personalidad intelectual de José M. Ramos Mejía.

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